A.C. No. 575.

February 14, 1991  Moreover, complainant admitted in his testimony that he had
MARCIANO JOSON, Complainant, v. ATTY. GLORIA M. read the deed of sale and had seen that the area of the land
BALTAZAR, Respondent sold was set out as 150 square meters but had not protested
about it.

 Respondent Baltazar did not deny that her commission as

Facts: notary public had expired by the time she notarized the deed
 Disbarment case instituted by Marciano Joson, Atty. Gloria of sale.
M. Baltazar, now Gloria Baltazar-Aguirre, is charged with
violation of the Revised Penal Code and grave malpractice as  Respondent in her defense, however, maintained that she had
a lawyer. applied for renewal of her commission prior to its expiration
 In his complaint, Marciano Joson alleged that on 10 July in 1956; that respondent forgot about the matter and in good
1957, respondent Atty. Gloria Baltazar-Aguirre notarized a faith continued to act as notary public in the honest belief
deed of sale executed by complainant in favor of one that her commission had been renewed with the filing of the
Herminia Feliciano, but: petition which she considered a routine formality; and that
1. Respondent had made it appear in the deed of sale that when she learned in August 1956 that her petition for
complainant-vendor sold 150 square meters of his renewal had not been filed, she applied anew for renewal of
unregistered land in Pulilan, Bulacan, instead of only 50 her commission and was in fact re-commissioned as notary
square meters which was the real agreement of the parties; public on 7 September 1957.
and
Issue: Was the conduct of respondent one which is characterized as
2. At the time respondent Baltazar notarized the deed of sale, malpractice and falsification of
she was no longer authorized to do so since her notarial a public document?
commission had expired on 31 December 1956 and was
renewed by her only on 17 September 1957. Held: Yes.

By itself, complainant's testimony is insufficient to show the  Notarization of a private document converts such document
existence of a mistake or imperfection in the writing or that into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without
the deed of sale failed to express the true intent and further proof of its authenticity.
agreement of the parties.
 It appears to the Court that the respondent considered the
requirements for appointment or renewed appointment of a
 notary public as a casual formality, since she did not bother
to ascertain whether her commission had in fact been
renewed before acting as such. By respondent's own
testimony, she had become aware before notarizing the deed
of sale that her petition for renewal of her notarial
commission had not been filed.

 The Court is, therefore, unable to accept her plea of good

faith simply on the basis of her claimed belief that her
commission would, as a matter of course, be approved upon
the filing of her petition for renewal of her commission.

 Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must

be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a
notary public and appended to a private instrument.
Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it
engages public interest in a substantial degree and the
protection of that interest requires preventing those who are
not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from
imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative
offices generally.

 ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND

respondent Atty. Gloria M. Baltazar-Aguirre from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months commencing
from receipt of this Resolution. Copies of this Resolution
shall be furnished to the courts and the Bar Confidant and
spread on the personal record of Respondent.
 had been subsequently cancelled already by Tax Declaration
Sales v. CA July 29, 1992 13875 in the name of Esperanza Sales Bermudez and by Tax
Declaration No.13874 in Severo Sales' name, one can hardly
Facts: ascribe bad faith to respondent, for unlike a title registered
Severo Sales mortgaged his unregistered parcel of land to the under the Torrens System, a tax declaration does not
spouses Agpoon to secure the payment of a loan. More than a year constitute constructive notice to the whole world. The issue
passed, Sales and his wife donated a portion of the property to their of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where
daughter, in which the tax declaration was replaced by two tax the subject of the sale is a registered land but not where the
declaration, one under their daughter’s name and the other under property is an unregistered land.
Sales’ name for the remaining portion. Sometime later, the mortgage
was set for foreclosure, so to prevent it, Sales requested Ernesto
Gonzales to pay his indebtedness to the Agpoon. On February 3,
1959, a document entitled "Deed of Sale" between Severo Sales and 2. No. While the deed of donation is valid between the donor
Leonilo Gonzales was registered with the Register of Deeds of and the donee thereby effectively transmitting the rights to
Pangasinan. The document stated that the Sales spouses had sold the said property from Sales to his daughter, such deed,
land described under Tax Declaration No. 5861in consideration of however, did not bind Leonilo Gonzales, a third party to the
the amount of P4,000 to Leonilo Gonzales, son of Ernesto Gonzales. donation. Non-registration of a deed of donation under Sec. 1
of Act No. 3344 does not bind other parties ignorant of a
Issues: previous transaction, notwithstanding the provision therein
which petitioners invoke that "any registration made under
1) W/N the buyer is in bad faith by the proof of tax declaration this section shall be understood to be without prejudice to a
of the unregistered land? third party with a better right." Petitioner Esperanza Sales
Bermudez may not be a considered a third party being the
2) W/N the buyer is bound by unregistered deed of donation? daughter of the vendor himself and the "better right"
possessed by a third party refers to other titles which a party
3) W/N the registration of a deed of donation or deed of sale is might have acquired independently of the unregistered deed
immaterial? such as title by prescription.

Rulings: 3. No. It is not convincing that it is useless to register deeds or

instruments affecting unregistered lands because the books
1. No. While it seems improbable that Severo Sales sold the of registration provided under Section 194 of the Revised
property described in Tax Declaration 5861 when in fact this Administrative Code as Amended by Act 3344 continue to
remain in force even to this day. In fact, under Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, instruments dealing with
unregistered lands can still be registered.
WINNIE C. LUCENTE and ALICIA G. DOMINGO vs. ATTY. thereof. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost
CLETO L. EVANGELISTA, JR care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
A.C. No. 5957. February 4, 2003

Facts: Lucente filed a complaint for gross misconduct against Atty.

Evangelista Jr. for certifying a Deed of Sale. He certified the deeds
considering that the documents were notarized by his late father as
notary public. On the basis of said deeds, the RD issued TCT.

Issue: WON Atty. Evangelista, Jr. is guilty of gross misconduct.

Ruling: Yes.

Ratio: By certifying true copies of the subject deeds, Atty.

Evangelista, Jr. engaged in an unlawful and deceitful conduct. He
was not the notary public before whom said documents were
acknowledged and has neither the custodian of the original copies
thereof.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is

invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection
of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or
authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public,
the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity
Yturralde v. Azurin of military services of my only son, Jeremias, who
GR L-22158 died in line of duty in Mindanao during the guerilla
May 30, 1969 days, Mrs. Consuelo G. Azurin offered me the
professional services of her son, Atty. Jose G. Azurin
FACTS: Plaintiff Reverend Cipriano Yturralde is the brother of to look for all necessary proofs and evidences of the
deceased, Carmen. He was also a witness to the notarial deed of military services of my son in Mindanao and then
donation executed by his deceased sister in favour of defendant Dr. prepared for me a new application for my pension
Azurin. The donation consisted of 10 lands in Antique. Plaintiff which was duly approved;
contended that this deed was merely a document for an
administration of properties, and not a donation. c) That due to those services, I was given an
accumulated pension and granted further a monthly
It is not disputed that on February 13, 1955, Dr. Azurin went to pension, without which, my living condition would
Sibalom on an urgent call because Carmen Yturralde had suffered a have been very precarious. That those services were
stroke. She became partly paralyzed. From then on, Dr. Azurin all given me without any monetary consideration;
attended to her. Since then and until her death, Dr. Azurin and his
family attended to her. d) That before receiving any pension, and being
bedridden patient due to paralysis, the Donee
In the deed of donation, the following are stipulated: extended me as a good daughter could do,
sympathetic, moral and mental comfort, besides
That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the money aid for almost one year without demanding
Donor to the Donee which have steadily developed in my from me the necessary formal acknowledgment of
heart, which may be explained in the following way and those amount; and
manner:
a) That just after the liberation of the last World War e) That since the onset of my paralysis, her husband,
II, the Donee invited me to go with her to Manila to Dr. Azurin has disinterestedly been attending to me
recuperate my health and to forget the hardships of promptly and up to date, sometime advancing money
life during the guerilla days. She furnished me all to buy medicines.
means that I needed, and accompanied me to see
what was Manila, and to renew old acquaintances; THEREFORE, and because of uncertainty of life and its
inevitable end, and my desire to demonstrate my act of
b) That she, on seeing that I found difficulties in gratefulness to Mrs. Consuelo G. Azurin and her husband,
securing from the USA Government the recognition Dr. Azurin, while able to do so, I, CARMEN YTURRALDE,
 the Donor herein referred above, in full possession of all my Donor and thus hereby express her appreciation and
mental faculties, hereby give, transfer and convey, by way of gratefulness for the kindness and generosity of the donor.
DONATION unto the said Consuelo G. Azurin, her heirs,
successors, and assigns the above-described properties, with At the bottom of the foregoing four-page instrument and at the left
all the improvements thereon, and such other personal hand margin of the first three pages are the signature of Consuelo G.
properties. Azurin, the thumbmark of Carmen Yturralde, as well as the
signatures of plaintiff Cipriano Yturralde and Apolonio Yturralde as
That the only condition(s) of this donation are as follows: instrumental witnesses.

1. — That in the meantime that I am living, the donee from The Azurins afterwards took steps to have the deed registered. They
the proceeds of said properties shall use them for my care learned that the Torrens titles were with the spouses Mariano
and sustenance and also of my brother, Cipriano Yturralde, if Vagilidad and Luz Manaquit upon loans from them obtained by
God, in HIS infinite wisdom, may decide I shall die ahead of plaintiff Cipriano Yturralde. The spouses refused to part with the
my said brother, Cipriano Yturralde. titles. This led the Azurins to take two court actions: First, a petition
in the cadastral proceedings to procure delivery of the titles to them;
2. — That from the proceeds of my properties above- and Second, to annul that mortgage which covers some of the
described, the donee shall take care in the maintenance of the donated properties. CFI ruled in favor of the Azurins.
family mausoleum which was constructed by me at the
municipal cemetery of Sibalom, wherein the remains of my Afterwards, the plaintiff Cipriano sought to annul the donation.
son, Jeremias, my sister Baltazara and my brother-in-law Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Azurin "talked to the patient who was not
Pedro Gella are kept and wherein, in the future my remains answering", grabbed the thumb of the patient and had it marked on
and that of my brother Cipriano shall also be kept and rested the papers. Plaintiff also cries of fraud is that the document signed
perpetually. was one for administration, not a donation.

