ELEMENTARY ETHICS

l/ BY
NOAH K. DAVIS, A.M., Ph.D., LL.D.
Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Virginia

AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE AUTHOR'S

ELEMENTS OF ETHICS

Tptcpovrai trdvres oi dvdpwireioi vbpai inrb ewj rod

ddov •
Kpartei yap to<tovtov 6k6(tov idfkei, /ecu e£ap/c&t

iracri ko.1 ireptylverat. — Herakleitos

SILVER, BURDETT & COMPANY

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OCT 6 1900
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Copyright, 1900,

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Typography by C. J. Peters & Son, Boston.

Presswork by Berwick <fc Smith.

 PREFACE

This treatise is intended for readers who feel the need of

a simple, direct and comprehensive theory of morals. Also
it is designed to serve as a handbook in institutions for

higher education, where the subject of ethics is usually

offered to hearers who, though already well advanced in a
course of liberal studies, are presumed to have no acquain-
tance with this branch of philosophy. My experience in
teaching it has led me to give such pupils primarily a
rounded scheme, postponing an examination of the various
and often conflicting views of philosophical moralists. Ac-
cordingly, in this elementary treatise, I have simply pre-

sented my preferred theory, starting from a principle,

proceeding logically in the development of a complete sys-

tem, and indicating cursorily many practical applications.

The preparation has been long and diligent. I have

been in search of truth, glad to receive light from any source,
and have now summed the results of my reading, thinking
and teaching for many years in what is here offered to my
fellow-teachers, hoping it may be suited to their wants, and
aid them in imparting high ideals and shaping noble char-
acters. Naturally I am solicitous that my work should
be well received and approved, but whatever judgment be
iii
iv PREFACE

finally passed upon it, I shall have been conscious of sincere

desire and earnest endeavor to reach and teach sound doc-

trine. This task finished, I shall hardly undertake another,
but rest in the hope that what is now done shall be found
well done, proving a step toward truth in philosophy, and
a help toward righteousness in life.

It has been thought desirable, in order to offer the work

in available forms, that two editions should be simultane-
ously issued under slightly varied titles. The text of the

" Elementary Ethics " is identical with that of the " Ele-

ments of Ethics ;
" but to the latter are added psychological
and philosophical prolegomena, together with a considerable
body of marginal notes. As these additions are not at all

essential to unfolding the theory, they have been omitted

from the present volume, thereby reducing its cost, yet fur-

nishing all that is strictly necessary, and as much as can be

advantageously used in the limited time of many classes of

students. It is recommended that, while the teacher will

supply orally whatever is needed for the elucidation of the

text, the attention of the pupil be directed to the table of

Contents. This is a logical analysis of the entire work, fur-
nishing a title to every section. It will greatly aid the

thoughtful student, both in more clearly apprehending the

specific points, and in grasping the theory as a comprehensive
whole.
NOAH K. DAVIS
University of Virginia
 COJSTTEWTS

FIRST PAET — OBLIGATION

Introduction page
§ 1. Moral law a reality. Ethics defined 1

§ 2. Two methods avoided 2

§ 3. The method adopted in this treatise 3

I. Rights
-§ 4. The claim. Contention for private for public ; 5
§ 5. The task of ethics. A right, how to be treated 6
§ 6. Conscious life a condition and determinant of 6
§ 7. Desires the basis. The ethical principle 7

§ 8. Kinds of rights, reduced to liberty 9

II. Liberty
§ 9. Freedom, the power of choosing, a postulate 11
§ 10. Four constitutional limitations, and corollary 11
§ 11. Freedom absolute. Liberty discriminated 13
§ 12. Objective restrictions of liberty 14
§ 13. Subjective restrictions. Persuasion. Menace 15
§ 14. Warranted restrictions. Unavoidable. Avoidable .... 16

III. Trespass
§ 15. Personal relations determinative of rights 19
§ 16. A right implies possible interference. A wrong 20
§ 17. Modified statement of the moral principle 21
§ 18. Trespass defined. Its wide sense. Limits liberty 22
§ 19. Practical difficulties. Partial clearances 23
§ 20. Property rights. Adjudication of 24
§ 21. The trespass of forced intrusion, of vice, of discourtesy ... 26
§ 22. Personal honor, its offense and defense 27
§ 23. Indirect trespass, its parity. Sin is trespass 29

TV. The Law

§ 24. Its cognitive origin, and
formula its 31
§ 25. Conscience defined. Inerrant. Uneducable 32
§ 26. Imperatives. The moral law categorical . 33
v
yi CONTENTS
PAGE
§ 27. Supremacy of the law. Addressed to the will 34
§ 28. The law objective in origin and character 35
§ 29. Negative form. Deductions. Decalogue. Civil law .... 37
§ 30. This form inadequate. Positive form 39

V. Sanctions
§ 31. Consequences ratify and sanctify the law 41
§ 32. Subjective sanctions. Moral sentiments 42
§ 33. The natural impulse to reward and punish 43
§ 34. The subjective objectified, and proportioned 45
§ 35. Legalized forms Reduction to unity
of. 46
§ 36. Pain a penal ordinance. Not an evil 48

VI. Right and Wrong

§ 37. The meaning and extension of the terms 50
§ 38. Their opposition. Determination of cases 51
§ 39. Moral quality not outside of volition 52
§ 40. Moral quality a property of the intention 54
§ 41. The immediate and the ulterior intention 55
§ 42. Imputation of moral quality to other activities 57
§ 43. The moral paradox 59

VII. Justice
§ 44. The positive demand of the moral law 62
§ 45. Definitions. Injustice and trespass identified 63
§ 46. Corrective and distributive justice 64
§ 47. Legalized justice. Its basis. Its imperfection 65
§ 48. Equity, its jural and its general sense 67
§ 49. Mercy, social, judicial, divine, consists with justice .... 68

VIII. Duty and Virtue

§ 50. Duty, meaning of, positive form of 70
§ 51. Right and duty. Corollaries. Other synonyms 70
§ 52. Virtuous character, how formed. Virtue defined 71
§ 53. The cardinal virtues, summed in justice 72
§ 54. Vice is slavery ; virtue is not liberty 73

IX. Selfishness

§ 55. The conscious ego, and the represented ego 75

§ 56. The so-called love of self, and duty to self 76
§ 57. That there is any such duty denied 77
§ 58. Citation and interpretation of examples 78
§ 59. General characteristics of the doctrine 79
§ 60. Argument in support of. First part 81

§ 61. Second part. Conclusion 82

 CONTENTS Vii

X. Service page
§ 62. Extension of the notion of duty. Service obligatory .... 85
§ 63. Illustrative cases. The law restated 86
§ 64. The dignity of service. Ministry. Heroism 87
§ 65. Distribution of benefits. Participation in. Modified altruism 89
§ 66. The using and serving each other as means 90
§ 67. Stewardship, in holding and using. In defending 91
§ 68. The law of service objectively insufficient 93

XI. Charity
§ 69. Love obligatory. Definition and distinctions 95
§ 70. Affection can be and is commanded 96
§ 71. The variations and extension of the obligation 97
§ 72. The law of loving service. The law of love 98
§ 73. Progress in moral culture. Irregularity of 99
§ 74. The law of love, the law of liberty 101

XII. Welfare
§ 75. Pleasure not the sole content of welfare 103
§ 76. Welfare denned. Its imperfect realization 105
§ 77. Happiness its reflex. Special conditions 107
§ 78. The summum bonum. Ancient doctrines of 109
§ 79. Modern doctrines of. The adopted view 110

XIII. Deity
§ 80. His existence postulated. Schemes without God 113
§ 81. His attributes. Anthropomorphic. The supernatural . . . 114
§ 82. No other ground for complete ethical theory 116
§ 83. Not the will, but the nature of God, ultimate 117
§ 84. Solves obligation. Our's Godward. He to us-ward .... 118

SECOND PART — ORGANIZATION

Transition
§ 85. A brief summary of the foregoing doctrine 121
§ 86. Complex social relations now to be considered 123

I. The Man
§ 87. Is aduplex organism. His corporeal organization .... 125
§ 88. His mental organization. Exemplified in desires 126
§ 89. What, if alone ; or if in society, without affections .... 127
§ 90. A solitary unreal. Man hardly without affections 130
§ 91. Ethical elements discoverable in personal relations only . . . 131
vm CONTENTS
{

II. The Family page

§ 92. Variety in obligations due to variety in relations 133
§ 93. Natural order determines the family 134
§ 94. The ideal family. Karely realized 135.
§ 95. Its organic order to be upheld. Kestored 135
§ 96. Marriage. Five prerequisites considered 136
§ 97. Its dissolution. Legal divorce ; limitation of 138
§ 98. Unmarried members of society. Their disadvantage . . . 139
§ 99. Family members, mutual influence and obligation of . . . 139
§100. Individuality and personality of the family 140
§101. Its extended life and obligations 141
§102. Family property, its ownership and management 142
§103. Testamentary disposition of. By consent 143

III. The Community

104. A product of pressure. An organism 145
105. Obligation of intercourse. Seclusion condemned 146
106. The common law of social decorum 147
107. Truthfulness a condition. Deception 147
108. Promises. Contracts. Common honesty 149
109. Minor organisms subordinate to thewhole 150
110. Division of labor. Its organic and moral effects 151
111. Capital and labor. Socialism. A preference 153

TV. The State

112. Its purpose. Its content. Limits of this discussion . 155
113. Forms of government. Its three essential branches . 156
114. The State an organism. Its ethical character . . . 157
115. Its basis the family. Other organic members . . . 159
116. Its individuality and personality wherein manifest . 160
117. Diversity of obligations. Civic virtue, patriotism 161
118. Ground of punishment. Eight and duty of defense . 162
119. The defense of its members and of itself against trespass 163
120. The right to punish is in this defense. Discipline 165
121. Of rebellion, and revolution and of defensive war
; . 166
122. The relations of States. A universal State .... 167

V. The Church
§ 123. Keligion, its definition and division 170
§ 124. Subject, in all its forms, to ethical principles 171
§ 125. The Christian Church, incorporating general ethics .... 173
§ 126. Its riseand resistless progress 174
§ 127. Elements of its power. Philosophy of its history 175
§ 128. Its union with the State. Opposed functions 176
§ 129. The Church Universal. Its ethical essence 178
 ELEMENTARY ETHICS
FIKST PABT- OBLIGATION
INTRODUCTION
§ In looking on the world around and above us, we
1.

discover, amid an infinite variety of ceaseless changes, a cer-

tain uniformity established, which, reduced to comprehensive
expression, is termed the law of gravity. In looking on the
world within us, we discover, amid its incessant changes, a
certain uniformity enjoined, which, reduced to comprehen-
sive expression, is termed the law of morality. The law of
gravity represents something real, a fixed corporeal order,
with which we have to do in every waking moment of active
life,and to which we must constantly adjust the movements
of our bodies. The law of morality also represents some-
thing equally real, a required spiritual order, with which we
constantly have to do, a universal mandate overruling all
relations between man and man, to which must be adjusted
every voluntary action and proposed line of conduct. The
reality of moral law as an inflexible factor in human life, in-
volved in the essential constitution of human nature, is a
scientific truth, as undeniable as the law of gravitation, and
one whose importance surpasses comparison.
Science has been well denned to be a complement of cogni-
tions, having, in point of form, the character of logical per-
fection; in point of matter, the character of real truth.
More briefly, science is systematized knowledge. There are
1
2 OBLIGATION

a number of sciences which may be distinguished as sciences

of human nature, Ethics being the
chief. Pre-supposing
and involving more or less knowledge of the others, it as-
sumes a basis, develops a system, and elaborates principles
and rules for the conduct of men individually and collec-
tively. In view of its basis, Ethics is the science of rights ?

in view of its system, Ethics is the science of obligation.

§ 2. The hypothesis of evolution has been applied to the

explanation of ethical phenomena. Evolution, as a doctrine,
is concerned with sequence in the form of a series, without a

beginning and without an end. It can neither ascertain the

primal origin of the series, nor predict its ultimate issue.
Only a small section of the series is accessible to observation,
yet it is boldly projected into a prehistoric past, and upon
this hypothetical history is founded an explanation of present
phenomena. The speculation is pleasing but hazardous. It
inquires how morality has come to be, assuming an origin in
some heterogeneous principle transmuted under the influence
of environment. But we are rather concerned to know what
morality is, and purpose to study its phenomena as manifest
in mankind of to-day and of history. Inquiry into its genesis
and prehistoric development may well be postponed until at
least we have a firm hold upon the thing itself.
There are many moralists who educe their ethical systems
from the Scriptures. No doubt the light of revelation has
enabled the Christian philosopher to advance far beyond the
conceptions of the heathen world; his higher height has
given him a greatly enlarged horizon. But a science may
not borrow its essence, nor appeal to authority in support of
its doctrines. More especially we should not confuse science
and revelation. These are distinct though concordant means
of knowledge, the one aspiring to attain truth by its own
effort, the other condescending to impart from itsabundant
 INTRODUCTION 3

store. If Ethics is to take rank with the philosophical

sciences, it must have a own, and build thereon
basis of its

its system. Therefore, in the progress of our proposed in-

vestigation, we shall in no case cite Scripture as warrant or
as proof, but only for illustration or verification. Still it will

be encouraging to find the elaborated and the revealed doc-

trines in accord, and mutually corroborative.

§ 3. A brief sketch of the ground and the process adopted

in the present treatise now in order.
is

The basis assumed human nature. Man has an original,

is

native constitution, which, however much it may be distorted,

disordered and depraved by his perverted free wilfulness, is

nevertheless traceable amid its ruins. There are certain fun-

damental and essential features of humanity, which no pro-
cess of suppression or violation can ever wholly efface.
There are capacities and faculties whose organic functions in
their mutual relations, and relatively to their environment,
are clearly manifest, however enfeebled by misuse, or de-
formed by abuse. The recognition of these features and
powers, and a representation of their orderly functioning, is
an ideal restoration of human nature to its normal condition,
and to its fitting place in the life of the world. This rehabil-
itated man we shall call the natural man, and propose to find
in him, in the native ordering of his being, a safe and suffi-

cient ground for determining his universal though intricately

varied obligation.
Referring to the foregoing definitions of Ethics, we observe
that a right in one person is correlative to an obligation in
some other person. A right and an obligation exist only as
they coexist ; neither can be alone. But rights are logically
prior ; they condition and originate their corresponding obli-

gations. For a right, being founded in the nature of its

possessor, determines that there be a corresponding obliga-

4 OBLIGATION

tion ; whereas an obligation cannot be conceived to determine

a right. Hence we shall take the notion of a right as our
point of departure for a search into the philosophy of
morals.
As already indicated, the matter that constitutes the con-
tent of Ethics is real truth. In order to become a science,
its matter must be developed in logical form whose perfection
is attained through clear, distinct, complete and consistent
treatment. To approximate this ideal a methodical proce-
dure is requisite. Beginning with observation, primarily of
facts of consciousness gathered by introspection or furnished
by testimony, and secondarily of the behavior of men in
social relations, present and past, the intellect discovers in
these phenomena the universally determinative notion of
inherent rights, native and acquired, and therein discerns a
formative principle, imperative in character, and constituting
the common bond of obligation among men. This strictly
universal and necessary principle is not inductively general-
ized, but is intuitively discerned. From it deductions are
then made to subordinate truths, until these, arranged in a
logical system, shall extend throughout all lines of human
activity, and comprehend all modes of human obligation.
Ethics thus constituted is a deductive science.
In this essay the First Part treats of the source and
character of Obligation. Its view is confined to the moral
bond subsisting in the simple relation of man to man in entire
parity and reciprocity. The Second Part treats of the va-
rieties of obligation arising from the varieties of relation due

to the Organization of men into complex associations.

 BIGHTS

CHAPTER I

EIGHTS

§ 4. Every man conceives himself as having certain per-

sonal rights which he esteems of great worth, and guards
with jealous care. Throughout life he is chiefly occupied

with enlarging, confirming and defending them. They are

a sacred possession which he zealously maintains, and whose
loss or diminution he regards as degrading his manhood.
This is one of the most striking and significant facts in the
historical and current activities of mankind.
Thence arises much of the strife that continually agitates
the world. Among barbaric peoples personal violence is

commonly used to maintain or to recover what one claims

to be his personal rights. Among civilized peoples courts
of justice are established to determine the relative rights of
contending parties, and an executive is empowered to enforce
their decrees. Nearly all the litigation abounding in every
nation throughout history is a contention for real or imagi-
nary rights.
While each individual man has his own private rights,
there are many of which he is possessed in common with
other persons. The maintenance and development of com-
mon or public rights is committed to organized society, the
tribe, the state, the nation. When the claims of one on
another of these conflict or are questioned, diplomacy assumes
to adjust the rights involved. This failing, recourse is had
to war. Hence the innumerable battles that mark the tragic
history of mankind.
6 OBLIGATION

§ 5. Evidently the notion of a right, since it is the

source of snch intense particular and social activity, has
deep root in human nature. Also it is evident that, through-
out the contentions to which it gives rise, there is an appeal
to some common law of widest generality, appli-
principle or
cable to an infinity ofand of the highest practical
cases,
importance in the progressive life of humanity. But inas-
much as this universal and overbearing law is for the most
part obscurely discerned and imperfectly formulated, it is

inevitable that men should differ often and widely in its ap-
plication to particular cases. It is the province of Ethics to
search out and formulate the law, and to unfold its general
bearing on the several classes of its subjects.
To this end let us fix discriminating attention on the no-
tion of a right. It is an abstract from personal relations, and
catholic in them. Whenever and wherever two persons
come into any mutually
affective relation whatever, then and
there come into being reciprocal rights, and consequent obli-
gations. The abstracted notion of a right, being pure and
simple, is as to itself incapable of analysis, and hence of
formal definition. But we may examine its conditions, its
antitheses, correlatives, and other implications, and thus clear
the conception, and distinguish it by its invariable environ-
ment and limitations. This analytical process will disclose
fundamental and determining elements, fixing clearly the
scope and bearing of the notion, and evolving the formative
principle and the law involved in its essence.

§ 6. Life is obviously a primary condition of any right.

Only living beings have rights. The notion is incongruous
to a stock or a stone. Among living beings, those alone can
be conceived as having rights that are endowed with a con-
sciousness involving at least volition, its primary element,
conjoined with some degree of sensibility. A right, then, is
 BIGHTS 7

a logical property, a mark that belongs to this, and to no

other class of beings.
But conscious life is not merely a condition of rights, not
merely what must be in order that rights may be. There is
in its very nature that which determines that rights shall be.
They are of its essence. Thus every conscious being neces-
sarily has rightsby virtue of its ultimate constitution. It is
not necessary that every one so constituted should be aware
of the fact, either in detail or in general, not even in the
most obscure way. But the higher orders of conscious be-
ings recognize relatively to themselves the existence of rights
in the lower orders, though these be quite destitute of the
notion.

§ 7. Every man has, elemental in his conscious life, cer-

tain powers of mind, and thence of body. These powers,
faculties and capacities, belong to his nature, to his original
constitution, and are essential in his make-up as a man, as a
human being. They are, more specifically, conditions psycho-
logically antecedent to the existence and apprehension of
rights, and rights are the natural and necessary consequence
of their existence. That is to say, powers and rights are
natural, constitutional, original correlatives.
These native powers are distributed as modes of knowing
and feeling, desiring and willing. The members of the latter
couple constitute more particularly the practical side of
human nature, and are intimately concerned with the exist-
ence and exercise of rights. Therefore on them especially
we fix our present attention.
A desire implies an impulse, occasioned by a want, urging
the will to an activity, relative to other powers, such as
seems likely to result in gratification. Every one is actuated
by desires which thus motive his conduct. These sources of
activity are the determinants of his welfare, and his rights
8 OBLIGATION

have in them their ultimate ground. Hence it is only as his

desires, either actual or potential, are infringed that his rights
are affected and to that for which he has not and cannot
;

possibly have a desire, e. g., a villa in the moon, he has not

and can never possibly have a right. Normal desires, or such
as have an instinctive rise, and are in accord with the gene-
ral order of nature, impel toward the fulfillment of the appro-
priate functions of the man in a world of persons and things.
This consideration of its terms brings into clear view the
truth of the principle A man has a right to gratify his normal
:

desires.

Every volition or act of the will is immediately conditioned

on desire ; that is to say, no exercise of the will can occur
except by virtue of an antecedent desire which as a motive
impels it to action. But notwithstanding this dependence,
the will is to be regarded as central in the personality, since
it has the function to control, modify, suppress or arouse the
activity of all other powers, including even its conditioning
desires. Freedom consists in the possibility of this voluntary
exercise of one's powers, and without freedom it is evident
that their normal functions cannot be fulfilled, or that free-
dom is necessary to the natural working and development of
the entire personality in its existing relations. These con-
siderations bring to light the truth of the principle : A man
has a right to a free use of his native powers.
The two statements are not to be taken as distinct princi-
ples. Together they constitute the mutually dependent and
complementary parts of the consistent whole A man has a -.

right to a free use of his native, powers in the gratification of

his normal desires.

This principle is the basis of Ethics. It is axiomatic, self-

evidently true, not needing or admitting any logical proof;
for the intuitive, synthetic d priori judgment involved in the

pure notion of a right, finds its immediate application to the

 BIGHTS y

desires and volitions. At first view it may appear thoroughly

egoistic or selfish in character, but the outcome of a pa-
tient and thorough scrutiny of its bearings will reverse
this primary impression. Likewise its formal universality
may seem to sanction unbounded license, but the close in-

spection to which we shall submit it will discover very strin-

gent limitations, not arbitrarily imposed, but arising from the

matter of its constituent terms, and leading to a disclosure of
our varied obligations. Thus there is no need to look be-
yond the natural and original constitution of man, despite its
weakness, perversion and distortion, to discern the prolific

principle of morality.

§ 8. In view of their objects it is usual to name three

kinds of rights : the right to life, the right to liberty, the
right to property. This division appears in the three funda-
mental verbs : to be, to do, to have. But the species are not
independent, for each involves the other two as complemen-
tary correlatives.
It follows that either two may be regarded as modified
forms and be expressed in the terms of the third. Thus, for
instance, life without some measure of liberty in the use of
instrumentalities, could hardly claim the name.
Also, life and liberty are commonly spoken of as forms of
property; as when one says, my life, his liberty. Indeed
rights in general are viewed as forms of property in the fa-

miliar phrases, my rights, our rights, their rights. We cor-

rectly say that every man has rights, he owns them, he is

their proprietor. Some rights he may dispose of at will, others

are inalienable except by forfeiture ; but, so long as they in-
here in him, they are his possession, his own. The sense of
proprietorship in rights is very strong, as seen in the tena-
cious retention and persistent defense of them when men-
aced.
10 OBLIGATION

Likewise the several kinds of rights may be reduced to the

right to liberty. Conscious life is an aggregate of active
powers, and a power is a possibility of change. right to A
life is a right to exercise these powers, a right to self-deter-
mined change, which is liberty. Also property in external
things means liberty to make use of them. To be dispos-
sessed of any property is to be deprived of this liberty but ;

the thing is still one's own, and the right to its free use,
though suspended, remains. Thus ownership in external
things is a right to liberty.
Of these reductions, the last, though least familiar, is most
clearly real, and of widest and deepest import. Hence,
while we cannot avoid using the language of possession, we
shall adhere to the view that every right, in its last analysis,

is a right to some phase of liberty, to the untrammeled exer-

cise of ability. Manifestly the cardinal element in the princi-
ple already formulated is a right to liberty in this general
sense, and on it our further consideration shall chiefly turn.
 LIBERTY 11

CHAPTER H
LIBERTY

§ 9. Freedom means the absence of causal restraint or

constraint. It is a function purely negative, yet a special

subjective property of volition. It is the power of choosing.
Causative determination is incompatible with the existence
of choice, for in causation there is no alternative, whereas in
choice an alternative is essential. The power of choosing
is simply the ability to decide freely for one act or line of
conduct rather than for its possible alternate.
Whether or not there be in reality a power of choice is an
old and difficult question in metaphysics. Without renew-
ing its discussion, the point is here made that the reality
of choice is a necessary condition and hence a postulate of
Ethics. Whoever is morally responsible must be free. Con-
sequently we here assume that in all voluntary activity there
is real freedom in measure sufficient for responsibility.

§ 10. Certain limitations of freedom need now to be

observed. Freedom liespower of choice, and in it
in the
alone. All other powers of mind are subject to causation,
their activities being always definitely determined by causa-
tive antecedents. That choice alone is free is a simple fact
in human nature, and a very narrow constitutional limitation
of our original and originating ability but it is the essential
;

difference between a creator and the passive work of his

hands. It renders possible not only moral obligation, but
also an infinite variety of self-determined activities.
12 OBLIGATION

A choice resolved is intention. The intention accords

with that desire to which preference is given by choice.
The elected desire, if it be for action, induces a voluntary
effort whose end is the object desired. This effort consists
solely in an act of attention. The fixing attention more or
less intense on a chosen object is the total of possible volun-

tary energy. We observe here a second very narrow consti-

tutional limitation of human ability. power of
Still this
attention proves sufficient for the purposes of and forlife,

fulfilling the demand for moral action and conduct, since by

means of it we are capable, directly or indirectly, of com-
plete self-mastery.
Because determined by the free act of choice, freedom is

attributed to the exercise of attention. This freedom, how-

ever, is not absolute, but suffers restriction. That the exer-
cise involves effort, a nisus or striving, shows the presence
of obstacles within the mind itself. Evidently there is some
mental inertia to be overcome, which checks and hmits the
action ; otherwise there would be no occasion for effort, no
point of application whereon to expend energy. Herein is a
third limitation.
Mental effort is a force or cause, free in that according to

choice it may or may not be put into play, and in that, if put
into play, its intensity may be varied. Now the mental may
be transformed into physical energy, and issue in muscular
action. This, too, is accomplished through attention. To
move my arm, I must have an idea of the arm and of it as
moving. Fixing my attention thereon, and willing the reali-
zation, the arm moves accordingly. This is inexplicable.
We know it only and simply from experience. But let it be
observed that the direct control of the animal body lies ex-
clusively in this power to contract, according to choice, the
voluntary muscles, a limited class, thus producing motion of
the limbs and some other organs, while very many vital
 LIBERTY 13

activities, as pulsation and digestion, are beyond direct con-

trol. Moreover, when the movable organs are at liberty,

still the extent of their motion is very closely circumscribed.

This discovers a fourth very narrow constitutional limitation
of free action, restricting or confining it to the ability to con-
tract a muscle, and so to move a member through a small
space. Still it is much, very much, to possess and to have
at command a free physical force, free in that it accords with
choice, which force we may use at will, combining it with
fixed natural causes, varying its direction and small inten-
sity, so as to arrest or modify the operations of nature.
It is a noteworthy corollary that this limitation to loco-
motion extends to the body as a whole, and to all external
things. These we move from place to place, but this is the
total of our direct physical efficiency. The planter moves a
spade and seed from one place to another the forces of na- ;

ture do the rest, producing the crop. The smith moves his
hammer up and down, the weaver throws his shuttle to and
fro; the outcome is fabricated by virtue of the natural
forces inherent in the materials. A knowledge of natural
forces, and an intelligent, purposeful placing of things so as

to take advantage of them, enable men to manage factories,

to tunnel Alps, to navigate oceans, to wrap the earth with
iron, and to cover its face with cities. But in all his infin-
itely varied works, man has at command only the single free
physical ability to place or displace things.

Freedom isolates each man from every other, setting

§ 11.
him apart and alone in the universe. For this center of his
personality is intangible, out of reach of any other being.
By the gift of his image the Deity has made man to this
extent independent of himself, putting it beyond his power
to cause a human creature willingly to do otherwise than
that creature may choose since therein would be a contra-
;
14 OBLIGATION

diction. He may reason and persuade, command and

threaten, but cannot causally coerce the man, for this de-
man in
stroys the essential conditions of personality; the
such case is not a man, not a moral being. Much less may
a fellow-man causally determine his choice. One may de-
stroy another's life, but not otherwise his personality. The
freedom of man, within constitutional limits, is absolute.

Freedom and synonymous terms, denoting the

liberty are
absence of causal determination. They are commonly used
interchangeably, but it will be convenient here to use them
distinctively. Freedom signifies the absence of causal deter-
mination antecedent to and effective of election and inten-
tion. It is strictly subjective. Liberty signifies primarily
the absence of preventive causes subsequent to intention, of
obstacles, impediments or hindrances that interfere more or
less effectively with its successful accomplishment. It im-
plies the untrammeled exercise of voluntary effort in its

normal function of carrying out the intention. It is objec-

tive in that it has reference primarily and especially to
external difficulties. A prisoner is entirely free in preferring
release to continued confinement; but not until the door
opens is he at liberty. The term is also applied in this sense
to purely physical facts ; as, an unscotched wheel is at lib-
erty ; a spark on powder liberates energy.

§ 12. The exercise of liberty or free action, in the sense

just indicated, often suffers restrictions that diminish it, even
to annihilation. Neglecting impossibilities and impersonal
difficulties, we shall consider only those restraints that arise

from the conflict of other wills.

One person may effectively interfere with the liberty of

another by using his own muscular force, either directly or

by setting obstacles to bar the way. The man thus assailed

may be overpowered by stronger handling, and be fettered or

 LIBERTY 15

imprisoned. Also he may be beset and embarrassed in his

taking or keeping possession of property, in producing and
imparting. Also any withdrawing or withholding of means
which he might use to attain a chosen end, is an interference
with his liberty. Such external interferences may occur in
an infinite variety of ways, and are cases of causal determina-
tion.

§ 13. There is, however, a secondary sense, even more im-

portant and perhaps more frequent, of the use of the term
liberty, in which it signifies the absence, not merely of causal
restriction, but also of any inducement presented to one in-

clining him otherwise than he, if unassailed, would be dis-

posed. When influences that are not causes are brought to

bear on a man pressing him to choose otherwise than he
would, modifying and sometimes reversing his original and
characteristic preferences, this is properly regarded as a
restriction of his liberty.
The process becomes clear upon a little consideration.
The power of choice is obviously conditioned on cognition.
There must be an idea of an action, and of its possible alter-
nate. A judgment is rendered between these, and the choice
accords with the weightier reason. Reasons are not causes.
A man may be influenced in his choice by them without loss
as to his personality, and indeed his every choice is subject
to rational determination. The reasons for one alternative
are more influential than those for the other, and he freely, of
himself, chooses the former. It is not at all requisite that
the prevailing reasons should be what might be called good
reasons ; they may be very bad, poor, trifling, or even absurd
reasons ; nevertheless they are the rational determinants with
which the choice accords.
Now, a man may not effect, but he may affect another's
choice by presenting such reasons as shall operate through
16 OBLIGATION

the desires to influence his course.This is done obviously

by argument; one obviously influences by persuasion
also
the decisions and conduct of his fellows. Even greater in
extent is the influence of instruction, as in the education of
children. Indeed, in the whole process of education, we in-

fluence powerfully the general disposition, character, and

course through life of other persons, thus putting permanent
restraints upon their liberty. So also in social and political
relations, and in religion, restraining influences, or interfer-
ences with liberty, are constantly exerted by the presentation
of reasons.
Another way of embarrassing the will, and so checking
liberty, is by reason of threatened harm, as seen particularly
in the penalties of the law. The police, the court and the
penitentiary offer a constant reason for conformity to law.
The footpad, who presents the alternative of your money or
your life, thereby proposes a reason usually sufficient to de-
termine in favor of yielding the purse. A plea of duress is

allowed by the courts in discharge of engagement, or in miti-

gation of penalty. Any menace inspiring apprehension in-
terferes with liberty, changing the preferable direction of
action, or diminishing its range, without bringing to naught
the possible alternative. The weightiest examples of such
interference are to be found in political oppression, in reli-

gious persecution, and still more generally in war.

§ 14. An important distinction now to be made is between

those interferences, both external and internal, that are war-
ranted and those that are unwarranted.
The state warrants its officers in the arrest and imprison-
ment, and even in the execution of offenders against its laws.
It warrants the seizure of goods to satisfy judgments, the
confiscation of private property for public weal, the levying
of taxes for its own support, the conscription of citizens for
 LIBERTY 17

military service, the bondage of a class as serfs or slaves.

Also by stringent enactments it regulates industry in produc-
tion and trade, restricts marriage and divorce, inheritance
and bequest, and provides compulsory education. These and
many other restraints on the original liberties of its subjects
it imposes, and enforces, if need be, with a strong arm.

Aside from those enjoined by the state, there are many for-
mal restraints in the common intercourse of men which are
warranted by social relations. To these may be added re-
straints within the family circle, especially those arising from
the exercise of parental authority.
The foregoing restrictions of liberty are unavoidable. One
may approve of and willingly comply with them, but his con-
sent is not asked ; he can neither refuse to accept them, nor
escape by renouncing them. But there are also many avoid-
able restraints that exist by consent, as in contracts, promises,
marriage, and membership in clubs, societies, institutions and
churches, whose requisitions are warranted by being legiti-

mate and voluntarily conceded.

Very grave questions and will be subsequently con-
arise,

sidered, respecting the ground of the warrant or right to

bind. It is sufficient here to observe that the occasion and
extent of warranted interference is determined by the rela-

tive rights of the parties. Granting the warrant in the vari-

ous cases cited, it is evident that they represent a large and
distinct class of restrictions in the range of personal lib-
erty.

