Can Disclosure in Canada's Fed
Can Disclosure in Canada's Fed
1. INTRODUCTION
Disclosure is a cornerstone of consumer protection: ‘‘The common element
of the federal government’s consumer-protection measures for financial services
in the United States is the requirement that institutions disclose designated
information to consumers in specified formats at required times. Disclosures are
so central to the purpose of some financial consumer protections that we might
properly call them ‘information protections.’”1
The goal of this article is to examine the function and challenges of
legislatively imposed disclosure in financial consumer protection regimes. To
achieve this goal, the article is organized in three sections. The first section will
examine the context that has shaped today’s approach to consumer disclosure,
studying the reasoning behind disclosure as a means to protect the consumer, as
well as the international community’s influence on Canada’s approach to
financial consumer protection.
The second section will review Canada’s approach to disclosure in the
financial services sector, both from a federal and provincial perspective.
The article concludes by examining the difficulties inherent with a
prescriptive disclosure-based regime to achieve financial consumer protection
in an ever-expanding digital banking environment.
*
Brigitte Goulard is Senior Counsel, Torys LLP. Peter Aziz is Senior Counsel, Torys LLP
and Matthew Gragtmans is an articling student at Torys LLP.
1
Thomas A. Durkin and Gregory Elliehausen, ‘‘Disclosure as a Consumer Protection” in
Thomas A. Durkin and Michael E. Staten, eds., The Impact of Public Policy on Consumer
Credit (Boston: Springer, 2002) at 109.
334 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [35 B.F.L.R.]
ensuring that all key information is provided. Unfortunately, for various reasons,
including the growing complexity of financial products and services, consumers
do not always fully understand the products and services they are purchasing.
Additionally, behavioural economics have demonstrated that even if given the
requisite information, consumers do not always make the best choices.
However, there are other reasons for policy makers to resort to disclosure
requirements to achieve consumer protection goals.2
First, disclosure can be so easily integrated in the offering of products and
services that it deters both policy makers and institutions from developing more
innovative ways to achieve consumer protection. Since sales representatives are
already providing product information to their customers through the sales
process, it makes sense that product features and pricing be provided as part of
their ‘‘sales pitch”. Standard disclosure used by all institutions can even be used
to readily compare and differentiate different institutions’ similar terms.
Second, a consumer protection regime that uses disclosure obligations to
achieve its purposes presumes, to a certain extent, that consumers have different
product options available. For example, consumers have so many credit card
options that there are now websites dedicated to assisting consumers in
comparing credit card fees, rates of interest, loyalty programs and terms and
conditions. Disclosures would be much simpler if there was only one card with
one set of terms and conditions. In a sense, a regime based on disclosures allows
for innovation in terms of product offering, whereas a stricter regulatory regime
with little flexibility reduces consumer choice.
Third, as noted by authors Durkin and Ellihausen, there are also political
imperatives favoring disclosure-based regimes: ‘‘required disclosures may be
relatively lower in cost, both in terms of market disruption and out-of-pocket
government expenditures. Disclosures have been viewed as a convenient political
compromise between those demanding greater consumer protection and those
arguing that market interference is too wrenching and costly.”3
2
Thomas A. Durkin and Gregory Elliehausen, ‘‘Disclosure as a Consumer Protection” in
Thomas A. Durkin and Michael E. Staten, eds., The Impact of Public Policy on Consumer
Credit (Boston: Springer, 2002).
3
Ibid. at 110.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 335
4
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, G20 High-Level Principles
on Financial Consumer Protection, 2011.
5
G20/OECD Task Force on Financial Consumer Protection, Update report on the work to
336 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [35 B.F.L.R.]
8
Ibid. at 5.
9
Ibid. at 9.
10
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, G20/OECD Policy
Guidance on Financial Consumer Protection Approaches in the Digital Age, 2018.
338 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [35 B.F.L.R.]
5. Testing and exploring new ways of making disclosure more effective for
consumers in terms of more targeted, proportionate and customer-
centric approaches.
