FORTIFICATION AND

SIEGECRAFT EB 1911
Editor A.W.J Graham Kerr &
picture editor C.H blackwood

RESEARCH guide VII. 2019

EncyclopÆdia BRITANNICA 1911

The Fortress Study Group is a registered charity (No.288790) founded in 1975.

It is an international group whose aim is to advance the education of the public in
all aspects of fortification and their armaments, especially works constructed to
mount or resist artillery.

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 Acknowledgements
Each of these Research Guides come from a collection of Encyclopædia Britannica
dated 1911, that I had inherited from my fathers library although somewhat out-
dated today, the historical value is still of interest. They are a stand-alone booklets,
available to members through the website for downloading.

Hard copies are available at a cost for printing and postage and packing.

We have been able to do this as a team and my thanks goes to Charles Blackwood
who has edited the maps, diagrams and some photographs. A number of photo-
graphs have been used from other sources all of which are copyrighted to their
author. The editor apologises in advance for any mistakes or inadvertent breach of
copyright, with thanks to Wikipedia, Wikisource and Google Earth, where we have
used them.

This publication ©AWJGK·FSG·2020

Contents
I. HISTORY page 5
II MODERN PERMANENT FORTIFICATION page 58
III. THE ATTACK OF A FORTRESS page 88
IV. MILITARY MINING page 107
V. FIELD FORTIFICATION page 117
VI. CONCLUSION page 139
Bibliography page 145
References
*1 VAUBAN, SÉBASTIEN LE PRESTRE DE page 146
*2 CORMONTAINGNE, LOUIS DE page 149
*3 CHASSELOUP-LAUBAT, FRANÇOIS page 150
*4 COEHOORN, MENNO page 151
*5 MONTALEMBERT, MARC RENÉ page 152
*6 CARNOT, LAZARE NICOLAS MARGUERITE page 153
Cover: Painting of the siege of Lisbon in 1147 CE. ©Roque Gameiro

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 FORTIFICATION AND SIEGECRAFT.
EB1911 - Volume 10.djvu/700

“Fortification” is the military art of strengthening positions against attack. The word
(Lat. fortis, strong, and facere, to make) implies the creation of defences. Thus, the
boy who from the top of a mound defies his comrades, or shelters from their snow-
balls behind a fence, is merely taking advantage of ground; but if he puts up a hur-
dle on his mound and stands behind that he has fortified his position.

Fortification consists of two elements, viz. protection and obstacle. The protection
shields the defender from the enemy’s missiles; the obstacle prevents the enemy
from coming to close quarters and delays him under fire.

Protection may be of several kinds, direct or indirect. Direct protection is given by a

wall or rampart of earth, strong enough to stop the enemy’s missiles. The value of
this is reduced in proportion as the defender has to expose himself to return the
enemy’s fire, or to resist his attempts to destroy the defences. Indirect protection is
given by distance, as for instance by a high wall placed on a cliff so that the defend-
er on the top of the wall is out of reach of the enemy’s missiles if these are of short
range, such as arrows. This kind of defence was very popular in the middle ages. In
the present day the same object is attained by pushing out detached forts to such a
distance from the town they are protecting that the besieger cannot bombard the
town as long as he is outside the forts. Another form of indirect protection of great
importance is concealment.

The obstacle may consist of anything which will impede the enemy’s advance and
prevent him from coming to close quarters. In the earliest forms of fortification, the
protecting wall was also the obstacle, or it may be a wet or dry ditch, an entangle-
ment, a swamp, a thorn hedge, a spiked palisade, or some temporary expedient,
such as crows’ feet or chevaux de frise. The two elements must of course be ar-
ranged in combination. The besieged must be able to defend the obstacle from
their protected position, otherwise it can be surmounted or destroyed at leisure.

But a close connexion is no longer essential. The effect of modern firearms permits
of great elasticity in the disposition of the obstacle; and this simplifies some of the
problems of defence. Protection must be arranged mainly with reference to the
enemy’s methods of attack and the weapons he uses. The obstacle, on the other
hand, should be of such a nature as to bring out the best effects of the defender’s
weapons. It follows from this that a well-armed force operating against a badly
armed uncivilized enemy may use with advantage very simple old-fashioned meth-
ods of protection; or even dispense with it altogether if the obstacle is a good one.
When the assailant has modern weapons the importance of protection is very
3
The art of the engineer who is about to fortify consists in appreciating and harmo-
nizing all the conditions of the problem, such as the weapons in use, nature of the
ground, materials available, temper of assailants and defenders, strategical possibili-
ties, expenditure to be incurred, and so forth. Few of these conditions are in them-
selves difficult to understand, but they are so many, and their reactions are so com-
plex that a real familiarity with all of them is essential to successful work. The key-
note of the solution should be simplicity; but this is the first point usually lost sight
of by the makers of “systems,” especially by those who during a long period of
peace have time to give play to their imaginations.

Fortification is usually divided into two branches, namely permanent fortification

and field fortification. Permanent fortifications are erected at leisure, with all the
resources that a state can supply of constructive and mechanical skill and are built
of enduring materials. Field fortifications are extemporized by troops in the field,
perhaps assisted by such local labour and tools as may be procurable, and with ma-
terials that do not require much preparation, such as earth, brushwood and light
timber. There is also an intermediate branch known as semi-permanent fortification.
This is employed when in the course of a campaign it becomes desirable to protect
some locality with the best imitation of permanent defences that can be made in a
short time, ample resources and skilled civilian labour being available.

The objects of fortification are various. The vast enceintes of Nineveh and Babylon
were planned so that in time of war they might give shelter to the whole population
of the country except the field army, with their flocks and herds and household
stuff. The same idea may be seen to-day in the walls of such cities as Kano. In the
middle ages’ feudal lords-built castles for security against the attacks of their neigh-
bours, and also to watch over towns or bridges or fords from which they drew reve-
nue; whilst rich towns were surrounded with walls merely for the protection of their
own inhabitants and their property. The feudal castles lost their importance when
the art of cannon-founding was fairly developed; and in the leisurely wars of the
17th and 18th centuries, when roads were few and bad, a swarm of fortified towns,
large and small, played a great part in delaying the march of victorious armies.

In the present-day isolated forts are seldom used, and only for such purposes as to
block passes in mountainous districts. Fortresses are used either to protect points of
vital importance, such as capital cities, military depots and dockyards, or at strategic
points such as railway junctions. Combinations of fortresses are also used for more
general strategic purposes, as will be explained later.

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 I. HISTORY
The most elementary type of fortification is the thorn hedge, a type which naturally
recurs from age to age under primitive conditions. Thus, Alexander found the vil-
lages of the Hyrcanians defended by thick hedges, and the same arrangements may
be seen to-day among the least civilized tribes of Africa. The next advance from the
hedge is the bank of earth, with the exterior made steep by revetments of sods or
hurdle-work. This has a double advantage over the hedge, as, besides being a
better obstacle against assault, it gives the defenders an advantage of position in a
hand-to-hand fight. Such banks formed the defences of the German towns in
Caesar’s time, and they were constructed with a high degree of skill. Timber being
plentiful, the parapets were built of alternate layers of stones, earth and tree
trunks. The latter were built in at right angles to the length of the parapet, and
were thus very difficult to displace, while the earth prevented their being set on
fire. The bank was often strengthened by a palisade of tree trunks or hurdle-work.

After the bank the most important step in advance for a nation progressing in the
arts was the wall, of masonry, sun-dried brick or mud. The history of the develop-
ment of the wall and of the methods of attacking it is the history of fortification for
several thousand years.

The first necessity for the wall was height, to give security against escalade. The
second-was thickness, so that the defenders might have a platform on the top
which would give them space to circulate freely and to use their weapons. A lofty
wall, thick enough at the top for purposes of defence, would be very expensive if
built of solid masonry; therefore, the plan was early introduced of building two
walls with a filling of earth or rubble between them. The face of the outer wall
would be carried up a few feet above the platform, and crenelated to give protec-
tion against arrows and other projectiles.

The next forward step for the defence was the construction of towers at intervals
along the wall. These provided flanking fire along the front; they also afforded ref-
uges for the garrison in case of a successful escalade, and from them the platform
could be enfiladed. The evolution of the wall with towers was simple. The main
requirements were despotic power and unlimited labour. Thus, the finest examples
of the system known to history are also amongst the earliest. One of these was
Nineveh, built more than 2000 years B.C. The object of its huge perimeter, more
than 50 m., has been mentioned. The wall was 120 ft. high and 30 ft. thick; and
there were 1500 towers. After this no practical advance in the art of fortification
was made for a very long time, from a constructional point of view. Many centuries
indeed elapsed before the inventive genius of man evolved engines and methods
of attack fit to cope with such colossal obstacles.

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The earliest form of attack was of course escalade, either by ladders or by heaping
up a ramp of faggots or other portable materials. When the increasing height of
walls made escalade too difficult, other means of attack had to be invented. Proba-
bly the first of these were the ram, for battering down the walls, and mining. The
latter might have two objects: (a) to drive an underground gallery below the wall
from the besiegers’ position into the fortress, or (b) to destroy the wall itself by
undermining.

The use of missile engines for throwing heavy projectiles probably came later. They
are mentioned in the preparations made for the defence of Jerusalem against the
Philistines in the 8th century B.C. They are not mentioned in connexion with the
siege of Troy. At the sieges of Tyre and Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar in
587 B.C. we first find mention of the ram and of movable towers placed on mounds
to overlook the walls.

The Asiatics, however, had not the qualities of mind necessary for a systematic de-
velopment of siegecraft, and it was left for the Greeks practically to create this sci-
ence. Taking it up in the 5th century B.C. they soon, under Philip of Macedon and
Alexander, arrived at a very high degree of skill. They invented and systematized
methods which were afterwards perfected by the Romans. Alexander’s siegecraft
was extremely practical. His successors endeavoured to improve on it by increasing
the size of their missile and other engines, which, however, were so cumbrous that
they were of little use. When the Romans a little later took up the science they re-
turned to the practical methods of Alexander, and by the time of Caesar’s wars had
become past masters of it. The highest development of siegecraft before the use of
gunpowder was probably attained in the early days of the Roman empire. The be-
ginning of the Christian era is therefore a suitable period at which to take a survey
of the arts of fortification and siegecraft as practised by the ancients.

In fortification the wall with towers was still the leading idea. The towers were pre-
ferred circular in plan, as this form offered the best resistance to the ram. The wall
was usually reinforced by a ditch, which had three advantages: it increased the
height of the obstacle, made the bringing up of the engines of attack more difficult,
and supplied material for the filling of the wall. In special cases, as at Jerusalem and
Rhodes, the enclosure walls were doubled and trebled. Citadels were also built on a
large scale.

The typical site preferred by the Romans for a fortified town was on high ground
sloping to a river on one side and with steep slopes falling away on the other three
sides. At the highest point was a castle serving as citadel. The town enclosure was
designed in accordance with the character of the surrounding country.

6
Where the enemy’s approach was easiest, the walls were higher, flanking towers
stronger and ditches wider and deeper. Some of the towers were made high for
look-out posts. If there was a bridge over the river, it was defended by a bridgehead
on the far side; and stockades defended by towers were built out from either bank
above and below the bridge, between which chains or booms could be stretched to
bar the passage.

The natural features of the ground were skilfully utilized. Thus when a large town
was spread over an irregular site broken by hills, the enceinte wall would be carried
over the top of the hills; and in the intervening valleys the wall would not only be
made stronger, but would be somewhat drawn back to allow of a flanking defence
from the hill tops on either side. The walls would consist of two strong masonry
faces, 20 ft. apart, the space between filled with earth and stones. Usually when the
lie of the ground was favourable, the outside of the wall would be much higher than
the inside, the parapet walk perhaps being but a little above the level of the town.
Palisades were used to strengthen the ditches, especially before the gates. There
was little scope, however, in masonry for the genius of Roman warfare, which had a
better opportunity in the active work of attack and defence. For siegecraft the Ro-
man legions were specially apt. No modern engineer, civil or military, accustomed
to relying on machinery, steam and hydraulic apparatus, could hope to emulate the
feats of the legionaries. In earthworks they excelled; and in such work as building
and moving about colossal wooden towers under war conditions, they accom-
plished things at which nowadays we can only wonder.

The attack was carried on mainly by the use of “engines,” under which head were
included all mechanical means of attack—towers, missile engines such as catapults
and balistae, rams of different kinds, “tortoises”, &c. Mining, too, was freely resort-
ed to, also approach trenches, the use of which had been introduced by the Greeks.
The object of mining, as has been said, might be the driving of a gallery under the
wall into the interior of the place, or the destruction of the wall. The latter was
affected by excavating large chambers under the foundations. These were support-
ed while the excavation was proceeding by timber struts and planking. When the
chambers were large enough the timber supports were burnt, and the wall col-
lapsed. The besieged replied to the mining attack by countermines. With these they
would undermine and destroy the besiegers’ galleries or would break into them and
drive out the workers, either by force of arms or by filling the galleries with smoke.

Breaches in the wall were made by rams. These were of two kinds. For dislodging
the cemented masonry of the face of the wall, steel-pointed heads were used;
when this was done, another head, shaped like a ram’s head, was substituted for
battering down the filling of the wall.

7
For escalade they used ladders fixed on wheeled platforms; but the most important
means of attack against a high wall were the movable towers of wood. These were
built so high that from their tops the parapet walk of the wall could be swept with
arrows and stones; and drawbridges were let down from them, by which a storm-
ing party could reach the top of the wall. The height of the towers was from 70 to
150 ft. They were moved on wheels of solid oak or elm, 6 to 12 ft. in diameter and 3
to 4 ft. thick. The ground floor contained one or two rams. The upper floors, of
which there might be as many as fifteen, were furnished with missile engines of a
smaller kind. The archers occupied the top floor. There also were placed reservoirs
of water to extinguish fire. These were filled by force pumps and fitted with hose
made of the intestines of cattle. Drawbridges, either hanging or worked on rollers,
were placed at the proper height to give access to the top of the wall, or to a
breach, as might be required. Apollo-dorus proposed to place a couple of rams in
the upper part of the tower to destroy the crenulations of the wall.

The siege towers had of course to be very solidly built of strong timbers to resist
the heavy stones thrown by the engines of the defence. They were protected
against fire by screens of osiers, plaited rope or raw hides. Sometimes it was neces-
sary, in order to gain greater height, to place them on high terraces of earth. In that
case they would be built on the site. At the siege of Marseilles, described by Caesar,
special methods of attack had to be employed on account of the strength of the
engines used by the besieged and their frequent sallies to destroy the siege works.
A square fort, with brick walls 30 ft. long and 5 ft. thick, was built in front of one of
the towers of the town to resist sorties. This fort was subsequently raised to a
height of six storeys, under shelter of a roof which projected beyond the walls, and
from the eaves of which hung heavy mats made of ships’ cables. The mats protect-
ed the men working at the walls, and as these were built up the roof was gradually
raised by the use of endless screws. The roof was made of heavy beams and planks,
over which were laid bricks and clay, and the whole was covered with mats and
hides to prevent the bricks from being dislodged. This structure was completed
without the loss of a man, and could only have been built by the Romans, whose
soldiers were all skilled workmen.

Although these towers were provided with bridges by which storming parties could
reach the top of the wall, their main object was usually to dominate the defence
and keep down the fire from the walls and towers. Under this protection breaching
operations could be carried on. The approaches to the wall were usually made un-
der shelter of galleries of timber or hurdle-work, which were placed on wheels and
moved into position as required. When the wall was reached, a shelter of stronger
construction, known as a “rat,” was placed in position against it. Under this a ram
was swung or worked on rollers; or the rat might be used as a shelter for miners or
for workmen cutting away the face of the wall.

8
The great rat at Marseilles, which extended from the tower already described to
the base of the tower of the city, was 60 ft. long, and built largely of great beams 2
ft. square, connected by iron pins and bands. It was unusually narrow, the ground
sills of the side walls being only 4 ft. apart. This was no doubt in order to keep down
the weight of the structure, which, massive as it was, had to be movable. The slop-
ing roof and sides of timber were protected, like those of the tower, with bricks and
moist clay, hides and wool mattresses. Huge stones and barrels of blazing pitch
were thrown from the wall upon this rat without effect, and under its cover the
soldiers loosened and removed the foundations of the tower until it fell down.

In order that it might be possible to move these heavy structures, it was usually
necessary to fill up the ditch or to level the surface of the ground. For this purpose,
an “approach tortoise” was often used. This was a shelter, something between the
ordinary gallery and the rat, which was moved end on towards the wall, and had an
open front with a hood, under cover of which the earth brought up for filling the
ditch was distributed.

The missile engines threw stones up to 600 lb weight, heavy darts from 6 to 12 ft.
long, and Greek fire. Archimedes at the siege of Syracuse even made some throw-
ing 1800 lb. The ranges varied, according to the machine and the weight thrown, up
to 600 yds. for direct fire and 1000 yds. for curved fire. At the siege of Jerusalem
Titus employed three hundred catapults of different sizes and forty ballistae, of
which the smallest threw missiles of 75 lb weight. At Carthage Scipio found 120
large and 281 medium catapults, 23 large and 52 small ballistae, and a great num-
ber of scorpions and other small missile engines. Screens and mantles for the pro-
tection of the engine-workers were used in great variety.

In addition to the above, great mechanical skill was shown in the construction of
many kinds of machines for occasional purposes. A kind of jib crane of great height
on a movable platform was used to hoist a cage containing fifteen or twenty men
on to the wall. A long spar with a steel claw at the end, swung in the middle from a
lofty frame, served to pull down the upper parts of parapets and overhanging gal-
leries. The defenders on their side were not slow in replying with similar devices.
Fenders were let down from the wall to soften the blow of the ram, or the ram
heads were caught and held by cranes. Grapnels were lowered from cranes to seize
the rats and overturn them. Archimedes used the same idea in the defence of Syra-
cuse for lifting and sinking the Roman galleys. Wooden towers were built on the
walls to overtop the towers of the besiegers. Many devices for throwing fire were
employed. The tradition that Archimedes burnt the Roman fleet, or a portion of it,
at Syracuse, by focusing the rays of the sun with reflectors, is supported by an ex-
periment made by Buffon in 1747. With a reflector having a surface of 50 sq. ft.,
made up of 168 small mirrors each 6 by 8 in., lead was melted at a distance of 140

9
The development of masonry in permanent fortification had long since reached its
practical limit, and was no longer proof against the destructive methods that had
been evolved. The extemporized defences were, as is always the case, worn down
by a resolute besieger, and the attack was stronger than the defence.

Through the dark ages the Eastern Empire kept alive the twin sciences of fortifica-
tion and siegecraft long enough for the Crusaders to learn from them what had
been lost in the West. Byzantium, however, always a storehouse of military science,
while conserving a knowledge of the ancient methods and the great missile en-
gines, contributed no new ideas to fortification, so far as we know. In practice
the Byzantines favoured multiplied enceintes or several concentric lines of defence.
This of course is always a tendency of decadent nations.

In the West the Roman fortifications remained standing, and the Visigoths, allies of
Rome, utilized their principles in the defences of Carcassonne, Toulouse, &c. in the
5th century. Viollet-le-Duc’s description and illustrations of the defences of Carcas-
sonne will give a very good idea of the methods then in use:-

“The Visigoth fortification of the city of Carcassonne, which is still preserved, offers
an analogous arrangement recalling those described by Vegetius. The level of the
town is much more elevated than the ground outside, and almost as high as the
parapet walks. The curtain walls, of great thickness, are composed of two faces of
small cubical masonry alternating with courses of brick; the middle portion being
filled, not with earth but with rubble run with lime.

Fig. 1.—Plan of one of the Towers at Carcassonne

The towers were raised above these curtains, and their communication with the
latter might be cut off, so as to make of each tower a small independent fort; exter-
nally these towers are cylindrical, and on the side of the town square; they rest,
also towards the country, upon a cubical base or foundation. We subjoin (fig. 1) the
plan of one of these towers with the curtains adjoining.

10
 CHB

Carcassonne

Fig. 1a. Photograph of the double walls and Roman and Mediaeval Towers.

Fig.5a. 3D Image of town from the south east.

11
A is the plan of the ground-level; B the plan of the first storey at the level of the
parapet. We see, at C and D, the two excavations formed in front of the gates of
the tower to intercept, when the drawbridges were raised, all communication be-
tween the town or the parapet walk and the several storeys of the tower. From the
first storey access was had to the upper crenelated or battlemented portion of the
tower by a ladder of wood placed interiorly against the side of the flat wall. The
external ground-level was much lower than that of the tower, and also beneath the
ground-level of the town, from which it was reached by a descending flight of from
ten to fifteen steps. Fig. 2 shows the tower and its two curtains on the side of the
town; the bridges of communication are supposed to have been removed. The
battlemented portion at the top is covered with a roof, and open on the side of the
town in order to permit the defenders of the tower to see what was going on
therein, and also to allow of their hoisting up stones and other projectiles by means
of a rope and pulley. Fig. 3 shows the same tower on the side towards the country;
we have added a postern, the sill of which is sufficiently raised above the ground to
necessitate the use of a scaling or step ladder, to obtain ingress. The postern is de-
fended, as was customary, by a palisade or barrier, each gate or postern being pro-
vided with a work of this kind.”

Fig. 2.—One of the Towers at Carcassonne, inside view.

Meanwhile, in western Europe, siegecraft had almost disappeared. Its perfect de-
velopment was only possible for an army like that of the Romans. The Huns and
Goths knew nothing of it, and the efforts of Charlemagne and others of the Frank-
ish kings to restore the art were hampered by the fact that their warriors despised
handicrafts and understood nothing but the use of their weapons.

12
During the dark ages the
towns of the Gauls re-
tained their old Roman
and Visigoth defences,
which no one knew
properly how to attack,
and accordingly the sieges
of that period dragged
themselves out through
long years, and if ulti-
mately successful were so
as a rule only through
blockade and famine. It
was not until the 11th
century that siegecraft
was revived in the West
on the ancient lines.
By this time a new depar-
ture of great importance
had been made in the
seigneurial castle (q.v.),
which restored for some
centuries a definite supe-
riority to the defence
Fig. 3.—One of the Towers at Carcassonne, outside view.
Built primarily as strongholds for local magnates or for small bodies of warriors
dominating a conquered country, the conditions which called them into existence
offered several marked advantages. The defences of a town had to follow the
growth of the town and would naturally have weak points. It was not to be ex-
pected that a town would develop itself in the manner most suitable for defence;
nor indeed that any position large enough for a town could be found that would be
naturally strong all round. But the site of a castle could be chosen purely for its
natural strength, without regard, except as a secondary consideration, to the pro-
tection of anything outside it; and as its area was small it was often easy to find a
natural position entirely suited for the purpose. In fact, it frequently happened that
the existence of such a position was the raison d’être of the castle. A small hill with
steep sides might well be unapproachable in every direction by such cumbrous
structures as towers and rats, while the height of the hill, added to the height of
the walls, would be too much for the besiegers’ missiles. If the sides of the hill were
precipitous and rocky, mining became impossible, and the site was perfect for de-
fence.

13
A castle built under such conditions was practically impregnable; and this was the
cause of the independence of the barons in the 11th and 12th centuries. They could
only be reduced by blockade, and a blockade of long duration was very difficult in
the feudal age.

A very instructive example of 12th-century work is the Château Gaillard, built by

Richard Cœur-de-Lion in 1196. This great castle, with ditches and escarpments cut
out of the solid rock, and extensive outworks, was completed in one year. In a ref-
erence on Castles this is here supplemented by an elevation of the donjon (or keep).
The waved face of the inner or main wall of the castle, giving a divergent fire over
the front, is an interesting feature in advance of the time. So also, is the masonry
protection of the machicolation at the top of the donjon, a protection which at that
time was usually given by wooden hoardings. After the death of Richard, Philip Au-
gustus besieged the château, and carried it after a blockade of seven months and a
regular attack of one month. In this attack the tower at A was first mined, after
which the whole of that outwork was abandoned by the defenders. The outer en-
ceinte was next captured by surprise; and finally, the gate of the main wall was
breached by the pioneers. When this happened a sudden rush of the besiegers pre-
vented the remains of the garrison from gaining the shelter of the donjon, and they
had to lay down their arms.

Château Gaillard, designed by perhaps the greatest general of his time, exemplifies
in its brief resistance the weak points of the designs of the 12th century. It is easy to
understand how at each step gained by the
besiegers the very difficulties which had been Fig. 4. Donjon.
placed in the way of their further advance Château
prevented the garrison from reinforcing Gaillard
strongly the points attacked.

In the 13th century many influences were at

work in the development of castellar fortifica-
tion. The experience of such sieges as that of
Château Gaillard, and still more that gained in
the Crusades, the larger garrisons at the dis-
posal of the great feudal lords, and the im-
portance of the interests which they had to
protect in their towns, led to a freer style of
design. We must also take note of an essential
difference between the forms of attack pre-
ferred by the Roman soldiery and by the me-
dieval chivalry.

14
The former, who were artisans as well as soldiers, preferred in siege works the cer-
tain if laborious methods of breaching and mining. The latter, who considered all
manual labour beneath them and whose only ideal of warfare was personal com-
bat, affected the tower and its bridge, giving access to the top of the wall rather
than the rat and battering-ram. They were also fond of surprises, which the bad
discipline of the time favoured.

We find, therefore, important progress in enlarging the area of defence and in im-
proving arrangements for flanking. The size and height of all works were increased.
The keep of Coucy Castle, built in 1220, was 200 ft. high. Montargis Castle, also built
about this time, had a central donjon and a large open enclosure, within which the
whole garrison could move freely, to reinforce quickly any threatened point. The
effect of flanking fire was increased by giving more projection to the towers, whose
sides were in some cases made at right angles to the curtain walls.

We find also a tendency, the influence of which lasted long after medieval times,
towards complexity and multiplication of defences, to guard against surprise and
localize successful assaults. Great attention was paid to the “step by step” defence.
Flanking towers were cut off from their walls and arranged for separate resistance.
Complicated entrances with traps and many doors were arranged. Almost all de-
fence was from the tops of the walls and towers, the loopholes on the lower storeys
being mainly for light and air and reconnoitring. Machicolation galleries (for vertical
defence) were protected either by stone walls built out on corbels, or by strong
timber hoardings built in war time, for which the walls were prepared beforehand
by recesses left in the masonry. Loopholes and crenelles were protected by
shutters. Great care and much ingenuity were expended on details of all kinds.

Already in the 12th century the engineers of the defence had made provision for
countermining, by building chambers and galleries at the base of the towers and
walls. Further protection for the towers against the pioneer attack was given by
carrying out the masonry in front of the tower in a kind of projecting horn. This was
found later to have the further advantages of doing away with the dead ground in
front of the tower unseen from the curtain, and of increasing the projection and
therefore the flanking power of the tower itself. The arrangement is seen in several
of the towers at Carcassonne and has in it the germ of the idea of the bastion.

The defences of Carcassonne, remodelled in the latter half of the 13th century on
the old Visigoth foundations, exemplify some of the best work of the period. Figs. 5
and 6 (reproduced from Viollet-le-Duc) show the plan of the defences of the town
and castle, and a bird’s-eye view of the castle with its two barbicans. The thick black
line shows the main wall; beyond this are the lists and then the moat. It will be not-
ed that the wall of the lists as well as the main wall is defended by towers.

15
There are only two gates.
That on the east is defended
by two great towers and a
semi-circular barbican. The
gate of the castle, on the
west, has a most complicat-
ed approach defended by a
labyrinth of gates and flank-
ing walls, which cannot be
shown on this small scale,
and beyond these is a huge
circular barbican in several
storeys, capable of holding
1500 men. On the side of the
town the castle is protected
by a wide moat, and the
entrance is masked by an-
other large semi-circular
barbican. An interesting fea-
ture of the general arrange-
ment is the importance
which the lists have as-
sumed.
Fig. 5.—Plan of Carcassonne, 13th century
The slight wooden barricade of older times has developed into a wall with towers;
and the effect is that the besieger, if he gains a footing in the lists, has a very nar-
row space in which to work the engines of attack. The castle, after the Roman fash-
ion, adjoins the outer wall of the town, so that there may be a possibility of com-
municating with a relieving force from outside after the town has fallen. There were
also several posterns, small openings made in the wall at some height above the
ground, for use with rope ladders.

The siegecraft of the period was still that of the ancients. Mining was the most
effective form of attack, and the approach to the walls was covered by engines
throwing great stones against the hoardings of the parapets, and by crossbowmen
who were sheltered behind light mantelets moved on wheels. Barrels of burning
pitch and other incendiary projectiles were thrown as before; and at one siege we
read of the carcasses of dead horses and barrels of sewage being thrown into the
town to breed pestilence, which had the effect of forcing a capitulation.

16
With all this the attack was inferior to the defence. As Professor C. W. C. Oman has
pointed out, the mechanical application of the three powers of tension, torsion and
counterpoise (in the missile engines) had its limits. If these engines were enlarged,
they grew too costly and unwieldy. If they were multiplied it was impossible on ac-
count of their short range and great bulk to concentrate the fire of enough of them
on a single portion of the wall.

It is difficult to give anything like an accurate account, in a small space, of the

changes in fortification which took place in the first two centuries after the intro-
duction of gunpowder. The number of existing fortifications that had to be modified
was infinite, so also was the number of attempted solutions of the new problems.
Engineers had not yet begun to publish descriptions of their “systems”; also, the
new names and terms which came into use with the new works were spread over
Europe by engineers of different countries, and adopted into new languages with-
out much accuracy.

Artillery was in use for some time before it began to have any effect on the design
of fortification. The earliest cannon threw so very light a projectile that they had no
effect on masonry and were more useful for the defence than the attack. Later,
larger pieces were made, which acted practically as mortars, throwing stone balls
with high elevation, and barrels of burning composition. In the middle of the 15th
century the art of cannon-founding was much developed by the brothers Bureau in
France. They introduced iron cannon balls and greatly strengthened the guns. In
1428 the English besieging Orleans were entirely defeated by the superior artillery
of the besieged. By 1450 Charles VII. was furnished with so powerful a siege train
that he captured the whole of the castles in Normandy from the English in one year.

But the great change came after the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. with a greatly
improved siege train in 1494. The astonishing rapidity with which castles and forti-
fied towns fell before him proved the uselessness of the old defences. It became
necessary to create a new system of defences, and, says Cosseron de Villenoisy,
“thanks to the mental activity of the Renaissance and the warlike conditions pre-
vailing everywhere, the time could not have been more favourable.” There is no
doubt that the engineers of Italy as a body were responsible for the first advance in
fortification. There, where vital and mental energy were at boiling-point, and where
the first striking demonstration of the new force had been given, the greatest intel-
lects, men such as Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo and Machiavelli, busied them-
selves over the problem of defence.

17
 It has been claimed that Albert Dürer
was the first writer on modern fortifi-
cation. This was not so; Dürer’s work
was published in 1527, and more than
one Italian engineer, certainly Martini
of Siena and San Gallo, had preceded
him. Also, Machiavelli, writing be-
tween 1512 and 1527, had offered
some most valuable criticisms and
general principles. Dürer, moreover,
had little influence on the progress of
fortification; though we may see in his
ideas, if we choose, the germ of the
“polygonal” system, developed long
afterwards by Montalembert. Dürer’s
work was to some extent a connecting
link between the old fortification and
the new. He proposed greatly to en-
large the old towers; and he provided
both them and the curtains with vault-
ed chambers for guns (casemates) in
several tiers, so as to command both
the ditch and the ground beyond it.
His projects were too massive and
costly for execution, but his name is
associated with the first practical gun
Fig. 6.—Carcassonne Castle and Barbican casemates.

Before beginning to trace the effect of gunpowder on the design of fortification, it

may be noted that two causes weakened the influence of the castles. First, their
owners were slow to adopt the new ideas and abandon their high strong walls for
low extended parapets, and, secondly, they had not the men necessary for long
lines of defence. At the same time the corporations of the towns had learnt to take
an active part in warfare and provided trained and disciplined soldiers in large num-
bers.

When artillery became strong enough to destroy masonry from a distance two re-
sults followed: it was necessary to modify the masonry defences so as to make
them less vulnerable, and to improve the means of employing the guns of the de-
fence. For both these purposes the older castles with their restricted area were
little suited, and we must now trace the development of the fortified towns.

18
Probably the first form of construction directly due to the appearance of the new
weapons was the bulwark (boulevard, baluardo or bollwerk). This was an outwork
usually semi-circular in plan, built of earth consolidated with timber and re-
vetted with hurdles. Such works were placed as a shield in front of the gates, which
could be destroyed even by the early light cannonballs; and they offered at the
same time advanced positions for the guns of the defence. They were found so use-
ful for gun positions for flanking fire that later they were placed in front of towers
or at intervals along the walls for that purpose. This, however, was only a tempo-
rary expedient, and we have now to consider the radical modifications in designs.
These affected both the construction and trace of the walls.

The first lesson taught by improved artillery was that the walls should not be set up
on high as targets, but in some manner screened. One method of doing this in the
case of old works was by placing bulwarks in front of them. In other cases, the lists
or outer walls, being surrounded by moats, were already partially screened and
suitable for conversion into the main defence; and as with improved flanking de-
fence great height was no longer essential, the tops of the walls were in some cases
cut down. In new works it was natural to sink the wall in a ditch, the earth from
which was useful for making ramparts.

As regards resistance to the effect of shot, it was found that thin masonry walls
with rubble filling behind them were very easily destroyed. A bank of earth behind
the wall lessened the vibration of the shot, but once a breach was made the earth
came down, making a slope easy of ascent. To obviate this, horizontal layers of
brushwood, timber and sometimes masonry were built into the earth bank and
answered very well (fig. 7).

Another expedient of still greater value was the

(fig. 7).
use of counterforts. The earliest counterforts
were simply buttresses built inward from the wall
into the rampart instead of outward (fig. 8). Their
effect was to strengthen the wall and make the
breaches more difficult of ascent. An alternative
arrangement for strengthening the wall was an
arched gallery built behind it under the
rampart (fig. 9). This construction was in (fig. 8). (fig. 9).
harmony with the idea, already familiar,
of a passage in the wall from which coun-
termines could be started; but it has the
obvious weakness that the destruction of
the face wall takes away one of the sup-
ports of the arch.

19
 CHB

Fig. 8a. Roses Citadel, Spain after restoration above

and Fig. 10a Androussa Castle, Greece. below

CHB

20
The best arrangement, which is ascribed to Albert Dürer, was the “counter-arched
revetment.” This consisted of a series of arches built between the counterforts, with
their axes at right angles to the face of the wall. Their advantage was that, while
supporting the wall and taking all the weight of the rampart, they formed an obsta-
cle after the destruction of the wall more difficult to surmount than the wall itself
and very hard to destroy. The counter-arches might be in one, two or three tiers,
according to the height of the
wall (figs. 10 and 11, the latter
without the earth of the rampart
and showing also a countermine
gallery).
Fig.10.
A more important question, how-
ever, than the improvement of the passive defence or
obstacle was the development of the active defence
by artillery. For this purpose, it was necessary to find
room for the working of the guns. At the outset it was
of course a question of modifying the existing defenc-
es at as little cost as possible. With this object the
roofs of towers were removed and platforms for guns
substituted, but this only gave room for one or two
guns. Also, the loopholes in the lower storeys of tow- Fig.11.
ers were converted into embrasures to give a grazing
fire over the ditch; this became the commonest
method of strengthening old works for cannon but was of little use as the resulting
field of fire was so small. In some cases, the towers were made larger, with a semi-
circular front and side walls at right angles to the curtain. Such towers built at
Langres early in the 16th century had walls 20 ft. thick to resist battering.

Even in new works some attempts were made to combine artillery defence with
pure masonry protection. The works of Albert Dürer in theory, and the bridgehead
of Schaffhausen in practice, are the best examples of this. The Italian engineers also
showed much ingenuity in arranging for the defence of ditches with masonry ca-
poniers. These were developed from external buttresses, and equally with the case-
mated flanking towers of Dürer contained the germs of the idea of “polygonal” de-
fence.

The natural solution, however, which was soon generally adopted, was the rampart;
that is, a bank of earth thrown up behind the wall, which, while strengthening the
wall as already indicated, offered plenty of space for the disposal of the guns.

21
The ditch, which had only been occasionally used in ancient and medieval fortifica-
tion, now became essential and characteristic. Serving as it did for the double pur-
pose of supplying earth for a rampart and allowing the wall to be sunk for conceal-
ment, it was found also to have a definite use as an obstacle. Hitherto the wall had
sufficed for this purpose, the ditch being useful mainly to prevent the besieger from
bringing up his engines of attack.

When the wall (or escarp) was lowered, the obstacle offered by the ditch was in-
creased by reverting the far side of it with a counterscarp. Beyond the counterscarp
wall some of the earth excavated from the ditch was piled up to increase the pro-
tection given to the escarp wall. This earth was sloped down gently on the outer
side to meet the natural surface of the ground in such a manner as to be swept by
the fire from the ramparts and was called the glacis.

Now, however, a new difficulty arose. In all times a chief element in a successful
defence has consisted in action by the besieged outside the walls. The old ditches,
when they existed, had merely a slope on the far side leading up to the ground-
level; and the ditch was a convenient place in which troops preparing for a sortie
could assemble without being seen by the enemy, and ascend the slope to make
their attack. The introduction of the counterscarp wall prevented sorties from the
ditch. At first it was customary, after the introduction of the counterscarp, to leave
a narrow space on the top of it, behind the glacis, for a patrol path. Eventually the
difficulty was met by widening this patrol path into a space of about 30 ft., in which
there was room for troops to assemble. This was known as the covered way.
With this last addition the ordinary elements of a profile of modern fortification
were complete and are exemplified in fig. 12.

Fig. 12.

Up to the gunpowder period the trace of fortifications, that is, the plan on which
they were arranged on the ground, was very simple. It was merely a question of an
enclosure wall adapted to the site and provided with towers at suitable intervals.
The foot of the wall could be seen and defended everywhere, from the tops of the
towers and the machicolation galleries. The introduction of ramparts and artillery
made this more difficult in two ways. The rampart, interposed between the defend-
ers and the face of the wall, put a stop to vertical defence.

22
Also, with the inferior gun-carriages of the time very little depression could be given
to the guns, and thus the top of the enceinte wall, with or without a rampart, was
not a suitable position for guns intended to flank the ditch in their immediate
neighbourhood. The problem of the “trace” therefore at the beginning of the 16th
century was to rearrange the line of defence so as to give due opportunity to the
artillery of the besieged, both to oppose the besiegers’ breaching batteries and
later to defend the breaches. At the outset the latter rôle was the more important.

In considering the early efforts of engineers to solve this problem we must remem-
ber that for economic reasons they had to make the best use they could of the ex-
isting walls. At first for flanking purposes casemates on the ditch level were used,
the old flanking towers being enlarged for the purpose. Masonry galleries were
constructed across the ditch, containing casemates which could fire to either side,
and after this casemate were used in the counterscarps. Some use was also made
of the fire from detached bulwarks. It was soon realized, however, that the flanking
defence of the body of the place ought not to be dependent on outworks, and that
greater freedom was required for guns than was consistent with casemate defence.
The bulwark (which in its earliest shape suggests that it was in some sort the off-
spring of the barbican, placed to protect an entrance) gave plenty of space for guns,
but was too detached for security. The enlarged tower, as an integral part of the
lines, gave security, and its walls at right angles to the curtain gave direct flanking
fire, but the guns in it were too cramped. The blending of the two ideas produced
the bastion, an element of fortification which dominated the science for three hun-
dred years, and so impressed itself on the imagination that to this day any strong
advanced position in a defensive line is called by that name by unscientific writers.
The word had been in use for a long time in connexion with extemporized towers or
platforms for flanking purposes, the earliest forms being bastille, bastide, bastion,
and in its origin it apparently refers rather to the quality of work in the construction
than to its defensive intention.

The earliest bastions were modi-

fied bulwarks with straight faces
and flanks, attached to the main
wall, for which the old towers
often acted as keeps; and at first
the terms bulwark and bastion
were more or less interchangeable.
Fig. 13, taken from a contemporary
MS. by Viollet-le-Duc, shows a bas-
tion added to the old wall of
Troyes about 1528.

23
On the other hand, in fig. 14 (taken from an English MS. of 1559, which again is
based on the Italian work of Zanchi published in 1554), we find a spoken of as
“bulwarks” and b b as “bastions.” The triangular works between the bastions are
described as “ramparts,” intended to protect the curtains from breaching fire. (We
may also notice in this design the broad ditch, the counterscarp with narrow cov-
ered way, and loopholes indicating counterscarp galleries.)

Towards the end of the 16th century the term “bulwark” began to be reserved for
banks of earth thrown up a little distance in front of the main wall to protect it from
breaching fire, and it thus reverted to its original defensive intention. The term
“bastion” henceforth denoted an artillery position connected by flanks to the main
wall; and the question of the arrangement of these flanks was one of the main pre-
occupations of engineers.

Flanks retired, casemated or open, or sometimes in several tiers were proposed in

infinite variety.

Fig. 14.

Thus, while in the early part of the 16th century the actual modification of existing
defences was proceeding very slowly on account of the expense involved, the era of
theoretical “systems” had begun, based on the mutual relations of flank and face.
These can be grouped under three heads as follows:—
1. The crémaillère or indented trace: Faces and flanks succeeding each other in
regular order (fig. 15).
2. The tenaille trace: Flanks back to back between the faces (fig. 16).

Fig. 15. Fig. 16.

24
The development of the flanks in this case gives us the star trace (fig. 17).
3. The bastioned trace: Flanks facing each other and connected by curtains (fig. 18)

Fig. 17. Fig. 18.

In comparing these three traces it will be observed that unless casemates are used
the flanking in the first two is incomplete. Guns on the ramparts of the faces cannot
defend the flanks, and therefore there are “dead” angles in the ditch. In the bas-
tioned trace there is no “dead” ground, provided the flanks are so far apart that a
shot from the rampart of a flank can reach the ditch at the centre of the curtain.
Here was therefore the parting of the ways. For those who objected to casemate
fire, the bastioned trace was the way of salvation. They were soon in the majority;
perhaps because the symmetry and completeness of the idea captivated the imagi-
nation. At all events the bastioned trace, once fairly developed, held the field in one
form or another practically without a rival until near the end of the 18th century.
The Italian engineers, who were supreme throughout most of the 16th century,
started it; the French, who took the lead in the following century, developed it, and
officially never deserted it until late in the 19th century, when the increasing power
of artillery made enceintes of secondary importance.

It will be useful at this point to go forward a little, with a couple of explanatory fig-
ures, in order to get a grasp of the component parts of the bastioned trace as ulti-
mately developed, and of its outworks.

Fig. 19.

In fig. 19 above, ABCD represents part of an imaginary line drawn around the place
to be fortified, forming a polygon, regular or irregular.

25
ABC is an exterior angle or angle of the polygon.
BC is an exterior side.
zz is an interior side.
abcdefghijk is the trace of the enceinte.
bcdef is a bastion.
zdef is a demi-bastion.
de is a face of the bastion.
ef is a flank of the bastion.
fg is the curtain.
bf is the gorge.
(Two demi-bastions with the connecting curtain make the bastioned front, defghi.)
zd bisecting the exterior angle ABC is the capital of the bastion.
xy is the perpendicular, the proportionate length of which to the exterior side BC
(usually about one-sixth) is an important element of the trace.
efC is the angle of defence.
BCf is the diminished angle.
cde is the flanked angle or salient angle of the bastion.
e is the shoulder of the bastion.
def is the angle of the shoulder.
efg is the angle of the flank.

The line of the escarp is called the magistral line since it regulates the trace. When
plans of fortifications are given without much detail, this line, with that of the coun-
terscarp and the crest of the parapet, are often the only ones shown,—the crest of
the parapet, as being the most important line, whence the fire proceeds, being usu-
ally emphasized by a thick black line.

Fig. 20, overleaf, reproduced from a French engraving of 1705, shows an imaginary
place fortified as a hexagon with bastions and all the different kinds of outworks
then in use. The following is the explanation of its figuring and lettering.

1. Flat bastion: Placed in the middle of a curtain when the lines of defence were too
long for musketry range.
2. Demi-bastion: Used generally on the bank of a river.
3. Tenaille bastion: Used when the flanked angle is too acute; that is, less than 70°.
4. Redans: Used along the bank of a river, or when the parapet of the covered way
can be taken in reverse from the front.
A, B. Ravelins.
C. Demi-lunes: So, called from the shape of the gorge. They differ from the ravelins
in being placed in front of the bastions instead of the curtains.
D. Counter-guards: Used instead of demi-lunes, which were then going out of fash-
ion.

26
E. Simple tenaille.
F. Double tenaille (see L and M).
(If the tenaille E is reduced in width towards the gorge, as shown alternatively, it is
called a swallow-tail. If the double tenaille is reduced as at G, it is called a bonnet de
prêtre. Such works were rarely used.)
H. Hornwork: Much used for gates, &c.
I. Crown-work.
K. Crowned hornwork.
L. M. New forms of tenaille: (N.B.—These are the forms which ultimately retained
the name.)
N. New form of work called a demi-lune lunettée, the ravelin N being protected by
two counterguards, O.

Fig. 20.

27
 Fig. 20a. Elvas, Portugal

Google Earth

Fig. 20b. Tournay, Belgium

CHB

28
P. Re-entering places of arms.
Q. Traverses.
R. Salient places of arms.
S. Places of arms without traverses.
T. Orillion, to protect the flank V.
X. A double bastion or cavalier.
Y. A retrenchment with a ditch, of the breach Z.
&. Traverses to protect the terreplein of the ramparts from enfilade.

Turning back now to the middle of the 16th century we find in the early examples
of the use of the bastion that there is no attempt made to defend its faces by flank-
ing fire, the curtains being considered the only weak points of the enceinte. Accord-
ingly, the flanks are arranged at right angles to the curtain, and the prolongation of
the faces sometimes falls near the middle of it. When it was found that the faces
needed protection, the first attempts to give it were made by erecting cavaliers, or
raised parapets, behind the parapet of the curtain or in the bastions.

The first example of the complete bastioned system is found in Paciotto’s citadel of
Antwerp, built in 1568 (fig. 21). Here we have faces, flanks and curtain in due pro-
portion; the faces long enough to contain a powerful battery, and the flanks able to
defend both curtain and faces. The weak points of this trace, due to its being ar-
ranged on a small pentagon, are that the terreplein or interior space of the bastions

29
is rather cramped, and the salient angles too acute. In the systems published by
Speckle of Strasbourg in 1589 we find a distinct advance. Speckle’s actual construc-
tions in fortification are of no great importance; but he was a great traveller and
observer, and in his work, published just before his death, he has evidently assimi-
lated, and to some extent improved, the best ideas that had been put forward up to
that time.

Two specimens from Speckle’s work are well worth studying as connecting links
between the 16th and 17th centuries.

Fig. 22 is early 16th-century work

much improved. There are no out-
works, except the covered way,
now fully developed, with a
battery in the re-entering place of
arms. The bastions are large, but
the faces directed on the curtain
get little protection from the
flanks. To make up for this they are
flanked by the large cavaliers in
the middle of the curtain. The
careful arrangement of the flank
should be noted; part of it is re-
tired, with two tiers of fire, some
of which is arranged to bear on the
face of the bastion. The great sali-
ency of the bastion is a weak point,
but the whole arrangement is sim-
ple and strong.

In the second example, known as Speckle’s “reinforced trace” (fig. 23), we find him
anticipating the work of the next century. The ravelin is here introduced and made
so large that its faces are in prolongation of those of the bastions. Speckle’s other
favourite ideas are here: the cavaliers and double parapets and his own particular
invention of the low batteries behind the re-entering place of arms and the gorge of
the ravelin. These low batteries did not find favour with other writers, being liable
to be too easily destroyed by the besiegers’ batteries crowning the salients of the
covered way.

Speckle’s book is of great importance as embodying the best work of the period. His
own ideas are large and simple, but rather in advance of the powers of the artillery
of his day.

30
At the beginning of
the 17th century we
find the Italian engi-
neers following
Paciotto in develop-
ing the complete
bastioned trace; but
they got on to a bad
line of thought in
trying to reduce eve-
rything to symmetry
and system. The era
of geometrical fortifi-
cation (or, as Sir
George Clarke has
called it, “drawing-board” fortification) had already begun with Marchi, and his fol-
lowers busied themselves entirely in finding geometrical solutions for the applica-
tion of symmetrical bastioned fronts to such imaginary forms of perimeter as the
oval, club, heart, figure of eight, &c. Marchi, however, was one of the first to think
of prolonging the resistance of a place by means of outworks such as the ravelin. De
Villenoisy says that Busca was the first to discuss the proportions and functions of all
the component parts of a front; and Floriani, about 1630, was the last of the im-
portant Italians. The characteristics of a good deal of Spanish fortification carried
out at this time were, according to the same authority, that the works were well
adapted to sites, and the masonry excellent but too much exposed, while the basti-
ons were too small. The Dutch and German schools will be referred to later.

The French engineers now began to take the lead in adapting the principles already
established to actual sites. In the first half of the century the names of de Ville and
Pagan stand out as having contributed valuable studies to the advancement of the
science. In putting forward their designs they discussed very fully such practical
questions as the length of the line of defence, whether this should be governed by
the range of artillery or musketry fire, the length of flanks, the use in them of oril-
lion, casemates and retired flanks, the size of bastions, & c. It is the latter half of the
17th century, however, which is one of the most important periods in the history of
fortification, chiefly because it was illuminated by the work of Vauban. It was at this
time also that a prodigious output of purely theoretical fortification began, which
went on till the French Revolution. Many of the “systems” published at this time
were elaborated by men who had no practical knowledge of the subject, some of
them priests who were engaged in educating the sons of the upper classes, and who
had to teach the elements of fortification among other things.

31
They naturally wrote treatises, which were valuable for their clearness of style; and
with their industry and ingenuity the elaboration of existing methods was a very
congenial task. Most of these essays took the form of multiplication and elabora-
tion of outworks on an impossible scale, and they culminated in such fantastic ex-
travagances as the system of Rhana, published in 1769 (fig. 24). These proposals,
however, were of no practical im-
portance. Fig. 24.

The work of the real masters who

knew more than they published can
always be recognized by its compara-
tive simplicity. The greatest of these
was Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban *1
(q.v.). Born in 1633 and busied from
his eighteenth year till his death
in 1707 in war or preparations for
war, he earned alike by his genius, his
experience, his industry and his per-
sonal character the chief place among modern military engineers. His experience
alone puts him in a category apart from others. Of this it is enough to say that he
took part in forty-eight sieges, forty of which he directed as chief engineer without
a single failure and repaired or constructed more than 160 places. Vauban’s genius
was essentially practical, and he was no believer in systems. He would say, “One
does not fortify by systems but by common sense.” Of new ideas in fortification he
introduced practically none, but he improved and modified existing ideas with con-
summate skill in actual construction. His most original work was in the attack (see
below), which he reduced to a scientific method most certain in its results. It is
therefore one of the ironies of fate that Vauban should be chiefly known to us by
three so-called “systems,” known as his “first,” “second” and “third.” How far he
was from following a system is shown by de Villenoisy, who reproduces twenty-
eight fronts constructed by him between 1667 and 1698, no two of which are quite
alike and most of which vary very considerably to suit local conditions.

Vauban’s “first system,” as variously described by other writers even in his own
time, is pieced together from some of the early examples of his work. The “second
system” is the “tower bastion” defence of Belfort and Landau (1684–1688), obvi-
ously suggested by a design of Castriotto’s one hundred years earlier; and the “third
system” is the front of Neu-Breisach (1698), which is merely Landau slightly im-
proved. In other works, between 1688 and 1698, he did not keep to the tower bas-
tion idea. It will be convenient to take the “first system,” as reproduced in the Royal
Military Academy textbook of fortification (fig. 25) as typical of much of Vauban’s
work.

32
It may be observed that he sometimes uses the straight flank, and sometimes the
curved flank with orillion. Parapets in several tiers are never used, nor cavaliers.
The ravelin is almost always used. It is small, having little artillery power and giving
no protection to the shoulders of the bastions. Sometimes it has flanks and occa-
sionally a keep.
The tenaille is very generally found. In this form, viz. as a shield to the escarp of the
curtain, it was probably invented by him. Fig. 25 shows two forms. In both the para-
pet of the tenaille had to be kept low, so that the flanks might defend a breach at
the shoulder of the opposite bastion, with artillery fire striking within 12 ft. of the
base of the escarp. Traverses are used for the first time on the covered way to
guard against enfilade fire; and the re-entering place of arms, to which Vauban
attached considerable importance, is large.

For the construction

of the trace an aver-
age length of about
400 yds. (which,
however, is a matter
entirely dependent
on the site) may be
taken for the exteri-
or side. The perpen-
dicular, except for
polygons of less than
six sides, is one-sixth,
and the faces of the
bastions two-
sevenths of the exte-
rior side. The flanks
are chords of arcs
Fig. 25. struck from the op-
posite shoulder as
centres. An arc de-
scribed with the
same radius, but
with the angle of the
flank as a centre, and
cutting the perpen-
dicular produced
outwardly,

33
gives the salient of the ravelin; the prolongations of the faces of the ravelin fall up-
on the faces of the bastions at 11 yds. from the shoulders. The main ditch has a
width of 38 yds. at the salient of the bastions, and the counterscarp is directed up-
on the shoulders of the adjoining bastions. The ditch of the ravelin is 24 yds. wide
throughout. As regards the profile the bastions and curtain have a command of 25
ft. over the country, 17 ft. over the crest of the glacis and 8 ft. over the ravelin. The
ditches are 18 ft. deep throughout. The parapets are 18 ft. thick with full revet-
ments. In his later works he used demi-revetments.

Fig. 26 shows the tower bastions of Neu-Breisach, or the so-called “third system.” It
is worth introducing, simply as showing that even a mind like Vauban’s could not
resist in old age the tendency to duplicate defences.

Fig. 26.—Neu-Breisach.

34
 Fig. 26a-c. Neuf
Brisach, France

Google Earth

CHB

CHB

35
Here the main bastions and tenaille are detached from the enceinte. The line of the
enceinte is broken with flanks and further flanked by the towers. The ravelin is large
and has a keep. The section through the face of the bastion shows a demi-
revetment with wide berm, and a hedge as an additional obstacle.

After Vauban died, though the theories continued, the valuable additions to the
system were few. Among his successors in the early part of the 18th century Cor-
montaingne *2 (q.v.) has the greatest reputation, though his experience and author-
ity fell far short of Vauban’s. He was a clear thinker and writer, and the elements of
the system were distinctly advanced by him. His trace includes an enlarged ravelin
with flanks, the ends of which were intended to close the gaps at the end of the
tenaille, and a keep to the ravelin with flanks. He provides a very large re-entering
place of arms, also with a keep, the ditches of which are carefully traced so as to be
protected from enfilade by the salients of the ravelin and bastion. He was also in
favour of a permanent retrenchment of the gorge of the bastion. His works were
printed, with many alterations, more than twenty years after his death, to serve as a
textbook for the school of Mézières. This school was established in 1748, and from
this time forward there was an official school of thought, based on Vauban. Cor-
montaingne’s work, therefore, represents the modifications of Vauban’s ideas ac-
cepted by French engineers in the latter part of the 18th century. The school of Mé-
zières was afterwards replaced by that of Metz, which carried on its traditions. Such
schools are necessarily conservative, and hence, in spite of the gradual improve-
ment in ordnance and firearms, we find the main elements of the bastioned system
remaining unchanged right up to the period of the Franco-German War in 1870.
Chasseloup-Laubat tells us that, before the Revolution, to attempt novelties in forti-
fication was to write one’s self down ignorant. How far the general form of the bas-
tion with its outworks had become crystallized is evident from a cursory comparison
of fig. 27 with Vauban’s early work. This figure is the front of the Metz school in
1822, by General Noizet.

Since, therefore, the official view was that the general outlines of the system were
sacred, the efforts of orthodox engineers from Cormontaingne’s time onwards were
given to improvements of detail, and mainly to retard breaching operations as long
as possible. We find enormous pains being bestowed on the study of the compara-
tive heights of the masonry walls and crest levels; with the introduction here and
there of glacis slopes in the ditches, put in both to facilitate their defence and to
protect portions of the escarps.

Among the unorthodox two names deserve mention. The first of these
is Chasseloup-Laubat *3 (q.v.), who served throughout the wars of the Republic and
Empire, and constructed the fortress of Alessandria in Piedmont.

36
Chasseloup’s main pro- Fig. 27.—Noizet
posals to improve the
bastioned system were
two:

First, in order to prevent

the bastions from being
breached through the
gaps made by the ditch
of the ravelin, he threw
forward the ravelin and
its keep outside the
main glacis. This had the
further advantage of
giving great saliency to
the ravelin for crossfire
over the terrain of the
attack. On the other hand, it made the ravelin liable to capture by the gorge. It is
probable that this system would have lent itself to a splendid defence by an able
commander with a strong force; but under the opposite conditions it has a danger-
ous element of weakness.

Secondly, in order to get freedom to use longer fronts than those admissible for the
ordinary bastioned trace, he proposed to extend his exterior side up to about 650
yds. and to break the faces of his bastions; the portion next the shoulder being de-
fended from the flank of the collateral bastion and coinciding with the line of de-
fence, and the portion next the salient, up to about 80 yds. in length, being defend-
ed from a central keep or caponier placed in front of the tenaille. The natural criti-
cism of this arrangement is that it combines some of the defects of both the bas-
tioned and polygonal systems without getting the full advantages of either.

Fig. 28 shows a half front of Chasseloup’s system, of ordinary length, as actually

constructed. The section shows an interesting detail, viz. the Chasseloup mask—a
detached mask with tunnels for the casemate guns to fire through, the intention of
which is to save them from being destroyed from a distance.

The second name is that of Captain Choumara of the French Engineers, born in
1787, whose work was published in 1827.

37
 Fig.28.

38
Two leading ideas are due to him. The first is that of the “independence of para-
pets.” A glance at any of the plans that have already been shown will show that
hitherto the crests of parapets had always been traced parallel to the escarp or
magistral line. Choumara pointed out that, while it was necessary for the escarp to
be traced in straight lines with reference to the flanking arrangements, there was
no such necessity as regards the parapets. By making the crest of the parapet quite
independent of the escarp line he obtained great freedom of direction for his fire.
The second idea is that of the “inner glacis.” This was a glacis parapet placed in the
main ditch to shield the escarp; its effect being to prevent the escarp of the body of
the place from being breached in the usual way by batteries crowning the crest of
the covered way.

Fig. 29. Sedan in 1705.

The need for Choumara’s improvements has passed by, but he was in his time a real
teacher. One sentence of his strikes a resounding note: “What is chiefly required in
fortification is simplicity and strength. It is not on a few little contrivances carefully
hidden that one can rely for a good defence. The fate of a place should not depend
on the intelligence of a corporal shut up in a small post prepared for his detach-
ment.”
Before leaving the bastioned system, it will be of interest to study a couple of actual
and complete examples, one irregular and one regular. Fig. 29 shows the defences
of Sedan as they were at the end of the 17th century. One sees the touch of Vauban
here and there, but the work is for the most part apparently early 17th century. It
will be observed that on the river side of the town the defence consists of very ir-
regular bastions with duplicated wet ditches (see the Dutch style, below); and on
the other side, where water is not available, strength is sought for by pushing a suc-
cession of hornworks far out.

39
 Fig. 30 is Saarlouis, con-
structed by Vauban in
1680 in his early manner, a
remarkable example of
symmetry. Vauban of
course never thought of
aiming at symmetry, which
is of itself neither good nor
bad, but it is interesting to
note such a perfect exam-
ple of the system. It must
here be remarked that the
reproach of “geometrical”
fortification is in no way
applicable to the works of
Vauban and his immediate
successors. The true geo-
metric fortification, which worshipped symmetry as a fetish, marked, as has been
already pointed out, the decadence of the Italian school. Vauban and his fellows
excelled in adapting works to sites, the real test of the engineer.

The bastioned system was the 17th-century solution of the fortification problem.
Given an artillery and musketry of short range and too slow for effective frontal de-
fence, a ditch is necessary as an obstacle. What is the best means of flanking the
ditch and of protecting the flanking arrangements? If Vauban elected for the basti-
on, we must before criticize his choice remember that he was the most experienced
engineer of his day, a man of the first ability and quite without prejudice. What is
matter for regret is that the authority of Vauban should have practically paralysed
the French school during the 18th and most of the 19th century, so that while the
conditions of attack and defence were gradually altering they could admit no change
of idea, and their best men, who could not help being original, were struggling
against the whole weight of official opposition.

Again, such duplication of outworks as we see at Sedan is not geometric fortification.

It is a definite attempt to retard the attack, on ground favourable to it, by successive
lines of defence. As to the policy of this, no axiom can be laid down. Nowadays most
of us think, as Machiavelli did, that a single line of defence is best and that a second
line only serves to suggest the advisability of retreat. There are also, of course, the
recognized drawbacks of outworks, difficulty of retreat, of relief and so forth, and
the moral effect of their loss. But the engineers of such defences as Ostend and Can-
dia might well say, “Oh, if only when we had held on to that bastion for so many
months we had had a second and a third line of permanent retrenchment to fall

40
back upon, we could have held the place for ever.” And who shall say that they
were wrong? Let us at all events remember that the leading engineers of that time
were men who had passed their lives in a state of war, and that we ourselves in
comparison with them are the theorists.

From the end of the 16th century the Dutch methods of fortification acquired a
great reputation, thanks to the stout resistance offered to the Spaniards by some of
their fortresses, the three years’ defence of Ostend being perhaps the most striking
example. Prolonged defences, which were mainly due to the desperate energy of
the besieged, were credited to the quality of their defences. In point of fact the
Dutch owed more to nature, and more still to their own spirit, than to art; but they
showed a good deal of skill in adapting recent ideas to their needs.

Three conditions governed the development of the Dutch works at this time, viz.
want of time, want of money and abundance of water. When the Netherlands be-
gan their revolt against Spain, they would no doubt have been glad enough of ex-
pensive masonry fortresses on such models as Paciotto’s citadel of Antwerp. But
there was neither time nor money for such works. Something had to be extempo-
rized, and fortunately for them they had wet ditches to take the place of high re-
vetted walls. Everywhere water was near the surface, and rivers or canals were
available for inundations. A wide and shallow ditch, while making a good obstacle,
was also the readiest means of obtaining earth for the ramparts. High command
was, owing to the flatness of the country, unnecessary and even undesirable, as it
did not allow of grazing fire.

What the Dutch actually did in strengthening their towns gives little evidence of
system. Starting as a rule from an existing enceinte, sometimes a medieval wall,
they would provide a broad wet ditch. No further provision was usually made on
the sides of the town which were additionally protected by a river or inundation. On
the other sides the wet ditch was made still broader, and sometimes contained a
counterguard, sometimes ravelins and lunettes. These were quite irregular in their
design and relation to each other. At the foot of the glacis would be found another
but narrower wet ditch, which was a peculiarly Dutch feature; and sometimes if the
town was in a bend of a river there would be a canal cut across the bend in a
straight line, strengthened by several redans.

Speaking generally, they endeavoured to provide for the want of a first-class ma-
sonry obstacle by multiplication of wet ditches, and further to strengthen these
obstacles by great quantities of palisading, for which purpose the timber of old
ships was used. They also recognized the inherent weaknesses of wet ditches, as,
for instance, that when frozen they no longer provide an obstacle; and they studied
the means, not only of causing inundations, but also of arranging to empty as well

41
as to fill the ditches at will. Simon Stevin was the leader in this work. Nevertheless,
a Dutch school of design did come into existence at this time. The leaders, early in
the 17th century, were Simon Stevin, Maurice and Henry of Nassau, Marollois and
Freitag. The fortress of Coevorden, constructed by Prince Maurice, of which fig. 31
shows a front, is a well-known example of this, and the section shows clearly some
typical features of the school.
Fig. 31. Coevorden.

The elements of the plan are those of the early bastioned trace, but we find added
both ravelins and lunettes, very regular in design. There is also the ditch at the foot
of the glacis and surrounding the rampart of the enceinte a continuous Fausse-
Braye. This work, which partook of the nature of both boulevard and counterguard,
served several purposes. It was desirable that the weight of the rampart should be
drawn back a little from the edge of the ditch, and the Fausse-Braye filled what
would otherwise have been dead ground at the foot of the rampart. It also afforded
a grazing fire over the ditch, which was very important, and which the rampart sup-
ported by a plunging fire.

Coehoorn *4 (q.v.), the contemporary and nearest rival to Vauban, was the greatest
light of the Dutch school. Like Vauban he was distinguished as a fighting engineer,
both in attack and defence; but in the attack he differed from him in relying more
on powerful artillery fire than systematic earthworks. He introduced the Coehoorn
mortar. His “first system,” which was employed at Mannheim (fig. 32), is repro-
duced for the sake of comparison with the Coevorden front designed a hundred
years earlier. Among other points will be noticed the combination of wet and dry

42
ditches; the very broad main ditch with counterguard; the roomy keep of the rave-
lin; the expansion of the Fausse-Braye into an independent low parapet; and the
powerful flanking fire in three tiers.
The “tenaille” system and the “polygonal” system which grew out of it are mainly
identified with the German school. That school, says von Zastrow, does not, like that
of France, represent the authoritative teaching of an official establishment, but ra-
ther the general practice of the German engineers. It was founded on the principles
of Dürer, Speckle and especially Rimpler, and much influenced in execution by Mon-
talembert. “The German engineers desired a simple trace, a strong fortification with
retrenchments and keeps, bomb-proof accommodation and an organization suita-
ble for an offensive defence.”

Fig. 32. Coehoorn’s First System.

These had always been the German principles. Already in the 16th century the Prus-
sian defences of Kustrin, Spandau and Peitz had large bomb-proof casemates suffi-
cient for a great part of the garrison. The same thing is seen in the defences of Gio-
gau, Schweidnitz, &c., built by Frederick the Great. These works show various appli-
cations of the tenaille system. In 1776 Frederick became acquainted with the work
of Montalembert, and his influence is seen in the casemates of Kosel.

Whether through the influence of Albert Dürer or not cannot be said, but while the
bastion was being developed in France the tenaille and the accompanying case-
mates from the first found acceptance in Germany, and thence in eastern and
northern Europe. De Groote, who wrote in 1618, produced a sort of tenaille system,
and may have been the inspiration of Rimpler. Dillich (1640), Landsberg the elder
(1648), Griendel d’Aach (1677), Werthmuller (1685) and others advocated both bas-
tion and tenaille, sometimes in combination; the German bastion being usually dis-
tinguished by short faces and long flanks.

43
Rimpler, who was present at the siege of Candia (taken by the Turks in 1669) and
died at that of Vienna in 1683, exercised a great influence. He had been struck by
the weakness of the early Italian bastions at Candia and published a book in 1673
called Fortification with Central Bastions, which was practically the polygonal trace.
Zastrow thinks that Rimpler inspired Montalembert. He left unfortunately no de-
signs to illustrate his ideas.

Landsberg the younger (1670–1746), a

major-general in the Prussian service,
who saw many sieges, also had a great
influence. He appears to have been the
first who frankly advocated the tenaille
alone, chiefly on the ground that the
flank, which was the most important
part of the bastioned system, was also
the weakest. Fig. 33 shows his system,
published in 1712.

It was, however, ultimately a French-

man, Marc René Montalembert *5
(q.v.), who was the great apostle of the
tenaille, though in his later years he Fig. 33
leaned more to the polygonal trace. He
objected to the bastioned trace on many grounds; principally that the bastion was a
shell trap, that the flanks by crossing their fire lost the advantage of the full range of
their weapons, and that the curtain was useless for defence. He took the view that
the bastions with their ravelins constituted practically a tenaille trace, spoilt by the
detachment of the ravelins and cramped by the presence of the curtains and flanks.
His tenaille system consisted of redans, with salient angles of 60° or more, flanking
each other at right angles; from which he gave to his system the name of
“perpendicular fortification.”

Lazare Carnot *6 (q.v.), the “Organizer

of Victory,” was, in fortification, a fol-
lower of Montalembert, and produced
in 1797 a tenaille system (fig. 34) on
strong and simple lines.

Fig. 34

44
In 1812 Carnot offered three systems. For a dry and level site he recommended a
bastioned trace; but for wet ditches and for irregular ground, tenaille traces. Both of
these latter differ from his 1797 trace in that the re-entering angle is reinforced by a
tenaille whose faces are parallel to the main faces and reach almost to the salients.
There are also counterguards in front of the salients, whose ends overlap the ends
of the tenaille. (N.B. To avoid confusion between the tenaille trace and the tenaille,
it should be noted that the latter is a low detached parapet placed in front of the
escarp of the body of the place, partly as a shield, and partly as an additional line of
defence. It is used in front of the curtain in the bastioned trace, and in the re-
entering angle in the tenaille trace.)

Other important features of Carnot’s work were a continuous general retrench-

ment, or interior parapet, following more or less the lines of the main parapet; the
use of the detached wall in place of the escarp revetment; and the counter sloping
glacis. This last (of which Carnot was not the inventor), instead of sloping gently out-
wards from a crest raised about 8 ft. down to the natural level of the ground, sloped
inwards from the ground-level to the bottom of the ditch. The advantage of the ad-
ditional obstacle of the counterscarp was thus lost to the defence. On the other
hand, the besiegers’ saps, as they progressed down the glacis, were exposed to a
plunging fire from the parapet.

Carnot was also, like Coehoorn, a great believer in the mortar; but while Coehoorn
introduced the small portable mortar that bears his name, Carnot expected great
results from a 13 in. mortar throwing 600 iron balls at each discharge. He endeav-
oured to prove mathematically that the discharge of these mortars would in due
course kill off the whole of the besieging force. These mortars he emplaced in open
fronted mortar-casemates, in concealed positions. Fig. 35 shows in section one of
these mortar-casemates, placed
between the parapet of the re-
trenchment and a detached wall.

The leading idea of Montalem-

bert was that for a successful
defence it was necessary for the
artillery to be superior to that of the enemy. This
idea led him to the adoption of casemates in several Fig.36. Montalembert, 1786.
tiers; in preference to open parapets, exposed to
artillery fire of all kinds, high angle, ricochet and re-
verse. In considering the defects of bastions he had
arrived at the conclusion that for flanking purposes
two forms of trace were preferable; either the te-
naille form, connecting the ravelins with the

45
body of the place, or the form in which the primary flanking elements, instead of
facing each other with overlapping fire, as with the bastions, should be placed back
to back in the middle of the exterior side. Fig. 36 is an example of this. The central
flanking work resulting from this arrangement is the caponier of the early Italians,
reintroduced and developed; and with it Montalembert laid the foundation of the
polygonal system of our own time.

Montalembert was one of the first to foresee the coming necessity for detached
forts, and it was for these that he chiefly proposed to use his caponier flanking, pre-
ferring the tenaille system for large places. In abandoning the bastioned trace, he
was already committed to the principle of casemate defence for ditches; and the
combination of this principle with his desire for an overwhelming artillery defence
led him in the course of years of controversial writing into somewhat extravagant
proposals. For instance, for a square fort of about 400 yds. side, he proposed over
1000 casemate guns; and one of his caponier sections shows 10 tiers of masonry gun
-casemates one above the other. Confiding in the power of such an artillery, he
freely exposed the upper parts of his casemates to direct fire.

Montalembert is said to have contributed more new ideas to fortification than any
other man. His designs must be considered in some ways unworkable and unsound,
but all the best work of the 19th century rests on his teaching. The Germans, who
already used the tenaille system and made free provision of bomb-proof casemates,
took from him the polygonal trace and the idea of the entrenched camp.

The polygonal system in fortification implies straight or slightly broken exterior

sides, flanked by casemated caponiers. The caponier is the vital point of the front
and is protected in important works by a ravelin and keep. The essence of the sys-
tem is its simplicity, which allows of its being applied to any sort of ground, level or
broken, and too long or short fronts.

The final period of smooth bore artillery is an important one in the history of fortifi-
cation. It is true that the many expensive works that were constructed at this time
were obsolete almost as soon as they were finished; but this was inevitable, thanks
to the pace at which the world was travelling. After the Napoleonic wars the Ger-
manic Confederation began to strengthen its frontiers; and considering that they
had not derived much strategic advantage from their existing fortresses, the Ger-
mans took up Montalembert’s idea of entrenched camps, utilizing at the same time
his polygonal system with modifications for the main enceintes The Prussians began
with the fortresses of Coblenz and Cologne; later Posen, Königsberg and other plac-
es were treated on the same lines. The Austrians constructed, among other places,
Linz and Verona. The Germanic Confederation reinforced Mainz with improved
works and reorganized entirely Rastatt and Ulm.

46
The Bavarians built Germersheim and Ingolstadt. While all these works were con-
ceived in the spirit of Rimpler and Montalembert, they showed the differences of
national temperament. The Prussian works, simple in design, relied upon powerful
artillery fire, and exposed a good deal of masonry to the enemy’s view. The Austri-
ans covered part of their masonry with earth and gave more attention to detail.

The German development of the polygonal system at this time is not of great im-
portance, since the great masonry caponiers were designed without sufficient con-
sideration for the increasing powers of artillery. One example (fig. 37overleaf) is
given for the sake of historical comparison. It is a front of Posen.

“The exterior side of the front is about 650 yds. (600 metres) long. It is flanked by a
central caponier, which is protected by a detached bastion.... The main front is bro-
ken back to flank the faces of the bastion from casemates behind the escarp, as well
as from the parapet. “The central caponier forms the keep of the whole front and
sweeps both the interior and the ditch by its flanking fire. It has two floors of gun-
casemates and one for musketry, and on the top is a parapet completely command-
ing alike the outworks and the body of the place. It contains barrack accommoda-
tion for a battalion of 1000 men, and has a large inner courtyard closed at the gorge
by a detached wall. The caponier is itself flanked by three small caponiers at the
head, and one at the inner end of each flank.

“The escarp of the body of the place is a simple detached wall; that of the detached
bastion is either a detached wall with piers and arches, or a counter-arched revet-
ment. At the salient of the bastion there is a mortar battery under the rampart, and
a casemated traverse for howitzers upon the terreplein. The flanks of the bastion
are parallel to those of the caponier, and at the same distance from it as the faces.
“Masonry blockhouses, loopholed for musketry, are provided as keeps of the re-
entering and salient places of arms. In the latter case they have stairs leading down
into a counterscarp gallery, which serves as a base for countermine galleries, and is
connected with the detached bastion by a gallery under the ditch. The counterscarp
is not revetted if the ditch is wet.

“The angle of the polygon should not be less than 160°, in order that the prolonga-
tion of the main ditch may fall within the salients of the detached bastions of the
neighbouring fronts, and the masonry of the caponiers may thus be hidden from
outside view.” (R.M.A. Textbook of F. & M.E., 1886.)

We have now reached a period when the “detached fort” becomes of more im-
portance than the organization of the enceinte. The early conception of the rôle of
detached forts in connexion with the fortress was to form an entrenched camp
within which an army corps could seek safety if necessary.

47
 Fig. 37.

48
The idea had occurred to Vauban, who added to the permanent defences of Toulon
a large camp defended by field parapets attached to one side of the fortress. The
substitution of a ring of detached forts, while giving it the greater safety of perma-
nent instead of field defences, gave also a wider area and freer scope for the opera-
tions of an army seeking shelter under the guns of a fortress, and at the same time
made siege more difficult by increasing the line of investment. The use of the de-
tached fort as a means of protecting the body of the place from bombardment had
not yet been made necessary by increased range of artillery.

When these detached forts were first used by Germany the scope of the idea had
evidently not been realised, as they were placed much too close to the fortress.
Those at Cologne, for instance, were only some 400 or 500 yds. in advance of the
ramparts. The same leading idea is seen in most of these forts as in the new en-
ceintes; i.e. a lunette, with a casemated keep at the gorge. The keep is the essential
part of the work, the rampart of the lunette serving to protect it from frontal artil-
lery fire. The keep projects to the rear, so as not only to be able to flank its own
gorge, but to give some support to the neighbouring works with guns protected
from frontal fire. This is a valuable arrangement, which is still sometimes used. The
front ditches of the lunettes were flanked by caponiers. Some of the larger forts
were simple quadrangular works with casemate barracks and caponier ditch de-
fence.

In 1830, in Austria, the archduke Maximilian made an entirely fresh departure with
the defences of Linz. The idea was to provide an entrenched camp at the least pos-
sible cost, whose works should require the smallest possible garrison. With this
object Linz was surrounded with a belt of circular towers spaced about 600 yds.
apart. The towers, 25 metres in diameter, were enclosed by a ditch and glacis, and
contained 3 tiers of casemates. The masonry was concealed from view by the ditch
and glacis. On the top of the tower was an earth parapet, over which a battery of
13 guns fired en barbette. In order to find room for so many guns in the restricted
space, the whole 13 were placed parallel and close together on a single specially
designed mounting.

This new departure was received with a certain amount of approval at the time,
which is somewhat difficult to account for, as a faultier system could hardly be de-
vised; but the experiment was never repeated. The credit for much of the clear
views and real progress made in Germany during this period is due to General von
Brese-Winiari, inspector-general of the Prussian engineers. France, for a few years
after 1815, could spare little money for fortifications, and nothing was done but
repairs and minor improvements on the old lines. Belgium, having some money in
hand, rebuilt and improved in detail a number of bastioned fortresses which had
fallen into disrepair.

49
 Fig. 38.

In 1830 France began to follow the lead of Germany with entrenched camps. The
enceinte of Paris was reconstructed, and detached forts were added at a cost, ac-
cording to von Zastrow, of £8,000,000. The Belgian and German frontiers of France
being considered fairly protected by the existing fortresses, they turned their atten-
tion to the Swiss and Italian frontiers, and constructed three fortresses with de-
tached forts at Belfort, Besançon and Grenoble. The cost of the new works at Lyons
was, according to the same writer, £1,000,000 without the armament.

50
Here and elsewhere the enceinte was simplified on account of the advanced de-
fences. That of Paris, which was influenced by political considerations, was a simple
bastioned trace with rather long fronts and without ravelins or other outworks; the
escarp was high and therefore exposed, and the counterscarp was not revetted.

As regards the detached forts there was certainly a want of clearness of conception.
Those of Paris were simply fortresses in miniature, square or pentagonal figures
with bastioned fronts and containing defensible barracks. Those of Lyons were
much more carefully designed, but the authors wavered between two ideas. Unwill-
ing to give up the bastion, but evidently hankering after the new caponiers, they
produced a type which it is difficult to praise. The larger works were irregular four-
or five-sided figures with bastioned fronts; and practically the whole interior space
was taken up by a large keep, with its ditch, on the polygonal system. The smaller
works, instead of a keep, had defensible barracks in the gorge.

During the period 1855–1870 a considerable impulse was given to the science of
fortification, both by the Crimean War and the arrival of the rifled gun. One immedi-
ate result of these was the condemnation of masonry exposed to artillery fire. The
most important work of the period was the new scheme of defence of Antwerp,
initiated in 1859. This is chiefly interesting as giving us the last and finest expression
of the medieval enceinte, at a time when the war between the polygonal and bas-
tioned traces was still raging, though the boom of the long-range guns had already
given warning that a new era had begun. Antwerp is also associated with the name
of General Brialmont *7 (q.v.), of the Belgian engineers, whom posterity will no
doubt regard as the greatest writer on fortification of the latter half of the 19th cen-
tury.

We give in figs. 38, 39 and 40 the general plan of the 1859 defences of Antwerp, the
plan of a front of the enceinte, and its sections, as showing almost the last word of
fortification before the arrival of high explosives.

The defences of Antwerp were designed, as the strategic centre of the national de-
fence of Belgium, for an entrenched camp for 100,000 men. The length of the en-
ceinte is about 9 m. The detached forts, which on the sides not defended by inunda-
tion are about 114 m. apart and from 2 to 3 m. in front of the enceinte, are power-
ful works, arranged for a garrison of 1000 men. They have each a frontal crest-line
of over 700 yds. and are intended for an armament of 120 guns and 15 mortars.

51
52
Fig. 40. Sections of fig. 39.

The general arrangement

of the fronts of the en-
ceinte should be com-
pared with the earlier Ger-
man type of Posen. It will
be noticed that while the
large casemated caponier
at Posen breaks the en-
ceinte and flanks it both
without and within, at
Antwerp the caponier is
detached—a much sound-
er arrangement—and
flanks the front only. The
defence of the face’s rests
on the width of the wet
ditches and on the flank-
ing power of the caponier;
there is no attempt to add
to it by fausse-braye or
detached wall. The dimen-
sions are everywhere very
generous, allowing free
movement for the troops
of the defence; the cov-
ered way is 22 yds. wide

and there is a double terreplein on the face. The parapet of the face is 27 ft. thick.
The masonry of the casemate guns in the caponier, first flank and low battery, is
protected by earth, à la Haxo.

In 1859 Austria acknowledged the influence of the new artillery with some new
forts at Verona. The detached forts built by Radetzky in 1848 were only from 1000
to 2000 yds. distant from the ramparts. Those now added, of which fig. 41 (overleaf)
is an example, were from 3000 to 4000 yds. out. In the same year the land defences
of some of the British dockyards were taken in hand. These first serious attempts at
permanent fortification in England were received with approval on the continent, as
constituting an advance on anything that had been done before. The detached forts
intended to keep an enemy outside bombarding distance were roomy works with
small keeps.

53
Fig. 41.- Austrian Fort at Verona

The parapets were organized for artillery and the ditches were defended by ca-
poniers or counterscarp galleries. The forts were spaced about a mile apart and
arranged so as to support each other by their fire.

The sieges of the Franco-German War of 1870 are alluded to in the section below
dealing with the “Attack of Fortresses.” As regards their effect on the designs of
fortification the most important thing to note is the distance to which it was
thought necessary to throw out the detached forts. These distances were of course
influenced by the character of the ground, but for the most part they were very
largely increased. Thus, at Paris the fort at St Cyr was 18,000 yds. from the en-
ceinte; at Verdun the distances varied from 2300 to 12,000 yds.; at Belfort the new
forts were from 4500 to 11,500 yds. out; at Metz 2300 to 4500; and at Strasbourg
5200 to 10,000. One result of these increased distances was of course to increase
very largely the length of the zone of investment, and therefore the strength neces-
sary for the besieging force.

As regards the character of the works, the typical shape adopted both in France and
Germany was a very obtuse-angled lunette, shallow from front to rear. The German
type had one parapet only, which was organized for artillery and heavily traversed,

54
Fig 41a Forte Dossobuono, or Forte Gisella, Verona 1860-61. Google Earth.

Fig 41b The Caponier in Forte Dossobuono, or Forte Gisella, Verona 1860-61. CHB.

55
the living casemates being under this parapet. The ditch defence was provided for
by caponiers and a detached wall (see fig. 42).
Fig. 42.- German Fort about 1880.

The French forts had two parapets, that in the rear being placed over living case-
mates (in two tiers, as shown in the section of fig. 43 overleaf by a dotted line) and
commanding the front one. There was a long controversy as to whether the artil-
lery of the fort should be on the upper or the lower parapet, the advocates of the
upper parapet attaching great importance to the command that the guns would
have over the country in front. The other school, objecting to having guns on the
skyline, preferred to sacrifice the command and place them on the lower parapet,
as in fig. 43, the infantry occupying the upper parapet. It will be observed that the
bastioned trace is abandoned, the ditches, like those of the German fort, being de-
fended by caponiers.

While a great deal of work was done on these lines, a very active controversy had
already begun on the general question as to whether guns should be employed in
forts at all. Some declared that the accuracy and power of artillery had already de-

56
veloped so far, that guns in fixed and visible positions must needs be put out of
action in a very short time. The remedy proposed by these was the removal of the
guns from the forts into “wing-batteries” which should be less conspicuous; but
soon the broader idea was put forward of placing the guns in concealed positions
and moving them from one to another by means of previously prepared roads or
railways. Others declared that there was no safety for the guns outside the forts,
and that the use of steel turrets and disappearing cupolas was the only solution of
the difficulty. General Brialmont, who had by this time become the first European
authority on fortification questions, ranged himself on the side of the turrets. The
younger school were largely in favour of mobility and expressed themselves eagerly
in a shower of pamphlets.

Fig. 43.- French Fort about 1880.

57
It was at this juncture that a new factor was introduced, namely, the obus-torpille,
or long shell with high-explosive bursting charge. With its appearance we say good-
bye to the old school and enter upon the consideration of the fortification of to-
day.
II MODERN PERMANENT FORTIFICATION
Modern fortification dates by universal consent from 1885. The Germans had be-
gun experiments a year or two before this, with long shell containing large charges
of guncotton. But it was the experiments at Fort Malmaison in France in 1886 that
set the military world speculating on the future of fortification. The fort was used as
a target for 8-in. shell of five calibres length containing large charges of melanite.
The reported effects of these made a tremendous sensation, and it was thought at
first that the days of permanent fortification were over. Magazine casemates were
destroyed by a single shell, and revetment walls were overturned, and practicable
breaches made by two or three shells falling behind them. It must be remembered,
however, that the works were not adapted to meet this kind of fire. The casemates
had enough earth over them to tamp the shell thoroughly, but not enough to pre-
vent it from coming into contact with the masonry, and the latter was not thick
enough to resist the explosion of the big charges. Fig.44 Metz 1899.

58
Other experiments were made in the same direction in Germany, Holland, Belgium
and Austria. The Germans used shell containing from 60 to 130 lb of high explosive.

After the first alarm had subsided foreign engineers set about adapting their works
to meet the new projectiles. Revetments were enormously strengthened and de-
signed so that their weight resisted overturning. Concrete roofs were made from 6
to 10 ft. thick, and in many cases the surface of the concrete was left bare so as to
expose a hard surface to the shell without any earth tamping. The idea of cupolas
and shielded guns gained ground and is now practically accepted all over the conti-
nent of Europe. In many cases the main armament, in some only the safety arma-
ment, is in cupolas in the forts.

But meanwhile Europe had been flooded with literature on the subject, and the
whole policy of fortification as well as its minutest details were discussed above.
The extremists of both sides revelled in their opportunity. Some declared that, with
the use of heavy guns and armour, fortresses could be made stronger than ever.
Others held that modern fortresses were far too expensive, that their use led to
strategic mistakes, and (arguing from certain well-known examples) that extempo-
rized field defences could offer as good a resistance as permanent works.

European military opinion generally is now more or less agreed on the following
lines:-
1. Important places must be defended by fortresses.
2. Their girdle of forts must be far enough out to prevent the bombard-
ment of the place.
3. An enceinte is desirable but need not be elaborate.
4. A few guns (called “safety armament”) should be in the forts, and
these must be protected by armour.
5. The bulk of the artillery of the defence should be outside the forts;
the direct-fire guns preferably in cupolas, the howitzers in concealed
positions.
6. The forts should be connected by lines of entrenched infantry posi-
tions and obstacles, permanent bomb-proof shelters being provided
for the infantry.
7. There should be ample communications—radial and peripheral—
between the place and the forts, both by road and rail.
8. Special lines of communication—such as mountain passes—should be
closed by barrier forts.

These considerations will now be taken somewhat more in detail, but first it will be
useful to deal with the plan of Metz in 1899 (fig. 44).

59
Here the fortifications of successive periods can be readily recognized. First the old
enceinte, unaltered by the Germans and now déclassée. Next the detached forts,
begun by the French engineers in 1868 and still unfinished in 1870, can be readily
recognized by their bastioned trace. Among them are Fort Manteuffel, formerly St
Julien, and Fort Goeben (fig. 45), formerly Queuleu. These were not altered in their
general lines. Fig. 45.- Fort Goeben, Metz

This early line of detached forts, less than 3000 yds. from the enceinte, was com-
pleted by the Germans with forts of polygonal type such as Fort Prinz August. The
hill of St Quentin (fig. 46), a very important point, was converted into a fortified
position, with two forts and connecting parapets, and a communication running
north to Fort Alvensleben.

The arrangement of wing batteries in connexion with the forts can be clearly noted
at Fort Manteuffel. These are reinforced by other batteries either for the defence of
the intervals or to dominate important lines of approach such as the valley of the
Moselle (canal battery at Montigny). To these were added later armoured batteries.

There are also infantry positions, shelters and magazines in connexion with this line.

Finally, some new forts of modern type were commenced in 1899 at about 9000
yds. from the place.

60
Leaving out of consideration at present the strategic use of groups of fortresses, the
places which, as mentioned above, are intrinsically worth being defended as for-
tresses are:-
(a) Centres of national, industrial or military resources.
(b) Places which may serve as points d’appui for manoeuvres.
(c) Points of intersection of important railroads.
(d) Bridges over considerable rivers.
(e) Certain lines of communication across a frontier.

Examples of (a) are Paris, Antwerp, Lyons, Verdun. Again for (a) and (b), as is point-
ed out by Plessix and Legrand, Metz in the hands of the Germans may serve both as
a base of supplies and a point d’appui for one flank. Strasbourg is a bridgehead giv-
ing the Germans a secure retreat across the Rhine if beaten in the plains of Alsace,
and an opportunity of resuming the offensive when they have re-formed behind
the river. Fig. 46.- St Quentin position, Metz.

The distance of detached forts from the place depends on the range of the siege
artillery and the distance at which it can usually be established from the forts and is
variously given by different continental writers at from 4 to 9 km. (4500 to 10,000
yds.). The bombarding range of siege howitzers with heavy shells is considered to
be about 8000 yds., and if it is possible for them to be emplaced within say 2000
yds. of the forts, this would give a minimum distance of 6000 yds. From the forts

61
to the body of the place. Some writers extend the minimum distance to 7 km., or
nearly 8000 yds. In practice, however, it must happen that the position of the forts
is determined to a very large extent by the lie of the ground. Thus, some good posi-
tions for forts may be found within 4000 or 5000 yds. of the place, and no others
suitable on the same front within 15,000 yds. In that case the question of expense
might necessitate choosing the nearer positions. Some examples of the actual dis-
tances of existing forts have already been given. Others, more recent, are, at Bucha-
rest 7-10 km., Lyons 8-10½, Copenhagen 7-8 and Paris 14-17. Strategic pivots are in
a different category from other fortresses. While not necessarily protected from
bombardment, they may yet have one or two forts thrown out from 9 to 12 km., to
get advantage of ground. Such are Langres, Epinal and Belfort.

The Enceinte.—The desirability of this is almost universally allowed; but often it is

more as a concession to tradition than for any solid reason. The idea is that behind
the line of forts, which is the main defensive position, any favourable points that
exist should be provisionally fortified to assist in a “step-by-step” defence: and be-
hind these again the body of the place should be surrounded by a last line of de-
fence, so that the garrison may resist to the last moment. It may be remarked that
apart from the additional expense of an enceinte, such a position would not, under
modern conditions, be the most favourable for the last stages of a defence. Again,
there is the difficulty that it is practically impossible to shut in a large modern town
by a continuous enceinte. It has been proposed to construct the enceinte in sections
in front of the salient portions of the place. This system of course abandons several
of the chief advantages claimed for an enceinte. In actual practice enceintes have
been constructed since 1870 in France and other countries, consisting of a simple
wall 10 or 12 ft. high with a banquette and loopholes at intervals. This of course can
only be looked upon as a measure of police. For war purposes, in face of modern
artillery, it is a reductio ad absurdum.

The Safety Armament.—If the bulk of the artillery is to be placed in positions pre-
pared on the outbreak of war, it is considered very necessary that a few heavy long-
range guns should be permanently in position ready at any moment to keep an ene-
my at a distance, forcing him to open his first batteries at long range and checking
the advance of his investment line. Such guns would naturally be in secure positions
inside the forts, and if they are to be worked from such positions, they must have
armour to shield them from the concentrated fire of the numerous field artillery
that a besieger could bring to bear from the first.

Artillery outside the forts constitutes the most important part of the defence, and
there is room for much discussion as to whether it should have positions prepared
for its beforehand or should be placed in positions selected as the attack develops
itself.

62
On the one hand, the preparation of the positions beforehand, which in many cases
means the use of armour and concrete, increases very largely the initial expense of
the defence, and ties the defender somewhat in the special dispositions that be-
come desirable once the attack has taken shape. Moreover, such expenditure must
be incurred on all the fronts of the fortress, whereas the results would only be real-
ized on the front or fronts actually attacked. On the other hand much time and la-
bour are involved in emplacing heavy and medium artillery with extemporized pro-
tection, and this becomes a serious consideration when one remembers how much
work of all kinds is necessary in preparing a fortress against attack. Again, to avoid
the danger of a successful attack on the intervals between the forts before their
defences have been fully completed, the fire of the guns in the intermediate posi-
tions might be urgently required. The solution in any given case would no doubt
depend on the importance of the place. In most cases a certain amount of compro-
mise will come in, some preparation being made for batteries, without their being
completed. Armoured batteries of whatever kind must in any case be prepared in
peace time. It should not be overlooked that as, whatever theories may exist about
successive lines of defence, the onus of the defence will now lie on the fort line,
just as it formerly did on the enceintes, so that line should be fully prepared, and
should not have to commence its fight in a position of inequality.

Defence of Intervals of Forts.—The frontal fire of the batteries in the intervals and
the flanking fire of some of the guns in the forts will play an important part, but the
main reliance should be on infantry defence. A fully prepared fortress would have
practically a complete chain of infantry fighting positions and obstacles between
the forts, at all events on the fronts likely to be seriously attacked. The positions
would consist largely of fire trenches, with good communications; but it is pretty
generally recognized that there must be some points d’appui in the shape of re-
doubts or infantry forts, and also bomb-proof shelter for men, ammunition and
stores near the fighting line. This is usually included in the redoubts. If they are to
resist the heaviest shell, such shelters must be built in peace time.

Communications are of the first importance, not merely to facilitate the movement
of the enormous stores of ammunition and materials required in the fighting line,
but also, that defenders may fully utilize the advantage of acting on interior lines.
They should include both railways and roads running from the centre of the place
to the different sectors of defence, and all round, in rear of the line of forts; also
ample covered approaches to the fighting line. Concealment is essential, and where
the lie of the ground does not help, it must be got from earth parapets or planta-
tions.

The principal use of barrier forts is in country where the necessary line of communi-
cation cannot be easily diverted.

63
64
For instance, in a comparatively flat country a barrier fort commanding a road or
railway is of little use because roads may be found passing round it, or a line of rail-
way may be diverted for some miles to avoid it. But in mountainous country, where
such diversion is impossible, it will be necessary for the enemy to capture the fort
before he can advance; and the impossibility of surrounding it, the few positions
from which siege artillery can be brought into play, and the fact that there is practi-
cally only one road of approach to be denied, make these positions peculiarly suita-
ble for forts with armoured batteries. Italy makes considerable use of such forts for
the defence of frontier passes.

General Brialmont’s Theoretical Claim for the Defence of a Country.—Before going

into details, it is worthwhile to state the full claim of strategic fortification advanced
by General Brialmont, the most thorough of all its advocates. It is as follows:
A. Fortify the capital.
B. Fortify the points where main lines of communication pass a strategic
barrier.
C. Make an entrenched camp at the most important centre of communi-
cation in each zone of invasion: and support it by one or two places
arranged so as to make a fortified district.
D. Close with barrier forts the lines necessary to an enemy across moun-
tains or marshes.
E. Make a central place behind a mountain chain as a pivot for the army
watching it.
F. Defend mountain roads by provisional fortifications.
G. Make a large place in each theatre of war which is far from the princi-
pal theatre, and where the enemy might wish to establish himself.
H. Fortify coasts and harbours.

Objections to these proposals will be readily supplied by the officials of the national
treasury and the commanders-in-chief of the active armies. So many types of de-
tached forts have been proposed by competent authorities, as well as actually con-
structed in recent years, that it is impossible here to consider all of them, and a few
only will be reproduced of those which are most representative of modern conti-
nental thought.

Taking first the type of heavily armed fort, which contains guns for the artillery fight
as well as safety armament, we must give precedence to General Brialmont. The
two works here shown are taken from the Progrès de la défence des états, &c., pub-
lished in 1898. The pentagonal fort (fig. 47) has two special features. In section 1 is
shown a concrete infantry parapet, with a gallery in which the defenders of the
parapet may take shelter from the bombardment preceding an assault. In section 2
it will be seen that the counterscarp galleries flanking the ditch are drawn back

65
 Fig. 48.

from the face of the counterscarp. This is to counteract proposals that have been
made to obscure the view from the flanking galleries, and perhaps drive the de-
fenders out of them by throwing smoke-producing materials into the ditch at the
moment of an assault. The arrangement may save the occupants of the galleries

66
from excessive heat and noxious fumes but will not of course prevent the smoke
from obscuring the view. The following points may be noticed about this design in
comparing it with earlier types. There is no escarp, the natural slope of the rampart
being carried down to the bottom of the ditch. There is a counterscarp to the faces,
but no covered way. The flanks have no counterscarp, but a steel fence at the foot
of the slope, and the covered way which is utilized for a wire entanglement which is
under the fire of the parapet. The gorge has a very slight bastioned indentation,
which allows for an efficient flanking of the ditch by a couple of machine guns
placed in a single casemate on either side. The abolition of the covered way as such
is noteworthy. It marks an essential difference between the fort and the old en-
ceinte profiles; showing that offensive action is not expected from the garrison of
the fort and is the duty of the troops of the intermediate lines.

The great central mass of concrete containing all the casemates and the gun-
cupolas, a very popular feature, is omitted in this design, advantage being taken of
the great lateral extent of the fort to spread the casemates under the faces, flanks
and gorge, with a communication across the centre of the fort. This arrangement
gives more freedom to the disposition of the cupolas. The thickness of the concrete
over the casemate arches is more than 8 ft. Communication between the faces and
the counterscarp galleries is obtained by posterns under the ditch. The armament,
which is all protected by cupolas, is powerful. It consists of two 150–mm. (6 in.)
guns, four 120–mm. (4.7 in.) guns, two 210–mm. (8.4 in.) howitzers, two 210–mm.
(8.4 in.) mortars, four 57-mm. Q.F. guns for close defence. There is also a shielded
electric light projector in the centre.

This fort is a great advance on General Brialmont’s designs before 1885. These were
marked by great complexity of earth parapets and various chicanes which would not
long survive bombardment. This type is simple and powerful. It is also very expen-
sive.

The second Brialmont fort (fig. 48) is selected because it shows a keep or citadel, an
inner work designed to hold out after the capture of the outer parapet. General
Brialmont held strongly to the necessity of keeps for all important works. History of
course gives instances of citadels which have enabled the garrison to recapture the
main work with assistance or caused a really useful delay in the progress of the gen-
eral attack. It affords still more instances in which the keeps have made no re-
sistance, or none of any value. Some think that the existence of a keep encourages
the defenders of the main work; others that it encourages the idea of retreat. The
British school of thought is against keeps. In any case they add largely to expense.
In the present design the keep is a mass of concrete, which depends for the defence
of its front ditches on counterscarp galleries in the main work, the few embrasures
for frontal defence being practically useless. Its main function is to prevent the

67
attackers from establishing themselves on the gorge, thus leaving the way open for
a reinforcement from outside to enter (assisted by bamboo flying bridges) through
the passages left for the purpose in the outer and inner gorge parapets. As regards
the main work, the arrangements for defence of the ditch and the armament are

Fig. 49.- Fort Molsheim, Strassburg.

similar to the design last considered. This parapet has no concrete shelter for the
defenders. The casemates are all collected in the keep and the gorge, with a pas-
sage all round giving access to the parapet and the cupolas. Fig. 49 is a German
work, Fort Molsheim at Strassburg. This is a simple type of triangular fort. The main
mass of concrete rests on the gorge and is divided by a narrow courtyard to give
light and air to the front casemates. The fort has a medium armament for the artil-
lery fight, consisting of four 6-in. howitzers in cupolas. On each face are two small
Q.F. guns in cupolas for close defence, for which purpose, it will be seen, there is
also an infantry parapet. At the angles are look-out turrets. The ditch has escarp
and counterscarp and is defended by counterscarp galleries at the angles. There is
no covered way. The thickness of concrete over the casemates, where it is uncov-
ered, is about 10 ft.

Fig. 50 is Fort Lyngby at Copenhagen. The new Copenhagen defences are very inter-
esting, giving evidence of clear and original thought, and effectiveness combined
with economy. There is one special feature worth noting about the outer ring of
forts, of which Lyngby is one. These works are intended for the artillery fight only,
their main armament being four 6-in. guns (in pairs) and three 6-in. howitzers, all in

68
cupolas. The armament for immediate defence is trifling, consisting of only two 57-
mm. guns and a machine-gun. There is no provision for infantry defence. The ditch
has no escarp or counterscarp and is flanked by counterscarp galleries at the sali-
ent. It is usual in the case of works so slightly organized for their own defence, and
intended only for the long-range artillery fight, to withdraw them somewhat from
the front line. The Danish engineers, however, have not hesitated to put these
works in the very front line, some 2000 metres in front of the permanent interme-
diate batteries. The object of this is to force the enemy to establish his heavy artil-
lery at such long ranges that it will be able to afford little assistance to the trench
attack of the infantry. The intermediate batteries, being withdrawn, are compara-
tively safe. They therefore do not require expensive protection and can reserve
their strength to resist the advance of the attack. The success of this arrangement
will depend on the fighting strength of the cupolas under war conditions; and what
that may be, war alone can tell us.

In the details of these works, besides the bold cutting down of defensive precau-
tions, we may note the skilful and economical use of layers of large stones over the
casemates to diminish the thickness of concrete required. The roofs of the case-
mates are stiffened underneath with steel rails, and steel lathing is used to prevent
lumps of concrete from falling on the occupants. The living casemates look out on
the gorge, getting plenty of light and air, while the magazines are under the cupo-
las. The forts above described are all armed with a view to their taking an important
part in the distant artillery fight. The next type to be considered (fig. 51) is selected
mainly because it is a good example of the use of concealed flanking batteries,
known on the continent as batteries traditores, which seem to be growing in popu-
larity.

This design by Colonel Voorduin of the Dutch engineers has a medium armament,
which is not intended for the artillery duel, but to command the immediate front of
the neighbouring forts and the intervals. The fort is long and narrow, with small
casemate accommodation. It contains eight 4.7–in. guns. Two of these are in a cu-
pola concealed from view, though not protected, by a bank of earth in front. The
other six are in an armoured battery behind the cupola. It may be remarked that as
the cupola gets no real protection from the covering mass of earth, it would be
better to be able to utilize the fire of its guns to the front. The batterie traditore, if
properly protected overhead, would be very difficult to silence, and its flanking fire
would probably be available up to the last moment. There is very much to be said
both for and against the policy of so emplacing the guns. The immediate defence of
the work, with the aid of a broad wet ditch, is easy; but the great mass of concrete,
which is intended to form an indestructible platform and breastwork for the infan-
try, would seem to be a needless expense.

69
Fig. 50. Fort Lyngby, Copenhagen,
and today below

Google Earth

70
Fig.51. A good example of the use of concealed flanking batteries.

Fig 51a Charlottenslund Fortet, 1886-87 Copenhagen

Google Earth

71
Fig. 52 From Brialmont’s Progrès de la défense des états, & c., by permission of
Commandant G. Meeüs.
Fig. 52, designed by the Austrian lieutenant field-marshal Moritz Ritter von Brunner
(1839–1904), is selected as a type of the intermediate fort which is intended only to
be a strong point in the infantry line of defence between the main forts. It has a
protected armament, but this, which consists only of four small Q.F. guns in cupo-
las, is for its own defence, and not to take part in the artillery duel. There is also a
movable armament of four light Q.F. guns on wheels, for which a shelter is provided
between the two observatory cupolas. The garrison would be a half company of
infantry, for whom casemates are provided in the gorge. The gorge ditch is flanked
by a caponier, but there is no flank defence for the front ditch. This is defended by a
glacis parapet. At the bottom of the ditch is a wire entanglement and the glacis
slope is planted with thorns. The thickness of concrete on the casemates is 2 me-
tres (6 ft. 7 in.). This is a strong and simple form of infantry work but considering its
rôle it appears to be needlessly expensive.

72
Fig.53 From General Rocchi’s Traccia per lo studio della fortificazione, by permission.

73
Fig. 53 is an Italian type of barrier fort in mountainous country. A powerful battery
of eight medium guns protected by a Gruson shield commands the approach. The
fort with its dwelling casemates is surrounded by a deep ditch flanked by counter-
scarp galleries. There are certain apparent weaknesses in the type, but the difficul-
ties of the attack in such country and its limitations must be borne in mind.
Modern Details of Protection and Obstacle.—After considering the above types of
fort, it will be of use to note some of the details in which modern construction has
been modified to provide against the increasing power of artillery.

The penetration of projectiles varies according to the nature of the soil—the lighter
the better for protection. Sand offers the greatest resistance to penetration, clay
the least. Since, however, the penetration of heavy shells fired from long ranges
with high elevation may be 20 ft. or more in ordinary soil, we can no longer look to
earth alone as a source of protection against bombardment. Again, a moderate
quantity of earth over a casemate increases the explosive effect of a shell by
“tamping” it, that is by preventing the force of the explosion from being wasted in
the open air. We find therefore that in most modern designs the tops of casemates
are left uncovered, or with only a few inches of earth over them, in which grass may
be grown for concealment.

For the materials of casemates and revetment walls exposed to fire, concrete (q.v.)
has entirely replaced masonry and brickwork, not because of its convenience in
construction, but because it offers the best resistance. The exact composition of the
concrete is a matter that demands great care and knowledge. It should be, like an
armour plate, hard on the surface and tough within. The great thickness of 10 ft. of
concrete for casemate arches, very generally prescribed on the continent in im-
portant positions, is meant to meet the danger of several successive shells striking
the same spot. To stop a single shell of any siege calibre in use at present, 5 ft. of
good concrete would be enough. A good deal is expected from the use of
“reinforced concrete” (that is concrete strengthened by steel) both for revetment
walls and casemates.

Parapets are frequently made continuous or glacis-wise, that is the superior slope is
prolonged to the bottom of the ditch so that the whole rampart can be swept by
the fire of the defenders from the crest, and there is no dead ground in front of it. It
is also common to build the crest of the parapet in solid concrete, with sometimes a
concrete banquette, so that bombardment shall not destroy the line the defenders
have to man in repelling an assault. This concrete parapet may be further reinforced
by hinged steel bullet-proof plates, to give head cover; which when not in use hang
down behind the crest.

74
The escarp is falling into disfavour, on account of the great expense of a revetment
that can withstand breaching fire. A counterscarp of very solid construction is gen-
erally used. It is low and gives cover to a wire entanglement in the ditch. This may
be supplemented by a steel unclimbable fence, and by entanglements or thorn
plantations on the covered way and the lower slopes of the parapet. Entangle-
ments are attached to steel posts bedded in concrete. The upper parts of revet-
ments and the foundations of walls are protected against the action of shells, that
falling steeply might act as mines to overturn them, by thick aprons of large stones.
Fig. 54 shows most of these dispositions.

Electric searchlights are now used in all important works and batteries. They are
usually placed in disappearing cupolas. They are of great value for discovering
working parties at night and lighting up the foreground during an attack; and since
only the projector need be exposed, they are not very vulnerable. Their value, how-
ever, must not be over-estimated. The most powerful searchlight can in no way
compare with daylight as an illuminate, and, like all other mechanical contrivances,
they have certain marked drawbacks in war. They may give rise to a false confi-
dence; an important light may fail at a critical moment; and in foggy weather they
are useless.

The use of armour, (see Armour Plates *7 ), for coast batteries followed closely up-
on its employment for ships, for those were the days of short ranges and close
fighting, and it seemed natural not to leave the battery in a position of inferiority to
the ship in the matter of protection. In England the coast battery for a generation
after the Crimean War was a combination of masonry and iron; and in 1860
Brialmont employed armoured turrets at Antwerp in the forts which commanded
the Scheldt. For land defence purposes, however, engineers were very slow to
adopt armour. Apart from all questions of difficulty of manufacture, expense, &c.,
the idea was that sea and land fronts were radically different. It was pointed out
that a ship gun, fired from an unsteady platform, had not enough accuracy to strike
repeated blows on the same spot; so that a shield which was strong enough to re-
sist a single shot would give complete protection. A battery on a land front, on the
other hand, was exposed to an accurate fire from guns which could strike succes-
sive blows on the same spot and break down the resistance of the strongest shield.
But in time continental opinion gradually began to turn in favour of iron protection.
Practical types of disappearing and revolving cupolas were produced, and many

75
engineers were influenced in their favour by the effect of the big high-explosive
shell. Eventually it was argued that, after all, the object of fortification is not to
obtain a resisting power without limit, but to put the men and guns of a work in an
advantageous position to defend themselves as long as possible against a superior
force; and that from this point of view armour cannot but add strength to defen-
sive works.

The question has of course long passed beyond the stage of theory. Practically eve-
ry European state uses iron or steel casemates and cupolas. German, Danish, Ital-
ian and other types of forts so armed have been shown. Recent French types have
not been published, but it is known that cupolas are employed; and Velichko, the
Russian authority, long an uncompromising opponent of armour, in the end
changed his views. These countries have had to proceed gradually, by improving
existing fortresses, and with such resources as could be spared from the needs of
the active armies. Among the smaller states Rumania and Belgium have entered
most freely into the new way. In England, which is less directly interested, opinion
has been led by Sir George Clarke, since the publication in 1890 of his well-known
book on fortification. Having witnessed officially the experiments at Bucharest in
1885 with a St Chamond turret and a Gruson cupola, he expressed himself very
strongly against the whole system. Besides pointing out very clearly the theoretical
objections to it, and the weak points of the constructions under experiment, he
added: “The cost of the French turret was about £10,000 exclusive of its arma-
ment, and for this sum about six movable overbank guns of greater power could be
provided.” In view of the weight that belongs of right to his criticisms it is as well to
point out that while this remark is quite true, yet the six guns would require also
six gun detachments, with arrangements for supply, &c.; a consideration which
alters the working of this apparently elementary sum. The whole object of protec-
tion is to enable a few men and guns successfully to oppose a larger number.

At the time when Sir George Clarke’s first edition came out, such extravagances
were before the public as Mougin’s fort; “a mastless turret ship,” as he called it,
“buried up to the deck-level in the ground and manned by mechanics.” Such ideas
tended to throw discredit on the more reasonable use of armour, but whether the
system be right or wrong, it exists now and has to be taken account of. Nowhere
has it been applied more boldly than in Rumania. The defences of Bucharest
(designed by Brialmont) consist of 18 main and 18 small forts, with intermediate
batteries. The main forts are some 4500 yds. apart, and 11,000 to 12,000 yds. from
the centre of the place. The typical armament of a main fort is six 6-in. guns in
three cupolas (one for indirect fire), two 8.4–in. howitzers in cupolas, one 4.7–in.
howitzer in a cupola, six small Q.F. guns in disappearing cupolas. The total arma-
ment of the place (all protected) is eighty-six 6-in. guns, seventy-four 8.4–in. how-
itzers, eighteen 4.7–in. howitzers, 127 small calibre Q.F. guns in disappearing cupo-

76
las, 476 small calibre Q.F. guns in casemates for flanking the ditches. The “Sereth
Line” will be described later.

Different Forms of Protection: Casemate, Cupola, &c.—The broad difference be-

tween casemates or shielded batteries and turrets and cupolas is that the former
are fixed while the latter revolve and, in some cases, disappear. The casemate thus
has the disadvantages that the arc of fire of the gun, which has to fire through a
fixed embrasure or port-hole, is very limited, and that the muzzle of the gun and
the port-hole, the weak points of the system, are constantly exposed to the fire of
the enemy. The advantage of the casemate lies in its comparative cheapness and
the greater strength of a fixed structure. It is well suited for barrier forts (fig. 53)

Fig.55.

and other analogous positions; and the Italians amongst other nations have so em-
ployed it at such places as the end of the Mont Cenis tunnel. Steel and iron case-
mates are also useful as caponiers for ditch flanking (fig. 55).

Turrets and Cupolas.—The difference between a turret and a cupola is that the
former is cylindrical with a flat or nearly flat top and presents a vertical target;
while the latter is a flattened dome, the vertical supports of which are entirely con-
cealed. The turret appears to be little used. The object of both forms is at once to
give an all-round arc of fire to the guns and to allow of the weak point of the struc-
ture, the porthole and muzzle of the gun, being turned away from the enemy in the
intervals of firing. Both usually emerge from a mass of concrete, which is strength-
ened round the opening by a collar of chilled cast iron about 12 to 15 in. thick.

There are four types of cupolas, viz. (a) Disappearing, (b) Oscillating, (c) Central
pivot, (d) On roller rings.

(a) Disappearing cupolas are used chiefly for small quick-firing guns, on account of
the expense of the various systems. They can be used for medium guns. The details
of the best foreign systems are secret. (b) The oscillating turret is a Mougin type, in
which the turret is supported in the centre by a knife-edge on which it can swing.
The oscillation is controlled by powerful springs.

77
The effect of it is that after firing, the front of the cupola with the port-hole swings
downwards under cover and is held there until the gun is ready to fire again. (c)
Schumann’s centre pivot is understood to be approved in Germany. It has been
adopted in Rumania and Belgium for howitzer cupolas. It is only suitable for a single
piece; d is strong and steady—the best cupola for coast batteries; c and d are best
for rapid fire because they can be loaded without lowering. They are suited for long

Fig. 56 is a section of Messrs Krupp’s typical cupola for one 6-in. gun. The shield is of
nickel steel, the collar of cast steel. A small space is left between the cupola and its
collar to prevent the possibility of the shield jamming after being damaged. The
guns are muzzle-pivoting and thickened out near the muzzle by the addition of a
ring, so as to close the port as much as possible. The recoil is controlled within nar-
row limits both to economize space and to prevent the smoke from the muzzle from
getting into the cupola. To facilitate the elevation and depression of the gun (with
muzzle pivoting's the breech has of course to be moved through a much larger arc
than with ordinary mountings) it is balanced by a counterweight. The cupola rests
on a roller ring and is traversed by a winch. It can be turned through a complete
circle in about one minute.

78
 CHB

Fig.56a, Ouvrage de la Falouse,

eclipsing Twin 75mm turret. CHB

79
Fig. 57 shows a Schumann shield-
ed mortar (sphere-mortar, Ku-
gelmörser). In this case it will be
observed that the cupola is re-
placed by an enlargement of the
encircling collar; and the mortar
(8.4-in. calibre) is enclosed in a
sphere of cast iron, so as to close
completely the opening of the
collar in any position.

Fig. 58 shows a Gruson cupola

for one 4.7–in. Q.F. howitzer.

Fig. 59 shows a disappearing

turret for an electric light pro-
jector. Below.

Fig. 60 (next page), shows a Krupp

transportable cupola for a 5.7–cm.
gun. This is drawn on a four-
wheeled carriage, and when coming
into action slides on rollers on to a
platform in the parapet. It weighs
about 2½ tons, and with carriage
and platform about 4 tons.

The mechanism of these cupolas is

for the most part simpler than it
appears. Counterweights and hand
winches are much in use for the
lighter natures of guns. The armour-
ing of course keeps pace with im-
provements in manufacture.

80
Feste Wagner 15cm howitzer cupola, one of four in battery. CHB

Feste Wagner 75mm cupola gun

CHB

Fig. 60a. Fahrpanzer at Fest Kaiser Wilhelm II

CHB CHB

81
The chilled cast iron first made popular by the Gruson firm is now little used except
for such purposes as the collar round a cupola. Wrought iron, steel and compound
plates for the tops of cupolas have all been tried, the most recent Krupp-Gruson
designs being of nickel steel.

The sighting in some cases may be done by sights on the gun, with suitable enlarge-
ments in the port-hole; in others by sights affixed to the cupola itself (which of
course can give horizontal direction only); in others training and elevation are given
in accordance with the readings on electric dials, or instructions by telephone or
speaking tube. There is of course nothing unreasonable in this in the case of indirect
fire guns and howitzers, for if not firing from cupolas they would be behind the shel-
ter of some wood or quarry.

Schumann’s System: “Armoured Fronts.”—Lieut.-Colonel Maximilian Schumann

(1827–1889) of the Prussian engineers, who took a very prominent part in the de-
sign and advocacy of armoured defences, eventually produced a system which dis-
pensed entirely with forts and relied on the fire of protected guns. It consists of
several lines of batteries for Q.F. guns and howitzers in cupolas. He considered that
such batteries would be able to defend their own front, and the infantry garrison
was not to be called into action except in the case of the enemy breaking through at
some point of the line.

This system was actually adopted by Rumania (1889–1892) for the Sereth Line.
There are three routes by which the Russians can enter the country across the Ser-
eth river: through Focshani, Nemolassa and Galatz. These three routes are barred
by bridgeheads, those at Focshani, the most important, being on the left bank of
the Milkov, a tributary of the Sereth.

The Focshani works consist of 71 batteries arranged on a semi-circular front about

12 m. long and from 8000 to 10,000 yds. in advance of the bridges. The batteries
are placed in three lines, which are about 500 yds. apart, and are subdivided into
groups. The normal group consists of 5 batteries, of which 3 are in the first line, 1 in

82
the second, and 1 in the third. The first-line batteries each contain five small Q.F.
guns in travelling cupolas. The second-line batteries, each six small Q.F. guns in dis-
appearing cupolas. The third-line batteries have one 120–mm. gun in a cupola, and
two 210–mm. spherical mortars with Gruson shields. The immediate defence of the
batteries consists of a glacis planted with thorn bushes and a wire entanglement.

The fortification of these three bridgeheads are said to have cost about £1,100,000.
But the system of “armoured fronts” is never likely to be reproduced, having been
condemned by all authoritative continental opinion. Its defects have been summa-
rized by Schroeter as follows: weakness of artillery at long ranges, want of security
against a surprise rush, the neglect of the use of infantry in the defence, and the
difficulty of command. This last is the most serious of all. It is indeed difficult to con-
ceive that anyone should expect half-a-dozen expert gunners, each shut up in an
iron box with a gun, to stop the rush of a thousand men, even by day. But imagine
the feelings of the gunner on the night of a big attack, alone in his box, his nerves
already strained by a preliminary bombardment and nights of watching. He hears
the sounds of battle all around; he knows nothing of the progress of the attack, but
expects everything, and feels every moment the door of his box being opened and
the bayonet entering his back. No wise commander would submit his troops to such
a test.

Sir George Clarke and Unarmoured Systems.—Before leaving the subject of fortress-
es it is necessary to consider the ideas of those who, while recognizing the necessity
for places permanently organized for defence, prefer to treat them more from the
point of view of perfected field defences. It is to the credit of English military sci-
ence that Sir George Clarke may be taken as the representative of this school of
thought. His study of fortification, as he tells us, began with a history of the defence
of Plevna (q.v.). He was led to compare the resistance made behind extemporized
defences at such places as Sevastopol, Kars and Plevna, with those at other places
fortified in the most complete manner known to science. From this comparison he
drew the conclusion that the true strength of fortification does not depend on great
masonry works intricately pieced together at vast expense, but on organization,
communications and invisibility. In his 1907 edition he says:—

“Future defences will divide themselves naturally into the following categories: (1)
Permanent works wholly constructed in peace time and forming the key points of
the position. (2) Gun emplacements, magazines and shelters for men in rear of the
main line, all concrete structures and platforms to be completed, though some
earthwork may be left until the position is placed in a state of defence. (3) Field
works, trenches, &c., guarding the intervals between the permanent defences in
the main line, or providing rear positions. These should be deliberately planned in
time of peace ready to be put in hand at short notice. The essence of a well-fortified

83
position is that the weapons of the defender shall obtain the utmost possible scope
of action, and that those of the attacker shall have the minimum chances of
effecting injury.”

Since Sir George Clarke published his first edition in 1890 continental ideas have
expanded a good deal. The foregoing statement as to the three categories of de-
fences would be accepted anywhere now: the differences of opinion come in when
we reach the stage of classifying under the first head the permanent works to be
constructed in peace time. In most countries these would include forts with guns
for the artillery duel, forts with safety armaments, fixed batteries with or without
armour, and forts for infantry only. Sir George Clarke will have no armour for guns
except in certain special cases of barrier forts. Heavy guns and howitzers requiring
permanent emplacements (concrete platforms, & c.) must either be well concealed
or be provided with alternative positions. The only permanent works which he ad-
mits are for infantry. They are redoubts of simple form intended for 350 or 400
men, with casemate accommodation for three-fourths of that number. Fig. 61
shows the design:—two rows of casemates, one under the front parapet, one under
a parados; frontal musketry defence; obstacle consisting of entanglements, mines,
&c., with or without escarp and counterscarp.

Fig.61.

“The intervals (he says) between the infantry redoubts may be about 2500 yds.; but
this will necessarily depend upon the conformation of the ground. Where there are
good artillery positions falling within the sphere of protection of the redoubts, large
intervals will be permissible. Thus, in the case of an extended line of defence where
the ground offers marked tactical features, the idea of a continuous chain of perma-
nent works may be abandoned in favour of groups of redoubts guarding the artil-

84
lery positions. In this case, the redoubts in a group might be distributed on a curve
bent back in approximately horse-shoe form.”

The keystones of the close defence of the fighting line in future will undoubtedly
be these infantry redoubts, and therefore it is of great interest to compare with
the above types two studies put forward by Schroeter (Die Festung in der heuti-
gen Kriegführung), one in his first edition in 1898 (fig. 62), and the other in the
second in 1905 (fig. 63). In both these the defensive arrangements are merely
trenches of field profile with entanglements, the command and the obstacle being
less than in Sir George Clarke’s work; and it will be noticed that in the 1905 type,
published after the Russo-Japanese War, the plan is much less simple and arrange-
ments for close flanking defence have been introduced. But these works of Schroe-
ter’s are merely infantry supporting points in a line which contains forts of the tri-
angular type with guns, and armoured batteries, as well as a very complete ar-
rangement of field defences and communications; while Sir G. Clarke’s redoubts
are the only permanent works giving casemate protection in the front line.

Fig.62. From Schoeter’s Die Festung in der heutigen Kriegführung,

by permission of E. S. Mittler u. Sohn.

85
The comparative merits of either design for an infantry redoubt are not of much
importance. It is agreed that the main line of defence must consist of a more or less
continuous line of field defences and obstacles, and that at some points in the line
there should be infantry supporting points with bomb-proof protection capable of
resisting big shells. The open question is, what additional works, if any, are required
for the artillery, whether for the medium and heavy guns that will take part in the
“artillery duel,” or for the lighter natures that will help in the close fight and de-
fence of the intervals. Is it best for the defenders to rely on armoured protection or
on concealment for his guns?

Fig.63. From Schroeter’s Die Festung in der heutigen Kriegführung,

by permission of E. S. Mittler u. Sohn.

86
Official opinion outside England has certainly sanctioned armour, since all over the
continent it is to some extent adopted in practice. National practice is usually based
on the advice of the most distinguished officers of the day, and therefore it is un-
safe to condemn it hastily. Sir George Clarke and those who are with him—and they
are many, both in Great Britain and abroad—object entirely to armour. He says
(Fortification, ed. 1907, p. 96): “The great advantage possessed by the attack in all
ages has been the employment of a mobile artillery against armaments cribbed,
cabined and confined by fortification. It is necessary to perpetuate this advantage?”
Of course, the effect of long-range weapons, in increasing the length of front that
can be held by a given force, has given much greater freedom of action to the de-
fence and this should be taken full advantage of.

The argument as to the vulnerability of shielded guns is not at present strong. Sir
George says (ib. p. 94), “If the high angle fire ... is ever to find a favourable oppor-
tunity, it will surely be against a cupola, the site of which can generally be deter-
mined with accuracy.” On the other hand he says (p. 90), “During the long and cost-
ly experiments carried on at Bucharest in 1885–1886, 164 rounds were fired from
the Krupp 21 cm. mortar at targets of about 40 sq. metres area” (about 430 sq. ft.)
“without obtaining a single hit. The range was 2700 yds.; the targets were towers
built upon a level plain; the shooting conditions were ideal, and the fall of each shell
was telephoned back to the firing point; but it must have been evident to the least
instructed observer that to attempt to group 6 or 8 shells on an invisible area 2 me-
tres square would have been absolutely futile.” These facts are adduced to prove
that it is not necessary to give great thickness to concrete casemates, to resist suc-
cessive bursts of shells in the same place; but surely, they are equally applicable to
cupolas. Again (p. 252), “The experience gained at Port Arthur was not altogether
encouraging as regards the use of high angle fire. The Russian vessels in the harbour
were sunk by opening their sea-valves.... Fire was subsequently directed upon them
from 11 in. howitzers at ranges up to about 7500 yds. This was deliberate practice
from siege batteries at stationary targets; but the effect was distinctly disap-
pointing.” The cupolas therefore can hardly be considered ideal targets: and the
probability is that they would hold their own against both direct and indirect fire for
a long time. There are other and stronger arguments against the general use of
them, all of which are clearly set forth by Sir George Clarke.

The worst objections to the cupola are the military disadvantages of isolation and
immobility, and the multiplication of mechanical arrangements. For a successful
round from a disappearing cupola, the elevating and traversing arrangements, the
elevating and loading gear of the gun, and the telephone communication, must all
be in good order. At night the successful co-operation of the searchlight is also in
many cases necessary.

87
The teaching of history is all against immobile mechanical defences. Initiative, sur-
prise, unforeseen offensive action, keeping the besieger in ignorance of the disposi-
tions of the garrison, and of what progress he is making: all these, with their influ-
ence on the morale of both sides, tend towards successful defences and do not
point towards the use of armour. It may further be said that the use of armour as a
general rule is unnecessary, because a concealed battery is a protected one; and
with the long ranges now usual for heavy guns and howitzers, there is not generally
much difficulty about concealment.

In the opinion, however, of the present writer an exception must be made for guns
intended to flank the line of defence, which would generally need bomb-proof over
-head cover. Further, when we leave theory and come to the consideration of actu-
al problems of defence, it will often be found that it is necessary to place guns in
certain positions where good concealment cannot be got. In such cases some form
of protection must be given if the guns are to engage the concealed batteries of the
attack.

III. THE ATTACK OF A FORTRESS

In considering the history of siegecraft since the introduction of gunpowder, there
are three main lines of development to follow, viz. the gradually increasing power
of artillery, the systematizing of the works of attack, and in recent times the change
that has been brought about by the effect of modern small-arm fire. Cannon ap-
pear to have been first used in sieges as mortars, to destroy hoardings by throwing
round stones and barrels of burning composition. Early in the 15th century we find
cannon throwing metal balls, not only against hoarding and battlements, but also to
breach the bases of the walls. It was only possible to work the guns very slowly, and
archers or crossbowmen were needed in support of them, to drive the defenders
from the crenelations or loopholes of the battlements. At that period the artillery
was used in place of the medieval siege engines and in much the same manner. The
guns of the defence were inaccurate and being placed high on the walls were made
ineffective by bad mountings, which did not allow of proper depression. The besieg-
er therefore could place his guns close to the walls, with only the protection of a
few large gabions filled with earth, set up on the ground on either side of the muz-
zle.

In the course of the 15th century the power of artillery was largely increased, so
that walls and gates were destroyed by it in an astonishingly short time. Three re-
sults shortly followed. The guns of the defence having gained equally in effective-
ness, greater protection was needed for the attack batteries; bastions and outworks
were introduced to keep the besieger at a distance from the inner walls; and the
walls were sunk in ditches so that they could only be breached by batteries placed
on the edge of the glacis.

88
Early in the 16th century fortresses were being rapidly remodelled on these lines,
and the difficulties of the attack were at once very much increased. The tendency of
the assailants was still to make for the curtain, which had always been considered
the weak point; but the besiegers now found that they had to bring their guns right
up to the edge of the ditch before they could make a breach, and in doing so had to
pass over ground which was covered by the converging fire from the faces of the
bastions. Towards the end of the century the attack of the curtain was delayed and
the crossfire over the ground in front increased by the introduction of ravelins.

The slight gabion protection for the siege batteries was at first replaced by strong
timber shelters. These were found inadequate; but a still greater difficulty was that
of bringing up the siege guns to their positions, emplacing them and maintaining
communication with them under fire. In addition to this, the guns of the defence
until they could be overpowered (a slow process) dominated a wide belt of ground
in front of the fortress; and unless the besiegers could find some means of main-
taining a strong guard close to their batteries these were liable to be destroyed by
sorties from the covered way.

Gradually the whole problem of siege work centred round the artillery. The besieg-
ers found that they had first to bring up enough guns to overpower those of the
defence; then to advance their guns to positions from which they could breach the
walls; and throughout these operations to protect them against sorties. Breaches
once made; the assault could follow on the old lines. The natural solution of the
difficulty of approach to the battery positions was the use of trenches. The Turks
were the first to make systematic use of them, having probably inherited the idea
from the Eastern Empire. The soldiers of Christendom, however, strongly disliked
digging, and at first great leaders like Bayard and Montluc had themselves to use
pick and shovel, to give their men an example. In due course the necessity of the
trenches was recognized, but the soldiers never took kindly to them, and the diffi-
culty was dealt with in a manner reminiscent of the feudal ages, by impressing large
bodies of peasantry as workmen whenever a siege was in contemplation.

Through the 16th and most of the 17th century, therefore, we find the attack being
conducted by means of trenches leading to the batteries and supported by redoubts
often called “places of arms” also made by trench work. During this period the re-
sult of a siege was always doubtful. Both trenches and batteries were arranged
more or less at haphazard without any definite plan; and naturally it often hap-
pened that offensive action by the besieged against the trenches would disorder the
attack and at times delay it indefinitely. Fig. 64, taken from a late 17th-century print
by de Fer of Paris, gives a good idea of the general practice of that day when Vau-
ban’s methods were not yet generally known.

89
Another weak point about
the attack was that after
the escarp walls had been
strengthened to resist artil-
lery fire as has been de-
scribed, there was no clear
idea as to how they should
be breached. The usual
process was merely an in-
discriminate pounding
from batteries established
on the crest of the glacis.
Thus, there were cases of
sieges being abandoned
after they had been carried
as far as the attempt to
breach. It is in no way
strange that this want of
method should have char-
acterized the attack for two
centuries after artillery had
begun to assert its power. At the outset many new ideas had to be assimilated.
Guns were gradually growing in power; sieges were conducted under all sorts of
conditions, sometimes against medieval castles, sometimes against various and
widely differing examples of the new fortification; and the military systems of the
time were not favourable to the evolution of method. It is the special feature of
Vauban’s practical genius for siege warfare that he introduced order into this chaos
and made the issue of a siege under normal conditions, a mere matter of time, usu-
ally a very short time.

The whole of Vauban’s teaching and practice cannot be condensed into the limits
of this article, but special reference must be made to several points. The most im-
portant of these is his general arrangement of the attack. The ultimate object of
the attack works was to make a breach for the assaulting columns. To do this it was
necessary to establish breaching batteries on the crest of the glacis; and before this
could be done it was necessary to overpower the enemy’s artillery. This preliminary
operation is nowadays called the “artillery duel.” In Vauban’s day the effective
range of guns was 600 to 700 yds. He tells us that it was customary to establish
batteries at 1000 yds. from the place, but that at that range they did little more
than make a great deal of noise. The first object of the attack, therefore, after the
preliminary operations of investment, &c., had been completed, was to establish
batteries within 600 or 700 yds. of the place, to counter-batter or enfilade all the

90
faces bearing on the front of attack; and to protect these batteries against sorties.
After the artillery of the defences had been subdued—if it could not be absolutely
silenced—it was necessary to push trenches to the front so that guns might be con-
veyed to the breaching positions and emplaced there in batteries. Throughout
these processes it was necessary to protect the working parties and the batteries
against sorties.

For this purpose, Vauban devised the Places d’armes or lignes parallèles. He tells us
that they were first used in 1673 at the siege of Maestricht, where he conducted
the attack, and which was captured in thirteen days after the opening of the trench-
es. The object of these parallels was to provide successive positions for the guard of
the trenches, where they could be at hand to repel sorties. The latter were most
commonly directed against the trenches and batteries, to destroy them and drive
out the working parties. The most vulnerable points were the heads of the ap-
proach trenches. It was necessary, therefore, that the guard of the trenches should
be in a position to reach the heads of the approaches more quickly than the be-
sieged could do so from the covered way. This was provided for as follows.

Fig. 65, Regular Attack (Vauban).

91
The first parallel was usually established at about 600 yds. from the place, this be-
ing considered the limiting range of action of a sortie. The parallel was a trench 12
to 15 ft. wide and 3 ft. deep, the excavated earth being thrown forward to make a
parapet 3 or 4 ft. high. In front of the first parallel and close to it were placed the
batteries of the “first artillery position.”

While these batteries were engaged in silencing the enemy’s artillery, for which
purpose most of them were placed in prolongation of the faces of the fortress so as
to enfilade them, the “Approach Trenches” were being pushed forward. The nor-
mal attack included a couple of bastions and the ravelin between, with such faces
of the fortress as could support them; and the approach trenches (usually three
sets) were directed on the capitals of the bastions and ravelin, advancing in a zigzag
so arranged that the prolongations of the trenches always fell clear of the fortress
and could not be enfiladed.

Fig. 65, taken from Vauban’s Attack and Defence of Places, shows clearly the ar-
rangement of trenches and batteries. After the approach trenches had been carried
forward nearly half-way to the most advanced points of the covered way, the
“second parallel” was constructed, and again the approach trenches were pushed
forward. Midway between the second parallel and the covered way, short branches
called Demi-parallels were thrown out to either flank of the attacks: and finally, at
the foot of the glacis came the third parallel. Thus, there was always a secure posi-
tion for a sufficient guard of the trenches. Upon an alarm the working parties could
fall back, and the guard would advance.

Trenches were either made by common trenchwork, flying trenchwork or sap. In

the first two a considerable length of trench was excavated at one time by a large
working party extended along the trench: flying trenchwork (formerly known as
flying sap) being distinguished from common trenchwork by the use of gabions, by
the help of which protection could be more quickly obtained. Both these kinds of
trenchwork were commenced at night, the position of the trench having been pre-
viously marked out by tape. The “tasks” or quantities of earth to be excavated by
each man were so calculated that by daybreak the trench would afford a fair
amount of cover. Flying trenchwork was generally used for the 2nd parallel and its
approaches, and as far beyond it as possible. In proportion as the attack drew near-
er to the covered way, the fire of the defenders’ small-arms and wall-pieces natu-
rally grew more effective, though by this time most of their artillery would have
been dismounted by the fire of the siege batteries. It therefore became necessary
before reaching the 3rd parallel to have recourse to sap.

Sapping required trained men. It consisted in gradually pushing forward the end of
a narrow trench in the desired direction. At the saphead was a squad of sappers.

92
Fig.66.

93
The leading man excavated a trench 1 ft. 6 in. wide and deep. To protect the head
of the trench he had a shield on wheels, under cover of which he placed the gabi-
ons in position one after another as the saphead progressed. Other men following
strengthened the parapet with fascines and increased the trench to a depth of 3 ft.,
and a width of 2 ft. 6 in. to 3 ft. Fig. 66, taken from Vauban’s treatise on the attack,
shows the process clearly. The sap after being completed to this extent could be
widened at leisure to ordinary trench dimensions by infantry working parties.

As the work at the sap-head was very dangerous, Vauban encouraged his sappers
by paying them on the spot at piecework rates, which increased rapidly in propor-
tion to the risk. He thus stimulated all concerned to do their best and reckoned that
under average conditions he could depend on a rate of progress for an ordinary sap
of about 50 yds. in 24 hours.

It is interesting to compare the more recent method of sapping with that above
described (fig. 67 taken from the Instruction in Military Engineering, 1896). It is no
longer possible to place gabions in position at the saphead under fire. Accordingly,
the leading sapper excavates to the full depth of 4 ft. 6 in., and the rate of progress
is retarded proportionately, so that an advance of only 15 to 30 yds. in 24 hours can
be reckoned on instead of 50. The head of the sap is protected by a number of half-
filled sandbags, which the leading sapper throws forward as he goes on. The nearer
the approaches drew to the covered way, the more oblique became the zigzags, so
that little forward progress was made in proportion to the length of the trench. The
approaches were then carried straight to the front, by means of the “double sap,”
which consisted of two single saps worked together with a parapet on each side
(fig. 68). To protect these from being enfiladed from the front, traverses had to be
left at intervals, usually by turning the two saps at right angles to right or left for a
few feet, then forward, and so on as shown in fig. 69, the distance apart of these
traverses being of course regulated by the height from which the enemy’s fire com-
manded the trench.
The later stages in the
attack are illustrated in fig.
70. From the third parallel
the attack was pushed for-
ward up the glacis by
means of the double sap. It
was then pushed right and
left along the glacis, a little
distance from the crest of
the covered way. This was
Fig.67. called “crowning” the cov-
ered way, and on the posi-

94
tion thus gained breaching batteries were
established in full view of the escarp.
While the escarp was being breached, if it
was intended to use a systematic attack
throughout, a mine gallery (see Mining
page 107) was driven under the covered
way and an opening made through the
counterscarp into the ditch. The sap was
then pushed across the ditch, and if neces-
sary up the breach, the defenders’ re-
sistance being kept under by musketry and
artillery fire from the covered way. The
ravelin and bastions were thus captured

successively, and where the bastions

had been retrenched the same meth-
ods were used against the retrench-
ment. Vauban showed how to breach
the escarp with the least expenditure of
ammunition. This was done by making, with successive shots placed close together
(which was feasible even in those days from a position so close as the crest of the
covered way) horizontal and vertical cuts through the revetment wall. The portion
of revetment enclosed by the cuts being thus detached from support was over-
turned by the pressure of the earth from the rampart. Ricochet fire was also the
invention of Vauban. He showed how, in enfilading the face of a work, by using
greatly reduced charges a shot could be made to drop over the crest of the parapet
and skim along the terreplein, dismounting guns and killing men as it went.

The constant success of Vauban must be ascribed to method and thorough organi-
zation. There was a deadly certainty about his system that gave rise to the saying
“Place assiégée, place prise.” He left nothing to chance and preferred as a rule the
slow and certain progress of saps across the ditch and up the breach to the loss and
delay that might follow an unsuccessful assault. His contemporary and nearest rival
Coehoorn tried to shorten sieges by heavy artillery fire and attacks across the open;
but in the long run his sieges were slower than Vauban’s. So much a matter of form
did the attack become under these conditions, that in comparing the supposed de-

95
fensive powers of different systems of fortification it was usual to calculate the
number of days that would be required in each case before the breach was opened,
the time being measured by the number of hours of work required for the construc-
tion of the various trenches and batteries. It began to be taken as a matter of
course that no place under any circumstances could hold out more than a given
number of days; and naturally, when the whole question had become one of formu-
la, it is not surprising to find that places were very often surrendered without more
than a perfunctory show of resistance.

The theory of defence at this time appeared to be that since it was impossible to
arrest the now methodical and protected progress of the besiegers’ trenches, no
real resistance was possible until after they had reached the covered way, and this
idea is at the root of the extraordinary complications of outworks and multiplied
lines of ramparts that characterized the “systems” of this period. No doubt if a suc-
cessor to Vauban could have brought the same genius to bear on the actual de-
fence of places as he did on the attack, he would have discovered that the essence
of successful defence lay in offensive action outside the body of the place, viz. with
trench against trench. For want of such a man the engineers of the defence re-
signed themselves contentedly to the loss of the open ground outside their walls,
and relied either upon successive permanent lines of defence, or if these did not
exist, upon extemporized retrenchments, usually at the gorge of the bastion.

It is curious that such experienced soldiers as most of them were should not have
realized the fatal effect upon the minds of the defenders which this almost passive
abandonment of line after line must needs produce. Even a civilian—Machiavelli—
had seen into the truth of the matter years before when he said (Treatise on the Art
of War, Book vii.): “And here I ought to give an advice ... to those who are con-
structing a fortress, and that is, not to establish within its circuit fortifications which
may serve as a retreat to troops who have been driven back from the first line.... I
maintain that there is no greater danger for a fortress than rear fortifications whith-
er troops can retire in case of a reverse; for once the soldier knows that he has a
secure retreat after he has abandoned the first post, he does in fact abandon it and
so causes the loss of the entire fortress.”

It must, however, be remembered that in those days when soldiers were mostly of
a separate or professional caste, the whole thing had become a matter of business.
Fighting was so much regulated by the laws and customs of war that men thought
nothing of giving up a place if, according to accepted opinion, the enemy had ad-
vanced so far that they could no longer hope to defend it successfully. Once this
idea had set in it became hopeless to expect successful defences, save now and
then when some officer of very unusual resolution was in command. This is the real
reason for the feeble resistance so often made by fortresses in the 17th and 18th

96
centuries, which has been attributed to inherent weakness in fortifications. Custom
exacted that a commandant should not give up a place until there was an open
breach or, perhaps, until he had stood at least one assault. Even Napoleon recog-
nized this limitation of the powers of the defence when in the later years of his
reign he was trying to impress upon his governors the importance of their charge.
The limitation was perfectly unnecessary, for history at that time could have afford-
ed plenty of instances of places that had been successfully defended for many
months after breaches were opened, and assault after assault repulsed on the same
breach. But the same soldiers of the 17th and 18th centuries who had created this
artificial condition of affairs, established it by making it an understood thing that a
garrison which surrendered without giving too much trouble after a breach had
been opened should have honourable consideration; while if they put the besiegers
to the pains of storming the breach, they were liable to be put to the sword.

It has been necessary to dwell at some length on the siegecraft of Vauban and his
time, not merely for its historical interest, but because the system he introduced
was practically unaltered until the end of the 19th century. The sieges of the Penin-
sular War were conducted on his lines; so was that of Antwerp in 1830; and as far
as the disposition of siege trenches was concerned, the same system remained in
the Crimea, the Franco-German War and the Russo-Turkish War. The sieges in the
Napoleonic wars were few, except in the Iberian Peninsula. These last differed from
those of the Vauban period and the 18th century in this, that instead of being delib-
erately undertaken with ample means, against fortresses that answered to the re-
quirements of the time, they were attempted with inadequate forces and materials,
against out-of-date works. The fortresses that Wellington besieged in Spain had
rudimentary outworks, and escarps that could be seen and breached from a dis-
tance. At that time, though the power of small arms had increased very slightly
since the last century, there had been a distinct improvement in artillery, so that it
was possible to breach a visible revetment at ranges from 500 to 1000 yds. Welling-
ton was very badly off for engineers, siege artillery and material. Trench works
could only be carried out on a small scale and slowly. Time being usually of great
importance, as in the first two sieges of Badajoz, his technical advisers endeavoured
to shorten sieges by breaching the escarp from a distance—a new departure—and
launching assaults from trenches that had not reached the covered way. Under
these circumstances the direct attacks on breaches failed several times, with great
loss of life. Wellington in one or two earlier despatches reflected on his engineers
for not establishing their batteries on the crest of the glacis. The failures are, how-
ever, clearly due to attempts to push sieges to a conclusion without proper prepa-
ration.

97
 Fig. 70.—Later Stages of the Attack (Vauban).

So much has been written of late years in criticism of the fortification to what may
be called the Vauban period that it is important to note what were the prepara-
tions considered necessary for a siege at that time (Journals of Sieges in Spain, 1811
to 1814). Sir John Jones summarizes his own experience in Spain and the data accu-
mulated by practical engineers in former sieges from the time of Vauban onwards,
in the following conclusions: The actual work of entrenching, sapping, &c., on the
front attacked was much the same whether the fortress contained 5000 or 10,000
men. On the other hand, the guard of the trenches was proportionate to the
fighting men inside the fortress. (The total number of men had of course to be
sufficient to allow three or four complete shifts or “reliefs” for all work and duties.)
Adding a proportion of men for camp and other duties, he calculates, for the vigor-
ous siege of an ordinary place situated in open country and containing 5000 men, a
corps of 32,080 effectives, and remarks further that this force would be greatly
exhausted after a month’s service. The same place held by 10,000 would call for a
besieging army of 50,830 men (guards and duties increasing, but not working par-
ties). Thus, the besieger should if possible, have a superiority of 7 to 1 if the garri-
son numbered 5000, 6 to 1 if 10,000 and 5 to 1 if 15,000 and so on. As regards artil-
lery, he should have as many, and if possible, twice as many, guns as those of the
defender on the front of attack, as well as howitzers for sweeping every line subject
to enfilade and mortars for destroying traverses, &c.

98
Later in the siege, more howitzers and mortars to clear the covered way and places
of arms, and finally, after the covering of the covered way, fifty additional battering
guns would be required. It is apparent from this that the practical engineers of the
day looked upon a siege as a serious matter and did not find permanent fortifica-
tions wanting in defensive strength.

During the long peace that followed the Napoleonic wars, one advance was made
in siegecraft. In England in 1824 successful experiments were carried out in breach-
ing an unseen wall by curved or indirect fire from howitzers. At Antwerp in 1830
the increasing power and range of artillery, and especially of howitzers, were used
for bombarding purposes, the breaches there being mostly made by mines. Then
came one of the world’s great sieges; that of Sevastopol in 1854–1855. The out-
standing lesson of Sevastopol is the value of an active defence; of going out to
meet the besieger, with counter trench and countermine. This lesson has increased
in value for us in proportion to the increased power of the rifle.

In comparing the resistance made behind the earthworks of Sevastopol with the
recorded defences of permanent works, it is essential to remember that the condi-
tions there were quite abnormal. Sir John Jones has told us what the relative forces
of besiegers and besieged should be, and the necessary preponderance of artillery
for the attack. The following quotations may be added:

“The siege corps should be sufficiently strong—(1) To invest the fortress complete-
ly and maintain the investment against all the efforts of the garrison. (2) If a regular
siege is contemplated, to execute and guard all the siege works required for it.
Complete investment may sometimes be impossible, but experience has repeated-
ly shown that the difficulties of a siege are enormously increased if the garrison are
able to draw fresh troops and supplies from outside, and to rid themselves of their
sick and wounded.” (Lewis). Again as regards artillery: “In a regular attack, where
every point is gained inch by inch, it is impossible to succeed without overpowering
the defensive artillery”; and “it is useless to attempt to sap near a place till its artil-
lery fire is subdued ...” (Jones).

These conditions were so far from being fulfilled at Sevastopol that (a) there was
no investment—in fact the Russians came nearer to investing the Allies; (b) the
Russians had the preponderance in guns almost throughout; (c) the Russian force
in and about Sevastopol was numerically superior to that of the Allies. We must
add to this that Todleben had been able to get rid of most of his civilian population,
and those who remained were chiefly dockyard workmen, able to give most valua-
ble assistance on the defence works. The circumstances were therefore exception-
ally favourable to an active defence. The weak point about the extemporized earth-

99
works, which eventually led to the fall of the place, was the want of good bomb-
proof cover near the parapets.

The Franco-German War of 1870 produced no great novelty. The Germans were not
anxious to undertake siege operations when it could be avoided. In several cases
minor fortresses surrendered after a slight bombardment. In others, after the bom-
bardment failed, the Germans contented themselves with establishing a blockade
or detaching a small observing force. By far the most interesting siege was that
of Belfort (q.v.). Here Colonel Denfert-Rochereau employed the active defence so
successfully by extemporizing detached redoubts and fortifying outlying villages,
that he obliged the besiegers (who, however, were a small force at first) to take up
an investing line 25 m. long; and succeeded in holding the village of Danjoutin, 2000
yds. in advance of the enceinte, for two months after the siege began. He also used
indirect fire, withdrawing guns from the ramparts and placing them in the ditches,
in the open spaces of the town, &c. At Paris the French found great advantage in
placing batteries in inconspicuous positions outside the forts. Their direct fire guns
were at a disadvantage in being fired through embrasures. These had served their
purpose when artillery fire was very inaccurate but had now for a long time been
recognized by the best engineers as out of date. The Germans since the siege of
Düppel in 1864 had mounted their siege guns on “overbank” carriages; that is, high
carriages which made it possible to fire the guns over the parapet of the battery
without embrasures. The guns in the Paris forts which were further handicapped by
conspicuous parapets and the bad shooting of the gunners were easily silenced.

At Strassburg indirect fire against escarps was used. The escarp of Lunette 53 was
successfully breached by this method. The breaching battery was 870 yds. distant,
and the shot struck the face of the wall at an angle (horizontally) of 55°, the effect
being observed and reported from the counterscarp. 1000 rounds from 60-pounder
guns sufficed to make a breach 30 yds. wide. Fig. 71 (next page) is a good example
of the attack in the late stages. It will be observed that batteries for mortars and
field guns are established in the captured lunettes. The narrow-wet ditch of Lunette
53 was crossed by a dam of earth and fascines, the headway protected by a parapet
or screen of sandbags.

“Lunette 52 was unriveted, and its ditch was more than 60 yds. wide, and 6 to 9 ft.
deep.... It was determined to affect the passage by a cask bridge, for which the
casks were furnished by breweries near at hand.... The formation of the bridge was
begun at nightfall. A pioneer swam across, hauled over a cable, and made it fast to
the hedge on the berm. Four men were stationed in the water, close to the covered
way, the casks were rolled down to them one after the other, and fitted with sad-
dles, so as to form piers ... these piers were successively boomed out along the line
of the cable.... In two hours, the bridge was finished, and the lunette was entered....

100
Fig.71. Strassburg, Lunettes 52 and 53, 1870.
From Textbook of Fortification.
101
The work had not been discovered by the besieged, and the formation of lodge-
ments inside the lunette was already begun, when the noise made by some troops
in passing the bridge attracted attention and drew a fire which cost the besiegers
about 50 men. A dam was afterwards substituted for the bridge, as it was repeated-
ly struck by shells.” (R.E. Professional Papers, vol. xix.)

It is curious to realize that this happened at so recent a time. Such operations would
be impossible now, as long as any defending guns remained in action. On the whole
it may be said that siegecraft gained practically nothing from the Franco-German
War. The Russo-Turkish war taught less, Plevna (q.v.) having been defended by field
works and attacked by the old-fashioned methods. For the last ten years of the 19th
century military opinion was quite at a loss as to how the sieges of the future would
work out. As guns and projectiles continued to improve the “attaque brusquée”
proposed by von Sauer had many adherents. It was thought that a heavy bombard-
ment would paralyse resistance and open the way for an attack, to be delivered by
great numbers and with special appliances for crossing obstacles. Others thought
that the strength of the defence, as manifested by the Plevna field works, would be
greater than ever when the field works were backed by permanent works, good
communications and the resources of a fortress. One thing was obvious—namely,
that as long as the artillery of the place, of even the smallest calibres, remained un-
subdued, the difficulty of trenchwork and sapping would be enormously increased,
and no one seemed to have formed a clear conception of how that difficulty was to
be met. A lecture delivered in Germany about 1895 is worth quoting as a fair exam-
ple of the vagueness of idea then prevailing: “For the attack, the following is the
actual procedure: Accumulation and preparation of material for attack before the
fortress: advance of attacking artillery, covered by infantry. Artillery duel. Throwing
forward of infantry: destruction of the capability for defence of the position
attacked; when possible by long-range artillery fire, otherwise by the aid of the engi-
neers. Occupation of the defensive position. Assault on the inner lines of the for-
tress.” That seemed quite a simple prescription, but the necessary drugs were
wanting. And even since Port Arthur great uncertainty as to the future of the attack
remains.

Modern artillery has much simplified the construction of siege batteries. Formerly
siege batteries and rampart batteries opposed each other with direct fire at ranges
not too long for the unaided human eye, and the shells, travelling with low velocity,
bit into the parapets, and, exploding, produced their full effect. Accordingly, the task
of the gunners was, by accurate fire, to destroy the parapets and embrasures, and
to dismount the guns. The parapets of siege batteries were therefore made from 18
to 30 ft. thick, and the construction of such batteries, with traverses, &c., involved
much work. The height of parapet necessary for proper protection being 7 ft. 6 in. to
8 ft., a great deal of labour could be saved by sinking the gun-platforms about 4 ft.

102
below the surface level, but of course this was only possible where rock or water
were not near the surface. The effect of modern projectiles was to reduce the thick-
ness of earth necessary for parapets. High velocity projectiles are very
easily deflected upwards by even a slight bank of earth. This is especially the case
with sand. Loose earth is better than compacted especially the case with sand.
Loose earth is better than compacted earth, and clay offers the least resistance to
penetration. These facts were taken note of in England more than on the Continent
in the design of instructional siege batteries.

The construction of batteries is moreover vastly simplified by the long ranges at

which artillery will fight in future. It will as a rule be possible to place howitzer
batteries in such positions that even from balloons it will be difficult to locate them;
and even direct fire batteries can easily be screened from view. This renders para-
pets unnecessary, and probably no more protection will be used than light splinter-
proof screens to stop shrapnel bullets or fragments of common shell. Moreover,
batteries can be constructed at leisure and by daylight.

The most important point about the modern battery is the gun platform for the
larger natures of guns and howitzers. These require very solid construction to resist
the heavy shock of discharge. Not long ago it was thought that the defence would
have larger ordnance than the attack, as anything heavier than an 8 in. howitzer
required a concrete bed, which could not be made at short notice. The Japanese,
however, at Port Arthur made concrete platforms for 11 in. howitzers. It may be
remarked that difficulties which loom largely in peace are often overcome easily
enough under the stress of war.

Another gain to the attack is in connexion with magazines. The old powder maga-
zines were particularly dangerous adjuncts to batteries and had to be very carefully
bomb-proofed. Such propellants as cordite, however, are comparatively harmless in
the open. They are very difficult to detonate, and if set on fire do not explode like
gunpowder. It is therefore unnecessary to provide bomb-proof magazines for them
in connexion with the batteries.

In future sieges the question of supply will be more important than it has ever
been. Leaving out of the question the bringing up of supplies from the base of oper-
ations, the task of distribution at the front is a very large one. The Paris siege ma-
noeuvres of 1894 furnish some instructive data on this point. The main siege park
was at Meaux, 10 m. from the 1st artillery position, and the average distance from
the 1st artillery position to the principal fort attacked was 5000 yds. The front of
attack on Fort Vaujours and its collateral batteries covered 10,000 yds. There were
24 batteries in the 1st artillery position; say 100 guns, spread over a front of 4000
yds. To connect Meaux with the front, the French laid some 30 m. of narrow-gauge
103
railway largely along existing roads. The line was single, with numerous branches
and sidings. They ran 11 regular trains to the front daily and half-a-dozen supple-
mentary. The amount of artillery material sent up was over 5000 tons, without any
projectiles; but it can easily be imagined that large demands were also made on
transport for other purposes. For instance, one complete bakery train was sent up
daily. The amount of ammunition sent up would be limited only by the power of
transporting it. A siege train of 100 pieces could probably dispose of from 500 to
1000 tons of ammunition a day, at the maximum rate of firing.

But the most important question affecting the sieges of the future (putting aside
accidental circumstances) will be the configuration of the ground. Assuming that
local conditions do not specially favour the artillery of either side, it is highly proba-
ble that the artillery duel will result in a deadlock. If the besiegers’ guns do not suc-
ceed in silencing those of the defence from the 1st or distant artillery position
(which, whether they are in cupolas or in concealed positions, will in any case be an
extremely difficult task), it will be necessary for the infantry to press in; to feel for
weak points, and to fight for those that offer better positions for fire and observa-
tion. In doing this they will have to face the defenders’ infantry, entrenched,
backed by their unsilenced guns, and having secure places of assembly from which
to deliver counterattacks. The distance to which they can work forward and estab-
lish themselves under these conditions will depend on the ground. It will then be
for the engineers to cross the remaining space by sap. This, under present condi-
tions, will be a tedious process, and may even take long enough to cause the failure
of the siege.

As to the manner of the sap, it will certainly be “deep,” as long as the defence re-
tains any artillery power. When the 4 ft. 6 in. sap already described was first intro-
duced, it was known as a “deep sap”; but the sieges of the future will probably ne-
cessitate a true deep sap, that is one in which the whole of the necessary cover is
got below the surface of the earth.

Such a sap may consist of an open trench, about 6 ft. deep, the whole of the exca-
vated earth being carried away through the trench to the rear; or a blinded trench,
covered in as it progresses by splinter-proof timbers and earth; or a tunnelled
trench, leaving a foot or so of surface earth undisturbed. In either case nothing
should be visible from the front to attract artillery fire. As the sap is completed, it
will sometimes be necessary to add a slight parapet in places, to give command
over the foreground for the rifles of the guard of the trenches. The sap will have to
be pushed up quite close to the defenders’ trenches and obstacles. After that fur-
ther progress must either be made by mining, or as seems very probable, by getting
the better of the defenders in a contest with shells from short-range mortars.

104
Just as in the feudal ages a castle was built on some solitary eminence which lent
itself to the defensive methods of the time, so in the future the detached forts and
supporting points in the girdle of a fortress will be sited where smooth and gentle
slopes of ground give the utmost opportunity to the defenders’ fire, and the least
chance of concealment to the enemy. There will be considerable latitude of choice
in the defensive positions; though not, of course, the same latitude as when the
existence of a precipitous hill was the raison d’être of the castle. In some places, as
at Port Arthur, the whole countryside may by reason of its steep and broken slopes
be unfavourable to the defence, though even then genius will turn the difficulties to
account. But wherever it is possible the defender will provide for a space of 1000
yds. or so, swept by fire and illuminated by searchlights, in front of his lines. That
space will have to be crossed by sap, and it needs little imagination to realize how
great the task will be for the besieger.

There are other modern methods of siege warfare to be noticed, the use of which is
common to besiegers and besieged. Much is expected of balloons; but the use of
these in war is unlikely to correspond to peace expectations. They must be kept at a
considerable distance from the enemy’s guns, a distance which will increase as the
means of range-finding improve; and as the height from which they can observe
usefully is limited, so is the observers’ power to search out hidden objects behind
vertical screens. Thus, suppose a captive balloon at a height of 2000 ft., and distant
4000 yds. from an enemy’s howitzer battery: and suppose the battery placed behind
a steep hill-side or a grove of trees, at such a distance that a shell fired with 30° ele-
vation can just clear this screen. The line of sight from the observer to the battery is
inclined to the horizontal at 2000
3 × 4000, that is ⅙, or roughly 10°. It is obvious, there-
fore, that the observer cannot see the battery. Balloon observers are expected to
assist the batteries by marking the effects of their fire. For this to be done on any
practical scale a balloon would be required for each battery: that is, for only 100
guns, some 20 or 25 balloons. These would require an equal number of highly
skilled observers (of whom there are not too many in existence), besides the other
balloon personnel and accessories, and the means of making gas, which is too much
to expect, even if an enemy were obliging enough to give notice of his intentions.
Telephones and all other means of transmitting intelligence rapidly are now of the
utmost importance to both attack and defence. Maps marked with numbered
squares are necessary for directing artillery fire, especially from cupolas. Organiza-
tion in every branch will give better results than ever before, and the question of
communication and transport from the base of supplies right up to the front needs
detailed study, in view of the great weight of ammunition and supplies that will
have to be handled. The use of light mortars for the trenches, introduced by Coe-
hoorn and revived with extemporized means at Port Arthur, needs great attention.
It may be prophesied that the issue of important sieges in the future, when skilfully

105
conducted on both sides with sufficient resources, will depend mainly on the ener-
gy of the defenders in trench work, on mining and countermining in connexion with
the trenches, and on the use of light mortars made to throw large charges of high
explosive for short distances with great accuracy. For a brief narrative of the siege
of Port Arthur in 1904, one of the greatest sieges of history, both as regards its epic
interest and its military importance, the reader is referred to the article Russo-
Japanese War.

Definitions.
The following definitions may be useful but have no place in the evolution of the
attack, to which this section is mainly devoted.

Investment.—This most necessary, almost indispensable operation of every siege

consists in surrounding the fortress about to be besieged, so as to cut off its com-
munications with the outside world.

Preliminary investment which is carried out by cavalry and light troops before the
arrival of the besieging force, consists in closing the roads so as to shut out supplies
and reinforcements. Close investment should be of such a character as to prevent
any sort of communication, even by single messengers or spies. The term
“blockade” is sometimes loosely used instead of investment.

Lines of Circumvallation and Contravallation.—These now obsolete terms were in

great use until the 19th century. The circumvallation was a line of parapet which
the besieger made outside the investing position of his own force, to protect it
when there was a chance of attack by a relieving army. The line
of contravallation was the line of parapet and trench sometimes made by the be-
sieger all-round the town he was attacking, to check the sorties of the garrison.

Observing Force.—When circumstances make the reduction of a particular fortress

in the theatre of operations unnecessary a force is often detached to “observe” it.
The duty of this force will be to watch the garrison and prevent any hostile action
such as raids on the lines of communications.

Bombardment.—This operation, common to all ages, consists in a general

(sometimes an indiscriminate) fire against either the whole target offered by the
fortress or a particular section of that target. In ancient and medieval times, the
effect of a bombardment—whether of ordinary missiles, of incendiary projectiles,
or of poisonous matters tending to breed pestilence—upon a population closely
crowded within its walls was very powerful. In the present day little military im-
portance is attached to bombardment, since under modern conditions it cannot do
much real harm.

106
 IV. MILITARY MINING
It has been noted already that mining is one of the most ancient resources of siege
warfare. The use of gunpowder in mining operations dates from the end of the 15th
century. When Shakespeare makes Fluellen say, at Henry V.’s siege of Harfleur,
“th’athversary is digt himself four yards under the countermines; I think ’a will plow
up all, if there is not better directions,” he is anticipating the development of
siegecraft by nearly 100 years. Pedro di Navarro, a Spanish officer, is credited with
the first practical use of explosive mines. He employed them with great success at
the siege of Naples in 1503; and afterwards, when rebuilding the Castello Nuovo
after the siege, was probably the first to make permanent provision for their use in
countermines. Countermining had been a measure of defence against the earlier
methods of attack-mining; the object being to break into the besiegers’ galleries
and fight hand to hand for the possession of them. When the explosive mine was
introduced, it became the object of the defenders to establish their countermines
near the besiegers’ galleries and destroy them by the effect of the explosion. In the
400 years or so that have passed this branch of warfare has changed less than any
other. Methods of mining have not advanced much, and the increased power of
high explosives as compared with gunpowder has its least advantage in moving
masses of earth.

When a besieger has arrived by means of trenches within a certain distance of the
enemy’s works without having subdued their fire, he may find that the advance by
sap becomes too slow and too dangerous. He can then advance underground by
means of mine galleries, and by exploding large charges at the heads of these gal-
leries can make a series of craters. These craters are then occupied by infantry and
are connected with each other and with the parallel in rear by trenches, thus form-
ing a new parallel. If not interfered with by the defenders, the besieger can advance
in this way until he reaches the counterscarp. His mines will now be turned to a new
purpose, viz. to breach the counterscarp and afterwards the escarp. This is done by
placing suitable charges at intervals behind the scarps at such a height above the
foundations that the pressure of the earth above the mine will more than counter-
balance the resistance of the masonry.

But if the defenders are active, they will countermine. There is as a general rule this
broad difference between the mines of the defence and those of the attack, that
the defenders do not wish the surface of the ground broken, lest increased oppor-
tunities of getting cover should be offered to the besiegers. The object of the de-
fence, therefore, is to destroy the besiegers’ galleries without forming craters, and
for this purpose they generally endeavour to get underneath the attack galleries.
The defenders may, however, wish, if the opportunity has allowed them, to explode
mines under the attack parallels, in which case there is of course no objection to
disturbing the surface.

107
“At the commencement of the subterranean war the main object of the defence is
to force the besieger to take to mining operations as early as possible, as it is a tedi-
ous operation and will prolong the siege. Every endeavour must be made to push
forward countermines so as to meet and check the attack. On the approach of the
opponents to each other careful listening for the enemy must be resorted to. To
this end it is necessary at irregular intervals to suspend all work for some minutes
at a time, closing doors of communication and employing experienced listeners at
the heads of the countermines. This matter is a most important one, as a prema-
ture explosion of the defender’s mines is a double loss to the defender, a loss of a
mine and an advantage to the enemy in more than one way. As soon as the over-
charged mines of the besieger have been fired, a heavy fire should be brought to
bear on the craters, and if possible, sorties should be made to prevent the enemy
occupying them. At the same time every effort should be made underground to
surround with galleries, and as it were isolate, the craters so as to prevent the be-
sieger making a new advance from them. The efforts of the attack at this stage will
probably be directed to the formation of what are called “Boule shafts” (i.e. shafts
partially lined in which charges are hastily fired with little or no tamping), and to
meet these in time the defender may resort to the use of boring tools, and so place
charges somewhere in advance of the heads of the countermines. His great object
must be to prevent as long as possible the besieger from getting underground
again; and these occasions, when the power of resistance is temporarily equal to, if
not greater than, that of the attack, should be made the most of by the de-
fence.” (Lewis, Textbook on Fortification, &c., 1893.)

The defence has the advantage, in the case of fortresses, of being able to establish
beforehand a system of countermine galleries in masonry. Many systems have
been worked out for this purpose. A good typical arrangement is that of General
Marescot, published in 1799, shown in fig. 72.

The main galleries (those running out in a straight line from the counterscarp gal-
lery e to three of the points a) fall gently to the front to a depth of 30 or 40 ft. be-
low the surface—the deeper they are the less they will suffer from the enemy’s
mines. Branch galleries (marked c b + d c) run obliquely upward from them to right
and to left, leading to the mines, which are placed at various depths, according to
circumstances.

Two main points must be observed in any system of countermines: the branch gal-
leries must run obliquely forward, so as not to present their sides to the action of
the enemy’s mines; and the distance between the ends of the branches from adja-
cent main galleries should be such that the enemy cannot pass between them un-
heard.

108
This distance will vary
with the nature of the
soil, but may be taken
roughly as 20 yds. A con-
venient size for main
galleries is 6 ft. high by 3
ft. wide: branch galleries
may be 5 ft. by 3 ft.
When the enemy is ap-
proaching, other branch
galleries, called listeners,
will be pushed out from
main and branch galler-
ies. The section top of fig.
72 shows openings left
for the purpose.

Another use of mines in

defence is in connexion
with breaches. A perma-
nent arrangement for
this purpose, by General
Dufour, is shown in fig.
72. Yet another use, on
which much ingenuity
was expended in the
18th century, is to ex-
temporize retrench-
ments.

The charges of mines

depend of course upon
the effect which is de-
sired. When the charge is strong enough to produce a crater, the radius of the cir-
cular opening on the surface of the ground is called the radius of the crater. The
line drawn from the centre of the charge to the nearest surface, which is expressed
in feet, is called the line of least resistance (L.L.R.). When a mine produces a crater
the diameter of which is equal to the line of least resistance, it is called a one-lined
crater; when the diameter is double the L.L.R., a two-lined crater and so
on. Common mines are those which produce a two-lined crater. Over-charged
mines produce craters greater than two-lined, and undercharged mines less.
A camouflet does not produce a crater; it is used when the object is to destroy an

109
enemy’s gallery without breaking the surface. Fig. 73 shows sections of the different
kinds of mines, with their craters and the effect they will produce downwards and
horizontally in ordinary earth.

Consideration of this figure will show that it is possible to place a long charge at
such a depth below the surface that it will destroy all galleries of the enemy within a
considerable radius, without much disturbing the surface of the ground.

110
Bored mines, which have been alluded to above, are a comparatively recent innova-
tion. When the enemy is heard at work in one of his galleries and his position ap-
proximately determined by the sound, it is necessary to drive a branch gallery with
all speed in that direction, and when it has advanced as far as appears necessary, to
load, tamp and discharge a mine before the enemy can fire his own mine. This is
one of the most delicate and dangerous operations of war, and success will fall to
those who are at the same time most skilful and most determined. The work can be
hastened and made less dangerous as follows: Instead of driving a branch gallery, a
hole several inches in diameter is bored in the required direction. With suitable
tools there is no difficulty in driving a straight bore hole 20 or 30 ft. long. A small
charge of high explosives is then pushed up to the end of the borehole and fired.
This forms a small camouflet chamber by compressing the earth around it. Into this
chamber the charge for the mine is passed up the borehole. No tamping of course
is required.

Mine warfare is slow, dangerous and uncertain in its results. It will certainly delay
the besiegers’ advance very much and may do so indefinitely. One point is distinctly
in favour of the defence, namely that when ground has been much mined it be-
comes charged with poisonous gases. Some explosives are less noxious than others
in this way, and it will be advantageous for the attack, but not necessarily for the
defence, to make use of these.

Calculation of Charges.—The quantity of powder required for a charge is expressed

in lbs. in terms of L.L.R.3, and the following formulae are used:
l = L.L.R. in feet, r = radius of crater in feet, c = powder charge in pounds, s = a varia-
ble dependent on the nature of the soil.
For a common mine c = (s/10) l 3.
For an overcharged mine c = (s/10) {l + .9 (r − l)}3.
For an undercharged mine c = (s/10) {l − .9 (l − r)}3.
The values to be given to s are:
Nature of Soil. Value of s.
Very light earth 0.80
Common earth 1.00
Hard sand 1.25
Earth mixed with stones 1.40
Clay mixed with loam 1.55
Inferior brickwork 1.66
Rock or good new brickwork 2.25
Very good old brickwork 2.50
Military mining is carried on by means of vertical shafts and horizontal or inclined
galleries. When the soil is very stiff, very little or even no lining is required for shafts
and galleries; but usually they have to be lined either with cases or frames.

111
Cases make a complete lining of 2 in. planking. Frames are used at intervals of 4 or
5 ft. to support a partial lining of planks. Cases are of course preferable in other
respects; but in ordinary soil they take up more timber.

There are two kinds of gallery in ordinary use in the British service, namely the com-
mon gallery whose interior dimensions with cases are 5 ft. 6 in. × 2 ft., and the
branch gallery which is 4 ft. × 2 ft. The shaft has about the same dimensions as a
branch gallery. Formerly it was sometimes necessary in the systematic attack of a
fortress to get guns down into the ditch. For this purpose, a “great gallery” was
used, 6 ft. 6 in. in height and 6 ft. 8 in. wide, internal dimensions.

Miners’ Tools.—These are few and simple. The pick and shovel differ from the ordi-
nary types in having rather shorter helves suitable for the confined space in which
they are used. There is also a push-pick, an implement with a straight helve and a
pointed shovel head 6 in. long and 312 in. wide. The miner’s truck, used for drawing
the earth from the end of the gallery to the bottom of the shaft, is a small wooden
truck holding about 2 cub. ft. of earth. Formerly the noise of the wheels of the truck
passing over the uneven wooden floor of the gallery was very liable to be heard by
the enemy. To obviate this they now have leather tyres and should run on battens
nailed to the floor. The miner’s bucket is a small canvas bucket with a couple of
ropes attached, by which the earth can be drawn up the shaft. Nowadays, however,
the truck itself has chains attached to it, by which it is drawn up, with the aid of a
windlass, to the surface. By this method more earth can be taken up in one lift, and
time and labour are not wasted in transferring the contents of the truck to the
bucket.

Ventilation is an important point. The breath of the miners and the burning of their
candles (when electric light is not available) vitiates the air in the galleries; so that
even in clean ground a gallery should not be driven more than 60 ft. without provid-
ing some means of renewing the air. This is usually done by forcing fresh air, by
means of a pump or bellows, through a flexible hose to the head of the gallery.
Where mines have been fired close by, there is great danger from poisonous gases
filtering through the soil into the gallery. This difficulty is nowadays met by the use
of special apparatus, such as helmets into which fresh air is pumped, so that the
wearers need not breathe the air of the gallery at all. Ventilation can also be assist-
ed by boring holes vertically to the surface of the ground.

Where a point has been reached at which it is proposed to fire a mine, a chamber
just large enough to hold the charge is cut in the side of the gallery. The object of
this is to keep the charge out of the direct line of the gallery and thus increase the
force of the explosion. The charge may be placed in canvas bags, barrels or boxes,
precautions being taken against damp.

112
The operation of loading is of the first importance, for if the mine is not exploded
with success, not only is valuable time lost, which may give the enemy his oppor-
tunity, but it will probably be necessary to untamp the mine in order to renew the
fuze; an operation attended by considerable danger. The loading of the mine
should therefore be done by the officer in charge with his own hands. He has to
work in a very cramped position and practically in the dark (unless with electric
light) as of course no naked lights can be allowed near powder. Everything should
therefore be prepared beforehand to facilitate the loading of the mine and placing
of the fuze. At Chatham a 1000 lb mine, at the end of a gallery 136 ft. long, has
been loaded in 30 minutes. The powder was passed up the gallery by hand in sand-
bags and emptied into a box of the required size.

Whatever method of firing (see below) is employed, the officer who loads the mine
must be careful to see that it is so arranged as to make firing certain, and that the
leads passing out of the gallery are not liable to damage in the process of tamping.

Tamping.—This operation consists in filling up the head of the gallery solidly, for
such a distance that there shall be no possibility of the charge wasting its force
along the gallery. The distance depends on the charge and on the solidity of the
tamping. For a common mine it should extend to about 32 L.L.R. from the charge,
when the tamping is of earth in sandbags; for a 3-lined crater, to about 2 L.L.R.
Tamping can be improved by jamming pieces of timber across the shaft or gallery
among the other filling.

Firing.—This may be done electrically, or by means of safety or instantaneous

fuze or powder hose. Electric firing is the safest and best and allows of the charge
being exploded at any given moment. For this purpose, electric fuzes (for powder)
or electric detonators (for guncotton or other high explosive) are employed. The
current that fires them is passed through copper wire leads.

The safety fuze used in the British service burns at the rate of about 3 ft. a minute.
Instantaneous fuze burns at the rate of a mile a minute. Both can be fired under
water. They are often used in conjunction, a considerable length of instantaneous
fuze, leading from the charge, being connected to a short length of safety fuze.
Powder hose, an old-time expedient, can be extemporized by making a tube of
strong linen, say 1 in. in diameter, and filling it with powder. It burns at the rate of
10 to 20 ft. per second.

Explosives.—The old-fashioned gunpowder of the grained black variety is still the

best for most kinds of military mines. Pebble and prism powders do not give as
good results, presumably because their action is so slow that some of the gases of
explosion can escape through the pores of the earth. High explosives, with their

113
quick shattering and rending effect, are little more effective than gunpowder in
actually moving large quantities of earth. Most of them give off much more poison-
ous fumes than gunpowder. Some recent high explosives, however, have been spe-
cially designed to be comparatively innocuous in this respect.

Some formulae have been given above for the calculation of charges. It will, howev-
er, simplify matters for the reader to record some actual instances of charges fired
both in peace and war. In the matter of scientific experiment we find Vauban as
usual leading the way, and the following results among others were obtained by
him at Tournay in 1686 and 1689: A charge of 162 lbs placed 13 ft. below the sur-
face produced a crater of 13 ft. radius (a two-lined crater, or “common mine”). Gal-
leries were destroyed at distances equal to the L.L.R. in both horizontal and vertical
directions. Double the charge, placed at double the depth, i.e. 324 lbs with an L.L.R.
of 27 ft. made no crater, but like the first destroyed galleries below it and on each
side at distances equal to the L.L.R. A charge of 3828 lbs with L.L.R. of 37 ft. made a
two-lined crater and destroyed a gallery distant 61 ft. horizontally.

Bernard Forest de Belidor, a French engineer, made many experiments at La Fère

about 1732, and 20 years later, as a general officer and inspector of miners, contin-
ued them on a larger scale. His experiments were directed towards destroying an
enemy’s galleries at greater distances than had hitherto been supposed possible, by
means of very large charges (in proportion to the L.L.R.) which he called “globes of
compression.” In one of them a charge of 4320 lbs of powder placed only 15 ft. 9 in.
below the surface damaged or “compressed” a gallery distant 65 ft. horizontally.
The radius of the crater was 34 ft. 8 in.

At Frederick the Great’s siege of Schweidnitz in 1762 some very large charges were
exploded. One of them, of 5400 lbs with an L.L.R. of 16 ft. 3 in., made a crater of 42
ft. 3 in. radius. Readers of Carlyle’s Frederick the Great may recall his description of
the contest of the rival engineers on this occasion.

At Graudenz in 1862 (experiments) a charge of 1031 lbs of powder placed 10 ft.

deep, untamped, in a vertical shaft, made a crater of 15 ft. 6 in. radius. A charge of
412 lbs of guncotton, calculated as being equivalent to the above charge of powder
and placed under the same conditions, made a crater of 14 ft. radius. The absence
of tamping in both cases of course placed the gunpowder at a disadvantage.

Perhaps the most interesting mine ever fired was that at the siege of Petersburg in
the American Civil War, in June 1864. The circumstances were all abnormal, and the
untechnical account of it in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War is well worth perus-
al. No mining tools or materials and no military miners were available; and no one
had any confidence in the success of the attempt except its originator, Lieut.-

114
Colonel Pleasants, a mining engineer by profession, his regiment which was recruit-
ed from a mining population, and General Burnside the corps commander. The op-
posing entrenchments were 130 yds. apart. The mine gallery was started behind
the Federal lines and driven a distance of 510 ft. till it came under a field redoubt in
the Confederate lines. There two branches were made right and left, each about 38
ft. long, and in them eight mines aggregating 8000 lbs of powder were placed. The
first attempt to fire them failed, and an officer and a sergeant volunteered to enter
the gallery to seek the cause of the failure. A defective splice in two lengths of fuze
was thus discovered and repaired. At the second attempt all the mines were fired
simultaneously with success and made a gigantic crater 170 ft. long by 60 ft. wide
and 30 ft. deep. The occupants of the redoubt, at least several hundred men (they
have been stated at 1000), were blown up and mostly killed. The assault which fol-
lowed, however, failed completely, for want of organization. The infantry was
drawn up in readiness to advance, but no outlets had been provided from the par-
allel, and this and other causes delayed the occupation of the crater and gave the
defending artillery a moment’s respite. Thus, the assailants gained the crater but
could not advance beyond it in face of the defenders’ fire, nor could they establish
themselves within it, on its steep clay sides, for want of entrenching tools. A good
many troops were sent forwards in support, but being in many cases of inferior
quality, they could not be induced to go forward, and huddled in disorder in the
already overcrowded crater. Over 1000 of these were captured when the Confeder-
ates retook the crater by a counterattack and the total loss of the Federals in the
attack was nearly 4000.

The wars of the last generation have done little or nothing to advance the science
of military mining, but a good deal has been done in peace to improve the means.
Electric lighting and electric firing of mines will be a great help; modern drilling ma-
chines may be used to go through rock; ventilating arrangements are much im-
proved; and the use of bored mines is sure to have great developments. The Russo-
Japanese War taught nothing new in mine-warfare, or as to the effects of mines,
but the siege of Port Arthur had this moral among others; just as in future, in the
frontal attack of positions, trench must oppose trench, so in fortress warfare mines
will be more necessary than ever. It appears that they will be essential to destroy
both the ditch-flanking arrangements of forts and the escarp or other permanent
obstacle beyond the ditch.

115
 Illustration from Neil Demarco's The Great War

First World War Extract

On the Western Front during the First World War, the military employed specialist
miners to dig tunnels under No Man's Land. The main objective was to place mines
beneath enemy defensive positions. When it was detonated, the explosion would
destroy that section of the trench. The infantry would then advance towards the
enemy front-line hoping to take advantage of the confusion that followed the ex-
plosion of an underground mine. Soldiers in the trenches developed different strat-
egies to discover enemy tunnelling. One method was to drive a stick into the
ground and hold the other end between the teeth and feel any underground vibra-
tions. Another one involved sinking a water-filled oil drum into the floor of the
trench. The soldiers then took it in turns to lower an ear into the water to listen for
any noise being made by tunnellers.

It could take as long as a year to dig a tunnel and place a mine. As well as digging
their own tunnels, the miners had to listen out for enemy tunnellers. On occasions
miners accidentally dug into the opposing side's tunnel and an underground fight
took place. When an enemy's tunnel was found it was usually destroyed by placing
an explosive charge inside. Mines became larger and larger. At the beginning of
the Somme offensive, the British denoted two mines that contained 24 tons of ex-
plosives. Another 91,111 lb. mine at Spanbroekmolen created a hole that after-
wards measured 430 ft. from rim to rim. Now known as the Pool of Peace, it is large
enough to house a 40 ft. deep lake.

In January, 1917, General Sir Herbert Plumer, gave orders for 20 mines to be placed
under German lines at Messines. Over the next five months more than 8,000 me-
tres of tunnel were dug and 600 tons of explosive were placed in position. Simulta-
neous explosion of the mines took place at 3.10 on 7th June. The blast killed an
estimated 10,000 soldiers and was so loud it was heard in London.

116
 V. FIELD FORTIFICATION
Field Fortifications, now more often spoken of as field defences, are those which are
constructed at short notice, with the means locally available, usually when the ene-
my is near at hand. Subject to the question of time, a very high degree of strength
can be given to them, if the military situation makes it worthwhile to expend suffi-
cient labour. A century or more ago, the dividing line between permanent and field
fortification was very rigidly drawn, since in those days a high masonry escarp sur-
mounted by a rampart was essential to a permanent fortress, and these could natu-
rally not be extemporized. Works without masonry, in other ways made as strong as
possible with deep ditches and heavy timbers,—such as would require about six
weeks for their construction—were known as semi-permanent, and were used for
the defence of places which acquired strategic importance in the course of a war,
but were not immediately threatened. The term field fortification was reserved for
works constructed of lighter materials, with parapets and ditches of only moderate
development. Redoubts of this class required a fortnight at most for their construc-
tion.

In modern fortification if cupolas and deep revetted ditches were essential to per-
manent defences, the dividing line would be equally clear. But as has been shown,
this is not universally admitted, and where the resources exist, the use of our pre-
sent means of construction, such as steel joists, railway rails, reinforced concrete
and wire, in conjunction with the defensive power of modern firearms, makes it
possible to extemporize in a very short time works having much of the resisting
power of a permanent fortress. Further, such works can be expanded from the
smallest beginnings; and, if the site is not too exposed, in the presence of the ene-
my.

Field fortification offers, as regards the actual constructions, a very limited scope to
the engineer; and a little consideration will show that its defensive possibilities were
not greatly affected by the change from machine-thrown projectiles to those fired
by rude smooth-bore guns. There is therefore nothing in the history of this branch
of the subject that is worth tracing, from the earliest ages to about the end of the
18th century. One or two points may be noticed. The use of obstacles is probably
one of the earliest measures of defence. Long before missile weapons had acquired
such an importance as to make it worthwhile to seek shelter from them, it would
obviously have been found desirable to have some means of checking the onrush of
an enemy physically or numerically superior. Hence the use by savage tribes, to this
day, of pits, pointed stakes hidden in the grass, entanglements and similar obsta-
cles. In this direction the ages have made no change, and the most highly civilized
nations still use the same obstacles on occasion.

Another use of field defences common to all ages is the protection of camps at

117
night, where small forces are operating against an enemy more numerous but infe-
rior in arms and discipline. In daylight such an enemy is not feared, but at night his
numbers might be dangerous. Hence the Roman practice of making each foot-
soldier carry a couple of stakes for palisades; and the simple defence of a thorn
zariba used by the British for their camps in the Sudan.

Palisades and trenches, abatis and sharpened stakes have always been used. Ex-
cept wire, there is practically no new material. As to methods, the laagers of the
Boers are preceded by the wagon-forts of the Hussites, and those no doubt by sim-
ilar arrangements of British or Assyrian war chariots; and so in almost every direc-
tion it will be found that the expedient of to-day has had its forerunners in those of
the countless yesterdays. The only really marked change in the arrangements of
field defences has been caused not by gunpowder but by quick-firing rifled weap-
ons. For that reason, it is worthwhile to consider briefly what were the principles of
field fortification at the end of the 18th century. That period has been chosen be-
cause it gives us the result of a couple of centuries of constant fighting between
disciplined troops with fairly effective firearms. The field defences of the 19th cen-
tury are transitional in character. Based mainly on the old methods, they show only
faint attempts at adaptation to new conditions, and it was not till quite the end of
the century that the methods now accepted began to take shape.

The essential elements of fieldworks up to the time of the Peninsular War were
command and obstacle; now they are protection and concealment.

The command and obstacle were as necessary in the days of smooth-bore muskets
and guns as in those of javelins and arrows. When the enemy could get close up to
a work without serious loss, and attack in close order, the defenders needed a real-
ly good obstacle in front of them. Moreover, since they could not rely on their fire
alone to repulse the attack, they needed a two-deep line, with reserves close at
hand, to meet it with the “army blanche.” For this purpose, a parapet 7 or 8 ft.
high, with a steep slope, perhaps palisaded, up which the attackers must climb
after passing the obstacle, was excellent. The defenders after firing their last volley
could use their bayonets from the top of the parapet with the advantage of posi-
tion. The high parapet had also the advantage that the attackers could not tell what
was going on inside the redoubt, and the defenders were sheltered from their fire
as well from view until the last moment.

The strength of a fortified line in the 18th century depended principally on its re-
doubts. Lines of shelter trenches had little power of defence at the time, unless
they held practically as many men as would have sufficed to fight in the open. Ob-
stacles on the other hand had a greater value, against the inelastic tactics of the
time, than they have now. A good position therefore was one which offered good

118
fire-positions for redoubts and plenty of facilities for creating obstacles. Strong re-
doubts which could resist determined assaults; good obstacles in the intervals, guns
in the redoubts to sweep the intervals, and troops in formed bodies kept in reserve
for counter-strokes—these were the essentials in the days of the smooth-bore.

The redoubts were liable to a heavy cannonade by field-guns before the attack. To
withstand this, the parapets had to be made of a suitable thickness—from 4 or 5 ft.
upwards—according to the time available, the resisting nature of the soil, and the
severity of the bombardment expected.

The whole of the earth for the parapet was as a rule obtained from the ditch, in
order to make as much as possible of this obstacle. The garrison in all parts of the
interior of the redoubt were to be sheltered, if possible, from the enemy’s fire, and
with this object great pains were bestowed on the principle of “defilade.” The ob-
ject of defilade, which was a great fetish in theoretical works, was so to arrange the
height of the parapet with reference to the terreplein of a work that a straight line
(not, be it observed, the trajectory of the projectiles) passing from the muzzle of a
musket or gun on the most commanding point of the enemy’s position, over the
crest of the parapet, should just clear the head of a defender standing in any part of
the work. This problem of defilade became quite out of date after the development
of time shrapnel but was nevertheless taught with great rigour till within the last
twenty years.

The sectional area of the ditch was calculated so that with an addition of about 10%
for expansion it would equal that of the parapet. If a wider and deeper ditch was
considered necessary, the surplus earth could be used to form a glacis. The interior
of the redoubt had to afford sufficient space to allow the garrison to sleep in it,
which was sometimes a matter of some difficulty if a small irregularly shaped work
had to contain a strong garrison. Consideration of the plan and sections of these
works will show that the banquette for infantry with its slopes, and the gun
platforms, took off a good deal from the interior space within the crest-line. Guns
were usually placed at the salients, where they could get the widest field of fire.
They were sometimes placed on the ground level, firing through embrasures in the
parapet, and sometimes on platforms so as to fire over the parapet (en barbette).

As in permanent fortification, immense pains were taken to elaborate theoretically

the traces of works. A distinction was made between forts and redoubts, the for-
mer being those which were arranged to flank their own ditches, while the re-
doubts did not. Redoubts again were classed as “closed,” those which had an equal-
ly strong defence all round; and “half-closed,” those which had only a slight parapet
or timber stockade for the gorge or rear faces. Open works (those which had no
gorge defence) were named according to their trace, as redans and lunettes.

119
A redan is a work with two faces making a salient angle. It was frequently used in
connexion with straight lines of trench or breastwork. A lunette is a work with two
faces, usually forming an obtuse angle, and two flanks.

The forts described in the text-books, as might be expected, were designed with
great ingenuity, with bastioned or demi-bastioned fronts, star traces, and so forth,
and in the same books intricate calculations were entered into to balance The rem-
blai and déblai, that is, the amount of earth in the parapets with that excavated
from the ditches. In practice such niceties of course disappeared, though occasion-
ally when the ground allowed of it star forts and bastioned fronts were employed.
On irregular ground the first necessity was to fit the redoubt to the ground on
which it stood, so as to sweep the whole of the foreground, and this was generally
a sufficiently difficult matter without adding the complications of flanking defences.
Sir John Jones, speaking of the traces of the several works in the Torres Vedras
lines, says:- “The redoubts were made of every capacity, from that of fig. 74 a, lim-
ited by want of space on
the ground it occupied to
50 men and two pieces of
artillery, to that of fig. 74
b, for 500 men and six
pieces of artillery, the
importance of the object
to be attained being the
only guide in forming the
dimensions. Many of the
redoubts first thrown up,
even some of the smallest, were shaped like stars, under the idea of procuring a
flank defence for the ditches; but this construction was latterly rejected, it being
found to cut up the interior space, and to be almost fallacious with respect to flank
defence, the breadth of the exterior slopes being in some cases equal to the whole
length of the flanks so obtained. Even when, from the greater size of the work,
some flanking fire was thus gained, the angle formed by the faces was generally so
obtuse that it demanded more coolness in the defenders than ought reasonably to
be expected to aim along the ditch of the opposite face: and further, this construc-
tion prevented the fire of the work being more powerful in front than in rear.

In order to decide on the proper trace of a work, it is necessary to consider whether

its object be to prevent an enemy establishing himself on the ground on which it is
to be placed, or whether it be to insure a heavy fire of artillery on some other point
in its vicinity. In the first case every consideration should be sacrificed to that of
adding to its powers of self-defence by flanks or other expedients. In the second, its
powers of resistance are secondary to the establishment of a powerful offensive

120
fire and its trace cannot be too simple. Latterly, the shape of the redoubts was in-
variably that most fitted to the ground, or such as best parried the enfilade fire or
musketry plunge of neighbouring heights, care being taken to present the front of
fire deemed necessary towards the pass, or other object to be guarded; and such
will generally be found the best rule of proceeding.

This recommendation, however, is not intended to apply to isolated works of large

dimensions, and more particularly to those considered the key of any position. No
labour or expense should be spared to render such works capable of resisting the
most furious assaults, either by breaking the parapet into flanks, or forming a flank
defence in the ditch; for the experience gained in the Peninsula shows that an un-
flanked work of even more than an ordinary field profile, if skilfully and determined-
ly assaulted, will generally be
carried.... Nor does the serious
evil of curtailing the interior
space, which renders breaks in
the outline so objectionable in
small works, apply to works of
large dimensions.... Under this
view the great work on Monte
Agraça (fig. 75) must be con-
sidered as very defective, the
flank defence being confined
to an occasional break of a few
feet in the trace, caused by a
change of direction in the con-
tour of the height, whilst the
interior space is more than doubly sufficient for the number of its allotted garrison
to encamp.

Interior and other Defences.—This work, however, had some of its salient points ...
cut off by earthen lines of parapet, steeply revetted externally, and so traced as to
serve for traverses to the interior. It had also three or four small enclosed posts
formed within it; and the work of St. Vincent’s, on the Lines of Torres Vedras (fig.
76) had each of its salient points formed into an independent post. These interior
defences and retrenchments were intended to guard against a general panic
amongst the garrison, which would necessarily be composed in part of indifferent
troops, and also to prevent the loss of the work by the entry of the assailants at any
weak or ill-defended point. Such interior lines to rally on are absolutely essential to
the security of a large fieldwork. They serve as substitutes for a blockhouse or tow-
er, placed in the interior of all well-constructed permanent earthen works, and mer-
it far more attention than they generally receive.

121
 Fig.75a.
Forte do Alqueidão

Fig.75b.
Forte do Alqueidão
Google Earth

Fig.75a,b. Forte do Alqueidão on

the Lines of Torres Vedras,
Portugal.

Fig. 76c. Forte São Vicente or St.

Vincent’s Fort, on the Lines of
Fig.75c. CHB Torres Vedras, Portugal.

122
The small circular wind-
mills of stone, which were
frequently found occupy-
ing salient knolls ... readily
converted into admirable
interior posts of that na-
ture. The profile of the
several works varied on
every face and flank, ac-
cording to its liability to
be attacked or cannonad-
ed; the only general rule
enforced being that all
ditches should be at least
15 ft. wide at top and 10
ft. in depth, and the crest of the parapet have at least 5 ft. command over the crest
of the counterscarp. No parapet exceeded 10 ft. in thickness, unless exposed to be
severely cannonaded, and few more than 6 or 8 ft.; and some, on high knolls,
where artillery could not by any possibility be brought against them, were made of
stone or rubble less than 2 ft. in thickness, to gain more interior space, and allow
full liberty for the use of the defend-
ers’ bayonets.”

Fig. 77 gives two typical sections of

these works.

The works of Torres Vedras have

been chosen for illustration because
they offer very good historical exam-
ples, and also because of the value of
the critical remarks of Sir John Jones,
who as a captain was the engineer in
charge of their construction. At the same time, it must be remembered that they
differ from ordinary fieldworks in having an unusual degree of strength, plenty of
time and civilian labour having been available for their construction. In this respect
they approximate more to semi-permanent works, the main reason why they did
not receive under the circumstances a greater development of ditch and parapet
being that in addition to the large number of works required, much labour was ex-
pended in abatis, inundations, scarping hill-sides and constructing roads.

Some further remarks of Sir John on the situations of the works are very instructive:

123
—“Many of the redoubts were placed on very elevated situations on the summit of
steep hills, which gave them a most imposing appearance; but it was in reality a
defect ... for the fire of their artillery on the object to be guarded became so plung-
ing as to lose half its powers; the musketry could not be made to scour the face of
the hill sufficiently; and during the night both arms became of most uncertain
effect.

“The domineering situation of the redoubts, however, gave confidence to the

young troops which composed their garrisons, protected them from a cannonade,
and screened their interior from musketry, unless fired at a high angle, and conse-
quently at random. These considerations perhaps justify the unusually elevated
sites selected for most of the redoubts on the lines, though they cannot induce an
approval of them as a general measure.”

The chief principle of the period was thus that the redoubts were the most im-
portant features of lines of defence, and that they combined physical obstacle and
protection with good musketry and artillery positions. The value of concealment
was not ignored, but it was as a rule subordinated to other considerations.

The principles of this time remained unaltered until after the Crimean War. In the
American Civil War, the power of the rifle began to assert itself, and it was found
that a simple breastwork defended by a double rank of men could protect itself by
its fire against an ordinary assault. This power of the rifle gave greatly enhanced
importance to any defences that could be hastily extemporized behind walls, hedg-
es or any natural cover. About the period of the Franco-German War other consid-
erations came in. The increased velocity of artillery projectiles reduced in some
ways their destructive effects against earth parapets, because the shell had an in-
creasing tendency to deflect upwards on striking a bank of loose earth. Also, the
use of shrapnel made it impossible for troops to find cover on the terreplein of a
work some distance behind the parapet.

These considerations, however, were not fully realized at that time. The reason was
partly a want of touch between the engineers and the non-technical branches of
most armies, and partly that original writers from the Napoleonic wars to the pre-
sent day have been more occupied with the primary question of the value of field
defences as a matter of tactics than with their details considered from the stand-
point of fortification.

There was always an influential school of writers who declaimed against all defenc-
es, as being injurious to the offensive spirit so essential to success. Those writers
who treated of the arrangements of defences devoted themselves to theoretical
details of trace quite after the old style; discussing the size and shape of typical re-

124
doubts, their distance apart and relation to lines of trenches, &c. The profiles—the
thick parapet with command of 7 ft. or more, the deep ditch, and the inadequate
cover behind the parapet—remained as they had been for a century.
The American Civil War showed the power of rifles behind slight defences. Plevna
in 1877 taught a further lesson. It proved the great resisting power of extemporized
lines; but more than that, we begin to find new arrangements for protection
against shell fire (see plans and sections in Greene’s The Russian Army and its Cam-
paign in Turkey). The trace of the works and the sections of parapet and ditch sug-
gest Torres Vedras; but a multiplication of interior traverses and splinter-proof
shelters show the necessity for a different class of protection. The parapet was de-
signed according to the old type, for want of a better; the traverses and shelters
were added later, to meet the necessities of the case. The Turks also used two or
three tiers of musketry fire, as for instance one from the crest of the glacis, one
from the parapet, and one from a traverse in rear of it. This, however, is a develop-
ment which will not be necessary in future, thanks to magazine rifles.

From 1877 to 1899 the efficiency of rifles and guns rapidly increased, and certain
new principles, causing the field defences of the present day to differ radically from
those of the 18th century, remained to be developed. These may be considered
under the following heads: the nature of protection required, the diminished need
of obstacle, and the adaptation of works to ground.

The principle that thickness of parapet is no longer required, to resist artillery fire,
was first laid down at Chatham in 1896. The distance at which guns now engage
makes direct hits on parapets comparatively rare. Further, a shell striking near the
crest of a parapet may perhaps kill one man if he is in the way and displace a bush-
el of earth. That is nothing. It is the contents of the shell, whether shrapnel or ex-
plosive, that is the source of danger and not the shell itself. Thus, the enemy’s ob-
ject is to burst his common shell immediately behind the parapet, or his shrapnel a
short distance in front of it, in order to get searching effect. It follows that a para-
pet is thick enough if it suffices to stop rifle bullets, since the same thickness will a
fortiori keep out shrapnel bullets or splinters of shell. For this purpose, 3 ft. is
enough.

Real protection is gained by a trench close in rear of the parapet, deep enough to
give shelter from high angle shrapnel, and narrow enough to minimize the chance
of a common shell dropping into it. This protection is increased by frequent travers-
es across the trench.

The most essential point of all is concealment. In gaining this we say good-bye final-
ly to the old type of work. Protection is now given by the trench rather than the
parapet; command and the ditch-obstacle (which furnished the earth for the high

125
parapet) are alike unnecessary. Concealment can therefore be studied by keeping
the parapet down to the lowest level above the surface from which the foreground
can be seen. This may be 18 in. or less.

The need of obstacle, in daylight and when the defenders are not abnormally few,
has practically disappeared. For night work, or when the assailant is so strong as to
be able to force home his attack in face of protected rifle fire, what is needed is not
a deep ditch immediately in front of the parapet, difficult to climb, but also difficult
to flank, but an obstacle that will detain him under fire at short range. It may be an
entanglement, an abatis, an inundation: anything that will check the rush and make
him move slowly.

In the adaptation of works to ground, the governing factor is the power of the rifle
in frontal defence. We have seen that in Peninsular times great reliance was placed
on the flanking defence of lines by guns in redoubts. Infantry extended behind a
simple line of trench could not resist a strong attack without such support. Now,
however, infantry behind a slight trench, with a good field of fire should be able to
defend themselves against any infantry attack.

This being so, the enemy’s artillery seeks to locate the trenches and to cover them
with a steady hail of shells, so as to force the defenders to keep down under cover.
If they can succeed in doing this, it is possible for the attacking infantry to advance,
and the artillery fire is kept up until the last moment, so that the attack may have
he narrowest possible space to cover after the defenders have manned their para-
pets and opened fire. Fig. 78 shows the action of various natures of projectiles.

Fig. 78.—Effect of Projectiles.

126
We need not here discuss the rôle of the defenders’ artillery in replying to that of
the enemy and playing on the attack; nor for the moment consider how far the
defence of the trenches while under artillery fire can be made easier by overhead
cover. The main question is—what is, in view of the nature of the attack, the best
disposition of lines of trench; and do they require the addition of redoubts?
The most important point, with the object of protection, is that the trenches must
not be conspicuous; this is the best defence against artillery. With the object of
resistance by their own fire they must have a good view, or, as it is generally de-
scribed, no dead ground in front of them. For this purpose, 300 or 400 yds. may be
enough if the ground is even and affords no cover.

This necessity for invisibility, together with the shallowness of the zone that suffices
for producing a decisive fire effect, has of late years very much affected the choice
of ground for a line of trenches. For a defensive position on high ground, it was
usually laid down until the South African War that a line of trenches should be on
the “military crest” (Fr. crête militaire), i.e. the highest point on the hill from which
the whole of the slopes in front can be seen. Thus, in the three sections of ground
shown in fig. 79 it would be at a, b and c respectively. The simplicity of this pre-
scription made it attractive and it came
to be rather abused in the textbooks.
There were, even before the improve-
ments in artillery, objections to it, be-
cause on most slopes the military crest
would be found at very different eleva-
tions on different parts of the line, so that by a strict adherence to the rule some of
the trenches would be placed near the top of the hill, and some in dangerous isola-
tion near the bottom. Moreover, a rounded hill has no military crest.

Further, we have to consider nowadays not only the position of the fire-trenches,
but those of supports, reserves and artillery, and the whole question is extremely
difficult. For instance, considering the sections alone, as if they did not vary along
the line, the positions at a and b, fig. 79, are bad because they are on the skyline
and therefore a good mark for artillery. That at b is especially bad because the
slope in front is so steep that the defenders would have to expose themselves very
much to fire down it, and the artillery fire against them can be kept up until the
very last moment. The position c has the advantage of not being on the skyline, but
the position of the supports in rear is exposed.
Such a position as that at d, fig. 80, is good,
but protected or concealed communica-
tions must be made for the supports com-
ing from e over the brow of the hill.

127
Another possible position for the infantry
line is at f, fig. 81, with the guns on the
high ground behind. They might easily be
quite concealed from the enemy’s artil-
lery. The drawback is that no retirement
up the exposed slope would be possible for them, except at night. The fire
from f will be grazing, which will be a great advantage as compared with
the plunging fire that would be obtained from a position up the hill.

It is idle, however, to give more than the most cursory consideration to sections of
imaginary positions. It is only by actual practice on the ground that skill can be
attained in laying out positions, and only a trained soldier with a good eye can suc-
ceed in it. Briefly, the advantages of view and position given by high ground must
be paid for in some degree by exposure to the enemy’s artillery; and at least as
much consideration—possibly as much labour—must be given to communications
with the fire-trenches as to the trenches themselves. Irregular ground simplifies the
question of concealment but also gives cover to the enemy’s approach. The lie of
the ground will itself dictate the position of the trenches, subject to the predisposi-
tions of the responsible officer. On flat featureless ground the general trace of the
trenches should be irregular. This makes a more difficult target for artillery and
affords a certain amount of cross and flanking fire, which is a very great advantage.
Great care should, however, be taken not to expose the trenches to oblique or enfi-
lade fire; or at least to protect them, if so exposed, by traversing.

Concealment of trenches is generally attempted by covering the freshly turned

earth of the small parapet with sods, leafy branches or grass. In this connexion it
should be remembered that after a day or two cut leaves and grass wither and may
become conspicuous against a green surface. Where the ground is so even that a
good view of the foreground is possible from the surface level, the trench may be
made without a parapet; but this entails great labour in removing and disposing of
the excavated earth. A common device is to conceal the parapet as well as possible
and to make a dummy trench some distance away to draw fire.

Besides the direct concealment of trenches, care must be taken that the site is not
conspicuous. Thus a trench should not be placed along the meeting line of two
different kinds of cultivation, or along the edge of a belt of heather on a hill-side, or
where a difference of gradient is sharply defined; or where any conspicuous land-
mark would help the enemy’s artillery to get the range.

Trenches are broadly distinguished as “fire trenches” and “cover trenches,” accord-
ing as they are for the firing line or supporting troops. The following simple types
are taken from the 1908 edition of Military Engineering (part 1): “Field Defences.”

128
Fig. 82 is the most common form of fire trench, in
which labour is saved by equalizing trench and para-
pet. This would take 112 to 2 hours in ordinary soil.
Fig. 83 shows the same trench improved by 2 or 3
hours’ more work. Fig. 84 shows a fire trench without
parapet, with cover trench and communica-
tion. The addition of a loophole of sandbags
on the top for concealment (called head-
cover), gives increased protection, but at the
cost of greater prominence for the parapet
(fig. 85). Overhead cover can only be provided
in fire trenches by giving the parapet still
greater height and it is
not usually done. Por-
tions of the trench not
used for firing can, how-
ever, be given splinter-
proof protection by
putting over them
branches or bundles, covered with
a few inches of earth: or by boards,
or sheets of corrugated iron if they
can be had. A better plan when
time permits is to provide cover
trenches immediately behind and
communicating with the fire
trench. Fig.85.

The question of redoubts has been a vexed one for years; partly they were thought
to be unnecessary in view of the resisting power of a line of trenches, but chiefly
because the redoubt was always imagined as one of the older types, with a high
conspicuous parapet. Of course, a redoubt of such a nature would be readily identi-
fied and made untenable. But the idea of a redoubt does not necessarily imply
command. Its object is that it shall be capable of all-round defence. There can be
no doubt that as there is always a possibility of lines being pierced somewhere, it is
desirable, unless the whole line is to be thrown into confusion and forced back, to
have some point at which the defenders can maintain themselves. This is not possi-
ble unless at such points there is provision for defence towards both flanks and
rear, that is to say, when there are redoubts, which can hold on after certain por-
tions of the line have been lost and thereby can localize the enemy’s success and
simplify the action of supporting troops. In order that redoubts may exercise this
function, all that is necessary is that their defenders should be able to see the

129
ground for a furlong in front of them in every direction. Their parapets, therefore,
need be in no way more conspicuous than those of the neighbouring fire trenches,
and in that case, there is no fear of their drawing special attention from the ene-
my’s artillery. Whatever theories may have been put forward en the subject, in
practice they are constantly used, and in the Russo-Japanese War, where the expe-
rience of South Africa was already available, we find them in the fighting lines on
both sides.

The modern type of field re-

doubt is a fire trench, no more
conspicuous than the others, in
any simple form adapted to the
ground that will give effective all
-round fire, such as a square
with blunted angles. Enhanced
strength may be given by deep-
ening the trenches and improv-
ing the overhead cover; and
special use may here be made of
obstacles.

Within the redoubt cover may

be provided for men in excess of
those required to man the para-
pet, by means of cover trenches
and field casemates. Fig. 86
gives the general idea of such a
redoubt, and figs. 87, 88 the
plan and section of the interior
shelters. Such a work can easily
be made quite invisible from a
distance. It gives excellent cover
against shrapnel, but would not be tenable against howitzer common shell, if the
enemy did manage to bring an accurate fire to bear on it. Fig. 89 shows the section
of a parapet with two shelters behind it for a work with a high command of 5 or 6
ft. This work would require a concealed position, which can often be found a little
in rear of
the firing
line.

Fig.89.

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In the South African War, a good deal of interest was excited by a type of trench
used by the Boers. It was very narrow at the surface, giving only just room for a man
to stand; but undercut or hollowed out below, so that he could sit down with very
good cover. Such a section is only possible in very firm soil. Apart from this, the type
is really only suited to rifle pits, as a trench proper should have room for officers
and N.C.O’s to move along within it. The Boers showed great skill in concealing their
trenches. One good point was that there was generally something making a back-
ground immediately behind the men’s heads, so that they did not stand out in relief
when raised above the parapet.

In the Russo-Japanese War the Russian trenches at the outset were of old-fashioned
type and very conspicuous. Later on, better types were evolved. Figs. 90 and 91 are
a couple of sections from Port Arthur; the first borrowed from the Boers but wider
at the top. The Japanese appear to have taken their type mainly from the latest
British official books but applied them with great skill to the ground studying espe-
cially invisibility. In their prepared positions they used large redoubts manned by
several companies.

Fig.90.

Fig.91.

131
 AGK

Fig.91a. Modern reconstruction of WW1 trenches a (Ouvrage de la Falouse).

132
Cover for Guns.—Some
degree of cover for guns,
in addition to the shield,
is always desirable. If the
gun stands on the natural
surface of the ground,
the cover is called an
epaulment. In that case a
bank is thrown up in
front of the gun, about 1
ft. high in the centre, and
3 ft. 6 in. high at the Fig. 92. Gun-pit
ends. On either side of
the gun and close up to
the bank is a small pit for the gunners. The rest of the earth for the epaulment is
got from a trench in front. If the gun is sunk, the shelter is called a gun-pit.
In this case there is no bank immediately in front of the gun. Shelter can be got
more quickly with a pit than an epaulment, but it is generally undesirable to break
the surface of the ground.

Fig. 93.

The commonest forms of obstacle now used are abatis and wire entanglements.
Fig. 93 shows a well-finished type of abatis. The branches are stripped and pointed,
and the butts are buried and pegged firmly down. Wire entanglement may be add-
ed to this with advantage. An abatis should be protected from artillery fire, which is
sometimes done by placing it in a shallow excavation with the earth thrown up in
front of it. Wire may be used as a high or low entan-
glement or as a fence or trip wire or concealed ob-
stacle. The usual form of high wire entanglement
consists of several rows of stout stakes 4 or 5 ft.
long, driven firmly into the ground about 6 ft. apart,
and connected horizontally and diagonally with
barbed wire.

Palisades are still used and need no description. They

were formerly often made bullet-proof, but this is no
longer possible. Fraises are seldom heard of now,
though they may appear occasionally in a modified
form. They were much used in connexion with deep

133
ditches, and are palisades placed so as to project horizontally from the escarp or
sloping forward in the bottom of the ditch. Military pits both deep and shallow (the
latter, shown in fig. 95, called trous de loup) are not so much used as formerly, be-
cause the obstacle is hardly worth the labour expended on it. Both, however, were
employed in the Russo-Japanese War. Crows’ feet, formerly much used as a de-
fence against cavalry, are practically obsolete. They consisted of four iron spikes
joined together at their bases in such a manner that however they were thrown
down one point would always be pointing upwards (fig. 94). Chevaux-de-frise (q.v.)
were formerly a much-used type of obstacle. The best obstacle is that which can be
made to fulfil a given object with the least expenditure of time and labour. From
this point of view barbed wire is far the best. One of its greatest advantages is that
it gives no cover whatever to the enemy.

Dams are most effective obstacles, when circumstances allow of their use. They are
constructed by military engineers as small temporary dams would be in civil works.
A most important question, especially in connexion with obstacles, is that of
lighting up the foreground at night. Portable electric searchlights are most valuable,
especially for detecting the enemy’s movements at some distance; but their use
will naturally always be restricted. Star shells and parachute lights fired from guns
are not of much use for the immediate foreground, and do not burn very long. They
were formerly chiefly of use in siege works, to light up an enemy’s working parties.
Germany has introduced light balls fired from pistols, which will probably have a
considerable future.

Various civilian forms of flare-light would be very useful to illuminate obstacles but
cannot well be carried in the field. Bonfires are very useful when material is availa-
ble. They require careful treatment, e.g. they must be so arranged that they can be
lighted instantaneously (they may be lighted automatically, by means of a trip wire
and a fuze); they must give a bright light at once (this can be ensured with shavings
or straw sprinkled with petroleum); they must be firmly built so that the enemy
cannot destroy them easily; and if possible there should be a screen arranged be-
hind them so that they may not light up the defence as well as the attack.
Blockhouses are familiar to the public from the part they played in the South Afri-
can War of 1899–1902. In the old-fashioned permanent fortification, they were
used as keeps in such positions as re-entering places of arms and built of masonry.
Stone blockhouses have long been used in the Balkans for frontier outposts; they
are sometimes built cruciform, so as to get some flanking defence. In the form of
bullet-proof log-cabins they have played a great part in warfare between pioneer
settlers and savages.

In the 19th century blockhouses were usually designed to give partial protection
against field artillery; the walls being built of two thicknesses of logs with earth be-

134
Fig.96. Fougasses
have always for con-
venience been classed
as obstacles. A fou-
gasse is a charge of
powder buried at the
bottom of a sloping
pit. Over the powder
is a wooden shield, 3
or 4 in. thick, and over
the shield a quantity
of stones are piled.
The illustration, fig.
96, gives a clear idea
of the arrangement. A
fougasse of this form,
charged with 80 lbs of
powder, will throw 5
tons of stones over a
surface 160 yds. long
by 120 yds wide. They
may be fired by pow-
der hose, fuze or elec-
tricity. Their actual
effect is very often a
matter of chance, but
the moral effect is
usually considerable.

Fig.96a. Fougasse at
Madliena Tower,
Malta. CHB

135
tween them, the roof flat and covered with 2 or 3 ft. of earth, and earth being piled
against the walls up to the loopholes. Nowadays they are employed only in posi-
tions where it is not likely that artillery will be brought against them: but they may
be made tenable for a while even under artillery fire if they are surrounded by a
trench and parapet.

Blockhouses are especially useful for small posts protecting such points as railway
bridges, which the enemy may attempt to destroy by cavalry raids. The essential
feature is a bullet-proof loopholed wall, arranged for all-round fire, with enough
interior space for the garrison to sleep in. The roof may be simply weatherproof.
Some arrangement for storing water must be provided. Circular blockhouses were
very popular in South Africa. They were made of sheets of corrugated iron fastened
6 in. apart on a wooden framework, the space between the sheets being filled with
small stones. The loopholes were made of sheet-iron frames inserted in the walls.

Fig. 97 shows a section of one of these blockhouses.

The defence of woods was formerly an important branch of field defences. Abatis
and entanglements could readily be extemporized, trunks of trees made strong
breastworks, and the wood concealed the numbers of the defenders. A wood was
therefore generally considered a useful addition to a line of defence. It was custom-
ary to hold the front edge of the wood, the irregularities of the outline being uti-
lized for frontal and flanking fire, while obstacles were disposed some 50 yds. in
front. In a carefully prepared position, clearings would be made parallel to the front
and some distance back from it, for support positions, and great attention was paid
(in theory at least) to clearing communications, erections, signposts, &c., so that
the defending troops might move freely in any desired direction.

Woods, however, had their inherent drawbacks. The ground is hard to dig, clearing
involves great labour; and communication, at the best, is cramped. Nowadays a
wood can hardly be considered a strong defensive element in a line. The front of it
is an excellent ranging mark for artillery, and positions within the wood are not eas-
ily made, because of the difficulty of trenching, and the fact that no reasonable
amount of timber will make a breastwork proof against the modern bullet. Once an

136
enemy gets a footing within a wood, the position is more favourable to offensive
than to defensive action. If a wood has to be occupied in a line of defence, it is
probable that in most cases the rear edge or a line slightly behind it would be the
best to fortify, though the front edge would no doubt be held by the fighting line at
the outset.

The defence of villages is another question which has been much affected by recent
improvements in artillery. Formerly villages were very important adjuncts to a line
of defence, and strong points for a detached force to hold. There were indeed, al-
ways drawbacks. The preparations for defence entailed a good deal of labour, and
the defending force was scattered in houses and enclosures, so that control and
united action were difficult. But the value of the ready-made protection afforded by
walls was so great—and sometimes even decisive—that villages were occupied as a
matter of course. This is certainly now changed, but precisely to what extent it will
be impossible to say, until after the next European war. A village under fire is not
now an ideal defensive position. A single shrapnel penetrating the outer wall may
kill all the occupants of a room; a single field-howitzer shell may practically ruin a
house. At the same time, a house or line of houses may (without any preliminary
labour at all) give very good protection against shell fire to troops behind them.
Further, the value to the defence of the slightest cover, once the infantry attack has
developed, is so great that the ruins of walls and houses occupied at the right mo-
ment may prove an impregnable stronghold. This class of fighting, however, does
not properly come under the present heading. For the details of the defence of
walls, houses, &c., see the official Mil. Engineering (1908).

Entrenching under Fire.—Progress in this direction has been delayed by the reluc-
tance of military authorities to add a portable entrenching tool to the heavy burden
already carried by the infantry soldier. Further delay has resulted from the attempts
of enthusiastic inventors to produce a tool that shall weigh nothing, go easily in the
pocket, and be available as a pick, shovel, saw, hand-axe or corkscrew. A tool that
will serve more than one use is seldom satisfactory for any.

The object of entrenching under fire is to enable attacking infantry, when their ad-
vance is checked by the enemy’s fire, to maintain the ground they have won by
extemporizing cover where none exists. The need of this was first felt in the Ameri-
can Civil War, and towards the close of it a small entrenching spade 22 in. long and
weighing only 112 lbs was introduced by Brigadier-General H. W. Benham into the
Army of the Potomac. Since that time a great number of patterns have been tried,
including shovel, trowel and adze types. The most popular of these has been the
Linnemann spade, which is used by most continental armies and by the Japanese.
The Austrian form of this tool is a rectangular spade with straight handle. The
length over all is a little less than 20 in. The blade is 8 in. long by 6 in wide. One side

137
of it has a saw edge, and the other a cutting edge. For carriage, the blade is en-
closed in a leather case, which is strapped to the pack or the waist-belt. In the
British army the Wallace combined pick and shovel was used for some time but was
eventually dropped. There was always great doubt whether the utility of a portable
entrenching tool was such as to justify the inconvenience caused to the soldier in
carrying it. But the experience of the Russo-Japanese War seems to have finally
established the necessity of it, and also the fact that it must generally be used lying
down. For this purpose and for convenience in carrying it on the person, a very light
short-handled tool is required.

The soldier lying down cannot attempt to dig a trench but can make a little hole by
his side as he lies and put the earth in front of his head. A method introduced by
the Japanese is that at each check in the advance the front line should do this, and,
as they go forward, the supporting lines in succession should improve the cover
thus commenced.

There are few things that soldiers dislike more, in the way of training, than trench-
work. For men unused to it, it is tiring and tedious work, and it is difficult for them
to realize its importance. At the same time, it is a commonplace of recent history
that men who have been in action a few times develop a great affection for the
shovel. The need of trenches grows with the growth of firearms, and the latest fea-
ture of modern tactics is the use of them in attack as well as in defence. The obser-
vation has often been made—with what truth as a general proposition we cannot
here discuss—that modern battles tend more and more to resemble a siege. The
weaker side, it is said, entrenches itself; the other bombards and attacks. After
gaining as much ground as they can, the attacking troops wait for nightfall and en-
trench; perhaps making a further advance and entrenchment before dawn. In the
last stage the attack might even be reduced to gaining ground by sapping. In open
and featureless ground, where the rifle and gun have full play, the trench is to the
modern soldier very much what the breastplate was to the man-at-arms, an abso-
lute essential.

The most important point in connexion with modern field fortification is the effect
on both strategy and tactics of the increased resisting power of the defence. A
small force well entrenched can check the frontal attack of a very much larger
force, and while holding its position can make itself felt over a wider radius than
ever before. This must needs have a marked effect on strategy, and it is quite possi-
ble to foresee such an ultimate triumph of field fortification as that one force
should succeed in surrounding another stronger than itself, and by entrenching
prevent the latter from breaking out and compel its surrender.

138
 VI. CONCLUSION
In tracing the history of the science of fortification and in outlining the practice of
our own time it has been necessary to dwell chiefly on the material means of de-
fence and attack. The human element has had to be almost ignored. But here
comes in the paradox, that the material means are after all the least important ele-
ment of defence. Certainly, it is inconceivable that the designer of a fortress should
not try to make it as strong as is consistent with the object in view and the means at
his disposal. And yet while engineers in all ages have sought eagerly for strength
and refinements of strength, the fact remains that the best defences recorded in
history owed little to the builder’s art. The splendid defence in 1667 of Candia,
whose enceinte, of early Italian design, was already obsolete but whose capture
cost the Turks 100,000 men; the three years defence of Ostend in 1601; the holding
of Arcot by Clive, are instances that present themselves to the memory at once. The
very weight of the odds against them sometimes calls out the best qualities of the
defenders; and the man when at his best is worth many times more than the ram-
part behind which he fights. But it would be a poor dependence deliberately to
make a place weak in order to evoke these qualities. One cannot be sure that the
garrison will rise to the occasion, and the weakness of the place has very often been
found an excuse for giving it up with little or no resistance.

Very much depends on the governor. Hence the French saying, “tant vaut l’homme,
tant vaut la place.” Among modern men we think of Todleben (not governor, but
the soul of the defence) at Sevastopol, Fenwick Williams at Kars, Denfert-Rochereau
at Belfort, and Osman Pasha at Plevna. The sieges of the 16th and 17th centuries
offer many instances in which the event turned absolutely on the personal qualities
of the governor; in some cases, distinguished by courage, skill and foresight, in oth-
ers by incapacity, cowardice or treachery. The reader is referred to Carnot’s Défense
des places fortes for a most interesting summary of such cases, one or two of which
are quoted below.

Naarden was besieged by the prince of Orange in September 1673 and defended by
Philippe de Procé, sieur Dupas. The duke of Luxemburg visited the place some hours
before it was invested and arranged with Dupas to relieve him as soon as he had
collected his cavalry. But the governor lost his head when he saw the enemy en-
camped around the place and surrendered it before he had even lost the covered
way. He was subsequently tried by a council of war and sentenced to be degraded
before the troops and imprisoned for life. The reason the court gave for not con-
demning him to death was that they could find no regulation which condemned a
man to loss of life for being a coward. (At that period the decapitation of a governor
who was considered to have failed in his duty was not uncommon.) This man, how-
ever, was not wanting in physical courage. He was in prison at Grave when it was
besieged a year later, obtained leave to serve as a volunteer in the defence, fought

139
well and was killed. A similar case occurred in the English Civil War. In 1645 the
young governor of the royal post at Bletchingdon House was entertaining a party of
ladies from Oxford, when Cromwell appeared and summoned him to surrender. The
attacking force had no firearm more powerful than a carbine, but the governor,
overawed by Cromwell’s personality, yielded. Charles I., who was usually merciful to
his officers, caused this governor to be shot.

A defence of another kind was that of Quillebœuf in 1592. Henry IV. had occupied it
and ordered it to be fortified. Before the works had been well begun, Mayenne sent
5000 men to retake it. Bellegarde undertook its defence, with 115 soldiers, 45 gen-
tlemen and a few inhabitants. He had ammunition but not much provisions. With
these forces and a line of defence a league in length, he sustained a siege, beat off
an assault on the 17th day, and was relieved immediately afterwards. The relieving
forces were astonished to find that he had been defending not a fortified town but
a village, with a ditch which, in the places where it had been begun, measured no
more than 4 ft. wide and deep.

At that period the business aspect of siege warfare already alluded to had been
recognized, but many commanders retained the old spirit of chivalry in their reluc-
tance to say the “loth word.” The gallant Marshal d’Essé, who feared nothing but
the idea of dying in his bed, was lying ill at his country house when he was sent for
by the king. He was ordered to take command at Thérouanne, then threatened by
Charles V., and made his farewell with these words, which remind us somewhat of
Grenville: “Sire, je m’y en vais donc de bon et loyal cœur; mais j’ai ouï dire que la
place est mal envitaillée, non pas seulement pourvue de palles, de tranches, ni de
hottes pour remparer et remuer la terre; mais lors, quand entendrez que Thé-
rouanne est prise, dites hardiment que d’Essé est guéri de sa jaunisse et mort.”
(“Sire, I am therefore going with good and loyal heart; but I heard that the place is
badly supplied, not only provided with paddles, slices, or hoods to seize and stir the
earth; but then, when you hear that Thérouanne is taken, boldly say that D'Essé is
cured of his jaundice and dead. ”). And he made good his word, for he was killed at
the breach by a shot from the arquebus of a Spanish soldier.

Sometimes the ardour of defence inspired the whole body of the inhabitants Fine
examples of this are the defences of Rochelle (1627) and Saint-Jean de Lône (1636),
but these are too long to quote. We may, however, mention Livron, which is curi-
ous. In 1574 Henry III. sent one of his favourites, Saint Lary Bellegarde, against the
Huguenots in the Dauphiné. Being entrusted with a good army, this gentleman
hoped to achieve some distinction. He began by attacking the little town of Livron,
which had no garrison and was defended only by the inhabitants. But he was re-
pulsed in three assaults, and the women of the town conceived such a contempt for
him that they came in crowds to empty their slops at the breach by way of insult.

140
This annoyed him very much, and he ordered a fresh assault. The women alone
sustained this one, repulsed it light heartedly, and the siege was raised.

The history of siege warfare has more in it of human interest than any other branch
of military history. It is full of the personal element, of the nobility of human endur-
ance and of dramatic surprises. And more than any battles in the open field, it
shows the great results of the courage of men fighting at bay. Think of Clive at Ar-
cot. With 4 officers, 120 Europeans and 200 sepoys, with two 18-pounders and 8
lighter guns, he held the fort against 150 Europeans and some 10,000 native troops.
“The fort” (says Orme) “seemed little capable of sustaining the impending siege. Its
extent was more than a mile in circumference. The walls were in many places ruin-
ous; the rampart too narrow to admit the firing of artillery; the parapet low and
slightly built; several of the towers were decayed, and none of them capable of re-
ceiving more than one piece of cannon; the ditch was in most places fordable, in
others dry and in some choked up,” &c. These feeble ramparts were commanded
almost everywhere by the enemy’s musketry from the houses of the city outside
the fort, so that the defenders were hardly able to show themselves without being
hit, and much loss was suffered in this way. Yet with his tiny garrison, which tim-
bered about one man for every 7 yds. of the enclosure, Clive sustained a siege of 50
days, ending with a really severe assault on two large open breaches, which was
repulsed, and after which the enemy hastily decamped.

Such feats as this make arguments about successive lines of defence and the neces-
sity of keeps seem very barren. History, as far as the writer knows, shows no in-
stances where successive lines have been held with such brilliant results.

Clive’s defence of his breaches, which by all the then accepted rules of war were
untenable, brings us to another point which has been already mentioned, namely,
that a garrison might honourably make terms when there was an open breach in
their main line of defence. This is a question upon which Carnot delivers himself
very strongly in endeavouring to impress upon French officers the necessity of de-
fence to the last moment. Speaking of Cormontaingne’s imaginary Journal of the
Attack of a Fortress (which is carried up to the 35th day, and finishes by the words
“It is now time to surrender”), he says with great scorn: “Crillon would have cried,
‘It is time to begin fighting.’ He would have said as at the siege of Quillebœuf,
‘Crillon is within, the enemy is without.’ Thus, when Bayard was defending the
shattered walls of Mézières, M. de Cormontaingne, if he had been there, would
have said, ‘It is time to surrender.’ Thus, when Guise was repairing the breaches of
Metz under the redoubled fire of the enemy, M. de Cormontaingne, if he had been
there, would have said, ‘It is time to surrender.’” Carnot of course allows that Cor-
montaingne was personally brave. His scorn is for the accepted principle, not for
the man.

141
It is interesting to contrast with this passage some remarks by Sir John Jones, made
in answer to Carnot’s book. He says in the notes to the second volume of
the Journals of the Sieges in Spain: “When the breach shall be pushed properly for-
ward, if the governor insists upon the ceremony of his last retrenchment being
stormed, as by so doing he spills the blood of many brave men without a justifiable
object, his life and the lives of the garrison should be made the forfeit. A system
enforced by terror must be counteracted by still greater terror. Humanity towards
an enemy in such a case is cruelty to one’s own troops.... The principle to be com-
bated is not the obligation to resist behind the breach—for where there is a good
retrenchment the bastion should be disputed equally with the counter-guard or the
ravelin and can as safely be so—but the doctrine that surrender shall not take place
when successful resistance becomes hopeless.”

Carnot’s word is “fight to the last.” Sir John Jones says the commander has no right
to provoke further carnage when resistance is hopeless. The question of course is,
when is resistance hopeless? Sir John Jones’s reputation leaves little doubt that if
he had been commanding a fortress on British soil, he would not have thought re-
sistance hopeless as long as there was anything whatever left to defend. The reason
why these two men of similar temper are found in opposition is quite simple. When
Carnot wrote, the French army occupied most of the important fortresses of Eu-
rope, and it was to the interest of the emperor that if attacked they should be held
to the last moment, in order to cause the enemy as much delay and loss as possible.
Jones, on the other hand, was one of the engineers who were engaged in besieging
those fortresses, and his arguments were prompted by sympathy for his own coun-
trymen whose lives were sacrificed by the prolongation of such resistance.

A century has passed since Carnot and Jones wrote, and the ideas in which they had
been educated were those of the pre-Napoleonic era. In the 18th century fortresses
were many, good roads few, and campaigns for the most part leisurely. To the Eu-
ropean nations of that time, inheritors of a perennial state of war, the idea of con-
centrating the national resources on a short and decisive campaign had not oc-
curred. The “knock-out blow” had not been invented. All these conditions are now
so changed that new standards must be and indeed have been set up, both for the
defence of places and the general employment of fortification.

As regards the conduct of the defence, the massacre of a garrison as a penalty for
holding out too long would meet with no sympathy in the present day. On the other
hand, the issue of modern wars is worked out so rapidly that if a fortress is well
defended, with the advantage of the present weapons, there is always a chance of
holding out till the close of the war. If the place is worth holding, it should as a rule
be held to the bitter end on the chance of a favourable turn in affairs; moreover,
the maintenance of an important siege under modern conditions imposes a severe

142
strain on the enemy and immobilizes a large number of his troops.

In concluding this article some elementary considerations in connexion with the use
of permanent defences may be noticed, though the general question of strategic
fortification is outside its scope. The objects of fortification differ, as has been
shown, from age to age. In former times a peaceful people exposed to the raids of
piratical Norsemen might find their refuge tower essential; later, a robber-baron
might look on his castle as so much capital invested; a wealthy medieval town might
prove the value of its walls more than once in a generation; a country without a
standing army might gain time for preparation by means of fortresses barring the
roads across the frontier. But how does the question stand to-day among European
countries which can mobilize their full fighting strength at a few hours’ notice? It
can only be answered when the circumstances of a particular country are examined.
If we assume such an impossible case as that of two nations of equal fighting
strength and equal resources standing ready in arms to defend a common frontier,
and that the theatre of war presents no difficulties on either side, then the use of
permanent fortifications, merely an adjunct to military strength, is wrong. Fortress-
es do not decide the issue of a campaign; they can only influence it. It is better,
therefore, to put all the money the fortress would have cost, and all the manpower
that its maintenance implies, into the increase and equipment of the active army.
For the fate of the fortress must depend ultimately on the result of the operations
of the active armies. Moreover, the very assumption that resources on both sides
are equal means that the nation which has spent money on permanent fortifications
will have the smaller active army, and therefore condemns itself beforehand to a
defensive rôle.

This general negation is only useful as a corrective to the tendency to over-fortify,

for such a case cannot occur. In practice there will always be occasion for some use
of fortification. A mountain range may lend itself to an economical defence by a few
men and some inexpensive barrier forts. A nation may have close to its frontier an
important strategic centre, such as a railway junction, or a town of the first manu-
facturing importance, which must be protected. In such a case it may be necessary
to guard against accidents by means of a fortress. Again, if one nation is admittedly
slower in mobilization than the other, it may be desirable to guard one portion of
the frontier by fortresses so as to force invasion into a district where concentration
against it is easiest.

As for the defence of a capital, this cannot become necessary if it stands at a rea-
sonable distance from the frontier until the active armies have arrived at some re-
sult. If the fighting strength of the country has been practically destroyed, it is not of
much use to stand a siege in the capital. There can be but one end, and it is better,
as businessmen say, to cut losses. If the fighting strength is not entirely destroyed

143
and can be recruited within a reasonable time, say two or three months, then it
appears that under modern conditions the capital might be held for that time by
means of extemporized defences. The question is one that can only be decided by
going into the circumstances of each particular case.

The case of a weak country with powerful and aggressive neighbours is in a differ-
ent category. If she stands alone, she will be eaten up in time, fortifications or no
fortifications; but if she can reckon on assistance from outside, it may be worth-
while to expend most of the national resources on permanent defences.
These hypothetical cases have, however, no value, except as illustrations to the
most elementary arguments. The actual problems that soldiers and statesmen have
to consider are too complex to be dealt with in generalities, and no mere treatise
can supply the place of knowledge, thought and practice.

Coevorden

144
 Bibliography.

The more important works on the subject are:

Dürer, Unterricht zur Befestigung (Nuremberg, 1527).
Speckle, Architectur von Festungen (Strassburg, 1589).
Fritach, L’Architecture mil. ou la f. nouvelle (Paris, 1637).
Pagan, Les Fortif. (Paris, 1689).
De Ville, Les Fortif. (Lyons, 1629).
De Fer, Introduction à la fortification (Paris, 1723).
B. F. de Belidor, Science des Ingénieurs, &c. (Paris, 1729).
Works of Coehoorn, Vauban, Montalembert, Cormontaingne; Mandar, De l’archi-
tecture des fortresses (Paris, 1801).
Chasseloup-Laubat, Essais sur quelques parties de l’artil. et de la fortification (Milan,
1811).
Carnot, Défense des places fortes (Paris, 1812).
Jones, Journals of Sieges in Spain (3rd ed., London, 1846).
T. Choumara, Mémoire sur la fortification (1847).
A von Zastrow, Geschichte der beständigen Befestigung (N.D., Fr. trans.).
Works of Sir C. Pasley; Noizet, Principes de fortif. (Paris, 1859).
Dufour, De la fortif. permanente (Paris, 1850)
E. Viollet le Duc, L’Architecture militaire au moyen âge (Paris, 1854).
Cosseron de Villenoisy, Essai historique sur la fortification (Paris, 1869)
Works of Brialmont (q.v.).
Delambre, La Fortification dans ses rapport: avec la tactique et la stratégie (Paris,
1887)
V. Sauer, Angriff und Verteidigung fester Plätze (Berlin, 1885).
Schroeter, Die Festung in der heutigen Kriegführung (Berlin, 1898–1906).
Baron E. v. Leithner, Die beständige Befestigung und der Festungskrieg (Vienna,
1894–1899).
W. Stavenhagen, Grundriss der Befestigungslehre (Berlin, 1900–1909).
Plessix and Legrand, Manuel complet de fortification (Paris, 1900, new edition 1909)
Ritter v. Brunner, Die beständige Befestigung (Vienna, 1909), Die Feldbefes-
tigung (Vienna, 1904).
Rocchi, Traccia per lo studio della fortificazione permanente (Turin, 1902).
Sir G. S. Clarke, Fortification 1907); V. Deguise, La Fortification permanente contem-
poraine Brussels, 1908).
Royal Military Academy, Text-book of Fortification, pt. ii. (London, 1893).
British official Instruction in Military Engineering, pts. i., ii. and iv. (London, 1900–
1908).

145
 References

*1 VAUBAN, SÉBASTIEN LE PRESTRE DE (1633-1707), marshal of France, the most

celebrated of military engineers (see Fortification), was born at Saint-Léger-
Vauban (Yonne). At the age of ten he was left an orphan in very poor circumstanc-
es, and his boyhood and youth were spent amongst the peasantry of his native
place. A fortunate event brought him under the care of the Carmelite prior of
Sémur, who undertook his education, and the grounding in mathematics, science
and geometry which he thus received was of the highest value in his subsequent
career. At the age of seventeen Vauban joined the regiment of Condé in the war of
the Fronde. His gallant conduct won him within a year the offer of a commission,
which he declined on account of poverty. Condé then employed him to assist in the
fortification of Clermont-en-Argonne. Soon afterwards he was taken prisoner by the
royal troops; but though a rebel he was well treated, and the kindness of Mazarin
converted the young engineer into a devoted servant of the king. He was employed
in the siege of St Ménéhould (which he had helped to storm as a Frondeur) and
won a lieutenancy in the regiment of Burgundy, and at Stenay he was twice wound-
ed. Soon afterwards he besieged and took his own first fortress, Clermont; and in
May 1655 he received his commission as an ingénieur du roi, having served his ap-
prenticeship under the Chevalier de Clerville, one of the foremost engineers of the
time. Between that year and the peace of 1659 he had taken part in or directed ten
sieges with distinction, had been several times wounded, and was rewarded by the
king with the free gift of a company in the famous Picardy regiment. About this time
he married a cousin, Jeanne d'Aulnay. After the peace Vauban was put in charge of
the construction of several important defences, amongst other places at Dunkirk,
where his work continued until the year before his death. On the renewal of war in
1662 he conducted, under the eyes of the king, the sieges of Douai, Tournai and
Lille. At Lille he so distinguished himself that he received a lieutenancy in the guard
(ranking as a colonelcy).

The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle confirmed France in the possession of new fortresses,

which Vauban now improved or rebuilt. Hitherto the characteristic features of his
method of fortification had not been developed, and the systems of preceding engi-
neers were faithfully followed. Colbert and Louvois were profoundly interested in
the work, and it was at the request of the latter that the engineer drew up in 1669
his Mémoire pour servir a l'instruction dans la conduite des sièges (this, with a
memorandum on the defence of fortresses by another hand, was published at Lei-
den in 1740). On the renewal of war Vauban again conducted the most important
sieges (Rheinbergen and Nijmwegen 1672, Maestricht and Trier 1673, Besançon
1674). In the latter year he also supervised the only defence in which he ever took
part, that of Oudenarde. This was followed by the reduction of Dinant, Huy and
Limburg. At this time he wrote for the commandants of Verdun and Le Quesnoy,

146
valuable Instructions pour la défense (MS. Dépôt des Fortifications, Paris; see also
Quincy, Art de la guerre, Paris, 1740). In 1676 he was made maréchal de camp. He
took Condé, Bouchain and other places in that year, Valenciennes and Cambrai in
1677, Ghent and Ypres in 1678.

It was at this time that Vauban synthesized the methods of attacking strong places,
on which his claim to renown as an engineer rests far more than on his systems of
fortification. The introduction of a systematic approach by parallels (said to have
been suggested by the practice of the Turks at Candia in 1668) dates from the siege
of Maestricht, and in principle remains to this day the standard method of attacking
a fortress. The peace of Nijmwegen gave more territory to France, and more for-
tresses had to be adapted. Vauban was named commissaire-général des fortifica-
tions on the death of De Clerville, and wrote in 1679 a memorandum on the places
of the new frontier, from which it appears that from Dunkirk to Dinant France pos-
sessed fifteen fortresses and forts, with thirteen more in second line. Most of these
had been rebuilt by Vauban, and further acquisitions, notably Strassburg (1681),
involved him in unceasing work. At Saarlouis for the first time appeared Vauban's
“first system” of fortification, which remained the accepted standard till compara-
tively recent times. He never hesitated to retain what was of advantage in the
methods of his predecessors, which he had hitherto followed, and it was in practice
rather than in theory, that he surpassed them. In 1682 his “second system,” which
introduced modifications of the first designed to prolong the resistance of the for-
tress, began to appear; and about the same time he wrote a practical manual enti-
tled Le Directeur-Général des fortifications (Hague, 1683-85). Having now attained
the rank of lieut.-general, he took the field once more, and captured Courtrai in
1683, and Luxemburg in the following year. The unexpected strength of certain
towers designed by the Spanish engineer Louvigni (fl. 1673) at Luxemburg suggest-
ed the tower-bastions which are the peculiar feature of Vauban's second system
(see Augoyat, Mémoires inédits du Ml. de Vauban, Paris, 1841) which was put into
execution at Belfort in the same year (Provost du Vernois, De la fortification depuis
Vauban, Paris, 1861). In 1687 he chose Landau as the chief place of arms of Lower
Alsace, and lavished on the place all the resources of his art. But side by side with
this development grew up the far more important scheme of attack. He instituted a
company of miners, and the elaborate experiments carried out under his supervi-
sion resulted in the establishment of all the necessary formulae for military mining
(Traité des mines, Paris, 1740 and 1799; Hague, 1744); while at the siege of Ath in
1697, having in the meanwhile taken part in more sieges, notably that of Namur in
1692 (defended by the great Dutch engineer Coehoorn), he employed ricochet fire
for the first time as the principal means of breaking down the defence. He had in-
deed already used it with effect at Philipsburg in 1688 and at Namur, but the jeal-
ousy of the artillery at outside interference had hindered the full use of this re-
markable invention, which with his other improvements rendered the success of

147
the attack almost certain. After the peace of Ryswick Vauban rebuilt or improved
other fortresses, and finally New Breisach, fortified on his “third system” — which
was in fact a modification of the second and was called by Vauban himself système
de Landau perfectionné. His last siege was that of Old Breisach in 1703, when he
reduced the place in a fortnight. On the 14th of January of that year Vauban had
been made a marshal of France, a rank too exalted for the technical direction of
sieges, and his active career came to an end with his promotion. Soon afterwards
appeared his Traité de l'attaque des places, a revised and amplified edition of the
older memoir of 1669, which contains the methods of the fully developed Vauban
attack, the main features of which are the parallels, ricochet fire and the attack of
the defending personnel by vertical fire (ed. Augoyat, Paris, 1829).

But Louis XIV. was now thrown on the defensive, and the war of the Spanish Succes-
sion saw the gradual wane of Vauban's influence, as his fortresses were taken and
retaken. The various captures of Landau, his chef-d'œuvre, caused him to be regard-
ed with disfavour, for it was not realized that the greatness of his services was ra-
ther in the attack than in the defence. In the darkness of defeat he turned his atten-
tion to the defence; but his work De la défense des places (ed. by General Valazé,
Paris, 1829) is of far less worth than the Attaque, and his far-seeing ideas on en-
trenched camps (Traité des fortifications de campagne) were coldly received,
though therein may be found the elements of the “detached forts” system now
universal in Europe. The close of his life, saddened by the consciousness of waning
influence and by failing health, he devoted largely to the arrangement of the volu-
minous manuscripts (Mes oisivetés) which contained his reflections on war, admin-
istration, finance, agriculture and the like. In 1689 he had had the courage to make
a representation to the king in favour of the republication of the Edict of Nantes,
and in 1698 he wrote his Projet d'une dixme. royale (see Economistes financières du
XVIIIe siècle, Paris, 1851), a remarkable work foreshadowing the principles of the
French Revolution. Vauban was deeply impressed with the deplorable condition of
the peasantry, whose labour he regarded as the main foundation of all wealth, and
protested in particular against the unequal incidence of taxation and the exemp-
tions and privileges of the upper classes. His dixme. royale, a tax to be impartially
applied to all classes, was a tenth of all agricultural produce payable in kind, and a
tenth of money chargeable on manufacturers and merchants. This work was pub-
lished in 1707, and instantly suppressed by order of the king. The marshal died
heart-broken at the failure of his efforts a few days after the publication of the or-
der (March 30, 1707). At the Revolution his remains were scattered, but in 1808 his
heart was found and deposited by order of Napoleon in the church of the Invalides.
Vauban's attention was closely engaged, not only in general military matters, but in
political and financial reform and the inland navigation of France. He carried out the
rearmament of the French infantry with flint-lock muskets and the socket bayonet.
The order of St Louis was suggested by him, and lastly may be mentioned the for-

148
tress-models which he constructed, most of which are in the Invalides at Paris, and
some in the Berlin Zeughaus. The actual total of his work as an engineer is worth
recording. He conducted forty sieges and took part in more than three hundred
combats, while his skill and experience were employed on the construction or re-
building of more than 160 fortresses of all kinds. Mes oisivetés long remained un-
published, and of the twelve volumes of manuscript seven are lost. The remainder
were published in Paris, 1841-45, in an abridged form, and of the five manuscript
volumes three are in public hands, and two belong to the families of two famous
engineers, Augoyat and Haxo. At the Hague (1737–1742) appeared, dedicated to
Frederick of Prussia, De Hondt’s edition of De l’attaque et defense, &c., and of this
work an improved edition appeared subsequently. But the first satisfactory editions
are those of Augoyat and Valazé mentioned above.

*2. CORMONTAINGNE, LOUIS DE (c. 1697–1752), French military engineer, was

born at Strassburg. He was present as a volunteer at the sieges of Freiburg and Lan-
dau in the later years of the War of the Spanish Succession, and in 1715 he entered
the engineers. After being stationed for some years at Strassburg he became cap-
tain, and was put in charge (at first in a subordinate capacity, and subsequently as
chief engineer) of the new works, Forts Moselle and Bellecroix, at Metz, which he
built according to his own system of fortification. He was present at the siege of
Philipsburg in 1733, and as a lieutenant-colonel took part in most of the sieges in
the Low Countries during the War of the Austrian Succession. He attained the rank
of brigadier and finally that of maréchal de camp, and was employed in fortification
work until his death. His Architecture militaire, written in 1714, was long kept secret
by order of the authorities, but, an unauthorized edition having appeared at the
Hague in 1741, he himself prepared another version called Premier mémoire sur la
fortification, which from 1741 onwards was followed by others. His ideas are closely
modelled on those of Vauban (q.v.), and in his lifetime he was not considered the
equal of such engineers as d’Asfeld and Filley. It was not until twenty years after his
death that his system became widely known. Fourcroy de Rainecourt, then chief of
engineers, searching the archives for valuable matter, chose the numerous memoirs
of Cormontaingne for publication amongst engineer officers in 1776. Even then they
only circulated privately, and it was not until the engineer Bousmard published Cor-
montaingne’s Mémorial de l’attaque des places (Berlin, 1803) that Fourcroy, and
after him General La Fitte de Clavé, actually gave to the general public the Œuvres
posthumes de Cormontaingne (Paris, 1806–1809).

His system of fortification was not marked by any great originality of thought, which
indeed could not be expected of a member of the corps du génie, the characteristics
of which were a close caste spirit and an unquestioning reverence for the authority
of Vauban. Forts Moselle and Bellecroix are still in existence.

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*3 CHASSELOUP-LAUBAT, FRANÇOIS, Marquis de (1754–1833), French general and
military engineer, was born at St Sernin (Lower Charente) on the 18th of August
1754, of a noble family, and entered the French engineers in 1774. He was still a
subaltern at the outbreak of the Revolution, becoming captain in 1791. His ability
as a military engineer was recognized in the campaigns of 1792 and 1793. In the
following year he won distinction in various actions and was promoted successive-
ly chef de bataillon and colonel. He was chief of engineers at the siege of Mainz in
1796, after which he was sent to Italy. He there conducted the first siege of Man-
tua, and reconnoitred the positions and lines of advance of the army of Bonaparte.
He was promoted general of brigade before the close of the campaign, and was
subsequently employed in fortifying the new Rhine frontier of France. His work as
chief of engineers in the army of Italy (1799) was conspicuously successful, and
after the battle of Novi he was made general of division. When Napoleon took the
field in 1800 to retrieve the disasters of 1799, he again selected Chasseloup as his
engineer general. During the peace of 1801–1805 he was chiefly employed in re-
constructing the defences of northern Italy, and in particular the afterwards famous
Quadrilateral. His chef-d’oeuvre was the great fortress of Alessandria on the Ta-
naro. In 1805 he remained in Italy with Masséna, but at the end of 1806 Napoleon,
then engaged in the Polish campaign, called him to the Grande Armée, with which
he served in the campaign of 1806-07, directing the sieges of Colberg, Danzig and
Stralsund. During the Napoleonic domination in Germany, Chasseloup reconstruct-
ed many fortresses, in particular Magdeburg. In the campaign of 1809 he again
served in Italy. In 1810 Napoleon made him a councillor of state. His last campaign
was that of 1812 in Russia. He retired from active service soon afterwards, though
in 1814 he was occasionally engaged in the inspection and construction of fortifica-
tions. Louis XVIII. made him a peer of France and a knight of St Louis. He refused to
join Napoleon in the Hundred Days, but after the second Restoration he voted in
the chamber of peers against the condemnation of Marshal Ney. In politics he be-
longed to the constitutional party. The king created him a marquis. Chasseloup’s
later years were employed chiefly in putting in order his manuscripts, a task which
he had to abandon owing to the failure of his sight. His only published work
was Correspondence d’un général français, &c. sur divers sujets (Paris, 1801, repub-
lished Milan, 1805 and 1811, under the title Correspondance de deux générals, &c.,
essais sur quelques parties d’artillerie et de fortification). The most important of his
papers are in manuscript in the Depôt of Fortifications, Paris.

As an engineer Chasseloup was an adherent, though of advanced views, of the old

bastioned system. He followed in many respects the engineer Bousmard, whose
work was published in 1797 and who fell, as a Prussian officer, in the defence of
Danzig in 1807 against Chasseloup’s own attack. His front was applied to Alessan-
dria, as has been stated, and contains many elaborations of the bastion trace, with,
in particular, masked flanks in the tenaille, which served as extra flanks of the

150
bastions. The bastion itself was carefully and minutely retrenched. The ordinary
ravelin he replaced by a heavy casemated caponier after the example of Montalem-
bert, and, like Bousmard’s, his own ravelin was a large and powerful work pushed
out beyond the glacis.

*4 COEHOORN, MENNO, Baron van (1641-1704), Dutch soldier and military engi-
neer, of Swedish extraction, was born at Leeuwarden in Friesland. He received an
excellent military and general education, and at the age of sixteen became a cap-
tain in the Dutch army. He took part in the defence of Maastricht in 1673 and in the
siege of Grave in the same year, where the small mortars (called coehorns) invent-
ed by him caused the French garrison considerable trouble (Seydel, Nachrichten
über Festungskriege, Leipzig, 1818). He was made a colonel for his gallant conduct
at the battle of Seneff (1674), and was present also at the battles of Cassel (1677)
and Saint Denis (1678).

The circumstances of the time and the country turned Coehoorn’s attention to the
art of fortification, and the events of the late war showed him that existing meth-
ods could no longer be relied upon. His first published work, Versterckinge
de Vijfhoeks met alle syne Buytenwerken (Leeuwarden, 1682), at once aroused
attention, and involved the author in a lively controversy with a rival engineer,
Louys Paan (Leeuwarden, 1682, 1683; copies are in the library of the Dutch ministry
of war). The military authorities were much interested in this, and entrusted Coe-
hoorn with the reconstruction of several fortresses in the Netherlands. This task he
continued throughout his career; and his experience in the work made him the wor-
thy rival of his great contemporary Vauban. He formulated his ideas a little later in
his chief work, Nieuwe Vestingbouw op en natte of lage horizont, &c. (Leeuwarden,
1685), in which he laid down three “systems,” the characteristic feature of which
was the multiplicity and great saliency of the works, which were calculated and in
principle are still eminently suited for flat and almost marshy sites such as those of
the Low Countries. He borrowed many of the details from the works of his Dutch
predecessor Freytag, of Albrecht Dürer, and of the German engineer Speckle, and in
general he aimed rather at the adaptation of his principles to the requirements of
individual sites than at producing a geometrically and theoretically perfect fortress;
and throughout his career he never hesitated to depart from his own rules in deal-
ing with exceptional cases, such as that of Groningen. Subsequent editions
of Nieuwe Vestingbouw appeared in Dutch (1702, and frequently afterwards), Eng-
lish (London, 1705), French (Wesel, 1705), and German (Düsseldorf, 1709).
From 1688 to the treaty of Ryswick Coehoorn served as a brigadier. At the battle of
Fleurus he greatly distinguished himself, and in 1692 he defended Namur, a fortress
of his own creation. Namur was taken by Vauban; but the Dutch engineer had his
revenge three years later, when the place, on which in the meantime Vauban had
lavished his skill, fell to his attack.

151
Coehoorn became lieutenant-general and inspector-general of the Netherlands
fortresses, and the high-German peoples as well as his own countrymen honoured
him. He commanded a corps in the army of the duke of Marlborough from 1701 to
1703, and in the constant siege warfare of these campaigns in the Low Countries
his technical skill was of the highest value. The swift reduction of the fortress of
Bonn and the siege of Huy in 1703 were his crowning successes. At the opening of
his following campaign he was on his way to confer with Marlborough when he
died of apoplexy at Wijkel on the 17th of March 1704.
His “first system” was applied to numerous places in Holland, notably Nijmwegen,
Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom. Mannheim in Germany was also fortified in this way,
while the “second system” was applied to Belgrade and Temesvár in eastern Eu-
rope.

*5 MONTALEMBERT, MARC RENÉ, Marquis de (1714–1800), French military engi-

neer and writer, was born at Angoulême on the 16th of July 1714, and entered the
French Army in 1732. He fought in the War of the Polish Succession on the Rhine
(1733–34), and in the War of the Austrian Succession made the campaigns of 1742
in Bohemia and Italy. In the years preceding the Seven Years’ War, Montalembert
(who had become an associate member of the Académie des Sciences in 1747) de-
voted his energies to the art of fortification, to which Vauban’s Traité de
l’attaque attracted him, and founded the arsenal at Ruelle, near his birthplace. On
the outbreak of war he became French commissioner with the allied army of Swe-
den, with the rank of brigadier-general. He constructed the field fortifications of
Anklam and Stralsund. In 1761 he was promoted maréchal de camp, and began the
works on which his fame rests. Montalembert’s fortress has been aptly described
by an English author as an “immense battery.” The intricacies of trace by which
Vauban and Cormontaigne sought to minimize the power of the attack, are aban-
doned in favour of a simple tenaille plan so arranged that the defenders can bring
an overwhelming fire to bear on the works of the besieger. Montalembert, who
himself drew his idea from the practice of Swedish and Prussian engineers, fur-
nished the German constructors of the early 19th century with the means of de-
signing entrenched camps suitable to modern conditions of warfare. The
“polygonal” method of fortification is the direct outcome of Montalembert’s sys-
tems. In his own country the caste-spirit of the engineer corps was roused to de-
fend Vauban, and though Montalembert was allowed to construct some successful
works at Aix and Oléron, he was forbidden to publish his method, and given but
little opportunity for actual building. After fifteen years of secrecy he published in
Paris (1776–1778) the first edition of La Fortification perpendiculaire. At the time of
the Revolution he surrendered a pension, which had been granted him for the loss
of an eye, although he was deeply in debt, particularly on account of his Ruelle
foundry, on which 6000 livres were due to him from the state, which he never re-
ceived. Persuaded by his wife, he joined in the emigration of the noblesse, and for a

152
time lived in England. All his possessions were thereupon sequestrated by the re-
publican government. He very soon returned, divorced his wife, and married again.
He obtained the annulment of the sequestration. Carnot often called him into con-
sultation on military affairs, and, in 1792, promoted him general of division. Pro-
posed as a member of the Institut in 1797, he withdrew his candidature in favour of
General Bonaparte. He died at Paris on the 29th of March 1800. His wife, Marie
Josephine de Comarieu, was the hostess of one of the best-known salons of Louis
XVI.’s time. She wrote two novels of merit, Elise Dumesnil (1798) and Horace
(1822). She died in 1832.

*6 CARNOT, LAZARE NICOLAS MARGUERITE (1753–1823), French general, was born

at Nolay in Burgundy in 1753. He received his training as an engineer at Mézières,
becoming an officer of the Corps de Génie in 1773 and a captain ten years later. He
had then just published his first work, an Essai sur les machines en général. In 1784
he wrote an essay on balloons, and his. Éloge of Vauban, read by him publicly, won
him the commendation of Prince Henry of Prussia. But as the result of a controver-
sy with Montalembert, Carnot abandoned the official, or Vauban, theories of the
art of fortification, and went over to the “perpendicular” school of Montalembert.
He was consequently imprisoned, on the pretext of having fought a duel, and only
released when selected to accompany Prince Henry of Prussia in a visit to Vauban’s
fortifications. In 1791 he married. The Revolution drew him into political life, and he
was elected a deputy for the Pas de Calais. In the Assembly he took a prominent
part in debates connected with the army; Carnot was a stern and sincere republi-
can, and voted for the execution of the king. In the campaigns of' 1792 and 1793 he
was continually employed as a commissioner in military, matters, his greatest ser-
vice being in April 1793 on the north-eastern frontier, where. the disastrous battle
of Neerwindenz and the subsequent defection of Dumouriez had thrown every-
thing into confusion. After doing what was possible to infuse energy into the opera-
tions of the French forces, he returned to Paris and was made a member of the
Committee of Public Safety. He was charged with duties corresponding to those of
the modern chief of the general staff and adjutant-general. As a member of the
committee he signed its decrees and was thus at least technically responsible for
the acts of the Reign of Terror. His energies were, however, directed to the organi-
zation, not yet of victory, but of defence. His labours were incessant; practically
every military document in the archives of the committee was Carnot’s own work,
and he was repeatedly in the held with the armies. His part in Jourdan’s, great vic-
tory at Wattignies was so important that the credit of the day has often been as-
signed to Carnot. The winter of 1793–1794 was spent in new preparations, in insti-
tuting a severe discipline in the new and ill-trained troops of the republic, and in
improvising means and, material of warn He continued to visit the armies at the
front, and to inspire them with energy. He acquiesced in the fall of Robespierre in
1794, but later defended Barere and others among his colleagues, declaring that he

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himself had constantly signed papers without reading them, as it was physically
impossible to do so in the press of business. When Carnot’s arrest was demanded in
May 1795, a deputy cried “Will you dare to lay hands on the man who has orga-
nized victory?”; Carnot had just accepted promotion to the rank of major in the
engineers. Throughout 1793, when he had been the soul of the national defence,
and 1794, in which year he had “organized victory” in fourteen armies, he was a
simple captain.
Carnot was elected one of the five Directors in November 1796, and continued to
direct the war department during the campaign of 1796. Late in 1796 he was made
a member (1st class) of the Institute, which he had helped to establish. He was for
two periods president of the Directory, but on the coup d’état of the 18th Fructidor
(1797) was forced to take refuge abroad. He returned to France after the 18th Bru-
maire (1799) and was re-elected to the Institute in 1800. Early in 1800 he became
minister of war, and he accompanied Moreau in the early part of the Rhine cam-
paign. His chief work was, however, in reducing the expenses of the armies. Contra-
ry to the usual custom he refused to receive presents from contractors, and he
effected much-needed reforms in every part of the military administration. He ten-
dered his resignation later in the year, but it was long before the First Consul would
accept it. From 1801 he lived in retirement with his family, employing himself
chiefly in scientific pursuits. As a senator he consistently opposed the increasing
monarchism of Napoleon, who, however, gave him in, 1809 a pension and commis-
sioned him to write a work on fortification for the school of Metz. In these years he
had published De la correlation des figures de géométrie (1801), Géométrie de posi-
tion (1803), and Principes fondamentaux de l’équilibre et du mouvement (1803), all
of which were translated into German. His great work on fortification appeared at
Paris in 1810 (De la défense de places fortes), and was translated for the use of al-
most every army in Europe. He took Montalembert as his groundwork. Without
sharing Montalembert’s antipathy to the bastioned trace, and his predilection for
high masonry caponiers, he followed out the principle of retarding the develop-
ment of the attack, and provided for the most active defence. To facilitate sorties in
great force he did away with a counter scarp wall, providing instead a long gentle
slope from the bottom of the ditch to the crest of the glacis. This, he imagined,
would compel an assailant to maintain large forces in. the advanced trenches,
which he proposed to attack by vertical fire from mortars. Along the front of his
fortress was built a heavy detached wall, loop-holed for fire, and sufficiently high to
be a most formidable obstacle. This “Carnot wall,” and, in general, Carnot’s princi-
ple of active defence, played a great part in the rise of modern fortification.
He did not seek employment in the field in the aggressive wars of Napoleon, re-
maining a sincere republican, but in 1814, when France itself was once more in dan-
ger, Carnot at once offered his services. He was made a general of division, and
Napoleon sent him to the important fortress of Antwerp as governor. His defence
of that place was one of the most brilliant episodes of the campaign of 1814. On his

154
return to Paris he addressed a political memoir to the restored king of France,
which aroused much attention both in France and abroad. He joined Napoleon dur-
ing the Hundred Days and was made minister of the interior, the office carrying
with it the dignity of count, and on the 2nd of June he was made a peer of France.
On the second Restoration he was proscribed. He lived thenceforward in Magde-
burg, occupying himself still with science. But his health rapidly declined, and he
died at Magdeburg on the 2nd of August 1823. His remains were solemnly removed
to the Pantheon in 1889. Long before this, in 1836, Antwerp had erected a statue
to its defender of 1814. In 1837 Arago pronounced his éloge before the Académie
des Sciences. The sincerity of his patriotism and his political convictions was proved
in 1801–1804 and in 1814. The memory of his military career is preserved in the
title, given to him in the Assembly, of “The organizer of victory.” His sons, Sadi and
L. Hippolyte, are separately noticed.

Fig. 56. Fort Villey le Sec, Twin 155mm turret. CHB

155
Other Research Guides OS Research Guide VII
OS Research Guide I Fortifications & Siegecraft
Armour Plate OS Research Guide VIII
OS Research Guide II Ordnance
Artillery OS Research Guide IX
OS Research Guide III Ballistics
Ammunition OS Research Guide X
OS Research Guide IV Castles I
Explosives OS Research Guide XI
OS Research Guide V Castles II
Gunpowder OS Research Guide XII
OS Research Guide VI Castles III
Range Finding

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