It seems, then, that every man is surrounded by legitimate

checks on action, having warrant in the rights of others to
whom he is personally related. He cannot transgress a cer-
tain circumscribed bound without infringing on their privi-
leges, and he is debarred from doing so, as far as practicable,
by their conflicting wills. Thus by the rights of others
everyone's rights are limited. But within the limits thus set,
18 OBLIGATION

any willful restraint upon one's liberty of action, either exter-

nal or internal, being ex vi termini unwarranted, is a violation
of his ultimate constitutional right to a free use of his powers
in the gratification of his normal desires. On this class of
interferences we proceed to bestow special consideration.
 TRESPASS 19

CHAPTER III

TRESPASS

§ 15. Having considered certain conditions and limitations

of rights, we are now prepared to examine more particularly
the basis and origin of the notion, together with certain
other conditions, correlates and implications that mark the
limits of interference in liberty.
The notion of a right, being pure and simple, is incapable
of logical definition. Like all other pure notions it is imme-
diately discerned upon an empirical occasion. The occasion
for this intuition is the experience of a personal relation. It
is a matter of common observation that we all stand in vari-
ous and dissimilar relations to other sentient beings, as of
man to man in reciprocal parity, of parent to child, of bene-
factor to beneficiary, of ruler to subject, and many others.
Now, so soon as a human mind apprehends a relation between
two persons, whether the observer be one of the parties or
not, upon that occasion it immediately discerns the concomi-
tant existence of mutual rights. Their special character and
extent not immediately discerned, but only that they exist.
is

The character and extent of the rights discerned are de-

termined by the kind and intimacy of the relation between
the parties. Whenever we undertake to pass moral judg-
ment on any we examine and reflect upon the rela-
action,
tion sustained by the persons concerned, and make this the
basis of the judgment, approving or disapproving, mildly or
strongly, as the case may be. We
judge that a benefactor
has a right to the gratitude of his rightful beneficiary that ;
20 OBLIGATION

a subject has a right to the forbearance of his rightful ruler,

who, in violating that right, becomes a tyrant. Thus rights
vary with relations. Those of parent in child are different
from those of child in parent ; those of benefactor in recipi-
ent,from those of recipient in benefactor; and both differ
from those lying in elder and younger brothers, and in master
and servant. But in all such relations, however they may
otherwise differ from each other, we see the existence of
mutual rights, whose character and extent are determinable
only by, and ascertainable only from, the nature of the rela-
tion. It is therefore held as an ethical principle that rights
are conditioned on personal relations, discerned in personal
relations, and determined by personal relations.
In attempting to unfold the ethical theory grounded on
personal relations, we shall confine our attention primarily
and for the most part to the simple and indifferent relation
of man to man, in entire equipoise and reciprocity.

§ 16. A slight attention to the notion of a right discovers

that it is conditioned on a social relation. A solitary man,
one absolved from all fellowship, however entire his liberty,
however abundant the means of gratifying many desires, has
not, strictly speaking, any rights. Now a right, since it
exists only by virtue of a personal relation, near or remote,
implies a liability of conflict between wills ; at the least, the
conceivable possibility of an interference in one's liberty by
some other person. For example, a right to go involves the
notion of possibly being hindered or opposed, not by the
physical difficulties of the way, but by the counteracting will
of some other person, which coming into play, the right to
go is and perhaps violently exercised. Any
orally claimed,
right whatever that any man or people or nation may have,
is held in view of a conceivable hindrance or obstruction on

the part of others.

 TRESPASS 21

Let it be next observed that not every interference in one's

liberty is an interference in his right. Warranted interfer-

ence does not violate any right, but only unwarranted inter-
ference. The notion of a right implies that any intelligent
interference with its free exercise is unwarranted, which in-

terference is a wrong. Now a right and a wrong are logical

antithetical correlatives. The notion of the one necessarily
carries with it the notion of the other, like as the notions of
straight and bent, of order and disorder. A wrong, how-
ever, is conditioned on a right that is, a right must be in
;

order that a wrong may be. Whenever, then, a person

knowingly and willingly interferes in my right, checking or
preventing or making vain my effort to realize it, thereby
restraining the free course of my powers in seeking to gratify
my normal desires, he does me a wrong. Thus a wrong is a
violation of a right, and it again appears that a right can
exist only in view of its conceivable violation, a possible
wrong.

§ 17. The principle that every man has a right to the free
use of his powers in gratifying his normal desires, may be
stated thus : Every man has a right to the free use of his
powers in so far as he does not interfere in the rights of any
other ; that is, does not violate the right of another, or does
no one a wrong. We have just seen that the right of either
party exists only in view of its conceivable violation by the
other. The modified expression of the principle brings out
the point that rights in different parties limit each other;
or that each of two parties has a sphere of rights which
touches but does not intersect the sphere of the other.
The necessary and universal limitation expressed in the
foregoing modified statement of the principle, is merely a
partial explication of what is implied in the qualifying term
normal occurring in the prior statement. Normal desires are
22 OBLIGATION

those that strictly conform to the natural and original con-

stitution of man, harmonize with his other powers, and
accord with his relations to his fellows and to his general
environment. Those are abnormal which have not this con-
gruity. Normal desires, as acquisitiveness, are limited to
such gratification as may be attained without interference in
the rights of others. Abnormal desires, as covetousness,
impel to action in disregard of the rights of others. It
appears, then, that the latter statement of the moral princi-
ple modifies the former, not in content, but in expanded
expression only.

§ 18. In the further treatment of this matter it will be

convenient to use the word trespass, with some latitude of
meaning, yet quite definitely. A wrong is any violation of a
right ; so is a trespass. The terms have identical extension,
indeed are strictly synonymous. We have found that liberty
is necessary to the exercise and realization of a right, and
that a violation of a right is an interference in liberty. Also
we have found that a warranted interference in liberty is not
a violation of any right, not a wrong, not a trespass. It re-
mains, then, that a trespass is an unwarranted interference in
liberty.

In legal definition a trespass is an unlawful act committed

with force and violence, vi et armis, on the person, property,
or relative rights of another. This narrow, technical state-
ment is intended to designate those forms of trespass which
are forbidden by and have a remedy or a penalty
civil law,

therein provided. But

common, free and correct usage
in
the term includes many forms of offense of which civil law
takes no cognizance, indeed any and every act that injures or
annoys another, that violates any rule of rectitude or bond of
obligation, and we here adopt this comprehensive meaning.
Our wide definition gives occasion for another verbal
 TBESPASS 23

variation in the statement of the moral principle, thus: A

man has a right to the free use of his powers, provided he
commit no trespass. On further examination we shall find
that this provision sets very narrow bounds to rightful lib-

erty ; indeed that there is no rightful liberty that does not

conform to the limits and consist with the bonds of morality.

§ 19. The
which moral principle puts to the gratifi-
limit
cation of desire, that it must not involve a trespass on the

right of any one else, gives rise to many and grave practical
difficulties. The line between me and my neighbor which
neither should overstep, is often invisible and intangible.
To settle it requires, in a numberless variety of cases, very
thoughtful and careful consideration in which a respect for
personal right must dominate the greed of personal interest.
In the intricate, pressing, and ever-changing relations of men
in society, it is almost impossible to guard and keep intact
one's own rights, and to avoid a transgression of the bounds
set by the rights of others. Contentions inevitably abound.
Thence arise vast and costly systems of judicature among all
civilized peoples, systems that become more and more intri-
cate as civilization progresses, involving numerous courts of
authoritative decision, whose business is little else than to
mark the bounds of rights, and to enforce the law of trespass
in its infinitely varied applications.
The practical difficulties attending questions that concern
trespass on rights, may be lessened, especially as to our pri-

vate conduct, by clearing the conception in certain respects.

To end the following observations will be helpful.
this
Conflicting claims are seen on every hand, but rights
never conflict. They touch each other, but never overlap.
They limit by excluding each other, and indeed have no
other limitation. The same right cannot pertain to different
persons ; and different rights, however similar, are always
24 OBLIGATION

consistent. Wherever there is contention, there is trespass

somebody is doing a wrong somebody is interfering in the
;

rightful liberty of some one else. Even rights that are

shared, and so-called common do not and cannot con-
rights,
flict, but are entirely consistent in their exercise. Everybody
has a right to drive on a public road, but not so as to inter-
fere in the like liberty of any other.
Original rights are inalienable in the sense that one cannot
be unwillingly deprived of them, except by the extinction of
the objects in which the rights inhere, thus rendering their
exercise impossible, which is extreme trespass, as in murder,
arson, and the One may be dispossessed of property,
like.

and otherwise violently limited in liberty, but the right re-

mains whole, complete, intact so long as its object continues
to exist. Derived rights or such as have been conferred by
parental, civil, or other authority, may in many cases be
withdrawn by resumption of the grant, by confiscation, or by
exercise of eminent domain.
Rights in general may be alienated by the possessor him-
self transferring or forfeiting them. Property rights may be
transferred by exchange, gift or bequest. Property may be
alienated also by misdemeanor, the court imposing fines.
Liberty of person may be forfeited by crime and the criminal
imprisoned, or all liberty with life extinguished on the gal-
lows. Being warranted, therein is no trespass.

§ 20. For more specific illustrations of rights in their sub-

jection to trespass, we shall now briefly consider the ground

of property and its patent liability to trespass. Property
rights are found, in the last analysis, to consist in the origi-
nal right of every man to the free exercise of his powers in
the gratification of his normal desires. An infringement on
them is an interference in and so is a trespass.
this liberty,

Much the larger part of any man's activity consists in

 TBESPASS 25

appropriating, transforming, and using external objects.

Natural objects, as land, fruits, ores, to which no one has an

earlier claim, arewithdrawn from the disposal of every other

person, simply by the taking possession of them. For this
act of taking possession, inasmuch as it does not involve a
trespass on any one, is an original right, looking toward the
gratification of normal desires. Things thus become private
property, and any hindrance on the part of others to the
taking possession is a trespass. Moreover, the proprietor
must be left at liberty to transform his property, by his labor
and skill, as he wills the products arising therefrom being
;

likewise his own, to be used freely in further production, or

otherwise consumed. We shall find hereafter that all prop-
erty is held in trust, to be used usuriously and consumed
profitably, else the owner himself becomes a trespasser.
Many perplexing questions arise in the adjudication of
property. It may be that an original appropriation is exces-
sive, more than a fair share, and so a trespass beyond bound,
but this is very difficult to determine. Moreover, it con-
stantly happens that there are long pauses in the useful ac-
tivity of the proprietor of certain material, because of the
greater or less complexity of his plans, or from lack of con-
tinuous energy ; still it is evident that during such indefinite
pause, his right of property must be respected, and the
material thus reserved be left unmolested for his future use.
But if, within a time sufficiently great for the ordering of
all circumstances, he give no sign of making that use, the
right of property lapses; though it is needful that the inva-
lidity of the claim be determined and decreed under special
legal enactment. Finally, it is evident that, while possession
is proof presumptive of ownership, material may pass from
the possession of the rightful owner without loss or surrender
of the ownership; and therefore, while the presumptive
right of the possessor is to be recognized, it should be super-
seded by ownership established in action of trover.
26 OBLIGATION

§ 21. Setting aside felonies or high crimes, such as murder

which utterly destroys all rights and liberty, and robbery
which lessens the means of their exercise, the most familiar
form of trespass is that kind of injury which is done to a
man's land or house by intruding into it against his will. It
is an old legal maxim that eyery man's house is his castle,

and he is entitled to treat as an enemy any one who attempts

to enter it without his consent. As to land, the owner is

not bound to fence it, and whether inclosed or not, a neigh-

bor is not at liberty to enter on it himself, or to permit his
cattle so to do. For in all such cases the liberty of the
owner in the use of his house or field is at least liable to
infringement, is jeoparded, which is trespass.
It is perhaps not quite so clear that vice is trespass, yet
sufficiently clear. Gambling is a transfer of property deter-
mined by an event whose occurrence is believed by all parties
to the transfer to be due to chance. Therein is a misuse of
means, a transfer, without equivalent, of property held in
trust for beneficial ends. This alone makes gambling or bet-
ting wrong, even in its lightest forms, when there is no un-

fairness and when the stake is small. Any disregard of the

claim of others on a productive use of one's means, restricts
their privileges, and thus is a trespass. Intemperance, the
excessive indulgence of an appetite or of any desire, is an
abuse, a weakening, a degradation of powers, to whose fully
efficient service others have a rightful claim, and hence it is

an overstepping the bounds of liberty, a transgression, an

infringement on the privilege of other persons, a trespass.
The vice of lying, the hearer having a right to the truth, is
clearly, even when no further injury appears, a checking or

perverting of the hearer's privilege. Slander is of like char-

acter, doubling the trespass in the injury to both hearer and
subject, and in its grosser forms is a misdemeanor, liable to
legal action for damages. Much more might be said on the
 TBESPASS 27

ethics of vice, but it is sufficient here to point out that it is

essentially trespass.
A great many actions of trifling consequence, and hence
usually overlooked, have nevertheless essentially the nature
of trespass. They differ from crime and vice in degree
rather than in kind, all having the specific mark of unwar-
ranted interference in liberty. When I have a right to go
first, and another, who knows or might know this, steps in

before me, my right is violated. Even if the attempt is

thwarted by my stepping more quickly, still the integrity of
my right, the entirety of my liberty, has suffered. One who
walks through my garden without leave, or enters my door
unbidden, violates my right to be private. One who, with-
out warrant of good reason, intrudes on my conversation
with some one else, or interrupts my words to himself, breaks
in upon my right of free speech. When we occupy the time
or attention of another otherwise than he would, as by send-
ing a letter or making a visit, we apologize by stating reasons
that occasion and warrant the call. Any intrusion or inter-
meddling with what does not concern one, is a trespass.
When I am in haste, and some one needlessly detains me, it
is a trespass. Pressing the unwilling for a loan or donation,
or for an endorsement of any sort, is an embarrassment, a tres-
pass. Thus in the passing relations of men there are a multi-
tude of ways in which one may hinder the preferred action
of another, or turn its direction, thereby, lightly perhaps, yet
essentially, committing a trespass. The conventional unwrit-
ten laws of mutual courtesy in social intercourse are regulative
of private conduct and protective of private personal rights
from personal trespass. Politeness is morality in trifles.

§ 22. The foregoing mention of slander suggests a class of

offenses touching personal dignity that calls for special con-
sideration. An impolite act or word to a person worthy of
28 OBLIGATION

respect is a wrong, inasmuch as it unwarrantably interferes

in his liberty. In order that one may use his powers freely
a certain equanimity is necessary, a mental equilibrium.
This is disturbed by even a slight affront, and he is embar-
rassed, his liberty of action Every upright man
is checked.
cherishes a certain measure of self-respect, and claims a cor-
responding degree of respect from his fellows, a respect pro-
portionate to his estimate of his own dignity or moral worth.
These constitute his personal honor. It is very precious and
very sensitive, for no one can fulfill high aims in life unless
he preserve a calm equipoise of his faculties, and the obser-
vant deference of his associates.
If an affront be grave, such as giving the lie or other
verbal insult, or striking a blow even without physical harm,
it overthrows for an indefinite time the serene composure, if

not the entire self-command, requisite to the unbiased exer-

cise of one's faculties. Such indignity is intolerable. No
doubt the resentment which arises instinctively often becomes
excessive, putting into violent commotion the whole being,
turning it completely away from preferred conduct, and in-
ducing extreme acts, even such as involve the sacrifice of

one's life. And indeed in many cases death is better than

dishonor ; for while death is the loss of all rights, dishonor
may fix fetters and settle a slavery that is worse than all loss.

As a man himself defends his life, so he would himself

defend his honor, his most precious possession, essential to a
free life. The anger or resentment that naturally follows
indignation is instinctive impulse to self-defense. It is

normal, and therefore rightful in rational furtherance. Too

much cannot be said in favor of the sacred right and obliga-
tion to defend one's rights, and especially one's personal
honor. With the savage this passes over into malice and
revenge, a trespass retaliated by a trespass. But two wrongs
do not make right; this does not restore the prior state.
 TBESPASS 29

Among civilized peoples the savagery lingers, particularly in

the restricted form of dueling, for men are rarely willing to
submit a question touching personal honor to a civil court
or to a court of honor. One's honor is a thing too sacred
to be weighed in the no possible counterpoise.
scales, there is

It is to be personally defended, and in opinions which have

prevailed, personally avenged. But higher moral culture
brings its subject to see that he is limited to defense, and to
that mode of defense which will best prevent the trespass,
or its repetition, or its imitation. Other remedy is rarely
possible. It is hard to be angry, and sin not, yet such is the
moral ideal.

§ 23. The various kinds of offense to which we have re-

ferred are mostly modes of direct trespass, wherein an imme-

diate action unwarrantably checks liberty. Let it be now
observed and hereafter kept in mind that trespass is very
often indirect,by mediate action or by inaction. Indirect
trespass by inaction calls for special remark and emphasis,
since the term is commonly used only in the positive sense
of direct action.
Neglecting to pay amoney debt when due is clearly an
unwarranted interference in the liberty of the creditor for ;

he might use the money to gratify a normal desire, but is

restrained and more or less embarrassed by the non-payment.
In general, any withholding, unless by free consent, of
what it is one's right to possess is plainly akin to theft, and
as truly a trespass. A promise of every rightful kind is

to be kept, because it may have become a factor with the

promisee in ordering his life, and he may be embarrassed by
the disappointment of his confidence. A breach of promise
doing serious injury is a recognized form of trespass, action-
able at law. Lack of gratitude to a benefactor, omitting a
meed of praise, failing to show the worthy such outward
30 OBLIGATION

marks of respect as are conventional, neglecting to pay or to

acknowledge any polite attention, these and the like are em-
barrassing, and hence modes of trespassing. If I am using
my right of way, it is all one whether somebody else steps in
the way, or does not step out. In either case he is equally
in my way. The act committed in the one case and omitted
in the other, is in each a trespass, a restraint of my liberty,

and hence the cases are morally identical.

The notion widely prevails that an indirect trespass, espe-

cially one omitting to fulfill an obligation, is less offensive

than a direct trespass committing a deed violative of an obli-

gation. This is a popular error. In either case, if inten-

tional, there is a complete breach of obligation, a wrong, a
trespass. Forgetfulness is more likely to have occurred in
the former than in the latter case, but forgetfulness, though
it may palliate, does not wholly excuse an offense. If the
degree of offense be measured by the gravity of its conse-
quences, even this will not favor a fault; for it is evident
that very often a neglect of obligation may be as serious as
any direct violation. A sentinel who fails to give alarm and
thus to prevent surprise, is responsible for the disastrous
consequences, and is condemned to capital punishment. A
moral distinction between actions omitted and those com-
mitted is superficial and unessential.
Sin is transgression of the law of God, disobedience to
the divine command. We shall hereafter show that any tres-

pass of man on man is trespass on God, violating his will,

thwarting his purposes, checking the free course of his de-
signs. There is also indirect trespass on him in neglecting
his personal dues, and direct trespass in counteracting his
ways. All disaccord with him, whether by action or by inac-
tion, whether by sin of commission or by sin of omission, is

an unwarranted interference in the divine furtherance of the

world. Thus it comes to light that all trespass is sin, and
all sin is trespass.
 THE LAW 31

CHAPTER IV
THE LAW

§ 24. Let intellective attention be again fixed on the

primary notion of a right. Pure reason immediately dis-
cerns that a violation of a right, knowingly and willingly
committed, is a breach of normal order, a violation of law.
Also it discerns that this law, being violable, is not, like nat-
ural law, the designation of a constant order of facts that
have no alternates ; but the designation of an order of facts
that ought to be constant, an order which, though violable,
should be inviolate and universal.
Moreover, pure reason discerns the very important and
special characteristic of this law, that it is obligatory on the
potential transgressor. It is addressed to his will, laying
upon it a binding obligation, obliging him to conform his
actions to its behests. Accordingly it is recognized as an
imperative, a command, an order enjoining order on those
capable of disorder.
The order herein designated and demanded is a constantly
observant respect for the rights of others, forbidding any un-
warranted interference in liberty, forbidding trespass. Its
formula is: Thou shalt not trespass. This widely yet defi-
nitely interpreted is the completely comprehensive Moral
Law, binding all imperfect persons without exception, and at
all times, in all places, under all circumstances. Thus it is
both catholic and strictly universal.
The moral law is independent of experience, except that
experience must furnish the occasion for its discernment
by
pure intellect. It is not deduced from some higher law;
32 OBLIGATION

there is none higher. It does not logically follow from the

principle of liberty to gratify desire, bnt implies or is implied
in that principle, and a mere unfolding of the essential con-
tent of either is all that is requisite for a clear apprehension
of its truth. Indeed the principle and the law are but
varied forms of essentially the same necessary truth. As a
principle, it is an immediate intuition of pure intellect, hav-
ing the light of truth in itself. As a law, its universally
binding authority lies in its intuitively imperative truth.

§ 25. The intuitive cognition of this fundamental, catholic,

and universal law, is the sole function of the pure practical
reason or conscience. Conscience is pure reason discerning
moral law. This faculty has the moral law for its exclusive
object, and its' exercise is the primary, original, antecedent
condition of any moral activity whatever, without which lib-

erty has no moral restraint, and

no moral character.
volition
In thus identifying conscience with the pure practical rea-
son, we give to the term a clear and sharp definition, fitting
it by distinguishing it from those other fac-
for scientific use
ulties which, subordinatelyand occasionally, are concerned
with moral matter, and whose exercise on such matter is
quite commonly and confusedly spoken of as the exercise of
conscience. Except the pure practical reason, there is no
original, distinct, special moral faculty in the human mind.
Let it be remarked that conscience, as herein defined, can-
not err. The criterion of a pure intuition is its necessity and
universality. Conscience in its intuitive discernment discov-

ers what is necessarily and universally true, and this discern-

ment, being intuitive, is infallible. It is not, however, itself

a complete guide of conduct. must be supplemented by

It

the logical function of intelligence, by thought, deducing

minor rules or the moral quality of particular actions.

Thought may err, is peculiarly liable to error. Herein is

 THE LAW 33

the explanation of the great diversity of moral judgments

among men. The data of pure reason are the same in all

human minds but ; the judgments formed in the application

of these data often greatly differ, because of illogical think-
ing. The liability to error is greatly increased by a common
acceptance of traditional moral standards, expressed in ready-
made rules, which, if not themselves erroneous, are often im-
perfectly comprehended and applied to cases beyond their
scope. Thus certain individuals, or large classes of men, or
nations, are said to have high or low standards of morality
according to the degree of approach and logical conformity
of these standards to the intuition of pure reason.
The moral intuition, like all others, may be cleared by dis-

criminating attention to its occasions, abstracting from the

empirical elements, and fixing upon the pure; and further,
by distinguishing those abstract notions with which it is lia-

ble to be confused, as, for example, utility. In this manner

only is conscience capable of improvement, of education.
The accuracy and acumen of the logical faculty, by which
the moral quality of an action is inferred, may be greatly im-
proved by intelligent exercise, and thus furnish means for
the refinement of moral character. The moral sentiments
may be intensified and the moral impulse strengthened by
indulgent activity, and the will may become more and more
submissive to its law by habitual observance. Conscience,
in its loose general meaning, has these several sources of cul-
ture ; but in the narrow scientific sense here adopted, it is

capable only of clearance.

Turning from the faculty by which the law is cog-

§ 26.
nized to the law itself, we observe that this imperative truth
is categorical.
There are two classes of hypothetical imperatives, each
implying the practical necessity of a means to an end. The
34 OBLIGATION

condition in the first of these classes is problematical, being,

though constant, not universal, but merely possible. Exam-
ples are found in the technical rules of art. If one would

build a house, he must gather materials, employ skilled labor,

etc. The condition in the second class is assertorial, being
actual, constant Examples are found in the
and universal.
dictates of prudence. If one would be healthy, he must be
temperate. More generally: If one would be happy, he
must, etc. These rules and dictates command conditionally.
There is no necessity that any one should observe them, ex-
cept in case of his willing the antecedent, which, however,
in the second class, every one actually does.
But the moral law is a categorical imperative, command-
ing unconditionally. It is simply, Thou shalt, or Thou shalt

not. There is no hypothetical antecedent expressive of a

definiteend to be attained. Moreover, its behest is in disre-
gard of any special consequences, except in so far as these
may enlighten the obligation. Tradition and custom may
likewise illustrate its application, but they neither add to nor
take from its authoritative hoc age. Its authority is in its

irrefragable and universal truth, and its truth is in the essen-

tial and ultimate nature of the facts. It demands an uncon-

ditional and immediate obedience as a moral necessity, always

and everywhere, amid any and every combination of circum-

stances; a blind obedience, if in the dark; an intelligent

obedience, if there be light; but always an uncompromising,

unswerving obedience.

§ 27. The law is sovereign, subjecting all personal powers.

Each faculty operates according to its own constitutional

function, but it is not competent for its own guidance. All
others are dependent on intelligence as a guide, and for the
full and correct performance of this specific guiding function,

intelligence is dependent on conscience discerning the law of

 THE LAW 35

conduct. All human activities, whether they issue in exter-

nal expression or not, are thus subjected ultimately to the
moral law.
It is the peculiar, the exclusive function of the will to con-
trol all other powers, to bring them into normal and harmo-
nious exercise. The sovereign law is therefore addressed to
the will, the executive. It commands choice to conform to
its behest. It demands the regulation of all inner activity,
and thus the regulation of all outward action. It is the
essential informing element in all mandates and minor rules
of conduct ; the hypothetical imperatives, described above as
logically coordinate, being ethically subordinate, subject to
its regulation. Even conscience itself is subject to its au-
thority ; the law, dimly seen, demanding the voluntary atten-
tion requisite to its being clearly seen in the fullness of its
meaning, lest it be ignorantly violated.
This claim of supremacy, demanding the unconditional
subjection of the entire will, is more or less clearly recog-
nized by every one. I see that itis law for me I cannot
;

ignore or reject Yet a will often disregards or

its claim.
rebels against this authority and only when completely sub-
;

missive and perfectly accordant can a will be pronounced

morally good. For " nothing can possibly be conceived in
the world, or even out of it, which can be called good with-
out qualification except a good will."

§ 28. been indicated that rights are grounded

It has already
on personal and that a discernment of the existence
relations,
of rights takes place on an empirical occasion, on an obser-
vation of such relation in actual life, whether the observer be
a party or not. Now it is evident that personal relations
are strictly objective, and rights objectively determined hence ;

it follows that the moral law, being essentially implied in

really existent rights, is objective in origin and character.
36 OBLIGATION

It is true that human rights are more remotely grounded in

human nature, and men are spoken of as doing by nature
the things of the law, as being a law unto themselves, as
having the law written in their hearts. But this does not
make the law in any measure or sense subjective. For man
has a fixed, native constitution of both body and mind ; he
cannot make one hair of his head white or black, nor can he
add to or take from which is con-
his natural faculties, one of
science, the eye reading the law written for him in his heart.
This constitution, being independent of his subjective states,
is as truly objective as is the solar system, and it is this
objective constitution, acting in conformity with the existing
constitution of nature at large, that is determinative of rights,
of obligation, of the law.
Thus the moral law is, as to its origin, objective in the
constituent order of the world. It does not originate within
me, but beyond me. It is not given by me, but to me. It
comes to me from without ; it is adventitious. The law of
causation, every event is caused, and the law of conduct,
thou shalt not trespass, though the one be indicative, the
other imperative, the one inviolable, the other violable, are
alike in this, that each is independent of the mind apprehend-
ing it. Conscience is not autonomous, nor is the will. The
law, objectively determined, is read by conscience, interpreted
by the judicial faculty, and executed, under the moral im-
pulse, by the will.
The objective character of the moral law is indicated by
its independence of circumstances and its disregard of conse-

quences. Yet still more clearly is this character evidenced

in its sameness for all classes and conditions of men. Were
its character subjective, or were it liable to any subjective

modification, there might be as many variations of the law

as there are minds of men. But, being one and the same for
all individual minds, evidently it is not enacted by them, but
 :

THE LAW 37

enacted for them. Also, since it is not at all affected by

what one may think about it, every sane man being accused
or excused by his fellowmen in disregard of his peculiar no-
tions, it is clear that a law thus common and unalterable by

any subjective treatment has the essential character of an

objective reality.

§ 29. The law, in the form we have given, is negative

Thou shalt not. In this form, taken strictly, it forbids a
large class of actions without enjoining any. Unquestionably
this is its primary and most palpable aspect comprehending
our most obvious obligations, the one most clearly and fully
recognized in actual life. As prohibitory, it strikes the most
uncultured intellect, is patent to the grossest comprehension,
and impresses on the humblest capacity, making its ap-
itself

pearance in the very awakening of the moral consciousness.

This strictly negative or prohibitory aspect of the law is
therefore worthy of specific consideration in this place, re-
serving for subsequent examination its positive forms.
From the law in its prohibitory form many deductions can
be made to secondary laws, having less yet very wide gen-
and retaining the character of strict
erality, universality.
For example: Trespass is forbidden; Murder is trespass;
therefore Murder is forbidden. In this simple syllogism, the
major premise is an indicative form of the law intuitively
true; only the minor premise needs support, which the
slightest reflection furnishes; for the right to continue in
life is the highest of rights, it being the condition of all

others, and to kill unwarrantably, which is murder, is the

greatest possible trespass, since it extinguishes all liberty, all

possible enjoyment of any right. Maiming is likewise tres-

pass, for it diminishes one's liberty to realize his rights ; and
therefore it is forbidden. Cruelty is pain-giving trespass;
a wrong, not simply because it gives pain, but because
 :

38 OBLIGATION

it thereby unwarrantably interferes in liberty; it there-

fore is forbidden. Theft is trespass, a violation of the
right of property preventing its free use; and therefore,

Thou shalt not steal. These are very obvious yet typical
cases.
The Decalogue, which the foregoing suggests, is usually
spoken of as the moral law. It is eminently, but not ulti-

mately. Its ten-fold statement lacks the unity requisite to a

philosophic reduction. Yet it is easily seen that each of the
ten laws is a simple deduction from the one ultimate law
Trespass not. This is the basis. Consequently they are
throughout negative, simply prohibitory. Let us add the
observations, that these prohibitions are, in general, progres-
sive from higher to lower offenses, and that all are objective,

forbidding outward acts, except the last which is subjective,

entering themind or soul, and forbidding unrighteous desires.
The Ten Words are inadequate. A man may keep them
all from his youth up, and yet lack. They are directed
solely against sins of commission. They prohihit certain
prominent offenses, but posit no explicit obligation of benev-
olence, no duty of love to God or neighbor. They were
addressed originally to a people rude, uncultured, whose
moral character was very imperfectly developed by its Egyp-
tian experiences. They were for the time as much as could
be borne. Had the law in its fullness been at once revealed,
it probably would not have been understood, much less ap-
preciated, accepted and practiced. In general, the Old Tes-
tament morality is negative and prohibitory.
Civil law, under which phrase we include all laws rec-
ognized, enacted and enforced by an organized State, is
originally negative in its forms. Even after being greatly
expanded, it is still very largely negative in expression and
prohibitory in character. Especially is this true of the crim-
inal code, which consists of a series of prohibitions of certain
 THE LAW 39

overt acts. As a science of human rights, civil law is occu-

pied with classifying and denning the various rights of indi-

viduals, of corporations, and of communities in general. As

an art of social regulation, it provides for the adjudication of

particular cases, and the enforcement of judicial decrees.

Throughout it is a system of enactments deduced from the
universal and exhaustive law of trespass, which enactments
are used as major premises in further deduction ; the minor
premises being the particular cases which the court is con-
sidering. Hence it is evident that, in essence, there are not
many laws ; there is only one law.

§ 30. The law in its primarily negative sense, forbidding

certain actions and requiring none, tends to isolate men, to
set them apart from each other, to sever their natural rela-
tions. It says : Let your neighbor be,' do not interfere in his
liberty, do not step in his way or on his ground, respect his
rights. Accordingly, even among highly cultured people,
there are many who, while rigidly conforming their lives to
the prohibitions of the law, apparently have no wider concep-
tion of obligation, and know no difference between legality
and morality. Indeed there are some who regard the laws of
the State, with all their manifest imperfections and narrow
inadequacy, as marking the bounds of obligation, and con-
sider it right to claim or do whatever law does not
civil

forbid, all unforbidden actions being permissible and super-

erogatory.
A thorough analysis, however, of the conditions and impli-
cations of trespass, such as we shall subsequently undertake,
discovers that the limitation to prohibition is inadmissible,
that it is far from exhausting the moral principle, that there
is a positive aspect of this formally negative imperative, that
the injunction placed upon trespass by the universal moral
law is both a prohibition and a requisition, forbidding to do
40 OBLIGATION

this but equally requiring to do that, and embracing all par-

ticular acts and general conduct. The morality of the New

Testament advances to this higher positive plane. It does

not abrogate the earlier form of the law, but arises from it, de-
mands active benevolence, and so exhausts the obligation of
man to man. The influence of this positive presentation of
the law effectively counteracts the isolating tendency of the
exclusively negative view, restores and strengthens the mu-
tual relations of men, bringing them into fraternal fellow-
ship, and uniting them by common and indissoluble bonds.
 SANCTIONS 41

CHAPTER V
SANCTIONS

§ 31. The human will originates actions in the sense that

it elects one rather than another possibility, and does that
instead of this. It is therefore rightly regarded as the first
cause in a series of events whose subsequent members are its

effects or consequences. As this mastery of the will is itself

subject to the moral law, the causes and effects in the series
are qualified as moral causes and effects. But let it be ob-
served that causation in the mental or spiritual sphere is

still causation, and in that sphere moral causes determine

their effects as rigidly as, in the physical sphere, physical
causes determine their effects. Moreover, such is the recip-
rocal relation between the and material spheres
spiritual
that an activity in either may be the cause of an event in
the other.
When a voluntary act takes place, I have determined it

shall be this rather than some other. Until then the deed
ismerely potential, I am master, I have to do with it. When
itbecomes actual, then no longer have I to do with it, but it
has to do with me. I cease to be the actor, and become an.
observer, perhaps a sufferer. What is done can never be
undone. There may be counteraction, readjustment, restitu-
tion, compensation, but there is no restoration or erasure of

the past. The act is unchangeable. It has passed from

the domain of moral law and entered the realm of natural
law, to become a first link in an irrefragable chain of causes
and effects involving my welfare, perhaps completely and
inextricably. Often a word unspoken is a sword sheathed at
42 OBLIGATION

my belt; spoken, it is a drawn sword in the hand of my

enemy.
Experience in such matter brings reflection, and with it

the wider observation and induction that conformity of voli-

tion to moral law is wholesome, non-conformity perilous, per-
haps fatal. These good and evil effects constitute in general
the sanctions of the moral law, they conserve its sanctity,

ratifying and vindicating its authority, inducing obedience,

that it may be unbroken, whole, holy, sacred in the eyes of
its subjects.

