YTOL, WENDELYN F.

JURIS DOCTOR III-A

EVIDENCE
CASE 1

G.R. No. 174673

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ

FACTS:

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a Complaint for

Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses
before the Sandiganbayan which seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by the spouses as
dummies or agents of the Marcoses. The Republic presented documentary evidence attesting
to the positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez
Spouses as well as testimonies of several witnesses who testified on the bank accounts and
businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses. When the SB denied the motion to
recall Danilo Daniel’s testimony, the Republic manifested that it was "no longer presenting
further evidence. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29,
2006 "to file its formal offer of evidence." Upon the filing of a Motion to extend the submission
of FOE for 30 days, the SB issued a Resolution granting the same. Thereafter, the Republic
moved for another additional 15 days within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence which
was again granted.

The SB noted that the Republic failed to file its FOE notwithstanding repeated extensions and
the lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared
that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence arguing that argued that
the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action.
Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to
prosecute. Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to
evidence. Two days after the filing of the MTD, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the first assailed Resolution and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence consists of
Exhibits A to TT.

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss
and discussed that the ends of justice will not be served if this Court allows the wanton
disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. The Republic justified its failure to
timely file the formal offer of evidence due to the missing exhibits almost two years ago.
However, the SB believed that the plaintiff had an ample of time to locate them. The court also
noted that the documentary evidence presented by the Republic consisted mostly of certified
true copies. However, the persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were
not presented. Consequently, the DTE was granted. Hence, the filing of the Petition for Review
on Certiorari.

The Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Re-open Proceedings, to File and Admit Attached
Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari which was granted.

Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s functions
prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b), and form part of the official records of
the PCGG: "Certifications as to the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez,
her salaries and compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns
and Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the
Articles of Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes’ interests on
various corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove
that they acted as conduit in the disbursement of government funds."
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
EVIDENCE
On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s documents are not
"official issuances of the Philippine government." They are mostly notarized private
documents. Petitioner’s evidence has no probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to
evidence is only proper. 

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in in holding that the petitioner’s evidence
has no probative value and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez’s
Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence

RULING:

Yes. The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better
treatment.

Documents are classified as either public or private. The same Rule provides for the effect of
public documents as evidence and the manner of proof for public documents: Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter.

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will)
or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public
record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court . In contrast, a private document is
any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of
a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved
or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or
the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.

Case law discussed that financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as [a] general rule,
private documents. However, once financial statements are filed with a government office
pursuant to a provision of law, they become public documents. Another case ruled that the fact
that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not
make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule. Public documents are admissible
in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On the other
hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly authenticated. 
The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations
does not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.

The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner’s testimonial evidence without any basis or
justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner’s
witnesses.
Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a
presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s
incumbency as public officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion
to her and her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful income or properties. It presented
five witnesses who testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under the
control of spouses Gimenezes. Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as
part of petitioner’s testimonial evidence. The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence
especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
evidence.
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
EVIDENCE

CASE 2

G.R. No. 156132             October 12, 2006

CITIBANK, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) and INVESTORS' FINANCE CORPORATION,
doing business under the name and style of FNCB Finance, petitioners, 
vs.
MODESTA R. SABENIANO

FACTS:

Investor's Finance Corporation, an affiliate of petitioner FNCB Finance (Citibank), specifically

handles money market placements for its clients. Respondent Modesta R. Sabeniano was a
client of both petitioners Citibank and FNCB Finance. Respondent claimed to have substantial
deposits and money market placements with the petitioners, as well as money market placements
with the Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC), the proceeds of which were
supposedly deposited automatically and directly to respondent's accounts with petitioner Citibank.
Respondent alleged that petitioners refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money
market placements despite her repeated demand which compelled her to institute the civil action
against the petitioners.

Petitioners admitted that respondent had deposits and money market placements with them but
further alleged that the respondent later obtained several loans from petitioner Citibank, for which
she executed Promissory Notes (PNs), and secured by (a) a Declaration of Pledge of her dollar
accounts in Citibank-Geneva, and (b) Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with
petitioner FNCB Finance. When respondent failed to pay her loans despite repeated demands by
petitioner Citibank, the latter exercised its right to off-set or compensate respondent's outstanding
loans with her deposits and money market placements.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner’s failure to produce the original document is fatal to authenticate
whether the signature of respondent was indeed forged

RULING:

Respondent denied that it was her signature on the Declaration of Pledge. She claimed that the
signature was a forgery. When a document is assailed on the basis of forgery, the best evidence
rule applies.

Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances
mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Mere photocopies of
documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule. This is especially true when the
issue is that of forgery.

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a
forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged
signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged
forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized upon to have been forged. Without the original document containing the alleged
forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery. A
comparison based on a mere xerox copy or reproduction of the document under controversy
cannot produce reliable results.
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
EVIDENCE

Respondent made several attempts to have the original copy of the pledge produced before the
RTC so as to have it examined by experts. Yet, despite several Orders by the RTC, petitioner
Citibank failed to comply with the production of the original Declaration of Pledge. It is
admitted that Citibank-Geneva had possession of the original copy of the pledge. While
petitioner Citibank in Manila and its branch in Geneva may be separate and distinct entities,
they are still incontestably related, and between petitioner Citibank and respondent, the
former had more influence and resources to convince Citibank-Geneva to return, albeit
temporarily, the original Declaration of Pledge. Petitioner Citibank did not present any evidence
to convince this Court that it had exerted diligent efforts to secure the original copy of the
pledge, nor did it proffer the reason why Citibank-Geneva obstinately refused to give it back,
when such document would have been very vital to the case of petitioner Citibank. There is
thus no justification to allow the presentation of a mere photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge
in lieu of the original, and the photocopy of the pledge presented by petitioner Citibank has nil
probative value. In addition, even if this Court cannot make a categorical finding that
respondent's signature on the original copy of the pledge was forged, it is persuaded that
petitioner Citibank willfully suppressed the presentation of the original document, and takes
into consideration the presumption that the evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse to
petitioner Citibank if produced.

Therefore, this Court declares that the remittance of respondent's dollar accounts from
Citibank-Geneva and the application thereof to her outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank
was illegal, and null and void. 
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
EVIDENCE

CASE 3

G.R. No. 215009, January 23, 2017

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARMEN SANTORIO GALENO

FACTS:

Carmen Santorio Galeno filed a petition for correction of the area of parcels of land subject
matter of this case being one of the co-owners of the said lot. She  further alleged that when
she and her co-owners had the subject property resurveyed for the purpose of partition, they
discovered a discrepancy in the land area. There being no opposition to the petition, the RTC
allowed the presentation of respondent's evidence ex parte. Respondent offered in evidence
the following documents: (a) the Certification issued by a certain Althea C. Acevedo (Acevedo),
Engineer IV, Chief of the Technical Services Section of DENR in Iloilo City, which states that "the
true and correct area of [L]ot 2285, Cad. 246 Dingle Cadastre is 21,928 square meters;" ( b) the
technical description of Lot, a copy of which was certified by Ameto Caballero (Caballero), Chief
of the Surveys Division, while another copy was certified correct by Acevedo; and (c) the
approved subdivision plan certified by Rogelio M. Santome (Santome), Geodetic Engineer;
Alfredo Muyarsas, Chief of the Regional Surveys Division, and Edgardo R. Gerobin (Gerobin),
OIC, Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Services, DENR. On the strength of
these pieces of evidence, respondent sought a reconciliation of the area of the subject property
with the records of the DENR.

The RTC granted the petition upon a finding that respondent was able to substantiate the
allegations in her petition to warrant a correction of the area of the subject property. Upon
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC. Moreover, petitioner failed to rebut with contrary evidence
respondent's claim that she and her co-owners followed the boundaries in the technical
description when they caused its resurvey.

ISSUE: Whether the documents presented by respondent should be given probative value
despite not being

RULING:

No. The Court cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of the fact that the public
officers who issued the same did not testify in court to prove the facts stated therein.

Jurisprudence dictates that certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR cannot be
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a),
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that documents consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
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against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications [do] not fall within the
class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The
certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship
captain in the ship's logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The
certifications are not even records of public documents.

Hence, without the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public officers who issued
respondent's documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same are bereft
of probative value and cannot, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. At best,
they may be considered only as prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of
issuance but do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Hence, the contents of the documents are mere hearsay because the respondent nor the
attorney-in-fact are not competent to testify thereon because they are not the government
officials who prepared the same. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to
the hearsay evidence rule
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
EVIDENCE

CASE 4

G.R. No. 207786, January 30, 2017

SPOUSES MARCELIAN TAPAYAN AND ALICE TAPAYAN v. PONCEDA M. MARTINEZ

FACTS:

The parties herein are relatives by affinity. Petitioner Alice Tapayan is the sister of Clark
Martinez's (Clark) wife. Clark is Respondent's son.

