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People vs. Nazario

*
No. L-44143. August 31, 1988.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs.

EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.

Statutory Construction; Vague Statutes: A vague statue is one

that lacks comprehensible standards that men of “Common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application.—As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be
vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men “of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.” It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it

______________

* EN BANC.

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People vs. Nazario

violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the

parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2)
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
Same; Same; Declaration of Nullity of Statutes; To be
declared null and void, an act must be utterly vague on its face i.e.
it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.
—But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it
cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for “three or
more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.” Clearly,
the ordinance imposed no standard at all “because one may never
know in advance what ‘annoys some people but does not annoy
others.’ ”
Same; Same; Same; A “perfectly vague” act is to be
distinguished from a legislation couched in imprecise language.—
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a “perfectly vague”
act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished,
however, from legislation couched in imprecise language—but
which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively
phrased—in which case, it may be “saved” by proper construction.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; A “perfectly vague” act is to be

distinguished also from a statute which is apparently ambiguous,
yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities.—It must further
be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet
fairly applicable to certain types of activities. In that event, such
statutes may not be challenged whenever directed against such
activities. In Parker v. Levy, a prosecution originally under the
U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically,
“conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman”), the defendant,
an army officer who had urged his men not to go to Vietnam and
called the Special Forces trained to fight there thieves and
murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for vagueness
doctrine on the premise that accepted military interpretation and
practice had provided enough standards, and consequently, a fair
notice that his conduct was impermissible.
Same; Words and Phrases; “Managers” as used in Municipal
Ordinance No. 4 of Pagbilao, Quezon covers the actual operators of
fishponds who finance their construction, etc.—In no way may the
ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness.
It

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People vs. Nazario

is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls

within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he
comes within the term “manager.” He does not deny the fact that
he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries
into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them.
While it appears that it is the National Government which owns
them, the Government never shared in the profits they had
generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the
burden of tax under the said ordinances.
Same; Taxation; Tax Ordinances; Dates of payment not
ambiguous in Ordinance No. 15 and Ordinance No. 12.—Neither
are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no
merit to the claim that “the imposition of tax has to depend upon
an uncertain date yet to be determined (three years after the
‘approval of the fishpond’ by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an
uncertain event (if the fishpond started operating before 1964),
also to be determined by an uncertain individual or individuals.”
Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable “after the lapse of
three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by
the Bureau of Fisheries,” is unequivocal about the date of
payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning
liability thereunder “beginning and taking effect from the year
1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964,” does
not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of
payment have been definitely established. The fact that the
appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates
—as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966 is con-
cerned—presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not
make the ordinances vague.
Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Law; Municipal Ordinance No. 4
is not an ex post facto measure since it does not penalize acts or
events occurring before its passage.—The next inquiry is whether
or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The appellant
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argues that they are: “Amendment No. 12 passed on September

19, 1966, clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax
shall ‘beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964,’ In other words,
it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to
say, 1964 and even prior thereto.” The Court finds no merit in this
contention. As the Solicitor General notes, “Municipal Ordinance
No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955.” Hence, it cannot be said that
the amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply
retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of
enactment). Essentially, Ordi-

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People vs. Nazario

nances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures

intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the
original act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. Moreover, the act
(of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made
punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes
a retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it operates to grant
amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and
1964. It does not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective
one.
Taxation; Local Governments; Statutes; Fishpond are not
forest lands within the purview of RA 2264, the Local Autonomy
Act.—The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal
council of Pagbilao to tax “public forest lands.” In Golden Ribbon
Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan, we held that local
governments’ taxing power does not extend to forest products or
concessions under Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Act
then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264 likewise prohibited
municipalities from imposing percentage taxes on sales.) First of
all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate
thereof is based on the area of fishponds (“P3.00 per hectare”).
Secondly, fishponds are not forest lands, although we have held
them to the agricultural lands. By definition, “forest” is “a large
tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and
underbush; a large wood.” (Accordingly, even if the challenged
taxes were directed on the fishponds, they would not have been
taxes on forest products.)

APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of

Quezon, Br. 2.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Teofilo Ragodon for accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petitioner was charged with violation of certain

municipal ordinances of the municipal council of Pagbilao,
in Quezon province. By way of confession and avoidance,
the petitioner would admit having committed the acts
charged but would claim that the ordinances are
unconstitutional, or, assuming their constitutionality, that
they do not apply to him in any event.
The facts are not disputed:
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People vs. Nazario

This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal

Ordinance in an information filed by the provincial Fiscal, dated
October 9, 1968, as follows:

That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner and
operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio of Pinagbayanan, of said
municipality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS
(P362.62), required of him as fishpond operator as provided for under
Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended, inspite of repeated demands
made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay
the same.
Contrary to law.

For the prosecution the following witnesses testified in

substance as follows;
MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married, farmer and
resident of Lopez, Quezon—
In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon.
I know the accused as I worked in his fishpond in 1962 to 1964.
The fishpond of Nazario is at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I
worked in the clearing of the fishpond, the construction of the
dikes and the catching of fish.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I worked with the accused up to March 1964.
NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married, copra
maker and resident of Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon—
I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon since 1959 up to
the present. I know the accused since 1959 when he opened a
fishpond at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. He still operates the
fishpond up to the present and I know this fact as I am the barrio
captain of Pinagbayanan.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I came to know the accused when he first operated his fishpond
since 1959.
On re-direct examination, this witness declared:
I was present during the catching of fish in 1967 and the
accused was there.
On re-cross examination, this witness declared:
I do not remember the month in 1962 when the accused caught
fish.

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People vs. Nazario

RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal treasurer of

Pagbilao, Quezon, married—
As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax collection. I know
the accused even before I was Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I
have written the accused a letter asking him to pay his taxes
(Exhibit B). Said letter was received by the accused as per
registry return receipt, Exhibit B-1. The letter demanded for
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payment of P362.00, more or less, by way of taxes which he did

not pay up to the present. The former Treasurer, Ceferino
Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand to the accused (Exhibit
C). On June 28, 1967, I sent a letter to the Fishery Commission
(Exhibit D), requesting information if accused paid taxes with
that office. The Commission sent me a certificate (Exhibits D-1,
D-2 & D-3). The accused had a fishpond lease agreement. The
taxes unpaid were for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares.
On question of the court, this witness declared:
What I was collecting from the accused is the fee on fishpond
operation, not rental.
The prosecution presented as part of their evidence Exhibits A,
A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C, D, D-1, D-2, D-3, E, F, F-1 and the same were
admitted by the court, except Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3 which
were not admitted for being immaterial.
For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO, 48 years of
age, married, owner and general manager of the ZIP
Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of 4801 Old Sta. Mesa,
Sampaloc, Manila, declared in substance as follows:
I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I buy my
Residence Certificates at Manila or at San Juan. In 1964, 1965
and 1966, I was living in Manila and my business is in Manila
and my family lives at Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao,
Quezon. I do not own a house at Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a
fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a lease
agreement to that effect with the Philippine Fisheries
Commission marked as Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, the
contract of lease, Exhibit 1, was still existing and enforceable. The
Ordinances Nos. 4, 15 and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966, were
translated into English by the Institute of National Language to
better understand the ordinances. There were exchange of letters
between me and the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao regarding
the payment of the taxes on my leased fishpond situated at
Pagbilao. There was a letter of demand for the payment of the
taxes by the treasurer (Exhibit 3) which I received by mail at my
residence at Manila. I answered the letter of demand, Exhibit 3,
with Exhibit 3-A.

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I requested an inspection of my fishpond to determine its

condition as it was not then in operation. The Municipal
Treasurer Alvarez went there once in 1967 and he found that it
was destroyed by the typhoon and there were pictures taken
marked as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B and 4-C. I received another letter
of demand, Exhibit 5, and I answered the same (Exhibit 5-A). I
copied my reference quoted in Exhibit 5-A from Administrative
Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received another letter of demand from
Tomas Ornedo, Acting Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, dated
February 16, 1966, Exhibit 7, and I answered the same with the
letter marked as Exhibit 7-A, dated February 26, 1966. I received
another letter of demand from Treasurer Alvarez of Pagbilao,
Exhibit 8, and I answered the same (Exhibit 8-A). In 1964, I went
to Treasurer Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and
he said none and he told me just to pay my taxes. I did not pay
because up to now I do not know whether I am covered by the
Ordinance or not. The letters of demand asked me to pay different
amounts for taxes for the fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309 of
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the Revised Administrative Code, municipal taxes lapse if not

