ELECTION LAWS

FIRST PPT
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, December 3, 1985)
➢ The OEC is the decades-old law that governs all elections of public officers, as well as all
referendums and plebiscites.
Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, January 5, 1988)
➢ Section 10. Common Poster Areas
• strategic public places such as markets, barangay centers and the like
• common billboards may be installed by the Commission and/or non-partisan private
or civic organizations
• free of charge
➢ Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda (Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881)
o election propaganda outside the common poster areas
o Except
▪ candidate's own residence
▪ campaign headquarters
▪ two (2) feet by three (3) feet
▪ three (3) feet by eight (8) feet five (5) days before the date of the meeting or
rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or
rally
o sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political
purposes except to the Commission
o Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcement or personality who is a
candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work
as such during the campaign period.
➢ Section 12. Official Watchers
o every registered political party/candidate
➢ Section 13. Board of Election Inspectors
o Chairman and 2 members
o public school teachers
o private school teachers
o civil service employees
o citizens of known probity and competence
➢ Section 16. Certificates of Votes
o issued by the BEI upon request of the duly accredited watchers
o contain the number of votes obtained by each candidate written in words and
figures, the number of the precinct, the name of the city or municipality and province,
the total number of voters who voted in the precinct and the date and time issued
o signed and thumbmarked by each member of the board
➢ Section 17. Certificate of Votes as Evidence
o admissible in evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any anomaly
committed in the election returns
o duly authenticated by testimonial or documentary evidence presented to the board
of canvassers by at least two members of the board of election inspectors who issued
the certificate
o failure to present any certificate of votes shall be a bar to the presentation of other
evidence to impugn the authenticity of the election returns
➢ Section 25. Right to be Present and to Counsel During the Canvass
o Any registered political party, coalition of parties, through their representatives, and
any candidate has the right to be present and to counsel during the canvass of the
election returns
o only one counsel may argue for each political party or candidate
o right to examine the returns being canvassed without touching them, make their
observations thereon, and file their challenges in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Commission
o No dilatory action shall be allowed by the board of canvassers
 ➢ Section 27. Election Offenses
➢ Section 28. Prosecution of Vote-buying and Vote-selling
o paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
o at least one voter in different precincts representing at least twenty percent (20%) of the total
precincts has been offered, promised or given money, valuable consideration or other
expenditure by a candidate's relatives, leaders and/or sympathizers
o disputable presumption
▪ conspiracy under paragraph (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
▪ involvement of such candidate and of his principal campaign managers
o giver, offerer, and promisor as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator shall be
liable as principals
o any persons, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and
willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be
exempt from prosecution and punishment
o nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony
Republic Act No. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National And Local Elections And For
Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, And For Other Purposes, November 26, 1991)
➢ Section 2. Date of Elections
o President, Vice-President, twenty-four (24) Senators, all elective Members of the House
of Representatives, and all elective provincial, city and municipal officials on the
second Monday of May, 1992
o Thereafter, the President and Vice-President shall be elected on the same day every
six (6) years
o Senators, elective Members of the House of Representatives and all elective
provincial, city and municipal officials shall be elected on the same day every three
(3) years, except that with respect to Senators, only twelve (12) shall be elected
➢ Section 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections
o decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members
o causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the
casting of votes or on the day of the election
o permanent vacancy in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special
election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90)
days after the occurrence of the vacancy
➢ Section 5. Election Period
o ninety (90) days before the day of the election and shall end thirty (30) days
thereafter.
o Campaign periods
▪ For President, Vice-President and Senators, ninety (90) days before the day of
the election
▪ For Members of the House of Representatives and elective provincial, city and
municipal officials, forty-five (45) days before the day of the election
o Any election campaign or partisan political activity for or against any candidate
outside of the campaign period herein provided is prohibited and shall be considered
as an election offense punishable under Section 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
➢ Section 7. Filing of Certificates of Candidacy
o five (5) legible copies with the offices of the Commission specified hereunder not later
than the day before the date legally fixed for the beginning of his campaign period.
o President, Vice-President and Senators - main office of the Commission in Manila;
o Members of the House of Representatives - provincial election supervisor
o legislative districts in the National Capital Region - regional election director
o legislative districts in cities outside the National Capital Region which comprise one or
more legislative districts - city election registrar
o provincial offices - provincial supervisor
o city or municipal offices - city or municipal election registrar
➢ Annulment of the List of Voters
 o fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any other similar
irregularity or which is statistically improbable
o after due notice
o verified complaint
o no order, ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed within sixty
(60) days before an election.
➢ Section 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties.
o For candidates. –
▪ Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice-President;
▪ other candidates Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the
constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy
▪ candidate without any political party and without support from any political
party may be allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for every such voter
o For political parties. –
▪ Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or
constituencies where it has official candidates.
➢ Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement.
o 30 days after the day of the election,
o Pre-requisite for entry upon the duties of his office
o same prohibition if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to
file the statement
o administrative offense
o Fine of P1,000.00 to P30,000.00 payable within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice,
otherwise writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the
offender
o Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00) for second or
subsequent offense with perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
➢ Section 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President Vice-President,
Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives
o preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or
the certificates of canvass
o does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or
upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns before it
o composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board
or directly with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof
o objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or
on the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or
district boards of canvassers in Metro Manila Area shall be specifically noted in the
minutes of their respective proceedings.
➢ Section 16. Pre-proclamation Cases Involving Provincial, City and Municipal Offices
o allowed and shall be governed by Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 hereof
o All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed
terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the
boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the
filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party
o proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, the
Commission determined that the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues
an order for the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate order has been
issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari.
➢ Section 17. Pre-proclamation Controversies: How Commenced
o composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers - board or directly with the
Commission
o Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns,
and the certificates of canvass - in the first instance before the board of canvassers
only.
 ➢ Section 18. Summary Disposition of Pre-proclamation Controversies
o on the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board of canvassers,
be disposed of summarily by the Commission within seven (7) days from receipt
thereof
o decisions shall be executory after the lapse of seven (7) days from receipts by the
losing party
➢ Section 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns
o oral objection to the chairman of the board of canvassers at the time the questioned
return is presented for inclusion in the canvass
o objection shall be recorded in the minutes of the canvass.
o board of canvassers shall automatically defer the canvass of the contested returns
and shall proceed to canvass the returns which are not contested by any party
o objecting party shall also enter his objection in the form for written objections to be
prescribed by the Commission
o within twenty-four (24) hours from and after the presentation of such an objection, the
objecting party shall submit the evidence in support of the objection, which shall be
attached to the form for written objections
o within the same period of twenty-four (24) hours after presentation of the objection,
any party may file a written and verified opposition to the objection
o evidence attached to the objection or opposition, submitted by the parties, shall be
immediately and formally admitted into the records of the board by the chairman
affixing his signature at the back of each every page thereof
o Board summarily and immediately rules thereon. The board shall enter its ruling on the
prescribed form and authenticate the same by the signatures of its members.
o Any part adversely affected by the ruling of the board shall immediately inform the
board if he intends to appeal, board shall enter said information in the minutes of the
canvass, set aside the returns and proceed to consider the other returns
o board shall suspend the canvass
o within forty-eight (48) hours, written and verified notice of appeal
o unextendible period of five (5) days thereafter an appeal may be taken to the
Commission.
o upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the board shall make an appropriate report to
the Commission, elevating therewith the complete records and evidence
o Commission shall decide summarily the appeal within seven (7) days from receipt of
said record and evidence
o executory after the lapse of seven (7) days from receipts thereof by the losing party.
o not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the
latter has ruled on the object brought to it on appeal by the losing party
o Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the
contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election
➢ Election Contests for Municipal Offices
o Regional Trial Court
o appeal to the Commission within five (5) days from promulgation or receipt
o decide the appeal within sixty (60) days after it is submitted for decision, but not later
than six (6) months
o decision shall be final, unappealable and executory.
Republic Act 9006 (FAIR ELECTION ACT, February 12, 2001)
➢ Section 3. Lawful Election Propaganda
o 3.1. Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials the
size of which does not exceed eight and one half inches in width and fourteen inches
in length;
o 3.2. Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular
political party or candidate for public office;
o 3.3. Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not
exceeding
▪ two (2) feet by three (3) feet
 ▪ streamers not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet in size – public meeting
or rally five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally and shall be
removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally
o 3.4. Paid advertisements in print or broadcast media
o 3.5. All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by the Omnibus Election
Code or this Act.
➢ Section 4. Requirements for Published or Printed and Broadcast Election Propaganda
o newspaper, newsletter, newsweekly, gazette or magazine advertising, posters,
pamphlets, comic books, circulars, handbills, bumper stickers, streamers, sample list of
candidates or any published or printed political matter and any broadcast of election
propaganda by television or radio for or against a candidate or group of candidates
to any public office shall bear and be identified by the reasonably legible or audible
words "political advertisement paid for," followed by the true and correct name and
address of the candidate or party for whose benefit the election propaganda was
printed or aired.
o If given free of charge - "airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by"
followed by the true and correct name and address of the broadcast entity
o Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or political
party shall not be printed, published, broadcast, or exhibited without the written
acceptance by the said candidate or political party - attached to the advertising
contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC
➢ Section 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. – All registered parties and bona fide
candidates shall have equal access to media time and space. The following guidelines may
be amplified on by the COMELEC.
o Print advertisements - not exceed one-fourth (1/4) page in broad sheet and one-half
(1/2) page in tabloids thrice a week per newspaper, magazine or other publications
o nationally elective office shall be entitled - one hundred twenty (120) minutes of
television advertisement and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio
advertisement whether by purchase or donation
o locally elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty (60) minutes of television
advertisement and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase
or
o All members of media, television, radio or print, shall scrupulously report and interpret
the news, taking care not to suppress essential facts nor to distort the truth by omission
or improper emphasis. They shall recognize the duty to air the other side and the duty
to correct substantive errors promptly.
o mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, reporter, on-air correspondent or
personality who is a candidate for any elective public office or is a campaign
volunteer for or employed or retained in any capacity by any candidate or political
party
▪ deemed resigned, if so required by their employer
▪ leave of absence from his/her work as such during the campaign period
o media practitioner who is an official of a political party or a member of the campaign
staff of a candidate or political party shall not use his/her time or space to favor any
candidate or political party
o No movie, cinematograph or documentary portraying the life or biography of a
candidate shall be publicly exhibited in a theater, television station or any public
forum during the campaign period
o No movie, cinematograph or documentary portrayed by an actor or media
personality who is himself a candidate shall be publicly exhibited in a theater,
television station or any public forum during the campaign period
➢ Section 7. Affirmative Action by the COMELEC
o Pursuant to Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bldg.
881), the COMELEC shall procure the print space upon payment of just compensation
from at least three (3) national newspapers of general circulation
o allocated free of charge equally and impartially among all the candidates for
national office on three (3) different calendar days
 o COMELEC shall also procure free airtime from at least three (3) national television
networks and three(3) national radio networks
o allocated free of charge equally and impartially among all candidates for national
office on three (3) different calendar days
o COMELEC may require national television and radio networks to sponsor at least three
(3) national debates among presidential candidates and at least one (1) national
debate among vice presidential candidates
➢ Section 8. COMELEC Space and Time
o at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation and air time in at least one (1) major
broadcasting station or entity in every province or city
o in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine
or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "COMELEC Space“
o in the absence of said broadcasting station or entity, broadcasting shall be done in
any radio or television station in said province or city, which shall be known as
"COMELEC Time“
o Said time shall be allocated to the COMELEC free of charge, while said space shall
be allocated to the COMELEC upon payment of just compensation
o utilized exclusively by the COMELEC for public information dissemination on election-
related concerns.
➢ Section 9. Posting of Campaign Materials
o political parties and party-list groups to erect common poster areas for their
candidates in not more than ten (1) public places such as plazas, markets, barangay
centers and the like
o size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its
equivalent.
o Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect
common poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall
not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its equivalent.
o Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the
consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or property which shall be
allocated equitably and impartially among the candidates.
➢ Section 12. Substitution of Candidates
o valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the
substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the
whole ballot
o official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of the
substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter
o if the substitute candidate of the same family name, this provision shall not apply.
Republic Act No. 9369 (An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled "An Act Authorizing The
Commission On Elections To Use An Automated Election System In The May 11, 1998 National Or
Local Elections And In Subsequent National And Local Electoral Exercises, To Encourage
Transparency, Credibility, Fairness And Accuracy Of Elections, Amending For The Purpose Batas
Pampansa Blg. 881, As Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 And Other Related Elections Laws,
Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes", January 23, 2007)
➢ The Philippines first adopted the automated election system in the 2010 presidential election,
using the technology anew in 2013 and 2016 during the national elections in the said years.
➢ For the barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections on Oct. 23, 2017, the Comelec
reverted to a manual conduct of elections.
➢ Board of Election Inspectors. –
o at least one member of the Board of Election Inspectors shall be an information
technology-capable person, who is trained or certified by the DOST to use the EAS.
o considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy
o unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon that start
of the aforesaid campaign period
o any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members
of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in government-owned or-controlled
 corporations, shall be considered ipso factor resigned from his/her office and must
vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certification of
candidacy.
o "Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official candidate
within thirty (30) days before the start of the period for filing certificate of candidacy.
➢ SEC. 28. Section 29 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
o "SEC. 35. Prohibited Acts and Penalties. - The following shall be penalized as provided
in this Act, whether or not said acts affect the electoral process or results:
a. Utilizing without authorization, tampering with, damaging, destroying or
stealing:
1) Official ballots, election returns, and certificates of canvass of votes
used in the system; and
2) Electronic devices or their components, peripherals or supplies used
in the AES such as counting machine, memory pack/diskette,
memory pack receiver and computer set;
b. Interfering with, impeding, absconding for purpose of gain, preventing the
installation or use of computer counting devices and the processing,
storage, generation and transmission of election results, data or information;
c. Gaining or causing access to using, altering, destroying or disclosing any
computer data, program, system software, network, or any computer-
related devices, facilities, hardware or equipment, whether classified or
declassified;
d. Refusal of the citizens' arm to present for perusal its copy of election return
to the board of canvassers;
e. Presentation by the citizens' arm of tampered or spurious election returns;
f. Refusal or failure to provide the dominant majority and dominant minority
parties or the citizens'' arm their copy of election returns; and
g. The failure to post the voters' list within the specified time, duration and in
the designated location shall constitute an election offense on the part the
election officer concerned."
o "Any person convicted for violation of this Act, except those convicted of the crime
of electoral sabotage, shall be penalized with imprisonment of eight years and one
day to twelve (12) years without possibility of parole, and perpetual disqualification to
hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. Moreover, the offender shall
be perpetually disqualified to hold any non-elective public office."
➢ SEC. 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as follows :
o "SEC. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers,
have the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code,
and prosecute the same"
o Quinto v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009)
▪ WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
▪ For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate
of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the
election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period
shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces,
and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
 ▪ WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
▪ Section 66 of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the
Philippines, which reads:
▪ Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.- Any person holding
a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
▪ WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
▪ Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, which for ready
reference is quoted as follows:
▪ For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate
of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the
election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period
shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces,
and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
▪ For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and
Section 13 of RA 9369, which merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.
▪ IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the
intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution
declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Republic Act No. 8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996)
➢ Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters.
o conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours.
o No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special
election
➢ Section 9. Who may Register.
o All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law
o at least eighteen (18) years of age,
o resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year,
o in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately
preceding the election
o Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country solely by
reason of his occupation, profession, employment in private or public service,
educational activities, work in the military or naval reservations within the Philippines,
service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Police Forces, or
confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law, shall not
be deemed to have lost his original residence.
 o Any person, who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age
or period of residence but, who, on the day of the election shall possess such
qualifications, may register as a voter.
➢ Section 11. Disqualification.
o sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of not less than one (1) year,
such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty
o automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after
service of sentence
o adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having committed
any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion,
sedition, violation of the firearms laws or any crime against national security, unless
restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law
o automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after
service of sentence
o Insane or incompetent persons
➢ Notice and Hearing of Applications.
o Hearing
o notice of which shall be posted in the city or municipal bulletin board and in his office
for at least one (1) week before the hearing
o furnish copies thereof to the applicant concerned, the heads or representatives of
political parties, and other accredited groups or organizations which actively
participate in the electoral process in the city or municipality.
o Election Officer shall receive such evidence for or against the applicant
o not seasonably objected need not appear on the date set for the hearing
o Physical presence mandatory in all cases where objections against his application
have been seasonably filed with the proper Election Registration Board
➢ Section 18. Challenges to Right to Register.
o Any voter, candidate or representative of a registered political party may challenge
in writing any application for registration, stating the grounds therefor. The challenge
shall be under oath and be attached to the application, together with the proof of
notice of hearing to the challenger and the applicant.
o Oppositions to contest a registrant’s application for inclusion in the voter’s list must, in
all cases, be filed not later than the second Monday of the month in which the same
is scheduled to be heard or processed by the Election Registration Board.
o The hearing on the challenge shall be heard on the third Monday of the month and
the decision shall be rendered before the end of the month.
➢ Section 27. Deactivation of Registration.
o sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one (1) year
o crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government
o insane or incompetent
o did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections
o ordered excluded by the Court; and
o lost his Filipino citizenship.
➢ Section 28. Reactivation of Registration.
o sworn application for reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit stating
that the grounds for the deactivation no longer exist
o not later than one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90)
days before a special election.
➢ Section 31. Sealing of Precinct Book of Voters.
o fifteen (15) days before the start of the campaign period
o of all registered political parties and members of the Board of Election Inspectors to
inspect and verify the completeness of the voter’s registration records for each
precinct compiled in the book of voters.
o After verification and certification by the Board of Election Inspectors and party
representatives as to the completeness of the voters’ registration records in the
precinct book of voters.
➢ Section 32. Common Rules Governing Judicial Proceedings in the Matter of Inclusion,
Exclusion, and Correction of Names of Voters.
o The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no case rendered
upon a stipulation of facts. If the question is whether or not the voter is real or fictitious,
his non-appearance on the day set for hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the
challenged voter is fictitious
➢ Section 33. Jurisdiction in Inclusion and Exclusion Case.
o Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or
municipalities.
o appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within five (5) days from
receipt of notice
o regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten (10) days from the time it is
received and the decision shall immediately become final and executory.
o No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
➢ Section 37. Voter Excluded Through Inadvertence or Registered with an Erroneous or
Misspelled name. –
o file with the Board an application for reinstatement or correction of name.
o file on any date with the proper Municipal Circuit, Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court
a petition for an order directing that his name be entered or corrected in the list.
➢ Section 39. Annulment at Book of Voters.
o The Commission shall, upon verified petition of any voter or election officer or duly
registered political party, and after notice and hearing, annul any book of voters
o not prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act
o prepared through fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any
similar irregularity, or which contains data that are statistically improbable.
o No order, ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed within ninety
(90) days before an election.
