AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL WIRE TYPES

Associated with

AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL FIRES

An aviation safety article

by

Alex PATERSON

http://www.vision.net.au/~apaterson/aviation/wire_types.htm

Last Updated: 22 July 2012

INTRODUCTION

This article provides a list of electrical wire types most commonly used in jet transport aircraft. The articles lists both the positive and negative characteristics of each wire type and the
aircraft that these wires have been installed in. It needs to be understood that the article is by necessity incomplete because aircraft manufacturers and airlines have historically given
scant regard to the potential dangers posed by different wire types when installing them in their aircraft and therefore have not kept accurate records of what types of wire have been
installed in the same. The complacency within the aviation industry towards the dangers posed by electrical wire is endemic and is best summed up by the comment of United States
Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) deputy head, Tom McSweeny, who is reported to have said before a Congressional Committee in 19-- that "wire is wire". (more on Mr McSweeny's
alleged comment below)

NOTE: This is a draft web page only, setup for discussion between contributors. It undoubtedly contains omissions, and possibly some mistakes.

Readers are invited to agree with, disagree with, seek clarification about or put their point of view about any of the issues discussed in the article.

Alex Paterson (May 2007)

AIRCRAFT WIRE TABLE

The following table relates to general purpose aircraft electrical wire. It is important to understand that all transport jet and turboprop aircraft have a mixture of the following different
wire types installed in them. The wire types listed in the table relate to the predominant type of wire used in each aircraft. It would appear that even aircraft manufacturers themselves
are not completely sure as to what wire is installed in individual aircraft as their attitude towards electrical wire in the past has been that "wire is wire".

Table Colour code:

DANGEROUS WIRE
SAFETY UNKNOWN
PROBABLY SAFE
SAFE WIRE

NOTE: Wire is listed in the table by date of introduction into aircraft, with the oldest wire typed listed at the top.

WIRE TYPE DESCRIPTION AIRCRAFT INSTALLED IN (some)

PVC/Nylon Fails Far 25 Installed in

(Polyvinyl-Chloride)  Weight 6.8 lbs. per 1,000 ft  Early DC-9s up until 1979
(Heaviest and thickest) (e.g. Valujet 592)
Introduced 1950s  Rated temperature low: 105°C  Early B727s up until 1976
 Flammable - burns readily creating copious amounts of thick, toxic smoke rendering it virtually  Early B737s up until 1976
Specification No: 5086 impossible for pilots to see their flight instruments or breathe. (e.g. Valujet 592)
 Insulation when burning turns to hydrochloric acid when exposed to water. Still used as general purpose
 Outgasses onto electrical & electronic contacts replacement wire by sections
 Soft - Susceptible to chafing of the aviation industry.
 Susceptible to aging in that it dries out and becomes brittle.
 Banned by US Air Force.
 US Air Force had 800 autopilot anomalies due to defective PVC in a 6 month study in --?
 Still used as general purpose replacement wire.
 Implicated in Valujet Flight 592 DC9 which crashed into the Florida Everglades on 11 May 1996

Dangerous Wire
Kynar Fails Far 25 Installed in

Introduced in 1964  Thickness: 15 microns  DC9s from 1970 until 1976

 Weight 5.5 lbs per 1,000 ft.
Specification number:  Rated Temperature: 150°C
(fails temperature spec)
 81044/9  Poor fluid resistance
 No longer used

