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Von Glaserfeld's Radical Constructivism: A Critical Review

Article  in  Science & Education · January 1997

DOI: 10.1023/A:1008664626705

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VON GLASERSFELD’S
RADICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM:
A CRITICAL REVIEW1

MICHAEL D. HARDY

University of Southern Mississippi Gulfcoast, USA

PETER C. TAYLOR

Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Australia

Give up the requirement that knowledge represents an independent world, and admit instead that
knowledge represents something that is far more important to us, namely what we can do in our
experiential world. [EvG, 1995, p.6]

ABSTRACT: We explore Ernst von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism, its criticisms, and our own
thoughts on what it promises for the reform of science and mathematics teaching. Our investigation
reveals that many criticisms of radical constructivism are unwarranted; nevertheless, in its current
cognitivist form radical constructivism may be insufficient to empower teachers to overcome objectivist
cultural traditions. Teachers need to be empowered with rich understandings of philosophies of science
and mathematics that endorse relativist epistemologies; for without such they are unlikely to be prepared
to reconstruct their pedagogical practices. More importantly, however, is a need for a powerful social
epistemology to serve as a referent for regenerating the culture of science education. We recommend
blending radical constructivism with Habermas’ ' theory of communicative action'to provide science
teachers with a moral imperative for adopting a constructivist epistemology.

INTRODUCTION

Ernst von Glasersfeld is well recognized as the primary exponent of ' radical
constructivism' , a theory of knowing that is resonating worldwide with the reformist
desires of science and mathematics educators. In recent years, von Glasersfeld' s cogent
arguments concerning the ' constructed'nature of our knowing and its relativist status
have been endorsed and subject to critical analysis. In writing this paper, our intention
was to portray the central themes of von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism and to
consider their implications for teaching and learning activities. In an attempt to
develop a deep understanding of the evolving patterns of thought that underpin von
Glasersfeld's theory of radical constructivism, we read many of the writings he has

1
Hardy, M. & Taylor, P.C. (1997). Von Glasersfeld'
s radical constructivism: A
critical review. Science & Education, 6, 135-150.

1
published over the past 25 years and examined some of the criticisms of radical
constructivism that have been published recently.

Although our readings were conducted in the spirit of critical inquiry, it is

important that we reveal our sympathy for von Glasersfeld' s position and state clearly
the nature of our own interpretive frameworks. We are science and mathematics
educators who have been using radical constructivism as a referent for developing our
own pedagogies in teacher education, research supervision and school teaching
(Hardy, 1996; Taylor, in press; Taylor & Dawson, in press; Milne & Taylor, 1995a). In
that process, we have been testing the viability of radical constructivism and its fit
with other epistemological theories such as Habermas' s critical social theory. Unlike
most recent critical accounts of radical constructivism, we are able to ground our
criticisms within the context of our own practical teaching experiences. These
experiences have illuminated both the power and the paucity of radical constructivism
and, in this paper, have given us cause both to celebrate the strengths of this radical
theory of knowing and to recommend further elaborations of the theory so that it can
serve as a more powerful referent for teachers interested in transforming the cultural
climates of their science and mathematics classrooms.

Needless to say, we emphasise that what follows is a product of our own

interpretations and, as such, it is destined to reflect imperfectly von Glasersfeld’s
intended meanings.

CONSTRUCTIVISM VS OBJECTIVISM

Since constructivism is explicitly instrumentalist, it holds that . . . conceptual construction is

carried out not for the sake of representational knowledge of a ' given'world, but to enlarge the
map of viable pathways in the world constituted by the subject's experience.
[EvG, 1992b, p.383]