➢ Section 40. Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Registration Records.
o The Commission shall reconstitute all registration records which have been lost or
destroyed by using the corresponding copies of the provincial or national central files.
o If this is not feasible, the Commission shall conduct a general registration of voters in
the affected area: Provided, That there is a scheduled election before the next
scheduled general registration of voters in accordance with the Omnibus Election
Code.
o All such voters shall retain their voter’s identification number. Reconstituted forms shall
be clearly marked with the word "reconstituted."
o It shall be the duty of the Election Officer to immediately report to the Commission any
case of loss or destruction of registration record in his custody.
o The reconstitution of any lost or destroyed registration records shall not affect the
criminal liability of any person who is responsible for such loss or destruction.
➢ Section 46. Penalties.
o Election offense under this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than
one (1) year but not more than six (6) years
o not be subject to probation
o disqualification to hold public office and
o deprivation of the right of suffrage.
o If he is a foreigner, he shall be deported after the prison term has been served.
o Any political party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000).
➢ Paras vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996)
o Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan
City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall
as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on
the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995,
 and set the recall election on November 13, 1995.At least 29.30% of the registered
voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The
COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On
December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December
16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil
Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After
conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed
the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be
cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without
COMELEC approval.
o In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled
the recall election a January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with
urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public
respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor General's
manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter
through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a
reply.
o Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date
of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
local election“
o January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every
three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union
v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a
regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local
election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK
election from the recall election
o Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the
conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election.
The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the
local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's
replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a
successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping
with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as
one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought
to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
➢ Palatino, et. al. vs COMELEC, 2009 (G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009)
o Resolution No. 85141
▪ which, among other things, set December 2, 2008 to December 15, 2009 as the
period of continuing voter registration using the biometrics process in all areas
nationwide, except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.
o Resolution No. 85852
▪ adjusting the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 national and
local elections to October 31, 2009, instead of December 15, 2009 as previously
fixed by Resolution No. 8514.
o The intense public clamor for an extension of the October 31, 2009 deadline
notwithstanding, the COMELEC stood firm in its decision not to extend it, arguing
mainly that it needs ample time to prepare for the automated elections.
o Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
▪ challenge the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seek a declaration
of its nullity.
▪ the serious questions involved in this case and potential disenfranchisement of
millions of Filipino voters justify resort to this Court in the first instance, claiming
 that based on National Statistics Office (NSO) data, the projected voting
population for the May 10, 2010 elections is 3,758,964 for the age group 18-19
and 8,756,981 for the age group 20-24, or a total of 12,515,945.
o COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional encroachment on the legislative
power of Congress as it amends the system of continuing voter registration under
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189), otherwise known as The Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996, reading:
▪ Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the
Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
o COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void, and that the COMELEC be
accordingly required to extend the voter registration until January 9, 2010 which is the
day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.
o Ruling
▪ Section 8 of RA 8189 which provides:
• Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing
of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the
office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration
shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular
▪ Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the
COMELEC the power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities
only if the same cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by law.
This grant of power, however, is for the purpose of enabling the people to
exercise the right of suffrage – the common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA
6646 and RA 8436.
▪ In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of
continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period
provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 – daily during office hours, except during the
period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus
no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or
deadlines therefor.
▪ The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.11 In
said case, the Court held that the COMELEC did not commit abuse of
discretion in denying the request of the therein petitioners for an extension of
the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001
elections. For the therein petitioners filed their petition with the Court within the
120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter registration under Section
8 of RA 8189, and sought the conduct of a two-day registration on February 17
and 18, 2001, clearly within the 120-day prohibitive period.
▪ Petition is GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared null and void
insofar as it set the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 elections
on October 31, 2009. The COMELEC is directed to proceed with dispatch in
reopening the registration of voters and holding the same until January 9, 2010.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
TABLE
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and
Barangay Officials (A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC)
➢ Election Contests
o election protests
o petitions for quo warranto
➢ Election Protest - relating to the election and returns of elective officials, grounded on
frauds or irregularities in the conduct of the elections in the
➢ casting and counting of the ballots
➢ preparation and canvassing of returns.
 The issue is who obtained the plurality of valid votes cast
➢ Quo Warranto under the Omnibus Election Code - relating to the qualifications of an
elective official on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
o The issue is whether respondent possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.
➢ SEC. 2. Jurisdiction of municipal trial courts. –
o exclusive original jurisdiction over all election contests involving elective barangay
officials.
o An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto, nor shall a petition
for quo warranto include an election protest.
➢ SEC. 4. Modes of service and filing. – personally
o resort to other modes of service must be accompanied by a written explanation why
the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule shall be cause to
consider the pleading or paper as not filed.
➢ SEC. 5. Election protest. –
o A petition contesting the election or returns of an elective barangay official
o filed with the municipal trial court
▪ by any candidate who was voted for the same office and who received the
second or third highest number of votes or, in a multi-slot position, was among
the next four candidates following the last-ranked winner duly proclaimed
o party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant; the adverse party shall
be known as the protestee.
o Each contest shall refer exclusively to one office; however, contests for offices
of Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Barangay may be consolidated in one case.
➢ SEC. 6. Quo Warranto. –
o A petition for quo warranto against an elective barangay official shall be filed with
the municipal trial court
o by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned
o party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner; the adverse party shall
be known as the respondent.
➢ SEC. 7. Petition must be verified and accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping. –
o An unverified petition or one with insufficient verification or unaccompanied by a
certificate of non-forum shopping shall be dismissed outright and shall not suspend
the running of the reglementary period to file an election protest or petition for quo
warranto.
➢ SEC. 8. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. –
o non-extendible period of ten days following the date of proclamation.
➢ SEC. 9. Pendency of pre-proclamation controversy. –
o suspend the running of the period to file an election protest or petition for quo
warranto.
➢ SEC. 10. COMELEC judgment in disqualification case. –
o A decision of the Commission on Elections, either in division or en banc, in a
disqualification case shall not bar the filing of a petition for quo warranto based on the
same ground, except when the Supreme Court has affirmed the COMELEC decision
➢ SEC. 11. Contents of the protest or petition. - An election protest or petition for quo
warranto shall specifically state the following facts:
a. the position involved;
b. the date of proclamation; and
c. the number of votes credited to the parties per proclamation.
o An election protest shall also state:
d. the total number of precincts of the municipality or the barangay concerned;
e. (e) the protested precincts and votes of the parties in the protested precincts per
the Statement of Votes By Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not specified,
an explanation why the votes are not specified; and
f. (a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the
electoral frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts.
➢ SEC. 13. Summary dismissal of election contest. –
 o summarily dismiss, motu proprio, an election protest, counter-protest or petition
for quo warranto on any of the following grounds:
a. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
b. The petition is insufficient in form and content as required in Section 11 hereof;
c. The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;
d. The filing fee is not paid within the period for filing the election protest or petition
for quo warranto; and
e. In case of protest where a cash deposit is required, the cash deposit is not paid
within five days from the filing of the protest.
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay
Officials (A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC)
➢ SECTION 1. Summons. –
o Within twenty-four hours from the filing of the protest or petition
o filing of an answer within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.
➢ SEC. 2. Service of summons. –
o in person
o in case of refusal of the protestee or respondent to receive and sign for it, by tendering
the same.
o If, for justifiable causes, the protestee or respondent cannot be served in person as
provided above, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at:
a. the residence of protestee or respondent with some person of suitable age
and discretion residing therein, or
b. the office or regular place of business of protestee or respondent with some
competent person in charge thereof.
➢ Rule 4: ANSWER AND COUNTER-PROTEST
o SECTION 1. Verified answer; counter-protest. –
▪ five days from receipt
▪ three legible copies
▪ admissions and denials,
➢ SECTION 1. Prohibited pleadings and motions. –
a. Motion to dismiss the petition except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter;
b. Motion for a bill of particulars;
c. Demurrer to evidence;
d. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
e. Petition for relief from judgment;
f. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or other papers;
g. Memoranda, except as provided under Section 7, Rule 13 of these Rules;
h. Motion to declare the protestee or respondent in default;
i. Dilatory motion for postponement;
j. Motion to inhibit the presiding judge except on clearly valid grounds;
k. Reply or rejoinder; and
l. Third-party complaint.
➢ Sec. 2. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence that has not been formally
offered.1âwphi1 Offer of evidence shall be done orally on the last day of hearing allowed for
each party after the presentation of the last witness. The opposing party shall be required to
immediately interpose objections thereto. The court shall rule on the offer of evidence in open
court. However, the court may, at its discretion, allow the party to make an offer of evidence
in writing, which shall be submitted within three days. If the court rejects any evidence
offered, the party may make a tender of excluded evidence. (Rule 13)
➢ SEC. 2. Revision committee; under the supervision of the court. - There shall be constituted
such number of revision committees as may be necessary. Each revision committee shall be
composed of a chairperson and two members, one designated by the protestant and
another designated by the protestee. The court shall designate the chairperson from among
its personnel. The parties shall also designate their respective substitute revisors.
➢ SECTION 1. Motion for technical examination; contents. - A party may move for the technical
examination within five days after completion of revision in the protest or counter-protest,
 except when it involves allegation of massive substitute voting in the protest or counter-
protest, specifying:
a. The nature of the technical examination requested (e.g., fingerprint
examination, etc.);
b. The documents to be subjected to technical examination;
c. The objections made in the course of the revision of ballots which the movant
intends to substantiate with the results of the technical examination; and
d. The ballots covered by such objections.
➢ SEC. 6. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are considered as facts, unless
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
a. On the election procedure:
1. The election of candidates was held on the date and time set and in the polling
place determined by the Commission on Elections;
2. The Boards of Election Inspectors were duly constituted and organized;
3. Political parties and candidates were duly represented by pollwatchers;
4. Pollwatchers were able to perform their functions; and
5. The Minutes of Voting and Counting contains all the incidents that transpired
before the Board of Election Inspectors.
b. On election paraphernalia:
1. Ballots and election returns that bear the security markings and features
prescribed by the Commission on Elections are genuine
2. The data and information supplied by the members of the Boards of Election
Inspectors in the accountable forms are true and correct; and
3. The allocation, packing and distribution of election documents or
paraphernalia were properly and timely done
c. On appreciation of ballots:
1. A ballot with appropriate security markings is valid;
2. The ballot reflects the intent of the voter;
3. The ballot is properly accomplished;
4. A voter personally prepared one ballot, except in the case of assistors; and
5. The exercise of one's right to vote was voluntary and free.
➢ SECTION 1. Rendition of decision. –
o The court shall decide the election contest within thirty days from the date it is
submitted for decision, in no case beyond six months after its filing, unless the Supreme
Court authorizes an extension in writing. Failure to comply herewith shall be
considered a serious offense and shall be ground for disciplinary action against the
judge. In addition, after the expiration of six months, the judge shall be relieved of all
duties and functions, except to decide the election case.
o An election protest is deemed submitted for decision after completion of the
reception of evidence or, if the parties were allowed to submit memoranda, upon
submission of such memoranda or the expiration of the period for their filing,
whichever is earlier. In an election protest, the winner shall be the candidate who
obtained the plurality of the valid votes cast.
➢ SEC. 8. Appeal. –
o An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on Elections, within
five days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered
the decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by
counsel.
➢ SEC. 9. Appeal fee. –
o The appellant in an election contest shall pay to the court that rendered the decision
an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the
notice of appeal.
➢ SEC. 11. Execution pending appeal. –
o On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court, while still
in possession of the original records, may, at its discretion, order the execution of the
decision in an election contest before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject
to the following rules:
 a. There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day notice to the
adverse party. Execution pending appeal shall not issue without prior notice
and hearing. There must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal.
The court, in a special order, must state the good or special reasons justifying
the execution pending appeal. Such reasons must:
i. constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will
outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal
of the judgment on appeal; and
ii. be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of
the protestee or the victory of the protestant has been clearly
established.
b. If the court grants an execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall
have twenty working days from notice of the special order within which to
secure a restraining order or status quo order from the Supreme Court or the
Commission on Elections. The corresponding writ of execution shall issue after
twenty days, if no restraining order or status quo order is issued. During such
period, the writ of execution pending appeal shall be stayed.
➢ SEC. 12. Jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in certiorari cases.
o The Commission on Elections has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of the courts in election cases involving elective municipal and barangay
officials.
➢ Took effect May 15, 2007
➢ Regio vs COMELEC, 2013
o The Facts
▪ Petitioner Jaime C. Regio (Regio) and private respondent Ronnie C. Co (Co),
among other candidates, ran in the October 25, 2010 barangay elections in
Barangay 296, Zone 28, District III of the City of Manila for the position of punong
barangay.
▪ Immediately following the counting and canvassing of the votes from seven
clustered precincts in the adverted barangay, Regio, who garnered four
hundred seventy-eight (478) votes, as against the three hundred thirty-six (336)
votes obtained by Co, was proclaimed winner for the contested post of
punong barangay.
▪ The detailed tally of the votes per precinct, as reflected in the Statement of
Votes, is as follows :
Clustered Precinct Number Total
Candidate

1302A 1303A 1304A 1305A 1306A 1307A 1307B

Co, Ronnie C. 76 113 48 99 336

Regio, Jaime C. 171 151 73 83 478

▪ On November 4, 2010, Co filed an election protest before the MeTC.
▪ He claimed, among other things, that the Board of Election Tellers (BET) did not
follow COMELEC Resolution No. 9030, as it:
1. did not permit his supporters to vote;
2. allowed "flying voters" to cast votes; and
3. ignored the rules on appreciation of ballots, resulting in
misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of ballots.
▪ Additionally, he alleged that Regio committed vote-buying, and engaged in
distribution of sample ballots inside the polling centers during the day of the
elections.
▪ Of the seven clustered precincts (CPs) initially protested, Co would later
exclude CP Nos. 1304A and 1305A from the protest. During the preliminary
conference, the trial court allowed the revision of ballots. The revision of
 ballots occurred on January 13-14, 2011.3 Per the report of the revision
committee, the number of votes obtained by both candidates in the
contested precincts, as shown below, indicated a substantial recovery on
the part of Co:
Clustered Precinct Number Total
Candidate

1302A 1303A 1304A 1305A 1306A 1307A 1307B

Co, Ronnie C. 160 -- 63 98 321

Regio, Jaime C. 86 -- 62 84 232

▪ During his turn to present evidence, Co limited his offer to the revision
committee report, showing that he garnered the highest number of votes.
▪ The results of the revision notwithstanding, the trial court, in its Decision of
May 4, 2011, dismissed Co’s protest and declared Regio as the duly-elected
punong barangay of Barangay 296
▪ COMELEC First Division
o dismissed the appeal, noting, as the MeTC did, that Co failed to show
that the integrity of the ballots in question was in fact preserved.
o the absence of any report or record of tampering of the ballot boxes
does not preclude the possibility of ballot tampering.13
o affirmed the rejection of Co’s reliance on the revision committee
report as proof that no post-election tampering occurred
o note that protestant-appellant did not offer any evidence to prove
his claims of misreading, miscounting, and misappreciation of the
ballots; he posits that the variance between the election results
according to the election documents and the revision of the ballots
is in itself enough to prove his allegations of misreading, miscounting,
and misappreciation of the ballots by the Board of Election Tellers.
▪ a Motion for Reconsideration. In its assailed December 7, 2012 Resolution,
the COMELEC En Banc reconsidered the August 23, 2011 Resolution of the
First Division, and accordingly declared Co as the duly elected punong
barangay. Vital to the En Banc’s disposition is its finding that the ballots
subjected to revision were genuine
▪ WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby
RESOLVES to reconsider its Resolution dated August 23, 2011 and proclaim
protestant-appellant as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay
296, District III, Manila
▪ Thus, the present recourse, on the argument that the COMELEC En Banc
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it arbitrarily set aside the Decision of the MeTC and the
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, in the choice between the revision
results in the protested precincts and the official vote count recorded in the
election returns. Petitioner further argues that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion when it demanded from protestee direct proof of actual
tampering of ballots to justify consideration of the use of the election returns
in determining the winning candidate in the elections. In fine, petitioner
questions the ruling of the COMELEC giving precedence to the results of the
revision over the official canvassing results.
o Issues
▪ WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CO HAD SUCCESSFULLY DISCHARGED THE BURDEN
OF PROVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE BALLOTS SUBJECTED TO REVISION.
 ▪ WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
REVERSING THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION, TO THE EFFECT THAT
PETITIONER REGIO IS THE DULY-ELECTED PUNONG BARANGAY.
o Ruling
▪ Rosal v. COMELEC
• this Court summarized the standards to be observed in an election
contest predicated on the theory that the election returns do not
accurately reflect the will of the voters due to alleged irregularities in the
appreciation and counting of ballots.
• These guiding standards are:
1. The ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected
in the election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the
ballots have been preserved with a care which precludes the
opportunity of tampering and suspicion of change, abstraction or
substitution;
2. The burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been
preserved in such a manner is on the protestant;
3. Where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof
must be made of such substantial compliance with the requirements
of that mode as would provide assurance that the ballots have been
kept inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the precise
mode of achieving that end;
4. It is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with
the provisions of law on the preservation of ballots that the burden
of proving actual tampering or likelihood thereof shifts to the
protestee; and
5. Only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court of COMELEC that
the integrity of the ballots has been preserved should it adopt the
result as shown by the recount and not as reflected in the election
returns.
▪ Rosal was promulgated precisely to honor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions.
▪ Following Rosal, it is presumed that the BET and Board of Canvassers had
faithfully performed the solemn duty reposed unto them during the day of the
elections. Thus, primacy is given to the official results of the canvassing, even in
cases where there is a discrepancy between such results and the results of the
revision proceedings. It is only when the protestant has successfully discharged
the burden of proving that the re-counted ballots are the very same ones
counted during the revision proceedings, will the court or the Commission, as
the case may be, even consider the revision results. Even then, the results of the
revision will not automatically be given more weight over the official
canvassing results or the election returns. What happens in the event of
discrepancy between the revision results and the election returns is that the
burden of proof shifts to the protestee to provide evidence of actual tampering
of the ballots, or at least a likelihood of tampering. It is only when the court or
the COMELEC is fully satisfied that the ballots have been well preserved, and
that there had been no tampering of the ballots, that it will accord credibility
to the results of the revision
▪ Disputable Presumptions (A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC)
▪ The duty of the protestee in an election contest to provide evidence of actual
tampering or any likelihood arises only when the protestant has first successfully
discharge the burden or providing that the ballots have been secured to
prevent tampering or susceptibility of charge, abstraction or substitution. Such
need to present proof of tampering did not arise since protestant himself failed
to provide evidence of the integrity of the ballots.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The
▪
Resolution dated December 7, 2012 of the COMELEC En Banc in EAC (BRGY-
SK) No. 161-2011 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division dated August 23, 2011, affirming the Decision in Election
Case No. 02480-EC of the MeTC. Branch 4 in Manila is hereby REINSTATED.