Respondent owned the Pingol property. Based on the records, two mortgages were constituted
on the said property in favor of PNB and DBP. The records further show that respondent agreed
to constitute the DBP Mortgage upon Clark's request, and that, in order to release the Pingol
Property from the PNB Mortgage, the petitioners and respondent agreed to utilize a portion of
the proceeds of the DBP Loan to settle the remaining balance of respondent's PNB Loan. Then,
a Deed of Undertaking was executed between the parties stipulating that respondent has no
liability whatsoever insofar as the aforesaid loan contracted by petitioner and in case the
respondent paid the loan to prevent foreclosure, petitioner will be indebted to the respondent.
The DBP Loan was not paid when it fell due.

Respondent filed a Specific Performance directing the petitioner to constitute a mortgage over
their house. Respondent averred that petitioners used the proceeds of the DBP Loan exclusively
for their own purposes, and that since petitioners failed to pay the DBP Loan, she and her
children were constrained to pay DBP loan to save the Pingol property. Notwithstanding this,
petitioners have neither paid their indebtedness nor executed a mortgage over the Carangan
Property to secure the same.

The petitioners denied respondent's allegations and claimed that the Deed of Undertaking "is a
falsity." Petitioners argued that the proceeds of the DBP Loan were primarily used as capital for
the construction business that petitioner Marcelian put up as a collective ventures with Clark
and others. Petitioners supposedly applied for the DBP Loan in furtherance of the verbal
agreement among the Joint Venturers, while Respondent freely agreed to constitute the DBP
Mortgage to secure said loan upon Clark's request. To support their allegations, Petitioners
presented a Joint Affidavit executed by Mario Delos Reyes and Richard Sevilla, attesting to the
formation of the joint venture.

The RTC ruled in favor the respondents and noted that the Deed of Undertaking was
acknowledged before Atty. Emmanuel V. Chiong, a notary public, and reasoned that since the
latter enjoys the presumption of having performed his duties regularly, Petitioners' claim that
the Deed of Undertaking was a falsity must be rejected which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners successfully rebutted the presumption of due execution and
genuineness of the Deed of Undertaking

RULING:
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
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No. First, the best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section 3 of Rule
130. However, to set this rule in motion, a proper and timely objection is necessary.
Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by
the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere
photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was formally offered. In order
to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made at the proper
time, and the grounds specified. Objection to evidence must be made at the time it is formally
offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party
making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered.
It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be
made. And when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they
were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 

Likewise, petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of regularity ascribed to the Deed of
Undertaking as a notarized public document. The Deed of Undertaking became a public
document by virtue of its acknowledgment before a notary public. Hence, it enjoys the
presumption of regularity, which can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. While
Petitioners vehemently deny participation in the execution of the Deed of Undertaking, they did
not present any evidence to support their claim that their signatures thereon were forged. 
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
EVIDENCE

CASE 5

G.R. No. 216491, August 23, 2017

THE HEIRS OF PETER DONTON, THROUGH THEIR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE, FELIPE G.

CAPULONG, Petitioners, v. DUANE STIER AND EMILY MAGGAY,

FACTS:

The property subject matter of this case was previously registered under the name of Donton
until it was registered in the names of the Maggays. Donton was forced to return to the
Philippines, where he learned that respondents, through alleged fraudulent means, were able
to transfer the ownership of the subject property in their names. Accordingly, his title, TCT No.
N-137480, had been cancelled and a new one, TCT No. N-225996, had been issued in
respondents' names which prompted him to file for annulment of title and reconveyance of
property with damages against respondents alleging that the signature on the Deed of Absolute
Sale was forged considering that on the date of its purported execution, he was allegedly still in
the United States.

He averred that respondents conspired with the employees of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City to defraud him, and that Stier Maggay is an American citizen and a non-resident alien who
is, therefore, not allowed by law to own any real property in the Philippines.

Respondents argued that Donton executed an Occupancy Agreement whereby he

acknowledged that Stier had been residing thereat and that Stier had extended a loan to him,
secured by a mortgage over the subject property and its improvements; and that until full
payment thereof, Donton allowed Stier to occupy the same. An SPA was also executed in favor
of Maggay to dispose of the property and Donton’s loan was not paid.

During trial, Donton presented the findings of Rosario C. Perez Document Examiner II of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, who, after comparing the
alleged signature of Donton on the Deed of Absolute Sale to his standard ones, found
"significant divergences in the manner of execution, line quality, stroke structure, and other
individual handwriting characteristics" between them, and concluded that they were not
written by one and the same person. Perez herself testified on the results of her examination.

