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International Negotiation 11: 287–316, 2006. 28

© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.

International Business Negotiation in a Globalizing World:

Reflections on the Contributions and Future of a (Sub) Field

STEPHEN E. WEISS*
Schulich School of Business, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario M3J
1P3
Canada (Email: sweiss@schulich.yorku.ca)

Abstract. Research on international business negotiation has been underway for 35 years. It
has developed within two major paradigms: the macro-strategic, which focuses on
organizational wholes, and the micro-behavioral, which focuses on individuals. The former
further divides into business-government relations and interfirm relationship streams, while
the latter branches into comparative and intercultural studies. While this article summarizes
these bodies of literature, its main purpose is to offer a critique of this research, consider its
contribution to practice and to the field of international negotiation, and stimulate ideas for
future research.

Keywords: international business, negotiation, international relations, culture

In early 2006, Luxembourg-based steelmaker Arcelor, which had

successfully lured Canada’s Dofasco away from Germany’s ThyssenKrupp
the previous year, became itself the acquisition target of Mittal Steel, an
Indian-controlled firm headquartered in the Netherlands. During the same
period, U.S.-owned Boeing sold 27 787-Dreamliners to Air India and
finalized a supply contract with Japan’s Toray for the carbon fiber needed
to produce the aircraft. In China, Google Inc. (U.S.) negotiated with
government authorities over regu- latory conditions for operation of their
Internet search engine.
These are but a few examples of the millions of international business
(IB) negotiations that occurred during early 2006. These were the headline-
grab- bers, but less prominent actors also negotiated across borders. All
told, the amount of IB negotiation worldwide seems to have exploded in
recent years and shows no signs of abating. That is ample reason to ask
what we know about such negotiation.
Instead of only enumerating what we have learned so far, we could
consider how much of the phenomenon we now understand. Can we predict
even half

* Steve Weiss is an associate professor of policy and international business at the

Schulich School of Business at York University (Toronto). In 2006, he received the
university-wide award for teaching in graduate programs. He has delivered negotiation
programs to business, gov- ernment and education groups in 10 countries.
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288 STEPHEN E. WEISS

of the twists and turns of the process or the terms of final outcomes? For
that matter, what, besides the obvious cases above, actually qualifies as IB
nego- tiation? Is international merger & acquisition (M&A) negotiation
more simi- lar to international sales negotiation than it is to domestic M&A
negotiation? And if IB negotiation is viewed as a subfield of international
negotiation – the subject of this journal – how can the subfield significantly
advance the field? Then again, given developments in the world economy,
have the nature and course of IB negotiation changed so much that findings
of studies from dif- ferent decades cannot simply be pooled? Such
questions have been answered only partially in literature to date or not
addressed at all. Within the space of this article, I cannot cover all of these
questions fully either, but I trust that offering some thoughts and asking
provocative questions, as the editor has asked, will be of some value.
This article is organized in five major sections. After defining IB negotia-
tion and its changing context, the text summarizes research within two
major paradigms: the macro-strategic, and micro-behavioral. My goal is not
to pro- vide a comprehensive review (for that, see Weiss 2004). Subsequent
sections consider contributions to international negotiation research,
contributions to practice, and future research. A young field – far younger
than international business or international relations, let alone political
science or economics – IB negotiation has made a lot of progress, as we
will see, but there is much yet to do.

The Phenomenon

To be able to identify examples of IB negotiation in the headlines and else-

where, we need a good, operational definition. One of the few previously
pub- lished definitions states that international business (IB) negotiation
is the deliberate interaction of two or more parties (at least one of them a
business entity), originating from different nations, who are attempting to
define or redefine the terms of their interdependence in a business
matter (Weiss
1993:270). Notice the emphasis on the type of actor and subject of
negotiation. This understanding includes negotiations between multinational
enterprises (MNEs) and host governments over foreign direct investment.
At the same time, it differs from – in fact, subsumes – much “cross-cultural
negotiation,” a term that is, confusingly, often treated as a synonym in
research as well as practitioner works.
Today’s negotiations are not always easily classified, however, even by
this definition. Consider the talks in 2006 between representatives of four
kid- napped foreign oil workers and their Nigerian captors. Is that IB
negotiation?
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What about negotiations held in the U.S. between the U.S. subsidiaries of a
Japanese-owned automaker and a Japanese-owned parts supplier?
According to the definition above, the first case qualifies (the business
matter being oper- ations or employee safety) but the second does not (both
parties originate from the same nation, be it Japan or the U.S.). Because of
the various criteria pos- sible, determination of origin or nationality is often
complicated.1
For this article, let us set aside “different national origins” and construe
“international” to mean involvement of at least two national contexts,
whether that occurs via the parties’ affiliations or the business matter. This
allows us to include the Japanese example above. In addition, bear in mind
that a party may be an individual, not necessarily an organization or group.
In early 2006, for example, one individual – Saudi Prince Alwaleed –
spearheaded the $5 billion purchase of Canadian-owned Fairmont Hotels &
Resorts Inc. All in all, indi- viduals and teams representing companies large
and small, and individuals in business for themselves, negotiate with
diverse counterparts – investors, employees, suppliers, customers, public
officials, interest groups and others – in a wide variety of cross-border
situations.

The Changing Context

Over the last three decades, since the beginning of dedicated research on IB
negotiation, the broad context – world context – for such negotiation has
changed markedly. Just think of the political, economic, social and techno-
logical developments, and ubiquitous references today to “globalization.”
These developments bear mention here, if only briefly, for they have
influenced the nature and scope of IB negotiation (as illustrated above) and
should shape our understanding and interpretation of research.
The number of countries – economic arenas for business actors – has
increased by over 50%, from 124 (1970) to 191 (2003), based on
United Nations membership. At the same time, notwithstanding this
fragmenta- tion, most countries have expanded their international
economic ties both regionally and globally. The U.S., Canada and
Mexico established the North American Free Trade Agreement
(effective 1994), and 12 countries formed the European Union
(effective 1993) and subsequently added 13 members (as of 2004).
Signatories to the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
have undertaken three rounds of multi- year talks (Tokyo, 1973–79;
Uruguay, 1986–94; Doha, 2001-ongoing) and created, in 1994, a
World Trade Organization that today comprises
139 member countries.
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290 STEPHEN E. WEISS