Interestingly, the Digital Guidance recognizes that disclosure in a digital
channel requires a different approach, but still does not appear to step away from
the traditional disclosure approach adopted in the Principles. Rather, the Digital
Guidance implies that the digital format needs to be somehow adapted to fit the
disclosure requirements. For example, it is suggested that there should be a
minimum scroll down time for reading pre-contractual information. This
suggestion demonstrates that the Digital Guidance’s objective is not to
transform consumer protection approaches but rather to focus on how to
adapt digitalization to maintain the traditional disclosure method of long
discourse on terms and conditions. Additionally, a key objective of digitization is
to reduce consumer frustration with existing banking processes. Slowing
scrolling down time to ensure consumers read pre-contractual obligations will
most likely exacerbate consumer frustration, not reduce it.
Furthermore, the G20 Digital Guidance does not question the use of
standardized documents which was identified in the Principles as an effective
approach to disclosure. Standardized documents, which often use templates or
information boxes as a means to disclose information are not easily translated in
a digital format, nor do they always transmit the necessary level of information.
The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), as part of their Smart
Communications Initiative, recognized the shortcomings of ‘‘standardized
forms” as a disclosure tool and have removed from their handbook11 several
templates as they were concerned that ‘‘they created a ‘tick box’ approach to
disclosure and may be restricting firms from finding better ways to give
consumers this information.”12
Unlike the UK, Canada is not distancing itself from the OECD’s proposed
‘‘effective approaches”.
11
The Financial Conduct Authority Handbook contains the complete record of the
Financial Conduct Authority legal instruments.
12
United Kingdom, Financial Conduct Authority, Policy Statement: Smarter Consumer
Communications: Removing ineffective disclosure requirements in our Handbook, PS16/23
at 12 [PS16/23].
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 339
13
G20/OECD, supra note 5 at 8.
14
Ibid. at 8.
15
Bill C-86, A second Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament
on February 27, 2018 and other measures, 1st Sess., 42nd Parliament, Canada, 2018
(assented to December 13, 2018), c. 27, division 10 Section 328, s. 627.08 [Bill C-86].
340 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [35 B.F.L.R.]
However, the Framework does require banks to train its employees and
officers with respect to the policies and procedures that it has established to
comply with the consumer provisions,16 and furthermore, that the remuneration
and benefits paid to bank employees and officers must not interfere with the
policies and procedures established to ensure that the products and services sold
are appropriate for the consumer’s needs and circumstances. 17
(ii) With respect to disclosure requirements
Although generally aligned with the OECD Guidance, Canada’s Framework
is in some respects more restrained than the OECD’s recommended effective
approaches.
For example, the Framework contains a new general prohibition against
communicating or otherwise providing false or misleading information to a
customer, the public or the Commissioner. This requirement focuses only on the
information that is to be provided whereas the OECD recommended approach
also address information that is omitted: ‘‘Financial services providers and
authorized agents do not make statements that are untrue, misleading or omit
information that is necessary to understand the nature, risks, terms and
conditions of the products or services.”18 Although omitting information can
mislead customers, that may not always be the case which is why including an
obligation to ‘‘not omit” information further raises the bar in terms of disclosure
requirements.
In addition to the above noted general prohibition against communicating
false or misleading information, the Framework also imposes a general
requirement to disclose information in a manner, and using a language, that is
clear, simple and not misleading, and that the disclosure shall be in writing unless
otherwise provided for in the legislation.19
The Framework also includes a general ‘‘catch-all” disclosure provision that
unless the legislation provides product specific disclosure requirements, the
financial institution is required to disclose, with respect to each product and
service, its features, the list of charges and penalties, and the particulars of a
person’s rights and obligations in respect of the product or service.20
The above requirements are well aligned with the OECD’s effective
approaches, which recommends consumers be provided with adequate
information on the key features of a financial product or service, highlighting
the fees, charges, penalties, and risks.
With respect to advertisements, the Framework introduces a general
obligation that ‘‘any advertisement in Canada that is made by an institution
16
Ibid., s. 627.02.
17
Ibid., s. 627.07.
18
G20/OECD, supra note 5 at 6.
19
Bill C-86, supra note 15, s. 627.55.
20
Ibid., s. 627.59.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 341
21
Bill C-86, supra note 15, s. 677.14.
