Building Peaceful States and Societies

A DFID Practice Paper

Cover photo: Children playing outside at a community school in Mozambique
Building Peaceful States
and Societies
A DFID Practice Paper
Picture credits:
Cover: Giacomo Pirozzi/ Panos Pictures
p10: Ami Vitale/Panos Pictures
p15: (Mozambique) Giacomo Pirozzi/Panos Pictures
p15: labour: Barny Trevelyan-Johnson
p21: traditional leaders: Helen Sharkey
p22: Giacomo Pirozzi/Panos Pictures
p24: Frederic Courbet/Panos Pictures
p27: Giacomo Pirozzi/Panos Pictures
p28: family unit: Morag Baird
p32: Giacomo Pirozzi/Panos Pictures
p33: Rhodri Jones/Panos Pictures
p34: (Liberia) Giacomo Pirozzi/Panos Pictures
p34: (Sierra Leone) Aubrey Wade/Panos Pictures
p35: Sven Torfinn/Panos Pictures
p36: Fredrik Naumann/Panos Pictures
p41: young soldiers: Sarah White
p42: Ami Vitale/Panos Pictures
p43: Giacomo Pirozzi/Panos Pictures
p45: community meeting: Jane Hobson
p46: Robin Hammond/Panos Pictures
Building Peaceful States and Societies
A DFID Practice Paper

Contents
Executive Summary 6

Introduction 10

1. Definitions and frameworks 12

1.1 State-building 12
1.2 Peace-building 14
1.3 State-society relations 15

2. An integrated approach to building peaceful states and societies 17

Objective 1: Address the causes and effects of conflict and
fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms 19
Objective 2: Support inclusive political settlements and processes 22
Objective 3: Develop core state functions 27
Objective 4: Respond to public expectations 32
Links with other approaches 35

3. Key Operational implications 38

3.1 Recognise that politics are central to our work in
conflict-affected and fragile countries 38
3.2 Build consensus with our external partners 38
3.3 Analyse the context using the integrated framework… 39
3.4 … leading to different priorities and choices 40
3.5 Engage at the interface between state and society 44
3.6 Adapt delivery mechanisms 45

Conclusion 48
6 Executive Summary

Executive Summary
We will not achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or eliminate global poverty if
the international community does not address conflict and fragility more effectively. Simply
increasing the volume of aid will not be enough without tackling the underlying causes
directly. There is a tendency in development to work ‘around’ conflict and fragility. A step
change in international approaches is required.

This paper outlines a new, integrated approach, which puts state-building and peace-building
at the centre of our work in fragile and conflict-affected countries. It is based on four objectives:

1. Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility,

and build conflict resolution mechanisms
2. Support inclusive political settlements and processes
3. Develop core state functions
4. Respond to public expectations

GOAL: Building peaceful states and societies

Support Develop
inclusive core state
political functions
settlements Address causes
& effects of Strong
conflict and state-society
fragility relations

Respond to public
expectations
 Executive Summary 7

The approach should be applied as a whole. It aims to increase the impact of international
assistance, while recognising that state-building and peace-building are primarily internal
processes. The four objectives are not sequential – they form a ‘virtuous circle’, creating a
positive dynamic and strengthening state–society relations.

Strong state–society relations are critical to building effective, legitimate states and durable,
positive peace. In most fragile and conflict-affected countries, weak state–society relations
based on patronage and lack of accountability are the norm. Strengthening them will require
engagement with non-state and informal institutions as well as the state.

The Four Objectives:

Objective 1: Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build
conflict resolution mechanisms. This objective provides a ‘lens’ through
which to analyse the context, and assess priorities within the other three
objectives. It highlights the importance of focusing on prevention, supporting
positive capacities for peace (e.g. education systems that promote tolerance),
working with both state and non-state conflict resolution mechanisms and
addressing regional dimensions of conflict and fragility.

Objective 2: Support inclusive political settlements and processes. Political settlements

define how political and economic power is organised. Exclusionary
settlements are more likely to lead to instability. Supporting inclusive
settlements means understanding the incentives of the elites and identifying
when and how to empower different actors to push for a broader settlement.
Peace processes provide windows of opportunity to reshape existing
settlements, but may not address underlying power dynamics. Support
to democratic and political processes can help promote more inclusive
decision making.

Objective 3: Develop core state functions. Security, law and justice, and financial and
macroeconomic management are essential for states if they are to govern their
territories and operate at the most basic level. States also need a minimum
level of administrative capacity to deliver their functions. This objective focuses
on the importance of accountability within each function to ensure states
become responsive rather than repressive. Support to security, law and justice
should include working with both state and non-state actors as appropriate.

Objective 4: Respond to public expectations. States need to be seen to meet public

expectations in order to maintain legitimacy and stability. International actors
should be careful not to make assumptions about the expectations of
different groups in society, and must recognise that public goods are often
delivered in ways that maintain an exclusionary political settlement. Public
expectations that are high priority in many fragile contexts include jobs and
growth, delivery of basic services (including security and justice), human rights
and democratic processes.
8 Executive Summary

Key Operational Implications:

1. R
 ecognise that politics are central to our work in conflict-affected and
fragile countries
State-building and peace-building are internal, political processes. Effective support requires a
high level of political awareness, identification of opportunities to support social and political
change and a good understanding of elite politics and the nature of the political settlement.

All donor actions have political ramifications.1 For example, financial aid through the state
can strengthen the position of a regime and shift the balance of power between elites.
Political analysis must inform programme design and dialogue with international partners
and governments.

2. Build consensus with our external partners

It is essential to ensure that development, political and security approaches to state-building
and peace-building are coherent. This includes building close links with humanitarian and
stabilisation approaches where relevant (e.g. in highly insecure contexts). Joint assessments
and joint strategies are an important step forward.

In many contexts, bilateral donors will be supporting a multilateral-led international effort.

Working together to improve the performance and coordination of multilaterals (particularly
the UN, World Bank and EU) in fragile countries is critical, particularly ensuring there are
sufficient levels of high-quality, skilled staff on the ground.

3. Analyse the context using the integrated framework …

Where international actors fail to invest in good political and conflict analysis, actions can
result in more harm than good. Various analytical tools are available to help us better
understand state-building and peace-building processes and dynamics. However, translating
analysis into practical decisions and programmes can be challenging. It requires working
through the implications for international engagement and making hard choices.

4. … leading to different priorities and choices

Applying the framework is not easy, but it is an opportunity to re-focus strategy and ensure
we ‘do no harm’. The key is to use the approach to prioritise rigorously. In Nepal, an
integrated approach to state-building and peace-building has informed priorities within the
DFID country plan and UK strategy:
• Support to the peace process and peace agreement implementation;
• Work to foster an inclusive political settlement – e.g. by supporting excluded groups to
articulate their needs, and by facilitating dialogue on the management of political tensions.
• Strengthening core functions of the state – e.g. public security, public financial
management and more inclusive central and local state institutions.
• Strengthening service delivery and support growth and job creation to deliver a
‘peace dividend’ and meet public expectations;
• Producing up-to-date political economy and peace analysis.
1
For the purposes of this paper, ‘donors’ refer to both bilateral and multilateral donor organisations.
 Executive Summary 9

Consideration of issues of gender, human rights and inclusion is crucial. Peace-building and
state-building can offer unique opportunities to address the injustices and inequalities of the
past, and set new precedents for the future.

Sequencing interventions and clarifying division of labour between donors can help resolve
dilemmas between short-term and long-term objectives. In Sierra Leone, DFID focused initially
on building core state functions, and supporting progress on security to sustain the peace.
Service delivery and growth were seen as second-generation reform areas. DFID increased
support for service delivery later, in response to changing public expectations.

5. Engage at the interface between state and society

A ‘bottom-up’ approach that engages with non-state and community-level institutions is
central to building peaceful states and societies. These institutions may compete with the state
in negative ways, but they can also provide a bridge between state and society.

Practical ways of engaging at the interface include: (i) supporting links between traditional
authorities and local governance structures; (ii) strengthening civil society to engage with the
state and hold it accountable (particularly as a complement to budget support); and (iii)
community-driven development programmes that channel funds to local communities while
building local governance capacity (e.g. Yemen Social Fund for Development).

6. Adapt delivery mechanisms

The transaction costs of working in situations of conflict and fragility are higher, including
programme design, coordination, influencing and monitoring and evaluation. This needs to be
reflected in staff planning in fragile countries.

Choices about aid instruments must be politically informed. Aid modalities (including
predictability of aid) have the potential to enhance or undermine a state’s relations with
society. Donors need to clarify the form of alignment with the state that is appropriate in each
context: whether through the state, with the state or outside the state. Instruments will often
include pooled funding arrangements with other donors (usually led by the UN or World
Bank). It is important that such mechanisms do not detract from engaging with the state to
help it manage funds and pursue positive reforms in the future.

A rigorous approach to risk management is important. Risks are higher in fragile contexts,
particularly given the nature of state-building and peace-building interventions – for example,
decisions to align with particular elites (political or reputational risks), or support for measures
to counter violent extremism (programme or staff security risks). When considering specific
options for intervention, three factors – transaction costs, risk and expected return – can help
us compare their relative value for money.

Linked to this, our results frameworks also need to be adjusted to include indicators and
targets that focus explicitly on state-building and peace-building objectives. The MDGs are
important as long-term measures of development success, but they might not capture
medium-term results in fragile states. Measuring results against the four objectives contained
in this approach will help test its validity, and will build the evidence base for the future.
10 Introduction

Introduction
1. Conflict and fragility are significant challenges to international peace and security and to
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Of the 34 countries furthest from
reaching the MDGs, 22 are in, or are emerging from, conflict.2 Forty per cent of armed
conflicts recommence within a decade of hostilities ending.3 Fragile countries account for a
fifth of the population of developing countries, but they include a third of those living in
extreme poverty, half of children who are not in primary school and half of children who
die before their fifth birthday.4

2. Although the number of countries in

conflict is declining overall, conflicts that
remain are becoming increasingly
entrenched. Half of the world’s current
conflicts have endured over 20 years.
Local and regional conflict is also
becoming more common, fuelled, for
example, by resistance to central
authority. Civilians, especially women
and children, account for the majority of Young Maoist insurgents in Nepal
those adversely affected, and women are
particularly vulnerable to sexual violence as a weapon of war.5

3. Conflict or weak governance in one country can also have a negative influence on the
quality of governance in neighbouring countries, especially if they are poor. The cross-
border movement of weapons, armed groups and conflict resources, including diamonds,
has become a feature of conflicts in West and Central Africa. A range of global factors,
such as financial systems, criminal networks, climate change and interstate relations, can
also have a significant effect on conflict and fragility.

4. International support can make a positive contribution. In Sierra Leone, a combined

approach to development and security has helped to restore peace. In Mozambique, after
more than 20 years of conflict, aid contributed to a fall in poverty from around 70% in
1996 to under 55% by 2003. International support has been critical to the recent peace
agreements reached in Nepal and Sudan.

5. But significant challenges remain. Eliminating global poverty and achieving the MDGs will
not be possible unless the international community tackles conflict and fragility more
effectively. Simply increasing the volume of aid is not enough – many fragile countries lack
the capacity to use and absorb financial and technical assistance.

2
UN Millennium Project (2005)Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, New York.
3 
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004) ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers, 56 (4). Also Fearon, J. and Laitin, D.
(2003) ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American Political Science Review, 97 (1).
4 
DFID staff estimates (2009) using World Bank World Development Indicators database 2009 (for data on population, children out
of school and the proportion living in extreme poverty [on less than $1.25 a day]); and UNICEF State of the World’s Children 2009
(for data on child mortality).
5 
UN Security Council Resolution 1325, October 2000. See also Vlachova, M. and Biason, L. (eds.) (2005) Women in an Insecure
World: Violence Against Women, Facts, Figures, and Analysis, DCAF, Geneva.
 Introduction 11

6. A step change in international approaches is required. There remains a tendency to work

‘around’ conflict and fragility and focus on traditional development activities. Our
engagement in these states must be targeted towards a set of objectives that address the
causes and effects of conflict and fragility head-on. In conflict-affected and fragile
countries, state-building and peace-building objectives are the necessary building blocks
towards achieving poverty reduction and the MDGs.
7. The international system must be equipped to deliver. In many of these situations, the UN,
World Bank, regional and other organisations play crucial roles, and have unique
legitimacy, mandates and resources to address the challenges of peace-building and
state-building. DFID is strongly committed to strengthening international institutions to
ensure a more effective and rapid response to conflict and fragility.
8. This paper sets out an integrated approach that puts building peaceful states and
societies at the centre of our efforts in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Drawing on
evidence, it brings state-building and peace-building together into a single framework,
and is based on four closely linked objectives:

1. Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and

build conflict resolution mechanisms
2. Support inclusive political settlements and processes
3. Develop core state functions
4. Respond to public expectations

9. State-building and peace-building are primarily internal processes driven by a range of

national and local actors. But they are also affected by the regional and global context.
International actors will often have limited influence, but we can support positive
processes that lead to more effective states and to durable, positive peace.
10. This approach is intended to increase the impact of international assistance in fragile
countries, and should be used to prioritise interventions rigorously. It will help ensure that
state-building and peace-building initiatives are complementary, provide greater policy and
operational coherence, and increase synergies between the development, diplomatic and
defence communities.
11. The approach is relevant in all fragile contexts. In countries with deteriorating governance
(e.g. Kenya, Yemen), it can highlight ways to mitigate risks of conflict. In protracted crises
(e.g. Burma, Somalia), it can help identify opportunities to support the emergence of a
more inclusive political settlement. It is equally relevant in stable states with ‘pockets’ of
conflict or fragility (e.g. parts of India) and post-conflict situations (e.g. Nepal).
12. This paper is supported by a series of Briefing Papers on ‘Working Effectively in
Situations of Conflict and Fragility’, which provide operational guidance on
implementing the OECD DAC’s Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile
States and Situations.6 To access these, go to http://www.gsdrc.org/go/fragile-states and
click on the link ‘DFID guidance on working effectively in fragile states’.
6 
The Principles were agreed by DAC members in April 2007.
See http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_35233262_1_1_1_1,00.html
12 1 Definitions and frameworks

1. Definitions and frameworks

1.1 State-building
13. State-building is concerned with the state’s capacity, institutions and legitimacy, and with
the political and economic processes that underpin state-society relations.7 The
effectiveness of the state and the quality of its linkages to society largely determine a
country’s prospects for peace and development.8

14. State-building is a long-term, historically rooted and internal process driven by a wide
range of local and national actors. In fragile contexts it often reveals tensions between
state and non-state actors, with each wanting to exert influence and establish a dominant
position. In Afghanistan, state institutions coexist uneasily, with complex local power
structures, including tribal and clan groups, religious institutions, armed militias and
criminal networks. The dominance of these structures is a significant challenge to the
state-building process.

