Splitting the South:

Explaining China and India's Divergence in International Environmental Negotiations

Leah C. Stokes, Amanda Giang & Noelle E. Selin

University of California Santa Barbara & Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Forthcoming in Global Environmental Politics

February 2016

Abstract
International environmental negotiations often involve conflicts between developed and
developing countries. However, considering environmental cooperation in a North-South
dichotomy obscures important variation within the global South, particularly as emerging
economies become more important politically, economically and environmentally. This article
examines change in the Southern coalition in environmental negotiations using the recently
concluded Minamata Convention on Mercury as its primary case. Focusing on India and China,
we argue that three key factors explain divergence in their positions as the negotiations
progressed: domestic resources and regulatory politics, development constraints, and domestic
scientific and technological capacity. We conclude that the intersection between scientific and
technological development and domestic policy is of increasing importance in shaping emerging
economies’ engagement in international environmental negotiations. We also discuss how this
divergence is affecting international environmental cooperation on other issues, including the
ozone and climate negotiations.

Introduction
Global environmental negotiations scholars have largely analyzed two major negotiating blocs:
developed countries or the global North and developing countries or the global South (Joshi
2013). Research has explored differences within the North, for example contrasting the EU and
USA’s positions in the climate change and ozone negotiations (Hoffmann 2005; Downie 2014;
Fisher 2004). However, the global environmental politics literature, largely based in the North,

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2733872

has paid less attention to differences within the South. Yet, as countries in the South begin to
diverge in their development trajectories, their interests and preferences are also changing. This
is particularly the case for emerging economies, most notably China and India.
Developing countries and emerging economies have historically cooperated in
international negotiations, often through large coalitions such as the Group of 77 (G77) plus
China (Najam, Huq, and Sokona 2003). At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, where the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was negotiated, developing countries
worked together to successfully argue for several principles, including common but
differentiated responsibilities. This pattern of Southern cooperation continued through numerous
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings on topics such as financing, capacity
building, and targets and timetables. In the ozone negotiations, developing countries similarly
took a common position on many issues. When ozone standards were being strengthened in the
mid-1990s, developing countries together argued that tighter controls should be contingent on
increased financing (Parson 2000).
However, over time, these developing country alliances have frayed, particularly between
two major emerging economies: China and India. In the ozone regime, China has shown greater
willingness to act on limiting hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), while India has resisted (Hwang
2013). On climate change, China has enacted significant domestic policies including an
emissions trading system and has announced a bilateral climate agreement with the US. By
contrast, India has enacted less ambitious domestic climate policies, committing to intensity
rather than absolute reductions, and its cooperation with the US is limited.
While other scholars have pointed to growing divergence in the South, it is not clear why
this is happening. Why has cooperation between these emerging economies, with previously
similar perspectives on the environment and development, changed over time? In this article, we
explain this divergence empirically and explore its implications for future international
negotiations. We focus on China and India who often play a large role within negotiations and
whose decisions on global environmental issues can have substantial impacts. We argue that
domestic resources and regulatory politics, development constraints, and domestic scientific and
technological capacity all help explain increasing divergence in China and India’s negotiating
positions over time.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2733872

 This article uses the Minamata Convention on Mercury, as the most recent, successful
example of international environmental cooperation, to examine underlying interests,
preferences, and their temporal evolution. Evidence is drawn from meeting documents, technical
reports, scientific assessments, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), national governments,
and the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB). Further, information was gathered from participant
observation at the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) sessions on mercury and
interviews with individuals and delegates involved in the negotiations.
In the next section, we provide a theoretical background, followed by an overview of the
mercury negotiations, including how India and China’s positions changed over time. Next, we
explain why this divergence in positions occurred. While we develop this argument using
evidence from the mercury regime, we argue that it may generalize to other regimes including
climate and ozone. We conclude by discussing the implications for theory and practice in
international environmental cooperation.