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, finding that the
Deed of Absolute Sale, being a public and notarial document, enjoys the presumption of
regularity, and thus cannot be simply defeated by Danton's bare allegation of forgery of his
signature. Likewise, the RTC refused to give probative weight to the expert testimony offered
by Perez after the latter admitted that she conducted the examination of the sample signatures
not by virtue of a court order, but at the instance of Donton and the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG). The CA affirmed the same.

ISSUE:

Whether the authentication of Perez of the alleged forged signature should be give probative
value

RULING:

No. Forgery, as a rule, cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery - in this case,
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
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petitioners. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged
forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized to have been forged. Pertinently, Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by
the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. 

In the case at bar, Perez, who examined the signatures, admitted that she had no actual
knowledge of the source of the specimen signatures given to her for examination, as it was the
CIDG personnel who provided her with the same. Thus, Perez's findings deserve little or no
probative weight at all, considering that the signatures which she used for comparison came
from an unverified source. Opinions of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon
the court, the expert's function being to place before the court data upon which the court can
form its own opinion. This principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere
handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of
specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones. A finding of
forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge
must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
EVIDENCE

CASE 6

G.R. No. L-23614 February 27, 1970

PEDRO M. BERMEJO, petitioner-appellant, vs. ISIDRO BARRIOS, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-23615 February 27, 1970

JOVITA CARMORIN, petitioner-appellant,  vs. ISIDRO BARRIOS, ET AL

FACTS:

Pedro M. Bermejo and Julia "Doe" were charged of the crime of falsification of public or official
document. They allegedly prepared a document consisting of an amended petition for habeas
corpus which petition Pedro M. Bermejo signed while Julia "Doe" placed her thumbmark over
the name "Jovita Carmorin", and was subscribed and sworn to by the two accused before the
Clerk of Court, and filed in the Court of First Instance of Capiz, thus the two accused stated and
made it appear in the amended petition that the same was signed and sworn to by Jovita
Carmorin as one of the petitioners although Jovita Carmorin never signed and swore to it,
because it was in fact the accused Julia "Doe" who signed and swore to that petition as Julia
Carmorin.

Upon arraignment, Bermejo filed a motion to quash the information alleging in substance: (1)
that the information did not charge an offense because the amended petition for habeas
corpus allegedly falsified, is not a document contemplated under the provisions of Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code, and that in a previous judgment in the habeas corpus proceedings it
was declared that the thumbmark in the amended petition was that of Jovita Carmorin;

In G.R. No. L-23615, Jovita Carmorin was charged by respondent City Fiscal Quirico Abela with
perjury  in the same city court  for allegedly having "subscribed and swore to an affidavit” and
making it appear that it was her who signed the document.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for habeas corpus is not the document as contemplated in Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code, hence, Bermejo could not be prosecuted for falsification of the alleged
public or official document

RULING:

The contention of Bermejo is untenable.

 In the case of U.S. v. Orera, a "document" is defined as a deed, instrument or other duly
authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth. In U.S. v. Asensi,this
Court held that any instrument authorized by a notary public or a competent public official,
with the solemnities required by law, is a public document. Section 38, Rule 123 of the old Rules
of Court enumerates the following as public writings:

(a) The written acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority, of official bodies and
tribunals, and of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, whether of the Philippines, or
of a foreign country;

(b) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private writings.

YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
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The same principle also obtains in the United States, that "defendant's pleadings and papers,
which were involved in civil actions and which were in custody of county clerk as ex-oficio clerk
of superior court in which action was pending, were 'public documents' and were within scope
of subject matter of statute making alteration of court records an offense." Considering that the
petition for habeas corpus alleged the illegal confinement, or deprivation of liberty, of one
Soterania Carmorin, and that CFI of Capiz, forming, therefore, a part of the court records in said
proceedings, it cannot be disputed that said petition is a public or official document as
contemplated in Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner Bermejo, therefore, cannot say that he committed no crime if it can be shown that,
as charged in the information, he connived or conspired with a certain Julia "Doe" in falsifying
said petition by making it appear that Jovita Carmorin placed her thumbmark therein when in
fact she did not do so.
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
EVIDENCE

CASE 7

G.R. No. 194189, September 14, 2017

RAFAEL ALMEDA, EMERLINA ALMEDA-LIRIO, ALODIA ALMEDA-TAN, LETICIA ALMEDA-

MAGNO, NORMA ALMEDA-MATIAS AND PUBLIO TIBI, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF PONCIANO
ALMEDA IN SUBSTITUTION OF ORIGINAL DEFENDANT PONCIANO ALMEDA, INTESTATE
ESTATE OF SPOUSES PONCIANO AND EUFEMIA PEREZ-ALMEDA AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF TAGAYTAY CITY, Respondent.

CESAR SANTOS, ROSANA SANTOS, NORMAN SANTOS AND FERDINAND SANTOS, Unwilling

Plaintiffs/Petitioners.

FACTS:

The Almedas are parents of nine children. Power of Attorney was executed by Venancio and
Leonila, who were then 80 and 81 years old respectively, granting Ponciano, their son, the
authority to sell parcels of land. The lots were registered in the name of "Leonila L. Almeda
married to Venancio Almeda."

When the spouses died, a notice of adverse claim was filed by the other children with the
Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City over their parents' properties. A Complaint for Nullity of
Contracts, Partition of Properties and Reconveyance of Titles with Damages was filed by the
petitioners against Ponciano and his wife Eufemia Perez Almeda (Eufemia) and the Register of
Deeds of Tagaytay City. Petitioners alleged that the parties were the only heirs of the late
spouses Venancio and Leonila who died without leaving any will and without any legal
obligation.

In support of their Complaint, petitioners claimed that Ponciano, taking advantage of his being
the eldest child and his close relationship with their parents, caused the simulation and forgery
of the documents consisting of the deeds covering the parcels of land subject matter of the
case.

According to petitioners, their parents did not sign the October 3, 1978 Deed of Absolute Sale
(1978 Deed) in favor of Ponciano and their signatures may have been forged. They also averred
that their parents did not receive due consideration for the transaction, and if Ponciano
succeeded in making them sign said 1978 Deed, they did so without knowledge of its import.
Petitioners, however, would not claim rights and interest legally transferred to third parties.
Petitioners, thus, prayed that the 1978 Deed in favor of Ponciano be declared null and void.
Ponciano and his wife, Eufemia, denied that the 1978 Deed was simulated or forged, asserting
its genuineness and execution for valuable consideration from which some of the petitioners,
including Rafael, received substantial pecuniary benefits.

In the course of the trial, two other documents figured in the dispute, which petitioners
likewise impugned such as the (1) an Agreement to Sell and the (2) Deed of Mortgage.

The RTC held that the questioned documents, having been notarized and executed in the
presence of two instrumental witnesses, enjoy the presumption of regularity, and petitioners
failed to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. It stressed that
petitioners failed to present any proof of simulation or forgery of the subject documents. The
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
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CA further stressed that mere variance in the genuine and disputed signatures is not proof of
forgery.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners overcome the presumption of regularity of the notarized
documents and proved the signatures therein were mere forgery

RULING:

No. A notarized Deed of Absolute Sale has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.
It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face. Absent evidence of falsity so clear, strong and convincing, and not
merely preponderant, the presumption of regularity must be upheld.

Furthermore, as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. The Complaint, at the outset, did not
allege in definite terms that Venancio and Leonila's signatures on the 1978 Deed were forged.  It
merely stated that the signatures thereon may have been forged. Likewise, Emerlina's
testimony, upon which petitioners' case was built, is unclear and uncertain as to the supposed
forgery. She testified that the vendors' signatures appearing on the 1978 Deed did not belong
to her parents, Venancio and Leonila. Subsequently, however, she testified that if the latter did
affix their signatures, they did not know what they signed. Also, Emerlina declared that she
could not say if the signatures indeed belonged to her parents. Eventually, she conceded to
having two alternative answers to the question of forgery: first, that Venancio and Leonila did
not sign the document, and second, that it is possible that they signed it but without knowing
the consequences of their action. The uncertainty in petitioners' stance, as echoed in Emerlina's
testimony, clearly militates against their claim of forgery.

Lastly, Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to
make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine
by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge. Comparing these two sets of signatures, the Court finds prominent similarities as
to indicate the habitual and characteristic writing of Venancio and Leonila. Leonila's signature
on the 1978 Deed, in particular, appears almost the same as her signature on the 1976 Power
of Attorney. Venancio's signature on the 1978 Deed was not as smooth as his signature on the
1976 Power of Attorney, but the similarities in the angles and slants cannot be ignored. In fine,
the apparent dissimilarities in the signatures are overshadowed by the striking similarities and,
therefore, fail to overcome the presumption of validity in favor of a notarized documen
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
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CASE 8

GR No. 193117 November 26, 2014

Heirs of SPS. ANGEL LIWAGON AND FRANCISCA DUMALAGAN et., al.

vs.
Heirs of SPS. DEMETRIO LIWAGON AND REGINA LIWAGON et., al.

FACTS:

Petitioners and respondents in the case at bar are all children and grandchildren of the late
spouses Angel and Francisca Liwagon. Angel was provisionally awarded the following parcel of
land through the Board of Liquidators of the Y. Furukawa Plantation: A parcel of land being
portion of the Y. Furukawa plantation covered by the latest Tax Declaration No. ARP-007-00127
under the name of the deceased Angel Liwagon, xerox copy of said Tax Declaration is hereto
attached and marked as Annex "E”. Together with his children, he cultivated and introduced
improvements on the land. Later, his children got married and lived their own lives – except for
his son Demetrio. One of Angel’s sons named Demetrio, together with his wife Regina, stayed
with the former and administered the property in litigation. The defendants – who are all
Demetrio’s children – helped with the cultivation and took care of the family’s copra-making
business.

A deed of conveyance was thus executed in Angel’s favor. As he grew older, Angel stayed with
his children, one after the other until his death. After the said death, the petitioners demanded
of their brother Demetrio for the partition of the subject landholding. Demetrio pleaded to
defer the partition for economic reasons, to which the [petitioners] acquiesced by permitting
the spouses Demetrio and Regina, and their children, to continuously occupy the land in
litigation. When Demetrio died, followed shortly by Regina, [petitioner] Josefina signified her
demand for partition to one of Demetrio’s sons named Rodrigo which the latter ignored
contending that they now owned the property as inheritance from their parents, who had
earlier lawfully acquired the land by purchase from their grandfather, as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale.

Petitioners brought the instant case for annulment of the sale, partition, accounting and
damages against the defendants-heirs of Spouses Demetrio and Regina. Josefina claimed,
among others, that the signature appearing on the assailed Deed of Sale is not the signature of
her father, and that his father’s true signature is the one found on the Application for the sales
patent. The witness also testified on cross-examination that she only learned, for the first time,
that the subject property was purportedly bought by the spouses Demetrio and Regina in 1994
when she was demanding for the partition of the property. Her father also allegedly did not
inform her about the purported sale. She only saw the assailed Deed of Sale when it was
presented to her at the barangay office. On the other hand, Rodrigo stated that while he was
not present when the purported Deed of Sale over Lot 61 was executed, he is in possession of
the said document.

The trial court found that petitioners failed to disprove the genuineness of the signature of
Angel in the purported Deed of Sale which was duly executed before a notary public. Thus, the
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trial court held that the authenticity of the document must be upheld under the doctrine of
presumption of regularity.

ISSUE:

Whether the validity of the Deed of Sale should be upheld

RULING:

Yes. The plaintiffs in this case failed to overcome the presumption of regularity. 

 Aside from the sole testimony of petitioner Josefina that the signature appearing in the
assailed Deed of Saleis not that of her father, no clear, positive and convincing evidence was
shown to corroborate such claim. The presentation of a copy of a sales application is not
enough to substantiate her claim that the signature found on said application is the real and
true signature of her father Angel Liwagon. Plaintiff did not present the notary public who
notarized the Deed of Sale or any witness to prove that the signature of Angel appearing on the
deed is not the true signature of her father.

Forgery cannot be presumed and it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence.
Its mere allegation is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging it. The
authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as
regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades,
etc., that may be found between the questioned signatures and the genuine one are not
decisive on the question of the former’s authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned
handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best,
inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the
writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is
written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used,
play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is,
in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent
evidence on the character of the questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to
characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an
authentic one.

Accordingly, the contention of petitioners must fail that a "visual comparison" of Angel’s
signatures in the purported Deed of Sale and in his Application with the Bureau of Lands and
Affidavit would reveal "that the signature in the Deed of Sale was not genuine.
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
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CASE 9

G.R. No. 151944               January 20, 2004

ENGR. ERNESTO T. MATUGAS

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROBERT LYNDON S. BARBERS

FACTS:

Robert Lyndon S. Barbers filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of
Surigao del Norte. Ernesto T. Matugas, himself a candidate for the same post, filed with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Disqualify private respondent as candidate.
The Petition alleged, among other grounds, that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

In support of this claim, petitioner offered in evidence a copy of a letter-request dated August
25, 2000 from a certain Jesus Agana, a "confidential agent" of the Bureau of Immigration,
addressed to one George Clarke, purportedly of the United States Embassy. Below the request
was the reply of said George Clarke stating that the "subject" was naturalized as an American
citizen on October 11, 1991 in Los Angeles, California. Petitioner also presented a Certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) containing Barbers’ travel records
and indicating in certain entries that private respondent is an American citizen. He likewise
submitted a Certification issued by the Special Committee on Naturalization of the Office of the
Solicitor General stating that, based on their records, there is no pending petition by private
respondent for repatriation. Neither has one been granted in his favor.

In the meantime, private respondent garnered the highest number of votes in the gubernatorial
race which prompted petitioner to file a Motion for Suspension/Annulment of Proclamation of
private respondent. The COMELEC dismissed the petition. The COMELEC found "little or no
probative value" in the notation of George Clarke to Agana’s letter-request. While noting that
the BID certification involving the travel records of Robert Lyndon S. Barbers stated that he was
an American, the COMELEC held that "there is no other independent evidence to justify
petitioner’s claim that respondent has renounced his allegiance to the Philippines at any time."

ISSUE: Whether the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient to prove that respondent
is not a Filipino citizen

RULING:

No.  The documentary evidence he submitted fails to establish that private respondent is not a
Filipino citizen.

The document containing the notation of George Clarke does not prove that private respondent
is indeed a naturalized American citizen. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private. Public documents include the written official acts or
records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
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officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. The record of such public
documents may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the
attested copy should be accompanied by a certificate that such officer has custody thereof.

The grant of United States citizenship by naturalization is an official act of the United States.
The document containing the record of this act is, therefore, a public document and, following
the rule cited above, this document can only be evidenced by its official publication or a copy
duly attested by the officer having legal custody thereof. The notation in the letter-inquiry of
Jesus Agana is neither an official publication of the document that contains the record of
private respondent’s naturalization, nor a copy attested by the officer who has legal custody of
the record. Petitioner did not show if Clarke, the notation’s alleged author, is the officer
charged with the custody of such record.

Furthermore, Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that when the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, as in this case, the
contents of said document may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. The subject letter-inquiry, which contains the notation, appears to be a mere
photocopy, not a certified copy.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Admit Original

Documents, appending thereto the originals of the above documents. However, they cannot be
admitted. Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that if the public document or the
public record is not kept in the Philippines, its official publication or its copy duly attested by the
officer in charge of the custody of the same must be accompanied by a certificate that such
officer has the custody. Said certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated
by the seal of his office. In this case, the Authentication executed by Cristina G. Ortega, the
Philippine Consul in Los Angeles, California merely states that Abel Martinez is the Deputy Clerk
of the United States District Court, Central District of California. It does not state that said
Deputy Clerk has the custody of the above record.

Accordingly, petition is dismissed.

YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
EVIDENCE

CASE 10

G.R. Nos. 79597-98. May 20, 1991

HEIRS OF DEMETRIA LACSA, et., v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioners, the heirs of Demetria Lacsa, filed a a civil case for recovery of possession with
damages and preliminary injunction agains t Aurelio Songco and John Doe based on the
principal allegations that petitioners are heirs of deceased Demetria Lacsa who, during her
lifetime, was the owner of a certain parcel of land consisting partly of a fishpond and partly of
uncultivated open space.

Another case was filed for cancellation of title, ownership with damages and preliminary
injunction by the same petitioners against the respondents. Allegedly, the private respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest who occupied their lot and later on abandoned the same
when the case filed, transferred to the adjoining fishpond owned by the private respondent all
the fish. Respondent also presented before the Register of Deeds of Pampanga certain forged
and absolutely simulated documents, namely: "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA
DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" and "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA” and succeeded in
transferring the title to said property in his name, to the damage and prejudice of the
petitioners.

In raising its arguments, respondents said that the Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1038
(11725) was merely a reconstituted copy upon petitioners' expedient claim that the owner's
duplicate copy thereof had been missing when the truth of the matter was that it has been
cancelled and superseded already by TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE DE LA ESCRITURA DE
PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL and later on by ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA issued in the name
of the respondents’ father.

The lower court thus held that the fishpond in question belongs to the private respondents,
having been inherited by them from their deceased father Inocencio Songco which Decision
was affirmed with modifications by the CA.

Petitioners contend that for a document to be classified as an "ancient document", it must not
only be at least thirty (30) years old but it must also be found in the proper custody and is
unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion. Thus, according to petitioners,
exhibits "3" and "7" can not qualify under the foregoing rule, for the reason that since the "first
pages" of said documents do not bear the signatures of the alleged parties thereto, this
constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget unlimited alterations.

