Historical descriptions

 "Let us be clear about three facts: First, all battles and all wars are won in the end by the
infantryman. Secondly, the infantryman always bears the brunt. His casualties are heavier, he suffers
greater extremes of discomfort and fatigue than the other arms. Thirdly, the art of the infantryman is
less stereotyped and far harder to acquire in modern war than that of any other arm." [4] Field
Marshal Earl Wavell
 "I love the infantry because they are the underdogs. They are the mud-rain-frost-and-wind boys.
They have no comforts, and they even learn to live without the necessities. And in the end they are
the guys that wars can't be won without." [5]Ernie Pyle
 "I'm convinced that the infantry is the group in the army which gives more and gets less than
anybody else."[6] Bill Mauldin, Up Front (1945)
 "Never think that war, no matter how necessary, nor how justified, is not a crime. Ask the infantry
and ask the dead."[7] Ernest Hemingway[8]
 "The infantry doesn't change. We're the only arm [of the military] where the weapon is the man
himself."[9] C.T. Shortis
 "Ah, yes, mere infantry — poor beggars…"[10] Plautus
 "The army's infantry is its most essential component. Even today, no army can take and hold any
ground without the use of infantry."[11] George Nafziger
 "The infantry is there so that when some die the generals know where to direct the artillery fire"
(anonymous Japanese soldier, Iwo Jima)[verification needed]
 '"Aerial bombardment can obliterate, but only infantry can occupy" - a Finnish Army observation
of the Operation Allied Force in the 1990s
 “I don’t know what effect these men will have upon the enemy, but, by God, they terrify me.” -
the Duke of Wellington
 "Victory is still measured by foot" - The Indian Army
 “I don’t know why we have the Air Force and Navy. It's always up to the bloody infantry to get the
job done." - Australian Soldier At Tobruk[citation needed

In Praise of Infantry
Field-Marshal Earl Wavell

First published in "The Times," Thursday, 19th April 1945

MY attention was lately called by a distinguished officer to the fact that, whereas in official
correspondence and in the Press it is the practice always to use initial capital letters in referring to
other arms of the service—e.g. Royal Armoured Corps, Royal Artillery, etc.—the infantry often
suffered the indignity of a small "i". My friend wished to adopt the usual method of an Englishman
with a grievance and to write to The Times about it! But he proposed to do it vicariously, through me.
Hence this article. I had not, I admit, noticed the small "i" myself, nor would it have worried me
greatly if I had. But I do feel strongly that the Infantry arm (with a capital "I") does not receive either
the respect or the treatment to which its importance and its exploits entitle it. This may possibly be
understandable, though misguided, in peace; it is intolerable in war.

Let us be clear about three facts. First, all battles and all wars are won in the end by the infantryman.
Secondly, the infantryman always bears the brunt. His casualties are heavier, he suffers greater
extremes of discomfort and fatigue than the other arms. Thirdly, the art of the infantryman is less
stereotyped and far harder to acquire in modern war than that of any other arm. The role of the
average artilleryman, for instance, is largely routine; the setting of a fuse, the loading of a gun, even
the laying of it are processes which, once learnt, are mechanical. The infantryman has to use
initiative and intelligence in almost every step he moves, every action he takes on the battle-field.
We ought therefore to put our men of best intelligence and endurance into the Infantry.

Yet the Infantry in peace or war receives the lowest rates of pay, the drabbest uniforms, sometimes
even the least promising of recruits; most important of all, it ranks lowest in the public estimation and
prestige. This is all wrong and should be set right by methods more important than a capital I.

In all the long history of war on land the front-line fighting man, whose role is to close with the enemy
and force him to flee, surrender, or be killed—the only method by which battles are ever won—has
two categories only—those who fight mounted—once the Knights-at-arms, then the Cavalry, now the
Royal Armoured Corps—and those who fight on their feet—the inevitable, enduring, despised, long-
suffering Infantry (with a very capital I). Artillery, Engineers, R.A.S.C., and the like simply handle the
weapons and equipment which Infantry have from time to time discarded, when they found that they
encumbered their mobility and lessened their power to perform their primary role of closing with the
enemy. The cannon, bombard, or what-not, when first introduced was an infantry weapon; when it
impeded mobility it was handed over to second-line men, to support the Infantry. Similarly with other
weapons and devices.

