Pestilos vs.

Generoso (2014)

Summary Cases:

● Pestilos vs. Generoso

Subject: When arrest without a warrant is lawful; Hot pursuit arrest; Old rule (reasonable suspicion was
sufficient); 1940 and 1965 Rules of Court (restricting the arresting officer's determination of probable
cause); 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (restricting the time frame to make the warrantless arrest);
Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (standard is “probable cause” based on personal
knowledge); Probable cause; Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 vs. Probable cause in
preliminary investigations vs. Probable cause in judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest; Evidence to support determination of probable cause differs; Crime has just been committed;
Element: Personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; Warrantless arrest was lawful; The term "invited"
in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to mean as an authoritative command; Order denying the motion for
preliminary investigation is valid;

Facts:

On February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners
(Pestilos, Macapanas, Gaces, Fernandez, and Munoz) and Atty. Moreno Generoso.

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District to report the incident. SP02 Javier and others arrived at
the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso
badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted
the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. At the
inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.
Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso survived the attack.

Petitioners were charged for the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso.

Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not
been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers
had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They were just "invited" to the
police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary
investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

The RTC denied the motion for preliminary investigation. The petitioners filed a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) but the same was dismissed. The CA determined that the arrest
was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a
consequence. Moreover, the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the
meaning of a command.

Hence, the present petition. Petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested.
Held:

When arrest without a warrant is lawful

1. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which
states that:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -A peace officer or a private person may, without a
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 warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

2. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot
pursuit" arrest.

Hot pursuit arrest

3. Section 5(b) is the provision applicable in the present case. This provision has undergone changes
through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.

(a) Old rule (reasonable suspicion was sufficient)

4. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge
that a crime was actually committed. The gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's
reasonable suspicion (treated as tantamount to probable cause) that (i) a crime was committed and (ii)
the person sought to be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so much discretion
and leeway on the part of the arresting officer.

(b) 1940 and 1965 Rules of Court (restricting the arresting officer's determination of probable
cause)

5. Under the old rule, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion)
applied both as to (i) whether a crime has been committed and (ii) whether the person to be arrested
has committed it. However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there
should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's
"reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Consequently, the determination of probable
cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be
arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the
arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests.

(c) 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (restricting the time frame to make the warrantless arrest)

6. As amended, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced
under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission
of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This
limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering
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information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

(d) Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (standard is “probable cause” based on
personal knowledge)

7. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the
incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on
whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

8. Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

9. It is clear that the present rules have objectified the previously subjective determination of the
arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on
mere suspicion or hearsay.

10. As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are:

(1) an offense has just been committed; and

Element: Probable cause

11. The existence of ''probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting
officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of
determining whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

(a) US jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests

12. In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough
investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis
supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a
case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless
arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the
information acquired later.

13. In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical
questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to
be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved.

14. In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession,
his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements
of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable
cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the
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arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the
circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information.

(b) Philippine jurisprudence on probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113

15. In Abelita III v. Doria, the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 vs. Probable cause in preliminary investigations vs.
Probable cause in judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest

(a) Preliminary investigation

16. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for
trial.

17. In Buchanan vs. Viuda de Esteban, we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge
of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

18. In a preliminary investigation, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the
respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his
witnesses.

(b) Judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest

19. On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.

20. Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence
submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in
detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally
evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.

(c) Warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113

21. In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to
actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

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Evidence to support determination of probable cause differs

22. The standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant,
the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.

23. However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable
cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the
available facts and circumstance within their possession. Thus, the arresting officer should base his
determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their
determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.

24. The arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available information t
hat he must personally gather within a limited time frame. The Court has acknowledged the inherent
limitations of determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in
these instances.

Element: Crime has just been committed

25. In People v. del Rosario, the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed
means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed
and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

Element: Personal knowledge of facts or circumstances

26. In People vs. Doria, the Court held that Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.

27. Personal knowledge of a crime just committed does not require actual presence at the scene while a
crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent
(as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.

28. The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary,
"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions." Circumstances may pertain
to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer
at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he
could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the
scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of
facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply
with the element of immediacy.

29. In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the
required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This
required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers
would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an
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exhaustive investigation.

Warrantless arrest was lawful

30. The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour
from the time of the occurrence of the crime at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005. Hence, the CA finding
that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.

31. To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1)
hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and
the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his
mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their
participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what
transpired.

32. With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time
of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances
were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest.
These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal
knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that
the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.

The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to mean as an authoritative command

33. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest. Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention
on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary.

34. Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, SP02 Javier could not but have the
intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso's account. SP02 Javier did not need to
apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police
station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an
alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the
petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills
Police Station for investigation.

Order denying the motion for preliminary investigation is valid

35. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case.
Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not
in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.

36. No less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to
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state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings,
which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it
correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation.

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