RULE 128 – GENERAL PROVISIONS 1.

Concept of evidence; Rules of

evidence liberally construed 2. Proof vs. evidence 3. Equipoise rules 4.
Scope of the rules of evidence; Kinds of evidence 5. Admissibility of
evidence in general 6.
CASES:
(1)Uy v. Sps. Lacsamana, G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015;
FACTS:

On 4 May 1979, petitioner Luis Uy filed a Complaint for Declaration of

Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca and
spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Sps. Lacsamana).

Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca, and that they lived
together as husband and wife from the time they were married in 1944 until
1973 when they separated. Uy and Rosca had eight children.

Uy alleged that he and his wife acquired a 484 square meter residential
land evidenced by a Deed of Sale from the Spouses Manuel. TCT No. T-
24660 was issued in the name of “Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy.”

Uy further alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and
signed a false and simulated Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979 on the 484
square meter land, together with the house erected thereon, for a
consideration of P80,000 in favor of Spouses Lacsamana.

Uy prayed that the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979 executed by Rosca in
favor of Spouses Lacsamana be declared null and void with respect to his
rights, interest, and ownership.
Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired
the subject real properties using her paraphernal funds. Rosca added that
she was never married to Uy and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of merit.

Sps. Lacsamana claimed that they were buyers in good faith and for value
and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the
owner of the subject property.

Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy’s
consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

Held:
Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property
by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid
marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage."[29] Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio —
Always presume marriage.[30] However, this presumption may be
contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.

x x x In the case under consideration, the presumption of marriage, on

which plaintiff Uy anchored his allegations, has been sufficiently offset.
Records reveal that there is plethora of evidence showing that plaintiff Uy
and defendant Rosca were never actually married to each other, to wit
Xxx

While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband

and wife, defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not
legally married to her because their marriage was not consummated.
In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons living together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the
presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of
defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of
plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It
became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to
show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so.
[35]

While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband

and wife, defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not
legally married to her because their marriage was not consummated.
In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons living together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the
presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of
defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of
plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It
became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to
show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so.
[35]

In sum, we find that the Deed of Sale, executed by Rosca on her

paraphernal property in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14

September 2011 and Resolution dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

SO ORDERED.

(2)Richard A. Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman and National Bureau of

Investigation, G.R. No. 208643, December 16, 2016--- this is a wrong
citation in syllabus
RICHARD A. CAMBE v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN, GR Nos. 212014-15,
2016-12-06

Facts:

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective

participations in the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to
2010

The charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint
for Plunder[17] filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Atty.
Levito D. Baligod on September 16, 2013... and (2) a Complaint for Plunder
and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019[18] filed by the Field Investigation
Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18, 2013,... both before the
Ombudsman.

Issue: Whether or not the findings of probable cause against all petitioners
should be upheld.

Held:
It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the
context of a preliminary investigation which is "merely an inquisitorial mode
of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held
responsible for it."
It "is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
prosecution's evidence."
Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as
well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated
during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level."
Accordingly, "owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the
technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its
proceedings."
In this light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this Court has ruled that
"probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as
there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay," and that even an
invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta at this stage of the proceedings
is improper.

RULE 129 – JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSION

1. What need not be proved.
2. Matters of judicial notice; Mandatory and discretionary.
3. Judicial admissions.
4. Judicial notice of foreign laws; Laws of nations; Municipal Ordinance.

5. CASES:

(1) Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas v. Feliciano P. Legaspi, G.R.

No. 205966 (J. Peralta) March 2, 2016;
Facts:
Petitioner BSP filed a Complaint for annulment of title, revocation of
certificate and damages (with application for TRO/writ of preliminary
injunction) against Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., Luningning G. De
Leon, Engr. Ramon C. Angelo, Jr., Ex-Mayor Matilde A. Legaspi and
respondent Feliciano P. Legaspi before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
Petitioner BSP insists that the property involved has an assessed value
of more than P20,000.00, as shown in a Tax Declaration attached to the
complaint. Incidentally, the complaint,[10] on its face, is devoid of any
amount that would confer jurisdiction over the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the non-inclusion on the face of the complaint of the
amount of the property is fatal and whether or not the courts can take
judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.
Held:
The non-inclusion on the face of the complaint of the amount of the
property, however, is not fatal because attached in the complaint is a tax
declaration (Annex "N" in the complaint) of the property in question
showing that it has an assessed value of P215,320.00.