ISSUE: Whether the ancient document rule was incorrectly applied on the "ESCRITURA DE
PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" AND "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
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RULING:

No.

Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of
due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty (30) years old; it is
also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is produced from a
custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any
alteration or circumstances of suspicion

The first document, Exhibit "3", entitled 'Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial" was executed on 7 April 1923 whereas the second document, exhibit "7", entitled
"Escritura de Venta Absoluta" was executed on 20 January 1924. These documents are,
therefore, more than thirty (30) years old. Both copies of the aforementioned documents were
certified as exact copies of the original on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga, by the Deputy Register of Deeds. There is a further certification with regard to the
Pampango translation of the document of extrajudicial partition which was issued by the
Archives division, Bureau of Records Management of the Department of General Services.
Further, the documents in question, being certified as copies of originals on file with the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the proper custody. Clearly,
therefore, the first two (2) requirements of the "ancient document rule" were met. As to the
last requirement that the document must on its face appear to be genuine, petitioners did not
present any conclusive evidence to support their allegation of falsification of the said
documents. They merely alluded to the fact that the lack of signatures on the first two (2) pages
could have easily led to their substitution. A contract apparently honest and lawful on its face
must be treated as such and one who assails the genuineness of such contract must present
conclusive evidence of falsification. Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document
rule" that a document must be unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion
refers to the extrinsic quality of the document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages,
therefore, absent any alterations or circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract from
the fact that the documents in question, which were certified as copied of the originals on file
with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free from any blemish or
circumstances of suspicion.

Being an ancient document, further proof of their due execution and authenticity is no longer
required.
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
EVIDENCE

CASE 11

G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015

SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA AND LIGAYA CERCADO-BELISON, v.VICENTE CERCADO, JR.,

MANUELA C. ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C. ARALAR AND VIOLETA C. BINADAS,

FACTS:

Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga and Ligaya Cercado-Belison claimed that they are the
legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo. During the lifetime of their father, the
latter allegedly acquired gratuitiously a parcel of lot. Upon the deatg of their parents, they
became the owners thereof.

Petitioners learned that the estate of Vicente and a certain Leonora Ditablan has been
extrajudicially settled by their heirs, respondents herein. Upon verification, petitioners were
furnished a copy of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate (Deed) executed and signed by
respondents. Petitioners insist that Vicente and Leonora were not married or if they were so
married, then said marriage was null and void by reason of the subsisting marriage of their
parents, Vicente and Benita. Petitioners prayed for the declaration of the Deed as null and void;
for the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal to correct the entry on the marital status of
Vicente; and for the payment of damages and attorney’s fees.

To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented the following
documents: 1) Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract; 2) Certification dated 19
November 2000 issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente of its acceptance of original marriage
contract; 3) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Simplicia issued by the Office of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; 4) Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia; 5) Certification
of non-production of record of birth of Ligaya issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; and 6) Joint Affidavit of two disinterested persons attesting that Ligaya
is the child of Vicente and Benita

On the other hand, respondents tried to prove that Vicente and Leonora were married as
evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the LCR and that the document showing
that Vicente was married to Benita is not a certified true copy.

Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by

law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners
claim to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should
be regarded as original. Petitioners emphasize that the certification issued by the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente Church, the joint affidavit of two disinterested persons, the baptismal certificate
presented by petitioners, and the open and public cohabitation of petitioners’ parents are
sufficient proof of their marriage. If and when it is a private document, petitioners maintain
that said document should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from
the requirement of authentication.
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
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The trial court upheld the side of the petitioners and ruled that Vicente was married to Benita.
However, the appellate court found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being
a private document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence. 

ISSUE: Whether the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document

RULING:

No. Church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are
they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity
must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of
evidence.
Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court,before a private document is admitted in evidence,
it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after
its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the
instruments had previously confessed execution thereof.

In the case at bar, petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia
testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not
present during its execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia
admitted that she is illiterate. Furthermore, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting
to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer
acknowledging the accuracy of the copy.

Lastly, as to the claim that it is an ancient document, hence there is no need to be

authenticated, Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than
30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and
3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. 

The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years
old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration. However, if a document is found
where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be
satisfactorily accounted for. The requirement of proper custody was met when the ancient
document in question was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of
the person who would naturally keep it. However, Simplicia also failed to prove her filiation to
Vicente and Benita.
YTOL, WENDELYN F. JURIS DOCTOR III-A
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