Kapton Fails Far 25 Installed in

 Airbus A310 (all)
(complex aromatic  Thickness: 8.4 microns (Very thin)  Airbus A320 (currently) 2
polyamide)  Weight: 4.6 lbs per 1,000 ft (Very light weight)  Airbus A330 (currently)
 Rated temperature: 200°C  Airbus A340 (currently)
Manufactured by Dupont  'Explodes' and burns fiercely at flash-over during an arc tracking event due to the production of free  B727 (after 1979, EB)
Chemical Co. hydrogen, severely damaging adjacent wires and igniting surrounding structure. (i.e. behaves like  B737 (after 1979 to 1990)
1
detonator fuse.)  B747-400 (some from 1989 - 1991)
Introduced 1966  High ignition temperature to start burning (usually associated with an electrical short circuit of  B757 (up until 1990)
5000°C), but when it does finally ignite it burns very fiercely (explodes) creating virtually no smoke.  B767 (up until 1991)
Specification Numbers:  Fumes are clear and fairly benign.  BAe 146 (unconfirmed reports)
 Susceptible to wet and dry Arc Tracking.  DC-10
 81381/11  Susceptible to aging in that it dries out forming hairline cracks which can lead to micro current  MD-8x (all)
 BMS 13-51 leakage (i.e. electrical 'ticking' faults ) which in turn can eventually culminate in an explosive arc
1  MD-11 (up until early 1992)
tracking event. (i.e. short circuit)
(Boeing)  A300 -600 (with Teflon top-coat)
 Stiffness (straight line memory) makes it prone to vibration chafing, (rubbing) and stressed by
 L-1011 Tristar
bending.
 Concorde SST
 Abrasive to other wires. (due to its hardness)
 B-707 (but not according to EB)
 Hygroscopic (i.e. absorbs water ) rendering it susceptible to wet arc tracking.
 Dassault Mercure
 Installation difficulties (difficult to strip and mark)
 CL 600 Series (but not RJ/CL604 or Global Express
 Banned by
(Challenger)
* US Air Force
* US Navy  Shorts SD-330
* Canadian military  Gulfstream G-II, G-III
* Boeing in 1992  HS125-700
* Bombardier?  Bell 212, 214
 Sikorsky S-61, S-70B, S-76
 Westland 606
 Plus 31 military types such as P-3, C130, F-14, F-18,
VERY DANGEROUS WIRE Hawkeye, etc
Still used by AIRBUS
in A319, A320, A330, A340
until about 2005
(see footnote 2 below)
Teflon Fails Far 25 Installed in

(Polytetrafluoroethylene -  Thickness: 10 microns  B747

PTFE)  Weight 5.43 lbs/1,000 ft.  BAe146
 Rated temperature: 200°C
Introduced in 1969  Longitudinal splitting problem due to manufacturing process.
 Susceptible to cold-flow (creeping of conductor).
Specification Numbers:  Type of insulation found as ignition source on Apollo 13
 Type of insulation found split in TWA 800-fuel tank wires [Fuel Quantity Indicating System] (FQIS)
 22759/11  Banned by major manufacturers in 1983

Poly-X Fails Far 25 Installed in

(alkane-imide)  The first exotic blend of insulation (due to oil embargo)  Early 747s (e.g. TWA 800)
 Thickness: 10 microns  Early DC-10s
an Aliphatic polyimide  Weight: 4.7 lbs. per 1,000 ft (Light weight)
 Rated temperature: 150°C
Manufactured by Raychem  Susceptible to solvents
 Susceptible to radial cracking. Projected service life 60,000 hrs/but circumferential cracks found after
Introduced in 1970 just 2000 hrs by US Navy.
 Susceptible to premature aging. Banned by US Navy in 1978 due to premature aging of insulation
Specification Numbers: after 4000 hrs
 Brittle. Due to brittleness, 1" bare spots not uncommon.
 81044/16-29  Susceptible to chafing.
 Fails FAR 25 (airworthiness testing standards)
 Caused 323 USN F-14s to be re-wired
 Banned by US Navy.
 Implicated by Edward Block (and others) in the downing of TWA Flt 800 in 1996.
4

 No longer used in civilian aircraft.