Since 1970, the combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of countries

worldwide has multiplied 12-fold to US$55.7 trillion (purchasing
power parity in 2004).2 While five economies – Britain, France,
Germany, Japan and the U.S. – accounted for 60% of the total in 1980,
they represented only 40% in 2004. Other economies, from the Asian
Tigers to emerging “BRIC” markets (Brazil, Russia, India, China),
have also demonstrated their dynamism. Remarkably, international
trade has grown nearly twice as fast as World GDP since 1970, and
foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown even faster (Hill 2002:8–9,
15–16).
MNEs have played major roles in generating and shaping this activity.
In
2002, General Electric alone operated in over 100 countries and touted
a transnationality index (foreign to total assets, sales, and employees)
of 84% (UNCTAD 2004:6). Wal-Mart, the world’s largest if not
most transnational MNE, generated $288 billion in sales in 2004. Only
16 nations had larger GDPs, and Wal-Mart’s 1.6 million employees
could be compared to Israel’s entire labor force of 2.4 million.
Meanwhile, individuals worldwide have gained far-reaching
capabilities in gathering information, connecting, and communicating.
Out of a world population of 6.4 billion in 2004, 3 billion had
telephones (fixed or mobile). The Internet, a technology introduced to
the public only a decade ago, attracted an estimated 840 users – twice
the number four years earlier.3 In addition to disseminating
information, it has facilitated business transactions. Over 200 million
people have registered with eBay Inc., an on-line marketplace that
operates in 33 countries, carries over 100 million listings, and adds 6
million new listings daily.
This is a picture of international and global dimensions. This article distin-
guishes between the two terms, reserving the latter strictly for coordinated
activities that transcend national borders and occur simultaneously in
many locations around the world (Eden & Lenway 2001:387). While the
globalization of business has accelerated, especially in certain industries,
international business can also still be viewed, as it should be, on bilateral
and regional levels.4

Existing Research: A
Synopsis

Academic research on IB negotiation may be traced back to 1970, the date

of a doctoral dissertation entitled “International Business Negotiations: A
Study in India” (Kapoor 1970) at New York University. That year, Harvard
Business
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INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 291

Review also printed “How to Negotiate in Japan” (Van Zandt 1970). Thus
ini- tial interest in the subject came from IB scholars and practitioners who
saw it as a way to understand better how to further business objectives.
Scholarly interest intensified during the 1980s and gained critical mass in
the mid-1990s. International Negotiation devoted an entire issue to IB
nego- tiation in 1999 (Vol. 4, no. 1). By then, the field had also attracted
negotiation researchers who were intent on testing the generality of
intranationally devel- oped ideas. A small group of scholars started to
specialize in IB negotiation.
The resulting corpus of studies may be classified by subject matter of
nego- tiation, number and types of parties, geographical coverage,
negotiation process variables, and research method, to name just a few
possibilities.5
Comprehensive reviews are already available in existing literature, so this
sec- tion describes representative work in two previously identified
paradigms for most IB negotiation research to date: the “macro-strategic”
focus on interac- tions between organizations and aspects of bargaining
power, and a separate “micro-behavioral” focus on individual negotiators
and their behavior (Weiss
2004:418). In addition, this section distinctively offers for reference a
listing of noteworthy journal articles throughout the 35 years, organized by
decade (see the appendix), and an emphasis in the text on recent studies.

Macro-Strategic Paradigm

The macro-strategic paradigm consists of two streams of research. The first

targets MNE-foreign government relations. Originally labeled the “bargain-
ing school” and representing some of the earliest research on IB
negotiation, it is now referred to as “international business-government
relations.” The sec- ond, newer stream is directed at interfirm relationships.

International business-government
relations

Early empirical work on this topic explored the impact of foreign MNEs’
resources on the outcomes of market entry negotiations with host govern-
ments. Typically, the data concerned U.S.-owned MNEs in Latin America
or Asia. MNE resources included capital, technology, product
differentiation, product diversity, and access to other markets, and
negotiation outcomes were measured in terms of the percentage of
subsidiary ownership obtained by the MNEs (a proxy for negotiation
successfulness).
During the 1970s, the most salient concept in this paradigm was the
“obso- lescing bargain” (Vernon 1968). Put simply, an MNE’s bargaining
power in a relationship with a foreign government deteriorates over time.
The firm’s superior initial position diminishes as soon as it begins to invest
and transfer
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292 STEPHEN E. WEISS

resources, whereas the host government gains leverage by various means.

When its power exceeds the firm’s, the government can force renegotiations
and try to improve upon the original terms of their agreement.
This concept continued to orient research in subsequent years, although it
has generated considerable debate. Skeptics contend that the assumption of
an antagonistic relationship between business and government is outdated;
since the early 1980s, they argue, governments have sought FDI. (China
and Mexico, for instance, loosened their FDI regulations in 1984.) Other
scholars counter that the emphases on market entry and obsolescence may
have lost rel- evance, but the core elements of Vernon’s model – parties’
goals, resources, and constraints – still apply. It has been updated as the
“political bargaining model” (Eden, Lenway & Schuler 2005).
Empirical studies since the early period have refined and extended that
work. They include additional outcome measures such as actual ownership
adjusted by firm or country preference, extent of MNE control over sub-
sidiaries’ key functions, and bargaining success over time. Researchers
have also analyzed influences other than MNE resources, variables such as
host government resources, host country-home country ties (Ramamurti
2001), macroeconomic conditions, and moves by pressure groups. (For an
excellent collection of recent writings, see Grosse 2005.)
What has been learned about these negotiations? An obsolescing bargain
has indeed occurred in some countries (Vachani 1995). MNE technology
and product differentiation have had significant, positive effects on actual
sub- sidiary ownership levels in at least three empirical studies (Fagre &
Wells
1982; Kobrin 1987; Lecraw 1984; cf. Vachani 1995). So has export market
access (cf. Kobrin, 1987). On the other hand, these and related factors have
explained less than 50% of the variation in actual ownership (cf. Lecraw
1984), and their influence has not held up for other outcome and success
meas- ures such as firm-corrected ownership. A major lesson so far seems
to be that MNE-host government relationships and negotiations have many
dimensions, a number of which have yet to be systematically identified and
evaluated.

Interfirm
relationships

If firms in IB negotiate with governments about investment incentives and

operating conditions, they negotiate with each other about financing,
supplies, production, sales and distribution. These activities give rise to
various rela- tionships and agreements. For IB negotiation researchers, the
relationships of most interest have been joint ventures (JVs), strategic
alliances, and M&As.
Joint ventures, which entail the creation of a separate legal organization,
began drawing significant research attention in IB in the early 1980s amidst
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INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 293