As an offspring of the ' subjective empiricism'of Locke and Berkeley, radical

constructivism is a theory of knowing proposed as an alternative to the long-dominant
epistemological theory of objectivism (von Glasersfeld, 1986, 1991b, 1992a).
Objectivism assumes that reality has an inherent, observer-independent and, therefore,
objective structure. By means of rational thought processes governed by the rules of
propositional logic, it is possible to attain ‘true’ or objective knowledge, that is,
knowledge which is congruent with reality’s objective structure (Johnson, 1987; von
Glasersfeld, 1986). However, these assertions give rise to a paradox: in order to verify
one’s knowledge, one must be able to compare that knowledge with objective reality
and, hence, have ascertained the structure of objective reality prior to gaining
knowledge of it (von Glasersfeld, 1986, 1987).
Radical constructivism does not deny the existence of objective reality; however, it
does posit that we do not have any method of attaining objective knowledge (von
Glasersfeld, 1992a). Principally, we do not have access to a ' God's-eye'privileged
view of the universe (von Glasersfeld, 1981, 1986, 1991a). From a radical

2
constructivist perspective, knowledge consists of mental constructs which have
satisfied the constraints of objective reality. The learner constructs knowledge from his
experiences in an effort to impose order on and, hence, make sense of those
experiences. Moreover, the sole function of knowledge is to allow one to impose such
order on one’s ' experiential flow'(von Glasersfeld, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1989b, 1991a).
It is essential to understand that von Glasersfeld' s use of the term '
knowledge'sets it
well apart from the conventional use of the term. Traditionally, knowledge has been
taken to mean a representation of some aspect of the physical world around us, and its
truth status has been taken as a measure of how well the said knowledge corresponds
to, or represents, an observer-independent world. By contrast, von Glasersfeld uses
knowledge in Piaget' s'adaptational'sense "to refer to those sensory-motor actions and
conceptual operations that have proved viable in the knower' s experience" (von
Glasersfeld, 1992b, p. 380).This distinction is one that seems not to be well
understood by critics of radical constructivism who fail to distinguish between
knowledge and experience and whose arguments are framed implicitly by objectivist
assumptions.

VIABILITY

The shift to this postepistemological way of thinking has multiple consequences. The most
important is that the customary conception of truth as the correct representation of states or
events of an external world is replaced by the notion of viability. [EvG, 1995, p.7]

It is the concept of viability that makes radical constructivism an ' instrumentalist'

theory of knowledge and that sets it apart from traditional representationist
epistemologies. In arguing that knowledge consists of those mental constructs that
satisfy the constraints of objective reality, radical constructivists are asserting that
knowledge does not ' match'the world’s actual structure, but ' fits within'or '
slides
between'its constraints. Borrowing from biology, radical constructivism characterizes
such constructs as ' viable'. More clearly, a viable construction is any mental or
physical action that is consistent with one' s experiences AND fulfills an intended
purpose or, to use von Glasersfeld’s words, a construct that “stands up to experience
and enables us to make predictions and to bring about or avoid, as the case may be,
certain phenomena” (von Glasersfeld, 1984, pp. 8-9; see also von Glasersfeld, 1981).
A cursory inspection of the radical constructivist position might lead one to posit
that it falls prey to the 'solipsism'of the idealists: the world is as each of us dreams it
to be. However, the concept of viability prevents radical constructivism from such a
treacherous descent (von Glasersfeld, 1986). Contrary to any misleading surface
appearances, an individual is not at liberty to characterize ANY construction he or she
desires as viable. The ever-present socio-physical context in which one is situated
constrains the range of viable constructions (von Glasersfeld, 1989b, 1989c).
Moreover, a mental construct is viable only as long as it continues to fulfill its
intended purpose (von Glasersfeld, 1981, 1984, 1986).
Experiential constraints limit the realm of viable cognitive constructs very much
like Darwin' s evolutionary theory suggests that experiential constraints limit the realm
of viable life forms (von Glasersfeld, 1981, 1984). Correspondingly, any construct that

3
satisfies the constraints of experience is viable. Similarly, any mental construct that
fails to satisfy the constraints of one’s socio-physical environment is unviable and,
once a construct is so characterized, it is discarded or altered during the ensuing quest
to create a viable construction (von Glasersfeld, 1981, 1984).
Because any construct that accomplishes its intended purpose is viable, there are
potentially infinitely many solutions to a problem. Moreover, one solution to a
problem cannot be more viable than another since effectiveness is the only criterion
for determining viability. Therefore, if a qualitative distinction between solutions is to
be made, it must be made on the basis of some other criterion of assessment (von
Glasersfeld, 1984). We return to this important point in the final section on
communicative ethics. But first we consider what radical constructivism says about
the process of learning.

LEARNING: A COGNITIVE MODEL

Learning is not a stimulus-response phenomenon. It requires self-regulation and the building of

conceptual structures through reflection and abstraction. Problems are not solved by the retrieval
of rote-learned "right answers". To solve a problem intelligently, one must first see it as one' s
own problem . . . as an obstacle that obstructs one'
s progress toward a goal. [EvG, 1995, p.14]

Whatever a conception of learning may be, it should be consistent with the assertions
that knowledge serves to order one’s flow of experience and that knowledge consists
of viable mental constructs that one has abstracted from one’s experiences.
Accordingly, radical constructivists consider learning to have occurred when the
learner has neutralized a perturbation by reorganizing both his or her model of
experience and the activities associated therewith (Cobb, 1994; von Glasersfeld,
1987).
After conceiving of learning in this way, von Glasersfeld endeavoured to create an
explanation of the cognitive constructive process that incorporates Piaget' s concepts of
'assimilation'and ' accommodation' . During the course of his efforts, von Glasersfeld
realized that, in asserting that knowledge is abstracted from experience, constructivists
assume that it is possible to recognize experiential recurrences and that temporally
distinct experiences will be consistent (von Glasersfeld, 1984, 1987). On the basis of
these realizations, von Glasersfeld concluded that before one can characterize any
experiential phenomenon as regular or invariant, one must compare distinct
experiences and judge them to be similar (von Glasersfeld, 1984, 1986). The ability to
create an internal regeneration of an experience, or the ability to ' re-present'(von
Glasersfeld, 1989a), is an indispensable component of this process; as it is not possible
to compare noncoincident experiences without re-presenting at least one of them (von
Glasersfeld, 1984).
By noting that comparison, re-presentation and judgement of similarity are all
actions that learners intentionally engage in, and by relating these actions to the
learning process, von Glasersfeld provided substantiation of the constructivist claim
regarding the learner’s intentionality. Von Glasersfeld provided additional support for
this premise in realizing that experiences are not inherently similar; rather, it is the

4
learner who chooses and compares aspects of experiences, judges them to be similar
and, thereby, imposes on them a ' relation of similarity'(von Glasersfeld, 1986).
Von Glasersfeld argued that there are two forms of similarity: ' equivalence'and
'individual identity' . Both are concepts and, as such, must be abstracted from
experience. However, when making a comparison, a learner constructs the existence
of one relation or the other based on the perceived nature of the compared experiences,
not on the outcome of the comparison (von Glasersfeld, 1984).
The ability to judge phenomena as equivalent is the basis for the creation of
categories and the categorization process itself; however, categories are dependent for
meaning upon concepts and re-presentations (von Glasersfeld, 1989a). Even so, once a
learner has constructed the relation of equivalence, he or she is prepared to assimilate
experiences (von Glasersfeld, 1986).
On the other hand, individual identity is the basis of, what Piaget termed, ' object
permanence'(von Glasersfeld, 1986) which plays an important role early in the
process of accommodation (von Glasersfeld, 1984, 1986). When a physical or mental
action fails to produce the desired or expected result, a perturbation arises and the
accommodation cycle begins (von Glasersfeld, 1987, 1989b). The experience is
distinguished from its unperturbing counterparts, and the learner strives to resolve the
perturbation. During this quest, the learner re-presents and compares experiences in an
effort to determine what was unique about the perturbing experience and why her or
his initial model of experience failed to account for it (von Glasersfeld, 1984). Further,
the learner often examines consciously her experiential model, that is, engages in
'reflected abstraction' , in order to understand why her initial action produced an
unexpected or undesired result. Regardless, while synthesizing a viable solution the
learner utilizes reflected abstraction to reorganize his or her model of experience and
the activity that model guides (von Glasersfeld, 1987, 1989a, 1989b). Once a viable
solution is constructed, the perturbation is neutralized and cognitive equilibrium is re-
established.
Hence, von Glasersfeld constructed a cognitive model of the learning process, a
model that incorporates Piaget’s processes of assimilation and accommodation and
that has strong explanatory power. In particular, it explains the constructivist teaching
strategy of ' cognitive conflict'favoured by conceptual change researchers (Driver &
Erickson, 1983; Driver, 1995), and helps us to understand the well-documented
resilience of chidren' s' alternative frameworks' . Accommodation of children' s existing
schemas (towards, for example, a counter-intuitive scientific conception) is a
notoriously difficult teaching goal to attain. It is a cognitive process that can withstand
laboratory-based ' hands-on minds-on'personal empirical inquiry (Duit, 1995) and that
is likely to be dependent upon the socio-cultural background of the students (Baker &
Taylor, 1995). Perhaps this is why constructivists recently have turned their attention
to the role of interpersonal negotiation in attaining the ' holy grail'of cognitive
accommodation. What does radical constructivism say about the social dimension of
learning?

THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF KNOWING

5
 Kant wrote that we can only conceive of another subject by imputing our own subjectness to
another entity. . . you construct "others" out of elements of yourself, and soon these others
contribute to the image of yourself. [EvG, 1995, p.12]

Although it has been termed "the epistemological adventures of Robinson Crusoe"

(Davydov, 1990; in Confrey, 1995) and is alleged to portray the individual as nearly
“hermetically sealed in a privately constructed experiential world" (Ernest, 1993),
radical constructivism does not deny the social component of learning. On the
contrary, von Glasersfeld maintains that “Every individual' s abstraction of experiential
items is constrained (and thus guided) by social interaction and the need of
collaboration and communication with other members of the group in which he or she
grows up" (von Glasersfeld, 1991a). Von Glasersfeld argues further that social
interaction is both the most frequent source of perturbation (von Glasersfeld, 1989b)
and the most powerful method for testing the viability of one' s constructions (von
Glasersfeld, 1991b, 1993). Hence, "it is precisely the social aspect (of one' s
environment) that furnishes the key to the solidification of the individual' s experiential
reality" (von Glasersfeld, 1989c).
Clearly, radical constructivists do identify the social as an indispensable component
of the learning process. Nevertheless, the cognitive learning model of radical
constructivism does not proffer an adequate explanation of how the socio-cultural and
the personal components of learning interact (Cobb, 1994; Confrey, 1995).
Accordingly, such interaction needs to be investigated further. However, it is worth
realising that neither the social nor the individual components of learning necessarily
supersedes the other. A more pragmatic position for teachers is that the two are
complementary, and that each can serve interchangeably as the background against
which the other' s development can be foregrounded (Cobb, 1994).

Language

Texts contain neither meaning nor knowledge; they are a scaffolding on which readers can build
their interpretations. [EvG, 1993, p. 30]

Another favorite target of critics of radical constructivism has been the role its
adherents allocate to language in the development of abstract thought (Ellerton &
Clements, 1992; Lerman, 1993; Suchting, 1992). We believe this criticism to be due
largely to the infrequency with which radical constructivists expound upon the role of
language in the development of abstract thought and to the critics'failure to explore
radical constructivism' s roots in linguistic analysis and language acquisition (von
Glasersfeld, 1991b).
In 1971, von Glasersfeld argued that language could be linked to conceptual
structures and that such links were vital to the construction of understanding (von
Glasersfeld, 1971). Later, he asserted that "once ' language'has developed, it will
quickly acquire its function as an instrument of reflection and an almost indispensable
tool of thought" (von Glasersfeld, 1976, p. 218; see also 1991b). That is, language is
the tool one utilizes both to conduct one’s thinking and to impose a repeatable
structure on one’s cognition. In light of these arguments, it seems reasonable to

6
conclude that radical constructivism acknowledges a critical role for language in the
development of abstract thought.
However, language is responsible neither for our capacity for thought nor for its
own development (von Glasersfeld, 1976). On the contrary, it is constructed through
social interaction. Further, language is comprised of symbols which have no inherent
meaning and must, therefore, be interpreted. Accordingly, neither symbols nor
linguistic expressions acquire meaning prior to being associated with one or more
concepts, and since concepts are internal to the knower so are linguistic and symbolic
meanings (von Glasersfeld, 1971, 1974, 1990, 1992a; Wheatley, 1991). Nevertheless,
such meanings are abstracted from and adapted through social interactions (von
Glasersfeld, 1976, 1989c, 1992a), which again highlights the importance of the social
component of learning.
When one considers the social development of language in conjunction with its use
as a tool of reflection and for structuring thought, one might conclude that much of a
person' s self-image is constructed from her or his social interactions. Indeed Von
Glasersfeld argues thus: "Indeed out of the manifold of these frequent but nevertheless
special (social) interactions, there eventually emerges the way the developing human
individual will think both of ' others'and of him- or herself" (von Glasersfeld, 1989b).
Attacked for seeming to invert the relationship between the individual knower and the
"community of subjects/others that constitute individual subjects" (Suchting, 1992, p.
238), von Glasersfeld counters that, pace Piaget, he is interested in explaining the very
young infant' s initial separation of self from the objects that populate her experiential
world. Thus, he limits the social construction of self to later levels of development,
and argues that the young child utilizes her sensory input initially to distinguish herself
as a unique experiential entity (von Glasersfeld, 1989c, 1992b). Although social
interaction performs a vital role in the construction of self, one' s concept of others
cannot be taken as an ' ontological given'but must be constructed from one' s
experiences (von Glasersfeld, 1989b).
Although we do not disagree with these claims, we maintain that it is important to
remember that from the time one’s conscious cognitive activity begins, one' s
experiential field includes other people and one' s interactions with them. Therefore,
the construction of self and knowledge entails interwoven and inseparable personal
and social 'threads' .

Shared Meaning

By talking to an audience I cannot give people any new concepts, but I can prod them to
combine in different ways the concepts that they have associated with the words I am using.
[EvG, 1993, p.32]

Criticisms of the radical constructivist position on language are not limited to its
alleged failure to recognize language as playing a critical role in the development of
abstract thought. Also receiving fire has been radical constructivism’s assertion that
language does not have the capacity to serve as cognitive Tupperware. That is, one
cannot use language to package and convey meanings, concepts or knowledge to a
recipient who unpacks the exact meanings, concepts or knowledge that one has
endeavoured to communicate. Intimately associated with this claim is the assertion
that meanings cannot be shared in the sense that individuals construct identical

7
meanings. Like its counterpart, this claim has received intense criticism (Ellerton &
Clements, 1992; Strike, 1987). Apparently, the fundamental objection to radical
constructivism' s denial of both the objective existence of identically shared meanings
and the role of language as a transmitter of meaning is that its critics believe such
assertions defrock people of communicative ability.
From a radical constructivist perspective, communication necessitates not
identically shared meanings, but compatible meanings. Compatibility of meaning is
demonstrated when no participant of a communicative process engages in an action
that is unexpected by the other participants (von Glasersfeld, 1987, 1990). The
absence of unexpected action perpetuates within each participant a sense that the
interaction was understood and, thereby, promotes an illusion of identically shared
meaning.
Radical constructivists’ denial of the objective existence of identically shared
meanings is founded on the premise that each of us assigns meaning to linguistic
symbols and, although strongly influenced by the social, meaning is abstracted from
our individual subjective experiences (von Glasersfeld, 1987, 1989b, 1989c, 1993).
Therefore, the meanings we create are never identical or shared, in the literal sense of
the term (von Glasersfeld, 1989a, 1992a). Rather, compatible meanings have a socially
negotiated 'interpersonal fit'(von Glasersfeld, 1989b, 1989c).
However, we prefer to adopt a pragmatic perspective from which we argue that the
construction of identical meanings is within the realm of possibility. Nevertheless,
even if identical meanings are constructed, the limitations inherent in language and the
human condition (von Glasersfeld, 1986) preclude the verification of this alleged
match, which renders as moot the question of whether knowledge or meanings can be
congruent. The bottom line is that there is no privileged God' s-eye perspective from
which to judge congruence between individual meaning perspectives.

TRANSFORMING THE CULTURE OF TEACHING

Finally, we consider the viability of radical constructivism as a referent for

transforming teachers'pedagogies. In the process, we identify limitations of radical
constructivist theory as it is construed currently and argue for its elaboration by
coupling it to compatible theories drawn from the philosophies of science and
mathematics and from critical social theory.

Uncertainty

Science, having to a large extent replaced religion in the 20th century, is all too often presented
as the way to absolute truth. . . If mathematics were explained as a way of operating with a
particular kind of abstractions and science as a way of building models to help us manage the
world we experience, some of the latent resistances might be allayed. [EvG, 1995, p.6]

In the world at large, the epistemological relativism lying at the heart of radical
constructivism is highly susceptible to being colonised by the prevailing culture of
objectivism. For as long as teachers of science and mathematics continue to subscribe
implicitly to objectivist models of the nature of science and mathematics, they can be

8
expected to engage in teaching practices which indicate that they pay only ' lip service'
to a radical constructivist theory of knowing. While the historio-cultural myths of
‘cold reason’, ‘naive realism’, ‘value neutrality’, ‘confirmatory experiments’ and
‘infallible knowledge’ continue to constrain the experiential realities of science and
mathematics classrooms, radical constructivism is likely to serve only as a
handmaiden to objectivism (Milne & Taylor, 1995b; Taylor, in press).
Already in science and mathematics education we hear much of ' student-centred
learning'and ' learning as conceptual change'as teachers, curriculum developers, and
educational researchers articulate their interests in reforming from a constructivist
perspective the teaching of science and mathematics. What seems to be common
amongst these ' progressive'educational approaches is a purported concern for enabling
students to ' construct'their own knowledge. However, the issue of the status of
students’ constructed knowledge, which is of central concern to the relativist
epistemology of radical constructivism, is curiously silent. It is this silence that allows
the tradition of objectivism to attach the status of infallibility to knowledge that
students ‘construct’ in science and mathematics classrooms.
Of course, radical constructivist theory extends to include a conception of
scientists, themselves, as learners who use the constructed tool of mathematics to
generate tentative theories, or viable explanations, of the phenomenological world.
However, it is unrealistic to expect radical constructivism to provide teachers with
sufficient impetus to deconstruct the objectivist myths concerning the nature of
knowledge, learning, mathematics and science which have pervaded both the society
and the profession into which they have been enculturated and for which they function
as agents of enculturation. The power of myth lies in the sense of naturalness that it
inspires, and in its ability to conceal its presence (Barthes, 1985; Malinowski, 1944).
For many teachers, it seems natural that mathematics and science are privileged ways
of knowing and constitute journeys along the ' royal road'to revelation of the ultimate
secrets of Nature.
We believe that part of the solution to deconstructing the myth of objectivism is for
science and mathematics education to empower teachers with rich understandings of
the historical development of scientific and mathematical ideas and methods,
especially the emergence during the twentieth century of relativist views of science
(e.g., Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1970; Toulmin, 1972) and fallibilist views of
mathematics (Ernest, 1991; Kline, 1982; Tymoczko, 1986). Until teachers become
aware of the mythical nature of the ontological and epistemological claims of
objectivism in relation to science and mathematics, they will be intellectually and
emotionally unprepared to consider seriously the prospects of adopting radical
constructivism as a referent for reconstructing their well-established theories of
teaching and learning.

Communicative Ethics

The cultural and social reality would be a more livable and fruitful one if we could do away with
the notion that we have the "truth" and others had better believe it. [EvG, 1993, p.32]

There will always be more than one way of solving a problem or achieving a goal. This does not
mean that different solutions must be considered equally desirable. However, if they achieve the
desired goal, the preference for a particular way of doing this cannot be judged by its rightness,
but only with reference to some other scale of values . . . [EvG, 1995, p.8]

9
But why should teachers of science and mathematics adopt radical constructivism as a
referent for their pedagogies? Can a moral imperative be associated with an otherwise
instrumentalist theory of knowing that values knowledge on the basis of its usefulness
for attaining goals? The argument that it is highly compatible with contemporary
philosophies of science and mathematics might be enough to convince some, but
hardly constitutes a compelling case for resisting the considerable momentum of
tradition. After all, objectivism offers the morally-respectable position of a 'God' s-eye'
view of the cosmos. In the world of competing values, particularly in the crowded
curriculum world of competing ' content', radical constructivism needs to offer a moral
compulsion for its adoption.
As it is currently articulated, radical constructivism values explicitly constructive
processes that resolve cognitive perturbations aroused by a failure to attain a desired
goal state of meaning making or problem solving. Although radical constructivism
recognises that a knowledge construction process is constrained by the social
environment in which it occurs (by means of language and interpersonal fit), it does
not provide an explicit moral basis for differentiating between competing knowledge
claims, other than the self-regulating mechanism of determining the ‘consensual
fitness’ of one' s position. But what of the moral basis of the consensual viewpoint? Is
that to be taken as fixed, as unproblematic, or as uncontestable? If so, the individual is
at the mercy of the whim of the group. If we are to avoid the worst excesses of social
determinism, it seems wise to broaden radical constructivism' s instrumentalism by
building a moral dimension into, or complementary with, the notion of viability that
safeguards the interests of the individual while building a coherent consensual
community. One way of doing this is to couple radical constructivist theory to Jurgen
Habermas' s 'theory of communicative action'(Habermas, 1972; McCarthy, 1984;
Pusey, 1987), a social epistemology that posits an avowedly ethical approach to the
social construction of knowledge.
For Habermas, the highest moral form of human endeavor is rational
'communicative action'oriented toward constructing a society in which truth, freedom
and justice prevail. In particular, the intellectual autonomy of the individual should be
safeguarded from the coercive influence of arbitrary power exerted by self-serving
competitive interests. To achieve this democratic goal, we need to value social
relations that strive for achieving hermeneutic, or mutual and reciprocal,
understanding. Habermas identifies language as the vehicle for attaining this goal.
However, a problem with language is that it has an ideological dimension and can
serve, therefore, as a medium of power and oppression, especially in its role as the
'reservoir of tradition'which conceals and legitimates arbitrary power: "the most
sincere efforts at understanding often serve only to tighten the grip of ideologically
laden ascriptions of roles and responsibilities" (Pusey, 1991, p.64). Communication
that is ' systematically distorted' prevents us, therefore, from reaching a truly
consensual understanding.
Systematically distorted communication is inherent in ' instrumental'and ' strategic
action' . The former concerns actions that are oriented toward the control of impersonal
problems, such as the technical exploitation of Nature and the efficient functioning of
institutions, whereas the latter fuels a spirit of competitive individualism oriented
toward achieving success and domination over others. Both forms of action are
justified in terms of an instrumentalist ethic in which the pre-determined end justifies
the means. In the mathematics or science classroom, instrumental and strategic actions

10
give rise to an attitude in which the objects of pedagogical interest are the seemingly
independent mathematical or scientific laws and theories that are believed to mirror
Nature. An instrumentalist ethic attaches greater value to these objects than to the
social relations amongst teacher and students. Further, teacher and students are
constituted as objects serving complementary strategic interests in the main ' power
game'of delivery and reception of expert knowledge and the reproduction of the
normative values underpinning their social roles. The prevailing instrumentalist ethic
assigns, therefore, a privileged value to teacher control, student conformity and social
reproduction.
For the most part, ‘validity claims’ (or standards of truth and rightness) associated
with instrumental and strategic actions are legitimated by the authority vested in the
teacher by the institution. Thus, systematically distorted communication occurs
because traditional validity claims (e.g., value-neutrality, amorality, uncritical
obedience) underpinning both school science and mathematics and the institutionally-
sanctioned social roles of teaching and learning go unexamined and unchallenged.
Worse still, these official validity claims displace those that underpin the lifeworld
knowledge that students bring with them from their out-of-school lives. Thus, the
everyday classroom discourse that validates official knowledge and its generative
social actions serves as a normalising influence. In the absence of an opportunity to
engage in critical and self-reflective discourse about the legitimacy of competing
validity claims, the distorting influence of tradition remains both invisible and
irresistible. It is little wonder that the discursive practices of science and mathematics
classrooms perpetuate so successfully amongst students the socially-repressive myth
of objectivism.
On the one hand, radical constructivism is clearly antithetical to the objectivist
epistemology of instrumental action inasmuch as it identifies knowledge, meaning-
making and concepts as the objects of scientific and mathematical inquiry, and regards
the socio-physical environment as a constraining influence on the viability of these
thought objects. In contesting instrumental action, radical constructivism' s notion of
viability recaptures the essentially fallible human nature of scientific and mathematical
knowledge. On the other hand, however, radical constructivism' s somewhat
instrumental view of the social environment — as a collection of individual
subjectivities — does little to safeguard the social construction of scientific and
mathematical knowledge from the amoral excesses of self-serving strategic action,
especially by the most powerful others, be they teachers or other students.
It is at this juncture that Habermas’s theory of communicative action is helpful. It
posits a means of counterbalancing instrumental and strategic actions by working
towards the deconstruction of systematic distortions preventing mutual and reciprocal
understanding. Communicative action offers a metalanguage for teachers and students
of science and mathematics to examine conjointly the validity claims underpinning
their established social roles and epistemologies. This is demonstrated in part by Cobb
et al. (1993) who argue for two interlocking classroom discourses — ‘talking
mathematics’ and ‘talking about talking mathematics’ — in which the social norms
that constrain the way that students make sense of their mathematical learning
experiences become the subject of critical appraisal, negotiation and renewed
consensus-building.
Thus, by advocating conditions for examining underpinning validity claims,
communicative action complements radical constructivism by providing a moral basis
— a discourse ethics — for examining the worth of knowledge. The outcome of

11
educational discourses based on communicative action is unlikely, however, to be a
‘neat and tidy’ singularity. Indeed, science and mathematics education is likely to
witness the re-emergence of dialectical rationality (in which competing ideas are held
in essential tension) as the status of scientific and mathematical knowledge is assessed
in terms of not only its technical usefulness but also its value to the construction and
attainment of society’s utopic goals.
However, there is a cost to the establishment in school science and mathematics
classrooms of communicative action. Effort must be expended by teachers and
students on developing empathetic and trusting relationships that nurture a risk-taking
educational environment in which sincere self-disclosure and caring criticism can
flourish. Existing social norms must be subject to critical examination against the
explicit backdrop of tradition. Principles of equitable access and participation must
govern classroom discourse. Moreover, and because consensual communities cannot
be prescribed by authority, teacher and students must negotiate jointly new
groundrules for the development of their own dialectical learning communities.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to summarize Ernst von Glasersfeld' s construction of radical

constructivism, to examine the legitimacy of common criticisms of it, and to consider
it’s implications for teachers of science and mathematics. Our investigation has
revealed that recent criticisms of the radical constructivist position on language and
the social dimension of learning are unwarranted. Nevertheless, we believe that radical
constructivism does need to explore further the socio-cultural context of knowledge
construction and to incorporate a moral imperative for altering teaching practices if it
is to serve as a viable referent for transforming the pedagogies of teachers of science
and mathematics. We argue that integrating Habermas’s theory of communicative
action with radical constructivism’s concept of viability offers a promising avenue for
empowering educators with a moral imperative for deconstructing traditional
objectivist conceptions of the nature of science, mathematics and knowledge, and for
reconstructing their personal epistemologies, teaching practices and educative
relationships with students. The incorporation of Habermas’s theory of communicative
action offers a promising safeguard for the integrity of the individual student against
the overly deterministic influence of the technical imperatives of the educational
institution by setting out conditions for establishing a dialectical learning community.

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