§ 32. Mandatory law has necessarily penalty affixed. In-

deed the notion of the one seems to imply the other as of its
essence for the voice of command without power enforcing
;

it would be mere brutum fulmen, vox et prceterea nihil. Ac-

cordingly, in considering the moral order of the world, the
order that ought to be, we find that any deviation carries
with it penalty, or rather penalties, as its natural and neces-
sary consequence. Let us now examine first those that are
wholly subjective.
Subordinate to reverence for the law revealed by conscience
is the sentiment of approbation or of disapprobation, correla-
tive to the moral judgment approving or disapproving. These
innate sentiments bear powerfully upon conduct, and thus
constitute sanctions. Indeed they are the original, constitu-
tional,and primary sanctions of the law. In the pleasure or
pain, by which they are strongly marked, we discover native,
subjective reward and punishment.
The moral sentiments are so highly influential that their
function is often exaggerated, and they are supposed to be
sanctions in the sense of being a sure index and an authori-
tative exponent of the true moral character of an act or of
general conduct. Many a man of high culture will assert his
rectitude in a certain case because he experiences the pleasing
 ;

SANCTIONS 43

sentiment of self-approbation, saying: My conscience sanc-

tions my course. remark that
It is therefore important to
view of his actions do not, even in the most
one's feelings in
remote way, furnish any proof of their true moral character.
This would invert the psychological order that posits moral
sentiment as dependent on moral judgment. In reality the
feeling of approbation or disapprobation attends a false moral
judgment as readily and fully as it does a true one, having
no power to discern the difference. Hence these sentiments
do not at all confirm the judgment; but, on the contrary,
their own justification is wholly dependent on the validity of
the antecedent judgment ; and this depends ultimately on a
clear discernment of the moral law by conscience. Accord-
ingly we observe that even these sanctions, though original
and innate, are liable, as are all other human sanctions, to
distribute reward and punishment unduly, both in kind and
degree.
In the class of subjective sanctions must be included the
silent approval or censure of one's fellows. We are largely
dependent for our free welfare on even the private opinions
of each other. No man can reasonably be indifferent to the
judgment that others form of his conduct, and to the moral
sentiments with which it inspires them. Every right-minded
man feels this keenly, whether the judgment be just or un-
just. He is elated and encouraged by silent commendation
he is depressed and discouraged by condemnation. These
also are potent sanctions ratifying the moral law, and uphold-
ing its authority.

§ 33. From the foregoing considerations it appears that

the notion of violable law carries with it the notions of a gain
of worth or dignity in its observance, and of a loss of worth
or dignity in its violation ; also that the one implies the no-
tion of merit or desert, of reward due, the other of demerit,
44 OBLIGATION

of penalty due. Furthermore, an observation of meritorious

conduct, especially if despite adverse temptation, excites an
impulse to bestow reward; of culpable conduct, a disposi-
tion to inflict punishment. These natural impulses have,
no doubt, an instinctive origin and play, and so far are con-
stitutional ; but they have also a distinctively rational exer-
cise, and so far are susceptible of justification.

In view of one's own conduct, an approving judgment

of merit excites the instinctive impulse to reward well-
doing, realized perhaps in some special self-indulgence;
whereas a judgment of demerit incites an instinctive anticipa-
tion of punishment, which sometimes is self-inflicted. Crim-
inals not infrequently surrender themselves voluntarily to
public justice, that they themselves may have the satisfaction
of penance for their misdeeds. Suicide following remorse
has perhaps often the character of self-inflicted punishment.
Recompense and retribution are reasonable. It is patent
to common sense that the welfare of a community as a whole,
and of its several members, is favored by the steady observ-
ance of the law which requires each to respect the rights of
all others ; and more especially is it evident that a wrong
done, a trespass committed, is a breach of order affecting un-
favorably, not merely the immediate sufferer, but mediately
the welfare of all, even of those whose relation to him is

remote. Therefore, when a breach is threatened, all agree

that preventive restraints should be imposed ; and when a
breach is actually made, that the offender should be punished
in such manner and measure as will deter him from repeating
the offense, and deter all observers from like misdeed. If
the community be one of which I am a member, I am dis-
posed and indeed bound to take part directly or indirectly in
inflicting the deterrent penalty. On the other hand, if some
one, who, from moral weakness or from lack of moral culture,
is specially liable to temptation,conform manfully in a cer-
 ;

SANCTIONS 45

tain action or m general conduct to the social order that

ought to be, then there is a common judgment that he should
be rewarded, and a prompting to bestow reward in such man-
ner and measure as shall strengthen his good will, and induce
observers in his class to practice like conduct. This seems
to be a reasonable account and justification of the common
disposition of men in their treatment of orderly and disor-
derly persons.

§ 34. The subjective sanctions in the minds of observers

tend to become also objective in public opinion. The judg-
ment and sentiment usually find expression in outspoken
words of praise or blame, often in modes more forcible, as

popular honors, or social ostracism.

Reprobation of a wrongdoer is, in general, directly pro-
portioned to his intelligence and culture. For it is evident,
from the admitted supremacy of the moral law, that a knowl-
edge of one's obligations, implying the possibility of fulfilling

them, diminishes in so far the ground of apologetic defense.

Conversely, ignorance of facts and circumstances which go to
determine the moral quality of conduct, is allowed to be a
palliation of offense, followed by a mitigation of punishment
yet is not allowed as complete excuse, for no human mind
can be absolutely blind to its obligations.

The sentiment and impulse prompting us to reward one

who does well is, speaking generally, in inverse proportion to
his intelligence and culture. A street gamin who finds and
restores my lost purse should have some portion of its con-
tent bestowed on him, but I would not offer to reward a
gentleman ; should I commit the blunder, he would be justly
indignant. We heartily approve the good deeds of cultured
persons, but express rewards are rarely proposed
to them.
Academic honors are offered to youth as a stimulus before
the fact, but in mature life honors are indefinite, spontaneous,
46 OBLIGATION

and come after the fact. Titles of nobility are usually

granted as rewards only for some special and signal service.
Neither these, nor honorable distinctions of any kind, nor
any emoluments, are granted for mere conformity to law.
In the civil code, while to each law is attached a penalty

for its violation, to no law in any enlightened State is at-

tached a reward for its observance.
This last observation gives occasion to remark that while,
as already stated, penalty is a necessary sanction, essential
in the very notion of violable law, reward is only a contin-
gent sanction, it may or may not be applied, it is not essen-
tial. Moreover, in the progress of moral culture, not only
does a promise of reward, but also the threat of punishment,
gradually lose its influence. Many a man reaches the stage
where these are, for himself, lost to view, and he fulfills his

obligations without regard to either. This is a high, yet

not the highest, degree of culture.

§ 35. Another class of sanctions, originating in the fore-

going, may be discriminated as distinctly objective, being
embodied in formal ordinance, and having reference to overt
misdeeds. They are the enactments of an organized State.
No longer recognized as individual judgments, they super-
sede the private opinion of the offender, the court and the
executive, they have passed beyond the more or less sym-
pathetic opinion of the public, and are objectified in a bind-

ing penal code.

Such, in general, is the character of all civil law. It

cannot be too strongly or repeatedly emphasized that the

its various
whole science and practice of jurisprudence, in all
branches, together with the vast and complex
system of

courts of judicature, having a prescribed and

established

form, manner and order for conducting suits and

prosecu-
has ultimate basis
tions, and having executive powers,
its
 SANCTIONS 47

and justification in the ethical principle of a personal right,

and is merely an authoritative explication and application of
the one moral law : Thou shalt not trespass.
Very many kinds law have been
of enacted sanctions of
devised. There can be no doubt that in the early stages of
organized society, the spirit of personal vengeance dominat-
ing, the intent and form of legal punishment was largely
retaliatory, a paying back blow for blow. This barbarous,
strict lex talionis is no longer in vogue. It has been ex-
punged from the penal code of civilized States, excepting in
case of life for life, which is justified on grounds other than
vengeance. For it is evident that, if requital in kind, to
satisfy the thirst for revenge, be the object of punitive
measures, then it is the purpose of the State, as far as it

can reach, to double the suffering of its memberswhich is;

absurd. Whatever of vengeance is compatible with legal

punishment, is reserved expressly for a tribunal higher than
the State.
Under a prior topic it was stated that rights may be re-

duced to three, a right to life, a right to liberty, and a right

to property. In refined codes the penalties correspond, con-
sisting exclusively in deprivation of life, or of liberty by
imprisonment, or of property by fines, damages or confisca-
tion. Flogging has been generally abolished. Restitution,
or else compensation, is enforced when practicable, but is
not punishment; hence damages are added. Punishment,
then, is practically the taking away of that the right to which
has been forfeited by trespass, by a transgression of the bounds
set by personal relations to personal liberty. Moreover it
was pointed out that the three kinds of rights may be re-
duced to one, the right to liberty in the gratification of nor-
mal desires. Hence it appears that as all offenses are
unwarranted interferences in liberty, so all legitimate pen-
alties are warranted interferences in liberty.
 ;

48 OBLIGATION

§ 36. Pain is the correlate of restrained or constrained

energy. Each of our powers tends spontaneously, that is,

of its own proper nature, without strain, to put forth a defi-

nite quantity of free activity. If this amount be realized,
there is pleasure ; if less, the energy being repressed, or if

more, the energy being overwrought, there is pain. Thus

all pleasure arises from the free natural play of our faculties
all pain, from their restraint or constraint. The normal is

pleasurable, the abnormal painful.

Naturally we have an inclination to pleasure, and an aver-
sion to pain. A desire for pain, simply for its own sake, is
a psychological impossibility. This constitutional aversion
to pain impells one constantly away from abnormal extremes
toward an intermediate normal condition, while the co-operat-
ing constitutional inclination to pleasure constantly draws
one, like a pendulum, toward the same golden mean of mod-
eration and harmonious order.
All trespass, being an interference in natural spontaneous
liberty of action, gives pain. All legal penalty, for the same
reason, is the infliction of pain ; rarely in like manner, but
always, if adequate, graduated to correspond in measure with
the degree of trespass, and limited to the pain of repression.
More widely, all sanctions of the moral law, innate or enacted,
natural or artificial, are essentially the same, depending for
their efficacy on the same element all rewards are pleasures,
;

all punishments pains. These are the natural attraction and

repulsion in the spiritual sphere, tending to maintain a uni-
versal equilibrium, and to restore it when disturbed.
It was a mooted question among the ancients whether pain
is an evil, and to-day it is still a question. When we con-
sider its influence in the preservation of our powers of body
and mind, averting the ruinous effects of excess on the one
hand, and of inaction on the other; when we observe the
working of the whip of pain in the world of sentient beings,
 SANCTIONS 49

tending constantly to harmonize their mutual interests, and

adjust their actual relations to the moral order of the uni-
verse in " a stream of tendency that makes for righteous-
ness ; " it seems not merely unreasonable to account pain an
evil, but that it should be reckoned essential to welfare,
reckoned, along with the highest good, essential in the well
ordering of a world of free activity.
This is the sanction by which the Divine Ruler of the Uni-
verse upholds his government against trespass. We instinct-
ively revolt at the thought that the Deity is the author of
sin, the source and sum of evil. But that he is the author
of pain cannot be doubted, and is entirely accordant with
the infinite benevolence that proposes and actively seeks to
accomplish the highest welfare of humanity.
50 OBLIGATION

CHAPTER VI
RIGHT AND WRONG

§ 37. The substantive notions of a right and a wrong, used

hitherto, need now to be supplemented by the corresponding
qualifying notions of right and wrong.
A right is accorded in law; right is according to law.
Right lines are straight lines we draw them by means of a
;

rule or ruler. So in the ethical sense, right actions are such

as conform to rules of conduct, implying a ruler. More
generally, they are those conforming to the moral law, any
deviation from strict rectitude being wrong.
The terms a right and right are, in last analysis, coexten-
sive. Whatever one has a right to do is right for him to do.
This seems obvious. Yet it is commonly supposed that ex-
ceptions often occur, and even moralists have taught that a
man may have a right to do what is not right. A planter, it
is said, has a right to destroy his crop, but it would not be

right. This paradox cannot be allowed. It arises perhaps

from the false notion that one has a moral right to do what-
ever is not forbidden by civil law, which is mere legality, not
morality. The true limitations of rights are not found in
civil law, nor in enactments of any sort, but in the nature
and men, which the most elaborate enactments
relations of
fall far short of denning completely. A producer destroying
a product of any value, an heir wasting his inheritance, an
idler not exercising his ability, is wronging or trespassing on
rights of others naturally vested in these things. In the
proper ethical sense a right to do a wrong, or to do wrong,
is absurd.
 EIGHT AND WRONG 51

Conversely, whatever is right for one to do he has a right

to do ; any interference by any other is a trespass. For, if
it be not right, it is wrong, these being contradictories and ;

in doing wrong one always inflicts a wrong, greater or less,

near or remote, on some one affected by his act which, if not
punishable, is at least censurable. Hence the terms are co-
extensive.
A moral right, or simply a right should be distinguished
from a legal or jural right. The one is generic, the other
specific. The one is accorded in universal moral law, the
other is accorded in imperfect and exceptional civil law.
A right properly implies both exemption from legitimate
interference in its exercise and an obligation to exercise
it ; whereas a jural right implies immunity merely, not obli-
gation. Hence the unqualified term leads to confusion.
Sometimes indeed there is formal opposition between moral
and legal rights, for occasionally unrighteous laws are enacted,
technically conferring rights that are immoral, authorizing
wrongs. A moral right to act is an obligation to act, which
is synonymous with right action.

§ 38. Right or wrong is the moral quality of a voluntary

personal action. As propositions are always either true or
false, so actions are always either right or wrong. A true
proposition accords with axiomatic logical principle, and a
right action accords with axiomatic moral principle. As one
of two contradictory propositions must be false or logically
absurd, so one of two incompatible actions must be wrong or
morally absurd. An action that is wrong is a moral self-
contradiction, inconsistent with what may be known to be
right or in accord with axiomatic law, and thus is a self-
condemned absurdity.
It has already been stated that on the empirical occasion
of a voluntary personal action, we have an intuitive discern-
 ;

52 OBLIGATION

ment by conscience of the existence in it of moral quality,

we discern that it is either right or wrong. But whether
the observed action, as striking a blow, be right or be wrong,
is not at all intuitive, not at all discerned immediately by the
pure practical reason or conscience. Which one of these
two contrary qualities it has, conscience does not know; it
knows only that it must have one or the other.
For evidently the notions of right and wrong imply ac-
cord and discord with some general principle requiring all
voluntary activity or personal conduct to conform uniformly
to its indications. Hence every case must be subsumed
under that principle in order to ascertain which one of the
two qualities is predicable of it. This is a logical process.
It is not a discernment of pure reason, but is a reasoning
not conscience, but inference.
The logical process concluding the moral quality in a given
case, is very liable to The specific action in which
error. '

the moral quality inheres is, as we shall immediately show,

subjective, internal in the agent. Now, when one judges
his own act, though it is open to his direct observation by
introspective self-examination, still, from a lack of clear dis-

cernment of the primary principle, or from a lack of logical

skill inmaking the deduction, or from carelessness, he often
errs. Much more is one liable to err when judging the act
of another person. For the subjective movement of another
is beyond one's observation, and can be known only by his

confessions, his professions, or by his outward perceptible

movements, these together with circumstances being signs
from which the internal act is inferred. This additional in-
ference greatly increases the uncertainty of the conclusion,
and warns against hasty judgment.

§ 39. What is the specific action of which the moral qual-

ity is a property ? In other words, what is the distinct and
 BIGHT AND WRONG 53

informing fact wherein conscience discerns obligatory moral

quality, and whereon we pass discriminating moral judgment ?
It is to be premised that no fact of causation has moral
quality. Whatever is caused is necessitated by its cause to
be just what it is. There is no alternative. Moreover, by
the axiom of uniformity, that like causes have like effects,
there is no variation in effects, if there be none in their
causes. This is the realm of necessity. It is opposed to
the realm of freedom, wherein alone moral quality finds
place ; for freedom must be allowed as conditio sine qua non
of moral action. Only beings having free will are morally
responsible, and among these only such persons as are con-
scious of moral obligation.
Outward physical or muscular action, therefore, has in
itself no moral quality, not even that outward action com-

monly called voluntary. For the movement of the muscles

is due to physical causes originating in the brain, and this

brain action causing muscular motion is itself caused by ante-

cedent mental action. Hence only to mental action can
moral quality be immediately attributed.
The exercise of conscience discerning moral quality, for
like reason, has in itself no moral quality ; it is neither right
nor wrong. Knowledge of right and wrong, and of the dis-

tinction between them, arises on the presentation of a per-

sonal action, which empirical occasion is a condition precedent.
Moreover, conscience can never have the quality imported
into it ; for its exercise is originally and essentially involun-
tary, the discernment intuitively necessary. The same is

true of all pure intuitions.

All empirical intuitions, as the sense-perceptions, are like-
wise destitute in themselves of moral quality, since they are
the involuntary products of our constitution in the presence
©f causative objects.
The exercise of the logical faculty, even in case of moral
54 OBLIGATION

judgment, has no moral quality in itself, for it is an effect of

voluntary attention.
The like consideration sets aside, not only all presentations
and the representations of thought, but also the representa-
tions of mediate perception, memory and imagination, together
with the feelings and desires that attend them. All these are
strictly effects, and therefore destitute in themselves of moral
quality.

§ 40. Consequently, in our search for the activity which

has moral quality in itself, we are shut up to the volitions.
Volition has three constitutive elements, choice, intention,
effort.

This last, the effort, which is voluntary attention, is caused

by the motive, the desire that prevails, without alternative.
Hence the effort is a necessitated act, and so without moral
quality, in itself neither right nor wrong.
The first element, the choice, viewed simply as an act
apart from its specific character, is also causally necessitated
to take place or occur by the mere presentation of possible
alternatives ; I must choose between them. Hence the simple
act of choosing is in itself destitute of moral quality.
But the choice of one alternative rather than the other,
the taking this rather than that, is a fact uncaused, not neces-
sitated, free ; for herein is the specific characteristic and the
very essence of choice. In its resolution choice becomes
intention, the intention to do or forbear a certain action.
This central fact, the only fact in human nature or in nature
at large that is not caused to be what it is, this resolution,

this intention, purpose, design, this alone is capable of inhe-

rent moral quality.
An though not causally determined, is rationally
intention,
determined, is in accord with some one or more reasons.
Now the moral law furnishes a reason naturally and therefore
 EIGHT AND WRONG 55

rightly dominating all others, and since it is the intention

only that intelligently, impellingly, freely, preferably, con-
forms to or disregards moral law, it follows that the intention
properly has moral quality, is either right or wrong.
Moreover, since the all-dominating moral law, the ultimate
and absolute criterion of conduct, is addressed directly and
exclusively to choice becoming intention, it follows that the
intention is never morally indifferent, is always either right
or wrong; right, when it intelligently, reverently and will-
ingly conforms to the law ; wrong, when it knowingly violates
or merely disregards the law.
From these considerations it is manifest that the moral
law applies, not directly to the outward, expressed, objective
activity, but primarily and immediately to the inward, ante-
cedent, subjective intention. Hence, if we regard a trespass
as an action passing over from one person onto another, a
realization of an intention inflicting injury, the formula of
the moral law should be : Thou shalt not intend to do aught
that would involve a trespass. It will be better, however, to
regard a trespass as the total activity, including both the
subjective antecedents and the objective consequents, the
moral quality of this total residing in the intention.

§ 41. That moral quality is thus a constant property of

intention requires some further consideration, especially of
the distinction between the intention to do an act and the
ulterior intention with which it is done or the purpose.
There is a large class of offenses varying in degree from
extreme criminality to comparatively slight culpability, such
as murder, stealing, lying, betting, whose very essence is
trespass. Hence the intentional doing of an action of this
class iswrong; or, more closely, the intention to do it is
wrong, wrong in itself, being a radical violation of the law of
trespass. Complete, successful action is not requisite to
56 OBLIGATION

constitute guilt. An attempt, an overt act, though it fail, is

evidence of guilty intention, and therefore condemnable ; as

in the murderous contrivance of Guy Fawkes, and in the

villainous slander of Don John. A mere intention to do
the deed, an intention that, perhaps for want of opportunity,
never passes into overt action, is already a culpable violation
of the law. Now what is essentially wrong can never become
right, for this would be a contradiction. Hence any of this
class of intents can never be justified by an ulterior end,
however good, wise, benevolent this may be. No end can
sanctify such means. We may never do evil that good may
come.
Conversely, what is essentially right can never become
wrong. The intention to do an act that is right in itself
alone considered cannot be vitiated by an ulterior purpose,
however vicious this may be. Shylock did a righteous act in
the loan of the ducats ; it was his ulterior purpose that was
wicked.
There is another class of intents that, in themselves alone
considered, have no moral quality; as an intent to give
money, to take a walk, to write a letter, and very many oth-
ers. Such are usually spoken of as morally indifferent. But
an intent of this sort, being properly of a means to an end,
has the moral quality of the intended end imputed to it ; in
other words, the proposed end sanctifies or vilifies the pro-
posed means, this becoming right or wrong according to the
ultimate purpose, or the intention with which it is done. If
I propose to give money, which intent in itself has no moral
quality, with the further intent to relieve distress, the intent
to give becomes right ; if to buy becomes wrong.
votes, it
So the intended means takes its moral color from the in-
tended end ; for the intention in such case is to be judged
in its totality, not in its dependent parts ; it is dyed through-
out with a uniform hue.
 BIGHT AND WRONG 57

§ 42. The principle that moral quality is imputed to acts

which in themselves have none, is of wider application.
Let us recall the fundamental fact in human nature that
a free will is the primary condition of moral activity, is the
central essence of personality, and is most nearly identical
with the ego, is I myself. To it alone of my powers, that is

to me myself, the mandate of the moral law is addressed,

since by it alone am I able to direct my powers. For the
functional property of will is to control, according to its
freely formed intention, by means of attention, directly or
indirectly, all other elements of personality, as cognitions,
feelings, and muscular motions, awaking or stimu-
desires
lating or repressing their activity; and its obligation is to
exert this control according to the supreme moral law.
The mastery of the representative cognitions, of mediate
perception, memory, imagination and thought, is immedi-
diately accomplished by directing attention to this or that
object as one may choose. They thus have moral quality
imported into them, or imputed or attributed to them, accord-
ing to the intention. For the effort of attention is a passing
from the sphere of freedom into the sphere of causation or
necessity, and what shall take place in this sphere, being
determined by the freely formed intention, is marked by
the moral quality of the determinant, becomes essentially
right or wrong by imputation. I am morally obligated, for
instance, to exert and regulate my logical faculty in search
for truth, its proper object, especially for such truth as bears
upon conduct, lest an error lead to trespass. The moral
judgment, by inference from the moral principle, thus dis-
covers reasons determining intentional conduct, and so is

obligated, through the will, to a most patient and vigorous

exercise, which is also, because of this obligation, a righteous
exercise. Neglect of the obligation, or failure to fulfill it,

renders us responsible for our avoidable errors and their con-

sequences.
58 OBLIGATION

Inasmuch as feeling is correlated with knowing, our emo-

tions and sentiments are subject to indirect yet efficient con-
trol by means of the direct control of the cognitions with
which they coordinately cooperate. For, since we can at
will directly transfer attention from object to object, we are
able thus indirectly to induce or repress the feelings that
attend contemplation. These, therefore, have moral quality
imputed to them, those that are normal or orderly being
right, those that are abnormal or disorderly either in kind or
in degree being wrong. They can and should be controlled,
regulated, well-ordered. Because of its vast importance, let
belief be instanced. It is the feeling of conviction, the assur-
ance of physical or moral certainty that attends or is correla-

tive to the recognition of truth. Its opposites are the

feelings of doubt and disbelief. Now obviously, so far as
we are under obligation to search out attainable truth, thus
becoming responsible for our ignorance of what we could and
should know, just so far are we bound to believe and are
responsible for doubt or disbelief of attainable truth ; these,
indeed, being merely correlative statements. Hence we can
be and are reasonably commanded to believe authentic or
accessible truth ; the belief of it is right, the doubt or dis-
belief is wrong.
Likewise desires have imputed moral quality. Desire is

conditioned on real or imaginary objects of cognition ; con-

sequently comes and goes with their contemplation. Since
it

this is under direct control, the desire can be effectively

though indirectly regulated, and is right or wrong according
to the volition. But because desire directly solicits choice
and becomes the motive in effectuating the intention, it re-
ceives moral quality in a marked degree. For example,
covetousness, which may be taken as the type of abnormal
desire, is forbidden in the law, Thou shalt not covet ; the
only one of the Decalogue formally subjective. Thereby I
 BIGHT AND WRONG 59

am commanded to suppress covetousness whenever it instinc-

tively or spontaneously appears, much more am I forbidden to

incite and cherish it. I am required to choose, intend and
enforce its cessation ; for it is abnormal and evil, tending to
objective disorder and trespass. Therefore I do wrong to
allow it,and it becomes wrong by the allowance. Normal
desires, which within their limits not only are right in them-
selves, but constitute the very basis of all human rights,
become abnormal and evil by degree, either when weakened
by inattention to their objects, or when immoderate and inor-
dinate by excess. They then become wrong, because I do
wrong in neglecting or failing to regulate them.
External activities, the movements of the voluntary mus-

cles,and their proximate consequences, are, for like reason,

right or wrong by imputation. It is only by an observation
of his overt acts that one's mental states, thus expressed, can
be judged by other persons. Hence we correctly speak of
good deeds, bad habits, and the reverse, and approve or cen-
sure them; but always with reference, though tacit, to the
subjective intention.
It is a weighty and impressive truth that, not only our out-
ward conduct, but our innermost thoughts, imaginings, feel-
ings and desires, all at all times, are made by their intentions
right or wrong that we are responsible, not only for every
;

idle word, but for every idle thought or wish and that in ;

the perfected administration of moral government, all these

shall be brought into judgment. Who hath ears to hear, let

him hear.

§ 43. The many deeds that are essentially trespass, wrong

in themselves, are not known to be so intuitively, but only
by inference from the moral principle as an ultimate major
premise. Hence we are liable to error in judging them,
especially in the less obvious cases. The error arises from
60 OBLIGATION

an obscure or confused apprehension of the ultimate princi-

ple or law, or from an incomplete or inaccurate knowledge of
the particular case subsumed, or from bad logic in making
the deduction. Hence it sometimes happens that one sin-
cerely desiring to do right, having a motive and an ulterior
purpose that are right, honestly judging and believing that
what he is doing is right, may nevertheless be doing what is
wrong in itself, essentially, unalterably wrong.
Also it is true that every man in all cases is morally bound
to do what in his best judgment seems to him to be right.
In popular phraseology, he must obey his conscience is ;

doing right, if he acts conscientiously ; is wrong, if he vio-

late his conscience. Obviously it is implied that one should
carefully exercise his best ability in judging a case, bringing
to bear upon it all the light attainable, unobscured by predi-
lection, repugnance or passion; then, having done this, he
must conform his conduct to the result of his judgment. If
circumstances require a prompt decision, without time for
close consideration, then a habit of moral thought and a
familiarity with moral principles greatly enhance the proba-
bility of a correct decision; but in any case it is morally
necessary that he intend and do what his moral judgment
approves ; otherwise he becomes a willful offender.
Now, putting and that together, we have the moral
this
paradox, that one in doing what is wrong in itself may be
doing right. This is an inevitable consequence of the imper-
fections of moral judgment. Othello was bound by high
principles of honor, as he understood them and the case, to
commit uxoricide. The infanticide by the Hindu mother is
an act of piety. Saul as persecutor verily thought he was
doing God service. Conversely, one in doing what is right
in itself may be doing wrong. A judge in granting a right-
eous suit is doing what is right ; but if he do it merely to
escape annoyance or censure, or to entangle the plaintiff in
evil consequences, he is in the same act doing wrong.
 ;

RIGHT AND WRONG 61

This moral paradox involves imperfect persons in dreadful

responsibilities. We are answerable not only for wrong be-
lieved to be wrong, but for wrong believed and
to be right,
for right believed to be wrong. 'Tis a strait and narrow
way. A legal maxim holds that Ignorantia juris non excusat
but, in equity, ignorance or sincerity in a moral blunder pal-
a penitent, though it does not excuse, an
liates, especially in

offense,and so becomes a ground for mercy by a mitigation

or a transfer of punishment. Naturally we do not shudder
at the crime of Othello, as we do at those of Macbeth. Saul
obtained forgiveness because of ignorance. Divine mercy
dictated the prayer: Father forgive them; for they know
not what they do.
 ;

62 OBLIGATION

CHAPTER VII

JUSTICE

§ 44. Thus far the moral law has been considered chiefly
as prohibiting aggressive and injurious acts or lines of action.
The formula, Thou shalt not trespass, primarily forbids what-
ever unwarrantably interferes in another's liberty. Its cor-
recting effect is to put a strong positive check upon the
hindering activities of related persons, to the end that every
one may fully gratify his normal desires it restrains within
;

bounds the course of each, so that all others may freely exer-
cise their rightful license. This prohibitory sense is so obvi-
ous and emphatic that many who
under the law conceive
are
that by keeping within the prescribed bounds the demands
of the law are satisfied, that purity and innocence, which are
negatives, fulfill its behest, that to forbear injurious aggres-
sion is the sum of obligation.
But this is a very inadequate conception of the content of
the law, a law enjoining an order of facts that ought to be
enjoining in the negative sense of forbidding one class, and
enjoining in the positive sense of requiring another class. It

lays upon us the injunction both to refrain and to perform.

It says, Thou shalt not transgress stated bounds and by ;

necessary implication, it also says Thou shalt do many things

within those bounds. This positive requisition is not less
obligatory than the prohibition, and it is merely because of
the imperfection of language, unfitted to express both the
positiveand negative aspects of one and the same thought
or mandate in a single simple formula, that the one is appar-
ently more emphatic than the other.
 ;

JUSTICE 63

The necessary implication of active obligation is readily-

explicated. Trespass is effected either by commission or by

omission. That the one is direct, the other indirect, is not a
difference in essence, and either may be a wrong as heinous
and as fatal as the other. In the various relations of men,
every one has rightful claims upon the activities of others,
and they who omit to fulfill these claims commit a wrong, a
trespass. For, my willful omission of an act to which some
other has a right, is a violation of his right, is to leave him
under a restraint of his rightful liberty, which restraint I
am bound to remove. To be merely negligent, heedless,
thoughtless, careless of another's right to my action, is to
embarrass him more or less, is to interfere indirectly in his

liberty,and thus is to trespass on him. Therefore, to him

that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin.
The point here brought squarely to the front has been to
some extent anticipated in several In what follows
places.
we shall give it full and allow its weight to
recognition,
establish the equilibrium between forbearing and doing, which
equilibrium a correct conception requires. Thus it will
appear that the law of trespass rightly interpreted applies
exhaustively to the relations of man to man, and is compre-
hensive of every phase of obligation.

§ 45. The term justice is the abstract from the concrete

form just. To be just is to concede to everyone his rights
and justice is the concession of rights. This is the most
general sense. When a right consists in a specific claim on
the action or inaction of some one, the concession of a just
man implies his action or inaction in satisfaction of the claim.
Accordingly a distinction is sometimes laid down between
justitia interna, disposition to do right, and justitia externa,
rectitude of conduct. The opposite of justice is injustice,
which is to refuse or to neglect the concession, and of course
64 OBLIGATION

its actualization. Whoever is treated unjustly, be the injury

great or small, is thereby restrained, more or less, in his right-

ful liberty to gratify some normal desire, which restraint is

essentially a trespass.
Indeed it is quite obvious that injustice is trespass, and
trespass injustice ; and that the law forbidding trespass is a
law forbidding injustice. For, according to the moral princi-
ple, every one has a right, if not trespassing, to gratify his
normal desires ; .but it is impossible to have this gratification
in a multitude of cases except by concession of one's fel-
lows ; hence, if they withhold the concession, they disap-
point his desires, and nullify his claims. For example, I
have a right to the fulfillment of all formal contracts and of
all informal promises made to me, whether for money or ser-
vice, a right to the payment of all that is my due ; if the
debtor refuse, or any one hinder his payment, it is a tres-
if

pass, an injustice. Also I have a right to acquire knowledge,

property, social position and if any one hinder my effort,
;

or neglect due help, he does me a wrong. Again, I have a

rightful claim on my judgment on my char-
fellows for a fair
acterand conduct ; and to deny me the measure of honorable
esteem to which I am entitled is a gross injury to slander ;

me, one still more gross. Moreover, I am naturally a social

being and if, without warrant, my association with compan-
;

ions is prevented or disconcerted, my right is infringed, I

suffer a wrong, a trespass, an injustice. Thus injustice, or
its cognate injury, is as truly committed, indirectly, by with-
holding or perverting a right, as by directly inflicting damage.
Also it is evident that to prohibit injustice is to command
justice. The sole difference is in the negative and positive
expression of the same thing. The injunction, Thou shalt
not trespass, is identical with the injunction, Be thou just.

§ 46. Justice taken specifically, with reference to matters

 JUSTICE 65

involving gain or loss, is subdivided into corrective and dis-

tributive justice.
Corrective justice is fairness in exchange, or honesty in a
general sense. It is either voluntary, as in trade, in the
market, in commerce, in fulfilling contracts and promises, in
payment of debts, in remuneration for service rendered ; or
it is involuntary and rectoral, enforced by decrees of the
courts in civil cases, as in the settlement of suits, the award
of damages, the reparation of illegal trespass.
Distributive justice is distinguished from corrective by not
including the notion of exchange. It is the proper partition
of possessions and honors among members of society. It
corresponds to the notion of approbation or censure bestowed
in proportion to individual merit or demerit, to theaward of
prizes,and of penalties in criminal cases. When a man's
course in life entitles him to the esteem of his fellows, and
to such outward honors as express their valuation of his
worth, distributive justice requires that these be accorded.
From the recipient of a benefaction it requires gratitude. It
is violated by excessive adulation or by slander ; even by a
secret misjudging of another's worth. In case of overt in-

fraction of law it is satisfied rather than rectified by penalty.