22
G20/OECD, supra note 5, at 6.
23
Ibid. at 6.
24
Bill C-86, supra note 15, s. 627.61.
25
Ibid., s. 627.57(1).
342 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [35 B.F.L.R.]
Although this obligation currently exists under the Bank Act,27 the Framework’s
new responsible business conduct requirements add a level of complexity. The
requirement to ensure compliance by a bank’s agents is also found in the
Guidance on the Principles: ‘‘Consumers receive appropriate and consistent
information on the product or service, irrespective of whether they are dealing
with a financial services provider or an authorized agent.”28
(iv) With respect to a consumer’s rights and obligations
In several instances,29 the Framework refers to the bank’s obligations to
disclose the particulars of the person’s rights and obligations in respect of a
product or service. Although, the Framework does not address which particulars
are to be considered a ‘‘person’s obligation”, the OECD does offer some
guidance. According to the Guidance on the Principles, a person has the
obligation to provide financial institutions ‘‘with as much as relevant
information as necessary about their circumstances and not to withhold
relevant information so that the latter can fully assess their financial situation
and risk appetite and expectations, appropriately characterize them and
understand what the consumer really needs and wishes.”30 The OECD further
adds that a ‘‘Consumers’ responsibility to provide information is balanced by a
regulatory requirement for financial service providers to seek all relevant
information from the consumer.”31
The above analysis reveals that although federal policymakers were
influenced by the Principles, it did adopt a more tempered ‘‘made in Canada”
approach. But ‘‘made in Canada” also means that one must take into
consideration the provinces’ role in financial consumer protection.
26
Bill C-86, supra note 15, s. 627.15.
27
Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 6, s. 459.5.
28
G20/OECD, supra note 5 at 6.
29
Bill C-86, supra note 15, s. 627.59, s. 627.6(2), s. 627.61(2), s. 627.89(1).
30
G20/OECD, supra note 5 at 10.
31
Ibid. at 10.
32
Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5,
s. 91(15).
33
Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2018) at
24-1 [Peter Hogg].
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 343
34
Marcotte c. Banque de Montréal, 2014 CSC 55, 2014 SCC 55, 2014 CarswellQue 9001,
2014 CarswellQue 9002, (sub nom. Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte) [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, 25
B.L.R. (5th) 173, 374 D.L.R. (4th) 581, 462 N.R. 202 (S.C.C.) at para. 2.
35
Ibid. at para. 66.
36
Peter Hogg, supra note 33 at 16-4 & 16-10.1.
37
Marcotte c. Banque de Montre´al, supra note 34 at para 78.
38
Ibid. at para. 79.
344 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [35 B.F.L.R.]
the banks will face greater challenges as they strive to meet the disclosure
requirements of all operative regimes.
For example, Bill 134, amending the Quebec Consumer Protection Act (CPA)
came into force on August 1, 2019.39 Examining Quebec Bill 134 in light of the
Framework, we can foresee the challenges shared jurisdiction poses on disclosure
requirements. One of the fundamental difficulties is that provincial consumer
protection legislation is general in its application in that it applies to all
consumers purchasing good or services within the province, regardless of
whether it is a financial product or service. The wider application of the
provincial regime results in inconsistencies between the regimes.
For example, the CPA requires compulsory clauses to be included in all
contracts of credit, whether or not made with a bank.40 In one instance, the
compulsory text refers to ‘‘merchant” as being the provider of the credit (i.e. in
this instance, the bank). However, in the context of a credit card issued by a
bank, the term ‘‘merchant” in the cardholder agreement usually refers to the
third-party seller of goods and services who takes payment through the system,
not the bank. The text imposed by the provincial legislation does not align with
the manner in which credit cards are issued by banks and used by consumers.
Although drafted with the consumer in mind, dictating specific language fails to
take into consideration various permutations on how products can be sold.
Banks may wish to consider the risks of modifying the compulsory clauses for
clarity, without changing their meaning.