Dangerous Wire
Stilan Fails Far 25 Installed in

Introduced 1972  Thickness: 10 microns  B-747s built in mid-to-late 1970s

 Weight 4.7 lbs. per 1,000 ft (Light weight)
 Rated Temperature: 150°C  DC-10s built in mid-to-late 1970s
Specification Numbers:  Insulation breaks down in hydraulic and de-icing fluid
 Microscopic crazing problem seen under microscope
 Cracks under stress
 81044/20  Found to arc over
 Susceptible to spurious signal generation (EMI hazard)
 Absorbs water (i.e. hygroscopic)
 No longer used
Tefzel Fails Far 25 Installed in

(ETFE)  Rated temperature 150°C Arcturus

 Soft at rated temperature
Introduced 1972  Used as general installation wire but should never be mixed in bundle with other wire types due to Tefzel was found in Swiss Air flight SR111's Inflight Entertainment
its softness. System (IFEN) which was suspected as being the cause of the
inflight fire and subsequent crash of the aircraft off Nova Scotia in
November 1998.
Specification numbers

 F-5

Cross Linked Tefzel Fails Far 25 Installed in

(XL-ETFE)  Thickness: 10 microns  B737 (currently)

 Weight: 5.0 lbs/1000' (light weight)  B747 (currently)
Manufactured by Judd  Rated temperature: 150°C  B757 (currently)
Wire and Raychem.  Wet arc tracks  B767 (currently)
 Flammable producing copious amount of Dense toxic smoke (96%+ density) when it burns rendering  B777 (currently)
Known by some sections of it virtually impossible for flight crew to see their flight instruments.  BAe146
the aviation industry as  NASA states will fail flammability requirements in 30% oxygen.  Airbus A320
"Spec 55" wire. Apparently  Toxicity - the worst of all wires, banned for manned aerospace use by major manufacturer.  Airbus A330
the name "Spec 55" has
been trademarked by
(Grumman Corporation banned it in 1982 and NASA followed suit in 1983 due to its toxicity)  Airbus A340
 Soft at rated temperature
Raychem.
 Loses mechanical strength properties at rated temperature
Still used by BOEING in
 Fails FAR 25 (airworthiness standards test) B737, B747, B757, B767, B777
Introduced 1977
 Projected life 50,000 hrs and Airbus
 Notch propagation problems
Specification numbers

Dangerous Wire
 MIL-W-22759/34
 Spec 55
 Spec 55A
 BMS 13-48
(Boeing)
TKT Boeing Passes FAR 25 Installed in

(Teflon/Kapton/Teflon)  Weight: 5.0 lbs. per 1,000 ft (Light weight)  B737s built after 1992
 Arc-track resistant  B757s built after 1992
Introduced 1992  Abrasion resistant  Reported by some LAMEs to be partly installed in some
 Superb insulation protection B747-400 aircraftmanufactured between 1989 - 1999.
Boeing Specification No:  High heat tolerance
 Resists smoking when burning (less than 2% density) NOTE: Airbus Industries now use their own version of TKT (See
 MIL-W-22759  Displays all the positive aspects of Kapton (i.e. lightweight, resistance to burning, no fumes when below)
 BMS 13-60 burning etc) without any of Kapton's negatives.
(Boeing)  No known problems

Tufflite brand SAFE WIRE

manufactured by Tensolite
http://www.tensolite.com
KKF BAe FAR 25 attributes unknown Installed in

Two layers of Kapton Undoubtedly safer than Kapton if only because it reduces Kaptons propensity to dry out and form cracks.  BAe 146
within a FEP laquer
topcoat. Resistance to Arc Tracking unknown. Source: BAe Statement 7 July 1999

Installed within the

pressure cabin of BAe 146
aircraft.

Note: Source of info:

BAe Statement dated 7 July
1999
KT BAe FAR 25 attributes unknown Installed in

Single layer of Kapton Undoubtedly safer than Kapton if only because it reduces Kapton's propensity to dry out and form  BAe 146
overlaid by single wrap of cracks. However, similar to Airbus' KTT (see below) which according to the America's foremost independent
PTFE (i.e. Teflon) aircraft wire expert, Edward Block, "this type of wire is just Kapton with a cosmetic coating of Teflon which is Source: BAe Statement 7 July 1999
used for marking purposes only and does little to reduce Kapton's propensity to explosively arc track".
Installed outside the
pressure cabin of BAe 146 Safety Unknown
aircraft.