Developing countries’ positions in global negotiations

Developing countries have historically cooperated and crafted common positions, despite
differences in interests, to achieve more favorable outcomes. The global environmental politics
literature has largely treated developing countries as a collective within international
environmental negotiations (Hoffmann 2005; Roberts and Parks 2007). Examining ozone,
biodiversity and hazardous waste trade, Miller (1998) characterized Third World countries as a
negotiating bloc throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Building on her work, Williams (2005) argued
that this grouping continued to have relevance within international environmental negotiations in
the 2000s. In the climate negotiations, Najam, Huq, and Sokona (2003) have argued that
developing countries share common interests, including securing an equitable architecture,
enhancing capacities and pursuing sustainable development. The G77 is a key venue for this
cooperation, and internal negotiations within the South-South collective push the group towards
common positions (Najam 2004).
However, it is increasingly unclear whether this dichotomy continues to accurately
capture negotiating dynamics. In the development literature, the North-South model was
critiqued for ignoring heterogeneity amongst Southern countries (Eckl and Weber 2007; Therien
1999). In environmental negotiations, scholars have documented divergence in the Southern

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group on climate policy—between OPEC and the G77, and between emerging economies and
least developed countries (Barnett 2008; Roberts 2011). Perkins (2013) characterized the
developing world as increasingly diverse in terms of development, governance capacities, and
their power in negotiations (Perkins 2013). Najam (2005) also hypothesized that developing
countries’ pursuit of specific national interests might magnify as global environmental politics
moves from a declaratory stage towards a more substantive regulatory phase.
The role of China and India as emerging powers in global environmental governance has
drawn particular attention (Humphrey and Messner 2006). Research has focused on tensions
between emerging economies’ negotiating positions and how parties’ interests have shaped the
Southern coalition’s behaviour (Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2014). The climate regime, which has
not yet resulted in substantive commitments for the developing world, has received significant
focus. Examining India’s position in the climate negotiations, Joshi (2013) argued that the North
and South are “fluid and dynamic categories” and that these groups fluctuate between unity and
plurality depending on geopolitical and development factors. But despite this fluidity, she argues
North-South distinctions retain their importance, with the Indian delegation emphasizing
historical differences between the developed and developing world as a negotiating strategy.
Some research has focused specifically on the Minamata Convention on Mercury, as an
example of a recent international regime. Selin (2014a) showed that linkages with other
international environmental regimes affected the mercury negotiation. Templeton and Kohler
(2014) argued that developing countries worked together in negotiations to secure a commitment
for new financing. These studies demonstrated that the Minamata Convention represents a useful
case to examine larger issues of coalitions and consensus in international environmental politics.
Like other environmental regimes, such as climate and ozone, the developed world is responsible
for the majority of historic mercury emissions while emerging economies are currently the
largest emitters. Minamata also offers a case that has progressed from negotiation to a legally-
binding agreement, allowing us to examine changes in coalition dynamics as regulatory
requirements become more concrete.

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India and China’s Positions in the Mercury Negotiations
Although mercury is naturally occurring, human emissions have increased its presence in the
environment. Exposure to mercury, which often occurs through fish consumption, can lead to
adverse health effects. The main motivations for a global mercury treaty were human health
impacts and emissions transporting globally (UNEP 2002; UNEP 2008). In its most recent
assessment, UNEP estimated that the largest anthropogenic sources of mercury emissions are
ASGM (37%), and fossil fuel combustion (25%); however, emissions data for ASGM remain
highly uncertain (UNEP 2013a).
In the early 2000s, a large, Southern coalition cooperated in the global mercury
negotiations through the UNEP Governing Council and Global Ministerial Environment Forum.
The G77 and China argued that the existing chemicals regime and voluntary measures were
sufficient, and that developing countries knew little about mercury and had insufficient capacity
to address the problem (ENB 2003). However, as negotiators considered developing a legally
binding agreement, countries organized into regional groups, such as GRULAC and the African
Group, with growing disagreements. Increasingly, the African Group supported the EU’s
interests in negotiating a binding agreement, viewing it as a pathway towards financial and
technical support, including reducing mercury use in ASGM. GRULAC, along with the US, was
less willing to move forward.
As the two largest country emitters, India and China initially cooperated and formed an
influential coalition (ENB 2007a). In both countries, rapid economic development drove
emissions growth, through coal combustion, cement and non-ferrous metal production.
Projections suggested they would continue to be the leading emitters. Given the substantial
emissions from these two countries alone, cooperation from both China and India was essential
to addressing mercury globally (Giang et al. 2015).
However, India and China argued against legally-binding action in the mid-2000s (ENB
2007a). Their tactic was to downplay the science and availability of alternatives to mercury, and
limit the scope for the negotiations. They both expressed skepticism that action was necessary
and that abatement technology was feasible. Several negotiators from developed countries
expressed frustration that India in particular consistently argued for more baseline data and