§ 47. Justice, in the narrow sense of legal justice, is

administered by courts of law. The civil law, or else the

common law, and the statute law, which these courts apply
to cases, together with the forms by which their proceedings
are regulated and their decrees enforced, all have their imme-
diateground in the authority of the State, their ultimate
ground in human rights, and all are specific reductions of the
one law forbidding trespass, commanding justice. Jurispru-
dence, in general, is the science of rights as formulated and
sanctioned by governing powers. It is the science of enacted
law, investigating the principles common to all systems of
66 OBLIGATION

law. Morality enjoins obedience to the universal, natural

law, jus naturale, in all possible relations of men ; jurispru-
dence enjoins and exacts obedience to that law only in so far
as it is recognized and authorized in the enactments of the
State. Thus jurisprudence is a branch of ethics.
It is clear, then, that law-makers do not originate obliga-
tions ; their office is merely to interpret and formulate the
obligations already existing, and to enact special sanctions.
All laws, organic, municipal, military, international, all ordi-

nances, canons, edicts, decrees, treaties and arbitrations, have

the same ultimate basis, the moral law ; they must be just
to be obligatory. Jussum quia justum est. If the law-making
power, or, more generally, the constituted authority, depart
from its function, and promulgate laws or ordinances at vari-
ance with the one moral law, or for other ends than those of
public and private justice, or in disregard of the original and
inalienable rights of the subject, then the enforcement of such
laws and ordinances is unjust rule, is tyranny.
One an unrighteous law be
qualification is needful. If

not intolerably oppressive, and does not induce or sanction

an immorality in the subject, then he is morally bound to
obey it ; emanates from constituted authority, a
for, since it

refusal to obey would be a trespass on the State through its

accredited agents. The remedy is a repeal of the law. But
if a law be so unjust as to be intolerable, then there is appeal
to the higher law, jus naturale, by one as by Hampden, or by
many as by the English colonists in America. This is rebel-
lion, resulting perhaps in revolution.
The laws enacted by any human government, however
they may be elaborated and refined in the interest of thorough
justice, are nevertheless unavoidably inadequate and imper-
fect. They can effectually prohibit only the grosser forms of
wrong doing, and secure the practice of mutual justice only
in certain definite transactions, the vast majority of existing
 JUSTICE 67

obligations, many of the weightiest, being beyond the reach

of the courts. Moreover, in such cases as come under the
laws, and of which the courts of law take cognizance, it is
very often difficult and sometimes impracticable to determine

and administer strict justice. Yet, notwithstanding these

inherent defects, the laws and the courts of law are the tense
woof in the texture of social organization.

§ 48. Very early in the progress of civilization the prac-

tice of equity arose as a complementary extension of legality.
The ancients, in measuring building material of irregular
surface, used a flexible leaden rule. Equity, like a leaden
rule, bends to the specialities of each case, while the iron
rule of enacted law is inflexible. Circumstances alter cases,
and law rigidly applied may work injustice. Summum jus,
summa injuria. Laws are expressed in general terms, and
being framed with reference to ordinary cases, it often hap-
pens that the actual cases involve matter beyond their scope.
Moreover, there are many matters requiring adjudication for
which the laws make no provision. It is the part of equity
to supply such deficiencies by special action. Thence have
arisen courts of equity or courts of chancery, distinguishable
from courts of law. The decisions of a judge in equity are
regulated, when there is no binding precedent or statute, by
reference to the original principles of justice which give rise
to enacted laws ; hence his decisions are a species of legisla-

tion, judicial legislation. In the development and refinement

of common and statute law, many of the approved decisions
in equity have become incorporated in those systems and ;

equity itself, being more and more determined by precedent,

has become assimilated to the common law. Hence in many
of our States there is a fusion of official function, the same
court, sometimes on the same case, sitting now in law, now
in equity.
68 OBLIGATION

Casting off these limitations of its technical and juridical

sense, the exercise of equity in the common intercourse of
men is what is equal, fair and right. It
the doing is the
equitable between man and man, grounded on equal subjec-
tion to morallaw or equality of rights among men, whether
formulated in contracts, or existing in their merely natural
relations. The distinction between equity in this general
sense and the justice administered by the courts, that is,

between the claims of human charity or natural justice and

the claims of legal justice, corresponds nearly with the dis-
tinction between imperfect and perfect rights ; a distinction,
however, that is merely practical, not essential. Equity, in
itswide sense, and natural justice are coextensive, and both
are synonymous with right etymologically, the opposite of
;

justice is injury, of equity iniquity. The notion of equity

and justice limited to jurisprudence, is a narrow and inade-
quate view bounded by a rugged horizon ; but in their large
and proper meaning they expand over the whole sphere of
obligation, and are equivalent to rectitude and righteousness.

§ 49. Mercy is righteous forbearance toward an offender.

It implies kindness or gentleness, and is prompted by pity
or compassion. These feelings, when intense, are apt to
induce a sentimental aversion to the claims of strict justice.
Hence mercy is popularly supposed to be in opposition to
justice, implying a disposition to overlook injury, and to mit-
igate or even wholly remit the penalty that sanctions the
law. Such displacement of justice is not righteous forbear-
ance, and so is not true mercy, but a weak indulgence of
wrong that upholds license and works injustice. True mercy
forbears, whatever legal forms may allow, to exceed or to
abate the claims of natural justice.
Every man is necessarily a judge, not only of his own
actions, but also of those of his fellows. Whether his judg-
 JUSTICE 69

ment find utterance in words and deeds of requital or not, he

is bound to be just. Any excess of severity is injustice to
the subject; any abatement of righteous rigor is injustice

to society whose welfare is involved in the right judgment of

its members. Mercy is shown in forbearing to do or even to
think what is not strictly just.

The judge on the bench must be just. Usually, by the

very terms of the law which he is set to administer, he has a
measure of discretion but he must not transgress its sharply
;

defined bounds, and within these he is to use discretion, not

license. The range is allowed, not for the play of pity or of
resentment, but in order that he may mercifully adjust his
decree to the peculiarities of a case. Too great severity is

injustice to a party present; too great leniency is injustice

to societywhose interest he is empowered to guard. Judicial

mercy secures a righteous forbearance of trespass on either,
thus not merely coexisting but coinciding with strict justice.
The criminal law is merciful in holding the accused innocent
until proved guilty, and in giving him the benefit of doubt
which is but just. With a chief executive or sovereign is
lodged a pardoning power. This prerogative of clemency is
not for sentimental exercise, but for the equitable adjustment
of penal desert and general welfare. It is mercy, but also it

is justice.

Shall not the judge of all the earth do right ? Justice and
judgment are the habitation of his throne, mercy and truth
go before his face. He is long-suffering and of great mercy,
forgiving iniquity and transgression, yet in no case clearing
the guilty. Justice, no less than mercy, is an essential attri-

bute to God. He, as absolute sovereign, decrees unbounded

mercy to the penitent, and vindicates the claim of immutable
justice by a vicarious sacrifice. Such is the Christian scheme
such is divine mercy.
70 OBLIGATION

CHAPTER VIII

DUTY AND VIRTUE

§ 50. The obligations, both active and passive, laid upon

us in the moral law are duties. Duty is the name of a rela-
tion, and so requires two terms. Every duty is because of
something due from one person to another. It is the rela-
tion of debtor to creditor. Honesty, honor requires the pay-
ment of debt. The commercial meaning of dues or debts is

merely a specific application of the essential sense inherent

in these terms in their general application to every phase of
human obligation.
To withhold what is due another is a violation of his
right, is an unwarranted interference in his liberty of action,
is a trespass, and is But to
forbidden by the moral law.
forbid non-payment is to command payment.
Pay thy dues.
Owe no man anything. We must pay what we owe. We
ought to render to every man his own, that is, what we owe
him. These are but varied expressions of the one injunc-
tion, Trespass not, Be thou just, Do thy duty. Ethics may
fairly be defined as the science of duty.

§ 51. Right and duty are coextensive, merely different

aspects of the same notion. Right belongs to the action,
and is conformity to law. Duty belongs to the agent, and
is subjection to law. Hence they imply each other. That
whatever is duty is right, is quite evident. That whatever
is right is duty, is readily seen. For, each case as it arises

is subsumed under the law, or under rules, maxims of con-

duct, deduced from the law, and a conclusion is drawn as to
 DUTY AND YIBTTJE 71

what is right, what ought to be done. Now from given

premises, if the terms be unambiguous and the reasoning
correct, only one conclusion can follow, certainly not two or
more essentially different. Therefore, in every conceivable
situation there is for the moment one and only one course
that is right ; and this action alone being right it ought or
owes to be done. When an action is clearly conceived to be
right, that action and that alone is duty.
It is a corollary that duty is but another name for obliga-

tion, whose measure is found in the full application of the

whole law to the whole life. Also it follows that duties
never Often we are confused and in doubt as to
conflict.

the particular obligation, but of two possible acts, one being

right, the other is wrong. There
no "divided duty."
is

Moreover, it is wrong, ex vi termini, to do less than one

ought to do ; also it is wrong to do more for this is an ex-

;

penditure that due elsewhere for example, to overpay a

is ;

bill. Sometimes one ought to do all he can; he is never

bound to do more, but frequently less.
The essential identity of justice and right, and of injustice
and trespass, has already been indicated. Hence it suffi-
ciently appears that, right and duty being equivalent, justice
and duty are likewise equivalent terms. In a didactic treat-
ment of ethics, it is far less important to mark the shades of
distinction among these synonymous terms, a right, right,
justice, equity, mercy, obligation, duty, than it is to show
distinctly that, as to their essence, they are one and the same,
and that a violation of any one is a wrong, an injustice, a
trespass.

§ 52. An action conforming to moral law is a virtuous

action. This qualification implies a contrary inclination
overcome by will. It is the doing of justice, the perform-

ance of duty, in a particular case, wherein the agent was

72 OBLIGATION

tempted to disregard obligation by an opposed desire, against

which there was a voluntary struggle ending in its subjec-
tion. A
virtuous person is one with whom the voluntary
suppression of wrong desire is habitual, he subjecting him-
self uniformly to the law of duty, and thus molding his
character anew. Under the law of habit, that our faculties
acquire f acility and strength by exercise, the righteous desires
of the virtuous person prevail more and more uniformly,
while their opposites, denied the nourishment of gratifica-
tion,become weaker and suffer atrophy until, finally, when ;

and although all conflict, all struggle, has ceased, the victor,
because of his victory, is dubbed a perfectly virtuous person.
The abstract name of this mark is virtue. In general,
virtue is the conformity of will to the law discerned by prac-
tical reason or conscience. This definition implies that all

subjective activities are regulated, duly coordinated and sub-

ordinated, so that each fulfills its normal function ; thus
enabling objective activities to attain their highest efficiency.
Primarily it indicates the subjection of the craving to the
giving desires ; secondarily, the bringing of the members of
each class into harmonious cooperation. Otherwise there is

a continual strife, the lust of the flesh against the spirit and
disorderly preferences of each, that is incompatible with per-
fected virtue. Such entire harmony is perhaps an unattainable
ideal, but in human nature there is a native impulse toward
it, and an ability to approximate it. Virtue, then, is a pro-
ficiency in willing what is conformed to practical reason,
developed from the state of natural potentiality by practical
action.

§ 53. The cardinal virtues, as commonly listed, are forti-

tude, prudence, temperance and justice. The distribution

originated with the Greek philosophers, and still holds in
modern literature. They are called cardinal, because the
 BUTT AND VIBTUE 73

specific virtues hinge on them, and indeed they seem to be

conditions rather than kinds of virtue. Each may be con-
sidered a fountain from which virtues flow. The Pythag-
oreans and Plato regard fortitude, prudence and temperance
together as the source of justice, and justice as the genius of
all duty, of all virtue, the perfection of human nature and
of human society. With Aristotle also, justice is perfect
virtue," yet not absolutely, but in reference to others. In
this wide sense we have used the term justice, viewing it as
the sum which are but variations upon its
of all virtues,
essence, and are universally prescribed in the concrete com-
mandment, Be thou just.

§ 54. The man who disregards moral law, or in whom the

desire to weak, passes, by frequently yielding to
do right is

temptation, under the dominion of other desires. Especially

the appetites are likely, by reckless indulgence, to acquire
abnormal vigor, and drive the weakened will helplessly into
gross excesses. The appetencies, in men of higher order,
may take control, producing the refined voluptuary, the
avaricious seeker after material wealth, the secluded scholar
absorbed in the pursuit of " knowledge for its own sake," or
the unscrupulous ruler ambitious of irresponsible power.
The will, whose function it is to regulate these constitutional
powers, restraining their exercise, and determining natural,
which is normal and moral order, forsakes this high office,
and becomes their servant. Thus the man is enslaved by
his passions. His moral sense is deafened by their clamor,
his actions are determined by their impelling energy, his
independent self-mastery is lost, and his freedom is limited to
a choice among contending masters and forms of obedience.
To prevent or to escape from such degraded and deplora-
ble condition, one must, by good-will working in the light of
conscience, bring all his powers into subjection to moral law.
74 OBLIGATION

This regulation will give play to the faculties in their natural

relationsand proportions, which is the essence of right action,
and will determine uniformity of fit conduct, which is moral
order, the order of facts that ought to be. Such virtuous
rectification secures peace, harmony, and the dignity of moral
excellence.
The virtue that brings our activities into due conformity
with moral law is usually posited as the necessary condition
of soul-liberty, and perfected virtue is identified with per-
fected liberty. In surmounting his passions and inclinations,
one becomes a freedman, a freeman and a master. The sage,
said the Stoics, feels but is without passion, he is not indul-
gent but just to himself and to others, he alone attains to
the complete performance of duty, and thus he alone is free. 1

This is the common doctrine of moralists at the present day,

and we are exhorted to the exercise of morality because of
the worth of liberty.
The liberty thus acquired is independence of unrighteous,
discordant and distracting rulers. The virtuous man is freed
from the dominion of overweening inclinations, of unholy
lusts and passions. It is an ideal state, exciting our admira-
tion and emulation. But this liberty is merely relative, not
absolute. In breaking loose from subjective bondage, we
pass under the objective bondage of law, an exchange of one
bondage for another. All language supports this view. We
are bound to do duty, obliged or under obligation to be just,
forbidden to trespass, and must submit to many pains in
fulfilling the demands of an inexorable law, constant vigi-
lance being the price of impunity. This is not liberty, but
rigorous bondage. It is a voluntary bondage, one that ex-
pands and ennobles our powers, satisfies the all pervading
and overwhelming sense of duty, and harmonizes the man
with himself and with universal order. Still it is bond-

age. Strict morality is strict subjection. Absolute liberty is

incompatible with law.

 SELFISHNESS 75

CHAPTER IX
SELFISHNESS

§ 55. Names of mental states with the prefix self abound

in speech and literature. A few are, self-approbation, self-

condemnation, self-denial, self-control, self-esteem, self-abhor-

rence, self-love. Many of this class of expressions probably

have their origin in the fictitious idea of an alter ego. The
human mind subjectively distinguishes between the ego as
conscious and the ego as represented. The former, the con-
sciousness of self, is an element in every feeling, is essential
to the existence of any feeling, and is itself recognized as a
feeling. The latter, the representation of self, is a normal
and habitual cognition, wherein the ego contemplates itself
as an object, distinguishes itself from itself, and views this
subjective object as though it were really another self, an
alter ego. The idea of an alter ego is strengthened by a
conflict of desires ; the opposed impulses, being a pair, are
personified as two selves. Moreover, the mind regards the
objectified and personified self as a possession of the wholly
subjective self, and capable of being affected by it, which

finds expression in such familiar phrases as one's self, control

yourself, I hold myself responsible, and the The two
like.

are identified in the phrases I myself, he himself, we our-

selves, they themselves.
This distinction between the conscious ego and the repre-
sented ego, is unreal, inasmuch as it contravenes the essential
unity of the ego. Evidently, in thought it is a fiction, in
speech a metaphor. Hence, although it is a natural, a normal
76 OBLIGATION

mode of mind, there is need of caution lest it mislead us to

commit the fallacy of figure of speech.

§ 56. The name self-love is commonly used to denote that

longing for gratification which marks the craving desires
when their end is self. But love is essentially a desire to
benefit some other one, and this is contrary to the benefit of

self. It necessarily implies a relation between two ; in self

there is really and literally but one. The compound word
self-love is, therefore, a contradiction in terms, absurd literally,
and can be allowed only as a metaphor derived from the fan-
ciful idea ofan alter ego.
But self-love is merely a misnomer, for the reality of the
thing thus absurdly named is unquestionable. It is self-
interest, or simply interest, egoism, selfishness, the opposite
of love. For while love is desire to impart, interest is desire
to profit. Egoism makes self the end, seeking one's own
enjoyment and welfare at cost of or in disregard of another's.
Psychologically it is the supremacy of the craving desires,
the appetites and appetencies, over the affections either dis- ;

regarding these, or neglecting their call, or what is worse, a

more intense and refined egoism, making the affections sub-
serve self. Clearly the term self-love is a euphemism, filch-
ing the name of love to sanctify what in truth is its contrary,
interest, egoism, selfishness. That, however disguised, it is
to be condemned, will sufficiently appear in the sequel.
Closely related to the notion of self-love, is that of duty
to self. Can I literally owe myself anything? Can I owe
myself a dollar ? How is it to be paid ? By passing it from
one pocket to another ? Can I in any manner or measure be
indebted to myself ? Is anything due me from me ? Duty
is essentially the name of a relation between two I myself ;

am but one. I cannot possibly be in debt except to some

other one. Hence the phrase duty to self is, in its terms,
 :

SELFISHNESS 77

self-contradictory and absurd. It, too, originates in the

fancied alter ego, to whom the ego is said to be indebted as
to another person. Clearly it is a metaphor, and deductions
from the generic law of duty to this as a species of duty
commit the subtle fallaeia figurce dietionis. As in the phrase
love of self, so in the phrase duty to self, we detect selfish-
ness again masquerading, now in the guise and under the
sacred name of duty.

§ 57. But aside from terms the important question arises

Does not moral law command motives and actions that are
selfish, that is, such as find in self an end ? Moralists very
generally answer affirmatively, and recognize a wide and
weighty class of obligations terminating in self, having re-

spect exclusively to self, impelled by self-love, and usually

entitled duties to self. For example, they teach that every
one owes it to himself to be temperate, that moderation, as
opposed to excess in all things, is a duty to one's self, for the
sake of one's own personality, and in order to self-culture.
Popular speech also quite commonly recognizes, and is dis-

posed to emphasize, duties to self, usually holding them para-

mount. It is heard in the every-day phrases, I owe it to my-
self, he was bound in justice to himself so to do, and the like.

Postponing for the present a direct argument of the ques-

tion, we here observe merely that, if a man be morally bound
in any case whatever to make himself an *end, or in other
words, if there be any real thing answering to the lame
phrase duty to self, then the moral law as heretofore formu-
lated in this treatise is quite inadequate. For trespass
necessarily implies at least two parties, and the given inter-
pretation of duty and of justice, though very wide, presumes
always a relation between two. Obviously, then, our view
of moral obligation, in its widest comprehension, does not
include the notion of duties to self, indeed it excludes self
as an end.
 ;

78 OBLIGATION

And truly there is no duty to self. In this case the phrase

is not merely a misnomer, for there is nothing corresponding
to it in any admissible sense. Self is never, can never be a
moral end, but on the contrary, all selfishness or egoism is
violation of moral law. Duties, obligations universally relate
to others, and selfishness is sin.

§ 58. Let us briefly examine one or two of the duties usu-

ally classed as duties to self, and indicate their altruistic
interpretation.
Temperance, or the control of appetites and passions,
bringing them into conformity with reason, subjecting them
to moral law, is commonly cited as one of the most compre-
hensive and prominent duties to self. Is it my duty to be
temperate ? Certainly. It is a cardinal virtue. Is it a duty
I owe to myself in order to the perfection of my character ?
Is it a discipline in the process of self-culture for the sake
of my personal excellence? Assuredly, say nearly all the
moralists, both ancient and modern, it finds in self its end.
To be temperate is a primal duty, a weighty obligation
but it is strictly a duty, an obligation, to others.
I owe to
God, my maker
and highest benefactor, to modulate into
harmony the powers he has given me, that I may fulfill the
mission on which he has sent me, and accomplish the work
he has assigned me in the world. I ought to be temperate,
husbanding my energies, that I may serve my family, my
neighbor, the community, the state, mankind, as fully and
completely as possible. Unless I be temperate, I cannot pay
these dues. Moreover, I ought to be an example, in this
golden mean, to my fellows, inclining them to its practice.
Temperance is one of the highest obligations. It is the top
round in the ladder of Christian graces. It ennobles. Still
it is due, not to self, but to those around.
The pursuit of truth for the sake of truth is regarded as a
 SELFISHNESS 79

refinedand noble avocation. " Knowledge for its own sake "
is a high sounding phrase; but it is merely a euphemism

concealing the reality, which is knowledge for one's own

sake, a refined selfishness.But the worth of knowledge is
in its power and he who possesses it in large meas-
for good,
ure is a king among men. Every one is in duty bound to
increase his stores, solely that he may thereby more effi-
ciently promote the welfare of the present and the coming
generations.
Much the same may be said of the duty of preserving life

and health and strength. These belong not to me save in

trust. They belong my
relatives and friends, to mankind.
to
I am a guardian and agent. So of the duty of physical,
mental and moral culture. I am bound to account with
usury for the talents intrusted to me. So of cleanliness,
decency, modesty, propriety, in private as well as in public.
So of the preservation of my personal dignity and self-respect,
of my honor, sincerity and truthfulness. Even the indul-
gence of innocent pleasures should be primarily for recrea-
tion, preparing me for renewed efficiency in paying my
dues. The supply of necessities should ever be governed
by the same general purpose, so that whether we eat or
drink, or whatsoever we do, let all be done for others' sake.

§ 59. This doctrine is not ascetic, but altruistic. It trans-

fers the end of all right action from an exclusive self to its

fellows. All righteous conduct is disinterested, unselfish.

The moral law, Trespass not, or Be just, or Do duty, is

equivalent Withhold no due, but bestow in due measure.

to,

We say in due measure, for not all giving is righteous; a

lavish or a disproportionate distribution of means or of ser-
vice is wrong, being an expenditure that is due elsewhere.
The virtuous exercise of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, when
clearly understood, is not the giving up of what one has a
 ;

80 OBLIGATION

right to retain and enjoy, but the yielding to another his due,
discharging his rightful claim, according to him a right of
which he is perhaps quite ignorant. Truly it is a parting
with what I might keep, but what I have no right to keep.
It is free, unconstrained justice.
While the chief, indeed the only end of life is usefulness,
the promotion of the welfare of those to whom some one is

related in accord with the relations, he is not thereby ex-

cluded from participating in the benefaction. The law, by
this doctrine, forbids his making himself alone the end, and
requires his regard and intent to be constantly beyond him-
self ; but it does not prohibit his sharing, as a member of a
community of two or more, the welfare he promotes. It
does not require self-abnegation, nor entire self-forgetfulness,
but that the inclination, the impulse, the motive and the
intention be altogether benevolent.
It is a fact that in the judgment of mankind, for some rea-
son or other, the practice of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, the

exercise of affection, is held in high esteem, is accounted

generous, noble, even heroic, and receives the warmest praise
while, on the other hand, selfishness, exclusive or excessive
regard for one's own, is accounted ignoble, ungenerous, mean,
and is heartily condemned. Disinterested motives and con-
duct are always praised ; interested motives and conduct are
always blamed. Why is this? Is it a delusion? Is it

merely because when my neighbor works in his own interest,

I have less of his help in mine ? If so, then it is merely my
selfishness that prompts me to condemn his. Is there not
some less degrading, some better reason for the universal
condemnation of interested action, and the universal appro-
bation of disinterested service ? Surely there must be, for I
judge after this manner of the conduct of the ancients, whose
conduct cannot possibly affect me. Yet there is a school of
moralists holding that disinterestedness is a delusion, that
 :

SELFISHNESS 81

human nature is incapable of a purely disinterested action,

that all conduct resolves, in the last analysis, into selfnseek-
ing. It is undeniable that selfishness generally prevails and
is dominant. But let us distinguish between the actual and
the potential, and heartily deny the impossibility of disinter-
estedness. Nay more, let us hold that purely disinterested
conduct has sometimes been actually experienced, and also
observed, and that it is truly the culminating perfection, the
realization of ideal humanity.

§ 60. The thesis is presented in the following questions

Why is it that the affections, the giving desires, have a right-
ful supremacy over the appetites and appetencies, the craving
desires ? Why is it that the moral law enjoins the practice
of affections, impulses to benefit others, and forbids the in-
dulgence of impulses craving a gain for self as an end ? The
reason lies deep in human nature.
Let
it be granted that all constitutional desires have natu-

ral and therefore rightful aims, and should harmonize, thus

sustaining each other in their normal functions. Also, that
craving and giving are contraries, whence a conflict between
appetency and affection, which two therefore do not accord
but are in constant and inevitable discord, unless one become
subservient to the other. That our desires should be brought
into functional harmony, will hardly be denied. That this
harmony can be attained only by the subservience of one or
the other class, is evident. Which is entitled to supremacy ?
Now suppose affection be made to subserve interest. What
is the consequence ? The impulse to benefit another is ob-
scured under the impulse to benefit self. I treat my friend
with apparent and professed affection, using the manner and
language of friendship, my real intent being to obtain for
myself a gain. Perhaps I indulge my generous impulses in
order to cultivate my generosity, a virtue I desire to possess
82 OBLIGATION

in myself. Evidently this is egoism or selfishness doubly re-

fined,and therefore doubly odious. I degrade my friend

into a mere means for my own profit, and so dishonor and
wrong him. I do it under the form, and name, and profession
of love, when in reality it is the contrary, base, self-seeking
hypocrisy. If there be one character the most despicable of
all, it is the hypocrite, he whom our Lord denounces in his
most scathing terms.
But such procedure is something more than hypocrisy.
It is the extinction of half of one's nature, of his affections.
For, if I confer a benefit on my neighbor solely in order to
benefit myself, this does not merely subject love to interest,
since love is then no longer love, but simply interest. Love
has ceased to be, and I am wholly, exclusively selfish. This
is not the subordination and subservience of affection to
appetency, but the complete suppression and extinction of
affection. A large part of the normal nature of the man dis-

appears, and he stands in opposition to all his fellows. It is

universal war every man's hand against every other.
; Surely
this is not the way to personal excellence, to perfection of
character. Surely this violates the law. It is amazing that
many moralists should hold it obligatory to cultivate our
affections to the end that we may thereby perfect our own
personality, thus advocating a principle which would result
in the extinction of affection, and produce a character abso-
lutely selfish.

§ 61. Suppose, on the contrary, the craving desires be

made subject to the affections. What follows? Are they
likewise extinguished ? Not at all. It is easy to understand
how my appetency may, without loss, be made to subserve
the ends of affection, craving various objects, not for my own
sake as the end, but for the sake of those on whom I would
bestow my energies and gains. Thus I may seek pleasure as
 SELFISHNESS 83

a recreation, as a means of refreshing my powers for more

efficient service. I may strive, with great earnestness and
activity, to acquire property and increase my wealth, not
from the miser's desire to possess, nor the voluptuary's desire
to enjoy, but in order that I may bestow on others the bene-
fits wealth commands, reserving for myself only such portion

as is needful for further beneficence. I may cultivate my

intellect, not for the sake of proficiency, but of efficiency.
Further illustration is superfluous. But let us add, I may
desire power in order to greater usefulness ; and I may desire
reputation, the esteem of my neighbors, or even fame, simply
because my influence in favor of the welfare of others is

therein extended. Evidently the craving desires may crave

in order to give, that is, they may become entirely subject to
the affections, and so far from being extinguished, they are
thereby refined and ennobled, and their activity enlarged.
We conclude that, since the subjection of the affections
would quench them, but the subjection of the appetencies
would advance them, the affections have rightful supremacy.
Furthermore it follows that the right growth of character
consists largely in this subjection of selfish propensities to
the unselfish, and in so directing the former that they be no
longer interested, but disinterested.
If it be objected that there are occasions for the exercise
of affection, and other occasions for self-indulgence, the
answer is easy. The claims of near relatives, of friends,
of neighbors, of country, of mankind, of God, upon my means
and energies, are paramount and exhaustive. Paramount,
because these are dues, debts, duties, to be paid before self-

gratification ; exhaustive, since the totality of a devoted life

fails to requite their righteous demands. Hence no hour, no

dollar is my own to spend upon myself alone, regardless of
my overwhelming indebtedness, of my unremitting and end-
less obligations.
84 OBLIGATION

It must be allowed that the scheme of character and con-

duct here proposed, is ideal, a high ideal, unattained and
unattainable by any man. It calls for a declaration of truce-

less and internecine war upon selfishness. But selfishness so

interpenetrates, in its many and sacred guises,
subtle forms
the human soul, interweaving its delicate fibers and gilded
threads throughout our better nature, that to unravel and
wholly displace it seems impossible. The best of men, those
morally most refined, are still more or less influenced by
selfish propensities, and occupied with self-seeking. But to
approximate, as nearly as may be, the moral ideal, is the true
struggle of a noble life.
 SERVICE 85

CHAPTER X
SERVICE

§ 62. The three expressions of the law already considered,

Trespass not, Be jnst, Do duty, upon a liberal yet fair inter-
pretation, taking each in both its positive and its negative
sense, are evidently coextensive and have the same content.
This will be allowed. But their common extension may per-
haps be understood to be limited to the obligation to do no
harmful injury to another, either positively by direct aggres-
by reserve of what he may justly demand.
sion, or negatively
Practicallymost persons take this view, holding that, if one
commit no hurtful trespass, pay promptly his manifest dues,
be just in thought and deed, by this simple innocence his
obligations are completely fulfilled. Many a man holds him-
self acquitted before the tribunal of his own moral judgment,
before that of his fellow men, and of his final judge, pro-
vided he can truly say he has committed no wrong, meaning
thereby that he has done no violence to patent rights, and
awarded to every one his established claims. This seems to
have been substantially the doctrine of the Stoics. It is a
high estimate of duty, and one rarely accomplished. Never-
theless, if the notion be thus limited, it is safe to affirm there
are obligations higher than duty. But the indicated limita-
tion is by no means clear, the line cannot be sharply drawn,
and hence it is better to extend the notion of duty to include
these higher and wider obligations.
Recurring to the moral principle, a man* has a right to
gratify hisnormal desires, we observe that not merely the
 ;

86 OBLIGATION

acquiescence, but the assistance, of his fellows, is essential

to this gratification. No man can live for himself alone.
Apart from his natural longing for social intercourse, there
are necessities that can be supplied only by the concurrence
of those around, and in addition to necessities, there are many
native and normal wants that require the cooperation of
others. Here, then, is a just claim upon their assistance,
upon their service. It is his right, and if withheld, he suf-
fers trespass. The service cannot be compulsory, from lack
of power, except in rare cases, and therefore must be free,
willing service. Now rights are reciprocal. If some one
have a rightful claim upon some other for free service, then
this other has a like claim upon him ; not, however, by way
of repayment, of compensation, but because such claim is
original with either. Hence no man may live for himself
alone. Every one is morally bound to render, within certain
limits, willing service to his fellow men. It is due them
free, willing service is duty.

§ 63. The obligation to render mutual service is univer-

sally recognized among men. In all the relations of life, this
duty, though so imperfectly fulfilled and often grossly vio-
lated, is nevertheless judged by all to be binding on all, and
its observance to be an essential part of righteous living.
The prompting of instinct, antecedent to moral inference, is

decisive in the matter. Imagine an extreme case. Suppose

yourself standing on the brink of deep water in which a
stranger is drowning, and it needs only that you reach out
your hand to save him. Ought not you to do it ? If you
withhold the hand, and disregarding his cries for help and
his manifest need, allow would not your in-
him to drown,
action be instinctively self-condemned and condemned by all
as inhuman ? Suppose him to be your friend, or your only
brother and, further, suppose that by letting him drown you
;
 SERVICE 87

shall obtain the whole instead of half the inheritance would ;

not even hesitation be intensely vile ? Ought not a man to

help his brother, his father, his mother, his child, his neigh-
bor, his fellow man ? There is but one answer in any candid
mind, but one among all cultured peoples.
Again, let us suppose the drowning man to be known as a
worthless vagabond, or even as a dangerous criminal whose
death would be a blessed relief to his family, and to society
— let him drown? No. Is it to give him time to repent
and reform ? Hardly. Suppose him, on the contrary, to be
a godly man, afflicted with painful incurable disease, a dis-
tressing burden to himself, and to everybody else let him —
drown? No. Stretch forth thy hand. Help, in the name
of common humanity. The obligation of helpfulness has no
other condition. It is binding in every personal relation.
Setting aside the differences in concrete cases, there remains
the common, imperative principle : Thou shalt serve.
We have here another form of the law, but let it be ob-
served, not another law. The law is one. The several forms
may be viewed as progressing in comprehension, the second
including the first, but wider, and so on, until this last ex-
pands to embrace the larger duty of man. That it includes
the others is evident, for he who rightly serves will not
trespass, and will pay his just dues. But it is preferable to
interpret each as coextensive with the others, only presenting
a different phase. Thus it may fairly be regarded as a tres-

pass, as injustice, as undutiful to withhold helpful service,

the moral law being comprised and expressed in the formula
Serve thy fellows.

§ 64. To serve is to promote the welfare of another. He

who does this is a servant. The term as applied to menials
has acquired rather a bad sense, especially when the service
is compulsory, and the cognate word servile is distinctly
 ;

88 OBLIGATION

opprobrious. But no bad sense, indeed only the contrary,

colors the notion of voluntary service, and of this we are
speaking. To serve is to confer a benefit, and he who does
this is a benefactor. A teacher is a servant, though we call
him a master. He is a servant directly of his pupils, indi-
rectly of his employers, of the public, of posterity. Poli-
ticians proclaim themselves servants of the people, which
truly is their office, though the profession be insincere.
Husband and wife, parent and child, mutually subserve each
other's interests.
A servant is a minister, and this Min-
is a title of honor.
isters of religion are servants of the Church, and as such are

justly honored and reverenced. To become a Minister of

State is to attain the highest official rank. The Prime Min-
ister of Great Britain holds a place of exalted dignity. The
motto of the Prince of Wales, descending to him from the
Black Prince, is Hdj trim, I serve, and perhaps no heraldic

cognizance is more widely known, or more frequently quoted.

A king on his throne is rightly the servant of his subjects
and the very King of kings pronounced himself a lowly ser-
vant, coming not to be ministered unto but to minister, and
because of his humble service to humanity, he has the highest
throne.
All service implies sacrifice. In reaching forth my hand
to save a drowning brother, there is some expenditure of
mental and neural energy, perhaps not measurable, but real.
No service can be rendered without sacrifice, without giving,
imparting what is in one's keeping. Hence the law of ser-
vice is a law of sacrifice. Culture, in general, is preparation
for yielding a return ; specifically, as the cultured field is capa-
ble of yielding fruits, so the cultivated man is one prepared,
by what he has acquired, to render services. When a sacri-
fice is complete and directed to a noble end, we call it heroic.