paid and they are collecting on a lapsed ordinance. Because under
the Tax Code, fishermen are exempted from percentage tax and
privilege tax. There is no law empowering the municipality to
pass ordinance taxing fishpond operators.
The defense presented as part of their evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3,
3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B, 4-C, 5, 5-A, 6, 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and
the same were admitted by the court.
From their evidence the prosecution would want to show to the
court that the accused, as lessee or operator of a fishpond in the
municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the
municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by
Municipal Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and finally amended
by Municipal Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966.
On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show
to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have already
lapsed and that there is no law empowering municipalities to pass
ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their
evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be
converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal
ordinances; and finally that the accused should not be taxed as
fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being operated
by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under
construction during the period covered by the taxes sought to be
collected.
Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is
ultra vires as it is outside of the power of the municipal council of

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People vs. Nazario

Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that

the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain.
There is no question from the evidences presented that the
accused is a lessee of a parcel of forest land, with an area of
27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes, under Fishpond Lease
Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the accused and the
government, through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources on August 21, 1959.
There is no question from the evidences presented that the
27.1998 hectares of land leased by the defendant from the
government for fishpond purposes was actually converted into
fishpond and used as such, and therefore defendant is an operator
1
of a fishpond within the purview of the ordinance in question.
2
The trial court returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as
follows:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court

finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as
amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and further
amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal
Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby sentences him to pay a
fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
at the rate of P8.003 a day, and to pay the costs of this proceeding.
SO ORDERED.

In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of

Appeals, the petitioner alleges that:

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I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT

ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF 1955, AS AMENDED BY
ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND AS FURTHER
AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12, SERIES OF 1966, OF THE
MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON, IS NULL AND
VOID FOR BEING AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN.

_________________

1 Rollo, 7-13.
2 Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch 11, Hon. Manolo Madella,
Presiding Judge.
3 Rollo, id., 14.

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II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE

ORDINANCE IN QUESTIONS, AS AMENDED, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST FACTO.

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE

ORDINANCE IN QUESTION COVERS ONLY OWNERS OR
OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND
NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC LANDS.

IV.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

QUESTIONED ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID, CANNOT BE
ENFORCED BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS 4
OF
PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER NON-RESIDENTS.

The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of

1955, Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and Ordinance No.
12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao.
Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the salient portions
thereof are herein-below quoted:

Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the

territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in
the amount
5
of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per
annum.
xxx
Sec. 1(a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or
managers of fishponds within the territorial limits of this
municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax relative
thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting from
6
the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries.
xxx
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within
the territorial limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the
amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum
beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond

_________________

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4 Brief of Appellant, 1-2.

5 Mun. Ord. No. 4 (1955), id., 3.
6 Mun. Ord. No. 15 (1965), id., 4.

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7
started operating before the year 1964.

The first objection refers to 8the ordinances being allegedly

“ambiguous and uncertain.” The petitioner contends that
being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since
the said ordinances speak of “owner or manager.” He
likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as they
reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4
provides that parties shall commence payment “after the
lapse of three (3) years starting from the9 date said fishpond
is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries.” Ordinance No. 12
states that liability for the tax accrues “beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964 10
if the fishpond started
operating before the year 1964.”
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men “of common
intelligence must necessarily 11guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.” It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to
say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause 12or by
construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had
made it illegal for “three or more persons to assemble on
any sidewalk and there conduct 13themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by.” Clearly, the ordinance
imposed no standard at all “because one may never know in
advance 14what ‘annoys some people but does not annoy
others.’ ”

__________________

7 Mun. Ord. No. 12 (1966), id.

8 Id., 6.
9 Id., 4.
10 Id.
11 TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (1978), citing
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
12 402 U.S. 611 (1971); see TRIBE, id., 720-721.
13 See TRIBE, id.
14 Id., 721.