➢ Abad v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 128877 December 10, 1999)
o Factual antecedents
▪ Petitioner Abad and private respondent Sarenas were both candidates for
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) chairman of Barangay Sta. Barbara, Llanera,
Nueva Ecija, during the May 6, 1996, SK elections.
▪ Petitioner emerged as winner with 66 votes as against private respondent's 62
votes. Petitioner was thus proclaimed SK chairman of Sta. Barbara.
▪ Private respondent soon thereafter filed an election protest before the Second
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija, presided
over by respondent Judge
▪ alleging fraud on the part of petitioner through the registration of four
unqualified voters. Three voters were allegedly underaged while one lacked
the required residency in the barangay.
▪ asked for a recount of the votes cast.
▪ Order dated June 3, 1996, respondent MCTC Judge Fernandez ruled in favor
of private respondent
▪ while the registry list of voters is indeed conclusive as to who can vote, this must
be disregarded if justice were to prevail.
▪ a recount of the votes would not be determinative of who actually won the SK
chairmanship
▪ ordered that four votes, representing the votes of those persons whose
qualification as voters were questioned, be deducted from petitioner. 4
▪ As this resulted in a 62-62 tie between petitioner and private respondent, Judge
Fernandez ordered that the winner be determined via drawing of lots or toss of
a coin. 5
▪ Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26
which, however, dismissed his appeal
▪ since under COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, the decision of the MCTC insofar as
the SK election is concerned can only be elevated to the COMELEC en
banc through a petition for review and only in meritorious cases
▪ ordered remand of the case to the court of origin.
▪ The drawing of lots ordered by the MCTC proceeded on October 3, 1996.
▪ Petitioner was absent although he was duly notified of the proceeding. 7
▪ Private respondent Sarenas emerged as winner in the drawing of lots.
▪ In an order issued on the same day, the MCTC directed him to take his oath of
office and to assume his duties as SK chairman.
▪ petitioner Abad then filed a petition for review with the COMELEC en banc.
• In its Resolution dismissing the petition, the COMELEC said:
▪ the June 3, 1996 Order of the Municipal Trial Court had, as of the filing of the
Petition for Review already become final
▪ Records show that the decision of the Trial Court annulling the proclamation of
Abad and declaring a tie between him and Sarenas, to be broken by a
drawing of lots, was received by Abad on June 5, 1996. Though he appealed
said Order to the Regional Trial Court, the remedy availed of was not the one
obtaining under COMELEC Resolution 2824, Section 49 of which provides:
▪ Finality of Proclamation. —
• The proclamation of the winning candidates shall be final.
• However, the Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall have original jurisdiction over all election protest
cases, whose decision shall be final.
 ▪ The Commission En Banc in meritorious cases may entertain a petition for
review of the decision of the MeTC/MTC/MCTC in accordance with the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
▪ An appeal bond of P2,000.00 shall be required which shall be refundable if the
appeal is found meritorious.
▪ Petitioner should have directed his Petition to the Commission En Banc within
thirty days from June 5, 1996, the date the decision was served upon him. Even
if we assume that his procedural lapse was justifiable thus permit his appeal to
the RTC to stay the running of the prescriptive period, he should have rectified
his error upon receipt of the Order of the RTC dismissing his Appeal on July 10,
1996.
o Issues:
▪ Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC
for not declaring as null and void the challenged orders of the trial court
▪ COMELEC's own jurisdiction
o Rulings:
▪ Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections, [212 SCRA 307, 313 (1992)]
• the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the requisite authority to
hear and decide election cases in the first instance. This power pertains
to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en
banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null
and void.
▪ Zarate v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 129096, November 19, 1999, p. 8)
• We nullified the decision of the COMELEC, which incidentally also
concerns a 1996 SK election case appealed directly from the MTC. We
remanded the case and ordered it assigned to an appropriate division
of the COMELEC.
▪ petition is GRANTED.
▪ decision of the COMELEC en banc in SPR No. 45-96 is SET ASIDE
▪ Commission is ordered to assign the case to one of its Divisions for prompt
resolution.
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials
➢ Section 1. Jurisdiction of regional trial courts. – exclusive original jurisdiction over all election
contests involving municipal officials.
➢ Section 2. How initiated. – filed directly with the court in three legible copies plus such number
of copies corresponding to the number of protestees or respondents.
o An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto, nor shall a petition
for quo warranto include an election protest.
➢ Section 3. Modes of service and filing. – personally. Except for papers emanating from the
court, resort to other modes of service must be accompanied by a written explanation why
the service or filing was not done personally. A pleading or motion violating this Rule shall be
considered not to have been filed.
➢ Section 4. Election protest. –
o contesting the election or returns for an elective municipal office shall be
o filed with the proper Regional Trial Court
o by any candidate who was voted for the same office and who received the second
or third-highest number of votes or, in a multi-slot position, was among the next four
candidates following the last-ranked winner duly proclaimed
o Each contest shall refer exclusively to one office; however, contests for offices of the
Sangguniang Bayan may be consolidated in one case.
➢ Section 5. Quo warranto. –
o filed with the proper Regional Trial Court
o by any registered voter who voted in the municipal election
➢ Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. – non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from the date of proclamation.
➢ Section 8. Pendency of pre-proclamation controversy. – The pendency of a pre-
proclamation controversy, involving the validity of the proclamation as defined by law, shall
 suspend the running of the period for the filing of an election protest or petition for quo
warranto.
➢ Section 9. COMELEC judgment in disqualification case. – The decision of the COMELEC,
either en banc or in division, in a disqualification case shall not be a bar to the filing of a
petition for quo warranto based on the same ground, except when the Supreme Court has
affirmed the COMELEC decision.
➢ Section 10. Contests of the protest or petition. –
a. An election protest or petition for quo warranto shall commonly and specifically
state the following facts:
1. the position involved;
2. the date of proclamation; and
3. the number of votes credited to the parties per the proclamation
b. A quo warranto petition shall also state:
1. if the petitioner is not a candidate for the same municipal position, the facts
giving the petitioner standing to file the petition;
2. the qualifications for the municipal office and the disqualifications
prescribed by law;
3. the petitioner’s cited ground for ineligibility or the specific acts of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines.
c. An election protest shall also state:
1. that the protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and had been voted for the same office;
2. the total number of precincts in the municipality;
3. the protested precincts and votes of the parties are not specified, an
explanation why the votes are not specified; and
4. a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the
electoral frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts
➢ Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contests. – The court shall summarily dismiss, motu
proporio, an election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of the
following grounds:
a. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
b. The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section 10;
c. The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;
d. The filling fee is not paid within the period for filling the election protest or
petition for quo warranto; and
e. In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not paid
within five (5) days from the filling of the protest.
➢ PROHIBITED PLEADINGS
o Section 1. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following pleadings, motions or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by these Rules:
(a) Motion to dismiss the petition, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Demurrer to evidence;
(d) Motion for new trial, or for the reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening
of trial;
(e) Petition for relief from judgment;
(f) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or other papers;
(g) Memoranda, except as provided under Section 7, Rile 13 of these Rules;
(h) Motion to declare the protestee or the respondent in default;
(i) Dilatory motion for postponements;
(j) Motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge, except on clearly valid grounds;
(k) Reply or rejoinder; and
(l) Third-party complaint.
o Section 1. Filling fees. – No protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto shall
be accepted for filling without the payment of a filling fee in the amount of Three
Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) for every protest, counter-protest or petition for quo
warranto filed.
▪ If claims for damages and attorney’s fees are set forth in a protest or counter-
protest, additional filling fees shall be paid in accordance with the schedule
under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
o Section 2. Cash deposit. –
A. In addition to the fees prescribed in the preceding section, the protestant in an
election protest requiring revision or examination of ballots, or the verification
or re-tabulation of election returns, or which may require bringing copies of
other election documents and paraphernalia to court, shall make a cash
deposit with the court in the following amounts:
1. One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for each precinct covered
by the protest or counter-protest, provided that the deposit
shall in no case be less than Twenty-five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) to be paid upon the filling of the election protest
or counter-protest;
2. Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for the cost of
bringing to court and of storing and maintaining the PCOS,
the consolidation machines and other automated election
paraphernalia brought to court as evidence or as necessary
equipment in considering the protested or counter-protested
ballots;
3. If the amount to be deposit does not exceed One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), the required sum shall be paid
in full within ten (10) days from the filling of the protest or
counter-protest; and
4. If the required deposit shall exceed One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00), a cash deposit in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) shall be made within
ten (10) days from the filling of the protest or counter-protest.
The balance shall be paid in installments under the schedule
the court may require after hearing the Protestant or counter-
Protestant on the matter.
o Section 10. Post-revision determination of the merit or legitimacy of the protest prior to
revision of the counter-protest.
o immediately after the revision or examination of ballots, or the verification
or re-tabulation of election returns in all protested precincts, the protestant
shall be required to point to a number of precincts, corresponding to twenty
percent (20%) of the total of the revised protested precincts, that will best
attest to the votes recovered, ore that will best exemplify the fraud or
irregularities pleaded in the protest. In the meanwhile, the revision or
examination of the ballots, or the verification or re-tabulation of election
returns in the counter-protested precincts, shall be suspended for a period
not exceeding fifteen days to allow the court to preliminarily determine,
through the appreciation of ballots and other submitted election
documents, the merit of legitimacy of the protest based in the chosen
twenty percent (20%) of the protested precincts.
o Based on the results of this post-revision preliminary determination, the court
may dismiss the protest without further proceedings if the validity of the
grounds for the protest is no established by the evidence from the chosen
twenty percent (20%) of the protested precincts; or proceed with the
revision or examination if the ballots, or the verification or re-tabulation of
election returns in the counter-protested precincts. In the latter case, the
protestee shall be required to pay the cash deposit within a non-extendible
period of three (3) days from notice.
➢ TECHNICAL EXAMINATION
o Section 1. Motion f or technical examination; contents. – Except when the protest or
counter-protest involves allegation of massive substitute voting, a party may move for
the technical examination of the presented evidence within five (5) days after
completion of the revision in the protest or counter-protest, specifying:
a. The nature of the technical examination requested (e.g., fingerprint examination,
etc.);
b. The documents or machines/equipment to be subjected to technical
examination;
c. The objections made in the course of the revision of ballots which the movant
intends to substantiate with the results of the technical examination; and
d. The ballots covered by these objections.
o Section 2. Technical examination; time limits.
▪ The court may grant the motion for technical examination at its discretion and
under the conditions it may impose. If the motion is granted, the technical
examination shall start within five (5) days from notice to both parties, and shall
be completed within the period specified by the court, in no case to exceed
to twenty successive working days, unless the court grants an extension based
on exceptionally meritorious ground. A party may attend the technical
examination either personally or through a representative. However the
technical examination shall proceed with or without the attendance of a party,
provided that the due notice has been given.
▪ The expenses for technical examination shall be for the account of the party
requesting the examination. The technical examination shall be under the
supervision of the clerk of court.
o Section 3. Experts; who shall provide.
▪ Experts necessary for the conduct of technical examination shall be provided
by the party requesting the same and may come from the National Bureau of
Investigation, the PNP Crime Laboratory, the Commission on Elections, the
Department of Science and Technology, or experts from the private sector. The
other party may secure the services of his or her own expert who may only
observe, not interfere with, the examination conducted by the movant’s
experts.
o Section 2. Offer of evidence.
▪ The court shall not consider any evidence that has not been formally offered.
Offer of evidence shall be done orally on the last day of hearing allowed for
each party after the presentation of the party’s last witness. The opposing party
shall be required to immediately interpose objections to the offer. The court
shall rule on the offer of evidence in open court. However, the court may, at its
discretion, allow the party to make an offer of evidence in writing, which shall
be submitted within three days from notice of the court’s order. If the court
rejects any evidence offered, the party may make a tender of the excluded
evidence.
o Section 6. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are considered as
established facts, unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
a. On the election procedure:
1. The election of candidates was held on the date and at the time set and in
the polling place determined by the Commission on Elections;
2. The Boards of Election Inspectors were duly constituted and organized;
3. Political parties and candidates were duly represented by pollwatchers;
4. Pollwatchers were able to perform their functions;
5. The Minutes of Voting and Counting contains all the incidents that
transpired before the Board of Election Inspectors; and
6. The Audit Log contains the list of all activities performed by the PCOS
machines from the time it was powered on until it was turned off.
b. On election paraphernalia:
 1. Ballots and election returns that bear the security markings and features
prescribed by the Commission on Elections are genuine;
2. The data and information supplied by the members of the Boards of
Election Inspectors in the accountable forms are true and correct; and
3. The allocation, packing and distribution of election documents or
paraphernalia were properly and timely done;
4. The PCOS and consolidation machines and the data storage devices are
all in order, and the data generated reflect the activities entered in these
electronic machines and devices.
c. On appreciation of ballots:
1. A ballot with appropriate security markings is valid;
2. The ballot reflects the intent of the voter;
3. The ballot was properly accomplished;
4. A voter personally prepared one ballot, except in the case of assistors; and
5. The exercise of one’s right to vote was voluntary and free.
➢ Section 2. Form of decision in election protests. – After the termination of the revision of ballots
and before rendering its decision in an election protest that involved a revision, the court
shall examine and appreciate the original ballots. The court, in its appreciation of the ballots
and in ruling on the parties’ claims and objections, shall observe the following rules:
a. On marked ballots – The court must specify and point to the marking clearly indicating
the voter’s intent to identify the ballot.
b. On fake or spurious ballots, election document, machine, device or paraphernalia – The
court must specify the COMELEC security markings or features that are not found in the
ballot, election documents, machine, device or paraphernalia considered fake or
spurious, or the operation or aspects of the machine, device or paraphernalia that
resulted in fake or spurious results;
c. On stray ballots – The court must specify and state in detail why the ballots are considered
stray;
d. On claimed ballots – The court must specify the exact basis for admitting claimed votes
or crediting these to either party.
➢ Section 5. Finality of decision. – The court’s promulgated decision shall become final and
executory five (5) days after receipt of notice by the parties if no appeal is taken.
➢ Section 6. Entry of judgment. – If no appeal is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the
judgment shall be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of finality
of the judgment shall be the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of
the judgment and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that the judgment has
become final and executory.
➢ Section 7. Notice of final decision. – As soon as the decision becomes final, the clerk of court
shall send notices to the COMELEC, the Department of the Interior and Local Government,
and the Commission on Audit.
➢ Section 8. Appeal. – An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the COMELEC within
five (5) days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the
decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or on the adverse party who is not
represented by counsel.
➢ Section 9. Appeal fee. – The appellant in an election contest shall pay to the court that
rendered the decision an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with
the filing of the notice of appeal.
➢ Section 11. Execution pending appeal. – On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party, the court, at its discretion and while still in possession of the original records,
may order the execution of its decision before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject
to the following rules:
a. Execution pending appeal shall not issue except upon motion and hearing with prior
notice of the motion of at least three (3) days to the adverse party. The motion for
execution pending appeal must be supported by good reasons cited and stated by the
court in a special order. These reasons must:
 1. constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that would outweigh the
injury or damage, should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on
appeal; and
2. manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the protestee
or the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.
b. If the court grants an execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have twenty
working days from notice of the special order within which to secure a restraining order
or status quo order from the Supreme Court or the COMELEC. The corresponding writ of
execution shall issue after twenty (20) days if no restraining order or status quo order is
issued. During the twenty (20)-day period, the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal shall be stayed.
➢ Section 12. Jurisdiction of the Commission on Election
o Gomez – Castillo vs COMELEC, 2010
▪ Castillo and respondent Strike P. Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor of Bacoor,
Cavite during the May 14, 2007 local elections.
▪ After the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Revilla as the elected
Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, Castillo filed an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam2 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Bacoor, Cavite, which was
eventually raffled to Branch 19.
▪ Answer
• Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging that it was
filed in the wrong Branch of the RTC.
▪ Supreme Court Administrative Order (SCAO) No. 54-2007 designated Branch 22
of the RTC in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88 of the RTC in Cavite City to hear, try
and decide election contests involving municipal officials in Cavite; and that
contrary to SCAO No. 54-2007, Castillo filed his protest in the RTC in Bacoor,
Cavite, which was not the proper court.
▪ Branch 19 dismissed Castillo’s election protest for being violative of SCAO No.
54-2007.
▪ On December 23, 2008, Castillo presented a notice of appeal. Thereupon, the
RTC ordered that the complete records of the protest be forwarded to the
Election Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC.
▪ Issue:
• Does Section 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate the RTC
Branch that has jurisdiction over an election contest, or does it merely
designate the proper venue for filing?
• In case the RTC was incorrect, is the error enough to warrant the reversal
of its order of dismissal despite its having attained finality?
▪ The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has
been vested in the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code).11 On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the
proper venue where such cases may be filed and heard, only spelled out the
manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other
rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly
administration of justice,12 and is permissive, because it was enacted to ensure
the exclusive and speedy disposition of election protests and petitions for quo
warranto involving elective municipal officials.
▪ Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that:
• Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
Commission on Elections within five days after promulgation by filing a
notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision with copy
served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel
▪ Article IX-C, 1987 Philippine Constitution
• Chairman and six Commissioners
• a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years
• term of seven years without reappointment
• Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
• exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and
• appellate jurisdiction - elective municipal officials or elective barangay
officials
• Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable.
• Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections
• File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court
for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices
• en banc or in two divisions
• All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division
• motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
• Election period
o ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.
• Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC, 2015
o facts are not disputed.
o On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within
a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten
feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the
cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health
Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is
the subject of the present case.4 This tarpaulin contains the
heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-
RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay"
with an "X" mark.5 The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.6 Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising
"Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team
Buhay":
o On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her
capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials8 addressed to petitioner Most Rev.
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the
tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being
oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size
requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).9
o On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied10 requesting, among
others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by
COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2)
pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the
tarpaulin be allowed to remain.11
o On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a
letter12 ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin;
otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against
 petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silenton
the remedies available to petitioners.
o Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their
exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this
petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.14 They
question respondents’ notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter
issued on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition be
given due course; (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents
from further proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal
of the Team Patay tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and hearing, a
decision be rendered declaring the questioned orders of
respondents as unconstitutional and void, and permanently
restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other similar
order.
o Issue:
▪ WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TODETERMINE WHETHER THE
TARPAULINS ARE "POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT" OR
"ELECTION PROPAGANDA" CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER
IS NOT A POLITICAL CANDIDATE[;]
▪ WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION
(PROTECTED SPEECH), OR ELECTION
PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT[;]
a. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TARPAULINS
ARE A FORM OF EXPRESSION, WHETHER THE
COMELEC POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE THE SAME[;]
b. WHETHER THIS FORM OF EXPRESSION MAY BE
REGULATED[;]
o This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms
as "highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional
values."193 These rights enjoy precedence and primacy.
o The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda"
refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed
or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image,
logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or
graphic representation that is capable of being associated with
a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of
the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly
or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or candidates to
a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may
take the form of spots, appearances on TV shows and radio
programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and other
forms of advertising messages or announcements used by
commercial advertisers. Political advertising includes matters, not
falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any
Internet website, including, but not limited to, social networks,
blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for
consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation.