Box 1: Defining state and non-state actors

The state is the principal unit for exercising public authority in defined territories in
modern times. It is also the central structure in international relations. The state consists of:
(a) institutions or rules which regulate political, social and economic engagement
across a territory and determine how public authority is obtained and used
(e.g. constitutions, laws, customs). These may be formal or informal.9
(b) organisations at the national and the sub-national level which operate within
those rules (e.g. the executive, legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, ministries, army,
tax authorities).

A government refers to the specific administration in power at any one moment (the
governing coalition of political leaders), while the state is the basis for a government’s
authority, legality, and claim to popular support.10 The state provides the edifice within
which a government can operate.

Non-state actors include civil society organisations (CSOs)11 and the private sector, as
well as traditional authorities, and informal groupings such as social networks and
religious communities.

7 
See also Fritz, V. and Rocha Menocal, A. (2007), “Understanding State-building from a Political Economy Perspective”.
Paper prepared for DFID.
8 
World Bank (1997) World Development Report: The State in a Changing World. World Bank, Washington DC
9 
Formal institutions refer to clearly defined laws, rules, and regulations ranging from the constitution to simple procedures
governing the work of bureaucrats, private employees, and organised CSOs. Informal institutions refer to unwritten rules,
systems and processes. Examples include social and cultural norms, patronage systems.
10 
Alford, R. and Friedland, R. (1985) Powers of Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
11 
Civil society organisations (CSOs) include such groups as registered charities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community
groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, social movements, business
associations, and advocacy groups.
 Definitions and frameworks
1 13

15. This paper builds on the 2006 White Paper, which defines an effective state as one that is
capable, accountable and responsive (CAR):12
• Capable – leaders and governments are able to get things done.
• Accountable – citizens, civil society and the private sector are able to scrutinise public
institutions and governments and hold them to account.
• Responsive – public policies and institutions respond to the needs of citizens and
uphold their rights.

16. The processes that determine how states evolve are complex and variable. It is important
to develop a deep understanding of how states develop over time, including why some
states become effective, while others descend into fragility and conflict. Evidence
suggests that important factors include:
• the nature of the political settlement;
• the state’s ability to provide essential core functions (security; law and justice; and
financial and macroeconomic management);
• the state’s ability to meet the expectations of the population (such as health and
education services, or free and fair elections).

17. Each of these contributes to the development of state-society relations.

The diagram below illustrates how they interact:

Responsive & accountable state-building

Creates structures and robust
institutions responsive to citizens

State focuses Political Core Core

on enhancing Settlements Functions functions
legitimacy & & Processes delivered
recognises Robust by consent
importance state- society
of inclusive relations
politics

Public confidence State accepts

Expected Functions
and expectations need to
grow. Active and meet some
responsible citizens expectations

12 
DFID (2006) White Paper: Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor.
14 1 Definitions and frameworks

18. Most fragile countries combine aspects of responsive and unresponsive state-building.
A state may be relatively efficient and able to maintain stability for a period without being
responsive or accountable to its citizens (e.g. Cambodia). Or it may be based on an
exclusionary political settlement while still relatively peaceful and responsive in the
medium term (e.g. Mozambique).

1.2 Peace-building
19. A basic definition of peace is the absence of violence, or ‘negative peace’. But this can
disguise structural forms of violence, such as discrimination, underlying grievances or lack
of avenues for challenging existing structures in a peaceful way.13 ‘Positive peace’ is
characterised by social harmony, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and social
and economic development. It is supported by political institutions that are able to
manage change and resolve disputes without resorting to violent conflict.14

20. Peace-building aims to establish positive peace. It has three inter-related elements:

Building durable, positive peace

Supporting
inclusive peace
processes and
agreements

Building Addressing
mechanisms causes and
to resolve effects of
conflict conflict
peacefully

21. It includes measures to address underlying causes of conflict, such as social, political or
economic exclusion based on ethnicity, religion or gender or unequal power relations
between the centre and periphery. It entails responding to drivers or triggers of conflict,
such as youth unemployment, economic shocks or access to light weapons. And it
requires dealing with the devastating effects of violent conflict, to enable communities to
recover and reconcile, and prevent today’s effects becoming tomorrow’s causes.

13 
See Galtung, J. (1996) Peace by Peaceful Means, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
14 
See also the definition of “structural stability” as given in OECD-DAC (2001), Helping Prevent Violent Conflict.
Note this is distinct from more recent definitions of “stabilisation”.
 Definitions and frameworks
1 15

22. Non-violent conflict is normal and

healthy in a pluralistic society. But
without mechanisms to resolve
conflict, it can easily lead to
violence. Strengthening local,
national and regional capacity to
prevent and resolve conflict in
non-violent ways is crucial during
all phases of conflict and peace-
building. Conflict is rarely a linear
process, with progress and Mural at a school in Mozambique: ‘No to war’
setbacks towards peace.15

23. Inclusive peace processes and agreements provide a focus for peace-building efforts,
and often rely heavily on international support to succeed. An inclusive peace process
aims to achieve a peace agreement that lays a strong foundation for a new political
settlement. A sustainable, comprehensive peace agreement addresses causes of conflict,
and provides for the establishment of conflict resolution mechanisms.

1.3 State-society relations

24. State–society relations are interactions
between state institutions and societal
groups to negotiate how public
authority is exercised and how it can
be influenced by people. State–society
relations can be peaceful or contested
(and at times, violent). They are
focused on issues such as defining the
mutual rights and obligations of state
and society, negotiating how public
resources should be allocated and
Labourers building a road in Ethiopia as part of the
establishing different modes of Productive Safety Net Programme which helps people
representation and accountability. to protect their assets in times of need through public
works and cash transfers
25. Strong state–society relations
underpin effective states and durable, positive peace. A population’s trust in state
institutions increases as it sees the state acting in the collective interest. Where the state
has the will and capacity to deliver its functions, meet public expectations and uphold
its obligations to protect human rights, the population is more willing to pay taxes,
accept the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force and comply with laws
and regulations.

15 
Many academics describe conflict as passing through different stages or phases. See the work of Louis Kriesberg, Dean Pruitt,
Jeffrey Rubin and Sung Hee Kim, and William Zartman.
16 1 Definitions and frameworks

Box 2: State legitimacy and state-society relations

Issues of legitimacy lie at the heart of state–society relations. States are legitimate when
elites and the public accept the rules regulating the exercise of power and the
distribution of wealth as proper and binding.16 States can rely on a combination of
different methods to establish their legitimacy, including international recognition,
performance (e.g. economic growth, service delivery), ideology, procedural forms
(e.g. democratic procedures), or traditional authority.17 Building legitimacy is a primary
requirement for peace, security and resilience over the long term.

For example, the authoritarian Suharto regime in Indonesia was tolerated by citizens as it
delivered on basic services (primarily health and education) and the development of rural
constituencies. As soon as it became apparent that personal politics and advancement
began to replace these concerns, the government began to lose legitimacy, which
ultimately brought about its downfall.

25. In most fragile and conflict-affected countries, state-society relations are based
on patronage and fraught with tensions between different sources of authority
(e.g. traditional versus modern institutions).18 The state may relate to society through
oppressive or violent means of maintaining authority, particularly if the state’s legitimacy
is very weak. The quality of mechanisms to engage different social actors in decision-
making processes tends to be extremely poor.

16 
Papagianni, K. (2008) ‘Participation and State Legitimation’: in C. Call with V. Wyeth (eds.) Building States to Build Peace,
Lynne Rienner, USA
17 
See Norad The Legitimacy of the State in Fragile Situations (2009), prepared for OECD DAC.
Available at: http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+page?key=134243
18
Ibid.
 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies
2 17

2. An integrated approach to building

peaceful states and societies
27. The integrated approach brings together four objectives to help build peaceful states
and societies. These provide a framework to help shape development programmes
and broader international engagement in fragile and conflict-affected countries.19
The approach combines state-building and peace-building as critical building blocks
for achieving poverty reduction and the MDGs in such contexts. International actors
should work with local and national partners towards the four objectives, building on
internal processes.

28. The four objectives are closely linked:

1. Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility,

and build conflict resolution mechanisms
2. Support inclusive political settlements and processes
3. Develop core state functions
4. Respond to public expectations

GOAL: Building peaceful states and societies

Support Develop
inclusive core state
political functions
settlements Address causes
& effects of Strong
conflict and state-society
fragility relations

Respond to public
expectations

29. The integrated approach is designed to be used as a whole. The four objectives are
inter-related (not sequential), and they form a ‘virtuous circle’, helping to maintain a
positive dynamic and strengthen state-society relations.
19
DFID (2009), White Paper: Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future.
18 2 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies

30. There can be tensions between state-building and peace-building that need to be
worked through. State-building has historically been a violent process, and movements to
challenge an exclusionary political settlement can often lead to short-term instability or
conflict, while laying the foundations for a more sustainable, inclusive settlement.
States must be able to accommodate legitimate demands for change from society.

31. Political deals brokered to achieve a cessation of conflict may undermine the rule of law
and perpetrate impunity. Conversely, the threat of prosecution (e.g. by the International
Criminal Court) can be a disincentive for military and political leaders to negotiate peace.
The UK has obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL),20 human rights
law and international criminal law to ensure respect for these international norms and
to prevent impunity for perpetrators of violations. These are relevant to decisions
about when and how to engage elites in the development of peace agreements and
political settlements.

32. Other tensions include:

• Immediate service delivery v. state-building: where state capacity is very weak, the
impetus can be to deliver services quickly through non-state mechanisms, to meet
urgent needs and address grievances. However, this may weaken long-term capacity-
building and state legitimacy. Conversely, premature attempts to deliver services
through a weak state may overwhelm capacity and mean that basic needs go unmet.
• Political settlements v. economic growth: illicit gains for elites secured through
informal arrangements around the allocation of natural resources or public
expenditure may stabilise the political settlement initially, but may undermine market
capitalism and the economic viability of the state in the longer term.21
• Security and stability v. equity and rights: where certain groups pose a threat to peace
and security (such as political elites, rebel groups or unemployed youth), there is a
tendency to prioritise these groups over others. This can lead to inequalities of
concern from a rights perspective.

33. Nation-building may be an important complement to state-building and peace-

building efforts. Nation-building is the construction of a shared sense of identity and
common destiny, to overcome ethnic, sectarian or religious differences and counter
alternative allegiances. Issues of belonging and identity can also be manipulated for
political gain or to sow divisions or conflict, sometimes with appalling consequences
(as in apartheid South Africa or Rwanda). Nation-building efforts can help develop
greater social cohesion.

34. The way aid is delivered can confer legitimacy on certain groups and become part of
identity or legitimacy contests. Donors must be aware of this risk and ensure they do not
indirectly undermine efforts to foster social cohesion.

20 
IHL is also known as the Law of Armed Conflict. It is contained mainly in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (universally ratified)
and Additional Protocols of 1977. It seeks to limit the effects of war, by protecting people who are not or no longer participating in
hostilities and restricting the means and methods of warfare.
21 
Crisis States Research Centre (2009), ’Summary of Policy Relevant Findings‘, paper prepared for DFID
 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies 2 19

35. Centre-periphery relations are another important challenge. State-building has

historically focused on the centralisation of the state at the national level. In fragile
contexts, this often means that the state is more visible in capital cities. The population in
areas that are more remote (and in urban slums) often has limited and unsatisfactory
interaction with the state. In the periphery, non-state and informal systems compete with
formal structures for authority and power. They may have more presence and greater
legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.