Note: Source of info:

BAe Statement dated 7 July
1999
KTT Airbus FAR 25 attributes unknown Used by Airbus to replace Kapton as a general purpose wire.

Kapton with two very Undoubtedly safer than Kapton, but Airbus refuses to disclose performance attributes or specifications of this Installed in Airbus FBW aircraft up until mid 2006 when it was
thin outer layers of Teflon. wire to independent researchers. replaced by Airbus' TKT specification EN2267-008 listed below.
See footnote 3 below.
Called by Airbus According to specifications available, this wire is made up of 25΅m Kapton, sandwiched between two layers of
Polimide/PTFE/PTFE 2.5΅m FEP.

Airbus Specification No: Safety Unknown

 ASNE0261CF

TKT Airbus Probably meets FAR 25 Reportedly now installed in Airbus Aircraft as from mid 2006 as a
general purpose wire.
Called by Airbus Airbus refuses to fully disclose the performance attributes or specifications of this wire to independent
PTFE/Polimide/PTFE researchers.

Note:  No known specifications released by Airbus although suspected to be very similar to Boeing's TKT
PTFE/Polimide/PTFE is just wire listed above.
another name for TKT as  Allegedly has a much thicker outer layer of PTFE (i.e. Teflon) than the KTT wire used earlier by Airbus.
Teflon is a PTFE and (see below)
Kapton is a Polimide
Probably Safe
Airbus Specification No:

 EN2267-008

Sources:

 Edward Block (IASA) Edward B. Block is an international expert on aviation and wiring, specialising in aircraft crash investigations.
 Captain John Sampson (IASA) Is a practicing airline pilot with extensive experience in civil airline operations, helicopter piloting and military aviation. Was editor of Aviation
Safety Week for a period of time in the mid 2000s.
 Michael Murphy. Aviation safety auditor from Canada.
 Patrick Price (deceased) Ex-employee of Boeing Corporation tasked with investigating aircraft electrical wiring issues.
NOTES

FAR 25 comprises clauses mandating aircraft design safety rules. However, there are no specific clauses within FAR 25 pertaining to the flammability, toxicity or smoke visibility criteria
of electrical wire insulation. That said, FAR Section 601 mandates a general statement that;

FAR 25-601: "The airplane may not have design features or details that experience has shown to be hazardous or unreliable. The suitability of each questionable design detail and part
must be established by tests."

Source: http://www.flightsimaviation.com/data/FARS/part_25-601.html

As argued in this document the suitability of aircraft electrical wire insulation materials are "questionable", yet they have never been the subject of a comprehensive formal testing
program and as such are in breach of FAR 25-601.

Only Boeing's TKT wire has no known problems and meets FAR 25 requirements. Airbus' version of TKT probably meets FAR 25 requirements.

No specific standards spelt out by aircraft regulatory authorities such as US FAA or European JAR regarding aircraft electrical wire. Specifically no standards defined or any requirement
to test wire for:

 Propensity of wire to wet or dry arc track.

 Propensity of wire to burn.
 the density of smoke and toxicity of fumes when wire burns.

Modern jet transport aircraft are required by law (FAA 25 & JAR 25) to ensure all safety of flight items and aircraft systems have adequate backup systems installed in the event of a
failure of the main system, (and that includes aircraft electrical systems), yet no thought was given to the failure of the aircraft wiring system itself.

Wire is deemed by most in the aviation industry (i.e. aircraft manufacturers, pilots, airline management and regulatory authorities) as an "install and forget" item. This attitude is best
summed up by the comment of United States Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) deputy head, Tom McSweeny, who is reported to have said before a Congressional Committee that "Wire
is wire". This attitude ignores the fact that:

 Modern jet transport aircraft contain literally hundreds of kilometers of wire.