(Emphasis supplied)
o It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are
not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
o COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment
of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a
non-candidate in this case.
 o COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal
opportunities and reduce spending among candidates and their
registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech
of the electorate as it strives to participate inthe electoral
exercise.
o WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary
restraining order previously issued is hereby made permanent.
The act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice dated
February 22, 2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 is declared
unconstitutional.
o Section 6 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, reads:
o Sec. 6.Failure of election — If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting
and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of
a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
• Canicosa vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 120318 December 5, 1997)
o RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were
candidates for mayor in Calamba, Laguna, during the 8 May
1995 elections.
o After obtaining a majority of some 24,000 votes1 Lajara was
proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
o Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
▪ Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to Declare Null
and Void the Canvass and Proclamation
o Clearly, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of
election may be declared, namely:
a. the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
b. the election in any polling place had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or
c. after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure. violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes.
o None of the grounds invoked by Canicosa falls under any of
those enumerated.
o the names of the registered voters in the various precincts did not
appear in their respective lists of voters.
o Fifteen (15) days before the regular elections on 8 May 1995 the
final list of voters was posted in each precinct pursuant to Sec.
148 of R.A. No. 7166.
o Remedy: petition for inclusion of registered voters with the regular
courts.
o The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters
involves the right to vote3 which is not within the power and
authority of COMELEC to rule upon. The determination of whether
one has the right to vote is a justiciable issue properly cognizable
by our regular courts.
o Section 138, Art. XII, of the Omnibus Election Code states;
▪ Sec. 138. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases. —
The municipal and metropolitan trial courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of
inclusion and exclusion of voters from the list in their
respective municipalities or cities. Decisions of the
municipal or metropolitan trial courts may be appealed
directly by the aggrieved party to the proper regional trial
court within five days from receipts of notice thereof,
otherwise said decision of the municipal or metropolitan
trial court shall decide the appeal within ten days from the
time the appeal was received and its decision shall be
immediately final and executory. No motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained by the courts (Sec. 37,
PD 1896, as amended).
o Remedy : verified complaint seeking the annulment of the book
of voters
o Sec. 10, of R.A. No. 7166:
▪ Sec. 10. Annulment of the List of Voters. — Any book of
voters the preparation of which has been affected with
fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force
or any other similar irregularity or which is statistically
improbable may be annulled after due notice and hearing
by the Commission motu propio or after the filing of a
verified complaint: Provided, that no order, ruling or
decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed
within sixty (60) days before an election.
o the permanent list of voters as finally corrected before the
election remains conclusive on the question as to who had the
right to vote in that election, although not in subsequent elections.
o more than one-half (1/2) of the legitimate registered voters were
not able to vote, instead, strangers voted in their behalf.
o Remedy: watcher is empowered by law to challenge any illegal
voter
o Secs.199 and 202, Art. XVII, of the Omnibus Election Code,
provide:
▪ Sec. 199.Challenges of illegal voters. — (a) Any voter, or
watcher may challenge any person offering to vote for not
being registered, for using the name of another or suffering
from existing disqualification. In such case, the board of
election inspectors shall satisfy itself as to whether or not
the ground for the challenge is true by requiring proof of
registration or identity of the voter . . .
▪ Sec. 202.Record of challenges and oaths. — The poll clerk
shall keep a prescribed record of challenges and oaths
taken in connection therewith and the resolution of the
board of election inspectors in each case and, upon the
 termination of the voting, shall certify that it contains all the
challenges made . . .
o he was credited with less votes than he actually received and
that the control date of the election returns was not filled up
o Remedy: Protest by the watchers before the Board of Election
Inspectors
o Section 179, Art. XV, of the Omnibus Election Code clearly
provides for the rights and duties of watchers —
▪ Sec. 179.Rights and duties of watchers. — . . . The watchers
. . . shall have the right to witness and inform themselves of
the proceedings of the board of election inspectors . . . to
file a protest against any irregularity or violation of law
which they believe may have been committed by the
board of election inspectors or by any of its members or
by any persons, to obtain from the board of election
inspectors
a certificates as to the filing of such protest and/or of the
resolution thereon . . . and to be furnished with a certificate
of the number of votes in words and figures cast for each
candidate, duly signed and thumbmarked by the
chairman and all the members of the board of election
inspectors . . .
o Remedy: petition for correction of election returns with COMELEC
by all or a majority of the members of the board of election
inspectors or any candidate affected by the error or mistake.
o the election returns were delivered late and the ballot boxes
brought to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer unsecured, i.e.,
without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals
o These bare allegations cannot impel us to declare failure of
election. Assuming that the election returns were delivered late,
we still cannot see why we should declare a failure to elect. The
late deliveries did not convert the election held in Calamba into
a mockery or farce to make us conclude that there was indeed
a failure of election.
o In fine, the grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition do not fall
under any of the instances enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
o Mitmug v. Commission on Elections
▪ before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to
declare a failure of election, at least two (2) conditions
must concur:
a. no voting has taken place in the precincts on the date
fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election
nevertheless resulted in failure to elect; and,
b. the votes that were not cast would affect the result of
the election.
o From the face of the instant petition, it is readily apparent than an
election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect.
o Clearly, all these matters require the exercise by the COMELEC of
its administrative functions. Section 2, Art. IX-C, of the 1987
Constitution grants extensive administrative powers to the
COMELEC with regard to the enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections.
o Sec. 52 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, states:
▪ Sec. 52.Powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections. — In addition to the powers and functions
 conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections of the purposes of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections . . .
o Quite obviously, it is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear
and decide cases first by Division and then, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is
jurisdictional.
o Castromayor v. Commission on Elections thus
▪ It should be pinpointed out, in this connection, that what is
involved here is a simple problem of arithmetic. The
Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of
the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the
election returns. In making the correction in computation,
the MBC will be acting in an administrative capacity,
under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Hence,
any question pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC
may be raised directly to the COMELEC en banc in the
exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions
affecting elections.
o Rule 27, Sec. 7, of the Comelec Rules of Procedure that any party
dissatisfied with the ruling of the board of canvassers shall have a
right to appeal to the COMELEC en banc:
▪ Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of
Results by the Board of Canvassers. — (a) Where it is
clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors
were committed in the tabulation or tallying or election
returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing
as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct
or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass were
tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election
returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated
separately, (3) there was a mistake in the adding or
copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into
the statement of votes by precinct, or (4) so-called
election returns from non-existent precincts were included
in the canvass, the board may motu proprio, or upon
verified petition by any candidate, political party,
organization or coalition of political parties, after due
notice and hearing, correct the errors committed . . . (h)
The appeal shall be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc.
o WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by
public respondent Commission on Elections, the petition is
DISMISSED and its Resolution en banc of 23 May 1995 dismissing
the petition before it on the ground that the allegations therein
did not justify a declaration of failure of election is AFFIRMED.
• Dumayas vs COMELEC, 2001 (Protest not cognizable by MBC)
o Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. and respondent Bernal, Jr. were rival
candidates for the position of mayor in Carles, Iloilo last 11 May
1998 synchronized elections.
o During the canvassing on 13 May 1998, election returns for
precinct nos. 61A, 62A, and 63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan
was protested for inclusion in the canvass before the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBC for brevity) by petitioner-appellant
 Dumayas Jr. The grounds relied upon for their exclusion are all the
same- that is, "violation of Secs. 234, 235, 236 of the Omnibus
Election Code and other election laws; acts of terrorism,
intimidation, coercion, and similar acts prohibited by law."
o the Municipal Board of Canvassers denied petitioner’s objection
to the inclusion of the contested returns and proceeded with the
canvass.
▪ Dumayas 7,777
▪ Bernal 7,904
o Notice of Appeal before the MBC on May 15, 1998. The appeal
was given due course by the COMELEC Second Division3 which
rendered a resolution dated August 4, 1998
o WHEREFORE, finding the preparation of the contested election
returns to be tainted with irregularities, this Commission (SECOND
DIVISION) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to EXCLUDE Election
Return No. 3000976 from Precinct No. 61-A; Election Return No.
3000977 from Precinct No. 62-A; and Election return No. 3000978
from Precinct Nos. 63-A/64-A (clustered).
o Respondent Mun(i)cipal Board of Canvassers is hereby directed
to RECONVENE and FINISH the canvass of the remaining or
uncontested returns and thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning
mayoralty candidate of Carles, Iloilo
o On August 10, 1998, private respondent Felipe Bernal, Jr., filed a
motion for reconsideration of the above-cited resolution with the
COMELEC en banc.
o On August 12, 1998, an order certifying that the motion for
reconsideration and records of the case were elevated to the
COMELEC en banc was signed by Commissioner Julio F.
Desamito and issued by the Clerk of the Commission.
o Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration and
pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division,
Election Officer Rolando Dalen set the reconvening of the MBC
on August 13, 1998, for the continuation of canvass proceedings
and proclamation of winning candidates for Vice-Mayor and
Municipal Councilors of Carles, Iloilo. No winner for the position of
Mayor was proclaimed since private respondent was able to
present a copy of his motion for reconsideration before the MBC.
The MBC then reset the date for reconvening of the board on
August 17, 1998, after confirming by phone with COMELEC-
Manila that a motion for reconsideration was indeed filed by
private respondent. Thereafter, the MBC ruled that proclamation
of the winning candidate for Mayor would proceed on August
17, 1998 unless private respondent could present a certification
from the COMELEC that the motion for reconsideration was
elevated to the COMELEC en banc.
o On August 17, 1998, despite presentation of the August 12, 1998
order, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the election after
excluding from the canvass the election returns from the three
contested precincts in accordance with the COMELEC Second
Division Resolution. The MBC, with its Vice-Chairman dissenting,
justified its act by reasoning that it did not receive an official copy
of the order directing the elevation of the case to the banc.
o The following day, private respondent immediately filed an
urgent motion to declare void ab initio the proclamation of
petitioner on the ground that the resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division was not yet final and executory. For his part,
petitioner opposed both the motion for reconsideration and
 motion to declare void ab initio his proclamation as Mayor of
Carles, asserting that private respondent failed to show palpable
errors to warrant reconsideration of said resolution and
maintaining, at the same time, that his proclamation was legal
since respondent failed to produce the certification required by
the MBC.
o Meanwhile, on August 25, 1998, the duly-proclaimed Vice-Mayor
Arnold Betita filed an action for quo warranto5 against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 66. Docketed as
Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141, said petition included respondent
Bernal as one of the petitioners together with Vice-Mayor Betita.
o On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed before the COMELEC en
banc a motion to expunge respondent Bernal’s motion for
reconsideration and motion to declare petitioner’s proclamation
void ab initio, on the ground that respondent Bernal should be
deemed to have abandoned said motions by the filing of Spl.
Civil Action No. 98-141 which, according to petitioner, is a formal
election protest via quo warranto brought before the regular
courts.
o In a resolution dated August 24, 1999 but promulgated on March
2, 2000, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion to
expunge, thus:
o WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Second
Division is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the proclamation
of Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. is hereby ANNULLED. A new Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Carles, Iloilo is hereby constituted with the
following members: Atty. Nelia Aureus, Chairman; Atty. Rosel
Abad, Vice-Chairman; and Atty. Manuel Lucero, Third Member –
all of Election Contests and Adjudication Department of the
Commission. They are directed to convene at Session Hall of the
COMELEC – Main Office, Manila on the tenth (10th) day from the
date of promulgation of this Resolution with notice to the parties.
The new board of canvassers shall complete the canvassing of
all the returns and proceed with the proclamation of the true
winner for the position of mayor of Carles, Iloilo. Petitioner Rodolfo
Dumayas, Jr. is hereby directed to cease and desist from
performing the functions of the office of mayor of Carles, Iloilo.
Election Officer Rolando Dalen is hereby directed to bring to the
Commission’s Main Office the election returns of Carles, Iloilo
which need to be canvassed and the other election documents
necessary for the canvassing and proclamation and turn them
over to the new board of canvassers.
o special civil action, petitioner Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr., seeks to
nullify the Resolution promulgated March 2, 2000 by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc, reversing that of
the Second Division dated August 4, 1998, which annulled the
petitioner’s proclamation as Municipal Mayor of Carles, Iloilo.
o Issues
▪ Should respondent Bernal, who was named as petitioner
in the quo warranto proceedings commenced before the
regular court, be deemed to have abandoned the
motions he had filed with respondent Commission?
▪ Did the COMELEC err in ordering the inclusion of the
contested election returns in the canvassing of ballots?
▪ In view of the retirement of Commissioners Gorospe and
Guiani before the date of the promulgation of the assailed
resolution on March 2, 2000, should said resolution be
 deemed null and void for being violative of Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution?
o Jamil vs. Commission on Elections,
▪ we held that a decision becomes binding only after its
promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge or
member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or
registered his vote has vacated office, his vote on the
decision must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled.
Accordingly, the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and
Guiani should merely be considered as withdrawn for the
reason that their retirement preceded the resolution’s
promulgation. The effect of the withdrawal of their votes
would be as if they had not signed the resolution at all and
only the votes of the remaining commissioners would be
properly considered for the purpose of deciding the
controversy.
o As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition
for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-
proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of
one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to
inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity
of his proclamation.
o Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain
exceptions, as where:
a. the board of canvassers was improperly constituted;
b. quo warranto was not the proper remedy;
c. what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or
an election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation;
d. the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest
was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-
proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and
e. the proclamation was null and void
o Samad vs. COMELEC,
▪ we explained that a petition for quo warranto under the
Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or
ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to
unseat the respondent from office but not necessarily to
install the petitioner in his place. An election protest is a
contest between the defeated and winning candidates on
the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting and
counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of the returns.
It raises the question of who actually obtained the plurality
of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the
office.
o Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact by the COMELEC,
or any other administrative agency exercising particular
expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on this Court.18 In a
pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the
COMELEC are not required to look beyond or behind the election
returns which are on their face regular and authentic. Where a
party seeks to raise issues the resolution of which would
necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns
which are prima facie regular, the proper remedy is a regular
election protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy.19
o petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, public respondent having
committed no grave abuse of discretion.
o Its challenged resolution dated August 24, 1999 is AFFIRMED
➢ Guevara vs COMELEC, 1958 ➢ Nuisance Candidates
(Contempt) ➢ Timbolvs COMELEC, 2015
➢ Relampagos vs COMELEC, 1995 ➢ De la Cruz vs COMELEC, 2012
(Certiorari) ➢ Pre-proclamation Controversy
➢ Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC ➢ Ututalum vs COMELEC, 1990
➢ Cua vs COMELEC, (majority vote) ➢ Failure of Election
➢ Certificate of Candidacy ➢ Basher vs COMELEC, 2000
➢ Rulloda vs COMELEC, 2003 ➢ Petition for Disqualification
(substitution) ➢ Abundo vs COMELEC, 2013
➢ Hayudini vs COMELEC, 2014 ➢ Quo Warranto
(cancellation) ➢ Bengzon III vs HRET, 2001

➢ ELECTION OFFENSES
o Section 261, paragraphs (a) to (dd), Section 262, BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code)
▪ Amendments
• Section 261 (g) applies only to appointments covered by the Civil
Service Law, and not to those governed by special laws, such as the
Local Government Code. Thus, the prohibition does not apply to the
filling up of vacancies in the sanggunian of local government units (Ong
vs Herrera, 188 SCRA 830)
• Section 261 (h). Two elements must be establsihed to prove its violation
: (1) the fact of transfer or detail within the election period, and (2) the
transfer was effected without prior approval of the COMELEC in
accordance with its implementing rules and regulations.
• Section 261 (p). To support a conviction under the Section 261 (p), it is
not necesary that the deadly weapon should have been seized from
the accused while he was in the precinct or within a radius of 100 meters
therefrom. It is enough that the accused carried the weapon in the
polling place and within a radius of 100 meters thereof during any of the
specified days and hours [Mappala vs Nunez, 240 SCRA 600 (1995)]
• Section 261 (t) has been repealed by Sections 32, 33, 34 of Republic Act
7166
• Section 261 (y) and (z) have been repealed by Section 1, Article V of the
1987 Philippine Constitution, which makes the exercise of suffrage
voluntary and no longer compulsoary as provided for in the 1973
Constitution
• Section 262 has been repealed with retroactive effect by Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 7166 as far as the inclusion of Sections 105, 106, 107,
109, 110, 111, and 112 as among election offenses
▪ Section 263, 264, Omnubus Election Code
▪ Section 27, paragraphs (a) to (f), Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987)
▪ Section 27, paragraphs (a) to (f), Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987)
▪ Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Election Act)
▪ Section 24.1 to 24.9 of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003)
▪ Section 45 (a) to (j), Republic Act No. 8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996)
▪ Faelnar vs People, 2000
▪ Jalosjos vs COMELEC, 2012
▪ Javier vs COMELEC (January 12, 2016 G.R. No. 215847)
• On December 3, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the Omnibus
Election Code (Election Code). Section 261(d) and (e) of this Code
prescribe coercion as an election offense
• Coercion, as an election offense, is punishable by imprisonment of not
less than one year but not more than six years. Notably, Section 68 of the
 Election Code provides that the Commission may administratively
disqualify a candidate who violates Section 261(d) or (e).
• On February 20, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7890
amending the definition of Grave Coercion under the Revised Penal
Code. It increased the penalty for coercion committed in violation of a
person’s right to suffrage to prision mayor. Further, Section 3 of R.A. 7890
expressly repealed Section 261, paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of the Election
Code.
• On April 3, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9385 fixing the
calendar of activities for the May 2013 elections. The resolution set the
election period from January 13, 2013 until June 12, 2013.
• On September 3, 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Christopher
B. Maguad filed an administrative complaint for Gross
Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and Abuse of Authority against
Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero (Mayor Roquero). This
complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 05-2012.

SECOND PPT

Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials
➢ Section 1. Jurisdiction of regional trial courts. – exclusive original jurisdiction over all election
contests involving municipal officials.
o An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto, nor shall a petition for
quo warranto include an election protest.
➢ Section 3. Modes of service and filing. – personally. Except for papers emanating from the
court, resort to other modes of service must be accompanied by a written explanation why
the service or filing was not done personally. A pleading or motion violating this Rule shall be
considered not to have been filed.
➢ Section 4. Election protest. –
o contesting the election or returns for an elective municipal office
o filed with the proper Regional Trial Court
o by any candidate who was voted for the same office and who received the second
or third-highest number of votes or, in a multi-slot position, was among the next four
candidates following the last-ranked winner duly proclaimed
o Each contest shall refer exclusively to one office; however, contests for offices of the
Sangguniang Bayan may be consolidated in one case.
➢ Section 5. Quo warranto. –
o filed with the proper Regional Trial Court
o by any registered voter who voted in the municipal election
➢ Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. – non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from the date of proclamation.
➢ Section 8. Pendency of pre-proclamation controversy. – The pendency of a pre-
proclamation controversy, involving the validity of the proclamation as defined by law, shall
suspend the running of the period for the filing of an election protest or petition for quo
warranto.
➢ Section 9. COMELEC judgment in disqualification case. – The decision of the COMELEC, either
en banc or in division, in a disqualification case shall not be a bar to the filing of a petition for
quo warranto based on the same ground, except when the Supreme Court has affirmed the
COMELEC decision.
➢ Section 10. Contents of the protest or petition. –
a. Election Contests
1. the position involved;
2. the date of proclamation; and
3. the number of votes credited to the parties per the proclamation.
b. A quo warranto petition shall also state:
 1. if the petitioner is not a candidate for the same municipal position, the facts giving
the petitioner standing to file the petition;
2. the qualifications for the municipal office and the disqualifications prescribed by
law;
3. the petitioner’s cited ground for ineligibility or the specific acts of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines
c. An election protest shall also state:
1. that the protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy
and had been voted for the same office;
2. the total number of precincts in the municipality;
3. the protested precincts and votes of the parties are not specified, an explanation
why the votes are not specified; and
4. a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the
electoral frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts.
➢ Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contests. – The court shall summarily dismiss, motu
proporio, an election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of the
following grounds:
a. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
b. The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section 10;
c. The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;
d. The filling fee is not paid within the period for filling the election protest or petition for quo
warranto; and
e. In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not paid within five (5)
days from the filling of the protest.
➢ PROHIBITED PLEADINGS
o Section 1. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following pleadings, motions or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by these Rules:
a. Motion to dismiss the petition, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter;
b. Motion for a bill of particulars;
c. Demurrer to evidence;
d. Motion for new trial, or for the reconsideration of a judgment, or for
reopening of trial;
e. Petition for relief from judgment;
f. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or other papers;
g. Memoranda, except as provided under Section 7, Rile 13 of these Rules;
h. Motion to declare the protestee or the respondent in default;
i. Dilatory motion for postponements;
j. Motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge, except on clearly valid
grounds;
k. Reply or rejoinder; and
l. Third-party complaint.
o Section 10. Post-revision determination of the merit or legitimacy of the protest prior to
revision of the counter-protest. – Immediately after the revision or examination of
ballots, or the verification or re-tabulation of election returns in all protested precincts,
the protestant shall be required to point to a number of precincts, corresponding to
twenty percent (20%) of the total of the revised protested precincts, that will best attest
to the votes recovered, ore that will best exemplify the fraud or irregularities pleaded
in the protest. In the meanwhile, the revision or examination of the ballots, or the
verification or re-tabulation of election returns in the counter-protested precincts, shall
be suspended for a period not exceeding fifteen days to allow the court to
preliminarily determine, through the appreciation of ballots and other submitted
election documents, the merit of legitimacy of the protest based in the chosen twenty
percent (20%) of the protested precincts.
o Section 2. Offer of evidence. – The court shall not consider any evidence that has not
been formally offered. Offer of evidence shall be done orally on the last day of
hearing allowed for each party after the presentation of the party’s last witness. The
 opposing party shall be required to immediately interpose objections to the offer. The
court shall rule on the offer of evidence in open court. However, the court may, at its
discretion, allow the party to make an offer of evidence in writing, which shall be
submitted within three days from notice of the court’s order. If the court rejects any
evidence offered, the party may make a tender of the excluded evidence.
o Section 6. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are considered as
established facts, unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
a. On the election procedure:
i. The election of candidates was held on the date and at the time set
and in the polling place determined by the Commission on Elections;
ii. The Boards of Election Inspectors were duly constituted and
organized;
iii. Political parties and candidates were duly represented by
pollwatchers;
iv. Pollwatchers were able to perform their functions;
v. The Minutes of Voting and Counting contains all the incidents that
transpired before the Board of Election Inspectors; and
vi. The Audit Log contains the list of all activities performed by the PCOS
machines from the time it was powered on until it was turned off.
b. On election paraphernalia:
i. Ballots and election returns that bear the security markings and
features prescribed by the Commission on Elections are genuine;
ii. The data and information supplied by the members of the Boards of
Election Inspectors in the accountable forms are true and correct;
and
iii. The allocation, packing and distribution of election documents or
paraphernalia were properly and timely done;
iv. The PCOS and consolidation machines and the data storage
devices are all in order, and the data generated reflect the activities
entered in these electronic machines and devices.
c. On appreciation of ballots
i. A ballot with appropriate security markings is valid;
ii. The ballot reflects the intent of the voter;
iii. The ballot was properly accomplished;
iv. A voter personally prepared one ballot, except in the case of
assistors; and
v. The exercise of one’s right to vote was voluntary and free.
o Section 2. Form of decision in election protests
a. On marked ballots – The court must specify and point to the marking clearly
indicating the voter’s intent to identify the ballot.
b. On fake or spurious ballots, election document, machine, device or
paraphernalia – The court must specify the COMELEC security markings or
features that are not found in the ballot, election documents, machine,
device or paraphernalia considered fake or spurious, or the operation or
aspects of the machine, device or paraphernalia that resulted in fake or
spurious results;
c. On stray ballots – The court must specify and state in detail why the ballots
are considered stray;
d. On claimed ballots – The court must specify the exact basis for admitting
claimed votes or crediting these to either party.
o Section 5. Finality of decision
▪ five (5) days after receipt of notice by the parties if no appeal is taken.
o Section 6. Entry of judgment
▪ no appeal
▪ book of entries of judgments
▪ date of finality of the judgment shall be the date of its entry
 ▪ dispositive part of the judgment and shall be signed by the clerk, with a
certificate that the judgment has become final and executory.
o Section 7. Notice of final decision
▪ send notices to the COMELEC, the Department of the Interior and Local
Government, and the Commission on Audit.
o Section 8. Appeal
▪ appeal the decision to the COMELEC within five (5) days after promulgation
▪ notice of appeal
o Section 9. Appeal fee
▪ One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of the notice of
appeal.
o Section 11. Execution pending appeal
▪ motion of the prevailing party
▪ Court discretion
▪ hearing with prior notice of the motion of at least three (3) days to the adverse
party
▪ good reasons cited and stated by the court in a special order
1. constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that
would outweigh the injury or damage, should the losing party
secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and
2. manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the
defeat of the protestee or the victory of the protestant has
been clearly established.
3. twenty working days from notice of the special order within
which to secure a restraining order or status quo order from
the Supreme Court or the COMELEC
a. writ of execution shall issue after twenty (20) days if no
restraining order or status quo order is issued
o Gomez – Castillo vs COMELEC, 2010
▪ Castillo and respondent Strike P. Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor of Bacoor,
Cavite during the May 14, 2007 local elections.
▪ After the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Revilla as the elected
Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, Castillo filed an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam2 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Bacoor, Cavite, which was
eventually raffled to Branch 19.
▪ Answer
• Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging that it was
filed in the wrong Branch of the RTC.
▪ Supreme Court Administrative Order (SCAO) No. 54-2007 designated Branch 22
of the RTC in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88 of the RTC in Cavite City to hear, try
and decide election contests involving municipal officials in Cavite; and that
contrary to SCAO No. 54-2007, Castillo filed his protest in the RTC in Bacoor,
Cavite, which was not the proper court.
▪ Branch 19 dismissed Castillo’s election protest for being violative of SCAO No.
54-2007.
▪ On December 23, 2008, Castillo presented a notice of appeal. Thereupon, the
RTC ordered that the complete records of the protest be forwarded to the
Election Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC.
▪ Issue:
• Does Section 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate the RTC
Branch that has jurisdiction over an election contest, or does it merely
designate the proper venue for filing?
• In case the RTC was incorrect, is the error enough to warrant the reversal
of its order of dismissal despite its having attained finality?
▪ The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has
been vested in the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code).11 On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the
 proper venue where such cases may be filed and heard, only spelled out the
manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other
rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly
administration of justice,12 and is permissive, because it was enacted to ensure
the exclusive and speedy disposition of election protests and petitions for quo
warranto involving elective municipal officials.
▪ Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that:
• Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
Commission on Elections within five days after promulgation by filing a
notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision with copy
served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel
▪ Article IX-C, 1987 Philippine Constitution
• Chairman and six Commissioners
• a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years
• term of seven years without reappointment
• Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
• exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and
• appellate jurisdiction - elective municipal officials or elective barangay
officials
• Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable.
• Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections
• File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court
for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices
• en banc or in two divisions
• All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division
• motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
• Election period
o ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.
o Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC, 2015
o facts are not disputed.
o On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within
a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten
feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the
cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health
Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is
the subject of the present case.4 This tarpaulin contains the
heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-
RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay"
with an "X" mark.5 The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.6 Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising
 "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team
Buhay":
o On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her
capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials8 addressed to petitioner Most Rev.
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the
tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being
oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size
requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).9
o On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied10 requesting, among
others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by
COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2)
pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the
tarpaulin be allowed to remain.11
o On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a
letter12 ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin;
otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against
petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silenton
the remedies available to petitioners.
o Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their
exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this
petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.14 They
question respondents’ notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter
issued on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition be
given due course; (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents
from further proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal
of the Team Patay tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and hearing, a
decision be rendered declaring the questioned orders of
respondents as unconstitutional and void, and permanently
restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other similar
order.
o Issue:
▪ WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TODETERMINE WHETHER THE
TARPAULINS ARE "POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT" OR
"ELECTION PROPAGANDA" CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER
IS NOT A POLITICAL CANDIDATE[;]
▪ WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION
(PROTECTED SPEECH), OR ELECTION
PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT[;]
c. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TARPAULINS
ARE A FORM OF EXPRESSION, WHETHER THE
COMELEC POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE THE SAME[;]
d. WHETHER THIS FORM OF EXPRESSION MAY BE
REGULATED[;]
o This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms
as "highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional
values."193 These rights enjoy precedence and primacy.
o The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda"
refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed
or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image,
logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or
graphic representation that is capable of being associated with
a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of
the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly
 or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or candidates to
a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may
take the form of spots, appearances on TV shows and radio
programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and other
forms of advertising messages or announcements used by
commercial advertisers. Political advertising includes matters, not
falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any
Internet website, including, but not limited to, social networks,
blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for
consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation.
(Emphasis supplied)
o It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are
not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
o COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment
of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a
non-candidate in this case.
o COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal
opportunities and reduce spending among candidates and their
registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech
of the electorate as it strives to participate inthe electoral
exercise.
o WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary
restraining order previously issued is hereby made permanent.
The act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice dated
February 22, 2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 is declared
unconstitutional.
o Section 6 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, reads:
o Sec. 6.Failure of election — If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting
and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of
a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
o Dumayas vs COMELEC, 2001 (Protest not cognizable by MBC)
o Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. and respondent Bernal, Jr. were rival
candidates for the position of mayor in Carles, Iloilo last 11 May
1998 synchronized elections.
o During the canvassing on 13 May 1998, election returns for
precinct nos. 61A, 62A, and 63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan
was protested for inclusion in the canvass before the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBC for brevity) by petitioner-appellant
Dumayas Jr. The grounds relied upon for their exclusion are all the
same- that is, "violation of Secs. 234, 235, 236 of the Omnibus
 Election Code and other election laws; acts of terrorism,
intimidation, coercion, and similar acts prohibited by law."
o the Municipal Board of Canvassers denied petitioner’s objection
to the inclusion of the contested returns and proceeded with the
canvass.
▪ Dumayas 7,777
▪ Bernal 7,904
o Notice of Appeal before the MBC on May 15, 1998. The appeal
was given due course by the COMELEC Second Division3 which
rendered a resolution dated August 4, 1998
o WHEREFORE, finding the preparation of the contested election
returns to be tainted with irregularities, this Commission (SECOND
DIVISION) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to EXCLUDE Election
Return No. 3000976 from Precinct No. 61-A; Election Return No.
3000977 from Precinct No. 62-A; and Election return No. 3000978
from Precinct Nos. 63-A/64-A (clustered).
o Respondent Mun(i)cipal Board of Canvassers is hereby directed
to RECONVENE and FINISH the canvass of the remaining or
uncontested returns and thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning
mayoralty candidate of Carles, Iloilo
o On August 10, 1998, private respondent Felipe Bernal, Jr., filed a
motion for reconsideration of the above-cited resolution with the
COMELEC en banc.
o On August 12, 1998, an order certifying that the motion for
reconsideration and records of the case were elevated to the
COMELEC en banc was signed by Commissioner Julio F.
Desamito and issued by the Clerk of the Commission.
o Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration and
pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division,
Election Officer Rolando Dalen set the reconvening of the MBC
on August 13, 1998, for the continuation of canvass proceedings
and proclamation of winning candidates for Vice-Mayor and
Municipal Councilors of Carles, Iloilo. No winner for the position of
Mayor was proclaimed since private respondent was able to
present a copy of his motion for reconsideration before the MBC.
The MBC then reset the date for reconvening of the board on
August 17, 1998, after confirming by phone with COMELEC-
Manila that a motion for reconsideration was indeed filed by
private respondent. Thereafter, the MBC ruled that proclamation
of the winning candidate for Mayor would proceed on August
17, 1998 unless private respondent could present a certification
from the COMELEC that the motion for reconsideration was
elevated to the COMELEC en banc.
o On August 17, 1998, despite presentation of the August 12, 1998
order, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the election after
excluding from the canvass the election returns from the three
contested precincts in accordance with the COMELEC Second
Division Resolution. The MBC, with its Vice-Chairman dissenting,
justified its act by reasoning that it did not receive an official copy
of the order directing the elevation of the case to the banc.
o The following day, private respondent immediately filed an
urgent motion to declare void ab initio the proclamation of
petitioner on the ground that the resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division was not yet final and executory. For his part,
petitioner opposed both the motion for reconsideration and
motion to declare void ab initio his proclamation as Mayor of
Carles, asserting that private respondent failed to show palpable
 errors to warrant reconsideration of said resolution and
maintaining, at the same time, that his proclamation was legal
since respondent failed to produce the certification required by
the MBC.
o Meanwhile, on August 25, 1998, the duly-proclaimed Vice-Mayor
Arnold Betita filed an action for quo warranto5 against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 66. Docketed as
Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141, said petition included respondent
Bernal as one of the petitioners together with Vice-Mayor Betita.
o On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed before the COMELEC en
banc a motion to expunge respondent Bernal’s motion for
reconsideration and motion to declare petitioner’s proclamation
void ab initio, on the ground that respondent Bernal should be
deemed to have abandoned said motions by the filing of Spl.
Civil Action No. 98-141 which, according to petitioner, is a formal
election protest via quo warranto brought before the regular
courts.
o In a resolution dated August 24, 1999 but promulgated on March
2, 2000, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion to
expunge, thus:
o WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Second
Division is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the proclamation
of Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. is hereby ANNULLED. A new Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Carles, Iloilo is hereby constituted with the
following members: Atty. Nelia Aureus, Chairman; Atty. Rosel
Abad, Vice-Chairman; and Atty. Manuel Lucero, Third Member –
all of Election Contests and Adjudication Department of the
Commission. They are directed to convene at Session Hall of the
COMELEC – Main Office, Manila on the tenth (10th) day from the
date of promulgation of this Resolution with notice to the parties.
The new board of canvassers shall complete the canvassing of
all the returns and proceed with the proclamation of the true
winner for the position of mayor of Carles, Iloilo. Petitioner Rodolfo
Dumayas, Jr. is hereby directed to cease and desist from
performing the functions of the office of mayor of Carles, Iloilo.
Election Officer Rolando Dalen is hereby directed to bring to the
Commission’s Main Office the election returns of Carles, Iloilo
which need to be canvassed and the other election documents
necessary for the canvassing and proclamation and turn them
over to the new board of canvassers.
o special civil action, petitioner Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr., seeks to
nullify the Resolution promulgated March 2, 2000 by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc, reversing that of
the Second Division dated August 4, 1998, which annulled the
petitioner’s proclamation as Municipal Mayor of Carles, Iloilo.
o Issues
▪ Should respondent Bernal, who was named as petitioner
in the quo warranto proceedings commenced before the
regular court, be deemed to have abandoned the
motions he had filed with respondent Commission?
▪ Did the COMELEC err in ordering the inclusion of the
contested election returns in the canvassing of ballots?
▪ In view of the retirement of Commissioners Gorospe and
Guiani before the date of the promulgation of the assailed
resolution on March 2, 2000, should said resolution be
deemed null and void for being violative of Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution?
 oJamil vs. Commission on Elections,
▪ we held that a decision becomes binding only after its
promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge or
member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or
registered his vote has vacated office, his vote on the
decision must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled.
Accordingly, the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and
Guiani should merely be considered as withdrawn for the
reason that their retirement preceded the resolution’s
promulgation. The effect of the withdrawal of their votes
would be as if they had not signed the resolution at all and
only the votes of the remaining commissioners would be
properly considered for the purpose of deciding the
controversy.
o As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition
for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-
proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of
one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to
inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity
of his proclamation.
o Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain
exceptions, as where:
f. the board of canvassers was improperly constituted;
g. quo warranto was not the proper remedy;
h. what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or
an election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation;
i. the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest
was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-
proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and
j. the proclamation was null and void
o Samad vs. COMELEC,
▪ we explained that a petition for quo warranto under the
Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or
ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to
unseat the respondent from office but not necessarily to
install the petitioner in his place. An election protest is a
contest between the defeated and winning candidates on
the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting and
counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of the returns.
It raises the question of who actually obtained the plurality
of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the
office.
o Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact by the COMELEC,
or any other administrative agency exercising particular
expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on this Court.18 In a
pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the
COMELEC are not required to look beyond or behind the election
returns which are on their face regular and authentic. Where a
party seeks to raise issues the resolution of which would
necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns
which are prima facie regular, the proper remedy is a regular
election protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy.19
o petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, public respondent having
committed no grave abuse of discretion.
o Its challenged resolution dated August 24, 1999 is AFFIRMED
o Guevara vs COMELEC (G.R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958)
▪ The Commission on Elections, after proper negotiations, awarded to the
National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co.,
Inc. (ACME), and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to
manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot
boxes
▪ The Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the latter to
sign the contract within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and
the ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the
ACME.
▪ The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on May 16, 1957.
▪ Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration of
the resolution of the Commission
▪ May 14, 1957 which, after hearing, was denied by the Commission in its
resolution of May 16, 1957
▪ second petition was filed on May 16, 1957 and was denied on May 17, 1957
▪ third petition was filed on May 20, 1957
▪ The Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter
▪ The Commission issued its resolution denying the third motion for
reconsideration
▪ The article signed by petitioner was published in the June 2, 1957 issue of the
Sunday Times, a newspaper of nation-wide circulation
▪ Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday
Times issue of June 2, 1957 an article entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit“
▪ tended to interfere with and influence the Commission on Elections and its
members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending investigation and
determination before said body
▪ tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive
constitutional function of this Commission and its Chairman Domingo Imperial
and Member Sixto Brillantes in the administration of all the laws relative to the
conduct of elections."
▪ Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
▪ Issue
• Whether the Commission on Elections has the power and jurisdiction to
conduct contempt proceedings against Petitioner
▪ Ruling
• The Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to submit
petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him
because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under
consideration.
• "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to
the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and,
consequently, in the administration of justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Director
of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U. S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off.
Gaz. 2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944).
• The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary
incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of
Prisons, Ibid.).
• Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to
making effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 P.,
271).
• And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance
of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs.
Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts vs. Hacney, 58 S.W.,
810).
 • Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in
controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a
ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its
administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained
by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a
ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the
case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as
postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.
Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC
➢ Section 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions
o two (2) Divisions
o protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional
remedies, contempt, and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizen's
arms of the Commission
➢ Section 4. Composition of a Division
o three Commissioners, one of whom shall be the Presiding Commissioner
o Commission en banc shall determine who shall compose a Division
➢ Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required
o When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum
▪ majority of the Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling
o When sitting in Division, two (2) Members of a Division shall constitute a quorum
▪ concurrence of at least two (2) Members of a Division shall be necessary to
reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling
o Required number is not obtained, automatically elevated to the Commission en banc
for decision or resolution.
o Motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be
resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the
division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order.
➢ Rule 6 - Commencement of Action or Proceedings
o Section 1. Commencement of Action or Proceedings by Parties
▪ Any natural or juridical person authorized by these rules to initiate any action or
proceeding
▪ protest or petition alleging
▪ personal circumstances
▪ jurisdictional facts
▪ ultimate facts constituting his cause or causes of action
▪ relief sought
▪ general prayer for such further or other relief as may be deemed just or
equitable.
o Section 2. Commencement of Action by the Commission
▪ motu proprio
▪ order for hearing
▪ purpose for which the hearing is being called for
▪ concise statement of facts giving rise thereto
➢ Rule 10 - Periods for Pleading
o Answer
▪ 5 days (ordinary actions, special reliefs, and special proceedings0
▪ 3 days (special actions and special cases)
o Counter-protest, or a counterclaim
▪ 5 days
o Reply
▪ 5 days
➢ Rule 13 - Prohibited Pleadings
o Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed. - The following pleadings are not allowed:
a. motion to dismiss;
b. motion for a bill of particulars;
 c. motion for extension of time to file memorandum or brief;
d. motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision
except in election offense cases;
e. motion for re-opening or re-hearing of a
f. reply in special actions and in special cases; and
g. supplemental pleadings in special actions and in special cases
o Section 3. Oral Testimony Dispensed with Where Proceedings are Summary. –
▪ When the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies,
the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit their position paper
together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence;
and when there is a need for clarification of certain matters, at the discretion
of the Commission or the Division, the parties may be allowed to cross-examine
the affiants.
➢ Rule 18 - Decisions
o Section 1. Procedure in Making Decisions. –
▪ The conclusions of the Commission in any case submitted to it for decision en
banc or in Division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned
by raffle to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Commission or the
Division and a certification to this effect signed by the Chairman or the
Presiding Commissioner, as the case may be, shall be incorporated in the
decision. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a
decision or resolution must state the reason therefor.
o Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. - When the Commission en banc is
equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be
reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall
be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters,
the petition or motion shall be denied.
o Section 7. Period to Decide by the Commission En Banc
▪ thirty (30) days from the date it is seemed submitted for decision or resolution
▪ motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of a Division in Special
Actions and Special Cases - fifteen (15) days
o Section 8. Period to Decide by a Division
▪ ten (10) days from the date it is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
▪ Special Actions and Special Cases - five (5) days
o Section 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions
▪ Commission en Banc
• ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special
reliefs - thirty (30) days from its promulgation
• Special Actions and Special Cases - five (5) days
▪ Division
• Special actions and Special cases - five (5) days
• All other actions or proceedings - fifteen (15) days
➢ Rule 19 - Motions for Reconsideration
o Section 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration
▪ five (5) days from the promulgation thereof
o Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of
▪ Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours notify the Presiding
Commissioner
▪ within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc
o Section 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar Motion for Resolution
▪ Clerk of Court calendar the motion within ten (10) days from the certification
o ORDINARY ACTIONS
▪ Election Protests
▪ Quo warranto
▪ Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest Cases
o SPECIAL ACTIONS
 ▪ Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy
▪ Proceedings Against Nuisance Candidates
▪ Disqualification of Candidates
▪ Postponement or Suspension of Elections
o SPECIAL CASES
▪ Pre-Proclamation Controversies
o SPECIAL RELIEFS
▪ Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
▪ Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
o PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
▪ Injunction
o SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
▪ Annulment of Permanent List of Voters
▪ Registration of Political Parties or Organization
▪ Accreditation of Citizens' Arms of the Commission
o ELECTION OFFENSES
▪ Prosecution of Election Offenses
➢ Rule 37 - Review of Decisions of the Commission
o Section 1. Petition for Certiorari; and Time to File
▪ thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
o Section 2. Non-reviewable Decisions
▪ Decisions in appeals from courts of general or limited jurisdiction in election
cases relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of municipal and
barangay officials
o Section 3. Decisions Final After Five Days (from promulgation)
▪ pre-proclamation cases
▪ petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy
▪ petitions to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a
candidate
▪ Petition to postpone or suspend elections
➢ Cua vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 80519-21 December 17,1987)
o First Division of the COMELEC
▪ rendered a 2-1 decision on August 10, 1987, favoring the herein petitioner Cua
but nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone
congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous vote required
by the procedural rules in COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 dated May 2, 1984
o COMELEC en banc
▪ motion for reconsideration/appeal filed by private respondent Puzon
▪ three members voted to sustain the First Division, with two dissenting and one
abstaining (one member having died earlier).
o Cua moved for his proclamation - granted his motion
o Cua took his oath the same day
o Urgent motion to suspend Cua's proclamation or to annul or suspend its effect if
already made filed by Puzon
o COMELEC set the motion for hearing - restraining telegram enjoining Cua from
assuming the office of member of the House of Representatives
o Supreme Court
▪ Petition to enjoin the COMELEC from acting on the said motion and enforcing
its restraining order
o Ruling
o The 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm the
First Division constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated and voted
thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional
provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited
decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his seat in the House of
Representatives.
 o Article IX-A. Section 7 of the new Constitution
▪ Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case
or matter brought before it."
o Petition is GRANTED
o Public respondent is enjoined from further proceeding with the private respondent's
motion dated November 10, 1987.
o The restraining order issued by the COMELEC on November 14, 1987, enjoining
petitioner from assuming office as member of the House of Representatives for the
lone congressional district of Quirino is LIFTED.
o This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Certificate of Candidacy
➢ Section 73. Certificate of candidacy. –
o No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
o prior to the election, withdraw - written declaration under oath
o certificate of candidacy for more than one office
▪ not eligible for any of them
▪ declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel
the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices
➢ Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy
o the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office
o Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities,
highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent
o political party
o civil status
o date of birth
o Residence
o post office address
o profession or occupation
o he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto
o he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities
o he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country
o the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion
o the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge
➢ Section 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt
o Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by
the Commission or the board of election inspectors
➢ Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another
o after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy
o official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause
o person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate
of candidacy to replace the candidate
o substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected
o If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
election inspectors or the Commission (national)
➢ Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
o verified petition
o material representation (Section 74)
o at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy
 o decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election
➢ Section 79. Definitions. - As used in this Code:
a. The term "candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public
office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties
➢ Rulloda vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003)
o Barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were
the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan.
o On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away at the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center.1
o His widow, petitioner Petronila "Betty" Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on
Elections on June 25, 2002 seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband.
o Petitioner’s request was supported by the Appeal-Petition containing several
signatures of people purporting to be members of the electorate of Barangay Sto.
Tomas.
o On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the
Chairman and Members of the Barangay Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas as
follows:
o Just in case the names "BETTY" or "PETRONILA" or the surname "RULLODA" is written on
the ballot, read the same as it is written but add the words "NOT COUNTED" like "BETTY
NOT COUNTED" or "RULLODA NOT COUNTED."
o Petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio Placido received 290 votes.
o Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.
o After the elections, petitioner learned that the COMELEC, acting on the separate
requests of Andres Perez Manalaysay and Petronila Rulloda to be substituted as
candidates for Barangay Chairman of Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija
and Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, respectively, issued Resolution
No. 5217 dated July 13, 2002 which states:
o PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to ADOPT
the recommendation of the Law Department as follows:
1. To deny due course the Certificates of Candidacy of ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY
and PETRONILA S. RULLODA; and
2. To direct the Election Officer of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and San Jacinto,
Pangasinan to delete the name of ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY, candidate for
Barangay Chairman in Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija; and the name
of PETRONILA S. RULLODA, candidate for Barangay Captain in Barangay Sto.
Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
o Section 9, COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 dated May 23, 2002
▪ Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. – There shall be no substitution of candidates
for barangay and Sangguniang kabataan officials.
o Petition for certiorari
▪ annul Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217, both of the
COMELEC, insofar as they prohibited petitioner from running as substitute
candidate in lieu of her deceased husband
▪ nullify the proclamation of respondent
▪ proclaim her as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San
Jacinto, Pangasinan
o Ruling
▪ Contrary to respondent’s claim, the absence of a specific provision governing
substitution of candidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a
prohibition against said substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be
read into the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason
to allow the substitution of candidates where no political parties are involved
than when political considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must
have been subsumed by law.
 ▪ Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to
stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election
contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.(Carlos v. Angeles, supra., citing Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 436,
442 [1994])
▪ Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural
barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the
true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court
frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only
the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results. (O’Hara v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 148941-42,
March 12, 2002)
▪ Petition granted
• The assailed Resolution No. 5217 of the Commission on Elections, insofar
as it denied due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy - NULL
and VOID.
• The proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido as Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan - SET ASIDE
• Board of Canvassers of the said Barangay is ORDERED to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Barangay Chairman
➢ Hayudini vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014)
o On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position
of Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections
o Ten days after, or on October 15, 2012, Mustapha J. Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to
Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s CoC
o Hayudini should be disqualified for making false representation regarding his
residence
o Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian
when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City
o Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
▪ Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay
Bintawlan, South Ubian (November 30, 2012 )
▪ granted on January 31, 2013
o COMELEC’s First Division
▪ On that same day, dismissed Omar’s earlier petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC
for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false representation
as to his residency.
o RTC
▪ Reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered the deletion of Hayudini’s name in
Barangay Bintawlan’s permanent list of voters (March 8, 2013)
o COMELEC
▪ Omar filed a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S.
Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening Event (March 26, 2013)
o Court of Appeals (CA)
▪ Hayudini appealed the March 8, 2013 RTC decision (April 17, 20130
▪ denied
▪ On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi.
He was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.
o COMELEC Second Division
▪ Resolution granting Omar’s second petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC (June
20, 2013).
▪ Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations directed to constitute a
Special Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the lawful winner
for mayoralty position
▪ Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc
 ▪ Second Division committed grave error when it gave due course to a belatedly
filed petition and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as a supervening
event
• denied (July 10, 2013)
▪ Proclamation of HAYUDINI is hereby declared null and void and without any
legal force and effect
▪ OMAR proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor
▪ Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65,
▪ set aside and annul the assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), which cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy
o Issues
▪ Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
▪ FAILED TO OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS THE INSTANT PETITION TO CANCEL CERTIFICATE
OF CANDIDACY DUE TO SUPERVENING EVENT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF
RESPONDENT OMAR TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF
SECTIONS 2 AND 4 OF THE COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 9532.
▪ REVISITED AND MODIFIED THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY RESOLUTION ISSUED BY THE
FIRST DIVISION
▪ RESOLVED TO CANCEL PETITIONER HAYUDINI’S CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
AND DECLARE HIS PROCLAMATION AS NULL AND VOID.
▪ DECREED THE PROCLAMATION OF SALMA A. OMAR AS THE DULY-ELECTED
MAYOR FOR SOUTH UBIAN, TAWI-TAWI
o Section 2. Period to File Petition. — The Petition must be filed within five (5) days from
the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy; but not later than twenty five (25)
days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy subject of the Petition. In
case of a substitute candidate, the Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the
time the substitute candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.
▪ Here, Hayudini filed his CoC on October 5, 2012, which was also the last day of
filing of CoC
▪ Omar, on the other hand, filed the subject petition only on March 26, 2013.
▪ Omar’s petition was filed way beyond the prescribed period.
▪ Likewise, he failed to provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was
not served personally to Hayudini
o Section 4. Procedure to be observed. — Both parties shall observe the following
procedure:
1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a copy of the Petition,
through personal service to the respondent. In cases where personal
service is not feasible, or the respondent refuses to receive the Petition, or
the respondents’ whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the petitioner shall
execute an affidavit stating the reason or circumstances therefor and resort
to registered mail as a mode of service. The proof of service or the affidavit
shall be attached to the Petition to be filed
o As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed
in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated
by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for
an indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is
imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner
but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside
technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action.
o Tolentino v.Commission on Elections and De Castro v. Commission on Elections
▪ "in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect
the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by
procedural rules in resolving election disputes."
o Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its
rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition
of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the
 effective and efficient implementation of its objectives − ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just,
expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election
contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private
and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling
the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has
the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the
people truly chose as their rightful leader.(Violago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194143,
October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA 516, 525)
o Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate
is eligible to run for public office when in truth he is not, is a false material
representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
o Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector
which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his
date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession
or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders,
and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by
his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.
o Sec. 78.Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
o The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material fact,
not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot
run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted
for violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for
elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's
status as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement
which must be reflected in the CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he
or she wins, will work for and represent the local government under which he or she is
running.(Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590)
o Even the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in the instant case, that the
candidate was qualified.(Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120,
179132-33, and 179240-41, April 1, 2009, 583 SCRA 1)
o Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must
consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be made with a malicious
intent to deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's qualifications for public
office.(Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590)
o Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible for
said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a
candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the
municipality where he intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in his
certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate
 clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support a petition under
Section 78.
o A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification
case.(Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590)
o The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the candidate whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled as stray votes.(Section 9 of Rule 23,
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523)
o If the disqualification or CoC cancellation or denial case is not resolved before the
election day, the proceedings shall continue even after the election and the
proclamation of the winner. Meanwhile, the candidate may be voted for and even be
proclaimed as the winner, but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and
cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise applies even if the candidate facing
disqualification has already taken his oath of office.(Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590)
o The only exception to this rule is in the case of congressional and senatorial
candidates where the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate
or the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the candidates have been
proclaimed, taken the proper oath, and also assumed office
o Aratea v. COMELEC (case for cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code)
▪ a cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Whether a certificate of candidacy
is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial, because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. We then found that
since the winning mayoralty candidate's certificate of candidacy was void ab
initio, he was never a candidate at all and all his votes were considered stray
votes, and thus, proclaimed the second placer, the only qualified candidate,
who actually garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor.
o petition is DISMISSED.
o The COMELEC Resolutions dated June 20, 2013 and July 10, 2013 AFFIRMED
➢ Nuisance Candidates
o Section 69. Nuisance candidates. –
▪ The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested
party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is
shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity
of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts
which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to
run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. (Omnibus
Election Code)
o Timbol vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015)
▪ Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee
"a constitutional right to run for or hold public office[.]"36 To run for public office
is a mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed by law."37 Among these
limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates. Nuisance candidates are
persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity
of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts
which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run
for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."
▪ Pamatong v. Commission on Elections
• . . . The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral
exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State
 takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections.
Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These
practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the
conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial
actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships,
whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not
merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in
our democratic institutions. . . .
▪ To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their
certificates of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by
respondent. This denial or cancellation may be "motu proprio or upon a verified
petition of an interested party," "subject to an opportunity to be heard."
➢ De la Cruz vs COMELEC, 2012
o Fermin v. COMELEC
▪ This Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a
petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC)
under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different rules and have
distinct outcomes.
▪ To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised
on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under
Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as
a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
o Miranda v. Abaya,
▪ A candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted
under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until
disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or
cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never
considered a candidate.
▪ (5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly
where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate
shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion
for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not
be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide
candidate.
o The rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate
declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has
the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in favor
of the latter, remains a good law.
o A petition to cancel or deny a COC under Section 69 of the OEC should be
distinguished from a petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of
such cancellation of a COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a
candidate disqualified on grounds provided in the OEC and Local Government
Code.
o Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal G.R. No. 189034, January 12,
2010, 610 SCRA 53
▪ Laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of
ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.
Pre-proclamation Controversy
➢ Section 241. Definition.
 o A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by
any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or
directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and
236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
the election returns
➢ Section 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy
a. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
b. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
c. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or
they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
d. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or
candidates
➢ Ututalum vs COMELEC, 1990
o Petitioner Ututalum and private respondent, Arden S. Anni, were among the
candidates in the last 30 May 1987 Congressional elections for the Second District of
Sulu. 30 May was the date reset by the COMELEC from the 11 May 1987 elections.
o The election returns from Siasi showed that Petitioner Ututalum obtained 482 votes
while respondent Anni received 35,581 votes out of the 39,801 registered voters
o If the returns of Siasi were excluded, Petitioner Ututalum would have a lead of 5,301
votes.
o On 4 June 1987, during the canvass of votes, Petitioner Ututalum, without availing of
verbal objections, filed written objections to the returns from Siasi on the ground that
they "appear to be tampered with or falsified" owing to the "great excess of votes"
appearing in said returns.
o claimed that multiplying the 42 precincts of Siasi by 300 voters per precinct, there
should have been only 12,600 registered voters and not 36,663 voters who cast their
votes, thereby exceeding the actual authorized voters by 23,947 "ghost voters." (In his
Petition, however, he admits that an error was committed since "in the May 30,1987
elections, Siasi had 148 precincts".
o prayed for the exclusion from the canvass of any election returns from Siasi.
o Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu dismissed petitioner's objections
o "filed out of time or only after the Certificate of Canvass had already been canvassed
by the Board
o grounds for the objection were not one of those enumerated in Section 243 of the
Election Code"
o Also on the same day, 4 June 1987, petitioner filed with the Board of Canvassers his
Notice of Appeal from said Resolution to the COMELEC.
o COMELEC(5 June 1987)
▪ 1stPetition seeking a declaration of failure of elections in the Municipality of
Siasi and other mentioned municipalities
• that the COMELEC annul the elections in Siasi and conduct another
election thereat and order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to desist
from proclaiming any candidate pending a final determination of the
Petition.
• Decision : no failure of elections in the 1st and 2nd Districts of Sulu except
in specified precincts in the 1st District
▪ 2ndPetition
• praying for the annulment of Respondent Anni's proclamation and for
his own proclamation as Congressman for the Second District of Sulu.
o While those two petitions were pending, one LupayLoong, a candidate for Governor
of Sulu, filed a verified Petition with the COMELEC to annul the List of Voters of Siasi, for
purposes of the election of local government officials (docketed as SPC Case No. 87-
 624, p. 9, Rollo). This Petition was opposed by Respondent Anni. Petitioner Ututalum
was not a party to this proceeding.
o On 16 January 1988, the COMELEC issued, in said SPC 87-624, a Resolution annulling
the Siasi List of Voters "on the ground of massive irregularities committed in the
preparation thereof and being statistically improbable", and ordering a new
registration of voters for the local elections of 15 February 1988 (p. 41 Rollo).
o Said Resolution was affirmed by this Court in Anni vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 81398, 26
January 1988 (p. 43, Rollo). A new Registry List was subsequently prepared yielding
only 12,555 names (p. 228, Rollo).
o Supplemental pleading
▪ such annulment be considered and applied by the Commission in resolving his
two Petitions against Respondent Anni
o COMELEC (First Division)
▪ denied Petitioner Ututalum's two Petitions "for lack of merit
▪ While we believe that there was padding of the registry list of voters in Siasi, yet
to annul all the votes in this municipality for purposes of the May 30, 1987
elections would disenfranchise the good or valid votes.
o Espaldon vs. Comelec (G.R. No. L-78987, August 25, 1987)
▪ Padded voter's list, massive fraud and terrorism is clearly not among the issues
that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. They are proper grounds
for an election protest.
o Bautista vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 78994, March 10, 1988:
▪ The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated
under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of
the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy is restrictive
and exclusive
o Bashier vs. COMELEC (L-33692, 24 February 1972, 43 SCRA 238)
▪ The subsequent annulment of the voting list in a separate proceeding
initiated motu proprio by the Commission and in which the protagonists here
were not parties, cannot retroactively and without due process result in
nullifying accepted election returns in a previous election simply because such
returns came from municipalities where the precinct books of voters were
ordered annulled due to irregularities in their preparation.
o Padilla vs. COMELEC (L-68351-52, 9 July 1985, 137 SCRA 424), reiterated in Baldo
vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 83205,14 July 1988)
▪ Where the respondent had already been proclaimed as the elected
representative of the contested congressional district, and has long assumed
office and has been exercising the powers, functions, and duties appurtenant
to said office, the remedy of the petitioner lies with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The pre-proclamation controversy becomes
moot and academic.
o Antonio vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 84678, 29 March 1989):
▪ Where the winning candidates have been proclaimed, the pre-proclamation
controversies cease. A pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this
point in time and should be dismissed. The proper remedy thereafter is an
election protest before the proper forum. Recourse to such remedy would
settle the matter in controversy conclusively and once and for all.
Failure of Election
➢ Section 6 Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or
after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election
 not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect. (Omnibus Election Code)
➢ Section 45. Postponement or failure of election. - When for any serious cause such as
violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure,
and other analogous causes of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any barangay, the Commission, upon a verified
petition of an interested party and after due notice and hearing at which the interested
parties are given equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein for such
time as it may deem necessary.
o If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes,
the election in any barangay has not been held on the date herein fixed or has been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting therein and such
failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission, on the basis of a verified petition of an interested party, and after due
notice and hearing, at which the interested parties are given equal opportunity to be
heard shall call for the holding or continuation of the election within thirty days after it
shall have verified and found that the cause or causes for which the election has been
postponed or suspended have ceased to exist or upon petition of at least thirty
percent of the registered voters in the barangay concerned.
➢ Basher vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 139028, April 12, 2000)
o Petition praying that the election be declared a failure.
o no election was conducted in place and at the time prescribed by law,
o there was a dispute that day (August 30, 1997) among the candidates regarding the
venue of the election in the lone voting precinct of the barangay
o In order to avoid bloodshed, they ultimately agreed that no election would be
conducted. Accordingly, the election officer turned over for safekeeping the ballot
box containing election paraphernalia to the acting station commander (OIC) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
o The following day, petitioner and the third candidate were surprised to learn that the
election officer had directed the Board of Election Tellers to conduct the election and
to fill up the election returns and certificates of canvass on the night of August 30, 1997
at the residence of the former mayor
o no announcement to hold the election at the former mayor's house that night was
ever made
o Comelec
o dismissed the Petition.
o ruled against a failure of election because the two conditions laid down in Mitmug
v. Comelec were not established
▪ the "election was conducted on the scheduled date. The precinct functioned.
Actual voting took place, and it resulted not in a failure to elect."
o Petition
▪ assails the Resolution of the Commission on Elections which dismissed a Petition
to Declare a Failure of Election and to Call Special Election in Precinct No. 12,
Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur.
o Issues
▪ Whether or not the election held at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening of
August 30, 1997 after the Acting Election Officer had verbally declared or
announced a failure of election in Precinct No. 12, Barangay Maidan, Tugaya,
Lanao del Sur is contrary to law, rule and jurisprudence;
▪ Whether or not the election held at the residence of an Ex-mayor far from the
designated Polling Place of Precinct No. 12, Barangay Maidan, Tugaya,
Lanaodel Sur is legal or valid;
▪ Whether or not the proclamation of the private respondent as the duly elected
Punong Barangay of Barangay Maidan and the seven (7) Barangay is illegal,
null and void ab initio.
o Mitmug v. Comelec,
 ▪ A failure of election requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely
i. no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law,
or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and
ii. the votes not cast would have affected the result of the election.
▪ The peculiar set of facts in the present case show not merely a failure of
election but the absence of a valid electoral exercise
▪ Section 42 of the Omnibus Election Code
• "[t]he chairman of the board of election tellers shall designate the public
school or any other public building within the barangay to be used as
polling place in case the barangay has one election precinct . . .. "
o The election of officials for said barangay was held at the residence of former Mayor
Alang Sagusara Pukunun, which is located at Barangay Pandarianao, instead of the
officially designated polling precinct at Cagayan Elementary School
o The place where the voting was conducted was illegal.
▪ "[t]he casting of votes shall start at seven o'clock in the morning and shall end
at three o'clock in the afternoon, except when there are voters present within
thirty meters in front of the polling place who have not yet cast their votes, in
which case the voting shall continue but only to allow said voters to cast their
votes without interruption." 15
o Section 22, Article IV of Comelec Resolution No. 2971 also specifies that the voting
hours shall start promptly at 7:00 a.m. and end at 3:00 p.m. of the same day.
o However, the "election" for Barangay Maidan officials was supposed to have been
held after 9:00 p.m. of August 30, 1997 until the wee hours of the following day.
o Voting Time Was Likewise Irregular
o Section 2 of RA 6679,
▪ "[w]hen for any serious cause such as rebellion, insurrection, violence, terrorism,
loss or destruction of election paraphernalia, and any analogous causes of
such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should
become impossible in any barangay, the Commission on Election motu
proprio or upon sworn petition of ten (10) registered voters of a barangay, after
summary proceedings of the existence of such grounds, shall suspend or
postpone the election therein to a date reasonably close to the date of the
election that is not held or is suspended or postponed, or which resulted in a
failure to elect, but not later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the
cause for such suspension or postponement of the election or failure to elect,
and in all cases not later than ninety (90) days from the date of the original
election."
o As election officer, she has no authority to declare a failure of election. Indeed, only
the Comelec itself has legal authority to exercise such awesome power. An election
officer alone, or even with the agreement of the candidates, cannot validly postpone
or suspend the elections.
o She did not conduct any proceeding, summary or otherwise, to find out whether any
of the legal grounds for the suspension or postponement or the declaration of failure
of the election actually existed in the barangay concerned.
o Hassan v. Comelec
▪ the notice given on the afternoon of the election day resetting the election to
the following day and transferring its venue was "too short."
▪ "[t]o require the voters to come to the polls on such short notice was highly
impracticable. . . . It is essential to the validity of the election that the voters
have notice in some form, either actual or constructive, of the time, place and
purpose thereof. The time for holding it must be authoritatively designated in
advance."
▪ In the case at bar, the announcement was made only minutes before the
supposed voting. If one-day notice was held to be insufficient in Hassan, the
much shorter notice in the present case should all the more be declared
wanting. It should in fact be equated with "no notice."
▪ Petition is GRANTED
 ▪assailed Resolution SET ASIDE.
▪The proclamation of private respondent as punong barangay is declared
VOID.
➢ Canicosa vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 120318 December 5, 1997)
o RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were
candidates for mayor in Calamba, Laguna, during the 8 May
1995 elections.
o After obtaining a majority of some 24,000 votes1 Lajara was
proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
o Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
▪ Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to Declare Null
and Void the Canvass and Proclamation
o Clearly, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of
election may be declared, namely:
d. the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
e. the election in any polling place had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or
f. after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure. violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes.
o None of the grounds invoked by Canicosa falls under any of
those enumerated.
o the names of the registered voters in the various precincts did not
appear in their respective lists of voters.
o Fifteen (15) days before the regular elections on 8 May 1995 the
final list of voters was posted in each precinct pursuant to Sec.
148 of R.A. No. 7166.
o Remedy: petition for inclusion of registered voters with the regular
courts.
o The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters
involves the right to vote3 which is not within the power and
authority of COMELEC to rule upon. The determination of whether
one has the right to vote is a justiciable issue properly cognizable
by our regular courts.
o Section 138, Art. XII, of the Omnibus Election Code states;
▪ Sec. 138. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases. —
The municipal and metropolitan trial courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of
inclusion and exclusion of voters from the list in their
respective municipalities or cities. Decisions of the
municipal or metropolitan trial courts may be appealed
directly by the aggrieved party to the proper regional trial
court within five days from receipts of notice thereof,
otherwise said decision of the municipal or metropolitan
trial court shall decide the appeal within ten days from the
time the appeal was received and its decision shall be
immediately final and executory. No motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained by the courts (Sec. 37,
PD 1896, as amended).
o Remedy : verified complaint seeking the annulment of the book
of voters
o Sec. 10, of R.A. No. 7166:
▪ Sec. 10. Annulment of the List of Voters. — Any book of
voters the preparation of which has been affected with
fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force
or any other similar irregularity or which is statistically
improbable may be annulled after due notice and hearing
by the Commission motu propio or after the filing of a
verified complaint: Provided, that no order, ruling or
decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed
within sixty (60) days before an election.
o the permanent list of voters as finally corrected before the
election remains conclusive on the question as to who had the
right to vote in that election, although not in subsequent elections.
o more than one-half (1/2) of the legitimate registered voters were
not able to vote, instead, strangers voted in their behalf.
o Remedy: watcher is empowered by law to challenge any illegal
voter
o Secs.199 and 202, Art. XVII, of the Omnibus Election Code,
provide:
▪ Sec. 199.Challenges of illegal voters. — (a) Any voter, or
watcher may challenge any person offering to vote for not
being registered, for using the name of another or suffering
from existing disqualification. In such case, the board of
election inspectors shall satisfy itself as to whether or not
the ground for the challenge is true by requiring proof of
registration or identity of the voter . . .
▪ Sec. 202.Record of challenges and oaths. — The poll clerk
shall keep a prescribed record of challenges and oaths
taken in connection therewith and the resolution of the
board of election inspectors in each case and, upon the
termination of the voting, shall certify that it contains all the
challenges made . . .
o he was credited with less votes than he actually received and
that the control date of the election returns was not filled up
o Remedy: Protest by the watchers before the Board of Election
Inspectors
o Section 179, Art. XV, of the Omnibus Election Code clearly
provides for the rights and duties of watchers —
▪ Sec. 179.Rights and duties of watchers. — . . . The watchers
. . . shall have the right to witness and inform themselves of
the proceedings of the board of election inspectors . . . to
file a protest against any irregularity or violation of law
which they believe may have been committed by the
board of election inspectors or by any of its members or
by any persons, to obtain from the board of election
inspectors
a certificates as to the filing of such protest and/or of the
resolution thereon . . . and to be furnished with a certificate
of the number of votes in words and figures cast for each
candidate, duly signed and thumbmarked by the
chairman and all the members of the board of election
inspectors . . .
o Remedy: petition for correction of election returns with COMELEC
by all or a majority of the members of the board of election
inspectors or any candidate affected by the error or mistake.
o the election returns were delivered late and the ballot boxes
brought to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer unsecured, i.e.,
without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals
o These bare allegations cannot impel us to declare failure of
election. Assuming that the election returns were delivered late,
we still cannot see why we should declare a failure to elect. The
late deliveries did not convert the election held in Calamba into
a mockery or farce to make us conclude that there was indeed
a failure of election.
o In fine, the grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition do not fall
under any of the instances enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
o Mitmug v. Commission on Elections
▪ before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to
declare a failure of election, at least two (2) conditions
must concur:
c. no voting has taken place in the precincts on the date
fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election
nevertheless resulted in failure to elect; and,
d. the votes that were not cast would affect the result of
the election.
o From the face of the instant petition, it is readily apparent than an
election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect.
o Clearly, all these matters require the exercise by the COMELEC of
its administrative functions. Section 2, Art. IX-C, of the 1987
Constitution grants extensive administrative powers to the
COMELEC with regard to the enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections.
o Sec. 52 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, states:
▪ Sec. 52.Powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections. — In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections of the purposes of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections . . .
o Quite obviously, it is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear
and decide cases first by Division and then, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is
jurisdictional.
o Castromayor v. Commission on Elections thus
▪ It should be pinpointed out, in this connection, that what is
involved here is a simple problem of arithmetic. The
Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of
the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the
election returns. In making the correction in computation,
the MBC will be acting in an administrative capacity,
under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Hence,
any question pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC
may be raised directly to the COMELEC en banc in the
exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions
affecting elections.
o Rule 27, Sec. 7, of the Comelec Rules of Procedure that any party
dissatisfied with the ruling of the board of canvassers shall have a
right to appeal to the COMELEC en banc:
 ▪ Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of
Results by the Board of Canvassers. — (a) Where it is
clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors
were committed in the tabulation or tallying or election
returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing
as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct
or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass were
tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election
returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated
separately, (3) there was a mistake in the adding or
copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into
the statement of votes by precinct, or (4) so-called
election returns from non-existent precincts were included
in the canvass, the board may motu proprio, or upon
verified petition by any candidate, political party,
organization or coalition of political parties, after due
notice and hearing, correct the errors committed . . . (h)
The appeal shall be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc.
o WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by
public respondent Commission on Elections, the petition is
DISMISSED and its Resolution en banc of 23 May 1995 dismissing
the petition before it on the ground that the allegations therein
did not justify a declaration of failure of election is AFFIRMED.
Petition for Disqualification
➢ Section 12 Disqualifications.
o Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate
and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
o This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had
been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of
sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.(Omnibus
Election Code)
➢ Section 68. Disqualifications. –
o Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
▪ given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt
the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
▪ committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
▪ spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this
Code;
▪ solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95,
96, 97 and 104; or
▪ violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has been elected, from holding the office.
o Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
➢ Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
 a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
b. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
c. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic
d. Those with dual citizenship;
e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right the effectivity of this Code; and
g. The insane or feeble-minded
➢ Abundo vs COMELEC, 2013
o For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010
national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes.
o 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty
candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor.
o 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially
proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the
functions of the office of mayor.
o Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June
30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
o May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When
Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this
electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run
predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.
o June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding for Abundo, who
in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes and was accordingly proclaimed 2010
mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.
o Regional Trial Court
▪ May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted
disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private
respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto action to
unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to
disqualify.
▪ declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor
▪ Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,10 found Abundo to have already served three
consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and,
hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term.
▪ Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004
elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and actually
served as Viga mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9,
2006 to June 30, 2007, to be exact.
▪ The year and a month service constitutes a complete and full service of
Abundo’s second term as mayor.
o COMELEC’s Second Division
▪ decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac, Catanduanes is AFFIRMED
and the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
▪ ruled against Abundo on the strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of
the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an
election protest is considered as service for one full term within the
contemplation of the three-term limit rule.
o COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration
o Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
▪ assails and seeks to nullify
 1. the February 8, 2012 Resolution1 of the Second Division, Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and
2. the May 10, 2012 Resolution2 of the COMELEC en banc affirming that
division’s disposition.
▪ The assailed issuances, in turn, affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case
No. 55 declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in
the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes.
o Core Issue:
▪ Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms; or
▪ Whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official
arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election
protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application
of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.
o Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
▪ Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. he service of
a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being
declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as
full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive
term limit for elective local officials.
o Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991
▪ Sec. 43. Term of Office. —
• (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
o To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the
aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must
concur:
1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and
2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms.31
o Prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or
involuntary interruption
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely
assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his
service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be
treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and
statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term
limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his
assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation
of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not
seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall
election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had
become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election,
a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
a. Prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or
involuntary interruption
 3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to
a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of
service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s
continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period
of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office
during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
a. Prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or
involuntary interruption
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes
office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted
from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the
unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida
and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or
for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time,
provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service
(Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final
after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election
contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the
term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in
the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came
after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
➢ The two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be
considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of
the three-term limit rule
➢ Petition is PARTLY GRANTED
o the assailed February 8, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections Second
Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC
(AE) No. A-25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac,
Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
➢ Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly
ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O.
Cervantes are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and shall revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor
and First Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.
➢ The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.
➢ This Decision is immediately executory.
Quo Warranto
➢ Section 253. Petition for quo warranto.
o Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
o Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground
of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition
for quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court,
respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
➢ Bengzon III vs HRET (G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001)
o Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
o On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States.
o As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No.
63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
o Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased
by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in
the U.S. Marine Corps.
o On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.
o He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan
in the May 11, 1998 elections.
o He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III,
who was then running for re-election
o House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
o Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam
▪ respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article
VI, section 6 of the Constitution
o Decision
▪ dismissing the petition for quo warranto
▪ declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections.
▪ denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision
▪ petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision
o Issue
▪ Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
o Ruling
▪ As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.
▪ The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
▪ There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds
of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who
at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof
▪ Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."
▪ Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63),
enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3)
by direct act of Congress.15
▪ Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization
is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who
wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
 qualifications17and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A.
473.18
▪ Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those
who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services
in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the
Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23
▪ As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine
and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.
▪ Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
• xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and
2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship
would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had
to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence
or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.
▪ Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
▪ Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
• Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
▪ Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person
must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to
obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
▪ The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who
re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized
Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are
only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who
are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized
Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the
absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after
losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is
clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode
prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.
▪ The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.
▪ Petition DISMISSED.
Election Offenses
➢ Section 263. Persons criminally liable. - The principals, accomplices, and accessories, as
defined in the Revised Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses. If the one
responsible be a political party or an entity, its president or head, the officials and employees
 of the same, performing duties connected with the offense committed and its members who
may be principals, accomplices, or accessories shall be liable, in addition to the liability of
such party or entity.
➢ Section 264. Penalties
o imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years
o shall not be subject to probation
o disqualification to hold public office
o deprivation of the right of suffrage
o If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which shall be enforced after
the prison term has been served
o Any political party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than ten
thousand pesos, which shall be imposed upon such party after criminal action has
been instituted in which their corresponding officials have been found guilty
➢ Section 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers,
have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the
event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the
complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice
for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
➢ Section 267. Prescription. - Election offenses shall prescribe after five years from the date of
their commission. If the discovery of the offense be made in an election contest proceeding,
the period of prescription shall commence on the date on which the judgment in such
proceedings becomes final and executory.
➢ Section 261, paragraphs (a) to (dd), Section 262, BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code)
o Amendments
▪ Section 261 (g) applies only to appointments covered by the Civil Service Law,
and not to those governed by special laws, such as the Local Government
Code. Thus, the prohibition does not apply to the filling up of vacancies in the
sanggunian of local government units (Ong vs Herrera, 188 SCRA 830)
▪ Section 261 (h). Two elements must be establsihed to prove its violation : (1)
the fact of transfer or detail within the election period, and (2) the transfer was
effected without prior approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its
implementing rules and regulations.
▪ Section 261 (p). To support a conviction under the Section 261 (p), it is not
necesary that the deadly weapon should have been seized from the accused
while he was in the precinct or within a radius of 100 meters therefrom. It is
enough that the accused carried the weapon in the polling place and within
a radius of 100 meters thereof during any of the specified days and hours
[Mappala vs Nunez, 240 SCRA 600 (1995)]
▪ Section 261 (t) has been repealed by Sections 32, 33, 34 of Republic Act 7166
▪ Section 261 (y) and (z) have been repealed by Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, which makes the exercise of suffrage voluntary and no
longer compulsoary as provided for in the 1973 Constitution
▪ Section 262 has been repealed with retroactive effect by Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 7166 as far as the inclusion of Sections 105, 106, 107, 109, 110,
111, and 112 as among election offenses
▪ Section 263, 264, Omnubus Election Code
▪ Section 27, paragraphs (a) to (f), Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987)
▪ Section 27, paragraphs (a) to (f), Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987)
▪ Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Election Act)
▪ Section 24.1 to 24.9 of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003)
▪ Section 45 (a) to (j), Republic Act No. 8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996
➢ Faelnar vs People (G.R. Nos. 140850-51 May 4, 2000)
o On April 8, 1997, petitioner Eugenio Faelnar filed a certificate of candidacy for the
position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay Guadalupe, Cebu City in the May 12,
1997 barangay elections.
o The following day, on April 9, 1997, a basketball tournament, dubbed the "2nd JING-
JING FAELNAR'S CUP," opened at the Guadalupe Sports Complex and lasted up to
April 30, 1997.
o complaint for electioneering filed against petitioner and Cecilio Gillamac by Antonio
Luy
o the basketball tournament was actually a campaign gimmick staged outside the
campaign period which officially started on May 1, 1997, in violation of the Omnibus
Election Code.
1. during the tournament, a streamer bearing petitioner's name was placed on the
facade of the Guadalupe Sports Complex;
2. petitioner's name was repeatedly mentioned over the microphone during the
games;
3. the tournament was widely published in the local newspaper; and
4. a raffle sponsored by Cecilio Gillamac was held with home appliances given away
as prizes.
o Petitioner denied participation in the tournament and claimed that its major sponsor
was Gillamac Marketing, Inc. He contended that the same was purely a sporting
event for the benefit of the youth.
o Atty. Edwin Cadungog, election officer of Cebu City,
▪ recommended the dismissal of the charges against petitioner and Gillamac.
o Law Department of the COMELEC
▪ recommended the filing of a case against petitioner and Gillamac for violation
of §80,3 in relation to §262,4 of the Omnibus Election Code, and §50 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2888, in relation to §12 of Republic Act No. 6679.5
o COMELEC en banc (In its Resolution No. 97-3040, dated September 16, 1997)
▪ resolved to dismiss the case. However, on motion of Antonio Luy, the COMELEC
reconsidered its action and ordered the filing of the necessary Informations
against petitioner and Gillamac.
o Regional Trial Court, Cebu City
▪ under two Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-49941 and CBU-49942.
▪ Petitioner moved to quash the information or, in the alternative, for
reinvestigation of the case,
▪ contending that Resolution No. 97-3040, which dismissed the complaint against
him, was immediately executory and could no longer be reconsidered.
▪ Petitioner's motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated July 29, 1999.
o He moved for reconsideration, but his motion was likewise denied by the court in its
order, dated October 4, 1999..
o petition for certiorari
▪ to set aside the order, dated July 29, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
19, Cebu City, denying petitioner's motion to quash in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-
499411 and 49942,2 and the order, dated October 4, 1999, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
▪ reiterates his argument in the trial court that COMELEC Resolution No. 97-3040,
which dismissed the complaint against him, can no longer be reconsidered by
the COMELEC. He contends that under the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC, the dismissal of the complaint was immediately final and executory.
▪ avers that Antonio Luy's Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 97-3040 is
a prohibited pleading under the Commission's Rules of Procedure. He avers
that since the resolution in question was immediately final and executory, it was
no longer within the power of the COMELEC to reconsider.
o Resolution No. 98-2914, in directing the filing of charges in court, was "ultra-vires," and
the Informations filed against him should have been quashed.6
 o Sec. 2. Mode of Review. — A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission
on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to
the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
o Sec. 3 of said Rule provides that such petition shall be filed within 30 days from notice
of the resolution sought to be reviewed. No such petition was ever filed. The present
petition to set aside the orders of the trial court denying its motion to quash and motion
for reconsideration was filed only on November 12, 1999, more than a year after
Resolution No. 98-2194 was promulgated on October 29, 1998. Consequently, the
resolution is now final and binding upon the parties.
o Even if said resolution is erroneous for being contrary to the provisions of the Rules of
Procedure of the COMELEC, the same is not void. Since it has become final and
executory, it is already binding and effective.8
o The 1993 Rules of Procedure, now provides:
▪ Rule 13. — Prohibited Pleadings.
• Sec. 1. What pleadings are not allowed. — The following pleadings are
not allowed:
o (d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution,
order or decision except in election offense cases;
o In cases where the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal exercises the
delegated power 10 to conduct preliminary investigation of election offense cases,
after the investigating officer submits his recommendation, said officers already
resolve the issue of probable cause. From such resolution, appeal to the COMELEC
lies. As the exercise by the Commission of its review powers would, at this point,
already constitute a second look on the issue of probable cause, the COMELEC's ruling
on the appeal would be immediately final and executory.
o On the other hand, if the preliminary investigation of a complaint for election offense
is conducted by the COMELEC itself, its investigating officer prepares a report upon
which the Commission's Law Department makes its recommendation to the
COMELEC en banc on whether there is probable cause to prosecute. It is thus the
COMELEC en banc which determines the existence of probable
cause. 11 Consequently, an appeal to the Commission is unavailing. Under the
present Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC, however, a motion for reconsideration of
such resolution is allowed. This effectively allows for a review of the original resolution,
in the same manner that the COMELEC, on appeal or motu proprio, may review the
resolution of the State Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal.
o Petition DENIED
➢ Jalosjos vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013)
o On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 132875-76,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos," convicting petitioner by final
judgment of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of
lasciviousness.4 Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal5 for each count, respectively, which
carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to
Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
o On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order commuting
his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days (Order of
Commutation). After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From
Prison on March 18, 2009.
o On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City.
However, because of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the
Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to
file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City, Branch 1 (MTCC).
o Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC10 on October 5, 2012, seeking to run
as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13,
2013 (May 2013 Elections). In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for
the said office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City
o On October 18, 2012,11 the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his
perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote
in any election. Such denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
City, Branch 14 (RTC) in its October 31, 2012 Order12 which, pursuant to Section
13813 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus
Election Code" (OEC), was immediately final and executory.
o Meanwhile, five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC’s First and Second
Divisions (COMELEC Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of petitioner’s CoC. Pending resolution, the COMELEC En Banc issued
motu proprio Resolution No. 961314 on January 15, 2013, resolving "to CANCEL and
DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor
of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his
perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter
registration requirement. As basis, the COMELEC En Banc relied on the Court’s
pronouncement in the consolidated cases of Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC and
Agapito Cardino v. COMELEC15 (Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino).
o Petition for certiorari filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
o Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) En Banc Resolution No. 9613 dated January 15,
2013, ordering the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner Romeo
G. Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy (CoC) as a mayoralty candidate for Zamboanga
City.
o Issues
▪ whether the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued
motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner’s right to
due process;
▪ whether petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective
office had already been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC).
o Ruling
▪ The COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it
issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending
petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it
merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling
petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact
of which had already been established by his final conviction. In this regard,
the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing
with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section
3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial
proceedings.
▪ There is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En
Banc would be acting in a purely administrative manner.
▪ The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC En Banc may take action is confined only to cases where
the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It finds no application,
however, in matters concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of administrative
functions. The distinction between the two is well-defined.
▪ Villarosa v. COMELEC
• The term ‘administrative’ connotes, or pertains, to ‘administration,
especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or
superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or
things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and
weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. While a
‘quasi-judicial function’ is a term which applies to the action, discretion,
etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
• The COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in
view of a candidate’s disqualification to run for elective office based on
a final conviction is subsumed under its mandate to enforce and
administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections. Accordingly, in
such a situation, it is the COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu proprio the
candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating
a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same.
• Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government
Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the
COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public
office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and
the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but
also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final
judgment under the law.
• Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to
implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final
judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is
addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the
COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The disqualification
of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as
affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the
enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of
elections.
• To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special
disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely
exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos
was elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly
remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws"
relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from
running for public office those suffering from perpetual special
disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.
• Aratea v. COMELEC (Aratea),18
o the Court similarly pronounced that the disqualification of a
convict to run for public office, as affirmed by final judgment of a
competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration
of all laws relating to the conduct of elections.
• SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
o (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence
• ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification. - The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
o 1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which
the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular
election.
o 2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any
popular office or to be elected to such office.
 o 3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and
for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
▪ In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification
as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall
last during the term of the sentence.
o 4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any
office formerly held.
o while Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for
local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time
he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed
to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty, either as
principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the
convict to run for elective office
• ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory
penalties. - The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period
of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.
• Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law of general
application and therefore, must yield to the more definitive RPC
provisions in line with the principle of lex specialis derogat generali –
general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same
subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in
which the special provisions are not applicable. In other words, where
two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the
one specially designed therefor should prevail.
• Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously
convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion
temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon
• Petition is DISMISSED
➢ Javier vs COMELEC (January 12, 2016 G.R. No. 215847)
o On December 3, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the Omnibus Election
Code (Election Code). Section 261(d) and (e) of this Code prescribe coercion as an
election offense
o Coercion, as an election offense, is punishable by imprisonment of not less than one
year but not more than six years. Notably, Section 68 of the Election Code provides
that the Commission may administratively disqualify a candidate who violates Section
261(d) or (e).
o On February 20, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7890 amending the
definition of Grave Coercion under the Revised Penal Code. It increased the penalty
for coercion committed in violation of a person’s right to suffrage to prision
mayor. Further, Section 3 of R.A. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261, paragraphs
(d)(1) and (2) of the Election Code.
o On April 3, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9385 fixing the calendar of activities
for the May 2013 elections. The resolution set the election period from January 13, 2013
until June 12, 2013.
o On September 3, 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Christopher B. Maguad
filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and Abuse
of Authority against Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero (Mayor Roquero). This
complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 05-2012.
o On November 9, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) issued Resolution No. 291-
2012 recommending to Antique Governor Exequiel Javier (Gov. Javier) the
preventive suspension of Mayor Roquero.
o On November 21, 2012, Mayor Roquero filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Antique, against Gov. Javier and the members of the SP
to restrain them from proceeding with Administrative Case No. 05-2012. The petition
was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 12-11-86.
o The case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 11 which issued a writ of preliminary
injunction.
o Gov. Javier, Vice-Governor Dimamay, and the members of the SP filed a petition
for certiorari with urgent prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP-07307.
o On December 18, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9581 prohibiting any public
official from suspending any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay officer
during the election period for the May 13, 2013 elections. This resolution implements
Section 261 (x)7 of the Election Code.
o On January 15, 2013, the CA issued a TRO in CA-G.R. SP-07307.
o On January 16, 2013, the RTC, Branch 11 promulgated its judgment
granting certiorari and prohibition. It ordered the SP to cease and desist from further
proceeding with Administrative Case No. 05-2012. It likewise ordered Gov. Javier to
refrain from implementing SP Resolution No. 291-2012 and from preventively
suspending Mayor Roquero.
o On January 23, 2013, Gov. Javier issued Executive Order No. 003, S. 2013, preventively
suspending Mayor Roquero for thirty (30) days.
o On February 7, 2013, the SP of Antique issued a decision finding Mayor Roquero guilty
of Grave Misconduct in relation with Section 3(e) of R. A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and Grave Abuse of Authority in relation with Section 5(e) of
R.A. No. 6713. The SP suspended her for four (4) months.
o Mayor Roquero filed an Election Offense complaint against Gov. Javier for violating
Section 261(x) of the Election Code. The case was filed before the COMELEC Law
Department and docketed as Election Offense Case (EOC) No. 13-025.
o Meanwhile (or on March 15, 2013), the CA granted the writ of preliminary injunction
filed by Gov. Javier, et al., in CA-G.R. SP-07307. It enjoined Judge Nery Duremdes of
the RTC, Branch 11 from conducting further proceedings in SPL Civil Action No. 12-11-
86.
o On March 22, 2013, private respondents Cornelio P. Aldon (Aldon) and Raymundo T.
Roquero (Roquero) also filed a petition for disqualification before the Commission
against Gov. Javier, Vice-Governor Rosie A. Dimamay, and the other members of the
SP. The case was docketed as COMELEC Special Action (SPA) No. 13-254 (DC.)
o Aldon and Roquero sought to disqualify Gov. Javier and the other incumbent officials
from running in the 2013 elections on the ground that the latter committed the
election offenses of Coercion of Subordinates [Sec. 261(d)] and Threats, Intimidation,
Terrorism x x x or Other Forms of Coercion [Sec. 261(e)] by suspending Mayor Roquero.
They alleged that the suspension was political harassment calculated to intimidate
the Roqueros into backing out of the 2013 elections.8
o On April 29, 2013, the Clerk of the Commission conducted a conference hearing
between the parties.
o On April 30, 2013, Gov. Javier (together with the SP Members) filed a motion to dismiss
with answer ex abundante ad cautelam.
o After the May 13, 2013 Elections, only Gov. Javier and SP Members Tobias M. Javier,
Edgar D. Denosta, Teopisto C. Estaris, Jr., and Victor R. Condez were proclaimed
winners. Hence, the Commission considered the disqualification cases against the
losing candidates moot.
o On October 3, 2014, the COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution in SPA No. 13-
254 (DC) disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation as the Governor of
Antique. The resolution was penned by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph.
o On April 29, 2013, the Clerk of the Commission conducted a conference hearing
between the parties.
o On April 30, 2013, Gov. Javier (together with the SP Members) filed a motion to dismiss
with answer ex abundante ad cautelam.
o After the May 13, 2013 Elections, only Gov. Javier and SP Members Tobias M. Javier,
Edgar D. Denosta, Teopisto C. Estaris, Jr., and Victor R. Condez were proclaimed
winners. Hence, the Commission considered the disqualification cases against the
losing candidates moot.
o On October 3, 2014, the COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution in SPA No. 13-
254 (DC) disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation as the Governor of
Antique. The resolution was penned by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph.
o On January 20, 2015, Gov. Javier filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65
in relation with Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
o First Issue: Whether the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it issued
Resolution No. 9581 fixing the 2013 election period from January 13, 2013 until June 12,
2013, for the purpose of determining administrative and criminal liability for election
offenses.
▪ The COMELEC is expressly authorized to fix a different date of the election
period.
▪ Article IX-C, Section 9 provides:
• Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the
election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election
and shall end thirty days thereafter.15
▪ Election Code, explicitly recognizes this authority:
• Sec. 3. Election and campaign periods. – Unless otherwise fixed in
special cases by the Commission on Elections, which hereinafter shall be
referred to as the Commission, the election period shall commence
ninety days before the day of the election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.16 (emphases supplied)
▪ As defined by Congress, some election offenses and prohibited acts can only
be committed during the election period. An element of these offenses (i.e.,
that it be committed during the election period) is variable, as election periods
are not affixed to a specific and permanent date. Nevertheless, the definition
of the offense is already complete. By fixing the date of the election period,
the Commission did not change what the offense is or how it is committed.
There is thus no intrusion into the legislative sphere.
o Second Issue: Whether the Commission erred in ruling that R.A. No. 7890 did not
remove coercion as a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Election
Code.
▪ With the express repeal of Section 261(d), the basis for disqualifying Javier no
longer existed. As we held in Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,43 [t]he
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election
offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and
not administrative in nature.44 Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of
prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice.45
o Third Issue: Whether the Commission en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its Order dated January 12, 2015, disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his
proclamation as the governor of Antique.
▪ To our mind, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it disqualified
Gov. Javier based on a provision of law that had already
been expressly repealed. Its stubborn insistence that R.A. No. 7890 merely
impliedly repealed Section 261 (d) despite the clear wordings of the law,
amounted to an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of judgment.
▪ Lanot v. Commission on Elections:21
 • The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the
offender should be disqualified from being a candidate or from holding
office. Proceedings are summary in character and require only clear
preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may be disqualified
even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary
investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the
criminal aspect, and vice versa.
▪ The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is
probable cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor
is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether
probable cause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law
Department, files the criminal information before the proper court. Proceedings
before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require proof
beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the
disqualification of the offender, which may even include disqualification from
holding a future public office.
▪ Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which states:
• Part IV: Rule 18 – Decisions
o Sec. 1 Procedure in Making Decisions. – The conclusions of the
Commission in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in
Division shall be reached in consultation before the case is
assigned by raffle to a Member for the writing of the opinion of
the Commission or the Division and a certification to this effect
signed by the Chairman or the Presiding Commissioner, as the
case may be, shall be incorporated in the decision. Any member
who took no part, dissented, or abstained from a decision or
resolution must state the reason therefor.
• Every decision shall express therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based. (emphasis supplied)
• Sec. 3. Construction – These rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of
ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission.
• Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules – In the interest of justice and in order to
obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission,
these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the
Commission.
• hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the January 12, 2015 per
curiam order of the Commission on Elections en banc