The Quebec CPA also, in many instances, adds a layer of additional
requirements. For example, under the new federal Framework, the bank will be
required to electronically send to its customers, without delay, an alert when the
customer’s personal deposit account balance falls below a certain amount or
when the person’s amount of credit falls below a certain amount. 41 The CPA on
the other hand requires an alert to be sent once the person has exceeded its limit.
Compliance with both regimes would mean that customers may receive more
than one alert, potentially within days.42
Another example is with respect to cooling off periods. Under the CPA,
agreements where credit has been granted can be cancelled within two days of
entering into the agreement.43 This, of course, applies to a myriad of situations
where credit is granted such as purchasing appliances. Under the federal
legislation a cooling off period (cancellation) is possible for certain types of
agreements. For agreements44 entered into by mail or by telephone, the
39
Bill 134, An Act mainly to modernize rules relating to consumer credit and to regulate debt
settlement service contracts, high-cost credit contracts and loyalty programs, 1st Sess., 41st
Leg., Quebec, 2017 (assented to November 15, 2017), S.Q. 2017, c. 24.
40
Ibid., s. 125, Schedule 4.
41
Bill C-86, supra note 15, s. 627.13.
42
Bill 134, supra note 39, s. 128.1.
43
Ibid., s. 73.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 345
consumer can cancel within 14 days after entering into the agreement and for
agreements entered any other way, the agreement can be cancelled until the end
of the third business day after the day on which the agreement was entered into. 45
It then becomes a puzzle to determine which cancellation provision applies to
which product. For some products, the provincial and federal requirements may
apply, but for others, potentially, only the provincial requirements or the federal
requirements could apply.
The superimposition of two regimes adds to the banks’ compliance burden,
but it is questionable whether it leads to greater consumer protection.
This question is particularly relevant as the consumer’s growing shift towards
digital interaction further casts doubt on the effectiveness of disclosure as a
consumer protection tool. Technology may be considered useful as an innovative
medium to communicate with customers. However, merely transposing in a
digital format, disclosure that was previously provided in a paper format may
not satisfy consumer protection objectives. The FCA’s work on Smarter
Consumer Communication46 discussed below revealed that when the terms
and conditions governing products and services were digitally transmitted, few
customers accessed the online link to review such terms and conditions. It is
disheartening to think that the inordinate amount of time and resources that
banks are spending to comply with provincial and federal regulatory regimes
may not in the end protect consumers.
More innovative ‘‘out of the box” disclosure methods must be considered for
disclosure to be effective in the digital age.
44
Other than for credit cards, certain deposits and any products or services that may be
specified in regulations.
45
Bill C-86, supra note 15, s. 627.1(1). This section provides for cancellation periods for
products and services. The time delays provided above may be amended through
regulations.
46
Financial Conduct Authority, Smarter Consumer Communications Discussion Paper,
June 2015.
47
Ibid. at 4.
346 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [35 B.F.L.R.]
FCA admits that ‘‘a predominantly paper-based disclosure may not meet today’s
consumer information needs” and ensuring a more consumer-friendly disclosure
regime will require ‘‘a fundamental change in mindset about how to
communicate effectively with consumers.”48
The FCA’s Discussion Paper on Consumer Communications examined
several issues, including how to improve the communication of an agreement’s
terms and conditions and the disclosure of fees and charges; how to more
effectively raise consumer awareness of the Financial Ombudsman Service. The
FCA’s Feedback Statement following the Discussion Paper identified four
factors limiting innovation and quality of consumer communications within
financial services:
1. Concern about the risks of changing communications, due to the
uncertainty of the regulators’ expectations,
certain disclosure templates to ‘‘move away from a prescriptive format and tick
box style of disclosure towards a style of disclosure that would allow financial
institutions to communicate with consumers in more informative and innovative
ways.”51
Unfortunately, the UK’s progressive thinking has not crossed the Atlantic
into Canada. Although the four obstacles to innovation noted above are also
present in Canada, two are particularly problematic. First, Canada’s Framework
is very prescriptive and even leaves the door open for the establishment of
additional ‘‘disclosure templates” that may dictate what and how information
need to be disclosed.52 And second, in light of the Marcotte decision, Canadian
banks must now consider both provincial and federal disclosure requirements in
their communications efforts with consumers. Having to now comply with 10
provincial, three territorial, and one federal regime, banks will be even further
challenged to develop consumer communication approaches that are clear and
engage consumers into making good decisions.