Hence, being an annex to BSP's complaint, the tax declaration showing

the assessed value of the property is deemed a part of the complaint
and should be considered together with it in determining that the RTC
has exclusive original jurisdiction.

In connection therewith, the RTC, therefore, committed no error in taking

judicial notice of the assessed value of the subject property. A court will
take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of
its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of
related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same
court.[14] Since a copy of the tax declaration, which is a public record,
was attached to the complaint, the same document is already
considered as on file with the court, thus, the court can now take judicial
notice of such.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
dated March 13, 2013 of petitioner Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated August 15, 2012 and
Resolution dated February 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Orders dated January 20,
2009 and April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos
City, Bulacan, are AFFIRMED.

Let this case, therefore, be REMANDED to the trial court for the
continuation of its proceedings.
 SO ORDERED.

(2) Dela Llana v. Rebecca Biong, G.R.

No. 182356 ( J. Brion)December 4, 2013.

Facts:
Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that
she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC ruling.
It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection
between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by
preponderance of evidence

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take

judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
Held:

Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before

the trial court shows that Dra. Dela Llana did not present any testimonial
or documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation
between the vehicular accident and Dra. Dela Llana’s injury. Her claim
that Joel’s negligence causes her whiplash injury was not established
because of the deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point
out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular
ccidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public knowledge,
or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.46 We have no expertise in the
field of medicine. Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret
the law on the basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their
corresponding legal arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause by
preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with her, our solemn
duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the case binds
us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her claim, unsupported by
prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to
stand on.

WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed Decision dated

February 11, 2008 and Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RULE 130 – RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

14.CASES:
(i) People v. Piad, G.R. No. 213607(J.Mendoza), January 25, 2016;

Facts:

Accused-appellant, Nilo Davis (Davis) ,was found guilty all of violation of

Sections 13 and 14, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in Criminal Case Nos.
14088-D and 14089-D.

On August 8, 2005, Davis, however, was not arraigned because he had

jumped bail.3

Pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued. On May 15, 2008, after Davis was
arres
Issue: Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the chain of
custody rule.
Held: Yes. There was Substantial compliance with the Chain of Custody
Rule

The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts

regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring
and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the
police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court. 21 Section 21(a) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control

of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items. (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the law requires "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect

adherence" as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items were preserved as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.22

In this case, the CA meticulously assessed how the prosecution complied

with the chain of custody rule. When Piad was arrested, PO1 Arevalo
marked the confiscated drugs at the crime scene. Likewise, when Villarosa,
Carbo and Davis were arrested, PO1 Bayot immediately marked the seized
items at the crime scene. The items were brought to the Pasig City Police
Station where PO1 Bayot was designated as evidence custodian. P/Insp.
Sabio then prepared the requests for laboratory examination and drug test,
which were brought by PO1 Bayot, together with the drugs, to the Eastern
Police District Crime Laboratory. PSI Ebuen, received the confiscated items
for examination. The said items tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. Based on the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that there was
substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule.

WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision, dated September 24, 2009, of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 164, Pasig City in Criminal Case Nos. 14086-
D, 14087-D, 14088-D and 14089-D is AFFIRMED in toto.

For failure to submit to this Court's jurisdiction, the appeal filed by Nilo
Davis y Artiga is deemed ABANDONED and DISMISSED. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 164, Pasig City, is hereby ORDERED to issue a
warrant of arrest for the immediate apprehension and service of sentence
of Nilo Davis y Artiga.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(ii)People v. Susan M. Tamano and Jaffy B. Gulmatico, G.R. No. 208643,

December 16, 2016;

People of the Philippines vs. Susan M. Tamaño and Jaffy B.

Gulmatico
G.R. No. 208643 (J.Peralta) December 5, 2016

Facts
On July 30, 2004, appellants were charged with Violation of Section 5
(Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs), Section 11 (Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs) and Section 12 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drug
Paraphernalia), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in five (5) separate Informations.
Upon arraignment on September 13, 2004, both appellants pleaded not
guilty to the respective charges against them.

The evidence of the prosecution may be summed up as follows: On July

22, 2004, P03 Gepaneca of the PDEA was informed by a confidential agent
that one alias "Susan Kana" was selling shabu in Brgy. Gustilo, Zone 6,
Lapaz, Iloilo City. The following day, P03 Gepaneca and the agent
conducted a surveillance of the said area wherein the agent pointed to a
woman identified as "Susan Kana."