 Wire is often damaged during manufacture and/or installation.
 Wire is often incorrectly installed in aircraft. (i.e. incorrectly routed near hot equipment and/or bundled together with other incompatible wire types such as soft wire laying
adjacent hard wire etc)
 Wire (both the wire and its insulation) deteriorates with age. With regard to the insulation, it dries out, becomes brittle forming cracks exposing the conductor (i.e. wire) . Wire
itself, oxidises especially associated with the widespread electrolysis that occurs in aircraft leading to poor contacts and the generation of local hot spots in the wire which has
the potential to melt the surrounding insulation material.
 All wire deteriorates in service due to environmental factors such as:
o extremes of heat & cold experienced by aircraft on the ground and in the air. (i.e. wire can experience plus +200°C down to minus -70°C),
o water damage, (hydrolysis and the fact that some wire types exhibit hygroscopic tendencies)
 o salt damage associated with marine environments. (all aircraft operate into airfields adjacent marine environments at least some time in their operational lives)
o contamination by aircraft fluids such as fuel, oil, hydraulic fluid, deicing fluid, cleaning chemicals, toilet residue, galley spillage etc.
o inflight vibration causing chafing of wires rubbing against other wires or the structure of the aircraft. This is especially a problem with hard wire such as Kapton laying
adjacent a soft wire like Tefzel.
o All wire products display differing properties with regard to aging, but practically all wire insulation material dries out, goes hard and then develops hairline fractures
which allow the ingress of water and other aviation fluids leading to micro-discharges of current through the cracks to surrounding wires or the aircraft structure.
('ticking' faults)
o All aircraft use their airframe as their electrical earth return pathway resulting in significant constraints in the operation of protection devices such as circuit breakers
located in the cockpit. (see separate paper on this issue)

According to Ed Block: "Only TKT wire insulation (BMS 13-60) meets FAR 25 Standards."

RECOMMENDATIONS

The aviation industry as a whole needs to acknowledge that the shortcomings associated with different electrical wire types are a serious issue and potentially very dangerous as
evidenced by the information presented in this paper. The notion held by many with in the aviation industry that "wire is just wire" is irresponsible.

Practical steps that the industry should take to begin to address the situation include:

 Aviation regulatory authorities need to specify rigorous performance standards for electrical wire so that they conform to FAR 25 in that "insulation material is not used that is
hazardous, unreliable, or contributes smoke/fire". Any promulgated standards for electrical wire would need to be rigorously enforced.

 Acknowledge that Kapton wire is a particularly dangerous hazard to aircraft and insist upon its its removal from aircraft where practical. (this statement acknowledges the fact
that the complete removal of Kapton wire will be in many cases an impossibility)

 Insist that electronic 'Fly by Wire' (FBW) aircraft be fitted with a completely separate 'virgin' emergency electrical bus to allow pilots to remove all electrical current from all
'normal' electrical wire circuits in the event of an electrical fire. For more on this subject see 'Virgin Electrical Bus'

GLOSSARY

 Aging is the deterioration of wiring insulation with the passage of time. To certain extent aging is a natural process associated with the propensity of most materials to
breakdown into their constituent parts over time. (e.g. rust) Most electrical insulation compounds tend to dry out over time, become brittle and crack. Aging of wiring insulation
is exacerbated by aircraft vibration causing chaffing (see below) and exposure to a whole raft of chemicals within the aircraft such as hydraulic fluid, engine oil, toilet chemicals,
salt spray and moisture etc. Fluorination and other treatments (such as top-coating) may accelerate the aging process.

 Arc tracking is the process by which electrical conductance can occur through and along the insulating coating, rather than just the wire conductor. This is made possible by the
formation of carbon along cracks within the insulation material and because carbon is an electrical conductor, once formed the carbon track tends to grow associated with the
 localised heat that is generated along the track by the electricity leaking through it. The heat generated by the current flow leakage causes a chemical breakdown of the
insulating material adjacent to the carbon track, forming more carbon along the track. In other words once initiated the formation of a carbon track becomes self propagating
and therefore continues to grow with the passage of time. In other words, once started, arc tracking is capable of self propagation through the virtual instant creation of its own
combustion-induced carbon char leading to a massive leakage of electrical current through the carbon track so formed and the damage of adjacent wires in the same wire-
bundle. This process is called 'flash-over'. (see next)
The initiator of arc tracking can be a flaw in the insulation caused by imprint labeling, radial cracking, chafing between wires or contact between a wire conductor and the
airframe, hygroscopic absorption of water, salt and other contaminants or an electrical short circuit. It can also be precipitated by undetected shorting damage in inaccessible
areas or by use of inappropriate types of insulation in SWAMP areas (severe weather and moisture-prone areas such as wheel-wells).
NOTE: See also 'Ticking Faults' listed below.

 Flash-over is the self propagation and catastrophic escalation of an arc tracking event through the instant creation of a major carbon char pathway associated with the heat that
is generated during the initial arc track event (i.e. carbon is produced when the insulation material starts to burn) The resulting escalation of the arc track event associated with
flashover can be explosive (especially with Kapton wire) and the naked flames can cause damage to adjacent wire-bundles and thermal-acoustic insulation within the airframe.
(e.g. Mylar) Vertical wire runs are more susceptible to flash-over (because naked flames naturally rise vertically). However flash-over can also occur horizontally or, less
explosively, in a downward vertical sense. Unlike a straight electrical short, the conductor's temperature itself may not rise high enough to trip the circuit protective device (CPD)
meaning the arcing phenomena may not necessarily cause a thermal circuit-breaker to trip. The arc tracking phenomenon is based upon the ability of the conductive carbon char
to heat adjacent wiring and self-propagate, particularly along a wire bundle more so than an individual wire. Note that the phenomena induced in the presence of significant
moisture is called "Wet Arc Propagation" (as against "Dry Arc Propagation"). Wet arcing is more likely to produce the flash-over end-result.

 Chafing occurs when wires vibrate and rub against each other (or the structure of the aircraft) causing the insulation layer surrounding the wire to be rubbed away exposing the
electrical. The vibration causing the chafing is usually the cumulative effect of the high-frequency vibration which naturally occurs in flight associated with aerodynamic and
engine vibrations. The tendency for wire to chaff is exacerbated by insufficient tensioning, insufficient offset or the tightening of a wire against an airframe component (especially
around corners). Over-tensioning of wires and/or insufficient support intervals can lead to "strumming" of wires (causing them to contact other surfaces). Scraping caused by
pulling wire through narrow areas during installation can cause a similar effect to chafing.

 Cold-flow (creeping of the conductor) is any permanent deformation due to pressure or mechanical force, without the aid of heat softening.

 EMI: Electromagnetic Interference. Wiring that is unshielded is susceptible to strong electromagnetic fields stemming from systems and modules that are natural emitters such
as GPS, DME (Distant Measuring Equipment), radios, weather radars, radar altimeters etc (plus cell-phones and Gameboys etc)

 FBW: Fly By Wire. In conventional aircraft, flight control is actuated by pushrods and cables to hydraulic actuators driving the primary control surfaces (i.e. ailerons, rudders,
spoilers, canards, elevons and elevators). In FBW aircraft the physical connections of cables and pushrods are replaced by proportionate computer-generated digitized signals.
 Fluid resistance: Resistance to a wide range of commonly used solvents, fluids and lubricants used in aircraft.

 Hydrolysis: (noun) the chemical reaction of a substance with water, usually resulting in decomposition of the said substance. (Source: Oxford Dictionary)

 Hygroscopic: (adjective): A hygroscopic substance is one that tends to absorb moisture from the air (Source: Oxford Dictionary)
  Notch Propagation: The tendency of a wire insulation to propagate a crack through to the conductor with on going bending cycles. Usual requirement is expressed as an
acceptable limit. e.g. The wire shall not propagate a crack to the conductor following a minimum of ten bend cycles of the v-notched area.

 Outgasses: Some insulation materials are volatile. In many critical aerospace and semiconductor applications, low-outgassing materials must be specified in order to prevent
contamination in high vacuum environments. Outgassing occurs when a material is placed into a vacuum (very low atmospheric pressure) environment, subjected to heat, and
some of the material's constituents are volatilized (evaporated or "outgassed"). Outgassing is related to conductor temperatures (i.e. load carrying capabilities).

 Radial cracking: This can occur around a wire's circumference and expose the conductor and cause 'ticking faults'. (see below) Causes of radial cracking can be natural
deterioration, insufficient bend radii or damage at installation. Over significant stretches of wire runs, the cause will normally be the degradations due to aging, coupled with top-
coat flaking. This latter phenomenon is the natural breakdown of a shellac-like substance applied to protect aromatic polyamide (i.e. Kapton types) in particular from hygroscopic
activity. Radial cracking can be initiators of ticking faults.

 Rated temperature: The maximum temperature at which a given insulation or jacket may be safely maintained during continuous use, without incurring any thermally-induced
deterioration. Rated temperature of a wiring insulation/conductor gage may not remain constant for the life of an installation due to the aging process.

 'Ticking' faults. This is an intermediate process of wiring insulation breakdown where sufficient conductor exposure (perhaps due to radial cracking) coupled with the early phase
of outer carbon charring allows "arcing in miniature" (i.e. "ticking") to occur. Think of it as sparkling along the outer sheath. Once sufficiently advanced, this process will have
built up a sufficient carbon char for full-blown self-propagating arc-tracking to occur. If wetted (by say a galley or toilet leak or ramp moisture ingress), the condition may allow an
earlier 'flash-over' event.

FOOTNOTES

1. Kapton Arc Tracking and Flashover: According to Dr Armin Bruning of the Lectromechanical Design Company of Dulles, Virginia USA - a company which has been contracted by the US
Navy amongst others to investigate Kapton arc tracking - the reason Kapton explodes during an arc tracking event and 'flashover' is because "the arc will cause a temperature of 5000
degrees Celsius ... and in this condition carbon is vaporized and free hydrogen is liberated."
Source: email from Armin M. Bruning Lectromechanical Design Co to Alex Paterson dated 5 May 2001

It would appear that encapsulating Kapton between layers of Teflon [i.e. Teflon - Kapton - Teflon (TKT)] prevents the Kapton layer from drying out and cracking, as well suppressing the
production of hydrogen during a short circuit, rendering the Teflon coated Kapton (i.e. TKT) relatively benign from an arc tracking point of view.

2. Airbus Industries began using a hybrid version of Kapton comprising Kapton coated with Teflon (TK) made by Dupont in some parts of its Fly by Wire aircraft in the late 1990s. However,
according to the America's foremost independent aircraft wire expert, Edward Block, this type of wire is "just Kapton with a cosmetic coating of Teflon which is used for marking purposes
only and does little to reduce Kapton's propensity to explosively arc track".
However, see note 3 below.

3. As of mid 2006 Airbus Industries have started to install their own version of Boeing's TKT in their new Airbus aircraft. This wire is designated Airbus Specification No: EN2267-008. This
wire would almost certainly be much safer than bare Kapton, but Airbus Industries refuses to disclose the performance attributes of this wire so it is difficult to determine for certain how
safe this wire actually is. See main wire table above for more details about this wire.

___________________________
4. Source: Assertion made by Edward Block in 'Aerospace Testing International' magazine dated June 2009 on page 39.

RELATED WEBSITES:

 Fact Sheet on Aircraft Wiring Problems - Project on Government Oversight (POGO)

 Aircraft Wire Arc Tracking - by Patrick Price (deceased) - A resource guide to aircraft wiring.
 International Aviation Safety Association (IASA) - A resource guide to aircraft safety and aircraft wiring.
 RAF report into Kapton Wiring posted online by IASA
 An Analysis Of The Conventional Wire Maintenance Methods by Susan Jeruto Kiptinness (PDF file 1mb)
 'Aircraft Design Features that Enhance Safety' by Alex Paterson

ABOUT ALEX PATERSON

Alex PATERSON is an Australian airline pilot. He writes articles and advises on issues pertaining to aviation, politics, sociology, the environment, sustainable farming, history, computers,
natural health therapies and spirituality.

He can be contacted at: