Case Analysis

PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MR. ROBERTO NIEVA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 124100, April 1, 1998

In this case, the petitioner, Philtranco Services Enterprise, Inc. was the employer of the private
respondent, Mr. Roberto Nieva.

Facts:

Roberto Nieva, the herein private respondent was employed as a driver by petitioner, Philtranco
Services Enterprise, Inc. On May 15, 1989, the respondent sideswiped an owner type jeep owned by a
PC colonel. Because the event caused to the damage of the park light of the jeep, the PC colonel
arrested Nieva and brought him to Camp Crame. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed against
Roberto Nieva. Upon knowing the event, Philtranco secured a bail bond for Nieva, releasing him from
detention. However, Nieva was suspended by Philtranco. When Nieva reported back to work, he was re-
arrested for the reason that the bail bond was fake. Afterwards, when the incident was reported to the
management of Philtranco, Philtranco’s administrative officer advised Nieva to refrain from driving until
settlement with the jeep owner would come in to place, this is to avoid Nieva from being re-arrested.

Nieva followed the advice. However, when he reported for work, he was asked by Philtranco to file a
new application for he is not considered as an employee of the company anymore for being absent
without leave from October 19 to November 20, 1989. Aggrieved, Nieva then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of 13th month pay with the NLRC’s National Capital Region Arbitration
Branch in Manila. The conferences were scheduled. However, at the first four (4) conferences,
Philtranco did not appear. Because of this, the arbiter warned that Philtranco will be declared in default
if it failed to appear at the next hearing. Because of the warning, Philtranco’s representative appeared
on the next hearing. They filed a position paper with motion to dismiss contending that the complaint
should have been lodged with the NLRC’s Regional Arbitration Branch in Legaspi City because Nieva is a
resident thereof and also Nieva was hired, assigned and based in Legaspi City. The motions were
dismissed by the labor arbiter. Thereafter, Philtranco presented evidences to prove that Nieva had
abandoned his work, having been absent without leave from October 19 to November 20, 1989.
Weighing the evidences presented by both parties, the labor arbiter gave more credence to Nieva’s
version of facts and dismissed Philtranco’s allegation that Nieva had abandoned his work.

In this case, before the complainant filed his present complaint, he had already shown his determination
and persistence to return to his work as he untiringly kept on reporting for duty. Definitely, Nieva did
not abandon his job. On June 14, 1994, the labor arbiter rendered a decision awarding back wages and
separation pay to the herein private respondent Nieva. Philtranco appealed however the NLRC affirmed
the decision of the labor arbiter. Hence, this petition.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it denied the motion of Philtranco to dismiss complaint based on improper venue.
2. Whether or not the respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in ruling that Philtranco should be imposed back wages and separation pay
and as to its findings of facts and when it confirmed the labor arbiters decision that there was
no abandonment of work by the private respondent and that the latter showed his persistence
to return to work.

Ruling:

First Issue: No. The Supreme Court finds that the question of venue essentially pertains to the trial and
relates more to the convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance and merits of the case.
The provisions on venue are intended to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witnesses and to
promote the ends of justice. In fact, Section 1(a), Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
cited by Philtranco in support of its contention that venue of the illegal dismissal case filed by Nieva is
improperly laid, speaks of the complainant/petitioners workplace, evidently showing that the rule is
intended for the exclusive benefit of the worker. This being the case, the worker may waive said benefit.

Also, the said Section has been declared by the Court as merely permissive. This provision is permissive
because the said section uses the word “may”, thus, allowing a different venue when the interests of
substantial justice demand a different one. In any case, as stated earlier, the Constitutional protection
accorded to labor is a paramount and compelling factor, provided the venue chosen is not altogether
oppressive to the employer. Moreover, Nieva, as a driver of Philtranco, was assigned to the Legaspi City-
Pasay City route.

Section 1, Rule IV of the 1990 NLRC Rules additionally provides that, for the purposes of venue,
workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when
the cause of action arose. In this case, the filing of the complaint with the National Capital Region
Arbitration Branch was proper, Manila being considered as part of Nieva’s workplace by reason of his
plying the Legaspi City – Pasay route.

Section 1(a) Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedures of the NLRC provides:

SECTION 1. VENUE. – (a) All cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in
the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant or petitioner.

For purposes of venue, the workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is
regularly assigned at the time the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is
supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment, or travel. In case of field employees, as
well as ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where
they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries and wages or work instructions from, and report the
results of their assignment to, their employers.
Second Issue: No. Philtranco contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
affirmed the labor arbiters finding of non-abandonment by Nieva of his work. irregularity reports to the
effect that Nieva was absent without leave from October 19-31 and November 1-20, 1989; a letter from
Philtranco's assistant manager to Nieva requiring the latter to report within five days from receipt
thereof, on pain of being dropped from the roll; and a termination letter from Philtranco’s company
lawyer to Nieva, for his failure to report for work as directed.

The Supreme Court held that the NLRC did not commit abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse, when
it denied Philtranco’s motion to dismiss Nieva’s complaint on the ground of improper venue and
affirmed the labor arbiter’s award of back wages and separation pay to Nieva. For the Supreme Court, it
is evident that Nieva never abandoned his job, he was absent because he just followed the advice of the
administrative officer and for him not to be re-arrested.
HAGONOY WATER DISTRICT represented by its General Manager CELESTINO S. VENGCO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER VLADIMIR P.L.
SAMPANG, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOSE A. CRUZ and DANTE VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 81490, August 31, 1988

The private respondent in this case was the employee of the herein petitioner.

Facts:
Dante Villanueva, the herein private respondent was employed as a service foreman by Hagonoy Water
District, the herein petitioner. Villanueva was indefinitely suspended and dismissed on July 12, 1985 for
abandonment of work and conflict of interest. Aggrieved, Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, illegal suspension and underpayment of wages and emergency cost of living allowance against
its employer, Hagonoy Water District with the Ministry of Labor and Employment in San Fernando,
Pampanga. The petitioner contended that being a government entity, its personnel are governed by the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Moreover, the petitioner, Hagonoy Water
District contends that the lawfulness of dismissals from the service fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission, not the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Thus, the petitioner immediately
moved for the outright dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Also, the
petitioner cited Resolution No. 1540 of the Social Security Commission cancelling petitioner’s
compulsory coverage from the system effective May 16, 1979, "considering the rulings that local water
districts are instrumentalities owned and controlled by the government and that their officers and
employees are government employees." The private respondent, Dante Villanueva, contended that local
water districts, like herein petitioner, though quasi-public corporations, are in the nature of private
corporations since they perform proprietary functions for the government. A proprietary function is one
that a private entity can perform, and is not uniquely for the benefit of the general public. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of Villanueva and against petitioner Hagonoy. The Labor Arbiter also ordered the
immediate reinstatement of the petitioner and the payment of full back wages, including all the benefits
provided by law from the date that he was terminated up to his actual date of reinstatement. ,
Respondents are hereby ordered to pay the petitioner the amount of P4,927.50 representing the
underpayments of wages from July 1983 to May 16, 1985.

Thereafter, the petitioner moved for reconsideration on the ground that the public respondents had no
jurisdiction over the case. The petitioner also filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution with
Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction arguing that the writ was prematurely issued as its motion
for reconsideration had not yet been resolved. Both the application for preliminary injunction and
motion to quash were denied by the Commission. This directed the petitioner to reinstate immediately
private respondent and to pay him the amount of P63,577.75 out of petitioner's garnished deposits.

Issue:

Whether or not local water districts are government owned and controlled corporations whose
employees are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law.
Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Labor Arbiter asserted jurisdiction over the alleged illegal
dismissal of private respondent Villanueva by relying on Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 198,
known as “ Provincial Utilities Act of 1973” which exempts employees of water districts from the
application of the Civil Service Law. The provision states that:

Exemption from Civil Service. — The district and its employees, being engaged in a proprietary
function, are hereby exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law. Collective Bargaining
shall be available only to personnel below supervisory levels: Provided, however,  That the total
of all salaries, wages, emoluments, benefits or other compensation paid to all employees in any
month shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of average net monthly revenue, said net revenue
representing income from water sales and sewerage service charges, lease pro-rata share of
debt service and expenses for fuel or energy for pumping during the preceding fiscal year.

However, in this case, the Labor Arbiter failed to take in to account that Presidential Decree No. 1479
wiped away the said exemption. Moreover, NLRC relied upon Article 9 (B), Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which provides that:

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

At the time the dispute in the case at bar arose, and at the time the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision ,
there is no question that the applicable law was that spelled out in National Housing Corporation vs.
Juco (supra) and Baguio Water District vs. Cresenciano B. Trajano (supra) and that under such applicable
law, the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction to render the decision that he in fact rendered. By the time
the public respondent Commission rendered its decision of August 20, 1987 which is here assailed, the
1987 Constitution had already come into effect. There is, nonetheless, no necessity for this Court at the
present time and in the present case to pass upon the question of the effect of the provisions of Article
9, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution upon the pre-existing statutory and case law. The Supreme
Court believes and so holds that the 1987 Constitution did not operate retrospectively so as to confer
jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiter to render a decision which, under the law applicable at the time of
the rendition of such decision, was clearly outside the scope of competence of the Labor Arbiter. Thus,
the respondent Commission had nothing before it which it could pass upon in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. For it is self-evident that a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter without
jurisdiction over the case is a complete nullity, vesting no rights and imposing no liabilities.

Petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 17 March 1986, and public
respondent Commission's Resolution dated 20 August 1987 and all other Resolutions and Orders issued
by the Commission in this case subsequent thereto, are hereby SET ASIDE. This decision is, however,
without prejudice to the right of private respondent Villanueva to re-file, if he so wishes, this complaint
in an appropriate forum. No pronouncement as to costs.
ZAMBOANGA CITY WATER DISTRICT, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDING COMMISSIONER MUSIB M. BUAT, COMMISSIONERS LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., and OSCAR N.
ABELLA, and PRIVATE RESPONDENTS , Respondents.
G.R. No. 104389, May 27, 1994

The petitioner in this case is Zamboanga City Water District, a government owned and controlled
corporation. The private respondents are employees of the petitioner.

Facts:
Herein petitioner Zamboanga Water District is engaged in the business of supplying water in the City of
Zamboanga. In March 1987, private respondents participated in a strike that occurred in the company.
Because of the event, the petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter to declare the said strike
as illegal. The next day, Zamboanga Utilities Labor Union or ZULU, the labor union to which respondents
belonged, filed a complaint against Zamboanga Water District before the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal and unpaid wages. The two cases were consolidated and heard together. The Executive Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision declaring that both the strike and the dismissal of private respondents are
illegal. The Labor Arbiter ordered for the reinstatement of the private respondents to their former
positions, without loss of seniority rights and privileges, but without back wages. Aggrieved of the
decision, the petitioner appealed. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with modification,
that the strike leader, Felix Laquio be suspended from work without pay for a period of 6 months.

Three days after, private respondents filed with the Executive Labor Arbiter a motion for execution of
the said decision. On September 24, the Executive Labor Arbiter granted the writ of execution and
ordered petitioner to reinstate all private respondents. Thereafter, the Court issued a restraining order.
On March 13, 1991, the Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the NLRC dated July
17, 1990 and lifted the restraining order granted earlier. In April 16, the petitioner informed the
Executive Labor Arbiter that respondent Laquio would be reinstated on October 16 after the expiration
of the six-month suspension. On April 17, private respondents filed a motion to compel the immediate
reinstatement of Laquio and the payment of their back wages from March 6, 1991 up to the day of
actual reinstatement and to other private respondents from March 2, 1989 to April 15, 1991. The
petitioner appealed the decision of the NLRC. However, it was denied.

Issues:
1. Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction to issue the resolutions in question because jurisdiction
over labor disputes is vested in the Civil Service Commission.
2. Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when it ordered the payment of the salaries of private respondent during the
effectivity of the restraining order.
Ruling:

First Issue: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, a water district with an original charter is a
government-owned and controlled corporation. The established rule is that the hiring and firing of
employees of government-owned and controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the
Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Therefore, jurisdiction over the strike and the
dismissal of private respondents is therefore lodged not with the NLRC but with the Civil Service
Commission. However, in this case, petitioner is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the NLRC and
is bound to respect all the proceedings. This is because the petitioner never raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction before the Executive Labor Arbiter, the NLRC or even the Supreme Court. In fact, the
petitioner filed the complaint before the Executive Labor Arbiter. Thus, it is not fair for a party who has
voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a tribunal in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief
therefrom, to afterwards repudiate and deny that very same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Second Issue: No. The second issue involves the determination of when the private respondents should
be reinstated as ordered by the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter dated April 19, 1988. Their
salaries start to toll from the said date. The NLRC was of the view that private respondents should have
been reinstated on March 21, 1989 and paid their back wages from that date to April 15, 1991 including
the period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order of this Court in G.R. Nos. 95219-20.
Respondent Laquio on the other hand, should have been reinstated on March 6, 1991 and paid his back
wages from said date up to the day prior to his actual reinstatement. The reckoning date of March 21,
1989 used by the NLRC was the date of effectivity of R.A. No. 6715, amending the third paragraph of
Article 223 of the Labor Code which provides:

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee,
insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending
appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer,
merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided herein (Emphasis supplied).

Under the said provision of law, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall be immediately executory, even
pending appeal. The employer shall reinstate the employee concerned either by: (a) actually admitting
him back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation; or
(b) at the option of the employer, merely reinstating him in the payroll. Immediate reinstatement is
mandated and is not stayed by the fact that the employer has appealed, or has posted a cash or surety
bond pending appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the NLRC and recognized the right of
private respondents to reinstatement, as in G.R. Nos. 95219-20, private respondents are entitled to the
wages accruing during the effectivity of the temporary restraining order. Thus, the issuance of the
temporary restraining order in G.R. Nos. 95219-20 did not nullify the rights of private respondents to
their reinstatement and to collect their wages during the period of the effectivity of the order but
merely suspended the implementation thereof pending the determination of the validity of the NLRC
resolutions subject of the petition.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FERDINAND PINEDA and GOGFREDO
CABLING, Respondents.
G.R. No. 120567 March 20, 1998

The private respondents in this case are flight stewards of the petitioner, Philippine Airlines. Inc.

Facts:

Private respondents, Ferdinand Pineda and Gogfredo Cabling were dismissed from the service for their
alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Aggrieved, private
respondents appealed with the NLRC a petition for injunction praying that:

I. Upon filing of this Petition, a temporary restraining order be issued, prohibiting respondents
(petitioner herein) from effecting or enforcing the Decision dated Feb. 22, 1995, or to reinstate
petitioners temporarily while a hearing on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is being undertaken;

II. After hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering respondent to
reinstate petitioners to their former positions pending the hearing of this case, or, prohibiting
respondent from enforcing its Decision dated February 22, 1995 while this case is pending
adjudication;

III. After hearing, that the writ of preliminary injunction as to the reliefs sought for be made
permanent, that petitioners be awarded full back wages, moral damages of PHP 500,000.00
each and exemplary damages of PHP 500,000.00 each, attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent
of whatever amount is awarded, and the costs of suit.

On April 3, 1995, the NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner to cease and
desist from enforcing its memorandum of dismissal. In support of the issuance of the writ of temporary
injunction, the NLRC adapted the view that:

(1) private respondents cannot be validly dismissed on the strength of petitioner's Code of
Discipline which was declared illegal by this Court in the ease at PAL, Inc. vs. NLRC, (G.R. No.
85985), promulgated August 13, 1993, for the reason that it was formulated by the petitioner
without the participation of its employees as required in R.A. 6715, amending Article 211 of the
Labor Code;
 Article 211 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, on the State Policy on Labor
Relations:

a) To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations,
including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or
industrial disputes;
b) To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy and the
promotion of social justice and development;
c) To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement;
d) To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as union
members and as employees;
e) To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the expeditious settlement of labor or
industrial disputes;
f) To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace; and
g) To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting their
rights, duties and welfare.

(2) the whimsical, baseless and premature dismissals of private respondents which "caused them
grave and irreparable injury" is enjoinable as private respondents are left "with no speedy and
adequate remedy at law" except the issuance of a temporary mandatory injunction;

(3) the NLRC is empowered under Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code not only to restrain any actual
or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts but also to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute, which, if not restrained or performed
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party; and

Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code provides:

(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or
unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not
restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party:
Provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except after hearing the testimony of
witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint
made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of fact
by the Commission, to the effect:

(1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless
restrained, or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction
or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful
act, except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or
committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after
actual knowledge thereof;
 (2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow;
(3) That, as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant
by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;
(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are unable
or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.

(4) the temporary power of the NLRC was recognized by this Court in the case of Chemo-Technische
Mfg., Inc. Employees Union, DFA, et. al. vs. Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. [G.R. No. 107031,
January 25, 1993].

On May 4, 1995, the petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that the NLRC erred in granting a

temporary injunction order when it has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or restraining order since
this may be issued only under Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor
disputes. On May 31, 1995, the NLRC denied petitioner’s reconsideration. The now petitioner cannot
validly claim that NLRC cannot exercise it injunctive power under Article 218 of the Labor Code on the
pretext that what NLRC have here is not a labor dispute as long as it concedes that as defined by law,
Labor Dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not even without a complaint for illegal dismissal filed before the labor arbiter, the NLRC can
entertain an action for injunction and issue a writ enjoining the petitioner, Philippine Airlines, Inc. from
enforcing its orders of dismissal against private respondents, and ordering petitioner to reinstate the
private respondents to their respective positions.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that it is an essential requirement that there must be a labor dispute first
between the contending parties before the Labor Arbiter. In the case at hand, there is no labor dispute
between the petitioner and private respondents as there has been no complaint yet for illegal dismissal
filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner. The petition for injunction
directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal dismissal. Therefore, the NLRC
exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed order granting private respondents’ petition
for injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents.

Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed employee is to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter. In the case at bar, private respondents disregarded
this rule and directly went to the NLRC through a petition for injunction praying that petitioner be
enjoined from enforcing its dismissal orders. Moreover, an examination of private respondents’ petition
for injunction reveals that it has no basis since there is no showing of any urgency or irreparable injury
which the private respondents might suffer.

Also, an injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in Labor Law considering that it generally
has not proved to be an effective means of settling labor disputes. It has been the policy of the state to
encourage the parties to use the non-judicial process of negotiation and compromise, mediation and
arbitration. Thus, injunctions may be issued only in cases of extreme necessity based on legal grounds
clearly established, after due consultations or hearing and when all efforts at conciliation are exhausted
which factors, however, are clearly absent in the present case. Injunction is a preservative remedy for
the protection of one’s substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The
application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before
the main case is regularly heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief is
that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction
and that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to
protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation. Injunction is also a special equitable relief
granted only in cases where there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS
BROTHERHOOD, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., Respondents
G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940

Facts:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case
has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we
reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:

1. That an employment contract, both individual and collective, without a fixed term of duration or
that is not for a specific one, ends either at the will of any of the parties or each time the term
established for the payment of wages arrives. according to custom in the locality or when the
work is finished;
2. That the workers of a manufacturing company, who have entered into a contract, either
individually or collectively, with them, without a fixed time, and who have been forced to cease
their work for having declared forced unemployment in the factory in which they work , they
cease to be employees or workers of the same;
3. That an employer or company that has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with its
workers without a fixed duration of time and without being for a specific work and that refuses
to reinstate said workers who ceased as a result of a forced stoppage, is not guilty of unjust
practice in incurs the criminal sanction of Article 5 of Commonwealth Law No. 213, although his
refusal to reinstate is due to the fact that said workers belong to a specific labor body, since they
have already ceased to be their employees for termination of the contract by virtue of the
strike.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment
rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations
for a new trial, and contends:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in
ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor
Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather;
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army;
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture
of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army;
 4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal (281 U.S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.);
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
elective representation are highly essential and indispensable (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth
Act No. 213.);
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American
origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule;
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against
the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood;
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations; and
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

Issue:

Whether or not the issues should be properly directed, resolved or determined by the Court of Industrial
Relation.

Ruling:

Yes. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than part of the integrated judicial system of
the nation. It is not intended to be a more receptive organ of the Government. The CIR or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy
or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the
relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
103 or also known as “An Act To Afford Protection of Labor By Creating A Court of Industrial Relations
Empowered To Fix Minimum Wages For Laborers And Maximum Rentals To Be Paid By Tenants, and To
Enforce Compulsory Arbitration Between Employees or Landlords, and Employees or Tenants,
Respectively; and By Prescribing Penalties For The Violation of Its Orders.”

The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. In the right of the
foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and
does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of
law. This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National
Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the
"records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the
National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal."

The Supreme Court have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By
and large, after considerable discussions, the Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that the
interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing
the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction
that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth herein above.