On July 27, 2004, after confirmation from the agent that that they could
purchase shabu from "Susan Kana," a buy-bust team was formed by P/Sr.
Inspector Rapiz which made the team apprehend appellants during the
operation.

Issue:

Whether the chain of custody rule was complied.

Held:
es. We find untenable the contention of appellants that since the provision
of Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 was not strictly complied
with, the prosecution allegedly failed to prove the identity and integrity of
the seized prohibited drugs.

In the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous

drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and, in
sustaining a conviction therefor, the identity and integrity of the corpus
delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement
necessarily arises from the illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders
it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration
or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt
or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence
must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same
illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165
fails. In this regard, the aforesaid provisions outline the procedure to be
observed by the apprehending officers in the seizure and custody of
dangerous drugs.

However, under the same proviso aforecited, non-compliance with the

stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officers.

In the cases at bar, PO1 Aguenido immediately searched the persons of

appellants. From the right pocket of appellant Tamafio, a big plastic sachet
was recovered containing three (3) plastic sachets of shabu with a total
weight of 0.345 gram. On the other hand, PO I Aguenido recovered from
the right pocket of appellant Gulmatico twenty-four (24) sachets of shabu
with a total weight of 8.695 grams and two (2) small sachets of shabu. The
seized items were brought to the police officers' office and were accordingly
marked by SP03 Calaor and turned over to PDEA Exhibit Custodian SP04
Gafate. The following day, SP03 Calaor took the same items to the Iloilo
City Prosecution Office where they were all inventoried. Thereafter, SP03
Calaor submitted some of the items including the sachets of shabu to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. P/Insp. Ompoy, Forensic Chemical
Officer, examined the sachets and the contents were positive to the test for
methampheatmine hydrochloride (shabu). During the trial of the cases, P03
Gepaneca, P/Sr. Inspector Rapiz, PO1 Aguenido, SP03 Calaor, SP04
Gafate and P/Insp. Ompoy testified for the prosecution. They properly
identified the Chemistry Repmi and the subject specimens when presented
in court. From the foregoing, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs had not been
compromised because it established the crucial link in the chain of custody
of the seized item from the time it was first discovered until it was brought
to the court for examination.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00762
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the fine imposed in Criminal Case
No. 04-59520. For Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, JAFFY B. GULMATICO is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of
imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS and ONE (I) DAY TO LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P400,000.00).

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(iii) Roberto Otero v. Roger Tan, G.R. No.200134 ( J. Reyes) April 15, 2015;

Facts:
Respondent, Roger Tan (Tan) filed a Complaint for collection of sum of
money and damages against Roberto Otero (Otero).
Tan alleged that on several occasions:
Otero purchased on credit petroleum products from his Petron outlet... in
the aggregate amount of P270,818.01. Tan further claimed that despite
several verbal demands, Otero failed to settle his obligation.
Despite receipt of the summons and a copy of the said complaint, which
per the records of the case below were served through his wife

Issues:
Whether the pieces of evidence adduced by Tan during the ex parte
presentation of his evidence, excluding the said statements of account
sufficiently prove the material allegations of his complaint against Otero.

Held:
Indeed, a defending party declared in default retains the right to appeal
from the judgment by default. However, the grounds that may be raised in
such an appeal are restricted to any of the following: first, the failure of the
plaintiff to prove the material allegations... of the complaint; second, the
decision is contrary to law; and third, the amount of judgment is excessive
or different in kind from that prayed for.
In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the
burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must
rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the defense offered by their opponent.[26] This rule holds true especially
when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a
default order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be granted
can only be so much as has been alleged and proved with preponderant
evidence... required under Section 1 of Rule 133.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition

is DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2011 rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02244 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

(iv) Virginia D. Calimag v. Heirs of Silvestre N. Macapaz, G.R. No.

191936, (J.Reyes)June 1, 2016;

Facts:
Virginia co-owned a property with Silvestra under Transfer Certificate Title
(TCT) No.183088 and under such title is an annotation of an Adverse Claim
of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said property.
Anastacio Jr. and Alicia both surnamed Macapaz are children of Silvestra’s
brother, Anastacio Sr. and Fidela Vda de Macapaz. Anastacio Jr. filed a
criminal complaint against the petitioner for 2 counts of falsification of
documents but was dismissed. On 2006, respondents, asserting that they
are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of
Sale and Cancellation of TCT 221466 with damages. Petitioner countered
that respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil action
because they are illegitimate children of Anastacio Sr and Art. 992 of the
Civil Code prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate.