heightened media coverage (recall Beijing Jeep – one of the first Sino-
foreign JVs) and growing awareness of high failure rates. This research
did not highlight the role of negotiation but it did expose pertinent factors
such as pos- sible contributions of prospective parents and different
organizational struc- tures (e.g., Killing 1982) and later, partner selection
criteria (Geringer 1991). By the second half of the 1980s, negotiation-
specific work appeared (e.g., Weiss 1987).
The decade since the mid-1990s has seen a more concentrated effort to
understand JV negotiation, especially through rich case studies. An analysis
of four Sino-U.S. JVs showed, in contrast to the survey-based business-
government research above, that ownership was not negotiated by the
parties; management control was (Yan & Gray 1994). Moreover, bargaining
power was measured by contextual as well as resource-based factors. Other
case stud- ies have explicated the key issues in JV negotiations (Faure
2000), the impact of external stakeholders on negotiations in Eastern
Europe (Brouthers & Bamossy 1997), and types of explanations for
agreement and no-agreement outcomes (Weiss 1997). In addition,
conceptual work includes an integrated framework for JV contract
negotiations (Luo 1999) and an exposition of the obsolescing international
JV bargain (Inkpen & Beamish 1997). (For more on international JV
negotiation, see Urban 1996 and the “Micro-Behavioral Paradigm” section
below.)
Macro-strategic research on international alliances, which include JVs
but also other forms of tie-ups (Dussauge & Garrette 1999:2–22), has
tended to take up similar questions about partner resources, relationship
forms, and joint performance. The impact of culture has figured
prominently in a number of works, from primers on how to negotiate
alliances in Japan (Kobayashi 1988) or China (Nair & Stafford 1998) to
empirical studies of Mexican preferences concerning governance
structures (Teegen & Doh 2002) and Renault’s cultivation of an
“unlikely” alliance with Nissan (Korine, Asakawa & Gomez 2002).
There are other notable works on types of conflict arising from partners’
different perceptions of their contributions (de Mattos, Sanderson & Ghauri
2002), the nature of relational quality and trust (Arino, de la Torre & Ring
2005), and determinants of reciprocity (Kashlak, Chandran & Di
Benedetto 1998). (For more on alliance research, see Contractor & Lorange
2002).
Finally for interfirm relationships, scholars have analyzed cross-border
M&A activity, which has produced eye-catching results like Mittal-Arcelor
and grew 7-fold in world value between 1987–99 (UNCTAD 2000:10–16).
As with JVs and alliances, general literature on the subject can guide the
negoti- ation researcher. M&A literature addresses different possible
motives of the parties (Chen & Hennart 2004; Trautwein 1990) and aspects
of the acquisition
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294 STEPHEN E. WEISS

process such as escalating momentum and expectational ambiguity

(Jemison
& Sitkin 1986). With respect to negotiation research on international
M&As, however, a computerized search found only three scholarly writings
of note: a broad, conceptual discussion oriented to the European Union (de
Beaufort
& Lempereur 1996); a case study of the Telia (Sweden)-Telenor (Norway)
merger talks (Fang, Fridh & Schultzberg 2004); and an interview-based
analy- sis of the Italian acquisition of a French firm followed by guidelines
for nego- tiators (Sebenius 1998; also Morosini 1998:190ff). Perhaps the
recency of IB negotiation researchers’ attention and the sensitivity of
M&A deal-making explain the limited amount of published research. (For a
recent collection of work on international M&As, see Buckley & Ghauri
2002.)
As a whole, the stream of research on interfirm negotiations has provided
descriptions of real negotiations and insights into negotiation structure, bar-
gaining power, and influencing conditions. Careful case studies, those based
on rare access to all parties, have demonstrated the complexity of
negotiations in IB (e.g., Brouthers & Bamossy 1997; Weiss 1997) in ways
not evident in the large n studies prevalent in business-government
research. But they are few, as alliance researchers have noted (Salk 2005);
the process of negotiation requires closer examination. There are no theories
of interfirm negotiation in IB that address its complexity and fully explicate
process and outcome.

Micro-Behavioral Paradigm

The second of the two main approaches to IB negotiation research, the

micro- behavioral paradigm, is focused on individuals’ behavior. In
contrast to the macro-strategic paradigm, this research has typically been
based on one type of business transaction: buy/sell.6 These studies have
analyzed various facets of negotiation behavior, but the main theme – a
driving force – for most of them has been national culture.
This research may be subdivided into two categories. The first contains
comparative studies, that is, cross-cultural comparisons of intracultural
nego- tiation behavior. Although such negotiation is not international per
se, this work shares with international work an interest in understanding
negotiation practices in different countries, and it constitutes the bulk of
micro-behavioral research. The other body of work that we can review is
strictly intercultural.

Comparative studies

In the early 1980s, Graham (1983) undertook a series of experiments with

Brazilians, Japanese, and Americans that involved 1-on-1 person
negotiation of a combination of three goods. (The three-goods agenda
allowed for differ-
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ent types of bargaining.) Graham sought to uncover differences in the three

nations’ intracultural behavior and to explain any variance in negotiation
out- comes. He used pre- and post-negotiation questionnaires to obtain data
for three sets of variables: negotiator characteristics (e.g., self-esteem,
cultural background), situational constraints (e.g., buyer/seller role), and
process measures (e.g., negotiator’s strategy). By the mid-1990s, his
research covered
15 countries and over 1000 participants, making it the most extensive
collec- tion of such studies to date.
Subsequent investigators pursued the same questions as Graham’s with
more conceptual and methodological sophistication. The first wave of
refinement unbundled culture as a binary variable, identified constitutive
val- ues such as individualism and collectivism (Hofstede 1984), and
directly tested experimental subjects’ individual standings on these
dimensions (Morris et al. 1998; Tinsley & Pillutla 1998). Researchers
thereby related observed behavior to cultural particulars and also detected
intracultural variation.
The second wave, evident since the early 2000s, has added even more to
the study of culture and negotiation. Conceptual developments include
negotia- tors’ use of combinations of strategies as opposed to single styles
(Tinsley
2001), interactional elements of negotiation – action-response sequences –
rather than separate segments of individual behavior (Adair & Brett 2005),
and previously neglected situational and environmental influences on strate-
gic choices and behavior (Kumar & Worm 2004; Volkema & Fleury 2002).
Cross-cultural researchers have also increasingly pursued negotiator cogni-
tion (Gelfand et al. 2001) and expanded geographical coverage beyond Top
20 economies. Methodologically, researchers have carried out more direct
observation of negotiator behavior, albeit still in experimental settings,
rather than relying on self-report questionnaires (Roemer et al. 1999);
adopted culturally appropriate survey instruments instead of depending on a
single, U.S.-anchored tool (Liu, Friedman & Chi 2005); and discovered new
expla- nations by using different outcome measures for different cultural
groups (Ma et al. 2002).
What has been learned from comparative research so far? In most
countries, according to Graham’s data, partners reciprocate a negotiator’s
use of a prob- lem-solving approach – PSA (question-asking, and
information-gathering about needs and preferences). Negotiator PSA does
not explain much variance in negotiator profit outcomes, but combined
with a few other variables, it accounts for over 50% of the variance in
partner satisfaction outcomes (Graham, Mintu & Rodgers 1994).
Paradoxically, PSA increases partner sat- isfaction in the U.S., Canada, and
Germany, but decreases it in the U.K. and China. Yet these results stem
from one scenario and single samples of cultures, and one could reasonably
hesitate to rely solely on them.
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Turning to comparative research as a whole, we can ask whether it, as

intended, has: 1) produced valid descriptions of negotiator behavior in par-
ticular cultures, and 2) succeeded in predicting negotiator behavior in inter-
cultural or international settings. Experimental studies of Japanese
negotiators, a frequently targeted group, have led to some dramatic findings,
but they tend to concern only a few elements of negotiation behavior and
have not held up across studies. Graham (1993) reported that Japanese
negotiated much more successfully as buyers than as sellers (and even
labeled this the most distinc- tive feature of Japanese negotiation), but that
did not occur in earlier and later investigations by other researchers (Harnett
& Cummings, 1980; Brett & Okumura 1998:502). Similarly, some studies
have described Japanese nego- tiation behavior as information-gathering
and joint problem-solving, while others have emphasized compromise or
power strategies (Brett & Okumura
1998; Gelfand et al. 2001; Tinsley
2001).7
Reasons for these apparent inconsistencies have begun to show up in
research that is more sensitive to contextual influences. It has revealed that
individualistic and collectivistic orientations, long assumed to be polar
oppo- sites, are not mutually exclusive in a culture. The same negotiator may
act indi- vidualistically under certain conditions and collectivistically
under other conditions (Black & Mendenhall 1993; Cho & Cho 2001;
Kumar & Worm
2004:314). Recent attention to institutional factors, which are seldom repre-
sented in experiments, has also enriched understanding of negotiation
behav- ior in different countries (Lin & Miller 2003; Xin & Pearce 1996).
Even if descriptions of intracultural negotiation behavior become consis-
tent, studies have already cast doubt on the validity of predicting
individuals’ behavior in intercultural negotiation from their intracultural
practices. People in many cultural groups interact differently with outsiders
(Brett & Okumura
1998; Francis 1991). This finding is not invariant either, however, for
people in other cultures do not alter or adapt their behavior in different
cultural set- tings (Adler & Graham 1989; Tse, Francis & Walls 1994).
Where comparative research may have the most potential to serve IB
research is in elucidating the dynamics within a team of compatriots and the
pressures it deals with from external, cultural sources.

Intercultural
research

Finally in existing literature, one can find studies of intercultural

negotiation and cultural aspects of IB negotiation. I employ the two terms to
distinguish between relatively abstract negotiations, usually in experimental
settings, that feature cultural factors and more fully fleshed out international
negotiations, typically in situ. In both areas, researchers have focused on
describing and understanding negotiator behavior and interaction.
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Much of the early research was done by survey (e.g., Tung 1982).
American researchers set out to characterize Americans’ counterparts in
real negotia- tions and pinpoint causes of American success or failure.
Questionnaires included items on the business environment (e.g., labor
costs) as well as specific aspects of individual behavior (e.g., bargaining
style), although they were usually administered only to one side – the
Americans – and tapped impressions based on respondents’ aggregate
experience. One of the fruits of this research is a series of studies on U.S.-
Chinese negotiations that spans a
16-year period. Recent survey work features more penetrating probes of
par- ticular facets of negotiation behavior (e.g., influence tactics in Rao &
Schmidt
1998), application to previously neglected countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia in
Al-Ghamdi 1999), and access to all parties at the negotiating table (e.g., Lin
& Miller 2003).
Experimental scientists took up intercultural negotiation much later. A
turn- ing point in business research was Brett and Okumura’s (1998)
analysis of American and Japanese behaviors in a negotiation experiment
on syndication rights for a TV series. Subsequent examples of intercultural
experiments include studies of mental models in U.S.-Chinese negotiations
(Liu 2004), judgment bias in U.S.-Greek negotiations (Gelfand &
Christakopoulou 1999), and virtual interaction (Kersten & Noronha 1999).
Such work, which is still less plentiful than comparative work, typically
involves student negotiators or managers in training. (For a recent collection
of comparative and intercultural negotiation studies, see Gelfand & Brett
2004).
The third and last method for intercultural research, which has produced
few but fascinating studies, is ethnography. There are at least two studies of
this kind on negotiator behavior in “Western-Chinese” negotiations (Faure
2000; Miles 2003). A similar approach, augmented with surveys, has been
used to investigate one effect of intercultural interaction in a JV: the
creation of a “negotiated (third) culture” (Brannen & Salk 2000).
As we have done with all of the other research streams, we can ask: What
has been learned here? The surveys on U.S.-Chinese negotiations offer
inter- esting, comparable findings (e.g., Brunner & Taoka 1977, a replication
by Lee
& Lo 1988; Tung 1982; Stewart & Keown 1989; Rondinelli 1993). Based
on American perceptions, Chinese negotiating behavior entails slow
decision- making, tough bargaining (e.g., price reductions of as much as
50%), and pro- longation of the process. This picture held up across 16
years of surveys. One of the few changes detected was a greater propensity
to initiate international talks (Stewart & Keown 1989).
As to the keys to Americans’ successfulness in these negotiations, survey
results changed over time. In the early years, Americans thought knowledge
of Chinese culture was crucial whereas later, they gave more weight to the
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298 STEPHEN E. WEISS

uniqueness of the U.S. company’s product. In an interesting twist, at least

one survey with Chinese respondents has indicated that Americans may
have been unaware of other success factors, such as “constituent shadows”
and face saving (Shi 2001; Shi & Wright 2001).
Experimental intercultural studies have demonstrated that U.S. and
Japanese negotiators realize fewer joint gains with each other than when
they negotiate intraculturally (Brett & Okumura 1998). They appear to
develop less understanding of counterparts’ priorities in the former than in
the latter. They reciprocate offers at a much lower rate than intracultural
negotiators do (Adair
& Brett 2005). We have also learned that the degree to which intercultural
negotiators change their mental models of negotiation, as they negotiate,
has a significant, positive effect on joint gains (Liu 2004). Intercultural
work is essential to IB negotiation research, but it is only in the early stages
of its development.

A Critique of Existing
Research

Not long ago, Reynolds, Simintiras and Vlachou (2003) assessed over 100
peer-reviewed journal articles on IB negotiation published between 1990
and
2000. The three researchers considered the articles with respect to five
topics: environmental and organizational conditions, cultural factors,
negotiator char- acteristics, negotiation-related factors, and negotiation
outcomes. They found the articles to be “less than decisive” contributions to
existing conceptual mod- els and concluded (p. 249):
The [topics] . . . pertaining to IB negotiations are highly complex with
various interrelationships between variables, and unless a dominant
par- adigm emerges [i.e., an “all-encompassing model of IB
negotiations”], the likelihood of major advances is rather slim.
Their concern about an all-encompassing model was well-
taken.
Our synopsis of existing research also reveals fragmentation and
atomistic treatment. The macro-strategic and micro-behavioral paradigms
focus on different units of analysis and aspects of negotiation. Even within
each para- digm, there are disparate streams of research. The amount of
work that attempts to combine the two approaches or develop multi-level
analysis is, while growing, still rather limited (chronologically, de la Torre
1981; Weiss
1993; McCall 1996; Tinsley, Curham & Kwok 1999; Shi 2001; Arino, de la
Torre & Ring 2005).
There are models of IB negotiation in the literature, even rather encom-
passing ones (for a review, see Weiss 2004:424ff), but none, as noted
above,
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INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 299

has gained general acceptance. Their low status seems more a matter of
insufficient empirical scrutiny to date than an assessment of their quality. In
any event, without such a model, one is hard pressed to answer questions
raised at the outset of this article, such as how much of IB negotiation
processes and outcomes are understood and whether the nature of the phe-
nomenon has changed over the last 35 years.
A number of other concerns may be identified in the “what” and “how”
of IB negotiation research to date. They include the number and types of
coun- tries/national cultures selected, a focus on bilateral negotiations, the
treatment of organizational parties as monolithic wholes and of individuals
as solitary principal negotiators, and the external validity of experimental
studies.
Many of the countries in these studies have been chosen for reasons of
con- venience or ease of access to data. For Graham, another criterion was
promi- nence as a major trading partner of the U.S. An alternative for
statistical purposes would be the expected degree of difference (whatever the
dimension) in order to maximize the range of variation. Also, in order to
build knowledge bases with confidence, researchers could select common
country targets. As it stands, there is too little geographical overlap in
macro-strategic and micro- behavioral studies.
Research in both paradigms has concentrated almost exclusively on
bilateral negotiations (cf. Money 1998). Yet global business, by definition,
has led to multilateral or linked bilateral negotiations such as the Dofasco-
Arcelor- Mittal deal mentioned above and the “locational tournaments” that
take place when automakers plan a new assembly plant. These and many
other IB nego- tiations involve talks on multiple levels: A company
negotiates with national, state/provincial and municipal governments.
Existing research has largely set the latter arenas aside.
In a related vein, both paradigms have treated parties narrowly, and while
there are analytical benefits to abstraction, they may be offset by doubts
about the applicability of findings to real negotiation processes and
outcomes. Macro-strategic analyses have treated both companies and
national govern- ments as units (cf. Encarnation & Wells 1985), ignoring
internal divisions and activities that complicate “action” by the unit. Micro-
behavioral research contains a bias as well, especially in the largely U.S.-
sponsored studies reviewed above. Their bilateral negotiation designs
consistently put individ- uals in the role of principals. We have not learned
much about the behavior of individuals as representatives or as team
members in IB negotiations.
Lastly, concern about external validity, a criticism perhaps raised too
read- ily in social science generally, has two clear sources with respect to
micro- behavioral research on IB negotiation. The first has to do with
generalizability across experiments or surveys, for there are few
replication studies in the
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300 STEPHEN E. WEISS

literature (U.S.-Chinese negotiation surveys are an exception). Until

researchers repeat their experiments with different subjects from the same
country/cultural group, using the same negotiation scenario, or try other
researchers’ scenarios, we ought to view their findings with some
reservation. The second source has to do with real IB negotiations, which,
relative to many other types of negotiation, tend to be complex. So many
experimental designs have pared down the agenda, richness of context, and
number of actors that one could well question whether resulting negotiation
proceedings and out- comes can be used to inform our understanding of real
IB negotiations (see Eliashberg, Lilien & Kim 1995).

Contributions to International Negotiation Research

If international negotiation – the domain of this journal – denotes

“negotiations between governments or private entities (the latter including
corporations and nonprofit organizations) involving persons of different
nationalities” (Kauf- mann 1989:8), then IB negotiation certainly fits within
it. How does research on IB negotiation contribute to research on
international negotiation? Does IB research amount to stand-alone work on
a subset of actors within the field, or can it stimulate, support, and be
integrated with work in other subfields?
The most established subfield, often equated with the field at large, is
inter- national political or diplomatic negotiation – negotiation typically
between national governments.8 They negotiate with each other over
matters ranging from security to scientific exchange, but they also negotiate
with other, non- governmental parties. As with IB negotiation, the
boundaries of this subfield are not entirely clear. For the limited purposes of
this section, that is, to pro- vide a basis for comparison and to consider the
added value of IB research, let us view relevant political research as work
on negotiation that has appeared in international relations (IR) journals.
Specifically, we can refer to a systematic collection of IR articles
published since 1976, a year notable for the release of Zartman’s The 50%
Solution and a reprint of Ikle’s classic, How Nations Negotiate. The articles
appeared in four journals: International Studies Quarterly, World Politics,
International Organization and a non-U.S. source, European Journal of
Political Research. (International Negotiation is not included, as it began
later, in 1996.) There are two subsets of the collection (Weiss 2000). The
first, which covers 1976–1993, consists of 90 doubly screened and
rigorously content analyzed articles. The second subset, covering 1994–
2005, consists of 64 articles identified by title key words but not further
screened for relevance or content analyzed.
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INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 301

The Nature of IR
Research

The content analyzed IR articles (1976–93) concentrate mostly on

negotiations involving security issues (33%) and then on trade (19%) and
general political issues. A handful of articles cover investment (FDI)
negotiations (6%), and there are none at all on joint ventures or
understandably, sales. Over 80% of the articles address only government
parties while 7% address companies as well as governments. The
organizational level of analysis prevails (60%), compared to a mere 7% of
articles on individuals and 30% that incorporate multiple levels. With
respect to geographical scope, the largest portion of the
90 articles (33%) does not focus on a particular country. The country most
attended, however, is the former Soviet Union.
In this work, a number of researchers have delved into elaborate explana-
tions for negotiation outcomes (e.g., Friedheim & Durch 1977; Inoguchi &
Miyatake 1979; Odell 1980). Other major points of interest, in terms of
nego- tiation concepts, are agenda-setting/issue linkage (e.g., Bennett &
Sharpe
1979), bargaining power, and two-level (internal-external) games (Schoppa
1993). Almost half (46%) of the articles have been case studies. Data has
been sourced most frequently from public literature, then from
documents/archives, surveys and, in merely 1 of the 90 articles,
experiments. (The order in IB research is just the reverse.)
The other subset of IR articles (1994–2004) appears from preliminary
review to both extend previous work and branch out in new directions.
Extensions include articles on company-government negotiations over FDI
(Bartlett & Seleny 1998), bargaining power (Meunier 2000), game theoretic
perspectives (Zagare & Kilgour 2003), and cooperation theory, including
enforcement effects (Fearon 1998). New work ventures into cognition and
knowledge structures (Bonham, Sergeev & Parshin 1997), language use
(Duffy, Frederking & Tucker 1998), impatience (Blaydes 2004), ripeness
(Forde 2004), effects of transparency (Stasavage 2004), and clustered
negoti- ations (Pahre 2001).