Disclosure requirements created by policy makers and implemented by
regulators that operate in a ‘‘paper-based” world become impractical at best, and
unworkable at worst, in a digital environment. This is becoming increasingly
relevant as the appeal of digital banking has over the past few years expanded to
include nearly all banking customer groups, not just the millennials. 53
Disclosure as the principal tool to achieve consumer protection must be re-
thought, or at the very least, how such disclosures are currently taking place must
be reconsidered. Regulators and policy makers need to adopt a more proactive,
innovative approach to how best to protect consumers; and must in re-thinking
their approach appreciate the consumer’s growing expectations for a customized
experience.
Fortunately, the digital space, and an appropriate use of customer data,
would provide for such customized experiences. Providing ‘‘customized”
disclosures via digital platforms could lead to customer engagement which
would hopefully lead to better financial decisions. However, to achieve this
objective, policy makers and regulators will need to leave behind prescriptive
rules that are not easily transferable to the digital experience.
Not only are prescriptive rules not easily transferable to the digital
experience, but the shift in product and service delivery from font line staff to
online experiences also impacts consumer protection. Whereas in the traditional
delivery model, consumer protection is achieved by ensuring front line staff are
51
Ibid. at 14.
52
Bill-C86, supra note 15, s. 627.57(1).
53
Jonathan Godsall et al, ‘‘Inflection Point: Seven transformative shifts in US retail
banking”, McKinsey & Company Global Banking Practice, October 2019, online:
<https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Financial%20Services/
Our%20Insights/Inflection%20point%20Seven%20transformative%20shifts%20i-
n%20US%20retail%20banking/Inflection-point-Seven-transformative-shifts-in-US-
retail-banking-vF>.
348 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [35 B.F.L.R.]
properly incentivized and provided the required information, in the digital world,
front line staff are progressively being replaced by a digital channel. This shift
demands a rethinking of how consumer protection can be achieved. In her blog
post, ‘‘Consumer Protection in a Digital Age”, author Elisabeth Rhyne suggests
that in the context of digital banking, consumer protection should shift from
staff and operations to product design and delivery. She states:
With digital services, the consumer experience is embedded in the design of the
product and user interfaces — largely in advance. This is a profound shift. To
ensure consumer protection, digital financial service providers will need to
institute practices in the design process to confirm that consumer risks are
mitigated. These practices are only now emerging in the sector.54
Dealing with this shift will challenge policy makers, regulators and financial
institutions.
In his book, Bank 4.0: Banking Everywhere, Never at a Bank, Brett King,
devotes one chapter to the regulatory challenges associated with digital
banking.55 Mr. King makes the case for designing from scratch digitally-native
regulation which would gradually replace the existing system. He proposes a
number of elements for reform, including:
1. Moving away from rules-based regulations towards more principles-
based supervision coupled with data-intensive monitoring against
quantified metrics.
2. Creating new rules and systems that are digitally-native, not merely
enhancements of old analog processes.
54
Elisabeth Rhyne, ‘‘Consumer Protection in a Digital Age”, Centre for Financial
Inclusion, July 2019, online:<https://www.centerforfinancialinclusion.org/consumer-
protection-in-a-digital-age>.
55
Brett King, Bank 4.0: Banking Everywhere, Never at a Bank (London: Marshall
Cavendish International, 2019).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 349
The list of ‘‘to-do’s” for regulators and policy makers is long and challenging
but should be seriously considered if the objective is to ensure continued
consumer protection in the digital age.
As Brett King predicts, the future of banking will be ‘‘embedded in voice-
based smart assistants like Alexa and Siri, available at your command to pay,
book, transact, enquire, save or invest. It is going to be embedded in mixed-
reality smart glasses that can tell you, just by looking at something — like a new
television or a new car — whether you can afford it.”56
How does today’s prescriptive, standardized, long, and complex disclosure
approach fit in a pair of mixed-reality smart glasses? It doesn’t.
56
Ibid. at 40.
Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction
prohibited without permission.