Issue:
Whether or not the contention of petitioner that said documents of
respondent do not conclusively prove the respondents' legitimate filiation.
Held:
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries
(regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar)."42 Thus, being
public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are presumed
valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in
them.43

"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its

face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish
a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or
defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

Decision dated October 20, 2009 and Resolution dated April 5, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
(v) Virginia Calimag v.
Heirs of Silvestra Macapaz, G.R. No. 191936, June 1, 2016; repeat
(vi)
Spouses Bonifacio and Lucia Paras v. Kimwa and Development Corp.,
G.R. No. 171601, (J. Leonen)April 8, 2015;
Facts:
In their Complaint, Spouses Paras alleged that sometime in December
1994, Lucia was approached by Kimwa expressing its interest to purchase
gravel and sand from her.18 Kimwa allegedly asked that it be "assured"19
of 40,000 cubic meters worth of aggregates.20 Lucia countered that her
concession area was due to be rechanneled on May 15,1995, when her
Special Permit expires.21

Lucia Paras (Lucia) was a "concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at

Kabulihan, Toledo City[.]"9 Kimwa is a "construction firm that sells concrete
aggregates to contractors and haulers in . . . Cebu."10

On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract

denominated "Agreement for Supply of Aggregates" (Agreement) where
40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted"11 by Lucia as supplier to
Kimwa.12 Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia’s
permitted area in Toledo City13 at ₱240.00 per truckload.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of
aggregates. Sometime after this, however, Kimwa stopped hauling
aggregates.

Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the Agreement, Lucia, joined by

her husband, Bonifacio, filed the Complaint17 for breach of contract with
damages that is now subject of this Petition.
The trial court's May 16, 2001 Decision ruled in favor of petitioners
Spouses Bonifacio and Lucia Paras (plaintiffs before the Regional Trial
Court) in their action for breach of contract with damages against
respondent Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation (Kimwa).
But the CA reversed the decision of the RTC
In a subsequent Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration to
Spouses Paras.

Hence, this Petition was filed.

Issue:
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Kimwa Construction and
Development Corporation is liable to petitioners Spouses Paras for
(admittedly) failing to haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates from
petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted area by May 15, 1995.
Held:
We reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate that of the
Regional Trial Court. Respondent Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the
remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to acquire from petitioner
Lucia Paras.

Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the
Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence
when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an

agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents
of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their

successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills.

Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the formalities

observed,36 "forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a
written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the
written contract."

This rule is animated by a perceived wisdom in deferring to the contracting

parties’ articulated intent. In choosing to reduce their agreement into
writing, they are deemed to have done so meticulously and carefully,
employing specific — frequently, even technical — language as are
appropriate to their context. From an evidentiary standpoint, this is also
because "oral testimony . . . coming from a party who has an interest in the
outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as
reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform
language."38 As illustrated in Abella v. Court of Appeals:39

Without any doubt, oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does

exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence.1âwphi1 "I would sooner trust the smallest slip of paper for truth,"
said Judge Limpkin of Georgia, "than the strongest and most retentive
memory ever bestowed on mortal man." This is especially true in this case
where such oral testimony is given by . . . a party to the case who has an
interest in its outcome, and by . . . a witness who claimed to have received
a commission from the petitioner.40

This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue
in its pleading any of the four(4) items enumerated in the second paragraph
of Rule 130, Section 9, "a party may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the agreement[.]"41 Raising any of these items as an
issue in a pleading such that it falls under the exception is not limited to the
party initiating an action. In Philippine National Railways v. Court of First
Instance of Albay,42 this court noted that "if the defendant set up the
affirmative defense that the contract mentioned in the complaint does not
express the true agreement of the parties, then parol evidence is
admissible to prove the true agreement of the parties[.]"43 Moreover, as
with all possible objections to the admission of evidence, a party’s failure to
timely object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then be
entertained.

Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol
evidence sought to be introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the
party presenting it. That is, it must be relevant, tending to "induce belief in
[the] existence"44 of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms
averred by the party seeking to introduce parol evidence.

