Kimberly question: Eman

1. S.20 maliciously wound or cause grievous bodily harm, Offences against the person act 1861
as per the CPS charging standards provided that state that serious psychiatric injury be hold
one liable for grievous bodily harm S20 (Burstow).
2. To be held liable for Section 20, Ben, the defendant must satisfy the actus reus and mens rea
of the crime and the two elements must coincide (Woolmington v DPP). If guilty, D could be
liable for up to 7 years in prison. The actus reus of s20 is either malicious wounding or
inflicting grievious bodily harm. The Mens for S20 is malice (R v Rushmore) which
interpreted as requiring proof that D intended or foresaw that his conduct carried a risk of
harm, albeit not necessary to prove serious harm (Parmenter,approving Mowatt). A
corresponding intention or foresight to the wound or GBH inflicted is not needed, all that is
required is awareness as to some sort of risk of injury (R v Brady).
Since there is no continuity in the break of the skin, Ben cannot be charged under s20 for
malicious wounding, because there is no wound suffered (Moriarty v Brookes).
DPP v Smith says that really serious bodily harm satisfied the actus reus of section 20 (which
is a very vague description), Janjua and Chaudhry clarified that serious bodily harm suffices
for GBH under S20, and they need not be permanent, life-threatening, or dangerous
(Ashman). Ultimately the courts must consider the totality of the injuries sustained (Grundy).
It is left upon the jury to decide, whether the injuries amount to GBH (Hill), using
contemporary social standards (Golding), and this they determine objectively (Brown and
Stratton) by taking into account age, sex, physical fitness, and extent of injury of the victim
(Bollom).
The harm that resulted was in the form of psychiatric injury and as discussed earlier despite
the fact that the case of (Ireland) states that serious psychiatric injury can be charged under
s.47, but (Burstow) states the provided that the psychiatric injury is medically recognized, it
is grievous bodily harm for the purposes of section 20 so I will hold Ben with the highest
possible charge whose actus reus is satisfied.
The mens rea of section 20 is intending assault occasioning actual bodily harm; foreseeing
ABH; or foreseeing GBH. The facts state that ben was angry and “wanted to teach her a
lesson”. This proves that even if he did not have the intention to cause her actual bodily
harm, he had the intention to cause some sort of stress or discomfort in her life, and as
discussed earlier, identifiable clinical conditions or very serious psychiatric injuries can come
under S20. Her being absent for 3 months due to the harm sustained shows that the harm
suffered was of a great extent. Ultimately this depends upon the jury (Hill) but I think the
mens rea is satisfied for S20 along with the actus reus.
3. As a prosecutor, I would charge the highest possible offence of S20 Offences against the
person act 1861
4. As discussed earlier, the actus reus of s20 is an alternative conduct element. Either malicious
wounding or infliction of grievous bodily harm need to have occurred to satisfy the actus
reus requirement. The CPS charging standards for section 20 state that breaking of an arm
(or leg) constitutes for GBH under 20, although the charging standards are not binding, they
are used as a guide. Question may arise that the actus reus is not satisfied because Ben did
not cause the GBH as he was not the direct force that caused the broken arm. Clarence
required there to be a direct use of force to cause GBH, however since Wilson, the previous
requirement has been dispensed with and GBH can be caused indirectly, for example with a
weapon. The mens rea is either intention to cause ABH; foresight of GBH; or foresight of
ABH. The question states that he did it “for laughs” proves that he had at least some
 foresight as to a risk of harm, and as confirmed in Brady: A corresponding intention or
foresight to the wound or GBH inflicted is not needed, all that is required is awareness as to
some sort of risk of injury. So in my opinion, the actus reus and mens rea for S20 is satisfied.
The reason I would charge S20 is that the injury sustained complies with CPS charging
standards for S20 and there is evidence to prove that there was foresight of risk of harm
caused.
5. I would argue that Kimberly’s reaction was not within the foreseeable range of responses for
swinging the door, because the conduct in itself is not as threatening or dangerous. Since
her reaction was daft (William and Davis), Ben could not have possibly foreseen, or intended
any injury to result. Her reaction was due to the victim’s own fault of wrongfully assessing
the danger of the situation, which was hardly dangerous. Ben may be the factual (White)
‘but for cause’ but she is the legal cause (Smith) thus breaking the chain of causation.
6. V’s reaction was involuntary and was in fact a direct result of Ben swinging the door at her
and any person would have reacted the same way.
7. Section 47 Assault Occasioning actual bodily harm OAPA 1861
8. I would go for S47 because a broken nose in not serious enough to be considered under S20,
but it is aggravated harm caused by common assault, and it also comes under CPS charging
standards for S47. There is no legal definition of section 47 in statute and it is an aggravated
non fatal offence. S47 merely provides that an assault which occasion actual bodily harm is
more serious offence than common assault, and that whoever shall inflict an assault
occasioning actual bodily harm shall be liable to imprisonment for a maximum 5 years. In
order to hold D liable for S47, the prosecution must prove that ABH was caused by either
psychic assault (Mansfield) or battery, for the purposes of this question I will be discussing
battery.
The actus reus of S47 has 3 requirements:
1. Assault by psychic assault or battery, in this case battery: the least touching of another
without consent either unlawfully or recklessly (Faulkner v Talbot) (R v Venna). The
touching must be beyond everyday touching (Wilson v Pringle) (McMillan v CPS) and it
need not be hostile (Re F- Lord Goff), it also mustn’t be accidental (Cole v Turner) (Wiffin
v Kincard). Ben punching Richard is beyond everyday touching, and it is hostile.
2. Actual bodily harm: Swift J in Donovan defined ABH as any hurt or injury calculated to
interfere with the health and comfort of the victim, The injury must be substantial and
greater than trivial or trifling. The actual bodily harm was suffered in the form of a
broken nose which satisfies the CPS guidelines.
3. Occasioning: In order to occasion ABH, the prosecution must prove that the defendant’s
conduct caused the ABH. To prove this, a two limb test (Roberts) is conducted to
establish a casual link. It must be hsown that what occurred could reasonably be seen as
a consequence of what D said or did (LEWIS). The defendant’s act must be the factual
“but for cause” (White) as well as the legal cause (Smith) “substantial and operative
cause” of the consequence. Ben’s act must have caused the consequence because there
is not pre-existing condition nor is there an intervening act that is so potent in itself to
be the independent cause of the broken nose.
The Mens Rea of S47 is that of either Intention or Recklessness in relation to S.39
(Psychic Assault or Battery). The facts state that both decided to settle their dispute in a
boxing match, so yes him punching R was intentional, however this also brings the
question of consent which if proven will negate the actus reus since the force will then
be lawful. Assuming that consent isn’t established the actus reus and mens rea are
satisfied for the purposes of this question and the offence of S47 is established.
 9. The facts state that both decided to settle their dispute in a boxing match, this indicates that
both consented to the use of force, historically (Coney), consensual violence was unlawful,
but boxing has a special privilege where it is rendered lawful in properly conducted games
and sports A-G ref no 6 of 1980 and although this match was done privately, there was a
proper ring which indicates that it is not disorganized.
10. Consent is no defence to actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm. The facts of the case
are similar to A-G ref no.6 where consent was vitiated due to the fact that the violence was
informal and unorganized, despite the fact that in this case the fight may not be as
disorganized, there could be no possible public interest in this which is why consent should
be irrelevant in this case.