GRAVE COERCION/UNJUST VEXATION

We wish to stress that malice, compulsion or restraint need not be

alleged in an Information for unjust vexation. Unjust vexation exists
even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason
that the term is broad enough to include any human conduct which,
although not productive of some physical or material harm, would
unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. (Aquino, Revised
Penal Code, 1997 ed., Vol. III, p. 81) As pointed out in the
Decision sought to be reconsidered:

The paramount question [in a prosecution for unjust vexation] is

whether the offender's act causes annoyance, irritation, torment,
distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is
directed. That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while
relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack
and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond
cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed, by the acts of the
petitioner.
For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present:

1. that a person is prevented by another from doing something not

prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it
right or wrong;

2. that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or

intimidation; and

3. that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no
right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under
authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. (Sy v.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 166315, December 14, 2006,
511 SCRA 92, 96; Navarra v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
No. 176291, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 355, 363)

Admittedly, respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the

electricity, water and telephone facilities. Petitioners were thus
prevented from occupying the Unit and using it for the purpose for
which it was intended, that is, to be used as a law office. At the time of
the padlocking and cutting off of facilities, there was already a case
for the determination of the rights and obligations of both Alejandro,
as lessee and OPI as lessor, pending before the MeTC. There was in
fact an order for the respondents to remove the padlock. Thus, in
performing the acts complained of, Amor and Aguilar had no right to
do so.
The problem, however, lies on the second element. A perusal of
petitioners’ Joint Affidavit-Complaint shows that petitioners merely
alleged the fact of padlocking and cutting off of facilities to prevent
the petitioners from entering the Unit. For petitioners, the
commission of these acts is sufficient to indict respondents of grave
coercion. It was never alleged that the acts were effected by violence,
threat or intimidation. Petitioners belatedly alleged that they were
intimidated by the presence of security guards during the questioned
incident.

We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient

to cause intimidation to the petitioners.

There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a

reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil
upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his
spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. 44 Material
violence is not indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear
produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the
exercise of the will is sufficient.45

In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit

and cut off the facilities in the presence of security guards. As aptly
held by the CA, it was not alleged that the security guards committed
anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards
were not customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on
the part of petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation,
the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind.46
Here, the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards
are all lawyers who presumably know their rights. The presence of the
guards in fact was not found by petitioners to be significant because
they failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they
insist is that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from
using it for the purpose for which it was intended. This, according to
the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.

In the crime of grave coercion, violence through material force or

such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently,
control over the will of the offended party is an essential ingredient.
(People v. Alfeche, Jr., G.R. No. 102070, July 23, 1992, 211
SCRA 770, 779)

Notwithstanding the DOJ’s conclusion that respondents cannot be

charged with grave coercion, it ordered the filing of information for
unjust vexation against Amor, the Property Manager of DCCC and
Aguilar as head of the security division. We find the same to be in
order.
JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO VS. ATTY. JOSE A.
BERNAS
G.R. No. 179243
September 7, 2011

Petitioners’ Joint Affidavit-Complaint adequately alleged the

elements of unjust vexation. The second paragraph of Article 287 of
the Revised Penal Code which defines and provides for the penalty of
unjust vexation is broad enough to include any human conduct
which, although not productive of some physical or material harm,
could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person.54 Nevertheless,
Amor and Aguilar may disprove petitioners’ charges but such matters
may only be determined in a full-blown trial on the merits where the
presence or absence of the elements of the crime may be thoroughly
passed upon.55

MADERAZO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165065
September 26, 2006

Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 287. Light coercions. – Any person, who by means of violence,

shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of
applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the
value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.

Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto

menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.

The second paragraph of the Article is broad enough to include any

human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or
material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent
person.32 Compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in the
Information, for the crime of unjust vexation may exist without
compulsion or restraint. However, in unjust vexation, being a felony
by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a
good defense to a charge for unjust vexation because good faith
negates malice. The paramount question to be considered is whether
the offender’s act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or
disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.33 The
main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is
precisely to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into
his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men. It is
unlawful for any person to take into his own hands the administration
of justice.34

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VICTOR TAYCO

G.R. Nos. L-48707-48709
December 5, 1941

The offense in question is unjust vexation alleged to have been

committed by the defendant Victor Tayco against Marcelina
Alcacetas, Flora Carreon and Rosalina Valenzuela on May 5, May 6,
and May 2 and May 6, 1941, respectively. The offended parties
complained to the City Fiscal on May 24, 1941, but the City Fiscal's
office did not file the corresponding information in the Municipal
Court until July 10, 1941, that is to say, more than two months after
the commission and discovery of the offense. The Municipal Court
denied defendant's motion to quash, but upon appeal the Court of
First Instance (Judge Jose R. Carlos presiding) dismissed the three
cases, and the City Fiscal appealed to this Court.

Unjust vexation is classified as a light offense, it being punished

under the second paragraph of article 287 of the Revised Penal Code
with arresto menor or a fine ranging from P5 to P200 or both. Under
article 90 of the same Code, light offenses prescribed in two months;
and article 91 provides that "the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by
the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him."

We gather from the order of dismissal appealed from that the

contention of the City Fiscal is that the running of the prescriptive
period was interrupted from the time the offended parties reported
the offense to his office on May 24, 1941. We agree with the lower
court and the Solicitor General that such contention is untenable.
Section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the
City Fiscal relies, requires him to investigate "all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have the necessary
informations or complaints prepared or made against the person
accused." From this it is claimed by the City Fiscal that he has the
power to conduct a preliminary investigation like a justice of the
peace, and that the lodging of a complaint in his office by the
offended party is like the filing of a complaint in a justice of the peace
court. But under article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the running of
the period of prescription is interrupted not by the act of the offended
party in reporting the offense to the fiscal but by filing of the
complaint or information. Said article further provides that the
period of the prescription shall commence to run again when the
proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or information
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted. Thus, it
is clear that the compliant or information referred to in article 91 is
that which is filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or
accusation lodged by the offended party in the City Fiscal's office. It is
needless to add that such accusation in the City Fiscal's office cannot
end there in the acquittal or conviction of the accused.

“Article 90. Prescription of crime.—Crimes punishable by death,

reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty
years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in

fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten

years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which
shall prescribe in five years.

Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 286. Grave coercions. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine
not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another
from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.

Section 73, Republic Act 10951 (An Act Adjusting the

Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on Which a
Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised
Penal Code, Amending for the Purpose Act 3815, Otherwise
Known as “The Revised Penal Code”, as Amended)

“Art. 287. Light coercions. – Any person who, by means of violence,

shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of
applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the
value of the thing, but in no case less than Fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000).

“Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto

menor or a fine ranging from One thousand pesos (P1,000) to not
more than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000), or both.”

Applying the jurisprudence and the provision in your situation, the

prosecution must adduce evidence that your acts have caused
annoyance, irritation, torment or disturbance to the mind of your
neighbor. Moreover, the penalty for unjust vexation is arresto menor,
which has the duration of 1 to 30 days of imprisonment and a fine
ranging from P1,000 to P40,000, or both imprisonment and fine, if
the prosecution will be able to establish your guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.