Added Value from

IB

Now, then, what does IB research add to IR research and more importantly,
to international negotiation as a whole?
For starters, IB research fills gaps in knowledge about the process and
out- comes of negotiations that are clearly within the purview of IR. These
include negotiations involving subjects such as investment (FDI) and
JVs (those in which governments participate). (To compare coverage of
negotiation sub- jects by IB and IR, see Figure 1.) In addition, IB provides
knowledge about
INER 11,2_f6_287-316I 11/7/06 8:48 AM Page 302

302 STEPHEN E. WEISS

Figure 1

Subjects of International Negotiations in Research Articles

(By Type of Source Journal for 1975–93)
35

30

25

20

15

10

0
Sales Invest. Joint Security Trade Gen Labor Commons Other
Venture Politics
( n= 13 6 ar ti cl es )
IB Journals IR Journals

behavior at an individual level, including negotiators from countries and

cul- tures not studied in IR. While early IR research concentrated on the
Soviet Union, for instance, IB focused on Japan.
On a conceptual front, IB offers extensions and elaboration of ideas
already in IR literature as well as new concepts. Examples include a
longitudinal rather than point-in-time perspective of bargaining power (from
the obsolescing bargain) and the variety possible in parties’ resources (from
the macro-strate- gic paradigm). New or unusual concepts include the
“problem-solving approach” in negotiator behavior and cultural values
such as uncertainty avoidance. Some of these concepts may be imported “as
is;” others require adaptation.
IB research also offers methodological innovation and data for analysis.
IB researchers appear to have more experience with experimental designs
and are developing analytic techniques applicable to negotiations in IR
(e.g., coding systems in Adair & Brett 2005). For countries that both
subfields have explored (e.g., China), data from IB on negotiator behavior
may be used by IR researchers to test the robustness of their findings.
Imagine the possibilities in being able to combine and compare
experimental data on individual behavior with information from archives
and memoirs (e.g., Dobrynin 1995).
On an entirely different level, IB research presents IR with a contrasting,
business perspective on the very purpose and nature of negotiation: activity
 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 303

undertaken for economic gain. This point of view serves IR in at least two
ways. First, it informs analysis of the interests and behavior of
governments’ counterparts in company-government negotiations (an area
where the two subfields clearly overlap). These negotiations are no longer
limited to invest- ment issues. MNEs are becoming more active in public
policy (see Kobrin
2005; Saner, Yiu & Sondergaard 2000 on business diplomacy), and states
are engaging with business not only as regulators, but as customers,
competitors, and partners (e.g., public-private partnerships). Second, by
occasionally tak- ing an IB perspective – viewing negotiations from a
different worldview, IR researchers may detect otherwise neglected factors
and gain new insights. This applies not only to company-government
negotiations, but to other “mixed negotiations” (those between dissimilar
parties – parties with different raisons d’Atre, intergovernmental
negotiations, and international negotiations gener- ally. (See Doh & Teegen
2002 and International Negotiation issues on NGOs (1999) and
international economic negotiations (2000).)
Finally, beyond the contributions to IR research, IB’s contributions to
inter- national negotiation as a field deserve mention. The obvious one is a
body of knowledge on a subset of international negotiations (recall Figure 1).
But there is more. When juxtaposed with IR, IB research enables us to see
commonali- ties in negotiation structures, conditions, processes, behavior,
and outcomes – in short, the commonalities that characterize international
negotiation.9 They allow us to distinguish processes and outcomes in
international negotiation from those in other negotiations and to proceed to
build this field.

Contributions to Practice

Since its beginnings, research on IB negotiation, like research on other

nego- tiations, has been motivated partly by the desire to improve
negotiators’ capa- bilities and achievements. Zartman’s (1976) The 50%
Solution, if primarily an IR work, was subtitled “How to Bargain
Successfully with Hijackers, Strikers, Bosses, Oil Magnates, Arabs,
Russians and Other Worthy Opponents in This Modern World.” (Note the
prescience with respect to counterparts.) After three decades, one can
legitimately ask whether IB research has improved practice. Or, given the
expansiveness of that question, one might just as appro- priately ask
whether IB research assists a team or individual in a particular negotiation.
I faced the second question directly when a student approached me for
advice concerning a complicated, high stakes negotiation. Her father had
been working overseas for a subcontractor on an offshore oil rig when mili-
tants from the host country stormed it and took him and other foreigners
304 STEPHEN E. WEISS

hostage. Wanting him released unharmed as soon as possible, the student –

let’s call her “Sarah” – had scoured news sources for information about the
event and amazingly, obtained phone numbers and addresses for two key
par- ticipants in the hostage negotiations. She wanted to take action,
potentially in those negotiations, and asked me, “What should I do?”
My initial response, for both of us, was to work through a standard
negoti- ation analysis (parties, issues, interests, conditions, actions to date).
Several parties were involved: the rig-owning company, the subcontractor,
the host and multiple home country governments, the militants, and
intermediaries. Sarah and I then discussed the effects of increased
complexity (a likely consequence if she were to intervene), the full scope of
her interim and ultimate interests, and ways to add pressure to reach an
agreement. For one of her interests, one course of action, which Sarah took,
was initiating communication and infor- mation-sharing between the
hostages’ families. After our talk, she satisfied several other interests as
well. The effects of her actions and inaction on the hostage negotiations
cannot be gauged here. At least Sarah’s actions did not prevent her father’s
return; he was released unharmed.
My recommendations did not noticeably draw on particular studies in IB
research. (In retrospect, I could have consulted International Negotiation’s
(2003) issue on negotiating with terrorists.) But my thoughts were
influenced, I am sure, by my knowledge of IB research and teaching
experiences.
Some readers may question the use of a hostage negotiation in reflections
on the practical value of IB research or note more pointedly that there is
insufficient information to see any links between my advice and the
negotia- tion outcome. I selected this case primarily as a real example of the
new types of negotiations that companies face in a globalizing world, but
could have used any number of other test cases or problems, from a simple
import/export trans- action to how to counter obsolescence in company
bargaining power or develop better relationship fit in M&A negotiations.10
In any event, I know of no empirical investigations into the effects of
research on practice for IB negotiations of any type and of only one study
on the effects of advice on IB negotiator behavior (Eliashberg et al. 1992).
IB research shares this lack of hard evidence on transfer and training
effectiveness with the general field of negotiation (Deutsch 2000:583).
Nevertheless, let me suggest some reasons to be optimistic about the
benefits of IB research for practitioners. There is a growing body of
thought- ful research translations and research-based books for practitioners
(Salacuse
2003; Sebenius 2002; Usunier & Ghauri 1996). In business, albeit non-IB,
negotiation research, studies have substantiated the positive effects for
nego- tiators of knowledge about negotiation (e.g., Weingart, Hyder &
Prietula
 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 305

1996). In IR, problem-solving workshops (a.k.a. “interactive conflict

resolu- tion”), whose design expressly includes introducing research to
practitioners, have been supported by various groups for 40 years (see
International Negotiation 1997, 2(3)). Further, a recent study of Dutch
peacekeepers (Ramarajan et al. 2004) reported statistically significant,
positive effects of negotiation training. IB researchers still have much to do
to demonstrate how, and how much, research contributes to practice, but
they have some examples to use in charting their course.11

Future Research

The trajectories for future IB negotiation research extend from each of

the two existing paradigms – macro-strategic, micro-behavioral – and more
specifically, from the two streams within each of them (international
business- government relations, interfirm relationships; comparative
studies, intercul- tural research). Within each paradigm, researchers will
probably continue to fine-tune methods and attempt to explain more of the
variation in currently studied variables. Some cross-paradigm (multi-level)
and multi-perspective work will also likely continue, albeit to the same
limited extent.
Without wanting to launch a full-scale debate here on how science
advances, I think one can ask whether such compartmentalization is
desirable. Besides where research is headed, should it head in these
directions? In a provocative spirit, I would say, “No, at least not solely.”
There is limited value for international business negotiation in continuing to
pursue comparative rather than intercultural studies. Further, if we are to
understand IB negotia- tion as a whole, as complex as it often is, we need
synthesis – assimilation – of the perspectives and insights offered by both
paradigms. For the same reason, IB researchers should pay more attention to
IR research on negotiation and to the larger field of international
negotiation.
Three core questions about negotiation can and should continue to
motivate future IB research: how do parties negotiate (descriptions of
process); why do they reach non-agreements or agreements of different
kinds (explanations of outcomes); and how should parties negotiate
(prescriptions for behavior). For IB researchers in particular, there is
arguably a fourth question: the ways and degree to which answers to the
preceding questions for IB negotiation are distinct from other types of
negotiation. Let me suggest a few specific ideas for future research along
three lines: topics, methods, and perspectives.
306 STEPHEN E. WEISS