So that the real front-line fighters, mounted or dismounted, are the men who should receive such
panoply and glamour as are accorded to this dreary business of war. The mounted men have always
had it—prancing steeds, glittering uniforms, sabretaches, scimitars, dolmans, leopard-skins, and the
like in the old days; the imposing clatter of tanks and smart black berets in these sterner days. But
the infantryman who bears the danger, the dirt, and the discomfort has never enjoyed the same
prestige.

In peace, the Royal Armoured Corps, the Artillery, the Engineers all had Inspectors to look after their
interests. The Infantry had to content themselves with a humiliating asterisk in the Army List and a
footnote which explained that the Director of Military Training (who was sometimes a gunner or
engineer) also acted as Inspector of Infantry. The Royal Armoured Corps had a centre at Bovington,
the Artillery at Woolwich, the Engineers at Chatham. But the Infantry were homeless. There was a
Cavalry Journal, an Artillery Journal, an Engineer Journal, but no Infantry Journal. I understand that
it is intended to repair these omissions after the war.
But I believe that what the Infantry would appreciate more than anything is some outward and visible
symbol. No one grudges the parachutist his very distinctive emblem, but the infantryman is, I will
maintain, subject to greater and more continuous, though less spectacular, risk than the parachutist,
and should certainly have an emblem. What it should be I must leave to others—a rampant lion,
crossed bayonets, a distinctive piping ?

It can surely not have escaped notice that nearly all our leaders who have distinguished themselves
in this war have been infantrymen—Field-Marshals Dill, Alexander, Montgomery, Wilson; Generals
Auchinleck, O'Connor, Platt, Leese, Dempsey, and others. Last war was a very static war, but there
was a fashion for cavalry generals; in this war infantry generals have shown that they can move as
fast as any.

So let us always write Infantry with a specially capital "I" and think of them with the deep admiration
they deserve. And let us Infantrymen wear our battle-dress, like our rue, with a difference; and throw
a chest in it, for we are the men who win battles and wars.

I will conclude with a story which was told me some ten years ago by General Gouraud, a great
fighting French general of the last war, who was then Governor of Paris. He was dining with three
British generals, of different arms of the service. He told us the following as current in the French
Army to illustrate the characteristics of the three principal arms:—

"The general gives an order to the infantryman. The infantryman, being rather stupid, does
not well understand what the general wants, but goes out and engages the enemy.

"The general gives an order to the artilleryman. The artilleryman understands it perfectly, but
being much cleverer than the general goes and does something quite different.

"The general gives an order to the cavalryman. The cavalryman smiles politely and goes off
to water and feed his horses."

We all assured him that things were arranged differently in the British Army!

- Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, The Good Soldier, 1948

Every Soldier is a rifleman. The Army seems to relearn this lesson in every war. Sadly enough, it is usually as
the result of lost lives--lives the Army might have saved it if had not forgotten lessons from its past. Currently,
we are engaged in a war against a foe who seeks to strike our forces where they believe we are the weakest.
The insurgents plant improvised explosive devices along roadsides to kill Soldiers on a mail run. They lie in
wait, weapons ready, while a chow truck drives into their kill zone. Our enemy knows that attacking a well-
trained infantry squad will end in disaster for them, and so they choose to strike our cooks, our clerks, and our
drivers--men and women who know little about Battle Drill One Alpha, Squad Attack, or any other of the
infantry battle drills found in the Army Field Manual 7-8, the Infantry Bible.

Attacking enemy supply lines is not a new tactic. It is as old as warfare itself. Crusaders living in the Holy
Land routinely ambushed Arab caravans heading north from Mecca because they were easy pickings and
profitable targets. In 1415, during the Hundred Years War, French knights, sensing victory in the Battle of
Agincourt, rode down an English baggage train while the English archers slaughtered their comrades. In World
War II, partisans throughout Europe attacked German supply routes prior to major invasions. The idea of "rear
areas" and "forward areas" is a fallacious premise and dangerous one that leads to complacency and
overconfidence on the part of our Soldiers. We owe it to our Soldiers to train the combat support Soldiers and
dispel the foolish notion that only 11Bs face danger every day. We can do this by preparing all of our Soldiers,
and in doing so, we a train a better prepared Army.

Fortunately, we are on the right path. General Peter J. Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff of the Army, has ordered
that all Soldiers must undergo more rigorous infantry training. When better-trained Soldiers reach the
battlefield in places like Mosul, Hammam al Alil and Fallujah, the foreign fighters and former regime loyalists
will find that the supply convoy is no longer just a supply convoy, but a killing machine that happens to be
carrying supplies.

In World War II, experience taught harsh lessons to Soldiers who thought that only the infantrymen did the
fighting. In major battles like the Hurtgen Forest and the Battle of the Bulge, commanders had to call on
support troops to play decisive roles in desperate battles. In some of the worst cases, commanders simply had
run out of combat Soldiers, due to death and wounds. Someone had to fill the gaps. For the airborne units, this
was not a problem. Paratroopers and glidermen of the 101st and the 82nd Airborne Divisions were ready to
step up when the frontline infantry could not accomplish the mission alone. The men saw themselves as
paratroopers and glidermen first--not cooks or clerks. During the Battle of the Bulge, support Soldiers from the
327th Glider Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, played a pivotal role in the battle's outcome, fighting
…
Fourth Generation Warfare
   Recently I came across this interesting concept of “Fourth Generation Warfare” or 4GW in John Robb’s
blog. I did some research on it, which I decided to share it here along with some of my own views but
before I begin I must place a caveat that I am no strategist, analyst or even a journalist but just a curious
individual and the views are largely of those websites to which I have provided links. So if anyone is
interested to find out more just follow the white rabbit, blue rabbit would the proper word methinks : D

    4GW and asymmetric warfare are the two most recurring military strategy terms I come across while
going through various articles on military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. While 4GW
requires a detail explanation, asymmetric warfare I believe can be explained in fewer
words. Asymmetric warfare can be described as a conflict between forces of unequal strength,
dissimilarly equipped and exploiting the enemy’s weakness by using one’s own strength.   This
interaction often involves strategies and tactics outside the bounds of conventional warfare.A classical
example of asymmetric warfare is the Bibical story of David and Goliath, just weeks back the Hezbollah
managed to damage an Israeli warship by flying an explosive laden drone into it.

   ‘Fourth Generation Warfare’ is a concept defined in 1989 by a group of American analysts including
William S. Lind and John Boyd, to describe warfare’s return to decentralized form or to a form where
one of the forces in the conflict is a not a nation-state but a rather violent ideological network. The 1989
paper by Lind and team can be viewed here .

 [ 4GW definition in Wikipedia ]

  

   The Defense and National Interest website list a number of factors (here) that led to the rise of 4GW
forces but the most important of these are loss of the nation-state’s monopoly over war; internal
division of the society along religious and ethnic lines; and globalization through benefits of
communication technology. Technology has also helped these forces increase their productivity and
coordination helping them evolve into highly compartmentalized, cellular, predatory networks operating
outside the framework of nation-states. While propaganda has always played a major role in warfare
the current reach of media into the living room of masses has made it an effective tool of 4GW forces if
they can avail it. Freedom and civil rights, the modern society’s greatest strength can be effectively
exploited to carry on operations to subvert it.

  4GW is fought on tactical level through:

 Rear area operations -- 4GW warriors do not confront a nation-state's military but rather it society. 
 Psychological operations -- terror.
 Ad-hoc innovation -- use of the enemy's strengths against itself.

    Victory in 4GW warfare is won in the moral sphere. The aim of 4GW is to destroy the moral bonds that
allows the organic whole to exist. According to Boyd this is done by creating/exploiting /magnifying the
following:

1. Menace – Threaten basic human survival instinct.

2. Uncertainty -  Undermine economic activity by decreasing confidence in the future .Create
impressions, or atmosphere by events that appear ambiguous, contradictory, erratic, unfamiliar,
chaotic, etc     
3. Mistrust - Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that loosens human bonds among members of an
organic whole.
 

Countering 4GW forces does not seem as easy now due to various factors most important of which is
their statelessness. In order to defeat an enemy you need to identify but in this case identification is
difficult and attacking the territory may yield unfavorable results. This also ensures that the nuclear
deterrence that helped maintain balance of power during the Cold War is ineffective with a formless
enemy, further there is no certainty that the enemy wouldn’t use a WMD if it acquires one.

    I did not find much information on how dangerous groups like Al-Qaeda can be countered, however,
Boyd has described several actions to be taken to achieve the moral high ground.

        Undermine guerrilla causes and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence
of government to represent and serve needs of people – rather than exploit and impoverish them
for the benefit of a greedy elite.

        Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption and eliminate grievances at the
grass roots.

        Infiltrate guerrilla movements and employ the population for intelligence on the guerrillas

        Deploy administrative talent, police, and roving counter-guerrilla teams into affected regions.

        Take and keep the initiative by relentless pursuit.  Employ the guerrilla’s own tactics of
reconnaissance, infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to keep roving bands off-
balance and to make base areas untenable.

        Emphasize capture and conversion to government cause  -- instead of harsh anti-population reprisal
measures and “body count” – as a basis to undermine guerrilla influence.

        Visibly identify central government with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect
government with hopes and needs of people, thereby gain their support and confirm government
legitimacy.

        Destroy guerrilla cohesion and break their hold upon the population via political initiative that
demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that
emphasize stealth/fast tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort. .[Source]

4GW -- FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE

4GW (fourth generation wafare) is the term used by military thinkers to describe
conflict at the end of the 20th century. In general, 4GW is an extremely effective
method of warfare that the US and its allies will find very difficult to defeat (a slow
burn, rather than complete eradication, may be the best possible outcome). I have
outlined the basics of 4GW warfare below to enhance your understanding of the term.
Definition
4GW can be defined as a method of warfare that uses the following to achieve a moral
victory:

 Undermines enemy strengths (this may seem obvious, but most of modern
warfare has involved direct attacks on enemy strengths -- find the enemy army
and destroy it).
 Exploits enemy weaknesses.
 Uses asymmetric operations (weapons and techniques that differ substantially
from opponents).

Drivers
The rise of 4GW is both a product and a driver of the following:

 The loss of the nation-state's monopoly on violence.

 The rise of cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict.
 Globalization (via technological integration).

Tactics
4GW is fought on the tactical level via:

 Rear area operations -- 4GW warriors do not confront a nation-state's military

but rather it society. 
 Psychological operations -- terror.
 Ad-hoc innovation -- use of the enemy's strengths against itself.

Generations of Warfare
The generational development of warfare can be outlined as:

 First generation -- wars of Napoleon, conscription and firearms (the decline of

mercenaries).
 Second generation -- the US civil war and WW1, firepower and nation-state
alignment of resources to warfare.
 Third generation -- WW2, maneuver and armored warfare.
 Fourth generation -- ad hoc warriors and moral conflict.
Differences
Many of the methods used in 4GW aren't new and have robust historical precedent.
However, there are important differences in how it is applied today. These include:

 Global -- modern technologies and economic integration enable global

operations.
 Pervasive -- the decline of nation-state warfare has forced all open conflict
into the 4GW mold.
 Granularity -- extremely small viable groups and variety of reasons for conflict.
 Vulerability -- open societies and economies.
 Technology -- new technologies have dramatically increased the productivity
of small groups of 4GW warriors.
 Media -- global media saturation makes possible an incredible level of
manipulation.
 Networked -- new organizational types made possible by improvements in
technology are much better at learning, surviving, and acting.

Winning a 4GW conflict

Victory in 4GW warfare is won in the moral sphere. The aim of 4GW is to destroy the
moral bonds that allows the organic whole to exist -- cohesion. This is done by
reinforcing the following (according to Boyd):

 Menace. Attacks that undermine or threaten basic human survival instincts.

 Mistrust. Increases divisions between groups (ie. conservatives and liberals in
the US).
 Uncertainty. Undermine economic activity by decreasing confidence in the
future.