In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be

admitted: first, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been
put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the
adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented
serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting
party.
Our evidentiary rules impel us to proceed from the position (unless
convincingly shown otherwise) that individuals act as rational human
beings, i.e, "[t]hat a person takes ordinary care of his concerns[.]"58 This
basic evidentiary stance, taken with the. supporting evidence petitioners
Spouses Paras adduced, respondent Kimwa's awareness of the conditions
under which petitioner Lucia Paras was bound, and the Agreement's own
text specifying exclusive allotment for respondent Kimwa, supports
petitioners Spouses Paras' position that respondent Kimwa was obliged to
haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995. As it
admittedly hauled only 10,000 cubic meters, respondent Kimwa is liable for
breach of contract in respect of the remaining 30,000 cubic meters.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated July
4, 2005 and Resolution dated February 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
Special 20th Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 74682 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaue
City dated May 16, 2001 in Civil Case No. MAN-2412 is REINSTATED.

A legal interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total

judgment award from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
(vii) Damaso T. Ambray v. Sylvia A. Tsourous, G.R. No. 209264 ( J. Perlas-
Bernabe) July 5, 2016.
Facts:
The subject matter of the present controversy is a parcel of land described
as Lot 2-C of subdivision plan Psd-04-009554, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-413825 of the Register of Deeds of San
Pablo City (Lot 2-C) in the name of petitioners Damaso T. Ambray
(Damaso), and Ceferino T. Ambray, Jr. (Ceferino, Jr.; collectively,
petitioners).

In June 1996, Maristela discovered that TCT No. T-22749 covering Lot 2-C
had been cancelled and in its stead, TCT No. T-41382 was issued in the
name of petitioners.1âwphi1 It appears that by virtue of a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale14 (Deed of Sale) dated January 16, 1978, Ceferino, Sr., with
the consent of Estela, allegedly sold "a portion of lot 2 of the consolidation
subd. plan (LRC) Pcs-12441"15 to petitioners for a consideration of
P150,000.00. The Deed of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds
of San Pablo City only on February 5, 1996.16

This prompted respondents to file a criminal case for falsification of public

document against petitioners, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Damaso
T Ambray and Ceferino T Ambray" and docketed as Criminal Case No.
39153 (falsification case) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
of San Pablo City. In a Decision17 dated October 30, 2000, the MTCC
acquitted petitioners of the charge for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Thereafter, respondents filed the instant complaint18 for annulment of title,

reconveyance, and damages against petitioners and Estela (defendants),
docketed as Civil Case No. SP-5831(01), alleging that TCT No. T-41382
and the Deed of Sale were null and void because the signatures of
Ceferino, Sr. and Estela thereon were forgeries

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision31 dated June 11, 2010, the RTC nullified the Deed of Sale as
well as TCT No. T-41382 in the name of petitioners and rendered judgment
in favor of respondents

CA affirmed the decision of RTC

Issue:

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
affirming the RTC's nullification of the Deed of Sale dated January 16, 1978
and TCT No. T-41382 covering Lot 2-C in the name of petitioners.

Held:

The petition is meritorious.

At the core of the present controversy is the validity of the Deed of Sale,
the execution of which purportedly conveyed Lot 2-C in favor of petitioners.
To gauge the veracity thereof, it is imperative to pass upon the
genuineness of the signatures of the seller, Ceferino, Sr., and his wife,
Estela, who gave her consent to the sale, as appearing thereon, which
respondents, in the present complaint, assert to be forgeries.

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear,

positive and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater
weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The
fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the
alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the
person whose signature is theorized to have been forged.49

Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of

handwriting may be proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge.50 Corollary thereto, jurisprudence states that the
presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery
and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a
witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who
had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness
constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.51

In this case, the only direct evidence presented by respondents to prove

their allegation of forgery is Questioned Documents Report No. 266-39752
dated March 24, 1997 issued by National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Document Examiner II Antonio R. Magbojos (Magbojos), stating that the
signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale, when compared
to standard sample signatures, are not written by one and the same
person.

In refutation, petitioners offered in evidence, inter alia, the testimony of their

mother, Estela, in the falsification case where petitioners were previously
acquitted. In the course thereof, she identified53 the signatures on the
Deed of Sale as hers and Ceferino, Sr.' s, which was fully corroborated54
by Atty. Zosimo Tanalega (Atty. Tanalega), the notary public who notarized
the subject Deed of Sale and was present at the time the Ambray spouses
affixed their signatures thereon.

Between the Questioned Documents Report presented by respondents and

the testimony given by Estela in the falsification case in support of
petitioners' defense, the Court finds greater evidentiary weight in favor of
the latter. Hence, respondent's complaint for annulment of title,
reconveyance, and damages in Civil Case No. SP-5831(01) should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed April 25, 2013
Decision and the September 24, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95606 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
instant complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages
is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice