11 Lessons From Venture Capitalist Fred Wilson
11 Lessons From Venture Capitalist Fred Wilson
Venture Capitalist
Fred Wilson 2019
Table of Contents
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 5
INVESTMENT ADVICE 15
MANAGEMENT ADVICE 23
The year Wilson launched USV was also the year he started his
career as a prolific blogger on avc.com. His almost daily posts
run the gamut of subjects in the tech and investing space, from
policy issues like patent law to strategies for building and retaining
a team.
Building a startup isn’t like Olympic sports where “the way to win”
is to perform the most elaborate, technically challenging sequence
of moves, Wilson tells founders. Instead, they should think like a
beginning diver, and strive to “execute a simple dive and hit the
water perfectly.” In other words, build something that excels at
doing one thing and go from there.
These capabilities — and the idea that Twitter would have become a
virtual streaming platform — were far outside Twitter’s scope in its
infancy. Starting simple gave the product time to get there organically.
Rather than trying to dictate the way users interact with their
product from the beginning, the team should gradually learn what
users need and adapt accordingly.
For a startup founder, solid revenue traction can seem like a tonic
against the uncertainty of the startup business. If people are buying
the product, that must mean the team is doing something right.
What matters in the long run is whether the company has a solid
product that solves a problem for its customers. Strong revenue
figures might mean the team has gotten there — but they might not.
Wilson recalls that his firm has had “portfolio companies build
revenue models that did not line up well with the strategic direction,”
but that “these kinds of mistakes are usually not fatal.”
The first wave of hype around social media began to fade around
the early 2000s. The number of social networks had grown quickly,
overloading users with too many different profiles to manage.
Many speculated that platforms like Friendster and Orkut ultimately
failed because people couldn’t juggle more than one or two social
networks at a time.
Imagine you’re an entrepreneur who gets fed up with the long wait
at his dentist, Wilson says. Being the inventive type, you build and
sell a piece of software that helps dentists manage their practices
better, and you wind up building a successful company.
But over time, other companies build the same sort of software for
less money. The margins get smaller and smaller, and your work
gets harder. Eventually, an enterprising group of dentist/coders
bands together to build an open-source version that out-competes
them all.
This way apps do not need to compete to own and control their
networks. They all benefit when a new app ties its user base into
the network they share — the way that each dentist benefits when
a new user signs up for “Dentistry.com” because their potential
customer base has just expanded.
Any new service needs to be an interesting place even for its first
users. “Big open data rich social platforms are interesting places,”
Wilson explains.
Wilson often praises Foursquare for its high marks on this score.
He uses the app because the lists automatically geosort depending
on the user’s location, and because its map view can serve as a
walking map of a neighborhood or city.
Once the buzz around a social network dies down, good single
user utility can help retain users that might otherwise have jumped
ship. “If I get great single person utility from your service,” Wilson
explains, “it is less likely that I will follow my friends out of it when
your service ends its stay on the hype cycle.”
“The second quartile will try your patience and your conviction.
These investments often take longer to realize. And you will have to
take endless calls from friends in the VC passing on the investment
for all sorts of good reasons.”
Fred Wilson has observed that most venture capital portfolios obey
“power law dynamics”: a few high performers outstrip the returns of
the rest of the pack by a mile.
At first blush, the top tier would seem to merit the most attention.
Surely the companies that generate 80% of the returns deserve 80%
of the VC’s time and energy.
“You will have to talk your management team off the ledge
countless times,” Wilson warns. “You will work harder to recruit new
talent. You will put more money into them than you want to. You will
struggle to get the business profitable.” He does not see that as a
problem. As trying as it might be to sweat over a company you don’t
expect to become the next Google, it’s necessary.
Top quartile deals will end up being more valuable, and Wilson
can still add value to those kinds of companies; but for the most
part, they can move along without as much intervention. Those
companies are going to get big with or without Wilson’s help — like
Twitter, for example. For those in the middle though, a VC putting in
the effort can mean the difference between a modest profit at exit
and a total failure.
Wilson made a bold statement about the future of tech in the new
economy in a July 2009 interview: “Every industry that is based
on knowledge or information or some other form of non-physical
matter (atoms vs bits) is going to fundamentally transform.”
“Who wants to get into the back seat of the first self driving car and
let the car do its thing?” he asks. “Not me.”
That is fine by Wilson. In fact, he has called that fund “the best
venture fund I have ever worked on.” The lesson he draws from the
USV 2004 fund can be counterintuitive: if you do everything right as
an early-stage investor, many of the companies you back will fail.
That high rate of failure means you are taking the right amount of
risk, and you are not clinging to companies that will never work out.
Wilson indicates in an April 2016 blog post that the losses on those
9 companies were easily swamped by the gains from 5 investments
where the fund raked in double and triple-digit returns. Making the
hits count is much more important than trying not to miss.
In the same 2016 post, Wilson points out that the 2008 fund, while
unlikely to outperform its 2004 predecessor overall, did improve on it
in one regard. While both funds saw a 40% names loss ratio, the 2008
fund lost only 20% of the money it invested. USV did this by taking
what Wilson calls a “loving your losers” approach. It spent more time
with struggling firms so that it could identify the duds quickly and “get
the founders and other investors to see the light early.”
For Wilson, going slow and keeping the active portfolio narrow
ensures that the team is thoroughly thinking through each company
they back. On top of that, it lets them stay in the loop with every one
of those companies after making a deal.
All the while, the company took care to keep “its headcount and
expense structure under control so it had runway to evolve and
improve their product.” That sort of discipline, Wilson argues, can
turn a crisis from a damaging blow for a company to a pathway
for success.
A pivot takes place when a company’s new product hits the wall
and the company changes course, launching a different product
informed by the lessons from the original. Flickr, Twitter, Slack, and
Kik all overcame crises this way.
When a company opts for the grind, it buckles down and iterates
its original product until it lands on something that works. This
approach, Wilson makes clear, is not the same as clinging to a
bankrupt idea and burning through money. In fact, keeping the
company lean is critical to making the grind strategy work.
Wilson gives his own rule of thumb for how fast early-stage
companies should grow in a February 2015 blog post: a company’s
annual growth rate plus its operating margin should be at least
40%. In other words, if a company is getting 60% bigger every year,
it should aim to lose no more than 20 cents on every dollar of sales
it brings in.
He admits that there is “no magic” to the 40% number, but that the
rule is valuable because it is a reminder that growth at all costs is
not always the right way to go — especially if you’re losing a lot of
money on each sale.
Furthermore, not all types of growth are alike. Wilson makes a point
of distinguishing between “organic and sustainable” growth and
“temporary stimulated” growth. Building the management team or
developing key pieces of technology might be worthwhile in the
long run. Pumping up the customer base with a new marketing
push might not be if those new customers don’t stick around once
the company pivots to make money.