Topic
s

Not long ago in a different review (Weiss 2004), I listed six topics for
research: negotiation preparation, intergroup negotiation, cross-level
relationships (e.g., individual to counterpart team), negotiation stages,
multilateral negotiation, and no-agreement outcomes. While there has been
some progress (e.g., Adair
& Brett 2005 on stages), all of these topics, which are gaps apparent in a
com- prehensive view of IB negotiation, deserve more attention. They are
as rele- vant, one might add, for IR as for IB research (cf. International
Negotiation (2003) on multilateral negotiation.)
Based on the review in this article, we can add a few more deserving top-
ics for future IB research. One, given its prevalence in a globalizing world
and paucity in research literature, is international M&A negotiation,
especially its process. The variety of environmental conditions (e.g.,
political, economic) that affect negotiator behavior and negotiation
outcomes also merit greater scrutiny, for macro-strategic IB and IR research
both indicate that the negoti- ation contexts typical of micro-behavioral
studies, while useful for experi- mental control, are a far cry from the
contexts of the real negotiations they are intended to explain. Moreover,
there are new challenges for companies (and governments) today: the
involvement of diverse stakeholders and rapid diffu- sion of information as
well as nontraditional counterparts and new forms of interaction (e.g.,
electronic communication). In the same vein, as noted in “A Critique”
above, we need to learn about the interactions of individuals and of groups
as representatives, not just as principals. Since IB negotiators, by
definition, use multiple knowledge bases and skill sets, their relative impact
on negotiation effectiveness could also be explored. In other words, what
has more impact on reaching a satisfactory outcome: an IB negotiator’s
cos- mopolitanism or business acumen?12 Perhaps the answer will vary by
culture or counterpart, since some seem to emphasize relationship factors
while others pay more attention to the task. Lastly, for IB researchers to
enhance practice credibly, they need to allocate more effort to testing
practical impli- cations and prescriptions from their research.

Methods and Data

To resolve contradictions in findings to date, clarify what we do know, and

generally enrich our understanding of IB negotiation, we would be well
served, it seems, by wider use of multiple methods in the future (in addition
to the replication studies recommended earlier). Diverse methods and data
sources (e.g., archival analysis in IR, experiments in IB) could also be used
to test the robustness of results and build generalizability across subfields.
As De Dreu and Carnevale (2005) have previously suggested in this
journal,
 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 307

these efforts could be facilitated by common focal points such as reciprocity

or framing.
I would also argue that IB researchers should be more persistent in their
pursuit of data from real IB negotiations. We need to get closer to the real
phe- nomenon. Granted, many negotiators consider their efforts and
accomplish- ments too consequential to disclose, but there are a number of
examples in the literature where access was granted. Similar hurdles exist
for IR researchers, yet IR has produced work such as Zartman and
Berman’s (1982) synthesis of interviews with 84 U.S. and UN
representatives. There is no equivalent in IB. At the same time, this is not
only a matter of IB researchers negotiating more effectively with
practitioners but of their willingness to grapple with messy data (see Matz
2004). (For arguments in support of more case study research, see
Druckman (2002) and Zartman (2005).)

Perspectives
Broad conceptual suggestions have been saved for last mention because
they could call for the most dramatic or difficult change from existing
research. As Reynolds, Simintiras and Vlachou (2003) have concluded, we
need a valid “all-encompassing” model of IB, not just of intercultural
negotiation. Some conceptual and grounded models already exist (e.g.,
Weiss 1993), and they could be consulted more regularly to situate
empirical studies and themselves be put through rigorous testing and
validation. Researchers could consider strategic aspects at a micro-analytic
level and behavioral aspects at a macro level or combine the two existing
paradigms via bridge topics such as deter- minants of IB negotiation
outcomes.
Beyond the concern for a comprehensive model, we might significantly
advance our understanding of international and IB negotiations by
reconcep- tualizing process and outcome. Instead of looking for a single
pattern or set of stages, however general, across countries or cultures
(e.g., Adair & Brett 2005; Graham, Mintu & Rodgers 1994), should
researchers think of IB negotiation as a set of processes? Similarly, treating
a negotiation outcome only as a result at the very end of the process (even if
measured in multiple ways, such as individual profit, joint gain, and partner
satisfaction) is a some- what misleading view of negotiation. Agreements of
various kinds – or more precisely “results” – are often reached throughout a
negotiation. In large scale negotiations, process and outcome are
intertwined and recurring, not single iterations. Complicated arrangements
between real parties require con- tinuous negotiation.
Development along lines different from past research requires, among
other efforts, an explication and discriminating awareness of typically
implicit assumptions that guide research (see Lewicki, Weiss & Lewin
1992). Many of
308 STEPHEN E. WEISS

them are culturally bound, not just by the nationalities of the researchers
(Brett & Gelfand 2006), but also by their research cultures. More systematic
communication between IB researchers and practitioners will advance IB
research.

Conclusion

These reflections constitute in many ways a call for continuing yet greater
investment in research on IB negotiation. Business actors in a globalizing
world will increasingly engage in negotiation – in its various forms and
arenas – and depend on its capacity to bring about important results.
Research has a role to play in these developments. It also has a vital role to
play in knowledge-building. In both respects, IB research is bound to
continue con- tributing to and benefiting from work in the field of
international negotiation. Much has been accomplished since Kapoor’s
(1970) International Business Negotiations, but there is even more to do.

Acknowledgements

My thanks to the editor, an anonymous reviewer and David Feldman for

their comments on previous versions of this paper.

Notes

1. Criteria include place of legal establishment (incorporation), location of corporate head-

quarters or a particular unit or subsidiary, and nationality of majority shareholders. Many
MNEs obfuscate their ownership for marketing and other purposes.
2. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2000 and
April 2005 at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2005/01/data/ (accessed on April 8,
2006).
3. International Telecommunication Union at http://ww w.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/
wtdr_06/index.html (accessed on April 8, 2006). The “digital divide” between developed
and developing countries has decreased dramatically, but total Internet usage is still low
in Asia- Pacific, Arab states, and Africa. In-person connections, not just virtual ones, have
also con- tinued to rise. Total annual airline passengers worldwide (all types of travel)
increased 33% from 1994 to 2004 (Donoghue 2004).
4. Some authors (e.g., Rugman & Hodgetts 2003) argue that most international business is
not global but interregional (specifically between the triad zones of the U.S., Japan and
EU).
5. In February, 2006, an ABI Inform search for “international business negotia*” in a title or
abstract since 1970 yielded 3,902 references. Limiting that list to scholarly journal
articles
 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 309

led to a subset of 749 references. On the U.S. Library of Congress website, an on-line
search for “international business negotiation” literature produced over 10,000
references (although a quick examination spotted the inclusion of non-business
citations). These results could be expanded by extending the search beyond English
language sources.
6. Some of the research cited below is not explicitly business-based (e.g., Gelfand et al.,
2001), but it is included because it appears often in IB negotiation researchers’ literature
reviews.
7. For other examples of contradictory findings, see Gelfand and Dyer (2000) and Weiss
(2004:459). For information about Chinese negotiators, see Cai and Waks
(2002).
8. Nicolson (1973:4) defined diplomacy as “the management of international relations by
negotiation.”
9. This relates to the question earlier in this article about differences between international
and domestic M&A negotiations. Connections made between IB and IR to date include
a few compilations of work from both subfields (e.g., Kremenyuk 2002), individual
scholars’ cross-overs into the other subfield (e.g., Pye 1992), and IB-IR collaborations
(e.g., Crump
& Zartman 2003).
10. Practicing negotiators have their own ideas for how to improve their effectiveness. A
U.S. diplomat, a veteran of hundreds of international negotiations, told me that a
cultural briefing on his counterparts should tell him everything they would do from the
time he stepped off the airplane at their airport (pers. comm.).
11. Such work should also delve into how practitioners define “success” (see d’Estree et al.
2001 and International Negotiation 2002, 7(3)).
12. This would go a long ways toward answering the question about non-superficial
similari- ties and differences between international M&A negotiation, and international
sales and domestic M&A negotiations. (Recall Endnote 9.)

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Appendix
Noteworthy Journal Articles on International Business
Negotiation: A Sample from the Period 1970–2005 (English
language only)

1970–79
Brunner & Taoka. 1977. Marketing and negotiating in the People’s Republic of China . . .
Journal of International Business Studies 8(2):69–82.
Stoever. 1979. Renegotiations: the cutting edge of relations between MNCs and LDCs.
Columbia Journal of World Business 14(1):5–
14. Van Zandt. 1970. How to negotiate in Japan.
Harvard Business Review. November-December:45–56.

1980–89
Contractor. 1985. A generalized theorem for joint-venture and licensing negotiations.
Journal of International Business Studies 16(2):23–50.
de la Torre. 1981. Foreign investment and economic development: conflict and negotiation.
Journal of International Business Studies 12(2):9–32.
Encarnation & Wells. 1985. Sovereignty en garde: negotiating with foreign investors.
International Organization 39(1):47–78.
Fagre & Wells. 1982. Bargaining power of multinationals and host governments.
Journal of International Business Studies 13(2):9–23.
Graham. 1983. Brazilian, Japanese, and American business negotiations.
Journal of International Business Studies 14(1):81–96.
Kobrin. 1987. Testing the bargaining hypothesis . . . manufacturing . . . in developing countries.
International Organization 41(4):609–638.
Lecraw. 1984. Bargaining power . . . transnational corporations in developing countries.
Journal of International Business Studies 15(1):27–44.
Stewart & Keown. 1989. Talking with the dragon: negotiating in . . . China.
Columbia Journal of World Business 24(3):68–72.
 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 315

Tung. 1982. U.S.-China trade negotiations: practices, procedures and outcomes.

Journal of International Business Studies 13(2):25–38.
Weiss. 1987. Creating the GM-Toyota joint venture: a case in complex negotiation.
Columbia Journal of World Business 22(2):23–38.

1990–99
Brett & Okumura. 1998. Inter- and intracultural negotiation: U.S. and Japanese negotiators.
Academy of Management Journal 41(5):495–510.
Brouthers & Bamossy. 1997. The role of key stakeholders in IJV negotiations: . . . E. Europe.
Journal of International Business Studies 23:285–308.
Francis. 1991. When in Rome? . . . cultural adaptation on intercultural business negotiations.
Journal of International Business Studies 22(3):403–428.
George, Jones & Gonzalez. 1998. The role of affect in cross-cultural negotiations.
Journal of International Business Studies 29(4):749–772.
Gomes-Casseres. 1990. Firm ownership preferences and host government restrictions.
Journal of International Business Studies 21(1):1–22.
Graham, Mintu & Rodgers. 1994. Explorations of negotiation behavior in ten countries . . .
Management Science 40(1):72–95.
Kashlak, Chandran & Di Benedetto. 1998. Reciprocity in . . . telecommunications . . . contracts.
Journal of International Business Studies 29(2):281–304.
Luo, Yadong. 1999. Toward a conceptual framework of international joint venture negotiations.
Journal of International Management 5:141–165.
Morris et al. 1998. Conflict management style: accounting for cross-national differences.
Journal of International Business Studies 29(4):729–748.
Rao & Schmidt. 1998. A behavioral perspective on negotiating international alliances.
Journal of International Business Studies 29(4):665–694.
Tinsley, Curhan & Kwak. 1999. Adopting a dual lens . . . for . . . the dilemma of differences . . .
International Negotiation 4(1):5–22.
Vachani. 1995. Enhancing the obsolescing bargain theory: A longitudinal study . . .
Journal of International Business Studies, 26(1):159–180.
Weiss. 1993. Analysis of complex negotiations in international business: the RBC perspective.
Organization Science 4(2):269–300.
Weiss. 1994. Negotiating with ‘Romans.’
Sloan Management Review 35(2):51–61.
Yan & Gray. 1994. “Bargaining power . . . in United States-China joint ventures . . .”
Academy of Management Journal 37(6):1478–1517.

2000–05
Adair & Brett. 2004. The negotiation dance: time, culture and behavioral sequences . . .
Organization Science 16(1):33–51.
Brannen & Salk. 2000. Partnering across borders: . . . culture in a German-Japanese joint
venture.
Human Relations 53(4):451–487.
*Cai & Fink. 2002. Conflict style differences between individualists and collectivists.
Communication Monographs 69(1):67–87.
Doh & Teegen. 2002. Nongovernmental organizations as institutional actors . . .
International Business Review 11:665–684.
316 STEPHEN E. WEISS

*Gelfand et al. 2001. Cultural influences on cognitive representations of conflict: . . . US . . .

Japan.
Journal of Applied Psychology 86(6):1059–1074.
Kumar & Worm. 2004. Institutional dynamics and the negotiation process: . . . India and China.
International Journal of Conflict Management 15(3):304–334.
Ramamurti. 2001. The obsolescing ‘bargaining model’ . . . revisited.
Journal of International Business Studies 32:23–39.
Saner, Yiu & Sondergaard. 2000. Business diplomacy management: A core competency . . .
Academy of Management Executive 14(1):80–92.
Tinsley. 2001. How negotiators get to yes: . . . constellation of strategies used across cul-
tures . . .
Journal of Applied Psychology 86(4):583–593.

*not specific to business