695 Phil.

742

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. DINA
DULAY Y PASCUAL, APPELLANT
D E C I S I O N.

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve an appeal from the Decision[1] dated August 4, 2010 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03725 affirming with modification the
Decision[2] dated October 8, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 194,
Parañaque City, finding appellant Dina Dulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) 8353 as a co-principal by indispensable
cooperation.

The records bear the following factual antecedents:

Private complainant AAA[3] was 12 years old when the whole incident happened.
AAA's sister introduced the appellant to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter,
appellant convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio,
Parañaque City. Before going to the said wake, they went to a casino to look for
appellant's boyfriend, but since he was not there, they went to Sto. Niño at Don
Galo. However, appellant's boyfriend was also not there. When they went to
Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish, they saw appellant's
boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, appellant and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the
Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the
Kubuhan, appellant suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the
name “Speed” was waiting. AAA saw “Speed” give money to appellant and heard
“Speed” tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, “Speed” wielded a
knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant's
help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but
appellant did not do so. After the rape, “Speed” and appellant told AAA not to tell
anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her.

AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what
happened and the latter informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and
mother, filed a complaint at Barangay San Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay
officials of San Dionisio referred the complaint to the police station.

The Parañaque City Police Office (Women's and Children Concern Desk) asked the
assistance of the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, upon
which the latter assigned the case to Dr. Merle Tan. Consequently, with the consent
of AAA and her mother, and in the presence of a social worker of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Dr. Tan conducted the requisite
interview and physical examination on AAA. Later on, Dr. Tan issued a Medico-
Legal Report[4] stating that there was no evident injury in the body of AAA, but
medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse. During her testimony, Dr. Tan
explained that such impression or conclusion pertains to the ano-genital
examination and also stated that she found multiple abrasions on the back portion
of the body of AAA.[5]

Thus, an Information was filed, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of July 2005, in the City of Parañaque,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with one
alias “Speed,” whose true name and identity and present whereabouts is
still unknown, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, the herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered
for a fee complainant AAA, 12 year old minor, to accused alias
“Speed,” who with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge on said minor complainant AAA against her will and
without her consent, which act is prejudicial to the normal growth and
development of the said child.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

With the assistance of counsel de oficio, on August 3, 2005, appellant entered a

plea of not guilty.[7] Therafter, trial on the merits ensued.

To support the above allegations, the prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA
and Dr. Merle Tan. On the other hand, the defense presented the sole testimony of
appellant which can be summarized as follows:

Appellant met AAA a few days before June 2005 when the latter was introduced to
her by her cousin Eglay Akmad during the wake of a relative of AAA at Palanyag.
The cousin of appellant was AAA's neighbor at Palanyag. Around 1 o'clock in the
morning of July 3, 2005, appellant averred that she was at La Huerta, at the
Bulungan Fish Port in Parañaque City with her cousin Eglay and stayed there for
about thirty (30) minutes. They then proceeded to the house of appellant's cousin in
Palanyag. In the said house, appellant saw “Speed” and two (2) other male persons.
She also saw AAA who was engaged in a conversation with “Speed” and his two
(2) companions. She asked AAA what she was doing there and the latter said that it
was none of her business (“wala kang pakialam sa akin”). Because of the response
of AAA, appellant left the house and went home to General Trias, Cavite.

On October 8, 2008, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding Accused Danilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt

for rape as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation, she is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and to pay the offended party
the amount of P50,000.00 by way of damages.

The period of her detention shall be considered part of the service of her
sentence.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, the appellant brought the case to
the CA. The latter, on August 4, 2010, promulgated its decision affirming the
ruling of the RTC with a modification on the award of damages, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED

with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the
offended party the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and
Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Hence, the present appeal.

In her Brief, appellant assigned the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF RAPE AS CO-PRINCIPAL
 BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL

WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT [AAA].[10]

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the appellee, refutes the above
assignment of errors by stating the following arguments:

I.

CONSPIRACY WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE.

II.

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN BELIEVING THE

TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

III.

ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL CANNOT BE

GIVEN GREATER EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT THAN THE POSITIVE
TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.[11]

An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment,
or even reverse the trial court's decision on the basis of grounds other than those
that the parties raised as errors.[12]

The appellant in this case was charged in the Information as having committed the
crime of Rape under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353
in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. She was eventually convicted by the trial
court of the crime of rape as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua as provided under Article
266-B of the RPC.

In sustaining the conviction of the appellant as co-principal by indispensable

cooperation, the CA, ratiocinated:

To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that

common will or purpose does not necessarily mean previous
 understanding, for it can be explained or inferred from the
circumstances of each case. The cooperation must be indispensable, that
is, without which the commission of the crime would not have been
accomplished. x x x

xxxx

The proven facts and circumstances obtaining in this case fall squarely
on the above-cited example. It will be noted that the cooperation of the
accused-appellant consisted in performing an act which is different from
the act of execution of the crime committed by the rapist. Accused-
appellant cooperated in the perpetration of the crime of rape committed
by “Speed” by acts without which the crime would not have been
consummated, since she prepared the way for the perpetration thereof,
convinced the victim to go with her under the guise of looking for her
boyfriend and upon arrival at the kubuhan, she pulled the victim inside a
room where “Speed” was waiting, delivered the victim to him, and then
after receiving some amount of money from “Speed” she settled in
another room together with her boyfriend so that “Speed” might freely
consummate the rape with violence and intimidation, as he did.[13]

However, this Court is of another view and does not subscribe to the findings of the
trial court, as sustained by the CA that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as co-principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape.

Under the Revised Penal Code,[14] an accused may be considered a principal by

direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a
principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal
resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not
have been accomplished.[15] Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the
commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time
appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the
man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone
could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for
money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her
own services in exhange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped.
Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It
must be remembered that in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA,
she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by
“Speed.” Thus:

PROS. R. GARCIA: Now, what happened after you met this Dina
Dulay?
WITNESS [AAA]: She invited me to go with her boyfriend, Sir.
xxxx
Q: You went to the bulungan, what happened when you reached the
fish port or bulungan, AAA?
A: Pumunta kami sa kubuhan, Sir.
Q: Where is this kubuhan located in relation to the fish port?
A: At the back portion, Sir.
Q: And, when you said pumunta kami, who was then your
companion in going to that kubuhan?
A: Dina Dulay and her boyfriend, Sir.
Q: Do you know the name of the boyfriend of Dina Dulay?
A: No, Sir.
xxxx
Q: All right. After reaching the kubuhan, what happened next?
A: Pina-rape po ako, Sir.
Q: What made you say [AAA] that accused here Dina Dulay had
you raped at the kubuhan?
A: Kasi po binayaran siya nung lalaki, Sir.
Q:
Now, do you know how much this Dina Dulay was paid by that
person who was you said raped you?

A: No, Sir. I just saw them.

Q: And what did you see that was paid to Dina?
A: Pera, Sir.
Q: Aside from seeing a guy giving money to Dina Dulay, did you
hear any conversation between this Dina Dulay and that man
who gave money to her?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court [AAA], what was that
conversation you heard between this Dina Dulay and the person
who gave money to her?
A: He said to look for a younger girl, Sir.[16]
xxxx
PROS. R. GARCIA:
Q: Okay. After that conversation and the giving of money to Dina
Dulay, what happened to you and the man?
A: He raped me, Sir.
Q: Where were you raped?
A:
At the Kubuhan, Sir.

Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court how you were raped
by that person?
A: He tied me up, Sir.
Q: How were you tied up as you said?
 A: He tied up both my hands, Sir.
Q: Then after tying your hands what happened next?
A: He raped me and he pointed a knife at me, Sir.
Q: When you said you were raped, are you referring to the insertion
of his penis into your sex organ?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q:
And, how did you feel at that time when the organ of this man
was inserted into your organ?

A: It was painful, Sir.

Q:
And, how did you react when as you said you were being raped
by this person?

A: I cannot talk. He put clothes in my mouth, Sir.

Q: For how long did you stay in that kubuhan with this man? May
isang oras ba kayo doon?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, tell us how [AAA] many times did this person insert his
penis into your organ?
A:
Only one (1) [AAA], Sir.[17]

It must be clear that this Court respects the findings of the trial court that AAA was
indeed raped by considering the credibility of the testimony of AAA. The rule is
that factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal.[18] However, the review of a criminal case opens up the case
in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the
defense are weighed, thus, avoiding general conclusions based on isolated pieces of
evidence.[19] In the case of rape, a review begins with the reality that rape is a very
serious accusation that is painful to make; at the same time, it is a charge that is not
hard to lay against another by one with malice in her mind. Because of the private
nature of the crime that justifies the acceptance of the lone testimony of a credible
victim to convict, it is not easy for the accused, although innocent, to disprove his
guilt. These realities compel [this Court] to approach with great caution and to
scrutinize the statements of a victim on whose sole testimony conviction or
acquittal depends.[20]

In this light, while this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime
of rape as a principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of
Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which states that:
 Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion

perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child

prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by

means of written or oral advertisements or other similar
means;

(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure

a child as a prostitute;

(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage

him as a prostitute; or

(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary

benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in
prostitution.[21]

The elements of paragraph (a) are:

1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child

prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:

a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by
means of written or oral advertisements or other similar
means;
c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a
child as a prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him
as a prostitute; or
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary
benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in
 prostitution;

3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution

and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[22]

Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child

prostitution. It contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In
other words, under paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit.[23]

As alleged in the Information and proven through the testimony of AAA, appellant
facilitated or induced child prostitution. Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.[24] Thus,
the act of apellant in convincing AAA, who was 12 years old at that time, to go
with her and thereafter, offer her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her
liable under the above-mentioned law. The purpose of the law is to provide special
protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.[25] A child
exploited in prostitution may seem to "consent" to what is being done to her or him
and may appear not to complain. However, we have held that a child who is "a
person below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves
or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of their age or mental disability or condition" is incapable of giving
rational consent[26] to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.

It must be noted that in the Information, it was alleged that appellant was accused
of Rape under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in
relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, and then went on to enumerate the elements
of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610 in its body. The Information partly reads:

x x x the herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered

for a fee complainant AAA, 12 year old minor, to accused alias
“Speed,” who with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge on said minor complainant AAA against her will
and without her consent x x x [27]

Undoubtedly, the above-quoted falls under Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, the appellant
acting as a procurer of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution. It must be
remembered that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they may be conclusions of law, but by the recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.[28] The
sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective
designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the
narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and
sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.[29]

To dispute the allegation and the evidence presented by the prosecution, appellant
merely interposes the defense of denial. It is well settled that denial is essentially
the weakest form of defense and it can never overcome an affirmative testimony,
particularly when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.[30]

Anent the penalty, for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of R.A.
7610, the penalty prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. Therefore, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the proper imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the
medium of the penalty prescribed by the law.[31] Notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 is
a special law, appellant may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
[32] Since the penalty provided in R.A. 7610 is taken from the range of penalties in
the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.[33] Thus, appellant is entitled to a maximum term
which should be within the range of the proper imposable penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years) and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period (ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
months).[34]

As to the award of damages, the same must be consistent with the objective of R.A.
7610 to afford children special protection against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination and with the principle that every person who contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the
same.[35] Therefore, civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case involving
violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610. This is also in compliance with
Article 100 of the RPC which states that every person criminally liable is civilly
liable. Hence, the amount of P50,000.00 civil indemnity ex delicto as awarded in
cases of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610[36] shall also be the
same in cases of violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of appellant Dina Dulay y Pascual is hereby

DISMISSED. However, the Decision of the CA is hereby MODIFIED as
appellant is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, but of
violating Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610, as amended, for which she is
sentenced to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is
also ordered to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez,* Mendoza, and Perlas-Bernabe,** JJ., concur.

* Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1299 dated August 28, 2012

**Designated Acting Member, in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per

Special Order No. 1320 dated September 21, 2012.

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison, with Associate Justices
Noel G. Tijam and Danton Q. Bueser, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-14.

[2] Penned by Judge Leoncia Real-Dimagiba; CA rollo, pp. 48-53.

[3]In line with this Court's ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,
September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 426, citing Rule on Violence Against Women
and their Children, Sec. 40; Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No.
9262, Rule XI, Sec. 63, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act,” the real names of the rape victims will not be disclosed.
This Court will instead use fictitious initials to represent them throughout the
decision. The personal circumstances of the victims or any other information
tending to establish or compromise their identities will likewise be withheld.

[4] Exhibit “C.”

[5] TSN, November 27, 2006, pp. 12-13.

[6] Records, p. 1.

[7] Id. at 19.

[8] Id. at 208.

[9] Rollo, pp. 13-14.

[10] CA rollo, p. 39.

[11] Id. at 72.

[12] People v. Listerio, G.R. No. 122099, July 5, 2000, 335 SCRA 40, 65.

[13] Rollo, pp. 7-8.

[14] Revised Penal Code, Art. 17.

[15] People v. Jorge, G.R. No. 99379, April 22, 1994, 231 SCRA 693, 699.

[16] TSN, November 16, 2005, pp. 7-15. (Emphasis supplied.)

[17] TSN, November 16, 2005, pp. 17-19.

[18] People v. Lim, G.R. No. 141699, August 7, 2002, 386 SCRA 581, 593; People
v. Pacis, G.R. No. 146309, July 18, 2002, 384 SCRA 684.

[19]
People v. Fabito, G.R. No. 179933, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 591, 603, citing
People v. Larrañaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, July 21, 2005, 463 SCRA 652.

[20]Id. at 603-604, citing People v. Fernandez, G.R. Nos. 139341-45, July 25,
2002, 385 SCRA 224, 232.

[21] Emphasis supplied.

[22]
Malto v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, 533
SCRA 643, 655-656.

[23] Id. at 656.

[24] R.A. 7610, Sec. 5.

[25] R.A. 7610, Sec. 2.

[26]People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 115, 134-
135, citing People v. Manlapaz, No. L-41819, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 704.

[27] Records, p. 1.

[28] Reyes v. Camilon, G.R. No. 46198, December 20, 1990, 192 SCRA 445, 453.
[29] Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 465,
482.

[30] People v. Mendoza, 490 Phil. 737, 746 (2005).

[31]Malto v. People of the Philippines, supra note 22, citing People v. Delantar,
supra note 26, at 135.

[32]Id., citing People v. Bon, G.R. No. 149199, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 506,
516.

[33]
Id., citing Cadua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123123, August 19, 1999, 312
SCRA 703, 725, citing People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234
SCRA 555. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:

SECTION 1. G..R.No. 93028. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an

offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (Emphasis supplied)

Simon ruled:

It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an
offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that “if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall

sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which

shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same.” We hold that this quoted portion
of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the
penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised
Penal Code as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said
that the “offense is punished” under that law. (Emphasis supplied)

Cadua applied this rule by analogy and extension.

[34] Id.

[35] Id., citing Civil Code, Art. 20.

[36] Id.

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