3. — That from the proceeds of these properties, the donee ISSUES: Whether presumption of regularity of a public document
shall also construct a house where I and my brother Cipriano was overturned by plaintiff’s evidence
shall live comfortably, instead of repairing from time to time
the actual dilapidated and crumbling bamboo house, which is HELD: NO. A rule of long standing which, through the years, has
a constant hazard to my personal safety, taking into been adhered to is that a notarial document is evidence of the facts
consideration the paralytical condition of my being. in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the
That the donee, Consuelo G. Azurin, thus hereby receives presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, as plaintiff now
and accepts this gift and donation made in her favor by the seeks to do, there must be evidence that is "clear, convincing and
more than merely preponderant." Our task now is to weigh the If plaintiff really believed that Dr. Azurin acted in a manner which
evidence with a view of ascertaining whether plaintiff has made out would evoke suspicion, coupled with his own alleged knowledge
a case conformably to the foregoing standard. It is undisputed that that said Dr. Azurin was interested in the wealth of his sister, then it
plaintiff has been a priest of the Philippine Independent Church for a stands to reason to say that he must have been on guard. His normal
long time. He talks and writes Spanish very well. He knows how to reaction would have been to stave off execution of the deed of
read English. The judge below, who signed the decision and who donation. But according to him, he did not. Upon the other hand,
had the opportunity to observe plaintiff on the witness chair, gave defendants' evidence is that said document was handed over to
the opinion that although plaintiff was already old and a little bit plaintiff. Even if we concede that he knows no English, the very title
deaf, he was "fairly intelligent to say the least, and definitely ... not of the document must have arrested his attention. The English word
feeble-minded." This is the man who claims to have been misled by "DONATION" was there. That is the equivalent of the Spanish word
defendant Dr. Raymundo Azurin. "DONACION", which, of course he understands.

In addition to the foregoing, other circumstances there are which The fact indeed that plaintiff's present suit was started at a time
betray plaintiff's testimony as thoroughly unbelievable. If the when the donor, Carmen Yturralde, was already dead strikes a note
intention of the Azurins were to palm off donation for mere of implausibility on plaintiff's claim pressed upon the Court.
administration, they would not have chosen such a time when not Because, during the lifetime of Carmen, she joined defendants in the
only plaintiff but the latter's nephew, a person also of mature age, suit against the Vagilidads filed on December 29, 1956 for the
were present. They would not have then exhibited the document, purpose of annulling the mortgage in favor of the latter in order to
allowed the execution thereof. The ways of fraud are such that it is give effect to the very donation now being questioned in plaintiff. If
unlikely that the Azurins would risk the success of their alleged Carmen Yturralde, at the time that suit against the Vagilidads was
nefarious scheme in the presence of those who, by the nature of started on December 29, 1956 to the date of her death on January 23,
things, are bound to protect the interests of a close relation. 1960, ever entertained the belief that she was duped into signing the
deed of donation, certainly during that span of over three years, she
On the question of whether or not at the time the document was could have complained and asked that her name be stricken out from
executed the deceased Carmen Yturralde knew what she was doing that suit, and she herself could have commenced an action for the
and had the power of speech, evidence there is that clearly supports annulment of the donation. That she did not do so is a circumstance
the affirmative. At that time, Carmen was suffering from clear enough that the very party interested really intended a donation
hemiplegia, paralysis of the right half of her body. She was to take place.
bedridden, it is true, but otherwise feeling all right. She could talk
coherently, audibly, and properly, could answer questions sensibly,
could express her ideas clearly.
Monteverde v. People and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
G.R. No.139610 | August 12, 2002 and convert the same to her personal use
Panganiban, J.: and benefit, to the damage of the
Government and which crime was
Nature committed in relation to her office.”
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and b. Arraignment: Monteverde pleaded not guilty.
resolution of the Sandiganbayan 2. Sandiganbayan acquitted Monteverde of the crime of
estafa, but cconvicted her of falsification of a commercial
Facts document under Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code
1. The case originated from the Information signed by Facts (as per Prosecution)
Special Prosecution Officer Gualberto J. dela Llana with 1. Monteverde was the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 124 of
the approval of then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez/ Zone 10, District 1,Malaya, Balut, Tondo, Manilaa
a. Such charged petitioner Aurea R. Monteverde a. She received the amount of P 44,800 from the
with estafa through falsification of commercial Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp.
documents (PAGOCR)
i. “That on or about January 17, 1991, or i. The amount was spent for lighting,
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in cleanliness and beautification programs of the
Manila, Philippines, and within the Barangay
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the ii. To liquidate the amount
above-named accused, a public officer, 1. She q financial statement
being the Chairman of Barangay 124 of 2. August 44, 1991, Antonio R. Araza, Jose Salvatierra, Santos
Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo, L. Lopez, and Narciso Cruz, residents of Brgy. 124, charged
Manila with intent to defraud, and by Petitioner and Bella Evangelista, then Barangay Treasurer,
taking advantage of [her] official position with Malversation of the following funds: 1.) P82,500 from
and to liquidate the funds donated/granted the Barangay General Fund; 2.) P44,800.00 from the
by the Philippine Games and Amusement PAGCOR; and 3.) P600.00 allowance of Kagawad Lito
Corporation submitted Sales Invoice No. Galinda.
21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the 3. Evidences relied on by Sandiganbayan given by the
amount of P13,565.00 allegedly issued by Prosecution:
Sanford Hardware when in truth and in “EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
fact said sales invoice is falsified and later In its bid to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully reasonable
 doubt, the People presented the following documentary
evidence: “EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED
a) Exhibit “A” which is a letter complaint addressed to the “The defense presented eighty-one (81) Exhibits with
Ombudsman dated September 2, 1991 signed by Santos Exhibits “35” to “80” dealing with certificates of
Lopez, Narciso Cruz, Antonio Araza and Jose commendation in favor of the accused during her stint as
Salvatierra; Barangay Chairman from 1991 to 1993 and even prior to her
b) Exhibit “B” which is a JointAffidavit of the said four (4) being a Barangay Chairman. Exhibits “1” with its sub-
complainants subscribed and sworn to before a Notary markings (Exhibits “1A” to Exhibits “1A3”) is a letter of the
Public on September 8, 1991; accused addressed to Alice LI Reyes of the PAGCOR with
c) Exhibit “C” which is a letter dated June 13, 1991 signed attachment she captioned Financial Statement; Exhibits “2”
by complainants Jose Salvatierra and Antonio Araza to “15” are Sales Invoices/Receipts from different hardware
addressed to Mr. Manuel de la Fuente of the Chief stores and individuals while Exhibits “16” and “17” are
Barangay Bureau, City of Manila; pictures depicting a basketball court portion thereof being
d) Exhibit “D” which is the cover of the Booklet of Sales sub-marked, and Exhibits “18” to “32” are fifteen (15)
Invoice[s]/Receipts of Sanford Hardware. pictures depicting different alleys at Barangay 124. Exhibit
e) Exhibit “D1” which is the duplicate original copy of “33” is a turnover certificate/record of the Barangay
Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated July 20, 1981 listing only properties signed by the incoming Barangay Chairman with
three (3) items; the third page sub-marked as Exhibits “33A” to “33b2” ; and
f) Exhibit “D1A” which is a genuine machine copy of Exhibit “34” is the counter-affidavit of the accused sworn to
Exhibit “D1”; before a Notary Public on September 5, 1991. Exhibit “81”
g) Exhibit “E” which is a machine copy of an official is a Joint-Affidavit of Alfonso Cua, Jr. and Joel Magbanua.
receipt with Aurea Monteverde appearing as buyer and
listing eleven items as articles purchased; 4. Sandiganbayan:
h) Exhibit “E1” which is a certification of Luz Co, Manager a. Judgement finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
of Sanford Hardware stating that Exhibit E is not a doubt of the crime of Falsification of Commercial
genuine reproduction of the duplicate original; Document under Art. 172 of the RPC
i) Exhibit “F” (offered lately) is a xerox copy of Invoice b. Decision noted that petitioner was supposed to have
No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991; been charged with the complex crime of estafa
j) Exhibit “G” is a machine copy of an undated letter through falsification of a commercial document
signed by Bella Evangelista authorizing Antonio Araza i. However, no clear allegation in the
to verify the authenticity of Invoice No. 21568 dated Information that the falsification was a
January 17, 1991 in the sum of P13,565.00. necessary means to commit the estafa
 c. The anti-graft court acquitted petitioner of estafa intended by law to be part of the public or official record, the
because there was no evidence that funds had been preparation of which being in accordance with the rules and
misappropriated or converted. Neither was there regulations issued by the government, the falsification of that
proof that petitioner had been required to account for document, although it was a private document at the time of
the money received. Without these proofs, no its falsification, is regarded as falsification of public or
conviction for estafa was possible official document. “Prosecution witness Luz Co testified that
d. However, the court convicted her for allegedly the duplicate original of Sales Invoice No. 21568 was
falsifying the document she had submitted to show submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Thus this
that the P13,565 donated by PAGCOR was used and Sales Invoice is intended to be part of the public records and
spent for lighting materials for barangay. According the preparation thereof is required by BIR rules and
to the SBN, the falsification became very clear when regulations. Moreover, Sales Invoice No. 21568 formed part
the document was compared with another one of the official records of PAGCOR when it was submitted by
purporting to be a duplicate original presented by the petitioner as one of the supporting papers for the liquidation
prosecution. While the prosecution did not present of her accountability to PAGCOR.”
any proof evidencing that it was petitioner who had 2. Neither can it be denied that the Sales Invoice is also a
caused the falsification, the SBN relied on the commercial document. Commercial documents or papers
presumption that in the absence of a satisfactory are those used by merchants or businessmen to promote
explanation, a person who is found in possession of a or facilitate trade or credit transactions. This Court has
forged document, and who uses it, is the forger. previously characterized such documents in this wise: “x x x.
In most cases, these commercial forms [receipts, order slips
Issue and invoices] are not always fully accomplished to contain
WON petitioner guilty of falsification despite the finding all the necessary information describing the whole business
that no estafa was committed transaction. The sales clerks merely indicate a description
and the price of each item sold without bothering to fill up
Held: all the available spaces in the particular receipt or invoice,
No. The Supreme Court granted the petition and the assailed and without proper regard for any legal repercussion for such
decision set aside. Petitioner is acquitted on reasonable doubt. neglect. Certainly, it would not hurt if businessmen and
1. Both the OSG and the OSP agree that a private document traders would strive to make the receipts and invoices they
acquires the character of a public document when it issue complete, as far as practicable, in material particulars.
becomes part of an official record and is certified by a These documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of
public officer duly authorized by law. The OSP aptly probative value but vital pieces of evidence of commercial
explained this point as follows: “x x x, [I]f the document is
 transactions. They are written memorials of the details of the
consummation of contracts.”