5
questioned the science on mercury’s impacts on health and the environment (ENB 2005).1 China
argued a stand-alone treaty would be long and unnecessarily arduous to negotiate. Both countries
stressed the need for flexibility, and cited development goals, and the use of fossil fuels to attain
these goals, as the priority (Eriksen and Perrez 2014). On the issue of scope, both China and
India argued that mercury demand should be regulated rather than reduced, and that trade in
mercury containing products should be excluded (ENB 2007b). They argued that eliminating
atmospheric mercury emissions was not economically and technically feasible.
By the mid-2000s, already coalitions were not organized along north-south lines. The EU
advocated for action along with the African Group. The US and other developed countries did
not support a binding instrument. Consequently, China, India and the US, with support from
other resistant countries, were able to postpone global regulatory action on mercury for almost a
decade. It was only when the US changed its position in 2009, after President Obama took office,
that the negotiating dynamic altered (Selin 2014a). Still, China and India cooperated to delay
action on a legally binding instrument an additional year, moving the start date for the INC
process from 2009 to 2010.
At the first and second INC meetings, China and India signaled a continuing alliance
based on common interests. In one session, China’s negotiator referred to his Indian counterpart
as his “brother.”2 Substantively, China and India worked together to issue joint proposals and
cooperate. On atmospheric emissions, neither China nor India supported mandatory emissions
targets or timelines, arguing instead for a voluntary approach (ENB 2010a). China was unwilling
to commit to emissions reductions that might limit their growing energy sector, arguing the term
control should be used. India emphasized the importance of common but differentiated
responsibilities and the need for financial and technical assistance for developing countries (ENB
2011b). Indian delegates asserted that technology transfer would be necessary to comply with
obligations to control emissions and releases of mercury.
These common positions continued into the third and fourth INC, where draft text was
formulated. These negotiations centered on voluntary versus mandatory emissions standards,
compliance, and financial and technical assistance (ENB 2011a). Both China and India stressed
the importance of a financial mechanism. India emphasized that assistance from developed

1. Interview with EU member state negotiator, January 30, 2014.

2. Personal observations, INC2.

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countries should be mandatory. On compliance, India and China also cooperated, arguing that
any compliance article was contingent on both assistance and technology transfer commitments.
On emissions, India and China, along with Brazil, continued to argue for weaker standards and a
single approach for all emitters (ENB 2011b). Since these emerging economies all had
significant emissions, requiring all countries to act would likely weaken the standards. By
contrast, other developing countries, such as those in the African Group, argued that large
emitters should be considered separately. By this point, the African Group and GRULAC tended
to side with the EU, Norway and other developed countries on many issues. Thus, the
negotiations were not based on a developed versus developing country cleavage, but rather, a
more complex blend of current and historic emitters, and countries’ development status.
At INC4, China and India issued a joint submission that emphasized coal electricity
expansion for development, arguing against Best Available Techniques (BAT) for existing
facilities and mandatory emissions reductions. The document stated the agreement should
comprise both voluntary and binding measures, specifying products and processes as one area for
flexibility. This was particularly in China’s interests, given their large use of mercury in
manufacturing processes (Selin 2014a). Where requirements would be binding, China and
India’s joint submission called for financial support. Similarly, in statements at INC4, China
stressed a voluntary and flexible approach, as well as consideration of the differing
circumstances of developed versus developing countries. India argued that the mercury regime
should not “encroach” on a climate regime by imposing stringent technology standards and
emphasized the coal-based electrification’s importance for development (UNEP INC 2012).
Despite these strongly aligned positions, during the fifth and final INC, Chinese
negotiators made a sudden, clear and unanticipated break with India. The Chinese delegation
stated it was willing to accept more stringent measures on emissions.3 For new sources, China
suddenly accepted mandatory control requirements, provided parties were allowed to flexibly
choose measures based on their own situation. For existing sources, China was also more willing
to accept timelines for controls.4 This willingness to compromise allowed China to play a more
active role in shaping the final text. For example, China argued that emissions should only cover

3. Interviews with senior developed country negotiators, January 17, 2014, February 4, 2014;
three UK negotiators, January 21, 2014.
4. Personal observations, INC5.

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major sources. This view was incorporated into the final text, which focused on major point
source emissions. It was clear that China had a broader negotiating mandate and was interested
in reaching an agreement. By contrast, India was less constructive at INC5, and was reluctant to
commit to implementing any emissions control technologies above existing standards. India
obstructed contact group attempts to operationalize broad concepts like source thresholds. India
also objected to consensus on final negotiating packages on mercury phase-out dates, without
China’s support.5
In the final treaty, the emissions article called for parties to “control, and where feasible,
reduce” emissions of mercury, depending on whether sources were new or existing. For new
emissions sources, BAT and Best Environmental Practices (BEP) would apply within 5 years of
the treaty entering into force. For existing sources, within 10 years, parties would have to
implement one or more of the following options: emission limit values; BAT and BEP; a multi-
pollutant control strategy with co-benefits for other air pollutants; or alternative measures to
reduce emissions.
In part because of India’s and other hesitant parties’ influence during the negotiations,
these requirements are relatively weak compared to what the EU and NGOs advocated. There are
no quantified reduction targets, control rather than reduction is required, and the timelines for
action are far off, particularly for existing sources (Selin 2014a). However, several negotiators
from countries favoring more stringent measures stated in interviews that they felt the final text
was a good starting point; compromises were necessary for key emitters, like China and India, to
join the treaty.6 They also highlighted that requirements could be ratcheted up in the Conference
of Parties, as occurred when other chemicals agreements were implemented (Selin 2014b).
At the Diplomatic Conference formally adopting the Minamata Convention in late 2013,
China signed the treaty, and even provided financial resources to support other countries’
ratification and implementation. In their statement, China emphasized their significant domestic
policy measures to address mercury pollution, for example adopting control standards equivalent
to those in Germany. In contrast, India did not attend the conference, and only signed the
Convention in late 2014, after a change in national government. While India did not explain its

5. Interview with senior developed country negotiator, January 17, 2014.

6. Interviews with senior developed country negotiators January 17, 2014, February 4, 2014; EU
member state negotiator, January 30, 2014.

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initial reluctance to join, its non-participation was criticized by domestic NGOs as illustrating a
lack of commitment to addressing the mercury issue (ENB 2013).

Explaining divergence
How can we explain this divergence between China and India at the end of the mercury
negotiations, given past scholarship would suggest a coalition would persist between these
emerging economies? Since China and India continue to be large emitters, changes in their
contribution to the problem are unlikely to explain this change in positions. In fact, China has
greater global mercury emissions, suggesting it should bear greater costs and be less willing to
cooperate than India. Similarly, differences in the form of government—authoritarian versus
democratic—would suggest persistent differences rather than changing coalitions over time.
Instead, we argue that divergence in India and China’s positions was a function of three factors
that can explain changes over time: (i) domestic resources and regulatory politics, (ii)
development constraints, and (iii) domestic scientific and technological capacity.

Domestic Resources and Regulatory Politics

China and India have different resource endowments, in terms of both the type and quality of
domestic energy sources. As these resources have been developed over time, they have resulted
in distinct domestic stationary combustion regulations. In other words, there is an interaction
between each country’s resources and resulting regulatory politics. In the mercury negotiations,
key factors that varied over time across India and China were the salience of air pollution
domestically and emissions control measures’ feasibility. Air pollution has become an important
political issue in China as significant coal resources have been built. Consequently, China has
imposed tougher air quality regulations that concurrently remove mercury. In India, fewer coal
resources have been built, air quality remains less politically salient, and domestic coal resource
quality creates barriers to installing mercury control technology.
China was responsible for nearly half of global coal consumption in 2010, more than four
times India’s consumption (Yang and Cui 2012). During the early mercury negotiations, China
built more coal than India; in 2012, China alone built 40 percent of new coal generation
worldwide (Yang and Cui 2012). However, in 2013, China installed more non-coal than coal

9
sources, signalling the beginning of a shift away from coal-based electricity (CEC 2013). In
2014, China agreed to peak carbon emissions by 2030 through a bilateral pledge with the US. In
contrast, India is continuing to heavily invest in new coal, with plans to add 160 GW of
additional capacity by 2022 with projected coal consumption growth to 2050 (ICEA 2012;
RIVM 2001). Further, China has significant potential shale resources while India does not (EIA
2013). In short, China has already built its coal resources while India has lagged behind and is
significantly more resource constrained. Given new coal capacity, stringent requirements for new
sources under the Minamata convention would have disproportionately impacted India.
Coal resource quality also affected the link between mercury emissions and urban air
pollution in each country. Regulation of nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and particulates—three
traditional air pollutants—can lead to co-benefits for mercury reduction because control
technologies capturing these pollutants also capture mercury (Pacyna et al. 2010). However,
installing pollution capture technology can result in lower plant efficiency (US EPA 2003). Thus,
stringent air quality policies increase the cost of combusting coal. Whether countries are willing
to pay for these additional costs is contingent on air quality’s political salience, as well as
technical factors that increase costs, including the availability and quality of coal resources.
In recent years, the Chinese public has become concerned about urban air pollution and
increasingly dissatisfied with the government’s regulation of power plants (Zheng and Kahn
2013). In China satisfaction with air quality is below the global average, and Hong Kong has the
lowest satisfaction in the world (Loschky and Ray 2013). Citizens regularly monitor air quality,
and the recent pollution documentary “Under the Dome” was watched 200 million times before
being banned in March 2015.7 The Chinese government has signaled that environmental
problems are a potential threat to political stability (Economy 2010). As a result, the central
government has begun tightening air quality regulations. Over the past ten years, the fraction of
coal plants in China with desulfurization systems capturing sulfur dioxide jumped from 14 to 86
percent (Zhang and Schreifels 2011). Further, in 2011, the Chinese Ministry of Environmental
Protection adopted a new standard for thermal power plants. One Chinese negotiator described
the standard as reflecting a movement towards setting limits comprehensively for multiple

7. Daniel K. Gardner, “China’s ‘Silent Spring’ Moment?” New York Times, March 18, 2015.

10
pollutants—an approach common in developed countries.8 Between 2012 and 2014, China
adopted some of the most stringent conventional air pollutants emissions limits globally for both
new and existing plants (Schreifels, Fu, and Wilson 2012). These urban air pollution regulations
will lead to substantial mercury reduction co-benefits.
China is also directly targeting mercury emissions, mentioning it as a goal in its most
recent five-year plan. The 2011 Emission Standard included a mercury specific limit. One
Chinese expert involved in domestic air policy said the limit was set during the INC negotiations
and is based on values used in Germany.9 Complying with new air quality regulations, described
above, will require that almost all plants install several pollution control devices. Since these
devices also capture mercury, interviewed coal experts were confident that most plants would be
below the mercury emission limit without mercury-specific control technologies.10 For these
reasons, meeting the emissions requirements under a mercury treaty was compatible with
China’s existing actions, particularly under flexible implementation. Consequently, China sought
to shape the emissions article to ensure it conformed with domestic standards, did not mandate
reductions, or require mercury-specific control technologies. With these changes, China would
be able to comply.
In contrast, air pollution has been a lower public and regulatory priority in India.
Satisfaction with air quality in India is higher than in China and higher than the global average
(Loschky and Ray 2013). This is not because air pollution is less of an objective problem in
India; rather, it is not seen a key problem for policymakers to address (Hsu et al. 2014). Instead,
issues such as food insecurity, poverty and access to basic services are priorities for the
population. Consequently, there has only been limited regulation of pollution from coal-fired
power plants in India. Instead, improving urban air quality often centers on transportation rather
than electricity sources.
Further, characteristics of India’s power sector and domestic coal quality present
technical barriers to mercury regulations. Most coal used in India is domestic, with higher ash
and lower sulfur content than coal from other countries (Kumari 2011; Sloss 2012a). The high

8. Interview with Chinese negotiator, January 24, 2014.

9. Interview with Chinese negotiator, January 24, 2014.
10. Interviews with Chinese negotiator, January 24, 2014; senior developed country negotiator,
January 17, 2014; EU member state negotiator, January 30, 2014.

11
ash content makes it less efficient, meaning India requires more coal for the same energy output,
resulting in higher mercury emissions. The low sulfur rates mean that sulfur dioxide controls that
also capture mercury have not been a regulatory priority (Sloss 2012b). Desulfurization controls
are not common or required, and there are no specific emissions limits for nitrogen oxides in
India. Still, since 1981, emissions limits for particulates have been in effect, leading to the use of
electrostatic precipitator technology at most plants. However, the high ash content in Indian coal
may reduce these systems’ ability to capture mercury (Sloss 2012a). Consequently, in contrast to
China, there are few opportunities for mercury co-benefits in India. Further, India’s coal may be
very high in mercury, higher than coal in China; however, with few measurements, this remains
highly uncertain (UNEP 2011; UNEP 2014). But even the perception of high mercury content
may have presented barriers to India agreeing to emissions regulations in the negotiations.11
Unsurprisingly, recent power regulations have focused on improvements to plant
efficiency. In 2002, the Indian Central Pollution Control Board capped the ash content of coals
used in power generation at 34%, leading to increased coal cleaning and blending. Coal cleaning
also reduces mercury content. Recent generation capacity expansion plans include the adoption
of supercritical boilers in new installations—a technology with substantial efficiency gains
(ICEA 2012). Efficiency improvements will have benefits for mercury, traditional air pollutants,
and carbon dioxide. However, these changes are likely to take time, as they require modifications
to fuels and both new and existing power plants. Further, during the negotiations, it was not clear
whether efficiency improvements would be seen as acceptable actions to control mercury under
the treaty, making India more hesitant to agree to the convention. And if stricter standards were
placed on new sources, this would further compound India’s challenges with complying given
planned coal expansion.
These domestic differences between India and China in their coal quality and power
sector attributes interacted with differences in air pollution politics. In India, mandatory
emissions obligations were a larger obstacle, requiring end-of-pipe controls that would, in effect,
be mercury-specific, rather than offering co-benefits. These differences may also help explain the
increased emphasis that Indian delegates put on the availability of financial and technical

11. Interviews with coal expert, January 20, 2014; UNEP Chemicals Branch Programme Officer,
April 1, 2014.

12
assistance over their Chinese counterparts, as complying with treaty obligations would likely
require larger, additional costs in India.

Development Constraints
As emerging economies, China and India have prioritized development through expanding
energy capacity. Both countries have similar electricity mixes using substantial amounts of coal.
Thus, their mercury emissions trajectories depend not only on mercury control technologies, but
also on energy demand and capacity expansion. As is also the case with climate actions, placing
significant constraints on mercury emissions could hinder electricity expansion. These shared
interests could facilitate a coalition between China and India.
However, there are significant differences in energy access across China and India. One
report projected that all of China will be electrified in 2015, compared to 2030 in India (IEA
2010). Electrification is one of the government’s major priorities because a quarter of the Indian
population has no access to electricity, with ongoing electricity shortages (Ahn and Graczyk
2012). India brought up electrification needs in the INC process when mandatory emissions
limits were raised. As an Indian delegate stated during INC2, the country plans to double its
power capacity within the next ten years, largely through new coal capacity, providing electricity
for 100 million homes without power (ENB 2011a). The difference in energy access between
China and India suggests that India will continue to build significant coal generation capacity
into the future, making mercury controls more costly.
In addition to the electrification differentials between India and China, these countries
have diverged considerably in terms of their development trajectories over the past ten years.
China’s growth rate has surpassed India’s, with per capita GDP now twice as high in China than
India. Similarly, poverty more severe in India, with 33 percent living on less than $1.25 per day
compared to China’s 12 percent (World Bank 2009). China’s greater economic development
may be linked to a higher willingness to regulate air pollution, discussed below. Further, China
has shown a strong ability to profit from manufacturing new environmental technology (Lewis
2013). Thus, global environmental regulations may present greater economic opportunities for
China than India. In contrast, several interviewees indicated that for both regulators and citizens
in India, other challenges like poverty reduction, electrification, and drinking water are greater

13
priorities. In India, the mercury problem is typically viewed as one for developed countries to
address.12

Domestic scientific and technical capacity

Although significant research has focused on scientists’ roles in international negotiations
through linked, global networks (Kohler et al. 2012; Haas 1992), less attention has been paid to
how variation in domestic scientific capacity affects countries’ negotiating positions. Countries
can vary in their domestic knowledge on environmental issues and the degree to which that
knowledge is integrated into policy-making. Efforts within chemicals negotiations have focused
on making scientific assessments available to developing countries through regional workshops,
which can raise the salience of technical information to facilitate regime participation (Selin
2006). Despite these global-scale efforts, however, dramatic differences still exist in countries’
access to scientific and technical knowledge in environmental regimes (Tijssen 2007).
Direct input from academics is an increasingly common part of China’s policy-making
process (Cao 2004; Lewis and Gallagher 2014). Mercury control technologies, and their
scientific and technical implications became increasingly well-known to the Chinese delegation
over the INC process. Four out of 18 members of the Chinese delegation at INC5 were air
pollution and mercury scientists from academia. As in North America and Europe, China
benefits from a large group of domestic scientific researchers that focus on China-specific
mercury issues, such as domestic coal characteristics, emissions inventories, fate and transport
and human exposure.13 Further, China hosted the 2009 International Conference on Mercury as a
Global Pollutant (ICMGP) and a large number of the presentations focused on China, no doubt
deepening scientific knowledge of the mercury problem domestically. Research highlighted the
extent of China’s local mercury challenges, including contaminated sites and mercury exposure
through rice (Feng and Qiu 2008; Jiang and Shi 2006). Research also demonstrated that while
Chinese emissions contribute significantly to deposition in other countries, China is the largest
anthropogenic source of mercury deposition within its own borders, making mercury emissions

12. Interviews with senior developed country negotiator, January 17, 2014; Indian power sector
expert, February 25, 2014.
13. Interviews with senior developed country negotiators, February 4, 2014.

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control foremost a domestic issue (AMAP and UNEP 2013). This active scientific community
participated in developing the new emission standard domestically, as well as the Chinese
position in international negotiations.
In contrast, in India, the scientific community around mercury is far less developed.
According to one scientist, there are only three research groups in India studying mercury
emissions.14 At ICMGP 2013 only two presentations focused on India and were from Indian
institutions, whereas 38 addressed China, with 34 from Chinese institutions. Domestically, there
are relatively few studies of mercury impacts in India, though some NGOs have conducted
studies of the Singrauli region where mercury acutely affects some communities (Sahu et al.
2012; Kumari 2011). These same groups have brought attention to the lack of India specific
information about mercury emissions and mercury impacts. They have suggested the government
is politically reluctant to develop or release mercury information—for example on domestic
coals’ mercury content—as identifying the scope of the problem could commit the government
to responding.15 These gaps are partially being addressed through the UNEP Global Mercury
Partnerships rather than domestically. Further, in India, scientists and technical experts on
mercury seem to have less influence over government policy. For example, none of the Indian
delegates at INC5 were academic scientists. Instead, representatives came from environmental
and health ministries, the central electricity authority and diplomatic ministries. Consequently,
the Indian delegation did not have the same connection to scientific data when negotiating.
Scientific information can create shared narratives, forming a basis for cooperation.
Importantly, science may play different roles at different scales. Domestic science—in this case,
studies of the environmental and health effects within a country’s borders—may have a strong
influence on domestic regulation and therefore countries’ positions. This was the case for China,
who began to converge more closely with the EU and US as Chinese officials became more
knowledgeable about emissions inventories, available technologies, and their feasibility.16
International assessments, like those UNEP convenes, may weave a global narrative upon which
negotiations are built; but, this information may be insufficient to allow countries to understand

14. Interview with Indian environmental scientist, September 18, 2014.

15. Interview with Indian power sector expert, February 25, 2014.
16. Interviews with senior developed country negotiator, February 4, 2014; coal expert, January
20, 2014.

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domestic impacts. Instead, there is a need to foster domestic scientific communities that can
contribute to negotiators’ understanding of global environmental issues.

Conclusion
The North-South dichotomy in international environmental negotiations is breaking down. In this
paper, we have explored the roots of south-south divergence through a case study of China and
India’s positions in the mercury negotiations. We find that attention to three main factors can
help explain divergence: domestic resources and regulatory politics; development constraints;
and, domestic scientific and technological capacity. The splitting of India and China’s positions
during the final mercury negotiating session illustrates that countries’ positions can be highly
dependent on socio-technical interactions. Geopolitical considerations, for example domestic
coal reserve attributes, interact with technical considerations, such as pollutant control
technologies, to constrain domestic policy options and, thus, international cooperation. Further,
the extent to which domestic science has framed the problem as important to address can shape
countries’ positions. Countries’ diverging development status can further constrain cooperation.
In the past, developing countries gained additional power in negotiations by coming to a
common position, even if underlying interests were not perfectly aligned. However, as emerging
economies gain greater negotiating power and variation in their development status increases,
they are less willing to work in large, negotiating blocs. These developments, occurring across
several international environmental negotiations, suggest a shift away from multilateralism with
large Northern and Southern coalitions, towards greater bilateral cooperation. Although we used
the mercury case to present our argument, similar dynamics influence other negotiations,
including ozone and climate.
In the climate negotiations, the South has fragmented over time (Hurrell and Sengupta
2012). At the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the G77 cooperated to successfully argue for the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities. However, by Kyoto in 1997, tensions within the
South developed. On the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Brazil split with China and
India to support the US proposal. Here, developing countries would be paid to reduce emissions,
with the resulting credits counting towards developed countries’ reduction requirements.
Although China and India eventually became large beneficiaries under the CDM, they were

16
initially skeptical. Once the CDM was implementated, developing countries diverged further in
their views on the mechanism’s effectiveness. By 2007, the vast majority of CDM projects were
from China, India, Mexico and Brazil (Griffith-Jones, Hedger, and Stokes 2009). Consequently,
smaller African and Latin American countries clashed with emerging economies over whether to
prioritize smaller-scale projects as their interests were not aligned. By Copenhagen in 2009,
progress in the climate negotiations had largely stalled. Since Copenhagen, while developing
countries have maintained a common rhetoric on capacity building and financial assistance, their
domestic actions have diverged. Roberts (2011) documented over 13 distinct sub-groups in 2011,
with divergent interests and positions.
China and the US have had bilateral negotiations since 2009 through an annual Strategic
and Economic Dialogue, which includes a climate change working group. China is considering a
cap on coal use as early as 2016, and a cap on carbon with a peak emissions year as early as
2030. Further, since 2011, China has developed pilot emissions trading programs (Zhang et al.
2014). In part, China may be more willing to act on climate change, because of co-benefits with
air pollution, similarly to its mercury policy interests. In addition, due to China’s development as
a manufacturing economy, China stands to benefit as an exporter of renewables and other low-
carbon technology (Lewis 2014).
In contrast, India has made fewer domestic climate commitments. Although there are
small energy efficiency and solar goals, India lacks a comprehensive climate policy framework
(Trancik et al. 2014). While the US attempted to negotiate a similar bilateral agreement with
India, it failed to do so in early 2015. India’s plan for the Paris negotiations targeted emissions
intensity reductions rather than absolute carbon cuts. Given India’s development status, and
extensive need for electrification, India also stated more coal power would be built. As in the
mercury negotiations, China and India’s interests have diverged in the climate regime due to
differences in development and domestic regulatory politics.
Within the ozone negotiations developing countries cooperated during the 1980s. Once
the Montreal Protocol was finalized, it was unclear whether China or India, both significant
chlorofluorocarbon consumers, would ratify the agreement. China had been a productive
negotiator, signalling a willingness to sign the treaty while India showed little interest in acting
and Indian “officials in private conversations had characterized the issue as a ‘rich man's
problem - rich man's solution’” (Benedick 1998, 100). While cooperation was sometimes

17
fractious, the two countries largely shared positions on ozone, both signing the Montreal
Protocol. Still, the timing of each country’s actions have been different: China first ratified the
Vienna Convention in 1989, while India did not join until 1991. Similarly, China acted a year
before India on the Montreal Protocol and London Amendments. On the Beijing amendments,
China significantly lagged India, by seven years.
More recently, differences between China and India in the ozone negotiations have
become substantive due to disagreements on HFCs: chemicals with significant global warming
potential but lower ozone depleting potential. Due to HFCs’ climate effects, several countries,
most notably the US, Canada and Mexico, proposed an amendment in 2010 to create an HFC
phase-out (ENB 2010b). Initially, both China and India disagreed with phasing out HFCs in
either the ozone or climate negotiations. The issue was moved to the ozone proceedings, with
both countries continuing to resist a phase-out arguing that these were not ozone depleting
substances and alternatives had significant problems.
However, the emerging economies began to fracture in this common position. China and
Brazil, although not yet committing to a phase-out, signalled a willingness to discuss HFCs in
the ozone negotiations. In September 2013, at a G20 meeting, the US and China came to a
bilateral understanding that a contact group be established in the ozone negotiations to discuss
costs, alternatives and a potential HFC amendment to the Montreal Protocol. China may see
market opportunities in the switch away from HFCs, as it can manufacture new alternatives
(Hwang 2013). In contrast, India continued to oppose action on HFCs under the ozone
negotiations given its large, domestic HFC industry. India was concerned that switching away
from these chemicals could be a tactic for developed countries to profit from HFC substitutes
(ENB 2012). Eventually, in mid-2015 under pressure from the US, India agreed to a compromise
phase-down beginning in 2031—hardly an ambitious timeline. Here again, differences in
development and domestic industries played a role in Southern countries’ diverging positions in
the ozone regime.
Across international environmental negotiations, developing countries have begun to hold
diverging interests, and thereby, different positions. The mercury, climate and ozone negotiations
suggest that underlying south-south divisions have become apparent in the move from
conceptual framing into specific regulatory regimes. As global environmental cooperation moves
towards implementation, underlying differences between southern countries have become

18
clearer. Divergence can be partially attributed to interactions between politics, technology and
resources. In the future, we predict that where technological constraints divide emerging
economies preferences, where scientific knowledge is unequal, and where domestic resources
and politics differ, we are more likely to see disruptions to south-south coalitions. Normatively,
our findings suggest that building scientific capacity in developing countries and aligning global
requirements with domestic constraints can both be potential levers to increase international
cooperation. But, whether fracturing in the southern coalition will lead to better environmental
outcomes remains to be seen.

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