RAYMUNDO v.

LUNARIA

Petitioners approached Lunaria to help them find a buyer for their property for ₱60,630,000 (he will
get 5% agent’s commission)

After respondents found a buyer, Cecilio Hipolito, an "Exclusive Authority to Sell" 3 was executed.

After the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property 4 was registered in the Registry of
Deeds, a copy thereof was given to the FEBTC which was then holding in escrow the amount of
₱50,000,000 to be disbursed or paid against the total consideration or price of the property.

Ceferino G. Raymundo advised respondents to go to the bank to receive the amount of ₱1,196,000
as partial payment of their total commission. Also, respondents were instructed to return after seven
days to get the balance of the commission due them. 

Respondents returned to the bank. However, the check covering the balance of their commission
was already given by the bank manager to Lourdes R. Raymundo, the representative of the
petitioners. Respondents tried to get the check from the petitioners, however, they were told that
there is nothing more due them by way of commission as they have already divided and distributed
the balance of the commissions among their nephews and nieces.

For their part, petitioners counter that there was a subsequent verbal agreement entered into by
the parties after the execution of the written agreement. Said verbal agreement provides that
the 5% agent’s commission shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for the agents, 2/5 for Lourdes
Raymundo, and 1/5 for the buyer, Hipolito. The share given to Lourdes Raymundo shall be in
consideration for the help she would extend in the processing of documents of sale of the property,
the payment of the capital gains tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in securing an order from
the court. The 1/5 commission given to Hipolito, on the other hand, will be used by him for the
payment of realty taxes.

CASE FILED: Respondents filed an action for the collection of a sum of money

ISSUES:
Did the Court of Appeals err (1) in applying the parol evidence rule; (2) in requiring petitioners to
establish their case by more than a preponderance of evidence; and (3) in holding petitioners jointly
and severally liable for the payment of the entire broker’s fees?

AS TO THE FIRST ISSUE: PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

To begin with, we agree with petitioners’ claim that the parol evidence rule does not apply to the
facts of this case. First, the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the
terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, "at or
before" the execution of the parties’ written agreement, other or different terms were agreed
upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.10 Notably, the claimed verbal
agreement was agreed upon not prior to but "subsequent to" the written agreement. Second, the
validity of the written agreement is not the matter which is being put in issue here. What is
questioned is the validity of the claim that a subsequent verbal agreement was agreed upon by the
parties after the execution of the written agreement which substantially modified their earlier written
agreement.
Nonetheless, even if we apply the parol evidence rule in this case, the evidence presented by the
petitioners fell short in proving that a subsequent verbal agreement was in fact entered into
by the parties. We subscribe to the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that the
evidence presented by petitioners did not establish the existence of the alleged subsequent verbal
agreement. As pointed out by the trial court:

Note that no written evidence was presented by the defendants to show that the plaintiffs [herein
respondents] agreed to the above-sharing of the commission.

AS TO THE 2ND ISSUE:

For their part, respondents counter that the appellate court did not require petitioners to prove the
existence of the subsequent oral agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence. What
the appellate court said is that the petitioners failed to prove and establish the alleged
subsequent verbal agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.

Petitioners’ abovecited allegation has no merit. By preponderance of evidence is meant that the
evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. 12 It refers to the weight,
credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence".
It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.13

Both the appellate court and trial court ruled that the evidence presented by the petitioners is not
sufficient to support their allegation that a subsequent verbal agreement was entered into by the
parties. In fact, both courts correctly observed that if Lourdes Raymundo was in reality offered
the 2/5 share of the agent’s commission for the purpose of assisting respondent Lunaria in
the documentation requirement, then why did the petitioners not present any written court
order on her authority, tax receipt or sales document to support her self-serving testimony?
Moreover, even the worksheet allegedly reflecting the commission sharing was unilaterally prepared
by petitioner Lourdes Raymundo without any showing that respondents participated in the
preparation thereof or gave their assent thereto. Even the alleged payment of 1/5 of the
commission to the buyer to be used in the payment of the realty taxes cannot be given
credence since the payment of realty taxes is the obligation of the owners, and not the buyer.
Lastly, if the said sharing agreement was entered into pursuant to the wishes of the buyer, then he
should have been presented as witness to corroborate the claim of the petitioners. However, he was
not.

AS TO THE THIRD ISSUE:

The general rule is that once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent
court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to rest. 14 In this case,
petitioners failed to address the issue on their solidary liability when they appealed to the Court of
Appeals. They are now estopped to question that ruling.
RIMORIN v. PEOPLE

Col. Panfilo Lacson, then Chief of the Police Intelligence Branch of the MISG received
information that certain syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling activities
somewhere in Port Area, Manila. It was further revealed that the activities [were being]
done at nighttime and the smuggled goods in a delivery panel and delivery truck [were]
being escorted by some police and military personnel. He fielded three surveillance
stake-out teams the following night along Roxas Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del
Pan Bridge, whereby they were to watch out for a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167
bound for Malabon. Nothing came out of it. On the basis of his investigation, [it was
discovered that] the truck was registered in the name of Teresita Estacio of Pasay City.

"At around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of October 14, 1979, Col. Lacson and his men
returned to the same area, with Col. Lacson posting himself at the immediate vicinity of
the 2nd COSAC Detachment in Port Area, Manila, because as per information given to
him, the said cargo truck will come out from the premises of the 2nd COSAC
Detachment in said place. COSAC stands for Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime
Battalion. The night watch lasted till the wee hours of the following morning. About
3:00 a.m. an Isuzu panel came out from the place of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. It
returned before 4:00 a.m. of same day.

"At around 5 minutes before 4:00 o’clock that morning, a green cargo truck with Plate
No. T-SY-167 came out from the 2nd COSAC Detachment followed and escorted closely
by a light brown Toyota Corona car with Plate No. GR-433 and with 4 men on board. At
that time, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson had no information whatsoever about the car, so he
gave an order by radio to his men to intercept only the cargo truck. The cargo truck
was intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed that the Toyota car following the cargo truck
suddenly made a sharp U-turn towards the North, unlike the cargo truck which was
going south. Almost by impulse, Col. Lacson’s car also made a U-turn and gave chase
to the speeding Toyota car, which was running between 100 KPH to 120 KPH. Col.
Lacson sounded his siren. The chase lasted for less than 5 minutes, until said car made
a stop along Bonifacio Drive, at the foot of Del Pan Bridge. Col. Lacson and his men
searched the car and they found several firearms, particularly: three (3) .45 cal. Pistol
and one (1) armalite M-16 rifle. He also discovered that T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was the
driver of the Toyota car, and his companions inside the car were Sgt. Guillermo Ferrer,
Sgt. Fidel Balita and Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre, the four of them all belonging to the 2nd
COSAC Detachment. They were found not to be equipped with mission orders. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched, 305 cases of blue seal or
untaxed cigarettes were found inside said truck. The cargo truck driver known only as
‘Boy’ was able to escape while the other passengers or riders of said truck were
apprehended, namely: Police Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force, Pat.
Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian." 10 

On the other hand, petitioner’s version of the facts is summarized by the CA 11 as

"Accused Pasay City Policeman Arturo Rimorin, was assigned at Manila International
Airport (MIA for brevity) Detachment, Pasay City. He tried to show that in the [latter]
part of 1978 during the wake of a fellow police officer, he met a man named Leonardo
[a.k.a.] Boy. After that occasion, Boy would see him at Pasay City Police Station asking
for some assistance. Once Boy told him he will get rice at Sta. Maria, Bulacan and he
asked him to just follow him. He consented. A truckload of rice was brought from Sta.
Maria to Quezon City. Boy gave him a sack of rice for providing company.

"In the afternoon of October 14, 1979 while he was at his Station at MIA, Boy came and
requested that he [accompany] him to Divisoria to haul household fixtures. By
arrangement, they met at the gasoline station near Cartimar in Pasay City not later
than 2:30 a.m. of October 15. At the gasoline station, Boy introduced him to Gonzalo
Vargas, a mechanic and who is his co-accused herein. After boarding the truck, they
went to the other gasoline station where he was introduced to Felicisimo Rieta [a.k.a.]
Sonny, who also boarded the truck. When he came to know that Rieta is a policeman
from Kawit, he started entertaining the thought that Leonardo had plenty of policemen
friends.

"They passed Roxas Boulevard on their way to Divisoria. But he [noted] something
unusual. Boy, who was on the wheels, turned right before reaching Del Pan Bridge and
proceeded to pass under the bridge, a route that will take them to Port Area and not
Divisoria. So he commented that it [was] not the route to Divisoria. Boy replied that
there [would] be some cargo to be loaded. At a small carinderia fronting the Delgado
Bros., Boy pulled over after Rieta commented that he was hungry. So Rieta alighted
and Rimorin joined him. Rimorin asked Rieta what [would] be loaded in the truck but
Rieta professed ignorance. After about an hour, the truck arrived. Rimorin and Rieta
boarded the truck and they drove towards Roxas Boulevard-Bonifacio Drive. Rimorin
noted one more unusual thing. He expected Boy to have driven towards Rotonda so
they can go back to Divisoria but Boy drove straight ahead at the corner of Aduana to
Roxas Boulevard. So he asked why they . . . [weren’t] going to Divisoria, but Boy
replied ‘that there’s no more space in the truck’ and they’ll just go the next day. But
then, they were ordered to pull over by men in a vehicle who upon alighting[,] poked
guns at them. They introduced themselves as Metrocom [agents]. He noticed some
back-up vehicles. They were made to alight, lie on their belly . . . on the road and they
were frisked. They were ordered to board a Land Cruiser, one of the vehicles used by
the Metrocom [agents] and they drove towards Bonifacio Drive. The Metrocom [agents]
intercepted another vehicle.

"Rimorin claims that he did not see the Metrocom men open their truck. They were
hauled later to Camp Crame. There he asked: ‘What’s this?’ But a certain Barrameda,
while pointing to a truck different from what they used, told them ‘that’s the reason
why you’ll be jailed.’ So he thought they were being framed up. It was only two to
three days later that he saw the alleged smuggled cigarettes at the office of the MISG
when it was presented by the investigator. They were not present when these alleged
smuggled cigarettes were taken from the truck they rode in. On inquiry from the
Metrocom men where their driver Boy [was], the Metrocom men said he escaped. He
thought there [was] something fishy in that claim. He also thought there was
something fishy in their apprehension. He wondered that they were the only persons
during the apprehension, so how could have Boy escaped? There was no possibility for
escape when they were intercepted. Yet, out of the four, only three of them were
apprehended.
CA RULING:

In affirming the RTC, the CA ruled that the defense of denial interposed by petitioner
paled in comparison with the overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence
against him. In particular, it noted that while he and his co-accused raised questions of
fact in their appeal, they failed to show that the trial court had significantly erred in
assessing the credibility of the testimonies of witnesses for Respondent.

Moreover, the CA held that the non-presentation in court of the seized blue seal
cigarettes was not fatal to respondent’s cause, because the crime was
established by other competent evidence.

The appellate court, however, found no sufficient evidence against the other co-accused
who, unlike petitioner, were not found to be in possession of any blue seal cigarettes
ch
anrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

ISSUES:

(1) whether it was necessary to present the seized goods to prove the corpus delicti;
(2) whether petitioner knew that the cargo being transported was illegal; and (3)
whether, in the sale of the seized cargo, a notice to petitioner was required. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

RULING:
Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to
the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the
ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom 17 or to the body of the person
murdered. 18 Hence, to prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the prosecution to be
able show that (1) a certain fact has been proven — say, a person has died or a
building has been burned; and (2) a particular person is criminally responsible for the
act. 19 

Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled
that even a single witness’ uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove
it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence.

Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently established
by respondent’s evidence, which consisted of the testimonies of credible witnesses and
the Custody Receipt issued by the Bureau of Customs for the confiscated goods.

WHO TESTIFIED:
1. Lacson
2. Gregorio Abrigo — customs warehouse storekeeper of the Bureau — categorically
testify that the MISG had turned over to him the seized blue seal cigarettes, for
which he issued a Custody Receipt dated October 15, 1979.

We find no reason to depart from the oft repeated doctrine of giving credence to
the narration of prosecution witnesses, especially when they are public officers
who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.
 Moreover, it is well-settled that findings of fact of lower courts are binding on
this Court, absent any showing that they overlooked or misinterpreted facts or
circumstances of weight and substance. 27 This doctrine applies particularly to
this case in which the RTC’s findings, as far as petitioner is concerned, were
affirmed by the appellate court. chanrob1es virtua1

LEJANO v. PEOPLE
Vizconde massacre of Estrellita (mother), Carmela (rape victim), Jennifer (child)
Frame up of suspects – released.
After 4 years, darling of NBI, Jessica Alfaro testified that she knows the real culprits.
She was the girlfriend of one of the accused, Estrada. They met with Ventura, seller of shabu.
They met Webb, Lejano and the others. Webb asked her to relay his message to Carmela. When
she met Carmela, she told her to tell Webb to come back and that she will keep the gate and
the kitchen door open. She told Webb that she saw Carmela with another man.

WON Jessica Alfaro is a credible witness