36. The rest of this section describes the four objectives of the integrated approach:

Objective 1: Address the causes and effects of conflict and

fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms
37. Conflict and fragility are caused by a complex range of factors, including grievances,
opportunities, and feasibility, as illustrated below:22

Table 1: Causes of conflict and fragility

Cause Explanation

Grievances Identity groups (e.g. based on ethnicity, religion, caste) facing

discrimination and inequality are easier to mobilise for violence. Conflict
is most likely when political, social and economic exclusion coincide, and
victims do not have access to justice. Grievances may be exacerbated by
human rights abuses and IHL violations, oppressive security forces,
corruption and failure to deliver services. Extremist groups are likely to
take advantage of grievances and build them into their narratives. States
with systematic discrimination have a higher probability of instability.23

Opportunities High rates of unemployment and poverty can make the opportunities
provided by conflict attractive, and mean individuals have little to lose by
becoming involved. War economies can provide viable livelihoods – e.g.
through access to resources that can be looted and other illegal trades.
Political leadership may be focused on accumulation of power through
violent means and/or wealth from conflict resources or illegal goods.

Feasibility Conflict is feasible if the state is unable to crush or buy off rebels – e.g.
when security forces are weak, or the state lacks legitimacy or presence
throughout its territory. Availability of weapons and general instability or
conflict in the region also make rebellion easier. Availability of high-value
natural resources and other sources of finance/support for groups
engaging in conflict makes it more feasible.

22 
There is disagreement between analysts on the most significant causes of conflict. Frances Stewart stresses the importance of
grievances arising from horizontal inequalities, Paul Collier the need to raise the opportunity cost of conflict, and James Fearon the
need to address the feasibility of war.
23 
Political Instability Task Force (PITF) – see http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf
20 2 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies

38. As well as national factors, there are also regional and global drivers of conflict and
fragility, including organised crime, drug trafficking and corruption linked to high-value
natural resources. The arms trade and demand for oil, minerals and drugs may provide
warring factions with the resources and incentives to continue fighting.

39. Whatever the cause, conflict undermines development and exacerbates poverty and
inequality. Patterns of history, identity and trauma can fuel violence, and its effects include
divided communities, traumatised children and adults, human rights abuses (including
gender-based violence), destroyed livelihoods, food insecurity and other humanitarian
needs. These can all feed new grievances and conflict.

What does this mean for DFID and our external partners?
40. Objective 1 provides a ‘lens’ through which to analyse the context and assess priorities
within the other three objectives (e.g. which core state functions are most important to
resolve future conflict, or which public expectations need to be met to prevent
grievances from increasing). In Nepal from 2003 onwards, conflict analysis identified that
human rights abuses committed by both the state and Maoist rebels were a key factor
fuelling the conflict. By strengthening human rights monitoring, the international
community was able to work with local civil society to put pressure on the conflict
parties to reduce violations.

41. Addressing the causes and effects of conflict and fragility is ‘core business’ for DFID and
our partners – Annex A gives examples of interventions we can support. We should seek
to work through multilateral and regional organisations, such as the UN and the African
Union (AU), which enjoy the trust of key players at national and local levels. As well as
addressing causes of conflict, we should support positive ‘capacities for peace’, such as
education systems that promote tolerance and social cohesion, shared infrastructure
between communities and market development that expands opportunities.24

42. P
 reventing conflict and fragility: The international community’s Responsibility to
Protect civilians from suffering the worst excesses of violent conflict means that wherever
possible, it should focus on prevention. Deteriorating governance and instability must be
addressed early on – for example, supporting job creation and livelihoods to reduce
economic incentives to engage in violence. Local civil society actors can be useful in
detecting potential conflict and responding with appropriate interventions (see Box 3).
Work on countering violent extremism, which identifies and addresses the grievances that
drive extremist violence, is another part of prevention.

24 
See International Alert (2009) Programming Framework for International Alert: Design, Monitoring and Evaluation.
Available at: www.international-alert.org/about/files/Programming_Framework_2009.pdf .
 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies 2 21

Box 3: Support for conflict prevention in Kenya and Ghana

Funded by the Conflict Pool, Saferworld
responded to the 2008 post-election violence in
Kenya by supporting the organisation Kenyan
Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP). It sought
to link community-level and national-level
prevention and peace-building processes and
establish reconciliation structures. Known as the
Nairobi Peace Zones initiative, Saferworld and
CCP conducted participatory, local-level conflict
analysis and established peace committees in
Nairobi that brought together local
administration, civil society and community
representatives.

Following the post-election violence in Kenya,

Traditional leaders discuss conflict
Ghana’s National Peace Council, which UNDP prevention in Bakwu, Ghana, in
helped establish in 2006, and its chairman preparation for a radio interview
Cardinal Peter Turkson, a highly respected
non-partisan figure, led an advocacy campaign to ensure that the same mistakes would
not be made in Ghana’s election in December 2008. This initiative complemented the
work of the official Election Commission and the efforts of international and national
NGOs to promote an inclusive process and monitor the polls. In the event, the
transition of power through elections was largely peaceful. The role played by civil
society also reflected the success of the state-building process, which has seen civil
society in Ghana flourish over the past decade.

43. B
 uilding conflict resolution mechanisms: This is critically important for breaking the
cycle of violence. In fragile contexts, particularly when the state itself is a perpetrator of
violence and human rights abuses, we should consider the role of non-state and informal
systems in resolving conflict. However, these systems may also be exclusionary or
discriminatory, or lack sufficient transparency and accountability. DFID has been exploring
different ways to engage with informal and non-state justice systems (see para. 65).25

44. Work on deepening democracy can help ensure that the relationship between the state
and societal groups is mediated in a peaceful way. This requires engagement at the formal
level, through to grassroots civic education. DFID and our partners provide long-term
support to political institutions and processes, including parliaments and political parties,
the judiciary, media, civil society, human rights bodies and the electoral cycle.

45. R
 egional dimension: Development programmes are often focused on a single country.
It is also important to think regionally and consider the linkages between neighbouring
countries (e.g. Afghanistan and Pakistan). Regional economic communities can play a
supportive role. The UK has provided support for strengthening the conflict management

25 
See DFID (2004) ‘Working with Non-state Justice and Security Systems’, Briefing Note.
22 2 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies

capacity of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), which is critical to

the future stability of the region. With the AU, ECOWAS has helped set and promote
democratic standards in the region.

Box 4: A regional approach to peace-building

The UK is a significant donor to the World

Bank-led Multi-Country Demobilization and
Reintegration Program (MDRP), which has
demobilised around 300,000 former combatants
in seven countries since 2002 – Angola, Burundi,
Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Republic of Congo, Rwanda and
Uganda. The interlinked nature of the conflicts
in the region provided strong justification for a
multi-country approach. The programme has
successfully arranged the demobilisation and
return of many members of foreign armed
groups operating in the region, such as the
Rwandan Hutu Democratic Liberation Forces of
Rwanda (FDLR) based in DRC. The programme A young ex-combatant receives
has been a major factor in improving security in carpentry skills training in the
Democratic Republic of Congo
the Great Lakes region in recent years.

Objective 2: Support inclusive political settlements

and processes
46. Political settlements are the expression of a common understanding, usually forged
between elites,26 about how power is organised and exercised.27 They include formal
institutions for managing political and economic relations, such as electoral processes,
peace agreements, parliaments, constitutions and market regulations. But they also
include informal, often unarticulated agreements that underpin a political system, such as
deals between elites on the division of spoils. Political settlements establish the basic rules
governing economic relations and resource allocation.

47. Political settlements come in many shapes and sizes, as shown in table 2.

26 
Elite power is derived from multiple sources, including popular support (sometimes through elections), the accumulation of wealth,
control over the means of generating violence and waging war (warlord armies, private security operations, gang leaders) and
religious authority. Elites have sufficient power and standing in the community to shape outcomes and influence the views and
behaviours of others.
27
Whaites, A. (2008) ‘States in development: Understanding state-building’, DFID
 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies 2 23

Table 2: Political settlements typology

Types of political Characteristics
settlement
Engineered Explicitly negotiated, often as part of a peace process (Nepal,
settlements Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland). These tend to change as
the deals struck in peace negotiations are adjusted by
national elites.

Informal elite pacts Uneasy arrangements between elites that find accommodation
through the brokering of interests. These may stagnate, often as
a result of prolonged crisis (Zimbabwe) but will remain fragile.

Imposed Clear victory by one group allows them to impose a settlement

settlements on others. Maintained through a high level of security capability,
sometimes through coercion rather than consent (Burma).

Entrenched High degree of legitimacy and popular acceptance that make

settlements direct challenges unlikely to succeed (China), but may not
be inclusive.

Inclusive Settlement extends to a long-term negotiation between the

settlements state and groups in society. Societal rights and responsibilities
are broadly accepted. It evolves and is responsive to public
expectations (South Africa, Botswana, Denmark).

48. Elites have often used centralised and highly personalised political parties as a way of
embedding a political settlement. Many fragile countries are characterised by hegemonic
party systems, where the distinction between the state and the ruling party is blurred
(Mozambique, Angola, Cambodia). Many political settlements result in hybrid states,
where formal, democratic institutions co-exist with more informal ones (rooted in
traditional or indigenous social structures) in ways that are not mutually reinforcing.
Research suggests that these partial democracies are the most unstable regime type.28

49. The inclusiveness of a settlement, and public perceptions of its fairness, is critical to state
legitimacy and the sustainability of the settlement in the long term. Peace processes
and peace agreements provide a window of opportunity to reshape an existing political
settlement. They may lead to a new constitution, or extend political and economic
opportunity beyond elites to groups that have traditionally been marginalised, including
women. But informal arrangements that define the underlying political settlement and
allocation of power may be highly resistant to change.

28 
Findings of the Political Instability Task Force, referenced in Chandran, R. et al. (2008) Recovering from War: Gaps in Early Action. CIC, New York
24 2 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies

50. In Guatemala, a highly participatory and comprehensive peace agreement ending a
30-year civil war has failed to produce a more inclusive political settlement that delivers
gender equality, indigenous rights or voice for the poor. The Kenya example also shows
that while inclusive political agreements can be an important first step, the challenge is to
alter the underlying settlement. See Box 5.

Box 5: The Evolution of the Political Settlement in Kenya

With a mandate from the AU and the
support of the UN, Kofi Annan mediated a
post-election agreement in Kenya in early
2008 to rearticulate the political settlement
and make it broader and more inclusive. The
agreement led to a coalition government
based on power sharing among different
ethnic groups. However, this is proving to be
a coalition under strain, built on a stagnant
Graffiti urges peace, as riots flare in Nairobi
political settlement which has yet to address following the contested elections in 2007
the underlying grievances within Kenyan
society. In the long run, the fundamental fault lines in Kenyan society (e.g. ethnicity,
regional identity, the distribution of land ownership) will need to be accommodated in
the underlying political settlement if peace is to be sustained.

What does this mean for DFID and our external partners?
51. Our aim is to promote inclusive settlements that meet public expectations and address the
underlying causes of conflict and fragility. This requires understanding the opportunity cost
to elites of different types of reform; identifying when to empower different actors to push
for a broader settlement, taking into account the risks of instability29; and being sufficiently
flexible to support both formal/informal and state/non-state institutions as opportunities
arise. In Burma, DFID is supporting a £3.5 million Pyoe Pin (‘Green Shoots’) programme to
strengthen local civil society and support the development of coalitions around issues, a
flexible approach designed to respond to the changing political and social context.

52. When engaging with political settlements, the international community will need to
distinguish between legitimate grievances that can lead to violent conflict and demands
for a new, more inclusive political settlement, and efforts to undermine peace for
illegitimate reasons. Those with illegitimate objectives often co-opt those with legitimate
grievances for their own ends. It is important to be aware of their incentives.

53. External actors can play important roles in supporting peace processes through: mediation
and facilitation; political encouragement and/or pressure on parties to pursue negotiations
and dialogue; technical support to help parties engage more effectively in such processes;
and helping to build public support for peace. Donors can provide aid in ways that
directly and indirectly support the implementation of peace agreements. See Table 3:
29 
Rocha Menocal, A. (2009) ‘“State-Building for Peace” – A New Paradigm for International Engagement in Post-conflict Fragile
States?’, background paper prepared for the European Report for Development (2009).
 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies 2 25

Table 3: Issues addressed in contemporary peace agreements

Themes Examples of issues30
Military/security Ceasefires; decommissioning, demobilisation, reintegration;
security sector

Governance Constitution; power sharing; transitional governments;

arrangements elections; democratisation; political pluralism; state structure

Socio-economic Land reform; natural resource management; revenue

sharing; reconstruction

Legal-judicial Human rights monitoring; amnesties; prisoner releases;

judicial reform

Transitional justice Tribunals; truth commissions; reparations; property restitution;

lustration31

Exclusion Policies to support equality, identity groups, non-discrimination

(based on gender, and effective participation; voice and accountability programmes
ethnicity, religion that focus especially on excluded groups (e.g. women, youth,
and other factors) disabled, ethnic groups)

Humanitarian Access to humanitarian assistance and protection; demining;

(in accordance with return and reintegration or refugees and displaced persons;
IHL, human rights missing persons; separated families; detainees
and refugee law)

54. Peace processes should engage all parties that are sufficiently powerful to prolong
conflict, but should not be limited to armed groups. Negotiations should incorporate
those who have historically been excluded (e.g. women or indigenous minorities).32
They are most effective when there is a peace process support strategy involving formal
and informal levels, including leaders of conflict parties (track 1), individuals close to
them (track 2), and CSOs (track 3) that can address perceptions and stereotypes which
sustain conflict.33

30
Adapted from Barnes, C. (2009) ‘Re-negotiating Political Settlements’, draft paper prepared for DFID.
31
Lustration is a process which vets those who have committed past human rights abuses, to exclude them from certain public offices.
32
UN SCR 1325 requires member states to ensure women’s participation in all dimensions of peace-building.
33
See www.c-r.org/our-work/influencing-policy/peace-process-support-strategies.php for information on peace process support
strategies, and Paffenholz, T. and Spurk, C. (2006) Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peacebuilding, World Bank Working Paper
Series, Washington DC
26 2 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies

Box 6: An inclusive peace process in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea34

Between 1988 and 1997, Bougainville was embroiled in a violent campaign for
independence from Papua New Guinea (PNG). With a deeply divided population, the
peace process began by building consensus between parties, with talks facilitated by
New Zealand. Direct talks with the PNG government followed.