The very essence of heroism is the entire sacrifice of self for

 SERVICE 89

the sake of others. It is the object of unbounded admiration

and praise. In ancient days it became distinctly a cult.
But heroes and hero worship are not peculiar to antiquity,
for always and everywhere the heart of humanity responds
to the call. The heroic sacrifice of the great servant of all
is commanding, not merely the admiration, but the adoration
of mankind.

§ 65. The constant service demanded by moral law is not

to be indiscriminate. One is not to serve all others equally.
Our obligations to our fellows vary very greatly in extent.
To near relatives we are bound for more service than to those
further removed ; first, because the possibilities are greater
secondly, because service creates debt, and where intercourse
is intimate the exchange of benefactions more frequent; is

and husband and wife,

thirdly, because in certain cases, as of
the minute interdependence calls for minute reciprocation.
The extent of obligation is to be judged by the law of tres-
pass. My service is due to one in so far as I do not thereby
trespass on the rightful claims of some other. I may, for
example, distribute my fortune in alms so widely as to violate
the rights of my children. Likewise I am bound to promote
the general welfare of the state only in so far as I do not
thereby trespass on the rights of individual citizens, or of
neighboring states, either by encroachment, or by transferring
to either the service due to the other.
Moreover, it should be particularly observed that the alien
service required does not preclude the agent from participat-
ing in the benefit conferred. When a man labors for the
welfare of his family without thinking of or caring for his
own individual profit, still, as a member of the family, he
shares in the beneficence. When one serves the community
or his country, either by promoting or by defending the com-
mon interests, it is evident that, since the interests are
 ;

90 OBLIGATION

common, he thereby enlarges his own liberty, and guards his

own well being. If he does these things selfishly, himself
his end, then he meanly degrades his family, his country, so
far as in his power lies, to merely useful means ; which treat-
ment is unworthy, is a trespass, whatever be the result. But
if, with no thought of his own interest or gain, he does those
things unselfishly, making perhaps many painful personal
he shares in the beneficial
sacrifices, still results, is repaid
and rewarded and even should his efforts
; fail, he neverthe-
less enjoys the satisfaction of disinterested intent. Moral
law does not prohibit any one from acting in a way that shall
benefit himself, but only from thus acting in order that he
may benefit himself.
These modifying considerations forestall the criticism usu-
ally and justly applied to strict altruism, that if every one
should be constantly sacrificing his own welfare for that of
others, there would be no permanent recipient of benefaction,
and the perfection of morality on this basis would be not
only a universal disregard of welfare, but also its annihila-
tion. But according to the modified altruism of the present
treatise, moral law does not call for such absolute self-sacri-

fice, for the extinction of the natural and healthful desire for
one's own welfare. It forbids this only as a personal end
and the gratification of the desire is provided for, in the
economy of human nature, by the community of interests, so
that whatever promotes the welfare of another redounds to
the benefactor; for, although, in the existing disorder of
society, the objective return fail entirely, still the subjective
sanction is abundant reward.

§ 66. In view of the right to service arises the question,

in what manner and to what extent may one use another
person. According to Kant, never as a means, but only as
an end. He says: "The foundation of this principle is:
 SERVICE 91

Rational nature exists as an end in itself. . . . Accordingly

the practical imperative will be as follows : So act as to treat
humanity, whether in thine own
person or in that of another,
in every case as an end withal, and never as a means only."
He argues that to make use of another person as a means
whereby to accomplish one's end, degrades him from a person
into a mere thing, thus violating his dignity, his worth as a
man. Since this is to wrong him grievously, he should be
treated only as an end in himself.
The doctrine is striking, and with qualification it is true.
We should never use another as a means, unless with his
own full knowledge and free consent. If, without this, I
myself be used as a mere tool, then, on discovering it, I am
indignant, feeling I have been treated unworthily, degraded
and wronged, according to the measure of the abuse. But
with the consensus of all parties, the using each other as
means to rightful ends is justifiable. Indeed, the greater part
of the amenities of life, the enjoyment and benefit of social
intercourse, kindness, politeness, could not otherwise exist.
Such reciprocal use does not degrade, it ennobles; and by
consenting to become an instrumental means, one becomes a
participant in beneficence. This privilege of using others is

limited also to rightful ends. One may never seek to use

another even with consent in a way or to an end that is
wrong for this would be inducing him to become a partner
;

in wrong doing, which would be doing him a wrong. The

point in Kant's doctrine that I should make myself in mine
own person an end, we have previously rejected as the essence
of egoism. On the contrary, I ought ever and actively to
constitute myself an intelligent and willing means to the
welfare of others, which is altruism.

§ 67. A very important corollary from the general doc-

trine of obligatory service is stewardship. Since unintermit-
92 OBLIGATION

ting service is due from each one to others, according to his

relations," it follows that his time, his energy, his ability, his
capital, his estate, whatever he may have in possession or
acquire, is in reality not his own, but the property of those
others, and he himself is their steward. The transient in-
fluence one may have on his surroundings, his daily walk and
conversation, his health of mind and body, his life itself as
the basis of all, these are held in trust, and are to be devoted
to the well being of his fellow men! They are the owners;
he, their agent. All is due, all is debt, ever paying, never
paid. Not less is comprehended in the law of service.
We are bound, as trustees, not merely for the keeping,
but also for the increase, the accumulation of our holdings.
One's talents, whether of gold, silver or iron, of brain, brawn,
bone, of intellect, sensibility, will, are all, whether great or
small, to be put to usury, and a strict account rendered.
The servant who kept up in a napkin
his Lord's pound laid
was condemned wicked servant. Possessions are to be
as a
used, and used rightly, imbursed and disbursed, as dictated
by the law of service, which demands a continuous distribu-
tion of our gifts.
A further corollary is the obligation to guard and to de-
fend possessions. Obviously one is bound to secure what is

intrusted to his keeping against all comers, otherwise he can-

not fulfill the obligation to use it in alien service. Guardian-
ship is itself a service, since it preserves for others their
property, which preservation is, indeed, a very necessary part
of the general service due. Hence my rights are to be
watchfully and zealously guarded. The property in my
hands must be carefully protected, to prevent any trespass.
My personal liberty must be maintained free from unwar-
ranted interference. My bodily welfare, and especially my
life must be courageously defended against hurtful and
deadly violence. The powerful instinct of self-preservaticn
 SERVICE 93

indicates the sacred duty of self-defense, and the original

impulse of natural affection shows the no less sacred duty of
defending the lives intrusted to our care. Violence must be
repelled, if need be, by counter violence. But defense
should not be allowed to pass over, as it strongly tends to
do, into mere vengeance. The impulse to revenge is a male-
volent desire, and hence abnormal, and hence unjustifiable.
Yet retaliation is sometimes the best and indeed the only
means of effective defense, in which case it is duty.

§ 68. We can imagine a life conducted throughout accord-

ing to the principles thus far expounded. One might con-
ceivably be governed, in general and in particular, by a
sense of duty, duty being here taken in the limited meaning
of outward obedience to the law of trespass, justice and ser-
vice, inspired by respect for the law, recognized as demand-
ing thus much but no more. The whole life being one of
innocence and beneficence, duty is said to be perfectly ful-
filled by this external conformity to the law simply out of
respect for the law, a profound reverence for all pervading
moral obligation, and this alone is what should determine all

human conduct.
The rigorism of this stoical doctrine is impressive and
imposing. It is a severe and noble conception of duty, a
high ideal. But observe, it does not merely disregard the
affections ; it requires their suppression. If we judge a man
to be governed in all his conduct by a sense of duty, fulfill-

ing carefully, anxiously, assiduously his many obligations,

living a life of sacrificial service, purely because of respect
for the law of duty, we are filled with admiration for so lofty
a character ; we judge him at the same time destitute
but if

of love, we admire him as we admire an iceberg. There is

an instinctive repugnance to a person human, yet not hu-
mane. And if we find he has laboriously extinguished the
94 OBLIGATION

yearnings of natural affection in favor of an overruling and

exclusive conception of absolute duty, we turn from him as
from a monstrous and repulsive prodigy.
The sense of duty, rising high but stopping with good
works, fails to fulfill the law's demands. In the moral ideal
of humanity, there is something higher than this rigid stoi-
cism. Were I sick and suffering, and did my friend serve
me merely from a sense of duty, I should be displeased, I
would tell him to begone, I will hire a nurse. Is it suffi-
cient for a father to guard and promote the welfare of his
child simply out of respect for his rational obligation? Shall
a mother tend her babe with all the wonderful, beautiful
solicitude and ready self-sacrifice that wins our adoration,
merely because she knows she ought so to do ? No, there
is a higher, nobler impulse, maternal love. Should a hus-
band and wife serve each other merely from a sense of duty,
it would be a just cause of dissatisfaction, and perhaps of

disunion. The conception of duty, enlarged beyond inno-

cence to include beneficence, comes short of obligation. If
it be thus limited, then it is legality, not morality, and again

there is something higher than duty, something nobler than

service. We heartily reject a scheme of ethics implying
that a man is under no obligation to love his mother or his
country, but should purify his character by eliminating all

such inclinations ; a scheme that clearly, distinctly enacts

Thou shalt not love thy neighbor.
 CHARITY 95

CHAPTER XI
CHARITY

§ 69. An argument already offered, having its basis in the

general principle that the natural or constitutional powers
of man ought to fulfill their normal functions, or, more spe-
cifically, that every one has a right to gratify his normal
desires, a right being a duty, concludes the appetites and
appetencies to be auxiliary to the affections, which are thus
normally supreme. From this it was directly inferred that
self cannot rightly be an end. With equal cogency it is

implied that the object of affection is the normal and right-

ful end of all endeavor. In other words, the affections,
included under the general name love, are obligatory ; they
ought, in due manner and measure, to be gratified. The
moral law, found in the original and innermost nature of
man, enjoins that he love his fellow man.
Consider the meaning of affection, love, charity, benevo-
lence, these terms being taken synonymously. Love is a
desire, an impulse or inclination toward others, disposing
one to give out from his own resources what may benefit
them. Let it be kept clearly in mind that love is strictly a
desire. It should not be confused with volition, though the
synonym, benevolence, partakes, etymologically, of the voli-
tion; for love is simply the causative antecedent of the
volitional endeavor. It is not a feeling,though attended
by peculiar feelings ; being neither an emotion, though the
name is commonly applied to its attendant emotions ; nor a
sentiment, though the sentiments that normally accompany
it act and react powerfully to stimulate the desire. Love is
96 OBLIGATION

properly and definitely a desire, relative to a sentient object,

whose welfare it would promote.

§ 70. Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of

high authority, Love cannot be commanded, for it is an
affection, and not a volition which alone is subject to com-
mand. But love, benevolence, charity, pathological love,
as distinguished from practical love which is not properly
love but willing service, can be commanded though ; truly it

is an affection, becoming active only as the subject is affected

by an amiable object, that is, an object susceptible of wel-
fare. For, although every command is primarily addressed
to the will, yet the will, having, by means of voluntary atten-
tion, indirect control of all the mental faculties, carries out
the command, if not thwarted by passion, in impressing its

subordinates into the required order. Otherwise the sub-

jective springs of conduct could have no moral quality.
Even belief, a feeling of assurance, of conviction, is com-
manded in the presence of truth ; and the command is obeyed,
and the feeling is induced, by giving attention, sincere heed,
to the presented truth. Love, charity, a desire for another's
welfare, may likewise be commanded in the presence of
amiability, and the command obeyed, the affection induced,
by giving like heed to the amiable capacity of the object.
Hence the love of benevolence can be commanded, since it
can be voluntarily induced, nourished and invigorated.
Not only can this love be commanded, but it is com-
manded. The moral law is embedded in and arises from the
very constitution of human nature. Desires awakened by
objects and guided by intelligence are the motives of volun-

tary conduct. We have seen that among these the affections

are normally supreme, rightly subjecting all other motive

impulses to their ends. Therefore we find that, in order to
fulfill their natural functions, the affections must have not
 CHABITT 97

merely free but preeminent exercise, and that this is essen-

tiallythe supreme law of humanity demanding reverent
obedience.

§ 71. The affections having different objects, have re-

ceived various names ; as, conjugal, parental, filial and
fraternal love, friendship, kindness, patriotism, philanthropy.
In each of these the affection varies both in kind and degree.
The differences in kind are due to differences in the rela-
tions. The differences in degree are regulated by the pos-
sibilities. We are not bound to love all others equally, this
being unnatural. Many ties, many obligations. Those most
nearly related are bound to love each other with a special
ardor ; as, parents and children.
The sentiment of gratitude excites love for a benefactor
or neighbor. It enters largely along with friendship and
kindness into the forms and substance of true politeness,
which is love in littles, and in all its grades is essential to
high moral culture, and is ennobling.
We are bound to love those whose character and conduct
we abhor, cherishing the desire to remedy the evil in them,
and otherwise to better them. We should love even a
wicked and active enemy; righteous defensive resentment
being quite consistent with the impulse to promote, not his
evil way, but his well-being whenever opportunity offers or
can be found, and in so far as we do not thereby trespass
on some other. In civilized warfare after a victory the
wounded abandoned by the defeated are cared for humanely.
This is love to enemies ; we feel the obligation, and call it

humanity.
We are bound to love all men of all races, those in the

remotest regions of the globe, our very antipodes, yes, and

even the generation yet unborn, in a due manner and meas-
ure. This is the obligation of philanthropy.
98 OBLIGATION

§ 72. Service fulfilling the law must be, not merely willing
service, but loving service. We have seen that a life of
sacrificial service, of active beneficence, determined only by
respect for the law, fails of completeness. Though I be-
stow all my goods to feed the poor, and have not charity, it

profiteth me nothing. duty that love be its

It is essential to
spring. The service due is loving service. Let the duplex
form of this phrase be noted. Loving is desiring, a subjec-
tive motive ; it is benevolence, well-wishing. Service is

acting, an objective motive ; it is beneficence, well-doing.

Serving is the normal outcome, the natural consequent, of
loving ; they are psychological correlatives. Neither is com-
plete without the other.
For, how is it possible that one should sincerely, willingly,
intentionally endeavor to promote another's welfare, unless
he desire the other's welfare ? All voluntary effort is con-
ditioned on an antecedent desire, so that the command of
intelligent, willing service is a command of intelligent, loving
service. One cannot sincerely strive for another's welfare
unless he desire it, and this is love. If it be said, the desire
is simply to obey, we reply, a desire to obey a command to
serve, is a desire to serve as commanded.
On the other hand, how can
there be love not followed by
service ? As works is dead, so also is love
faith without
without service. If it have any life, it is at least ready and
watchful of opportunity to serve. For generous love impels
to service. He who loves will serve, will render willing,
active, self-sacrificing service. Also he who loves will be
just, will pay all dues, will not trespass. Bear ye one
another's burdens, and so fulfill the law. Owe no man any-
thing, save to love one another, this being the only debt that
cannot be finally discharged ; for he that loveth another hath
fulfilled the law. Love is the fulfillment of the law.
All the various presentations of the moral law heretofore
 CHABITY 99

considered, we now find to be summed in the law of loving

service, Thou shalt love and serve. And indeed we see that
even herein is superfluity, for the whole moral law, the total
of human obligation, is completely and comprehensively
summed in the single categorical imperative of one syllable,
love. Thou shalt love, is the perfect law, the law of love.

§ 73. Progress in moral culture consists in transforming

fear into respect, and respect into love. With primitive char-
acters, and even with many highly cultured otherwise, the fear
of penalty is the chief, often the only, motive of obedience.
To this may be added as one step higher, the hope of reward.
In this is an appeal to the selfish propensities usually pre-
dominant in crude humanity. They are not thereby ap-
proved, but used to bring the man to at least outward
obedience, a step toward inward culture. Thus the law is a
pedagogue, leading men upward.
A thoughtful consideration of one's relations, a clear recog-
nition of the law in us, inspires respect for its mandate, and
an impulse to observance. Herein is a passing away from
the influence of threats and promises. These are lost to
sight, and obedience is determined simply by respect for the
law. The vast all-pervading sense of moral obligation, a
wide comprehensive view of duty, an obedience to the law
for its own sake superior to its sanctions, produces nobility
and excellence in moral character. Yet this ideal is cold,
hard, stern, repressing as weakness the natural play of tender
sympathy, of generous sentiment, of warm inclination toward
others, maintaining a stoical indifference to their weal or
woe, and giving help exclusively out of respect for the law
of service. As a scheme of morals, this cannot be purged of
egoism, of selfishness ; for necessarily it holds that the so-
called duties co self are equally or even more imperative than
duties to another, those being the basis from which all other
duties arise.

U«* c '
100 OBLIGATION

In the still higher ideal, cold respect for law is gradually,

as culture progresses, replaced by charity, which is the bond
of perfectness. As in the second grade the sanctions of the
law are lost to sight, so in this highest grade the law itself

disappears from view, and its requirements are fulfilled with-

out reference to its mandate. It is the fruit of moral

growth that both subjective and objective activities accord
with the law, not because of its pressure, but because the
order and harmony of the natural powers have been restored,
and the man does what is right because his dominant im-
pulses lead thereto, and his free preference finds therein his
highest gratification. He renders loving service in due meas-
ure to his fellow men, this having become the habit, the
second nature of his being. He does by nature the things
of the law, and having no law, is a law unto himself, showing

the work of the law written in his heart. For love knows
no law other than its own impulse.
Obviously, in the economy of human nature, this progres-
sion does not take place uniformly. A criminal at war with
society at large may be dutiful to his family in other matters
because of strong domestic affection, and in so far fulfill the
law of love. The average good citizen knows little and
cares less about the criminal code. Its enactments are not
for him. He has not the slightest disposition to do what it

forbids, and orders his actions without reference to it. The

penitentiary, the jail, the gallows, have no terrors for him.
The police, the courts, the judiciary, he recognizes as social
machinery devised and maintained for the protection of his
rights. They have no other meaning for him. He has risen
above the great body of civil law, and is not, properly speak-
ing, an obedient, but a law-abiding citizen who, without
thought of the law, governs his conduct by his own cultured
preferences. In his intercourse with friends and acquaint-
ances, he may still have duties that are irksome and repug-
 CHABITT 101

nant which he fulfills from a sense of duty, and therein feels

the tense bonds of obligation.
His further moral growth
requires the enlarging and deepening of charitable sympa-
thies, so that his conduct may be determined more and more

by love, less and less by law ; doing always the right thing,
not because he ought so to do, but because he wants to do
just that thing rather than any other.

§ 74. We
have seen that so long as one acts merely from
respect for the law, he
is in bondage to the law. He has
passed perhaps with many a fierce struggle out from a de-
grading slavery to appetites and passions and unbridled lusts,
for of what a man is overcome of the same is he also brought
and honorable bondage. His
into bondage, into a voluntary
conduct becomes uniform, reduced to the order of facts that
ought to be, regulated by principles conforming to moral
law. This is a dignified attitude, a high and rare attain-
ment. But the man is in bonds, rigid, inexorable, though
honorable, bound under a law that knows no concession or
relaxation. By many moralists this is called liberty. Surely
it is not liberty, but strict, the strictest, bondage. It is

moral necessity. Regulus said: I must return. Luther

cried I can do
: no otherwise. Where, then, is liberty, the
perfect liberty for which man so ardently longs ?
Evidently when one does more and more as the law
requires, not by virtue of the obligation, but by virtue of

his own native or cultured disposition, he is passing from

under bondage into the realm of liberty. When love takes
the place of constraining duty, the law ceases to be law. Then
he no longer under law, but under grace then, but not
is ;

till then, is he perfectly free. The law commands, Thou

shalt love and when through obedience love has become the
;

dominating impulse, confirmed and established, the law as

law has disappeared. Thus perfect love is perfect liberty.
 ;

102 OBLIGATION

Then all doing is righteous yet free, since

it is done in

free preference to any Here and here only is the

other.
longed for liberty to be found. In our imperfection and
struggles with self, which never cease, this highest ideal is
never fully realized in human life. The imperfect person
is one conscious of obligation. The perfect person is one
conscious of holiness. Perfect persons are not under law
so that we may truly say the holy angels and the Deity are
under no obligation to do what they do, but being perfect
in love, are perfect in work, and perfect in liberty. Heaven
knows no law.
 WELFARE 103

CHAPTER XII

WELFARE

§ 75. The term welfare has been used in the foregoing

discussion. The corresponding notion is of so great impor-
tance in ethical theory as to require special examination.
Many philosophers, both ancient and modern, hold that
the total essence of well-being or welfare or happiness is

pleasure. All activity, they say, resolves ultimately into

seeking for pleasure and shrinking from pain, this being a
necessary consequence of the original constitution of the
animal man, fully explaining all his conduct, and determin-
ing his character in its highest development. The maxi-
mum of pleasure attained throughout life is the maximum
of welfare. Pleasures are admitted to vary in quantity, and
even in quality, the coarse enjoyment of brutal sensuality
differing widely from the refined enjoyment of delicate sen-
timent. Originally, according to the hypothesis of evolu-
tion, all impulsion is brutally selfish ; gradually it becomes
polished by its environment, but with no change of sub-
stance. The doctrine is essentially egoistic. Benevolence,
in its most generous forms, is explained by the pleasure it
gives the benefactor, and a purely disinterested action is pro-
nounced a psychological impossibility.
Without renewing the objections to egoism, let it be here
observed that pleasure and pain are qualities belonging to
feeling only. They are not elements of desire or of its grat-
ification, though indeed they accompany both. We often
seek to gratify a desire utterly regardless of the attendant
pleasure or pain, and hence these are not universal ends.
104 OBLIGATION

Moreover, pleasure and pain have in themselves no moral

quality, they are neither right nor wrong. But if pleasure
were the ultimate end of human endeavor, then it were
ethical in the highest degree, and the maximum of pleasure
attained would be the maximum of virtue which is absurd.
;

It is freely admitted that there is a natural and hence uni-

versal desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, the reverse
being psychologically impossible. But pleasure as an object
of desire is only one among a large number of appetencies,
and it is not the chiefest or strongest or most prevailing, for
there are others that often override it. Now it is evident
that the gratification of one normal desire among many that
are coordinate cannot constitute entire well-being ; for to
this end there must be a measured, harmonized gratification
of all native inclinations. Nor can desire for pleasure be,
even obscurely, the constantly informing element of the
other desires for very often we desire and ardently pursue,
;

not pain itself, but what we know to be painful we take ;

pains to reach a painful end, bitterly demanding satisfaction,

and heartily accepting the poignant consequences. Hence
pleasure, even should it be at a continuous maximum through-
out life, cannot of itself be accounted welfare, though indeed
in complete welfare it is an ever-present and important factor.
Of course one may define welfare as a maximum of pleas-
ure and discuss it accordingly ; but it is very certain that
this is not the notion of welfare that prevails among men.
No doubt the notion includes pleasure, but it much
includes
more ; for men condemn, as lacking dignity, a life whose
sole aim is pleasure however refined. Who enjoys more
delightful pleasure, according to De Quincey, than the
opium-eater? Despite his delicious dreaming, he is judged
a most pitiful wretch. Even he who devotes himself to
giving pleasure to others, as the professional musician, is

held in slight esteem. So also the comedian. Men enjoy

 WELFARE 105

laughing, but the perpetually funny man is classed with the

circus clown, a lineal descendant of the court jester, whose
rank was low, and whose quips were regulated with whips.
Still the pleasure giver has a calling, for pleasant recreation

is needful to our welfare. But the mere pleasure seeker,

studying his own
enjoyment, not occasionally as a recreation
but as the end of living, the devotee of social amenities, the
professional sportsman, the dissipated spendthrift, the disso-
lute libertine, each of these is even more justly reprobated,
hardly for lack of wisdom in his way, rather for total lack of
wisdom's way. A
life of pleasure, whether generous or self-

ish, even one of simple playful gayety apart from vice, is

accounted a wasted life, and wise men take infinite pains to
secure, through much self-denial, a regulated and sober
welfare.

§ 76. We are, then, in great need to know, clearly and

distinctly, the meaning of welfare. In accord, with the fun-
damental doctrine of this treatise, the following definition is
proposed: Welfare is the gratification of normal desire.
From this it follows that continuous welfare is the constant
gratification of normal desires throughout a complete life.

Its attainment calls for self-control, for a measured adjust-

ment of incompatible gratifications, in order to harmony,, and
to the maximum gratification of those desires that are natu-
ral, normal and in accord with moral law. The primary
principle is, a man has a right to gratify his normal desires,
if he do not trespass. Hence he has a right to welfare ; but
whether he will attain it or not depends on the intelligent
regulation of his desires, together with the possibility of
their gratification within the given limits.
It has been pointed out that, taken concretely, virtuous
conduct is conduct conformed to practical reason or con-
science, and, taken abstractly, virtue is action in conformity
106 OBLIGATION

with moral law. Also it was observed that virtue implies a

struggle against obstacles. Now, besides the subjective dif-
ficulties of virtuous endeavor, the judging, choosing and
striving for right life, there are practically numerous and
great objective difficulties, external obstacles in circum-
stances, that oppose one at every turn, preventing the com-
plete gratification of virtuous longings. If the subjective
intention and effort be accomplished, then, even though the
objective result fail, the chief Condition of welfare is ful-

filled, and its principal element provided.But to complete

welfare, there must be an external realization of the subjec-
tive virtuous intent. So it is that, in the actual warfare of
life, though it chastens and strengthens, there is rarely, if
ever, a complete realization of thorough-going welfare.
Since we have defined welfare as the gratification of nor-
mal desires, and have characterized virtue as being the effort
to realize this gratification in loving service, it appears that
one's welfare consists in seeking disinterestedly to promote
the welfare of others, and that an earnest constant striving
to reach thisend comprises the sum total of obligation. It
is attained on two parallels. First, as a prime condition,

one should seek, directly and indirectly, by precept, by exam-

ple, and by whatever influence he may rightly use, to culti-

vate in his fellows a virtuous disposition, inducing generous

impulses, and impressing the mandate, Go, and do thou
likewise. Such education is due especially from parents to
children, from teachers to pupils, from the enlightened civ-
ilizer to the benighted barbarian. Secondly, he should
strive to remove, in so far as practicable, the external obsta-
cles to their welfare lying in the way of his fellows, espe-
cially of those more nearly related to him ; and also to fur-
nish out of his own resources all reasonable facilities for
these others to do likewise, thus helping them to modify and
arrange their circumstances favorably to their own righteous
 WELFARE 107

ends. So doing, he shall himself, without thought of him-

self, experience the working of that great natural law of
human activity, It is more blessed to give than to receive.

§ 77. It is now needful to inquire concerning happiness,

of which nothing has heretofore been said. The term is
very indefinite, and though in common use, there is difficulty
in fixing its meaning. Sometimes we hear that happiness
is continuous pleasure. If this be allowed, then happiness
cannot be identified with welfare ; for, as we have seen, wel-
fare is something more than pleasure. But, while pleasure
is a large, and perhaps an essential ingredient in happiness,
this also seems to have other elements. Then shall not
happiness and welfare be identified? Not strictly; for,
though surely there is an intimate connection between them,
a distinction remains. It is the distinction of antecedent
and consequent in causal relation. "Welfare consists in the
constant gratification of right desires. Now, like as pleas-
ure is the reflex or correlate of spontaneous and unimpeded
energy exerted in any special case, so, in the general course
of living, happiness is the reflex or correlate of virtuous and
successful conduct. Thus welfare is antecedent, well-being
consequent; the one is dynamic, the other static ; the one,
prosperity, the other, happiness.
There can be no doubt that happiness is universally re-
garded as desirable in the highest degree. Whence it may
be presumed that the desire for happiness is a subjective
necessity, an established uniformity, a natural law in human-
ity. Also it may be allowed that no man can forecast the
particular circumstances that would make him happy. Yet
itseems not impossible for practical ethics to lay down rules
of conduct in accord with fundamental principles, which, if
favored by environment and followed intelligently and per-
sistently, should conduce to happiness. But only a brief
theoretical consideration is herein admissible.
108 OBLIGATION

It appears, then, there are in general two necessary condi-

tions of welfare and its consequent happiness, subjective
observance of moral law, and objective environment favor-
ing realization. The former is necessary, but insufficient.
The inward satisfaction arising from a full discharge of obli-
gation, isan essential and the chief element of happiness
but untoward circumstances may so mar the felicity of a
righteous worker that we deem him stricken, smitten of
God, and afflicted. The most perfect man was a man of
sorrows, suffering the contradiction of sinners against him-
self. On the other hand, the full possession of health,
wealth and honors does not in itself constitute welfare.
Outward success what doth
only, like that of Alexander,
it profit a man ?
There must be prosperity both within and
without in order to welfare, and to its reflex, happiness.
Also we observe that no one can hopefully make happi-
ness, however much he may desire it, his immediate object.
It is altogether out of direct reach. The only possible way
to it is through its condition, welfare. Hence wisdom dis-
regards happiness as an end, not looking beyond welfare,
but seeking end of all endeavor. This attained,
this as the .

happiness results by a benign law of human nature well- ;

being, the sanction of well-doing. A poet has said Happi- :

ness is a wayside flower plucked, it withers in the hand

;

passed by, it is fragrance to the spirit.

Moreover, let it be especially observed that, still less can

any one hopefully make his own personal happiness his end.
It has been sufficiently shown that, one's own welfare de-
pends on his seeking the welfare of others. Hence one's
own happiness is found only in thus promoting that of
others. Outward duty done for the sake of inward satisfac-
tion, fails as duty and as satisfaction. The mother, who
with much self-denial waits upon her sick babe merely be-
cause, should the babe die from neglect, she could never for-
 WELFARE 109

give herself and -would suffer the pangs of remorse, that

mother is an egoist, and not the mother we adore. She may
escape the pain, yet is unhappy, for this is not the outcome
of maternal love. Self-seeking in any form is foredoomed to
failure, for it lacks the perfect virtue which, forgetful of
self, strives for the welfare of others. Living for one's own
happiness is living for one's self ; and living for one's self is

sure to be a failure. Living for loving service is living for

others ; and living for others is the sure and only road to
welfare, both theirs and ours, that welfare whose correlate
is happiness, both theirs and ours.

§ 78. Involved in the notion of welfare is the notion of

good, a term so very ambiguous that its use has thus far
been avoided. Good things are relatively or absolutely good.
The good are those not good in themselves, but
relatively
only as a means to something beyond; as, riches. We seek
them in order to attain those absolutely good, that is, such
as are good in themselves, and not good for aught else ; as,
luxuries. What is good for something else has value what ;

is good in itself has worth. An end good in itself is an

absolute end.
Absolute ends are altogether subjective, found only in
certain mental states of sentient beings, more especially of
persons, who habitually seek some one end, and only occa-
sionally others, as desirable. Ends vary in degrees of excel-
lence, as good, better, best. The best, the highest aim of
human activity, is termed the summum bonum.
The determination of the absolute, the ultimate good, the
summum bonum, as the end of all moral endeavor, was the
primal problem of ancient ethics. The Hedonists found it

in pleasure, the highest enjoyment of the present passing

moment. The Epicureans also found it in pleasure, but
posited the maximum of enjoyment extending throughout
110 OBLIGATION

and called this happiness. Plato solved the problem

life,

grandly by declaring that the highest ultimate good is not

pleasure, nor wealth, nor knowledge, nor power, but is the
greatest possible likeness to God, as the absolutely good.
He taught that happiness depends on the possession of this
moral beauty and goodness. Aristotle's ultimatum is happi-
ness, but with a definition, already noted, that distinguishes
it from pleasure, and is hardly exceptionable. The Stoics
taught that the supreme end of life, the ultimate good, is

virtue, that is, a life conformed to nature, the agreement of

conduct with the all- regulating law of nature, the human
with the divine will, whereby the sage combines in himself
all the essential perfections of deity. We remark that each
of these several doctrines is egoistic, finding the summum
bonum, the ultimatum of moral endeavor, to be an attainment
'

of the moral agent for and within himself.

§ 79. In modern ethics investigation of the summum

bonum is less prominent, and various and conflicting views
are entertained. The utilitarians teach the right aim and
end to be happiness, which is variously and hazily defined.
This doctrine divides into egoism and altruism, according as
the agent regards his own happiness as the end of his
endeavor, or makes that of related persons its object. If the

good of a particular person, himself or some other or others,

be the aim, it is called individualism if the good of a com-
;

munity at large be the aim, it is called universalism, which

has as many forms as there are kinds of community ; for
instance, social, national, or humanistic universalism. In
seeking the good of a community the aim should be the
greatest good of the greatest number.
The dominant form of philosophical ethics at the present
day seems to be evolutionism, which affirms that develop-
ment, progress, prosperity, is the end of moral endeavor.
 WELFARE HI
According to Spencer, that is good, in the widest sense,
which serves to accomplish some purpose and the ultimate
;

conscious purpose of all vital activity is the production or

retention of pleasure, or the avoidance or removal of pain.

According to Wundt there is a series of ethical ends, begin-
ning with and self-improvement, rising to
self -contentment

social ends in public well-being and general progress, and

terminating in humanistic ends, chiefly intellectual, which
consist in the continuous improvement of mankind.
In opposition to the foregoing empirical doctrines, is the
extreme intuitionism of the Kantians, who make the absolute
ethical end to lie in obedience, pure and simple, to the objec-
tive moral law. Less extreme are the perfectionists, who
make the supreme good to lie in excellence of moral charac-
ter, which excellence they fail to define clearly, but hold
that it is attained by the active exercise of the intellectual
and sensitive nature under the presidency of reason.
The present treatise teaches that the aim and end of life
is the harmonious and complete development of the man,

individually, socially, politically and religiously, each one

devoting his constant and total activity to the welfare of his
fellows in loving service, thus obeying the perfect law of
love and liberty, and thus attaining, as an unsought conse-
quence, both his own and their happiness. The ideal of an
ultimate and absolute good is that of a complete organism
whose members cooperate in entire harmony which implies;

the fulfilling by every organ of its normal functions, and

hence the perfect wholeness of the organism. It denotes,

negatively, the absence of all discord, of all impurity; posi-

tively, the perfection of functional activity. In the moral
sphere, each rational being is himself an organized whole,
and an organized member of wider organisms. Now,
also
since in every organic whole each member is at once means
and end to every other, the law of an intelligent organism
112 OBLIGATION

requires that each member become voluntarily an active

imparting means, as well as a passive receptive end. Herein
is the ideal of welfare, and the sphere of the moral law,
which commands every man to seek, not his own, but
another's weal. Its observance regards that wholeness
which is the summum bonum.
The correlative concomitant of wholeness or holiness is
beatitude or blessedness. This is more than happiness, as
holiness is more than virtue. Virtue implies a struggle,
and a virtuous being is still under and continuously endeav-
oring to conform to the law. But in holy beings there is no
struggle, they are not under the law, but dwell in a realm of
perfect love, liberty and bliss.
 DEITY 113

CHAPTER XIII

DEITY

§ 80. The existence of God is a postulate of Ethics. A

speculative system may be evolved from the mere conception
of a deity, a conception such as is found, with many modifi-
cations and varying in degree from obscure to clear, in every
human mind. But a true ethical theory, thoroughly estab-
lished as a correct representation of its matter, to be complete
and fully rounded out in accord with the demands of philo-
sophical system, must posit as essential, not merely the con-
ception, but the reality of Deity. We might adopt, relative
to ethical system, the saying of Voltaire that " if God did
not exist, it would be necessary to invent him but
; all nature
cries out to us that he does exist."
In modern times the attempt has been made, especially by
the Comteists, to devise a system of humanitarian ethics,
shutting out even the thought of God. To give such scheme
philosophic unity and completeness,, its authors have been
necessitated to find a common end for all lines of moral activ-
ity, and they propose the general welfare of Humanity.
This Humanity is personified, and set up as an object of rev-

erence, and even of worship. Or the deity recognized in

the affairs of the world is " the Stream of Tendency that
makes for righteousness," which is "the Eternal, not our-
selves." A modified view substitutes " the Unknowable,"
which, notwithstanding the negation, is defined to be " forma-
tive force, working according to its inner necessity." But
it is very certain that a generalized abstraction, rhetorically
personified by a capital letter, will never satisfy the minds
114 OBLIGATION

and hearts of men, nor even meet the demands of a godless

philosophy. Such proposed end of human endeavor is at
most either a logical generalization, gathering up in an ab-
stract formula the moral causes manifest in secular history,
or an enfeebled pantheism. True ethical theory, however,
arises, not from impersonal generalities, but from individual
men and combinations of rational beings in their actual rela-

tions ; not from intellectual abstractions, but from concrete

realities the most vivid and stern.
One point may be particularly noticed. Ethical schemes
that do not recognize a personal sovereign Deity are unable
to provide for the perfect administration of justice ; they find
no court of appeal beyond the consensus of men. Now,
from the patriarchal day of Job until this late and enlight-
ened day of ours, it has been and still is the common convic-
tion of thoughtful observers that the distribution of rewards
and punishments, the avenging of wrongs, the adjustment of
claims, in the historical life of our race, fail of righteousness.
But such is the profound faith of mankind in the ultimate
triumph of the principle of universal justice that this further
conviction prevails There must of necessity be a supreme
:

court of appeal which shall, in an after life, administer retri-

bution, vindicate justice, and establish righteousness. Unless

there be such provision, there is no ground for faith in the
unity and supremacy of moral law.

§ 81. The ethical theory herein proposed posits as essen-

tial the real existence of a personal Deity. The one eternal
God, from everlasting to everlasting, the almighty maker of
the world, himself a spirit and the father of our spirit, the
founder and center of all truth, the supreme ruler and final

judge, unfailing in strict justice while abounding in tender

mercy, a perfect person conscious of holiness and ruling in
love — he it is on whom an intelligent faith rests as the
 DEITY 115

original source of authority, as legislator, judge and executor

in one, who shall finally perfect all righteousness.
To those objecting to the anthropomorphic character of
this conception, a sufficient reply is that no other kind of
notion is possible to the human mind. For us God is thus,
or he is not. Holding this to be the true conception does
not degrade the Deity to the human rank, but lifts the
human to the divine. He has made us in his image, a little

lower than divinity, that in his likeness we may become par-

takers in his glory.
Should it be objected that the introduction of a supernatu-
ral element into an explanation of natural phenomena is

unscientific, we admit this to be true of physical science,

which is concerned with second causes only, having no re-

course to a first cause. Bacon in Iris Organum, and Newton

in his Principia, make frequent and devout reference to the
Deity, though not as a factor in their systems ; but Laplace,
it is said, when asked by Napoleon why he made no reference
to God Mechanique Celeste, replied Sire, I had no
in his :

need of that hypothesis. So the physics of to-day very prop-

erly makes no mention of the Deity. But in metaphysics
the chief problem is the existence of God. Ethics, which
also is not a science of material nature, but of human nature,
of man on his spiritual side, manner transcends
in like

physics. It treats exclusively of mental states and acts, of

phenomena of the soul or spirit. The facts on which its
theory is based are subjective facts of direct observation by
introspection, which are combined with inferences from them
and from observed external activities. Here we are wholly
within the spiritual sphere. A clear distinction may be
made, by a difference in degree, between the human and the
superhuman, but who shall draw the line between the natu-
ral and the supernatural ? To posit in the spiritual sphere
a, supreme personal spirit, so far from being unscientific, is
 ;

116 OBLIGATION

simply to complete the content of the sphere with a substance

and its attributes, with the conscious personality of a rational
being, in kind like to that which gives rise to the theory
and therefore this complementing of the scheme is strictly
scientific.

§ 82. The ground from which the doctrine of this treatise

has thus far been developed, is the natural constitution of
man. His several powers of intellect and will, his emotional
capacity,and the impulse to activity in his motive desires,
have each a normal and cooperative function. Herein is dis-
cerned the principle that it is right to gratify normal desire,
together with the supreme law of humanity commanding the
constant order of facts that ought to be, the single impera-
tive of trespass, duty, justice or loving service. Now, it may
reasonably be asked whether the common constitution of
human beings is an ultimate ground, an
to be regarded as
original source of obligation, beyond which there is no
determinant.
Positivism answers affirmatively, which consists with its

rigid empiricism. But we have tried to show that there is

for us something more than experience. Evolutionism finds

an antecedent determinant in the environment, a combina-
tion of second causes, under whose influence the human con-
stitution has been developed. But when we consider the
great variety of environment to which the several races of
mankind have been subjected, we should expect, on this
view, to find a corresponding variety of constitution, and
consequent varieties of moral law ; whereas, however great
the variations in degree especially of intelligence, and the
variety of constructions built upon the law, still, throughout
history and everywhere, mankind is one, and the law is one.
This essentially permanent uniformity points distinctly
to an origin for the human constitution in a cause beyond
 DEITY 117

itself and environment, and, on the principle of like effect

its

like cause, to a common cause, to a unity in the originating

cause. The existence of an omnipotent and consistent
maker and ruler, is the only satisfactory explanation of these
significant facts that has been or can be offered, and this
explanation alone fulfills the demand of ethical theory.

§ 83. Many theistic moralists hold that the will of God

is the original and ultimate ground of obligation. He has
made us as it hath pleased him, revealing his will in us, and
in our relations to each other and to himself. A reverent
interpretation of nature and of history enables us to under-
stand his will more clearly, and to these he has added a
distinct revelation of it in the holy scriptures. Had it

pleased him to make us and our surroundings otherwise, or

merely to issue different, even contrary, commandments, our
obligations would have been different from what they are,
since his express will is their sole, sufficient and final
ground.
That the will of God, however revealed, defines our obliga-
tions is unquestionable. But we cannot regard his authority
as decisive, if it be merely arbitrary ; for this view implies
the possibility of contradictions that are revolting. Should
he capriciously command lying, murder, theft, all heaven
and earth would rebel. The doctrine unwittingly represents
him as a tryant ruling by fear, liable to transient whims
inverting right and wrong, disordering order, compounding
felony, falsifying truth, thereby divesting his intelligent
subjects of all reliable knowledge of himself and of his crea-
tions. Such notion is psychologically, philosophically and
logically absurd.
We must look beyond the will of God for the ultimate
determinant of obligation, into that which determines his
will, into his original, eternal, essential nature. Necessarily
118 OBLIGATION

and rightly we conceive of him as a spirit, having harmoni-

ous attributes constituting his nature, in which is no vari-
ableness nor shadow of turning. Being in himself the
embodiment of truth, it is impossible for him to he ; being
essentially just, he can never justify crime ; such self-contra-
diction would dethrone him, would be the suicide of God.
His omnipotence is not absolute, but limited to what accords
with his nature, and his every action is confined to the strait
and narrow way of righteousness. The macrocosm, the
world, " answering his fair idea," conforms in the fixed
material laws to his unchanging essence, and the uniformity
of nature is the faithfulness of The microcosm, man,
God.
the express image of his person, formed to conform in the
is

fixed moral law to the same unchanging essence, and the

oneness of justice is the righteousness of God. It is not
the will, but the nature of the Deity that is the original and
ultimate ground of obligation.

§ 84. The final problem in our obligation to each other

is now readily solved. The prior examination of human
nature found it constituted for a free and harmonious play
of its powers in the exercise of loving service, and this was
recognized as the sum of obligation. Further examination
has disclosed that human nature is derived from and akin to
the divine nature, so that in promoting the welfare of each
other, men are conforming to the divine will arising from
the divine nature. The maker and ruler has given to every
man more or less ability to promote the common welfare, and
holds him accountable for its exercise. Whoever unwar-
rantably interferes with this service trespasses both on the
servant and on the served, and thereby violates the divine
will and nature. Much
has been said about the divine
right of kings. Every man's right is a divine right both ;

because of its origin, and because it involves the right of the

 DEITY 119

Deity himself. Hence the sacredness of human rights, and

the paramount obligation to respect them. Arising from the
very nature of God, they are invariable, inalienable, irrevo-
cable, grounded in eternal justice and truth, and he who
would violate them is at war with the inflexible Almighty.
Along with our obligation to each other is our obligation
to God. To him is due, in the most comprehensive sense,
loving service. We are bound to love God for his own sake,
and all others for God's sake. The recognition of him as
our personal creator and ruler, and of our obligation to him
as his creatures and subjects, leading to adoration, is religion,
the binding of man to God. Thus ethics expands over reli-
gion by comprehending the author of our being, the father
of our spirit, the eternal One from whom all our obligations
arise, and in whom all our obligations end. He desires all
that is disorderly to become orderly, and calls upon his
rational free creatures to gratify, so far as in them lies, this
desire ; hence it is hardly too much to say that our conduct
affects the welfare and happiness of Our Father. To serve
rightly our fellows for his sake, is to serve him ; and a tres-

pass upon a fellow man is a trespass upon him. Moreover,

he has a supreme right to our reverential worship, and omit-
ting or neglecting it is using our freedom, which having
given he will not revoke, to restrict his liberty in gathering
up his due.
Contemplating, inversely, the relation of God to man, we
observe that the obligation is not properly reciprocal. We
cannot think of the Deity as under any obligation, under
any law, under anything for this contradicts his essentially
;

absolute supremacy and sovereignty. But while it cannot

correctly be said that he is bound to be steadfast in purpose,
and faithful in promise, it is very certain that he will be
thus, and all that is righteous, because of his ultimate
nature. Now, as the universality of physical, psychical and
120 OBLIGATION

ethical law indicates his unity, so does the total content of

ethical law, loving service, indicate his benevolence. He
seeks the welfare and consequent happiness of his sentient
creatures in his own constant loving service of them, both
by direct providence, and by the obligation laid upon them
to serve each other. Hence are we confident of his inexor-
able and perfected justice, essential to entire welfare, in
which justice every life shall eventually be complete ; also
of his tender mercy to the erring, he having opened a way,
through whereby to be just and yet
infinite self-sacrifice,

justify the penitent, and secure to him eternal welfare and

blessedness. Our God is no egoist, but an altruist. He did
not make us, nor does he rule us, for his own glory, but for
our own beatitude. God is love.
 ELEMENTARY ETHICS
SECOND PAET-OEGA]SriZATION
TRANSITION
§ 85. A glance over the course thus far pursued will
prepare for further advance. The purpose of Ethics is to
bring our ordinary moral judgments, so far as they tally with
enlightened conscience, into a coherent system, discovering
in them a principle which shall give it philosophic unity,
and also furnish, if we would not have a mere castle in the
air, a foundation on which to build. Beginning with the
common notion of a right, its condition is at once seen to be
a reciprocal relation between persons, each having orderly
claims upon the other, which claims compose his rights.
These rights are grounded in the very constitution of human
nature, which, moved by its normal desires, seeks their grati-
fication. The fundamental right is a right to liberty in this
pursuit. This is the primary principle of Ethics. An inten-
tional violation of a right, an interference in one's proper
liberty, is a wrong, a trespass, which being a subversion of
constituted order, is forbidden. This is the moral law, dis-
cerned by conscience, and supported by subjective and objec-
tive sanctions.
Obligation takes several forms whose essence is one. Pri-

marily its law forbids aggressive trespass, then equally it

forbids retentive and neglective trespass. From these emerge
121
122 ORGANIZATION

the comprehensive forms of justice, duty, virtue, service and

love, the last pair being the choice expression simply because
it brings more clearly forward the common essence. For, in
examining the springs of action, the affections are seen to be
naturally paramount, all other desires ancillary and disinter-
ested. They are inconsistent with interested motives whose
ends, lying within the agent himself, are selfishly opposed
to loving service. The ideal man expends his energies in
serving the interests of his fellows without thought of his
own as separate and independent, but only as involved in
thecommon welfare.
It should be observed that there are three principal notions
pervading the discussion, which grow out from the funda-
mental notion of rights. These are:
1st. Trespass, in its direct and indirect sense, which as
forbidden expresses the whole of obligation.
2d. Trust, in the active sense of mutual confidence that
the law of trespass will be observed; and in the passive
sense of stewardship, of being a trustee of all possessions,
including life itself.

3d. Defense, meaning the right and duty to guard trusts

by resisting encroachment on them ; which is the only prem-
ise that can warrant an interference in another's liberty.
A strict and generous conformity to law results in common
welfare. Welfare consists of liberty and continuous success
in the exercise of benevolence and beneficence. The correl-
ative criterion and natural consequence of welfare is happi-
ness, which involves the special pleasure arising from a
consciousness of disinterested conduct, and in general that
arising from the satisfaction of enlarged and harmoniously
regulated desires. But it is the essential dignity of benevo-
lence rather than the resultant happiness that makes common
welfare the proper aim and end of endeavor.
Finally, the general constitution or nature of mankind is
 TRANSITION 123

not the ultimate ground of obligation. A practical ethics

may be built upon but complete theory needs to look
it,

beyond, into the nature of the Maker, which is the ultimate

determinant of all nature, and more especially of the native
obligation which binds his rational creatures to each other
and to himself.

§ 86. We are to pass now from the consideration of obli-

gation, a binding together, to that of organization, a working
together. Heretofore the simple reciprocal relation of man
to man, with occasional anticipations of other relations, has
been the basis of our explanation. This view has proved
sufficient for the development of certain ethical principles,
and their application to the case supposed. But human
relations are mostly complex, consisting largely of relations
of the individual man to societies, and of societies to their
individual members, and also of societies to each other. In
considering hereafter these complex relations, it will be
found that the same principles without addition are applica-
ble to solve the obligations involved. The right aim of
society, in its various organic forms, is likewise the common
welfare, to be sought under the impulse of love. Every
moral agent is a member some system in whose welfare
of
his own is bound up, and thus sharing his own beneficence,
he finds his welfare, not in opposition to or deprivation of
others or in any self-seeking, but in union with his kind.
The advantage of organized effort is familiar in the notion
of help, the combination of several energies to accomplish a
single purpose, one will directing many forces to the same
end. The will may be that of one man, as a Caesar, a Loy-
ola, a Richelieu, a Napoleon, a Bismarck, overmastering and
bringing to unity the wills of a multitude ; or, turning from
autocracy to democracy, the unity of many wills may be the
result of a free consensus, as in a republic, and in voluntary
124 ORGANIZATION

associations of all kinds. In this oneness of will the divided

becomes an individual, a Briareus. What is subjectively
plural is objectively single. The individuality is complete
and the combination is to be judged as an
in its solidarity,
undivided whole, whether it be a family, a mercantile firm, a
society, an army, or a nation.
Likewise let it be observed that conscience is catholic, and
the law it reveals universal. Now a combination of men for
a common purpose or purposes must be duly regulated by
the common conscience. An organized association is respon-
sible for its official actions. Even a nation may do right or
wrong, and accordingly is honored or censured and perhaps
punished. As a common will makes it an individual, so a
common conscience makes it a person ; for as a body it is

conscious of obligation, and thus is a person. This organic

personality, though not wholly independent of, yet is to be
distinguished from, the private and persistent personality of
the members taken severally, for it implies a mass of super-
added obligations dominating the whole. Thus an organism,
or that wherein all parts and the whole are mutually means
and end, is recognized, when it consists of men, as an indi-
vidual personality, subject in all functional activity, both
internal and external, to the moral law.
 THE MAN 125

CHAPTER I

THE MAX

§ 87. It will be well, as introductory- to the subsequent

matter and for the sake o£ its clear treatment, to examine
here the organic character of the human constitution.
Each individual man is a completely organized being.
Primarily he consists of a body and a mind or spirit. He is

essentially a duality. A human body without a mind is not

a man ; it is merely a corpse. A mind without a body is —
science knows not what. The disembodied human spirit

may furnish matter for revelation, but since it presents no

phenomena for our observation, it is beyond the reach of
science. The man we study is a body and mind. These
are coordinate. Both being essential, we cannot say which
has priority in efficiency, any more than we can say which
blade of a pair of shears does the more work. They cooper-
ate, and neither can perform its functions apart from the
other. Thus the body is for the mind, and the mind is for
the body. Each is a means serving the other as an end, so
that together they constitute a duplex organic whole.
Evidently the body an organism. The limbs are
is itself

for the sustenance of the trunk, and the trunk is for the
sustenance of the limbs. If the body suffer mutilation, the
loss may in a measure be compensated by an increased or a
specialized activity of other organs, yet it is a defect. The
heart supplies the brain with blood, the brain supplies the
heart with energy. Moreover, each subsidiary organ is itself

an organism. The visual organ, the eye, serving as a guide

to the movements of the whole, is composed of various
126 OE GANIZA TION

organs, as the cornea, the lens, the retinal screen, each of

which is a means to every other as an end. Thus the whole
body is an organism composed of many organisms, to each of
which every other and the whole brings its contribution.

§ 88. The mind is a complement of faculties, an assem-

blage of functions. Its several generic powers, knowing and
feeling, desiring and willing, are reciprocally related. Each
class is a means to the others as ends, enabling them to fulfill
their normal functions. Were there no intelligence, there
could be no emotion or sentiment were there no intelligence
;

and feeling, there could beno desire were there no desire,

;

there could be no volition and were there no motived voli-

;

tion, there could be no intelligence higher than mere brutal

receptivity. Each serves the other and the whole.

We must be on our guard lest we transfer to this spiritual
sphere our notions of corporeal organs. These organs are
distinct entities standing apart in space whereas the mental
;

facultiesand capacities are simply properties or functions of

one and the same entity whose substance has no relation to
space, except through the incorporating body. It is never-
theless evident that these generic properties are mutually
related as means and end. Hence they are organized as to
their functions, and the mind, by virtue of this constitution,
is a spiritual organism.
Furthermore, the specific powers are organically related,
each special faculty being supported in the exercise of its
functions by each and all the rest of its class. It will be

best to exemplify this by the desires, with which, as motives

of the will, we are here particularly concerned.
The desires are primarily divided into the craving desires,
or and appetencies, whose function impels to
appetites
acquire, and the giving desires, or affections, whose func-
tion impels to impart. This opposition is merely logical,
 TEE MAN 127

for actually, in their naturally constituted order, they coop-

erate, the former seeking to acquire in order that the latter
may be prepared to impart. The suppression or hinderance
of either would be a mutilation, worse than the amputation
of a leg or arm. As already pointed out, the exercise of the
craving desires in disregard of the affections, is abnormal,
leading to a distraction of the affections from their proper
objects, and to a subversion of their functions; also the
exercise of the affections in disregard of the appetites and
appetencies, is abnormal, leading to inefficiency from lack of
resources supplying what affection would bestow; but, if

both classes be exercised according to their constitutional

relations, each with regard to the other, then the offices they
are naturally fitted to fulfill are performed, their several and
combined efficiency is attained, and their exercise is normal.
Each is for the other.
The same principle is applicable to all the various mental
powers both in particular and in general, thus showing the
mind as a whole to be an organism consisting of minor or
subsidiary organisms so delicately adjusted that an excess or
deficiency or distortion in the action of any one disorders
every other and the whole.

§ 89. Let us try for a moment to imagine what a man

might be and become if he were somehow so separated from
all objects of affection that it could have no play. We need
not suppose him incapable of affection, but only that it be
wholly dormant from lack of call. Allow that this solitary can
provide the necessaries of life, and even many of its luxuries,

and that he can successfully engage in self-culture. Pru-

dently caring for his body, he is temperate, and enjoys phys-
ical health and strength. Under the impulse of craving
propensities, he acquires a wealth of means to further enjoy-
ment, and his cultured intellect gathers and delights in treas-
ures of knowledge.
128 ORGANIZATION

Now we point out that, in this imaginary case, there is

strictly nothing moral or immoral; for, it is the relation

to rational beings, including Deity, or at least to sentient
beings, and not merely the possession of a rational nature,
that determines the existence of rights and obligation. No
trespass is possible, in case of an absolute solitary, for there
are no rights or counter rights. No duty is done, for there
is no one to whom a debt is due. There is no virtue or
vice, for there is no law demanding conformity. There is

no justice or injustice, for there is no claimant. Nor can

there be loving service. Indeed, this isolated man is desti-

tute of actual conscience, for no occasion would bring the

potential to an actual discernment of moral law. He has no
responsibility, is not a moral being, not human, not a man,
unus homo, nullus homo, not a person, since he has no con-
sciousness of obligation. With him nothing is either right
or wrong even suicide would not be a crime.
; Truly it is
not good that the man should be alone. Pleasures we allow
he may have, even the intellectual; otherwise they are less
than brutal, for the brute enjoys at least instinctive affec-
tion. But the solitary can never be happy, certainly not
with that happiness which ripens into blessedness.
It appears, then, that man is essentially a moral being,
and therefore essentially a social being. So let us change
our supposition from one solitary to one in society, whose
affections, however, are wholly dormant because of his entire
selfishness. Guided by the counsels of prudence, negatively
in avoiding harm, positively in securing personal benefit, he
may accomplish the correct functioning of his physical or-

gans, and maintain his body in wholesome condition. Also

he may wisely discipline his intellectual powers, and regulate
his passions and emotions, and so attain a high grade of effi-

ciency. Moreover, by observing certain rules of art, using

his fellows as means to secure his own ends, he may accu-
 THE MAN 129

mulate wealth, power, and fame. Such seem to have been the
character and aims of the more refined peoples of antiquity,
especially of the Greeks. Their self-culture, looking solely
to the beautiful development of the individual man, was
very sensitive to the aesthetic elements essential to excel-
lence, while the ethical elements were more lightly esteemed
and often disregarded. The tendency was strongly egoistic,
seeking the enjoyment of a fair personality, and its secure
tenure against infringement. And modern times such
in
self-culture is widely and highly approved, many moralists
making it the basis of their systems.
The supposition of a cultured man in society without nat-
ural affection is monstrous. Unlike the solitary, he is a
morally responsible person, for conscience in him is actual,
the law is upon him, and in his disregard of all save his own
interests, he is a law-breaker, thoroughly immoral. Yet,
strange to say, he may be a good neighbor and citizen ; for,

if one selfishly serve his own interest with far-sighted pru-

dence and wide-reaching wisdom, this works out for society
very much the same result as if his energies were wholly
devoted to thoroughly unselfish, disinterested, loving ser-

vice. Such is the economical ordering of human affairs.

But it does not so work for the man himself. Though far
from criminal or even disorderly, though he do not sin with
his lips, and though he practice, for his own ends, a large
beneficence, yet, without benevolence, he is a whited sepul-
cher, a hypocrite, a moral monster. More likely, however,
the inward corruption breaks forth, poisoning the air and
multiplying ills. This has usually been the historical result.

These considerations illustrate the fact that men are social

beings in the sense of interdependence, not merely for the
common needs of pleasurable living, but also for moral devel-
opment by the exercise of mutual affection, through which
alone the dignity of complete manhood is attainable.
130 ORGANIZATION

§ 90. But in real human life thereis not and cannot be

thorough seclusion. A solitary is a mere negation, a meta-

physical abstraction, a logical ghost. We find ourselves in
a world of fellow beings from whom it is impossible to be
completely absolved. Even a Selkirk on his desert
isle not

only remembers his former associations, but contemplates

the possibility of a return to the world, and hence is bound
to comport himself with reference to it, to care for and culti-
vate his powers as far as may be in view of that possibility.
But should he reasonably despair of a return among men,
still he may not neglect his personal dignity, or ever, even
under the greatest suffering, take his own life for he can- ;

not know his future here, and one relation, the chiefest of
all, persists. He is bound by indissoluble obligations to his
maker, law-giver and judge, whose claims are never released,
and whose honor is involved.
Also let it be remarked that the individual owes his exis-
tence, as well as the possibility of its continuance and of all
moral culture, so much to the human society in which he is
ordinarily included, that it is rare to find one so totally de-
praved as to be entirely destitute of all natural affection.
A mother gives birth to her child; therein and thereafter
the moral tie binds. No distance of place or time can atten-
uate it to nothingness, no violence can sever it, even death
spares a bond in dutiful memories rendered more precious
and sacred by loss. Can a woman forget her sucking child,
that she should not have compassion on the son of her
womb ? Hardly is it possible. Can a son forget the mother
who bore him, that he should not have compassion for her
pains, her nurture, her watchings, her tender caresses?
Hardly, yet perhaps less rare. Shall he not, even in mature
years, honor his fatherand mother with kindly watch-care
and grateful memories? Surely, even amid a godless civ-
ilization, or even amid a barbarous heathenism, Nature
 THE MAN 131

will enforce in some measure her claims for loving ser-

vice.

§ 91. If we view each man, then, as an organism of orga-

nized organs, these standing to each other and to the whole
in a relation of interdependence, and if we observe that he
has the power of self-direction and control, it is clear that it

is within him to conserve and cultivate his natural powers

by regulating their organic relations, and that the bringing
of all the corporeal and spiritual powers with which he is

endowed by nature into full activity and harmonious coop-

eration, is the discharge of obligation and the perfection of
manhood. But also it is clear that the constitution of the
man, apart from his affections, furnishes no ethical element,
no basis for an ethical system. His subsidiary powers of
body and mind are not persons, and there is no moral ele-
ment that does not involve a personal relation.
Such relation is necessarily implied in the existence and
exercise of affection. There must be a sentient object, one
capable of benefit, to whom there is conscious obligation.
Herein, and herein only, personality appears ; herein, and
herein only, moral character has its root and growth. The
affections being psychologically and ethically essential to
integral manhood, it follows that a man cannot be truly
and rightly a man apart from his fellows, and in his
relations to them his conscience discerns the moral law de-
manding the exercise of righteous affections, and claiming
recognition as the supreme law of humanity.
There is no need to consider further the individual man.
We have noted him as a typical organism, pointing out that,
apart from his relations to others, that is, in him alone, there
is no ethical element. In the prior part of this treatise the
reciprocal relations of man to man, in their ethical aspect,
have been discussed at length. True the mere coexistence
132 ORGANIZATION

of two persons may correctly be construed as an organism,

each being for the other and both for the pair; especially
exemplified by partners in business, they being formally uni-
fied. But view the simple relation of man to man as an
to
organism would lead to no conclusions other than those
already attained, and hence we may now dismiss this simple
case also, and proceed to consider more intricate relations.
 TEE FAMILY 133

CHAPTER II

THE FAMILY

§ 92. A
study of the simple relation of man to man has
enabled us to discover the principles of obligation, with their
application in equivalent intercourse. This exposition, how-
ever, though fundamental and widely comprehensive, is not
exhaustive, and not adequate to the demands of right living.
For, in actual life, the relations subsisting among men exhibit
many varieties in kind, and those of the same kind many
differences in degree; also these relations are subject to
many and extreme changes, often amounting to reversal, due
to growth, activity, and the ceaseless mutations of inter-
course. Now, since all obligations originate in and corre-
spond to present relations, it follows that the special duty of.

a man some one on his right hand is rarely quite similar

to
to what is due to some one on his left also that his duty to
;

either is often quite unlike the duty of that other to him

and further, that his duty to any one to-day frequently
differs greatly from what is due to the same one to-morrow.

It is needful, therefore, to consider the kinds of relations in

which men stand to each other, and their variations, in order
to determine the corresponding obligations.
The relations that obtain among men exhibit many varie-
ties chiefly because of differences in social organization
under which general title, therefore, human relations and
consequent obligations may be distributed and discussed.
The procedure involves the principle that the perfection of
natural order, its harmony and stability, require that each
member fulfill its office in the several organisms to which it
134 ORGANIZATION

belongs. This is a natural principle, physical and psychical

and ethical, being applicable to the universe considered as
an organic whole, as well as to each of its organized mem-
bers,and specially, as we have just seen, to the microcosm,
man. In society at large each one is morally bound to fulfill
his functions as a member of the whole, and also as a mem-
ber of each of those subordinate and constitutive organisms
in which he is integrant. A study, then, of the chief con-
stituents of society will bring into view the various kinds
and degrees of duty corresponding to these functional rela-

tions,whose variations determine the variations of personal

obligation under the sole but universal law of loving service.
To this study we now proceed.

§ 93. Nature presents in both animals and plants a fun-

damental fact in sex. This is a primary, inerasable distinc-
tion that cuts all higher forms of animated beings, and
especially the total of humanity together with every subordi-
nate class of mankind, into two portions, delicately marked
by anatomical and physiological variations which extend
throughout the body, being discoverable even in the brain.
The physical differences are normally attended by mental and
moral differences which though less definite are not less deep,
permanent and universal. In these differences originate an
appetite and an affection which often become passionate,
tending on the one hand toward the deepest degradation, and
on the other to the highest exaltation. Hence it comes that
the relation of the sexes is perhaps the most powerful social
factor in every community, both savage and civilized.
Herein the pointing of nature is distinctly to marriage and
offspring. It sets apart a pair, a male and female, for each
other, their exclusive union being spontaneously guarded by
hygienic barriers, and by a prompt jealousy, fierce and fatal.
Offspring brings into play strong parental instincts, prompt
 THE FAMILY 135

ing protection, provision and nurture until maturity. Thus

the family is preeminently a natural institution, which in
some important respects takes precedence of all others, and
isfundamental in the constitution of society.

§ 94. The ideal family in modern society consists of a

mature man and woman, not differing greatly in age, who of
their own free will, have entered with civil and ecclesiastical
forms, into the marriage bond, are living together as husband
and wife, and providing for their yet unemancipated chil-
dren. Their children are first a son, then a daughter, again
a son, then another daughter. The parents, beside each
other,have both a son and a daughter, and each child has
both a brother and a sister. These exhaust the family rela-
tions. To complete this ideal, add a home, giving common
shelter, furnishing conveniences, and serving as a local habi-
tation and center of union.
What support this ideal receives from ethical principles
will be more clearly seen after a detailed consideration of
the several relations involved. But we make at once the
obvious remark that it is not often fully realized, because of
failure or irregularity in births, intervention of death, or ex-
treme poverty. Still, even in such incomplete families, the
relations are generally sufficient for the unfolding of the
domestic virtues, the building of character, and the enjoy-
ment of home life.

§ 95. It is evident that a family is an organic union of

several persons, as indicated in their common surname, and
in the correlative terms husband and wife, parent and child,

father or mother and son or daughter, brother and sister;

each of these implying the existence of the other. Ethically
each member is related to every other, and to the whole, as
at once means and end. The existence of relations among
136 ORGANIZATION

these persons determines that there be corresponding obliga-

tions, and the variety of relations determines a variety in
the obligations. The particular kind and degree of the obli-
gation of each member, is determined by the special function
belonging to that member in maintaining the orderly unity
of the organism. Just this much is the duty of each, and
no more.
If, however, there be, as there often is, disorder, distrac-
tion or failure on the part of some one member, requiring addi-
tionaland special efforts on the part of the others to restore
and maintain order and efficiency, then their duty is enlarged
to meet the requisition. An excellent analogy is seen in the
physical organism of the individual man. Each of the organs
of his body contributes to the healthful action of every other,
and all the others contribute to sustain each one. Moreover,
when any one is disordered, there is a disturbance more or
less general, a sympathetic suffering of all allied organs, and
a feverish effort of nature to restore the normal condition.

§ 96. In the actual case of a man and a woman obeying

the beck of nature, and entering into the marriage relation,
let the distinct personality of each, and their entire moral
equivalence, be granted ; then several important truths are
logically consequent.
First. In consenting to this union, both parties are to
exercise their unbiased free will. Any unwarranted inter-

ference, objective or subjective, in the liberty of either is a

trespass the more grievous because of its far reaching conse-
quences. It is true that circumstances often warrant or even
require a hindering interference, extending perhaps to pro-
hibition, on the part of parents especially, or of friends, or of
the State but it is obvious that, in a matter so extremely
;

delicate,and of such vast importance to those immediately

concerned, the warrant should be very clear. Compulsory
 THE FAMILY 137

marriage, on the other hand, is never warrantable, and is one

of the grossest forms of trespass.
Secondly.
Actual marriage, or the yielding of each to the
other of what
is peculiar to the distinct personality, works no

detriment to the honor of either party, provided it be accom-

panied by an entirely voluntary, mutual and unreserved sur-
render of all the interests of life into the common keeping
of both. Thereby the pair, without losing the distinct
personality, become a single individual personality. In this
fusion, their honor, social standing, propertyand prospects
are rightly held in common by each for the other, by each
for both, by both for each. The two are one. Their joint
welfare and happiness is an inseparable compound.
Thirdly. In the pair thus unified there should be but one
will. A constant endeavor to harmonize opinions, senti-
ments and desires, wherein a firm adherence to principle is

combined with a yielding even in matters of importance,

results in a singleness of will that is essential to the perfec-
tion of the union. A tie so sacred should never be loosened
by willful discord. Custom has established on firm and suf-
ficient grounds that, generally speaking, the control in detail
of interests outside the home shall be in the hand of the hus-
band, and those within the home shall be subject to the man-
agement of the wife. But, while the decisions of each
should be as far as possible in accord with the views and
wishes of the other, yet, in case of a permanent differ-
ence, the final decision should be left to the one in whose
province the matter in question belongs.
Fourthly. The union may not be enlarged by the addi-
tion of another partner. Polyandry or polygamy, common
among brutes, is inadmissible among persons, it being incon-
sistent with the moral equivalence of the sexes. If more
than one of either sex be bound to one of the other, the plu-
rality is severally deprived of the rank of equal fellowship,
and degraded to a thing useful merely as a means.
138 OBGANIZA TION

Fifthly. While it may be doubted whether there be physi-

ological reasons why the marriage of persons of near consan-
guinity should not be permitted, the ethical reasons are
clearly good and sufficient. The marriage of members of
the same family would bring about such an admixture of
moral relations as to confuse the functions of its members,
rendering them perplexing and distracting, and so disorder-
ing the harmony of its system. Hence the State, in the
interest of the family, and of general society whose moral
health is involved with that of the family, prohibits such
marriage as incestuous, tending to disturb the normal opera-
tion of the family organism, and to check the unfolding of
its peculiar beauty and worth.

§ 97. Marriage is indissoluble, except by death or crime.

If death sever the bonds, a new marriage of the survivor

cannot be prohibited by the State, for civil law is properly

concerned with temporal relations only, and so the question
of second marriage must be left to the religious convictions

of the parties. A formal dissolution of marriage is justified

specially by the crime of conjugal infidelity, this being a vio-

lation of its peculiar significance and manifest purpose, and
itself an actual breaking of the vow.
Legal questions concerning divorce, with permit of new
marriage, present many difficulties, especially on plea of
cruelty or desertion. But it is clear that a wished-for disso-
lution cannot rightly be decreed merely because of disease,
poverty, misfortune, disappointed expectation, "incompati-
bility," whatever this may mean, or the dissatisfaction of one
or both parties, or even because of wickedness and crime
that does not victimize home. None of these can be allowed

as sufficientground for entire divorce, if society would pre-

serve its moral health, so largely dependent on the sanctity
of marriage. Relief may be had in extreme cases by a legal
 THE FAMILY 139

recognition of actual separation, without a severance of the

moral bond that forbids a new relation.

§ 98. Persons of and emancipated from parental

full age,
authority, often do not marry for some years, or perhaps
never marry. The social status of such persons is more or
lessabnormal according as they are more or less absolved
from family connection. For the family is the basis of social
organization, and since these are now but external appen-
dages to some one, they cannot be accounted more than
fractionalmembers of society at large.
Such persons are unhappily at great disadvantage in respect
of moral culture. For the conditions of complete develop-
ment are lacking to those destitute of the familiar objects
around which the strongest and best affections of the human
soul gather and grow, and whose lack it is not possible fully
to compensate by other lines of moral activity. In these
other lines, however, exceptional attainments are often made,
commanding high respect, and rounding out a useful life.

§ 99. When the family circle is completed by the birth

of children, a new and wide field is opened for the cultiva-
tion of ethical graces. Moral possibilities, which otherwise
are forever latent, become patent. The potential becomes
actual, and nature has not planted in vain. No man is ever
wholly a man until he is a husband and a father and, more ;

emphatically, no woman is wholly a woman until she is a

wife and mother. A babe is a pledge of love, an additional
and powerful tie, a sacred trust, calling out and taxing the
moral energies, and making an unlimited demand on loving
service. All that is beautiful in human nature blooms under
the influence of this fertilizing relation. It is easy to adore

the Madonna.
The familiar care and provident rearing of children con-
140 OR GANIZA TION

stantly exercises the domestic virtues, tending directly to the

perfection of manhood and womanhood. The responsibility
and difficulty are of the gravest. The culture should be
dominated by the view that, in the order of nature, the child
is destined to moral independence, and to membership in

society. In being prepared for this, it has many and very

sacred rights. Its parents are bound, as their function in
the family organism, to provide for its healthful maintenance
suitable to their rank in society, for its education, intellec-
tual,moral and religious, and, in general, for its present and
prospective welfare. Great laxity of restraint is likely to be
ruinous; but, on the other hand, severe restrictions, a rigid
molding of character, opinions, and religious creed, is hardly
less to be deprecated as an injurious trespass on the right of
the child to generous culture, and the free growth of its

individuality.
The office of brothers and sisters in this organic relation
is affectionate sympathy, and mutual helpfulness, which
should extend throughout As sons and daughters they
life.

are bound to honor father and mother by a willing and

pleased obedience to their rightful authority, and by a
prompt readiness to promote their welfare. Also they are
bound to guard sedulously the honor of the family name,
and to seek actively the advancement of the common interest.

§ 100. This human institution, the family, is preeminently

natural, being physically determined. Those born into it
are involuntarily and inseparably its members. By its pri-
macy it stands as the unit of society and of the State, with-
out derogation from the distinct personality, moral status
and obligation of its individual members. Yet it is a whole.
Even when some part or parts are lacking, it is still a unit.
It is not a logical whole, a genus, for its parts are not
species or kinds of family. It is an integral whole ; not col-
 ;

THE FAMILY 141

lective, as a cluster of grapes, but organic, as a flower whose

central organs, stamen and pistil, yield germ and seed, within
a corolla. It is an individual, indivisible in itself, and sepa-
rate from every other.
Less clear perhaps, but not less true, is it that a family is

a single personality. The definition of a person is a being

conscious of obligation. Now there is a consciousness com-
mon to all members of a family, an intelligent apprehension
of moral law which is the same in each, a judgment which,
under the influence of common interest, is assimilated into
one, a pervading sentiment, a united impulse to effectuate a
single will. The obligation of some one family as an organic
whole to some one man as its benefactor, or to some other
family, or to general society, is matter of familiar speech and
acknowledgment, and the common consciousness of such
obligation constitutes its unique personality, quite distin-
guishable from the peculiar personality of its several mem-
bers. To this conception of its distinct personality may be
added the possession of family traits in features, manners,
customs, habits, and in general, of character, often sharply
marked. Moreover, what wounds one member, wounds all

the honor, dignity and welfare of the whole, is in common

keeping.

§ 101. The individual personality of a family as an organ-

ized unit, distinct from the personality of its members, is

manifest in the significant fact that beyond

it claims a life

the present generation. Its ancestry extending back for

ages is its pride, and its posterity in an indefinite future is

its hope. What it has been confers titles of honor, and what
itmay become excites anxious solicitude. The death of a

member breaks in upon its present entirety, but does not

interrupt its Only by sterility and death com-
continuity.
bined is it extinguished, and this is accounted a special loss
to society, a public and private misfortune.
142 ORGANIZATION

A family of the present generation, inheriting the honor

and wealth of the same family in preceding generations, rec-
ognizes its moral obligation to maintain and rightly use the
trust, thus discharging a sacred debt due the dead. Also it
recognizes its moral obligation to the coming generation in
provision for its welfare, thus discharging a sacred debt due
descendants, including those yet unborn. That one is thus
bound to pay debts due the deceased and the unborn, is not
fanciful sentiment, nor figurative speech, but real, literal
ethics. Current expressions and approved literature recog-
nize in many ways
the obligation as especially incumbent on
the whose individuality and personality extend
family,
through generations that come and go, yet perpetuate its
organic unity.

§ 102. The foregoing considerations enable us to under-

stand more clearly the ethical principles that regulate the
holding and disposing of property.
Property owned by either party at time of marriage, and
that acquired afterward, is, by virtue of the marriage, the
common property of the family. That either husband or
wife should have property at disposal apart from and inde-
pendently of the other, though often it is so arranged, con-
tradicts the unity of the relation, drawing a line of separation
and making a distinction that ought never to exist. Such
an arrangement is inconsistent with that entire surrender of
all the interests of life into the common keeping which the
marriage bond requires; and in so far the marriage is but
partial. The reserve implies a distrust that is chilling, and
likely to produce a discord that is fatal. It is a withholding
trespass.
Evidently, then, the family property should not be largely
ventured in trade, or otherwise disposed of, without the free
consent of all members, including the children, in whom also
 THE FAMILY 143

property rights are vested by birth, when they become suffi-

ciently mature to appreciate and rightly judge the interests
involved. Yet, be it remembered, that each and all should
seek, by a reasonable yielding, to assimilate their views and
wishes, thereby attaining a unity of will which thus becomes
the will of the family.
Also it is evident that the management of the family prop-
erty in detail must be left to some one member. This seems
naturally to devolve upon the husband and father who,
according to the usual and approved order, takes charge of
the family interests outside of home, and hence is best
acquainted with public affairs. Because property is held
and ordinary business transacted in his name, he is apt to
regard himself as exclusive and irresponsible owner. This
error, pervading society, stands greatly in need of correction.

§ 103. Distribution by testament of the property of a

family is, for like reasons, by the hand and in the name of
its ostensible head ; also for the reason that, preparatory to
his decease, when the house band is loosed, and the family
disintegrated, there is need of a special and provisory adjust-
ment by the one to whom their care has
of property rights
been chiefly committed. In any such adjustment the united
consensus of all members should be had, so that together
with the avoidance of any actual trespass, complaint of wrong
may also be forestalled.
Testamentary distribution gives rise to many difficult
questions which largely occupy the courts. The funda-
mental principles involved are, however, sufficiently clear.

A producer has a right to use and dispose of his products at

will, and this will must be effective beyond his decease, else

a great incentive to industry and accumulation would be lost,

projects for the benefit of the coming generation would not

be devised and driven, and social progress would be hindered,
144 OB GANIZA TION

inasmuch as each generation would have to make a new be-

ginning. But let it be observed that the home management
and industry, its provision for rest and refreshment, its cheer-
ing influence, its trifling comforts even, are very important
elements in the efficiency of the producer, and thereby enter
into his product so that all members of the home circle, but
;

especially the husband and wife, are partners in business,

and since they share in the producing, are entitled to share
in the production, both in consuming and in disbursing.
Beside this, it should be distinctly recognized that all posses-
sions are held and managed as trusts, and their agreed testa-
mentary distribution should be regulated accordingly. The
testator is bound to provide suitably for the family, thus dis-
charging his primary obligation as its trustee. A surplus
may rightly become matter of bequest to collaterals, to friends,
or to the general public, in the founding or endowing hospi-
tals, schools, libraries, and such like benefactions, according
to the best judgment of the trustee representing the family in
this discharge of its alien obligations.
 THE COMMUNITY 145

CHAPTER III

THE COMMUNITY

§ 104. Human beings manifest a strong disposition to

gather into groups more or less permanent. In some of these
population is massed, as in cities ; in others it is more sparse,
as in villages, hamlets, neighborhoods. Hence in any inhab-
ited region, it is easy to point out centers of population,
though the circumference be quite indefinite. Besides the
gregarious instinct of the human animal, there are many
rational determinants of this tendency, both economical and
ethical. Every one owes his existence to progenitors and
also is indebted for its continuance, for all physical means,
conveniences and comforts of living, for all intellectual and
moral culture, so entirely to association, more or less intimate,

with his fellows, that all the interests of life, his whole wel-
fare, is bound up with them. Strict independence is a prac-
tical impossibility.

A group of people thus specially related by living in prox-

imity is a community. This is not merely a collection but a

body of people for the necessities of its members which draw
;

them together determine at once an organic constitution.

Each member contributes more or less directly to the welfare
of every other, and to the welfare of the whole, in which
welfare he participates. The variations of function are deter-
mined by the pressure of various needs, and by the fitness of

various abilities to meet them. There is a tacit consensus in

the distribution of these functions; but since there is no

formal and definite enactment of a constitution, the com-
munity is often spoken of as unorganized society ; whereas,
146 ORGANIZATION

though not formally, yet it is essentially an organism, neces-

sitated by the interdependence of its members.

§ 105. Recur to the primary ethical principle that every

one has a right to gratify his normal desires, and to this, be-
side, that it is his obligation not merely passively to allow

their impulse, but actively to seek their gratification, and it

is manifest that the fulfillment of obligation is impracticable

apart from society. For, no class of normal desires can
properly be gratified without reference to associates; but
especially the affections, which are conditioned on the presen-
tation of sentient objects, can have no exercise in solitary life.
In such life the chiefest, indeed the sole function of humanity
is perverted and comes to naught. Mankind is a brother-
hood, and it is only by close fraternization, only by being a
man among men, that it is possible to be wholly a man.
Whoever lives his life in its natural and rightful fullness is a
constant recipient from his fellows of the necessary means,
for which he is dependent on them, and therefore is constantly
incurring an indebtedness which requires a constant reciprocal
activity to repay.
These considerations forbid an ascetic life, which, under
the guise of righteous self-denial, renounces invigorating en-
joyment, and thus leads to such an impoverishment of spirit-

ual power that its dues go unpaid. Nor can the life of a
recluse be approved, which seeks self-sufficiency in solitude
and retired contemplation, or an escape from thronging ills
by a timid retreat into privacy, idle ease, and indifference to
the common welfare. Likewise we must condemn the life

of a reserved student who, enamored of truth, withdraws

from familiar intercourse, and in the scholarly seclusion of
his library seeks to accumulate knowledge with no intent or
thought of sharing it, and thereby promoting the well-being
even of his compeers. These several forms of social seques-
 THE COMMUNITY 147

tration can be approved only when they are temporary, and

for the purpose of recuperation and preparation for better
service in subsequent life. Thus only can they be acquitted
of selfishness, and accepted as transient phases of that active
life of practical benevolence which alone develops the moral
dignity of true manhood.

§ 106. The members of a com-

reciprocal obligations of the
munity are recognized in a code of social intercourse, an
unwritten common law, which prevails throughout and regu-
lates communication. This law, like the unwritten Common
Law of the courts, is a detail of rights Both sys-and duties.
tems originated in the exigencies of popular intercourse, and
by degrees have been fully developed and both are but va- ;

riations, explications and applications of the law of trespass.

The conventions of society are known as the rules of good
breeding and good manners. They require comity, a proper
consideration and respect for the minor rights of each other,
a delicate regard for one another's wishes, feelings and pe-
culiarities, a prompt attention to wants, their serviceable
anticipation, a complaisant readiness in assistance; this is

politeness. In the denser portions of a community there

is constant call for its exercise, so that people, even those of
otherwise indifferent culture, become by attrition polished,
that is, polite ; and the higher ranks are cour-
they are civil,

teous or courtly in address. To this must be added the spe-

cial code of social etiquette observed in refined circles, which

descends to minutiae, and is so rigid in its required decorum

that an infraction of it is sometimes less readily condoned
than vice. All such conventionalities arise from the union
or consolidation of interests and responsibilities, and betoken
the solidarity of the community.

§ 107. A prime condition of the wholesomeness of a com-

munity is the truthfulness of its members. The obligation
148 ORGANIZATION

to be truthful in both word and deed

is clear. Every one
has a right to certain services from his fellow man, and a
usually just and sometimes very important claim is for an
opinion, judgment, information, direction, advice, sympathy.
If these be reserved when due, it is a trespass, a restriction
of a rightful liberty to use and profit by them. Still greater
is the trespass, if they be misstated, thereby misinforming
and misleading the recipient, for then his trust is violated,
his confidence outraged. If the claim be allowed, the expres-
sion by word or deed must be true to the thought.
But the claim is not always just, not always to be allowed.
We are not always bound to speak; often it is right and
wise to be silent. Nor, if we speak, are we always bound to
tell the whole truth which case the extent of the reserve
; in
is matter for conscientious judgment, having care not to mis-
lead by the partial statement. This right of private reserve
is superseded by the courts in the interest of society, and the
witness required to the whole truth without reserve.
tell

Whether deceit in any form is ever justifiable is a ques-

tion that has been discussed for centuries, and is still unset-
tled. On the one hand it is affirmed that deceit is in its
very nature irreconcilable with the eternal principles of right
and justice ; and on the other hand it is asserted that certain
emergencies may justify a departure from ordinary rules of
conduct, and render deceit not only justifiable bat obligatory.
This question of the ages is not to be answered in a few
words. We must be content here with saying : first, that a
lie is never justifiable ; secondly, that not every deception is

to be accounted a lie, e.g., the myth of Santa Claus ; and

thirdly, if the definition of a deception be allowed wider
scope than the definition of a lie, yet is a deception so rarely
right and duty that every one should practice habitual truth-
fulness, deviating from it with great hesitation, and only
when the justification is beyond all question.
 THE COMMUNITY 149

§ 108. The general obligation to be truthful takes a num-

ber of specific forms. Beside this duty in the commonplace
talking of familiar intercourse, we place the formal tie of a
promise, written, oral, or indirectly implied in mere behavior.
The obligation in such case is strengthened by the fact that
the promisee, in reliance on the faithfulness of the promiser,
may in his life conduct order important matters with refer-
ence to the promise, and suffer injury or even disaster should
it fail. A promise given under an essential misunderstand-
ing, or, since we cannot accurately forecast the future, in
case the duty of its observance is superseded by some higher
unforeseen duty with which it is radically inconsistent, is

null. This does not endorse the loose aphorism that a bad
promise is better broken than kept for, if its badness work ;

merely the private personal injury of the promiser, unless

ruinous in an intolerable extreme, he is not thereby dis-

charged of the obligation. We commend him that sweareth

to his own hurt, and changeth not. A promise made under
compulsion cannot be claimed by the promisee, yet it meas-
urably binds the promiser because of respect for his word.
In no case, however, is a promise obligatory if the fulfillment
be criminal, for it can never be duty to commit crime.
A contract or covenant differs from a simple promise in
that it implies an exchange of services, and reciprocal obliga-
tion. under the protection of special statute,
It is usually
an outcome of the moral element, of that mutual trust which
is the basis of social order. Contracts are of endless variety,
and affect nearly every detail of private and public life ; and
if their binding character were not fully recognized there

would be no security in affairs. A deception practiced by

either party in making a contract invalidates it ; but both
parties must abide the consequences of carelessness, thought-

lessness, or stupidity.
Common honesty in trade, and in business dealings gener-
150 ORGANIZATION

ally, is another form of truthfulness. Exchange of services,

of goods, and of other forms of property, has the advantage
of being estimated numerically in the medium of exchange,
money, which gives exactness to the mutual obligation, and
sharply expresses its violation. The interests involved in
such transactions are so widely interlaced that fraud excites
general indignation and reprobation. There is hardly any
form of trespass that incurs such deep and lasting disgrace
as dishonesty.

§ 109. The membership of an organized community does

not consist in merely so many men, women and children,
standing singly as discrete elements coalescing into a con-
crete body. A strong tendency to such individualism has
marked the nineteenth century, in France, in England, and
even more positively in the United States. It cries out for
liberty, equality, fraternity, and demands that creed, race, and

even sex shall be ignored on the forum, at the polls, and in

the schools. Now, while each individual man and woman is
a distinguishable member of society, it should be observed,
in opposition to individualism, that each is primarily a mem-
ber of a family whereby he or she is socialized, that the
family is properly the organized and organizing unit of so-
ciety, and that a community consists fundamentally of asso-
ciated families. This incidentally appears in the fact that
the social standing of the individual is in general determined
by that of his family, above which it is difficult to rise, and
below which one rarely falls. The question, What is he?
asks after his vocation ; but, Who is he ? asks after his
family.
A variety of minor organizations are usually formed by
voluntary association, which also are integrant members ; as,

social or literary clubs, and benevolent societies. Beside

these are business firms of two or more members, stock com-
 THE COMMUNITY 151

panies, cooperative associations, and guilds or trade-unions.

Such combinations more effective achievement are often
for
legally incorporated, and usually have a contract or articles
of agreement, or a written organic law or constitution, stating
the ends they seek and the means, and defining the functions
of members and officers as duties; the variations in duty
arising from a specializing of functions so as to constitute
an efficient cooperative whole. A special class of subordi-
nate organisms is seen in the schools, which also usually
have a formal constitution and laws defining the duties of
members, official and unofficial. They are instituted specially
to meet the debt due the next generation, are essential to the
perpetuity rather than to the maintenance of society, and
form a bond, a historical enchainment, between its present
and its future.
Each of the foregoing minor organizations is itself a mem-
ber of the community, having, as already said of the family,
an individual personality distinguishable from the individual
personality of its components. Moreover, although the
bounds of any single community be ill defined, still commu-
nities are recognized as more or less distinct from one
another. Now each of these as an organic whole has not
only obligations to its various members, but also to neighbor-
ing communities with which it is in communication. Thus
the community as a whole is an individual, a personality,
with a conscience, and a moral judgment in the consensus of
itsmembers, which passes upon its own character and con-
duct, upon that of its several members, and upon that of
affiliated communities.

§ 110. The organic nature of a community distributing

various functions or offices and consequent duties among its
members, is clearly seen in its division of labor. The neces-
sities of life necessitate labor, but no one by his own labor
152 OB GANIZA TION

alone can surely supply even these, much less can he produce
the many requisites to comfortable living. The civilized man
has many desires or wants that have become so habitual as to
be classed as necessaries. For the full gratification of these

he is dependent on the productive labor of his fellows.

Hence the pressure of such wants molds the community
into an organism, in which each works for every other, and
they for him also he labors for the welfare of the whole, and
;

the end of the whole is the welfare of each. Thus a simple

community will comprise a shoemaker, a tailor, a carpenter,
a blacksmith, a shopkeeper, a printer, a doctor, a lawyer, a
schoolmaster, and a These exchange services or
curate.
products, and a variety of duties is a consequence of the
organization.
A discussion of division of labor is not proper to a treatise
on Ethics, but belongs rather to the theory of Economics.
It is appropriate, however, to observe that, in addition to its
economical advantage, it has the moral advantage of giving
rise to the common virtues of honesty, industry, and respect
for order, and to a sense of personal responsibility, the re-
sponsibility of each worker to his fellows and to the commu-
nity at large. Besides, it originates the conception of a
vocation, a calling,and establishes each worker in a position,
changed from a mere man into a member, whereby he is no
longer just like all others, but assumes a place and mark
specially his own. Extreme division of labor, however, de-
presses the intellectual status of the laborer, narrows his
spiritual horizon, and assimilates his activity to that of an
automatic mechanism.
The distribution of functions brings about social classifica-
tion. Mere laborers are distinguished from farmers and
mechanics, and these from skilled artisans, and these again
from artists and the professional class whose work is mostly
intellectual. Greater honor always attaches to the finer, and
 THE COMMUNITY 153

less to the coarser kinds of labor. This has the wholesome

effect of inducing effort to rise into what is accounted a
higher social rank, and is thus a powerful stimulus to civil-
ization.But here also an abatement must be made. Classes
stronglymarked tend to become castes, in which form their
wholesome effect disappears, ambitious effort is paralyzed,
improvement discouraged, and civilization restrained.

§ 111. In a prosperous community, one whose wealth in

general is increasing, capital or the wealth destined to repro-
ductive consumption tends to accumulate in the hands of
those more intelligently industrious, and thereby a special
class is formed, the capitalists. These are marked off from
the wage-earners whom they employ in their large and
enlarging industrial enterprises. Now the economical advan-
tages of large capital engaged in extensive and systematic
industry are obvious, yet just because of the greater uni-
formity, abundance and cheapness of its products, the ability
of the small free crafts to subsist is curtailed, which reduces
the larger portion of the community to the position of wage-
earners under the mastership of the capitalists, on whom
their livelihood depends. The evils of this division of soci-

ety, and of this enforced relation, have become familiar in

what are known as labor troubles. The grasping selfishness
of moneyed power induces oppression; and the sense of
injustice, and the dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution
of the amenities of life, induce violent revolt.
Certain remedial schemes, under the generic name of
socialism, have attained notoriety and many advocates. They
propose a reorganization of society, giving it a more definite

and compact In general, they would abolish com-

solidarity.

petition in labor, wages, and particular or private ownership

of property, especially of land substituting work under the
;

stimulus of public spirit, an equal distribution of products,

154 ORGANIZATION

and a common ownership and disposition of all fixed property

by closely organized society. A still more radical scheme of
reorganization, called communism, proposes to abolish also
the family, substituting for domestic relations and the gov-
ernment of parental authority, temporary unions, and a com-
munistic care for the nurture and education of offspring.
Attempts to maintain such schemes in practical operation
have hitherto failed.

A discussion of socialism as to its economical value, and

even as to its ethical worth, must be passed by with the gen-

eral remark that the evils of society as actually constituted

arise, not from contrived injustice, but from a lack of moral

equipoise. In the ideal community, which moral culture

seeks to attain, there would be no tolerated trespass upon
the rights of even the humblest member and in the absence
;

of just cause of revolt, all would be content in the station

determined by merit, by the relative value of services. Until
this Utopia be realized, a more intelligent apprehension of the
inseparable interests of capital and labor would conduce to
greater harmony, to mutual respect, and to a wider recogni-
tion of reciprocal rights. Meantime, remedy against oppres-
sion by either party should be sought, not in turbulence and
disorder, but in appeal to that which is set for the guardian-
ship of rights, to the strong arm of the State.
 THE STATE 155

CHAPTER IV
THE STATE

§ 112. It is essential to any widely associated life of men

that there should be definite and effective provision for the
protection of rights. For in every community evil-doers, or
at least doers disposed to trespass, are so many, active and
strong, that its several members are not competent, without
combination, to maintain intact their rightful liberties.

Moreover, certain important interests of the total community

are best served by concerted action, indeed many cannot
otherwise be served. To two general ends, the
attain these
safeguard of rights and the advancement of the common weal,
the one protecting, the other promoting, is the purpose of
the State.
The established State occupies a definite territory. It em-
braces several, perhaps many distinguishable communities,
usually of one race and language, having common manners,
customs and traditions. It consists primarily of the whole
body of people, the body politic, including all officers of gov-
ernment but the term is often, secondarily, limited to the
;

official class, the sovereign body having supreme power held

in trust for the common weal, which class, however, is more

properly termed the government.
It is not within the scope of this treatise to discuss the
relative merits of different forms of state government, nor to
trace the historical evolution of the State through the abuses,
turmoils, and civil wars which, because of the imperfect or
erroneous views and the selfish ambition of statesmen and
156 ORGANIZATION

rulers, have embarrassed its We shall attempt

development.
no more than to sketch the essential features of its constitu-
tion, and to indicate its exclusively ethical basis, its thor-

ough-going ethical character, and the varieties of moral

obligation imposed on its members by its specific and peculiar
organization.

§ 113. Governments are distinguished as monarchic, aris-

tocratic or republican, and democratic. Some combine ele-
ments of each of these principal forms; as, Great Britain.
No exclusive preference can be given to any one form. That
is best which best accords with the historical traditions and
habits of its subjects, is suitable to their grade of intellectual
and ethical culture, and is administered in the interest of the
public rather than of the rulers.
Every well-ordered State, whatever be its form of govern-
ment, has essentially a Constitution, unwritten or written,
positively decreed, and loyally observed by its officials and
citizens. The Constitution
is the fundamental organic law,

organizing the body politic. It has three essential features

arising from the very nature of the State, the legislative, the
judicial, the executive. The functions of the three are some-
times embodied in one person ; as, an absolute monarch. In
many cases they are irregularly distributed to a number of
persons ; but the historical trend is clearly to separate them
as distinct departments intrusted to a distinct personnel ; as,

in each of the States of our Union, and in the Federal whole.

The function of the Legislature is to enact statutory laws
within the limits and in pursuance of the organic law, the
Constitution. As a necessary corollary it has authority to
affix penalties to these laws to insure their observance, and
power to lay and collect taxes for the support of the govern-
ment, and for the execution of its measures.
The function of the Judiciary is to sit in judgment on the
 THE STATE 157

constitutionality of the legislated statutes, to interpret their

application, to sanctionand decree the penalty for violation.
When not otherwise directed by statute, the inferior courts
proceed in accord either with the Roman or Civil Law, as in
the States of continental Europe, or with the English Com-
mon Law, which has been adopted as the basis of jural rights
in the United States.
The function of the Executive is to enforce the laws and
carry out the measures enacted by the Legislature. The
execution of laws respecting crime, and of those respecting
property rights, is intrusted to the inferior courts with their
police and prison auxiliaries, backed by the superior courts,
and by the chief executive, be he governor, or president, or
king. Measures for the public weal, as the coinage of money,
the care and disbursement of the public funds, the system of
public education, the postal system, the improvement of har-
bors and waterways, the making of treaties, and many others,
are carried into effect by this branch of the government.
Also the chief executive is commander in chief of the army
and navy, wherewith to insure domestic tranquillity, and the
common defense against foreign aggression, invasion, or other
form of trespass.

§ 114. Now be it observed that the State is a complete,

authoritative and powerful organization. Its foundation is

on human rights, its superstructure is a fortress against tres-

pass, a lodgment of justice, an abode of public duty and
patriotic service. The structure is not new ; for the human
race, so long as it has existed, has been busied in building,
remodeling, repairing, improving, and maintaining in differ-

ent forms, through all the vicissitudes of history, this emi-

nently ethical institution.

Recalling the definition of an organism, that each member
is at oncemeans and end for every other, and the whole for
158 ORGANIZATION

each and each for the whole, we observe: first, that each
citizen in his action as such, as in voting, or
paying a tax, or
serving on a jury or in the army, and likewise each officer of
any department in exercising his special function, is thereby
expending energy as a means for the profit, directly or re-

motely, of every other individual member of the State sec- ;

ondly, that in so far as each member is profited thereby, he is

an end ;thirdly, that the whole as a systematized means finds
its end in guarding and promoting the liberty, privileges,
rights and property of each individual member separately
taken; and fourthly, that it is the function of each officer
and citizen to become a means whereby to maintain the integ-
rity and efficiency of the its departments as an
State in all
end. In ancient times this last relation was emphasized, the
people are for the State ; as in the Roman Constitution, and
in the Spartan Constitution so greatly admired by Aristotle.
In modern times the reverse relation is emphasized, the State
is for the people ; as in the Virginia Bill of Rights, which
has been generally accepted as their Magna Charta by the
United States. The right relation, however, between the
governing and the governed is one of constant reciprocity.
The mutual obligations are dissimilar, but in delicate and
admirable equipoise.
Moreover, in observing that the ends in every view are
the preventing of trespass and the promoting of welfare, it

is evident that the raison d'etre of the organization, and its

informing element is strictly ethical. It would be easy to

treat in detail of the duties of citizens to the State, and of
the duties of the State to citizens, showing them to be
strictly and exclusively moral obligations of high order, all
coming under die law of trespass as prohibitions or as
requisitions and it is well worth repeating that all laws of
;

civil government are amplifications and specifications of the

law of trespass. The Legislature originates no law abso-

 THE STATE 159

lutely. Haying discovered certain rights unguarded or in

abeyance, it is obligated to enact specific laws to meet the
specific and these laws derive their authority ulti-
cases;
mately, not from the enacting body, nor from the whole
people whom it represents, but from the fundamental impera-
tive principle of right and justice, the moral law.

§ 115. Mention has already been made of the strong

tendency in recent days to individualism, of the disposition
upon the individual personality of each man
to lay stress
and woman, slighting the unity of society in favor of its
disparate plurality. It is evidently a reaction against the
centralizing tendency of former times, which regarded the
State as comprised in one man, or in one set of men, and all
others as fused to a mass whose sole relation to the state
was subservience. Both views are exaggerations, between
which lies the truth. Both violate the organic character of
the State, the latter excessively integrating, the former dis-
integrating.
Against individualism we point out that the State is not
an aggregate of men and women, nor are individual men
and women its originating units. The unit of the State is

the family. As a city composed of houses, so is a State

is

of homes. The representative head of a family judges and

acts for it in uniting with others to organize, or in the far
more usual case, to conduct the affairs of the already organ-
ized State. To him alone is properly committed the right of
suffrage, as the one best capable of guarding and promoting
all interests outside the domestic sphere. It hasbeen wisely
said that the two pillars upon which the whole structure of

the State reposes, are the sanctity of the family relations

and of the judicial oath. Should a blind Samson bow

himself on these, the whole would fall with disaster
edifice

to ruins.
160 ORGANIZATION

The State is thus constituted primarily of a congeries of

families organized into the larger whole. But beside these
are many other organizations holding membership in the
State, to whom protection is due ; as, business firms, stock
companies, and corporations generally, including incorporated
towns and These are endowed by the State with
cities.

large powers, and thus become subordinate municipalities,

each imperium in imperio. Also each department of the
State, and each of its subdivisions, as a court, an army, is
itself a subsidiary organism.

§ 116. The State as an organized whole, while distin-

guished by special characteristics, has features resembling
those of its elementary and subsidiary members. It is logi-
cally indivisible in itself, an individual. Its subdivisions are
not kinds, but departments, into which it is logically severed.
As a self-subsisting individual, it has a life whose beginning
is sometimes out of sight in remote antiquity, as that of
Greece and whose continuity does not depend on that of
;

its several members. We are born into it, we live within it,
we die out from it we are but its transient accidents. A
;

man looks forward to his end, and makes provision for it by

testament ; a State, looking forward with expectation of in-
definite continuity, makes no provision for an end.
Moreover, a State is a personality. It has an intelligence
and a culture of its own, and it has a will of its own. Also
it has a conscience of its own. Often it incurs debt, and
with unconstrained honesty meets its obligation. If it fail,
it is dishonored and disgraced before the world, and causes
guilty shame in every citizen, though he himself be blame-
less. Sometimes States commit crime as States, and are
punished by other States, or by ordinary providence. Usu-
ally they are very jealous of national honor, and an offense
arouses national indignation.
 THE STATE 161

Also this distinct individual personality is manifest in the

familiar recognition of national calamities, national pros-
and national thanksgiving all these
perity, national blessing, ;

being clearly distinguished from what befalls this and that

man, or this and that family. Withal there is a national
character, as seenby contrast of the English, French, and
Spanish peoples, more or less common to the individual
citizens, but attributed to the nationality rather than to the
man. It is only in a clear recognition of the distinct
and
unique personality of the State that a full and correct con-
ception can be had of civic interest, of common welfare, and
of public obligation.

§ 117. Let us here give a passing glance at the great vari-

ety of duties devolving upon a man because of his member-
ship in a variety of organizations, each involving a special
class or series of obligations. First as a member of a family,
whose name he bears, he has peculiar obligations to each of
the other members and to the whole. Then as a member of
polite society, as a business man in the market, on change or
in professional relations, as one of a club, or company, or as-
sociation, or church, he enters into many varied relations;
and, since obligation is founded on relation, these many varied
relations determine, not only a multiplication but also a diver-
sity, in kind and degree, of obligations. No man compre-
hends life until he is made to see by how many organic fila-

ments he is bound to his fellows ; how utterly impossible it

is for him to separate his interests and his fortunes from

theirs in how many ways the welfare of those who are
;

round about him depends upon the working, in due manner

and measure, of that part of the organism which he occupies.
With membership in the State, whether as a citizen sim-
ply or as an official also, arises another distinct series of obli-

gations, often of a very exacting and absorbing character.

162 ORGANIZATION

Upon the sincere discharge of these by rulers and subjects

depend the health and strength, the wholesome welfare, of
the body politic. No merely perfunctory conduct, no dis-
play of avowed patriotism, can replace genuine civic virtue.
It is sorrowful to observe that public duties are ordinarily
performed from dread of penalty or hope of reward, or per-
haps from the higher motive of respect for the law. But in
extraordinary junctures, in crises, in war, the service ren-
dered, even when enforced, is often loving service, the com-
pulsory is lost in the voluntary, and the dormant good-will
of the people arouses to free and devoted exercise. This
loving service of the State is the noble affection of true
patriotism.

§ 118. What is the justification of legal punishment?

What is the ground on which rests the acknowledged right
of society organized as a State to deprive a member offend-
ing against its laws of his property, his liberty, his life?
What is the warrant ? This grave question has been vari-
ously answered. It is the right of the stronger, the com-
bined force of many against one, the right of might, say
some. It is the right of vengeance, of revenge for injury,
transferred from the sufferer to the more capable and effect-

ive State, say others. Yet others say, in lofty words, the
dignity and authority of the law must be vindicated; the
broken law must have its integrity restored, must be made
whole again, rendered holy, sanctified, reconsecrated in the
eyes of all before whom it has been violated, and this is the
end of penalty. Let us seek firmer ground, some more
rational justification.
At the beginning of this treatise it was pointed out as a
familiar fact in history that men are exceedingly tenacious of
their rights, defending their claims with great pertinacity.
This is obviously the ultimate explanation of most quarrels
 THE STATE 163

between individual men, of suits and prosecutions before the

courts, of contestsbetween states or nations leading to inter-
necine wars. Evidently by the common judgment of men
every one has a right to defend a right.
This judgment is clearly correct. For, if we once more
fix discriminating attention on the primary, necessary, and
universal notion of a right, we discern, implied in its exclu-
sive ownership, this addendum to the original conception, a
right to defend a right. Whatever possession is truly my
own, I may retain and use, I may protect it from all damage,
especially from trespass, I have a right, indeed am bound, to
defend it against all comers. Evidently the right and obli-
gation to defend my right is an essential implication in the
demand Again, of my pos-
for maintenance of moral order.
sessions I am
steward and guardian, they are trusts. A
neglect to conserve and defend, within limits, a trust, is an
indirect trespass upon all who have a claim upon me for its
keeping and using. An attempted or threatened trespass
upon my life, liberty or property, is to be resisted, else I my-
become a
self trespasser. Thus defense is not a mere con-
tingent privilege, but a necessary obligation.
Further, the obligation to defend a right implies a recipro-
cal loss of right in the aggressor. By becoming a trespasser
he forfeits in some corresponding degree his right to liberty,
in extreme cases even to life. One attempting assassination,
or arson, or burglary, is killed, if this be the only preventive
means, by his intended victim, with regret, with sorrow in-

deed, but without compunction. In the right of defense lies

the warrant for interference in the liberty of a trespasser,

which interference is not, therefore, itself a trespass.

In an unrestrained intercourse of men, with their

§ 119.
various abilities physical and mental, and with the varied
opportunities afforded by wealth and station, the stronger
 ;

164 OR GANIZA TION

trespass upon the weaker. An oppressor may perhaps con-

sole himself with the brute maxim that might makes right,
but the oppressed is not thereby relieved and quieted. Be-
sides, impelled by selfish interests, men combine in couples,
or squads, or large bands, and thus accumulate force to over-
come the weaker. To inhibit such predicament society is

organized into a State, constituted by a combining majority

which organization is not oppressive but rather protective of
the minority, the organic law becoming its shield, a defensive
weapon, against popular caprice. The body politic employs
agents, empowered by general consensus, to frame, apply
and enforce particular laws in accord with the general pur-
pose.
To accomplish the chief end of its existence, the protec-
tion of its subjects in their rightful liberty, the government
must, as far as practicable, defend, both at large and in de-
tail, the original and acquired rights of individual men, of

trade firms, of legalized corporations, of all subordinate com-

binations of its citizens for legitimate purposes ; the right of
private defense being transferred, except in emergency, to
the more potent and equable agency. In order to fulfill this

great trust, the government must defend itself. Its officers

must be protected in the discharge of their legitimate func-
tions against violence or intimidation. It must prevent the
high crimes of regicide and treason, must resist the insurrec-
tion of a disaffected minority, or the aggression of a foreign
power. As an individual personality it is bound to preserve
its integrity and efficiency by vigorous self-defense. It is
clear that a State, as a faithful trustee, is bound, first, to pre-
serve its own existence, and secondly, to restrain, to resist,
and, if need be, to destroy whatsoever and whomsoever
assails its authority or attacks the interests committed to its
charge. Self-preservation, and the preservation of all that
is intrusted to it, are moral obligations of every State.
 THE STATE 165

§ .120. Therein is the ultimate ground that justifies legal

punishment. It is discovered in the obligation to exert pro-
tective defense of rights. All legal penalties are set for the
defense of rights. They inflict pain on the law-breaker, are
a painful interference in his liberty, warranted by the prin-
ciple of defense. They deter him from repetition of the
offense, and they deter observers from like misconduct, thus
defending the rights involved. Practically imperfect as it is,

no other means is known by which to effect defense against

offense, except this of inflicting pain on offenders in propor-
tion to the gravity of their misdeeds. The punishment, as to
kind and degree, is determined by what is past and cannot
be reinstated ; its purpose is to determine what is future, and
is deterrent, preventive of further or like trespass. Thus the
sufficient, rational, and only righteous ground of legal penalty
is the protective defense of rights.
The principle applies to the divine government of the
world. The natural sanctions of universal moral law are the
typical antecedents of the artificial sanctions of civil law,
and go far in an explanation of the righteousness of pain.
The sovereign Deity has rights on which men trespass as
well as on the rights of his subjects. He defends these and
his authority by the appointed natural pains attending dis-
order, and by special penalties affixed to special offenses.
Sin is essentially trespass on Deity, and the punishment of
sin is self-defense, and the defense of all under his protec-
tion. To have any other gods before him is high treason.
Deterrent defense is disciplinary. This gives title to

houses of correction or reformatories set especially for re-

claiming youthful offenders, and to penitentiaries where felons

do penance, rendering them penitent, leading to reformation.
So imprisonment generally, and also fines are disciplinary,
not only of the offender, but of the observer, and even capi-
tal punishment has this salutary effect on society. Thus the
166 ORGANIZATION

law is a schoolmaster, a pedagogue, leading to higher life.

But this, with the State, is not its original, nor its avowed,
nor indeed its ultimate purpose, but is an accessory. The
State is not an educational, but a protective institution, and
reformation is not the end, but a means of preventing tres-
pass. Its enacted sanctions, among which are no rewards,
are not incentive, but deterrent. Indeed, in the last analysis,
any and every warranted interference in liberty is a defense
against trespass, or, no interference in a person's liberty has
ever a warrant save in defense against trespass. In the
domestic sphere parents punish to chasten. Chastisement is

punishment intended to benefit the sufferer. It is often and

rightly inflicted with no wider or further view ; but this whip
of love means more, and the chastening has its only complete
justification in forestalling the trespasses of perhaps a remote
future. Our Father, in the abundance of his love, chastens
his children, not only that the erring may turn and live, but
more largely that all who might suffer from the persisting
error may be spared the harm, and loss, and sorrow.

§ 121. The right of a government to suppress mob turbu-

lence or riots of any kind, is obviously the right and duty to
defend domestic tranquillity; and to quell an insurrection
against magisterial authority, is clearly to exercise the right
and duty of self-defense. The inverse right of revolution
has the same basis. The ends of the State being the defense
of rights and the promotion of the common welfare, " when
any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to
these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indu-
bitable, inalienable,and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or
abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive
to the public weal." Evidently, if a government be con-
tinuously oppressive to the body of the people, their original
and sacred right of self-defense justifies them in subverting
it, and substituting one that promises better things.
 THE STATE 167

War has no other justification. A war of conquest is

plainly the crimes of murder, arson, robbery, and the rest of
the foul catalogue, many times multiplied. On the other
hand, a defensive war, provided all other honorable means of
rectification have failed, is thoroughly righteous. That a
State repel vi et armis the encroachment, the aggression, the
trespass of another, is a moral obligation of highest order.
A brave and conscientious people, possessing civic rights
inherited to be fostered and transmitted, maintains them,
even against overwhelming numbers and resources, and does
not surrender, but dies in defending its trusts, warring until
resistance becomes madness. Defense may fire the first gun,
may invade the enemy's territory, may sweep his commerce
from the sea, thus to conquer immunity and peace ; but, to
be justified, all proceedings must originally and continuously
be intentional and essential defense. This is so clearly recog-
nized by civilized States in modern times that, whenever war
between them occurs, each party loudly claims to be acting
on the defensive, thus seeking to justify its action in its own
eyes, and in the eyes of the rest of mankind.

§ 122. Geographic, climatic, and other conditions deter-

mine that there shall be many States. Differences of race,
language, religion, tradition, the genius and general culture
of the people, further determine different forms of governs
ment, as monarchies, republics, democracies. These, the
world over, have both common and conflicting interests, and
are otherwise more or less intimately related. Their relations
are adjusted by resident ambassadors and consuls, and by
occasional diplomatic correspondence, forming and perform-
ing treaties of commerce, and of alliance, fixing boundaries,
and regulating minor matters. The trend of civilization has
long been towards a brotherhood of peoples, and the enter-
prise of the nineteenth century has so vastly increased the
 ;

168 ORGANIZATION

facilities of intercommunication, by multiplying roads of

rapid transit, by tunneling Alpine barriers, by devising a
swift and safe crossing of seas, by weaving over the globe
a network of electric wires and submarine cables, that civic
isolation has now almost entirely disappeared, and the na-
tions are fusing and welding together. This intimate inter-
course and manifold relation is subject to the one universal
moral law of trespass not. There is no other obligation in
all the comity of nations.
The increasing intimacy of these civic relations brings
view the organic unity of mankind, and suggests
clearly into
the conception of a universal State, whose mighty function
shall be to secure international justice without war. This
ideal is becoming in a measure realized. " Its realization,"
says Dr. Seelye, "does not require, indeed, in the actual
condition of men, would not permit that all particular States
should lose their individuality of government or institutions,
and be merged in what might be deemed the visible embodi-
ment of the one universal State. The universal State has no
visible embodiment. Yet it is not thereby without reality or
power. In our modern world nothing has shown itself more
real or potent. What we call international law, or the law

of nations, unknown except in the vaguest, faintest way in

ancient times, is recognized in our day as a sovereignty in
human affairs, equally majestic and mighty. It has no visible
throne ; it does not utter itself through the voice of a mon-
arch, or the votes of a legislature or people ; it has no courts
to expound, nor any fleets or armies to enforce its dictates
but it guides kings, and legislatures, and peoples, and courts,
and and armies in our times, with an authority whose
fleets,

manifestation of power is steadily increasing. There is

nothing so characteristic of modern politics as the sway which
international law, a development of the one moral law, is
continually gaining among existing nations. There is no
 THE STATE 169

other point in which the politics of the present day are

so clearly distinct from those of the ancient world. But
international law is nothing other than the voice of the one
universal State. It is the State in the highest exhibition of
it yet given in history." The State thus organizing is a
whole, is one and indivisible, uniting through itself more and
more manifestly its constituent organizations, without effa-
cing their distinct individuality, and presenting to the vision
of political philosophy a world of united States.
170 ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER V
THE CHUKCH

§ 123. Religion, in its widest sense, viewed subjectively,

is belief in presiding, superhuman, spiritual power, earnest
enough to influence moral character and conduct; viewed
objectively it is a body of doctrine relative to such power,
instructing and regulating its votaries. Religion is of two
kinds, natural and revealed the former relying for its be-
;

lief and doctrine on reason alone the latter claiming to

;

have in addition information communicated by the higher

power.
The negative member of this dichotomy is natural reli-
gion. Under scientific treatment it is entitled natural theol-
ogy. It proceeds independently of historical, racial and
local influences, discarding the dogmas of tradition, author-
ityand custom, and upon rational grounds investigates the
evidence furnished by nature of the reality and character of
a higher power. More particularly, it seeks proof of the
existence of God, his unity and personality, the kind and
degree of his attributes, his will concerning us, the distinc-
tion between right and wrong, good and evil, our relation
and obligation to him, and our destiny both here and here-
after.

Revealed religions, which Diderot calls the heresies of

natural religion, seek in general to impose their systems far
less by reason than by persuasion with appeal to emotion
and passion. Historically they have been largely character-
ized by superstition or extreme reverence and fear of what is
unknown or mysterious, and by fanaticism or ignorant, irra-
 THE CHURCH 171

tional worship of deities, with excessive rigor in opinions

and practice. Witness the prevailing Asiatic and African
cults. Christianity, however, is a revealed religion claiming
to be in entire accord with natural religion, to be at its basis
strictly rational, and to demand no more of its adherents
than a reasonable faith in its transcendent doctrine.

§ 124. It has already been pointed out that a theory of

Ethics to be complete as to its system must include the rec-
ognition of a personal God, and of man's relation to him, and
consequent obligation to render him loving service. This
does not mean that there may not be practical morality even
of very high grade in the various relations among men, with-
out religion, without any acknowledgment of God; but it

means that a scheme of morality without God is necessarily

incomplete, has no ultimate support, no philosophic unity,
and cannot be expanded into a scientifically systematized
theory. Herein it appears that natural religion is the cap-
stone, or rather the keystone, of Ethics.
Oriental scholars testify that Confucianism is simply and

solely a body of inconsistent, ill assorted and often erroneous

Buddhism, the confession of one-third
ethical doctrines, that
of the human and that both are distinctly
race, is little else,

atheistic. Hinduism is pantheism, and pantheism, whether

taught by the Brahman or by the god-intoxicated Spinoza, or
by the haughty Hegelian, is merely a refined and enlarged, a
generalized feticism. It denies the intelligence and freedom,
the personality of its god. Now, since ethics with its com-
plement religion is grounded in and arises from relations
among persons, an impersonal being can have no part therein.
Man cannot trespass on the world of nature, on the moun-
tains, the continents, the ocean, or the stars, but only on
him who intelligently and freely produced them, and to
whom therefore they belong. The impersonal, so-called god
 ;

172 OR GANIZA TION

of the pantheist is not at all the God of the ethical and reli-

gious philosopher. Pantheism is essentially atheism.

The mythical polytheistic cult of the ancient Greeks, in
form adopted by the skeptical Romans, and by them diffused
over the Empire, was doubtless originally a deified personifi-
cation of natural objects and forces, and an apotheosis of
heroes. was replaced in the philosophic thought of An-
It
axagoras and of his successors by a strict monotheism, shin-
ing forth clearly in the famous hymn of Cleanthes. Thus
unaided philosophy early reached and taught esoterically a
remarkably pure natural religion, which, though it seems not
to have taken practical form, nevertheless gave to the ethics
of the Stoics a coherence, a consistency, an ultimatum and
completeness that secured its permanence and general accep-
tance even to this day.
All religions, and even atheistic cults, come within the
scope of Ethics. We
have already seen that a man is re-
sponsible for his beliefs. Every belief relating to conduct,
be its subject true or false, carries with it obligations, duties
for every one is bound, whatever be its error, to conform his
conduct to the results of his moral judgment, or, as it is com-
monly expressed, is bound to obey his conscience. In reli-

gion it is not otherwise. Ethical principles prevail within

the shrine.They are immutable and all pervading. They
ground not only from which natural religion arises,
are the
but on which revealed religion descending must take its
stand to find a firm support.
Shall an exception be made in favor of Christianity? Not
at all. Christianity is preeminently ethical. Indeed in a
philosophic view its great strength lies in the exact conform-
and eternal ethical princi-
ity of its teaching to the universal
ples which it and refines. It came
enlightens, widens, exalts
not to destroy but to fulfill the law more enduring than
heaven and earth. The Sermon on the Mount speaks of the
 THE CHURCH 173

Kingdom of heaven and of the fatherhood of God, but it con-

tains no distinctively Christian doctrine, and is occupied
otherwise with applications of purely ethical principles. It
might fairly be entitled a Lecture on Practical Ethics.
These principles determine what is due in domestic, in social,
and in civic order, and are likewise fundamental in religious
order. Hence it is that so much is discovered to be common
to all those religions, both natural and revealed, that have
attained to the dignity of a system.

§ 125. In general it is true that wherever cults develop,

even those full of superstition, there arises a priesthood pro-
fessing the function of mediator to propitiate the super-
human power. The priesthood becomes organized, and
unites with the State, seeking its protection, using its au-
thority, and lending in turn its potent influence to strengthen
the secular government. So it has been with the Christian
Church, an organization that prevails to-day throughout
Europe and America. To it we will now give special
attention.
In the Christian Church we find a purified and exalted
ethical doctrine, including natural religion, supplemented and
complemented by revelation. Christianity is differentiated
from other religions by the teaching that Jesus of Nazareth
is the Christ, the incarnate Son of God, making atonement by
the cross, and ever living as Savior and King. It is this
differentia only that Christian polemics has to defend against
infidelity. Its expansion constitutes Christology. With
on Ethics has nothing to do it is concerned
this a treatise ;

only with the generic elements expanded into natural religion.

For, all the great virtues that stand out as cardinal have
had existence among all peoples from the beginning. The
decalogue, excepting perhaps the sabbath-day law, contains
nothing new. All moral obligations binding men to God
174 ORGANIZATION

and to each other originate, not in legislation, but in the

nature which God gave to man, and are determined in detail
by the variations in his complex relations. The virtues have
been developing through all the ages among all peoples, and
are developing to-day under a better understanding, a fuller
comprehension, a more subservient recognition of personal
relations and their consequent obligations. No doubt Chris-
tianity has been and still is powerfully influential in their
higher development, giving brighter light over a widening
horizon but Christianity did not originate them, it merely
;

found them, enlarged them, enlightened them. Manifestly,

the all-informing, all-embracing, fundamental law of Chris-
tian activity, is the ethical, altruistic law of loving service.

§ 126. Historically the Christian Church emerged from

Judaism very weak in numbers, and in social influence. Its
organization, comparable to a shepherd with his flock, was
extremely simple and apparently feeble. But its native
strength was soon manifested. The original hundred and
twenty speedily became as many thousands. Local churches
were multiplied. The "heresy" was propagated with an
activity, energy and devoted zeal that knew no bounds. It

spread into Asia Minor, it invaded Europe, and entered

Rome. The vast power of the State, then mistress of the
civilized world,was put forth to suppress the rising super- «

and in the course of three centuries ten fierce and

stition,'

bloody persecutions, extending throughout the Empire, and

waged with all the implacable might of the Roman power,
sought to crush it, and failed. Gathering new and greater
strength from adversity, it successfully resisted the oppressor,
conquered the conqueror, and shared the throne of the
Caesars.
This affiliation of the Church with the State, in the middle
of the fourth century, together with an increasing complexity
 THE CHURCH 175

and solidarity of organization, gave even greater efficiency to

its propagandism. Apparently weakened by the schism into
East and West, into Greek and Latin, it nevertheless with-

stood the floods of barbarians that overwhelmed and over-

threw the Empire, converted and snbdned them, saved
Christianity for Europe, and ruled the continent throughout
the mediaeval centuries. In modern times, beginning with
the sixteenth century, a further division of the Western
Church into Catholic and Protestant, with many subdivi-
sions, has occurred, which seems to have stimulated rather
than impaired its zealous activity. Thus during two millen-
niums, amid the rise and fall and Empires, the
of States
Church has maintained its growing power, and to-day Chris-
tendom embraces Europe and America, and is pressing its
jurisdiction into Asia, Africa, and the isles of the sea.

§ 127. What therein determines this unique persistence

and expanding potency is not far to seek. First, there is an
exalted, purified and extended morality, approving itself to
the heart and conscience of humanity as in accord with its
ideal constitution and the natural order of life among men,
which morality is taught in precept and urged in practice.
Secondly, there is an enlarged and enlightened view of our
relation and obligation to God as Our Father, giving to
natural religion a clearness and cogency never attained in
the schools of philosophy. Thirdly, there is a well settled
claim of a divine origin, of a divine founder in the person of
Jesus of Nazareth, of a divine revelation promising redemp-
tion to the faithful and eternal blessedness to the righteous.
We would not ignore but heartily approve the further claim
of the Church that it is multiplied, upheld and impelled by
the immanent Spirit of God but, from a historic and philo-
;

sophic point of view the aforementioned principles go far

toward explaining the phenomenal strength and growth of
 :

176 ORGANIZATION

this the most durable and comprehensive of all human

organizations.
Moreover, consider the ends for which the Church pro-
poses itself as the means. It claims to have solved the
problem of life, to interpret its meaning, and to offer sure
guidance to the faithful. Maintaining that our terrestrial
life is teleologically justified only by the fact that it is related
to a higher life, and therefore has import,
to a life beyond,
not as an end in itself, but as a period of preparation and
probation for eternal life, it proclaims to restless humanity
Come unto me, and find your promised rest. " We may con-
cede that the teleology of history has never reached a system
formally more complete than the philosophy of the Church.
Heaven and eternal happiness the goal of historical life, the
earth its temporal scene of action, its central point the incar-
nation of God and the foundation of the Kingdom of heaven
on earth, all past ages leading up which
to this culmination
whole course of history
shall determine the entire future, the
bounded by the day of creation on the one hand and the day
of judgment on the other, these indeed constitute such a
grand philosophy of history that Hegel's or Comte's barren
abstractions are mere nothing when compared with the fruits
fill, concrete conception." Under the shield of this massive
doctrine,and by right of its divine ordination, the Church is
claiming ownership and actively seeking possession of the
whole world in the name of its living King.

§ 128. In the fourth century the Church was incorporated

with the State. It is generally admitted by ecclesiastical his-

torians that, from and after the time of Constantine, the ori-
ginal constitution of the Church was overlaid by a vast body
of human additions, particularly by the hierarchy, assimilating
the magistracy by a long gradation of ecclesiastical dignities
or powers, rising upward from the primitive pastor or curate
 THE CHURCH 177

to the bishop, to the pope or patriarch; and that by these

and other results of the alliance of the Church with the
Empire, its simplicity was lost, its purity corrupted, and the
prior relations of the clergy and laity injuriously affected.
Yet "it was of immense advantage to European civilization
that a moral influence, a moral power, a power resting entirely
upon moral convictions, upon moral opinions and sentiments,
should have established itself in society, just at the period
when it seemed on the point of being crushed by an over-
whelming physical force. Had not the thoroughly organized
Church at this time existed, the whole world must have
fallen a prey to mere brute power. It alone possessed a
moral power; it maintained and promulgated the idea of
a precept, of a law superior to all human authority it pro- ;

claimed that great truth which forms the only foundation of

our hope for humanity, namely, that there exists a law above
all human law, which, by whatever name it be called, whether

reason, or the law of God, or what not, is, at all times and in
all places, eternally one and the same."

In the course of the centuries, however, the alliance of the

Church with the State proved unwholesome. An arrogant
and ambitious clergy endeavored to render its rule entirely
independent of the people, to bring them under authority, to
take possession of their mind and life without the conviction
of their reason or the consent of their will. Claiming to be
in possession of the keys, it exercised a spiritual lordship of
almost unbounded power. It endeavored with all its might
to establish a theocracy, to usurp the temporal authority of
the State, to establish universal dominion. The struggle for
supremacy between the Church and the State, always at the

expense of the liberties of the people, often resulted in the

subjugation and subservience of the latter; and the former,

asserting its catholicity, was for centuries the dominant power
over Europe. Ecclesiastical dissension and division, in some
 ;

178 ORGANIZATION

States, broke this dominion, but the ill-starred communion of

the two organizations has persisted, an unholy alliance, con-
fusing the sacred with the secular to the prejudice of both. 1
The end, the ultimate purpose for which the State exists,
and that for which the Church exists, are quite distinct, and
their rightful means of attaining their ends have little in
common. The proper function of the State is concerned with
the material prosperity, the external wealth of its citizens

the proper function of the Church is concerned with the

spiritual prosperity, the internal weal of its clergy and laity.
The one seeks to protect and promote the health and wealth
of the body politic the other to edify and multiply its adhe-
;

rents. Membership in the one is quite involuntary in the ;

other it is essentially voluntary. The one upholds its au-

thorityby physical force; the other by moral force alone,
having no penalties beyond censure and excommunication.
The State has sharply marked geographical limits which it
may not transgress the Church, expanding its realm, freely
;

invades all other realms. The former is no sense a propa-

in
gandist ; the latter is essentially a missionary. In their union
the lines of demarcation become obscured, and each under-
takes more or less the office of the other, leading to a strug-
gle for mastery and a consequent hinderance of efficiency.
Christendom has greatly suffered, and is still suffering from
this error. And not without warning. For, at the very
origin of the Church, their prospective divorce, their separate
work and harmonious adjustment,
functions, their distinct
were declared in the profoundly wise prescription of its
founder Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and
:

unto God the things that are God's. 1

§ 129. A local church politically free, and constituted

simply of a pastor, deacons and lay members, is strictly and

distinctly an organism. Very generally, local churches come

 THE CHURCH 179

into organic union with each other, constituting synods, con-

ferences, councils. These again organize into yet more com-
prehensive ecclesias or general assemblies, officered by a
hierarchy of priests, bishops, and other clergy, whose consti-
tutional functions are formally defined. All the various
groups of church organization, of various denomination, not-
withstanding their differences and dissensions, are furthermore
in reality organized into a holy Church universal, one truly
catholic, by their common acceptance of the New Testament
as organic and ultimate law, interpreted, and in some cases
modified, as in the Church of Rome, by ecclesiastical au-
thority. In the universal and intensely active Christian
Church, with its many subsidiary organizations, their officers
and members, we discover the most extensive, complete and
powerful organism ever known, and one which is rapidly
realizing the ancient dream of universal empire in an organic
unification of mankind.
From the varied relations obtaining in this Christian body,
wherein members one of another, arises a multiplicity
all are

of special obligations and active duties calling for a never

flagging constancy and devotion, and heartily recognized as
displacing by superior claim all conflicting calls. Each mem-
ber confesses that he belongs to the Church, and does not
hesitate to name this servitude as a sufficient reason for his
special conduct. On the other hand, the Church belongs to
him, serving to edify his spiritual worth. Moreover, it is a
common brotherhood, a communion, a fellowship one with
another,and with the divine head, all working together for
nearness and likeness to God. These obligations ramify
throughout every other class of duties, intensify and sanctify
them. The Christian man among men, the Christian father,
mother, son and daughter, the Christian member of the com-
munity where his lot is cast, the Christian man of affairs, the
Christian citizen and statesman, is more closely bound in
180 ORGANIZATION

each and all of these relations by virtue of his Christian con-

fession, and finds therein new and higher, the highest motives
for ordering all his conduct on the principles inculcated by
the Christian Church. Thus this spiritual organism enters
into, and exerts a dominant influence over, all the relations
and obligations of our temporal life, while looking and pre-
paring for the eternal life beyond.
It has been pointed out that natural religion in its origin
and perfection is ethics, also that the Christian religion is
ethics extended, confirmed, refined. The revelation of God
in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, expands obliga-
tion heavenward, and widens its all man-
horizon to embrace
kind. The ethics of every day
which is not itself life,

distinctively Christian, finds its complement in the doctrines

of the Church. The teachings of the Teacher have enlight-
ened human reason, cleared the moral judgment, exalted the
moral sentiments, purified motives, and subdued the will.
The realm is enlarged, but it is the realm of ethics still,

involving conscience, obligation, duty, gratitude, love. We

found the moral law to be Thou shalt not trespass either by
invasion of rights or by evasion of dues, having an equivalent
in Be thou just, and in Thou shalt love and serve. Chris-
tianity lays no other mandate. The loving service of God,
and of his Christ, and of his creatures, a fellowship in mutual
self-sacrifice, is its very essence ; and clear definitions of
duty, pressing incentives to activity, and divinely ordained
means of efficiency, are supplied by its organized Church.

FINIS.
 IIN'DEX
The number refers to the page. For general topics, see Table of Contents.

Actions, the moral quality of, 55. Deity, a personal, postulated, 114, 171.
Affection, the supremacy of, 81, 127. — nature of, the ultimate ground, 117.
Alter ego, the fiction of, 75, 77. — superior to obligation, 119.
Altruism, the modified doctrine of, 79, 90. Desires, logical distribution of, 126.
Argument against egoism, 81. Disinterested action, 80.
Attention, the means of self-control, 57. Division of labor, moral aspect of, 151.
Divorce, ground of, 138.
Basis of ethics in human nature, 3, 9, 116. Duties to self, fictitious, 76.
Beneficence, or beneficial service, 98.
Benevolence, love, charity, defined, 95, 98. Equity corrective of legality, 67.
Ethics defined, 2, 70.
Choice and intention, 11, 12, 54. — basic principle of, 8, 21.
— incapable of coercion, 13. Evolution of morals, 2, 103, 110, 116.
Christianity an expansion of ethics,172,180.
— its persistence and potency, 175. Family, an individual personality, 124, 141.
Church, the universal, an organism, 178. — the ideal, an organism, 135, 141.
— its solidarity, 179. — the unit of the state, 159.
— and state, union of, 174, 176. Freedom defined, its limitations, 11.
— their distinct functions, 178. — and liberty discriminated, 14.
Conscience defined, inerrant, 32. — the condition of morality, 53, 57.
— discrimination of, 52.
Cruelty defined, a trespass, 37. Gambling, a trespass, 26.
Cults, the heathen, 171. Good, relative and absolute, 109.
Culture, progress in moral, 46, 88, 99. Government, kinds and department of ,156.
— ends of, 158.
Decalogue and the moral law, 38.
Defense of personal honor, 28. Happiness and welfare distinguished, 107.

— of all trusts obligatory, 92, 122. Heroism, its essence, 88.

— assumed by the state, 164. Honor, personal, 28.
— in form of legal punishment, 165. Humanitarian ethics, 113.
Definition of science, 1.

— of ethics, 70.
2, Imperatives, hypothetical, categorical, 33.

— of trespass, 22. Didividualism, the tendency to, 150.

— of cruelty, 37. Datention and attention, 12.
— of pleasure and pain, 48. — moral quality in, 55.
— of justice, 63. Intuition of ethical principle, 4, 6, 8.

— of jurisprudence, 65. — of the notion of a right, 19.

— of virtue, 72. — of the moral law, 31.
— of love, charity, benevolence, 95.
— of welfare, 105. Judgment, the moral, errant, 33, 52.

— of organism, 111, 121. Jurisprudence defined, 65.

— of religion, 170. Justice defined, 63.

181
182 INDEX
Kant, on using another person, 90. Reasons not causes, 15.
— his scheme of morality rejected, 93. Religion, definition and divisions of, 170.
Knowledge for its own sake, 73, 79. — heathen cults, 171.
— Christian, differentiated, 173.
Law, the moral, 31. Right and a right coextensive, 50.
— and penalty, sanctions of civil, 42, 46. — and wrong, conscience, 52.
— of retaliation in kind, 47. — and duty coextensive, 70.
— positive forms of, 62, 64, 70, 87, 99. — of revolution, 166.
— of service, 87. Rights prior to obligations, 3.
— of love, the perfect, 99. — the notion of, pure and simple, 19. 6,
Liberty and freedom discriminated, 14. — kinds of, reduced, 9.
— interference in, 14, 16, 21. — conditioned on personal relations, 20, 35.
— incompatible with law, 74. — of property, 24.
— perfected in love, 101. — moral and legal, 51.
Limits of human ability, 13.
Love of self, egoism, selfishness, 76. Sacrifice, implied in service, 88.
— or charity, benevolence, defined, 95. — limitations of, 89.
— may be and is commanded, 96. Science defined, 1.
— kinds of, degrees of, 97. Scriptures, how used, 2.
— the perfect law of, 99. Self as an end, excluded, 77, 81.
— perfected, liberty perfected, 101. Sentiments, the moral, 42.
Service, the law of, 87.
Marriage, the pointing of nature, 134. Sin defined, a trespass, 30.
— moral conditions, 136.
its Slander, a trespass, 26.
Mercy and justice identified, 68. Social intercourse, ends of, 147.
Merit and demerit, judgment of, 43. Socialism, its moral aspects, 153.
Method of this treatise, 4. Solitary, destitute of rights, 20, 127, 130.
Mind, its powers distributed, 7, 126. State, an individual personality, 124, 160.
Minister, dignity of the title, 88. — the unit of the, 159.
Moral law, negative form of, 31, 37. — a universal, 168.
— categorical, supremacy of, 34. Stewardship, the using of trusts, 92.
— objectivity of, 35. Summum bonum, 109.
— positive forms of, 62, 64, 70, 85, 87, 99. Supernatural and superhuman, 115.
— quality in intention, 55.
— quality imputed, 58. Temperance, an altruistic virtue, 78.
— paradox, 60. Trespass defined, 22.

— culture, progress in, 46, 88, 99. — indirect, by reservation, 29, 62, 122.
— identified with injustice, 64.
Normal and abnormal desires, 22. Trusts, all possessions are, 92, 122.
Truthfulness, fundamental in society, 147
Organism defined, 111, 121, 157.
Utilitarianism, kinds of, 110.

Pain and pleasure, 48, 103. Virtue defined, 72.

Person, perfect and imperfect, 114, 124. Volition, its elements, 54.
Personal relations condition rights, 20, 35.
Positivism, the Comteists, 113, 116. War, its sole justification, 167.
Principle of ethics, 8, 21. "Warranted interference in liberty, 16.

Property, ground of, 24. Welfare, defined, 105.

— in family relations, 142. — conditions of, 108.
— inheritance of, 143. — attainment of, 111.
Punishment, various forms of, 47. Will, its freedom and limitations, 11.
— legal, its warrant, 162, 165. Will of God, not the ultimate ground, 117.