Add- on (if ma’am asks): -> case filed was a complex crim (Estafa
through Falsification of a Commercial Document)
1. There is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are
committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one
crime is not a necessary means for committing the other (or
others)
2. There is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are
committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one
crime is not a necessary means for committing the other (or
others). When more than one offense is charged, the accused
may move to quash the information
3. When a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to
establish one of the component offenses, the defendant can
be convicted of the others, so long as they are proved —
acquittal from a component offense will not necessarily lead
to an acquittal from the other (or others).
 h) If for any reason, any of the above terms and conditions
Raz v. IAC (184 SCRA 720) cannot fully be complied, the same may be considered
rescinded by either party, in which event the ASSIGNOR
Nature of the case: Appeal shall return whatever money she or her heirs may have
received from the ASSIGNEE, and the said ASSIGNEE,
Facts: shall relinquish any and all rights which if any she or her
heirs may have, and this contract shall forthwith be
The subject of this petition is a Conditional Assignment of considered null and void and without force and effect
Rights and Interests over a Foreclosure Judgment entered into whatsoever.
between petitioner Reva Raz and the original private respondent
herein, Encarnacion Villanueva, on August 7, 1972. To support her claim, Villanueva presented two letters 3 she said
she had sent Raz, the first to remind her of the third installment that
The said judgment was rendered in favor of Villanueva on had not yet been paid and the second to tender her the refund of her
February 5, 1969, and ordered the defendants therein to pay her the earlier payments in view of the rescission of their contract.
amount of P35,000.00, with 12% per annum interest from August 7,
1965, and other amounts, in default of which the property subject of Procedural (Court Decision)
the proceeding would be sold at public auction to satisfy the
amounts owing her. 2This property was a parcel of land located at Lower Court:
Quezon City which had been mortgaged by the defendants to secure
the payment of a loan she had extended to them. The judgment was The Court has deliberated on the issues and the arguments of
pending appeal before the respondent court at the time of the the parties and finds that the respondent court 4committed no
execution of the Conditional Assignment. reversible error in sustaining the trial court 5 and dismissing the
appeal.
On April 13, 1978, the petitioner filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against the private respondent, Issues:
claiming that the latter had reneged on her duty to deliver the
property to the assignee in accordance with their agreement. In her Whether or not the petitioner is correct in invoking Rule 132,
answer, Villanueva alleged that it was the petitioner who had Section 21, for one of the modes prescribed therein for proving the
defaulted in her payments and thus given just cause for the execution and authenticity of any private writing is "by evidence of
rescission of the agreement. This was authorized in its Par. 3(h) the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker."
reading as follows:
 Whether or not the two letters allegedly sent to her by the
private respondents should not have been admitted in evidence not
only because there was no proof that she had received them.

Ruling w/ Ratio:

The court made such comparison and find that the signature
of Encarnacion G. Villanueva on the Conditional Assignment
(which is not disputed) is similar to the signatures affixed to the two
letters sent to the petitioner. There is no doubt that the agreement
and the two letters were signed by private respondent Encarnacion
G. Villanueva. Consequently, their authenticity and execution
having been established, we hold that the letters were admissible as
evidence of the private respondent.

The Court is also convinced that the two letters were

correctly sent to and personally delivered at the petitioner's address
as stated in the Conditional Assignment, were actually received
there and later presumably conveyed to her. Indeed, the signature of
the person who received the first letter closely resembles that of one
of petitioner's counsel as an examination of her pleadings will
reveal. 6 At any rate, even if they were not really transmitted to the
petitioner and the letters were correctly rejected as inadmissible, Raz
would still be bound by her own admission in the complaint, where
she made the following allegations in Par. 8:

a) A week or so before August 7, 1974, defendant

demanded from plaintiff the payment of the balance of
P33,000.00 of the consideration;
 [G.R. No. 140904. October 9, 2000] (3) a plant gate pass from one J.P. Valencia dated February 16,
1993 for entry into the Antipolo compound and pull-out of the
machine;
RENE S. ONG, MAGDALENO B. ALBARRACIN, JR., (4) a letter from one Atty. Maximino Robles demanding
PETRONIO C. AALIWIN and J. O. NERIT, petitioners, delivery of the machine to the complainant;
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF (5) a letter of Solid Cement's Rene S. Ong offering to return
APPEALS, respondents. P362,000.00 plus interest; 
DECISION (6) a letter from Atty. Robles informing Solid Cement of
complainant's refusal to accept the refund of the P362,000.00;
On February 8, 1993, Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-
making machine for P362,000.00 from the Solid Cement (7) a memorandum from five officers or employees of Solid
Corporation. When she went to the corporation's Antipolo plant, Cement Corporation recommending the sale of the paper bag-
however, no machine could be given to her, it appearing that the making-machine;
machine sold had been earlier mortgaged to a creditor, who, (8) another gate-pass dated December 3, 1992 from one Ramon
unfortunately, refused to release the mortgage. Herein petitioners Enriquez allowing the pull out of the machine;
offered to return the money paid by Mrs. Alfonso but she refused
and instead filed a criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor of (9) a letter from one Lorenzo P. Ligot thanking Solid Cement,
Makati. through one Peter Aaliwin, for the former's grant of a right of first
refusal; and (
On October 18, 1994, an Information for estafa and other deceit
based on Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the 10) a copy of the resolution dated July 26, 1993 of the
MeTC of Makati City. After pre-trial, the prosecution presented as Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Rizal. 
its sole witness complainant Zeny Alfonso. The prosecution then
The defense objected to the admission of these pieces of
formally offered its documentary evidence and rested its case. The
evidence, claiming that the same were only unauthenticated
admissibility of these documents was questioned by petitioners.
photocopies of the originals.
The disputed documents are alleged photo copies of
On July 12, 1996, petitioners filed a motion for leave to file
 (1) the approval of the sale of the paper bag-making machine demurrer to evidence, attaching thereto their demurrer. In their
supposedly signed by petitioners; pleading, petitioners stressed that all the above-mentioned
documents being uncertified photocopies bearing unidentified or
(2) an official receipt of Solid Cement Corporation evidencing unauthenticated signatures are inadmissible in evidence. 
payment of P362,000.00;
MeTC DECISION: demurrer denied. The accused (petitioners here) is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to
then filed a petition for certiorari   and prohibition with the RTC. support a verdict of guilt (Gutib v. CA, supra).
In the instant case, there is no competent and sufficient
RTC DECISION: reversed decision and ordered the dismissal of the
evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of
criminal case.
guilt against petitioners. As pointed out by petitioners, all
documentary evidence submitted by the private complainant
CA DECISION: reversed RTC’s decision. Order dismissing case
were uncertified photocopies of certain documents, the
was set aside and the accused were given the option to either present
signatures on which were either unidentified or
their evidence before the trial court below (Metropolitan Trial
unauthenticated.
Court)or to submit the case for decision based solely on the
prosecutor's evidence. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
that "before any private document offered as authentic is received in
Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct in upholding the MeTC evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
decision which denied the defendants’s motion for leave to file
(a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written;
demurrer to evidence
or
(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
Ruling:
handwriting of the maker.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set
Thus, prior to the admission in evidence of a private writing, the
aside. The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 157290 entitled "People
identity and authenticity of the document sought to be presented
of the Philippines v. Rene S. Ong, et al. is AFFIRMED, without
must first be reasonably established. Where there is no proof as to
prejudice to the filing of an appropriate civil action.
the authenticity of the executor's signature appearing in a
private document, such private document should be
excluded (Paz v. Santiago, 47 Phil 334 [1925]).
 A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an
action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced Being private instruments, their due and valid execution and
is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a their genuineness and authenticity must first be established, either
case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the by the testimony of any one who saw the writing executed or by
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker hereof.
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is
A painstaking perusal of the testimony of the prosecution's sole
merely required to ascertain whether there
witness reveals, however, that the due execution and authenticity of
these documents were never proved. In fact, the prosecution took no
effort to prove the due execution and authenticity of these case, the prosecution miserably failed to establish by sufficient
documents during the presentation of their sole witness. Absent such evidence the existence of the crime of estafa and other deceit.
proof, these documents are incompetent as evidence. It is elementary
Aside from complainant's testimony, the only evidence of
that this Court cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the genuineness of
petitioners' supposed complicity in the alleged offense is the
an unverified and unidentified document; much less, accord it
photocopy of the approval of the sale of the paper bag-making
evidentiary value (People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464
machine, said document containing the names of petitioners Ong,
[1998]). In People v. Gamiao (240 SCRA 254 [1995]), we declared,
Nerit, Aaliwin, and Albarracin. As stated earlier, however, said
"[p]arenthetically, appellant failed to present in evidence the
document is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, there is no evidence
originals or the xerox copies of the documents hereinbefore
as to their participation in the crime. In fact, among the
discussed. The requirements for the admission of such secondary
petitioners, private complainant had personal contact only with
evidence in court were not satisfied. The Rules of Court provide
Ong, whom she met only after the alleged approval of the sale of
that private documents require proof of their due execution and
the machine. Having met Ong after the sale, Ong could not have
authentication before they can be received in evidence. When
misrepresented anything to complainant to induce her to part
there is no such proof, the substitutionary documents may be
with her money. As to the others, not having had personal
excluded."
dealings with private complainant, it boggles one's mind to even
. entertain the speculation that they could have misrepresented
anything to the latter.
The due execution and authenticity of the documentary
evidence presented not having been proved, and since these are mere With our ruling that the documentary evidence submitted by the
photocopies, the loss of the originals of which was not previously prosecution is inadmissible in evidence, the prosecution's evidence
established, the same are clearly inadmissible in evidence. Being against petitioners is grossly and patently insufficient to support a
incompetent evidence, the only evidence the prosecution could rely finding of guilt. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the
on to prove petitioners' guilt would be the sole testimony of the MeTC to consider that there was a prima facie case against
private complainant. Unsupported by any other evidence, said petitioners warranting a trial on the merits given the paucity of
testimony is insufficient to sustain a finding of culpability. evidence against petitioners.
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer
thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will
legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to ERNANDO C. LAYNO, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE
the circumstances. To be considered sufficient, therefore, the PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents
evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the
precise degree of participation therein by the accused. In the instant G.R. No. 93842. September 7, 1992
PADILLA, J.: May 1980, the Civil Service Commission approved the appointment
of Fernando Y. Layno. The appointee, however, neither assumed the
Petition for review on certiorari position to which he was appointed nor collected the salary
corresponding to it.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
The petitioner was the incumbent municipal mayor of Lianga, falsification of public document defined in Article 171, paragraph 4
Surigao del Sur, on 16 March 1980. He appointed Fernando Y. of the Revised Penal Code.
Layno, his legitimate son, meat inspector in the office of the
municipal treasurer of Lianga. He signed the appointment document During the pre-trial, upon motion of the Petitioner, his admission
— Civil Service Form No. 35 — twice, first as the appointing that he appointed Fernando Y. Layno was made subject to the
authority and second, as the personnel officer, certifying" (t)hat all qualification that he later on revoked the appointment upon being
the required supporting papers pursuant to MC 5, s. 1974, as advised that it was against the law on nepotism.
amended. have been complied with, reviewed and found to be in
order." The Sandiganbayan found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
cralaw virtua1aw library doubt of the crime of falsification of public document.
Among the supporting papers required for the appointment is the
Certification (Exh. "B") signed by the petitioner, reading as follows: ISSUE:
hanrobles.com.ph Whether or not petitioner signed the certification (Exh. B) in
"In connection with the appointment of MR. FERNANDO Y. question
LAYNO, Lianga, Surigao del Sur, in the Office of Municipal
Treasurer, Lianga, Surigao del Sur at the rate of FOUR HELD:
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY TWO PESOS ONLY per
annum (P4,632.00), effective March 16, 1980. I HEREBY Yes.
CERTIFY THAT:
Petitioner claims that the lone witness for the prosecution, Amando
"1. He is not related to me to (sic) any person exercising immediate R. Pandi, Jr., who identified his signature on the said certification is
supervision over him within the third degree of either consanguinity incompetent to testify on the matter because he admitted during the
or affinity. trial that he never saw him (petitioner) actually signing (affixing) his
signature on the questioned certification. Petitioner further claims
On the same day, i.e., 16 March 1980, Fernando Y. Layno took his that the said witness is biased and prejudiced and that his testimony
oath of office with the petitioner as the administering officer. On 20 is incredible, unreliable and undeserving of belief. He argues that
Pandi did not testify voluntarily but was actually instructed by the identify and did identify the full signature on the Certification,
incumbent mayor who was his (petitioner’s) political opponent for Exhibit "B", to be that of the accused."
the mayorship of the Municipality of Lianga in the last local election
and that he (Pandi) is a relative of the incumbent vice-mayor against Moreover, the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the signature on the
whom he (petitioner) has a long-standing political feud. certification in question is the signature of the petitioner was not
only based on the testimony of Amando R. Pandi, Jr. Section 22,
The petitioner’s aforesaid contentions are without merit. Under Sec. Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence further provides that"
22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, the handwriting of a (e)vidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
person may be proved by any witness who "has seen writing comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
purporting to be his upon which the witness acted or been charged, admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
person." Otherwise stated, any witness any be called who has, by judge." Pursuant thereto, the Sandiganbayan compared the signature
sufficient means, acquired knowledge of the general character of the on the certification with the signatures of the petitioner on
handwriting of the party whose signature is in question. documents filed with the court, and which were proved to be
genuine.
Prosecution witness Amando R. Pandi, Jr. was competent to testify
on the signature of Petitioner on the Certification, Exhibit "B" After making the comparison, the Sandiganbayan was satisfied and
because in the course of his employment as municipal secretary and convinced that the signature on the certification Exhibit B is truly
designated personnel officer in the municipal government of Lianga. the signature of the petitioner. The Court finds no ground or reason
Surigao del Sur, he had seen records under his charge bearing the for disturbing such finding or conclusion.
long and short signatures of the petitioner, and, as such, he had
acquired knowledge of the general character of the handwriting of
the petitioner. As aptly observed by the Sandiganbayan:

". . ., Pandi has seen in the course of his employment in the

Municipal Government of Lianga as Municipal Secretary since July
15, 1988, and as designated Personnel Officer from February 1,
1989, appointment records of municipal employees and old
resolutions of the Municipal Council bearing the full and
abbreviated signatures of the accused as Municipal Mayor. For this
reason, he became familiar with those signatures. He could therefore
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the 1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local
Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, civil registrar by the solemnizing officer;
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE 2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob
REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and merely placed his thumbmark on said contract
JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of Balalong, respondents. purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the
marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed
Facts: Petitioner  claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased between Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged
Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for date of marriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting that
the various estates of the deceased by virtue of both of them lived together as husband and wife for
a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the five (5) years, Alfredo affixed his customary signature;
deceased. Respondent on the other hand, claimed to be the legally- 3. In his Affidavit stating the circumstances of the loss of
adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never
Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. mentioned that he allegedly gave the copies of the
Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for
by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the registration;
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, 4. Petitioner admitted that there was no record of the
Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the purported marriage entered in the book of records in
deceaseds estate as Alfredos adopted son and as his sole surviving San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly
heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between solemnized.
appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Anent to the issue of legality of adoption of Pedro, Tomasa
uestioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya
Petitioner claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was
granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo 
solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros,
Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to
original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original test the authenticity and genuineness of Judge Moyas signature.
document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose
A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C.
Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented
Albacea, NBI Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used
as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in
thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and compared
1978.
it with the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities
and significant fundamental differences in handwriting
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities
characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the
in the execution of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:
standard signature and concluded that the questioned and the
standard signatures JOSE L. MOYA were NOT written by one ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa
and the same person. Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid- YES

On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moyas RULING: Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was
signature, appellee presented the comparative findings of the void because the parties had no marriage license. This argument is
handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief Document misplaced, because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and
Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not
noted the existence of significant similarities of unconscious require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code. The
habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and
between the standard and the questioned signatures and concluded the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family
that the signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 Code.
July 1961 granting the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or
RULING OF THE LOWER COURT: Sustained the findings
cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or
of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the
destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy
challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by
recollection of witnesses. Upon a showing that the document was
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:  Proof of due
duly executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the
execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of the marriage
part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its
contract has not been shown for the introduction of secondary
contents.
evidence of the contents of the reconstructed contract. Also,
appellant failed to sufficiently establish the circumstances of the loss The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
of the original document. when they (1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil
and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a)
With regard to the trial courts finding that the signature of then photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence,
Judge Moya in the questioned Order granting the petition for such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had
adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine, suffice it to state solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed
that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in
presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of
the performance of his regular duties. parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by
the Archbishop -- through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr.
Benjamin L. Marino -- ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob examination in the place or places where the document or papers of
and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made
stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate. any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that
the instrument has indeed been lost.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies
introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by
of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony,
the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused
and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss
the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary"
was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating
evidence of the marriage.
priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioners own declaration
in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible
It is the contents, which may not be proven by secondary evidence
evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary
not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document,
evidence -- testimonial and documentary -- may be admitted to
and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the contents:
prove the fact of marriage.
due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for
the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis,

necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol
testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined
from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the
most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish
its execution may affect the weight of the evidence presented but not
the admissibility of such evidence. Truly, the execution of a
document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the
parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously
narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that the loss
may be shown by any person who knows the fact of its loss, or by
anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
 Issue: W/N forgery was proven by the respondent in relation to the
unauthorized en-cashed checks?

Ruling: No
Security Bank VS Triumph Lumber and Construction
 First under the best evidence rule, the originals of the alleged
G.R. No. 126696 – January 21, 1999
forged checks were not presented as evidence, but rather
Facts: photocopies were provided for
 The proper procedure in the investigation of the disputed
 Respondent is a depositor of the petitioner bank, having handwriting was not observed.
several accounts from the latter.  Only photocopies not the originals of the long bond papers
 Three checks all payable to cash were withdrawn from the containing the alleged specimen signature were presented,
respondent’s accounts after encashment. nobody was presented to prove that the specimen signature
 The said checks were said to be not authorized by the were in fact the signatures affixed by the authorized
defendant and the signature from which were forged. signatories of the respondent (Yu Chun Kit and Co Yok
 Respondent claims that due to the gross and inexcusable Teng).
negligence in exercising ordinary diligence in verifying from  Even though one of the signatories took the witness stand, he
the petitioner, the encashment of the respondent’s checks, was never called to identify or authenticate his signature on
the said checks were en-cashed by unauthorized person to the said photocopy.
the damage and prejudice of the respondent.  The specimen signature was not even turned over to the
 Respondent requested the petitioner to credit back and expert witness (Tabo) by the persons who purportedly wrote
restore to its account the value of the checks which were them.
wrongfully en-cashed.  The expert witness never saw the parties write the specimen
 Despite due demand the petitioner failed to make the signatures, she just presumed the signature specimen to be
payment. genuine signatures of the parties concerned.
 RTC decided in favor of the Petitioner
Appeal Granted
 CA reversed the decision of the RTC
 the following described parcel of land, together with
damages for the illegal detention of the same
- From a judgment in favor of the defendants dismissing the
complaint upon the merits, with costs, and ordering the
return of the deeds and state grants, plaintiff appealed and
Dupilas v. Cabacungan (short facts and held pertinent to the now urges that the court erred (1) in finding that the seven
topic) parcels of land all belonged to Gregorio Cabacuñgan; (2) in
finding that the sales to Leon Alumising were fictitious and
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI
made for the sole purpose of enabling him to raise a loan on
- Gregorio Cabacungan et al obtained from the Spanish the lands in order that Gregorio Cabacuñgan might pay him a
government state grants for certain parcels in Tarlac debt of P77.50; (3) in finding that the letters, Exhibits Nos.
- Titles were duly registered on Nov. 9, 1892 2, 3, and 4 of the defendants, are authentic and not forged;
o The 3 grantees (Gregorio et al) appeared before a (4) in finding that Leon Alumising had never been in
notary and duly executed Exhibits D, E, and F, possession of the land up to the time of his death; and (5) in
wherein they acknowledged having sold for cash in finding that Gregorio Cabacuñgan and his heirs have been in
hand on that day their respective parcels of land to continuous, peaceable, and quiet possession of the lands
Leon Alumising since and before the issuance of the state grants. All of these
o Leon later died and was survived by his wife and 2 alleged errors may be considered together.
daughters. Issue
 Alejandra (wife of Gregorio) sold the lands to
Cecilio Alumising, brother of Leon
 Evidenced by a duly executed and
Held
ratified notarial document, but not
The judgment appealed from is affirmed
registered
- Subsequent to the death of Cecilio, Rosa Dupilas, as 1. Public documents are perfect evidence of the fact which gave
administratix of the estate of the deceased Cecilio instituted rise to their execution and of the date of the latter, if the act
this action for the purpose of recovering the possession of which the officer witnessed and certified to or the date
written by him are not shown to be false; but they are not
 conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the
statements made therein by the interested parties. ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Ocampo must be considered.

Petitioner’s case:
 The RTC should not consider evidence not formally offered
(Sec 34 Rule 132)
 The objection must be made immediately after the offer is
CATUIRA vs CA, PEOPLE made, and hence the objection was timely since the
GR 105813 | 12 September 1994 petitioner objected after the prosecution rested its case (at
which point impliedly offered na yung testimony)
PONENTE: J. BELLOSILLO
HELD:
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review assailing the CA Petition is DENIED.
decision denying the petition for certiorari against the order of the
RTC denying the motion to dismiss. The reason for requiring that evidence be formally introduced is to
enable the court to rule intelligently upon the objection to the
FACTS: questions which have been asked. As a general rule, the proponent
 8 June 1990, two Informations for estafa was filed against must show its relevancy, materiality and competency. Where the
Catuira for issuing checks without sufficient funds to cover proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to
the same [BP22]. Apparently, Ocampo is the injured party. be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object.
 After the prosecution presented its evidence, Catuira filed a Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest opportunity,
Motion to Dismiss (by way of Demurrer to Evidence) on the lest silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a
ground that the testimony of Ocampo was not formally waiver of objections.
offered by the time she was presented on the witness stand
per Sec. 35 of Rule 132. Alternatively, they also aver that While it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned
even if the testimony is considered, the prosecution still testimony when private respondent was called to the witness stand,
failed to prove that the checks were issued in payment of an petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to object at the
obligation. appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection became
 RTC denied the motion. reasonably apparent the moment private respondent was called
 On a Petition for certiorari with the CA, the CA dismissed to testify without any prior offer having been made by the
the petition and sustained the action of the RTC. proponent. Catuira should have objected to the testimony of the
complaining witness when it was not first offered upon calling
her and should not have waited in ambush after she had already
finished testifying. By so doing she did not save the time of the
Court in hearing the testimony of the witness that after all
according to her was inadmissible. And for her failure to make
known her objection at the proper time, the procedural error or
defect was waived.

But even assuming that petitioner's objection was timely, it was at

best pointless and superfluous. For there is no debating the fact that
the testimony of complaining witness is relevant and material in
the criminal prosecution of petitioner for estafa. It is
inconceivable that a situation could exist wherein an offended
party's testimony is immaterial in a criminal proceeding.
Consequently, even if the offer was belatedly made by the
prosecution, there is no reason for the testimony to be expunged
from the record.
 de Oñate to execute a public document of sale in favor of the
deceased and her heirs and she refused.

The trial court rejected the petitioners' defense that Elvira Mato Vda.
de Oñate contracted a verbal loan from Leonor Taguba in the
amount of P12,000.00 payable within a period of 4 years with 12%
interest. Also disbelieved was the allegation that two (2) parcels of
land covered by TCT No. 5167 and TCT No. 5168 (the land in
dispute) were mortgaged by Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate to Leonor
Taguba as security for the payment of the loan and that only
P5,000.00 of the P12,000.00 loan was given by Taguba.l
Vda. De Onate v. Court of Appeals (250 SCRA 283)

Facts: Petitioners appealed to respondent Court of Appeals faulting the trial

court's factual findings. They contended that the trial court erred
The controversy involves Lot No. 1571, a riceland located at Toran, when it took cognizance of the plaintiff's evidence, particularly
Aparri, Cagayan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- Exhibits "F," "F-1," "F-2" and "F-3", which had been marked but
5168. On January 10, 1980, an action for specific performance with never formally submitted in evidence as required by the Rules of
damages was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan, Court. Consequently, it was claimed that the trial court erred in
Branch II by Eulalia Marcita Taguba in her capacity as relying on the said evidence in deciding for private respondents.
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Leonor Taguba against
Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate. On December 13, 1993, respondent court affirmed the decision of
the trial court. 6 In sustaining the lower court, the respondent court
As the trial court found, the deceased Leonor Taguba bought the held that Exhibits "F, "F-1," "F-2" and "F3" though not formally
subject parcel of land from Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate sometime in offered, may still be admitted in evidence for having complied with
1976 for a consideration of P5,000.00 payable in four (4) the two (2) requisites for admission enunciated in our jurisprudence,
installments. Accordingly, she paid P2,250.00 on January 20, 1976, 7 that is, (1) evidence must be duly identified by testimony duly
1 P750.00 on February 23, 1976, 2 P1,000.00 on March 20, 1976 3 recorded and (2) it must be incorporated in the records of the case.
and P1,000.00 on July 29, 1976. 4 After full payment was made on
July 29, 1976, the parties however failed to reduce their contract in A motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied for lack of
writing. On December 30, 1976, Leonor Taguba died. The instant merit on June 13, 1994. 8
complaint was filed when demand was made upon Elvira Mato Vda.
Hence, the present petition for
However, in People v. Napat-a citing People v. Mate, we relaxed the
foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be
Issue: admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following
W/N COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly
DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE MARKED AS EXHIBITS BUT identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must
NOT FORMALLY OFFERED ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED have been incorporated in the records of the case.
BY THE COURT;
In the case at bench, we find, as respondent court did, that these
requisites have been satisfied.
Held:
Section 35 (now Section 34) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:

Sec. 35. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no

evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified.

From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be

considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere
fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit
does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, we had
the occasion to make a distinction between identification of
documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said
that the first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by
the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done
only when the party rests its case and not before. A party, therefore,
may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will
advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do
the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider
the same.
 a. Filipina amended the action – to a petition for
separation of property on the grounds:
i. That her husband abandoned her without
just cause
ii. That they have been living separately for
more than one year
iii. They voluntarily entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement, containing
the rules that would govern the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership
4. TC
Sy v. CA a. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal
G.R. 127263 | April 12, 2000 partnership of gains and approving a regime of
Quisumbing, J.: separation of properties based on the
Memorandum of Agreement executed by the
Nature: spouses
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA b. Granted custody of the children to Filipina
5. Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide
Facts: against her husband
1. Filipina Y. Sy and Fernando Sy contracted marriage on a. Filipina testified that one afternoon, she went to
November 15, 1973 the dental clinic at Manila, owned by her husband
a. Both were then 22 years old but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and
b. They were blessed with 2 children, Frederick and bring him to Pampanga
Farrah Sheryll b. While talking to her son, the boy ignored her and
2. Fernando left their conjugal dwelling continued playing
a. Since then, spouses lived separately, and their 2 c. Filipina got mad and started spanking him
children were in the custody of their mother d. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away
b. However, their son Federick transferred to his from their son, and punched her in the different
father’s residence, and from then on, lived with parts of her body
his father e. Filipina also claimed that her husband started
3. Filipina filed a petition for legal separation choking her when she fell on the floor, and
released her only when he thought she was dead
 f. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions i. Habitual alcoholism
on different parts of her body as a result of the ii. Refusal to live with her without fault on
blows inflicted by her husband her part, choosing to live with his mistress
i. It was not the first time Fernando instead
maltreated her iii. Refusal to have sex with her, performing
6. RTC the marital act only to satisfy himself
a. Convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of c. Filipina alleges that such psychological
slight physical injuries incapacity of her husband existed from the time
7. Filipina later filed a new action for legal separation of the celebration of their marriage and became
against private respondent on the following grounds: manifest thereafter
a. Repeated physical violence 10. RTC
b. Sexual infidelity a. Denied the petition of Filipina for the declaration
c. Attempt by respondent against her life; and of absolute nullity of her marriage
d. Abandonment of her by her husband without i. Alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by
justifiable cause for more than one year Filipina, do not constitute psychological
8. RTC incapacity which may arrant the
a. Granted the petition on the grounds of repeated declaration of absolute nullity of their
physical violence and sexual infidelity; and marriage
issued a decree of legal separation 11. CA
b. Awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll a. Affirms RTC
to Filipina, and their son Federick to respondent
Fernando Issue:
9. Filipina then filed a petition for the declaration of 1. WON the marriage between petitioner and private
absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a
ground of psychological incapacity marriage license at the time of the ceremony
a. Points out that the final judgment rendered by the 2. WON private respondent is psychologically incapacitated
RTC in her favor, in her petitions for separation at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a
of property and legal separation, and Fernando’s declaration of its absolute nullity
infliction of physical violence on her which led to  Note: allegation as to lack of marriage license was only
the conviction of her husband for slight physical made by petitioner during appeal
injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity Held:
b. She cites the following:
 Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract
the decisions promulgated by RTC and CA. The marriage celebrated shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was
between Filipina and Fernando is declared void ab initio for lack of issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private
marriage license at the time of celebration. respondent ever resided in Carmona.
1. Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise 3. We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license
an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene are only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son
the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a number of Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these
instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of
noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist the trial below, which shows that these have been
to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We examined and admitted by the trial court, with no
said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity objections having been made as to their authenticity and
and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
would be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice plainly petitioner’s testimony in open court when she affirmed
requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage
technicalities should not be subject to cavil. In our view, the was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore,
case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse
of the marriage between Filipina and Fernando which party failing to timely object thereto, these documents
petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.
marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of
a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties.
Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed;
and what is required now is a declaration of their effects
according to existing law.
2. November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of
the parents in both their son’s and daughter’s birth
certificates, which are also attached as Annexes “B” and “C”
in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits “B”
and “C” in the course of the trial. These pieces of evidence
on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of
the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A
marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders
 crime and implicated petitioners Melecio Macasiray and
Virgilio Gonzales, his co-accused.
 Exhibit D, which was the transcript of stenographic notes,
was presented in evidence. This transcript contained
statements allegedly given by Benedicto in answer to
questions of the fiscal, in which he affirmed the contents of
his extrajudicial confession.
 Petitioners objected to its admissibility of the extrajudicial
confession on the ground that it was given without the
assistance of counsel.
G.R. No. 94736. June 26, 1998  Trial Court sustained the objections and declared the two
documents to be inadmissible.
MELECIO MACASIRAY, VIRGILIO GONZALES, and  The Court of Appeals declared the two documents
BENEDICTOGONZALES, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE admissible in evidence and ordered the trial court to admit
PHILIPPINES, HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and ROSALINA them. Hence, this petition for review of the appellate court’s
RIVERA VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, respondents. decision.

Issue: Are both extrajudicial confession and TSN excluded as

evidence?
Facts:
Held:
 The case is for the murder of Johnny Villanueva, husband of
private respondent Rosalina Rivera Villanueva, on February  Yes. Petitioners objected to the admissibility of the
9, 1986 documents when they were formally offered; they did not
 In the course of the trial of the case, the prosecution waive objection to admissibility of the said documents by
introduced in evidence, as Exhibit B, an extrajudicial their failure to object when these were marked, identified,
confession executed by petitioner Benedicto Gonzales on and then introduced during the trial.
March 27, 1986, in which he admitted participation in the
 Objection to the identification and marking of the
document is not equivalent to objection to the document
when it is formally offered in evidence.
 In the case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all
the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified,
specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being
offered.
 It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to
the documentary evidence may be made.
 There was no need for Gonzales to deny the contents both of
the confession and the TSN since they had already been
excluded in evidence.
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the orders dated April 14,
1988 and October 17, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court of
San Jose City are REINSTATED.
 Torres reported the robbery to the police authorities and the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On July 25, 1988,
Madaraog (Torres’ maid) and Quintal (neighboring maid) described
the physical features of the four (4) robbers before the NBI
cartographer. On August 30, 1988, petitioner was arrested by the
NBI agents. The next day, at the NBI headquarters, he was pointed
to by Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses as one of the
perpetrators of the crimes at bench. Throughout cross-examination
petitioner testified that during line-up at the NBI, the reason why he
was testified and pointed as one of the robbers is that an NBI agent
pointed at him before the witnesses did. The trial court in a Joint
Decision convicted petitioner of the crimes charged. The respondent
Court of Appeals gave no credence to the exculpatory allegations of
petitioner and affirmed in toto the assailed Decisions. Petitioner's
Sheraton v. Quijano (pending) Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence,
ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner, this petition.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Issue:
G.R. No. 113779-80 February 23, 1995 WON the court should appreciate the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, especially the identification of the accused.
Facts:
Petitioner Alvin Tuason y Ochoa, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Ruling: No.
Richard Doe were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Ratio: Time and again, this Court has held that evidence to be
Quezon City with Robbery for robbing the vault and other valuable believed, must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible
items in the house CIPRIANA F. TORRES (Article 294, paragraph witness but the same must be credible in itself. The trial court and
5 of the Revised penal Code) and Carnapping (republic Act No.
respondent appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of
6539) for carnapping the latter’s car which the former used for
escaping. Of the four (4) accused, only petitioner was apprehended. prosecution witness Madaraog that from her vantage position near
The other three (3) are still at-large. Upon arraignment, petitioner the door of the bedroom she clearly saw how petitioner allegedly
pleaded not guilty to both charges and was tried. participated in the robbery. After a careful review of the evidence,
we find that the identification of petitioner made by Madaraog
and Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve as a basis for beginning the crop-year 1983 dry season up to the filing of the
conviction of petitioner. complaint.

The trial court cannot convict petitioner on the basis of a Private respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint
deduction that is irrational because it is not derived from an and claimed that until 1983 their sharing system was on a 50-50
established fact. The records do not show any fact from which the basis; that his share in the crop year 1983 dry season was still with
petitioner Natividad Candido who likewise retained his water pump.
trial court can logically deduce the conclusion that petitioner
He denied any provisional rental allegedly fixed by the Ministry of
covered up his scar with black coloring to make it appear as a mole. Agrarian Reform and at the same time maintained that only a
Such an illogical reasoning cannot constitute evidence of guilt proposal for 13 cavans for the rainy season crop and 25% of the net
beyond reasonable doubt. harvest during the dry season was put forward. He claimed that he
paid his rentals by depositing thirteen 13 cavans of palay for the
1984 rainy season crop, 13 cavans for 1985 and 8 cavans
representing 25% of the dry season harvest.

After finding that no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove

the provisional rental alleged by petitioners, RTC dismissed. The
counterclaim of respondent Dabu was likewise dismissed after it
was established that the tenancy relationship prevailing between
the parties was on a 50-50 basis.
Rumbaua v. CA
G.R. No. 107493 CA affirmed, ruling: “We have carefully examined the testimonial
February 1, 1996 and documentary evidence on record and found nothing therein
about the so-called provisional rates supposedly fixed by the DAR
FACTS: Petitioners Natividad Candido and Victoria Rumbaua are and allegedly breached by appellee. Indeed neither appellant herself
co-owners of a first-class irrigated Riceland in Bataan. Respondent Natividad C. Candido nor appellants other witness Benjamin Santos
Sofronio Dabu served as their agricultural tenant. On 21 July 1986 ever mentioned in the course of their respective testimonies the
petitioners lodged a complaint with the RTC of Bataan against alleged provisional rates fixed by the DAR. For sure, going by
respondent Dabu for termination of tenancy relationship and appellant’s evidence it would appear that no such rates were in fact
recovery of the provisional rental of 26 and 29 sacks of palay for the fixed by the DAR.”
rainy and dry seasons, respectively, which respondent failed to pay
The appellate court also found that no evidence was introduced to will be deprived of his chance to examine the document and
prove the expenses incurred by the parties for planting and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty
harvesting hence the amount of the net harvest was never reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below.
determined. Only the transfer certificate of title of the property and The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the
its corresponding tax declaration were offered in evidence. inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the
records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s verified complaint and the affidavit documents not offered at the hearing of the case.
presented by petitioners to the DAR are proofs of the provisional
rentals fixed by it Petitioners would insist that we take judicial notice of the affidavit
of petitioner Natividad C. Candido despite absence of any formal
HELD: NO. It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence offer during the proceedings in the trial court. This is futile since this
that which has been formally offered. The affidavit of petitioner is not among the matters which the law mandatorily requires to be
Natividad Candido mentioning the provisional rate of rentals taken judicial notice of; neither can we consider it of public
was never formally offered; neither the alleged certification by knowledge, or capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. Not having been formally be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
offered, the affidavit and certification cannot be considered as
evidence. Thus the trial court as well as the appellate court correctly The testimony of petitioner Natividad Candido cannot even be relied
disregarded them. If they neglected to offer those documents in upon, to say the least. Quite interestingly, she could not even recall
evidence, however vital they may be, petitioners only have when private respondent first failed to pay his rent, if indeed there
themselves to blame, not respondent who was not even given a was any failure on his part to comply with his obligation. She only
chance to object as the documents were never offered in evidence. said that it was sometime in 1982 or 1983, and did not even know
precisely how many cavans of palay were being harvested per crop-
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is year.
simply marked for identification; it must be formally offered, and
the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross- Petitioners definitely failed to establish their cause of action. They
examine the witness called upon to prove or ide never proved that respondent Dabu failed to pay his rentals starting
1982. Neither were they able to competently confirm the provisional
A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their rate of rentals allegedly fixed by the team of the Ministry of
findings of fact and judgment only and strictly upon the evidence Agrarian Reform.
offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any
document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as
evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party
 Epifanio Cabales and his friends Simplicio Garong, Benjamin Alico
and Jose Dayola were drinking tuba in the evening of August 14,
1993 at the side of the auditorium in the middle of Barangay Tigbao,
Matalom, Leyte when he was approached from behind and shot at
the right side of the head with a .38 (paltik) revolver. He fell down
on the ground face up. As he lay thus, his assailant fired a second
shot which hit him at the right side of his upper lip. Thereafter, the
malefactor walked away and then fired a third shot in the air.

The accused was charged with murder and upon arraignment,

accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. The case then proceeded to trial after which the court a quo
rendered judgment against the accused.

Accused appeal the decision because the lower court did not give
course to his defense.

Accused-appellants defense is alibi. In insisting on his innocence, he

claims that: 1.] the testimony of prosecution witness Felix Timkang
which is the only one material from among the testimonial evidence
presented, is not corroborated by any witness; 2.] the autopsy report
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. which is a machine copy of the original should not be admitted in
PACIFICO BARELLANO @ Junior, accused-appellant. evidence despite the admission of said document by accused-
appellants counsel during trial; 3.] Jose Dayola was not presented as
G.R. No. 121204. December 2, 1999 a witness, neither did he execute an affidavit regarding the shooting
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: incident; and 4.] the trial court dwelt on the weakness of accused-
appellants defense rather than on the weakness of the prosecution
Facts: evidence.
Accused also brought up the issue that the autopsy was a mere evidentiary value because he never objected to its admissibility
Xerox copy hence cannot be admitted as evidence. when it was offered in evidence and was, in fact, admitted to be
genuine by his counsel during trial. The rule is that evidence not
Issue: objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by
Whether the autopsy was invalid for being a mere Xerox copy? the court in arriving at its judgment. Particularly instructive on this
point is Quebral v. Court of Appeals,[51] where the Court said that:
Ruling:
Even if it were true that Exhibit K consisted of a mere photocopy
It is Valid, question should have been brought up during the formal and not the original of the petitioners letter, petitioner nevertheless
offer of evidence. failed to make a timely objection thereto. As to when an objection
to a document must be made, the Court ruled in Interpacific Transit,
Ratio
Inc. v. Aviles:[52]
The argument that the xerox copy of the autopsy report should not
Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the
be admitted in evidence inspite of his counsels admission of its
time it is formally offered, not earlier. The identification of the
authenticity will not extricate accused-appellant from his
document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute
predicament. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the document
the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party
is indeed inadmissible in evidence and is not given any evidentiary
presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the
weight, still it would not alter the judgment of conviction because
document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it
accused-appellant was found guilty primarily on the basis of the
is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the
testimonies of the eyewitnesses who positively identified him as
objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an
the perpetrator of the crime. The fact of death was sufficiently
exhibit.
established through the credible and straightforward testimonies of
these eyewitnesses who saw the victim die as a result of the gunshot In the case at bench, no such timely objection was ever made.
wounds inflicted by accused-appellant. Consequently, the evidence not objected to became the property of
the case, and all the parties to the case are considered amenable to
any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. x x
At any rate, it is a trifle too late at this time for accused-appellant to x
raise the question of the autopsy reports supposed lack of
Accused-appellant can not likewise seek refuge behind the claim
that the failure of the prosecution to present Jose Dayola as a
witness raises the presumption that if produced his testimony would
not be favorable to the prosecution, As pointed out by the Court in
the recent case of People v. Jose Silvestre y Cruz :

Appellant cannot fault the prosecution for failure to present

Bernadette Matias. The prosecution has [the] discretion to decide on
who to call as witness during trial and its failure to do so did not
give rise to the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced[54] since the evidence was at the
disposal of both parties.[55] If the defense believed that the
testimony of Bernadette Matias was important to its case, it should
have insisted on presenting her as witness, or as appellee points out,
made a tender of excluded evidence of the witness in question under
Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The same may be said of
Joanna Santiago, another supposed witness to the shooting, who was
also not presented.

Furthermore, it must be pointed out that Dayolas testimony would

merely be corroborative of that of the two eyewitnesses. Suffice it to
state in this regard that the adverse evidentiary presumption invoked
by accused-appellant does not apply when testimony of the witness
not produced would only be corroborative.[56] In other words, no
prejudicial inference can arise against a party who fails to call a
witness where the only object of presenting him would be to
produce corroborative or cumulative evidence.
 birthday of his daughter, Grace. At around 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, Hilario Miranda and his companions headed home to
Barangay Villanueva, Bautista, Pangasinan. When the group
reached the provincial road at Barangay Villanueva, appellant
Sanchez blocked the middle of the road while the other appellants
Jose, Contawe, Abayan, Robiños, and Callo were some twenty (20)
to twenty-five (25) meters behind him. Contawe, Robiños, and
Callo were holding their bolos; Jose had his bolo sheathed on his
shoulder, while Abayan was holding two (2) fist-size stones. 5
Appellant Sanchez confronted Hilario Miranda about his accusation
that Sanchez was stealing ipil-ipil wood and fish. 6 Thereafter, an
argument ensued.

Of the six (6) accused, only four (4) were initially arrested
and brought to trial, namely Rodrigo Abayan, Gaudencio Contawe,
Federico Robiños, and Remegio Jose. Accused Basilio Callo
eluded arrest and remains at-large up to present. Before
promulgation of sentence, appellant Cesario Sanchez was arrested
on March 26, 1991. The trial court suspended promulgation of
sentence pending trial of appellant Cesario Sanchez.
Upon arraignment, the four (4) appellants Abayan, Contawe,
Robiños and Jose, duly assisted by respective counsels, entered a
plea of "not guilty." Appellant Sanchez later entered a plea of "not
People v. Sanchez (308 SCRA 264) guilty." During trial, the prosecution presented six (6) witnesses:
(1) Dr. Nestor C. Pascual, Municipal Health Officer of Bautista,
Nature of the case: Appeal Pangasinan; (2) Cpl. Abdiel Agustin of the INP of Bautista,
Pangasinan; (3) Freddie C. Miranda, the victim’s son; (4) Romulo
Facts: T. Marquez; (5) Jessie C. Pajimola; and (6) Mrs. Rufina C.
Miranda, the victim’s widow.
On November 23, 1986, Hilario Miranda, together with Rene
Alegre, Jessie Pajimola, Romulo Marquez, Freddie Miranda, Eladio On the other hand, the defense presented Alberto Parcasio and
Miranda and several others, went to his fishpond to celebrate the Pedro Soriano as common witnesses. The four (4) appellants,
Abayan, Robiños, Contawe and Jose testified on their behalf, while Issues:
appellant Sanchez likewise took the stand on his behalf.cralawnad
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the
On March 26, 1991, appellant Sanchez was arrested by the police. testimony of prosecution witnesses Romulo Marquez, Freddie
Trial as to him commenced, and he called prosecution witness Dr. Miranda and Jessie Pajimola.
Nestor Pascual and defense witness Alberto Parcasio as his
witnesses, who reiterated their earlier testimonies. Appellant Second, even assuming that these witnesses are credible, whether
Sanchez, testifying on his behalf, admitted that he stabbed Miranda, or not the trial court erred in considering their testimonies as these
but claimed that it was in self-defense. He testified that while he were not offered in the manner required by the Rules of Court.
was on his way to Obillo to thresh palay, he was met by the victim
and his companions who were drunk. The victim commanded his Ruling w/ Ratio:
companions to maul him because he (Sanchez) voted for Cory
(Aquino) in the last presidential elections. He tried to evade them Appellants Jose and Contawe contend that the uniformity of
but somebody met him and the victim’s group surrounded him. 35 the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Romulo T. Marquez
The victim boxed him three times and ordered his (the victim’s) and Freddie C. Miranda indicate that their testimonies were coached
son to get the gun. It was then that he turned around and stabbed and should be disbelieved. On the contrary, however, we find the
the victim with his bolo. 36 He then ran away and spent the night in testimonies of these witnesses straightforward, credible, and replete
the ricefields. 37 He claimed that he did not see any of his co- with details of the commission of the crime, as shown in several
accused at the locus criminis. sketches of the respective positions of the assailants at the time of
the incident. 40 These witnesses never wavered in the face of
Procedural (Court Decision) rigorous cross-examination by the respective counsels of the
appellants. Furthermore, the material points in their testimonies,
Lower Court: particularly the identities of the assailants, were corroborated by the
testimony of prosecution witness Jessie Pajimola.
On September 29, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision
39 finding all appellants, except Callo who remains at-large, guilty Appellants contend that the testimonies of the prosecution
of Murder. witnesses were not formally offered as required by the Rules, and
therefore should not have been considered by the trial court. Indeed,
CA Decision:
a perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes will show that no
CA affirmed the judgement appealed from. formal offer of testimonial evidence was made prior to or after the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. However, the transcripts
also reveal that in spite of the lack of formal offer of the testimonial that his testimony was not formally offered, its presentation was not
evidence, appellants failed to object to the presentation of such objected to either. Section 36 of the aforementioned Rule requires
evidence, and even subjected the prosecution witnesses to a rigorous that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness
cross-examination. should be made as soon as the grounds therefore shall become
reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of
"Indeed, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the
requires that for evidence to be considered, it should be formally first time on appeal will not be considered. (Asombra v. Dorado, 36
offered and the purpose specified. This is necessary because a judge Phil. 883)." (Emphasis supplied)
has to rest his findings of fact and his judgment only upon the
evidence formally offered by the parties at the trial. (People v. Thus, the failure of the defense to interpose a timely objection to the
Pecardal, G.R. No. 71381 [1986]). presentation of the prosecution’s testimonial evidence results in the
waiver of any objection to the admissibility thereof. Appellants’
Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the said rule belated invocation of the strict interpretation of the Rules of
which became effective on July 1, 1989, the offer of the testimony Evidence to suit their purposes is clearly misplaced.
of a witness must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.
The previous practice was to offer the testimonial evidence at the
end of the trial after all the witnesses had testified. With the
invocation, the court is put on notice whether the witness to be
presented is a material witness and should be heard, or a witness
who would be testifying on irrelevant matter or on facts already
testified to by other witnesses and should therefore, be stopped from
testifying further.

In the case at bar, we note that Pastor Valdez was not one of the
witnesses originally intended to be presented by the prosecution. He
was merely called to the witness stand at the latter part of the
presentation of the prosecution’s evidence. There was no mention
why his testimony was being presented. However, notwithstanding
 Dunkin' Donut and the heirs of Aurelio Cuya, in the amounts of
P12,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively. Contending "that the trial
court erred in convicting x x x him x x x [based] on evidence
illegally obtained,"[4] appellant now interposes this appeal. For its
part, the Solicitor General recommended appellant's acquittal on the
ground that "his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt."[5]
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Factual antecedents:

On August 9, 1991 at around 6:45 a.m., Angelo Tongko, then an

employee of Dunkin Donut located at Quintin Paredes [Street],
Binondo, Manila, discovered the lifeless body of Aurelio Cuya, a
security guard of the said establishment (tsn, Nov. 19, 1991, pp. 2-
3). Upon discovery of the lifeless body, Tongko informed his co-
workers, (ibid, p. 3) who then reported the matter to the police (ibid.
p, 3).

Upon investigation by the police, the branch supervisor of Dunkin

Donut informed the police that the total sales of the establishment on
August 8, 1991 in the amount of P10,000.00 and which was
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. allegedly kept in the safety locker in the same place where the dead
JULITO FRANCO y TIANSON, accused-appellant. body was found, was missing (ibid, p., 7, Exh. K). The supervisor of
the security agency where the victim was employed also informed
DECISION the police that he suspected the appellant as the culprit (ibid, p. 15,
Exh. K). Acting on this allegation by the supervisor, the police
FRANCISCO, J.: proceeded to the place of appellant and were able to interview
Maribel Diong ("Diong") and Hilda Dolera ("Dolera") (ibid, p. 15;
Appellant JULITO FRANCO y TIANSON was charged Exh. L). The police then tried to convince Diong and Dolera, who
with  and convicted[2] of the crime of robbery with homicide.[3] He
[1]
allegedly told the police that appellant allegedly confessed to them
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and directed to indemnify that he killed somebody in the evening of August 8, 1991 (ibid).
Diong and Dolera were not presented in court to substantiate their The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
affidavits. formally offered.[12] So fundamental is this injunction that litigants
alike are corollarily enjoined to formally offer any evidence which
On August 10, 1991, appellant was apprehended by the police in they desire the court to consider.[13] Mr. Chief Justice Moran
front of Jollibee Restaurant in Caloocan City .Thereafter, appellant explained the rationale behind the rule in this wise:
was brought to the police headquarters where his confession (Exh.
N) was taken on August 12, 1991 allegedly on his freewill and with x x x "the offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest
the assistance of a lawyer his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties to the suit."[14]
The trial court convicted the appellant on the basis principally
of his alleged extra-judicial confession.[8] This is evident from the It cannot be argued either that since the extra-judicial
assailed decision which even quoted the pertinent portions of the confession has been identified and marked as Exhibit "N" by the
aforementioned extra-judicial confession.[9]  prosecution in the course of the cross-examination of the appellant,
[15]
 then it may now be validly considered by the trial court.
Indeed, there is a significant distinction between identification
Issue:
of documentary evidence and its formal offer.[16] The former is done
in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the
evidence as an exhibit, while the latter is done only when the party
Whether or not Franco’s extrajudicial confession is sufficient rests its case. Our settled rule incidentally is that the mere fact that a
to convict him of the crime of robbery with homicide particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not
mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence
of a party.[17]
Ruling:
From the records, it appears that not a single person witnessed
NO. The SC disapproved the trial court's undue consideration the incident. In fact, aside from the testimony of police investigator
and reliance on this extra-judicial confession for, as the records Pat. Nestor Napao-it, none of the other three prosecution
reveal, the same was not offered in evidence by the prosecution. witnesses, to wit:
[10]
 Neither were its contents recited by the appellant in his
testimony.[11] It was a grave error for the trial court, therefore, to (1) Angelo Tongko a Dunkin' Donut employee who testified to
have considered the same, let alone be the basis of appellant's have found the body of Aurelio Cuya inside the supervisor's room of
conviction. the establishment in the early morning of August 9, 1991,[18] 
 (2) Dr. Marcial Cenido the physician who autopsied the body of prison is ordered unless he is being held on other legal grounds. No
Aurelio Cuya, and who testified on the cause of the latter's death; costs.
[19]
 and
(3) Teresita Cuya the wife of Aurelio Cuya who testified on the
civil aspect of the case,[20] 
ever imputed, directly or indirectly, to the appellant the
commission of the crime.
With respect to the testimony of Pat. Nestor Napao-it, [21] there is
no dispute that his testimony on the conduct of the investigation is
admissible in evidence because he has personal knowledge of the
same.[22] However, his testimony on appellant's alleged separate
confession/admission to Hilda Dolera and Maribel Diong, which the
trial court invariably considered in its decision as establishing the
truth of the facts asserted therein, is hearsay
Anent the issue of admissibility of Exhibits "F"[25] and
"G"[26] original and additional sworn statements of Maribel Diong,
and Exhibits "H"[27] and "I"[28] original and additional sworn
statements of Hilda Dolera, it assumes significance to note that their
admission in evidence has been seasonably objected to by the
appellant on the ground that they are hearsay .Without Maribel
Diong and Hilda Dolera being called to the witness stand to affirm
the contents of their sworn statements, the allegations therein are
necessarily hearsay[33] and therefore inadmissible.
.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 33, convicting the appellant of the crime of robbery
with homicide is REVERSED. Appellant JULITO FRANCO y
TIANSON is hereby ACQUITTED and his immediate release from
 This petition seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision
affirming the earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 150 in Civil Case No. 7889 dismissing petitioner Philippine
Bank of Communications' (PBCOM) complaint for annulment of a
Deed of Exchange executed by respondent Joseph L.G. Chua in
favor of Jaleco Development, Inc. (JALECO).

FACTS:

Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. executed a Surety Agreements in favor

of PBCOM with defendant-appellee Joseph L.G. Chua, as one of the
sureties.

Likewise, Forte Merchant Finance, Inc., executed a Surety

Agreement in favor of PBCOM with Joseph L.G. Chua as one of the
sureties.

Chua executed a Deed of Exchange transferring a parcel of land

with improvements thereon covered by TCT No. S-52808 (343721)
to JALECO Development, Inc., in exchange for 12,000 shares of
said Corporation. As a result, TCT No. 126573 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal covering the aforementioned parcel of land was
issued in the name of JALECO Development, Inc.
Chua sold 6,000 shares of JALECO Development, Inc., to Mr. Chua
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner, vs. Tiong King and another 6,000 shares to Guillermo Jose, Jr.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEPH L.G. CHUA and JALECO
DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondents. In the meanwhile, for failure of both Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc.
and Forte Merchant Finance, Inc. to meet their respective financial
G.R. No. 92067             March 22, 1991 obligations with PBCOM, the latter filed Civil Case No. 84-25159
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: against Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc., Joseph L. G. Chua, et al and
Civil Case No. 84-25160 against Forte Merchant Finance, Inc.,
Joseph L. G. Chua, et al. both for Sum of Money with Writ of
Preliminary Attachment where PBCOM was able to obtain a notice Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower
of levy on the properties of Fortune Motors (Phils.) When plaintiff court took into consideration the documents attached to the
was able to locate Chua's former property situated in Dasmariñas, complaint as a part thereof, without having been expressly
Makati, Metro Manila, covered by TCT No. S-52808 which was introduced in evidence, This was no error. In the answer of the
already transferred to JALECO Development, Inc., PBCOM filed defendants, there was no denial under oath of the authenticity of
Civil Case No. 7889 for annulment of Deed of Exchange. these documents. Under section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the authenticity and due execution of these documents must, in that
RTC dismissed the case. CA affirmed the decision. case, be deemed admitted. The effect of this is to relieve the plaintiff
from the duty of expressly presenting such documents as evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Exchange should be admitted The court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should
consider, without the introduction of evidence, the facts admitted by
HELD: the parties. (at p. 532)

Yes. For its part, JALECO stated in its Answer:

x x x           x x x          x x x
Chua's admission of the existence of the Deed of Exchange, attached 2. That it has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
to the "Petition as Annex "F" falls squarely within the scope of belief as to the truth of the allegation contained in pars. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
Judicial Admissions under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Petitioner; (Emphasis supplied)
Court. The rule provides:
Paragraph 12 refers to the deed of exchange in the petition.
Judicial Admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceeding in the same case, does not The Deed of Exchange was attached to the petition. Necessarily,
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing JALECO's contention that it has no knowledge or information
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the deed of exchange
was made. becomes an invalid or ineffective denial pursuant to the Rules of
Court. Under the circumstances, the petitioner could have easily
As early as 1925 in the case of Asia Banking Corporation v. Walter asserted whether or not it executed the deed of exchange.
E. Olsen & Co. (48 Phil. 529), we have ruled that documents
attached to the complaint are considered a part thereof and may be Considering the admission by Chua and the non-denial by JALECO
considered as evidence although they were not introduced as such. of the document forming part of the petition, the appellate court
We said: committed reversible error in not admitting the deed of exchange as
evidence.
 The evidence on record also shows that despite the "sale" of the
One other point. Dasmariñas property, respondent Chua continued to stay in the said
property.
The trial court disregarded the ex-parte evidence adduced by the
petitioner against JALECO when the latter was declared in default The well-settled principle is that a corporation "is invested by law
on the ground that the ex-parte proceedings were conducted by the with a separate personality, separate and distinct from that of the
Deputy Clerk of Court which is not allowed in accordance with the person composing it as well as from any other legal entity to which
ruling in the case of Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete (66 SCRA 425 it may be related." However, the separate personality of the
[1975]). That ruling has already been overruled in the later case of corporation may be disregarded, or the veil of corporate fiction
Gochangco vs. CFI of Negros Occidental. pierced when the corporation is used "as a cloak or cover for fraud
or illegality, or to work an injustice, or where necessary to achieve
Consequently, there is no legal impediment to the admissibility of equity or when necessary for the protection of creditors."
the evidence presented by the petitioner against JALECO.
In the instant case, the evidence clearly shows that Chua and his
These findings pave the way to the resolution of the case on its immediate family control JALECO. The Deed of Exchange
merits. executed by Chua and JALECO had for its subject matter the sale of
the only property of Chua at the time when Chua's financial
Upon investigation with the Securities and Exchange Commission obligations became due and demandable. The records also show that
(SEC), the petitioner gathered the following facts based on the SEC despite the "sale", respondent Chua continued to stay in the
records: a) JALECO was organized on November 2, 1982 with a property, subject matter of the Deed of Exchange.
capital stock of P5,000,000.00; b) the stockholders of said
corporation were mostly members of the immediate family of These circumstances tend to show that the Deed of Exchange was
Joseph L. G. Chua; c) on April 4, 1983, a Board Resolution was not what it purports to be. Instead, they tend to show that the Deed
passed authorizing the issuance of 12,000 shares of stocks worth of Exchange was executed with the sole intention to defraud Chua's
Pl,200,000.00 to a new subscriber and non-stockholder Joseph L. G. creditor—the petitioner.
Chua; and d) prior to the acquisition by the corporation of the
property located at Dasmariñas Village, Makati, the percentage of DISPOSITIVE:
the shareholding of the members of the family of Joseph L. G. Chua
was 88% while after the acquisition of the property and the issuance WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, The questioned
of the shares to Chua, they owned 94% of the corporation. decision dated February 8, 1990 of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Deed of Exchange executed by
and between Joseph L. G. Chua and JALECO Development, Inc.,
and the title issued in the name of JALECO on the basis thereof are Facts: Petitioner alleged that respondents are the owners of an
declared NULL and VOID. Costs against the private respondents. undivided one-half portion of a parcel of land with an area of about
89.35 square meters located
in Limay Street, Manuguit Subdivision, Tondo, Manila, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title.  Respondent Domingo
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
authorizing Elpidio Domingo to sell one-half portion of said parcel
of land; that Elpidio, acting pursuant to the provisions of the SPA
sold, with a right to repurchase within five months, one-half of the
land covered by TCT and that respondent Domingo failed to redeem
or repurchase the disputed land within the five-month period
provided for under the Deed of Sale Under Pacto  de Retro,  thus,
ownership over the subject land was consolidated in petitioner.

Respondent Domingo filed an Answer to the Petition alleging that

the SPA was executed for the purpose of enabling Elpidio to secure
a loan of P150,000.00 by using Domingos share in the land covered
by TCT as security. The proceeds of the loan was supposed to be
used for the construction of a duplex residential house to be
supervised by Elpidio. However, Elpidio obtained a loan
of P350,000.00 and used a substantial portion thereof for his
personal advantage and benefit. As Elpidio had exceeded his
authority, Domingo claimed that he revoked the SPA through
several letters and by a formal notice of revocation sent by his
counsel. As for the pacto  de retro sale, Domingo maintains that the
same was simulated as Elpidio had already obtained a loan
totaling P350,000.00 from petitioner as evidenced by a Real Estate
Mortgage executed by the two of them. In any case, he claims that
ANATALIA B. RAMOS, Petitioner vs SPOUSES DOMINGO A. the pacto de retro sale should be treated as an equitable mortgage
DIZON and EDNA MEDINA DIZON, Respondents which cannot be enforced through a petition for consolidation of
ownership.
During the trial of the case, petitioner herself took the witness stand amount. Respondent Domingo then suggested that Elpidio secure a
and testified that on 10 August 1988, Elpidio sold to her, with a loan from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in
right to repurchase, one-half of a parcel of land located order to complete the construction of the two-door
in Limay, Tondo, Manila, which was owned by respondent apartment. Adopting respondent Domingos
Domingo. According to her, Elpidio was then authorized by a SPA suggestion, Elpidio secured a loan from petitioner in the initial
executed by respondent Domingo to enter into said transaction with amount of P150,000.00 evidenced by a promissory note dated 17
her. It was agreed upon that the owner (referring to respondent April 1988 and marked as Exhibit 1 for respondent Domingo. In
Domingo) had five months within which he could buy back the order to secure this loan, petitioner and Elpidio agreed to execute a
property from her. Respondent Domingo, however, failed to real estate mortgage over the land embraced by TCT No. 172510.
exercise his right forcing her to institute the Petition for The real estate mortgage was marked as Exhibit 3.Subsequently, the
consolidation of ownership before the court a quo. all of which were amount of the loan extended by petitioner was increased
admitted by the trial court. With this, petitioner rested her case. to P350,000.00 as shown by Exhibit 3-A a document entitled
Increase in the Loan Value of Real Estate Mortgage dated April 24,
  1988. Elpidio likewise admitted before the court that the amount
of P350,000.00 appearing in the pacto  de retro  sale dated 10 August
Petitioner presented Elpidio as her second witness and he essentially 1988 was the same sum of money he earlier received from petitioner
reiterated what petitioner had stated in her testimony. After the for which the promissory note and Real Estate Mortgage with its
conclusion of Elpidios testimony, petitioner offered into evidence subsequent increase in loan value were executed.
Exhibits A, B, and C  
It was also revealed during Elpidios cross-examination that
In the same hearing, Elpidio was subjected to cross-examination respondent Domingo had previously filed a case for specific
during which he declared that he owns the two-door residential performance and/or rescission against him. The subject matter of
apartment built on respondent Domingos share in the land covered said action was the purported contract of sale between respondent
by TCT No. 172510. The apartment building, however, encroaches Domingo and Elpidio involving the same apartment building and a
upon the other half portion of the said land which is owned portion of Ricardos land.
by Elpidios brother, Ricardo Dizon. Sometime in March 1988, he
offered to sell to respondent Domingo, for  Respondent Domingos counsel was given ten days to submit his
P550,000.00, the partially built two-door structure, as well as formal offer of evidence in writing and petitioner was given the
Ricardos portion of the land on which a part of said building same period of time to file her comment or opposition thereto after
stood. Respondent Domingo agreed to Elpidios proposal such that which the case would be submitted for resolution. It was only on 31
he remitted to the latter the amount of P207,000.00. Later, he tried January 1995 when respondent Domingo filed his Formal Offer of
to collect from respondent Domingo the remainder of the purchase Exhibits.
The trial court, however, prior to the submission of respondent  
Domingos formal offer of evidence, rendered a Decision dated 24 The case of Vda. De  Oate, which was relied upon by the Court of
January 1995 holding that the contract between petitioner Appeals, reiterated our previous rulings in People v. Napat-
and Elpidio was actually one of equitable mortgage and not a and People v. Mate relative to the admission and consideration of
a pacto  de retro sale. exhibits which were not formally offered during the trial. We
declared in Vda. De Oate that:
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence were not formally offered.  
YES From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for
evidence to be considered, the same must be formally
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS: Petitioner argues that it is
offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular
axiomatic that the court shall not consider evidence which has not
document to identified and marked as an exhibit does
been formally offered. In this regard, they argue that Exhibits 1 to 7,
not mean that is has already been offered as part of
inclusive of sub-markings, should not have been considered by the
the evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc.
trial court in its Decision considering that the same were not
v. Aviles we had the occasion to make a distinction
formally offered in evidence.
between identification of documentary evidence and
Petitioner also assails the Court of Appeals for its alleged improper its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is
application of rule enunciated in Vda. De Oate, as the requirements done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by
laid out in said case, relative to the admission of evidence which was the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the
not formally offered, were not observed in the present second is done only when the party rests its case and
case. Petitioner insists she was deprived of due process as she no not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally
opportunity to file her objection to or comment on respondent offer his evidence if he believes that it will advance
Domingos exhibits. Moreover, she was denied the occasion to cross his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he
examine the witness regarding their exhibits. chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not
authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
RULING: The applicable provision of the Rules of Court on this  
matter is Sec. 34, Rule 132. It reads: However, in People v. Napat-a citing People v.
Mate we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
  evidence not formally offered to be admitted and
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider considered by the trial court provided the following
no evidence which has not been formally requirements are present, viz: first, the same must
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded
offered must be specified.
 
 and, second, the same must have been incorporated in
the records of the case. (Underscoring supplied.)
 
 
In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been
satisfied. The exhibits in question were presented and marked during
the pre-trial of the case thus, they have been incorporated into the
records.