The main negotiations in 1999 yielded agreements on the following:

(i) a constitutionally guaranteed referendum on independence, deferred for 10–15
years; (ii) constitutional reform for high levels of autonomy; and (iii) Bougainville
disarmament matched by withdrawal of the state army. The agreement was
implemented sequentially, with steps for one party reciprocated by the other.

External actors provided sensitive facilitation and technical support to the peace
process, including security for talks, capacity-building for both negotiations teams and
technical advice on constitutional reform and weapons disposal.35 Reconstruction aid
was matched with state-orientated technical assistance (e.g. on community policing
and administrative reform) and efforts to maximise the peace-building contribution of
aid. For example, a road rehabilitation project required the international contractor to
develop numerous small construction businesses along the road route, involving former
combatants and communities.

55. Identifying other ways in which the international community can support the emergence
of an inclusive political settlement, while respecting state sovereignty, can be difficult.
Support to democratic and political processes in fragile countries can promote inclusive
decision making, create incentives for governments to develop a wider support base,
including women and excluded groups, and encourage the peaceful transfer of power.

56. Donor support has often focused on elections. Elections can legitimise a new government
internally and internationally, as in Nepal, DRC and Sierra Leone in recent years. But they can
also destabilise an already fragile situation by renewing contestation for power,36 or by giving
formal legitimacy to leaders and elites who may have little interest in inclusive peace or the
interests of the population. The timing of elections in post-conflict and fragile situations is
particularly challenging.37 The state may be unable able to meet public expectations that are
inevitably heightened by elections.38 An environment may not yet exist to ensure elections
contribute to a wider process of democratisation (e.g. a free and responsible media).

57. However, postponing democratic reforms until perfectly functioning institutions are in
place is unrealistic. If left too late, the concentration of power within the hands of elite
groups, without democratic checks and balances, may bring greater risks and reinforce
the causes of conflict and instability. An incremental approach to supporting democratic

34
Case study provided by Conciliation Resources. See Weaving the Consensus: The Papua New Guinea – Bougainville Peace Process.
Available at www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/contents.php
35
Australia had close relationship with the PNG government, including in defence cooperation, so was careful to play an indirect supporting role.
36
Walters, B. (2002) Committing to Peace, Princeton University Press, Princeton. The author argues that constitutional arrangements that
safeguard the interests of election losers are critical in post-conflict situations.
37
UK Government How To Note on Electoral Assistance, forthcoming
38
Snyder, J. (2000) From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, W. W. Norton, London; Paris, R. (2004) At War’s End.
Building Peace after Conflict, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies 2 27

politics is needed.39 This will have the greatest impact where international efforts are in
line with internal drivers for reform. It means seeing elections as only one step in a much
broader process towards building a more inclusive political system, as reflected in DFID’s
programme in DRC:

Box 7: Supporting democratic reforms in DRC

In 2006, DRC held credible national

elections. They took place shortly after
the end of the conflict, without many
of the ideal preconditions for elections.
Despite this, a recent study concludes
that they had a positive effect:40
• Participation in national elections
produced a shift to groups seeking
legitimacy through popular will, and
weeded out those leaders at local and Voters in the Democratic Republic of Congo are
issued with identity cards ahead of the elections
national level without a popular base.
• The electoral winner gained authority, partly through efforts to attain legitimacy,
which matters for the international community, but mainly through the control of
patronage opportunities.
• The international community was relatively successful in taking preventive action to
reduce risks and manage outbreaks of violence; the AU sent a panel of three
eminent persons to DRC to monitor pre-election conflict and facilitate dialogue.
• The stability and legitimacy of the post-election settlement depended on
strengthening state capacity: in particular, its ability to provide security and regain
control over its territory, monopolise tax revenues and provide services at a local level.
Democracy in DRC will require long-term donor commitment and a focus on
strengthening accountability mechanisms. DFID’s programme now includes assistance
to parliament, political parties and the electoral commission; anti-corruption;
decentralisation programmes; and work with civil society and the media to improve
accountability and transparency.

Objective 3: Develop core state functions

58. There are some functions that the state must be able to perform to govern its territory
and operate at the most basic level. Evidence suggests that three are indispensable:
(i) security; (ii) law and justice; and (iii) financial and macroeconomic management.41
But without a clear focus on improving accountability within each function, there is a risk
that the state will exert control without responding to the population’s needs, creating a
strong but potentially repressive state.
39
Carothers, T. (2007), ‘How Democracies Emerge: The Sequencing Fallacy’, Journal of Democracy 18 (1).
40
Kadima, D., Leonard, D. and Schmidt, A. (2008) ‘Elections and Democratisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo’,
paper prepared for DFID.
41
See Whaites, A. (2008).
28 2 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies

What does this mean for DFID and our external partners?
Security42
59. Without security for the people and the state, the economy and public services cannot
function and positive peace cannot be achieved (e.g. Somalia and Afghanistan). The state
needs to be able to protect itself and its territory from internal and external challenges by
establishing a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. A responsible and accountable
security sector is also essential for building the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the
population. Critically, the governed should have confidence that they will be protected by
the police, the military and the justice system.
60. Effective support to security sector reform requires coordination between development,
diplomacy and defence actors. It also requires a focus on accountability and oversight of
security functions. This may involve working with state and non-state security systems
(e.g. informal policing structures and community safety groups), and on the links between
security and justice institutions, to ensure the system works as a whole.

Box 8: A coordinated, holistic approach to security sector reform

in Sierra Leone
DFID, FCO and MOD have come together to
support the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform
Programme, which embraces a wide range of
state and non-state institutions. These include
the Office of National Security, intelligence,
defence, police, internal affairs and accountability
institutions (parliament, civil society, media and
academia). Local ownership of reform has been
transferred to the Sierra Leone Ministry of A newly built Family Support Unit in
Defence, where principles of accountability, Sierra Leone. The Family Support Units
civilian leadership and good management are have been set up within the police to
deal with cases of sexual and child abuse
being adopted.
The linkages between security and justice institutions have also been strengthened
through the DFID-funded Justice Sector Development Programme – particularly the police,
prisons and judiciary – to improve case management. Building on these two successful
programmes, the aim is to design a new integrated security and justice programme that
will support a series of interlocking interventions across the security and justice sectors.
A recent case study observed that ‘the revised national security agenda of Sierra Leone
displays a remarkably progressive understanding of threats to peace and security in the
country, emphasising the persistent lack of human security over regional threats’.43
DFID was perceived to have been effective in building capacity and giving full
responsibility to national bodies. The armed forces were effectively downsized and the
capacities of the national police force were increased, helping to facilitate free and fair
elections in 2007 and 2008.

42
For further guidance see OECD DAC (2007) Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice.
Available at: www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/ssr
43
Sierra Leone case study, in London School of Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (2009) ‘State-Building in Fragile Situations – How Can
Donors ‘Do No Harm’ and Maximise their Positive Impact? Summary of the Country Case Studies’, joint study prepared for the OECD DAC.
 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies 2 29

61. Gender dimensions are important, although often neglected in international responses.
Entrenched social attitudes and gender-biased criminal justice systems mean that most
victims of violence (including at the hands of state organisations) suffer in silence, with
little recourse to justice or support. Alongside support for victims of violence, greater
attention should be given to preventive measures – for example, legislation, gender
awareness-raising within police and military structures, working with men and boys
and tackling perpetrator impunity.44

Law and justice

62. The state must be able to establish laws and rules that govern the behaviour of the state
and society. These underpin predictable economic, political and social interactions. To
build state legitimacy, this must be done in a transparent and fair way. In fragile countries,
there are likely to be formal and informal ‘rules’, which do not necessarily complement
each other.

63. In a responsive and accountable state, a focus on establishing rules evolves into respect
for the rule of law. This means that the law is applied fairly and without discrimination,
whether by state or non-state justice systems, and there is mutual agreement on the
rights and obligations shared by society and the state. The rule of law also includes
mechanisms to ensure state institutions are accountable and comply with international
standards (e.g. on corruption, human rights and humanitarian issues), and an
independent judiciary and civil society that can hold state officials to account.

64. International actors can support the development of formal systems of rules and laws,
such as justice sector reforms, protection of property rights, economic regulation and
trade, constitution-making and the establishment of anti-corruption mechanisms.
Ultimately, everyone should have access to appropriate, affordable systems that protect
their rights, keep their families safe and resolve disputes fairly and promptly. Achieving
this requires a people-centred approach that recognises the importance of civil,
commercial and family law alongside criminal justice.

65. A major challenge is to develop a deeper understanding of informal institutions and

traditional systems, and assess whether and how these can help support equal access to
justice and the rule of law. In many fragile countries, the majority of people seek justice
through informal means. In Nepal, it is estimated that 85% of disputes in rural areas are
settled by traditional dispute management practices. Efforts are needed to encourage
non-state and state actors to work together, as illustrated in Nigeria.

44
Klot, J. (2007) ’Women and Peace-building‘. Available at: http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Working%20Group%20on%20
Lessons%20Learned/WGLLbackgroundpaper%2029.01.08.pdf .
30 2 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies

Box 9: Supporting formal and informal justice systems in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the rules governing people’s daily interactions are established through formal
and informal institutions and at various levels (international, federal, state, community,
religious and tribal). The majority of Nigerian citizens tend to rely on traditional leaders,
customary courts or community-based security providers as their first port of call.

DFID Nigeria is working with a range of different security and justice service providers.
These include the formal court system and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
(such as citizen mediation centres) to promote access to justice, the Nigeria Police
Force, and selected informal policing structures (such as ‘neighbourhood watch’
arrangements). Improving the capacity of informal policing structures has enabled them
to work within the law, and increased their respect for human rights. Integrating their
roles within the operations of the formal police has helped them become more
accountable to the communities they serve. DFID also supports the training of
traditional rulers and customary court judges in the use of simplified procedural
guidelines to help guarantee fair hearings.

Financial and macro-economic management

Financial
66. States need to raise and manage revenue (e.g. from taxation, aid or natural resources).
The state’s ability to generate taxes has important implications for the relationship
between state and society. Sequencing issues need careful consideration, as tax collection
without capacity to deliver services in return may increase instability. Where taxes are
raised and managed responsibly, they can have a significant impact on people’s trust in
state institutions.45 Effective taxation is illustrated in Rwanda:

Box 10: Rwanda Revenue Authority: Strengthening Taxation46

The Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) was established in 1997 as a semi-autonomous

executive agency. With substantial financial and technical support from DFID, and
driven by high-level political commitment to change on the part of Rwanda’s
leadership, the RRA has helped raise revenue collection from 8.5% of GDP to over
15% of GDP.

Setting out to overcome the legacy of civil war and genocide, it has focused on
strengthening state–society relations by offering a credible and stable tax system that
seeks to promote economic growth and political stability. Its slogan is ‘Taxes for Growth
and Development’. The RRA has arguably contributed to developing a culture of
participation and citizenship as part of a wider process of establishing the norms and
practices of democratic governance.47

45
See Everest-Phillips, M. (2010) ‘State-Building Taxation for Developing Countries: Principles for Reform’,
Development Policy Review, 28 (10), for seven operating principles that link taxation and state-building.
46
World Bank (2006) ‘The Rwandan Revenue Authority Project’, World Bank Note, Washington DC
47
Land, T. (2004) ‘Developing Capacity for Tax Administration: The Rwanda Revenue Authority’, ECDPM Discussion Paper 57D.
 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies 2 31

67. It is important to support the state to manage revenue from other sources, such as aid
and natural resources, in an accountable way. This will help to reduce the risk of
corruption and seeking of illicit gains by elites. Supporting global initiatives such as the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative can complement support for public financial
management at the national level. Donors should also seek to ensure equitable allocation
of public resources across groups, including women.

Macroeconomic
68. Macroeconomic stability is needed to inspire confidence that the government has the
means to deliver on public expectations. It is essential for governments to implement
policies that address fiscal and trade deficits and debt arrears, stabilise inflation, secure a
stable currency, regulate exchange rates and reserves, and provide basic monetary and
financial regulation (e.g. by strengthening central banks). International actors can support
partner governments to analyse macroeconomic policy options, recognising that some
options may be politically difficult or disadvantage certain groups.

69. The following table illustrates sample objectives for the core functions outlined above:

Table 4: Examples of objectives in support of core functions

Core function DFID/partner objectives (examples)
Security • Work with state and non-state security institutions to protect
the personal safety and property of people, and establish a state
monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
• Strengthen civilian oversight and accountability of security
institutions to tackle violence against the population and hold.
those responsible to account.

Law and justice • Work with state and non-state justice institutions to establish an
environment based on transparent, predictable and fair rules, and
improve access to justice for poor and excluded people.
• Encourage respect for the rule of law by state and non-state actors,
including establishing mechanisms to hold state actors to account .
• Encourage adherence to obligations under international law,
including international human rights and humanitarian law.

Financial and • Support the state to raise and manage different sources of revenue
macroeconomic (in a transparent, accountable manner).
management • Ensure aid is delivered in ways which strengthen (or do not
undermine) the state’s ability to manage funds effectively.
• Work with state institutions to ensure a minimum level of financial
and economic stability and sound macro-economic management.

70. In order to deliver core and expected functions, states need a minimum level of
administrative capacity. But building a competent, meritocratic civil service in which
jobs are distributed on the basis of competence rather than patronage is a long-term
process, which requires a fundamental shift in attitudes among elites.
32 2 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies

71. As donors, we need to ensure that our own practices do not harm the development of an
effective civil service. Higher salaries paid to those working for international organisations
compared with those on civil service wages can have negative impacts on performance.48
In Afghanistan, competition with international wage rates means the government cannot
recruit or retain good staff at salary levels it can afford. DFID Afghanistan has a policy on
donor salary top-ups, to ensure these are accompanied by improvements to the
performance incentives of the public sector.49

72. Choosing which core functions of the state should be prioritised for international
assistance will depend on the outcome of robust political economy analysis. In
Afghanistan, DFID views sub-national governance as a core function given its importance
for the state’s ability to maintain control over its territory. Deconcentration and delegating
spending and planning authority have often been considered the best response to the
challenge of uneven state presence. This may promote accountability by improving service
delivery to local communities and ‘bringing government closer to the people’. But it may
also strengthen local power brokers, or replicate inefficiencies of the central state.50 In
Afghanistan, an incremental approach to deconcentration is needed, focusing initially on
creating linkages between the central government in Kabul, local government and other
local institutions.

Objective 3: Respond to public expectations

73. This objective focuses on state
functions and behaviours which are
expected by the population. States
need to be seen to meet public
expectations in order to maintain
legitimacy and stability. The negotiation
process around citizens’ expectations,
and whether the state is doing enough
to meet them, can help improve state
performance. In fragile contexts, public
goods may be delivered in a biased and A woman addressing a community meeting
selective manner that helps maintain in Guinea
an exclusionary political settlement.
Addressing this is essential to improve confidence in the state, and to address grievances.

74. Society’s expectations of the state are diverse, and relate to people’s understanding of
their rights and entitlements. Expectations may range from jobs and inclusive growth, to
provision of public services. There may also be expectations about the quality of
governance, such as an open political system with fair elections, free media, freedom of
information and association, and protection of other human rights.

48
Op. cit. London School of Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (2009).
49
See DFID Briefing Paper B (Do No Harm) for the full case study.
50
Op. cit. Fritz and Rocha Menochal (2007).
 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies 2 33

What does this mean for DFID and our external partners?
75. International actors should be careful not to make assumptions about the expectations of
different groups in society. Research into public expectations may be needed. Following
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2006) in Nepal, DFID commissioned a series of
public expectation surveys to identify priorities for peace and state reform. This was
influential in shaping donor strategies.

76. The rest of this section highlights examples of public expectations that are likely to be
high priority in many fragile contexts.

Inclusive growth and job creation

77. The development of a healthy,
diverse private sector is essential for
jobs and tax revenues. Elites need to
see an advantage in investing their
funds in the country, rather than in
foreign banks. The state can play
a central role in providing the
infrastructure and regulations for
market development, not only for
foreign direct investment, but also
Local tailors in the rebuilt bazaar in the old centre of
for domestic producers and investors Dakovica, Kosovo, which was almost totally destroyed
(many of whom may be women).51 during the 1999 conflict
Expanded social insurance packages
and basic living allowances can also help prevent women’s engagement in commercial
sex or other exploitative practices.

78. International support to promote private sector development might include: supporting
national institutions and regulatory frameworks to protect property rights, contracts and
other market transactions; providing an efficient communications and energy
infrastructure; promoting private investment, competition and consumer benefits; and
providing easier access to credit. Donors should work with governments to help simplify
procedures for setting up small businesses, and address the drivers of the informal
economy, which keep businesses small and wages low.

79. Job creation and ensuring that local people, especially women and youth, have the
appropriate skills and opportunities to enter the labour market are critical. Inclusive
growth that supports job creation can play a key role in diffusing possible conflict.
Growth must be equitable, and in the short term the focus should be on vulnerable
groups (e.g. training ex-combatants in Liberia). In the longer term, there is a need for
strategies to build human capital, such as secondary and tertiary education.

51
See World Bank (1997) World Development Report: The State in a Changing World; and World Bank (2002)
World Development Report: Building Institutions for Markets, World Bank, Washington DC
34 2 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies

Box 11: Economic reintegration programme in post-conflict Liberia

Following the disarmament and

demobilisation phase, ex-combatants
became eligible for reintegration
assistance under a UNDP programme.
Options available to participants
included vocational skills training
(e.g. in carpentry, masonry, tailoring,
auto mechanics and agriculture),
apprenticeships, formal education, and
financial and start-up support for
agriculture and alternative livelihoods.
Other benefits included subsistence
allowances, counselling and temporary Demobilised youth receiving training in motor
employment opportunities. mechanics skills at a rehabilitation centre in Liberia

Basic services
80. Basic services include security and justice (see paras. 59–65), as well as health,
education, social protection and water and sanitation. Political elites engage in service
delivery for different reasons, such as promoting social cohesion or consolidating their
power base and buying loyalty. Alternative service providers may exist alongside the
state, but these will have differences in coverage, price and quality. Service delivery can
help improve state–
society relations, but
if handled poorly, it
can sow discord and
discrimination (e.g.
school curricula that
reinforce divisions).
The Sudan example
shows how education
programmes can be
designed to reduce
local conflict (see
Box 12).

Women with their babies waiting to see the nurse at a

health centre in Freetown, Sierra Leone
 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies 2 35

Box 12: Education in Abyei, Sudan: building common interests

Abyei is an area disputed between the governments of north and south Sudan, populated by
a mix of Dinka and Misserya communities. Following the peace agreement, large numbers of
internally displaced people were encouraged to return to the area, putting pressures on
limited resources. Relief efforts focused on the groups most affected by the war, and so
tended to favour the Dinka, creating resentment among Misserya. Analysis supported by
DFID identified this as a potential source of conflict between the two communities.

The Integrated Strategic Plan for Abyei identified education as a key priority for both
communities. In response to rising tensions and against a background of limited local
capacity, DFID has supported UNICEF to develop and implement a rapid school building and
education programme. The goal is to reduce conflict and support the implementation of
the peace agreement through creating school places and basic education programmes for
adolescents, serving both communities, thus creating a point of common interest.

81. Political economy and conflict analysis should be integrated with needs analysis in the
design of sector programmes. Donors should think carefully about the nature of support
for basic services from a state-building and peace-building perspective, including which
services should be prioritised, how to provide support, when, and for whom. The state
does not need to meet all expectations or deliver all public services directly. But it should
be able to organise and regulate the activities of those who are delivering them, including
NGOs and private companies. In Afghanistan, a new DFID programme to support
informal justice systems includes a central role for the state as regulator.

Links with other approaches

82. Ensuring coherence between different international approaches will help maximise the
added value of our efforts and minimise the risk of doing harm. This section considers
two important approaches that relate to state-building and peace-building: humanitarian
action and stabilisation.

Humanitarian action
83. Where people’s lives and dignity are at
risk, one of the leading international
responses is humanitarian action.
While the primary purpose is the
alleviation of suffering, there are
complementarities between the
humanitarian, peace-building and
state-building agendas. Humanitarian
action is concerned with addressing
the effects of conflict as well as
Sudanese women carry jerry cans from a water point
potential causes. If humanitarian to their temporary shelter in a refugee camp in Chad
needs are not addressed, grievances
are likely to increase and public expectations will remain unmet.
36 2 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies

84. In severely conflict-affected situations, humanitarian action may be the only way to
provide basic services. International actors should ensure that such efforts help maintain
state capacity during crises (where feasible) and are built upon in longer term capacity-
building work. At the same time, building the state’s long-term capacity to deliver
services to the population should not distract from the international community’s
responsibility to meet humanitarian needs wherever they exist, when the state is unable
or unwilling to do so.

85. A smooth transition from humanitarian to development programmes in the ‘early

recovery’ phase (post-conflict) is critical to the success of peace-building and state-
building strategies. There is a responsibility on both the humanitarian and development
communities to address the ‘early recovery gap’ that is often created by a sudden cut-off
between humanitarian and development programmes. We need to ensure the right
architecture and processes are in place.52

Stabilisation
86. In severely conflict-affected situations,
levels of insecurity make normal
development and governance
interventions impossible. The
stabilisation approach is designed to
reduce conflict, provide sufficient
stability to kick-start a political process
and begin to address the underlying
causes of conflict. It is the ‘first step’
towards progress on state-building
and peace-building in very insecure Boots and shoes are left outside a room where
Norwegian ISAF (International Security Assistance
environments. The UK may be Force) troops meet with local leaders in Afghanistan
pursuing a range of objectives
simultaneously, and stabilisation, development and humanitarian activities may share
the same operational space. Every effort should be made to reduce tensions between
approaches and increase complementarity. All activities must also be consistent with
international humanitarian law.

52
United Nations (2009) ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Peace-building in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict’.
Available at: http://es.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=pbf_090611_sg.pdf
 An integrated approach to building
peaceful states and societies 3 37

Box 13: Links with stabilisation

Stabilisation involves three dimensions:

(i) Preventing, stopping or reducing violent conflict – often using military engagement
and sometimes only in small areas. This lays the groundwork for Objective 1 (address
causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build resolution mechanisms);
(ii) Protecting people and their livelihoods. This is an important component of
Objective 1 (security for the people as a core function), and Objective 4 (responding
to public expectations);
(iii) Preparing for peace. This helps to lay the groundwork for a more inclusive political
settlement, and a minimum level of state functionality through support to core state
functions – Objectives 2 and 3.

Intergrating stabilisation into the approach

Preparing for peace Preventing/stopping/reducing

violent conflict

Support Develop
inclusive core state
political functions
settlements Address causes
& effects of
conflict and Strengthen
fragility state-society
relations

Respond to public
expectations

Protecting people and their livelihoods

Stabilisation, state-building and peace-building together combine short-term actions to

establish good enough security and stability with actions to address the structural causes
of conflict, poverty and instability over the medium to longer term. This enables us to
engage earlier (e.g. pre-peace process) and more effectively in an ongoing conflict. And
it helps us to fill the gap between violent instability and the establishment of normal
diplomatic, development and security relations.
38 3 Key operational implications

3. Key Operational implications

87. This section outlines ways in which the integrated approach to state-building and peace-
building will change development practice on partnerships, analysis, strategy and
planning, and programme delivery in conflict-affected and fragile countries. The typology
in Annex B sets out questions to be considered in five types of conflict-affected and
fragile situations. Annex C illustrates ways in which the approach can help improve our
work in four different sectors.

88. The integrated approach is not intended to provide all the answers; it should be applied
with some humility, given the scale and complexity of the challenge. In some countries,
the integrated framework is already being used to inform analysis, DFID country plans
and the development of UK strategies, but we are in the early stages of testing out its
application. The approach provides a starting point for dialogue between development
actors and their partners, and can help guide decision making and priorities in the most
challenging environments.

3.1 Recognise that politics are central to our work in

conflict-affected and fragile countries
89. This requires a significant shift in mindset and perspective from a traditional development
approach. State-building and peace-building are political processes. Effective support
requires a high level of political awareness, identification of opportunities to support
social and political change, and an understanding of elite politics and the nature of the
political settlement.

90. In partnership with the diplomatic community, development actors need to be able to
make judgements about how best to support positive state-building and peace-building
dynamics, and how to avoid reinforcing negative political trends. In Timor Leste from
2002 to 2006, a lack of political understanding and conflict analysis among international
actors led to a flawed state-building strategy, which contributed to the centralisation of
power in the executive branch of government and at the national level, and exacerbated
political and economic exclusion.53

91. All donor actions have political ramifications. Financial support to strengthen state
functions can consolidate the position of the incumbent regime and shift the balance of
power between elites. Equally, support to enhance the voice and well-being of excluded
groups is not a neutral activity; it strengthens their position in society and has important
social and political ramifications. Political analysis should inform programme design and
the development dialogue with partner governments.

3.2 Build consensus with our external partners

92. Ensuring that development, political and security approaches are coherent is a
prerequisite for effective engagement. The UK government is committed to developing
joint cross-departmental strategies in all fragile countries where they do not already

53 
Adapted from Norad (2007) ‘Review of Development Co-operation in Timor Leste’.
Available at: http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+Page?key=109749
 Key operational implications
3 39

exist.54 The UK Stabilisation Unit has planning capacity and guidance to support the
development of these strategies.