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Coates 15highlights what has been referred to as a “perfectly

vague” act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be
distinguished, however, from legislation couched in
imprecise language—but which nonetheless specifies a
standard though defectively phrase—din which case, it
may be “saved” by proper construction.
It must further be distinguished from statutes that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types
of activities. In that event, such statutes may not be
challenged whenever
16
directed against such activities. In
Parker v. Levy, a prosecution originally under the U.S.
Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically,
“conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman”), the
defendant, an army officer who had urged his men not to go
to Vietnam and called the Special Forces trained to fight
there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the
void for vagueness doctrine on the premise that accepted
military interpretation and practice had provided enough
standards, and consequently, a fair notice that his conduct
was impermissible.
It is interesting
17
that in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, a divided Court sustained an act of Congress
(Republic Act No. 488018 penalizing “the too early
nomination of candidates,” limiting the election campaign
period, and prohibiting “partisan political activities”), amid
challenges of vagueness and overbreadth on the ground
that the law had included an “enumeration of the acts
deemed included in the terms 19
`election campaign’ or
‘partisan political activity’ ” that would supply the
standards. “As thus limited, the objection that may be
raised as to 20vagueness has been minimized, if not totally
set at rest.” In his opinion, however, Justice Sanchez
would stress that the conduct 21
sought to be prohibited “is
not clearly defined at all.” “As worded in R.A. 4880,
prohibited discus-

________________

15 Id., 720.
16 417 U.S. 733 (1974); see TRIBE, id., 721.
17 No. L-27833, April 8, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, per Fernando, J.
18 Supra, 850.
19 Supra, 867.
20 Supra, 868.
21 Supra, 884; Sanchez, J., concurring and dissenting.

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sion could cover the entire spectrum22 of expression relating

to candidates and political parties.” He was unimpressed
with the “restrictions” Fernando’s opinion had relied on: “
‘Simple expressions of opinions and thoughts concerning
the election’ and expression of ‘views on current political
problems or issues’ leave the reader conjecture, to
guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to
the nature of the utterance (‘simple expressions of opinion
and thoughts’) or the subject 23
of the utterance (‘current
political problems or issues’).”

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The Court likewise

24
had occasion to apply the “balancing-
of-interests” test, insofar as the statute’s ban on early
nomination of candidates was concerned: “The rational
connection between the prohibition of Section 50-A and its
object, the indirect and modest scope of its restriction on
the rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing
public interest which Congress has found in the moderation
of partisan political activity, lead us to the conclusion that
the statute may stand 25consistently with and does not
offend the Constitution.” In that case, Castro would have
the balance achieved in favor of State authority at the
“expense” of individual liberties.
In the United States, which had ample impact on
Castro’s separate opinion, the balancing test finds a close 26
kin, referred to as the “less restrictive alternative”
doctrine, under which the court searches for alternatives
available to the Government27
outside of statutory limits, or
for “less drastic means” open to the State, that would 28
render the statute unnecessary. In United States v. Robel,
legislation was assailed, banning members of the
(American) Communist Party from working in any defense
facility. The U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute,
held that it impaired the right of association, and that in
any case, a screening process was available to the State
that

________________

22 Supra.
23 Supra, 885.
24 Supra; see Castro, J., Separate Opinion, 888-913.
25 Supra, 902.
26 TRIBE, id., 722.
27 Id.; see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
28 389 U.S. 258 (1967).

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would have enabled it to29 identify dangerous elements

holding defense positions. In that event, the balance
would have been struck in favor of individual liberties.
It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that
the result is usually close. It is said, however, that the
choice of the courts is usually narrowed 30
where the
controversy involves say, economic rights, or as in the
Levy case, military affairs, in which less precision in
analysis is required and in which the competence of the
legislature is presumed.
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be
tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from
their very provisions that the appellant falls within its
coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes
within the term “manager.” He does not deny the fact that
he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced
fish fries into the
31
fishponds, and had employed laborers to
maintain them. While it appears 32
that it is the National
Government which owns them, the Government never
shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore

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only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the

said ordinances.
We agree with the trial court that
33
the ordinances are in
the character of revenue measures designed to assist the
coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it
cannot be the owner, the Government, on whom liability
should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient principle
that the Government is immune from taxes and for
another, since it is not the Government that had been
making money from the venture.
Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the
fisponds in question, and as the recipient of profits brought
about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the
municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not
have a fair notice of such a liability to make such
ordinances vague.
Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of
payment. There is no merit to the claim that “the
imposition of tax

_________________

29 See TRIBE, id., 723.

30 Id., 721.
31 Brief for the Appellee, 5.
32 It was the then Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
who signed the lease contract.
33 Rollo, id., 13.

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VOL. 165, AUGUST 31, 1988 199

People vs. Nazario

has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be determined

(three years after the ‘approval of the fishpond’ by the
Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if the
fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be 34
determined by an uncertain individual or individuals.”
Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable “after the
lapse of three (3) years starting from the date
35
said fishpond
is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries,” is unequivocal
about the date of payment, and its amendment by
Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability there-under
“beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 36
if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964,” does not
give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of
payment have been definitely established. The fact that the
appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning
dates—as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and
1966 is concerned—presents a mere problem in
computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague. In
addition, the same would have been at most a difficult
piece of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this
jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law.
As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on
January 1, 1964 for fishponds in operation prior thereto
(Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years
after their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance
No. 15). This is so since the amendatory act (Ordinance No.
12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond
operators. It did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4
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and 15). With respect to new operators, Ordinance No. 15

should still prevail.
To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth
enough standards that clarify imagined ambiguities. While
such standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they
are visible from the intent of the said ordinances.
The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be
ex post facto measures. The appellant argues that they are:
“Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly
provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall
‘beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the
fishpond started

________________

34 Brief of Appellant, id., 8.

35 Id., 4.
36 Id.

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200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Nazario

operating before the year 1964.’ In other words, it penalizes

acts or events occurring before37
its passage, that is to say,
1964 and even prior thereto.”
The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the
Solicitor General notes, 38“Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was
passed on May 14, 1955. Hence, it cannot be said that the
amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to
apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is
1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12
and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to
facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues 39
the
originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. Moreover,
the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955,
made punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No.
12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it
operates to grant amnesty to operators who had been
delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It does not mete out a
penalty, much less, a retrospective one.
The appellant assails, finally, the power of the
40
municipal
council of Pagbilao to tax “public forest land.”
41
In Golden
Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan, we held that
local governments’ taxing power does not extend to forest
products or concessions under Republic Act No. 2264, the
Local Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264
likewise prohibited municipalities from imposing
percentage taxes on sales.)
First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property,
although the rate thereof
42
is based on the area of fishponds
(“P3.00 per hectare” ). Secondly, fishponds are not forest
lands,43 although we have held them to the agricultural
lands. By definition, “forest” is “a large tract of land
covered with44 a natural growth of trees and underbush; a
large wood.” (Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes
were directed on the

______________

37 Id., 10.

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38 Brief for the Appellee, id., 8.

39 MARTIN, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 31-32 (1984).
40 Brief of Appellant, id., 11-12.
41 No. L-18535, December 24, 1964, 12 SCRA 611.
42 Brief of Appellant, id., 3.
43 Santiago v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 593 (1909).
44 Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 (1918).

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People vs. Nazario

fishponds, they would not have been taxes on forest

products.)
They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the
business of fishpond maintenance. They are not charged
against sales, which would have offended 45
the doctrine
enshrined by Golden Ribbon Lumber, but rather on 46
occupation, which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264.
They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes
and this is obvious from the ordinances themselves.
There is, then, no merit in the last objection.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs
against the appellant.

     Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,

Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Cortés, Griño-Aquino and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.
     Melencio-Herrera, J., no part. Concurred in Court of
Appeals decision under review.
     Gancayco, J., on leave.
          Regalado, J., no part; did not participate in
deliberations.

Appeal dismissed.

Note.—Rule that if words and phrases of Statute are

not obscure or are unambiguous, meaning and intention of
the legislature is determined from language employed. No
room for construction when there is absence of ambiguity
in words of a Statute. (Aparri vs. Court of Appeals, 127
SCRA 321.)

——o0o——

____________

45 Supra.
46 See Northern Philippines Tobacco Corporation v. Municipality of
Agoo, La Union, No. L-26447, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 304.

202

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