93. No single donor or international player can address conflict and fragility alone. Building
peaceful states and societies should ideally be at the heart of joint assessments (such as
joint UN/World Bank/EC Post Conflict Needs Assessments) and national strategies (such as
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers or Transitional Results Frameworks) in conflict-affected
and fragile situations.

94. In many contexts the UK and other bilateral donors will be supporting a multilateral-led
international effort. To improve multilateral-led coordination and performance, we are
pursuing a number of reform efforts, particularly focused on improving the coherence
and effectiveness of the UN, World Bank and EU. These include pressing for sufficient
levels of high-quality, appropriately skilled staff in the field, and improving the
management of UN/World Bank-led Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs).

95. As outlined in the UN Secretary General’s Report on Peacebuilding, an effective approach
requires (i) strong UN leadership in country, (ii) joint needs assessments, and (iii) strategies
which bring together the international system behind government priorities. It also
requires: strengthened national and international capacity; fast, flexible financing
mechanisms; and effective partnership between the UN and the World Bank, including
agreement on their roles and responsibilities in the key peace-building and state-building
sectors. Country offices can support the implementation and monitoring of these reform
efforts – see DFID Briefing Paper F (Coordination).

3.3 Analyse the context using the integrated framework…

96. In fragile countries, context analysis is especially important. Experience shows that
where there is a lack of such analysis, donor actions can lead to more harm than good.
In Rwanda in 1994, donors failed to identify and address the underlying conditions of
the genocide, and instead pursued a ’narrow economic-technical approach‘.55
DFID Briefing Paper B (Do No Harm) provides further examples.

97. DFID has developed a range of analytical tools to help understand state-building and
peace-building dynamics and the implications for our programmes. DFID Briefing Paper
A (Analysis) provides a summary of these tools and a range of country examples. The
tools include Country Governance Analysis, Political Economy Analysis, Strategic Conflict
Assessments, and Gender and Social Exclusion Analysis. The UK’s Countries at Risk of
Instability framework is useful for capturing national, regional and global dimensions
together. Drivers of Radicalisation studies have helped identify grievances or extremist
influences, and ways to prevent them from escalating.

98. However, translating analytical findings into practical changes to programmes can be
challenging. Applying the integrated approach to state-building and peace-building not
only requires a concerted focus on context analysis, but also a thorough assessment of
the implications for programme choices. DFID country offices have started explicitly

54
DFID (2009) Op. cit.
55
Uvin, P. (1999) ‘Development Aid and Structural Violence: The Case of Rwanda’, Development, 42 (3).
40 3 Key operational implications

analysing state-building dynamics and their implications, as illustrated in Box 14.

Future analysis should cover all four objectives of the integrated approach, including
peace-building dimensions, as well as regional and global issues.

Box 14: Understanding state-building dynamics in Afghanistan

DFID Afghanistan used the DFID state-building framework developed in 2008 to

improve its understanding of the relationships between political, human development
and governance issues. The exercise formed part of a wide-ranging context analysis
process called ‘Understanding Afghanistan’ and informed the development of DFID’s
approach within the UK strategy for Afghanistan. The use of the framework helped to
illustrate the relationship between increased corruption and problems with the political
settlement, as well as stalled progress on revenue generation and management
capacity. It also demonstrated that for Afghanistan, establishing sub-national
government fitted the criteria for a core function, along with anti-corruption, public
administration reform, tax, security and justice. Finally, it suggested a long-term focus
on state–society relations.

3.4 … leading to different priorities and choices

99. The integrated framework should first be used to review an existing country strategy and
programme, to offer a fresh view on strategic direction and priorities. Applying the
framework can be challenging as it may raise questions around current strategy and
choices. However, it should be viewed as an opportunity to improve engagement, and to
ensure we ‘do no harm’. Kenya provides an early example:

Box 15: A state-building ‘health check’ in Kenya

In Kenya, DFID and FCO undertook an analysis of state-building and its implications in
September 2008. The process concluded that the state-building lens provided a useful
means of identifying critical objectives, beyond the MDGs. It highlighted the fragile
nature of the political settlement, the risks of a return to violence and the limited
potential for reform. It identified gross failures in core state functions, in particular state
control of violence and the rule of law. It concluded that a renewed focus on judicial and
police reform was needed.

The analysis also identified that the DFID Kenya programme may have been neglecting,
or even undermining, state-building through its major service delivery programmes.
Traditional DFID sectoral approaches may overlook critical sources of fragility, such as
youth, exclusion, urbanisation and informal settlements. New partnerships and change
agents may help strengthen the fragile political settlement, such as youth, the middle
class, the business sector and the media – actors who will be integrated into the new
Drivers of Accountablity Programme.
 Key operational implications
3 41

100. This stage should include clarifying future strategic direction and objectives, and
considering how best to align and position a country programme in light of the
integrated approach. This will depend on context (see Annex B).

101. For example, Yemen is a

deteriorating governance
environment with declining state
legitimacy and rising risks of
instability and conflict. DFID has
brought a focus on state-building
and peace-building into the
renewed UK strategy. UK
objectives 2010 to 2012 are based
on analysis of the key issues that
need to be addressed to slow
down Yemen’s decline and buy
time for longer term reform and Young soldiers in Sana’a, Yemen
state-building. Priorities are:
• Yemen builds political structures that govern in the best interests of all Yemenis
(short term);
• Yemen must address the causes of conflict and build solutions;
• Government of Yemen effectively addresses Yemen’s role as an incubator of
terrorist threats; and
• External support to deliver services and jobs to the population (short term), and if
political will is demonstrated, Yemen must develop its capacity to deliver the
functions of the state expected by its citizens (long-term).

The next step is to take decisions on specific priorities and allocate resources to deliver.
Depending on the stage of the country planning cycle, this may feed directly into a new
country plan, or it may mean adjusting priorities and resources within an existing
portfolio. The key is to use the approach to prioritise rigorously. In Nepal, an
integrated approach to state-building and peace-building has informed priorities within
the DFID country plan and UK strategy:
42 3 Key operational implications

Box 16: Aligning with state-building and peace-building

objectives in Nepal

In 2006, Nepal emerged from a ten-year

conflict driven by decades of poverty,
exclusion and an unresponsive state. Key
challenges for the country included
redefining the nature of the political
settlement and renegotiating the
relationship between citizens and the
state. A UN political mission was
established in 2007 at the request of the
conflict parties to support the Constituent Villagers in front of pro-Mao-ist graffiti in
Rukum district, Nepal
Assembly and the entire peace process.

Building on previous work to address the causes of conflict and fragility – particularly
the Gender and Social Exclusion Assessment initiated by the World Bank and DFID to
understand the political, social and economic exclusion of women and non-elite groups
– the UK increased its political and financial resources to support critical elements of a
peace-building and state-building agenda which are in line with the integrated
approach. These included:
• Support to the peace process through joint donor funds to implement the peace
agreement; and through building domestic capacity to engage in the process.
• Work to foster an inclusive political settlement by: supporting poor and excluded
groups to articulate their needs and views; strengthening new political leaders and
voices; supporting elections to the Constituent Assembly; and facilitating dialogue
among the parties on the management of political tensions across the country;
• Support to strengthen the core functions of the state – including public security,
public financial management, more inclusive and accountable central and local state
institutions, and planning and monitoring functions;
• Strengthening service delivery capacity and supporting growth and job creation
strategies in order to deliver stability and a ‘peace dividend’ through development; and
• Producing up-to-date political economy and peace analysis to inform UK
government internal planning processes and debates on issues such as federalism
and local governance.

Focusing on this agenda has meant a lower priority afforded to other issues (e.g. water,
HIV/AIDS). While these issues were clearly important, they were, in DFID’s analysis, less
critical for consolidating peace than growth and employment, and were to some extent
being covered by other donors. Our experience suggests that such choices must be
informed by a careful analysis of ongoing and emerging opportunities for sustaining the
peace-building and state-building effort, and must take account of the potential harm that
disengaging from a sector might have on people, communities and political processes.
 Key operational implications
3 43

102. The process of prioritisation may mean reconsidering the relative priority given to
traditional areas of development programming. The degree to which delivery of basic
services and growth strategies should be prioritised will depend on an assessment of
needs, and on their contribution to state-building and peace-building objectives. Service
delivery and job creation may be critical to achieving state legitimacy (even where the
state is not a direct provider) and responding to public expectations.

103. Issues of gender equality, human rights and inclusion must be considered as part of
strategy and programming decisions:

Box 17: Why gender matters for building peaceful states

and societies56
Unlike other inequalities and types of exclusion (e.g.
on the basis of religion, ethnicity or caste), gender
inequality is not usually a key cause of conflict, and
addressing it is often seen as a lower priority. But
responding to gender inequality early is a crucial
element of state-building and peace-building
strategies. If gender is deprioritised, inequalities can
become entrenched in new or rebuilt systems and it
is much more difficult to bring about positive
change at a later stage.
Peace-building and state-building can offer unique
opportunities to address the inequities and injustices
of the past, while setting new precedents for the
future. Efforts to reshape gender relations are Women at a community meeting in
central to addressing the legacy of violent conflict the Democratic Republic of Congo
(which often disproportionately affects women), to
building inclusive state–society relations, and to increasing the prospects of a durable
peace by maximising the contribution that women can make. Research by RAND on
Afghanistan sets out strong arguments that an early emphasis on gender equity and
women’s inclusion is central to building a stable state.57
Briefing Paper D (Non-discrimination) provides further guidance on how to consider
gender, human rights and inclusion as part of the integrated approach.

104. As noted earlier, significant dilemmas may emerge when prioritising. In Afghanistan,
counter-narcotics activity is an important part of creating a more formal, licit economy
that will increase public revenues through taxation. However, this threatens the
interests of powerful elites, state officials and warlords complicit in drug trafficking and
may, in the short term, increase conflict. Similarly, counter-insurgency work needs to
ensure that short-term measures to address security concerns do not undermine public
confidence in the state.
Adapted from DFID Briefing Paper D (Non-discrimination), and from Klot (2007) op. cit.
56

57
Benard, C., Jones, S., Oliker, O., Thurston, C., Stearns, B. and Cordell, K. (2008) ‘Women and Nation-Building’.
Available at: www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG579.pdf
44 3 Key operational implications

Box 18: D
 ifficult choices: Peace, security and state-building
in Sierra Leone
In 2001, following ten years of conflict, Sierra Leone was confronted with serious
challenges to consolidate peace and become a democratic and effective state. DFID’s
political economy and conflict analysis concluded that security and restoration of the rule
of law were preconditions for progress in other areas; it also found that building the state
and transforming formal and informal power-sharing mechanisms were critical to the
peace-building process.
DFID and donor partners took difficult choices about what to prioritise and how to
manage the tensions between short-term and long-term objectives. It was agreed that in
the first few years, DFID would primarily invest in: (i) building the key capacities of the
state; and (ii) supporting progress on security, to sustain the peace. Service delivery and
growth promotion were seen as second-generation reform areas, with budget support
the main delivery mechanism.
Part of the rationale for limiting support to service delivery initially was that other
development partners would cover this sufficiently. The recent Country Programme
Evaluation found that this did not hold true, highlighting the importance of continually
reassessing priorities and monitoring assumptions. By 2007, DFID had increased its
support to service delivery and civil society (reflected in a new joint EC/DFID strategy) and
started to shift the focus away from security.
The evaluation concluded that DFID has made a significant contribution to the restoration
of peace and stability in Sierra Leone. Human security has improved since the end of the
conflict, but Sierra Leone remains fragile. Questions remain about whether a stronger
focus on service delivery at an earlier stage was needed. However, this would have
required a much larger aid framework, or reducing other areas of the programme.

3.5 Engage at the interface between state and society

105. When considering specific programme interventions, we must identify opportunities to
work at the interface between state and society. This may require a shift away from the
traditional donor focus on central government, towards a ‘bottom-up’ approach that
engages with non-state and community-level institutions. The aim is to link state and
society in ways that promote inclusive decision making and accountability.
106. International actors should avoid making assumptions about informal and non-state
institutions; such institutions can compete with the state in negative ways, but they can
also provide a bridge between the state and society. Empirical research should be carried
out to identify the challenges and opportunities they present.58
107. Working through formal CSOs is often an appropriate channel for engaging with
informal or customary institutions. For example, DFID funding supports the Bangladesh
National Women Lawyers’ Association,59 which sponsors grassroots ‘vigilance teams’ to
intervene in cases of rights violations (e.g. domestic violence, dowry extortion) and
58
Kelsall, T. (2008) ‘Going with the Grain in African Development?’, Development Policy Review, 26 (6), 627–655, cited in Norad (2009) op. cit.
59
This funding is channelled through the Rights and Governance Challenge Fund managed by Manusher Jonno Foundation.
 Key operational implications
3 45

advocate women’s rights to religious and community leaders. In Sierra Leone, traditional
chiefs are being integrated into formal local governance structures to help reduce
tensions between the systems:

Box 19: Improving links between traditional chiefs and local

governance in Sierra Leone
DFID provides pooled funding to the Institutional
Reform and Capacity Building Programme (IRCBP),
with the EC and the World Bank. The IRCBP has
identified opportunities to strengthen links between
traditional chiefs and formal local governance
structures. It has organised ward committee
training and district-level orientation activities that
provide opportunities for traditional chiefs to
increase their understanding of local governance.
Chiefs have actively participated in the preparation
of the decentralisation policy, which will provide a
framework to improve the relationship between
chiefdom councils and local councils. The IRCBP has
also financed the printing of local tax receipt books
Community meeting with local
and handed them to local councils for joint action chief, Bombali district, Sierra Leone
with the chiefdom councils.
A lesson learned through the programme is that issues of revenue sharing can seriously
affect the relationship between chiefdom councils and local councils. Struggles for
supremacy between traditional chiefs and local council authorities surfaced very early in
the implementation of Sierra Leone’s decentralisation policy, and concerted efforts
continue to diffuse these ongoing tensions.

108. Other ways of engaging at the interface include: (i) strengthening the capacity of civil
society to engage with the state and hold it accountable, particularly as a complement
to budget support or other forms of financial aid60; and (ii) community-driven
development programmes, which channel funds directly to local communities while
building local governance capacity. In Yemen, the Social Fund for Development (SFD)
employs a bottom-up approach, involving beneficiaries in community projects. The SFD
has contributed to state-building by increasing the visibility of the state as a service
provider, introducing democratic practices into local communities and building links
between communities and local authorities.61

3.6 Adapt delivery mechanisms

Staffing
109. Ensuring that DFID and our external partners have sufficient numbers of appropriately
skilled staff on the ground is critical to delivering on the integrated approach. The
transaction costs of working in situations of conflict and fragility tend to be higher,
60
The 2009 White Paper includes provision for 5% of budget support finance to support domestic accountability institutions and organisations
in partner countries.
See DFID Briefing Paper E (Alignment) for full case study on the Yemen SFD.
61
46 3 Key operational implications

including programme design, coordination, influencing, and monitoring and evaluation

– this should be reflected in staff planning. DFID is working to increase incentives and
improve preparation for staff to work in such contexts, and the World Bank has initiated
a staff training programme tailored to fragile contexts.

Aid instruments
110. It is important to make politically informed choices about the mix of instruments in a
given context. Experience of good practice in choosing aid instruments in conflict-
affected and fragile countries is emerging, and DFID Briefing Paper E (Alignment)
illustrates the range of instruments available. Donors should work to strengthen
accountability between government and citizens, ensuring they do not weaken that
relationship. Aid modalities (including the predictability of aid) have the potential to
enhance or undermine the state’s relations with society.62

111. When considering the mix of aid instruments to be

used, it is helpful to clarify the form of alignment
with the state that is appropriate at the current time,
and think through how this may change. DFID’s
conditionality policy is particularly relevant here.63
The following typology may also help:
(i) Through the state – In situations where the state
is increasingly responsive, risks are decreasing or
there is an urgent need to increase people’s
confidence in the state, instruments prioritising
delivery through the state may be used (e.g.
budget support, non-budget support financial
aid and some MDTFs). It will be important to
complement financial aid with other aid
A child fills up from a UNICEF
instruments focused on strengthening bottom-up
water tank in Harare, Zimbabwe
accountability and state–society relations.
(ii) With the state – In situations where state responsiveness is mixed, or the governance
situation is deteriorating, it is possible to use aid instruments that work with the
state and encourage state–society interaction. The Yemen SFD operates as a quasi
government body alongside and aligned with government policy. Its managing
director is Yemen’s Deputy Prime Minister and its board is chaired by the Prime
Minister. It reaches all 333 districts in Yemen (compared to the more limited reach of
government ministries) and is highly responsive to local priorities (see para. 108).
UN/World Bank managed MDTFs underpinned by a strong strategy may also be an
appropriate instrument in this context.
(iii) Outside the state – In contexts where the legitimacy of the state is questioned, or
the state is largely unresponsive or absent, it may be necessary to deliver aid outside
the state (e.g. through UN-managed pooled funds or civil society). Instruments that
work through non-state actors can provide a platform for state-building, supporting

62
Norad, (2009), op.cit.
63
DFID (2005) ‘Partnerships for Poverty Reduction: Rethinking Conditionality’.
 Key operational implications
3 47

legitimate demands for a more inclusive political settlement. In Zimbabwe (until

2009 when a power-sharing arrangement was agreed), DFID supported non-state
actors to deliver services, and to help sustain a fragile civil society so that it would be
able to engage with the state following political change.

112. The choice of aid instruments in many fragile contexts will include pooled funding
arrangements with other donors (usually led by the UN or World Bank), which are an
effective way to improve coordination, lower transaction costs and manage risk.
However, such mechanisms must not detract from engaging with the state where
appropriate – for example, by providing technical assistance to the government to help it
manage funds in the future, or conducting political dialogue around reform processes,
which technical secretariats or steering committees of pooled funds are not always well
equipped to take forward.

113. A further concern in many fragile countries is the quality and transparency of the
decision-making processes around investments by the international community.
Weaknesses in government or donor processes such as contracting or monitoring can
open up opportunities for corruption, and create serious difficulties in building public
trust. Donors (particularly bilaterals) can play an important role in encouraging
transparency and public participation in monitoring of major investments.

Risk management
114. Working in conflict-affected and fragile situations requires an increased appetite for risk,
and a thorough approach to risk management. Many decisions and programmes are
likely to be high risk, due to both the dynamic context and the nature of state-building
and peace-building interventions. This is particularly true in deteriorating governance
situations, protracted crises and highly insecure environments. Examples include
decisions to align with particular elites (political or reputational risks), or support for
measures to counter radicalisation and extremism (programme or staff security risks).
DFID Briefing Paper H (Risk Management) sets out a number of options for
managing risks at different levels, with examples of emerging good practice.

Results
115. Putting state-building and peace-building objectives at the centre of the development
approach also means adjusting the way we think about results and impact. While the
MDGs remain critically important as long-term measures of development success in all
our partner countries, they may not capture medium-term results in conflict-affected
and fragile countries. Our results frameworks need to be adjusted to include specific
indicators and targets on state-building and peace-building.

116. In DRC, DFID monitors at country plan level how the programme as a whole is
contributing to sustaining peace as well as tackling poverty, jointly with FCO and MOD.
The monitoring system uses seven indicators covering conflict reduction and security,
human rights and the rule of law, corruption, democratic process, basic service delivery,
public financial management and economic growth.
48 3 Key operational implications

117. The practicalities of monitoring and evaluation activities in conflict-affected and fragile
situations are challenging. Perception surveys are useful for assessing whether public
expectations are being met, and whether state legitimacy or grievances are increasing or
decreasing. In highly insecure environments, it may be necessary to rely more heavily on
reporting by implementing partners and other secondary sources. Monitoring of impact
by beneficiaries can be effective, including through public or social audits. Briefing
Paper I (Monitoring and Evaluation) provides further guidance.

Value for Money

118. Three factors – transaction costs, risk and expected return – can help compare the
relative value for money (VFM) of different priorities or options. For example, a cost–
benefit analysis of options for the Safety and Justice Programme in Bangladesh
concluded that informal sector programming represented significantly better VFM than
formal sector engagement, which carries greater risk. DFID is planning to pilot test a
revised approach to VFM that includes specifying the expected returns of each
intervention. This pilot can help test the feasibility of assessing VFM in the area of
state-building and peace-building, where there are particular challenges in defining and
measuring impact, and attribution.

119. Evidence on the effectiveness of different approaches is growing. For example, an

evaluation of DFID’s work in fragile countries concluded that ‘DFID’s support for inclusive
political settlements – from peace agreement negotiations to the holding of elections –
has successfully underpinned state–society relationships, particularly through its work
with the media and support for civic participation (including women)’64. Current DFID
research is also looking at the effectiveness of peace-building interventions.65 But future
research and evaluation will need to focus more explicitly on relative cost effectiveness
and VFM to address the lack of evidence in this area.

Conclusion
120. Achieving the MDGs in conflict-affected and fragile countries requires a step change
in international action. This is increasingly recognised by the multilaterals and the
major OECD donors. The integrated approach set out in this paper provides a
platform for more effective engagement in the most difficult, fragile environments.
We are at an early stage of applying the approach in practice. Given the complexity of
the challenge, our focus must be on learning from experience.

121. The integrated approach recognises that a new route to achieving the MDGs is
required – one that is focused on achieving social and political change. It means
prioritising differently, and using new skills and partnerships to achieve our aims.
DFID is committed to working with our partners to put these changes into practice.

64
Chapman, N. and Vaillant, C. (2010), Draft Synthesis of DFID Country Programme Evaluations Conducted in Fragile States,
prepared for DFID Evaluation Department
65
This work will be published as ‘What Price Peace?’ in 2010.
 Annexes A 49

Annex A: Practical ways of addressing causes

and effects of conflict and fragility
Stage of conflict Examples of interventions that
and fragility donors can support1

Prevention • Measures to reduce discrimination and exclusion, including

(all stages) gender inequality
• Reforms to strengthen checks and balances, reduce abuse of power
and curb opportunities for private gain by elites
• Measures to strengthen a domestic private sector, linked to promotion
of youth and women’s employment
• Measures to counter radicalisation and violent extremism
• Support for democratic processes/free and fair elections
• Delivery of security and justice as basic services, security sector reforms,
reduction of availability of small arms and light weapons
• Protection and humanitarian action where people’s lives, integrity and
dignity could be at risk

During • Humanitarian action to save lives when populations are displaced and
violent conflict livelihoods and coping mechanisms have broken down
• Quick impact development work, focused on social protection,
infrastructure and employment for vulnerable groups
• Support for human rights monitoring and civilian protection, and
measures to ensure humanitarian and development access
• Measures to counter violence against women

After conflict, • Continued protection and humanitarian assistance

fragility • Transitional justice mechanisms to address war crimes and human
remains rights violations, including gender-based violence
• Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), including a
focus on women and girl combatants
• Return of refugees and internally displaced people
• Community-based recovery and reconciliation activities
• Restoration of land/property rights
• Resolution of disputes over cross-border mineral rights
• Smooth transition from humanitarian to development assistance

1
For further examples of policy tools available at different stages of conflict see Lund, M. (2006) Preventing Violent Conflicts – A Strategy for
Preventive Diplomacy, United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC.
50 A Annexes

Annex B: Applying the integrated approach

in different fragile situations
This table illustrates the types of issues to be considered under each of the four objectives of the
integrated approach, in five types of fragile situations. It is not intended to be comprehensive, but
may help assist the discussions and considerations of international actors working in such contexts.

In all contexts:
1. Analysis – political economy analysis of underlying drivers of conflict/fragility, and sources of
resilience within societies. Supplement with regular, light-touch analysis of dynamics as
situations change. Map all actors (including UK, national and international partners), their
interests, incentives, contributions and capacities for (or against) progress on peace-building
and state-building.
2.  Conflict and fragility sensitivity of aid, based on analysis, to ensure that aid does no harm,
and where possible helps to address causes.
3. Consider gender, exclusion and respect for human rights as important cross-cutting issues
in all four objectives.
4. Monitoring of humanitarian indicators, protection issues, ensuring respect for international
humanitarian law (IHL) and humanitarian access.
5. Note that different areas of a country/region may be characterised by different types/stages
of conflict and fragility.
Objective Deteriorating Prolonged crisis/ Ongoing violent Post-conflict/crisis or Gradual
governance impasse conflict political transition improvement
1. Address the What are the main risks What are the key How can humanitarian What measures are What are the current
causes and of descending into factors that could and development space needed to support the risks of instability?
effects of instability and violent precipitate a positive be maintained? implementation of the How can these be
conflict and conflict? How can change (e.g. bring peace or political mitigated?
How can the worst
fragility, these be monitored on parties to the agreement?
effects of violent What are the long-term
and build a regular basis? What negotiating table)? Are
conflict on civilians be How can the effects of effects of previous
conflict are the potential risks there opportunities to
reduced? conflict be alleviated conflict or fragility –
resolution to staff and provide support (e.g.
(e.g. human rights including psycho-social?
mechanisms programmes? regional dialogue)? What are the prospects
violations, trauma, How can these be
for a ceasefire or peace
How might the risks be What might encourage breakdown of identified and
negotiations? Are there
mitigated? Can we parties to feel they are communities)? Options addressed? Is
third parties who could
help reduce incentives in an uncomfortable for transitional justice? reconciliation still
convene negotiations?
to engage in violence and costly needed?
What is the risk of a
before it breaks out? predicament? What local capacities
return to conflict? Are the conditions for
Can internal and for peace can still be
Is the current What capacities do the durable, positive peace
external stabilising supported?
international state and communities emerging or in place?
factors be strengthened If a UN or other
engagement strategy have to manage the
(e.g. responsible media, international mission is
helpful? Could it be risks and resolve future
regional integration)? present, does its
more so? conflict?
Is the response from mandate support
Does the international
international actors addressing causes? Is
transition support
(especially the UN and the mission delivering?
strategy address causes
World Bank) effective?
Annexes

and effects sufficiently?

A
51
 52
A
Objective Deteriorating Prolonged crisis/ Ongoing violent Post-conflict/crisis or Gradual
governance impasse conflict political transition improvement
2. Support Are there opportunities Are there opportunities How can the incentives How can we support How can inclusive
Annexes

inclusive to support positive to support the of those who are opportunities for political or democratic
political dialogue and emergence of a more benefiting (politically/ excluded groups and processes be further
settlements interaction between inclusive settlement? economically) from the non-violent actors to strengthened? Are
and elites and/or societal Which actors would we conflict be changed? participate in political there ways to support a
processes groups? need to engage with? negotiations or peace transition to
How can we help
processes? sustainable, democratic
Are there upcoming (How) should we prepare for a future
politics (e.g. following
events that can engage with imperfect peace process? What How can links between
transitional power-
increase/decrease elections? What would might elements of an different ‘tracks’ of the
sharing arrangements,
inclusion (e.g. be the potential risks inclusive peace peace process (e.g.
or identity-based
elections)? What and benefits of agreement look like official, civil society) be
politics)?
opportunities are there engaging? (including mechanisms encouraged?
to support more for implementation)? Are there opportunities
Could coalition-building Are there informal,
inclusive decision to work at the interface
– under regional, UN or Is it possible to develop underlying exclusionary
making? between state and
other international a shared vision of elements of the political
society to strengthen
What ‘preventive leadership – help shift society and progress? settlement that need to
linkages?
diplomacy’ initiatives the balance of power Can we support be addressed? How
might be relevant (e.g. or create openings? consultation processes? might this be done? Are there tensions
sanctions)? Is enhanced between formal
How can the space for Might mediation How can state
monitoring of our democratic systems and
civil society be initiatives be helpful? legitimacy be
development informal/traditional
preserved or Can we support them? improved?
partnership principles systems of authority?
strengthened?
needed? How might these be
addressed?
Objective Deteriorating Prolonged crisis/ Ongoing violent Post-conflict/crisis or Gradual
governance impasse conflict political transition improvement
3. Develop Are core functions If direct support to state Could support for core Is the international What are the key
core state being supported in institutions is not functions generate system equipped to priorities for reform
functions ways that improve appropriate, are there incentives/disincentives support the within the core
accountability and opportunities to work towards peace? development of state functions, in order to
inclusion as well as with the state on its functions during the strengthen the inclusive
Could further support
efficiency? policy and oversight transition process – political settlement,
to encourage state
roles? including long-term address causes and
Is instability being institutions (especially
financing? How can we respond to public
exacerbated by the way Are there ways of security and justice) to
ensure donors do not expectations?
in which core functions supporting non-state comply with human
undermine the state’s
are delivered? How can actors to deliver core rights law and IHL be
administrative capacity?
this be addressed? functions, without helpful? Can human
undermining the future rights monitoring by What are the most
What are the incentives
role of the state non-state actors help? important core
for the state to improve
(shadow alignment)? functions to support
its governance record?
the transition to peace?
Are there clear future
priorities where What measures
preliminary analysis and would strengthen
strategic thinking can macroeconomic
be carried out (e.g. stability, and create the
security and justice)? environment for
inclusive growth?
Annexes
A
53
 54
A
Objective Deteriorating Prolonged crisis/ Ongoing violent Post-conflict/crisis or Gradual
governance impasse conflict political transition improvement
4. Respond to What expectations Can non-state actors What are the key needs What are people’s What are people’s
Annexes

public need to be met most help meet basic needs? and expectations of expectations for a expectations of a
expectations urgently to reduce the What role for the conflict-affected peace dividend (if any)? peaceful state? How
risk of violent conflict? state is appropriate communities? can the state be
Does the transition
How can these be in the context? Is What local capacity supported to meet
offer opportunities to
identified (e.g. shadow alignment exists to address them? these?
redefine rights and
Afrobarometer possible/appropriate?
To what extent should entitlements, in ways Are there tensions
surveys)?
Are there internal needs and expectations that meet the between the state’s
coalitions based on be met by humanitarian expectations of all demands on society
unmet public actors? groups in society? (e.g. for taxation) and
expectations that could its capacity to deliver?
How can the recovery
precipitate positive How can these be
of lives and livelihoods
change? Are the state resolved?
be supported? Is job
and/or elites under
creation being given
pressure to deliver?
sufficient priority?
Can these dynamics be
supported?

The above typology is based on the OECD DAC’s2 with the addition of a fifth category for ongoing violent conflict. The types of fragility are:
Deteriorating governance: increasing risk of conflict and instability; likely to include increasing tensions between government
and the international community on development strategy (and other policies).
Prolonged crisis/impasse: entrenched situation characterised by violent repression, instability and/or weak state legitimacy.
Limited or no opportunities for the international community to work with government on development strategy.
Ongoing violent conflict: highly insecure situations, with very limited stability, reach, capacity and legitimacy of the state.
International community may be engaged militarily as well as politically.
Post-conflict/crisis or political transition: peace agreement, national reconciliation or agreed political transition process
supported by the international community.
Gradual improvement: state effectiveness improving and reform efforts have made some progress with international support,
but situation remains fragile. Includes ‘post-post conflict countries’, where reform progress has been positive but gradual.
2
See Principle 1 in the OECD DAC’s Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf
 Annexes A 55

Annex C: Applying the integrated approach to

our sector work: some examples
This annex illustrates how applying the integrated approach can help us improve and adapt our
development programmes. Using four different sectors, examples are given under each of the
four objectives of the approach, to show how positive support can be provided and how potential
harm can be done.

Access to justice
Objective 1: Address the causes and Objective 2: Support inclusive political
effects of conflict and fragility settlements and processes
What to support How to do harm What to support How to do harm

Address war crimes Ignoring the Support inclusive, Rushing through peace
and human rights requirement to balance participatory and agreements and
violations through the goal of peace with transparent constitution-making
transitional justice the goal of justice and constitution-making processes to fit donor
mechanisms accountability for those processes deadlines and priorities
who have committed
Support measures to Ensure peace Reinforcing political
crimes during conflict
provide effective, fair agreements include fair interference and elite
and equitable justice Ignoring those who and equitable judicial capture of the judiciary
mechanisms (formal lose out from changes reform, and transitional
and informal) for in power sharing in the justice measures (e.g.
addressing grievances security and justice truth commissions,
(e.g. land disputes) sectors prisoner releases)

Objective 3: Develop core state functions Objective 4: Respond to public expectations

What to support How to do harm What to support How to do harm
Ensure the provision of Ignoring the linkages Support a people- Supporting
affordable, accessible between justice and centred approach unaccountable formal
and equitable justice security systems and and informal justice
Address not only
systems negative impacts of systems that reinforce
criminal justice but also
‘silo’ support (e.g. discrimination against
Balance support to local issues (e.g.
support to police with women and
both formal and protection of land,
sufficient attention to marginalised groups
informal systems such property and livestock;
prisons or court
as community family disputes and Ignoring local security
systems, exacerbating
mediation services and inheritance rights; civil and justice mechanisms
issue of pre-trial
paralegal committees and commercial justice) in favour of state
detainees)
provision only, without
Assist the judiciary to Address violence against
analysing the
become an women through legal
challenges and
independent branch of advocacy, paralegal
opportunities they
government, able to services, judicial reform
present
check the power of the and awareness raising
legislature and within police, judiciary
executive and traditional leadership
56 A Annexes

Education
Objective 1: Address the causes and Objective 2: Support inclusive political
effects of conflict and fragility settlements and processes

What to support How to do harm What to support How to do harm

Ensure the education Judging success only in Develop a long-term Reproducing an

system and curricula do terms of increased vision of how excluded education system which
not exacerbate societal enrolment or numbers groups (e.g. girls) can favours an elite few
divisions or conflict in education develop skills and
legacies, but widen confidence to enter
social and economic politics
mobility
Encourage approaches
to learning that
strengthen tolerance
of differences and
resilience to extremist
ideologies

Objective 3: Develop core state functions Objective 4: Respond to public expectations

What to support How to do harm What to support How to do harm

Support codes of Improving efficiency of Ensure the education Allowing elites or

conduct within the education system system has special interest groups
education institutions without increasing institutionalised ways to dominate decision
that hold people to accountability of its of communicating with making on curriculum
account for management and parents and responding choice, girls’
unacceptable leadership to the public to issues they raise attendance etc.
behaviour (e.g. using regarding fees, safety,
girls as teachers’ standards, opening
servants, rape in hours etc.
schools)
 Annexes A 57

Job creation – labour-based contracting

Objective 1: Address the causes and Objective 2: Support inclusive political
effects of conflict and fragility settlements and processes

What to support How to do harm What to support How to do harm

Ensure that benefits Rewarding combatants Ensure economic elites Allowing those with
extend to groups or ex-combatants only see the benefits of power to seize
involved in conflict as investing in inclusive economic opportunities
well as the general job creation schemes without ensuring other
population groups also benefit

Objective 3: Develop core state functions Objective 4: Respond to public expectations

What to support How to do harm What to support How to do harm

Allocate resources and Distorting labour Ensure that what is Creating white
opportunities on the market with perverse being produced through elephants that do not
basis of transparent, incentives, creating the jobs created is benefit the majority of
acceptable rules (e.g. suspicions or useful, as perceived by the population
use standard pay scales exacerbating tensions the local population
Ignoring serious
for particular jobs in through a lack of
Ensure enforcement of corruption that
accordance with transparency
local anti-corruption alienates local people
market norms)
standards
58 A Annexes

Political institutions and processes

Objective 1: Address the causes and Objective 2: Support inclusive political
effects of conflict and fragility settlements and processes

What to support How to do harm What to support How to do harm

Support political Ignoring the underlying Develop a gradual Having a narrow and
reforms to recognise/ historical and structural approach to short-term focus on
protect the rights of legacies that determine democratisation and elections
marginalised and what kind of political view elections as part
Transplanting political
excluded groups (e.g. change is possible of a broader system of
models from outside
women, indigenous reforms rather than as
people), and address one-off events Focusing only on formal
disparities between institutions without
Engage with both
different sub-regions taking into account
formal and informal
how informal practices
institutions to see how
and arrangements
a more equitable and
shape power relations
representative political
system can be Ignoring the power
developed dynamics and potential
struggles/conflict that
may be involved in
altering political
systems

Objective 3: Develop core state functions Objective 4: Respond to public expectations

What to support How to do harm What to support How to do harm

Support reforms to Relying on individual Support measures to Strengthening citizens’

strengthen checks and champions rather than strengthen citizens’ voice without
balances, and reduce focusing on institutions voice and state strengthening the
abuse of power and accountability (e.g. free capacity of the state to
Working only with
opportunities for media, freedom of respond to expectations
strong government
illicit gains information) and demand
departments for the
sake of expediency and Work with both state Placing undue
quick results and non-state providers expectations on the
of basic services (e.g. state to deliver,
justice, education), and especially in the
explore synergies and short term
linkages between them
Bypassing state
institutions altogether
in the provision of key
functions and services,
rather than considering
a regulatory/oversight
role
A
What is Development?
Why is the UK Government involved?
What is DFID?
International development is about helping people fight poverty.
This means people in rich and poor countries working together to settle conflicts, increase opportunities for trade,
tackle climate change, improve people’s health and their chance to get an education.
It means helping governments in developing countries put their own plans into action. It means agreeing debt relief,
working with international institutions that co-ordinate support, and working with non-government organisations
and charities to give communities a chance to find their own ways out of poverty.

Getting rid of poverty will make for a better world for everybody.
Nearly a billion people, one in 6 of the world’s population, live in extreme poverty. This means they live on
less than $1 a day. Ten million children die before their fifth birthday, most of them from preventable diseases.
More than 113 million children in developing countries do not go to school.
In a world of growing wealth, such levels of human suffering and wasted potential are not only morally wrong,
they are also against our own interests.
We are closer to people in developing countries than ever before. We trade more and more with people in poor
countries, and many of the problems which affect us – conflict, international crime, refugees, the trade in illegal
drugs and the spread of diseases – are caused or made worse by poverty in developing countries.
In the last 10 years Britain has more than trebled its spending on aid to nearly £7 billion a year.
We are now the fourth largest donor in the world.

DFID, the Department for International Development, is the part of the UK Government that
manages Britain’s aid to poor countries and works to get rid of extreme poverty.
We work towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals - a set of targets agreed by the United Nations
to halve global poverty by 2015.
DFID works in partnership with governments, civil society, the private sector and others. It also works with
multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations agencies and the European Commission.
DFID works directly in over 150 countries worldwide. Its headquarters are in London and East Kilbride,
near Glasgow.
1 Palace Street
London SW1E 5HE,
UK
and at:
Abercrombie House
Eaglesham Road
East Kilbride
Glasgow G75 8EA,
UK
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7023 0000
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7023 0016
Website: www.dfid.gov.uk
E-mail: enquiry@dfid.gov.uk
Public enquiry point: 0845 3004100
or +44 1355 84 3132 (if you are calling from abroad)
© Crown copyright 2010
Copyright in the typographical arrangement and design rests with the Crown. This publication
(excluding the logo) may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium provided that
it is reproduced accurately and not used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged
as Crown copyright with the title and source of the publication specified.
Published by the Department for International Development. Printed in the UK, 2010,
on recycled paper containing 80% recycled fibre and 20% totally chlorine free virgin pulp.