REMEDIAL

LAW
Case Digests

UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW

REMEDIAL LAW
(Case Digests January 1, 2019 – December 31, 2019)

Prepared by:
UST LAW REVIEW
and
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019

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Table of Contents
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES ............................................................................................................................... 8
A. Substantive law vs. remedial law ........................................................................................................ 8
B. Rule-making power of the Supreme Court ....................................................................................... 12
C. Principle of judicial hierarchy ............................................................................................................ 12
D. Doctrine of non-interference/judicial stability ................................................................................. 14
II. JURISDICTION ........................................................................................................................................ 14
A. Classification of jurisdiction ............................................................................................................. 17
1. Original vs. appellate ................................................................................................................... 17
2. General vs. special........................................................................................................................ 17
3. Exclusive vs. concurrent ............................................................................................................... 17
B. Doctrines of hierarchy of courts and continuity of jurisdiction ........................................................ 19
C. Jurisdiction of various Philippine courts ........................................................................................... 21
D. Aspects of jurisdiction...................................................................................................................... 35
1. Jurisdiction over the parties ......................................................................................................... 35
2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter............................................................................................. 35
3. Jurisdiction over the issues .......................................................................................................... 44
4. Jurisdiction over the res or the property in litigation ................................................................... 44
E. Jurisdiction vs. exercise of jurisdiction ............................................................................................. 44
F. Jurisdiction vs. venue ....................................................................................................................... 44
G. Jurisdiction over cases covered by Barangay Conciliation, Small Claims Cases, and cases covered by
Summary Procedure ............................................................................................................................. 44
III. CIVIL PROCEDURE ................................................................................................................................ 44
A. General provisions (Rule 1) ............................................................................................................... 44
B. Cause of action (Rule 2) .................................................................................................................... 44
C. Parties to civil actions (Rule 3) .......................................................................................................... 47
D. Venue (Rule 4) .................................................................................................................................. 59
E. Pleadings ........................................................................................................................................... 62
1. Kinds (Rule 6) ............................................................................................................................... 62
2. Parts of a pleading (Rule 7) .......................................................................................................... 62
3. Manner of making allegations (Rule 8) ........................................................................................ 74
4. Effect of failure to plead (Rule 9) ................................................................................................. 74

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 5. Amended and supplemental pleadings (Rule 10) ......................................................................... 74
6. When to file responsive pleadings (Rule 11) ................................................................................ 74
F. Filing and service of pleadings, judgments, final orders, and resolutions ......................................... 74
1. Rules on payment of docket fees; effect of non-payment ........................................................... 74
2. Rule 13 ......................................................................................................................................... 78
G. Summons .......................................................................................................................................... 80
1. Nature and purpose of summons in relation to actions in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem 2.
Rule 14 .............................................................................................................................................. 80
H. Motions ............................................................................................................................................ 80
1. In general (Rule 15) ...................................................................................................................... 80
2. Motion to dismiss (Rule 16) ......................................................................................................... 80
3. Motion for bill of particulars (Rule 12) ......................................................................................... 82
I. Dismissal ............................................................................................................................................ 82
1. Kinds............................................................................................................................................. 82
2. Rule 17 ......................................................................................................................................... 82
J. Pre-trial (Rule 18) ............................................................................................................................... 82
K. Intervention (Rule 19) ....................................................................................................................... 84
L. Subpoena (Rule 21) ........................................................................................................................... 84
M. Computation of time (Rule 22) ........................................................................................................ 84
N. Modes of discovery .......................................................................................................................... 84
1. Depositions (Rules 23 and 24) ...................................................................................................... 84
2. Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25) .............................................................................................. 84
3. Admission by adverse party (Rule 26) .......................................................................................... 87
4. Production or inspection of documents or things (Rule 27) ......................................................... 87
5. Physical and mental examination of persons (Rule 28) ................................................................ 87
6. Refusal to comply with modes of discovery (Rule 29) .................................................................. 87
O. Trial (Rule 30) ................................................................................................................................... 87
P. Consolidation or severance (Rule 31) ............................................................................................... 89
Q. Demurrer to Evidence (Rule 33) ....................................................................................................... 92
R. Judgments and final orders ............................................................................................................... 94
1. Judgment on the pleadings (Rule 34) ........................................................................................... 96
2. Summary judgments (Rule 35) ..................................................................................................... 96

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 3. Rendition and entry of judgments and final orders (Rule 36) ....................................................... 99
S. Post-judgment remedies ................................................................................................................. 102
1. Motion for new trial or reconsideration..................................................................................... 102
2. Appeals....................................................................................................................................... 104
3. Petition for relief from judgment (Rule 38) ................................................................................ 136
4. Annulments of judgment (Rule 47) ............................................................................................ 139
5. Collateral attack on judgments .................................................................................................. 143
T. Execution, satisfaction, and effect of judgments (Rule 39) ............................................................. 143
IV. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES.................................................................................................................... 166
A. Nature, purpose, and jurisdiction over provisional remedies ......................................................... 166
B. Preliminary attachment (Rule 57) ................................................................................................... 166
C. Preliminary injunction (Rule 58) ..................................................................................................... 166
D. Receivership (Rule 59) .................................................................................................................... 185
E. Replevin (Rule 60) ........................................................................................................................... 185
V. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS ....................................................................................................................... 185
A. Jurisdiction and venue .................................................................................................................... 185
B. Interpleader (Rule 62) ..................................................................................................................... 185
C. Declaratory relief and similar remedies (Rule 63) ........................................................................... 185
D. Review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and COA (Rule 64 in relation
to Rule 65)........................................................................................................................................... 188
E. Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus ........................................................................................... 188
1. Definitions and distinctions ........................................................................................................ 188
2. Requisites; when and where to file (Rule 65) ............................................................................. 192
3. Exceptions to filing of motion for reconsideration before filing petition ................................... 209
F. Quo warranto (Rule 66)................................................................................................................... 209
G. Expropriation .................................................................................................................................. 209
1. Rule 67 ....................................................................................................................................... 209
2. Guidelines for expropriation proceedings of National Government Infrastructure Projects (Sec. 4,
RA 8974).......................................................................................................................................... 214
H. Foreclosure of real estate mortgage .............................................................................................. 214
1. Judicial foreclosure (Rule 68) ..................................................................................................... 214
2. Extrajudicial foreclosure (Act 3135, as amended) ...................................................................... 214
3. The General Banking Law of 2000 (Sec. 47, RA 8791) ................................................................ 216

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 I. Partition (Rule 69) ............................................................................................................................ 216
J. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer ............................................................................................... 219
1. Differentiated from accionpubliciana and accionreivindicatoria................................................ 234
2. Rule 70 ....................................................................................................................................... 234
K. Contempt (Rule 71) ......................................................................................................................... 234
VI. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS ...................................................................................................................... 241
A. Settlement of estate of deceased persons ..................................................................................... 246
1. Venue and process (Rule 73) ...................................................................................................... 246
2. Summary settlement of estates (Rule 74) .................................................................................. 246
3. Allowance or disallowance of wills (Rule 76).............................................................................. 246
4. Claims against the estate (Rule 86) ............................................................................................ 246
5. Payment of the debts of the estate (Rule 88) ............................................................................ 248
6. Sales, mortgages, and other encumbrances of property of decedent (Rule 89) ......................... 248
7. Distribution and partition (Rule 90) ........................................................................................... 248
B. Escheat (Rule 91) ............................................................................................................................ 248
C. Guardianship................................................................................................................................... 250
1. Venue (Rule 92) .......................................................................................................................... 250
2. Appointment of guardians (Rule 93) ........................................................................................... 250
3. General powers and duties of guardians (Rule 96) ..................................................................... 250
4. Termination of guardianship (Rule 97)........................................................................................ 250
D. Writ of habeas corpus .................................................................................................................... 250
1. Rule 102 ..................................................................................................................................... 250
2. Writ of habeas corpus in relation to custody of minors (A.M. No. 03-0404-SC)......................... 254
E. Change of name (Rule 103) ............................................................................................................. 254
F. Cancellation or Correction of entries in the Civil Registry (Rule 108) .............................................. 254
G. Clerical error law (RA 9048) ............................................................................................................ 258
VII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ..................................................................................................................... 260
A. General matters .............................................................................................................................. 260
1. Criminal jurisdiction; concept and requisites for exercise ........................................................... 260
B. Prosecution of offenses (Rule 110) ................................................................................................. 263
C. Prosecution of civil action (Rule 111) .............................................................................................. 267
D. Preliminary Investigation ................................................................................................................ 271

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 1. Executive vs. judicial determination of probable cause .............................................................. 273
2. Rule 112 ...................................................................................................................................... 280
E. Arrest (Rule 113) ............................................................................................................................. 282
F. Bail (Rule 114) ................................................................................................................................. 287
G. Arraignment and plea (Rule 116).................................................................................................... 293
H. Motion to quash (Rule 117) ............................................................................................................ 293
I. Pre-trial (Rule 118) ........................................................................................................................... 295
J. Trial (Rule 119)................................................................................................................................. 295
K. Judgment (Rule 120) ....................................................................................................................... 298
L. New trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) .......................................................................................... 298
M. Appeal (Rules 122, 123, 124 and 125) ........................................................................................... 298
N. Search and seizure (Rule 126) ........................................................................................................ 301
O. Provisional remedies in criminal cases (Rule 127) .......................................................................... 308
P. Revised Guidelines on Continuous Trial (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC) .................................................... 308
Q. The Rule on Cybercrime Warrants (A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC) ............................................................ 308
VIII. EVIDENCE ......................................................................................................................................... 309
A. General concepts ............................................................................................................................ 309
1. Proof vs. evidence ....................................................................................................................... 309
2. Burden of proof vs. burden of evidence ...................................................................................... 309
3. Equipoise rule ............................................................................................................................. 311
B. Admissibility.................................................................................................................................... 311
1. Requisites (Rule 128)................................................................................................................... 311
2. Exclusionary rules........................................................................................................................ 315
3. Judicial notice and judicial admissions (Rule 129) ....................................................................... 320
C. Object (Real) Evidence (Rule 130, A) .............................................................................................. 322
D. Documentary Evidence (Rule 130, B)............................................................................................. 516
1. Definition ................................................................................................................................... 516
2. Best Evidence rule ...................................................................................................................... 516
3. Secondary evidence ................................................................................................................... 516
4. Parol Evidence rule ..................................................................................................................... 519
5. Interpretation of documents ...................................................................................................... 519
E. Testimonial Evidence (Rule 130, C) ................................................................................................ 519

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 1. Qualification of witnesses .......................................................................................................... 521
2. Testimonial privilege ................................................................................................................... 523
3. Admissions and confessions ....................................................................................................... 523
4. Previous conduct as evidence .................................................................................................... 523
5. Testimonial knowledge .............................................................................................................. 523
6. Hearsay and exceptions to the hearsay rule .............................................................................. 523
7. Opinion rule ............................................................................................................................... 525
8. Character evidence .................................................................................................................... 527
F. Burden of proof and presumptions (Rule 131) ............................................................................... 527
G. Presentation of evidence (Rule 132).............................................................................................. 542
1. Examination of witnesses............................................................................................................ 542
2. Authentication and proof of documents ..................................................................................... 548
3. Offer and objection ..................................................................................................................... 552
H. Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC) ................................................................................... 555
I. Weight and sufficiency of evidence (Rule 133) ............................................................................... 555
J. Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)........................................................................ 593
IX. WRIT OF AMPARO (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) .......................................................................................... 593
X. WRIT OF HABEAS DATA (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC) ................................................................................ 593
XI. RULES OF PROCEDURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL CASES (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) ..................................... 593
A. Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) ..................................................................... 593
B. Writ of continuing mandamus ........................................................................................................ 593
C. Writ of kalikasan ............................................................................................................................ 593

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I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. Substantive law vs. remedial law
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANEC CORPORATION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, CHAIRPERSON
MICHAEL G. AGUINALDO, DIRECTOR JOSEPH B. ANACAY and SUPERVISING AUDITOR ELENA
L. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 222710, 10 September 2019, EN BANC (Gesmundo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Curative statutes are intended to [correct] defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws and
curb certain evils. Curative statutes have long been considered valid in this jurisdiction. Their purpose
is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have
been complied with. They are, however, subject to exceptions. For one, they must not be against the
Constitution and for another, they cannot impair vested rights or the obligation of contracts. By their
nature, curative statutes may be given retroactive effect, unless it will impair vested rights. A curative
statute has a retrospective application to a pending proceeding.

In this case, while the Court initially declared that PhilHealth personnel were not public health
workers in its July 24, 2018 Decision and that ND No. H.O. 12-005 (11) was final and executory, the
subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 11223, which transpired after the promulgation of its decision,
convinces the Court to review its ruling. Thus. R.A. No. 11223 is a curative legislation that benefits
PhilHealth personnel and has retrospective application to pending proceedings.

FACTS
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7305, otherwise known as the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers,
granted longevity pay to a health worker. Pursuant to this law, former Department of Health (DOH)
Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr., issued a Certification which declared PhilHealth officers and
employees as public health workers.
Following this, its former PhilHealth President and Chief Executive Officer issued guidelines
on the grant of longevity pay, incorporating it in the basic salary of qualified PhilHealth employees
for the year 2011 and every year thereafter. This was passed and approved by the PhilHealth board
which confirmed the grant of longevity pay to its officers and employees for the period January to
September 2011, in the total amount of ₱5,575,294.70.
However, COA Supervising Auditor issued an Audit Observation Memorandum which stated
that the grant of longevity pay to PhilHealth officers and employees lacked legal basis, and thus,
should be disallowed. This was followed by the issuance of a Notice of Disallowance (ND) for the
amount used for paying the longevity pay.
The ND was received by PhilHealth; however, it filed its appeal to the COA Corporate
Government Sector (CGS) after 179 days from its receipt. The COA-CGS ruled that officers and
employees of PhilHealth were not entitled to longevity pay. It defined that government health worker
must be principally tasked to render health or health-related services, which is not present in the
responsibilities done by PhilHealth.
When elevated to the COA, the latter denied the petition for review for being filed out of time.
PhilHealth then filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme

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Court. The petition was also denied for the same reason. The Court also ruled that PhilHealth cannot
claim good faith to escape liability since the ND had already attained finality. Hence, these motions
for reconsideration.
ISSUES
(1) Are PhilHealth Personnel public health workers as defined and determined under R.A. No.
7305 and its IRR?

(2) Assuming arguendo that PhilHealth personnel are not public health workers, can they be
ordered to refund the amount disallowed in audit, considering that the Supreme Court found that
they received the benefit in good faith?

RULING
(1) YES. R.A. No. 11223 provides for a clear and unequivocal declaration regarding the
classification of all PhilHealth personnel. Plainly, the law states that all personnel of the PhilHealth
are public health workers in accordance with R.A. No. 7305. This confirms that PhilHealth personnel
are covered by the definition of a public health worker. In other words, R.A. No. 11223 is a curative
statute that remedies the shortcomings of R.A. No. 7305 with respect to the classification of
PhilHealth personnel as public health workers.

Curative statutes are intended to [correct] defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws and
curb certain evils. Curative statutes have long been considered valid in this jurisdiction. Their
purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing
laws have been complied with. They are, however, subject to exceptions. For one, they must not be
against the Constitution and for another, they cannot impair vested rights or the obligation of
contracts. By their nature, curative statutes may be given retroactive effect, unless it will impair
vested rights. A curative statute has a retrospective application to a pending proceeding.

In this case, while the Court initially declared that PhilHealth personnel were not public
health workers in its July 24, 2018 Decision and that ND No. H.O. 12-005 (11) was final and executory,
the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 11223, which transpired after the promulgation of its decision,
convinces the Court to review its ruling. Thus. R.A. No. 11223 is a curative legislation that benefits
PhilHealth personnel and has retrospective application to pending proceedings.

(2) NO. Evidently, R.A. No. 11223 removes any legal impediment to the treatment of
PhilHealth personnel as public health workers and for them to receive all the corresponding benefits
therewith, including longevity pay.

Thus, ND H.O. 12-005 (11), disallowing the longevity pay of PhilHealth personnel, must be
reversed and set aside. As PhilHealth personnel are considered public health workers, it is not
necessary anymore to discuss the issue on good faith.

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 SOCRATES C. FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Talisay v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 205389, 19 November 2019, EN BANC (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

At any rate, it has been ruled time and again that the essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard. In administrative proceedings, the parties are heard when they are accorded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their case or are given the chance to have the ruling complained of
reconsidered. Further, it is settled that there is no denial of procedural due process where the
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded.

In this case, Fernandez and the other persons named liable in the NDs were accorded the
opportunity to be heard when their appeal was given due course and decided on its merits by the
Commission Proper. They were also able to file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of their appeal
which the Commission Proper likewise duly considered before ruling to deny it with finality. Evidently,
Fernandez and all the persons liable under the NDs were not deprived of due process.

FACTS

The present case involves two contracts entered into by the City Government of Talisay,
Province of Cebu, to wit: 1) the computerization project, which took place in 2002 to 2003, during
the term of Eduardo R. Gullas as Mayor of Talisay City; and 2) the purchase of liquid fertilizers, which
took place in 2005 to 2006, during the term of Socrates C. Fernandez (petitioner) as Mayor of Talisay
City.

The City of Talisay, after allegedly conducting a public bidding, awarded its computerization
project to PowerDev Corporation (PowerDev). However, the Audit Team Leader (ATL) of the
Commission on Audit (COA), Talisay City, questioned the foregoing project. Having found
deficiencies, including lack of the required documents, an audit observation was conducted. Later on
the payments for said project was suspended issuing four Notices of Suspension (NS). The
suspensions matured into disallowances. Accordingly, Notices of Disallowance (ND) were issued.

The ATL also questioned the price of 3,333 bottles of liquid fertilizer purchased by the City of
Talisay at P900.00 per liter or a total of P2, 999,700.00.13.

On account of the audit findings, a special audit team was constituted to conduct an
investigation of the above contracts under the COA.

Pending review of the Special Investigation Report, the persons held liable under the five NDs,
through counsel, filed an appeal. Aside from petitioner, the persons named liable under the NDs were
the other signatories, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) members, and the payee. Their appeal
was addressed to the Regional Legal and Adjudication Director of COA Regional Office No. VII.

Subsequently, the Regional Director of COA Regional Office No. VII transmitted the appeal to
the Team Leader of the special investigation team for appropriate action.

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 The COA rendered the assailed Decision denying the appeal and affirming the subject
disallowances. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari in representation of all the persons
named liable in the NDs issued by the COA.
ISSUE

Did COA deprive Fernandez and the other persons named liable in the Notice of Disallowance
of their right to due process when their appeal addressed to the Director of the Legal and
Adjudication Sector of COA Regional Office No. VII was not decided by said official but forwarded to
the COA?

RULING

NO. Fernandez and the other persons named in the NDs were not deprived of due process.

Under the then 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, an aggrieved party may appeal
from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report, memorandum,
letter, NDs and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction
over the agency under audit. In turn, the party aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Director
may appeal to the Commission Proper.

Pending the resolution of the appeal, which was filed before the Regional Legal and
Adjudication Director in December 2007, the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA (2009
Revised Rules of COA) took effect. Under these Rules, the pertinent provisions on appeal substantially
remained the same. Section 1, Rule V of the 2009 Revised Rules of COA states that "an aggrieved party
may appeal from the decision of the Auditor to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency
under audit.”

In this case, however, observance of the aforementioned rules of procedure was

impracticable. Here, the investigation of the case was conducted by a special team of auditors, and
this team was headed by Atty. Roy L. Ursal (Ursal), the Regional Director himself. Through LAS Office
Order No. 2007-S-009, Director Ursal, Atty. Federico E. Dinapo, Jr., Atty. Marites E. Banzali, and Ma.
Jocelyn N. Merencillo were deputized to act for and in behalf of the COA in the investigation of the
case. Certainly, the direct referral to the Commission Proper of the decision appealed from, rendered
by the special audit team headed by Director Ursal himself, was appropriate under the circumstances.

At any rate, it has been ruled time and again that the essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard. In administrative proceedings, the parties are heard when they are accorded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their case or are given the chance to have the ruling complained
of reconsidered. Further, it is settled that there is no denial of procedural due process where the
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded.

In this case, Fernandez and the other persons named liable in the NDs were accorded the
opportunity to be heard when their appeal was given due course and decided on its merits by the
Commission Proper. They were also able to file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of their
appeal which the Commission Proper likewise duly considered before ruling to deny it with finality.
Evidently, Fernandez and all the persons liable under the NDs were not deprived of due process.

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 B. Rule-making power of the Supreme Court
C. Principle of judicial hierarchy
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF STA.CRUZ, DAVAO DEL SUR v.
PROVINCIAL OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
DIGOS CITY, DAVAO DEL SUR
G.R. No. 204232, 16 October 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, J. JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The determinative factor in allowing the application of one of the aforementioned exceptions is
the nature of the question raised by the parties in those "exceptions" that enabled the Court to allow
such direct resort.
In this case, the Local Government merely speculates in its Petition that the benefits of classifying
the Tan Kim Kee Estate as an industrial zone far outweighs the benefits of the implementation of the
CARL because in previous experiences, the CARP beneficiaries were not able to develop the agricultural
lands awarded to them. However, such conjecture does not constitute any of the exceptions to the
general rule. Thus, the supremacy of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts prevails.

FACTS
The Tan Kim Kee Estate, comprising more or less 220 hectares, was designated as an
industrial zone by virtue of the Municipal Comprehensive Development Plan/Land Use Plan and
Zoning Ordinances (MCDP/LUP and ZOs) CY 1991-2000. Said classification was carried on in the
MCDP/LUP and Zos CY 2000-2012.
It appears that in 1994, the application for conversion of the Tan Kim Kee Estate into
commercial/industrial uses was granted with the condition that the Estate be developed within the
period of five (5) years.
In 2012, however, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) subjected the Tan Kim Kee
Estate under the coverage of the CARP. In an Order, the DAR denied the application for exclusion.
The Local Government Unit of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur as represented by its Municipal Mayor,
Atty. Joel Ray Lopez, filed a Petition for Injunction with Application for Permanent Restraining Order
against the Provincial Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Digos City, Davao del Sur to
prevent the latter from subjecting the Tan Kim Kee Estate under the coverage of the CARP under
Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).

ISSUE
Was the direct resort to the Supreme Court in applying for the issuance of an injunctive writ
proper?

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RULING
NO. Whether injunction is available as a remedy in assailing the propriety of the
implementation of the CARL is explicitly provided under Section 68 thereof, to wit:
SEC.68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. — No injunction,
restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The Department of Agriculture (DA), the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in their implementation of the program.
With the exclusion of the lower courts, the Supreme Court and the CA has concurrent
jurisdiction to issue an injunctive writ as against the DA in the implementation of the CARL. However,
such concurrence does not give the Local Government of Sta. Cruz unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Said principle, however, is subject to exceptions:
(1) When there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time;
(2) When the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
(3) Cases of first impression;
(4) The constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court;
(5) Exigency in certain situations;
(6) The filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
(7) When petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in
violation of their right to freedom of expression; and
(8) The petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement
of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."

However, as clarified in the Gios-Samar case, the determinative factor in allowing the
application of one of the aforementioned exceptions is the nature of the question raised by the parties
in those "exceptions" that enabled the Court to allow such direct resort.
In this case, the Local Government merely speculates in its Petition that the benefits of
classifying the Tan Kim Kee Estate as an industrial zone far outweighs the benefits of the
implementation of the CARL because in previous experiences, the CARP beneficiaries were not able
to develop the agricultural lands awarded to them. However, such conjecture does not constitute any
of the exceptions to the general rule. Thus, the supremacy of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
prevails.

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 D. Doctrine of non-interference/judicial stability

II. JURISDICTION
OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, et. al.
v. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, as represented by its Chairperson, HON. EMERSON B.
AQUENDE, and LEB Member HON. ZENAIDA N. ELEPAÑO
G.R. No. 230642, 10 September 2019, EN BANC (Reyes, J. Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Judicial power is no longer limited to the Court's duty to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, or the power of adjudication, but also includes,
the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
In this case, the propriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition is assailed on the ground
that R.A. No. 7662 is a legislative act and not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function. In any
case, respondents argue that the issues herein presented involve purely political questions beyond the
ambit of judicial review.
FACTS
Sometime in 2016, LEB issued a Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-
2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the minimum standards for law admission" under Section
7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662. This memorandum created the PhilSAT, a mandatory nationwide uniform law
school admission test. PhilSAT was designed to measure the academic potential of the examinee to
pursue the study of law. Effective for the academic year 2017 to 2018, no applicant to law school was
allowed admission without having taken and passed the PhiLSAT.
Days before the scheduled conduct of the first-ever PhiLSAT, petitioners Pimentel et. al. filed
their Petition for Prohibition, seeking that R.A. No. 7662 be declared unconstitutional and that the
creation of LEB be invalidated together with all its issuances, most especially PhilSAT, for
encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning admission to practice of law.
Petitioners-in-intervention Caballero et. al. intervened and joined Pimentel, et. al.
Thereafter, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by petitioners Abayata, et. al.
seeking to invalidate R.A. No. 7662 or, in the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional the PhiLSAT.
The two petitions were later on consolidated by the Court and oral arguments were held.
Pimentel, et. al argued that R.A. No. 7662 and the PhilSAT are offensive to the Court’s power
to regulate and supervise the legal profession, that Congress cannot create an administrative office
that exercises the Court's power over the practice of law. Caballero, et. al, on the other hand, contend
that the PhiLSAT violates the right to liberty and pursuit of happiness of the student-applicants and
the equal protection clause as it is an arbitrary form of classification not based on substantial
distinctions. They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the right of all citizens to quality and
accessible education, violates academic freedom, and is an unfair academic requirement.

14
 Abayata, et. al., argue that certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies either under the
expanded or traditional jurisdiction of the Court. They also invoke the doctrine of transcendental
importance. They further contend specific sections of R.A. 7622 for it infringe upon the power of the
Court to regulate admission to the practice of law. It is also their contention that the PhiLSAT violates
academic freedom as it interferes with the law school's exercise of freedom to choose who to admit.
Procedurally, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the LEB, argues that
certiorari and prohibition are not proper to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7662 either under
the traditional or expanded concept of judicial power. For the OSG, R.A. No. 7662 was enacted
pursuant to the State's power to regulate all educational institutions, and as such, there could be no
grave abuse of discretion. It also claims that the Congress is an indispensable party to the petitions.
OSG argues that R.A. No. 7662 was enacted pursuant to the State's power to regulate all educational
institutions, and as such, there could be no grave abuse of discretion.
Substantively, the OSG contends that the Court's power to regulate admission to the practice
of law does not include regulation of legal education penal regulations, and the consequent forfeiture
of school fees and the ban on enrollment for those who failed to pass the PhiLSAT violate due process.
ISSUES
(1) Are the remedies of certiorari and prohibition proper?
(2) Is the petition ripe for judicial review?
RULING
(1) YES, as constitutionally defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
judicial power is no longer limited to the Court's duty to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, or the power of adjudication, but also includes, the
duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition as it is understood under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
are traditionally regarded as supervisory writs used as a means by superior or appellate courts, in
the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction, to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their
jurisdictions. As such, writs of certiorari and prohibition correct only errors of jurisdiction of judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies.
However, considering the commonality of the ground of "grave abuse of discretion," a Rule
65 petition, as a procedural vehicle to invoke the Court's expanded jurisdiction, has been allowed.
After all, there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law
or jurisprudence, or is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will, or
personal bias.
(2) YES. The power of judicial review is tritely defined as the power to review the
constitutionality of the actions of the other branches of the government. For a proper exercise of its
power of review in constitutional litigation, certain requisites must be satisfied: (1) an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
In this case, the petitions raise an actual controversy insofar as they allege that R.A. No. 7662,
specifically Section 2, paragraph 2, Section 3 (a) (2), Section 7 (c), (e), (g), and (h) of R.A. No. 7662

15
infringe upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and upon
institutional academic freedom and the right to quality education. Necessarily, a review of the LEB
issuances when pertinent to these assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7662 shall also be undertaken.

Furthermore, although, by jurisprudence, standing requires a personal and substantial

interest in the case such that the petitioner has sustained, or sustain, direct injury as a result of the
violation of its rights, it admits exceptions: the over breadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third-party
standing and the doctrine of transcendental importance. In this case, petitioners filed the petition as
persons who sustained direct injury and as citizens. Standing as a citizen has been upheld by this
Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when
paramount public interest is involved. Without a doubt, the delineation of the Court's rule-making
power vis-à-vis the supervision and regulation of legal education and the determination of the reach
of the State's supervisory and regulatory power in the context of the guarantees of academic freedom
and the right to education are novel issues with far-reaching implications that deserve the Court's
immediate attention.

16
 A. Classification of jurisdiction
1. Original vs. appellate
2. General vs. special
3. Exclusive vs. concurrent
NARZAL R. MUÑEZ and ROGELIO LALUCAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 247777, 28 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (LAZARO-JAVIER, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the appeals from final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts
pertaining to violations of RA 3019.

Here, the case, however, was erroneously transmitted to the CA. The subsequent Decision and
Resolution of the CA were therefore rendered without jurisdiction, hence, void.

FACTS
Ombudsman received an anonymous letter-complaint, reporting anomalies in the
procurement of seedlings by Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) - Cagayan
de Oro. An investigation on the matter led the Ombudsman to Demetrio Velasco (Velasco), owner of
Velasco Nursery Plants.

According to Velasco, he entered into a contract with DENR for the production of 247,000
clonal seedlings. This was upon favorable recommendation of Narzal Muñez (Muñez), then Officer-
in-Charge (OIC) of the City Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO). The contract price for
the seedlings was P5.00 each for a total of P1, 235,000.00.

Despite the terms of the contract, Velasco and Muñez, together with Rogelio Lalucan
(Lalucan), who was a forest guard, entered into a side agreement. In accordance therewith, Velasco
only produced 50,000 clonal seedlings and was paid P1.50 for each or P75, 000.00 in total. The
difference between the contract price and the amount actually paid to Velasco was pocketed by
Muñez and Lalucan. More, Muñez and Lalucan themselves produced, and was paid for the remaining
197,000 clonal seedlings.

The prosecution maintained that Muñez and Lalucan had undue interest in the seedling
production contract and benefited therefrom, hence they were charged with violation of Section 3(b)
of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted
Muñez and Lalucan. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Hence, this petition
for review.

ISSUE
Did the CA have jurisdiction to review the verdict of conviction rendered by the trial court for
violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019?

17
RULING
NO. The CA does not have appellate jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments,
resolutions or orders of Regional Trial Courts pertaining to violations of R.A. No. 3019. The assailed
rulings should, therefore, be vacated and the case, remanded to the court of origin for referral to the
proper forum - the Sandinganbayan.

Under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the
exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided, for
cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

Here, Muñez and Lalucan were OIC-CENRO and forest guard of DENR-Cagayan de Oro,
respectively. The case, however, was erroneously transmitted to the Court of Appeals. The
subsequent Decision and Resolution of the CA were therefore rendered without jurisdiction, hence,
void.

Muñez and Lalucan are not responsible for the error in transmitting the case. For such duty
rests on the shoulders of the clerk of court. Rule 122, Section 8 of the Rules of Court commands that
within five (5) days from the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the court with whom the notice
of appeal was filed must transmit to the clerk of court of the appellate court the complete record of
the case, together with said notice. Thus, Muñez and Lalucan should not be prejudiced by the clerk of
court's mistake.

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 B. Doctrines of hierarchy of courts and continuity of jurisdiction
JUDGE BENSAUDI A. ARABANI, JR. v. RAHIM A. ARABANI AND ABDURAJI G. BAKIL
A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P, SCC-10-15-P & SCC-11-17, 12 November 2019,
EN BANC (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Jurisdiction over an administrative case is not lost by the demise of respondent public official
during the pendency of his case. This is especially true when Rodrigo had already been given the
opportunity to answer the complaint and substantiate his defenses, as in this case, and the fact of his
death has been reported to the Court only after a decision was rendered in the administrative case
against him. Thus, the Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce Rodrigo innocent of the charges
or declare him guilty thereof because a contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant
with dreadful and dangerous implications.
FACTS
In a letter, Judge Arabani charged Clerk of Court Rodrigo Ramos, Jr. (Rodrigo) with conduct
unbecoming a court employee for (a) not constantly being at his assigned table; (b) roaming in and
out of the office openly; (c) not attending to his work; (d) refusing to comply with the directive to
place his bundy card on the designated rack, thereby making it difficult to monitor the correctness
and accuracy of the entries therein for the months of March and April 2010; and (e) not properly
filling up his Application for Leave filed in April 2010 with the specific dates of his intended leave of
absence.

Responding to the Court’s Resolution directing him to comment on the charges against him,
Rodrigo averred that he kept with him his bundy cards for the months of January and February 2010
for reasons of convenience. He, however, complied with Judge’s Arabani’s directive to place his March
2010 bundy card on the designated rack but the latter took and hid the same in bad faith, and
submitted the same to the Leave Division, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) after a few months
without signing the same. Accordingly, in a letter dated October 27, 2010 to the Leave Division, OCA,
Rodrigo manifested that he is submitting his April to September 2010 Daily Time Records (DTRs)
sans Judge Arabani 's signature.

Thereafter, OCA adopted the findings contained in Judge Barraquias’ Joint Investigation,
Report and Recommendation that: (a) Rodrigo be found guilty of violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations for his refusal to leave his bundy card on the designated rack, and be meted the
penalty of forfeiture of two (2) months' salary (February and March 2010) with a stern warning that
the commission of the same or any similar act shall be dealt with more severely; (b) the complaint
charging Rodrigo of being constantly not at his assigned table, roaming in and out of the office, and
not attending to his work (loafing) be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence; and (c) Rodrigo be
allowed to remedy his failure to indicate the specific dates of his leave of absence for April 2010 for
being a mere formal defect.

On June 20, 2019, the surviving spouse of Rodrigo sent a letter: (a) informing the Court that
Rodrigo passed away on December 5, 2016, attaching therewith the original copy of the Philippine
Statistics Authority authenticated Death Certificate of Rodrigo; and (b) imploring the Court to reduce

19
the penalty of suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day without pay meted on him to fine in
view of his demise.

ISSUE

Has Court lost jurisdiction over Rodrigo?

RULING

NO. Jurisdiction over an administrative case is not lost by the demise of Rodrigo during the
pendency of his case. This is especially true when Rodrigo had already been given the opportunity to
answer the complaint and substantiate his defenses, as in this case, and the fact of his death has been
reported to the Court only after a decision was rendered in the administrative case against him. Thus,
the Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce Rodrigo innocent of the charges or declare him
guilty thereof because a contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful
and dangerous implications.

However, considering Rodrigo’s demise, the penalty of suspension imposed on him is no

longer possible. In the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Cobarrubias where respondent was
similarly found guilty of frequent unauthorized absences but was no longer in the service at the time
of the promulgation of the decision, the Court imposed a fine of P20,000.00 in lieu of suspension. The
Court finds it apt to impose the same penalty.

20
 C. Jurisdiction of various Philippine courts
OMAR ERASMO GONOWON AMPONGAN v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND OMBUDSMAN SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
G.R. Nos. 234670-71, 14 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is clear from the transitory provision of R.A. No. 10660 that the amendment introduced
regarding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall apply to cases arising from offenses committed
after the effectivity of the law. Consequently, the new paragraph added by R.A. No. 10660 to Section 4 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1606, as amended, transferring the exclusive original jurisdiction to the RTC
of cases where the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or
(b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions
or acts in an amount not exceeding One Million Pesos, applies to cases which arose from offenses
committed after the effectivity of R.A. 10660.

In this case, the Informations were filed on July 14, 2017, for Ampongan's violations of Section 3
(e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 171 (2) of the RPC, allegedly committed on November 3, 2014. While R.A. No.
10660, which took effect on May 5, 2015 is the law in force at the time of the institution of the action,
such law is not applicable to Ampongan's cases. R.A. No. 10660 provides that the reckoning period to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 is the time
of the commission of the offense.

FACTS
On July 14, 2017, the Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations with the
Sandiganbayan charging Omar Ampongan (Ampongan) with (1) violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) violation of Article 171,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), in connection with the appointment of one Dimaiwat
to the vacant position of Secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Iriga City in 2014. At the time
of the commission of the alleged offenses, Ampongan was the Vice Mayor of Iriga City with salary
grade 26.

Ampongan filed a motion to quash the Informations for lack of jurisdiction. He claimed that
the Informations did not allege any damage to the government or any bribery. Granting without
admitting that the damage had been suffered by the government, the Informations did not allege that
the government suffered any damage in excess of One Million Pesos, hence, the jurisdiction is vested
with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC) as provided under Section 2 of R.A. No. 10660.

The Sandiganbayan, during the arraignment, ordered that the plea of not guilty be entered
for the Ampongan in the two criminal cases, when Ampongan refused to enter a plea. Hence, this
Petition.

ISSUE
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case?

RULING
YES. Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time
of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.

21
 In this case, the Informations were filed on July 14, 2017, for Ampongan's violations allegedly
committed on November 3, 2014. While R.A. No. 10660, which took effect on May 5, 2015, is the law
in force at the time of the institution of the action, such law is not applicable to Ampongan's cases.
R.A. No. 10660 provides that the reckoning period to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 is the time of the commission of the offense.

Furthermore, it is clear from the transitory provision of R.A. No. 10660 that the amendment
introduced regarding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall apply to cases arising from offenses
committed after the effectivity of the law. Consequently, the new paragraph added by R.A. No. 10660
to Section 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1606, as amended, transferring the exclusive original
jurisdiction to the RTC of cases where the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the
government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the
same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One Million Pesos, applies to
cases which arose from offenses committed after the effectivity of R.A. No. 10660.

In this case, while the Informations were filed on 2017, the alleged offenses were committed
by Ampongan on 2014, which was six (6) months before the effectivity of R.A. No. 10660 on May 5,
2015. Hence, the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to quash the
Informations since R.A. No. 10660 finds no application to Ampongan's case.

Therefore, the applicable law to Ampongan's cases is R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249
states that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of Republic Act No. 3019, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense.

22
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF IKANG PAUS
G.R. No. 201273, 14 August 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In a reversion suit, the attack is directed not against the judgment ordering the issuance of title,
but against the title that is being sought to be cancelled either because the judgment was not validly
rendered, or the title issued did not faithfully reflect the land referred to in the judgment, or because no
judgment was rendered at all.

The allegations of the Republic in the Complaint squarely assert a reversion suit as described
above. It is attacking OCT No. 0-CALT-37 because it arose from NCIP Resolution, which the Republic
claims was not validly rendered.

FACTS
In 2009, the Heirs of Ikang Paus (Heirs of Paus), represented by Elias Paus, filed a petition for
identification, delineation, and issuance of Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT) with the
National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP). They sought to confirm their rights to the
ancestral land in Baguio City and Benguet. This was opposed by the Heirs of Cariño.

The NCIP issued a resolution finding for the Heirs of Paus, and issuing two (2) CALTs in their
favor. Consequently, an OCT was issued in the name of the Heirs of Paus. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the Heirs of Cariño, but this was denied.

In 2010, Republic questioned the issuance of the OCT, contending that the lot covered by the
OCT is part of a parcel of land of Baguio Stock Farm. This is an agricultural land of the public domain
that has been withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for animal breeding purposes under
the administration of the Bureau of Animal Industry. The Republic, therefore, filed a suit with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for reversion, annulment of document and cancellation of title, pointing
out the several irregularities in the issuance of the CALT.

The RTC dismissed the complaint, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals (CA). The
CA denied the petition for having been filed late. Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the Republic’s complaint?

RULING
YES. The RTC has jurisdiction over cases for reversion and cancellation of the certificate of
title. The nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action are to be
determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint
is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims averred.

Here, the Complaint thus seeks the nullification and cancellation of (a) OCT No. 0-CALT-37
and any derivative title issued pursuant thereto; (b) CALT No. CAR-BAG-0309-000207; and (c) the
reconstructed and unapproved survey plan together with the technical description of Lot 1, SWO-
14110215703-D-A-NCIP. Only the last two reliefs emanated from NCIP Resolution.

23
 To the mind of the Court, the case is not a review of the NCIP En Banc Resolution because a
subsequent event occurred that gave rise to a cause of action for reversion and cancellation of a
Torrens title, namely, the issuance of OCT No. 0-CALT-37. This is the reason the Republic has
impleaded the Register of Deeds of Baguio City and the LRA.

Under B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 19 (2), the Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20, 000.00 or for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50, 000.00).

Actions for cancellation of title and reversion belong to the class of cases under B.P. Blg. 129,
Sec. 19 (2). It should be emphasized that in a reversion suit, the attack is directed not against the
judgment ordering the issuance of title, but against the title that is being sought to be cancelled either
because the judgment was not validly rendered, or the title issued did not faithfully reflect the land
referred to in the judgment, or because no judgment was rendered at all.

The allegations of the Republic in the Complaint squarely assert a reversion suit as described
above. It is attacking OCT No. 0-CALT-37 because it arose from NCIP Resolution, which the Republic
claims was not validly rendered.

Lastly, given the special limited jurisdiction of the NCIP, only those cases over which the NCIP
has jurisdiction may be appealed to the CA, following Section 67 of the IPRA. It was, therefore, error
for the RTC and the CA to treat the Complaint as an appeal from Resolution of the NCIP because based
on the allegations of the Complaint, the NCIP could not have jurisdiction over it. And in fact, given
that NCIP cases are limited to ICCs/IPs, it would even be legally impermissible for a non-ICC/IP to
appeal a decision of the NCIP.

24
 SPS. LINO REBAMONTE, ET AL., v. SPS. GUILLERO LUCERO and GENOVEVA S. LUCERO
G.R. NO. 237812, 2 October 2019, SECOND DIVISION (CAGUIOA J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In the seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (Tijam), it was ruled that the party raising the
ground of lack of jurisdiction for the first time after such a lengthy period is already barred from doing
so due to the doctrine of estoppel by laches. For the case of Tijam to apply, the following exceptional
circumstances — the existence of a statutory right in favor of the claimant, the non invocation of such
statutory right, the lapse of an unreasonable length of time before the claimant raised the issue of
jurisdiction, and the active participation of the claimant in the case — must be all present.
In this case, the Court finds that these exceptional circumstances in Tijam are attendant and are
actually much more grave than those present in Tijam. Same as in Tijam, the petitioners Spouses
Rebamonte utterly failed to invoke the ground of lack of jurisdiction despite having full knowledge of
this ground, considering that the assessed value of the subject lot was plainly indicated in the Complaint,
a copy of which was fully furnished to the them. Further, the Spouses Rebamonte participated in every
stage of the proceedings before the RTC and CA. Also, reckoned from the date of the receipt of the
respondents Spouses Lucero's Complaint in 1990 to the filing of the instant Petition in 2018, which was
the first time the ground of lack of jurisdiction was invoked by the petitioners Spouses Rebamonte, an
outstandingly long period of 28 years has passed. To make matters worse, the petitioners Spouses
Rebamonte fail to make any justification whatsoever explaining why they failed to raise the ground of
lack of jurisdiction after almost three decades of litigation.

FACTS
The subject matters of the case are two portions of a land which was previously owned by
and registered in the name of Guillermo Lucero’s (Guillermo) parents. Previously, Guillermo’s
parents obtained a loan from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP). The loan was secured by a mortgage of the subject land. For their failure to
pay the loan obligation, DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the lot, wherein DBP, as the lone bidder,
purchased the lot in the public auction conducted. The period of redemption then lapsed without
Guillermo’s parents redeeming the lot. Hence, ownership over the lot was consolidated in favor of
DBP. Nevertheless, DBP entered into a repurchase agreement with Guillermo’s parents. The latter
were able to repurchase the lot from DBP and regained ownership over the lot.
Afterwards, Guillermo’s parents sold the lot to Guillermo as evidence by a Deed of Absolute
Sale. However, prior to the sale, there were three separate unregistered sales in favor of Guillermo’s
mother’s cousin, Lino Rebamonte (Lino), covering certain portions of the lot in question. Lino took
possession of these portions. As a result, Guillermo was unable to possess the entire lot. Guillermo
made repeated demands for Lino to vacate the said portions of the lot but the latter refused to do so.
Hence, Guillermo together with his wife Genoveva Lucero (collectively referred to as Spouses Lucero)
instituted a complaint for recovery of real estate property, recovery of possession, quieting of title,
damages and attorney’s fees against Lino together with his wife, Teresita Rebamonte (collectively
referred to as Spouses Rebamonte). The Spouses Lucero alleged that the sale to Lino was invalid
considering that Guillermo’s sisters had no right to convey any portion of the subject lot.

25
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that the sale to Lino void and found that Guillermo’s
sisters had absolutely no right to convey the subject portions of the lot. The Spouses Rebamonte filed
a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same decision where the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the RTC also approved the substitution of Lino by his heirs on account
of his death.
Afterwards, the Spouses Rebamonte appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
denied the appeal. The Spouses Rebamonte moved for reconsideration but it was denied as well.
Hence, the Spouses Rebamonte filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court. The Spouses Rebamonte modified the theory of their case and are now primarily relying on
three new arguments that are invoked for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. These
are:
1. The RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint considering that the assessed value of the
subject portions establish that the jurisdiction of the complaint falls within the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC).
2. There was a defective service of summons and, consequently, all the proceedings
conducted by the RTC are considered null and void; and
3. There was a defect on the substitution of Lino.
4.
ISSUES
(1) Did the RTC have no jurisdiction over the case?
(2) Was there a defect in the service of summons?
(3) Was there a defect on the substitution of Lino?

RULING
(1) NO. While it is true that the Court has held that the jurisdiction of a court may be
questioned at any stage of the proceedings, and that lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted
grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings
or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer
or in a motion to dismiss, nevertheless, the Court has likewise pronounced that this general rule is
not absolute. It is settled that, upon the existence of certain exceptional circumstances, a party may
be barred from raising lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of estoppel.
In the seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (Tijam), the Court barred belated objections
raised by a party with respect to the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court because the said party
raised the objection only when the adverse decision was already rendered by the lower court and
that the said party had already sought affirmative relief from the lower court and had actively
participated in all the stages of the proceedings. In Tijam, the Court ruled that allowing the party to
raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction after a long delay of 15 years is unfair to the opposing party.
Hence, the party raising the ground of lack of jurisdiction for the first time after such lengthy period
is already barred from doing so due to the doctrine of estoppel by laches.

26
 The Court explained that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction. The active participation of the party against whom the action is brought,
coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or administrative body where the
action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction.
For the case of Tijam to apply, the following exceptional circumstances — the existence of a
statutory right in favor of the claimant, the noninvocation of such statutory right, the lapse of an
unreasonable length of time before the claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction, and the active
participation of the claimant in the case — must be all present.
In this case, the Court finds that these exceptional circumstances in Tijam are attendant and
are actually much more grave than those present in Tijam.
First, the Spouses Rebamonte had every right to question the jurisdiction of the RTC. Same as
in Tijam, the petitioners Spouses Rebamonte utterly failed to invoke the ground of lack of jurisdiction
despite having full knowledge of this ground, considering that the assessed value of the subject lot
was plainly indicated in the Complaint, a copy of which was fully furnished to the them.
Second, the Spouses Rebamonte participated in every stage of the proceedings before the RTC
and CA. Aside from filing their Answer and Amended Answer, they even sought affirmative relief
before the RTC by filing a counterclaim against the respondents Spouses Lucero. A Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise filed by the petitioners Spouses Rebamonte before the RTC. Analogous
to the factual circumstances in Tijam, the petitioners Spouses Rebamonte were also able to file an
appeal and a Motion for Reconsideration before the CA. Yet, even before the CA, the ground of lack of
jurisdiction was never invoked.
In the instant case, reckoned from the date of the receipt of the respondents Spouses Lucero's
Complaint in 1990 to the filing of the instant Petition in 2018, which was the first time the ground of
lack of jurisdiction was invoked by the petitioners Spouses Rebamonte, an outstandingly long period
of 28 years has passed. To make matters worse, the petitioners Spouses Rebamonte fail to make any
justification whatsoever explaining why they failed to raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction after
almost three decades of litigation.
Therefore, the petitioners Spouses Rebamonte are estopped from invoking the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.
(2) NO. It must be emphasized that under Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, "the
defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons."
In the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the petitioners Spouses Rebamonte
fully and actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC and CA. To repeat, the petitioners
Spouses Rebamonte filed their Answer and Amended Answer. They even sought affirmative relief
from the RTC by filing a counterclaim against the respondents Spouses Lucero. The petitioners
Spouses Rebamonte participated in the pre-trial, during the trial by presenting their witnesses and
cross-examining the witnesses of the respondents, and were able to ask for a reconsideration of the
RTC's adverse Judgment. In fact, the heirs of the late petitioner Lino even sought to substitute their
father as parties in the instant case, which was duly granted by the RTC in its Omnibus Order. They
were able to lodge an appeal before the CA.

27
 After very actively participating in the proceedings, and after almost three decades of
litigation, the petitioners Spouses Rebamonte cannot now allege for the first time that their right to
be heard was transgressed.
(3) NO. The argument could have been raised even when the case was pending before the
RTC. Yet, after almost three decades of litigation, the petitioners Spouses Rebamonte raise the issue
for the very first time on appeal before the Court.
It is a well-settled principle that issues of fact and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the lower courts will not be considered by the reviewing courts as they cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.
In any case, the Court has ruled that "mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not
sufficient ground to nullify a trial court's decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there
was an undeniable violation of due process."
In the instant case, there is absolutely no allegation that the right to due process of the
respondents Spouses Lucero was violated due to the non-substitution of respondent Guillermo after
the latter's death. No one disputes that the respondents Spouses Lucero were fully able to participate
and present their evidence during the trial.

28
 ERIC STO TOMAS, ET AL v. ADORIACION I. DEL VALLE
G.R. No. 223637, 28 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Statutes conferring powers on administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable
them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. In addition, it is
settled in jurisprudence that when an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial
functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to
be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored.
The Court thus finds absurd petitioners' insistence that the HLURB has no jurisdiction to rule on
respondents' claim for damages in the instant intra-association case. The competence of the HLURB to
award damages should not be limited to cases filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers
against the project owners, developers, brokers or salesmen pursuant to P.D. No. 1344 or P.D. No. 957,
as petitioners would want to impress upon this Court; rather, such power should likewise apply to other
cases within the agency's jurisdiction, including inter-association and intra-association controversies
pursuant to R.A. No. 9904, like the one at bar.

FACTS
Eric Sto Tomas et al. (Sto Tomas et al.) are the officials of the officers and members of the
board of Vermont Royal Homeowners Association, Inc. (VRHAI), the association of residents in
Vermont Royale Village (Vermont) duly registered with the HLURB. On the other hand, respondents
were members of VRHAI, who seek to construct a duplex in Vermont.
Del Valle requested a VRHAI clearance for the construction of a duplex. The application,
however, was denied in view of the Construction Rules and Regulations that VRHAI passed. These
rules stated that only one family dwelling can be built per lot. Despite the absence of the, respondents
managed to secure a building permit. However, VRHAI still refused to issue a clearance and
reaffirmed its construction rules through its Board Resolution.
The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board’s (HLURB) Board of Commissioners issued a
TRO/Cease and Desist Order (CDO) enjoining petitioners from preventing respondents from
constructing their proposed residential dwelling. A few months later, the Housing and Land Use
Arbiter rendered a decision favoring respondents and ordered the immediate issuance of the
necessary permits and clearances to allow respondents to build the proposed two-storey duplex
Sto Tomas et al. filed a petition for review to the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing that the
HLURB did not have the jurisdiction to award damages in intra-association controversies. The CA
dismissed the petition finding that Sto Tomas et al. violated respondents' property rights when they
passed a resolution to enforce the restriction against the construction of duplexes after respondents
were issued a building permit. It further noted that Sto Tomas et al. prolonged refusal to allow
respondents to construct the duplex on their own lot. For these reasons, the CA found that the
HLURB's award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees was proper.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in declaring that HLURB has the authority to award damages?

29
RULING
NO. Moral damages may be awarded when there is willful injury to property if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. Further, exemplary damages
may be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral
damages. In this case, the CA aptly observed that petitioners violated respondents' property rights
and acted with discrimination and bad faith when they passed the Board Resolution restricting the
construction of duplexes in Vermont after respondents were able to secure a building permit, and
despite the fact that some duplexes already existed therein prior to the issuance of the resolution.
Verily, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of respondents was proper.
Moreover, the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses was in order. Recovery of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, may be allowed in cases where
"the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest."
Here, due to petitioners' prolonged refusal to allow respondents to construct the proposed duplex on
their own lot, respondents were compelled to litigate their claim before the HLURB and to incur
expenses to protect their rights and interests. Consequently, respondents' entitlement to the
recovery of attorney's fees and litigation expenses cannot be denied.

30
 PROCESO L. MALIGALIG v. SANDIGANBAYAN (SIXTH DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT and BATAAN
SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING CORPORATION, INC.
G.R. No. 236293, 10 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Peralta, CJ.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegation in the complaint
or information. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent
in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.

Here, the two (2) Informations filed against Maligalig alleged that both crimes were committed
“in the discharge of his administrative functions.” Both also alleged that he is a public officer being then
President and a member of the Board of Directors of BASCO, a GOCC. Thus, on the basis of the allegations
in the accusatory Informations alone, there is sufficient basis for the Sandiganbayan to take cognizance
of the two (2) cases against Maligalig.

FACTS

Proceso Maligalig (Maligalig) was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Article 217
(Malversation of public funds or property), in relation to paragraph 4 of Article 48 (Penalty for complex
crimes) of the Revised Penal Code, under two (2) Informations. Maligalig, as a public officer, being
then the President and a member of the Board of Directors of the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering
Co., Inc. (BASECO), a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC), in the discharge of his
official functions, executed a falsified Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of Northstar Transport
Facilities, Inc. (Northstar) without authority from the BASECO Board of Directors, and received from
Northstar a full settlement of its total rental in arrears covered by a Contract of Lease over BASECO
properties. He allegedly failed to remit the amount to BASECO, causing undue injury to the latter and
the Government and gave Northstar unwarranted benefits and advantage.

Maligalig filed an alternative Motion to Quash or To Suspend Proceedings on the ground that
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over his person and that the Office of Ombudsman had no
authority to file the above-quoted Informations against him. He also moved for the suspension of his
arraignment on the ground of a prejudicial question.

Maligalig contended that BASECO is not a GOCC. Invoking BASCO v. PCGG, et al., he argued that,
while BASECO was under sequestration by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), there was no divestment of title over the seized property since the PCGG has only powers of
administration and that it may not exercise acts of ownership over the property sequestered, frozen
or provisionally taken over. He argued that since BASECO is a private corporation under the tutelage
of PCGG as conservator and that he was elected to the Board of Directors (BOD) by reason of his being
a stockholder of the company, he cannot be considered as a public official or employee within the
definition of Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019. He, thus, concludes that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over his person, and that the Office of the Ombudsman also has no jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation against him.

31
ISSUE
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over Maligalig?

RULING
YES. The jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan is provided in P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
10660.

"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional

director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ’27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or

controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.

"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexes with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a. of
this section in relation to their office.

The two (2) Informations filed against Maligalig alleged that both crimes were committed “in
the discharge of his administrative functions.” Both also alleged that he is a public officer being then
President and a member of the Board of Directors of BASCO, a GOCC. Thus, on the basis of the
allegations in the accusatory Informations alone, there is sufficient basis for the Sandiganbayan to
take cognizance of the two (2) cases against Maligalig. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case
is determined by the allegation in the complaint or information.

On the defense of Maligalig that he was not a public officer at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense does not hold water, because jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or
the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to
quash. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of
defendant or respondent. He also admitted in his Counter-Affidavit that he was a member of the
Board of Directors of BASECO. As held in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, an investment in an individual of
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public makes one a public officer.

32
 SUSAN GALANG and BERNADETH ALBINO,
in representation for BRENDA FAGYAN, et al. v. VERONICA WALLIS, et al.
G.R. No. 223434, 03 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same
ICC/IP group, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP. Thus,
even if the real issue involves a dispute over a land which appears to be located within the ancestral
domain of the ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP, but the RTC, which has the power to hear, try and decide the
case.

This is precisely the case in the present controversy. As the RTC pointed out and likewise alleged
by Wallis, et al., the parties herein are members of indigenous groups and that the case involves a dispute
among groups of indigenous people. They do not, however, belong to the same ICC/IP group. Thus,
applying the doctrine in Unduran, it is the RTC, and not the NCIP, which has jurisdiction over the instant
case.

FACTS
Galang and Albino, in representation for Fagyan, et al. and their successors-in-interest filed a
Complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, Declaration of Nullity of Title, Annulment of Tax Declaration,
Injunction with Prayer for a TRO and Damages, claiming to be the lawful owners of parcels of land
located in Benguet.

Wallis, et al. alleged that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case because of the fact that the land subject of the controversy is an ancestral land and
that said controversy is among members of indigenous peoples' groups. As such, the case falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP).

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the finding that it is bereft of jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case. The trial court used as its basis Section 66 of R.A. No. 8371, otherwise known as The
Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), which provides that "[t]he NCIP, through its regional
offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights" of Indigenous Cultural
Communities (JCC)/Indigenous Peoples (IP), as well as Section 5, Rule III of NCIP Administrative
Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before
the NCIP, reiterating the exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP over claims and disputes involving
ancestral lands. Thus, since the case involves a dispute or controversy of property rights over an
ancestral land between members of the IP, jurisdiction is with the NCIP. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE

Does NCIP have jurisdiction over the complaint such that it precludes the RTC from taking
cognizance of the case?

RULING

33
 NO. The bone of contention in the present case has already been extensively discussed in the
Court’s pronouncement in Unduran, et al. v. Aberasturi, et al. There, the Court unequivocally declared
that pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes
involving rights of ICC/IP only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP group.

When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the
same ICC/IP group, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP.
Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over a land which appears to be located within the
ancestral domain of the ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP, but the RTC, which has the power to hear, try and
decide the case.

This is precisely the case in the present controversy. As the RTC pointed out and likewise
alleged by Wallis, et al., the parties herein are members of indigenous groups and that the case
involves a dispute among groups of indigenous people. They do not, however, belong to the same
ICC/IP group. Thus, applying the doctrine in Unduran, it is the RTC, and not the NCIP, which has
jurisdiction over the instant case.

Besides, it bears emphasis that as in Unduran, the allegations in Galang and Albino's
complaint neither alleged that the parties are members of ICC/IP nor that the case involves a dispute
or controversy over ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IP. Rather, the allegations in their complaint
make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action involving an interest in a real property with an
assessed value of more than P20, 000.00.

All told, even if the land subject of the instant case appears to be classified as ancestral, since
the dispute thereon does not comply with the requirements under Section 66, nor does it involve the
exceptional matters under Sections 52 (h) and 53, in relation to Section 62, as well as Section 54 of
the IPRA; the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint before it, being the proper tribunal clothed with
jurisdiction to entertain the same.

34
 D. Aspects of jurisdiction
1. Jurisdiction over the parties
2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
MR. HOLDDINGS, INC AND MARCOPPER CORPORATION v.
ROLANDO A. DE JESUS as OFFICER IN CHARGE (OIC) – Regional Director,
MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU (MGB) et al.
G.R. No. 217837, 04 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Under the Philippine Mining Act, The Panel of Arbitrators shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following: a) disputes involving rights to mining areas, (b) disputes
involving mineral agreements, FTAAs or Permits (c) Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and
claimholders/concessionaires.
Thus, it is clear that the issues presented in this case falls under the jurisdiction of the Panel of
arbitrators as it is a dispute involving mining areas.
FACTS
Onephil Mineral Resources, Inc. filed an Exploration Permit Application in the municipalities
of Sta. Cruz and Boac, Province of Marinduque before the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB). The
MGB projected the technical description of the land area applied for in the Mineral Land Survey Map
(MLSM) but such survey found that the application of Onephil overlaps several other mining
application or claims. Thus, the MGB required Onephil to submit an amended application excluding
the affected areas.
On the other hand, Marcopper Mining Corporation has a pending application for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) with the MGB. The application is a renewal of Marcopper’s
previous Lode Lease Contracts, otherwise known as the San Antonio Copper Project (SACP). Aware
of Onephil’s application, Marcopper sent a letter to the officer-in-charge, Rolando De Jesus notifying
him that the areas covered by the SACP are closed to mining applications and requested the latter to
ensure that said areas be excluded from any application for Exploration permit, MPSA or any other
type of mining application.
Onephil then submitted the amended application for exploration which was still pending
approval by the MGB. Meanwhile, Marcopper sought to expand its MPSA application through a sketch
plan which was in conflict with several Exploration Permit Applications including that of Onephil.
Marcopper reminded the officer-in-charge, De Jesus that it has valid mining rights over the said land
under R.A. 7942.
However, Onephil argued that at the time it applied for the application permit, the
applications are clear and open for mining. Finding merit in Onephil’s contention, the MGB likewise
denied the amendment of Marcopper’s application as it conflicts with Onephil’s EPA.
Aggrieved, Marcopper filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against De Jesus and contended that there was grave abuse
of discretion in the acts of De Jesus.

35
 De Jesus et. al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the trial court has no jurisdiction over
the case and that such issues are under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Panel of
Arbitrators.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of the Appeals granted the Motion to dismiss
and ruled that the issues involve a mining dispute and should be under the jurisdiction of the Panel
of Arbitrators. The petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied by the CA.
ISSUE
Did the panel of arbitrators have jurisdiction over the case?
RULING
YES. The petitioners are essentially opposing the Exploration Permit Application of Onephil
or any other applicant for mining rights that allegedly overlaps with the SACP. Once more, the
material allegations of their amended petition and the character of the reliefs they seek indubitably
show that the case involves a dispute over the conferment of mining rights to Onephil – which is
within the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators.
Under the Philippine Mining Act, The Panel of Arbitrators shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following: a) disputes involving rights to mining areas, (b)
disputes involving mineral agreements, FTAAs or Permits (c) Disputes involving surface owners,
occupants and claimholders/concessionaires. Thus, it is clear that the issues presented in this case
falls under the jurisdiction of the Panel of arbitrators as it is a dispute involving mining areas.
Further, it is a settled rule that whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during
appeal or even after final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred
by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set
aside.

36
 THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES ALEJANDRO RAMIRO AND FELICISIMA LLAMADA,
NAMELY; HENRY L. RAMIRO; MERLYN R. TAGUBA; MARLON L. RAMIRO; MARIDEL R.
SANTELLA, WILMA L. RAMIRO; VILMA R. CIELO AND CAROLYN R. CORDERO, PETITIONERS, V.
SPOUSES ELEODORO AND VERNA BACARON, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 196874, FIRST DIVISION, February 6, 2019, JARDELEZA, J.]

Settled is the rule that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by
the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. For instance, when the main relief sought is specific
performance, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
When the action, on the other hand, primarily involves title to, or possession of land, the court which has
exclusive original jurisdiction over the same is determined by the assessed value of the property.

FACTS:

Respondent spouses Eleodoro and Verna Bacaron filed a Civil Case before the RTC against
petitioners. In their amended complaint, spouses Bacaron claimed that the father of petitioners, the
late Alejandro, was the registered owner of a lot. Spouses Alejandro Ramiro and his wife, Felicisima
Llamada sold the property to spouses Bacaron and that spouses Bacaron took possession of the
property after the sale. The property, however, was earlier mortgaged by spouses Ramiro to the DBP.
Spouses Bacaron paid the DBP for the redemption of the property and that in June 1998, petitioners
forcibly dispossessed spouses Bacaron of the property.

Petitioners, on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the amended complaint, raising,
among others, the affirmative defense that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the case
considering that it involves recovery of possession of the property.

RTC: The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of spouses Bacaron. It ruled that spouses Bacaron were
able to prove by preponderance of evidence the due execution of the Deed of Sale with spouses
Ramiro over the property. Although the original copy of the Deed of Sale was lost, the RTC held that
spouses Bacaron were able to introduce competent secondary evidence to prove its existence.[11] It
also found that the purchase price of P400,000.00 as stated in the Deed of Sale corresponded, more
or less, to the amount paid by spouses Bacaron to the DBP.

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the RTC’s Decision to the CA. In their appeal, petitioners argued that
the main thrust of the complaint was to recover the property; yet, spouses Bacaron failed to allege its
assessed value. Petitioners, thus, asserted that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by (R.A.) No. 7691.

CA: The CA rendered its assailed Decision, dismissing the appeal and affirming the RTC Decision in
toto. The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. Noting that the
amended complaint alleged causes of action for the declaration of validity of the Deed of Sale or
specific performance, and recovery of possession, damages, attorney's fees and injunction all of
which are incapable of pecuniary estimation, joinder in the RTC is allowed by the Rules of Court.
Motion for reconsideration was denied.

37
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

RULING:

No. The RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, provides that the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction on the following actions …

Meanwhile, Section 33 of the same law provides the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level
courts, viz. …

Settled is the rule that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for
by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. For instance, when the main relief sought is
specific performance, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the RTC. When the action, on the other hand, primarily involves title to, or possession of land, the
court which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the same is determined by the assessed value of
the property.

Here, petitioners argue against the CA's view that the action is under the RTC's jurisdiction because
it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. They contend that the main thrust of respondents' complaint
before the RTC is the recovery of possession of the property. Thus, the primary purpose of all of
respondents' alternative causes of action involves title to or possession of real property. This is
allegedly evident from respondents' amended complaint which seeks, among others, to cancel the
OCT covering the property, to have a new title issued in their name, and to place respondents in
peaceful and undisturbed possession of the property. In view of these allegations, petitioners posit
that the complaint should be filed with the court having jurisdiction based on the assessed value of
the property. In this case, however, there was no effort on the part of respondents to allege the
assessed value of the property.

The SC agrees with petitioners.

It is clear from respondents' amended complaint and the reliefs sought by respondents in their
amended complaint that while respondents claim that their amended complaint before the RTC is
denominated as one for the declaration of validity of the Deed of Sale and for specific performance,
the averments in their amended complaint and the character of the reliefs sought therein reveal that
the action primarily involves title to or possession of real property.

An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's cause of action is based on a
claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession,
enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property
and (2) the property itself."

38
The ultimate relief sought by respondents is for the recovery of the property through the
enforcement of its sale in their favor by the late spouses Ramiro. Their other causes of action for the
cancellation of the original title and the issuance of a new one in their name, as well as 'for injunction
and damages, are merely incidental to the recovery of the property. Before any of the other reliefs
respondents prayed for in their complaint can be granted, the issue of who between them and
petitioners has the valid title to the lot must first be determined.

Similarly in Gochan v. Gochan, the SC ruled that where a complaint is entitled as one for specific
performance but nonetheless prays for the issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary
objective and nature is one to recover the parcel of land itself and is, thus, deemed a real action.
Accordingly, under these circumstances, the court which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case is determined by the assessed value of the subject property.

Here, respondents neither alleged the assessed value of the property. The Court cannot take judicial
notice of the assessed or market value of lands. Thus, absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined which between the RTC or the Municipal
Trial Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over respondents' action. Consequently, the
complaint filed before the RTC should be dismissed.

Furthermore, it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of the action. In resolving the issue of whether or not the correct amount of docket fees
were paid, it is also necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint. Having settled that the
action instituted by respondents is a real action and not one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
basis for determining the correct docket fees shall, therefore, be the assessed value of the property,
or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant. As already discussed, however, respondents
did not allege the assessed value of the property in their amended complaint. They also did not allege
its estimated value. As a result, the correct docket fees could not have been computed and paid by
respondents and the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. All
the proceedings before it are consequently null and void.

39
 VICTORIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION v.
VICTORIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 234446, 24 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (A.B. Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCRTINE OF THE CASE

Like courts, administrative boards and officers vested with quasi-judicial power may only
exercise jurisdiction over matters that their enabling statutes confer in them. This rule applies even
though the parties hold out to the administrative agency concerned that it has jurisdiction over a
particular dispute. Generally, lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and is a defense that cannot
be lost. However, by way of narrow exception, the doctrine of estoppel by laches, which rests on
considerations of public policy, may effectively bar jurisdictional challenges. But it must be emphasized
that the doctrine finds application only where the jurisdictional issue is so belatedly raised that it may
be presumed to have been waived by the invoking party.

In this case, the Labor Code vests in Voluntary Arbiters (VA) the power to hear and decide labor
disputes. VAs have no competence to rule on the propriety of withholding of tax. Furthermore, VMC was
not estopped from assailing the VA’s jurisdiction. First, VMC raised lack of jurisdiction timely. Second,
VMC never prayed for affirmative relief.

FACTS

Victoria Manufacturing Corporation (VMC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the textile

business. On the other hand, Victoria Manufacturing Corporation Employees Union (VMCEU) is the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the permanent and regular rank-and-file employees within the
pertinent bargaining unit of VMC.

VMC sought the opinion of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the tax implications of
the wage structure that was stipulated in the collecting bargaining agreement (CBA) between VMC
and VMCEU. The BIR opined that VMCEU’s members were not exempt from income tax as they were
earning more that the statutory minimum wage. As a result, VMC withheld the income tax due in the
wages of VMCEU’s members.

Thereafter, VMC and VMCEU held a grievance meeting to settle various issues, including the
company's decision to withhold income tax from the wages of the union members who were earning
the statutory minimum wage. Unfortunately, the parties failed to resolve the issue. Thus, they
submitted the issue before a Voluntary Arbiter (VA) who ruled that VMC erroneously withheld
income tax from the wages of the union's members. Ratiocinating that the subject employees were
statutory minimum wage earners, the VA held that they were exempt from the payment of income
tax.

Aggrieved, VMC brought the case before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the VA’s
ruling finding that the VA has no jurisdiction over the matter.

ISSUES

(1) Did the Voluntary Arbitrator have jurisdiction to rule that VMC erroneously withheld
income tax from the wages of the union's members?

40
 (2) Did VMC’s active participation in the arbitration proceedings operate to rectify the VA’s
lack of jurisdiction?
RULING

(1) NO. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. The Labor Code vests in VA’s
the power to hear and decide labor disputes. In Honda Cars Philippines, Inc. v. Honda Cars Technical
Specialist and Supervisors Union (Honda Cars), the Court ruled that VAs have no competence to rule
on the propriety of withholding of tax and that the jurisdiction of VAs is limited to labor disputes.
Given the foregoing, the Court ruled that the company and the union should have submitted the
question to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR).

(2) NO. Lack of jurisdiction is a serious defect that may be raised anytime, even for the first
time on appeal, since it is a defense that is not subject to waiver. However, by way of exception, the
doctrine of estoppel by laches, pursuant to the ruling in Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy (Sibonghanoy),
may operate to bar jurisdictional challenges. Estoppel by laches has been broadly defined as "failure
or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier.” Notwithstanding the unequivocal dictum in
Sibonghanoy, it must be emphasized that the general rule remains to be that jurisdiction is not to be
left to the will or stipulation of the parties; it cannot be lost by estoppel.

In this case, VMC was not estopped from assailing the VA’s jurisdiction. First, VMC raised lack
of jurisdiction timely. Second, VMC never prayed for affirmative relief. In Sibonghanoy, the party that
raised lack of jurisdiction, a bonding company, prayed that it be relieved of its liability under the bond
subject of that case. On the other hand, VMC, in the position paper that it filed before the VA, merely
prayed that "the complaint of [VMCEU] be dismissed with prejudice for utter lack of merit." Since all
the company sought was the dismissal of the union's complaint, the former's prayer cannot be
considered as one seeking affirmative relief.

41
 JOAQUIN BERBANO, TRINIDAD BERBANO, and MELCHOR BERBANO v.
HEIRS OF ROMAN TAPULAO
G.R. No. 227482, 01 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Court has repeatedly held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
examining the material allegations of the complaint and the relief sought.
Here, the Complaint clearly alleged that the assessed value of the lot subject of the case is P22,
070.00. In accordance with B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, since the value of the subject
matter exceeds P20, 000.00, the same falls within the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Hence, the RTC-Branch 1,
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
FACTS
The heirs of Roman Tapulao (heirs) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages against Joaquin Berbano, Trinidad Berbano, and Melchor Berbano (the Berbanos).
In their Complaint, the heirs averred that their father Roman Tapulao was the registered
owner of a lot located in Taguing, Baggao, Cagayan. They paid the realty taxes thereon.
After the death of their parents, the heirs caused the relocation survey of the lot. It revealed
that the Berbanos occupied portions of the lot. Despite several demands, however, the Berbanos
refused to vacate and return the lot to respondents.
In their Answer, the Berbanos argued that the original owner of the lot was Felipe Peña.
Sometime in 1954, Felipe Peña ceded his possession over half hectare of the lot in
favor of Joaquin Berbano. From that time on, Joaquin had been in open and exclusive
possession of the lot.
Subsequently, Felipe Peña sold the adjacent lot to Roman Tapulao. When
Roman Tapulao caused its registration, the survey mistakenly included therein the adjacent lot
belonging to Joaquin. As a result, OCT No. P-9331 (in the name of Roman Tapulao) also covered
Joaquin's lot. Roman and Catalina Tapulao acknowledged this error through their Affidavit dated
April 2, 1976. They promised to respect Joaquin's ownership of that specific portion.
The case was then called for pre-trial which for one reason or another got reset for eight (8)
consecutive times. During the pre-trial on January 30, 2014, petitioners and counsel failed to appear.
Thus, respondents moved to present evidence ex parte which the trial court granted.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Heirs of Roman Tapulao. On appeal, the Berbanos again
for the first time, justified their failure to appear at the pre-trial. They claimed they were allegedly
not notified of the pre-trial. They also insisted that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
According to them, the assessed value of the whole lot should not be taken into consideration
considering that only a portion thereof was in dispute. Hence, only the value of the specific portion
they were occupying must be the determining jurisdictional factor. The CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE
Is petitioners' challenge against the trial court's jurisdiction tenable?
RULING

42
 YES. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a
case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the
merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the
parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists.
The Court has repeatedly held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
examining the material allegations of the complaint and the relief sought.
Here, the Complaint clearly alleged that the assessed value of the lot subject of the case is
P22,070.00. In accordance with Batas Pambansa 129 (B.P. Blg. 129), as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
since the value of the subject matter exceeds P20, 000.00, the same falls within the jurisdiction of the
RTCs. Hence, the RTC-Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case.
Petitioners' claim that the property in dispute is only a specific portion of the lot or only 6,804
square meters, which supposedly carries the proportional assessed value of P8, 111.72, is irrelevant.
It does not alter what is actually alleged in the complaint. Besides, it is not for petitioners to define
the allegations in their adversaries' complaint. That is the respondents' prerogative as plaintiffs
below. Additionally, petitioners cannot limit the dispute to the alleged area actually being contested.
This is because the rest of the contiguous portion of the lot could be relevant to the remedy or
remedies flowing therefrom. For example, who bears the burden of paying for improvements; what
are the indicators of good and bad faith by petitioners? The point is this: respondents' allegations in
their complaint cannot be at once deemed to be a case of bad and false pleading.
Lastly, but no less important, petitioners never questioned the trial court's jurisdiction in the
proceedings before it. In fact, petitioners even filed their Answer and sought affirmative relief
therein. The trial court summarized petitioners' prayer in their Answer.
It is only after the case was decided against them that they challenged it for the first time via
their motion for reconsideration. In Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, the Court held that a party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court and ask for affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. So must it be.

43
 3. Jurisdiction over the issues
4. Jurisdiction over the res or the property in litigation
E. Jurisdiction vs. exercise of jurisdiction
F. Jurisdiction vs. venue
G. Jurisdiction over cases covered by Barangay Conciliation, Small Claims Cases, and
cases covered by Summary Procedure

III. CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. General provisions (Rule 1)
B. Cause of action (Rule 2)

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONERS, V.

SPOUSES JUANITO AND VICTORIA LEDESMA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 211176 & 211583, THIRD DIVISION, February 6, 2019, LEONEN, J.]

Petitioner PNB has not violated any of its obligations toward respondents since it was never tasked by
the law to refund the claim for excess payments. As a private banking institution and as a publicly listed
company, it has no jurisdiction, control, or relation to the sugar restitution fund.

FACTS:

These are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision and Resolution. The CA
reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC in a civil case for Sum of Money/Refund of Excess
Payments. The CA ordered the BSP and the PNB to pay Spouses Juanito and Victoria Ledesma (the
Ledesma Spouses) to be taken from the sugar restitution fund upon its establishment.

The Ledesma Spouses stated in their Complaint that they were farmers engaged in sugar farming in
Negros Occidental, with sugar productions from crop year 1974 to 1975 to crop year 1984 to 1985.
Within this period, they were among those who suffered losses in sugar farming operations due to
the actions of government-owned and controlled agencies. Among these agencies were the BSP and
the PNB.

The Ledesma Spouses obtained several crop loans from the PNB. After full payment of the loans, there
was an excess payment, as admitted by the Philippine National Bank and as certified by the COA. The
Ledesma Spouses argued that under R.A. No. 7202, the BSP and the PCGG should compensate them
for their losses and refund the excess payment from the sugar restitution fund.

RTC: The RTC dismissed the complaint for reason of prematurity and/or lack of cause of action. The
RTC ruled however that the judgement is without prejudice to its refiling once the Sugar Restitution
Fund under R.A. No. 7202 or any fund for that purpose is already set up and ready for distribution.

44
CA: The CA found the Ledesma Spouses' case meritorious. It held that there is no dispute as to the
Ledesma Spouses' inclusion in the coverage of R.A. No. 7202, "which was enacted to restitute the
losses suffered by sugar producers due to actions taken by government agencies in order to revive
the economy in the sugar-producing areas of the country."

The CA did acknowledge that the BSP and the PNB's liability to pay the Ledesma Spouses depends on
the establishment of the sugar restitution fund under R.A. No. 7202. The CA held that it was clear that
until the sugar restitution fund is established, payment to the Ledesma Spouses and other sugar
producers under R.A. No. 7202 would "have to be held in abeyance."

The CA noted that based on a certification issued by the then Deputy Governor of the BSP and the Ad
Hoc Committee Chair on the Sugar Restitution Law, the PCGG, along with all other government
agencies, have not made any funds available for the BSP to pay the sugar producers' claims.

The PCGG certified that it had not made any fund or asset available to the BSP for the sugar restitution
fund. It stated that all recoveries it had made were remitted to the agrarian reform fund under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

According to the CA, it was indeed lamentable that after more than two decades after R.A. No. 7202
was enacted, the Ledesma Spouses and thousands of other sugar producers still could not reap the
law's benefits. Nevertheless, there is no other recourse but to await the establishment of the sugar
restitution fund. MRs were denied.

Hence, BSP and PNB filed their separate petitions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioners BSP and PNB liable for the refund of excess
payments to sugar producers covered by R.A. No. 7202.

RULING:
Yes. The CA erred in holding petitioners BSP and PNB liable for the refund of excess payments to
sugar producers covered by R.A. No. 7202.

The CA erred in ruling that petitioner BSP is mandated to pay the sugar producers. The money to be
used to compensate these sugar producers should come from the sugar restitution fund. Without the
fund, there is no restitution to speak of at all.

Petitioner BSP cannot effect the restitution since neither the PCGG nor other government agencies
have turned over funds to it for the sugar producers' compensation.

The RTC was correct in ruling, "[t]hat there is no Sugar Restitution Fund even up to this time is not
the fault of the herein defendants. Indeed[,] one cannot give what he does not have."

Likewise, petitioner PNB is not beholden to respondents. All claims for restitution shall be filed with
the BSP.

45
Petitioner PNB’s role was merely that of a lending bank. Under R.A. No. 7202 and its IRR, lending
banks are not obligated to compensate sugar producers for their losses. Restitution falls under the
BSP, upon the establishment of a sugar restitution fund.

There is no dispute that respondents are covered under R.A. No. 7202. While this Court recognizes
the plight of the thousands of sugar producers and their right as beneficiaries, there is, sadly, no fund
from where the money should come.

The SC agrees with the RTC that the Complaint states no cause of action against petitioners. A cause
of action is "the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the
primary rights of the plaintiff."

Here, the second and third elements are lacking. Without the sugar restitution fund, petitioners have
no correlative legal duty to compensate respondents for their losses. They committed neither a delict
nor a wrongful act or omission in violation of respondents' rights.

Petitioner PNB has not violated any of its obligations toward respondents since it was never tasked
by the law to refund the claim for excess payments. As a private banking institution and as a publicly
listed company, it has no jurisdiction, control, or relation to the sugar restitution fund.

Thus, the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution are contrary to law and jurisprudence.

46
 C. Parties to civil actions (Rule 3)
HEIRS OF JUAN M. DINGLASAN v. AYALA CORPORATION
GR No. 204378, 5 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

An indispensable party is one who stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of the
petition. He has an interest in the controversy that final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such
that the courts cannot proceed without his presence. It is settled that indispensable parties is required
under any and all conditions, their presence being a needed sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

In the case at bar, Orosa is an indispensable party because the main issue is whether or not the
TCT in favor of Shell and Omniport was fraudulently obtained, and it was alleged that Orosa was the
one who issued the TCTs in favor of Shell and Omniport via sale.

FACTS
The Heirs of Juan M. Dinglasan filed an application for Registration of Title with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City. The application sought for judicial confirmation and registration
over a parcel of land located at Barangay Tabangao, Batangas City. Subsequently, several persons
filed their oppositions.

The oppositors, Ayala Corporation and Omniport alleged that they are the registered owners
of the lots in question as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) in their name, issued by
the Register of Deeds of Batangas City and that they acquired the TCTs from Severina Orosa (Orosa)
who sold the lands to them.

The Heirs argued that they acquired the land from Juan Dinglasan; inherited it intestate; that
Juan Dinglasan was the owner of the land since time immemorial; that the acquisition of Ayala and
Omniport of the TCTs under their names were only through fraudulent and spurious means.

The RTC and Court of Appeals (CA) both ruled in favor of Ayala and Omniport and noted that
Orosa was an indispensable party and that no valid judgment could have been rendered but
nevertheless disposed of the case based on its merits because the plaintiffs failed to present evidence.

ISSUE
Did the RTC and the CA correctly dispose of the case based on the merits despite the fact that
indispensable parties were not impleaded in the case?

RULING
NO. An indispensable party is one who stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of
the petition. He has an interest in the controversy that final decree would necessarily affect his rights,
such that the courts cannot proceed without his presence. It is settled that indispensable parties is
required under any and all conditions, their presence being a needed sine qua non of the exercise of
judicial power. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest a court with jurisdiction,
which is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus, without the

47
presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real
finality.

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

In the case at bar, Orosa is an indispensable party because the main issue is whether or not
the TCT in favor of Shell and Omniport was fraudulently obtained, and it was alleged that Orosa was
the one who issued the TCTs in favor of Shell and Omniport via sale. Thus, the Court cannot render
judgment on the merits because, if done so, would render a violation of due process. The Court then
remanded the case to RTC to implead indispensable parties so give opportunity to present
evidence.

48
 FRANCISCO DELGADO v. GQ REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., et. al.
G.R. No. 241774, 25 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION, (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule
may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary
hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

FACTS
Francisco Delgado (Francisco) was married to Carmecita Chuidian-Delgado (Carmencita) and
they had five children. After many years, Carmecita passed away. Subsequently, Francisco met
Victoria Quirino Gonzales (Victoria), who is the daughter of the former President Elpidio Quirino.
Victoria and Francisco took another shot at love and entered into a special relationship.
In their time together, Francisco learned that Victoria was formerly married to Luis Gonzales,
who already passed away. Victoria and Luis produced four children. Together with her children with
Luis, Victoria started a company named GQ Realty Development Corporation (GQ Realty).
Despite GQ Realty’s decent capitalization, Francisco offered to help Victoria by supposedly
buying real properties using his own money, but the naked title would be named after the respondent
corporation. Francisco told Victoria to invest in real estate to attract investors. The latter supposedly
agreed and suggested that Francisco buy a condominium apartment located in Makati and the latter
agreed. Allegedly, Francisco lived in the subject property even when the Condominium Certificate of
Title (CCT) was issued in the name of GQ Realty.
Subsequently, 56-year old Victoria and 76-year old Francisco got married. After almost 20
years of marriage, Victoria passed away. Following Victoria’s death, Francisco learned that Victoria’s
children with her ex husband, Luis Gonzales (Luis) distributed among themselves the properties held
in trust by Victoria’s corporations, including GQ Realty. Francisco discovered that the subject
property was transferred from GQ Realty to Rosario.
On their part, the respondents alleged that GQ Realty was a family corporation established
after the death of their father Luis. The said corporation was established for the sole purpose of
holding Victoria’s property and was not intended to invite or allow investors to become part of the
corporation. Neither did it need additional capital.
Luis was the son of the wealthy Don Manuel Gonzales and Dona Paz Tuason. Victoria and Luis
lived a privileged life among Philippine society's elite. They were among the first families who lived
in Forbes Park since 1956. After the death of Luis, Victoria left their home in Forbes Park and
transferred to the unit beside the subject property. Since Luis left Victoria financially comfortable,
she managed to live without having to engage in any business or profession.
Respondent Rosario Meyer (Rosario), one of the children of Luis and Victoria, became
paraplegic due to a vehicular accident. Thus, Victoria decided that it was best that Rosario
permanently moved to Manila. For this purpose, Victoria bought the subject property using her own
funds as a gift for her daughter. Realizing that the condominium was not wheelchair-friendly, Victoria
swapped apartments with Rosario.

49
 It took Francisco two years to convince Victoria to marry him. Before their marriage,
Francisco and Victoria executed an Ante-Nuptial agreement which stipulates that their properties
would be governed by complete separation of properties. After their marriage, Francisco moved with
Victoria to the subject property.
When Victoria fell ill, she started to assign her properties to her children with Luis. The
subject property was allegedly transferred to Rosario. As a result, Rosario contended that she had
been paying the real estate taxes due on the subject property.
Several months after the death of Victoria, Francisco filed a Complaint for Reconveyance,
Declaration of Nullity of Sale, and Damages against respondents before the Regional Trial Court. He
alleged that it was the intention of the parties that the subject property was to be held by GQ Realty
merely in the concept of an implied trust.
Respondents filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses, wherein they
argued that Francisco’s claim had already been deemed waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished by virtue of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of Francisco. The Court of Appeals
(CA) likewise denied Francisco’s appeal.

ISSUE
Did Francisco, in executing the Ante-Nuptial Agreement, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished his alleged interest over the subject property?

RULING
YES. Under Rule 16, Section 6, if no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for
dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the
discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been
filed.
In the instant case, the respondents did not file any Motion to Dismiss. Instead, they filed a
Motion for Preliminary Hearing so that the RTC could receive evidence and thereafter decide whether
the affirmative defenses raised by the respondents are meritorious. According to the RTC, and as
affirmed by the CA, after the preliminary hearing, the respondents were able to prove their
affirmative defense that, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the Complaint, the
alleged claim of petitioner Francisco over the subject property has been deemed waived, abandoned,
or otherwise extinguished when petitioner Francisco and Victoria executed the Ante-Nuptial
Agreement.
In this regard, the Court found that the RTC and CA did not err. Hypothetically admitting the
material allegations in the Complaint, the Court held that petitioner Francisco indeed waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished his alleged rights over the subject property.
Moreover, the Ante-Nuptial Agreement states that the property relations of the spouses shall
be under the regime of complete separation of property. In addition, it states that any gift which
Francisco may have bestowed or shall bestow on Victoria shall become her exclusive property.

50
Hence, under the Ante-Nuptial Agreement, Francisco unequivocally discharged any and all interest
over all gifts that he had bestowed upon Victoria.
While petitioner Francisco does not deny that his purchase of the subject property was borne
out of gratuity, he now maintains that the subject property was not bestowed upon Victoria, but was
instead given to respondent GQ Realty, a separate juridical entity. Petitioner Francisco now argues
that as respondent GQ Realty was the registered owner of the subject property and not Victoria, then
the subject property is not within the coverage of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement.
The Court was not persuaded. As already explained above, the material allegations of the
Complaint itself readily reveal that the interest of GQ Realty in the subject property is purely in name.
In fact, Francisco himself readily acknowledged that "GQ Realty would only appear as the buyer on
paper." In actuality, the subject property was given to Victoria as a gift from Francisco. Hence, the
subject property is aptly within the coverage of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement.
In sum, as GQ Realty is a mere holding company and alter ego of Victoria, the sheer fact that
the subject property was registered in its name does not denigrate the fact that the subject property
was really the property of Victoria. Hence, hypothetically admitting the material allegations of
petitioner Francisco in his Complaint, when petitioner Francisco executed the Ante-Nuptial
Agreement and waived any and all rights and interests over the properties of Victoria, the subject
property was deemed included therein.

51
 SISTER PILAR VERSOZA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-LONDRIZ,
PEDRO AGUIRRE, and DR. MARISSA PASCUAL
G.R. No. 184535, 03 September 2019, EN BANC RESOLUTION (Per Curiam)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A petitioner's demise extinguishes his or her legal capacity, which would warrant the dismissal
of any of his or her pleadings pending in court. Moreover, the Court has consistently held that "the
authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General[,]" with the private complainant's role as
only that of a witness, the rationale being that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of
the criminal action is the State and not the private complainant. The interest of the private complainant
or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability.

Considering that Sister Pilar Veroza died during the pendency of this case, she no longer has the
legal capacity to pursue the appeal. In addition, as a private complainant to the criminal action, Sister
Pilar's role is confined to being a mere witness. Only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
can appeal the criminal aspect of the case. Thus, absent any action on the part of the Office of the
Solicitor General, the appeal cannot prosper.

FACTS

This case involves a man with cognitive disability who, at 24 years old, was made by his legal
guardians to undergo bilateral vasectomy without his consent. Laureano "Larry" Aguirre (Larry) was
a ward of the Heart of Mary Villa, a child-caring agency under the Good Shepherd Sisters and licensed
by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).

In 1980, Larry, then two (2) years and nine (9) months old, was taken in as a ward by Pedro
and his wife, Lourdes (the Aguirre Spouses). An Affidavit of Consent to Legal Guardianship was
executed in favor of the Aguirre Spouses. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) then appointed the Spouses
to be the legal guardians of Larry and of his properties.

As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children noticed that his
developmental milestones were remarkably delayed. His cognitive and physical growth did not
appear normal. The psychological evaluation done on Larry revealed that he was suffering from a
mild mental deficiency.

In 2001, Dr. Agatep, urologist/surgeon, was approached concerning the intention to have
Larry, then 24 years of age, vasectomized. In view of the required psychiatric clearance, Larry was
brought to a psychiatrist who stated that the responsibility of decision making may be given to his
parent or guardian. Using this assessment as basis, and upon the instruction and written consent of
Pedro, Dr. Agatep performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry on January 31, 2002. Two (2) cases arose
simultaneously after the vasectomy.

Pedro's eldest daughter, Gloria Aguirre, filed a criminal case against her father and the
doctors who cleared and conducted the procedure on Larry for violation of Article 172 for
falsification and Article 262 for mutilation, both under the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Sections

52
3 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7610. The case reached the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed the
Petition for lack of merit.

The second is a criminal case filed by Sister Versoza against Pedro, Dr. Pascual, Dr. Agatep,
and Michelina, one (1) of the Aguirre Spouses' children with whom Larry grew up. Sister Versoza,
like Gloria, charged them of falsification under Article 172 and mutilation under Article 262, both
under the Revised Penal Code and child abuse under Sections 3 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7610.

Accordingly, an Information was filed. When it learned, however, of the judicial

determination of the CA that there was neither probable cause, nor was there a case of falsification
nor mutilation in the similar case filed by Gloria, RTC issued an order dismissing the second case. On
appeal, CA upheld the dismissal of the Information. Hence, this petition. In the interregnum,
Michelina and Pedro moved to dismiss the Petition due to Sister Pilar's untimely demise on
September 9, 2012. As such, they claim that whether she had legal standing has become a moot issue.

ISSUES

(1) Did the death of Sister Pilar Versoza warrant the case's dismissal?
(2) Did Sister Pilar Versoza have the legal personality to institute the criminal case
against Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Pedro Aguirre, and Dr. Marissa Pascual?

RULING

(1) YES. A petitioner's demise extinguishes his or her legal capacity, which would warrant
the dismissal of any of his or her pleadings pending in court. Moreover, the Court has consistently
held that "the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General[,]" with the private
complainant's role as only that of a witness, the rationale being that in a criminal case, the party
affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not the private complainant. The
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability.

Considering that Sister Pilar Veroza died during the pendency of this case, she no longer has
the legal capacity to pursue the appeal. In addition, as a private complainant to the criminal action,
Sister Pilar's role is confined to being a mere witness. Only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, can appeal the criminal aspect of the case. Thus, absent any action on the part of the Office
of the Solicitor General, the appeal cannot prosper.

(2) YES. Ordinarily, it is the offended party or a law enforcer who commences the case's
prosecution. However, in cases concerning violations of Republic Act No. 7610, Section 27
enumerates seven (7) classes of persons who may initiate criminal proceedings, namely:
(a) Offended party;
(b) Parents or guardians;
(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;
(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution;
(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development;
(f) Barangay chairman; or
(g) At least three (3) concerned responsible citizens where the violation occurred.

53
 Here, Sister Pilar hinged her legal standing on being an officer or representative of a licensed
child-caring institution, the Heart of Mary Villa, the foster home that had custody of Larry before his
guardianship was passed to the Aguirre Spouses. Michelina and Pedro oppose this and claim that the
Aguirre Spouses' appointment as Larry's legal guardians divested Sister Pilar of the authority to file
a criminal case for child abuse.

By itself, respondents' position of an almost jealous monopoly of parental authority may seem
to have basis. Guardianship, similar to adoption, is one (1) of the instances under Articles 210 and
222 Family Code where parental authority may be legally transferred. However, the exercise of
parental authority should be understood more as "a sum of duties" to be exercised in favor of the
child's best interest, as explained in Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals.

The authority granted to the Aguirre Spouses to raise Larry as their ward is a responsibility
that went beyond the mere transfer of the child's physical custody. When they were granted
guardianship, the Aguirre Spouses committed themselves to protect and uphold Larry's best
interests. Granted, family affairs cannot always be subject to the State's inquiry, especially if no one
comes forward to shed light on ongoing abuses, or worse still, if the abused merely sees the acts as
matters of fact. Indeed, in child abuse cases, the parents or guardians may be the abusers themselves.
In these situations, allowing another person to represent the abused becomes apparent and more
urgent, which is why barangay chairs, social workers, and concerned responsible citizens are
enjoined to file a complaint.

Thus, the argument that the transfer of parental authority has severed all ties between Larry
and Heart of Mary Villa does not hold water. To tolerate this line of reasoning would be to allow the
persistence of abuses against children. The title of a parent or guardian is not a magic word to be
wielded with immunity.

54
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
REGION X, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, petitioner, – versus – BENJOHN
FETALVERO, respondent.
G.R. No. 198008, THIRD DIVISION, February 4, 2019, LEONEN, J.

The OSG shall have the power to deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies
and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving
their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal
officers with respect to such cases. But it is likewise settled that the OSG's deputized counsel is no more
than the “surrogate” of the Solicitor General in any particular proceeding and the latter remains the
principal counsel entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and decisions. The
appearance of the deputized counsel did not divest the OSG of control over the case and did not make
the deputized special attorney the counsel of record.

Under the reservation in the Notice of Appearance, Atty. Lorea must submit the resulting Compromise
Agreement to then Solicitor General Agnes VST Devanadera for review and approval, especially since
the amount respondent claims is significantly larger than what he was allegedly only entitled to
get.Without the Solicitor General's positive action on the Compromise Agreement, it cannot be given any
effect and cannot bind the Solicitor General's client, the government. Nonetheless, despite the lack of
the Solicitor General's approval, this Court holds that the government is still bound by the
Compromise Agreement due to laches.

The Solicitor General is assumed to have known of the Compromise Agreement since, as principal
counsel, she was furnished a copy of the trial court's June 27, 2008 Order, which referred the case to
mediation. Even if she did not know that Atty. Lorea signed a Compromise Agreement, she was later
informed of it through the copy of the trial court's October 17, 2008 Order, which approved the
Compromise Agreement. The Solicitor General received the October 17, 2008 Order on November 6,
2008; yet, she filed no appeal or motion to contest the Order or the Compromise Agreement's validity.

FACTS:

BenjohnFetalvero (Fetalvero) owned a 2,787-square meter parcel of land in Iligan City, Lanao del
Norte. In 1999, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region X took 569 square
meters from Fetalvero's property to be used in its flood control project. Fetalvero stated that the
project's construction on that portion of land rendered the remaining part useless, so he demanded
payment for the entire area at P15,000.00 per square meter. However, under Presidential
Administrative Order No. 50, series of 1999, the just compensation Fetalvero was entitled to was only
P2,500.00 per square meter, or a total of P1,422,500.00, plus 10% thereof. The rate was based on the
BIR zonal valuation in 1999, when the property was taken. Despite negotiations, the parties failed to
agree on the amount of just compensation.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed before the RTC a Complaint for expropriation against Fetalvero.
It prayed for the determination and payment of the just compensation and the entry of a judgment of
condemnation of the portion of Fetalvero's property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7118.

Subsequently, the OSG sent a letter to Atty. Earnest Anthony Lorea (Atty. Lorea), the Legal Staff Chief
of the DPWH, Region X. The OSG deputized Atty. Lorea to assist it in the case, the latter’s authority
was subject to the reservation contained in the Notice of Appearance filed by the Solicitor General.

55
The OSG filed before the trial court a Notice of Appearance. The OSG entered its appearance as
counsel for the Republic and informed the trial court that the OSG authorized Atty. Lorea to appear
on its behalf. The OSG emphasized that since it retained supervision and control of the representation
in the case and had to approve the withdrawal of the case, non-appeal, or other actions which appear
to compromise the interest of the Government, only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions
served on the OSG will bind the Republic.

On June 27, 2008, the trial court issued an Order and referred the case to the Philippine
Mediation Center for mediation. The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement.

Fetalvero filed before the trial court a motion to approve the Compromise Agreement and for
the issuance of judgment. On October 17, 2008, the trial court issued an Order approving the
Compromise Agreement. On November 6, 2008, the Republic received a copy of the Order.

In a letter, Jaime Pacanan, Assistant Secretary and Central Right of Way Committee Chair of the DPWH
Manila, requested advice from the OSG regarding the Compromise Agreement's legality.

The OSG replied that the government cannot be bound by the Compromise Agreement since it was
not submitted to its office for review, which is a condition under the deputation letter and the Notice
of Appearance. Thus, it was improper for DPWH to directly submit the Compromise Agreement to
the trial court for judgment. Further, the Compromise Agreement failed to state how it arrived at the
just compensation of P9,500.00 per square meter.

Meanwhile, Fetalvero filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Order for a Writ of Garnishment.

The Republic opposed the Motion, arguing that since the Compromise Agreement was not legally
binding, it cannot be the subject of a valid writ of execution or garnishment. Moreover, the
government still owns its funds and properties that were in official depositaries. Thus, these cannot
be garnished or levied.

In its Order, the trial court granted Fetalvero's Motion. It held that the despite the lapse of almost a
year, the OSG never lifted a finger to question the validity of the Compromise Agreement. The OSG is
now precluded from questioning the validity of the compromise agreement. It should be noted that
judgment based on compromise agreement is immediately executory. Hence, the validity of the said
judgment can no longer be questioned without transgressing the doctrine of immutability of
judgment. The trial court further held that since the OSG received a copy of the trial court's Order
approving the Compromise Agreement, the judgment was valid and binding on the Republic. Further,
government funds in official depositaries remain government funds only if there
was no appropriation by law. The trial court found that funds were already appropriated under SAA-
SR 2009-05-001538 of the DPWH for payment of the road-rights-of-way.

The CA denied the petition for lack of merit. It found that the OSG received a copy of the trial court's
Order approving the Compromise Agreement, but did not file any pleading or action to assail it. If the
OSG wanted to question the Compromise Agreement's validity, it should have raised the matter
immediately, not when the Order was about to be executed. The CA further held that public funds
may be seized or garnished if they were already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of
the money judgment against the government.

56
ISSUE:

Whether the Compromise Agreement is void for not having been submitted to the OSG for review.
(NO)

RULING:

On petitioner's first claim, this Court takes this opportunity to reiterate our ruling in Republic of the
Philippines v. Viaje, et al., which clarified the role of a deputized counsel in relation to the OSG:

The power of the OSG to deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus,
agencies and offices to assist it in representing the government is well settled. The
Administrative Code of 1987 explicitly states that the OSG shall have the power to deputize
legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor
General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices,
brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with
respect to such cases. But it is likewise settled that the OSG's deputized counsel is no more
than the “surrogate” of the Solicitor General in any particular proceeding and the latter
remains the principal counsel entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and
decisions. The appearance of the deputized counsel did not divest the OSG of control over the
case and did not make the deputized special attorney the counsel of record.

Here, the OSG, as the principal counsel, is shown in both the deputation letter addressed to Atty. Lorea
and the Notice of Appearance filed before the trial court.

When Atty. Lorea entered into mediation, he only did so on behalf of the principal counsel, the
Solicitor General. Mediation necessarily involves bargaining of the parties' interests, and a
compromise agreement is one of its consequences. Under the reservation in the Notice of
Appearance, Atty. Lorea must submit the resulting Compromise Agreement to then Solicitor General
Agnes VST Devanadera for review and approval, especially since the amount respondent claims is
significantly larger than what he was allegedly only entitled to get. Without the Solicitor General's
positive action on the Compromise Agreement, it cannot be given any effect and cannot bind the
Solicitor General's client, the government.

Nonetheless, despite the lack of the Solicitor General's approval, this Court holds that the
government is still bound by the Compromise Agreement due to laches.

The Solicitor General is assumed to have known of the Compromise Agreement since, as principal
counsel, she was furnished a copy of the trial court's June 27, 2008 Order, which referred the case to
mediation. Even if she did not know that Atty. Lorea signed a Compromise Agreement, she was later
informed of it through the copy of the trial court's October 17, 2008 Order, which approved the
Compromise Agreement. The Solicitor General received the October 17, 2008 Order on November 6,
2008; yet, she filed no appeal or motion to contest the Order or the Compromise Agreement's validity.

Thus, based on the deputation letter, which stated that "only notices of orders, resolutions, and
decisions served on the OSG will bind the government, the entity, agency, and/or official
represented," and the Notice of Appearance, which stated that "only notices of orders, resolutions, and

57
decisions served on the OSG will bind the party represented," the Solicitor General's receipt of the Order
approving the Compromise Agreement bound petitioner to the trial court's judgment.

58
 D. Venue (Rule 4)
HYGIENIC PACKAGING CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- NUTRI-ASIA, INC., DOING
BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF UFC PHILIPPINES (FORMERLY NUTRI-ASIA,
INC.), Respondent.
G.R. No. 201302, THIRD DIVISION, January 23, 2019, LEONEN, J.
Petitioner and respondent both claim that the Sales Invoices and the Purchase Orders, respectively,
contained a stipulation on where to raise issues on any conflict regarding the sale of plastic containers.
Each party also insists that the other party accepted the venue stipulation in the Sales Invoices or the
Purchase Orders when its representative signed them.

A closer look at the Sales Invoices issued by petitioner reveals that above the signature of respondent's
representative is the phrase, "Received the above goods in good order and condition." Clearly, the
purpose of Nutri-Asia's representative in signing the Sales Invoices is merely to acknowledge that he or
she has received the plastic containers in good condition. He or she did not affix his or her signature in
any other capacity except as the recipient of the goods. To extend the effect of the signature by including
the venue stipulation would be to stretch the intention of the signatory beyond his or her objective.

A scrutiny of the Purchase Orders issued by respondent also reveals that above the signature of
petitioner's representative is the phrase "Acknowledged by Supplier." Since the Purchase Orders
indicated how many pieces of plastic containers respondent wanted to order from Hygienic, the
signatory merely affixed his or her signature to acknowledge respondent's order. Moreover, the
Purchase Orders included a note stating that the "Purchase Order must be DULY acknowledged to
facilitate payment."

It was necessary for petitioner's representative to sign the document for the processing of payment. The
act of signing the Purchase Orders, then, was limited to acknowledging respondent's order and
facilitating the payment of the goods to be delivered. It did not bind petitioner to the terms and
conditions in the Purchase Orders, which included the arbitration clause.

FACTS:

Hygienic is a domestic corporation that manufactures, markets, and sells packaging materials such
as plastic bottles and ratchet caps. Meanwhile, Nutri-Asia is a domestic corporation that
manufactures, sells, and distributes food products such as banana-based and tomato-based
condiments, fish sauce, vinegar, soy sauce, and other sauces.

From 1998 to 2009, Hygienic Packaging Corporation (Hygienic) supplied Nutri-Asia with KG Orange
Bottles and Ratchet Caps with Liners for its banana catsup products. Every transaction was covered
by a Purchase Order issued by Nutri-Asia. Under the said Terms and Conditions:

Arbitration of all disputes arising in connection with this Contract shall be referred to an
Arbitration Committee, in accordance with the Philippine Arbitration Law, composed of three
members: one member to be chosen by the Buyer; another member to be chosen by the Seller;
and the third member to be chosen by the other two members. The decision of the Arbitration
Committee shall be binding upon the parties.

59
From, 2007 to 2009, Nutri-Asia purchased from Hygienic plastic containers. Hygienic issued Sales
Invoicesand Delivery Receipts to cover these transactions.

In 2009, Hygienic filed a Complaint for sum of money against Nutri-Asia. It instituted the case before
the RTC of Manila "pursuant to the stipulation of the parties as stated in the Sales Invoices submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the City of Manila in any legal action arising out of their
transaction."

In its Answer, Nutri-Asia argued that the case should be dismissed as Hygienic failed to comply with
a condition precedent prior to its filing of the Complaint. It claimed that under the Terms and
Conditions of the Purchase Orders, Hygienic should have first referred the matter to the Arbitration
Committee.

Nutri-Asia alleged that the venue was also improperly laid since the RTC of Manila was not the proper
venue for the institution of Hygienic's personal action. The Complaint should have been filed either
before the trial courts of San Pedro, Laguna or Pasig City, where the principal places of business of
Hygienic and Nutri-Asia are located, respectively. The venue of actions as stated in the Sales Invoices
could not bind Nutri-Asia since it did not give its express conformity to that stipulation.

ISSUE:

Whether venue was improperly laid in the action for collection of sum of money. (Yes)

RULING:
Parties are allowed to constitute any stipulation on the venue or mode of dispute resolution as part
of their freedom to contract under Art 1306 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.

Here, however, the records lack any written contract of sale containing the specific terms and
conditions agreed upon by the parties. The parties failed to provide evidence of any contract, which
could have contained stipulations on the venue of dispute resolution. Nonetheless, petitioner and
respondent both claim that the Sales Invoices and the Purchase Orders, respectively, contained a
stipulation on where to raise issues on any conflict regarding the sale of plastic containers. Each party
also insists that the other party accepted the venue stipulation in the Sales Invoices or the Purchase
Orders when its representative signed them.

A closer look at the Sales Invoices issued by petitioner reveals that above the signature of
respondent's representative is the phrase, "Received the above goods in good order and
condition." Clearly, the purpose of Nutri-Asia's representative in signing the Sales Invoices is merely
to acknowledge that he or she has received the plastic containers in good condition. He or she did not
affix his or her signature in any other capacity except as the recipient of the goods. To extend the
effect of the signature by including the venue stipulation would be to stretch the intention of the
signatory beyond his or her objective.

60
A scrutiny of the Purchase Orders issued by respondent also reveals that above the signature of
petitioner's representative is the phrase "Acknowledged by Supplier." Since the Purchase Orders
indicated how many pieces of plastic containers respondent wanted to order from Hygienic, the
signatory merely affixed his or her signature to acknowledge respondent's order. Moreover, the
Purchase Orders included a note stating that the "Purchase Order must be DULY acknowledged to
facilitate payment."

It was necessary for petitioner's representative to sign the document for the processing of payment.
The act of signing the Purchase Orders, then, was limited to acknowledging respondent's order and
facilitating the payment of the goods to be delivered. It did not bind petitioner to the terms and
conditions in the Purchase Orders, which included the arbitration clause.

Petitioner and respondent may have entered into a contract of sale with respect to petitioner's
merchandise. However, the case records do not show that they have a contract in relation to the
venue of any civil action arising from their business transaction.Since there is no contractual
stipulation that can be enforced on the venue of dispute resolution, the venue of petitioner's personal
action will be governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

An action for collection of sum of money is a personal action. Taking into account that no exception
can be applied in this case, the venue, then, is "where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, ... at the election of the
plaintiff." For a corporation, its residence is considered "the place where its principal office is located
as stated in its Articles of Incorporation."

In its Complaint, petitioner stated that its principal place of business is on San Vicente Road beside
South Superhighway, San Pedro, Laguna. Meanwhile, respondent admitted in its Answer that its
principal office is at 12/F Centerpoint Building, Garnet Road corner Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City. Considering that the amount petitioner claims falls within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, petitioner may file its Complaint for sum of money either in the RTC of San
Pedro, Laguna or in the RTC of Pasig City.

61
 E. Pleadings
1. Kinds (Rule 6)
2. Parts of a pleading (Rule 7)
MASAKAZU UEMATSU v. ALMA BALINON
G.R. No. 234812, 25 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In fine, there is forum shopping when a party files two or more cases involving the same parties,
causes of action and reliefs. Notably, forum shopping is one of the grounds for the dismissal of a case. In
this case, the identity of parties in the Dissolution case and in the Motion to Account (filed in the PPO
case) cannot be denied. Both of these cases involved Masakazu Uematsu and Alma. Moreover, the rights
and reliefs asserted by Masakazu Uematsu in the Dissolution case pertained to the same ones that he
declared in the Motion to Account.

FACTS
The case emanated from a Petition for the issuance of a permanent protection order (PPO)
and plea for issuance of temporary restraining order under R.A. No. 9262 (PPO case) filed by Alma
Balinon against Masakazu Uematsu. Alma asserted that she filed the case due to the physical,
emotional, mental and sexual abuses committed against her by Masakazu Uematsu, her common-law
spouse who was a drug dependent.
In the Decision of the Regional Trial Court Tagum (RTC-Tagum), the petition for the PPO case
was granted. Almost three years after the finality of the PPO case, Masakazu Uematsu filed a
complaint with RTC-Lapu-Lapu for the dissolution of co-ownership, liquidation, and accounting
(Dissolution case) against Alma.
While the Dissolution case was pending, Masakazu Uematsu filed with the RTC-Tagum a
Motion to Account, praying that Alma be ordered to account all the proceeds of their closed
businesses and sold properties. However, despite the 15-day extension period granted her, Alma
failed to file her comment. In its Order, RTC-Tagum directed Alma to explain why she should not be
sanctioned for her failure to comply with the directive of the court within a period of five days.
RTC-Tagum then found Alma guilty of indirect contempt. Consequently, Alma filed a notice of
appeal, which RTC-Tagum denied. After which, Alma filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA).
CA decreed that Masakazu Uematsu’s Motion to Account must be dismissed because he
committed forum shopping when he filed it despite the pendency of the Dissolution case before the
RTC-Lapu-Lapu. It noted that: (1) there was forum shopping considering that these two actions
pertained to the same parties, the rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for arose from the same facts;
(2) and any ruling in them would amount to res judicata. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

62
 Did Masakazu Uematsu commit forum shopping when he filed the Motion to Account before
the RTC-Tagum even if he pursued it during the pendency of his Dissolution case with the RTC-Lapu-
Lapu?

RULING
YES. In fine, there is forum shopping when a party files two or more cases involving the same
parties, causes of action and reliefs. Notably, forum shopping is one of the grounds for the dismissal
of a case. The rule against it aims to avoid the rendition of two competent courts of separate and
opposite rulings which may arise because a party-litigant takes advantage and tries his or her luck
into seeking relief until a result in one’s favor is attained.
In this case, the identity of parties in the Dissolution case and in the Motion to Account (filed
in the PPO case) cannot be denied. Both of these cases involved Masakazu Uematsu and Alma.
Moreover, the rights and reliefs asserted by Masakazu Uematsu in the Dissolution case pertained to
the same ones that he declared in the Motion to Account.
To stress, in the Dissolution case, Masakazu Uematsu prayed that: (1) an order be issued
against Alma in order for their co-ownership to be wound up and accounted, and for Alma to turn
over papers and effects affecting the co-ownership; and (2) for the affairs to be settled and
distribution to be made to them. In said case, Masakazu Uematsu listed real properties located in
Tagum City, which, he claimed to have been purchased because of his and Alma’s lending business
and which were subject of their supposed co-ownership.
On the other hand, in his Motion to Account filed in the PPO case, M prayed for the court to
order Alma to account all the proceeds of his and Alma’s closed business and sold properties.
Interestingly, Masakazu Uematsu listed the same properties in the Motion to Account as those he
listed in the Dissolution case. He also similarly stated in the Motion to Account that these properties
were acquired by his and Alma’s joint efforts or in other words, were co-owned by them.
In sum, it cannot be mistaken that the Dissolution case and the Motion to Account (in the PPO
case) were practically pursuant to the same facts and reliefs asked for, that is, for an accounting of
the co-owned properties of the parties. They are so interrelated that any disposition made in any of
them, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata. Evidently, the subsequent
filing of the Motion to Account despite the pendency of the Dissolution case was unnecessary and
vexatious; thus, it should have been dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping.

63
 ISLA LPG CORPORATION v. LEYTE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 220262, 28 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, Jr. J., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

There is forum shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration.
Here, the CA correctly held that there exists a forum shopping when LDCI successively filed
complaints before the RTC-Makati and RTC-Tacloban.
FACTS
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) and Respondent Leyte Development Company,
Inc. (LDCI) entered into a Distributorship Agreement sometime. Under the Agreement, the Shell
appointed the LDCI to store, sell, and distribute Shellane LPG products for domestic household or
commercial market within Tacloban City and Southern Leyte.
Shell informed LDCI that it has sold its share in Shell Gas (LPG) Philippines, Inc. in favor of
Petitioner Isla Petroleum and Gas (Isla). Shell assured LDCI that the sale of shares would not have an
immediate impact on its operations. However, the sale of shares warranted rebranding of its LPG
cylinders, which cause delay in LDCI’s sales.
Isla advised LDCI that the Distributorship Agreement on a month-to-month basis was
terminated effective January 12, 2013. Thus, on said date, LDCI may no longer use any Solane LPG
trademark, logo and trade name. Isla then appointed Supreme Star Oil (Supreme) as its new
distributor of Solane LPG products in the Provinces of Leyte, Masbate, and Biliran.
LDCI filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages with application for writ of
preliminary injunction, against Shell, Isla and their respective officers before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Makati. RTC Makati issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the absence of any valid ground
which sufficiently warranted the immediate termination of the Distributorship Agreement. RTC
Makati ordered Isla and Shell to file their pleadings.
However, instead of filing its pleading, Isla sought the reconsideration of the Order, stating
that LDCI filed a complaint for damages with application for injunctive relief, before the Regional
Trial Court of Tacloban City while the case before RTC-Makati is pending. RTC-Makati denied the
motion.
LDCI filed a petition for Certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-
Makati in not dismissing the case before it on the ground of litis pendentia, before the CA. The CA
found that litis pendentia exists in the case because the issue raised before the RTC-Makati and RTC-
Tacloban is the same, that is, the validity of the termination of the Distributorship Agreement.
However, while litis pendentia is extant, Isla's claim that the case before the RTC-Makati should have
been dismissed is without basis as the priority in time rule is applicable.
ISSUE

64
 Did the CA err in ruling that there exists litis pendencia between the cases filed in RTC
Makati and RTC Tacloban?

RULING
NO. In this case, what is left to be determined by this Court is the existence of forum shopping
which results to litis pendentia. As such, whether Isla committed forum shopping in filing a second
complaint before the RTC-Tacloban is a question of law. Thus, the filing of a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 is proper.
Forum shopping is the repetitive availment of judicial remedies based on the same facts and
circumstances with winning as an end in view, viz:
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies
in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a
favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.
Here, the CA correctly held that there exists a forum shopping when LDCI successively filed
complaints before the RTC-Makati and RTC-Tacloban. First, there is identity of parties in this case. It
must be noted that in both cases, the plaintiffs are LDCI and its President. Except for Shell and Isla,
the defendants in both cases differ but there exists a community of interest among them. Said
defendants, who are the officers of Isla and Shell and the Tacloban distributor of Isla, were being sued
essentially for unilaterally terminating the Distributorship Agreement without valid grounds and for
allowing the newly-appointed distributor to supply LPG in the Province of Leyte. Second, there is
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in both complaints.
Verily, the reliefs prayed for in the complaints stemmed from the alleged undue termination
of the Distributorship Agreement by Isla, which allowed another distributor to assume the
distributorship rights of LDCI. It must be noted that the averred damage to LDCI caused by such
termination which led to the appointment of a new distributor is entwined in the question of the
propriety of the cancellation of said Agreement.
Clearly, while the first complaint prayed for the determination of Isla's breach of the terms of
the Distributorship Agreement, it likewise sought for indemnification for its lost business
opportunities as a result thereof. Similarly, the second complaint attempted to obtain such relief,
supported with the same allegations against Isla, et al.
Moreover, both complaints sought for damages on account of the termination of the
Distributorship Agreement which led to lost business opportunity on the part of LDCI. Also, it bears
stressing that in the civil case filed in RTC-Tacloban, LDCI put forth the validity of the terms of the
Distributorship Agreement, asserting its right as a distributor. This further belies LDCI's claim that
the second complaint was solely related to the breach of the injunctive writ.
Third, it is clear that any judgment rendered by the RTC-Makati amounts to res judicata in
the case before RTC-Tacloban. At the risk of sounding repetitive, the issues in both cases are the
validity of the termination of the Distributorship Agreement and the consequential damages that may
arise in case of any breach.

65
 Thus, while forum shopping exists in this case, the Court did not agree that the filing of the
second complaint is willful and deliberate. Hence, it is necessary to rule on which of the two cases
must be dismissed.
Generally, the first action which was filed should be retained in accordance with the maxim
qui prior est tempore, potior est jure. However, this rule is subject to exceptions: (a) the first action
may be abated if it was Bled merely to pre-empt the later action or to anticipate its Bling and lay the
basis for its dismissal or the anticipatory test; and (b) the first action may be abated if it is not the
more appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties or the more appropriate action
test.
In this case, the Court deemed it proper to apply the general rule, there being no showing that
the first complaint was filed to simply pre-empt the second complaint or anticipate its filing nor any
indication that the second complaint was the more appropriate case. Noteworthy is the fact that the
first complaint delves into the validity of the contract itself, which would determine whether or not
the award of damages is in order. Hence, it is but proper to allow the first complaint to proceed for
the determination of the rights of all the parties.

66
 MULTILISTIO, INC. AND JUDITH M. LABURADA, AS PRESIDENT v.
MINDS VIEW GRAPHICS ADS, represented by SPOUSES JACQUELINE A. MANHILOT AND CESAR
A. MANHILOT, OWNER AND MANAGER
G.R. No. 195773, 01 October 2019, EN BANC (Peralta, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Litis pendentia refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the same parties
for the same cause of action, such that either of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. Thus there is
litis pendentia when the following elements are present, namely: (a) the identity of parties or at least
such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and the relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. In
this case, all of the elements of litis pendentia are present.

Here, the similarity of the parties was readily apparent as both parties are the same litigants in
the case before the RTC of Pasig City and the one before the RTC of Davao City.

FACTS
Multilistio, Inc. (Multilistio) and Judith Laburada (Laburada) entered into a deed of
conditional sale with the Spouses Jacqueline and Cesar Manhilot (Spouses Manhilot) for the sale of
an inkjet printer.

Later, Spouses Manhilot sent a letter of request for technical support under its warranty to
Multilistio and Laburada. In response, the latter demanded in advance the payment for the repair and
replacement of the printer heads, subject to reimbursement upon approval under the warranty
clause. Spouses Manhilot delivered the payment but stopped paying for the subsequent installments.

Multilistio and Laburada sent demand letters for the remaining unpaid installments but
Spouses Manhilot refused to pay. As a result, the former opted to file a complaint against the latter
for Recovery of Possession with Replevin and Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City. The spouses duly filed their answer with counterclaim for Rescission of contract and/or breach
of warranty before the RTC of Davao City. Multilistio and Laburada moved for dismissal arguing that
the case filed by the spouses in RTC of Davao City amounted to forum shopping.

ISSUE
Is there forum shopping in the instant case?

RULING
YES. There is forum shopping when “a party repeatedly avails himself of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other courts.”

The test of determining forum shopping is whether the element of litis pendentia are present,
or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia refers
to the situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action,
such that either of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious.

67
 Thus there is litis pendentia when the following elements are present, namely: (a) the identity
of parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights
asserted and the relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of
the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other. In this case, all of the elements of litis pendentia are present.

Here, the similarity of the parties was readily apparent as both parties are the same litigants
in the case before the RTC of Pasig City and the one before the RTC of Davao City.

As for the second element, Spouses Manhilot have asserted the same rights and reliefs in both
civil cases. The spouses presented the same set of evidence before the two courts in asserting its right
of reimbursement for amortizations already paid and for breach of warranty in the other court.
Accordingly, the Spouses Manhilot violated the rule on splitting of cause of action by opting to file a
separate case similar to what should have been pleaded in a counterclaim. Such prohibition is a
matter of policy “to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same
subject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and
expenses incident to numerous suits.

Finally, the similarity in both cases in such that any decision rendered in the case filed before
the RTC of Pasig City will, regardless of the winning party, would constitute res judicata in the one
filed before the RTC of Davao City.

68
 BF CITILAND CORPORATION v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS.
G.R. No. 224912, 16 October 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, J. JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is
identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. If a situation of litis pendentia or res
judicata arises by virtue of a party’s commencement of a judicial remedy identical to one which already
exist (either pending or already resolved), then a forum shopping infraction is committed. Here, all the
elements of forum shopping are present.

FACTS
BF Citiland Corporation (BF Citiland) executed a Deed of Conveyance over its real property
in favor of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) as payment for subscription
of shares. Banco Filipino used the property to secure its Special Liquidity Facilities Loan (SLF loan)
from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). However, the property’s title was not yet transferred to Banco
Filipino pending BSP’s favorable endorsement.
Upon the request of Banco Filipino, BF Citiland executed a deed of real estate mortgage as
accommodation mortgagor to secure Banco Filipino’s SLF loan from the BSP. BF Citiland then learned
that BSP disapproved the conveyance of the property in exchange for Banco Filipino stocks, so it
rescinded the deed of conveyance. Subsequently, Banco Filipino was placed under the receivership
of Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
BSP filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage against BF
Citiland. BF Citiland filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with application for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order against BSP, the Makati
RTC Clerk of Court and the Ex-Officio Sheriff. The Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) Clerk of Court
proceeded with the auction sale of the mortgaged property in which BSP was the highest bidder.
Thereafter, BF Citiland filed an action for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale with
application for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order against Banco Filipino, BSP, the
Makati RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff.
BSP filed individual motions to dismiss in the Makati RTC Branches 141 and 143 on the
ground of forum shopping. Branch 141 denied the motion to dismiss in the annulment case and the
motion for reconsideration. However, Branch 143 ruled differently and dismissed the petition for
declaratory relief because Citiland committed forum shopping.
BSP filed an omnibus motion before Branch 141 to take judicial notice of the Order of Branch
143 and to dismiss the annulment case. Branch 141 dismissed the omnibus motion and denied the
motion for reconsideration. The BSP filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
The CA granted the petition for Certiorari and dismissed the annulment case. The CA resolved
that there is identity of parties and of causes of action in the declaratory relief case and the annulment
case. The CA found that both cases were based on a single issue: whether or not the foreclosure of
the real estate mortgages was proper while Banco Filipino is under receivership.
ISSUE

69
 Did BF Citiland commit forum shopping?
RULING
YES. The elements of forum shopping are present. The test to determine whether or not
forum shopping was committed was explained in Dy, et al. v. Yu, et al.:
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping,
the most important factor to ask is whether the element of litis pendentia is present
or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
Otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two
(or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and
reliefs sought. If a situation of litis pendentia or res judicata arises by virtue of a
party’s commencement of a judicial remedy identical to one which already exist
(either pending or already resolved), then a forum shopping infraction is
committed.
First, the petitioner/complainant in the declaratory relief case and the annulment case is the
same, BF Citiland. There are common respondents in the two actions, BSP and the Makati RTC Clerk
of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff. Even if Banco Filipino was not a party in the declaratory case, it still
has an interest in its outcome because the foreclosure affects its SLF loan from BSP. With the identity
of parties or interests in both cases, one of the elements of forum shopping is present.
Second, the Court finds that, although terminologies of the two actions are dissimilar, they
were rooted on the same theory of the case, protected the same right of BF Citiland, and pursued the
same result. Thus, there is identity of right or cause of action and relief sought. Both were aimed to
protect BF Citiland’s right to retain title and ownership over the mortgaged property. Both actions
asked the courts (Branch 141 and Branch 143) to stop and/or invalidate the foreclosure proceeding
and its subsequent proceedings. Both were based on the same theory of the case—Banco Filipino
cannot be forced to perform its principal loan obligation to BSP because of the prohibition to pay
while it is under PDIC receivership. Consequently, the accessory mortgage obligation cannot be
enforced as well.
Lastly, a decision on the merits in one action is, in theory, also a decision on the other
remaining action. Since the two actions were filed in two different courts/fora, the
complainant/petitioner is considered to be shopping for a favorable result.

70
 DIGITEL EMPLOYEES UNION v. DIGITAL TELECOMS PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 217529, 03 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Reyes, A., Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The petition was signed by Licardo as President of the DEU. The Court recognized the authority
of the President of a corporation to sign a verification and certification of non-forum shopping without
authority from the board of director. This recognition was extended to union presidents.

FACTS

In 2013, DIGITEL announced that it was terminating all of its employees on the ground of
redundancy arising from the acquisition of PLDT of the former’s telecommunication network. In
response to this, Digitil Employees Union (DEU) filed a Request for Prevention Mediation with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).

When the preventive mediation did not work, DEU filed a Manifestation and Motion to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) praying for the suspension of the termination of
DIGITEL’s employees, execution of the decision compelling DIGITEL to negotiate a CBA with them
and to reinstate the laid-off employees. DIGITEL countered this with their own Manifestation and
Motion praying that the SOLE resolve DEU’s motions either by denying them on the ground of the
supervening event of redundancy declaration or by certifying the matter to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). SOLE certified the matter to the NLRC, which upheld the validity of
the redundancy program.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, DEU filed a petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA). CA ordered the submission of DEU’s and DIGITEL’s addresses, as well as the
resolution authorizing the DEU President to sign and file the petition for Certiorari on behalf of DEU.
DEU sent the document requested in compliance as evidenced by the documentation of the registered
mail. However, CA issued a resolution dismissing DEU’s petition, as per Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court, failure to comply with the requirements in contents and filing of a petition.

The dismissal of the petition prompted DEU to file a MR. In response to this, CA issued another
resolution which noted without action DEU’s compliance in view of the earlier resolution. DEU
treated this as a denial of the MR. Hence, this petition for Certiorari.

DIGITEL contends that the verification/certification of non-forum shopping is defective

because the board resolution authorizing DEU President to file the petition in its behalf that was
submitted to the CA was signed much later than the verification itself. Thus, the signatory of the
certification had no authority to sign it on behalf of DEU at the time it was filed.

ISSUE

Was DEU’s petition for Certiorari substantially compliant with the Rules of Court?

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RULING

YES. In achieving this conclusion, the SC considered the following parameters:

l) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or

submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily

render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or
act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge
to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,
and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect

therein, unlike in verification, [which is] generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the
case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially
complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. It, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-
pleader is unable to sign; he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

The Court finds the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in DEU's petition for
Certiorari to be substantially compliant with the Rules of Court. The petition was signed by Licardo
as President of the DEU. The Court recognized the authority of the President of a corporation to sign
a verification and certification of non-forum shopping without authority from the board of director.
This recognition was extended to union presidents. The recognition of the authority of the president
of a juridical entity (whether a corporation or a union) to sign verifications and certifications without
prior board approval is based on the role and function of a president within the juridical entity, such
that the president is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the
petition.

Furthermore, the union president, Licardo's authority to sign the verification and
certification was also given after the petition had been filed. It cannot therefore be said that Licardo
was absolutely bereft of authority to sign the petition, considering that he is the president of DEU and

72
the DEU board subsequently ratified his act. The substantive issues raised in this case, and the
implications they have for the livelihood of DIGITEL's workers, compel this Court, in the name of
justice, to relax the rules and allow DEU's petition to be tried on the merits.

73
 3. Manner of making allegations (Rule 8)
4. Effect of failure to plead (Rule 9)
5. Amended and supplemental pleadings (Rule 10)
6. When to file responsive pleadings (Rule 11)
F. Filing and service of pleadings, judgments, final orders, and resolutions
1. Rules on payment of docket fees; effect of non-payment
EMPIRE INSURANCE, INC., MARIO A. REMOROSA (in his capacity as approving officer of
Empire Insurance Company), VIRGINIA BELINDA S. OCAMPO, JOSE AUGUSTO G. SANTOS, and
KATRINA G. SANTOS, petitioners, vs. ATTY. MARCIANO S. BACALLA, JR., ATTY. EDUARDO M.
ABACAN, ERLINDA U. LIM, FELICITO A. MADAMBA, PEPITO M. DELGADO, and THE
FEDERATION OF INVESTORS TULUNGAN, INC., respondents.
(G.R. No. 195215, THIRD DIVISION, March 6, 2019, A.B. REYES, JR., J.)

Seen in light of these doctrines, the Court holds that the action filed by the Bacalla group in the case at
bar is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The action has for its primary objective the nullification of the
transactions which brought the shares in dispute outside the control of the debtor, i.e., Tibayan Group,
and perforce to preserve them for inclusion in the assets to be liquidated.

Furthermore, the Bacalla group does not assert direct, personal claims over the shares. Bacalla claims
the shares only in his capacity as receiver of the Tibayan Group, while Abacan, et al. and FITI claim the
shares only for purposes of having them included in the asset pool of the Tibayan Group, out of which
their respective claims are to be paid.

The Court, therefore, held that the primary objective of the claim in that case was for recovery of
property, hence, filing fees must be computed on the basis of the value of the shares as alleged by the
claimant. Considering that the Bacalla group paid almost Php1,100,000.00 in filing fees, they have more
than complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
__

Jurisprudence has laiddown the following requisites for the valid grant of preliminary injunctive relief:
(a) thatthe right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined isviolative of
that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for thewrit to prevent serious
damage.

Anent the first requisite, there has been a prima facie showing of the existence of a right in essein favor
of the Bacalla group. As found by the CA, their right to the shares in dispute is based on the final and
executory decision of the trial court in the dissolution proceedings against Tibayan Group. The findings
of the SEC which led to the issuance of the Cease-and-Desist Order against the Tibayan Group, and the
PSE memorandum only serve as further proof of the existence of this clear and unmistakable right, by
illustrating the flow of the assets from the Tibayan Group to the dummy corporations to the defendants.

Anent the second and third requisites, given that shares of stock are a readily tradable commodity, the
Court concurs with the CA that the right of the Bacalla group to the return of the shares to the Tibayan
Group's asset pool will be greatly prejudiced if the continued disposition thereof is not enjoined.

74
FACTS:
This case is an offshoot of the liquidation proceedings of the Tibayan Group of Companies, involving
the recovery of 650,225 Prudential Bank common shares allegedly acquired in fraud ofTibayan
Group's investor creditors.

Both entities were allegedly dummy corporations used by the Tibayan Group to dispose of assets in
fraud of creditors by using illegally transferred assets to buy and sell shares of stock, some of which
were acquired by Empire Insurance, Inc. (EII), et al.RTC of Las Piñas City granted thepetition for
involuntary dissolution.

Subsequently, Atty.Bacalla, Jr., in his capacity as the court-appointed receiver of the Tibayan Group,
filed a "Very Urgent" application for injunctive relief before the trial court, seeking to enjoin the
holders of the Prudential Bank shares from selling or otherwise disposing the same to other parties.
The trial court, in its Resolution, granted the application.

Bacalla, together with certain Tibayan Group investors who filed the dissolution suit, thus filed a case
for securities fraud, declaration of nullity, and specific performance with prayer for issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Las Piñas City.

In their answer, defendants countered that: 1) the filing fees were deficient because the correct basis
of computation should have been the market value of the shares, which was alleged to be at
Php400.00 to 700.00, thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction; 2) the complaint failed to state
a cause of action; 3) Bacalla and the Federation of Investors Tulungan, Inc. (FITI) were not real
parties-in-interest; and 4) the sales of the shares by the alleged Tibayan Group dummies to the
defendants were valid.

Trial court issued an Order, granting the Bacalla group's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction,
ruling that they were able to substantiate the bases for the grant of such relief in their favor. As
regards the alleged deficiency in the payment of filing fees, the trial court refused to disturb the clerk
of court's computation thereof, invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties.

On petition for certiorari, the CA ruled that the Bacalla group was able to establish the existence of a
material and substantial invasion of a clear and unmistakable right in their favor, which would cause
them serious damage if not stopped through a writ of preliminary injunction.On the issue of the
correct amount of filing fees to be paid, the CA upheld par value as the basis for the computation of
the filing fees. It held that the market value of the shares was only mentioned as part of the
complaint's narration of facts. In contrast, the par value is the nominal value of the shares as stated
in the stock certificates.On the issue of the propriety of the grant of preliminary injunctive relief, the
CA held that there was a "traceable connection" from the Tibayan Group to TMG Holdings and CAHC;
and a "discernible flow of assets" from the Tibayan Group to the defendants. Aggrieved, the Empire
group sought recourse before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in upholding the trialcourt's issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction, despite the Bacalla group's failure to pay the correct filing fees; and

75
(2)Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in refusing to recognize that the Empire group
was denied due process of law when the injunction was issued?

RULING:
(1) Correct amount of filing fees
The settled rule is that a case is deemed filed only upon the payment of the filing fee. The court
acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon full payment of such prescribed filing fee. The
computation of the correct amount of filing fees to be paid rests upon a determination of the nature
of the action. Thus, in a money claim or a claim involving property, the filing fee is computed in
relation to the value of the money or property claimed;while in an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the Rules prescribe a determinate amount as filing fees.

Jurisprudence has laid down the "primary objective" test to determine if an action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. This test is explained in the 1968 case of Lapitanv. Scandia, Inc., et al.,viz.:

If the action is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of the principal relief sought like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.

In Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr., et al.,the Court held that an action for "Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue,
Receivership and Dissolution" was incapable of pecuniary estimation, because "the annulment of the
shares, the dissolution of the corporation and theappointment of receivers/management committee
are actions which do not consist inthe recovery of a sum of money. If, in the end, a sum of money or
real property would berecovered, it would simply be the consequence of such principal action.” The
Court further noted in Lu that actions assailing the legality of a conveyance or for annulment of
contract have been considered incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Seen in light of these doctrines, the Court holds that the action filed by the Bacalla group in the case
at bar is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The action has for its primary objective the nullification
of the transactions which brought the shares in dispute outside the control of the debtor, i.e., Tibayan
Group, and perforce to preserve them for inclusion in the assets to be liquidated.

Furthermore, the Bacalla group does not assert direct, personal claims over the shares. Bacalla claims
the shares only in his capacity as receiver of the Tibayan Group, while Abacan, et al. and FITI claim
the shares only for purposes of having them included in the asset pool of the Tibayan Group, out of
which their respective claims are to be paid.

The Court, therefore, held that the primary objective of the claim in that case was for recovery of
property, hence, filing fees must be computed on the basis of the value of the shares as alleged by the
claimant. Considering that the Bacalla group paid almost Php1,100,000.00 in filing fees, they have
more than complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.

76
Propriety of injunctive relief
The Empire group, in assailing the grant of preliminary injunctive relief to the Bacalla group, argue
that the SEC findings and the PSE memorandum do not constitute sufficient basis for the grant of a
preliminary injunctive writ. Empire group failed to offer cogent reasons to reverse the concurrent
rulings of the courts a quo.

Jurisprudence has laiddown the following requisites for the valid grant of preliminary injunctive
relief: (a) thatthe right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined
isviolative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for thewrit to prevent
serious damage.

The Court is satisfied that the allegations and evidence set forth by the Bacalla group constitute
sufficient bases for the grant of preliminary injunctive relief.

Anent the first requisite, there has been a prima facie showing of the existence of a right in essein
favor of the Bacalla group. As found by the CA, their right to the shares in dispute is based on the final
and executory decision of the trial court in the dissolution proceedings against Tibayan Group. The
findings of the SEC which led to the issuance of the Cease-and-Desist Order against the Tibayan
Group, and the PSE memorandum only serve as further proof of the existence of this clear and
unmistakable right, by illustrating the flow of the assets from the Tibayan Group to the dummy
corporations to the defendants.

Anent the second and third requisites, given that shares of stock are a readily tradable commodity,
the Court concurs with the CA that the right of the Bacalla group to the return of the shares to the
Tibayan Group's asset pool will be greatly prejudiced if the continued disposition thereof is not
enjoined.

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 2. Rule 13
VIRGILIO VILLALONGHA, LUZVIMINDA P. VILLALONGHA-OMBING, and
VIRGINCITA P. VILLALONGHA-BATUTO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 227222, 20 August 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Service of the court's order upon any person other than the counsel of record is not legally
effective and binding upon the party, nor may it start the corresponding reglementary period for the
subsequent procedural steps that may be taken by the attorney.

Since Ariel Hernandez was not an employee and, thus, not authorized to receive court notices in
behalf of Atty. Advincula, Jr., his alleged receipt of the notice of the March 22, 2013 Decision is without
any effect in law, and cannot start the running of the period within which to file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal.

FACTS
The instant case stemmed from a complaint for annulment of sale and transfer certificates of
title (TCT) originally filed by the siblings Virgilio, Luzviminda, and Virgincita Villalongha
(Villalonghas) against their mother and other siblings, Bolton Bridge Homeowners Association
(BBHA), and the Register of Deeds (RD) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the Villalonghas failed to establish their
claim by a preponderance of evidence. It adjudged that Felipa was the sole owner of the subject lands.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC and declared the sale of Felipa to BBHA
as valid and binding (March 22, 2013 Decision).

A copy of the CA’s decision was sent to Atty. Victorio Advincula, Jr., the counsel of Villalonghas,
and was received by a certain Ariel Hernandez. However, Atty. Advincula informed the CA that he did
not receive a copy of the notice containing the judgment of the CA, and Ariel Hernandez is not his
staff or employee. Atty. Advincula filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and was granted by the CA.

Virgilio, on behalf of Villalonghas, requested that he be given some time to engage the services
of a new counsel to handle his case. Thereafter, Atty. Arnold C. Abejaron (Atty. Abejaron) filed a
formal entry of appearance as counsel of the Villalonghas. He opposed BBHAI’s Motion for Issuance
of Entry of Judgment.

In a Resolution, the CA held that its March 22, 2013 Decision had become final and executory
and directed the entry of judgment. The March 22, 2013 was thus entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgments.

ISSUE
Was the Court of Appeals correct in directing entry of judgment despite claim of lack of proper
service by the Villalonghas?

RULING

78
 NO. Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that "if any party has appeared by
counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the
party himself is ordered by the court." Thus, even if a party represented by counsel has been
actually notified, said notice is not considered notice in law.

In the case at bar, the registry return card pertaining to Atty. Advincula, Jr.'s copy of the notice
was not returned to the CA. However, the CA concluded that the notice was received by Atty.
Advincula, Jr. on the basis of the reply to tracer of William H. Olmoguez, Postmaster of Davao City,
that a certain Ariel Hernandez received the notice on May 8, 2013. 50 But in his request
manifestation, Atty. Advincula, Jr. denied having received such notice and knowing Ariel Hernandez,
which was not refuted by BBHA.

Service of judgments may be made by mail. However, it must be stressed that the mail matter
must be received by the addressee or his duly authorized representative since service on a person
who was not a clerk, employee or one in charge of the attorney's office, is invalid. "[S]ervice of the
court's order upon any person other than the counsel of record is not legally effective and
binding upon the party, nor may it start the corresponding reglementary period for the
subsequent procedural steps that may be taken by the attorney."

Since Ariel Hernandez was not an employee and, thus, not authorized to receive court notices
in behalf of Atty. Advincula, Jr., his alleged receipt of the notice of the March 22, 2013 Decision is
without any effect in law, and cannot start the running of the period within which to file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal.

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 G. Summons
1. Nature and purpose of summons in relation to actions in personam, in rem,
and quasi in rem 2. Rule 14
H. Motions
1. In general (Rule 15)
2. Motion to dismiss (Rule 16)
ENGRACIO U. ANG, JR. v. SPOUSES BENJAMIN M. BITANGA and MARILYN ANDAL BITANGA,
MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS STOCK TRANSFER
OFFICE and WILFRED T. SIY
G.R. No. 223046, 28 November 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Peralta, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The second way or the “conclusiveness of judgment rule,” on the other hand, considers the final
judgment in a previous case not as an absolute bar to a subsequent case between the same parties, but
merely as having a preclusive effect on the latter case insofar as the matters already settled in that final
judgment are concerned. This variant of res judicata applies when there is an identity of parties, but
not of claim, demand, or cause of action, between the subsequent case and the previously decided case.
The complaint fails not by reason of litis pendentia, but because the main cause of action therein
has already been precluded by the finality of the Order of the RTC Quezon City in the indirect contempt
case even though Engracio Ang’s complaint and the indirect contempt case may have different
objectives and ask for distinct relief.
The Order of the RTC Quezon City dismissing the charges of indirect contempt against MGCCI
and Siy attained immediate finality upon its promulgation. Thus, under the rule of conclusiveness of
judgment, a variant of res judicata, matters settled in that final order already assumed binding and
conclusive effect on the Engracio Ang.
FACTS
In 1997, Macrogen Realty (Macrogen) engaged the services of Pyramid Construction
Engineering Corporation (Pyramid) for the construction of a shopping mall in Parañaque City.
Pyramid began working on the construction project in May 1997.
In August 1998, Pyramid stopped working on the project due to Macrogen’s failure to settle
its outstanding obligations under the construction agreement. Thereafter, Pyramid and Macrogen
entered into a compromise agreement, which was approved by the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC). Under the terms of the compromise agreement, the payment of Macrogen’s
obligation was secured by a guaranty of its president, Benjamin Bitanga (Bitanga).
Macrogen, however, failed to pay any of the monthly installments agreed upon. Thus,
Pyramid filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for specific performance with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Bitanga and his wife. In
implementing the writ, the sheriff of RTC issued a notice of garnishment against the shares of stock
of Bitanga in Manila Golf and Country Clud, Inc. (MGCCI), covered by the Membership Certificate (MC)
No. 2254.

80
 Pyramid promptly requested MGCCI for the transfer of MC No. 2254 in its name. However,
the request was turned down by MGCCI. MGCCI explained that MC No. 2254 was no longer Bitanga’s
since July 30, 2008 because it was already transferred to and recorded in the books of the corporation
under the name of Wilfred Siy (Siy). MGCCI professed that it knew no attachment of Bitanga’s stocks
in favor of Pyramid.
Pyramid filed before the RTC a petition for indirect contempt against MGCCI, Bitangga, and
Siy. Initially, they were ordered to pay a fine, while Bitanga and Siy were meted prison sentences in
addition to fine. Yet the RTC reversed itself, exonerating both MGCCI and Siy from any liability for
indirect contempt because it found that neither the MGCCI nor Siy is capable of violating the notice
of garnishment since it was not actually addressed and delivered to MGCCI or Siy, but to a completely
different entity. Hence, the notice of garnishment never imposed any duty of obligation upon MGCCI
or Siy that they, in turn could breach.
During the pendency of the petition for indirect contempt, Engracio Ang, as assignee of
Pyramid, filed before the RTC Makati another complaint seeking to compel MGCCI to transfer MC No.
2254 in his name.
ISSUE
Did the RTC Makati err in dismissing Ang’s complaint on the ground of litis pendentia?
RULING
NO. The norm observed in our jurisdiction regards as unappealable any judgment or final
order that dismisses on the merits a charge of indirect contempt.
The principle of res judicata may be applied in two (2) ways. The first way, which is known
as the “bar by former judgment rule,” considers the final judgment in previous case as an absolute
bar to a subsequent case between the same parties. For this variant of res judicata to apply, however,
it is essential that the subsequent case was prosecuted between the same parties and on the same
claim, demand, or cause of action as the previously decided case.
The second way or the “conclusiveness of judgment rule,” on the other hand, considers the
final judgment in a previous case not as an absolute bar to a subsequent case between the same
parties, but merely as having a preclusive effect on the latter case insofar as the matters already
settled in that final judgment are concerned. This variant of res judicata applies when there is an
identity of parties, but not of claim, demand, or cause of action, between the subsequent case and the
previously decided case.
The complaint fails not by reason of litis pendentia, but because the main cause of action
therein has already been precluded by the finality of the Order of the RTC Quezon City in the indirect
contempt case even though Engracio Ang’s complaint and the indirect contempt case may have
different objectives and ask for distinct relief.
The Order of the RTC Quezon City dismissing the charges of indirect contempt against MGCCI
and Siy attained immediate finality upon its promulgation. Thus, under the rule of conclusiveness of
judgment, a variant of res judicata, matters settled in that final order already assumed binding and
conclusive effect on the Engracio Ang.
The finality of the order in the indirect contempt case was unaffected by the filing of the
certiorari case before the CA. The certiorari case is neither an appeal from nor a continuation of the

81
indirect contempt case. It is an original action founded upon a cause of action that is distinct from
the one in the indirect contempt case.

3. Motion for bill of particulars (Rule 12)

I. Dismissal
1. Kinds
a. With prejudice vs. without prejudice
b. Dismissals which have an effect of an adjudication on the merits
2. Rule 17
J. Pre-trial (Rule 18)

SPOUSES AURORA TOJONG SU and AMADOR SU v.

EDA BONTILAO, BONTILAO, and DA YANDA YAN
G.R. No. 238892, 04 September 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 4, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the non-appearance of a party may
be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully
authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
In this case, petitioners executed an SPA in favor of their former counsel, Atty. Amores, expressly
granting him full authority to represent them during the preliminary conference. The Court finds the
SPA to be sufficient written authorization in favor of petitioners' counsel that excused the non-
appearance of petitioners at the preliminary conference.

FACTS
Spouses Su filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, against Bontilao et al. as well as several
others in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), alleging that Bontilao et. al. had constructed their
houses on the subject property and had been occupying the same by mere tolerance, with the
understanding that they will peacefully vacate the premises upon proper demand. Unfortunately,
when the Spouses Su requested them to voluntarily vacate the premises, they refused. Thus, after
efforts for an amicable settlement before the barangay similarly failed, Spouses Su instituted the
present complaint for unlawful detainer.

In defense, Bontilao et. al. claimed that petitioners had no cause of action against them, not
being the real owners of the subject property. They averred that petitioners obtained their title
through fraud.

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 At first, the MTCC dismissed the case insofar as respondents were concerned for failure of
petitioners and their counsel to appear at the preliminary conference despite due notice. However,
upon motion for reconsideration, the MTCC issued an order granting the same and resetting the
preliminary conference anew.

The MTCC found that the Spouses Su have the right of possession over the property as the
registered owner of it. Consequently, the respondents’ actual possession and occupation was by mere
tolerance of petitioners, hence, respondents were bound to peacefully vacate upon demand. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MTCC’s decision.

However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC issuances and instead,
dismissed the complaint altogether. The appellate court held that it was wrong for the RTC to affirm
the MTCC’s decision since even if the counsel’s reason for his failure to attend the preliminary
conference was justifiable, it did not excuse the absence of the spouses.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer based on procedural
considerations?

RULING
YES. Section 7 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure states that the failure of the
plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint.
Moreover, Section 4, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the non-appearance of a party
may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf
fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of
dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
In this case, petitioners executed an SPA in favor of their former counsel, Atty. Amores,
expressly granting him full authority to represent them during the preliminary conference. The Court
finds the SPA to be sufficient written authorization in favor of petitioners' counsel that excused the
non-appearance of petitioners at the preliminary conference. Unless and until a clear and manifest
abuse of discretion is committed by the judge, his appreciation of a party's reasons for his non-
appearance will not be disturbed.
Verily, the CA erred in completely dismissing petitioners' petition before it on purely
procedural grounds. Indeed, it is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently
held that cases shall be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation
of their causes and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In so
doing, the ends of justice would be better served. The dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds
is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense,
for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very
ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other
matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.

83
 K. Intervention (Rule 19)
L. Subpoena (Rule 21)
M. Computation of time (Rule 22)
N. Modes of discovery
1. Depositions (Rules 23 and 24)
2. Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25)
BDO STRATEGIC HOLDINGS, INC. v. ASIA AMALGAMATED HOLDINGS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 217360, 13 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION, (Reyes, A., JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Good cause means a substantial reason – one that affords a legal excuse. In other words, it is for
the court to determine whether there is a substantial reason to disallow a deposition, as in this case.
Thus, the grounds for disallowing a written interrogatory are not restricted to those expressly
mentioned under the Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence. It must also be emphasized that the
court's exercise of such discretion will not be set aside in the absence of a use, or unless the court's
disposition of matters of discovery was improvident and affected the substantial rights of the parties.

Here, the court finds no reason to reverse the ruling of the CA, affirming the RTC's decision to
disallow the written interrogatories addressed to respondents. Petitioners failed to establish that the
disallowance by the lower court was made arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively to warrant a
reversal.

FACTS

BDO Strategic Holdings, Inc. (formerly EBC Strategic Holdings, Inc.) and Banco De Oro
Unibank, Inc. (formerly Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.) (petitioners) are corporations duly organized under
the laws of the Philippines. Asia Amalgamated Holdings Corporation (PAAH) is a holding company
whose shares are listed in the Philippine Stock Exchange, and whose majority shares are owned by
Mr. Jimmy Gow (Mr. Gow).

Subsequently, PAAH filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract and damages
against petitioners.

The trial for the case started and Mr. Gow was presented as the first witness. Cross-
examinations were also conducted during the hearing dates. However, the cross-examination for the
next trial was suspended since petitioners filed a request for issuance of subpoena duces tecum, which
was granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the same day.

84
 Petitioners insisted that PAAH must comply with the subpoena duces tecum before the cross-
examination of Mr. Gow could be continued. However, PAAH manifested that it would file an
opposition and motion to quash the subpoena. Pending petitioners' opposition to PAAH’s motion to
quash, BDO Strategic Holdings, Inc. filed its written interrogatories addressed to PAAH.

RTC granted the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum of PAAH and the written
interrogatories served on them. It set aside the issued subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum on
the belief that it in effect would make Mr. Gow a witness for the adverse party. Also, the RTC denied
the taking of Written Interrogatories because it would not facilitate the disposition of the case.

The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the quashal of the subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum but upheld the disallowance of the written interrogatories. The petitioners filed a
motion for partial reconsideration but the same was denied.

ISSUE

Did the CA commit a reversible error in affirming the disallowance of the written
interrogatories addressed to PAAH?.

RULING

NO. It is true that depositions are legal instruments consistent with the principle of
promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding. They are
designed to facilitate the early disposition of cases and expedite the wheel of justice. Hence, the use
of discovery is highly encouraged.

However, while the petitioners are correct in contending that modes of discovery are
important and encouraged, this is not absolute. It is important to be reminded that the right to take
deposition, whether in a form of oral or written interrogatories, has limitations. The Rules of Court
expressly provides for limitations to deposition when the examination is being conducted in bad faith
or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. Depositions
are also limited when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized
domains of privilege.

Under statutes and procedural rules, the court enjoys considerable leeway in matters
pertaining to discovery. Section 16 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court clearly states that, upon notice
and for good cause, the court may order for a deposition not to be taken. Clearly, the court shall
exercise its judicial discretion to determine the matter of good cause.

Good cause means a substantial reason- one that affords a legal excuse. In other words, it is
for the court to determine whether there is a substantial reason to disallow a deposition, as in this
case. Thus, the grounds for disallowing a written interrogatory are not restricted to those expressly
mentioned under the Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence.

PAAH showed good cause for the disallowance. As correctly ruled by the CA, considering that
the case is in the cross-examination stage already, the use of written interrogatories will not serve its
purpose anymore. It cannot aid in the reparation and speedy disposition of the pending case. Instead,
it will only cause further delay in the proceedings. It is worthy to note that petitioners' written

85
interrogatories have a total of 561 questions, which comprise the 16 sets of interrogatories from A
to Q. The facts which the written interrogatories want to elicit can be extracted from the continuation
of the cross-examination.

Petitioners also alleged that the findings of the RTC and CA that the written interrogatories
were framed to "annoy, embarrass or oppress" the deponent. They, however, must be reminded that
this Court is not a trier of facts. It is a fundamental and settled dictum that conclusions and findings
of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, unless
strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise. This is because the trial court is in a better position to
examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the
case.

In this case, the mere allegations of petitioners that the subjects of the written interrogatories
are relevant to the case and not made in bad faith, or in a manner intended to annoy, embarrass or
oppress, are not sufficient bases to revisit the factual evidence involved. It is also important to
remember that inquiry in written interrogatories should not only be relevant to the case, but also
made in good faith and within the grounds of the law. Thus, this Court finds no reason to reverse the
finding of the CA.

86
 3. Admission by adverse party (Rule 26)
4. Production or inspection of documents or things (Rule 27)
5. Physical and mental examination of persons (Rule 28)
6. Refusal to comply with modes of discovery (Rule 29)
O. Trial (Rule 30)
HUN HYUN PARK, petitioner -versus- EUNG WON CHOI, respondent.
G.R. No. 220826, SECOND DIVISION, March 27, 2019, CARPIO, J.
As the Court enunciated in Sibay v. Bermudez: Thus, in considering motions for postponements, two
things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the
movant. Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by
mandamus or appeal. Because it is a matter of privilege, not a right, a movant for postponement should
not assume beforehand that his motion will be granted.
It does not escape the Court's attention that from the time the MeTC gave Choi the opportunity to
present his evidence on July 16, 2008 until the issuance of the MeTC Order dated March 7, 2011 declaring
Choi' s right to present evidence to have been waived, Choi had been given several opportunities -
spanning almost three (3) years - to present his evidence.
Inasmuch as Choi had been given more than enough opportunity to present his case, the Court agrees
with the MeTC and the RTC that Choi had waived his right to present evidence. In this regard, Choi
cannot claim that he was "prevented from testifying" by the trial court, considering that all the
postponements in the proceedings were at the instance of Choi.
FACTS:
Petitioner Park, who was engaged in the business of lending money, extended a loan to respondent
Choi in the amount of P l,875,000.00. As payment, Choi issued PNB Check No. 0077133 in the same
amount in favor of Park. However, the check was dishonored for being drawn against a closed
account. Despite Park’s notice and demand upon Choi, the latter failed to make good of the check. As
a result, Park instituted a complaint against Choi for violation of B.P. 22.
Later in the criminal proceedings, the MeTC granted Choi’s demurrer to evidence. On appeal, the RTC
remanded the case to the MeTC, holding that while the evidencepresented was insufficient to prove
Choi's criminal liability for B.P. 22, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability.
With the proceedings now before the MeTC, the MeTC ordered the presentation of Choi's evidence
on the civil aspect of the case. However, in the course of the proceedings before MeTC, Choi
repeatedly moved for several postponements, which postponements eventually led the MeTC to
issue an order, declaring that Choi had waived his right to present evidence.
Subsequently, the MeTC, rendered a decision finding Choi civilly liable to Park, as affirmed by the
RTC. However, the CA reversed the lower courts. To the CA, the courts' strict adherence to the rules
of procedure may be relaxed when a strict implementation of the rules would cause substantial
injustice to the parties. In particular, the CA held that several postponements were with "justifiable
reasons," such as, in the instances of the erroneous certification and the substitution of counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not Choi was deprived of due process (NO)
RULING:

87
Choi was not deprived of due process. Choi had waived his right to present evidence. Claiming that
substantive justice must be the determinative end of courts, Choi argues that any grant of
postponement must take into consideration the reason for the postponement and the merits of the
case of the movant. To that extent, the Court agrees, and so holds, that Choi had been provided with
more than ample opportunity to present his case.
To begin with, the grant or denial of a motion - or, in this case, motions for postponement is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court, which should always be predicated on the consideration that the
ends of justice and fairness are served by the grant or denial of the motion. As the Court enunciated
in Sibay v. Bermudez:
x x x When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest with the
corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial
discretion to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated. Thus, in
considering motions for postponements, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the
postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant. Unless grave abuse of discretion is
shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or appeal. Because it is a
matter of privilege, not a right, a movant for postponement should not assume beforehand that his
motion will be granted.
In fact, pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, although a court may adjourn a
trial from day to day, a motion to postpone trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be granted
only upon affidavit showing the materiality or relevancy of such evidence, and that due diligence has
been used to procure it. Rules governing postponements serve a clear purpose –to avert the erosion
of people's confidence in the judiciary.
Consequently, in granting or denying motions for postponements, courts must exercise their
discretion constantly mindful of the Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the
disposition of cases. In other words, while it is true that cases must be adjudicated in a manner that
is in accordance with the established rules of procedure, so is it crucial that cases be promptly
disposed to better serve the ends of justice.
It does not escape the Court's attention that from the time the MeTC gave Choi the opportunity to
present his evidence on July 16, 2008 until the issuance of the MeTCOrder dated March 7, 2011
declaring Choi' s right to present evidence to have been waived, Choi had been given several
opportunities - spanning almost three (3) years - to present his evidence.
There is no deprivation of due process when a party is given an opportunity to be heard, not only
through hearings, but even through pleadings, so that one may explain one's side or arguments.
Inasmuch as Choi had been given more than enough opportunity to present his case, the Court agrees
with the MeTC and the RTC that Choi had waived his right to present evidence. In this regard, Choi
cannot claim that he was "prevented from testifying" by the trial court, considering that all the
postponements in the proceedings were at the instance of Choi.

88
 P. Consolidation or severance (Rule 31)
GOODLAND COMPANY, INC., petitioner –versus- BANCO DE ORO-UNIBANK, INC., AND
GOODGOLD REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 208543, FIRST DIVISION, February 11, 2019, DEL CASTILLO, J.
To be clear, the failure to consolidate a case with a related case does not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the former, unless there is litis pendentia or res judicata. Thus, it is incumbent upon the
parties to be on the lookout and to immediately inform the courts of cases pending with other courts,
and if needed, to move for the consolidation of related cases in order to avoid the dismissal of a case
on the grounds of litis pendentia and/or res judicata, or the issuance of conflicting decisions. This
petitioner Goodland failed to do.
In this case, the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 119327, on the ground of litis pendentia. As aptly found by the CA, the parties and
issues raised in the said case were identical to that of CA-G.R. SP No. 117223. This could have been
avoided had the two petitions for certiorari been consolidated. Petitioner Goodland, however, has
no one to blame but itself as it failed to inform the CA of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 117223 at
the time it filed its Petition for Certiorari.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1999, Gilbert Guy, on behalf of petitioner Goodland, Richgold Realty Corporation,
Smartnet Philippines, Inc., and respondent Goodgold Realty Development Corporation, secured
loans and credit facilities from Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCI). The debtor corporations, however,
failed to pay the monthly interest on the loan obligation. Thus, they offered to pay their loan
through a dacionenpago. Accordingly, on July 30, 2004, EPCI wrote a letter agreement confirming
that the property in Makati City, covered by TCT No. 218470, registered under the name of
respondent Goodgold, shall be applied as full payment of the loan obligation of the debtor
corporations at a dacion price of P245 million. A Deed of Cession of Property in Payment of Debt
(DacionEn Pago) was thereafter executed. However, despite the execution of the DacionEn Pago,
EPCI was not able to cause the transfer of the title under its name due to the alleged fraudulent
refusal of respondent Goodgold to turn over the transfer documents.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 2007, EPCI merged with respondent Banco De Oro Universal Bank to form
Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. (BDO).
On January 16, 2009, respondent BDO filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong
City, a Complaint for a Sum of Money with Application for Preliminary Attachment, against Guy,
petitioner Goodland, and the other debtor corporations.
On February 2, 2009, the RTC issued an Order granting respondent BDO's application for a writ
of preliminary attachment, and accordingly, caused the attachment of debtor corporations’
properties.
As expected, petitioner Goodland and Richgold filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion [a] to lift
attachment and/or partial discharge of attachment and [b] to stop implementation thereof on
account of excessive attachment. Guy, on the other hand, filed a Motion to Lift/Discharge
Attachment and to stop further implementation thereof; while respondent Goodgold filed an Ad
Cautelam Motion to Discharge Attachment.
On March 3, 2010, the RTC issued an Order discharging the properties of Guy and petitioner
Goodland with respect to TCT No. S-97436 (451440) on the ground that the properties of

89
respondent Goodgold covered by TCT Nos. 43837, 43838, and 218470 were sufficient to cover
the claims of respondent BDO.
Respondents Goodgold and BDO both moved for reconsideration.
On October 4, 2010, the RTC issued an Order denying respondent BDO's motion but partly
granting respondent Goodgold's motion in so far as it ordered the discharge of TCT No. 43838
and the reinstatement of the attachment of petitioner Goodland's property covered by TCT No.
S-97436 (451440).
Respondent BDO elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 117223.
Petitioner Goodland, on the other hand, moved for reconsideration.
On January 24, 2011, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner Goodland's motion. Thus, on
April 25, 2011, petitioner Goodland also filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 119327.
On June 6, 2011, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 117223, rendered a Decision granting the Petition for
Certiorari of respondent BDO. The CA, finding that the legal requisites for the attachment of Guy's
properties were duly proven, reinstated the attachment on the said properties. However, as to
the properties of respondent Goodgold, the CA ruled that there was no sufficient basis to include
the same in the writ, except for the property covered by TCT No. 218470 subject of the DacionEn
Pago but only to the extent of P69,821,702.77.
On February 22, 2013, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 119327, dismissed petitioner Goodland's
Petition for Certiorari in view of the June 6, 2011 Decision in the CA-G.R. SP No. 117223. The CA
found that there was an identity of parties and issues between the two petitions for certiorari,
and thus, a judgment in one would result in res judicata in the other.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Goodland. (YES)

RULING:

Consolidation is "a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its
docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with
economy while providing justice to the parties." Though there is no hard and fast rule requiring
the consolidation of related cases, Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court allows the courts to
order the consolidation of cases involving a common question of law or fact that are pending
before it in order to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
To be clear, the failure to consolidate a case with a related case does not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the former, unless there is litis pendentia or res judicata. Thus, it is incumbent upon
the parties to be on the lookout and to immediately inform the courts of cases pending with other
courts, and if needed, to move for the consolidation of related cases in order to avoid the dismissal
of a case on the grounds of litis pendentia and/or res judicata, or the issuance of conflicting
decisions. This petitioner Goodland failed to do.

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Litis pendentia is a ground for the dismissal of an action when there is another action pending
between the same parties involving the same cause of action, thus, rendering the second action
unnecessary and vexatious. It exists when the following requisites concur:
1. Identity of parties or of representation in both cases, AIDSTE
2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
3. The relief must be founded on the same facts and the same basis, and
4. Identity in the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment
which may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata on the action under consideration. 49
Res judicata, on the other hand, exists if the following requisites concur: "(1) the former judgment
or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there must
be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of
action."
In this case, the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 119327, on the ground of litis pendentia. As aptly found by the CA, the parties
and issues raised in the said case were identical to that of CA-G.R. SP No. 117223. In CA-G.R. SP
No. 117223, respondent BDO sought to reinstate the attachment of the properties of Guy on the
ground that the remaining attached properties were insufficient to secure its claim. In CA-G.R. SP
No. 119327, petitioner Goodland claimed that its attached property should be discharged as the
total current market value of the attached properties of its co-defendants were more than enough
to cover the amount claimed by respondent BDO. Clearly, both petitions for certiorari raised as
an issue the sufficiency or insufficiency of the attached properties. The resolution of the said issue
in CA-G.R. SP No. 117223 thus prevented the CA in CA G.R. SP No. 119327 from resolving the same
issue.
In fact, the dismissal was inevitable as the argument of petitioner Goodland, that the attached
properties of respondent Goodgold were sufficient to cover the amount sought to be collected by
respondent BDO, no longer holds water because of the issuance of the June 6, 2011 Decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 117223 discharging the properties of respondent Goodgold, except for TCT No.
218470. The failure of petitioner Goodland to move for a reconsideration or to file an appeal
likewise sealed its fate as it is now bound by the June 6, 2011 Decision. Though petitioner timely
availed of petition for certiorari to assail the Orders of the RTC, the CA still had no choice but to
dismiss the said petition for certiorari on the ground of litis pendentia, now res judicata in view
of the finality of the June 6, 2011 Decision.
This could have been avoided had the two petitions for certiorari been consolidated. Petitioner
Goodland, however, has no one to blame but itself as it failed to inform the CA of the pendency of
CA-G.R. SP No. 117223 at the time it filed its Petition for Certiorari. It is significant to note that
when Guy, on behalf of petitioner Goodland, signed the Verification and Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping of CA-G.R. SP No. 119327, he failed to inform the CA there was a pending petition
for certiorari involving the same parties and the same issues, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 117223.
Petitioner Goodland and Guy cannot feign ignorance of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 117223
considering that they were respondents in the said case. Knowing that there was a pending
petition for certiorari involving the same parties and the same issues, petitioner Goodland should
have moved to consolidate its petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 119327, with that
of CA-G.R. SP No. 117223. Unfortunately, it did not. And although respondent BDO later moved to

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 consolidate the same on July 27, 2011, it was too late because by then, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No.
117223, had already rendered a decision.

Q. Demurrer to Evidence (Rule 33)

JOAQUINA ZAMBALES, ESTELITA ZAMBALES NARVASA, ENRICO ZAMBALES, CASTULO.

ZAMBALES, ADELINA ZAMBALES, and MIGUELA ZAMBALES CAYAO, Petitioners, - versus –
SALVACION VILLON ZAMBALES (SURVIVING WIFE OF DOMINGO ZAMBALES), AS
SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 216878, THIRD DIVISION, APRIL 3, 2019, PERALTA, J.

The grant of a demurrer to evidence was proper when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has
shown no right to the relief sought. As correctly held by the CA, where the evidence of the plaintiff
together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn from it does not warrant
recovery from the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. In this case, the records show
that apart from the fact that the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights and Sale
sought to be annulled and· the titles sought to be cancelled were not offered in evidence, the
Extrajudicial Settlement itself alluded to in the testimonial evidence presented was not offered in order
to allow the trial court to determine the veracity of the claims of the witnesses.

FACTS:

The petitioners in this case are the surviving children of Enrique Zambales, the sole heir of Blas
Zambales. Blas is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Puerto Princesa City. On
December 14, 1979, a document denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver of Rights and
Sale was executed by the petitioners wherein they waived and transferred all their rights, interest
and shares over their 1/7 undivided interet over the subject land in favor of Domingo Zambales, who,
in turn, accepted the transfer made by his co-heirs and expressed his appreciated and gratitude to
them in the same document. Subsequently, a new title was issued in the name of Domigho. Thereafter,
it was subdivided resulting in the issuance of 10 titles, all under the name of Domingo.

After more than two decades, petitioners filed a complaint to cancel the document denominated as
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver of Rights and Sale and the subsequent titles derived therefrom.
In their complaint, petitioners allege that they are the heirs of Enrique Zambales and the
grandchildren of Blas Zambales, the original owner of the subject land. Respondent Salvacion (as
substituted by her heirs) filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The Motion to
Dismiss was denied, prompting the respondents to file an Answer with Counterclaim, stating that the
complaint was barred by prescription as the document sought to be nullified was executed 21 years
ago.

During the trial, no formal offer of exhibits was presented in view of the Certification issued by the
RD that the Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver of Rights cannot be located from the records. The
RTC held that while the petitioners submitted testimonial evidence to show that the subject
extrajudicial settlement was allegedly forged, which would thus render the subsequent titles issued
pursuant thereto void, herein petitioners did not offer the said document nor the titles sought to be
cancelled during trial. CA affirmed the dismissal of the case by the trial court for lack of merit, and
granted the demurrer to evidence filed by respondents.

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ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the case by the trial court.

RULING:

Petitioners submit, among others, that the appellate court erred when it upheld the validity of a
falsified document on the sole ground that it was notarized, arguing that one of their witnesses was
a "disinterested witness, who has no ill motive to testify falsely" and whose testimony, "if properly
appreciated," would alter the outcome of the case. It bears emphasis that the factual findings of the
appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the
findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the
records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

The issues and arguments raised by the petitioners are factual matters that were threshed out and
decided upon by the trial court which were subsequently affirmed by the appellate court. The
findings and conclusions of both the RTC and the CA in this case are all in accord: that the grant of a
demurrer to evidence was proper when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right
to the relief sought. As correctly held by the CA, where the evidence of the plaintiff together with such
inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn from it does not warrant recovery from the
defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained.

In this case, the records show that apart from the fact that the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Waiver of Rights and Sale sought to be annulled and· the titles sought to be cancelled were not
offered in evidence, the Extrajudicial Settlement itself alluded to in the testimonial evidence
presented was not offered in order to allow the trial court to determine the veracity of the claims of
the witnesses. In Oropesa v. Oropesa, the SC affirmed the dismissal of the case on demurrer to
evidence based on petitioner's non-submission of the Formal Offer of Evidence.

In this case, the records show that apart from the fact that the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Waiver of Rights and Sale sought to be annulled and the titles sought to be cancelled were not
offered in evidence, the Extrajudicial Settlement itself alluded to in the testimonial evidence
presented was not offered in order to allow the trial court to determine the veracity of the claims of
the witnesses.

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 R. Judgments and final orders
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. GARCIA-LIPANA COMMODITIES, INC. and TLL REALTY
AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 192366, 01 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, J. JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is noteworthy that settlement of cases in court at any stage of the proceeding is not only
authorized, but, in fact, encouraged in the [court's] jurisdiction; and when a compromise agreement is
given judicial approval, it becomes more than just a contract binding upon the parties, it is no less than
a Judgment on merits. Verily, there is no more actual substantial relief to which BPI would be entitled
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

FACTS

Garcia-Lipana Commodities, Inc. and TLL Realty and Management Corporation obtained
several loans from Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), secured by real estate mortgage on 30 parcels
of land with improvements. Garcia-Lipana and TLL Realty religiously paid its loan obligations until
at some point, they defaulted. This prompted BPI to initiate foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged properties, which were later on sold at public auction to BPI as the highest bidder.

Averring lack of demand and irregularities in the foreclosure proceedings, Garcia-Lipana and
TLL Realty filed a Complaint for Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, Nullification of
Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against BPI.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the application for writ of preliminary injunction,
enjoining BPI from consolidating its ownership over and taking possession of the foreclosed
properties.

BPI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC. The CA dismissed said petition for lack of merit. BPI's motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.

While the case was pending in the CA, Garcia-Lipana and TLL Realty filed a Verified
Manifestation and Motion averring that they, together with the BPI, submitted to the RTC a
"Compromise Agreement with Joint Omnibus Motion: 1) To Dismiss with Prejudice and 2) To Lift
Annotations." The said Compromise Agreement substantially states that the parties "agreed to
forever release, remise, renounce and discharge each other from any and all liabilities, claims,
demands, actions, counterclaims, and causes of actions of whatever nature and kind," arising from
and connected with the Complaint before the RTC, as well as the instant case before this Court. The
Verified Manifestation and Motion also states that on June 24, 2015, the RTC issued a Judgment Based
on the Compromise Agreement.

ISSUE
Should BPI’s Petition for Review on Certiorari proceed?

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RULING
NO. In view, therefore, of the final and executory Judgment based on the Compromise
Agreement, which settled any and all claims of the parties against each other in relation to the
Complaint before the court of origin, and considering Garcia-Lipana and TLL Realty's manifestation
and motion to dismiss the instant petition and BPI's assent thereto, the case at bar has been rendered
moot and academic.

In the case of Penafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. v. Sugar Regulatory Administration, the Court
explained: A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on
the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief
which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any
practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.

Under the terms of the compromise, Garcia-Lipana and TLL Realty already agreed, with
judicial imprimatur, to relinquish their rights over the subject properties in favor of BPI. In
turn, BPI agreed to accept said properties and to release Garcia-Lipana and TLL Realty from any and
all liabilities arising from the loan obligation.

It is noteworthy that settlement of cases in court at any stage of the proceeding is not only
authorized, but, in fact, encouraged in the [court's] jurisdiction; and when a compromise
agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than just a contract binding upon the
parties, it is no less than a Judgment on merits. Verily, there is no more actual substantial
relief to which BPI would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition

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 1. Judgment on the pleadings (Rule 34)
2. Summary judgments (Rule 35)
GLOBE ASIATIQUE REALTY HOLDINGS CORPORATION v.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 229339, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (J.C. Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

For summary judgment to proceed in lieu of a full-blown trial, the party who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or that the issue
posed is patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue.
In this case, Globe Asiatique failed to discharge its burden of showing that there was no genuine
issue to be tried. Moreover, the RTC found that the pleadings submitted by the parties clearly show
conflicting allegations between them making the facts disputed.

FACTS
Globe Asiatique executed 10 Deeds of Assignments (DAs) and 11 copies of Special Powers of
Attorney (SPAs) in favor of Union Bank covering 10 condominium units situated along EDSA,
Mandaluyong City. A common provision of the DAs provides that Globe Asiatique absolutely
transferred, assigned, and conveyed to Union Bank, its successors and assigns, all its rights, title,
interests and participation "on that parcel of land, and subsequent improvements thereon."
Subsequently, Globe Asiatique sent Union Bank a letter requesting the reformation of the DAs
and the SPAs alleging that some of their provisions do not conform to their real agreement. However,
Globe Asiatique's request remained unheeded. Thus, Globe Asiatique filed a Complaint for
reformation of the DAs and SPAs. Globe Asiatique claimed that the parties only intended the sale or
assignment of rights, title, and interests over the receivables, and not the parcels of land themselves.
It asserted that the DAs are the result of a mutual mistake. Hence, it prayed that the DAs and SPAs be
reformed for failing to express the parties' real intent and agreement.
However, Union Bank denied that the subject DAs failed to express the true intent or
agreement between the parties or that they were the result of mutual mistake. It also denied that the
parties only intended the sale or assignment of rights, titles and interests over the receivables. As an
affirmative defense, Union Bank alleged that when the parties executed the subject MOA, they also
signed, as annexes, forms for the DAs, SPAs, and the Notice of Assignment and Instruction to Pay
(NAIP) Union Bank which constitute as supplementary agreements to the MOA. It further averred
that when the parties, through their respective representatives, signed the MOA and the forms, they
knew and were fully aware of the contents of the forms attached to the MOA.
After the termination of the pre-trial of the case, Globe Asiatique filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied Globe Asiatique’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
stating that based on the pleadings submitted by the parties, a trial is necessary to ascertain which of
the conflicting allegations of the parties are true. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the
RTC, ruling that a genuine issue exist in this case.

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ISSUE
Is summary judgment proper in this case?

RULING
NO. A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In relation to this, a "genuine
issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an
issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a genuine issue for trial. "The
court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits, and/or
counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial."
For summary judgment to proceed in lieu of a full-blown trial, the party who moves for
summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or
that the issue posed is patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue.
The Supreme Court concurs with the rulings of the lower courts. In denying the subject
Motion for Summary Judgment, the RTC found that the pleadings submitted by the parties clearly
show conflicting allegations between them making the facts disputed.
These ruling and findings by the trial court could not be considered as tainted by grave abuse
of discretion as they are sufficiently and properly supported by legal and factual bases.
In this case, Globe Asiatique alleges that the subject instruments must be reformed because
mutual mistake by the parties prevented the meeting of their minds. Verily, Globe Asiatique seeks
reformation under Article 1361 of the Civil Code which provides that an instrument may be reformed
when mutual mistake of the parties caused the failure of the instrument to disclose their real
agreement.
However, Union Bank's Answer poses material allegations which clearly dispute those
alleged by Globe Asiatique in its Complaint, particularly with regard to the allegation of mutual
mistake. While Union Bank admits the execution of the MOA for the purchase of Globe Asiatique's
receivables, and that the MOA shall be implemented by the execution of deeds of assignments, it
nevertheless explicitly denies that mutual mistake attended the execution of the subject DAs and
SPAs, and that the parties only intend the sale or assignment of rights, titles and interests over the
receivables. Union Bank counters that if there is mistake, it is only on the part of Globe Asiatique, but
definitely not mutual. It further avers that the subject DAs are executed by Globe Asiatique to secure
a credit facility. From the foregoing, it is clear that a factual dispute arises from the parties' opposing
versions of facts, which dispute may only be resolved with the parties presenting their respective
evidence in a full blown trial. Whether there is mutual mistake and whether the subject DAs are
actually intended as security, are genuine issues which could not be decided summarily.
Furthermore, it has been held that a trial should be conducted and the trial court should
receive the respective evidence of the parties when the complaint raises, among others, the issue that
the contract does not express the true intention or agreement of the parties. The alleged failure to
express the true intention between the parties in the DAs and SPAs is the very reason for Globe
Asiatique's complaint for reformation.

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 Due to the parties' conflicting factual positions, and considering that Globe Asiatique's main
allegation is the alleged failure of the DAs and SPAs to express the true agreement with Union Bank,
it is clear that the trial court properly denied the move for a summary judgment.
Indubitably, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the trial court in requiring a trial to
determine whether the prayed reformation of the subject instruments may be granted, and to
ascertain the true intention of the parties. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
In other words, whether there was mutual mistake on the part of Globe Asiatique and Union
Bank is an issue that calls for the presentation of evidence. Since the facts are in dispute, the RTC is
not allowed to decide the case summarily. The contrasting allegations engender a cloud of doubt as
to the certainty of the facts as alleged. In such a case, such doubt should be resolved against the grant
of a motion for summary judgment. Thus, it has been held that lower courts, when faced with a
motion for summary judgment, should resolve doubts in favor of the party against whom it is
directed, giving such party the benefit of all favorable inferences.

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 3. Rendition and entry of judgments and final orders (Rule 36)
CENTRAL VISAYAS FINANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES ELIEZER* S.
ADLAWAN AND LEILA ADLAWAN, AND SPOUSES ELIEZER* ADLAWAN, SR. AND ELENA
ADLAWAN, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 212674, FIRST DIVISION, March 25, 2019, DEL CASTILLO, J.

In case of a loan secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor -
the recovery of the credit with execution upon the security. The creditor cannot split his single cause of
action by filing a complaint on the loan, and thereafter another separate complaint for foreclosure of
the mortgage.

Applying the case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal, where the Court held: For non-payment of a
note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause
of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor
in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But
both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and for that reason, they
constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements,
the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation.

Applying the case of PCI Leasing v. Dai the Supreme Court ruled that an action for replevin, which is
both an action in personam and in rem, bars the deficiency suit because the deficiency could well be
raised in the replevin case.

FACTS:

Respondents Eliezer and Leila Adlawan obtained a Php3,669,685.00 loan from petitioner Central
Visayas Finance Corporation covered by a Promissory Note, Chattel Mortgage over a Komatsu
Highway Dump Truck, and a Continuing Guaranty executed by respondents Eliezer, Sr. and Elena
Adlawan.

Eliezer and Leila Adlawan failed to pay the loan, prompting petitioner to file an action against
respondents for replevin before Branch 58 of the Cebu Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-22294.

In a June 22, 1999 decision, the trial court ruled in petitioner's favor, and respondents were ordered
to deliver possession of the dump truck to petitioner. Petitioner then foreclosed on the chattel
mortgage and caused the sale at public auction of the dump truck, which was then sold to it as the
highest bidder for Php500,000.00.

In 2000, petitioner commenced a second case before the RTC - Civil Case No. CEB-24841 - this time
for collection of sum of money and/or deficiency judgment relative to respondents' supposed unpaid
balance on their loan, which petitioner claimed to be at Php2,104,604.97 - less the value of dump
truck - with damages. This time, petitioner in its Amended Complaint[9] sought to hold respondents
Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan liable on their continuing guaranty.

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The Court agrees with the defendants that the instant complaint is barred by res judicata under
Section 47(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

The judgment of this Court in Civil Case No. CEB-22294, which involves, as in this case, the same
parties, subject matter and cause of action, i.e., non-payment of the loan, secured by a mortgage over
the above vehicle, obtained by defendants Eliezer and Leila from the plaintiff, was one on the merits,
rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and the parties therein, and
had become final.

Petitioner appealed the above Order of the trial court before the CA, claiming that the trial court erred
in ruling that res judicata applied, in that there is no identity of cause of action between Civil Case No.
CEB-22294 and Civil Case No. CEB-24841, as the first was one for the recovery of personal property
used as collateral in the loan, while the latter case was one for deficiency judgment and based on the
continuing guaranty executed by Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan.

CA stressed that only substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application of res judicata and
the addition or elimination of some parties would not even alter the situation. There is substantial
identity of parties when there is a community of interest between the party in the first case and a
party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case. In this case, there is no
question that Elena Adlawan, acting as a guarantor, has the same interest and defenses as that of the
principal debtors Spouses Eliezar and Leilani Adlawan. Her exclusion in the first case is therefore of
no moment, res judicata still applies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in applying the doctrine of res judicata to the amended complaint of
petitioner for deficiency judgment under civil case no. 24841 considering the absence of identity of
parties and similarity of causes of action in Civil case no. 22294 (NO)

RULING:

Petitioner’s prayer for relief in its complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-22294 was in the alternative, and
not cumulative or successive, to wit: recover possession of the dump truck, or, if recovery is no longer
feasible, a money judgment for the outstanding loan amount. Petitioner did not pray for both reliefs
cumulatively or successively. "The rule is that a party is entitled only to such relief consistent with
and limited to that sought by the pleadings or incidental thereto.

In case of a loan secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor -
the recovery of the credit with execution upon the security. The creditor cannot split his single cause
of action by filing a complaint on the loan, and thereafter another separate complaint for foreclosure
of the mortgage. This is the ruling in the case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal, where the Court
held: For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against
the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the
security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt
and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment
of the debt, and for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the
mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one
and the same obligation.

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Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff,
then, by applying the rules above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint
for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does
so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file
two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to
foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of
contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.

In PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Dai cited by respondents, the specific issue of whether a judgment
in a replevin case would bar a subsequent action for deficiency judgment was raised. The Court
resolved the question in the affirmative, thus: For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and
cause of action.

Since petitioner had extrajudicially foreclosed the chattel mortgage over the vessel even before the
pre-trial of the case, it should have therein raised as issue during the pre-trial the award of a
deficiency judgment. After all, the basis of its above-stated alternative prayer was the same as that of
its prayer for replevin - the default of respondents in the payment of the monthly instalments of their
loan. But it did not.

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 S. Post-judgment remedies
1. Motion for new trial or reconsideration

VALENCIA (BUKIDNON) FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC.,

REPRESENTED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING
ASSOCIATION (FACOMA) AS TRUSTEES, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY DAVID M. PORTICOS,
BOARD CHAIRMAN, Petitioner, -versus- HEIRS OF AMANTE P. CABOTAJE, NAMELY: ESTHER M.
CABOTAJE, AMANTE M. CABOTAJE, JR., JULINDA M. CABOTAJE, FERNANDO M. CABOTAJE,
CHRISTINA IMELDA M. CABOTAJE-NELAM, ALL HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ESTHER M.
CABOTAJE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 219984, SECOND DIVISION, June 4, 2019, Caguioa, J.

Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be proforma, the motion
was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the
rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that
the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof.

Thus, it is evidently settled that the respondents Heirs of Cabotaje's Motion for Reconsideration
is not a proforma motion. It is not alleged to be a second motion for reconsideration. It is not contended
that the said Motion failed to specify the findings and conclusions contained in the RTC's Decision that
the respondents Heirs of Cabotaje opined were contrary to law or not supported by the evidence. It is
likewise not alleged that the said Motion merely alleged that the Decision in question was contrary to
law without making any explanation.

FACTS:
Petitioner FACOMA, represented by its Directors Sergio Belera and Pedro Pagonzaga
instituted an action for quieting of title and recovery of ownership and possession of parcel of land,
and damages against respondents Heirs of Cabotaje and Francisco Estrada. RTC rendered a Decision
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the Annulment and Cancellation of the
Deed of Sale executed by Francisco Estrada in favor of Amante Cabotaje.

On February 3, 2011, the RTC denied the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, on
February 25, 2011, respondents Heirs of Cabotaje filed the Notice of Appeal. Incidentally, FACOMA
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Notice of Appeal averring that the Motion for Reconsideration earlier
filed by respondents Heirs of Cabotaje did not toll the running of the reglementary period to appeal
for the reason that the Motion was but proforma and raised no new issue. RTC issued a Resolution
which denied the Notice of Appeal for being filed out of time. CA granted the Certiorari Petition filed
by respondents Heirs of Cabotaje, setting aside the RTC's Resolution. Consequently, the CA ordered
the RTC to give due course to the respondents Heirs of Cabotaje's Notice of Appeal. CA found that the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents Heirs of Cabotaje is not a proforma motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration is a pro forma motion. (NO)

RULING:

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 RTC found the respondents Heirs of Cabotaje's Motion for Reconsideration a proforma
motion because it did not raise any new arguments. However, the Court has decided in a catena of
cases that the mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and
passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma. The Court, in Coquilla v. Commission
on Elections, held that:

x x x The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the
parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma otherwise, the
movant's remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other
remedy. But, as we have held in another case:

Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed,

one is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and
improper, contrary to the law or the evidence and in doing so, the movant has
to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a motion for
reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence would be that
after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only
motions for reopening and new trial.

Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be proforma, the
motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not
comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be
contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged
errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the
adverse party was not given notice thereof.

Thus, it is evidently settled that the respondents Heirs of Cabotaje's Motion for
Reconsideration is not a proforma motion. It is not alleged to be a second motion for reconsideration.
It is not contended that the said Motion failed to specify the findings and conclusions contained in
the RTC's Decision that the respondents Heirs of Cabotaje opined were contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence. It is likewise not alleged that the said Motion merely alleged that the
Decision in question was contrary to law without making any explanation.

In addition, the CA was correct in invoking the Court's Decision in Department of Agrarian
Reform v. Uy, citing Security Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Cuenca, 23 which held that a motion
for reconsideration is not pro forma just because it reiterated the arguments earlier passed upon and
rejected by the appellate court. A movant may raise the same arguments precisely to convince the
court that its ruling was erroneous.

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 a. Rule 37
b. Remedy against denial and fresh-period rule
2. Appeals
a. Judgments and final orders subject to appeal
b. Matters not appealable; available remedies
c. Doctrine of finality/immutability of judgment
SPOUSES CELIA FRANCISCO and DANILO FRANCISCO v. ALBINA D. BATTUNG
G.R. No. 212740, 13 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (A, Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Law of the case is the opinion rendered on a former appeal. It dictates that whatever is once
permanently established as the controlling legal rule of decision involving the same parties in the
same case persists to be the law of the case regardless of the correctness on general principles so
long as the facts on which such decision was premised remain to be the facts of the case before the
court. Simply stated, the ruling of the appellate court cannot be deviated from in the subsequent
proceedings in the same case. It applies only to the same case.
As correctly found by the CA, the application of the principle of the law of the case is
misplaced. While the Spouses Francisco’s action for specific performance and Battung’s action for
unlawful detainer involve a similar set of facts, these are two different cases.

FACTS
On February 25, 1997, Celia Francisco (Celia) entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale of
Registered Land (Deed) as the buyer with Albina D. Battung (Battung) as the seller over the subject
land.
Thereafter, Battung filed an action for unlawful detainer with damages against Celia before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) which ordered Celia to vacate the property and consider
the payment of P89,000.00 as rent.
Celia appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC affirmed the Decision of the MTCC
but vacated the order that the amount of P89,000.00 be considered a rent.
Dissatisfied, Celia filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA nullified
and set aside the RTC Decision.
On April 30, 2003, Celia and her husband Danilo Francisco (Spouses Francisco) filed a
complaint for specific performance with damages against Battung before the RTC of Tuguegarao City,
Branch 3 (RTC Branch 3). Spouses Francisco alleged that while the Deed was entered on February
25, 1997, they already made an advance payment and installment payments amounting to
P151,000.00. Subsequently, they discovered that the subject land was already sold by Battung to
another person. For this reason, they stopped continuing the payment agreed upon. Later on, they
learned that the previous title of the subject land in the name of another person was cancelled and

104
reverted to its former status as a clean title. The Spouses Francisco then manifested their intention
to pay their balance in the conditional sale by sending a letter to Battung. Despite due receipt of the
letter, Battung failed and still fail to get the said balance.
As a counterclaim, Battung maintained that the Deed is a contract to sell where the ownership
or title is retained by the seller and is passed only upon the full payment of the purchase price. Hence,
she may not be compelled to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioners as the conditions
of the Deed were not satisfied.
The RTC Branch 3 rendered judgment in favor of the Spouses Francisco. The trial court
ratiocinated that the judgment where it was ruled that the Deed was a contract of sale, is applicable
in this case and binds both parties under the principle of the law of the case.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal, ruling that the Deed is a contract to sell and
not a contract of sale. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES
(1) Did the CA commit serious error of law when it revived the issue on the nature of the
Deed, which issue is said to have been long resolved by another division of the CA, disregarding the
doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and immutability of judgments?
(2) Did the CA commit serious error of law when it revived the said issue by considering it an
"assigned error," granting an affirmative relief in favor of respondent who did not appeal in violation
of Rule 51, Section 8 of the Rules of Court?

RULING
(1) NO. Law of the case is the opinion rendered on a former appeal. It dictates that whatever
is once permanently established as the controlling legal rule of decision involving the same parties
in the same case persists to be the law of the case regardless of the correctness on general principles
so long as the facts on which such decision was premised remain to be the facts of the case before the
court. Simply stated, the ruling of the appellate court cannot be deviated from in the subsequent
proceedings in the same case. It applies only to the same case.
As correctly found by the CA, the application of the principle of the law of the case is
misplaced. While the Spouses Francisco’s action for specific performance and Battung’s action for
unlawful detainer involve a similar set of facts, these are two different cases.
Meanwhile, the doctrine of res judicata provides that "a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction of the rights of the parties is conclusive of the rights of
the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.”
Said final judgment becomes conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and serves as
an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.
In this case, the doctrine of res judicata is also not applicable. While there is an identity of
parties in the action for unlawful detainer and action for specific performance, there is no identity of
the claims, demands, and causes of action. As aptly noted by the CA, the action for unlawful detainer
dealt with the issue of possession and any pronouncement on the title or ownership over the subject

105
land is merely provisional while performance involved the determination of the rights over the
subject land of the petitioners and respondent under the Deed.
Along the same line, the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgments
provides that once a decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable, unalterable, and may no
longer be modified in any aspect, regardless if the modification is meant to correct erroneous factual
and legal conclusions and if it be made by the court that rendered it or by this Court.
In the present case, the nature of the Deed was incidentally passed upon in the action for
unlawful detainer to determine the rights of petitioners and respondent relative to the ownership of
the subject land so as to determine who is entitled to possession thereto. Then again, such
determination of ownership based on the Deed is provisional, thus, not a conclusive adjudication on
the merits of the case. Thus, the CA was not precluded to revisit the issue on the nature of the Deed
and make its ascertainment based on the facts and evidence on record.

(2) NO. Section 8, Rule 51, of the Rules of Court provides that as a general rule, only matters
assigned as errors in the appeal may be resolved. As an exception thereto, the CA may review errors
that are not assigned but are closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and is given
discretion if it finds that the consideration of such is necessary for a complete and just resolution of
the case.
Applying the foregoing to this case, the determination of the nature of the Deed was indeed
necessary for the complete and just resolution of the case. After all, establishing the true nature of
the Deed would set forth the contractual rights and obligations of petitioners and respondent. It
would clarify who is legally vested with the ownership of the subject land. Consequently, the CA
cannot be faulted for re-examining the contractual relations of the parties based on the Deed.
Based on the provisions of the Deed, the CA is correct in ruling that the Deed is a contract to
sell and not a contract of sale. Clause 2(b) of the Deed readily reveals that Battung shall only execute
the Deed and transfer the title over the subject land in favor of Spouses Francisco upon full payment
of the purchase price. Resultantly, given that the ownership over the subject land was retained by
Battung until full payment by "Spouses Francisco of the purchase price," the Deed is a contract to sell.

106
 PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANEC CORPORATION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, CHAIRPERSON
MICHAEL G. AGUINALDO, DIRECTOR JOSEPH B. ANACAY and SUPERVISING AUDITOR ELENA
L. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 222710, 10 September 2019, EN BANC (Gesmundo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The doctrine of immutability of judgment has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical
errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments;
and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable.

The Court finds that this case falls under the exception of the doctrine of immutability of
judgment because there is a particular circumstance that transpired after the finality of ND No. H.O. 12-
005 (11), specifically, the enactment of R.A. No. 11223 on February 20, 2019.

FACTS
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7305, otherwise known as the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers,
granted longevity pay to a health worker. Pursuant to this law, former Department of Health (DOH)
Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr., issued a Certification which declared PhilHealth officers and
employees as public health workers.
Consequently, its former PhilHealth President and Chief Executive Officer issued guidelines
on the grant of longevity pay, incorporating it in the basic salary of qualified PhilHealth employees
for the year 2011 and every year thereafter. This was passed and approved by the PhilHealth board
which confirmed the grant of longevity pay to its officers and employees for the period January to
September 2011, in the total amount of ₱5,575,294.70.
However, COA Supervising Auditor Elena C. Agustin issued an Audit Observation
Memorandum which stated that the grant of longevity pay to PhilHealth officers and employees
lacked legal basis, and thus, should be disallowed. This was followed by the issuance of a Notice of
Disallowance (ND) for the amount used for paying the longevity pay. The ND contained the names of
the officers who approved the disbursement and all payees who were held liable for the said amount.
The ND was received by PhilHealth; however, it filed its appeal to the COA Corporate
Government Sector (CGS) after 179 days from its receipt. The COA-CGS ruled that officers and
employees of PhilHealth were not entitled to longevity pay. It defined that government health worker
must be principally tasked to and function directly related to render health or health-related services,
which is not present to the responsibilities and tasks done by PhilHealth.
This decision was received on March 25, 2014, and PhilHealth filed its motion for extension
of time of thirty days, from March 30, 2014 to April 30, 2014, to file its petition for review. The said
petition was filed before the COA on April 30, 2014. COA denied the petition because it was filed out
of time since the reglementary period to appeal the decision of an auditor is six months or 180 days
from receipt of the decision and that PhilHealth’s motion for extension of time to file the petition for
review only after the lapse of the said period.
After which, PhilHealth filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
before the Court. The petition was also denied for the same reason that it was filed out of time. It also

107
found that petition lacks merit even on its substantive issues because PhilHealth personnel's
functions are not principally related to health service. The Court also ruled that PhilHealth cannot
claim good faith to escape liability since the ND had already attained finality. Hence, these motions
for reconsideration.
ISSUE
Can the doctrine of immutability of judgment be applied in this case?

RULING
YES. As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect the appeal
renders the judgment of the court final and executory. As such, it has been held that the availability
of an appeal is fatal to a special civil action for Certiorari, for the same is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. This is in line with the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment under
which a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any
act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.

In this case, it was established that PhilHealth filed its petition for review before the COA
beyond the reglementary period, hence, the subject ND is deemed final and executory.

However, the doctrine of immutability of judgment has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction
of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3)
void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering
its execution unjust and inequitable.

The Court finds that this case falls under the exception of the doctrine of immutability of
judgment because there is a particular circumstance that transpired after the finality of ND No. H.O.
12-005 (11), specifically, the enactment of R.A. No. 11223 on February 20, 2019.

108
 DAVAO ACF BUS LINES, INC., Petitioner, -versus- ROGELIO ANG, Respondent.
G.R. No. 218516, SECOND DIVISION, March 27, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

While it is true that the rule on the immutability and finality of judgments admits of certain exceptions,
such as when the questioned final and executory judgment is void, a catena of cases has held that a mere
erroneous judgment, though rendered according to the course and practice of the court is contrary to
law, is not a void judgment. A wrong judgment is not a void judgment, provided the court which renders
it had jurisdiction to try the case.

FACTS:

The present controversy is a consequence of the execution of judgment in the case of "People of the
Phils. vs. Rodolfo Borja Tanio," for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 99,282-E-2000 filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities MTCC,
Branch 5, Davao City, wherein accused Rodolfo Borja Tanio, then the driver of a Daewoo Bus with
plate number LVX-883, registered under the name of ACF was charged with reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries.The crime charged was an offshoot of an incident wherein Tanio
bumped a Mitsubishi sedan driven by one Leo B. Delgara causing damage to the said vehicle and
inflicting serious physical injuries upon its passenger, [herein] respondent Rogelio Bajao Ang.

In a Judgment dated December 27, 2005, the MTCC convicted Tanio. No appeal from the judgment
was interposed, and in time, the decision became final and executory. In view of its finality, the
prosecution filed a Motion for Execution against the accused Tanio which was granted. However, the
writ was returned unsatisfied as the latter had allegedly no properties that can be levied to satisfy
the money judgment. Hence, upon motion, the MTCC issued a writ of execution against [ACF,] being
the employer of accused Tanio.

Consequently, ACF filed a Motion to Recall and/or Quash The Writ of Execution against it which was,
however, denied by the MTCC in its Order dated March 21, 2007.

ACF moved for a reconsideration of the said Order but this was denied by the MTCC in its Order dated
May 18, 2007. In view of the denial, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was denied by the RTC. The RTC likewise denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On May 27, 2011, ACF filed a Notice of Appeal, which was, however, denied by the Court of Appeals.
The CA held that the RTC did not err in holding that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Order denying ACF's Motion to Recall and/or
Quash The Writ of Execution and ordering the conduct of a hearing to determine whether ACF should
be held subsidiarily liable under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code for the civil liability ex delicto
of its employee, accused Tanio.

ACF filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the aforesaid Decision of the CA, which was
eventually denied by the latter in its Resolution dated May 5, 2015. Hence, ACF file the instant Petition
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

109
Whether the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's holding that the MTCC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its Order denying ACF's Motion to
Recall and/or Quash The Writ of Execution and ordering the conduct of a hearing to determine
whether ACF should be held subsidiarily liable under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code for the
civil liability ex delicto of its employee, accused Tanio. (YES)

RULING:

It must be stressed that, as correctly held by the CA, certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error
was committed. Otherwise, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed.

The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil
action of certiorari. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over
the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. In the instant case, the
primary argument of ACF is centered on the supposed erroneous award of damages against the ACF's
employee, accused Tanio, made by the MTCC in its Judgment dated December 27, 2005 convicting
the latter. But as amply explained by the court a quo, such supposed errors merely pertain only to
mistakes of law and not of jurisdiction, thus putting them beyond the ambit of certiorari.

It must be emphasized that the aforesaid Judgment of the MTCC awarding civil indemnity, which is
now being assailed by ACF, was not appealed; thus, making it final and executory. Hence, ACF cannot
now assail the MTCC's Judgment lest the elementary principle of immutability of judgments be
disregarded. It is established that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. Such judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court
of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.

While it is true that the rule on the immutability and finality of judgments admits of certain
exceptions, such as when the questioned final and executory judgment is void, a catena of cases has
held that a mere erroneous judgment, though rendered according to the course and practice of the
court is contrary to law, is not a void judgment. A wrong judgment is not a void judgment, provided
the court which renders it had jurisdiction to try the case.

110
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JEFFREY SANTIAGO y MAGTULOY
G.R. No. 228819, 24 July 2019, SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCRTINE OF THE CASE

Immutability of judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and prerogative
to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the
case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

In this case, a special or compelling circumstance exists that is the Court was belatedly informed
of Santiago's supervening death pending his appeal.

FACTS

Earlier, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) finding Jeffrey Santiago
(Santiago) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. However, based on a letter
from the Bureau of Corrections, Santiago had already died even before the Court affirmed the said
decision. Notably, this means that Santiago had already passed away during the pendency of the
criminal case against him. Thus, Santiago’s death prior to his final conviction by the Court should
have resulted in the dismissal of the criminal case against Santiago in accordance with Article 89(1)
of the Revised Penal Code. The Court acknowledges that the conviction of Santiago attained finality
and hence, covered by the doctrine on immutability on judgments.

ISSUE

Can the Court set aside its resolution affirming the conviction of Santiago although the
resolution already attained finality and covered by the doctrine on immutability of judgments?

RULING

YES. In People v. Layag, the Court explained that immutability of judgments is not a hard and
fast rule as the Court has the power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands
of substantial justice considering:
(a) Matters of life, liberty, honor, or property;
(b) The existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(c) The merits of the case;
(d) A cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules;
(e) The lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and
(f) That the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

In this case, a special or compelling circumstance exists that is the Court was belatedly
informed of Santiago's supervening death pending his appeal. Thus, the Court sets aside its previous
resolution and the entry of judgment corresponding to the said resolution.

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 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) v.
KENTEX MANUFACTURING CORPORATION and ONG KING GUAN
G.R. No. 233781, 08 July 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Del Castillo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Compliance Order may be appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
by filing a Memorandum of Appeal, furnishing the other party with a copy of the same, within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof. No further motion for extension of time shall be entertained.

Here, instead of filing an appeal with the DOLE Secretary, Ong moved for a reconsideration of
the subject Order; needless to say, this did not halt or stop the running of the period to elevate the matter
to the DOLE Secretary.

FACTS
A fire broke out in a factory owned by Kentex Manufacturing (Kentex), claiming 72 lives. As
part of the Department of Labor and Employment’s (DOLE) protocol, labor inspectors went to inspect
Kentex’s premises. It was discovered that Kentex contracted with CJC Manpower (CJC) for the
deployment of workers.

DOLE eventually found out that CJC was an unregistered private recruitment agency and that
it does not comply with occupational health and safety standards and labor standards. The DOLE
eventually declared CJC as a labor-only contractor and Kentex as its principal.

After the mandatory conference, DOLE-NCR issued a Compliance Order instructing Kentex,
together with corporate officers Beato C. Ang and Ong King Guan (Ong), to pay the appropriate
amount of wages with their corresponding penalties to their employees.

Ong motioned for reconsideration, which was denied for being an improper remedy. Also, the
Compliance Order attained finality owing to the fact that he only had ten (10) days from receipt of
the letter on June 26, 2015 to make an appeal. He thus had only until July 6, 2015.

Kentex and Ong filed a Motion before the Court of Appeals (CA), which upheld validity of the
Compliance Order but absolved Ong absent the finding of bad faith or wrongdoing for the
corporation’s unlawful act.

DOLE filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration to set aside the release or discharge of Ong
from liability to pay the monetary awards. But the CA denied the motion in its Resolution. Hence, this
Petition under Rule 45.

ISSUE
Was the Compliance Order issued by DOLE wrongfully altered by the CA?

RULING
YES. Both the DOLE-NCR and the CA correctly ruled that the June 26, 2015 Order had already
become final and executory in view of the failure of Kentex and Ong to appeal therefrom to the
Secretary of Labor. Notice ought to be taken of the fact that, at the time the DOLE-NCR rendered its

112
ruling, Department Order No. 131-13 Series of 2013 was the applicable rule of procedure. The
pertinent provision states:

Rule 11, Section 1. Appeal. — The Compliance Order may be appealed to the Office of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment by filing a Memorandum of Appeal, furnishing the other
party with a copy of the same, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. No further motion
for extension of time shall be entertained.

A mere notice of appeal shall not stop the running of the period within which to file an appeal.

Here, instead of filing an appeal with the DOLE Secretary, Ong moved for a reconsideration of
the subject Order; needless to say, this did not halt or stop the running of the period to elevate the
matter to the DOLE Secretary. Indeed, the DOLE NCR took no action at all on Ong's motion for
reconsideration; in fact, it categorically informed Ong that his resort to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration was procedurally infirm. The June 26, 2015 Order having become final, it could no
longer be altered or modified by discharging or releasing Ong from his accountability.

Furthermore, a definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is no longer subject to change

or revision. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of
immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification
is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land.

The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction
of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and
(3) void judgments.

In the absence of any showing that the CA's modification or alteration of the subject Order
falls within the exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments, the DOLE-NCR's June
26, 2015 Order must be upheld and respected.

113
 d. Modes of appeal from judgments or final orders of various courts
(Rules 40, 41, 42, 43, and 45)
QUIRINO T. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, -versus- NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 215545, THIRD DIVISION, January 07, 2019, LEONEN, J.

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari shall only pertain to questions of
law. While several exceptions to these rules were provided by jurisprudence, they must be alleged,
substantiated, and proved by the parties so this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the case.

Petitioner’s arguments are questions of fact not proper for review in this case. The date he received the
assailed National Police Commission Resolution is a question of fact that was resolved by the Civil
Service Commission. Similarly, whether there was sufficient evidence to find petitioner liable of grave
misconduct is also an evidentiary matter, which this Court will not look into.

Finally, the relaxation of procedural rules is warranted only if compelling and justifiable reasons exist.
This is not a case that calls for relaxation of the rules. This Court will not tolerate abuse of police
authority over civilians.

FACTS:

In an October 15, 2001 Information, a certain Sonny H. Villarias was charged with violation of P.D.
No. 1866 after he was arrested for allegedly possessing two (2) firearms without permits.

Villarias filed before the National Police Commission a Complaint-Affidavit narrating that at about
8:00 p.m. that night, he was awakened by four (4) uniformed officers, namely: Special Police Officer
4 Quirino Dela Cruz, Police Officer 1 Ariel Cantorna, whom he said he had known, and two others. He
said that SPO4 Dela Cruz poked an armalite rifle at him, pulled him up, and frisked him without any
explanation despite him repeatedly asking what he had done wrong. He was taken to their patrol
vehicle and was handcuffed on its steering wheel. The officers then returned to his house.

When the officers returned to the vehicle, they had with them eight of Villarias's most valuable
fighting cocks, a large plastic bag containing items from his house, two air guns, and two bolos.

After the officers left with Villarias, his common-law wife Nicar took photos of their personal
belongings in the house, which had been left in disarray when the officers ransacked their home.
While Villarias was in jail, he was informed that the policemen had stolen a pair of wedding rings, a
necklace, a coin bank filled with P5.00 coins, cash worth P12,000.00, and a bottle of men's cologne.
The officers told Villarias to admit to owning two (2) old and defective-looking handguns.

The National Police Commission filed a Complaint against SPO4 Dela Cruz and PO2 Cantorna.

Villarias was acquitted by the Regional Trial Court ruling that the warrantless arrest of the accused
was unlawful being outside the scope of Sec. 5, Rule 113. The guns seized from the accused, if ever
the same came from him, are inadmissible in evidence.

On January 12, 2010, the NPC declared Dela Cruz and Cantorna culpable of grave misconduct.

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SPO4 Dela Cruz filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The NPC found that SP04 Dela
Cruz neither presented newly discovered evidence nor cited errors of law or irregularities that would
affect the assailed Decision. Further, it found that he filed the Motion on September 21, 2010, well
beyond the 10-day non-extendible period after he received the Decision on September 8, 2010.

He filed before the Civil Service Commission an appeal. The CSC found that the Appeal had been filed
out of time, as SPO4 Dela Cruz did so on January 14, 2011, beyond the 15-day period after the Decision
for review was promulgated on December 15, 2010. The questioned Resolution had attained finality.

SPO4 Dela Cruz moved for reconsideration, but it was denied.

He filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review, which was dismissed. His motion for
reconsideration was denied.

Thus, SPO4 Dela Cruz filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:

First, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it sustained the Civil Service Commission's
dismissal of petitioner's appeal for having been filed out of time

RULING:

The Petition is denied. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari shall
only pertain to questions of law. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court. While
several exceptions to these rules were provided by jurisprudence, they must be alleged,
substantiated, and proved by the parties so this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the case.

Petitioner’s arguments are questions of fact not proper for review in this case. The date he
received the assailed National Police Commission Resolution is a question of fact that was
resolved by the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission might have resolved his
motion for reconsideration differently, had petitioner substantiated his claim with evidence that he
received the National Police Commission Resolution on January 4, 2011. Yet, petitioner failed to do
so. It is not this Court's role to review the evidence to resolve this question. Further, petitioner has
not addressed the December 15, 2010 Resolution of the National Police Commission, which found
that his motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. Thus, the January 12, 2010 Decision would
have already attained finality when he failed to timely seek its reconsideration, regardless of whether
the December 15, 2010 Resolution was received on January 4, 2011.

Similarly, whether there was sufficient evidence to find petitioner liable of grave misconduct is also
an evidentiary matter, which this Court will not look into. He claims that the judgment was based on
a misapprehension of facts to persuade this Court to review the case's factual questions. However, he
has failed to sufficiently substantiate this claim to convince this Court to look into the evidence.
Supported by substantial evidence, NPC Decision was properly affirmed by the CSC and the CA. There
is no cogent reason to reverse their factual findings.

115
Finally, the relaxation of procedural rules is warranted only if compelling and justifiable reasons
exist. This is not a case that calls for relaxation of the rules. This Court will not tolerate abuse of police
authority over civilians. Where a police officer has been shown to have committed atrocities against
a civilian, such as in this case, and is punished for his actions, he will find no relief in this Court.

116
 CARLITO L. MIRANDO, JR. v.
PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and MANOLITO MORATO
G.R. No. 205022, 03 July 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Jardeleza, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Resolving the issue of whether or not Mirando was the jackpot prize winner of the lotto entails
the necessity for the Court to evaluate the records, documentary and testimonial evidence and decide
on which side the preponderance of evidence, which is a question of fact. It requires an appreciation of
the relative weight of the competing parties’ evidence. It cannot be entertained in a Rule 45 petition.

FACTS
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) drew the lottery and there was one winner of
the jackpot prize who purchased the winning ticket at the Zenco Footsteps, Libertad, Pasay City lotto
outlet (Zenco outlet, for brevity)

Carlito L. Mirando, Jr. claimed that he is the owner of the winning ticket. Through his counsel,
he wrote to PCSO requesting for the release of the jackpot prize. PCSO Chairman Manolito Morato
denied the request, saying that the winning ticket was sold at the Zenco outlet and was already
claimed.

After almost five years, Mirando filed a complaint for damages against PCSO and Morato.
PCSO denied that Mirando was a bona fide holder of the winning ticket, arguing foremost that a
computer verification made at the PCSO main computer center showed that the winning ticket was
sold to a lone winner from Batangas, who bought his ticket at the Zenco outlet.

Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the complaint, concluding that it was Mirando who actually
tampered with the ticket. Mirando filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied. Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC ruling, saying that the Mirando alleged circumstances of prejudice
caused to him by PCSO, yet failed to prove any. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE
Should the Court reevaluate the evidence presented to determine the preponderance of
evidence?

RULING
NO. First, a Rule 45 petition pertains to question of law and not to factual issues. A question
of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question
of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts or when the question
necessarily invites an examination of the evidence.

In this case, resolving the issue of whether or not Mirando was the jackpot prize winner of
the lotto entails the necessity for the Court to evaluate the records, documentary and testimonial
evidence and decide on which side the preponderance of evidence lies. A determination of whether
a matter has been established by a preponderance of evidence is, by definition, a question of fact as

117
it entails an appreciation of the relative weight of the competing parties' evidence. Since a question
of fact is not the office of a Rule 45 petition, the Court has no choice but to deny the petition.

Second, the findings of the trial court, more so when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on the
Court when supported by the evidence on record. The Supreme Court will not assess and evaluate all
over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to an appeal
particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide.
While there are exceptions to this rule, none of them is palpable in this case.

Lastly, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Mere allegation is not evidence. The
case shows that the Mirando accuses Morato of altering the ticket on the day they supposedly met at
the PCSO, but the meeting and the alleged tampering by Morato were not proven by Mirando.

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 i. Period of appeal
PUERTO DEL SOL PALAWAN, INC., Petitioner, -versus - HON. KISSACK B. GABAEN, Regional
Hearing Officer, Regional Hearing Office IV, National Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
PERLAS-BERNABE, CAGUIOA, J. REYES, JR., and LAZARO-JAVIER, JJ. Commission on
Indigenous Peoples Promulgated: and ANDREW ABIS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 212607, SECOND DIVISION, March 27, 2019, Caguioa, J.

Section 97, Rule XVII of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure states that the rules of procedure under the
Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily with respect to cases heard before the NCIP. Under the Rules of
Court, with the advent of the Neypes Rule, otherwise known as the Fresh Period Rule, parties who availed
themselves of the remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file an appeal within fifteen
days from the denial of that motion.

The Court is not unaware that jurisprudence has held that the Neypes Rule strictly applies only with
respect to judicial decisions and that the said rule does not firmly apply to administrative decisions.
However, in the cases wherein the Court did not apply the Neypes Rule to administrative decisions, the
specific administrative rules of procedure applicable in such cases explicitly precluded the application
of the Fresh Period Rule.

In the instant case, there is no similar provision in the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure which states that
in case the aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an adverse decision of the RHO, the
said party has only the remaining balance of the period within which to appeal, reckoned from receipt
of notice of the RHO's decision denying the motion for reconsideration.

Oppositely, Section 46, Rule IX of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure clearly adopts the Fresh Period Rule,
stating that, in a situation wherein a motion for reconsideration was filed, a judgment rendered by the
RHO shall become final only when no appeal is made within fifteen ( 15) days from receipt of the order
denying such motion for reconsideration. By issuing an Order that plainly and unmistakably goes
against the above-stated rule, the Court finds that NCIP, RHO IV gravely abused its discretion.

FACTS:

On August 15, 2011, Abis filed with the NCIP RHO IV a Complaint entitled "Andrew Abis v. Puerto Del
Sol Resort/Michael Bachelor" for "Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion with Prayer for TRO and
Permanent Injunction with Damages." The case was docketed as NCIP Case No. 038-RIV-l l.

In the said Complaint, Abis alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interest, who are all members of
the Cuyunen Tribe, have been occupying and cultivating property located in Sitio Orbin, Brgy.
Concepcion, Busuanga, Palawan as their ancestral land since time immemorial. It is claimed that
PDSPI, through Michael Batchelor, entered the Cuyunen ancestral lands, put up a "no trespassing,
private property" sign therein, installed armed security guards, destroyed crops and plants planted
by the tribe, and occupied a portion of the Cuyunen ancestral lands. The Puerto del Sol Resort was
subsequently developed in the Cuyunen ancestral lands.

On November 22, 2012, after assessing all the facts and evidence adduced by both parties, the NCIP
RHO IV, through Gabaen, rendered its Decision in favor of Abis, holding that the land wherein the
Puerto del Sol Resort is situated in the ancestral lands of the Cuyunen Tribe. Further, the NCIP RHO
IV found that PDSPI unlawfully intruded into the ancestral domain of the Cuyunen Tribe.

119
PDSPI received a copy of the Decision dated November 22, 2012 on November 29, 2012.

A Motion for Reconsideration dated December 10, 2012 was filed by PDSPI fourteen (14) days from
November 29, 2012 or on December 13, 2012, which was eventually denied by the NCIP RHO IV
in its Order dated December 18, 2012.

PDSPI received the NCIP RHO IV's Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration on December 21,
2012.

Unsatisfied, PDSPI filed a Memorandum on Appeal with the NCIP RHO IV on Monday, January 7,
2013, considering that the fifteenth (15th) day from December 21, 2012, i.e., January 5, 2013, fell on
a Saturday.

In its Order dated January 14, 2013, the NCIP RHO IV, through Gabaen, denied due course the
Memorandum on Appeal of PDSPI for being filed beyond the reglementary period.

According to the NCIP RHO IV, since PDSPI filed its Motion for Reconsideration a day before the end
of the reglementary period to file an appeal of the NCIP RHO IV's Decision, PDSPI had only one (1)
day remaining to file an appeal upon receipt of the NCIP RHO IV's Order denying its Motion for
Reconsideration. Simply stated, according to the NCIP RHO IV, PDSPI was not granted a fresh period
to appeal after it received a copy of the NCIP RHO IV' s denial of its Motion for Reconsideration.

Feeling aggrieved, PDSPI filed its Petition for Certiorari dated March 4, 2013 before the CA, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 129036. PDSPI alleged that grave abuse of discretion was extant in the issuance of
the NCIP RHO IV's Order dated January 14, 2013.

In its assailed Resolution, the CA denied outright PDSPI's Certiorari Petition of PDSPI, invoking the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. According to the CA, instead of filing a petition for
certiorari, PDSPI should have first filed a motion for reconsideration of the NCIP RHO IV's Order
dismissing outright its Memorandum on Appeal. Hence, the CA held that there was a plain, adequate,
and speedy remedy available to PDSPI that precluded the institution of a Certiorari Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA was correct in invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
to deny PDSPl's Certiorari Petition assailing the NCIP RHO IV's Order dated January 14, 2013. (NO)

RULING:

In the main, the CA posits the view that, since PDSPI supposedly had the available remedy of filing a
motion for reconsideration against the NCIP RHO IV's Order dismissing outright PDSPI's
Memorandum on Appeal, the Certiorari Petition could not prosper as there was still a plain, adequate,
and speedy remedy at the disposal of PDSPI, invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

First and foremost, the CA was incorrect in holding that a motion for reconsideration was an available
remedy at the disposal of PDSPI in questioning NCIP RHO IV's Order dated January 14, 2013.

120
According to NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2003, or the Rules on Pleadings, Practice
and Procedure Before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (2003 NCIP Rules of
Procedure), the Rules of Procedure governing actions before NCIP at the time of the instant
controversy, only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained before the RH0. In the instant
case, PDSPI had already filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 10, 2012, barring it from
filing another similar motion before the NCIP RHO IV.

Neither can it be validly argued that the NCIP RHO IV's Order denying due course to PDSPI' s
Memorandum on Appeal should have first been appealed before the NCIP En Banc.

According to Section 97, Rule XVII of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure, the provisions of the Rules
of Court shall apply in an analogous and suppletory character. Hence, following Section 1, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, which states that an appeal may be taken only from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes the case, and that an appeal may not be taken from an order disallowing an
appeal, the NCIP RHO IV' s Order denying due course to PDSPI's appeal cannot be subject of an appeal
before the NCIP En Banc.

In any case, although the general rule states that the filing of a prior motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari, such rule is subject to well-recognized
exceptions. Jurisprudence has held that the special civil action of certiorari will lie even without a
party first availing itself of a motion for reconsideration if, among other exceptions, the order
challenged is a patent nullity or where the issue raised is one purely of law.

Moreover, while the general rule dictates that it must be first shown that all the administrative
remedies prescribed by law have been exhausted before filing an extraordinary action for certiorari
under the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, there are however exceptions to this
rule, such as where the issue is purely a legal one or where the controverted act is patently
illegal.

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the issue raised by PDSPI in the instant Petition, i.e., the
correct reglementary period applicable with respect to appeals of RHO decisions before the NCIP En
Banc, is a purely legal one.

Furthermore, the Court finds that the NCIP RHO IV's Order dated January 14, 2013 is patently in
violation of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure.

Clearly and unequivocally, Section 46, Rule IX of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure states that a
judgment rendered by the RHO shall become final only when no appeal is made within fifteen ( 15)
days from receipt of the assailed decision or, when a motion for reconsideration was filed by the
party, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the order denying such motion for
reconsideration:

Section 46. Finality of Judgment. -A judgment rendered by the RHO shall become final
upon the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision, award or order denying
the motion for reconsideration, and there being no appeal made. If the 15th day falls on a
Saturday, Sunday or a Holiday, the last day shall be the next working day.

121
To recall, PDSPI received a copy of the assailed Decision dated November 22, 2012 issued by the NCIP
RHO IV on November 29, 2012. Within fourteen (14) days from such date, or on December 13, 2012,
a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 10, 2012 was filed by PDSPI on December 12, 2012.
The said Motion was eventually denied by the NCIP RHO IV in its Order dated December 18, 2012.
PDSPI received the NCIP RHO IV's Order dated December 18, 2012 denying its Motion for
Reconsideration on December 21, 2012.

With the fifteenth (15th) day from December 21, 2012, i.e., January 5, 2013, falling on a Saturday,
according to Section 46, Rule IX of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure, PDSPI had until Monday,
January 7, 2013, to file its appeal. This is exactly what PDSPI did on such date.

Therefore, NCIP RHO IV committed a palpable and manifest error, violating the 2003 NCIP Rules of
Procedure in denying PDSPI's appeal due course on the ground that the reglementary period for the
filing of an appeal had already passed, based on the erroneous theory that PDSPI had only one (1)
day remaining to file an appeal upon receipt of the NCIP RHO IV's Order denying its Motion for
Reconsideration.

To reiterate, Section 97, Rule XVII of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure states that the rules of
procedure under the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily with respect to cases heard before the
NCIP. Under the Rules of Court, with the advent of the Neypes Rule, otherwise known as the Fresh
Period Rule, parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for reconsideration are now
allowed to file an appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that motion.

The Court is not unaware that jurisprudence has held that the Neypes Rule strictly applies only with
respect to judicial decisions and that the said rule does not firmly apply to administrative decisions.
However, in the cases wherein the Court did not apply the Neypes Rule to administrative decisions,
the specific administrative rules of procedure applicable in such cases explicitly precluded the
application of the Fresh Period Rule.

In the instant case, there is no similar provision in the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure which states
that in case the aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an adverse decision of the
RHO, the said party has only the remaining balance of the period within which to appeal, reckoned
from receipt of notice of the RHO's decision denying the motion for reconsideration.

Oppositely, Section 46, Rule IX of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure clearly adopts the Fresh Period
Rule, stating that, in a situation wherein a motion for reconsideration was filed, a judgment rendered
by the RHO shall become final only when no appeal is made within fifteen ( 15) days from receipt of
the order denying such motion for reconsideration. By issuing an Order that plainly and
unmistakably goes against the above-stated rule, the Court finds that NCIP, RHO IV gravely
abused its discretion.

122
 ii. Perfection of appeal
iii. Issues to be raised
JASON ALVARES PARAN v.
ERLINDA MANGUIAT and THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 200021-22, 28 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (J.C. Reyes, JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law. SPO1 Paran's
main argument that he did not lie in his affidavit is obviously a question of fact. Clearly, this question is
not proper in a petition for review on Certiorari.
The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause is entitled to great respect absent a showing of
grave abuse of discretion. For this reason, the Court would not normally interfere in the Ombudsman's
exercise of discretion in determining probable cause. Here, SPO1 Paran failed to show that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS
On March 22, 2008, a Barangay (Brgy.) Tanod from Brgy. Solis, Municipality of Balete,
Province of Batangas, visited the Balete Police Station and reported that a dead person was found
lying on the street of Brgy. Solis. SPO2 Melencio Landicho (Landicho), SPO1 Jason Alvares Paran
(Paran), and three more policemen stationed at the Balete Police Station, proceeded to the alleged
crime scene to verify the report. In Brgy. Solis, the policemen found the lifeless body of Damiano M.
Manguiat (Damiano) sprawled on the roadside near the store of Brgy. Captain Vicente Bathan (Brgy.
Captain Bathan), the Brgy. Captain of Brgy. Solis. Later, the policemen found the cadaver of Damiano's
older brother, Victorio M. Manguiat (Victorio), in the forest.
On April 4, 2008, Erlinda B. Manguiat (Erlinda), the widow of Damiano, filed an Amended
Complaint-Affidavit wherein she accused Brgy. Captain Bathan and six other persons for the killing
of Damiano and Victorio. Erlinda alleged that on the night of March 22, 2008, she asked his sons, Lary
Manguiat (Lary) and Dennis Manguiat (Dennis) to fetch their father and uncle at the house of a certain
"Lando." However, when his sons returned, they told her that they saw Brgy. Capt. Bathan, together
with several barangay tanods and private persons, mauling and shooting Damiano and Victorio.

On May 30, 2008, SPO1 Paran executed an affidavit declaring that at dawn of March 23, 2008,
he and SPO2 Landicho went to Lary's house to inform the latter of his father's death. He stated that
he personally informed Lary that his father was killed; and that Lary replied by saying "siningil agad
si itay?"

On June 11, 2008, Erlinda and Lary filed their respective affidavits to belie the statements
made by SPO1 Paran in his affidavit. On July 9, 2008, Erlinda filed before the Ombudsman an
administrative complaint for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service, and Oppression, and a criminal complaint for Perjury against SPO1 Paran.

The Ombudsman found SPO1 Paran guilty of Simple Dishonesty. He was suspended from
office for a period of one month and one day, without pay. The Ombudsman also ruled that there is
probable cause to believe that SPO1 Paran committed the crime of Perjury.

123
ISSUES
(1) Did Paran avail the right legal remedy?
(2) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion when it found SPO1 Paran guilty
of Simple Dishonesty?
RULING
(1) NO. SPO1 Paran availed of the wrong remedy which necessitates the denial of this
petition. A petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law. SPO1
Paran's main argument that he did not lie in his affidavit is obviously a question of fact. Clearly, this
question is not proper in a petition for review on Certiorari. Further, it is settled that appeals from
the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be elevated to the CA
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The proper remedy in cases in which it is alleged that the
Ombudsman has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
its adjudication of criminal cases is a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the Supreme
Court (SC).
(2) NO. SPO1 Paran failed to show that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion.
The Ombudsman's powers to investigate and prosecute crimes allegedly committed by public officers
or employees are plenary and unqualified. Simply stated, the Ombudsman is empowered to
determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with
the appropriate courts.
First, it is not disputed that SPO1 Paran executed an affidavit wherein he declared that he
personally informed Lary that his father was killed. Second, it is clear from SPO1 Paran's affidavit
that the same was sworn before the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Province of Batangas, a
person authorized to receive an oath. Third, there is reason to believe that SPO1 Paran made a willful
and deliberate assertion of a falsehood in his affidavit. Lary's statement that he only talked with SPO2
Landicho, and no one else, was corroborated by SPO2 Landicho himself in his own affidavit. Lastly, it
is clear that SPO1 Paran's affidavit was made for a legal purpose. After all, he would not have filed the
subject affidavit before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Batangas if this was not the case.
The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause is entitled to great respect absent a showing of
grave abuse of discretion. For this reason, the Court would not normally interfere in the
Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining probable cause.

124
 EQUITABLE PCI BANK (FORMERLY INSULAR BANK OF SIA & AMERICA/PHIL. COMMERCIAL
AND INDUSTRIAL BANK) v.
MANILA ASJUSTERS & SURVEYORS, INC.
G.R. No. 166726, 25 November 2019, SECOND DIVISON (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, the Court may not review the findings of facts all over again. It must be stressed that the Court
is not a trier of facts, and it is not its functions to re-examine and weigh anew the respective evidence of
the parties.

The Bank mainly contends that it did not receive the required documents from MASCO in order
for the latter to claim the proceeds of the LOC. Clearly, this is a question of fact which is not within the
purview of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Moreover, the instant case does not fall
under the exceptions wherein the Court should once again review the actual circumstances surrounding
the case before arriving at its conclusion.

FACTS
On June 27, 1975, the Ilocos Sur Federation of Farmers Cooperative (Federation) and the
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. (Philam), represented by its adjuster, Manila
Adjusters and Surveyors, Company (MASCO), executed a Deed of Sale involving salvaged fertilizers
which were stored in warehouses in San Fernando, La Union. The agreement provided that the
Federation would pay for the stocks of fertilizers in installments. Moreover, the Federation would be
accountable for the storage and warehousing charges. The Federation was also required to open an
irrevocably confirmed without recourse Letter of Credit (LOC) amounting to P1, 000,000.00 which
will be forfeited in favor of MASCO in case of the Federation’s non-compliance with the terms and
conditions of the contract.

Apparently, the Federation already availed of an LOC from petitioner Equitable PCI Bank
(Bank), with a face value of P1, 000,000.00 in favor of MASCO. The LOC was valid until October 22,
1975. Likewise, the LOC shall be drawable by MASCO upon its submission to the Bank of a
certification that the Federation failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the sale.

The Federation failed to pay MASCO, so the latter sought to call on the LOC but the Bank
refused to release it to them.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that the Federation did not comply with the terms and
conditions of the Deed of Sale, since it failed to pay the entire sum. It found that MASCO properly filed
its claim against the LOC with the Bank. It further found that the Federation and the Bank did not
present sufficient evidence to overturn the said facts.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC and likewise found that MASCO
complied with the conditions to claim the proceeds of the LOC upon presentation of the required
documents to the Bank.

ISSUE
Is MASCO allowed to draw on the LOC?

125
RULING
YES. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, the Court may not review the findings of facts all over again. It must be stressed that the
Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its functions to re-examine and weigh anew the respective
evidence of the parties.

The Bank mainly contends that it did not receive the required documents from MASCO in
order for the latter to claim the proceeds of the LOC. Undoubtedly, such contention’s truth or falsity
can easily be verified by assessing the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the
parties during trial. Clearly, this is a question of fact which is not within the purview of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Moreover, the instant case does not fall under the exceptions
wherein the Court should once again review the actual circumstances surrounding the case before
arriving at its conclusion. In fact, based on the records, the findings of fact by the CA and the RT are
accurate and have no badges of misapprehension or bad faith, and thus need not be interfered with.
To stress, factual findings of the CA, especially if they coincide with those of the RTC, as in the instant
case, is generally binding.

Both the CA and the RTC found that MASCO properly presented the documentary
requirements of the Bank in order to claim from the LOC. The Bank was not able to overturn such
finding as it merely denied receipt of the same without corroborating evidence, except for an
allegation that all documents received by the Bank should go through a metered machine which was
not found on those documents submitted by MASCO.

Contrariwise, MASCO averred that the official papers were personally handed over to the
manager of the Bank at the time, which could explain why it did not pass through the metered
machine or the usual procedure in the Bank.

Interestingly, the Bank was not able to completely establish if the practice of utilizing a
metered machine was already being enforced when the documents were presented, considering that
the incident happened in 1975. The Bank did not even submit an affidavit or offer the testimony of
the bank manager during trial in order to debunk MASCO’s assertion that he or she actually received
the documents.

In addition, the contention that the Federation instructed the Bank not to pay MASCO
suggested that the Bank, regardless of receipt of the documents, would not pay MASCO immediately.
Unfortunately, it would be difficult to either prove or debunk the parties; allegations since more than
40 years had already passed.

Hence, given that MASCO was able to prove with preponderant evidence that it submitted the
documents which the Bank required in order to claim from the LOC, there is basis to affirm the
findings of the RTC and the CA that the Bank should release the proceeds of the LOC amounting to
MASCO.

126
 e. Review of judgments or final orders of the COA, COMELEC, CSC, and
the Ombudsman
ELENITA S. BINAY v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.
G.R. No. 213957-58, 7 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Settled is the rule that a sitting Ombudsman has the power to revoke or alter the rulings of a
predecessor within the bounds of law. Moreover, reinvestigation is merely a repeat investigation of the
case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for
the prosecutor to review and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted.

Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial. Consequently, it need not be subjected under the
same due process requirements mandated during trial.

Mere disagreement with the Ombudsman’s findings is not enough to constitute grave abuse of
discretion. It is necessary for Mayor Binay to prove that the Ombudsman conducted the preliminary
investigation in such a way that amounted to a virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law. In this
case, the Supreme Court did not find that the Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it determined the existence of probable cause against Mayor Binay.

FACTS
From September 2001 to February 2002, the Commission on Audit’s Special Task Force of
Local Government Units audited the financial transactions of the local government units in Metro
Manila. The audit revealed that the City of Makati entered into a contract with Apollo Medical
Equipment and Supplies (Apollo). Under the contract, the City of Makati was to purchase P38,
799,700 worth of hospital beds and bedside cabinets for Ospital ng Makati. The audit revealed that
the contract was awarded to Apollo without the benefit of public bidding. The public officials
allegedly relied on Apollo’s representation that it was the sole and exclusive Philippine distributor of
UGM-Medysis of New Jersey, USA. However, upon delivery, it was discovered that the beds were
manufactured by Juhng Mei Medical Instruments, a Taiwanese company. Moreover, the
manufacturer’s invoice revealed that the items’ actual total cost was merely P2, 447,376.14.

Two complaints were filed separately by the Commission on Audit and one Roberto Brillante
(Brillante) before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman issued
a Resolution finding probable cause to indict 15 officials for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for malversation of public funds through falsification.

No probable cause was found against Mayor Binay. In so ruling, the Arias doctrine was cited.
The Office of Ombudsman ruled that the evidence shows that Binay had relied in good faith on the
representations of Aspillaga, as City General Services Head, and of Santiago, as City Administrator,
that the transaction was regular on its face. Santiago and Aspillaga argued that they could not be held
liable for malversation because they were not the funds’ custodians. They averred that it was Mayor
Binay who was not only the custodian, but was also the approving authority in their disbursement.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a Consolidated Resolution recommending the
inclusion of Mayor Binay as an accused. It was also recommended that the Information for
malversation through falsification be withdrawn and an amended Information for malversation

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against Mayor Binay and the other accused be filed. Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales approved
the Consolidated Resolution. Informations were subsequently filed before the Sandiganbayan. Hence,
this action through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES
(1) Did the Office of the Ombudsman act without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in finding probable cause against
Mayor Binay?
(2) Was Mayor Binay’s right to due process violated?
(3) Was Mayor Binay’s right to speedy disposition of cases violated?

RULING
(1) NO. Mere disagreement with the Ombudsman’s findings is not enough to constitute grave
abuse of discretion. It is necessary for Mayor Binay to prove that the Ombudsman conducted the
preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted to a virtual refusal to perform a duty under
the law. In this case, the Supreme Court did not find that the Office of the Ombudsman acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it determined the existence of probable cause against Mayor Binay.
The Resolution had not yet attained finality when the Ombudsman received the initial finding.

Settled is the rule that a sitting Ombudsman has the power to revoke or alter the rulings of a
predecessor within the bounds of law. In Roxas v. Hon. Vasquez, the Court ruled that “Consistent with
its independence as protector of the people and as prosecutor to ensure accountability of public
officers, the Ombudsman is not and should not be limited in its review by the action or inaction of
complainants. The Ombudsman may motu proprio conduct a reinvestigation to assure that the guilty
do not go unpunished.” Moreover, reinvestigation is merely a repeat investigation of the case. New
matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the
prosecutor to review and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted.

Absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court will not interfere with the
Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause.

(2) NO. Mayor Binay’s failure to receive a copy of the Motions for Reconsideration does not
result in a violation of her right to due process. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial.
Consequently, it need not be subjected under the same due process requirements mandated during
trial. A person’s rights during preliminary investigation are limited to those provided by procedural
law, to wit: the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant, but he does not have a
similar right over the evidence submitted by his or her co-respondents.

Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. In this case, Mayor Binay moved for reconsideration of the assailed
Consolidated Resolution. Hence, she was given the opportunity to question the decision against her.
She was not denied due process.

(3) NO. A number of factors are to be considered in determining whether a person’s right to
speedy disposition of cases had been violated. The Office of the Ombudsman sufficiently explained
the delay in the resolution of the Complaints. From the time of the receipt of the Complaints, various

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fact-finding investigations had been conducted. There were several separate investigations
conducted. Moreover, the Complaints involved 23 respondents, each of whom was given the
opportunity to submit and present counter-affidavits and evidence. Mayor Binay herself submitted
her counter-affidavit only in 2008, three years after the Supplemental Complaints had been filed.

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 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v.
MELCHOR J. CHIPOCO AND CHRISTY C. BUGANUTAN
G.R. No. 231345, 19 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The consolidation of two or several erstwhile similar cases is, at least as a rule, not considered
as mandatory or automatic, but merely discretionary. Hence, the mere filing by Galon of a second
complaint-affidavit does not, by itself, strip the Ombudsman of the authority to resolve the first
complaint-affidavit on its own. The consolidation of the two cases does not happen automatically or as
a matter of course just because they happen to share the same underlying facts and implicate the same
parties; that still requires an exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman.

FACTS
The municipality of Labason, Zamboanga del Norte purchased a Nissan Patrol vehicle from
Eduardo A. Ayunting (Ayunting). This transaction was embodied in a Deed of Sale that was signed by
Ayunting and by the then Vice Mayor of Labason, Virgilio Go (Go).

Believing the transaction to be anomalous, a certain Roberto Galon (Galon) filed with the
Ombudsman an Affidavit-Complaint. Galon claimed that the purchase of the Nissan Patrol vehicle was
designed to give undue benefit to incumbent Municipal Mayor Wilfredo Balais, at the expense of the
municipality.

Galon's Affidavit-Complaint kick-started an administrative case and a criminal case with the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman rendered a Decision holding Balais administratively liable, but
absolved the rest of the Labason officials. Meanwhile, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding
the existence of probable cause to charge Ayunting, Balais and Go for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019. The Ombudsman's Decision was challenged by Galon and the respondents via separate
motions for reconsideration.

Galon filed with the Ombudsman a second complaint-affidavit concerning the same
transaction as in his original complaint-affidavit. Galon justified the filing of a second complaint-
affidavit on what he claims as "newly-discovered evidence" in the form of several documents that had
been attached by Ayunting in his application to become a state witness in the criminal case pending
before the Sandiganbayan. To avoid conflict with his pending motion for reconsideration, Galon
prayed that the same be consolidated with the administrative aspect of his second complaint-
affidavit.

The Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration of Ayunting, Balais and Go, but
partially granted that of Galon. Aggrieved, Ayunting, Balais and Go elevated the Order of the
Ombudsman to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. The CA rendered a Decision setting aside the Order of the Ombudsman for being premature,
remanding back to the latter, and ordering the consolidation of the motions. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES
(1) Does the Ombudsman have the requisite standing to intervene and become a party in
cases wherein its administrative ruling is under review?
(2) Did the CA err in setting aside the Order of the Ombudsman and directing the
consolidation of the case?

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RULING
(1) YES. The question of whether the Ombudsman has the requisite standing to intervene and
become a party in cases wherein its administrative ruling is under review was decisively settled in
the affirmative by the en banc in the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego.

Its legal interest lies in the fact that it is the constitutionally mandated "protector of the
people," a disciplinary authority vested with quasi-judicial function to resolve administrative
disciplinary cases against public officials. To hold otherwise would have been tantamount to
abdicating its salutary functions as the guardian of public trust and accountability.

Samaniego further ruled that it is plain error to equate the Ombudsman to a judge or a court
when the former is discharging its duty to decide administrative cases. Unlike a judge or a court, the
Ombudsman — by virtue of its special power, duty and function under the Constitution and the law
— is on "a league of its own" and thus cannot be "detached, disinterested or neutral" with respect to
the administrative decisions it renders. Hence, the Ombudsman ought not to be precluded from
defending its decision on appeal

(2) YES. The Order of the Ombudsman is not premature, and appears to be perfectly apt and
was only meant to settle the pending motions for reconsideration. Under the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman (RPOO), the issuance of an order disposing of such motions is merely
something that the Ombudsman is expected, nay authorized, to do given the circumstances.

The mere filing by Galon of a second complaint-affidavit does not, by itself, strip the
Ombudsman of the authority to resolve the first complaint-affidavit on its own. The consolidation of
the two cases does not happen automatically or as a matter of course just because they happen to
share the same underlying facts and implicate the same parties; that still requires an exercise of
discretion by the Ombudsman.

Consolidation, in the context of legal proceedings, is a procedural tool that permits individual
cases that involve common questions of fact or law to be jointly heard and resolved by a court or
tribunal. It bears stressing, however, that the RPOO does not contain a direct provision on the
consolidation of related administrative cases pending with the Ombudsman. Be that as it may, a guide
for the application of the tool may be derived from Section I, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court which, by
virtue of Section 18(2) of R.A. No. 6770, in relation to Section 3, Rule V of the RPOO, has suppletory
application to proceedings before the Ombudsman.

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 f. Review of judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. P/SUPT. CRISOSTOMO P. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 219772, 17 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, J. Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence. The factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are generally accorded with great weight
and respect, if not finality by the courts, due to its special knowledge and expertise on matters within its
jurisdiction.

However, the Court of Appeals may resolve factual issues, review and re-evaluate the evidence
on record, and reverse the findings of the administrative agency if not supported by substantial evidence.
Stated in the reverse, appellate courts should affirm the findings of the OMB if the same are supported
by substantial evidence. Only arbitrariness would warrant judicial intervention of the OMB's findings
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to
believe that the respondent is guilty of the act complained of even if the evidence is not overwhelming.

In the present case, the Court finds that the decision of the OMB in the administrative case
against Mendoza should be respected as it is supported by substantial evidence.

FACTS
Muhad Pangandaman y Makatanong (Muhad) was arrested by the police officers and was
released after giving P200, 000.00 in exchange for his liberty. As a consequence, Muhad filed an
administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against the police officers involved.

In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Muhad alleged that while tending his store, Senior Police Officer
2 Dante Naguera (Naguera), with five other police officers in civilian clothing, arrested him. Muhad
was then brought to the police station and was asked to give P200, 000.00 in exchange for his
freedom. Naguera threatened Muhad that he would be arrested again if he squealed on them.

In their Pinagsamang Salaysay, Muhad’s relatives Diamungan Pangandaman (Diamungan)

and Mampao Rasul (Rasul) corroborated Muhad’s narration. And in their Karagdagang Sinumpaang
Salaysay, they averred that before they left the police station, SPO2 Naguera accompanied Rasul
inside the office of P/Supt. Crisostomo P. Mendoza (Mendoza).

On the other hand, in his Counter-Affidavit, Mendoza denied the accusations against him
claiming that Naguera was neither assigned nor detailed at Police Station 6. He explained that
Muhad’s arrest was done without his knowledge and that he would never tolerate any wrongdoings
done by his subordinates.

OMB found Mendoza, along with some police officers implicated in Muhad’s complaint, guilty
of grave misconduct and meted the penalty of dismissal from the service. As a result, Mendoza filed
a petition for review questioning the decision of the OMB in the administrative case against him.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) granted Mendoza’s petition and absolved him from any
liability in connection with the administrative case filed against him finding that Executive Order No.
(E.O. No. 226). Hence, this petition.

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ISSUE
Did the CA gravely err in finding Mendoza guilty of Grave Misconduct?

RULING
YES. Substantial evidence exists to hold Mendoza guilty of grave misconduct.
In Ombudsman-Mindanao v. Ibrahim, the Court held that the general rule is that the findings
of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. The
factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are generally accorded with great weight and respect,
if not finality by the courts, due to its special knowledge and expertise on matters within its
jurisdiction. However, the Court of Appeals may resolve factual issues, review and re-evaluate the
evidence on record, and reverse the findings of the administrative agency if not supported by
substantial evidence. Stated in the reverse, appellate courts should affirm the findings of the OMB if
the same are supported by substantial evidence. Only arbitrariness would warrant judicial
intervention of the OMB's findings supported by substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. It is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent
is guilty of the act complained of even if the evidence is not overwhelming.

In the present case, the Court finds that the decision of the OMB in the administrative case
against Mendoza should be respected as it is supported by substantial evidence.

In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Muhad narrated his own version of what happed on the day of
his arrest. It is true that mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence. However, Muhad, Diamungan and Rasul's affidavits were based on personal knowledge
regarding the circumstances behind Muhad's arrest and subsequent release. As such the statements
of Muhad, Diamungan and Rasul were not hearsay as they were based on their personal knowledge
and not merely rumors or information they learned from another.

Mendoza's defense of denial and alibi has no leg to stand on. To reiterate, Rasul positively
identified Mendoza as the one who received a portion of the extortion money from Naguera. In tum,
Mendoza denied the same claiming that he attended a religious activity with his sect. However,
Mendoza's allegations are unsubstantiated and uncorroborated by statements of other participants
of the said religious activity.

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 g. Dismissal, reinstatement, and withdrawal of appeal
HEIRS OF BATORI, represented by GLADYS B. ABAD, petitioner, -versus- THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF BENGUET and PACITA GALVEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 212611, SECOND DIVISION, February 11, 2019, J.C. REYES, JR., J.
Section (1) (h), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that the CA may dismiss an appeal motu
proprio for failure of the appellant to comply with orders, circulars or directives of the court without
justifiable cause. The said provision confers a discretionary power and not a mandatory duty.
Abad claims that the CA erred in dismissing her appeal for her alleged failure to comply with its
lawful order. Thus, it is incumbent upon her to prove that the CA unsoundly exercised its discretion
to dismiss her appeal as it is presumed that the appellate court had exercised its discretion
judiciously. Unfortunately, Abad failed to overcome the said presumption.

FACTS:

The late Batori possessed a 6,000-square meter parcel of land in La Trinidad, Benguet since time
immemorial. In October 1948, Batori caused the said property to be surveyed and was identified
as Lot 1, per PSU No. 121133. Batori occupied the land until his death and was continued by Abad
and her siblings as their father's heirs.
In 2000, Abad went to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to follow
up Batori's Free Patent application. She, however, discovered that there had been an amended
survey on PSU No. 121133 in February 2000 and approved on August 30, 2000 wherein Lot 1
was subdivided into three lots, as follows: (1) Lot 1-A in Galvez's name; (2) Lot 1-B in the name
of Abraham Batori, Sr.;and (3) Lot 1-C in Abad's name. Abad wondered why Lot 1-A was in
Galvez's name considering that the latter was not one of Batori's heirs, no waiver was executed
in her favor, and the said lot was supposed to be in the name of Abad's sister, Magdalena
BatoriShagol. In addition, she learned that an amended survey of PSU No. 1000175 in the name
of Johnson Andres (Andres) indicated that an area of 2,000 square meters of Andres' property
allegedly overlaps with Batori's property under PSU No. 121133.
Consequently, Abad filed a protest before the DENR-Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR)
Office for the annulment of PSU No. 1000175. The DENR-CAR decided in Abad's favor, however,
the Secretary of the DENR upheld the validity of both PSU No. 121133 and PSU No. 1000175 and
directed the segregations of Lot 1. Aggrieved, Abad appealed the said decision before the Office
of the President (OP).
Meanwhile, in April 2008, Abad was surprised to learn that Galvez was able to secure a certificate
of title over the parcel of land covered by PSU No. 1000175 especially since she thought her
appeal was still pending with the OP. Believing that Galvez obtained the title fraudulently, Abad
filed her complaint before the RTC.
In its November 18, 2010 Decision, the RTC granted Abad's complaint. However, in its April 1,
2011 Resolution, the RTC granted Galvez's motion for reconsideration and reversed its
November 18, 2010 Decision. The trial court expounded that fraud must have been deliberately
and intentionally resorted to. It highlighted that the Secretary of the DENR, as affirmed by the OP,
upheld the validity of PSU No. 1000175 and PSU No. 121133. As such, the RTC posited that Galvez
did not act fraudulently when she applied for Free Patent and a certificate of title as it was based
on a final decision of the DENR, and the application was supported by relevant documents and
requirements.

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In its November 19, 2013 Resolution, the CA dismissed Abad's appeal for failure to comply with
the CA's Order to furnish proof of receipt of appellee's counsel of a copy of the appellant's brief
to determine whether the said brief was timely filed.
ISSUES
Whether the CA erred when it dismissed the petitioner’s appeal for failure to comply with the
CA's Order to furnish proof of receipt of appellee's counsel of a copy of the appellant's brief to
determine whether the said brief was timely filed. (NO)
RULING:
Section (1) (h), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that the CA may dismiss an appeal motu
proprio for failure of the appellant to comply with orders, circulars or directives of the court
without justifiable cause. The said provision confers a discretionary power and not a mandatory
duty.
In Tiangco v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the Court explained that it is presumed that the CA had
exercised sound discretion in deciding whether to dismiss the case in accordance with the rules,
to wit:
The CA has, under the said provision of the Rules of Court, discretion to
dismiss or not to dismiss respondent's appeal. Although said discretion must be
a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play,
having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case, the presumption is that
it has been so exercised. It is incumbent upon herein petitioners, as actors in the
case at bar, to offset this presumption.
Abad claims that the CA erred in dismissing her appeal for her alleged failure to comply with its
lawful order. Thus, it is incumbent upon her to prove that the CA unsoundly exercised its
discretion to dismiss her appeal as it is presumed that the appellate court had exercised its
discretion judiciously. Unfortunately, Abad failed to overcome the said presumption.

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 3. Petition for relief from judgment (Rule 38)
JACINTO J. BAGAPORO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
G.R. No. 211829. SECOND DIVISION. January 30, 2019. J.C. REYES, JR., J

The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on
the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

Notably, the petition for relief was filed in the same case, which resolution had already become final. An
examination of petitioner's averments and relief sought, i.e., the setting aside of a final and executory
resolution denying an appeal, leads to no other conclusion than that it is the mode provided under Rule
38, whether or not that was what petitioner intended.

The CA cannot, thus, be faulted for treating the petition as one which sought the relief provided by Rule
38, and consequently dismissing it. It is settled that a petition for relief from judgment is not an
available remedy in the CA.

Petitioner nonetheless insists that his petition for relief is different from that under Rule 38. As his
petition was based on the alleged gross negligence of his counsel, he asserts that there exists a distinct
remedy provided by jurisprudence and not by the Rules of Court. There is, however, no such mode that
is independent of the Rules.

FACTS:

Petitioner Bagaporo was indicted for Bigamy in an Information before the RTC. The RTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner appealed his conviction. According to the
petitioner, his then counsel of record, Atty. Cerdon, broached the idea that he might want to
engage a new lawyer based near in Manila to henceforth handle the appeal. This allegedly prompted
the petitioner to consult his present counsel, Atty. Causing, in January of 2013.

Atty. Causing advised the petitioner to secure first Atty. Cerdon's formal withdrawal as counsel.
Nonetheless, upon Atty. Causing's advice and assistance, petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw
Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC on January 11, 2013.

Copies of both motions were allegedly furnished to Atty. Cerdon when the petitioner visited the
former's office on February 25, 2013. It was then that petitioner supposedly clarified with Atty.
Cerdon's secretary that Atty. Cerdon remained to be his counsel of record to take charge of the appeal
before the CA, notwithstanding Atty. Causing's engagement to pursue post-judgment remedies
before the RTC.

Meanwhile, the appeal before the CA proceeded. Petitioner was, thus, required by the CA on March
18, 2013 to file an appeal brief. The notice was received by Atty. Cerdon. The CA dismissed
petitioner's appeal for failure to file the required appellant's brief.

Petitioner filed in the same case a "Petition for Relief from Resolution or Judgment in Case Entry was
Already Ordered," alleging gross negligence on the part of Atty. Cerdon. Treated as a petition for relief
under Rule 38, the petition was denied by the CA. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which

136
the CA denied. Hence, petitioner's present recourse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in treating the Petition as one under Rule 38. (NO)

RULING:

The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based
on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

Notably, the petition for relief was filed in the same case, which resolution had already become final.
An examination of petitioner's averments and relief sought, i.e., the setting aside of a final and
executory resolution denying an appeal, leads to no other conclusion than that it is the mode
provided under Rule 38, whether or not that was what petitioner intended.

The CA cannot, thus, be faulted for treating the petition as one which sought the relief provided by
Rule 38, and consequently dismissing it. It is settled that a petition for relief from judgment is not
an available remedy in the CA.

Petitioner nonetheless insists that his petition for relief is different from that under Rule 38. As his
petition was based on the alleged gross negligence of his counsel, he asserts that there exists a distinct
remedy provided by jurisprudence and not by the Rules of Court. There is, however, no such mode
that is independent of the Rules.

While the Court indeed provides relief to litigants when gross negligence of counsel is manifest, in
such cases, petitioners go to court through modes specifically provided by law and the Rules.

In both APEX Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, and Legarda v. Court of Appeals, cited by petitioner, the
remedy availed of before the CA was a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court. In Callangan v. People of the Philippines, the petitioner resorted to a Rule 45 petition on a
pure question of law before this Court, which assailed the RTC's dismissal of a Rule 65 petition
questioning the MTC's denial of a motion for new trial in a criminal case. We are, thus, confounded
by what mode of relief petitioner is referring to in his contention that the CA erred in treating his
petition before it as one filed under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

As to petitioner's vain attempt to withdraw his notice of appeal to give way to a motion for
reconsideration before the RTC, without manifesting such fact before the CA, the same smacks of
forum shopping.

At any rate, it remains incumbent upon the petitioner to manifest before the CA the engagement of
present counsel, the filing of motions before the RTC, and to follow-up the status of the case at the
appellate stage. Even if we were to presume good faith, petitioner cannot avoid responsibility for any
confusion caused by his engagement of a new lawyer without securing the written withdrawal or
conforme of the lawyer who handled his case during the trial stage. Furthermore, on petitioner's
averments alone, this Court does not have sufficient basis to conclude that Atty. Cerdon was grossly
negligent, especially without having heard Atty. Cerdon's side on the matter. Petitioner must,

137
therefore, bear the loss of his appeal.

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 4. Annulments of judgment (Rule 47)
THE HEIRS OF ALFREDO CULLADO v. DOMINIC GUTIERREZ
A.C. No. 11830, 30 July 2019, EN BANC (Jardeleza, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The issue in an accion publiciana is the "better right of possession" of real property
independently of title. This "better right of possession" may or may not proceed from a Torrens title.
Thus, a lessee, by virtue of a registered lease contract or an unregistered lease contract with a term
longer than one year, can file, as against the owner or intruder, an accion publiciana if he has been
dispossessed for more than one year. In the same manner, a registered owner or one with a Torrens title
can likewise an accion publiciana to recover possession if the one-year prescriptive period for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer has already passed. While there is no express grant in the Rules of Court
that the court wherein an accion publiciana is lodged can provisionally resolve the issue of ownership,
unlike an ordinary ejectment court which is expressly conferred such authority there is ample
jurisprudential support for upholding the power of a court hearing an accion publiciana to also rule on
the issue of ownership.
In this case, the petition that was filed was an accion publiciana, the court a quo, therefore, does
not have jurisdiction over the issue of reconveyance and fraudulence which were raised by petitioners.
FACTS
The father of Dominic Gutierrez (Gutierrez) filed an action for recovery of ownership of a
parcel of land as the representative of his minor child, he claimed that the Cullado has been squatting
on the parcel of land for years. In his reply, Cullado used the defense of actual and continuous
possession, claiming that the Gutierrez fraudulently had the subject property registered under his
son's name. Cullado died, thus his heirs replaced him.
The lawyer of the Gutierrez failed to attend the scheduled hearing and was deemed to have
waived their right to cross-examine the witness, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and
dismissed the complaint.
Gutierrez then filed a petition from the relief of judgment, stating the negligence of his counsel
among other grounds prevented him from filing his appeal. The Cullados in their answer prayed for
the reconveyance of the property fraudulently titled to the respondent. CA granted the petition of the
Gutierrez. It held that the allegations of the Cullado constitute a collateral attack against the
respondent's title, which cannot be allowed in an accion publiciana. Hence, the present action.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in reversing the Decision of the RTC and in granting Dominic's petition for
annulment of judgment?
RULING
NO. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that the remedy of annulment by the CA
of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial Courts can only be
availed of where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Thus, a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party,

139
without fault on his part, had failed to avail of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided
by law; and such action is never resorted to as a substitute for a party's own neglect in not promptly
availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.
The RTC was bereft of jurisdiction to rule with finality on the issue of ownership and
consequently was without the power to order the reconveyance of the subject land to the heirs of
Cullado given the fact that the original complaint was only an accion publiciana. Accordingly, the CA
was correct in upholding the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment.

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 HEIRS OF JACINTO ROQUE, NAMELY: JANET ROQUE AREVALO, ET AL. v.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 240071, 04 December 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy of equity that can only be availed of where the
ordinary remedies are wanting or no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. It is only
granted under exceptional circumstances and not intended as substitute for a party’s own neglect in not
promptly availing of the other ordinary and appropriate remedies.
In this case, however, it should be noted that the family of the heirs reside on the same subject
property. Hence, it is unfathomable how petitioners could now claim that they were deprived of due
process when they were not impleaded by the respondents in their complaint as they would have easily
known about the ongoing litigation which their mother and other siblings had been attending since they
all reside on the same subject property. Sadly, the heirs did not even avail of the remedy of intervention
during the early stage of the proceedings at the RTC in order to assert their alleged rights over the
property.
FACTS
The case involves a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership filed by the
respondents Spouses Victor and Cristina Princess Jaraba (Sps. Jaraba) against Josefina Roque
(Josefina), Reynaldo Roque, Pia Roque and Arlene Roque before the RTC. The subject of the complaint
is a parcel of land under the name of respondent Victor Jaraba.
The Sps, Jaraba claimed that they are the lawful owners of the subject land having acquired
the same from Dominga Badelles Jaraba who’s right the same was based on the Extrajudicial
Settlement, which has been previously confirmed by the Court. As current owners, Sps. Jaraba have
been paying the realty taxes thereon. On the other hand, herein petitioners, heirs of Jacinto Roque
(heirs) possessed the land covered by Sps. Jaraba’s title. They alleged that they are the owners of the
subject land by virtue of the “Contract of Exchange of Lots with Consideration”. Hence, they have been
in possession of the same since 1997 in the concept of an owner.
The RTC rendered a decision finding that the heirs’ occupation and possession of the subject
land is without basis as the Contract of Exchange refers to Lot No. 1695-B and not the subject land
which is Lot No. 1695-A. Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the case to the CA praying that the
judgment rendered by the RTC be nullified on the ground that they were not impleaded as party
defendants, despite them being co-heirs of the subject land. CA dismissed the petition, thus, the
present petition.
ISSUE
Is the CA correct in dismissing the petition motu proprio and in affirming the judgment even
as petitioners being indispensable parties were not impleaded?
RULING
YES. The remedy of annulment of judgment of the trial court, while has been long authorized
and sanctioned in the Philippines, recognizes only two grounds. One is extrinsic or collateral fraud,
and the other is lack of jurisdiction. Pursuant to jurisprudence, an indispensable party is one whose
interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final

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determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the
relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party
to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In this case, however, it should be noted that the family of
the heirs reside on the same subject property. Hence, it is unfathomable how petitioners could now
claim that they were deprived of due process when they were not impleaded by the respondents in
their complaint as they would have easily known about the ongoing litigation which their mother and
other siblings had been attending since they all reside on the same subject property.
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy of equity that can only be availed of where
the ordinary remedies are wanting or no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. It is only
granted under exceptional circumstances and not intended as substitute for a party’s own neglect in
not promptly availing of the other ordinary and appropriate remedies. Sadly, in this case, the heirs
did not even avail of the remedy of intervention during the early stage of the proceedings at the RTC
in order to assert their alleged rights over the property. Verily, with the absence of extrinsic fraud in
this case, and considering that jurisdiction was duly acquired over the person of the defendants
below, the annulment of judgment being prayed for by the heirs has no leg to stand on.

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 5. Collateral attack on judgments
T. Execution, satisfaction, and effect of judgments (Rule 39)
SOLOMON SON v. ROLANDO C. LEYVA
A.M. No. P-11-2968, 28 November 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Well-settled is the rule that when writs are placed in the hands of sheriffs, it is their ministerial
duty to proceed to execute them in accordance with the rules. A purely ministerial act or duty is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and
without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
Where a requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the sheriff —
he must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.

FACTS
In Civil Case No. 1218-A, entitled "Mamerto Sibulo, Jr vs. Ricardo Mendoza and Baclaran
Marketing Inc. ," for damages, the RTC Br. 74, Antipolo City, Rizal ruled in favor of BMC and dismissed
the complaint against it. Aggrieved, Sibulo appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), sans notice to BMC.
Fifteen (15) years later, the CA reversed the RTC. Since BMC and Son were unaware of the said appeal,
the aforesaid decision became final. Thereafter, a Writ of Execution dated January 16, 2006 and Order
dated February 23, 2006 ordering the levy of BMC's real properties, was issued. Without demanding
cash payment from BMC or proceeding against its personal properties first, Rolando Leyva, Branch
Sheriff of Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 74, Antipolo City immediately sold on public auction
BMC's real property. Thus, Son alleged that there was an excessive levy in violation of Section 9, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court. Respondent allegedly violated: (1) Section 15(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which requires written notice of sale to the judgment obligor at least three (3) days before the
sale; (2) Section 9(b), Rule 39 in relation to Section 7(a), Rule 57 of the same rules when he failed to
leave a copy of the order, together with the description of the property and notice that was attached,
with the occupants of the property; and (3) Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court when he did not
make a return to the court immediately after the property was auctioned on April 17, 2006. He only
submitted his Sheriff's Report more than nine (9) months after the auction sale was completed. Yet,
he peremptorily issued the Certificate of Sale on the day of the auction sale itself.

Leyva denied the charges. He countered that he simply performed his ministerial duty of
implementing the Writ of Execution dated January 16, 2006 and the Order dated February 23, 2006.
He separately served BMC and its counsel of record, Atty. Isagani Rizon, copies of the notice of levy,
writ of execution, and the February 23, 2006 Order on March 13, 2006 and March 21, 2006,
respectively. But these notices were both returned unserved with corresponding notations "Baclaran
Marketing does not exist" and "CNEE moved out as per SIG Tiquio." He also sent both BMC and Atty.
Rizon copies of the Notice of Sheriff's Sale at their respective addresses. These were also returned
unserved with notation "returned to sender, moved."

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 The OCA recommended to grant complainant's request for a final hearing and referred the
case to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Antipolo City, for investigation, report, and
recommendation. The Investigating Judge found that respondent violated the procedure outlined in
Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Respondent failed to demand payment of the monetary
judgment from BMC before proceeding with the levy itself. He also failed to levy on BMC's personal
properties first before proceeding against the subject real property. Hence, the levy thereon was
premature. A sheriff who failed to limit the properties to be levied to the amount called for in the writ
is guilty of misconduct. The OCA found respondent guilty of gross neglect of duty for failure to follow
the mandatory procedure in the execution of a money judgment and for making an excessive levy on
BMC's real property which had a fair market value of P19,890,000.00 as compared to the judgment
debt in the amount of only P765,159.55. Thus, the OCA recommended that Leyva be found guilty of
gross neglect of duty.

ISSUE
Is Leyva guilty of gross neglect of duty?

RULING
YES. Records show that respondent failed to follow the procedures laid down under Section
9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for the proper implementation of the writ of execution and Section
11, Rule 13 of the same rules for the proper service of notices as discussed by the Investigating Judge
and the OCA. Respondent, therefore, is liable for gross neglect of duty and gross incompetence in the
performance of his official duties.

The rule commands that the executing officer shall enforce the judgments for money in this
order: First, the officer must demand from the judgment obligor to pay in cash the judgment
obligation; Second, if the judgment obligor fails to pay in cash, the officer shall proceed to levy on the
personal properties of the judgment obligor; and Third, if there are no personal properties, the officer
shall then levy on the real properties of the judgment obligor.

Here, Leyva did not attempt to demand from BMC or complainant Son for payment of the
judgment obligation nor levy on BMC's personal properties. Instead, Leyva immediately sent BMC
and its counsel on record, Atty. Isagani Rizon, copies of the notice of levy, writ of execution and Order,
respectively. Albeit, they were all returned to sender.

Moreover, even Leyva’s service of the notices was also improper. Under Section 5 of Rule 13 of
the Revised Rules of Court, service of notices shall either be done personally or by registered mail.
Here, aside from failing to demand cash payment first from BMC, Leyva also erroneously served the
notices through LBC without any explanation why personal service or service by registered mail was
not made in violation of Sections 8 and 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.

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 Hence, whichever way it goes, Leyva committed illegal procedural shortcuts in the
enforcement of the writ of execution. A sheriff cannot just unilaterally and whimsically choose how
to enforce the writ without observing the proper procedural steps laid down by the rules, otherwise,
it would amount to gross neglect of duty.

The OCA stressed that Leyva has been a sheriff since 1987, his long years in the service should
have equipped him already with the requisite knowledge in the execution of money judgments.
Despite the clear provisions of the law, Leyva insists on the correctness of his action in directly
levying on BMC's real property. Undoubtedly, Leyva exhibited arrogance, if not incompetence in the
performance of his official duties.

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 SIMEONA PRESCILLA, et. al. v. CONRADO LASQUITE and JUANITO ANDRADE
G.R. No. 205805, 25 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION, (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is elementary that a judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties and
their successors-in-interest after the commencement of the action in court. A decision rendered on
complaint in a civil action or proceeding does not bind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for
no person shall be adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a
party.
There is nothing in the Rules of Court that mandates, or even allows, the appellate courts to
suspend the resolution of a party’s motion for reconsideration on account of a co-party’s appeal before
the Court. Otherwise stated, when the trial court or appellate court issues a judgment or final resolution
in a case involving several parties, the right of one party to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal
is not hinged on the motion for reconsideration or appeal of the other party.

FACTS
In a complaint, Simeona Priscilla, Gloria Prescilla et. al. (Prescilla, et. al). claimed to be the
owners of two parcels of land (Lot 3050 and 3052) located in San Mateo. According to them, they
have been in possession in conception de dueno of the said properties since 1940. However, it was
alleged that Conrando Laquite (Laquite) and Juanito Andrade (Andrade) were able to fraudulently
obtain the original certificate of titles (OCTs) covering the subject properties.
A second complaint in Intervention for Annulment and Cancellation of Title was filed by
Roberto and Raquel Manahan, et al. (the Manahans) against Laquite and Andrade. On their part, the
Manahans asserted title over the property as successors of Jose Manahan.
While the trial was ongoing, Victory Hille, Inc. (Victory Hills) intervened, claiming to be the
owner of the subject property.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld Prescilla’s right of ownership over Lot No. 3052, while
also upholding the Lasquite and Andrade’s rights of ownership over the subject property. The Court
of Appeals (CA) annulled and set aside the trial court’s decision and declared Victory Hills the owner
of the subject property.
Feeling aggrieved, Prescilla et. al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Lasquite and Andrade
resorted to a different remedy and decided to directly file a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Upon the knowledge of the CA of the respondent’s appeal, the appellate court issued a
resolution, which suspended the proceedings and the resolution of petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration until the appeal has been resolved.
The CA, in the appeal, held that the CA (8th Division) erroneously declared Victory Hills as the
absolute owner of the property. The CA’s decision became final and executory.
Lasquite and Andrade filed a Motion for Execution before the RTC. The trial court granted the
said motion and issued a Writ of Execution. Hence, Prescilla, et. al. filed a Petition for Certiorari (Rule

146
65) before the CA (7th Division), alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the Writ of Execution.
The CA (7th Division) found that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
granted the Motion of Execution in view of the finality of the decision declaring respondents as the
rightful owner of the subject property.
ISSUES
(1) Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing a Writ of Execution ?
(2) Is the Decision of the CA (7th Division) already final and binding?

RULING
(1) YES. The RTC gravely abused its discretion. To recall, when the CA (8th Division) issued
its decision in favor of Victory Hills and against Prescilla, et. al., the latter timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.
It is not disputed that petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is still pending before the CA
(8th Division) and has not been resolved as of date. In the assailed Decision, the CA (7th Division) itself
recognized that the resolution of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration is still suspended and has
not yet been resolved.
Sec. 4, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal: the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration filed on time and by a proper party shall stay the execution of the judgment of final
resolution sought to be reconsidered.
Therefore, as to petitioners Prescilla, et. al., whose Motion for Reconsideration is still pending
before the CA (8th Division), it must be stressed that the controversy has not been resolved with
finality. Consequently, as far as the petitioners are concerned, there is no judgment that is already
ripe for execution.
(2) NO. Consequently, as far as the petitioners are concerned, there is no judgment that is
already ripe for execution. It is elementary that a judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only
upon the parties and their successors-in-interest after the commencement of the action in court. A
decision rendered on complain in a civil action or proceeding does not bind or prejudice a person
not impleaded therein, for no person shall be adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or
proceeding in which he is not a party.
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the respondents, only the Lasquite and
Andrade as well as Victory Hills were parties involved. Petitioners Prescilla, et. al. were not
impleaded parties to the said case.
The CA (7th Division) argued that the decision concerning the ownership over the subject
property was already settled. However, the sole issued resolved by the appellate court was only the
validity of Victory Hill’s claim of ownership and not the petitioners Prescilla, et. al.’s and nothing
more.
On a final note, the Court notes that this complication originated from the CA (8th Division)
act of suspending the resolution of the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. There is nothing in
the Rules of Court that mandates, or even allows, the appellate courts to suspend the resolution of a

147
party’s motion for reconsideration on account of a co-party’s appeal before the Court. Otherwise
stated, when the trial court or appellate court issues a judgment or final resolution in a case involving
several parties, the right of one party to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal is not hinged on
the motion for reconsideration or appeal of the other party. Effectively, by failing to resolve their
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners were prevented from exercising their right to appeal.
Subjecting petitioners Prescilla, et. al. to a judgment that they had no opportunity to appeal from due
to no fault on their own smacks of violation of due process.

148
 MARIA PEREZ v. MANOTOK REALTY, INC.
G.R. No. 216157, 14 October 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ
may be issued without scire facias.

The exception operates in this case because of Perez’s motions for reconsideration and appeals
before the RTC, CA, and SC. Because of Perez’s acts, there has been a long delay in the enforcement of
the MeTC decision by motion has been interrupted by the acts of the judgment debtor.

FACTS
Manotok Realty Inc. (Manotok) filed a case for unlawful detainer against Maria Perez (Perez)
in Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). It rendered a decision and after which, Manotok filed a Motion
for Execution, which was granted.

Meanwhile, Perez filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
which was granted, except for the issuance of TRO. Consequently, the Sheriff III MeTC was directed
to put on hold any further action on the case without giving due course to Perez’ prayer for the
issuance of the TRO.

Thereafter, the parties entered into a compromise agreement. However, Perez violated the
terms and conditions thereof. Thus, Manotok moved for the execution of the MeTC decision, which
was granted.

Unfortunately, the MeTC Sheriff reported that the writ was not implemented due to his
receipt of a written communication from Perez’s counsel strongly urging him, under pain of contempt
and court to desist from taking any action against Perez in view of the pending case lodged before
the RTC. The RTC proceedings were dismissed, as well as her appeal to the (Court of Appeals) CA and
Supreme Court.

Again, Manotok moved for the execution of MeTC decision. MeTC issued a Resolution denying
Manotok’s motion since the subject of which being the July 15, 1999, Decision, was filed only on April
28, 2010. The MeTC found that this motion was filed beyond the 10-year period provided under
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, for the enforcement of a judgment through a
motion.

RTC reversed the MeTC decision regarding the execution, stating that the MeTC decision can
still be enforced by mere motion despite the lapse of more than five years inasmuch as the delays
were caused by Perez. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE
Can the judgment in favor of Manotok be executed by a mere motion even after the lapse of
five years?

RULING

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 YES. Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment may be
executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory. After that, a judgment may be enforced by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations.

However, there are instances where the Court allowed execution by motion even after the
lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds. Thus, in computing the time limited for suing out of an
execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be
included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by
injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death
of a party or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time
within which the writ may be issued without scire facias.

The exception operates in this case because of Perez’s motions for reconsideration and
appeals before the RTC, CA, and SC. Because of Perez’s acts, there has been a long delay in the
enforcement of the MeTC decision by motion has been interrupted by the acts of the judgment debtor.

The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments is to prevent
parties from sleeping on the rights. In this case, Manotok was diligent in seeking the execution of the
judgment in its favor.

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 LYDIA BALMACEDA-TUGANO v. JERRY R. MARCELINO, SHERIFF III, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 71, QUEZON CITY
A.M. No. P-14-3233, 14 October 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is clear that the aforementioned provisions mandate that upon the issuance of the writ of
execution, the sheriff must demand that the person against whom the writ is directed must peaceably
vacate the property within three working days; otherwise, they will be forcibly removed from the
premises. Even in cases wherein decisions are immediately executory, the required three-day notice
cannot be dispensed with. A sheriff who enforces the writ without the required notice or before the expiry
of the three-day period is running afoul with the Rules.
In the instant case, the guilt of Sheriff Marcelino is undisputed. He admitted that he merely
posted the notice to vacate on the front door of complainant's house because the latter was nowhere to
be found. Likewise, he enforced the writ of execution on the same day he posted the notice to vacate on
the door by forcibly opening the door, and took out movables from the subject premises, albeit, in the
presence of barangay officials. There was no prior notice given.

FACTS
Lydia Balmaceda-Tugano (Balmaceda-Tugano) is the defendant in an unlawful detainer case.
In that case, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ordered Balmaceda-Tugano to vacate the subject
premises. The MeTC issued a Writ of Execution.
Thereafter, Balmaceda-Tugano assailed the manner by which Sheriff Jerry Marcelino (Sherriff
Marcelino) enforced the writ of execution before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). She
claimed that all the defendants in the case were neither notified nor furnished with a copy of the writ
of execution and were not given sufficient time to vacate the premises. She also averred that at the
time Sheriff Marcelino enforced the writ, she was not at home because she was looking for a new
place where they could move in.
Sheriff Marcelino explained that he issued a Notice to Vacate which he posted on the front
door of Balmaceda-Tugano's house because the latter was not around. He admitted that he opened
the house and enforced the writ albeit in the presence of two barangay peace officers and a barangay
councilor.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Sheriff Marcelino be fined in
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos for having been found guilty of grave abuse of authority.

ISSUE
Did the sheriff violate the procedures when serving the writ of execution?

RULING
YES. Well settled is that the sheriff's duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is

151
to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the
judgment or not.
When the writ is placed in his hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the
contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its
mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the order is executed without undue delay. This
holds especially true herein where the nature of the case requires immediate execution. Absent a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), an order of quashal, or compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, the sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ.
However, immediacy of the execution does not mean instant execution. The sheriff must
comply with the Rules of Court in executing a writ. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down
in the Rules of Court is a misconduct and warrants disciplinary action. Sheriff Marcelino's duties as a
sheriff in implementing a writ of execution for the delivery and restitution of real property are
outlined in Rule 39, Section 10 (c) and (d), and Section 14 of the Rules of Court.
It is clear that the aforementioned provisions mandate that upon the issuance of the writ of
execution, the sheriff must demand that the person against whom the writ is directed must peaceably
vacate the property within three working days; otherwise, they will be forcibly removed from the
premises. Even in cases wherein decisions are immediately executory, the required three-day notice
cannot be dispensed with. A sheriff who enforces the writ without the required notice or before the
expiry of the three-day period is running afoul with the Rules.
In the instant case, the guilt of Sheriff Marcelino is undisputed. He admitted that he merely
posted the notice to vacate on the front door of complainant's house because the latter was nowhere
to be found. Likewise, he enforced the writ of execution on the same day he posted the notice to vacate
on the door by forcibly opening the door, and took out movables from the subject premises, albeit, in
the presence of barangay officials. There was no prior notice given. Clearly, this arbitrary manner in
which Sheriff Marcelino acted in delivering possession of the subject premises to the plaintiff is
inexcusable.

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 DANNY BOY C. MONTERONA,JOSELITO S. ALVAREZ,IGNACIO S. SAMSON, JOEY P.OCAMPO,
ROLE R. DEMETRIO, and ELPIDIO P.METRE, JR., Petitioners,- versus - COCA-COLA
BOTTLERSPHILIPPINES, INC. and GIOVANNI ACORDA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 209116, SECOND DIVISION, January 14, 2019, REYES, J. JR., J.

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the
first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. x x x Should identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as
a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown,
but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies.

In this case, it satisfies all the requisites of res judicata under the first concept of bar by prior judgment.
The judgment on the first illegal dismissal case has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter as well as over the parties and it was a judgment on the merits. Further, there can be
no question as to the identity of the parties. Petitioners were among the complainants in the first illegal
dismissal case which was instituted against the same respondents.
The subject matters and causes of action of the two cases are also identical because both the first and
second actions involve petitioners' right to security of tenure.

FACTS:

In September 2003, petitioners Danny Boy C. Monterona(Monterona), Joselito S. Alvarez (Alvarez),

Ignacio S. Samson (Samson),Joey P. Ocampo (Ocampo), Role R. Demetrio (Demetrio), Elpidio P.
Metre,Jr. (Metre) and their co-employees filed before the Labor Arbiter (LA) acomplaint for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment ofbackwages, damages and attorney's fees
(first illegal dismissal case) againstrespondents Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Coca-Cola) and
its officer,Giovanni Acorda. They alleged that they were hired by Coca-Cola onvarious dates from
1986 to 2003. Coca-Cola, however, terminated theiremployment in August 2003.

In a Decision dated August 30, 2004, the LA dismissed the complainton the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The LA ruled that no employer-employeerelationship existed between Coca-Cola and the
complainantsbecause the latter were hired by Genesis Manpower and General Services,Inc.
(Genesis), a legitimate job contractor and it was Genesis whichexercised control over the nature,
extent and degree of work to be performedby the complainants.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA's Decision. The complainantsmoved for reconsideration, but the
same was denied by the NLRC in aResolution dated November 29, 2005.

Then, the complainants, except petitioners Monterona, Alvarez,Samson, Ocampo Demetrio and
Metre, filed a petition for certiorari beforethe CA. Thereafter, Demetrio was ordered dropped from
the case for failureto sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping despite
theappellate court's order. In a Decision dated December 11, 2006, the CAreversed the ruling of the
NLRC and held that there was an employeremployeerelationship between the parties. It declared that
respondentsfailed to prove that Genesis had sufficient capital and equipment for the conduct of its
business and that the complainants' jobs as route salesmen, drivers and helpers were necessary and
desirable in the usual trade orbusiness of Coca-Cola. When respondents moved for reconsideration,

153
theCA denied the motion and further ruled that petitioners Monterona, Alvarez,Samson, Ocampo and
Metre should not benefit from the decision becausethey were not impleaded as petitioners in the
petition for certiorari. Itlikewise stated that Demetrio was dropped from the case for not
havingsigned the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, and thus,should not also
benefit from the Decision.

Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for review with the SupremeCourt but it was denied for being
the wrong mode of appeal and for failureto show any reversible error in the assailed Decision. The
Resolutiondenying the appeal became final and executory on July 28, 2008. 12

Subsequently, on July 14, 2009, petitioners filed before the LA acomplaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement, payment ofbackwages, separation pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th
month pay,damages and attorney's ·fees (second illegal dismissal case) againstrespondents.

In an Order13 dated February 16, 2010, the LA dismissed thecomplaint on the ground of prescription
and res judicata.In a Decision dated June 16, 2010, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the LA but only on
the ground of res judicata.

In a Decision dated August 30, 2012, the CA dismissed the appeal onthe ground of laches and
estoppel. It noted that when a petition for certiorariinvolving the first case was filed, Demetrio was
ordered dropped from thecase because he did not sign the verification and certification of non-
forumshopping. But he did not act on it by seeking reconsideration of the court's order. The appellate
court further observed that when the other petitionerswere excluded from the petition for certiorari
because they were notimpleaded as petitioners, no action was taken by any of them. It added thatif
petitioners were really interested in the outcome of the first illegaldismissal case, they should have
acted at the earliest opportunity, i.e., whenthey were declared dropped or excluded from the case.
The CA likewisepronounced that petitioners did not attempt to seek relief from the SupremeCourt.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground of laches and estoppel. (NO)

RULING:

Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted uponor decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment." It lays the rule that anexisting final judgment or decree rendered on the merits,
without fraud orcollusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within
itsjurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in
the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrentjurisdiction on the points and matters in issue
in the first suit.
The doctrine of res judicata embodied in Section 47, Rule 39 of theRules of Court provides:
SEC. 47. Effect a/judgments or final orders. -
The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of thePhilippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order,may be as follows:
xx xx

154
 (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to thematter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been[missed] in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and theirsuccessors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of theaction or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under thesame title and
in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or theirsuccessors in interest, that only
is deemed to have been adjudged in aformer judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have beenso adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein
ornecessary thereto.
The above-quoted provision embraces two concepts of res judicata:(1) bar by prior judgment as
enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b); and (2)conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as
between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. x x x
Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res
judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only
identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as
"conclusiveness of judgment" applies.
In this case, it satisfies all the requisites of res judicata under the first concept of bar by prior
judgment. The judgment on the first illegal dismissal case has been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over thesubject matter as well as over the parties and it was a judgment on themerits.
Further, there can be no question as to the identity of the parties.Petitioners were among the
complainants in the first illegal dismissal casewhich was instituted against the same respondents.
The subject matters and causes of action of the two cases are alsoidentical. A subject matter is the
item with respect to which the controversyhas arisen, or concerning which the wrong has been done,
and it is ordinarilythe right, the thing, or the contract under dispute. In the case at bar, boththe first
and second actions involve petitioners' right to security of tenure.Meanwhile, Section 2, Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court defines a cause of actionas "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another." In Yapv. Chua, the Court held that the test to determine whether the causes ofaction are
identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence would supportboth actions, or whether there is
an identity in the facts essential to themaintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence
would supportboth actions, then they are considered the same; and a judgment in the firstcase would
be a bar to the subsequent action. Here, the two cases involve thesame cause of action, i.e.,
respondents' act of terminating petitioners'employment. The facts in the two cases are identical and
petitionerspresented the same evidence to prove their claims in both cases.
In fine, while the Court commiserates with petitioners' predicament, itcannot sanction the setting
aside of a doctrine so well-settled as res judicata.Petitioners' complaint in NLRC NCR Case No. 07-
10297-09 is rightfullydismissed for being barred by prior judgment.

155
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner, - versus – ROGUZA DEVERLOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 199705, SECOND DIVISION, APRIL 3, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

The principle of res judicata precludes the re-litigation of a conclusively settled fact or question in any
future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same
or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. For
the principle to apply: (i) the issue or fact sought to be precluded must be identical to the issue or fact
actually determined in a former suit; (ii) the party to be precluded must be party to or was in privity
with a party to the former proceeding; (iii) there was final judgment on the merits in the former
proceedings; and (iv) in compliance with the basic tenet of due process, that the party against whom the
principle is asserted must have had full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in the prior proceedings.
All the foregoing requisites are present in this case.

FACTS:

Respondent RDC was awarded the construction of the Rosario-Pugo Baguio Road Rehabilitation
Project, Contract Package I by DPWH. The contract duration is 12 months. Accordingly, the Notice to
Proceed was issued by DPWH on May 15, 1997 to RDC and the latter commenced construction
activities. However, the project was suspended due to DPWH’s failure to secure the required ECC and
to settle the attendant right of way problems. The suspension lasted for almost 21 months when RDC
was furnished by the DPWH within the Resume Order. The project was finally accomplished and
completed by RDC on September 6, 2001.

The RTC made its claim upon DPWH for expenses incurred due to the suspension of work on the
project in the amount of P93,782,093.64 pursuant to the Conditions of Contract. The Ad Hoc
Committee created by the DPWH recommended payment but only in the reduced amount of
P26,142,577.09 and subject to the condition that RDC should waive or no longer claim the balance of
its claim. The RDC was constrained to accept the amount because it was already in financial distress
at that time and its financial condition was aggravated by the len gth of time that elapsed since RDC’s
claim was made. Subsequently, RDC made various demand for the payment of the balance of its entire
claim but were denied.

RDC filed a Complaint against DPWH before the CIAC demanding the payment of the balance of its
original claim. the CIAC rendered an award in favor of RDC in the amount of P22,409,500. DPWH filed
a petition for review before the CA. Meanwhile, RDC filed an MR before the CIAC but was denied. The
RDC filed its second MR but was also denied. Both Orders by the CIAC bore only the signature of CIAC
Chairman Tadiar.

RDC filed a petition for review before the CA via Rule 43. It proceeded independent of DPWH’s CA
petition. RDC assailed the First and Second CIAC Orders (both denying its MR), for they were signed
by only 1 out of its 3 members. DPWH averred that motions for reconsideration and new trial
constitute prohibited pleadings under CIAC revised rules of procedure. It also argued that RDC
waived its claim in view of the Letter-Waiver. CA granted RDC’s petition and required the DPWH to
pay the sum of P61,748,346. DPWH’s MR was denied.

ISSUE:

156
Whether the CA erred in directing DPWH to pay RDC the amount of the balance of its original claim.

RULING:

Months prior to the issuance of the assailed Decision, the CA 7th Division already issued its own
Decision granting DPWH’s CA Petition. RDC filed an MR. which was denied by the CA 7th Division. The
denial was no longer appealed by the RDC. Hence, said Decision became final. Despite the outcome of
DPWH's CA Petition, the CA Special 17th Division and Former Special 17th Division later issued the
herein assailed Decision and Resolution granting RDC's CA Petition and essentially reversing those
rendered by their co-equal division. It failed to refer to the resolution of DPWH’s CA petition, despite
the identity of issues and parties.

The principle of res judicata precludes the re-litigation of a conclusively settled fact or question in
any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the
same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of
action. For the principle to apply: (i) the issue or fact sought to be precluded must be identical to the
issue or fact actually determined in a former suit; (ii) the party to be precluded must be party to or
was in privity with a party to the former proceeding; (iii) there was final judgment on the merits in
the former proceedings; and (iv) in compliance with the basic tenet of due process, that the party
against whom the principle is asserted must have had full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in
the prior proceedings. All the foregoing requisites are present.

As between the two CA petitions, there is an identity of facts, issues and parties. The is no allegation
on the part of the RDC that it had been deprived of a fair and full opportunity to litigate the issued. It
is also evident from the CA 7th Division Decision that due process had been afforded both parties.

It bears emphasizing that the foregoing Decision rendered by the CA 7th Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
104920 had become final on July 30, 2011, during the pendency of DPWH's Motion for
Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 107412, which the CA Special 17th Division later denied through
the assailed Resolution. Thus, there was, at the time of the issuance of the assailed Resolution, already
a final judgment on the merits concerning the very same facts, issues and parties - a judgment which
could not have been disturbed, let alone reversed, by a co-equal division of the same court.

157
 MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO., INC. Petitioner, - versus - SARA YI, ALSO KNOWN AS SARAH YI,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 234501, SECOND DIVISION, March 18, 2019, J. REYES, JR., J.
In an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and
not the facts from which it prescinds. Relevantly, MIC's failure to satisfy the terms of the foreign
judgment engenders a cause of action as to Yi, who becomes clothed with requisite interest to institute
an action for enforcement.
FACTS:
FAM MART Co., Inc. (FAM MART), owned and operated by Young C. Chun and Young H. Chun, (the
Chuns) was secured by an insurance policy issued by petitioner Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc.
(MIC), through its California surplus lines broker, Great Republic Insurance Agency (GRI), under
policy number MIC 001007.
Respondent Sara Yi was involved in an accident while within the premises of FAM MART, a business
establishment located at El Cajon, California, United States of America. As a result of which, her right
little finger was severed.
Yi filed a personal injury action (Civil Case No. 649705) against the Chuns. Upon service of summons,
FAM MART tendered the claim to its insurer, MIC. The Superior Court of California issued a judgment
in favor of Yi.
Yi, together with the Chuns, filed a complaint for breach of insurance contract, breach of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, fraud and negligent misrepresentation and negligence (Civil Case No.
670417) against MIC. However, despite service of summons, MIC did not file any pleading. Hence, a
Judgment by Default was issued by the Superior Court of California. Said Judgment became final and
executory as no appeal was filed by any of the parties.
As Yi was not able to enforce the Judgment in California, she filed an action for enforcement of
judgment before the RTC. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that Yi was not able to prove
her claim because the insurance policy was not presented in evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure to present the insurance policy warrants the dismissal of the complaint (NO)
RULING:
In our jurisdiction, a judgment or final order of a foreign tribunal creates a right of action, and its non-
satisfaction is the cause of action by which a suit can be brought upon for its enforcement.
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides for the conditions for the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment, to wit:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

158
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
The causes of action arising from the enforcement of foreign judgment and that arising from the
allegations that gave rise to said foreign judgment differs, such that the former stems from the foreign
judgment itself, whereas the latter stems from the right in favor of the plaintiff and its violation by
the defendant's act or omission. The evidence to be presented likewise differs.
The case of Mijares v. Rañada illustrates in this wise: For example, in a complaint for damages against
a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates from the violation of the right of the complainant through
the act or omission of the respondent. On the other hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment awarding damages from the same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same right
through the same manner of action, the cause of action derives not from the tortious act but from the
foreign judgment itself.
More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the complainant will
have to establish before the court the tortious act or omission committed by the tortfeasor, who in
turn is allowedto rebut these factual allegations or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive
litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are
assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof
is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.
Guided by the foregoing, what is indispensable in an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment
is the presentation of the foreign judgment itself as it comprises both the evidence and the derivation
of the cause of action. Further, the above-cited rule provides that a foreign judgment against a person,
i.e., an action in personam, as in this case, is merely a presumptive evidence of rights between the
parties. Such judgment may be attacked by proving lack of jurisdiction, lack of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law. What our courts will do is to recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact and enforce the same as such foreign judgment creates a right of action in favor of
Yi. Relevantly, MIC's failure to satisfy the terms of the foreign judgment engenders a cause of action
as to Yi, who becomes clothed with requisite interest to institute an action for enforcement.

159
 AZUCENA E. BAYANI v. EDUARDO, LEONORA, VIRGILIO, VILMA, CYNTHIA and NANCY, all
SURNAMED YU and MR. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN
G.R. Nos. 203076-77, 206765 and 207214, 10 July 2019, FIRST DIVISION, (Bersamin, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Evident from Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is that the guidelines therein only extend
to the judgment obligor or any person claiming rights under him. It is truly doctrinal that the execution
of any judgment for a specific act cannot extend to persons who were never parties to the main
proceeding. A court process that forcefully imposes its effects on or against a stranger, even if issued by
virtue of a final judgment, certainly offends the constitutional guarantee under Section 1, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.
Considering that the Spouses Melencio and Talinanap sought to nullify two documents (i.e., the
Agreement to Transfer Rights and Deed of Sale and the Quitclaim Deed) to recover Lot No. 2 from Sycip,
who was then in possession of the lot's original certificate of title, the judgment rendered thereon was
not enforceable against the whole world but only against the defendants thereat (i.e., the Heirs of Sycip).

FACTS
In 1953, a parcel of land located in Makar, General Santos City with an aggregate area of
54.4980 hectares was subdivided into five lots. Melencio Yu filed applications for free patent as to
Lots Nos. 2 and 4, and his application was eventually approved.
In 1963, Melencio executed an Agreement to Transfer Rights and Deed of Sale and a Quitclaim
Deed upon the intervention of Alfonso Non. It turned out, however, that the said documents were for
the sale of all the subdivided lots to one John Sycip (Sycip), instead of only the lots covered by the
free patent. As a result, the OCT was delivered to Sycip instead of to Melencio Yu and Talinapnap
Matualaga.
After the subdivision, the disposition of the Makar property – particularly Lot 2- became the
controversy in several cases in 1990 and 2013.

ISSUE
Is the principle of res judicata applicable?

RULING
NO. The factual antecedents in the 1990 Case and the 2013 Case are common. However, the
pleas of the petitions for review on Certiorari should not be lightly brushed aside by applying res
judicata. The Court, in the 1990 Case, resolved the principal issue of the validity of the sale or transfer
from the Melencio Yu to Sycip that had been effected through the Agreement to Transfer Rights and
Deed of Sale and Quitclaim Deed. The focus of the 2013 Case was the propriety of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Court of Appeals as a relief that was preliminary and
ancillary to the main case.

160
 In contrast, the petitioners raise in these consolidated appeals the core controversy
concerning the propriety of the 2007 Resumption Order and its implementation, which was the
subject matter of the main case in CA-G.R. SP No. 02084-MIN (later on consolidated with CA-G.R. SP
No. 02118-MIN). Indeed, the ruling in the 1990 Case affirming the RTC's pronouncement of absolute
ownership in favor of Melencio and Talinanap was not conclusive upon the issue raised herein of
whether or not the RTC's issuance of the 2007 Resumption Order was proper, for the determination
of such issue was separable and independent from the issue of ownership.

Even granting that the issue of ownership of Lot No. 2 was previously resolved in favor of
Melencio and Talinanap, such resolution did not prejudice the rights of the Heirs of Non Andres as
persons who had not been parties in the main proceeding. The present controversy stems from the
implementation against them of the RTC's judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 1291 despite their
being strangers in the action. The following circumstances show that, indeed, they were strangers to
the action.

Evident from Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is that the guidelines therein only
extend to the judgment obligor or any person claiming rights under him. It is truly doctrinal that the
execution of any judgment for a specific act cannot extend to persons who were never parties to the
main proceeding. A court process that forcefully imposes its effects on or against a stranger, even if
issued by virtue of a final judgment, certainly offends the constitutional guarantee under Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.

Considering that the Spouses Melencio and Talinanap sought to nullify two documents (i.e.,
the Agreement to Transfer Rights and Deed of Sale and the Quitclaim Deed) to recover Lot No. 2 from
Sycip, who was then in possession of the lot's original certificate of title, the judgment rendered
thereon was not enforceable against the whole world but only against the defendants thereat (i.e.,
the Heirs of Sycip).

The Heirs of Non Andres were not impleaded in Civil Case No. 1291, much less personally
served summons therefor, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over any of them. The execution of
the judgment rendered therein could not validly include strangers to the case like the Heirs of Non
Andres, for the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them and were consequently not given their
day in court.

161
 JAIME BILAN MONTEALEGRE and CHAMONTÉ, INC. v.
SPOUSES ABRAHAM and REMEDIOS DE VERA
G.R. No. 208920, 10 July 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Jardeleza, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

As a general rule, a writ of execution must strictly conform to every particular of the judgment
to be executed. It should not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the
terms of the judgment sought to be executed, otherwise, if it is in excess of or beyond the original
judgment or award, the execution is void.

Here, it is undisputed that the final and executory LA Decision adjudged the corporation guilty
of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay Servandil separation pay and backwages. It did not mention
the De Veras' liability. Nevertheless, the Writ of Execution and the Alias Writ of Execution were directed
against the movable and immovable properties of both the corporation and De Vera. Clearly, the writs
of execution here exceeded the terms of the final and executory judgment of the LA.

FACTS
Jerson Servandil (Servandil) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against A. De Vera
Corporation (Corporation). The Labor Arbiter (LA) found the corporation guilty of illegal dismissal.
LA then issued a Writ of Execution against the movable and immovable properties of the corporation
and Abraham De Vera (De Vera).

Pursuant to this writ, a parcel of land (property) registered in the name of Abraham and
Remedios De Vera (De Veras) was levied upon and sold at a public auction. The De Veras filed a
verified counter-manifestation with omnibus motion stating that the property sold at auction does
not belong to the judgment debtor, the corporation, but to the De Veras, who were not impleaded as
party-respondents in the case for illegal dismissal.

The LA denied the omnibus motion. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) affirmed the decision of the LA reasoning that, although as a rule, the officers and members
of a corporation are not personally liable for acts done in performance of their duties, an exceptional
circumstance exists in this case, i.e., the corporation is no longer existing and is unable to satisfy the
judgment in favor of the employee.

The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the NLRC stating that LA exceeded his authority and acted
without jurisdiction in issuing such writ of execution which do not conform to the dispositive of the
final judgment. Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE
Was the CA correct in declaring null the writ of execution issued by the LA against the
property of the De Veras?

RULING

162
 YES. As a general rule, a writ of execution must strictly conform to every particular of the
judgment to be executed. It should not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it
go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed, otherwise, if it is in excess of or beyond
the original judgment or award, the execution is void.

Furthermore, the power of the courts in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor and liability may even be incurred by the sheriff
for levying properties not belonging to the judgment debtor.

Here, it is undisputed that the final and executory LA Decision adjudged the corporation
guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay Servandil separation pay and backwages. It did not
mention the De Veras' liability. Nevertheless, the Writ of Execution and the Alias Writ of Execution
were directed against the movable and immovable properties of both the corporation and De Vera.
Clearly, the writs of execution here exceeded the terms of the final and executory judgment of the LA.

The SC in Carag v. NLRC clarified that Article 212(e) of the Labor Code, by itself, does not
make a corporate officer personally liable for the debts of the corporation. The doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil applies only in three basic areas, namely: 1) defeat of public convenience as when
the corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; 2) fraud cases or
when the corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or 3) alter ego
cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person,
or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make
it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation. In the absence of
malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate
officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities.

To hold a director or officer personally liable for corporate obligation is the exception and it
only occurs when the following requisites are present: (1) the complaint must allege that the director
or officer assented to the patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that the director or officer was
guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) there must be proof that the director or officer acted
in bad faith.

Here, the two requisites are wanting. Servandil's complaint failed to allege or impute bad
faith or malice on the part of De Vera. There was likewise nothing in the LA Decision that would
establish that De Vera acted in bad faith when Servandil was dismissed from the service.

163
 GENEVIEVE ROSAL ARREZA TOYO v. TETSUSHI TOYO et al.
G.R. No. 213198, 01 July 2019, EN BANC (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Settled is the rule that in actions involving the recognition of a foreign divorce judgment, it is
indispensable that the petitioner proves not only the foreign divorce judgment granting the divorce, but
also the alien spouse’s national law.
In the given case, the English translation of the law submitted by Genevieve is not an official
publication exempted from the requirement of authentication. Hence, such document cannot be
admitted to prove the divorce as it lacks the proper authenticity needed.

FACTS
Genevieve Rosal Arreza Toyo (Genevieve), a Filipino Citizen, married Tetsushi Toyo
(Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, in Quezon City. After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification
of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of Konohana-ku of Osaka City, Japan certified. It was later
registered in Tetsushi’s family register.
Genevieve then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. Genevieve submitted a copy of their divorce
certificate, Tetsushi’s family register, the certificate of acceptance of the notification of divorce and
an English translation of the civil code of Japan, among others.
However, RTC denied the petition for recognition of the divorce since their divorce
agreement was accepted by the local government of Japan, but there was no copy of Japan’s law. In
addition, the copy of the civil code of Japan and its English translation were not duly authenticated
by the Philippine Consul, the Japanese Consul in Manila or the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied by the RTC. Hence, this petition for review
on Certiorari.

ISSUE
Should the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry filed by Genevieve be denied?

RULING
YES. Settled is the rule that in actions involving the recognition of a foreign divorce judgment,
it is indispensable that the petitioner proves not only the foreign divorce judgment granting the
divorce, but also the alien spouse’s national law. This rule is rooted in the fundamental theory that
Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.
Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse's national law, purported to be official
acts of a sovereign authority, can be established by complying with the mandate of Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25 of the Rules of Court, thus:

164
 A writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
Genevieve argues that the English translation of the Japan Civil Code is an official publication
having been published under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice and, therefore, is considered
a self-authenticating document.

In Patula v. People, however, the Court explained that a self-authenticating document become
such by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a
notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by
law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law. This requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.

Here, the English translation submitted by was published by a private company in Japan
whose translations are "not advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese laws;" rather, it
is in the KANPŌ or the Official Gazette where all official laws and regulations are published, albeit in
Japanese.

Accordingly, the English translation submitted by Genevieve is not an official publication

exempted from the requirement of authentication. Hence, such document cannot be admitted to
prove the divorce. The case was however referred to the Court of appeals for the further
determination of factual issues in accordance with the ruling herein, presented.

165
IV. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
A. Nature, purpose, and jurisdiction over provisional remedies
B. Preliminary attachment (Rule 57)
C. Preliminary injunction (Rule 58)
MAUNLAD HOMES, INC. et al v. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 228898, 4 December 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Simply put, the main issue in the injunction case, i.e., whether Union Bank should be permanently
enjoined from collecting rental payments from the tenants of the Maunlad Shopping Mall, no longer
need to be resolved by the RTC, given that the Contract to Sell, which allowed Maunlad Homes to possess
the property and collect rentals from its tenants, had already been determined to be without any force
and effect by the Court in the ejectment case. Consequently, Union Bank, being the owner of the
commercial complex, cannot be legally enjoined from collecting rental payments from the property's
tenants.
To allow the RTC to adjudicate the issue would run the risk of violating the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments should it find the issuance of permanent injunctive relief in Maunlad
Homes' favor to be proper. After all, the Court's definitive judgment in the ejectment case, being final
and executory, "is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal."

FACTS

In 2002, Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank), as the seller, and Maunlad Homes, Inc.
(Maunlad Homes), as the buyer, entered into a Contract to Sell involving a commercial complex in
Malolos, Bulacan known as the Maunlad Shopping Mall. The terms of the contract allowed Maunlad
Homes to retain possession and management of the Maunlad Shopping Mall and collect rental
payments from its tenants. The contract stipulated that in the event of rescission due to failure to pay
the monthly amortizations or to comply with its terms and conditions, Maunlad Homes will be
required to immediately vacate the property and voluntarily turn over possession thereof to Union
Bank.
Maunlad Homes eventually defaulted in the payment of its monthly amortizations to the
bank. Consequently, Union Bank sent Maunlad Homes a Notice of Rescission of Contract demanding
payment of the installments. Despite receipt of the notice, Maunlad Homes still failed to pay the
monthly amortizations. Thus, Union Bank sent Maunlad Homes a letter requiring the latter to pay the
rentals due and vacate the property. As its demands were left unheeded, Union Bank filed an
ejectment case against Maunlad Homes before Branch 64 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City (MeTC).
Union Bank began to interfere in the operations and management of the Maunlad Shopping
Mall and convinced its tenants to pay rent directly to the bank instead. This prompted Maunlad
Homes to file an injunction case against Union Bank before Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos City (RTC).
The RTC granted Maunlad Homes' application for preliminary injunction. Union Bank filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the RTC Order. The CA
granted the petition and reversed the RTC ruling.

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 Maunlad Homes, therafter, elevated the case to the Supreme Court (SC). The SC in its
December 23, 2008 decision reversed and set aside the CA Decision and reinstated the RTC Order.
The SC Decision became final and executory on December 29, 2010.
Meanwhile, on May 18, 2005, the MeTC dismissed Union Bank's ejectment complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. It held that the proper action to resolve the parties' conflicting claims of right of
possession over the property based on ownership was an accion reivindicatoria, over which it had no
jurisdiction.
On appeal, Branch 139, RTC, Makati City, affirmed the MeTC ruling. Union Bank, thereafter,
appealed the RTC Decision with the CA which affirmed the RTC Decision.
Aggrieved, Union Bank filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC
assailing the CA ruling. In its August 15, 2012 decision, the Court reversed and set aside the CA
Decision.
To recall, the Court, in the injunction case, reinstated the writ of preliminary injunction issued
by the RTC against Union Bank and remanded the case to the trial court for the resolution of the issue
of injunction.
When the Decision dated August 15, 2012 attained finality on February 14, 2013, Union Bank
immediately moved for the dismissal of the injunction case before the RTC on the ground of
mootness. It claimed that the legal and factual issues involved in the complaint for injunction had
already been resolved in the ejectment case.
The RTC denied the motion but the CA reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint for
injunction for having been rendered moot by the SC’s decision in the ejectment case.

ISSUE:

Did the CA correctly dismiss the Complaint for Injunction for having been rendered moot by
the decision dated August 15, 2012?

RULING:

YES. In determining whether the Complaint for Injunction has indeed become moot and
academic, the Court examined its December 23, 2008 decision (injunction case) and its August 15,
2012 (ejectment case).
In the injunction case, the Court found it premature for the CA to rule on Maunlad Home’s
right to collect rental payments from the tenants of the Maunlad Shopping Mall as the issue had yet
to be resolved by the RTC. At the time, what was at issue was the propriety of the RTC's issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction against Union Bank to enjoin the bank from collecting rental payments
from the tenants of the Maunlad Shopping Mall. The Court found the issuance of the writ proper and
directed the RTC to resolve the issue of permanent injunction with dispatch.
Then came the ruling in the ejectment case wherein the Court categorically ruled that
Maunlad Homes had lost its right to possess the property under the Contract to Sell when it defaulted
in the payment of its monthly amortizations to Union Bank.
The Court thus ordered Maunlad Homes to vacate the Maunlad Shopping Mall and to pay
rentals-in-arrears and rentals accruing in the interim until it turned over possession of the property
to Union Bank. The case was thereafter remanded to the MeTC of Makati City for the determination
of the amount of rentals due.

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 It is quite obvious that the Court's ruling in the ejectment case had effectively rendered any
further adjudication in the injunction case unnecessary and superfluous.
Simply put, the main issue in the injunction case, i.e., whether Union Bank should be
permanently enjoined from collecting rental payments from the tenants of the Maunlad Shopping
Mall, no longer need to be resolved by the RTC, given that the Contract to Sell, which allowed Maunlad
Homes to possess the property and collect rentals from its tenants, had already been determined to
be without any force and effect by the Court in the ejectment case. Consequently, Union Bank, being
the owner of the commercial complex, cannot be legally enjoined from collecting rental payments
from the property's tenants.
To allow the RTC to adjudicate the issue would run the risk of violating the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments should it find the issuance of permanent injunctive relief in Maunlad
Homes' favor to be proper. After all, the Court's definitive judgment in the ejectment case, being final
and executory, "is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal."

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 MELLIEMOORE SAYCON v. COURT OF APPEALS and ROEL DEGAMO
G.R. No. 238822, 09 October 2019, SPECIAL NINETEENTH DIVISION (Reyes, A. Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists
prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

Verily, there is no basis for the issuance of a TRO or a WPI in favor of Roel. He did not have an
absolute right to the office of the governor. There was also no urgent necessity or serious, irreparable
damage that would result in the immediate implementation of the OMB's decision because Roel is
deemed under preventive suspension during the pendency of his appeal with the CA. Should the CA grant
his appeal, he would be paid the salary and monetary benefit accruing to his position.

FACTS
Roel Degamo (Degamo), the Provincial Governor of Negros Oriental proposed before the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan an allotment of P10, 000,000 as Intelligence Fund for the year 2013. The
Sanggunian however, appropriated it under Gender and Development projects. Degamo
subsequently vetoed such appropriation and ordered the Treasurer, Accountant, and Budget Officer
to siphon the funds towards Intelligence. The officers complied with the orders of the Governor but
simultaneously made known their objection as it does not comply with the law.

The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) found that the order of Degano in vetoing
the appropriation was valid. However, the act of the Governor in subsequently placing the amount
towards Intelligence Funds was illegal as it is an act of appropriation which is solely vested in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

The Commission on Audit (COA) agreed with the finding of the DBM that the disbursement
was illegal to which Degamo opposed by arguing that the Sanggunian was outside of its jurisdiction
in not approving the proposed allocation of fund when it was already acceded thereto by the Local
Development Council.

The Ombudsman found Degamo administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, but absolved
the officers from conspiracy charges. Degamo opposed the ruling of the Ombudsman and appealed
before the Court of Appeals (CA) wherein the CA finds that the condonation doctrine should be
applied considering that he was elected subsequent to the erroneous allocation of funds. On this
basis, the CA directed the issuance of a TRO, enjoining the OMB from implementing its decision to
dismiss Roel from government service

ISSUE
Was the Court of Appeals correct in issuing a TRO and WPI?

RULING
NO. Injunctive relief is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief
demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right,
or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final
relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right

169
to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and
(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent
and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent
the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute.
Verily, there is no basis for the issuance of a TRO or a WPI in favor of Roel. He did not have an
absolute right to the office of the governor. There was also no urgent necessity or serious, irreparable
damage that would result in the immediate implementation of the OMB's decision because Roel is
deemed under preventive suspension during the pendency of his appeal with the CA. Should the CA
grant his appeal, he would be paid the salary and monetary benefit accruing to his position.

In this regard, the Court ruled that the issuance of an injunctive writ to stay the
implementation of the OMB's decision is an encroachment on the part of the CA on the rule-making
power of the OMB. Following this ruling, the CA should not have issued the challenged TRO and WPI
to enjoin the implementation of Rod's dismissal from service.

170
 SHULEY MINE, INC. v.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATIONAL RESOURCES
G.R. No. 214923, 28 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (J.C. Reyes, Jr. J., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to a main suit, as well
as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of the things subject of the action or the
relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. Its purpose is to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. Concomitantly, jurisprudence has established
that the following requisites must be proven first before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued:
(a) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (b)
there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (c) there is an urgent need for the writ to
prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (d) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy
exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
In this case, the SMI had no more right in esse to speak of when it filed a complaint with prayer
for the issuance of an injunction to enjoin the DENR from suspending the issuance of the OTPs and
MOEPs before the RTC. The records show that the SMI and Pacific Nickel's MOA had already expired as
early as April 27, 2013. It is obvious that, at the time of seeking an injunction, the MOA had already
expired and the SMI had no more right to perform any act agreed or even contemplated in such
agreement. Moreover, the issue of the MOA's expiration need not reach the trial stage as the same had
been conclusively resolved and established by the evidence offered during the hearing for the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction. To replicate the same evidence during trial would be to cause
needless delays and contribute to the clogging of court dockets.

FACTS
The Philippine Government and Philnico Mining and Industrial Corporation (Philnico)
entered into a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement for the exploration, development and
commercial utilization of nickel ores Cagdianao, Surigao del Norte and Hanigad, Awasan and Nonoc
Islands, Surigao City.
Philnico assigned its mining rights to Pacific Nickel and its processing rights to Nonoc Mining.
Pacific Nickel, entered into a Mines Operating Agreement (MOA) with the petitioner Shuley Mine Inc.
(SMI), where the latter agreed to perform the mining activities of nickel ore in Nonoc Island as an
Operator. The contract period was for 48 months.
The Finance Secretary called the attention of the DENR Secretary regarding the continuing
mining activities in the contract area despite Philnico's non-payment of the amount of
US$263,762,000.00 due to the government.
The DENR immediately suspended the Ore Transport Permits (OTPs) and Mineral Ore Export
Permits (MOEPs) issued to Philnico and suspended the issuance of the same permits. SMI, without
Philnico’s permission and even with repeated letters from the DERN to suspend operations,
continued its mining operations in Nonoc Island.
The DENR informed the SMI that its MOA with Pacific Nickel had already expired. SMI filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to enjoin the DENR from preventing its mining and

171
operations. The RTC granted SMI’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction, stating that SMI
and Philnico’s MOA remains effective by virtue of their supplemental agreement registered with the
DENR extending its validity for an additional year.
The DENR, without a motion of reconsideration, elevated the matter before the Court of
Appeals (CA) via a petition for Certiorari. The CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling and setting
aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the RTC on the ground that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the
application for writ of preliminary despite the lack of a clear and unmistakable right on the part of
the SMI in view of the expiration of the MOA

ISSUE
Did the CA correctly find the RTC to have committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the DENR’s Petition for Certiorari?

RULING
YES. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to a main suit,
as well as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of the things subject of the action
or the relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. Its purpose is to prevent actual
or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. Concomitantly, jurisprudence has
established that the following requisites must be proven first before a writ of preliminary injunction
may be issued: (a) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a
right in esse; (b) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (c) there is an urgent need
for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (d) no other ordinary, speedy, and
adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
In this case, SMI had no more right in esse to speak of when it filed a complaint with prayer
for the issuance of an injunction to enjoin the DENR from suspending the issuance of the OTPs and
MOEPs before the RTC. The records show that the SMI and Pacific Nickel's MOA had already expired
as early as April 27, 2013. It is obvious that, at the time of seeking an injunction, the MOA had already
expired and the SMI had no more right to perform any act agreed or even contemplated in such
agreement. Moreover, the issue of the MOA's expiration need not reach the trial stage as the same
had been conclusively resolved and established by the evidence offered during the hearing for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. To replicate the same evidence during trial would be
to cause needless delays and contribute to the clogging of court dockets.
The real status quo in the case is not the DENR’s act of continually issuing OTPs and MOEPs,
but the preservation of the State's mineral resources. Status quo is defined as the last actual peaceful
uncontested situation that precedes a controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive
writ. In the context of mineral exploration and extraction, the event which is considered as "the last
actual peaceful uncontested situation preceding the controversy" is the unexplored and unextracted
state of the mineral resources involved in this dispute, not the continued exploration, extraction,
transportation and exportation of mineral resources out of the country and out of the State's
dominion and control.

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 In the realm of issuing injunctive reliefs, urgent necessity is present when there is an
immediate threat to the status quo. Once the minerals have been shipped to third parties or, worse,
exported to other countries, the State, being the owner, cannot retrieve these resources back. The
Government stands to irretrievably lose millions or even billions of pesos in revenue for the value of
the transported, shipped and lost minerals.
Second, filing a motion for reconsideration is an exercise in futility on the part of the DENR.
Generally, a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for
Certiorari. The purpose for this requirement is to grant an opportunity for the court or agency to
correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case without the intervention of a higher court. One of the exceptions to this
rule is when there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government.
Since it is virtually impossible for the State to retrieve the mineral resources once the same
have been shipped, it is an evident manifestation that filing a motion for reconsideration against the
RTC's Decision would be a waste of time and would prejudice the interest of the Government. The
pendency of a motion for reconsideration's resolution would facilitate or buy SMI time in continuing
to ship out precious minerals to third persons and even out of the country.
Lastly, mining contracts are not wholly immune to State regulation by virtue of the State's
police power. Since mineral production sharing agreements partake the nature of both a permit and
a contract, it may be validly regulated by virtue of the State's police power. Thus, the CA correctly
nullified the RTC's Order and the writ of preliminary injunction it issued because the DENR has the
primary authority to protect the State's interest by strictly regulating the conduct relative to
exploration, development, utilization and disposition of mineral resources.

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 PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE v.
TMA GROUP OF COMPANIES PTY LTD.
G.R. Nos. 212143, 225457, 236888, 28 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (A.B. Reyes, JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the probability of irreparable
injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and
where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be
refused.

Here, the RTC's injunctive writs appear to have been issued even in the absence of facts sufficient
to establish the aforementioned requisites

FACTS
This is a consolidated Decision for the petitions filed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) and its key officials, against TMA Group of Companies Pty Ltd., now known as TMA
Australia Pty. Ltd. (TMA Australia) and TMA Group Philippines, Inc. (TMA Philippines) (collectively
referred to as TMA) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

On April 8, 2011, TMA filed the Complaint for Specific Performance and Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
relative to a Contractual Joint Venture Agreement (CJVA) dated December 4, 2009 that was executed
by and between TMA Australia and PCSO. Under the CJVA, PCSO, the government entity created under
Republic Act No. 1169 to hold charity sweepstakes and lotteries, and TMA Australia, a company based
in Australia and which specializes in the production of consumables and accountable documents
using thermal-coated substrates, agreed to enter into a joint venture (JV) for the establishment of the
first thermal coating plant in the Philippines.

TMA committed to invest approximately P4.4 billion over the life of the JV, while PCSO
committed all its thermal paper and other specialized paper products and consumables requirements
for all current, future and other gaming activities for the next fifty (50) years, subject to the
negotiation provisions under the afore quoted paragraph 4.3 of the CJVA.

The request for the OGCC's review of the CJVA was made by then PCSO General Manager Jose
Ferdinand M. Rojas II. The ensuing Opinion of the OGCC provided that the subject CJVA was null and
void, mainly because the purpose for which the JV was constituted went beyond the primary
corporate purpose, mandate or charter of PCSO. The PCSO's contribution to the JV that pertained to
the purchase of thermal paper for the next fifty (50) years likewise breached the provision in the JV
Guidelines that requires government contribution in JVs to be through assets (including money,
equipment, land, intellectual property or anything of value). "Hardly can a mere promise be
categorized as anything of value." Further, the OGCC opined that the CJVA appeared to be relatively
simulated because while it was apparently a JV arrangement for the establishment of a thermal
coating plant, the agreement appeared to be, in fact, a Supply Contract. No actual capital contribution
was even expected from PCSO under the terms of the CJVA.

In the meantime, prompted by PCSO's suspension of the implementation of the subject CJVA,
TMA had sent a letter dated March 21, 2011 to the PCSO Board of Directors and General Manager,

174
urging them to lift the suspension of the CJVA.

By April 8, 2011, TMA instituted with the RTC of Makati City the action for specific
performance. TMA's prayer for the issuance of Writs of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction was thereby GRANTED.

Aggrieved, PCSO filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction by which they alleged that the RTC had prejudged the case in TMA's favor, as it practically
granted the main prayer in the action for specific performance. They likewise argued that the
requisites for the issuance of an extraordinary writ of injunction were not satisfied. RTC denied the
said Motion.

PCSO through the OGCC, filed with the Court the Petition for Review on Certiorari with Urgent
Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed
as G.R. No. 212143. On the other hand, TMA filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution. Judge Calis
issued an Order granting the motion for execution. He explained that "the supply and delivery of
thermal papers and betting slips by TMA to the PCSO is part and parcel of the implementation of the
JVA.

Undaunted, the petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) another Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition to seek the reversal and annulment of the RTC Orders docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
132655. The CA dismissed the case.

ISSUE
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
the disposition of the writs and motions prayed for?
RULING
YES. The RTC's injunctive writs appear to have been issued even in the absence of facts
sufficient to establish the aforementioned requisites, which we reiterate to be that: (a) the invasion
of right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear
and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. Requisites (a) and (b) are specific: the invasion of the right sought to be protected needs to
be material and substantial, and the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable. In this case,
TMA invoked and premised its purported rights solely on the basis of the CJVA that it had earlier
executed with PCSO, and the trial court took such proposition hook, line and sinker, as the RTC found
it necessary to protect such rights by the continued implementation of the contract between the
parties. This was the same justification provided by the CA when it sustained the orders of the RTC

G.R. No. 212143

Both lower courts failed to sufficiently assess the contents and implications of the terms that
were embodied in the agreement, which would have been the prudent thing to do when they
determined the nature of TMA's claimed rights, especially since the validity of the contract was early
on made an issue and was precisely the reason why PCSO opted to suspend its implementation. The
petitioners' stand on the agreement's invalidity was even backed by the recent OGCC Opinion that
extensively discussed the bases for such stance. The validity of the CJVA was a key issue in the main
case, and the alleged right of TMA under the CJVA remained to be resolved.

175
 If only the trial court made a closer look into the terms of the contract as against the parties'
respective assertions, it would have readily determined the reasonable reservations on the validity
of the CJVA, and that the claimed rights of TMA were far from being "clear and unmistakable." The
absence of such clear and unmistakable right, as mandated by the second requisite for the valid
issuance of an injunctive writ, then precludes the possibility of an invasion of a right that is material
and substantial, as required by the first requisite. Further, there must be an urgent and paramount
necessity to prevent serious damage so that their issuance could be justified. "It must be proven that
the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable damage. However, the purported
damage to TMA by the suspension of the implementation of the CJVA was more apparent than real.

G.R. Nos. 225457 and 236888

The questioned writs of execution clearly went beyond the purpose of the injunctive writs.
First, it has been reiterated by the Court in this Decision that the sole objective of a preliminary
injunction must be to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. Prior to the
parties' conflict, the subject JV was still in its initial stage of implementation. There was as yet no clear
showing of a thermal plant that was established by virtue of the JV, and from which PCSO could be
obliged to source its paper products. There was also no showing that PCSO has been ordering and
paying for its paper requirements from the JV. Rather than preserving the status quo corresponding
to the "last and actual peaceable uncontested status" between the parties, the manner by which the
trial court implemented its injunctive writs resulted in greater conflict and controversy.

Second, by the terms of the writs of execution, the RTC missed the very terms of the CJVA that
it sought to implement, as it wrongfully arrogated to itself the liberty of determining the parties'
respective rights and obligations even as they lacked factual and legal bases.

The RTC likewise improvidently determined and pegged in its Orders and writs of execution
the substantial volume and price of papers that PCSO should receive from and pay to TMA. It
substituted its own judgment to that of the actual need for thermal papers and betting slips of PCSO,
which matter could have only been best determined by the agency. The trial court totally missed the
provision in the CJVA that committed PCSO for its paper requirements under specifications that it
should establish.

In sum, the Court held as void and of no force and effect the following writs issued by the RTC
in Civil Case No. 11-310: (a) the Writ of Preliminary Injunction that directed the petitioners to
immediately lift the suspension of the implementation of the CJVA, and to resume such
implementation without delay; (b) the Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction that enjoined the
petitioners to cease and desist from performing any act that would lead to or constitute cancellation
of the CJVA and committing any other act that would nullify, in effect, the implementation of the CJVA,
including but not limited to the conduct of any bidding for its lotto paper requirements; and (c) the
Writs of Execution that were issued pursuant to the injunctive writs. Consequently, TMA must return
to PCSO any and all amounts paid by the latter under such void writs.

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 EMPIRE INSURANCE, INC., MARIO A. REMOROSA (in his capacity as approving officer of
Empire Insurance Company), VIRGINIA BELINDA S. OCAMPO, JOSE AUGUSTO G. SANTOS, and
KATRINA G. SANTOS, petitioners, vs. ATTY. MARCIANO S. BACALLA, JR., ATTY. EDUARDO M.
ABACAN, ERLINDA U. LIM, FELICITO A. MADAMBA, PEPITO M. DELGADO, and THE
FEDERATION OF INVESTORS TULUNGAN, INC., respondents.
(G.R. No. 195215, THIRD DIVISION, March 6, 2019, A.B. REYES, JR., J.)

Seen in light of these doctrines, the Court holds that the action filed by the Bacalla group in the case at
bar is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The action has for its primary objective the nullification of the
transactions which brought the shares in dispute outside the control of the debtor, i.e., Tibayan Group,
and perforce to preserve them for inclusion in the assets to be liquidated.

Furthermore, the Bacalla group does not assert direct, personal claims over the shares. Bacalla claims
the shares only in his capacity as receiver of the Tibayan Group, while Abacan, et al. and FITI claim the
shares only for purposes of having them included in the asset pool of the Tibayan Group, out of which
their respective claims are to be paid.

The Court, therefore, held that the primary objective of the claim in that case was for recovery of
property, hence, filing fees must be computed on the basis of the value of the shares as alleged by the
claimant. Considering that the Bacalla group paid almost Php1,100,000.00 in filing fees, they have more
than complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
__

Jurisprudence has laiddown the following requisites for the valid grant of preliminary injunctive relief:
(a) thatthe right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined isviolative of
that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for thewrit to prevent serious
damage.

Anent the first requisite, there has been a prima facie showing of the existence of a right in essein favor
of the Bacalla group. As found by the CA, their right to the shares in dispute is based on the final and
executory decision of the trial court in the dissolution proceedings against Tibayan Group. The findings
of the SEC which led to the issuance of the Cease-and-Desist Order against the Tibayan Group, and the
PSE memorandum only serve as further proof of the existence of this clear and unmistakable right, by
illustrating the flow of the assets from the Tibayan Group to the dummy corporations to the defendants.

Anent the second and third requisites, given that shares of stock are a readily tradable commodity, the
Court concurs with the CA that the right of the Bacalla group to the return of the shares to the Tibayan
Group's asset pool will be greatly prejudiced if the continued disposition thereof is not enjoined.

FACTS:
This case is an offshoot of the liquidation proceedings of the Tibayan Group of Companies, involving
the recovery of 650,225 Prudential Bank common shares allegedly acquired in fraud ofTibayan
Group's investor creditors.

Both entities were allegedly dummy corporations used by the Tibayan Group to dispose of assets in
fraud of creditors by using illegally transferred assets to buy and sell shares of stock, some of which
were acquired by Empire Insurance, Inc. (EII), et al.RTC of Las Piñas City granted thepetition for
involuntary dissolution.

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Subsequently, Atty.Bacalla, Jr., in his capacity as the court-appointed receiver of the Tibayan Group,
filed a "Very Urgent" application for injunctive relief before the trial court, seeking to enjoin the
holders of the Prudential Bank shares from selling or otherwise disposing the same to other parties.
The trial court, in its Resolution, granted the application.

Bacalla, together with certain Tibayan Group investors who filed the dissolution suit, thus filed a case
for securities fraud, declaration of nullity, and specific performance with prayer for issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Las Piñas City.

In their answer, defendants countered that: 1) the filing fees were deficient because the correct basis
of computation should have been the market value of the shares, which was alleged to be at
Php400.00 to 700.00, thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction; 2) the complaint failed to state
a cause of action; 3) Bacalla and the Federation of Investors Tulungan, Inc. (FITI) were not real
parties-in-interest; and 4) the sales of the shares by the alleged Tibayan Group dummies to the
defendants were valid.

Trial court issued an Order, granting the Bacalla group's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction,
ruling that they were able to substantiate the bases for the grant of such relief in their favor. As
regards the alleged deficiency in the payment of filing fees, the trial court refused to disturb the clerk
of court's computation thereof, invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties.

On petition for certiorari, the CA ruled that the Bacalla group was able to establish the existence of a
material and substantial invasion of a clear and unmistakable right in their favor, which would cause
them serious damage if not stopped through a writ of preliminary injunction.On the issue of the
correct amount of filing fees to be paid, the CA upheld par value as the basis for the computation of
the filing fees. It held that the market value of the shares was only mentioned as part of the
complaint's narration of facts. In contrast, the par value is the nominal value of the shares as stated
in the stock certificates.On the issue of the propriety of the grant of preliminary injunctive relief, the
CA held that there was a "traceable connection" from the Tibayan Group to TMG Holdings and CAHC;
and a "discernible flow of assets" from the Tibayan Group to the defendants. Aggrieved, the Empire
group sought recourse before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in upholding the trialcourt's issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction, despite the Bacalla group's failure to pay the correct filing fees; and

(2)Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in refusing to recognize that the Empire group
was denied due process of law when the injunction was issued?

RULING:
(1) Correct amount of filing fees
The settled rule is that a case is deemed filed only upon the payment of the filing fee. The court
acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon full payment of such prescribed filing fee. The
computation of the correct amount of filing fees to be paid rests upon a determination of the nature
of the action. Thus, in a money claim or a claim involving property, the filing fee is computed in

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relation to the value of the money or property claimed;while in an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the Rules prescribe a determinate amount as filing fees.

Jurisprudence has laid down the "primary objective" test to determine if an action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. This test is explained in the 1968 case of Lapitanv. Scandia, Inc., et al.,viz.:

If the action is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of the principal relief sought like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.

In Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr., et al.,the Court held that an action for "Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue,
Receivership and Dissolution" was incapable of pecuniary estimation, because "the annulment of the
shares, the dissolution of the corporation and theappointment of receivers/management committee
are actions which do not consist inthe recovery of a sum of money. If, in the end, a sum of money or
real property would berecovered, it would simply be the consequence of such principal action.” The
Court further noted in Lu that actions assailing the legality of a conveyance or for annulment of
contract have been considered incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Seen in light of these doctrines, the Court holds that the action filed by the Bacalla group in the case
at bar is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The action has for its primary objective the nullification
of the transactions which brought the shares in dispute outside the control of the debtor, i.e., Tibayan
Group, and perforce to preserve them for inclusion in the assets to be liquidated.

Furthermore, the Bacalla group does not assert direct, personal claims over the shares. Bacalla claims
the shares only in his capacity as receiver of the Tibayan Group, while Abacan, et al. and FITI claim
the shares only for purposes of having them included in the asset pool of the Tibayan Group, out of
which their respective claims are to be paid.

The Court, therefore, held that the primary objective of the claim in that case was for recovery of
property, hence, filing fees must be computed on the basis of the value of the shares as alleged by the
claimant. Considering that the Bacalla group paid almost Php1,100,000.00 in filing fees, they have
more than complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.

Propriety of injunctive relief

The Empire group, in assailing the grant of preliminary injunctive relief to the Bacalla group, argue
that the SEC findings and the PSE memorandum do not constitute sufficient basis for the grant of a
preliminary injunctive writ. Empire group failed to offer cogent reasons to reverse the concurrent
rulings of the courts a quo.

Jurisprudence has laiddown the following requisites for the valid grant of preliminary injunctive
relief: (a) thatthe right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined

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isviolative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for thewrit to prevent
serious damage.

The Court is satisfied that the allegations and evidence set forth by the Bacalla group constitute
sufficient bases for the grant of preliminary injunctive relief.

Anent the first requisite, there has been a prima facie showing of the existence of a right in essein
favor of the Bacalla group. As found by the CA, their right to the shares in dispute is based on the final
and executory decision of the trial court in the dissolution proceedings against Tibayan Group. The
findings of the SEC which led to the issuance of the Cease-and-Desist Order against the Tibayan
Group, and the PSE memorandum only serve as further proof of the existence of this clear and
unmistakable right, by illustrating the flow of the assets from the Tibayan Group to the dummy
corporations to the defendants.

Anent the second and third requisites, given that shares of stock are a readily tradable commodity,
the Court concurs with the CA that the right of the Bacalla group to the return of the shares to the
Tibayan Group's asset pool will be greatly prejudiced if the continued disposition thereof is not
enjoined.

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 TIONG BI, INC. [Owner of Bacolod Our Lady of Mercy Specialty Hospital], petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondent.
(G.R. No. 229106, SECOND DIVISION, February 20, 2019, J.C. REYES, JR., J.)

A TRO is issued only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury
will arise unless it is issued immediately. Parenthetically, the burden is on the Tiong Bi, Inc. to show in
the application that there is meritorious ground for the issuance of the TRO in its favor. In this case,
Tiong Bi, Inc. failed to discharge such burden.

Tiong Bi, Inc. is not the only health service provider in the region. Hence, the suspension of its PhilHealth
accreditation and the imposition of fine against it will not, in any way, hamper the delivery of health
care services to the public. More importantly, it should be stressed that the subject PhilHealth Resolution
merely imposes a fine and the suspension of the hospital's PhilHealth accreditation not the closure of
the hospital. Hence, neither will Tiong Bi, Inc.'s health care services be forestalled by the implementation
of the penalty sought to be restrained.

FACTS:
Tiong Bi, Inc. was charged with "Padding of Claims" and "Misrepresentation by Furnishing False and
Incorrect Information" before respondent PhilHealth. The charges of fraudulent benefit claims
include padding of prescriptions and recommending of medicines and supplies such as oxygen and
intravenous fluids not needed by the patients nor actually provided by the hospital or the doctors.

These charges, in turn, stemmed from similar charges against two PhilHealth-accredited eye
surgeons, who used Tiong Bi, Inc.'s facilities and the services of its staff to attend to the needs of said
physicians.

In a Decision, PhilHealth's Arbitration Department dismissed the charges against the two doctors for
lack of merit. This Decision was affirmed by the PhilHealth Board. On the other hand, PhilHealth
affirmed the Decision of Arbiter De Leon, finding Tiong Bi, Inc. guilty, for the second time, of a
fraudulent offense.

Aggrieved, Tiong Bi, Inc. appealed the said PhilHealth Resolution before the CA through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and likewise filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). Tiong Bi, Inc. insists that since the
charges against the two doctors were dismissed for lack of merit, the charges against it which were
grounded upon the same set of facts should likewise be dismissed.

CA denied Tiong Bi, Inc.'s motion for issuance of TRO, finding no actual existing right to be protected
on the part of the Tiong Bi, Inc. nor the possibility of irreparable injury.CA likewise denied Tiong Bi,
Inc.'s motion for reconsideration.Tiong Bi, Inc. now comes before the Supreme Court through the
instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the pretext that it is
grounded on pure questions of law.

ISSUE:
Whether theCA's denial of Tiong Bi, Inc.'s motion for issuance of TRO was tainted with grave abuse
of discretion?

RULING:

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At the outset, it should be pointed out that the Tiong Bi, Inc. resorted to an improper remedy before
this Court. Tiong Bi, Inc. resorted to a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to question the denial of its motion for issuance of an injunctive relief. Being interlocutory in
nature and, thus, unappealable,the proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari and/or
prohibition under Rule 65 of the same Rules. At any rate, even if we treat this case as a petition under
Rule 65, it shall still fail for lack of merit.

The grant or denial of a TRO or an injunctive writ rests on the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case. Verily, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must
not be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion.In the issuance or denial of an
injunctive writ, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In this case, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the CA in denying the issuance of a TRO.

To be entitled to the injunctive writ, Tiong Bi, Inc. must show that (1) there exists a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be
enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.

A TRO is issued only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable
injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Parenthetically, the burden is on the Tiong Bi, Inc.to
show in the application that there is meritorious ground for the issuance of the TRO in its favor. In
this case,Tiong Bi, Inc. failed to discharge such burden.

Tiong Bi, Inc. is not the only health service provider in the region. Hence, the suspension of its
PhilHealth accreditation and the imposition of fine against it will not, in any way, hamper the delivery
of health care services to the public. More importantly, it should be stressed that the subject
PhilHealth Resolution merely imposes a fine and the suspension of the hospital's PhilHealth
accreditation not the closure of the hospital.Hence, neither will Tiong Bi, Inc.'s health care services
be forestalled by the implementation of the penalty sought to be restrained.

If at all, it is merely the members' benefits which may temporarily be hampered when the penalty is
implemented. Such damage, if any, is easily quantifiable and, as such, cannot be considered as "grave
and irreparable injury" as contemplated under the law. The Court in Heirs of Melencio Yu v. Court of
Appeals,citing Social Security Commission v.Bayonaexplained the concept of irreparable damage or
injury as follows:

Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction
where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy. "An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of
wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that
can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement."

Here, the only possible injury which may be perceived is easily subject to mathematical
computation.In sum, this Court finds no reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion, on the
part of the CA in denying the motion for the issuance of the TRO. What is more, the prevailing rule is
that the courts should avoid resorting to interlocutory injunctive reliefs that would in effect preempt
the resolution of the main case.

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 THE LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD (LTFRB) and THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOTR), Petitioners, - versus - HON. CARLOS A.
VALENZUELA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANDALUYONG CITY, BRANCH 213 and DBDOYC, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 242860, SECOND DIVISION, March 11, 2019, PERLAS-BERNABE, J
In Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., the Court held that "the plaintiff praying for a writ of
preliminary injunction must x xx establish that he or she has a present and unmistakable right to be
protected; x x x thus, where the plaintiffs right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not
proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground
for a preliminary injunction."
In this case, the RTC premised its issuance of the assailed injunctive writ on DBDOYC's purported clear
and unmistakable legal right "to conduct its business based on its constitutional right to liberty." As in
all fundamental rights, the State has a legitimate interest in regulating these rights when their exercise
clearly affects the public.
FACTS:
On May 8, 2015, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), the predecessor of
DOTr, issued Department Order No. (DO) 2015-11, amending DO 97-1097, which set the standard
classifications for public transport conveyances to be used as basis for the issuance of a Certificate of
Public Convenience (CPC) for public utility vehicles (PUVs). The DOTC, through DO 2015-11, created
two (2) new classifications, namely, Transportation Network Companies (TNC) and Transportation
Network Vehicle Service (TNVS).
Consequently, the LTFRB issued various memorandum circulars to govern the issuance of the
necessary CPC for a TNVS and the accreditation of a TNC. In its issuances, the LTFRB declared that a
TNC is treated as a transport provider whose accountability commences from the acceptance by its
TNVS while online. On the other hand, the accountability of the TNVS, as a common carrier, attaches
from the time the TNVS is online and offers its services to theriding public.
Meanwhile, on May 26, 2016, DBDOYC registered its business with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and subsequently, in December 2016, launched "Angkas," an online and on-
demand motorcycle-hailing mobile application (Angkas app) that pairs drivers of motorcycles with
potential passengers without, however, obtaining the mandatory certificate of TNC. In this regard,
DBDOYC accredited Angkas drivers and allowed them to offer their transport services to the public
despite the absence of CPCs.
LTFRB issued a press release on January 27, 2017 informing the riding public that DBDOYC, which is
considered as a TNC, cannot legally operate. In response, DBDOYC, on July 4, 2018, filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Application for Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against petitioners before the RTC.
The RTC issued the said writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioners and anyone acting on
their behalf: (a) from interfering, whether directly or indirectly, with DBDOYC's operations; (b) from
apprehending Angkas bikers who are in lawful pursuit of their trade or occupation based on Angkas
mobile application; and (c) from performing any act/acts that will impede, obstruct, frustrate, or
defeat DBDOYC's pursuit of its lawful business or trade as owner and operator of Angkas. In so ruling,
the RTC found that DBDOYC has a clear and unmistakable right "to conduct its business based on its
constitutional right to liberty," which includes "the right of an individual to x xx earn his livelihood

183
by any lawful calling; and to pursue any vocation and essentially to do and perform anything unless
otherwise prohibited by law."
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
(YES)
RULING:
The first and foremost requisite in the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is the existence of
a clear legal right. The rationale therefor hews with the nature of these writs being mere provisional
reliefs. In Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., the Court held that "the plaintiff praying for a writ
of preliminary injunction must x xx establish that he or she has a present and unmistakable right to
be protected; x x x thus, where the plaintiffs right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is
not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a
ground for a preliminary injunction."
In this case, the RTC premised its issuance of the assailed injunctive writ on DBDOYC's purported
clear and unmistakable legal right "to conduct its business based on its constitutional right to liberty."
As in all fundamental rights, the State has a legitimate interest in regulating these rights when their
exercise clearly affects the public. To recount, "police power is the inherent power of the State to
regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and property for public welfare." Accordingly, the State "may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare as long as the interference is reasonable and not arbitrary."
Lest it be misunderstood, the pronounced grave abuse of discretion of the RTC exists only with
respect to its issuance of the assailed injunctive writ. It is fundamental that preliminary injunction
proceedings are separate and distinct from the main case. The writ is provisional because it
constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary
because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action. Under this limited
scope, it is thus beyond the power of the Court to determine the ultimate rights and obligations of the
parties, else it unduly prejudges the main case for declaratory relief which is still pending before the
court a quo. While the Court acknowledges the contemporary relevance of the topic at hand, it
remains self-aware of this case's procedural and jurisdictional parameters. Accordingly, the
definitive resolution of the issue of regulating ride-booking or ride-sharing applications must await
the proper case therefor.

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 D. Receivership (Rule 59)
E. Replevin (Rule 60)
V. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
A. Jurisdiction and venue
B. Interpleader (Rule 62)
C. Declaratory relief and similar remedies (Rule 63)
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, -versus- APOLINARIO K. DAYMIEL,
substituted by his heirs MADELINE D. VILORIA, YOLANDA D. DE CASTRO, JOVENA D.
ACOJEDO, ALBERTO DAYMIEL, MA. IMELDA D. GANDOLA, MARIDEL D. MORANDANTE* and
MA. NYMPHA DAYMIEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 218097, SECOND DIVISION, March 11, 2019, REYES, J. JR., J.
In the case of Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, we reiterated that the
determination of whether a rule is issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the
Constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
GSIS tried to brush aside the issue of legality of the assailed issuances by focusing on the ultimate
consequence should such issuances be declared invalid, i.e., the re-computation of the retirement
benefits. However, this is pure incidental to the outcome of the relief prayed for in the action for
declaratory relief. It is so precisely because the primary issue was the starting point of the computation
of the retirement benefits.
FACTS:
Respondent assumed the position of Accounting Clerk III until his retirement on July 1, 2003.
Thereupon, respondent applied for retirement benefits before the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). A Tentative Computation was made pursuant to respondent's application. However,
a re-computation was made wherein GSIS credited respondent only with 23.85082 years of service
instead of the initial 33.65678. Accordingly, respondent's lump sum payment was decreased.
The re-computation was made as a result of theimplementation of Policy and Procedural Guidelines
No. 171-03 (PPG No. 171-03) issued by then GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia,
and subsequently approved by the GSIS Board of Trustees.
In his Petition for Declaratory Relief, Mandamus, and Damages, respondent interpreted the
provisions of PPG No. 171-03 as gravely prejudicial to him since the starting point in the computation
of the creditable service of a retiree shall be the date of the payment of monthly contributions,
whereas the starting point as regards Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8291 or The Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997 is the date of original appointment.
The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 8291. The
CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC and declared PPG No. 171-03 and Resolution No. 90
null and void. In ruling so, the CA reasoned that since the petition filed before the RTC is one for
declaratory relief, the RTC has jurisdiction over the same.
ISSUE: Whether the regular court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case (YES)
RULING:

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Section 30 of R.A. No. 8291 vests upon the GSIS the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes
arising from said law or related issuances. Section 14.3 (now Section 27.1) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8291 provides that such quasi-judicial power lies with the GSIS
Board of Trustees, thus:
SEC. 30. Settlement of Disputes. - The GSIS shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to settle any
dispute arising under this Act and any other laws administered by the GSIS.
The Board may designate any member of the Board, or official of the GSIS who is a lawyer, to act as
hearing officer to receive evidence, make findings of fact and submit recommendations thereon. The
hearing officer shall submit his findings and recommendations, together with all documentary and
testimonial evidence to the [B]oard within thirty (30) working days from the time the parties have
closed their respective evidence and filed their last pleading. The Board shall decide the case within
thirty (30) days from the receipt of the hearing officer's findings and recommendations. The cases
heard directly by the Board shall be decided within thirty (30) working days from the time they are
submitted by the parties for decision. xx xx
SEC. 14.3. Body Vested with Quasi-Judicial Functions. - The quasi-judicial function of the GSIS shall be
vested in its Board of Trustees.
Section 14.l (now Section 27) of the IRR provides in detail the coverage of such quasi-judicial power,
to wit:
SEC. 14.1. Quasi-Judicial Functions of theGSJS.- x x x settle any dispute arising under Republic Act No.
8291, Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, and other laws administered by the GSIS with respect
to: x xx 2. Entitlement of members to the following benefits under these Rules: (c) Retirement
benefits x xx
However, the records of the case reveal that what the respondent is seeking for is the nullification of
PPG No. 171-03 and Resolution No. 90 on the ground of illegality. While respondent's contention
deals with a dispute as to the computation of his retirement benefits, his petition mainly attacks the
legality of the assailed issuances.
Consistent with the petition filed, the allegations partake of a petition for declaratory relief under
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. -Any person interesteda under deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and
for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved
must be ripe for judicial determination.26 Certainly, it is the RTC which is vested with jurisdiction to
try such petition.
In the case of Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, we reiteratedthat the
determination of whether a rule is issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the
Constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
We find that respondent's petition is sufficient to meet all the requirements.

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Firstly, there is justiciable controversy as respondent questions the legality and constitutionality
of PPG No. 171-03 and Resolution No. 90, both of which were issued by the GSIS.
On this note, we emphasize that the courts are vested by the Constitution with the power of
judicial review, including the authority of the regular courts to determine in an appropriate the
action validity of the acts of political departments.

Secondly, the issue is between the GSIS, which implements the assailed issuances and the respondent
who seeks to claim his retirement benefits.
Thirdly, respondent has legal interest over the case since the amount he seeks to claim would differ
because the implementation ofR.A. No. 8291 and PPG No. 171-03 and Regulation No. 90 provide for
different starting point for the computation of retirement benefits. Application of the latter would
decrease his retirement benefits from P542,325.00 to P342,295.80 considering the varying starting
point for the computation of retirement benefits. Under R.A. No. 8291, the reckoning period is the
date of original appointment while in PPG No. 171-03 and Resolution No. 90, the starting point is the
date of the payment of monthly contributions by a member who was receiving a fixed basic monthly
compensation for his services rendered.
Finally, the issue is ripe for judicial determination because litigation is inevitable for the reason that
respondent's retirement benefits would be substantially reduced by the implementation of the
assailed issuances.
GSIS tried to brush aside the issue of legality of the assailed issuances by focusing on the ultimate
consequence should such issuances be declared invalid, i.e., the re-computation of the retirement
benefits. However, this is pure incidental to the outcome of the relief prayed for in the action for
declaratory relief. It is so precisely because the primary issue was the starting point of the
computation of the retirement benefits.

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 D. Review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and COA
(Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65)
E. Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
1. Definitions and distinctions
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MEGAWORLD CORPORATION
G.R. NOS. 103893-4, 9 October 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Court notes at the outset that Landbank challenges individual components of the
computation contained in the revised award. Thereby, Landbank raises questions of fact that require
the re-evaluation of evidence presented before the CIAC. Ordinarily, such a challenge is disallowed
because the factual findings of the CIAC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive upon this
Court. The conclusiveness proceeds from the reality that the CIAC, being the quasi-judicial body that has
jurisdiction over disputes involving construction agreements, whether government or private contracts,
holds the recognized technical expertise on such matters, and should thus be accorded great respect as
to its findings thereon. Moreover, the present recourse is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari,
which is limited to the consideration and resolution of questions of law.
Nonetheless, the Court may review such factual matters by way of exception to the regular
procedure where the CA has disagreed with the CIAC's factual findings. The need arises to resolve and
settle the disagreement. In this appeal, however, the Court confines its review to the components thereof
that the CA modified on appeal, it being reiterated that the factual findings of the CIAC affirmed by the
CA have become conclusive on this Court.

FACTS
Land Bank of the Philippines (Landbank) is the registered owner of a parcel of land. It entered
into a development contract (agreement) whereby Megaworld Corporation (Megaworld) undertook
to construct non the property a 35-storey building to be known as the Landbank Plaza, Landbank's
proposed corporate headquarters that would include a first-class commercial and residential
condominium complex (project).
In 1999, Megaworld notified Landbank that it had already completed the project.
Nonetheless, Landbank did not issue a certificate of completion and acceptance in favor of
Megaworld, but only released P168 million from the money retained under the agreement based on
the accomplishment rate of 96.7586%.
Almost three years following the notice of completion, Landbank had wholly occupied the
project. Insisting that Landbank had not yet settled its balance in full, Megaworld demanded payment
of the retention money equivalent to 10% of every progress billing, as well as payment of its billings
for various change orders and rectification works performed from July 1999 to August 2002.
In its answer, Landbank denied liability for the several change orders being claimed by
Megaworld; and countered that it had performed certain works at its own expense, for which it had
to procure the services of other contractors to complete the project because of Megaworld's delay in

188
correcting the reported defects. Landbank asserted that Megaworld should reimburse it for the
additional costs, and be further liable for exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The parties agreed to Terms of Reference (TOR) which provides that presentation of
testimonial evidence shall be by way of affidavits of witness. Conformably with the TOR, the parties
submitted affidavits of their respective witnesses, the lists of exhibits, and offers of documents.
However, Landbank offered additional documents as evidence in the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC) but without previously furnishing Megaworld with copies thereof
prior to the trial. The CIAC denied Lanbank’s offer of additional documents as evidence for violating
the Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration.
Landbank moved for reconsideration. The CIAC granted the motion and admitted all of
Landbank’s additional documents. Thereafter, the CIAC rendered a decision awarding Megaworld the
net amount of P6,999,667.59 recognizing both the claims of Mandbank and Megaworld.
Landbank moved to correct the award. Thus, CIAC amended the award and recognized the
increase in Lanbank’s counterclaim. The award in favor of Megaworld was decreased to
P6,179,798.21.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA modified the net award in favor
of Megaworld to P35,779,501.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari before the Court whereby Landbank
challenges components of the computation contained in the revised award. Thereby, Landbank raises
questions of fact that require the re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the CIAC.
ISSUE
Is Landbank allowed to raise questions of fact before the Supreme Court?
RULING
YES. The Court notes at the outset that Landbank challenges individual components of the
computation contained in the revised award. Thereby, Landbank raises questions of fact that require
the re-evaluation of evidence presented before the CIAC. Ordinarily, such a challenge is disallowed
because the factual findings of the CIAC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive upon this
Court. The conclusiveness proceeds from the reality that the CIAC, being the quasi-judicial body that
has jurisdiction over disputes involving construction agreements, whether government or private
contracts, holds the recognized technical expertise on such matters, and should thus be accorded
great respect as to its findings thereon. Moreover, the present recourse is an appeal by petition for
review on certiorari, which is limited to the consideration and resolution of questions of law.
Nonetheless, the Court may review such factual matters by way of exception to the regular
procedure where the CA has disagreed with the CIAC's factual findings. The need arises to resolve
and settle the disagreement. In this appeal, however, the Court confines its review to the components
thereof that the CA modified on appeal, it being reiterated that the factual findings of the CIAC
affirmed by the CA have become conclusive on this Court.
The CA affirmed the CIAC's amended awards except as to the following three items as to
which the CA acted thusly:

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 1. Reducing the costs of rectification works pertaining to the curtain walls, etc., from
P40,975,126.41 to P32,293,042.58;
2. Deleting other costs such as those of the electrical works for the telephone system of
P4,717,619.28; and
3. 3. Deleting costs of the rectification works pertaining to the slope of the parking areas in
the amount of P16,200,000.00.
A careful review of the records impels the Court to find no reversible error regarding the CA's
modifications of item 1 above. The Court does not uphold the CA as regards items 2 and 3.
To start with, Landbank charged Megaworld with item 2 as part of its counterclaims, which
related to the costs of electrical works for the telephone system, as a deduction from the total amount
due to the latter. According to Landbank, deductive costs were "costs [that] are either required in the
contract but not done by Megaworld or those items [that] were supposed to be provided by
Megaworld but were instead provided by Landbank. These also include costs [that were] incurred by
the bank (i.e., electric/water bills/processing fees) that should have been shouldered by Megaworld."
Deductive costs were also "those items [that were] included in the contract but requested by
Landbank to be excluded for its own implementation." Landbank averred that it had installed such
electrical works "as recommended by [its] Technology Management Group to bring the original
design and [telephone system] materials to more modern standards." Thus, having done the works
at its own expense, Landbank asserted its right to reimbursement by way of deduction of the costs
from the total contract price.
The Court agrees with the CA to the extent that there had been no agreement by Megaworld
authorizing the deduction of such costs from the contract price. Yet, even without the agreement, the
CIAC still had to determine whether the aforecited general practice in the construction industry
applied herein or not, and, if it did, to determine the extent of Megaworld's liability.
Secondly, Landbank insisted that it had procured the services of another contractor, LRDC, to
rectify the concrete floors in the parking area because the floors sloped to a designated drainage, and
thereby address the "water ponding" problem on the surfaces; and that Megaworld should reimburse
the amounts under item 3 (representing the additional cost of rectification works on the slope of the
parking areas at a rate of P596.44/square meter). Denying liability, Megaworld argued that Landbank
had approved the overall design of its parking area; and that the parties should bear equal
responsibility over the "water ponding" issue.
Initially, the CIAC struck down Landbank's proposed rate of P596.44/square meter for being
excessive. It explained that mere additional work orders, applications, and certificates of payment,
without presenting progress billings and payment vouchers, rendered such estimated rates
questionable. In the end, however, the CIAC ruled in favor of Landbank, albeit reducing the estimated
rate of rectification costs to P450.00/square meter.
However, the CIAC did not explain how it had arrived at the rate of P450.00/square meter. It
did not identify its source documents or provide any computation for arriving at such a rate. As such,
the rate became unsupported and unjustified.
Furthermore, the CA found that Landbank had been able to submit documents to support its
claim only through the offer of additional evidence. In the view of the CA, the belated submission of
the additional documents had deprived Megaworld of the opportunity to examine the documents in
violation of Megaworld's right to due process. The CA, pointing out that the CIAC should not have

190
admitted the documents, ruled out Landbank's claim for the cost of rectification works on the slope
of parking areas as unmeritorious.
Contrary to what the CA ruled, the Court cannot entirely delete the award relating to item 3.
That Megaworld had admitted its responsibility for the "water ponding" issue, only that it insisted on
sharing the responsibility with Landbank, cannot be justly ignored. With its admission, Megaworld's
obligation to compensate Landbank for such rectification works should no longer be in doubt. Only
the exact amount of Megaworld's liability remained undetermined.
In view of the foregoing, and considering that the Court is not equipped to receive evidence
in order to fully resolve the issues relating to item 2 and item 3, the remand of the case to the CIAC
for the appropriate determination of the costs of such works as well as of the extent of Megaworld's
liability corresponding thereto should be made.

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 2. Requisites; when and where to file (Rule 65)
RICARDO P. CARNIYAN, et al. v. HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 228516, 14 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (A. REYES, JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be
resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. An order denying a motion to dismiss is classified as an interlocutory, as opposed to a
final, order. This classification is vital because it is determinative of the remedy available to the
aggrieved party.

Considering that Judge Villordon, through the 18 March 2011 Order, denied the Carniyans’
motion to dismiss, the appropriate remedy was to file an answer, proceed to trial, and, in the event of an
adverse judgment, interpose an appeal, assigning as errors the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss.
For this reason, Certiorari did not lie as a remedy in the proceeding a quo. The Carniyans committed a
fatal procedural lapse when they sought relief before the CA via Certiorari.

FACTS
Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint
for recovery of possession against Edilberto, Ricardo, and Sherly Carniyan (the Carniyans) seeking
their eviction from a portion of a parcel of land in Quezon City. Instead of an answer, a Motion to
Dismiss and a Motion to Archive the case as may be possible in Lieu of Dismissal was filed. Carniyans
argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction to resolve the complaint (1) due to the fact that HGC has not
yet acquired ownership over the contested property; and (2) because the assessed value thereof fell
below P400, 000.00, the alleged jurisdictional amount of civil actions filed in Metro Manila.

On March 18, 2011, Judge Tita Marilyn Payoyo-Villordon (Judge Villordon) ruled that the
Carniyans’ contention as to the jurisdictional amount was misplaced since the case was an action
involving title to, or possession of, real property, and because the subject property had an assessed
value of P50,000.00. Judge Villordon likewise denied the motion to archive the case on the ground
that the said motion was merely dilatory.

Thereafter, Carniyans filed a Motion to Expunge/Rescind the Interlocutory Order with

Motion for Inhibition. On February 8, 2012, Judge Villordon issued the second challenged order. In
denying the Carniyans' motion to expunge, she ruled that the same was essentially a motion for
reconsideration, the merits of which had already been thoroughly passed upon. She further denied
the motion of inhibition.

Despite Judge Villordon's directive, the Carniyans failed to file an answer within the allotted
period. Consequently, HGC moved to declare the Carniyans in default. On October 31, 2012, Judge
Villordon issued the third challenged order, declaring them in default.

Finally, on November 21, 2012, Judge Villordon issued the last of the challenged trial court
orders, rescheduling the ex parte presentation of HGC's evidence.

Aggrieved, the Carniyans challenged the four aforesaid trial court orders before the Court of
Appeals (CA) via a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus. The CA denied the said petition
and ruled that the Carniyans should have instead filed a motion under oath to set aside the order of

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default. Moreover, the CA held that the Carniyans' failure to file an answer was attributable solely to
their own negligence.

ISSUE
Did Judge Villordon act with grave abuse of discretion?

RULING
NO. A petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that
may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. An order denying a motion to dismiss is classified as an interlocutory, as
opposed to a final, order. This classification is vital because it is determinative of the remedy available
to the aggrieved party.

Considering that Judge Villordon, through the 18 March 2011 Order, denied the Carniyans’
motion to dismiss, the appropriate remedy was to file an answer, proceed to trial, and, in the event
of an adverse judgment, interpose an appeal, assigning as errors the grounds stated in the motion to
dismiss. For this reason, Certiorari did not lie as a remedy in the proceeding a quo. The Carniyans
committed a fatal procedural lapse when they sought relief before the CA via Certiorari.

Jurisprudence, however, provides exceptions to the rule that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is not the proper subject of a petition for Certiorari. When such orders are issued without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or when their issuance is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, Certiorari
lies as a remedy. None of the exceptions apply in this case.

Contrary to the Carniyans’ stance, the submission of a certified true copy of the Torrens title
was not a condition precedent to vest the Quezon City RTC with jurisdiction over HGC's complaint.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the pleadings. Therefore, no
grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to Judge Villordon in denying the motion to archive the
case.

Moving on to the second challenged trial court order, dated February 8, 2012, the Court
remains unconvinced that Judge Villordon gravely abused her discretion in issuing the same. Anent
the motion for inhibition, A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC, which finds particular application to litigations in
Quezon City trial courts, specifically prohibits the filing of multiple motions for inhibition by one
party. Since A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC explicitly proscribed the filing by the Carniyans of the Motion to
Expunge/Rescind the Interlocutory Order Dated March 18, 2011 with Motion for Inhibition insofar
as Judge Villordon's inhibition was concerned, hardly any grave abuse of discretion can be imputed
to her in denying the same through the second challenged trial court order.

As to the third challenged court order (October 31, 2012 Order), Carniyans assailed the said
order via Certiorari before the CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari was not the
proper remedy. Considering that no judgment had yet been rendered a quo, the Carniyans,
pursuant to Section 3 (b) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, should have filed a motion to lift the
order declaring them in default.

Lastly, anent the fourth challenged order (November 21, 2012 order) which rescheduled the
ex parte presentation of evidence of HGC, originally, the reception of evidence was set to take place

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on December 9, 2012. However, since that date fell on a Sunday, the presiding judge, through the last
challenged trial court order, rescheduled the same to Friday, December 14, 2012.

Aside from their bare allegations, the Carniyans miserably failed to show any circumstance
indicative of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Villordon. Without such a showing, the
Court is left with no alternative other than to uphold the CA's denial of their petition for Certiorari.

194
 FLUOR DANIEL, INC. PHILIPPINES v. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC.
G.R. NO. 212895, 27 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, A., JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Under the Rules of Court currently in force, a petition for certiorari must be filed not later than
60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution complained of. If a motion for reconsideration
or new trial was timely filed, the petition must be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the denial
of the motion. Under the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC in 2000, motions for extension
of time to file petitions for certiorari were allowed for compelling reasons only.

FACTS
On April 26, 2000, the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) issued a Notice
of Award in CIAC Case No. 42-98, which was captioned "Fluor Daniel, Inc. - Phils. , Claimant, versus Fil-
Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI), Respondent. " Attached to the Notice of Award was a Decision ordering
FEPI to pay FDIP the amount of P13,579,599.57, plus interest.
The matter was then raised before the appellate courts. The CIAC decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals (CA) and by the Supreme Court (SC), and said judgment attained formality.
Perforce, the CIAC issued a writ of execution. FEPI offered real properties as satisfaction for the
judgment debt, but FDIP refused. After further investigation, FDIP discovered that FEPI owned shares
of stock in another corporation, Fil-Estate Industrial Park, Inc. (FEIP). The existence of these shares
was relayed to the sheriff, and they were garnished. Later, the shares were auctioned and awarded
to FDIP as the highest bidder. However, FDIP subsequently discovered that FELP had ceased
operations, thereby rendering its shares worthless. FDIP, thus, decided not to pay the sheriff's
commission, and as such, the corresponding certificate of sale was not executed. Deeming the award
unsatisfied, FDIP filed with the CIAC a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution, which the CIAC
denied. The CIAC issued a Declaration reiterating the denial of FDIP's motion for an alias writ of
execution. Nevertheless, on February 10, 2014, FDIP filed its Motion for Additional Time to File
Petition for Certiorari with the CA, requesting for an additional period of 15 days, or until February
25, 2014, within which to file a petition for certiorari. FDIP filed its petition for certiorari dated
February 19, 2014.
The CA ruled that there was no showing of exceptional and meritorious circumstances that
would enable the appellate court to exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time to file a
petition for certiorari. The CA also noted that there was no showing that FDIP filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CIAC's Order and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. As a result, the CA simply considered FDIP's petition for certiorari as noted.
FDIP filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Thus, the instant petition.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in denying FDIP’s Motion for Additional Time to File Petition for Certiorari?

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RULING
YES. Under the Rules of Court currently in force, a petition for certiorari must be filed not
later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution complained of. If a motion for
reconsideration or new trial was timely filed, the petition must be filed not later than 60 days from
notice of the denial of the motion. Under the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC in 2000,
motions for extension of time to file petitions for certiorari were allowed for compelling reasons only.
It was held in Yutingco v. Court of Appeals that “it is a familiar and fundamental rule that a motion for
extension of time to file a pleading is best left to the sound discretion of the court and an extension
will not be allowed except for good and sufficient reason and only if the motion is filed before the
expiration of the time sought to be extended.” This has been the prevailing rule ever since, even after
the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in 2007.
Following this rule, the Court has relaxed the 60-day requirement in the following instances:
when the assailed decision was contradictory to the evidence presented; in a motion for
consolidation of several criminal cases, when the relief sought would be more in keeping with law
and equity, and to facilitate a speedy trial, considering that there was substantial identity in the
informations filed and the witnesses to be presented; where paramount public interest necessitated
that the dispute involving the operation of a major power plant be resolved on the merits; where the
case involved the expropriation of private property to build a major highway and no undue prejudice
or delay will be caused to either party in admitting the petition; and when the appellate court had
already granted an extension but later reversed itself.
The foregoing questions involve mixed issues of fact and law which are best litigated by the
CA. The fact remains that up to now, FDIP has not collected a single centavo of the 13 million-peso
award that was rendered in its favor almost 20 years ago. On the other hand, FEPI has been
successfully evading its legal obligation for almost 20 years by the simple expedient of a denial of a
motion for additional time to file a petition for certiorari. There is no showing that FEPI will be
prejudiced or unjustly deprived of any benefit if FDIP's motion is granted. To settle the matter once
and for all, substantial justice dictates that the issues raised by the parties before this Court be
litigated in the proper forum — the CA.

196
 CAPT. JOMAR B. DAQUIOAG v.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND HADJI SALAM M. ALABAIN
G.R. No. 228509, 14 October 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Carandang, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Petitions for review on Certiorari should be limited to questions of law, except: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; and (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
In this case, the CA and the OMB-MOLEO should have appreciated the detailed statements of Lt
Col. Teodoro and 2Lt. Eribal which established that Capt. Daquioag did not commit the act subject of
the charge against him.

FACTS
Hadja Alabain, farm worker Francisco, his nephew Alviar, his son Palces, and others were on
their way home from the farm of Hadja Alabain's husband, Hadji Alabain, when they saw patrolling
Philippine Marine soldiers led by Capt. Jomar Daquioag (Capt. Daquioag). Francisco threw away the
shotgun he was holding, raised his hands, and shouted "civilian" but the soldiers still fired upon them.
As a result, Alviar died while Palces sustained a minor injury.
Hadji Alabain and Hadja Alabain filed a complaint against Capt. Daquioag before the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR). The CHR issued a Resolution recommending that the case be
forwarded to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Office
(OMB-MOLEO) for the filing of appropriate criminal and administrative charges against Capt.
Daquioag and his co-respondents.
The OMB-MOLEO found Capt. Daquioag guilty of grave misconduct and imposed upon him
the penalty of dismissal from the service. The OMB-MOLEO ruled that there was substantial evidence
against Capt. Daquioag since he was positively identified by Hadja Alabain as the leader of the group
who shot them and it was not shown that Hadja Alabain had ill-motive or bad faith against him.
Even though Master Sergeant Tomas, Technical Sergeant (TSgt.) Victa, TSgt. Abalos, and
Private First Class Baloca affirmed the Captain’s claim that he was at their camp when the incident
took place, the OMB-MOLEO was not convinced that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
place of the incident since the camp is also in the same place. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
ruling of OMB-MOLEO.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in upholding the finding of grave misconduct against Capt. Daquioag?

RULING

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 YES. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides
that "[f]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive." As such, the Court generally accords great respect and even finality to the findings of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitions for review on Certiorari should be limited to questions of law except: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; and (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
In this case, the CA and the OMB-MOLEO relied on the statement of Hadja Alabain. According
to the CA and the OMB-MOLEO, substantial evidence or relevant evidence, which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, was satisfactorily presented in this case.
However, a perusal of Hadja Alabain's affidavit reveals that she did not state when she saw
Capt. Daquioag or how she was able to identify him. She said that more or less 100 armed men located
around 20 feet away fired upon them. She did not aver that Capt. Daquioag was one of these men.
None of her companions corroborated her statement that Capt. Daquioag commanded the soldiers
who attacked them. Hadji Alabain, who was not present when the incident occurred, was the only
one who said in his affidavit that Capt. Daquioag led the soldiers during the incident. Considering this,
the CA and the OMB-MOLEO unduly gave weight to Hadja Alabain's identification of Capt. Daquioag.
Capt. Daquioag's explanation that as the Civil Military Officer (CMO) of Marine Battalion
Landing Team 7 (MBLT-7), he was prohibited from engaging in armed combat and, as such, he did
not participate in the armed conflict, was more credible.
The CA and the OMB-MOLEO should have appreciated the detailed statements of Lt Col.
Teodoro and 2Lt. Eribal which established that Capt. Daquioag did not commit the act subject of the
charge against him.

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 DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE-REVENUE INTEGREITY PROTECTION SERVICE (DOF-RIPS) v.
EDITA CRUZ YAMBAO and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. Nos. 220632 and 220634, 06 November 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Special civil actions for certiorari do not correct errors of fact or law that do not constitute grave
abuse of discretion. Thus, as a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the exercise of the Office
of the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining the existence of probable cause when there is no showing
that it acted in an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner.”
In its assailed Joint Resolution, the Office of the Ombudsman carefully considered the evidence
presented, and its conclusions were based on the case records. DOF-RIPS has, thus, failed to show any
basis for this Court to find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Yambao.
FACTS
The Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service (DOF-RIPS) is mandated to
conduct lifestyle checks, investigate graft and corruption allegation, and, when warranted, to file
corresponding complaints against officials and employees of Department of Finance and its attached
agencies.
Pursuant to this, the affiants to the Complaint conducted an investigation on Edita Cruz
Yambao’s lifestyle, assets, and properties acquired during her tenure at the Bureau of Customs. Based
on a comparative analysis of her Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth and her expenditure,
they claimed to have discovered the following: (1) Yambao did not file her Statement of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net Worth in 2000 and 2003; (2) she amassed wealth that was grossly
disproportionate to her income; and (3) over the years, she had made false, misleading, and
incomplete statements in her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth.
DOF-RIPS filed a Joint Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Yambao. It accused her of falsification of public documents and perjury in violation of Republic Act
No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and
violation of Republic Act No. 1379.
In a Joint Resolution, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against Yambao on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Further, it found that the DOF-RIPS did not substantiate its
allegation that Yambao had unexplained wealth. The charge rested on the allegation that Yambao was
the only breadwinner in her family, but the Office of the Ombudsman did not find sufficient evidence
to establish this claim.
The DOF-RIPS filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Office of the Ombudsman denied.
Thus, petitioner DOF-RIPS filed this Petition.
DOF-RIPS insist that The Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion by
disregarding jurisprudential parameters in determining probable cause. It argues that The Office of
the Ombudsman disregarded the evidence that established a prima facie presumption of ill-gotten
wealth, which Yambao was not able to overturn.

ISSUE

199
 Did the Office of the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in determining that no
probable cause exits to charge Yambao with any of the offenses charged?
RULING
NO. Special civil actions for certiorari do not correct errors of fact or law that do not constitute
grave abuse of discretion. Thus, as a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the exercise of
the Office of the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining the existence of probable cause when there
is no showing that it acted in an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner.”
In its assailed Joint Resolution, the Office of the Ombudsman carefully considered the
evidence presented, and its conclusions were based on the case records.
On the claim that Yambao did not file her 2000 and 2003 Statements of Assets, Liabilities and
Net Worth, the Office of the Ombudsman did not give credence to DOF-RIPS evidence: the October 1,
2010 Certification issued by Human Resource Management Division of the Bureau of Customs. The
Office of the Ombudsman noted that although the Human Resource Management Division receives or
collates the statements of Bureau of Customs employees, it is not the repository of these statements.
On the charge Yambao falsified her Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, the Office
of the Ombudsman found that her disclosures in her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth
appeared substantially true or compliant with the law, and found insufficient proof of any deliberate
intent to falsify.
DOF-RIPS claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
disregarding a Bureau of Permits Certification it presented, which showed that Arnold L. Cruz
Customs Brokerage has not operated since 2006. It insists that this Certification establishes that
Yambao’s husband had no income to contribute to the family.
The Office of the Ombudsman found that such certification, without any other evidence, was
insufficient to establish that Yamboa’s husband was unemployed and had no income. This is not grave
abuse of discretion.
The Office of the Ombudsman further noted that petitioner did not show which of Yambao’s
acquisitions, investments and expenses were extravagant or lavish. It observed that the increase in
Yambao’s wealth was gradual, its percentage increase minimal and commensurate to Yambao’s and
her husband’s annual income.
DOF-RIPS has, thus, failed to show any basis for this Court to find grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Yambao.

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 HADATUTAWAHIG (RODERICK D. SUMATRA), TRIBAL CHIEFTAIN, HIGAONON TRIBE,
Petitioner, -versus-THE HONORABLE CEBU CITY PROSECUTOR I LINE TH LAPINID, CEBU CITY
PROSECUTOR II FERNANDO GUBALANE, ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR ERNESTO NARIDO,
JR., CEBU CITY PROSECUTOR NICOLAS SELLON, AND THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT BRANCH 12, CEBU CITY ESTELA ALMA SINGCO
G.R. No. 221139, THIRD DIVISION, LEONEN, J.
The Philippine legal system's framework for the protection of indigenous peoples was never intended
and will not operate to deprive courts of jurisdiction over criminal offenses. Individuals belonging to
indigenous cultural communities who are charged with criminal offenses cannot invoke Republic Act
No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, to evade prosecution and liability under courts
of law.
FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Mandamus 1 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by
petitioner Sumatra, also known as Ha DatuTawahig, praying that respondentJudge Singcoand her co-
respondents, all public prosecutors from Cebu City, be compelled to honor a January 3, 2007
Resolution issued by a body known as the "Dadantulan Tribal Court," and be required to put an end
to Sumatra's criminal prosecution. The Dadantulan Tribal Court absolved Sumatra, a tribal leader of
the Higaonon Tribe, of liability for charges of rape and discharged him from criminal, civil, and
administrative liability.
Relying on the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and "other related laws concerning cases involving
indigenous peoples," petitioner maintains that a writ of mandamus must be issued to compel
respondents to "uphold and respect" the Dadantulan Tribal Court Resolution, and "[t]hereby
releas[e] [Sumatra] from jail to stop [his] continued arbitrary detention."
ISSUE: Whether or not this Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondents Judge Estela
Alma Singco, City Prosecutor II Fernando Gubalane, City Prosecutor I LinethLapinid, City Prosecutor
Nicolas Sellon, and Assistant City Prosecutor Ernesto Narido, Jr. to desist from proceeding with the
rape case against petitioner Roderick D. Sumatra. (NO)
RULING:
I. Petitioner is well-served to disabuse himself of the notion that the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act will shield him from prosecution and prospective liability for crimes.
It does not escape this Court's attention that an equally effective avenue for relief was available to
petitioner through recourse to the Court of Appeals. This Court, however, takes cognizance of the
Petition, in the interest of addressing the novel issue of whether the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act
works to remove from courts of law jurisdiction over criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It
does not.
II. Rule 65, Section 3 indicates that a writ of mandamus is available in two (2) alternative
situations:
A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations: first, "when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station"; second, "when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person . . . unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled. "

201
Petitioner asserts that, in light of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, it was respondents' duty to
desist from proceeding with the case against him. His plea for relief, therefore, falls under the first
situation.
For a writ of mandamus to be issued in such a situation, there must be a concurrence between: (1) a
clear, duly established legal right pertaining to petitioner; and (2) a correlative, ministerial duty
imposed by law upon respondent, which that respondent unlawfully neglects.
III. Petitioner anchors his plea on Section 65 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, which reads:
SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. -When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary
laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.
xxx
With the 1987 Constitution in effect, the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act was adopted precisely
recognizing that indigenous peoples have been "resistan[t] to political, social[,] and cultural inroads
of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, [and] became historically differentiated from
the majority of Filipinos.
Among the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's provisions on self-governance and empowerment is
Section 15: Section 15 limits indigenous peoples' "right to use their own commonly accepted justice
systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other
customary laws and practices[.]" It explicitly states that this right is applicable only "within their
respective communities" and only for as long as it is "compatible with the national legal system
and with internationally recognized human rights." xxx
Section 65 ought not be read as an all-encompassing, unqualified authorization. Rather, it must be
viewed within the confines of how it is acomponent of a larger mechanism for self-governance.
Section 65 is qualified by Section 15. xxx
xxx The1987 Constitution qualifies the State's duty of "recogniz[ing] and promot[ing] the rights of
indigenous cultural communities"as necessarily operating "within the framework of national unity
and development.” This reference to "national unity" is as much an articulation of an ideal as it is a
legal formulation. Thus, it entails the imperative of legal harmony. Customary laws and practices
are valid and viable only to the extent that they do not undermine the proper scope and
application of legislative enactments, including criminal statutes
IV. The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not compel courts of law to desist from taking
cognizance of criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It expresses no correlative rights
and duties in support of petitioner's cause. Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued. A crime is "an
offense against society."It "is a breach of the security and peace of the people at large. x xx
It was never the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's intent to facilitate such miscan-iage of justice. xxx
Viewed through the lens of the requisites for issuing a writ of mandamus, there is no right or
duty to even speak of here. Nowhere in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does it state that
courts of law are to abandon jurisdiction over criminal proceedings in favor of mechanisms
applying customary laws.
Petitioner derives no right from the Dadantulan Tribal Court to be spared from criminal liability. The
Regional Trial Court is under no obligation to defer to the exculpatory pronouncements made by the

202
Dadantulan Tribal Court. Instead, it must proceed to rule on petitioner's alleged liability with all
prudence and erudition.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division), MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS, MARILOU D. BARE, ROSARIO S. NUÑEZ and LALAINE N.
PAULE ,Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 219824-25, EN BANC, February 12, 2019, REYES, JR., J.
Thus, the proper remedy from the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dismissing the criminal cases is an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 and not under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The availability of appeal, it
being speedy and adequate, proscribes a certiorari petition under Rule 65.
Subject to certain exceptions, the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is cause for dismissal of the petition
following the basic rule that certiorari, being an independent action, is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
None of the allowable exceptions are present in the instant case, thus, the general rule must be applied.
FACTS:
Due to their alleged involvement in the “pork barrel scam”, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
filed a complaint against then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula (Jaraula) and several other public
officers, which included Mario L. Relampagos (Relampagos) as then Undersecretary for Operations,
Rosario S. Nuñez (Nuñez), Lalaine N. Paule (Paule) and Marilou D. Bare (Bare) (collectively,
Relampagos, et al.), assigned to the Office of the Undersecretary for Operations, all of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM), for malversation of public funds, direct bribery, corruption of
public officials and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (b), (e), (g) and (j), and Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019.
The Ombudsman found probable cause against therein respondents, including Relampagos, et al.
Respondents Relampagos, et al., filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration, which was however
denied. Consequently, three Information for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 were filed
before the Sandiganbayan and were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-15- CRM-0016, SB-15-CRM-
0017 and SB-15-CRM-0018. As well, three Information for malversation of public funds were filed
before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan found probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against all the
accused. Meanwhile, Relampagos, et al., jointly filed an omnibus motion for judicial redetermination
of probable cause and to defer arraignment, which was granted and the criminal cases against them
were dismissed. Hence the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether the Petition for Certiorari is the proper remedy. (NO)
RULING:
Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7975 provides that
decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Court by a petition for
review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This is in harmony with the procedural rule that the provisions of Rules 42, 44, 45, 46 and 48 to 56
relating to the procedure in original and appealed civil cases shall also be applied to criminal cases.
Thus, the proper remedy from the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dismissing the criminal cases is an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 and not under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The availability of
appeal, it being speedy and adequate, proscribes a certiorari petition under Rule 65.
Subject to certain exceptions, the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is cause for dismissal of the
petition following the basic rule that certiorari, being an independent action, is not a substitute for a

204
lost appeal. None of the allowable exceptions are present in the instant case, thus, the general rule
must be applied.

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NIEVES TURGO JADER and HEIRS OF ALFREDO TURGO: ZENAIDA TURGO BASCO and LUCIA R.
TURGO, represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact, CARLITO JADER, Petitioners, -versus -
HEIRS OF EVELYN. TURGO ALLONES: NICASIO ALLONES and MICHAELTURGO ALLONES,
Repondents.
G.R. No. 209014, SECOND DIVISION, March 27, 2019, Reyes, J. Jr., J.

Certiorari is an extraordinary prerogative writ that is never demandable as a matter of right. It is meant
to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not errors-of judgment committed in the exercise of the
discretion of a tribunal or an officer. To warrant the issuance thereof, the abuse of discretion must have
been so gross or grave, as when there was such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power was done in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. The abuse must have been committed in a manner
so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Here, petitioners failed to show specific instances that the RTC gravely or grossly abused its discretion
or acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing the May 24, 2013 Order. On the contrary, the RTC's order
was clear, concise, and substantiated by law, jurisprudence, and facts on record. The May 24, 2013 Order
was consistent with the earlier RTC orders and resolution. The RTC dismissed the complaint due to lack
of jurisdiction. The RTC sufficiently explained that the real issue of the case is ownership of two-thirds
portion of the land, and the assessed value of which is jurisdictional to this case. The Court found
petitioners' claim of grave abuse of discretion to be unsupported by evidence other than their bare
allegations.

FACTS:

On October 23, 1924, Mariano Turgo died intestate, leaving behind six children namely: Nicolas,
Filemon, Alfredo, Abreo, Trinidad, and Juan. On September 30, 1960, the Turgo siblings executed a
Kasulatan ng Pagbabahaging Labas sa Hukuman ng Ari-ariang Naiwan ng Namatay na Mariano Turgo
(Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the Late Mariano Turgo ), in which they agreed to
partition among themselves a land measuring 1,125 square meters and originally covered by Tax
Declaration 3276.

In 1963, Tax Declaration No. 3276 was split into two: Tax Declaration Nos. 9795 and 9796, covering
563 square meters each. Tax Declaration No. 9796 was divided among Nicolas, Filemon, and Alfredo.
The subject matter of this case pertains to the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9796, since the
children of Nicolas, Filemon and Alfredo are the party litigants in this case.

Through the years, the tax declaration underwent several cancellations and replacements. One time,
the land was covered by Tax Declaration No. 14-001-0188-R, which indicated that the land was
reduced to 373 square meters due to road widening.

In 1985, Nicolas executed a Relinquishment of Rights in favor of her daughter, Evelyn. Later, Evelyn
filed an application for free patent and was granted Free Patent No. IV-8-2187. Consequently, she
was issued Original Certificate of Title P-9980 (OCT P-9980).

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Upon learning this, petitioner Nieves Turgo J ader (Nieves) filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim before
the Quezon Register of Deeds, claiming part ownership of the land as she is the daughter of Filemon,
one of the co-owners of the land.

In 1993, Nieves, through her son and attorney-in-fact, Carlito Jader (Carlito), occupied and built a
house on a portion of the land with Evelyn's consent as she recognized Nieves' right of ownership.

In 1999, Evelyn's husband, Nicasio, evicted Carlito and rented out the house for P1,500.00 monthly.
Nieves tried to reach out to Evelyn but to no avail, until Evelyn died on August 3, 2006.

Since Nicasio refused to hand over a portion of the land due to Nieves, the latter was forced to file an
action for partition of property with damages and claimed litigation costs and attorney's fees
estimated at P200,000.00, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Infanta, Quezon, Branch 65 and
docketed as Civil Case No. 785-I.

After the parties exchanged their pleadings, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment under Rule
35 of the Rules of Court. On April 14, 2011, the RTC issued an Order treating the motion as judgment
on the pleadings under Rule 34, instead. The RTC denied the motion because there is a genuine issue
to be litigated, that is, who between Mariano and Romana Lucero-Turgo (Romana) is the real owner
of the land measuring 1, 125 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 3276.

The RTC further resolved that the issue affects title or ownership over the land. Section 19 (2) of BP
129, as amended by RA 7691, states that exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions involving
title to or possession of real property or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property located outside Metro Manila exceeds P20,000, is conferred upon the RTC.

Considering that the 2003 Tax Declaration No. 02-14-001-0064-R indicates that the land's assessed
value is P13,055.00, the RTC ruled that the case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
first level court pursuant to Sec. 33 (3) of BP 129, as amended by RA 7691. Thus, the RTC dismissed
the complaint.

Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal, which the RTC dismissed in its April 22, 2013 Order.

Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its May 24, 2013 Order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the May 24, 2013 Order. (NO)

RULING:

The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the petition shall be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, x x x as
provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

Last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 states that failure of the petitioner to comply any of the
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

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Here, petitioners specifically stated in their Reply that the primary subject for review x x x is the order
of the Court a quo of May 24, 2013 denying the Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated April 22, 2013 denying their Notice of Appeal. Petitioners failed to attach a certified true copy of
the May 24, 2013 RTC Order in their Petition. What petitioners attached is a mere photocopy of the
order. Non-compliance with the requirement of the Rules is already a ground for the dismissal of the
petition. However, the Court will further discuss substantial grounds for its dismissal.

Certiorari is an extraordinary prerogative writ that is never demandable as a matter of right. It is

meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not errors-of judgment committed in the exercise of
the discretion of a tribunal or an officer. To warrant the issuance thereof, the abuse of discretion must
have been so gross or grave, as when there was such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power was done in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. The abuse must have been committed
in a manner so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Here, petitioners failed to show specific instances that the RTC gravely or grossly abused its
discretion or acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing the May 24, 2013 Order. On the contrary,
the RTC's order was clear, concise, and substantiated by law, jurisprudence, and facts on record. The
May 24, 2013 Order was consistent with the earlier RTC orders and resolution. The RTC dismissed
the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction. The RTC sufficiently explained that the real issue of the case
is ownership of two-thirds portion of the land, and the assessed value of which is jurisdictional to
this case. The Court finds petitioners' claim of grave abuse of discretion to be unsupported by
evidence other than their bare allegations.

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 3. Exceptions to filing of motion for reconsideration before filing petition

F. Quo warranto (Rule 66)

G. Expropriation
1. Rule 67
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS v. SPOUSES MARCELINO BUNSAY and NENITA BUNSAY
G.R. No. 205473, 10 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct
from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public
use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying
on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property.

The expropriation covered the entire Disputed Property, that is, the entire 100-square meter lot
covered by Spouses Bunsay’s TCT No. V-16548. Hence, there is no basis for an award of consequential
damages where there is no “remaining portion” to speak of, as in this case.

FACTS

Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) is the Republic of the Philippines’
(Republic) engineering and construction arm tasked to undertake public works in accordance with
national development objectives. Among DPWH’s projects is the C-5 Northern Link Road Project
Phase 2 (Segment 9) connecting the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) to McArthur Highway,
Valenzuela City (the Project).

In connection with the implementation of the Project, DPWH filed with Regional Trial Court
(RTC) a Complaint for Expropriation with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession
(Expropriation Complaint) against Spouses Marcelino and Nenita Bunsay (Spouses Bunsay)
regarding the lot in Valenzuela City (Disputed Property) issued in their name.

In the hearing scheduled by the RTC on the issuance of writ of possession prayed for, DPWH
deposited checks representing the sum of the Disputed Property’s zonal value and replacement cost.
The RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of DPWH in its Order.

Later still, the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective nominees for determination
of just compensation. However, DPWH manifested in open court that while all notices sent to Spouses
Bunsay were returned unserved, they already claimed the checks that DPWH deposited with the RTC.
Thus, DPWH moved that the amount received by Spouses Bunsay be deemed as just compensation.

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 The RTC’s award of just compensation represented the sum of replacement cost of the
improvements built on the Disputed Property. DPWH filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
(MPR), praying that the award corresponding to the replacement cost of improvements, and
equivalent value of capital gains tax (CGT) and other transfer taxes be deleted.

The RTC resolved to exclude the replacement cost of improvements from the total award. The
RTC did not order DPWH to pay the CGT and other transfer taxes. What was ordered of DPWH is to
pay the consequential damages constituting the value of CGT and other transfer taxes.

Aggrieved, DPWH filed the present Petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Did the RTC err in awarding consequential damages equivalent to the value of CGT and
transfer taxes in favor of Spouses Binay?

RULING

YES. Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs expropriation proceedings. With respect to
consequential damages, Section 6 of Rule 67 states:

Section 6. Proceedings by commissioners. — Before entering upon the performance

of their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will
faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court
with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party
before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before
them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after
due notice to the parties, to attend, view and examine the property sought to be
expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either
party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess
the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner
from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its
franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the
corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential
benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be
deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.

From the foregoing, it becomes clear that the award of consequential damages representing
the value of CGT and other transfer taxes in favor of Spouses Bunsay was improper.

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 The expropriation covered the entire Disputed Property, that is, the entire 100-square meter
lot covered by Spouses Bunsay’s TCT No. V-16548. Hence, there is no basis for an award of
consequential damages where there is no “remaining portion” to speak of, as in this case.

In any event, even if there was a “property not taken” or “remaining portion” to speak of, the
award of consequential damages constituting the value of CGT and transfer taxes would still be
improper, in the absence of evidence showing that said remaining portion had been impaired or had
suffered a decrease in value as a result of the expropriation

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 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BALDOZA
G.R. No. 221571, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (J.C. Reyes, JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 12 of Rule 67 of the Rules categorically identifies that the "plaintiff" is the party
responsible for the payment of the commissioners' fees as part of the costs of the proceedings. Clearly,
the "plaintiff" in this case is not the Republic, but the landowner who refuses to accept the property's
valuation by the DAR. Be that as it may, the Rules shall govern, considering its suppletory application to
all proceedings before the SAC.

FACTS

Baldoza et al. offered that their lots be placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Such offer was duly accepted by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Pursuant to the voluntary offer for sale (VOS) by respondents, DAR acquired the
aforementioned lots.

On the bases of the valuations made by the Land Bank, DAR offered to buy the subject lots.
However, Baldoza et al. refused to accept the offer as they maintained that the initial valuation was
way below the fair, reasonable, and just compensation of the lots. Thus, they elevated the
determination of just compensation of the subject lots before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)
of the Province of Negros Oriental.

Ruling against the respondents, the DARAB affirmed the valuation of the petitioner. The
Regional Trial Court, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC) sought the aid of the
Commissioners. It found that both Land Bank and Baldoza et al. pay the commissioners’ fees. The
Court of the Appeals (CA) granted the petition and affirmed the previous order of the DARAB. It also
ordered both parties to pay for the commissioners' fees.

ISSUE

Is Landbank, an entity performing a governmental function, liable to pay commissioners' fees

in an agrarian expropriation proceeding?

RULING

NO. In eminent domain proceedings under the Rules, the appointment of commissioners is
mandatory. However, in agrarian expropriation proceedings under R.A. No. 6657 as in this case, the
appointment of commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of any
of the parties. In both cases, these fees are considered as part of the costs of the proceedings.

Unlike in the Rules, R.A. No. 6657 does not categorically identify the party responsible for the
payment of commissioners' fees. However, this gap was supplied by Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 which
states that the Rules shall apply suppletorily in agrarian reform proceedings, including the exercise
of the State of its eminent domain power. Relevantly, Section 12 of Rule 67 of the Rules categorically

212
identifies that the "plaintiff" is the party responsible for the payment of the commissioners' fees as
part of the costs of the proceedings.

Clearly, the "plaintiff" in this case is not the Republic, but the landowner who refuses to accept
the property's valuation by the DAR.
Be that as it may, the Rules shall govern, considering its suppletory application to all
proceedings before the SAC.

Thus, Baldoza et al. in this case shall pay the costs of commissioners' fees as they are the
parties who led a case for the determination of just compensation after being discontented with the
initial valuation of the DARAB.

Nonetheless, in view of the nature of commissioners' fees as part of the costs of suit, Land
Bank is exempt from paying the same. Since Land Bank is performing a governmental function in
agrarian reform proceeding it is exempt from the payment of costs of suit as provided under Rule
142, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

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 2. Guidelines for expropriation proceedings of National Government
Infrastructure Projects (Sec. 4, RA 8974)
H. Foreclosure of real estate mortgage
1. Judicial foreclosure (Rule 68)
2. Extrajudicial foreclosure (Act 3135, as amended)
SPOUSES SALVADOR BATOLINIO AND AMOR BATOLINIO v.
SHERIFF JANET YAP ROSAS AND PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK
G.R. No. 206598, 04 September 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure becomes the absolute owner of the subject property
in case no redemption is made within one year from the registration of the certificate of sale. As absolute
owner, the purchaser is entitled to all the rights of ownership, including the right to possess the property
In this case, the Spouses Batolinio sold the subject property to Miñoza through a deed of absolute
sale and relinquished their title over it in favor of the latter. This also means that from the time they sold
the subject property, petitioners no longer had any right over it and cannot be considered as third
parties with an adverse interest from the judgment debtor. Since such sale was an absolute one, it was
without any reservation of ownership
FACTS
Nicefort Miñoza obtained a loan from Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) in the amount of 5.7
million. As security thereof, Miñoza executed a real estate mortgage (REM) over a parcel of land
registered under her name. However, Miñoza failed to pay the loan, thus, the PSB instituted an
extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM and emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction such
that the certificate of sale was eventually issued in its favor and registered with the Registry of Deeds.
PSB added that it demanded from Miñoza and all those persons claiming rights under her to vacate
the subject property, but to no avail.
Hence, PSB filed a writ of possession with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was granted.
Meanwhile, Spouses Batolinio filed an Omibus motion with prayer for the issuance of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction. They claimed that they were the owners of the subject property.
The Spouses Batolinio claimed that in 2003, they mortgaged the said property to Union Bank.
However, the spouses eventually decided to sell it to Miñoza for P2.435 million. Allegedly, the
aforesaid sale was subject to these conditions: (1) Miñoza would secure financing from one Velez and
Maria Elena Simbulan, who, in turn, would pay petitioners' balance with Union Bank; (2) Miñoza
would then secure a loan from PSB for P5.5 Million using the same property as collateral; and (3)
upon approval of the loan, private respondent would release the proceeds to petitioners.
Spouses Batolinio added that they were third persons claiming rights adverse to Miñoza;
thus, they could not be deprived of the possession of the subject property without being heard of
their claim first.
ISSUE
Did the lower court correctly issue the writ of possession?

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RULING
YES. A successful buyer of a foreclosed property bought at a public auction sale is authorized
to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period upon filing of the corresponding bond;
and after the expiration of the redemption period without any need of a bond.
It bears stressing that a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure becomes the absolute owner
of the subject property in case no redemption is made within one year from the registration of the
certificate of sale. As absolute owner, the purchaser is entitled to all the rights of ownership, including
the right to possess the property. It, thus, follows that upon proper application and evidence of
ownership, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court except where
a third party is holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor. In the latter case, the issuance
of a writ of possession is no longer ministerial and may not be done ex parte and sharing for the
purpose of determining entitlement to possession must be held. Let it be stressed that by third party
holding the property by adverse title or right, the Court refers to one who is in possession of the
disputed property in his or her own right, such as a co-owner, a tenant or a usufructuary.
In this case, the Spouses Batolinio sold the subject property to Miñoza through a deed of
absolute sale and relinquished their title over it in favor of the latter. This also means that from the
time they sold the subject property, petitioners no longer had any right over it and cannot be
considered as third parties with an adverse interest from the judgment debtor. Since such sale was
an absolute one, it was without any reservation of ownership
Under these circumstances, the right of private respondent to the possession of the subject
property was fully established. As the buyer in the foreclosure sale and to which the title to the
property was already issued, private respondent’s right over it is absolute, which the court must
facilitate into delivering. In this regard, there being sufficient factual and legal bases in issuing the
writ of possession in favor of private respondent.

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 3. The General Banking Law of 2000 (Sec. 47, RA 8791)
I. Partition (Rule 69)
VICTORIA T. FAJARDO, Petitioner, -versus- BELEN CUA-MALATE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 213666, SECOND DIVISION, March 27, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

The fact that petitioner Victoria failed to sign the written document bearing the terms of the parties'
agreement is of no moment. As explicitly held in V da. de Reyes v. Court of Appeals, an oral partition
may be valid and binding upon the heirs; there is no law that requires partition among heirs to
be in writing to be valid.

Citing Hernandez v. Andal, the Court in the above-mentioned case explained that under Rule 74, Section
1 of the Rules of Court, "there is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or
other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is
valid." The Court further added that the partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some
of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property because it does not involve transfer of property from
one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir
renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance. Hence, an oral partition
is not covered by the Statute of Frauds.

FACTS:

On December 1, 2003, respondent Belen filed an Amended Complaint for Partition and Accounting
with Damages (Amended Complaint) against her siblings, namely petitioner Victoria, Ramon T. Cua,
Adelaida T. Cua, Emelita T. Cua, and Elena T. Cua. The Complaint was filed before the RTC of
Calabanga, Camarines Sur, Branch 63. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. RTC 03-
173.

In the Amended Complaint respondent Belen alleged that she and the defendant siblings are
compulsory heirs of their late mother, Ceferina Toregosa Cua. Ceferina died intestate on June 10,
1998 and had left certain real and personal properties, as well as interest in real properties.
Respondent Belen further alleged that she did not receive her lawful share from Ceferina's estate.

On April 6, 2004, defendant siblings filed their Answer, alleging that they were willing to settle the
partition case amicably; that respondent Belen was receiving her share from the income of the
properties left by their late mother, Ceferina; and that it was respondent Belen who intentionally
refused to show documents pertaining to the supposed properties left by Ceferina.

Meanwhile, on August 14, 2004, petitioner Victoria filed an Answer alleging that she is in favor of
the partition and accounting of the properties of Ceferina.

Pre-trial was conducted and terminated on January 25, 2007. Thereafter, respondent Belen was
presented as a witness. But after her direct examination, and before the conduct of the cross-
examination, the parties agreed to refer the case to mediation. Hence, the RTC issued an Order of
Referral dated October 22, 2008, referring the case to mediation through the Philippine Mediation
Center. During the mediation conferences, all the parties attended and successfully arrived at an
agreement on the manner of partition of Ceferina's estate. Thus, an Order dated November 5, 2009
was issued requiring respondent Belen's counsel to draft a written compromise agreement. A

216
meeting was then scheduled on April 8, 2010 for the signing of the document entitled Compromise
Agreement, which reduced into writing the prior agreement reached by the parties during the
mediation conferences.

On said date, petitioner Victoria did not appear, while all her other siblings appeared. It was
subsequently explained by petitioner Victoria's counsel that petitioner Victoria was not able to
attend the meeting as she did not have enough money to travel from Manila to Calabanga, Camarines
Sur. Respondent Belen and the other siblings proceeded to sign the Compromise Agreement and
submitted the same before the RTC for approval.

On July 1, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision approving the Compromise Agreement. Feeling
aggrieved, petitioner Victoria appealed the RTC's Decision before the CA. Petitioner Victoria alleged
that the Compromise Agreement cannot be binding as to her considering that she did not sign it and
supposedly did not consent to its execution.

The CA denied petitioner Victoria’s appeal holding that "[t]he RTC did not err when it approved the
Compromise Agreement."

Petitioner filed a motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:

Whether the RTC erred in rendering its Decision dated July 1, 2010 based on the compromise
agreement entered into by the parties during the mediation conferences before the PMC. (NO)

RULING:

The Court finds the instant petition unmeritorious.

In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the Court does not pass upon questions of fact as the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts are binding on the Court. The Court is not a trier of facts.
Hence, to disprove the factual findings of the RTC and CA that there was already a valid and binding
agreement that was entered into by the parties during the mediation conferences before the PMC, it
was incumbent on the part of petitioner Victoria to provide clear and convincing evidence to
substantiate her claim that she never reached an agreement with her siblings as to the partition of
their late mother's estate during the mediation conferences.

The fact that petitioner Victoria failed to sign the written document bearing the terms of the parties'
agreement is of no moment. As explicitly held in V da. de Reyes v. Court of Appeals, an oral partition
may be valid and binding upon the heirs; there is no law that requires partition among heirs
to be in writing to be valid.

Citing Hernandez v. Andal, the Court in the above-mentioned case explained that under Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "there is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a
writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral
partition is valid." The Court further added that the partition among heirs or renunciation of an
inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property because it does not involve
transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of

217
property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.
Hence, an oral partition is not covered by the Statute of Frauds.

Therefore, even if the document titled Compromise Agreement was not signed by petitioner Victoria,
there was already an oral partition entered into by the parties that bound all of the siblings. The
written agreement only served to reduce into writing for the convenience of the parties the terms of
the agreement already entered into during the mediation conferences.

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 J. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer
SPOUSES BELINDA LIU v. MARCELINA ESPINOSA, et al.
GR No. 238513, 31 July 2019, EN BANC (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

An action for unlawful detainer will stand if the following requisites are present:
(a) Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
(d) Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In this case, it is clear upon the records that Spouses Liu are the registered owners of the subject
property and that the occupation by Espinosa, et al. of the property was only by mere tolerance.
Subsequently, this occupation became illegal when Espinosa, et al. refused to heed Spouses Liu’s demand
to vacate, the last of which was dated February 12, 2013. It is evidently clear that the complaint for
unlawful detainer, filed on August 6, 2013, was made within one year from the time the last formal
demand to vacate was made.

FACTS
Spouses Belinda and Hsu Pin Liu (Spouses Liu) were the registered owners of a parcel of land
in Davao City. The presence of Marcelina Espinosa et al. were merely tolerated by the Spouses Liu
and their predecessors-in-interest with the understanding that they would vacate the land once
needed.

Later, the spouses Liu demanded that Espinosa, et al. vacate the property. The demands were
left unheeded, thus, a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer was filed by the Spouses Liu in the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC).

In their defense, Espinosa, et al. argue that the occupation of land was in good faith and that
the title issued to plaintiffs was null and void due to the fact that the title was issued before the land
was declared as alienable and disposable.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ruled in favor of Spouses Liu. Espinosa, et al. thus
filed an Appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), where they asserted that: (1) the MTCC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the action because it failed to take into consideration that the defendants
were in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, and not by tolerance of the plaintiffs nor
of their predecessors-in-interest.

Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the Spouses Liu, stating that the allegations of
Espinosa, et al. were bereft of legal basis and could not be proven with evidence. The Court of Appeals
(CA) reversed the decision and ruled in favor of Espinosa, et al. hence, this petition for review on
Certiorari.

219
ISSUE
Should the action for unlawful detainer be sustained?

RULING
YES. Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property
filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land or building
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of
any contract, express or implied.

Thus, an action for unlawful detainer will stand if the following requisites are present:
(a) Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(d) Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In this case, it is clear upon the records that Spouses Liu are the registered owners of the
subject property and that the occupation by Espinosa, et al. of the property was only by mere
tolerance. Subsequently, this occupation became illegal when Espinosa, et al. refused to heed Spouses
Liu’s demand to vacate, the last of which was dated February 12, 2013. It is evidently clear that the
complaint for unlawful detainer, filed on August 6, 2013, was made within one year from the time the
last formal demand to vacate was made.

Thus, the Court finds that the appellate Court gravely erred when it reversed the findings of
the RTC. Spouses Liu clearly possess superior rights being the registered owners of the land in
question.

220
 CHANSUYCO v. SPOUSES LOPE and JOCELYN PALTEP
G.R. No. 208733-34, 19 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully
withholds its possession after the termination of his right of possession under any contract, express or
implied.
In this case, the complaint failed to allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does not
describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which
became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of such lawful possession. The Court ruled that
possession could not have been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent much
less was it based on any contract, express or implied.

FACTS
Claire Anne Chansuyco, Ronald Allan Chansuyco and Abraham Chansuyco II (collectively,
Chansyco) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents Spouses Lope and Jocelyn
Paltep.
The Chansuyco alleged that their father Abraham Chansuyco acquired a 138 square meters
residential lot at Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City. When their father died, Abrahama left Chansuyco
and their mother Elvira as heirs. Subsequently, Chansuyco discovered that their mother Elvira sold
the subject property to respondents Spouses Lope and Jocelyn Paltep. Chansuyco claimed that the
subject property was their family home. Chansuyco demanded the return of the property but
respondents refused to do so. To save their family home, Chansuyco bought 52 square meters of the
property from respondents. They averred that the property was part of their parents’ conjugal
property and that Elvira sold it prior to liquidation of the conjugal property allegedly in violation of
Article 130 of the Family Code. Since the property was also their family home, the sale was made
without their consent as provided in Article 158 and 159 of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the respondents refused to vacate the property and claimed that they
acquired the property from Elvira through a Deed of Sale. When the Chansuyco questioned the sale,
respondents voluntarily relinquished the 52 square meters in favor of the petitioners.
The complaint was initially filed at the barangay but the parties failed to settle amicably. The
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ordered respondents to vacate the property. The sale was in
violation of Article 130, Article 158, and Article 159 of the Family Code. On appeal, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) ruled that Elvira's conveyance or sale of the property is a tacit form of liquidation of both
the conjugal partnership and the estate of Abraham Chansuyco. The deed of sale was valid only up to
the extent of Elvira's share. The RTC also held that petitioners were able to establish the jurisdictional
elements of unlawful detainer on the share pertaining to the siblings. Upon appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Did the complaint sufficiently allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer?

221
RULING
NO. The complaint did not sufficiently allege a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer
is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds its possession
after the termination of his right of possession under any contract, express or implied. The
defendant's possession in unlawful detainer was originally legal but became illegal due to
termination of the right to possess.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it indicates the
following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the
defendant of the termination of the right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one
year from the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment. Accordingly, these aforesaid jurisdictional facts must be alleged in the
complaint itself for unlawful detainer. Failure to do so divests the first level court of jurisdiction over
the case.
In this case, one jurisdictional allegation is conspicuously lacking, i.e., defendants' possession
of the property was initially lawful or legal; or defendants' possession of the property was by mere
tolerance. The complaint for unlawful detainer below should have been dismissed outright in view
of its jurisdictional infirmity. Specifically, it lacks the jurisdictional allegation pertaining to
respondents' initially legal or tolerated possession of the property. Consequently, the MeTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case, let alone, the authority to dispose of it on the merits.

222
 ESSICA LIO MARTINEZ v. HEIRS OF REMBERTO F. LIM
G.R. No. 239903, 11 September 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, CJ.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Court reiterate that a boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily through the action for
forcible entry covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant
is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant
had the prior possession de facto.

If Martinez had possession of the disputed areas by virtue of the same being covered by the metes
and bounds stated and defined in her Torrens titles, then she might not be validly dispossessed thereof
through the action for forcible entry. The dispute should be properly threshed out only through accion
reivindicatoria. Accordingly, the MCTC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and resolving
the dispute as one for forcible entry.

FACTS

Remberto Lim, during his lifetime, owned, possessed and cultivated a parcel of land located
in Sitio Banga, Barangay VI, Coron, Palawan. Adjoining Remberto's land is the land of his brother, Jose
Lim.

Jose sold his land to a certain Dorothy and Alexander Medalla who, thereafter, subdivided the
same into two (2) smaller lots, designated as Lots 1 and 2. Lot 2 was further subdivided into nine (9)
smaller lots, this time designated as Lots 2-A to 2-I, inclusive. Lots 2-D, 2-E and 2-F were thereafter
sold to herein Martinez.

Subsequently, Martinez and her father entered into the property and uprooted some of the
acacia mangium trees that were previously planted thereon by the late Remberto Lim and his son,
Alan Lim. To further delineate their claimed property, Martinez fenced the same and placed signs
thereon that read "NO TRESPASSING" and "NOTICE THIS PROPERTY IS OWNED BY THE MARTINEZ
FAMILY."

Now then, claiming that Martinez had unlawfully encroached into a portion of their property,
the heirs of Remberto sent a demand letter to Martinez demanding that she immediately remove the
fence that she built on their land as well as to turn over peaceful possession of that portion of
property that Martinez intruded into. Unfortunately, the demand was ignored, and heirs were
constrained to file the instant complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against Martinez before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Coron-Busuanga
(MCTC).

The MCTC ordered Martinez, among others, to vacate and turn over peaceful possession of
the disputed portion of property.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed in toto the disposition of the MCTC.
Martinez then filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof, but to no avail. The Martinez timely filed
an appeal.

223
 The Court of Appeals (CA) denied the Petition for Review. The CA opined that in ejectment
cases, the better right of possession was primarily associated with the party who could prove prior
physical possession of the property in dispute; that the Heirs had the better right of possession over
the disputed portion on account of priority in time considering the documents submitted as evidence.
Martinez moved for reconsideration but her motion to that effect was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

Is the remedy of forcible entry under Rule 70 proper to resolve the controversy?

RULING

NO. The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of
the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or only some
of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be
made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, otherwise,
the matter of jurisdiction will become almost entirely dependent upon the defendant. If the nature of
the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint determines the jurisdiction of
the court, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be ascertained.
Verily, the body of the complaint, not its title, fixes the nature of an action.

A proper reading of the allegations of the complaint shows that the case revolved around the
actual metes and bounds of the parties' respective properties. The complaint was anchored on the
theory that the properties registered in three certificates of title issued in the name of Martinez had
erroneously included portions of the property covered by the tax declaration issued in the name of
the Remberto's predecessor in interest. In contrast, Martinez hinged her right on the indefeasibility
of her Torrens titles, and relied on the technical descriptions of the boundaries of her properties.

The dispute did not primarily concern merely possessory rights, but related to boundaries,
and could not be summarily determined. Nonetheless, the MCTC rendered its ruling based on its
deduction that "a part of the property being claimed by the Heirs of Socorro Lim had been included
in the lots that were titled in the name of the defendant."

The foregoing ruling was plain error. What the MCTC should have quickly seen was that the
dispute did not concern mere possession of the area in litis but the supposed encroachment by
Martinez on the portion of the heirs. In other words, the question focused on whether the property
being claimed and occupied by Martinez had really been part of her registered properties, or of the
heirs' property. The proper resolution of such dispute in favor of the heirs could be had only after a
hearing in which the trial court was enabled through preponderant proof showing that, indeed, the
disputed area was not within the metes and bounds appearing and stated in the TCTs of Martinez.

The Court reiterate that a boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily through the action
for forcible entry covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and
the defendant had the prior possession de facto. If Martinez had possession of the disputed areas by
virtue of the same being covered by the metes and bounds stated and defined in her Torrens titles,
then she might not be validly dispossessed thereof through the action for forcible entry. The dispute

224
should be properly threshed out only through accion reivindicatoria. Accordingly, the MCTC acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and resolving the dispute as one for forcible entry.

Given the foregoing, the CA committed reversible error in affirming the judgments of the
lower courts, and in ordering the summary ejectment of Martinez from the disputed area.

Considering that the remedy availed of by the respondents as the plaintiffs was improper, the
Court need not discuss and settle the other issues raised by the petitioner.

225
 RHEMA INTERNATIONAL LIVELIHOOD FOUNDATION, INC., ET AL., v.
HIBIX, INC., represented by its Board of Directors, YOSHIMITSU TAGUCHE, et al.
G.R. Nos. 225353-54, 28 August 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Carandang, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

The elements of forcible entry are: (1) prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful
deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth.
For forcible entry to prosper, an appreciable length of time of prior physical possession is not
required. However short it is, for as long as prior physical possession is established, recovery of
possession under Rule 70 of the Rules may be granted.
In this case, it was shown that Hibix enjoyed possession of the property until 25 June 2008, when
Rhema wrestled possession of the property from Hibix. However, Hibix did not file a case for forcible
entry against Rhema. It was proven that on 29 August 2008, Hibix, aided by the NBI and without any
court order, retook possession of the property. Hence, Rhema had prior physical possession of the
property from June 25, 2008 to August 29, 2008.
FACTS
A complaint for forcible entry was filed by Rhema International Livelihood Foundation, Inc.
(Rhema) against Hibix, Inc. (Hibix) and its Board of Directors.
Rhema averred that it previously enjoyed juridical and physical possession of the property
for years when suddenly, on 29 August 2008, Hibix, together with armed men claiming to be
members of the special action unit of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), forcibly evicted
Rhema's personnel.
Meanwhile, Hibix alleged that it had been in possession of the property until 25 June 2008,
when a certain Romeo Prado (Prado), introducing himself as a special sheriff, together with four
policemen, six security guards, and a certain Julian Go, claiming to be the owner of the property
accompanied by two armed security guards, took over the possession of the property through force,
violence, and intimidation.
Hibix lodged a complaint with the NBI relative to the unlawful and forcible take-over of the
property. On 29 August 2008, Hibix and the NBI took possession of the property.
The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Hibix to have
forcibly entered the property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decisions of the RTC and the MeTC.
ISSUE
Are the elements of forcible entry present in this case?
RULING
YES. The elements of forcible entry are: (1) prior physical possession of the property; and (2)
unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth.

226
 Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physical possession or
possession de facto; not legal possession. For forcible entry to prosper, an appreciable length of time
of prior physical possession is not required. However short it is, for as long as prior physical
possession is established, recovery of possession under Rule 70 of the Rules may be granted.
In this case, it was shown that Hibix enjoyed possession of the property when Rhema
wrestled possession of the property from Hibix. However, Hibix did not file a case for forcible entry
against Rhema. It was proven that subsequently, Hibix, aided by the NBI and without any court order,
retook possession of the property. Hence, Rhema had prior physical possession of the property from
June 25, 2008 to August 29, 2008.
Undeniably, it was Rhema who first used violence in order to deprive Hibix possession over
the property. The remedy, which the latter should have resorted to, is to file a case for forcible entry
against Rhema. Instead, Hibix went to the NBI to lodge a complaint and sought their aid to wrestle
possession back from Rhema. This is tantamount to putting the law into one's hands, which is the evil
sought to be avoided by the special civil action of forcible entry.

227
LEONORA RIVERA-AVANTE, Petitioner, -versus- MILAGROS RIVERA AND THEIR HEIRS WITH
THE LATE ALEJANDRO RIVERA, and ALL OTHER PERSONS WHO ARE DERIVING CLAIM OR
RIGHTS FROM THEM, Respondents.
G.R. No. 224137, THIRD DIVISION, May 17, 2019, Peralta, J.

The established rule as enunciated by this Court in Racaza v. Gozum is that subsequent demands
that are merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year
period within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period will still be reckoned
from the date of the original demand.

Thus, on the basis of this settled rule, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled that the letter of
September 3, 2007, which is a mere reiteration of the original demand, will not operate to renew the
one-year period within which petitioner should file her unlawful detainer case because the said period
will still be counted from the date of the original demand which was made on May 22, 2006. Hence, on
the basis of the foregoing discussions, the instant petition should be dismissed.

FACTS:

Petitioner is the registered owner of a house and lot located at 1404 Leroy St., Paco, Manila.
Respondent Milagros Rivera is her sister-in-law, being the wife of her deceased brother, Alejandro.
Petitioner claims that she and her husband allowed respondents to stay in the disputed premises out
of compassion for respondent and in consideration of her deceased brother Alejandro. However, in
2005, petitioner and her husband, finding the need to utilize the subject property and in view of their
plan to distribute the same to their children,· demanded that respondents vacate the premises in
question. However, respondents refused the demand of petitioner and her husband, and even filed a
case questioning petitioner's ownership of the said property contending that they are, in fact, co-
owners of the subject property and that petitioner obtained title over the disputed lot through fraud,
deceit and falsification. On May 22, 2006, petitioner sent a formal demand letter to respondents
asking them to vacate the disputed premises, but this remained unheeded. On September 3, 2007,
petitioner sent respondents another letter asking them to leave the subject property and to pay
reasonable rent from the date of receipt of the said letter until they have fully vacated the questioned
premises, but to no avail. Hence, petitioner filed an unlawful detainer case with the MeTC of Manila.

MeTC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner. The RTC Decision set aside the judgment
of the MeTC and dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by petitioner on the ground that the
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed beyond the one-year reglementary period required by the
Rules of Court, thus, his remedy should have been an accion publiciana which should be filed with
the RTC. CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s action for unlawful detainer was timely filed. (NO)

RULING:

An action for unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real roperty from one
who unlawfully withholds possession after the expir ion or termination of his right to hold possession

228
under any contract, expre s or implied. The possession of the defendant in an unlawful detainer case
s originally legal but becomes illegal due to the expiration or termi ation of the right to possess.

A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if the following allegations are present:

1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with cf by tolerance of

the plaintiff;
2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to def~ndant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and depriV]ed the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
4. within one year from the last demand on defondant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Moreover, the sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim 1of ownership by any of the parties.12
When the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall
be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

The established rule as enunciated by this Court in Racaza v. Gozum is that subsequent
demands that are merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew
the one-year period within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period will
still be reckoned from the date of the original demand.

Thus, on the basis of this settled rule, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled that the letter of
September 3, 2007, which is a mere reiteration of the original demand, will not operate to renew the
one-year period within which petitioner should file her unlawful detainer case because the said
period will still be counted from the date of the original demand which was made on May 22, 2006.
Hence, on the basis of the foregoing discussions, the instant petition should be dismissed.

229
 SPOUSES EDILBERTO & EVELINE POZON; EDILBERTO POZON, deceased, substituted by his
heirs, namely, wife EVELINE POZON and daughters GERALDINE MICHELLE POZON and
ANGELICA EMILIA POZON, Petitioners, -versus- DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 210607, SECOND DIVISION, March 25, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.
1. The Court held that an action for specific performance praying for the execution of an instrument in
connection with an undertaking in a contract to sell, which is precisely similar to the Specific
Performance Case invoked by petitioners Sps. Pozon in the instant case, is an action in personam. And
being a judgment in personam, the judgment is binding ONLY upon the parties properly impleaded
therein.
2. It is an elementary rule that since the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case is physical or
material possession, where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may
pass upon that issue only for the purposes of determining who between the parties has the better right
to possess the property. Where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession,
adjudication of ownership is not final and binding, but merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession.
FACTS:
Diana Jeanne Lopez (Lopez) filed a petition for quieting of title and damages before the RTC of Makati
against petitioners Sps. Pozon, Tradex Realty Development Corporation (Tradex), Estate of Oscar
Beltran, the Register of Deeds of Makati (RD), George Raymundo (Raymundo), ZosimoCuasay
(Cuasay), Cesar Diomampo (Diomampo), and Liserio Evangelista (Evangelista). The petition sought
to declare void the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 151522 issued to [Tradex], covering a parcel
of land with improvement located at 2149 Paraiso St., Dasmariñas Village, Makati City (subject
property). In a Supplemental Complaint, respondent Lopez also sought the declaration of nullity of
TCT No. 212133 subsequently issued in the name of [petitioners Sps. Pozon.
It was alleged that Lopez bought the property but she discovered that the title of the subject property
was in the name of Tradex and was never transferred in her name. She also learned that Raymundo
was brokering the sale of the subject property to petitioners Sps. Pozon on behalf of Tradex.
Respondent Lopez claimed that she told Raymundo and petitioners Sps. Pozon that she owned the
subject property and it was not for sale. Lopez also refused them entry into the subject property for
inspection. Despite Lopez's warning, Tradex, sold the subject property to petitioners Sps. Pozon.
Nonetheless, Tradex could not deliver possession of the subject property, as respondent Lopez was
still in possession of the subject property, prompting the petitioners Sps. Pozon to file an action for
Specific Performance with Damages but respondent was not pleaded as a party thereto.
The petitioner spouses filed their answer contending that Lopez's cause of action had already
prescribed as the latter, despite knowledge of the pendency of the Specific Performance case, did not
intervene to defend her right of ownership over the subject property. Moreover, the second case
invoked by petitioners Sps. Pozon is a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent Lopez, which
ruled in favor of the petitioner spouses.
The RTC rendered a decision declaring respondent as the lawful owner of the property and such was
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the judgments in the Specific performance case and the Ejectment case are conclusive as to
the issue of ownership over the subject property. (NO)

230
RULING:
In a Decision, RTC, Branch 147 issued its Decision granting petitioners Sps. Pozon's prayer for specific
performance, declaring the sale over the subject property made by Tradex to J.H. Pajara Construction
Corporation null and void, as well as ordering Tradex to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of
petitioners Sps. Pozon.
At the outset, a perusal of the RTC, Branch 147's Decision reveals that the issue of ownership was not
discussed and resolved; the right of ownership over the subject property was not at all an issue
in the Specific Performance Case.
We have held in an unbroken string of cases that an action for specific performance is an action in
personam. In Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction and Development Corporation, we ruled that an
action for specific performance praying for the execution of a deed of sale in connection with an
undertaking in a contract, such as the contract to sell, in this instance, is an action in personam.
The Court held that an action for specific performance praying for the execution of an instrument in
connection with an undertaking in a contract to sell, which is precisely similar to the Specific
Performance Case invoked by petitioners Sps. Pozon in the instant case, is an action in personam.
And being a judgment in personam, the judgment is binding ONLY upon the parties properly
impleaded therein.
It is an elementary rule that since the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case is physical or
material possession, where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts
may pass upon that issue only for the purposes of determining who between the parties has the
better right to possess the property. Where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of
possession, adjudication of ownership is not final and binding, but merely for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession.
In fact, ironically, in the same Decision by the Court in the Ejectment Case heavily invoked by
petitioners Sps. Pozon, and contrary to their assertion, the Court held that despite the resolution of
the Ejectment Case, respondent Lopez may thresh out the issue of ownership in the appropriate
proceeding, i.e., the Quieting of Title Case filed before the RTC, Branch 142.

231
 MA. ANTONETTE LOZANO, PETITIONER, V. JOCELYN K. FERNANDEZ RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 212979, SECOND DIVISION, February 18, 2019, J. REYES, JR., J.

In Reyes v. Heirs of DeograciasForlales the Court had expounded on the concept of tolerance in unlawful
detainer cases, to wit:

Professor Tolentino defines and characterizes "tolerance" in the following manner:

“. . . acts merely tolerated are those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those
particular services or benefits which one's property can give to another without material injury or
prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy. They are acts of little
disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do
on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well.
And even though this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription. “

In the present case, Fernandez's alleged tolerance was premised on the fact that she did not do anything
after the Waiver was executed. However, her inaction is insufficient to establish tolerance as it indicates
negligence, rather than tolerance, on her part. As above-mentioned, inaction should not be confused
with tolerance as the latter transcends silence and connotes permission to possess the property subject
of an unlawful detainer case. Thus, even assuming the Waiver was valid and binding, its execution and
Fernandez's subsequent failure to assert her possessory rights do not warrant the conclusion that she
tolerated Lozano's continued possession of the property in question, absent any other act signifying
consent.

FACTS:
The present controversy revolves around a parcel of land and its improvements in CM Subdivision,
New Cabalan, Olongapo City currently declared for taxation purposes under the name of respondent
Jocelyn K. Fernandez (Fernandez).
Respondent's position
On December 11, 2006, petitioner Ma. Antonette Lozano (Lozano) executed a Waiver and Transfer
of Possessory Rights (Waiver) over the subject property in favor of Fernandez. After the execution of
the document, Fernandez continued to tolerate Lozano's possession over the property. On July 15,
2009, she sent a demand letter to Lozano ordering her to vacate the premises. Because Lozano failed
to leave the property, Fernandez was constrained to file an action for unlawful detainer against her
before the MTCC
Petitioner's position
Since 1996, Lozano had owned and possessed the subject property. She never recalled signing any
Waiver in Fernandez's favor. Lozano explained that Fernandez duped her into signing a blank
document, which was later converted to a Waiver. She denied having appeared before a notary public
to notarize the said document. Lozano claimed that the real contract between her and Fernandez was
a loan with mortgage as evidenced by the fact that she remained in possession of the property even
after the execution of the said Waiver and that she had issued checks in payment of the loan.
The MTCC dismissed Fernandez's complaint for unlawful detainer. It explained that Fernandez only
filed the present case for ejectment three years after she gained possessory rights over the property.
It added that Fernandez failed to prove that she tolerated Lozano's possession over the property.
The RTC granted Fernandez's appeal. It explained that after the execution of the Waiver on December
11, 2006, Lozano's possession over the property was merely tolerated by Fernandez. The CA affirmed

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the RTC Decision. The CA agreed that there was tolerance when after the execution of the Waiver,
Fernandez allowed Lozano to continue possessing the land.

ISSUE:
Whether tolerance in contemplation of the law on ejectment was proven. (NO)

RULING:
Tolerance is more than mere passivity
In an action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the acts of tolerance must be proved. Bare
allegations of tolerance are insufficient and there must be acts indicative of tolerance.In Reyes v.
Heirs of DeograciasForlales the Court had expounded on the concept of tolerance in unlawful
detainer cases, to wit:
Professor Tolentino defines and characterizes "tolerance" in the following manner:
“. . . acts merely tolerated are those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those
particular services or benefits which one's property can give to another without material injury or
prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy. They are acts of little
disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to
do on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from
a well. And even though this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription. “
There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of
knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of
tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are realized
or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission.
In other words, for there to be tolerance, complainants in an unlawful detainer must prove that they
had consented to the possession over the property through positive acts. After all, tolerance signifies
permission and not merely silence or inaction as silence or inaction is negligence and not tolerance.
In the present case, Fernandez's alleged tolerance was premised on the fact that she did not do
anything after the Waiver was executed. However, her inaction is insufficient to establish tolerance
as it indicates negligence, rather than tolerance, on her part. As above-mentioned, inaction should
not be confused with tolerance as the latter transcends silence and connotes permission to possess
the property subject of an unlawful detainer case. Thus, even assuming the Waiver was valid and
binding, its execution and Fernandez's subsequent failure to assert her possessory rights do not
warrant the conclusion that she tolerated Lozano's continued possession of the property in question,
absent any other act signifying consent.
In addition, contrary to the appreciation of the CA, the affidavitsof Fernandez and Gascon do not
prove that the former tolerated Lozano's possession of the property. A close perusal of the averments
in their affidavits reveals that they merely concluded that Lozano's possession was by mere
tolerance. The affidavits were bereft of any statement describing positive acts of Fernandez
manifesting tolerance or permission. The CA erred in giving weight to these affidavits as they do not
contain specific averments of tolerance and merely stated unfounded conclusions.
Again, Fernandez cannot simply claim that she had tolerated Lozano's possession because she did
not do anything after the execution of the Waiver as silence does not equate to tolerance or
permission. In short, the execution of the Waiver alone is not tantamount to the tolerance
contemplated in unlawful detainer cases. The absence of an overt act indicative of tolerance or
permission on the part of the plaintiff is fatal for a case for unlawful detainer.

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 1. Differentiated from accionpubliciana and accionreivindicatoria
2. Rule 70
K. Contempt (Rule 71)
HUBERT JEFFREY WEBB v. NBI DIRECTOR MAGTANGGOL GATDULA, et. al.
G.R. No. 194469, 18 September 2019, THIRD DIVISION, (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Civil contempt is one’s failure to fulfill a court order in a civil action that would benefit the opposing
party. It is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made. Good
faith is not a defense in civil contempt proceedings.
Here, respondents were charged with indirect contempt on two (2) grounds under the Rules of
Court: (1) “disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court”;
and (2) “improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice.

FACTS
This Court resolves a Petition for Indirect Contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The
case was filed against officers of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which are the
respondents in this case.
This Petition is an offshoot of the rape-homicide case of Lejano v. People. In that case, Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb (Webb), among others, was charged with the crime of rape with homicide for
allegedly raping Carmela Vizconde (Carmela), then killing her, her mother, and her sister in 1991—
the events of which had been infamously called the Vizconde Massacre.
While the criminal case was pending before the trial court, Webb filed a Motion to Direct the
NBI to Submit Semen Specimen to DNA Analysis. As he claims in his Petition, the DNA testing would
establish his innocence since the results would show that the semen found in Carmela did not belong
to him. When the Motion was denied, Webb filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial.
In a Resolution, this Court granted Webb’s request to order a testing on the semen specimen
found in Carmela’s cadaver, in view of the Rules on DNA Evidence. It ordered the NBI to assist the
parties in submitting the semen specimen to the University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute.
In its Compliance and Manifestation, the NBI claimed that the semen specimen was no longer
in custody. It alleged that the specimen had been submitted as evidence to the trial court. The trial
court denied this claim. The Branch Clerk of Court explained that what was marked in evidence were
photographs of the slides containing the vaginal smear, not the slides themselves.
However, Dr. Renato Bautista (Dr. Bautista) of the National Bureau of Investigation’s Medico-
Legal Division confirmed that the slides containing the specimen were still in the Bureau’s custody.
When required by this Court to explain the discrepancies, the NBI filed its Compliance. In its
Compliance, Dr. Prospero Cabanayan (Dr. Cabanayan) explained that he submitted the semen

234
specimen to the trial court during his direct and cross-examinations. Dr. Bautista, denying
responsibility, clarified that he issued the certification based on the information given to him by the
medical technologist of the Bureau’s Pathology Section.
Due to the missing semen specimen, Webb filed this Petition for Indirect Contempt. He prays
that the impleaded former and current NBI officers be cited for indirect contempt for impeding,
degrading, and obstructing the administration of justice and for disobeying the Resolution of the
Court.
In essence, petitioner claims that the National Bureau of Investigation made a false report to
this Court when it stated that it had submitted the specimen to the trial court. The testimony and
certification from respondents Dr. Cabanayan and Dr. Bautista, respectively, show that the Bureau,
not the trial court, had the last custody of the specimen.
In addition, petitioner asserts that the National Bureau of Investigation devised a deliberate
scheme to falsely inculpate him and his co-accused.
About two (2) weeks after the filing of this Petition for Indirect Contempt, this Court ruled on
Lejano, the criminal case. In finding that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, petitioner and his co-accused were acquitted of the crime charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Petition is rendered moot upon the
promulgation of Lejano. Since the non-production of the specimen is merely incidental to the
determination of petitioner’s innocence, his acquittal has rendered the issue moot as no useful
purpose can be served by its resolution. It emphasizes that in Lejano, this Court settled that the mere
loss of the specimen did not warrant petitioner’s acquittal. It argues that there is no violation of due
process because the State is not required to preserve the semen specimen unless there was bad faith
on the part of the prosecution or the police.
The OSG likewise avers that this Court’s Resolution ordering the DNA analysis of the
specimen was only to afford petitioner his constitutional right to due process and was not
indispensable in determining his guilt.
Assuming that the specimen was still with the NBI, the OSG claims that the legal presumption
of good faith and regularity in the performance of their official duties must prevail absent any
showing of malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. It maintains that there was no bad faith
on the part of respondents for the non-production of the specimen.
The OSG further contends that in Lejano, this Court settled that at the time the petitioner
requested the DNA analysis, rules governing DNA evidence did not yet exist. There is neither any
technology available in the country nor any precedent recognizing its admissibility as evidence. It
also questions petitioner’s failure to challenge the trial court’s denial of his request to have the DNA
analysis.
Respondents NBI Director Magtanggol Gatdula (Gatdula) and Atty. Reynaldo Esmeralda
(Esmeralda) also stressed that since this, the Court had already settled the issue of the loss of DNA
evidence, the nonproduction of the specimen is a non-issue. They argue that they never intended to
disrespect or defy the order of this Court.

ISSUES

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 (1) Is this action barred by the decision of the Court in Lejano?
(2) Are the respondents guilty of indirect contempt?

RULING
(1) NO. The principle of res judicata, a civil law principle, is not applicable in criminal cases,
as explained in Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman. As further held in People v. Escobar, while certain
provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Besides, even if the principle of res judicata were applied, this action is still not precluded by the
finality of the decision in the criminal case. Between Lejano and this contempt case, only the first
three (3) elements of res judicata are present: (1) the judgment in Lejano is final; (2) it was rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (3) it was a judgment on the merits. The last element is
absent: there is no identity of parties, issues, and cause of action in the two (2) cases.
Clearly, respondents in this contempt action are not parties in the criminal case. Moreover,
the issue and the cause of action here are different from the criminal case.
(2) YES. The facts here sufficiently prove that, indeed, there was willful disobedience.
Respondents should, therefore, be cited in contempt for disobedience of a lawful order of this Court.
Contempt proceedings are sui generis. They may be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions,
and independently of any action.
The power of contempt has a two-fold aspect, namely: “(1) the proper punishment of the guilty
party for his disrespect to the court or its order; and (2) to compel his performance of some act or
duty required of him by the court which he refuses to perform.” Due to this two-fold aspect, contempt
may be classified as civil or criminal.
Criminal contempt is a “conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or
a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect.” On the other hand, civil contempt is one’s failure to fulfill a court
order in a civil action that would benefit the opposing party. It is, therefore, an offense against the
party in whose behalf the violated order was made.
Since the order to have the DNA test was made for petitioner’s benefit, disobedience of or
resistance to the order is in the nature of civil contempt. Petitioner has shown that respondents acted
with gross negligence in safekeeping the specimen in their custody. The records show that
respondents, when repeatedly asked to produce the specimen, convinced the trial court that they
have the specimen in their custody.
Consequently, the National Bureau of Investigation also issued a certification that the sperm
specimen was still in its custody. In their attempt to evade responsibility, respondents later claimed
that it was the medical technologist who confirmed that the specimen was still in the Bureau’s care,
and they relied on this information in good faith. As discussed, good faith is not a defense in civil
contempt proceedings.
Corollary to its power of contempt, courts have the inherent power to impose a penalty that is
reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the offense. This penalty must be exercised on the
preservative and corrective principle, not for vindicatory or retaliatory purpose.

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 Under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, if a respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt committed against a regional trial court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he or she
may be punished by a fine not exceeding ₱30,000.00, or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months.
Thus, this Court finds it proper to mete out the penalty of ₱20,000.00 on respondents Gatdula,
Caabay, Mantaring, Dr. Bautista, Dr. Cabanayan, Atty. Arizala, and Atty. Esmeralda.

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 POLO PLANTATION AGRARIAN REFORM MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE (POPARMUCO),
REPRESENTED BY SILANDO GOMEZ AND ELIAS RAMOS, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO T. INSON,
CESO III, AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REGION
VII-CEBU CITY, respondent.
G.R. No. 189162. THIRD DIVISION. January 30, 2019. LEONEN, J

In Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Paruñgao, this Court explained the concept of contempt of
court:

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its

authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court's order,
but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law
into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be
considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of
the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the
Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so
that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden
or required.

Still, respondent'serroneous cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion can only be deemed
as grave abuse of discretion, which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, not a
petition for contempt. "No one who is called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process
of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."

At any rate, whether respondent's actions were improper is not an issue here. What is crucial in
contempt proceedings is the intent of the alleged contemnor to disobey or defy the court as held in St.
Louis University, Inc. v. Olairez:

In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack of
it, of the alleged contemnor is considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not
clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith,
is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held
to be determinative of its character. . . . To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully
and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.

FACTS:

Sometime in 2003, a 394.9020-hectare portion of the landholding owned by Polo Coconut Plantation,
Inc. in Negros Oriental was placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. A Notice of Coverage was sent to Polo Coconut President Espina.

After Polo Coconut failed to reply to the Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition, the Department of
Agrarian Reform conducted summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation.
Regional Adjudicator Arrieta affirmed the valuation offered by Land Bank of the Philippines.
Meanwhile, Polo Coconut's title was canceled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. A collective
Certificate of Land Ownership Award was issued. It was registered under TCT No. T-802 in favor of
POPARMUCO members whom the Department of Agrarian Reform identified as agrarian reform
beneficiaries.

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Polo Coconut filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari questioning the propriety of subjecting its
property to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. The CA ruled in favor of Polo Coconut. In
its September 3, 2008 Decision, the SC in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Polo Coconut Plantation
Company, Inc. reversed the CA’s Decision. It confirmed the acts of the Department of Agrarian
Reform and declared the issuance of TCT No. T-802 and CLOA No. 00114438 as valid. The
Decision became final and executory on November 26, 2008.

On June 30, 2009, 164 alleged regular farmworkers of Polo Coconut (Alcantara, et al.) filed a Petition
for Inclusion as qualified beneficiaries in TCT No. T-802/CLOA No. 00114438 and Exclusion of
those named as beneficiaries therein. They were allegedly not informed when the Department of
Agrarian Reform conducted the identification and screening process for potential beneficiaries. They
contend that the Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders were not qualified beneficiaries under
Section 22 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. On July 1, 2009, Alcantara, et al. also filed a
Petition for Immediate Issuance of a Cease and Desist Order and/or Injunction.

Acting on the Petition, Regional Director Inson issued a Cease and Desist Order dated July 7,
2009. Regional Director Inson also issued Special Order No. 070, series of 2009, creating an
independent body to conduct a revalidation of farmers-beneficiaries in the property.

POPARMUCO filed before this Court a Petition for Contempt against respondent Inson, raising that
respondent defied this Court's September 3, 2008 Decision, which ruled with finality on the
qualification of petitioner's members as beneficiaries in Polo Coconut's landholding covered under
TCT No. T-802/CLOA No. 00114438.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Regional Director Inson's cognizance of the Petition for
Inclusion/Exclusion of farmer beneficiaries constitute defiance of this Court's September 3, 2008
Decision. (NO)

RULING:

In Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Paruñgao, this Court explained the concept of contempt of
court:

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its

authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court's
order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration
of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or
prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for
disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be
done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty
as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.

The court's contempt power should be exercised with restraint and for a preservative, and not
vindictive, purpose. "Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be

239
exercised."

Here, respondent justified his cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion based on the
Department's exclusive prerogative in the identification, selection, and subsequent re-evaluation of
agrarian reform beneficiaries. However, the issue on the qualification of the existing Certificate of
Land Ownership Award holders had long been laid to rest in this Court's final and executory
September 3, 2008 Decision. Some of the petitioners in the inclusion/exclusion proceedings were
even respondents in that case.

Still, respondent'serroneous cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion can only be

deemed as grave abuse of discretion, which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari,
not a petition for contempt. "No one who is called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."

At any rate, whether respondent's actions were improper is not an issue here. What is crucial in
contempt proceedings is the intent of the alleged contemnor to disobey or defy the court as held in
St. Louis University, Inc. v. Olairez:

In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack
of it, of the alleged contemnor is considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or
does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in
good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some
instances, held to be determinative of its character. . . . To constitute contempt, the act must
be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.

All told, this Court finds no clear and contumacious conduct on the part of respondent. His acts do
not qualify as a willful disobedience to this Court nor a willful disregard of its authority.

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VI. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
JACQUES A. DUPASQUIER and CARLOS S. RUFINO et al. v.
ASCENDAS (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION
G.R. No. 211044, 24 July 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Jardeleza, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It must be remembered that arbitration is a matter of contract and the parties cannot be obliged
to submit any dispute to arbitration, in the absence of their consent to submit thereto. The parties may
lay their rights and liabilities in relation to the parties' resort to arbitration in the contract. As any other
agreements, the parties have freedom to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
orderand public policy. The parties may, therefore, agree as to the submission of the disputes to
arbitration, the forum of arbitration, the subject of arbitration and the termination of their arbitration
agreement.

The MOU itself provides that its "Closing Date" shall be two calendar weeks after the signing of
the MOA, but not later than March 31, 2007. Since no MOA was signed by the parties, the MOU lapsed
on March 31, 2007 by operation of the provisions of the MOU. Reading Clause 14(e) of the MOU in
relation to definition of "Closing Date" therein, the MOU's provisions, including the Arbitration Clause,
shall be of no effect as of March 31, 2007. This is the manifest intent of the contracting parties.

FACTS

Jacques A. Dupasquier and Carlos S. Rufino, for themselves and on behalf of The Net Group et
al. (The Net Group) and Ascendas (Philippines) Corporation (Ascendas) entered into a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU), agreeing to the Ascendas' acquisition of the entire issued and outstanding
shares of stock of the Net Corporations.

The parties also agreed that the details of the contractual framework of their transaction will
be contained in the Definitive Agreements to be executed by the parties subsequent to the signing of
the MOU. The MOA is defined as the Memorandum of Agreement to be signed by the parties on or
before March 15, 2007, or such other date as may be subsequently agreed upon by the parties in
writing, and which, when signed, will supersede the MOU.

The MOU provided an Arbitration clause which states that in case of any dispute arising out
of or in connection with this MOU, the parties agreed to negotiate in good faith, failing which the said
dispute shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration.

Likewise in Clause 14 of the MOU, the parties stipulated that the MOU shall take effect upon
the signing thereof and shall continue to have force and effect unless earlier terminated or until this
is superseded by the execution of the Definitive Agreements. Upon the termination or lapse of this
MOU, the MOU shall cease to have any force and effect except for Clause 14(e) [Confidentiality], which
shall survive and remain effective and enforceable.

By March 31, 2007, the parties were not able to execute a MOA and Definitive Agreements.
The Net Group informed Ascendas that they deemed the MOU as lapsed, but manifested their
willingness to continue negotiations on purely voluntary and non-exclusive basis. On the other hand,

241
Ascendas informed The Net Group of its position that the MOU did not expire. Later, Ascendas wrote
another letter to resolve the disputes between them, otherwise, Ascendas will refer the dispute to
arbitration.

The Net Group filed a petition for declaratory relief with an application for preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order (TRO), alleging that Ascendas’ demand to arbitrate is
baseless. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the prayer for TRO. The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled
that RTC cannot exercise jurisdiction over the dispute because the parties should have referred the
matter to arbitration, considering the separability doctrine wherein the Arbitration Clause remains
operative despite the termination of the contract.

ISSUE

Did the expiration of the MOU also terminate the effectivity of the subject Arbitration clause?

RULING

YES. It must be remembered that arbitration is a matter of contract and the parties cannot be
obliged to submit any dispute to arbitration, in the absence of their consent to submit thereto. The
parties may lay their rights and liabilities in relation to the parties' resort to arbitration in the
contract. As any other agreements, the parties have freedom to establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public orderand public policy. The parties may, therefore, agree as to the submission
of the disputes to arbitration, the forum of arbitration, the subject of arbitration and the termination
of their arbitration agreement.

The MOU itself provides that its "Closing Date" shall be two calendar weeks after the signing
of the MOA, but not later than March 31, 2007. Since no MOA was signed by the parties, the MOU
lapsed on March 31, 2007 by operation of the provisions of the MOU. Reading Clause 14(e) of the
MOU in relation to definition of "Closing Date" therein, the MOU's provisions, including the
Arbitration Clause, shall be of no effect as of March 31, 2007. This is the manifest intent of the
contracting parties.

Moreover, that the parties agreed to exempt the Confidentiality Clause in the effects of the
Closing Date is an indication of their intent. To the Court’s mind, this exception bolsters the manifest
intent of the parties to terminate the Arbitration Clause. The parties expressly specified the provision
of the contract that is not time-limited. Since the Arbitration Clause is not one mentioned as an item
to survive upon the termination or lapse of the MOU, the only conclusion is that said provision has
been deliberately included to be time-limited. If the parties intended the Arbitration Clause to
survive, there is no reason why they would not have so stated it expressly.
To reiterate, where a contract is clear and unambiguous as to the intent of the parties, it is
the court's obligation to enforce its wordings accordingly. Thus, the Arbitration Clause of the MOU
ceased to have an effect by March 31, 2007 and should not be considered a condition precedent prior
to the filing of an appropriate case before our courts.

242
 TONDO MEDICAL CENTER, represented by DR. MARIA ISABELITA M. ESTRELLA v. ROLANDO
RANTE, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF JADEROCK BUILDERS
G.R. No. 230645, 01 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, J. JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this
Court on appeal, except when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by
corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators
or of any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4)
one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under section nine of Republic Act No.
876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or
so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
to them was not made. TMC failed to show that any of these exceptions exist in the instant case.

FACTS

Tondo Medical Center (TMC), through its then Medical Center Chief II, Dr. Victor J. Dela Cruz,
entered into a Contract Agreement with Jaderock Builders, represented by Rolando Rante, for the
construction project (project) involving the renovation of its OB-Gyne wards. To secure the
performance of the project, Jaderock posted a performance bond.

TMC claims Jaderock incurred delays in the project. Dr. Acuesta granted Jaderock an
extension of up to June 27, 2014 to complete the project. On June 27, 2014, the project was still
unfinished.

Upon the assumption of Dr. Maria Isabelita M. Estrella (Dr. Estrella) as Medical Center Chief
II of TMC, she created the Contract Termination Review Committee (CTRC) to assist her in the
disposition of the case. On the basis of the recommendation made by the CTRC, Dr. Estrella rendered
a decision terminating the contract of Jaderock with TMC and forfeit its performance security.

Jaderock filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied and proceeded to file an appeal
with the Department of Health (DOH). The DOH informed Jaderock that it could not rule on the appeal
since it is Dr. Estrella who has direct supervision or administration over the implementation of the
subject contract.

Jaderock filed a Request for Arbitration with the CIAC for the resolution of his claim against
TMC. The CIAC through a three-member Arbitral Tribunal issued the Final Award wherein it upheld
the validity of TCM's termination of the contract, but ruled that Jaderock is still entitled to monetary
claims P12, 840,323.95.

Aggrieved by the findings of the CIAC, TMC filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA
affirmed the CIAC's Final Award. TMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, pending
resolution of the said Motion, the CIAC and the Jaderock proceeded to execute and garnish TMC's
public funds. TMC was constrained to file a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the

243
CA, questioning the said post-award proceedings. CA still denied TMC’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence the instant petition.

ISSUE

Was the CIAC’s act of granting monetary awards in favor of Jaderock proper despite the
alleged finding of Jaderock’s breach of Contract?

RULING

YES. "Executive Order No. 1008 entitled, 'Construction Industry Arbitration Law' created the
CIAC and vests upon it original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected
with, contracts entered into by the parties involved in construction in the Philippines. The CIAC has
a two-pronged purpose: (a) to provide a speedy and inexpensive method of settling disputes by
allowing the parties to avoid the formalities, delay, expense and aggravation which commonly
accompany ordinary litigation, especially litigation which goes through the entire hierarchy of courts;
and (b) to provide authoritative dispute resolution which emanates from its technical expertise.

Consistent with the foregoing purposes, the Court will not review the factual findings of an
arbitral tribunal upon the artful allegation that such body had "misapprehended facts" and will not
pass upon issues which are, at bottom, issues of fact, no matter how cleverly disguised they might be
as "legal questions."

However, such factual findings of construction arbitrators will not be insulated from judicial
review when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by corruption,
fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of
any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4)
one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under section nine of Republic Act No.
876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted to them was not made.

TMC failed to show that any of these exceptions exist in the instant case. While there were
indeed factual and legal bases for TMC to terminate the Contract Agreement, the CIAC did not say
that TMC was entirely faultless. A cursory reading of CIAC's Final Award would reveal its findings of
breach of contract on the part of TMC, thus: (a) TMC is guilty of sectional delivery of the project area
[as this] was deemed to have delayed the start of the construction and thus, Jaderock has the right to
demand contract time extension; (b) TMC is guilty of inaction as to Variation Orders. The CIAC
concluded that TMC was in bad faith when it required Jaderock to conduct additional works, giving a
promise of payment, allow performance of the additional works and later on disavowing all these
orders.

Owing to the CIAC's technical expertise on the matter, the CA cannot be faulted for deferring to
CIAC's factual findings of mutual breach of contract committed by both parties. Then again, settled
is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise on
specific matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded respect and finality, especially

244
when affirmed by the CA. As such, in this case, there is no reason to deviate from the factual findings
of the CIAC, which has acquired technical competence in resolving construction disputes.

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 A. Settlement of estate of deceased persons
1. Venue and process (Rule 73)
2. Summary settlement of estates (Rule 74)
3. Allowance or disallowance of wills (Rule 76)
4. Claims against the estate (Rule 86)
OSCAR LL. ARCINUE v. ALICE ILALO S. BAUN
G.R. No. 2111149, 28 November 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

An action for damages caused by tortious conduct survives the death of a party for it
falls under suits to recover damages for an injury to person of property, real or personal.

I njury to property is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other
wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished. To maliciously cause a party to incur
unnecessary expenses, as in this case, is certainly injury to that party's property.

FACTS
AMA Computer Learning Center (ACLC) granted Oscar Arcinue (Arcinue) a franchise
to operate a computer training school under ACLC's name in Dagupan City, Pangasinan.

Arcinue not only failed to commenced operation, but also sold his franchise to Alice
Halo Baun (Baun) without ACLC's prior approval.

ACLC thus directed Arcinue to send the corresponding documents for transfer of
franchise. S i n c e ACLC did not receive any response from Arcinue, ACLC terminated
Arcinue's franchise for his continuous failure to operate and for having assigned his
franchise to Baun without its prior approval.

Baun filed a complaint against Arcinue and ACLC for specific performance and
damages to enforce her rights as transferee of Arcinue’s franchise. During trial, Baun died. She
was survived by her siblings whom the trial court allowed to substitute as plaintiff in the
proceedings.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found that Arcinue's transfer of franchise to Baun
was never approved by ACLC. Baun, therefore, never had any right which she could have
enforced against ACLC. Arcinue, on the other hand, had acted in bad faith in his dealings with

246
ACLC and Baun. Not only did he fail to set-up the computer school as stipulated in the
franchise agreement with ACLC, he also profited from it by selling his franchise to Baun,
sans ACLC's prior approval. The trial court thus ruled that Arcinue's acts were in violation
of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code which warranted payment of damages.

Arcinue appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) but only impleaded Baun as defendant-
appellee, arguing that the case should have been dismissed when Baun died since an action for
specific performance and damages is a personal action which did not survive Baun’s death. CA
affirmed the RTC ruling, finding that the case was for "recovery of damages for an injury
to person or property" which survives even after a party's death.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming Arcinue’s liability for damages?

RULING
NO. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the following actions
which survive the death of a party, thus:

(1) recovery of real or personal property, or an interest from the estate;

(2) enforcement of liens on the estate; and
(3) recovery of damages for an injury to person or property.

Here, both the trial court and the CA found Arcinue to have acted in bad faith to the
damage and prejudice of Baun. The lower courts thus ruled that Arcinue’s tortious acts were
in violation of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code warranting payment of damages.

An action for damages caused by tortious conduct survives the death of a party for it
falls under suits to recover damages for an injury to person of property, real or personal.
I njury to property is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs
by which personal estate is injured or diminished. To maliciously cause a party to incur
unnecessary expenses, as in this case, is certainly injury to that party's property.

Verily, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the consistent findings of
the courts below holding Arcinue for damages.

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 5. Payment of the debts of the estate (Rule 88)
6. Sales, mortgages, and other encumbrances of property of decedent (Rule
89)
7. Distribution and partition (Rule 90)
B. Escheat (Rule 91)
SPOUSES NELSON A. PADILLA & CLARITA E. PADILLA v. FILIPINAS P. SALOVINO, HELEN S.
TAN, NORMA S. MERIDA AND RAUL S. PADILLA
G.R. No. 232823, 28 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, J. JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State seeks to revert land to the mass
of public domain and is the proper remedy when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of in
favor of private individuals or corporations. Reversion is not automatic as the government, through the
OSG, must file an appropriate action. Since the land originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is thus a matter between the grantor and the grantee. In other words, it is only the State
which may institute reversion proceedings.
To determine whether the present action involves reversion or not, a review of the pertinent
allegations in respondents' complaint is in order.
Similar to applicants of free patent, respondents do not claim that the property is their private
property but acknowledged that it is part of the public domain in trying to buy the property pursuant
to Proclamation No. 172 and M.O. No. 119. As such, even if petitioners may have committed fraud or
misrepresentation in their application, ownership of the property reverts to the State and not to
respondents. They are but applicants for the purchase of a land belonging to the public domain.

FACTS
Spouses Nelson and Clarita Padilla (Sps. Padilla) filed an application for registration of parcel
of land situated in Taguig. Thereafter, the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) registering the aforementioned property in Sps. Padilla’s name.
Subsequently, Filipinas P. Salovino, Helen S. Tan, Norma S. Merida and Raul S. Padilla
(respondents) filed a Complaint for Cancellation of Title, Declaration of Nullity of Instrument with
Reconveyance and Damages against Sps. Padilla. They alleged that: they were the bona fide residents
of the subject property; Sps. Padilla were able to secure the registration over the property through
fraud and misrepresentation; and that Sps. Padilla were not eligible to acquire the present property
pursuant to Memorandum Order (M.O.) No. 119 and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 730 because they are not
bona fide residents.
Sps. Padilla filed their Motion to Dismiss arguing that the complaint should be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action as respondents were not the real parties-in-interest. They assailed
that respondents admitted that the subject land belonged to the State. As such, petitioners posited
that the present complaint was actually an action for reversion, which only the State could file.

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 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and dismissed respondents’ complaint
holding that the present action was one of reversion. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed
the RTC decision. Aggrieved, Sps. Padilla moved for reconsidered but it was denied by the CA. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE
Do respondents have a legal standing to file the instant complaint?

RULING
NO. A reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State seeks to revert land to the
mass of public domain and is the proper remedy when public land is fraudulently awarded and
disposed of in favor of private individuals or corporations. Reversion is not automatic as the
government, through the OSG, must file an appropriate action. Since the land originated from a grant
by the government, its cancellation is thus a matter between the grantor and the grantee. In other
words, it is only the State which may institute reversion proceedings.
To determine whether the present action involves reversion or not, a review of the pertinent
allegations in respondents' complaint is in order. The nature of the action, as well as the court which
has jurisdiction, are defined by material allegations in the complaint.
A perfunctory reading of respondents' complaint may suggest that they claim ownership over
the questioned property. In particular, they alleged in the seventh paragraph of the complaint that
petitioners, through fraud and misrepresentation, secured a title over the property owned by
respondents.
Nevertheless, a thorough and holistic review of respondents' complaint reveals that they do
not in fact assert ownership over the subject property. They merely aver that they are the qualified
applicants for a land grant from the government being the bona fide residents thereof. This is readily
apparent when taking into account that in the reliefs respondents had prayed for in the complaint,
they recognize that ownership over the parcel of land should first be reconveyed to the State, then
for the State to award the property to them. In recognizing that ownership over the property should
first revert to the State before title thereto is granted to them, respondents cannot now claim that
they have a pre-existing right of ownership over the property in question even before the issuance of
title in favor of petitioners.
Similar to applicants of free patent, respondents do not claim that the property is their private
property but acknowledged that it is part of the public domain in trying to buy the property pursuant
to Proclamation No. 172 and M.O. No. 119. As such, even if petitioners may have committed fraud or
misrepresentation in their application, ownership of the property reverts to the State and not to
respondents. They are but applicants for the purchase of a land belonging to the public domain.

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 C. Guardianship
1. Venue (Rule 92)
2. Appointment of guardians (Rule 93)
3. General powers and duties of guardians (Rule 96)
4. Termination of guardianship (Rule 97)
D. Writ of habeas corpus
1. Rule 102
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR MICHAEL LABRADOR ABELLANA (Petitioner,
detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City) v. HON. MEINRADO P. PAREDES, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch 13, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, S/SUPT. BENJAMIN DELOS SANTOS (ret.), in his capacity as Chief of Bureau of
Corrections
G.R. No. 232006, 10 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Abellana’s claim of denial of right to competent counsel must fail. While Atty. Albura was indeed
negligent when he deliberately failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation of judgment as a sign of
protest, the same does not warrant the granting of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. On the contrary, Abellana is bound by Atty. Albura's negligence.

In sum, the negligence and mistakes of the counsel are binding on the client, unless the counsel
has committed gross negligence. For a claim of a counsel's gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of
clear abandonment of the client's cause must be shown. As well, the gross negligence should not be
accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice.

FACTS

Michael Labrador Abellana was charged with violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Abellana pleaded
not guilty to the crimes charged in both Informations.

He thereafter filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant, which was denied by the RTC. After
the pre-trial, the trial for the case ensued. Abellana was represented then by Atty. Dario Rama, Jr.
(Atty. Rama).

On November 9, 2007, Abellana filed a Motion for Physical Re-examination and Re-weighing
of the alleged shabu confiscated from him, which was granted by the RTC. The Qualitative Report
revealed that the actual weight of the drugs seized was 4.4562 grams and not 6.89 grams. As a result,
Abellana was able to file a Petition for Bail, which was granted.

Thus, Abellana was released from detention after furnishing the bail bond.

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 After the prosecution rested its case, Abellana filed a demurrer to evidence, which was
denied.

On December 3, 2008, Atty. Raul Albura (Atty. Albura) filed his Entry of Appearance as
counsel for Abellana.

The RTC promulgated its judgement finding Abellana guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

On August 13, 2009, Abellana filed a Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration. He alleged that
his rights as an accused had been prejudiced by some irregularities committed during trial.
Specifically, he claimed that he had been deprived of his right to due process because he had not been
properly notified ever since Atty. Albura became his new counsel and that in total, Atty. Albura
received only two notices involving the case, which included the Notice of Promulgation of Judgment.
Abellana also discussed the merits of his case, claiming that there were errors of fact in the RTC.

The RTC denied the Motion. The RTC ruled that Abellana was not deprived of his right to due
process. The RTC stated that there was no proper substitution of counsel. The RTC also rejected
Abellana’s claim that his previous counsel was negligent for failing to quash the warrant and for
failure to file the demurrer to evidence on time. The RTC ruled that there was no ground to quash the
warrant and the demurrer was actually filed on time. Moreover, the RTC stated that the previous
counsel, Atty. Rama, was not remiss in his duties as he filed several pleadings for Abellana, including
the motion for re-examination and re-weighing of the shabu and the petition for bail, both of which
were granted for Abellana’s benefit. In contrast, the RTC stated that it was Atty. Albura who
discouraged his client from attending the scheduled promulgation as a sign of protest.

Lastly, the RTC ruled that contrary to Abellana’s claims, he was not deprived of his day in
court. He was represented when all prosecution witnesses testified and the latter were cross-
examined by his previous counsel.

On June 20, 2017, Abellana filed a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
before the Court. He claims that a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus may be availed
of as a post-conviction remedy in such cases when a person is deprived of his Constitutional rights
during the court proceedings. Specifically, he claims that he has been deprived of his rights to due
process and to competent counsel.

Abellana avers that he has been deprived of his right to due process because of lack of notice
of the proceedings in the RTC. He claims that the RTC hastily submitted the criminal cases for decision
even if there was no proof on record that Abellana or his previous counsels, Attys. Rama and Albura,
received any notice or order from the court of the proceedings, thereby effectively depriving him of
his right to be heard and to present evidence on his behalf. Moreover, Abellana argues that he has
been deprived of his right to competent counsel due to the negligence of Atty. Albura.

ISSUE

Should the petition for the writ of habeas corpus be granted?

RULING

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 NO. The petition should be denied. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus is a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. It secures to a prisoner the right to
have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice and to have it
ascertained whether he is held under lawful authority.

Broadly speaking, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, the most basic criterion for the issuance
of the writ is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement
or placed under some form of illegal restraint.

Concomitantly, if a person's liberty is restrained by some legal process, the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailing. The writ cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent
court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not ousted of this jurisdiction through
some irregularity in the course of the proceedings.

However, jurisprudence has recognized that the writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of
as a post-conviction remedy when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following
exceptional circumstances is attendant: 1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person; 2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or 3)
the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. Here, Abellana
is invoking the first circumstance.

Abellana avers that he has been deprived of his right to due process because of lack of notice
of the proceedings in the trial court. To recall, the RTC submitted the case for decision on April 30,
2009 for failure of Abellana and his counsel to appear during the scheduled hearing on the same date
for initial presentation of the evidence for the defense. However, Abellana claims that he was not
notified of said hearing. He likewise claims that he was not given the notice setting the promulgation
of judgment on July 29, 2009.

As regards the scheduled hearing on April 30, 2009, even if it were true that Abellana or his
counsel were not notified of such, it is still not enough to warrant a finding of denial of due process.
For in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. To reiterate, as long as a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied
due process.

In this case, the Court finds that Abellana was still afforded opportunity to be heard, as will
be discussed below. Moreover, the hearing on April 30, 2009 was not the first scheduled hearing for
the presentation of evidence of the defense. The records show that as early as September 10, 2008,
the RTC had already ordered Abellana to present his witnesses; however, he failed to do so.

Likewise, Abellana’s claim of denial of right to competent counsel must fail. While Atty. Albura
was indeed negligent when he deliberately failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation of
judgment as a sign of protest, the same does not warrant the granting of the petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus. On the contrary, Abellana is bound by Atty. Albura's negligence.

252
 In sum, the negligence and mistakes of the counsel are binding on the client, unless the
counsel has committed gross negligence. For a claim of a counsel's gross negligence to prosper,
nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause must be shown. As well, the gross negligence
should not be accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice.

In this case, Abellana failed to convince the Court that the proceedings before the trial court
were attended by violations of his rights to due process or competent counsel as to oust the RTC of
its jurisdiction. Thus, the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is unwarranted.

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 2. Writ of habeas corpus in relation to custody of minors (A.M. No. 03-0404-
SC)
E. Change of name (Rule 103)
F. Cancellation or Correction of entries in the Civil Registry (Rule 108)
GLENN M. MILLER v. JOAN MILLER y ESPENIDA and
THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GUBAT, SORSOGON
G.R. No. 200344, 28 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are confined to “innocuous or clerical errors such as misspellings
and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding” or corrections that are
not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence.
What Glenn sought for in the correction of Joan’s surname to Espenida is not a mere clerical
change but rather to disallow Joan from using their father’s surname by reason of her allegedly not
being acknowledge as the illegitimate child of John. Such constitutes a collateral attack on the filiation
between Joan and John Miller.
FACTS
Glenn is one of the four children of John with Beatriz Marcaida and the other children. After
John’s death, Joan, through her mother Lennie Espenida (Lennie) filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) a Petition for Partition and Accounting of John’s estate with a prayer for preliminary
attachment, receivership, support, and damages. Alleging that she is John’s illegitimate child with
Lennie, Joan presented her Certificate of Live Birth which showed John to be her registered father.
Glenn discovered Lennie’s filing before the RTC and questioned Joan’s claim as John’s illegitimate
child.
Glenn filed a separate Petition praying that Joan's Certificate of Live Birth be canceled.
Contrary to Joan’s claim, Glenn averred that Joan was never recognized by John as his illegitimate
daughter and pointed out that there was no signature of John in Joan’s birth certificate.
While Joan admitted that John’s signature was not in her birth certificate, she contended the
fact that she and her mother have been living with John open and continuously, and recognized her
as his child in his lifetime. Moreover, Joan noted the fact that she lived in John’s ranch, and that the
latter financed her studies in John Miller Primary School. Also, Joan pointed out the fact that John left
1/8 share of his estate to her in the holographic will.
The RTC ruled that Joan is allowed to use the surname, “Miller.” It gave credence to Joan’s
testimony. Disappointed with the trial court’s ruling, Glenn elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA) which upheld the RTC’s decision on the matter. The appellate court noted that the fact that 1/8
of the share of John’s estate was given to Joan is enough showing that she was recognized as his child.
Hence this Petition.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming the RTC Judgment allowing Joan to continue using the surname
Miller?

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RULING
NO. The Court partially grants the petition insofar as the CA decision in affirming RTC’s
dismissal of the Petition for the Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller y
Espenida. Joan can still use the surname Miller. However the Court nullified and set aside the
declarations of the CA and RTC as to the legitimacy and filiation of Joan as they cannot be collaterally
attacked in a petition.
The Court stressed that Glenn’s petition to change Joan’s surname to Espenida is governed by
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which the following entries may be cancelled or corrected,
upon good and valid grounds:
(a) Births;
(b) Marriages;
(c) Deaths;
(d) Legal separations;
(e) Judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) Judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
(g) Legitimations;
(h) Adoptions;
(i) Acknowledgments of natural children;
(j) Naturalization;
(k) Election, loss or recovery of citizenship;
(l) Civil interdiction;
(m) Judicial determination of filiation;
(n) Voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(o) Changes of name.
In Barreto vs. The Local Registrar of Manila, the Court explained, however, that Article 412 of
the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are confined to “innocuous or clerical errors such
as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding” or
corrections that are not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence.
What Glenn sought for in the correction of Joan’s surname to Espenida is not a mere clerical
change but rather to disallow Joan from using their father’s surname by reason of her allegedly not
being acknowledge as the illegitimate child of John. Such constitutes a collateral attack on the filiation
between Joan and John Miller.
In this light, the Court affirms the CA’s resolution insofar as they affirm the Judgment of the
RTC. However, the Court nullified and set aside the RTC and CA’s affirmation of the declarations made
by the trial court pertaining to the legitimacy and filiation of Joan Miller for the reason that this matter
raised in Glenn Miller’s petition is tantamount to a collateral attack.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- MILLER OMANDAM UNABIA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 213346 FIRST DIVISION, February 11, 2019, DEL CASTILLO, J.
Under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, "documents consisting of entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All
other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter."
There was therefore no need to further identify and authenticate Dr. Labis' Medical Certificate. "A public
document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a
notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law,
or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires
no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court."
FACTS:
Respondent Miller OmandamUnabia filed before the RTC a Petition for Correction of Entries on the
Birth Certificate of Mellie UmandamUnabia claiming that his Birth Certificate contained errors in
that the name entered therein was "Mellie UmandamUnabia," when it should properly have been
written as "Miller OmandamUnabia"; that the gender was erroneously entered as "female" instead of
"male"; and that his father's middle initial was erroneously indicated as "U" when it should have been
"O."
To support the claim for change of entry as to gender, a Medical Certificate was presented which was
supposedly issued by a physician of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center, Dr. Andresul A. Labis
(Dr. Labis), which certificate stated that respondent was "phenotypically male"; however, the
physician was not presented in court to testify on his findings and identify the document.
The RTC granted the petition. Petitioner appealed before the CA, arguing that respondent failed to
state a valid ground for change of name; that the petition failed to state the aliases by which
respondent was known; that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and that
respondent failed to present the physician who allegedly issued the medical certificate stating that
respondent was male. But the appeal was dismissed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the grant of the petition for correction of entries was proper. (YES)
RULING:
Under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, "documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave
rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."
There was therefore no need to further identify and authenticate Dr. Labis' Medical Certificate. "A
public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged
before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities
required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court."

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Nonetheless, it must be laid down as a rule that when there is a medical finding that the petitioner in
a case for correction of erroneous entry as to gender is phenotypically male or female, the no-sex
change or transplant certification becomes mere surplusage.
Finally, suffice it to state that, as correctly declared by the CA, respondent was actually using the
name Miller OmandamUnabia; that "Miller" and "Mellie" and "Omandam" and "Umandam" were
confusingly similar; and that respondent's medical certificate shows that he is phenotypically male.
The CA thus properly held that respondent's birth certificate contained clerical errors in its entries
necessitating its rectification.

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 G. Clerical error law (RA 9048)
DR. RUBEN C. BARTOLOME v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 243288, 28 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Republic Act No. 9048 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively removing
clerical errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them under the
jurisdiction of the civil registrar.
Here, the administrative proceeding under R.A. 9048 applies to all corrections sought by the
petitioner, Bartolome. The Court denied the instant petition without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate administrative action under R.A. 9048, as amended by R.A. 10172.

FACTS
Bartolome filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to correct the name 'Feliciano Bartholome' as appearing in his
birth certificate. He stated that he has been using the name 'Ruben [Cruz] Bartolome' since his
childhood."
After posting and publication, Bartolome was allowed to present the following documents to
support his claim: 1) Doctor of Medicine Diploma; 2) CSC Certificate for Medical Examiners Physician;
3) PRC ID; 4) Marriage Contract; 5) Philippine Passport; 6) Senior Citizens ID Card; and 7) NBI
Clearance, which all bore the name, "Ruben C. Bartolome."

The RTC denied the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, insufficiency of
evidence, and improper venue. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied the appeal. It held that Bartolome
should have filed a petition for the correction of entries in his birth certificate under R.A. 9048

ISSUE
Should the change or correction sought in Bartolome's first name, middle name, and surname,
as appearing in his birth certificate, from "Feliciano Bartholome" to "Ruben Cruz Bartolome" be filed
under R.A. 9048?

RULING
YES. The administrative proceeding under R.A. 9048 applies to all corrections sought by the
petitioner, Bartolome. All changes sought by him fall within the ambit of R.A. 9048. He may only avail
of the appropriate judicial remedies when the changes or corrections sought through the
administrative proceeding are denied.

While the grounds for change of name under Rule 103 are found in jurisprudence, the
grounds for change of first name or nickname are expressly provided in R.A. 9048, Section 4. RA 9048
now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change

258
of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,
form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

The inclusion of Bartolome's middle name is likewise covered by R.A. 9048, as amended.
While substantial corrections of entries in the civil register are still covered by Rule 108,
typographical or clerical corrections must now be filed under R.A. 9048 as amended. Bartolome’s
prayer that his middle name, "Cruz," be entered, is a mere clerical correction, and must therefore be
likewise undertaken through the administrative proceeding.

To obviate further confusion, the Court categorically holds that typographical or clerical
errors in a person's surname must likewise be corrected through the administrative proceeding
under R.A. 9048. Bartolome’s allegedly misspelled surname, "Bartholome," may be readily corrected
by merely referring to the existing records of the civil registrar, such as the surnames of Bartolome's
parents and immediate family members, the petition should have been filed under R.A. 9048 and not
under Rule 103 of the Rules.

The Court denied the instant petition without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
administrative action under R.A. 9048, as amended by R.A. 10172.

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VII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. General matters
1. Criminal jurisdiction; concept and requisites for exercise
RUEL FRANCIS M. CABRAL, Petitioner, -versus – CHRIS S. BRACAMONTE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 233174, THIRD DIVISION, January 23, 2019, PERALTA, J.

Time and again, the Court has held that territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where any one of the essential
ingredients took place.

Here, the crime allegedly committed by Bracamonte is estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the
Revised Penal Code. It was merely stated in the Information, and alleged by Cabral in his complaint
affidavit, that the crime of estafa was committed in Parañaque City because it was there that he was
convinced to sell the subject shares of stock. Apart from said allegation, however, he did not present any
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would support or corroborate the assertion. Equally guilty
of the same failure to substantiate is the trial court which relied merely on Cabral's complaint-affidavit
in connecting the alleged offense within its territorial jurisdiction.

On the contrary, and as the appellate court pointed out, what were actually proven by the evidence on
record are the following: (1) Cabral and Bracamonte executed a MOA in Makati City; (2) Bracamonte
issued and delivered a postdated check in Makati City simultaneous to the signing of the agreement; (3)
the check was presented for payment and was subsequently dishonored in Makati City. As such, the Court
does not see why Cabral did not file the complaint before the Makati City trial court.

Since the evidence adduced during the trial showed that the offense allegedly committed by Bracamonte
was committed somewhere else, the trial court should have dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction.

FACTS:

Respondent Bracamonte and petitioner Cabral executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in

Makati City for the purchase of shares of stock in Wellcross Freight Corporation (WFC) and Aviver
International Corporation (AVIVER).

Simultaneous with the signing of the MOA, Bracamonte issued a postdated check to Cabral in the
amount of P12,677,950.15. When the check was presented for payment, however, the drawee bank
in Makati City dishonored the same for lack of sufficient funds. Consequently, for failure to settle the
obligation, Cabral instituted a complaint for estafa against Bracamonte in Parañaque City. The
prosecutor filed with the RTC of Parañaque City an Information.

Bracamonte moved to quash the Information contending that the venue was improperly laid in
Parañaque City, because the postdated check was delivered and dishonored in Makati City. Thus, the
prosecution failed to show how the supposed elements of the crime charged were committed in
Parañaque City.

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The RTC denied the Motion to Quash explaining that it has jurisdiction over the case because
Bracamonte employed fraudulent acts against Cabral in Parañaque City prior to the issuance of the
postdated check. The CA set aside the RTC Order and dismissed the Information against Bracamonte.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it held that the trial court is devoid of jurisdiction
to try the criminal case against Bracamonte as venue was improperly laid thus dismissing the
Information. (NO)

RULING:

Time and again, the Court has held that territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where any one of the essential
ingredients took place.

Thus, a court cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of its limited territory. In this relation, moreover, it has been held that the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. Once it
is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.

Here, the crime allegedly committed by Bracamonte is estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of
the Revised Penal Code. It was merely stated in the Information, and alleged by Cabral in his
complaint affidavit, that the crime of estafa was committed in Parañaque City because it was there
that he was convinced to sell the subject shares of stock. Apart from said allegation, however, he did
not present any evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would support or corroborate the
assertion. Equally guilty of the same failure to substantiate is the trial court which relied merely on
Cabral's complaint-affidavit in connecting the alleged offense within its territorial jurisdiction.

On the contrary, and as the appellate court pointed out, what were actually proven by the evidence
on record are the following: (1) Cabral and Bracamonte executed a MOA in Makati City; (2)
Bracamonte issued and delivered a postdated check in Makati City simultaneous to the signing of the
agreement; (3) the check was presented for payment and was subsequently dishonored in Makati
City. As such, the Court does not see why Cabral did not file the complaint before the Makati City trial
court.

Not only were the MOA and subject check executed, delivered, and dishonored in Makati City, it was
even expressly stipulated in their agreement that the parties chose Makati City as venue for any
action arising from the MOA because that was where it was executed. It is, therefore, clear from the
foregoing that the element of deceit took place in Makati City where the worthless check was issued
and delivered, while the damage was inflicted also in Makati City where the check was dishonored
by the drawee bank.

261
Since the evidence adduced during the trial showed that the offense allegedly committed by
Bracamonte was committed somewhere else, the trial court should have dismissed the action for
want of jurisdiction.

As to Cabral's contention that Bracamonte's motion should be considered barred by laches as it took
him four (4) years before he raised the issue of jurisdiction, actively participating in the proceedings
by cross-examining the prosecution witness, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground
that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or considered motu proprio
by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject
matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or
otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court,
and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.

2. When injunction may be issued

262
 B. Prosecution of offenses (Rule 110)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANTE CUBAY y UGSALAN
G.R. No. 224597, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

An Information which does not sufficiently charge an offense is fatally defective and warrants
the acquittal of the accused.
In this case, the Informations conspicuously lack the second element of rape, i.e., the accused
employed force or intimidation, or that the victim was deprived of reason, unconscious, under twelve
(12) years of age, or was demented.
FACTS
Dante Cubay was charged with 44 counts of rape under separate Informations. At a Special
Education Dormitory (SPED) in Bukidnon, he unlawfully have sexual intercourse with 18-year-old
[AAA], against her will. Complainant is a congenital deaf mute. Cubay is the school watchman
assigned at XXX Elementary School, XXX SPED Center, and the SPED dormitory, where [AAA] is
currently staying.
Cubay denied the charges. He admitted he had sexual congress with complainant for more
than forty-four times but asserted they were all consensual. He argued that complainant filed the
rape charges only because her pregnancy and illicit affair with him brought embarrassment to her
family.
The trial court found Cubay guilty of 44 counts of rape.
On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for finding him guilty of 44 counts of rape despite
the prosecution's alleged failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintained that the prosecution was able to prove
to a moral certainty that appellant had carnal knowledge of complainant for 44 times through force,
threat, or intimidation. Her consistent and positive identification of appellant as the man who raped
her prevails over appellant's self-serving denial and uncorroborated sweetheart theory.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE
Did the Information validly charge the crime of rape?
RULING
NO. The principal purpose of an Information is to ensure that the accused is formally
informed of the facts and acts constituting the offense charged in accordance with the rights of the
accused enshrined in the Constitution. Toward this end, the Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
requires that the Information clearly accurately allege every element of the offense charged. Where
the Information is insufficient, it cannot be the basis of any valid conviction.
Quimvel v. People of the Philippines states that the main purpose of requiring the elements of
a crime to be set out in the Information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense
because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

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The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and the right of an
accused to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the information cannot be waived.
Andaya v. People further explained that no matter how conclusive and convincing the
evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the
information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein.
The Informations conspicuously lack the second element of rape, i.e., the accused employed
force or intimidation, or that the victim was deprived of reason, unconscious, under twelve (12) years
of age, or was demented.
Surely, being a deaf-mute does not necessarily take the place of the element of force or
intimidation or having been deprived of reason, unconscious, or demented. The allegation that "the
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with AAA, an
18-year-old (who) suffered a physical defect (hearing impaired) against her will,” does not equate to
force or intimidation either.
In fine, the Informations did not validly charge the crime of rape or any offense at all. The
same, for sure, cannot be the basis of a valid judgment of conviction.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
THE HONORBLE SANDIGANBAYAN and JAIME KISON RECIO
G.R. No. 240621, 24 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

While there is no precise definition under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of what
should be deemed as a substantial amendment, case law instructs that substantial amendments consist
of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
On the other hand, formal amendments which can be made at any time do not alter the nature of the
crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
accusation.

In this case, the Supreme Court finds that the amendment of the Information sought by the
prosecution is one of form, and not of substance, as it adds nothing essential for Recio's conviction of the
crime charged nor does it seek to amend the Information's recital of facts constituting the offense
charged.
.
FACTS

An Information filed before the Sandiganbayan (SB) charging Jaime Kison Recio (Recio) with
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act." Verily, the Information accuses Recio, then Executive Director III of the National Parks and
Development Committee (NPDC), of entering into numerous security service contracts with Variance
Protective and Security Agency (Variance) from 2002 to 2010 absent the required public bidding,
thereby giving the latter unwarranted benefits. During trial and before the prosecution presented its
last witness, it filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Amended Information seeking to amend the
amount stated in the Information from P7,843,54.33 to P7,842,941.60, which is the amount reflected
in the disbursement vouchers. In opposition thereto, Recio argued that the amendment is not merely
formal but substantial, which would be prejudicial to his right to be informed of the charges against
him.

The SB denied the prosecution's motion for lack of merit. It ruled that the mistake in the
amount of the alleged undue injury stated in the Information is too substantial to have been left
uncorrected for more than a year, during which time evidence to prove the allegations in the
Information had already been presented. Moreover, it held that the alleged difference could not be
ruled out as a mere typographical error, especially considering that the amount involved was only
alleged numerically and had not been spelled out in words where the difference would have been
readily apparent.

ISSUE

Did the Sandiganbayan gravely abuse its discretion in denying the Ombudsman's Motion for
Leave of Court to File Amended Information?

RULING

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 YES. There is grave abuse of discretion when: (1) an act is done contrary to the Constitution,
the law, or jurisprudence; or (2) it is executed whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily out of malice,
ill-will, or personal bias. The proper procedure for the amendment of an Information is governed by
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Under this provision, the prosecution is given the right to amend the information, regardless
of its nature, so long as the amendment is sought before the accused enters his plea, subject to the
qualification under the second paragraph thereof. However, once the accused enters his plea during
arraignment, the prosecution is already prohibited from seeking a substantial amendment,
particularly citing those that may prejudice the rights of the accused. One of these rights is the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him,
a right which is given life during the arraignment of the accused. The theory in law is that since the
accused officially begins to prepare his defense against the accusation on the basis of the recitals in
the information read to him during arraignment, then the prosecution must establish its case on the
basis of the same information.

While there is no precise definition under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of what
should be deemed as a substantial amendment, case law instructs that substantial amendments
consist of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the court. On the other hand, formal amendments which can be made at any time do not alter the
nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity
to meet the new accusation. Verily, they are amendments which merely state with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original Information, and which, therefore,
adds nothing essential for conviction of the crime charged. Hence, the following are considered as
mere formal amendments: (a) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the
court might impose in the event of conviction; (b) an amendment which does not charge another
offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (c) additional allegations which do
not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the
form of defense he has or will assume; and (d) an amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.

In this case, the Supreme Court finds that the amendment of the Information sought by the
prosecution is one of form, and not of substance, as it adds nothing essential for Recio's conviction of
the crime charged nor does it seek to amend the Information's recital of facts constituting the offense
charged. On the contrary, the amendment simply sought to correct the total amount of the
disbursement reflected in the Information to make it conform to the evidence on record. Clearly,
Recio will not be prejudiced by the amendment sought considering that the same did not involve a
completely new fact or matter previously unknown to him and thereby deprive him of an opportunity
to meet the same, nor require him to undergo a material change or modification in his defense.

All told, the amendment sought by the Ombudsman in this case involves mere matters of form
that are allowed under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly,
the Court finds the SB to have gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion for Leave of Court
to File Amended Information.

266
 C. Prosecution of civil action (Rule 111)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
WENDALINO ANDES y CAS a.k.a. WINDALINO ANDES y CAS.
G.R. No. 217031, 14 August 2019, SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, Andes y Cas' death prior to his final conviction by the
Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.
However, it is well to clarify that Andes y Cas's civil liability in connection with his acts against
the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil
action against the estate of Andes y Cas, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

FACTS
In a Resolution, the Court adopted the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) finding
Wendalino Andes y Cas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape. Andes y Cas
moved for reconsideration, which was denied with finality.
However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued in this case, the Court received a Letter
from the Bureau of Corrections informing the Court of Andes y Cas' death on March 17, 2016.

ISSUE
Is the criminal liability of Andes y Cas totally extinguished?

RULING
YES. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, Andes y Cas's death prior to his final conviction
by the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:
Article 89. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.
Thus, upon Andes y Cas's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded
as it is on the criminal action.

267
 However, it is well to clarify that Andes y Cas's civil liability in connection with his acts against
the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate
civil action against the estate of Andes y Cas, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

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 BDO UNIBANK, INC., v. FRANCISCO PUA
G.R. No. 230923, 08 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A private complainant or offended party in a criminal case may file a petition directly with the
Supreme Court, to wit: (1) when there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or
its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party; and (2)
when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court.
With respect to the first exception, BDO did not allege that it and the State were deprived of due
process of law. On the other hand, in relation to the second exception, BDO did not file the petition in
order to preserve its interest in the civil aspect of the criminal case. In the case under consideration, BDO
not only sought for the reversal of the Decision of the CA but also the reinstatement of the criminal case
and the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Pua for estafa by means of deceit. The latter relief being
prayed for by BDO clearly involves the criminal aspect of the criminal case.

FACTS
BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO) entered into an Investment Management Agreement (IMA) with
Ernesto Ang, Edgard Ang, Trilogy Properties Corporation (TPC), Lucia and Sharlene Po (collectively,
Original Funders). Pursuant to the specific directive and authority to lend and invest signed by the
Original Funders authorizing the release of the loan in favor of Franciso Pua, BDO released the
amount of P41, 500,000.00 to Pua.
Later, Pua informed BDO of his intention to change the Original Funders of the loan. Two days
thereafter, Pua delivered two checks payable to the order of BDO. The checks, however, were
dishonored when they were presented for payment, on account that they were drawn against a
closed account. BDO demanded payment from Pua which was ignored. Thus, BDO filed a complaint
for estafa by means of deceit against Pua.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case, finding no probable cause to support and
justify the case. BDO appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the order of the RTC,
ruling that Pua’s mere act of informing BDO about R. Makmur's interest in replacing the Original
Funders does not constitute false pretense and misrepresentation, as contemplated in the crime.
Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in upholding the Order of the RTC dismissing the criminal case of estafa by
means of deceit against Pua?

RULING
NO. The Court notes that the present petition was filed by BDO without the required authority
from or conformity of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In a plethora of cases, the Court has
consistently ruled that only the OSG may bring or defend actions in behalf of the Republic of the

269
Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals. The aforesaid is subject to two exceptions where a private complainant or
offended party in a criminal case may file a petition directly with the Supreme Court, to wit: (1) when
there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the
case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party; and (2) when the private offended
party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court.
The first exception contemplates a situation where the State and the offended party are
deprived of due process, because the prosecution is remiss in its duty to protect the interest of the
State and the offended party. This Court recognizes the right of the offended party to appeal an order
of the trial court which denied him or her and the State of due process of law. On the other hand,
under the second exception, it is assumed that a decision on the merits had already been rendered
by the lower court and it is the civil aspect of the case which the offended party is appealing. The
offended party, not being satisfied with the outcome of the case, may question the amount of the
grant or denial of damages made by the court below even without the participation of the OSG.
With respect to the first exception, BDO did not allege that it and the State were deprived of
due process of law. On the other hand, in relation to the second exception, BDO did not file the petition
in order to preserve its interest in the civil aspect of the criminal case. In the case under
consideration, BDO not only sought for the reversal of the Decision of the CA but also the
reinstatement of the criminal case and the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Pua for estafa by
means of deceit. The latter relief being prayed for by BDO clearly involves the criminal aspect of the
criminal case.
Nevertheless, Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure notably
provides that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
An examination of the records of the case reveals that BDO did not waive the civil action, and
neither did it reserve the right to institute such separately nor institute the civil action prior to the
criminal action. Hence, it is only with respect to the criminal aspect that the petition must necessarily
fail. Consequently, the civil aspect of the case at hand may proceed.

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 D. Preliminary Investigation
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MATEO A. LEE, JR.
G.R. No. 234618, 16 September 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The issue of when prescription of a special law starts to run and when it is tolled was settled in
the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, et al., wherein the Court had the occasion to discuss
the set-up of our judicial system during the passage of Act 3326 and the prevailing jurisprudence at that
time which considered the filing of the complaint before the justice of peace for preliminary
investigation as sufficient to toll period of prescription.

In the case at bar, it was clear that the filing of the complaint against the respondent with the
Office of the Ombudsman on April 1, 2014 effectively tolled the running of the period of prescription.
Thus, the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan on March 21, 2017, for unlawful acts
allegedly committed on February 14, 2013 to March 20, 2014, is well within the three (3)-year
prescriptive period of R.A. No. 7877.

FACTS

Mateo Lee Jr. (Lee) was charged for the Violation of Republic Act No. 7877, a special law
otherwise known as the Anti- Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. He is a Deputy Executive Director of the
National Council on Disability Affairs, who allegedly committed an offense in relation to his official
functions and taking advantage of his position. He would allegedly demand, request or require sexual
favors from Diane Jane M. Paguirigan, an Administrative Aide VI in the same office who served
directly under the supervision of the accused. Thus, Lee has authority, influence and moral
ascendancy over her. He would allegedly ask for sexual favors Ms. Paguirigan, when they would check
in a hotel, send her flowers, food and messages of endearment and continue to do so even after
several protests from her, visit her house and church and inquire about her from her family, relatives
and friends, and even follow her on her way home, which sexual demand. These resulted in an
intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment to Ms. Paguirigan.

Lee filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Prescription
Extinguishing Criminal Liability with Prayer for Outright Dismissal of the Case. Lee's motion was
denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution.

Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan resolved to reconsider and set aside its earlier Resolution and
ordered the dismissal of the case against Lee on the ground that the offense charged had already
prescribed. After which, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Honorable Court’s Resolution, which was subsequently denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE

Did the filing of the complaint against Lee before the Office of the Ombudsman for the purpose
of preliminary investigation halt the running of the prescriptive period?

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RULING

YES. Lee stands charged with violation of R.A. No. 7877. The prescriptive period for violations
of R.A. No. 7877 is three (3) years. The Affidavit-Complaint for sexual harassment against him was
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman on April 1, 2014. The Information against the respondent
was, subsequently, filed before the Sandiganbayan on March 21, 2017. It alleged respondent's
unlawful acts that were supposedly committed "from February 14, 2013 to March 20, 2014, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto."

The issue of when prescription of a special law starts to run and when it is tolled was settled
in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, et al., wherein the Court had the occasion to
discuss the set-up of our judicial system during the passage of Act 3326 and the prevailing
jurisprudence at that time which considered the filing of the complaint before the justice of peace for
preliminary investigation as sufficient to toll period of prescription. Panaguiton also cited cases
subsequently decided by this Court involving prescription of special laws where the Court
categorically ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused.

In the case at bar, it was clear that the filing of the complaint against Lee with the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 1, 2014 effectively tolled the running of the period of prescription. Thus, the
filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan on March 21, 2017, for unlawful acts allegedly
committed on February 14, 2013 to March 20, 2014, is well within the three (3)-year prescriptive
period of R.A. No. 7877.

Finally, The Court noted in the attachments to the present Petition that the People's Motion
for Reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan was filed on September 18, 2017. While the Petition
failed to clearly indicate the date of receipt of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated September 6,
2017, it can be deduced, however, that the resolution was presumptively received by the petitioner,
at the latest, on the date when it was issued. It could not have been received prior to the date of the
resolution. Hence, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on September 18, 2017 is well within
the period to file the same.

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 1. Executive vs. judicial determination of probable cause
ZENAIDA E. SILVER and NELSON SALCEDO v.
JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY et al.
G.R. No. 219157, 14 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The judge must (1) personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.
Both Judges Belo and Daray personally examined the eight (8) Informations led by the
prosecution, the relevant DOJ resolutions on the existence of probable cause against petitioners et al.,
the previous order of RTC-Branch 14, Davao City issuing warrants of arrest on petitioners et al., the
prosecution's ex-parte manifestation for issuance of warrants of arrest and petitioners et al.'s opposition
thereto, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of Order dated April 28, 2011, the prosecution's
opposition, petitioners' reply, private respondents' rejoinder, and the parties' respective position papers.
In fine, probable cause here exists for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest on petitioners et al.
FACTS
Zenaida Silver (Silver) was engaged in "buy and sell" of motor vehicles under the business
name "ZSH Commercial." She participated in the auction sale of several units of vehicles and assorted
surplus parts and accessories held at the Bureau of Customs (BOC). For this, she loaned the amount
for the bid price from Loreto Hao (Hao).

After obtaining the vehicles and accessories, Silver authorized Hao's nephew, Kenneth Hao,
to sell the items and act as her liaison officer. This authority was covered by a corresponding special
power of attorney. Later, Silver claimed Kenneth Hao allegedly disposed of sixty-four (64) items
without her knowledge or any accounting.

She later confronted them about these things and thereafter rescinded the SPA she issued in
Kenneth Hao's favor. But Hao and Kenneth Hao and their cohorts continued to pull out, and dispose
of, the remaining motor vehicles. By reason thereof, Haos and their cohorts committed grave
coercion, quailed theft, and carnapping.

However, Hao, in his Counter-affidavit and Counter-charges stated that Silver's bid, however,
was invalidated because she failed to pay the full bid price within forty-eight (48) hours after she
entered her bid.

By Joint Resolution the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City dismissed the complaints.
However, the DOJ modified such. It found probable cause against Zenaida Silver, SPO4 Nelson
Salcedo, and six (6) others for violation of R.A. No. 6539. The eight (8) Informations were raffled to
Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Silver and Salcedo sought relief from the Court of Appeals (CA) via a special civil action for
Certiorari, and essentially argued that Judge Danilo Belo who issued the warrants of arrest, and Judge

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Marivic Trabajo Daray who denied their subsequent motion for reconsideration — did not personally
determine the existence of probable cause to justify warrants of arrest issued on them. By its assailed
Decision, the CA dismissed the petition because there was no showing that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against
Silver and Salcedo. Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the trial court's finding of probable cause against
Silver and Salcedo for violation of R.A. No. 6539?

RULING

NO. Probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest pertains to facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Thus, the standard used for issuance of a
warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. So long as
the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court judge has
sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest against him or her.

The judge must (1) personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant
of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause. Note that supporting documents include but are not limited to
affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind
the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge to make his determination of
probable cause.

The trial court’s decision on its face shows that it took into account the history of the case, the
eight (8) Informations led by the prosecution, the relevant DOJ resolutions on the existence of
probable cause against Silver and Salcedo. As noted by the Court of Appeals, Judge Belo even held a
clarificatory hearing on the matter of probable cause. And based on these documents and the
information he gathered during the hearing, Judge Belo undeniably had made a personal assessment
of the existence of probable cause.

As for Judge Daray, through her Joint Order dated September 14, 2012, she evaluated
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the prosecution's opposition petitioners' reply, private
respondents' rejoinder, and the parties' respective position papers.

Based thereon, they independently concluded that there was probable cause to issue
warrants of arrest on Silver and Salcedo, in compliance with the directive of Section 6 (a), Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In fine, probable cause here exists for the purpose of
issuing warrants of arrest on Silver and Salcedo.

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 JESSIE TAGASTASON, et al. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 222870, 08 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The function of the judge is exclusive, and cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition
for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause, which is a function that is
executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on
the exclusive prerogative of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest.
Here, the accused assail the issuance of the warrants of arrest against them by Judge Maclang.
However, the issuance of a warrant of arrest is within the discretion of the issuing judge upon
determination of the existence of probable cause.
FACTS
A Complaint-Affidavit for Murder and Frustrated Murder was filed against Jessie Tagastason,
et al. The City Prosecutor issued an Omnibus Motion finding probable cause for murder and
frustrated murder, and subsequently issued an Information against the accused.

Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Maclang issued the Warrants of Arrest against the accused.
The latter then filed the following: (1) Petition for Review before the Department of Justice (DOJ); (2)
Administrative Complaint against the City Prosecutor; and (3) Motion for Inhibition and Holding in
Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest before the trial court.

RTC denied the Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest but set the
Motion for Inhibition for hearing. The accused filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of their
Motion.

During the pendency of their motion for reconsideration, the accused filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals (CA), which denied the petition. According to
the CA, the grant or denial of the motion for reconsideration rests with the sound discretion of the
City Prosecutor and that the accused's lawyer should have followed up their motion. The accused
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in sustaining the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Maclang?

RULING
NO. There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a
function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine
whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime
as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy

275
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with
whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination
of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
The function of the judge is exclusive, and cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a
petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause, which is a function
that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an
encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest.
Here, the accused assail the issuance of the warrants of arrest against them by Judge Maclang.
However, the issuance of a warrant of arrest is within the discretion of the issuing judge upon
determination of the existence of probable cause.

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 MELCHOR J. CHIPOCO, et al., v. HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 239416, 24 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (A. Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

As probable cause is simply based on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not require
absolute certainty. Probable cause does not demand an inquiry into the sufficiency of evidence to
secure a conviction. In determining probable cause, the belief that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the crime charged is enough. It is acceptable that the elements of the crime charged
should be present in all practical probability.

A meticulous scrutiny of the records readily shows that the Ombudsman was able to
substantiate its finding of probable cause against Chipoco, Philip S. Balais, Sabijon, Villamil,
Antoque, and Eslabon. The Ombudsman pointed out that the acts and/or omissions of Chipoco,
Philip S. Balais, Sabijon, Villamil, Antoque, and Eslabon satisfied the elements of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 and Article 171(2) of the RPC.

FACTS

Mayor Wilfredo S. Balais (Balais) sold his Nissan Patrol Wagon 2001 model (subject vehicle)
to Eduardo A. Ayunting (Ayunting). Ayunting sold the subject vehicle to the local government unit of
the Municipality of Labason, Zamboanga del Norte, represented by then Vice Mayor Virgilio J. Go (Go).
The Sangguniang Bayan of Labason passed Resolution No. 117, authorizing Balais to negotiate the
rescission of the contract of sale of the subject vehicle as it was found that the purchase price of it
was quite high compared when it was first sold to the vendor, thus, disadvantageous and prejudicial
to the government.
Thereafter, Roberto R. Galon (Galon) filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Ombudsman
against petitioners Melchor J. Chipoco (Chipoco), in his capacity as then municipal treasurer and Bids
and Awards Committee (BAC) chairperson; Christy C. Buganutan (Buganutan), in her capacity as then
municipal accountant; Ceriaco P. Sabijon (Sabijon), Thelma F. Antoque (Antoque), and Aida P. Villamil
(Villamil), in their capacity as then BAC members; and Glenda G. Eslabon (Eslabon), in her capacity
as then BAC secretariat, charging them with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the “Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Also impleaded were Balais, in his capacity as then municipal mayor; Go, in his capacity as
municipal vice mayor; members of the Sangguniang Bayan, Ernesto B. Ramirez, in his capacity as then
legislative staff officer of the Sangguniang Bayan; the state auditor; the general services officer; and
Ayunting as the vendor Of the subject vehicle.
While the case was being tried in the Sandiganbayan, Ayunting turned as a state witness.
Chipoco contended that the BAC members were not negligent in their duties and that they have
no knowledge of any scheme defrauding the government. Meanwhile, Buganutan, Sabijon,
Antoque, and Villamil maintained that the expenditure of the subject vehicle was appropriated
in their 2011 budget, that the required public bidding was conducted, and that the abstract of
bids was prepared after the bidding and based on the bids submitted. For her part, Eslabon
averred that her duty was only to record the proceedings and prepare the minutes as BAC
secretariat and that she has no knowledge of the circumstances attendant to the sale.

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 However, the Ombudsman, in its Resolution, found probable cause against Chipoco, Philip
S. Balais, Sabijon, Villamil, Antoque, and Eslabon for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and
Article 217 of RPC.

ISSUE

Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it found probable cause to charge Chipoco, Philip S. Balais, Sabijon, Villamil,
Antoque, and Eslabon for their respective violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Article
171(2) of the RPC?

RULING

NO. As probable cause is simply based on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not require
absolute certainty. Probable cause does not demand an inquiry into the sufficiency of evidence to
secure a conviction. In determining probable cause, the belief that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the crime charged is enough. It is acceptable that the elements of the crime charged
should be present in all practical probability.

A meticulous scrutiny of the records readily shows that the Ombudsman was able to
substantiate its finding of probable cause against Chipoco, Philip S. Balais, Sabijon, Villamil,
Antoque, and Eslabon. The Ombudsman pointed out that the acts and/or omissions of Chipoco,
Philip S. Balais, Sabijon, Villamil, Antoque, and Eslabon satisfied the elements of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 and Article 171(2) of the RPC.

As to the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the following are the elements of this
crime: (1) that the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
(2) that the accused acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;
and (3) that the accused caused undue injury to any party including the Government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. First,
Chipoco, Philip S. Balais, Sabijon, Villamil, Antoque, and Eslabon were public officers performing
official functions at the time of the negotiations and sale. Even if Antoque was just an observer during
the proceedings in the BAC, she failed to submit a report as legally required thereby assenting to the
irregularities. Second, the Ombudsman found that there was bad faith on the part of Chipoco, Sabijon,
Antoque, Eslabon, and Villamil when they specifically procured, in violation of Section 18 of R.A. No.
9184, thesubject vehicle previously owned by Balais and when they made it appear in the documents
that bidding was conducted even if there was none. On thepart of Buganutan, it was found that she
allowed the disbursement and procurement notwithstanding the obvious infirmity of the supporting
documents. Last, it was clarified that there was unwarranted benefit when petitioners recommended
the award of the sale of the subject vehicle to Ayunting/Oro Cars even if the latter did not submit its
bid. As aptly put by the Ombudsman, they gave it a benefit without justification.

With respect to the falsification by a public officer, employee, or a notary public under
Articlel7l of the RPC, the following are the elements of this crime: (1) the offender is a public officer,
employee, or a notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of his or her official position; and (3)
the offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification under Article 171.43
Article 171 (2) provides that “causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or

278
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate” is an act of falsification. As resolved by the
Ombudsman, the foregoing elements were met when it seemingly appeared in the Notice of Award,
Abstract of Bids as Read, and Minutes of Opening of Bids that Oro Cars, Eves Display Center, and
Catmon Car Sales participated in the procurement of the subject vehicle yet these establishments
categorically denied participation in the bidding process. The Ombudsman elucidated that
petitioners had control over the said documents in their respective capacities and that they signed
these notwithstanding the utter falsities therein. Clearly, the Ombudsman duly performed its
mandate in ascertaining facts and circumstances that will reasonably warrant a belief that petitioners
are probably guilty of violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 171(2) of the RPC.

While the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman are plenary in nature,
its acts may bereviewed by the Court when tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman
is considered to have gravely abused its discretion when it unduly disregarded crucial facts and
evidence in the determination of probable cause or when it blatantly violated the Constitution,
the law, or prevailing jurisprudence.

Observing the foregoing principles, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it issued the resolution and the order. The issuance of the resolution and
the order was properly grounded on probable cause to charge petitioners for their respective
violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 171(2) of the RPC.

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 2. Rule 112
JIMMY LIM PALACIOS, PETITIONER, V. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 240676, SECOND DIVISION, March 18, 2019, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Section 1,[31] Rule 112 of the Rules of Court requires the conduct of a preliminary investigation before
the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to fine.
In this case, although the OCP-QC conducted a preliminary investigation relative to the complaint filed
by Ramirez against petitioner, the latter bewails the lack of notice to him of the proceedings, which
resulted in his failure to participate in the preliminary investigation. He claims that Ramirez committed
fraud by intentionally giving the wrong address in her Sinumpaang-ReklamongSalaysay instead of his
true and correct residence address xxx
It bears to stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or
technical. As such, to deny petitioner's motion for reinvestigation on the basis of the provisions of A.M.
No. 11-6-10-SC would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process on purely
procedural grounds.
FACTS:
The present case stemmed from a complaint for violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262otherwise known
as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004" filed by Ramirez against
petitioner. Ramirez alleged that she and petitioner were married on November 17, 1987 and
thereafter, had a son. However, petitioner abandoned them and refused to give them financial
support, acts which constitute economic abuse under Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. Further, in her
Sinumpaang-ReklamongSalaysay filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City (OCP-QC),
she alleged that petitioner's residence where he may be served with summons is Block 3 Lot 24
Turquoise St., Las Piñas Royale Estate, Naga Road, Brgy. PulangLupa Dos, Las Piñas City.
Petitioner, through his lawyer, filed before the RTC an extremely very urgent motion for
reinvestigation and to recall warrant of arrest,decrying violation of his right to due process upon
learning of the case that Ramirez filed against him and the RTC's May 12, 2015 Order directing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. He alleged that he would not have been denied of his right to due
process and to a preliminary investigation had Ramirez not concealed his true and correct address,
i.e., Block 9 Lot 6 Pag-Ibig Homes, Talon IV, Las Piñas City. As a result of the fraud employed by
Ramirez, petitioner asserted that he was not able to interpose his valid and meritorious defenses to
show that no probable cause exists to charge him in this case
RTC: ruled against the petitioner.
CA: affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the denial of petitioner's motion for preliminary
investigation and to recall warrant of arrest. (YES)
RULING:Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The rationale of preliminary
investigation is to "protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense [,] and burden of defending
himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained

280
in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer.” Section 1,[31] Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
requires the conduct of a preliminary investigation before the filing of a complaint or
information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day without regard to fine.
In this case, although the OCP-QC conducted a preliminary investigation relative to the complaint
filed by Ramirez against petitioner, the latter bewails the lack of notice to him of the proceedings,
which resulted in his failure to participate in the preliminary investigation. He claims that Ramirez
committed fraud by intentionally giving the wrong address in her Sinumpaang-ReklamongSalaysay
instead of his true and correct residence address, which is Block 9 Lot 6 Pag-Ibig Homes, Talon IV,
Las Piñas City, as evidenced by: (a) a Certification dated July 10, 2017 issued by Barangay Talon
Kuatro, Las Piñas City; (b) his Seaman's Service Record Book; and (c) their Marriage Contract dated
November 17, 1987. To bolster his claim that Ramirez was fully aware of his correct address, he
pointed out that in the petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage and the Affidavit of
Withdrawal dated May 3, 1990, both of which Ramirez filed, she indicated his address at Block 9 Lot
6 Pag-Ibig Homes, Talon, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. Thus, petitioner contends that he was denied due
process when Ramirez supplied the wrong address when she filed the present complaint against him
It bears to stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or
technical. As such, to deny petitioner's motion for reinvestigation on the basis of the provisions of
A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due processon purely
procedural grounds. Thus, the courts a quo should allow petitioner to be accorded the right to submit
counter-affidavits and evidence in a preliminary investigation for, after all, "the fiscal is not called by
the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to
do justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice."
Given petitioner's insistence that Ramirez provided the wrong address in her complaint, it behooved
the respondent to show that petitioner was duly notified at the said address, especially in light of the
fact that the warrant for his arrest was returned unserved at the said address. Such failure, to the
Court's mind, compounded the violation of petitioner's constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process. Besides, the said certification in the Information is merely pro forma, and hence, does not
enjoy the presumption of regularity in its issuance. Consequently, Crim. Case No. R-QZN-15-04286
pending before the RTC must be suspended until the completion of a preliminary investigation in
order to afford petitioner a chance to present his counter-affidavit and any countervailing evidence.

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 E. Arrest (Rule 113)
PAULO JACKSON POLANGCOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 239866, 11 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In the very recent case of People v. Cristobal, the Court similarly held that the search was
unlawful because it was not preceded by a valid arrest. As the violations of the accused therein were
only punishable by fine, the Court ruled that there was no reason to arrest the accused, and, as a
consequence, no valid arrest preceded the search thereafter conducted. Accordingly, the Court held that
the accused therein must be acquitted as the evidence against him was rendered inadmissible by the
exclusionary rule provided under the Constitution.

The case of Cristobal squarely applies to this case. There was likewise no valid arrest to speak of
in this case — as Polangcos' violations were also punishable by fine only — and there could thus be no
valid "search incidental to lawful arrest." Ultimately, Polangcos must be similarly acquitted, as the
corpus delicti of the crime, i.e., the seized drug, is excluded evidence, inadmissible in any proceeding,
including this one, against him.

FACTS

Based on the version of the prosecution, SPO2 Juntanilla testified that he was on board a
mobile patrol car with his team along J.P. Rizal St., Marikina City, when they spotted a motorcycle
without a plate number. They then pursued the motorcycle. Furthermore, on cross-examination,
SPO2 Juntanilla stated that when they reached the motorcycle driven by Polangcos, he issued an
Ordinance Violation Receipt for violation of a city ordinance. However, prior to this, SPO2 Juntanilla
narrated that he frisked Polangcos first, and subsequently a piece of plastic sachet containing an
alleged shabu fell off the hat of Polangcos.

The defense was unable to present any evidence. Polangcos was not able to take the witness
stand as he was absent during the scheduled presentation of defense evidence.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Polangcos of violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165), relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty to hold that the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item were preserved.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's conviction of Polangcos. Polangcos filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the same. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE

Is Polangcos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11 of Article II of R.A. No.
9165?

RULING

282
 NO. The CA manifestly overlooked the undisputed fact that the seized item was confiscated
from Polangcos as he was being issued a traffic violation ticket. His violations consisted of (1) not
having a plate number, and (2) expired official receipt (OR) and certificate of registration (CR) of the
motorcycle he was riding.

Polangcos' main violation or the violation for which he was apprehended, which was the lack
of a plate number in his motorcycle, was punishable only by a city ordinance. Polangcos' second
violation — having expired OR and CR for the motorcycle — is likewise punishable only by fine. Even
SPO2 Rey J. Juntanilla (SPO2 Juntanilla), the apprehending officer, recognized that he arrested
Polangcos even though the penalty for his violation was merely a fine.

In view of the foregoing, SPO2 Juntanilla thus conducted an illegal search when he frisked
Polangcos for the foregoing violations which were punishable only by fine. He had no reason to
"arrest" Polangcos because the latter's violation did not entail a penalty of imprisonment. It was thus
not, as it could not have been, a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no, as there could
not have been any, lawful arrest to speak of.

In the very recent case of People v. Cristobal, the Court similarly held that the search was
unlawful because it was not preceded by a valid arrest. As the violations of the accused therein were
only punishable by fine, the Court ruled that there was no reason to arrest the accused, and, as a
consequence, no valid arrest preceded the search thereafter conducted. Accordingly, the Court held
that the accused therein must be acquitted as the evidence against him was rendered inadmissible
by the exclusionary rule provided under the Constitution.

The case of Cristobal squarely applies to this case. There was likewise no valid arrest to speak
of in this case — as Polangcos' violations were also punishable by fine only — and there could thus
be no valid "search incidental to lawful arrest." Ultimately, Polangcos must be similarly acquitted, as
the corpus delicti of the crime, i.e., the seized drug, is excluded evidence, inadmissible in any
proceeding, including this one, against him.

It is also worth pointing out that the circumstances under which the seized item was
discovered appears to be dubious. There is serious doubt as to whether Polangcos was really even
wearing a cap during his apprehension. This is because SPO2 Juntanilla himself testified that
Polangcos' violations were only, to repeat: (1) not having a plate number, and (2) expired OR and CR
of the motorcycle he was riding. SPO2 Juntanilla never suggested or asserted that Polangcos was not
wearing a helmet. It must be pointed out that RA 10054, or the Motorcycle Helmet Act of 2009,
requires that "all motorcycle riders, including drivers and back riders, shall at all times wear standard
protective motorcycle helmets while driving, whether long or short drives, in any type of road and
highway." If Polangcos was not violating RA 10054 — and was therefore wearing a helmet — at the
time of his apprehension, then how could he have worn a cap and a helmet at the same time?

To recall, the defense was not able to present any evidence, not even the testimony of the
accused. Despite this, the Court still acquits Polangcos for failure of the prosecution to offer proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

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 JOSEPH VILLASANA y CABAHUG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209078, 04 September 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Evidence seized as a result of an illegal warrantless arrest cannot be used against an accused
pursuant to Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Even if the seizure was reasonable, the arresting
officers' unjustified noncompliance with the legal safeguards under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
compromises the integrity of the confiscated drug. This creates reasonable doubt on the conviction of
the accused for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

FACTS
While PO3 Martinez was on duty at the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Unit of
the Valenzuela City Police Station, a confidential informant arrived and reported that Jojo Villasana
and Nida Villasana were rampantly selling drugs in Valenzuela City.

On the same day, a team was formed to conduct surveillance operations. It proceeded to the
target area on board three (3) vehicles: a car, a Revo van, and a motorcycle. PO3 Martinez, PO3
Soriano, and PO2 Magno parked on Hustisya Street and waited inside the van. Around 10 to 15
minutes later, they saw, through the van's tinted front windshield, Villasana coming out of an alley
around five (5) to six (6) meters away. He was holding a plastic sachet while talking to a woman. The
Police officers approached him discreetly.

As he reached Villasana, PO3 Martinez held his hand and introduced himself as a police
officer. He told Villasana not to throw the plastic sachet, to which the latter replied, "panggamit ko
lang to." After verifying that Villasana was indeed holding shabu, PO3 Martinez arrested him and
confiscated the sachet. The woman, however, was able to escape.

Villasana and the seized drug were brought to the Marulas Barangay Hall, where an inventory
was made. The inventory was signed by Kagawad Jose Mendez and a certain Artemus Latoc, a former
official. PO3 Martinez marked the confiscated item with Villasana's initials, "JCV," in the "office." Then,
he brought Villasana and the seized specimen to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Caloocan City for drug testing and laboratory examination.

For the defense, Villasana testified that he was having a conversation with Sabel and Diane
inside a jeepney, which was then parked in front of his house. Not far from them, a group of Police
officers arrived and accosted several persons that were playing cara y cruz. One (1) of the Police
officers, PO2 Sanchez, called Villasana to come out. He did as asked, but as he alighted from the
jeepney, PO2 Magno grabbed him by the waist and forced him to board a car parked behind the
jeepney. He tried to resist, but the arresting officers overpowered him.

In an Information, Villasana was charged with violation of Article II, Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for illegal possession of "one (1)
self-sealing transparent plastic bag containing 0.15 gram of white crystalline substance
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu)[.]"

Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a Decision convicting Villasana of the crime charged.
Villasana appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this
Petition.

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ISSUE
Was the guilt of Joseph Villasana y Cabahug proven beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING

NO. The prosecution failed to establish probable cause to justify the in flagrante delicto arrest
of Villasana. Thus, the ensuing seizure of the shabu purportedly in his possession is unlawful, and the
seized drug is, therefore, inadmissible in evidence.

For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer."

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, on the other hand, requires
that at the time of the arrest, an offense had just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the accused had committed it. In both instances, the
police officer must have personal knowledge of the commission of an offense.

Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself or herself witnesses the crime; in Section 5 (b), the
officer knows that a crime has just been committed and had witnessed some facts that led him or her
to believe that the person about to be arrested committed the offense.

On several occasions, the Court has invalidated warrantless arrests and ensuing searches and
seizures for the arresting officers' failure to comply with the overt act test, or for their lack of personal
knowledge that a crime has just been committed by the accused.

In this case, PO3 Martinez was about six (6) to ten (10) meters away when he saw Villasana
emerge from an alley, talking to a woman while holding a plastic sachet. His testimony fails to state
that he had personal knowledge that the sachet contained shabu, or that he saw the sachet containing
white crystalline substance, to create a reasonable suspicion that the sachet did indeed contain shabu.
From all indications — the time of the arrest being 11:30 p.m., PO3 Martinez's location, and the tinted
front windshield of the van through which he was looking — it was highly doubtful that PO3 Martinez
saw, let alone deciphered, the contents of the sachet. For sure, it was only when he held Villasana's
hand and confiscated the plastic sachet that he was able to verify its contents. With Villasana's arrest
being illegal, the subsequent seizure of the shabu allegedly in his possession becomes "unreasonable."

Likewise, Villasana's imputation of irregularities in the custody and the police officers'
handling of the seized shabu is well taken. From the facts on record, the police officers had
compromised the integrity of the shabu purportedly seized from him.

The corpus delicti in the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs consists in the
dangerous drug itself, without which no conviction of the accused can be obtained. Toward this end,
each link in the chain of custody of the seized drug must be accounted for to show that there was no
"tampering, alteration[,] or substitution either by accident or otherwise." The first and crucial stage
in the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs and other related items immediately upon

285
confiscation from the accused. Marking is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs. It
operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material, thus, is
indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value.

Here, PO3 Martinez stated during trial that he marked the seized sachet with accused-
appellant's initials "JCV" in the "office." But the office — whether in the Marulas Barangay Hall where
Villasana was supposedly first brought, or in the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Unit —
remained unclear from his testimony. In any case, it is manifest that the seized drugs were not
immediately marked upon seizure, and the records do not show why it was not done at the earliest
possible opportunity. More importantly, there is no clear showing that the marking had been done in
the presence of Villasana or his representative. Moreover, while it was stipulated that PO3 Martinez
delivered the specimen together with the letter-request for laboratory examination to the Crime
Laboratory in Sangandaan, Caloocan City, it is unclear who actually received the confiscated plastic
sachets and had their custody and possession before they were examined by Inspector Arturo.

Furthermore, there was noncompliance with the legal requirements under Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165. Section 21 defines the procedure to be followed by the apprehending officers
to ensure the integrity of the seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. Here, the inventory
sheet was not signed by representatives from the media and the Department of Justice, and there
were no photographs taken. These procedural lapses happened despite the conduct of a briefing
prior to the operation and PO3 Martinez's supposed experience in the conduct of drug-related
operations. PO3 Martinez neither tendered any justification in court, nor was there any explanation
or justification by the apprehending officers in the case records.

The police officers' unjustified noncompliance with the requirements for the marking and
inventory of the seized drugs overthrows the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official duty. Their "ostensibly approximate compliance" is not enough, and therefore, tantamount to
a failure to establish the corpus delicti. This raises reasonable doubt in Villasana's favor.

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 F. Bail (Rule 114)
MARIO JOEL T. REYES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 237172, 18 September 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The grant of bail after a judgment of conviction is discretionary upon the courts. Bail may be
denied if the courts find any of the circumstances present in Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

In this case, Mario Reyes was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan for graft and corrupt practice.
The Court initially allowed him to post bail in the decision convicting him. However, upon motion of the
prosecutor to cancel the bail due to flight risk, the Sandiganbayan revoke the imposition of bail. Reyes
cannot claim that the revocation was improper because a grant of bail after judgment is not a matter
of right but of discretion of the court.

FACTS

Mario Reyes as provincial governor of Palawan approve the small mining scale permit of
Olympic Mines and Development Corporation (Olympic Mines) and Platinum Group Metal
Corporation (Platinum Group), with the limit in extraction of 50,000 dry metric tons of laterite ore.

Later on, he renewed said permit before their expiry date, allegedly on the recommendation
of Provincial Mining Regulatory Board. This permit was subsequently nullified by DENR Secretary.
This nullification was overturned by the Office of the President.

However, Mario Reyes was then charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 when they allegedly gave unwarranted benefits, preference, and advantage to Olympic Mines
in the renewal of its Small-Scale Mining Permit.

The Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision finding Mario Reyes guilty of violation of Republic
Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e). The Sandiganbayan found that there was gross inexcusable negligence
when Reyes renewed SSMP PLW No. 37.1 during the validity of SSMP PLW No. 37. In its decision it
initially sets the bail of Mario Reyes. However, upon the Urgent Omnibus Motion of the prosecution
to cancel the bail due to him being a flight risk. Prosecution narrates that Mario Reyes had initially
been granted bail when he voluntarily surrendered on September 1, 2011, after he had filed a Waiver
of Appearance/Identity and a Hold Departure Order was issued against him. But on the scheduled
hearings on October 22 and 23, 2013, petitioner failed to appear, and it was later discovered that he
managed to escape to Thailand. He was only returned to the country with the assistance of Thai
authorities. As such, Sandiganbayan revoked the privilege of bail.

Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, he
filed this Petition.

ISSUE

Did the Sandiganbayan err in revoking his bail on the ground of violation of the conditions of
his bail and for possibility of flight?

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RULING

NO. Bail after conviction is not a matter of right. Its grant or cancellation is within the sound
discretion of the court. After conviction of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, the grant of bail becomes discretionary upon the court, which may either deny or
grant it. In circumstances where the penalty imposed exceeds six (6) years, the court is not precluded
from cancelling the bail previously granted upon a showing by the prosecution of the circumstances
enumerated in Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. The presence of even one (1) of the
enumerated circumstances is sufficient cause to deny or cancel bail.

The Sandiganbayan deemed it necessary to cancel petitioner's bail. Indeed, the factual
findings show the presence of two (2) circumstances stated in Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court: (1) petitioner had previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; and (2) he poses a flight risk if admitted to bail.
The Sandiganbayan did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, but rather, arrived at its decision with due
consideration of the arguments presented by the prosecution.

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 ALLEN C. PADUA and EMELITA F. PIMENTEL, petitioners, – versus – PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, FAMILY CHOICE GRAINS PROCESSING CENTER, INC.,and GOLDEN SEASON
GRAINS CENTER, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 220913, THIRD DIVISION, February 4, 2019, PERALTA, J.

We must also distinguish that bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. The accused has the right
to bail if the offense charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment"
before conviction. However, if the accused is charged with an offense and the penalty of which is
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment — regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution —
and when evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the
discretion of the trial court.

Thus, an accused who is charged with an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as in this case, they must be admitted to bail as they are entitled to it as a matter of right.
Here, considering that estafa is a bailable offense, petitioners no longer need to apply for bail as
they are entitled to bail, by operation of law. Where bail is a matter of right, it is ministerial on
the part of the trial judge to fix bail when no bail is recommended.

FACTS:

Juanito Tio (Tio), in his capacity as representative of Family Choice Grains Processing Center of
Cabatuan, Isabela filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners Allen Padua (Padua), Emelita
Pimentel (Pimentel), and Dante Frialde (Frialde), as officials of Nviro Filipino Corporation (Nviro).

In the complaint, Tio accused petitioners of falsely claiming that they are in the business of power
plant construction when their actual and authorized line of business only involves manufacturing
and selling fertilizer. Tio claimed that petitioners obtained €130,000.00 from Family Choice allegedly
for "expat fees," yet failed to remit the same to their supplier. Tio also alleged that petitioners failed
to make good of their promises to deliver the appropriate equipment and even demanded an
additional P23,618,401.00 despite being paid nearly 90% of the agreed construction price. As a result
of petitioners' swindling scheme, Tio claimed that Family Choice suffered actual damages amounting
to P16,388,253.90.

Petitioners, on the other hand, denied the allegations against them. They claimed that said allegations
were absurd, defamatory, libelous and wanting of any credible evidence. They asserted that they
never claimed to be in the business of power plant construction, and that they are only the accredited
agent/developer of K.E.M A/S Energy and Environmental Technology Company of Denmark. While
they admitted to have delivered a second-hand/incompatible equipment induction motor, they
explained that the same was not due to the fault of Nviro but of the local supplier. Nviro asserted that
the construction project was done in good faith and that they tried to complete the project in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the construction contract.

In a Resolution, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ferdimar Garcia found all the elements of the crime
of estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the RPC to be present. Thus, the filing of four (4)
separate Informations against petitioners for estafa under Article 315 were recommended.

289
Four (4) Informations for estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the RPC were filed against
petitioners Padua, Pimentel, and Frialde before the RTC. Consequently, a Warrant of Arrest was
issued by the RTC.

Four years after, petitioners Padua and Pimentel filed an Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad
Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) wherein they alleged that their co-accused
Frialde had died. They also alleged that it was only recently that they were able to find a lawyer who
explained to them that they are entitled to bail under the law and under existing jurisprudence.

Petitioners asserted that the Informations only charged them with estafa under paragraph 2(a),
Article 315 of the RPC. They claimed that the Informations failed to allege that the crimes charged
against them had been amended by P.D. No. 1689. Hence, the penalty for estafa under paragraph 2(a),
Article 315 of the RPC shall be in the range of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They averred that the
Informations, likewise, failed to allege any aggravating circumstance which is necessary for the
purpose of imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, petitioners averred that the imposable
penalty cannot exceed twenty (20) years of imprisonment which is the maximum of reclusion
temporal, therefore, the charges in the Informations are bailable, and that they are entitled to bail for
their provisional liberty.

The RTC denied petitioners' Omnibus Motion. The CA affirmed the ruling of the court a quo. It ruled
that the petitioners are still at large and have not surrendered nor been arrested. Thus, before public
respondent can act upon petitioners' application to fix bail and grant the same, they must submit
themselves first to the custody of the law signifying restraint on their person or custody over their
body, which is accomplished either by arrest or their voluntary surrender. A person applying for
admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose
of bail is to secure one's release, and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.

Petitioners maintain that being charged with estafa which is an offense punishable by reclusion
temporal, they should be granted bail as a matter of right. They also asserted that they already
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court when they filed their Omnibus Motion Ex-
Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) and, thus, there is no need to
make personal appearance.

Respondents, however, asserted that while petitioners were indeed charged with estafa under par.
2(a), Art. 315 of the RPC which is bailable, bail cannot still be granted to them who are at large. They
claimed that under the law, accused must be in the custody of the law regardless of whether bail is a
matter of right or discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners are entitled to bail. (YES)

RULING:

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution and
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The general rule, therefore, is that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with
an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is

290
strong. Thus, from the moment an accused is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and
he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

In the instant case, in four (4) Informations, petitioners were charged with estafa under paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the RPC. Clearly, in the instant case, petitioners are entitled to bail as a
matter of right as they have not been charged with a capital offense. Estafa, under Art. 315 of
the RPC as amended by R.A. 10951, which petitioners have been charged with, has an
imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, which is still bailable.

In addition, a person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
has no right to invoke the processes of that court. However, applying also the same pronouncement
in Tuliao, the Court also held therein that, "in adjudication of other reliefs sought by accused, it
requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the
person." Thus, except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that petitioners were at large when they filed their Omnibus
Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelamwherein they asked the court to quash the warrant of arrest and
fix the amount of the bail bond for their provisional release pending trial. However, albeit, at large,
it must be clarified that petitioners' Omnibus Motion is not an application for bail.They were
neither applying for bail, nor were they posting bail.

Thus, in filing the subject Omnibus Motion, petitioners are questioning the court's jurisdiction with
precaution and praying that the court fix the amount of bail because they believed that their right to
bail is a matter of right, by operation of law. They are not applying for bail, therefore, custody of
the law, or personal appearance is not required. To emphasize, custody of the law is required
before the court can act upon the application for bail, but it is not required for the adjudication of
other reliefs sought by the accused, as in the instant omnibus motion to quash warrant of arrest and
to fix bail.

We must also distinguish that bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. The accused has the right
to bail if the offense charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment"
before conviction. However, if the accused is charged with an offense and the penalty of which is
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment — regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution
— and when evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the
discretion of the trial court.

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the grant or denial of an application for bail is dependent on
whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called
for the purpose. The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a
matter of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion in granting bail may indeed be exercised only after
the evidence of guilt is submitted to the court during the bail hearing. It is precisely for this reason
why an accused must be in the custody of the law during an application for bail because where bail
is a matter of discretion, judicial discretion may only be exercised during bail hearing. However,
where bail is not a matter of discretion, as in fact it is a matter of right, no exercise of discretion is

291
needed because the accused's right to bail is a matter of right, by operation of law. An accused must
be granted bail if it is a matter of right.

Thus, an accused who is charged with an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as in this case, they must be admitted to bail as they are entitled to it as a matter of
right. Here, considering that estafa is a bailable offense, petitioners no longer need to apply
for bail as they are entitled to bail, by operation of law. Where bail is a matter of right, it is
ministerial on the part of the trial judge to fix bail when no bail is recommended.

292
 G. Arraignment and plea (Rule 116)
H. Motion to quash (Rule 117)
SOCORRO G. ONGKINGCO and MARIE PAZ B. ONGKINGCO v. KAZUHIRO SUGIYAMA and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 217787, 18 September 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

If the Information is filed by the public prosecutor without the city prosecutor's or his or her
deputy's approval both in the information and, the resolution for the filing thereof, then the court should
require the public prosecutor to seek the approval of the city prosecutor before arraignment; otherwise,
the case may be dismissed on the ground of lack of authority to file the information under Section 3 (d),
Rule 117. This ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, which may cause the dismissal of
the case.

In this particular case, there is proof in the records that Prosecutor II Hirang filed the
Informations with prior authority from the 1st Assistant City Prosecutor. The records — which include
those of the preliminary investigation accompanying the Informations filed before the court, as required
under Rule 112 — clearly show that 1st Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Jaime A. Adoc, signing in behalf
of the City Prosecutor, approved the filing of four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, after it was
recommended for approval by the Investigating Prosecutor.

FACTS

Four Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed by Prosecutor Edgardo Hirang after
four out of seven checks issued by Socorro and Maria Paz Ongkingco (Ongkingco) were drawn against
insufficient funds covering a series of transactions with Kazuhiro Sugiyama (Sugiyama).

Thirteen years after the filing of the Informations and after conviction, Ongkingco raised the
issue of the authority of the prosecutor to file the Information. Moreover, Marie Paz questioned her
conviction arguing that no notice of dishonor was given.

ISSUE

Is the Information valid?

RULING

YES. Socorro and Marie Paz are barred by laches for questioning the authority of the
prosecutor as it was made only thirteen years after.

In instances where the information is filed by an authorized officer, like a public prosecutor,
without the approval of the city prosecutor appearing in the Information, but the resolution for filing
of the Information bears the approval of the city prosecutor, or his or her duly authorized deputy,
and such lack of approval is timely objected to before arraignment, the court may require the public
prosecutor to have the signature of the city prosecutor affixed in the Information to avoid undue
delay.

293
 However, if the objection is raised after arraignment, at any stage of the proceeding or
even on appeal, the same should no longer be a ground to declare the Information as invalid, because
it is no longer a question of jurisdiction over the case.

After all, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor attached to the information carries
with it the recommendation to file the information and the approval to file the information by the
prosecutor, or his or her duly authorized deputy.

If the Information is filed by the public prosecutor without the city prosecutor's or his or her
deputy's approval both in the information and, the resolution for the filing thereof, then the court
should require the public prosecutor to seek the approval of the city prosecutor before arraignment;
otherwise, the case may be dismissed on the ground of lack of authority to file the information under
Section 3 (d), Rule 117. This ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, which may cause
the dismissal of the case.

If, however, the information is filed by an unauthorized official — not a public prosecutor,
like a private complainant, or even public officers who are not authorized by law or rule to file the
Information — then the Information is invalid from the very beginning, and the court should motu
proprio dismiss the case even without any motion to dismiss, because such kind of Information
cannot confer upon the court jurisdiction over the case.

In this particular case, there is proof in the records that Prosecutor II Hirang filed the
Informations with prior authority from the 1st Assistant City Prosecutor. The records — which
include those of the preliminary investigation accompanying the Informations filed before the court,
as required under Rule 112 — clearly show that 1st Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Jaime A. Adoc,
signing in behalf of the City Prosecutor, approved the filing of four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg.
22, after it was recommended for approval by the Investigating Prosecutor.

It would be too late at this stage to task the prosecution, and it would amount to denial of due
process, to presume that ACP Adoc had no authority to approve the filing of the subject Informations.
Had petitioners questioned ACP Adoc's authority or lack of approval by the city prosecutor before
the MeTC, and not just for the first time before the Court, the prosecution could have easily presented
such authority to approve the filing of the Information.

294
 I. Pre-trial (Rule 118)
J. Trial (Rule 119)
ROSEMARIE ERIBAL BOWDEN, represented by FLORENCIO C. ERIBAL, SR. v.
DONALD WILLIAM ALFRED BOWDEN
G.R. No. 228739, 17 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (J.C. Reyes, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In a nutshell, the remedy from an order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is a petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 grounded on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or denial of due process which renders the consequent order of acquittal null and void. It
being a nullity, the dismissal order does not result in jeopardy.

Rosemarie files the instant petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Civil Procedure,
instead of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, hence, an erroneous remedy. On this point alone, the
petition must be dismissed.

But even if a Rule 65 petition is filed, the same will not prosper since the CA did not act with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the cases for use of
falsified affidavit of loss and use of falsified deed of sale. The Court agrees with the CA that the Rosemarie
fails to put up a prima facie case of use of falsified documents which justifies the grant of the demurrer
but for a different reason.

FACTS

Rosemarie claimed that while she was in London, she entrusted the Original Receipt-
Certificate of Registration (OR-CR) of the subject vehicle to her niece. However, her husband Donald,
a British national, succeeded in procuring a new Certificate of Registration in his name. The marriage
of Rosemarie and Donald was later dissolved by virtue of a Decree of Divorce dated June 12, 2006.

Thereafter, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed two separate Informations before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), charging Donald of the crimes of falsification of public
document by a private individual and use of falsified documents.

Donald filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court claiming insufficiency of evidence
since Rosemarie's witnesses did not testify as to the identity of the person who affixed the forged
signature of Rosemarie in the affidavit of loss and submitted the falsified document to the Land
Transportation Office (LTO). Even Rosemarie admitted in her judicial affidavit that she did not see
Donald sign the affidavit of loss and deed of sale bearing her forged signature, more so present them
to the LTO.

MTCC acquitted Donald as to the charge of falsification. The trial court noted, however, that
the Informations are duplicitous, charging Donald with the commission of two crimes in each
information. But since Donald had been arraigned and had entered his plea of not guilty without a
motion to quash having been filed, Donald was deemed to have waived the defects in the
Informations.

295
 Consequently, Donald filed a petition for Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Roxas City, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in denying the demurrer on the
charge of use of falsified documents. The RTC dismissed the petition. It cited Section 23 (5), Rule 119
of the Rules of Court stating that the order denying the demurrer shall not be reviewable by appeal
or Certiorari before judgment.

On appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA), Donald invoked the ruling of the Court in Choa v.
Choa that Certiorari is available to challenge the denial of a demurrer when such denial is attended
with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE

Did the CA gravely err in granting the appeal interposed by Donald that Certiorari is available
to challenge the denial of a demurrer when such denial is attended with grave abuse of discretion?

RULING

NO. When the accused files a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence, it is
incumbent upon the trial court to review and examine the evidence presented by the prosecution
and determine its sufficiency to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. If
competent evidence exists, the court shall deny the demurrer and the accused may still adduce
evidence on his behalf if the demurrer was filed with leave of court. If filed without leave, the accused
submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution.

On the other hand, if the court finds the evidence insufficient to support a verdict of guilt, the
court shall grant the demurrer and the criminal case shall be dismissed. Such dismissal is a resolution
on the merits and tantamount to an acquittal. Any further prosecution of the accused after an
acquittal is a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Accordingly, an order
granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence cannot be the subject of an appeal. It bears stressing, however, that the Court is not at all
precluded from reviewing an order of denial if it is shown that grave abuse of discretion attended its
issuance.

In a nutshell, the remedy from an order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is a petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 grounded on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or denial of due process which renders the consequent order of acquittal null and void.
It being a nullity, the dismissal order does not result in jeopardy.

Rosemarie files the instant petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Civil
Procedure, instead of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, hence, an erroneous remedy. On this
point alone, the petition must be dismissed.

But even if a Rule 65 petition is filed, the same will not prosper since the CA did not act with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the cases for use
of falsified affidavit of loss and use of falsified deed of sale. The Court agrees with the CA that the

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Rosemarie fails to put up a prima facie case of use of falsified documents which justifies the grant of
the demurrer but for a different reason.

The last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes two acts: first, the
introduction of a falsified document as evidence in any judicial proceeding; and second, the use of a
falsified document in any other transaction. The second punishable act presupposes that the person
who used the falsified document is not the one who falsified such document.

Thus, the elements of the crime of use of falsified document in any transaction (other than as
evidence in a judicial proceeding) are: (1) the offender knew that a document was falsified by another
person; (2) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivision Nos. 1 and 2 of
Article 172; (3) he used such document (not in judicial proceedings); and (4) the use of the false
document caused damage to another or at least it was used with intent to cause such damage.

The information in Criminal Case No. C-06-15995-10 alleges that Donald prepared and
executed an affidavit of loss of OR-CR by "imitating the signature of Rosemarie Bowden y Eribal
therein making it appear that she signed the same" and submits it to the LTO which resulted in the
issuance of a second OR-CR in the name of Rosemarie. The information in Criminal Case No. C-06-
15996-10 meanwhile states that Donald executed a deed of sale in his favor imitating Rosemarie's
signature and thereafter, submits said deed to the LTO. Consequently, the LTO issued a new CR, this
time, in the name of Donald as the owner of the subject vehicle.

Obviously, the averments in the Informations implicate Donald as the person who falsified
the affidavit of loss and the deed of sale and used said falsified documents to the damage of
Rosemarie. But it is striking to note that in the crime of use of falsified document, the person who
used the falsified document is different from the one who falsified it such that "[i]f the one who used
the falsified document is the same person who falsified it, the crime is only falsification and the use
of the same is not a separate crime."

Falsification of a public document and use of false document by the same person who falsified
it constitute but a single crime of falsification. It follows, therefore, that with the dismissal of the case
for falsification of public documents, the case for use of falsified documents has no leg to stand on.

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 K. Judgment (Rule 120)
L. New trial or reconsideration (Rule 121)
M. Appeal (Rules 122, 123, 124 and 125)
PRIMO A. MINA, FELIX DE VERA, POMPEYO MAGALI, BERNADETTE AMOR AND PURIFICACION
DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, -versus – THE COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO C. TANDOC,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 239521, SECOND DIVISION, January 28, 2019, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the ORSPs the authority to rule with finality cases
subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, provided that: (a) the case is not
filed in the National Capital Region (NCR); and (b) the case, should it proceed to the courts, is cognizable
by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts (MCTCs) — which includes not only violations of city or municipal ordinances, but also all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine,
and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties attached thereto.

This is, however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the ORSP ruling, should the former
deem it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice. The foregoing amendment is further strengthened
by a later issuance, namely DOJ Department Circular No. 018-14 dated June 18, 2014, entitled "Revised
Delegation of Authority on Appealed Cases,"

In this case, records show that petitioners filed a criminal complaint before the OPP accusing Tandoc of
Perjury. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the OPP and such dismissal was upheld by the ORSP.
Since (a) the criminal complaint was filed outside of the NCR; (b) perjury cases are cognizable by the
first-level courts since the maximum penalty therefor is imprisonment for less than six (6) years; and (c)
it appears that the SOJ did not exercise its power of control and supervision over the entire NPS
by reviewing the ORSP ruling, the ORSP's affirmance of the OPP ruling was with finality. As such,
petitioners have already exhausted its administrative remedies and may now go to the CA via a
petition for certiorari.

FACTS:

This case stemmed from an Affidavit-Complaint for Perjury, as defined and penalized under Article
183 of the Revised Penal Code filed by petitioners against respondent Tandoc before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan (OPP). After the requisite preliminary investigation
proceedings, the OPP dismissed petitioners' criminal complaint against Tandoc for lack of probable
cause. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP)
located in San Fernando City, La Union. However, the ORSP affirmed the OPP's findings that no
probable cause exists to indict Tandoc for the crime of Perjury. Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA.

The CA dismissed the petition outright on the ground that petitioners availed of a wrong remedy. It
held that under Department of Justice (DOJ) Department Circular No. 70-A, petitioners should have
first appealed the adverse ORSP ruling to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) before elevating the matter to
the regular courts.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground of petitioners'
supposed availment of a wrong remedy. (YES)

RULING:

DOJ Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, entitled the "2000 NPS Rule on Appeal," governs
the appeals process in the National Prosecution Service (NPS). However, this procedure was
immediately amended by DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A dated July 10, 2000, entitled "Delegation
of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases," which reads:

DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 70-A

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases

“In order to expedite the disposition of appealed cases governed by Department Circular No. 70
dated July 3, 2000 ("2000 NPS RULE ON APPEAL"), all petitions for review of resolutions of
Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts , except in the National Capital Region, shall be filed with
the Regional State Prosecutor concerned who shall resolve such petitions with finality in
accordance with the pertinent rules prescribed in the said Department Circular.”

As may be gleaned above, DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the ORSPs the authority to
rule with finality cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it,
provided that: (a) the case is not filed in the National Capital Region (NCR); and (b) the case, should
it proceed to the courts, is cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial
Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) — which includes not only violations of
city or municipal ordinances, but also all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties attached thereto.

This is, however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the ORSP ruling, should the
former deem it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice. The foregoing amendment is further
strengthened by a later issuance, namely DOJ Department Circular No. 018-14 dated June 18, 2014,
entitled "Revised Delegation of Authority on Appealed Cases,"

In Cariaga v. Sapigao, the Court harmonized the foregoing DOJ Circulars, and accordingly, interpreted
the prevailing appeals process of the NPS as follows:

“(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs,
the ruling of the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the ORSP, which
ruling shall be with finality

(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the
ruling of the OCP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the Prosecutor
General, whose ruling shall be with finality;

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 (e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c), the SOJ may, pursuant to his power of
control and supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify, or
reverse the ruling of the ORSP or the Prosecutor General, as the case may be.”

In this case, records show that petitioners filed a criminal complaint before the OPP accusing Tandoc
of Perjury. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the OPP and such dismissal was upheld by the
ORSP. Since (a) the criminal complaint was filed outside of the NCR; (b) perjury cases are cognizable
by the first-level courts since the maximum penalty therefor is imprisonment for less than six (6)
years; and (c) it appears that the SOJ did not exercise its power of control and supervision over the
entire NPS by reviewing the ORSP ruling, the ORSP's affirmance of the OPP ruling was with finality.
As such, petitioners have already exhausted its administrative remedies and may now go to the CA
via a petition for certiorari. In this light, the Court concludes that the CA gravely abused its discretion
in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari filed before it by petitioners.

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 N. Search and seizure (Rule 126)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROSEMARIE GARDON-MENTOY
G.R. No. 223140, 04 September 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Inspections at checkpoints are confined to visual searches. An extensive search of the vehicle is
permissible only when the officer conducting the search had probable cause to believe prior to the
search that he will find inside the vehicle to be searched the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to
the commission of a crime.
In this case, there was no direct evidence on the identity of the culprit as of the time of the search
simply because the officers still had to know who Rose was from among the passengers. Also, the officers
did not immediately effect the arrest of the accused appellant once she had identified herself as Rose,
and the only explanation for this was that they still had to check if her bag had really
contained marijuana. Also, the arrest of Rosemarie did not justify the search of the personal belongings
because the arrest did not precede the search.
Hence, both the warrantless arrest of Rosemarie and the warrantless search of her personal
effects were unreasonable. The consequence is to invalidate the search.

FACTS
Rosemarie Gardon-Mentoy (Rosemarie) was charged for the crime of illegal transportation
of dangerous drugs as defined and penalized under Section 5 of Republic Act. No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002. She had been incriminated following the warrantless search
of her personal effects as a passenger of a shuttle van.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Rosemarie as charged. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE
Were the marijuana leaves supposedly taken from the bag of Rosemarie inadmissible
in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule?

RULING
YES. Generally, there can be no valid arrest, search and seizure without a warrant issued by
a competent judicial authority. The warrant, to be issued by a judge, must rest upon probable cause
- the existence of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed a crime, or is about to
do so; or the person whose property is to be searched has used the same to commit crime, and its
issuance must not be based on speculation, or surmise, or conjecture, or hearsay.

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 To enforce such inviolable right, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitutions enunciates the
exclusionary rule by unqualifiedly declaring that any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The exclusionary rule is
intended to deter the violation of the right to be protected from unreasonable searches and arrest.
The Court is mindful that the guarantee against warrantless arrests, and warrantless searches
and seizures admit of some exceptions. One such exception relates to arrests, searches and seizures
made at a police checkpoint. Indeed, routine inspections made at checkpoints have been regarded as
permissible and valid, if the inspections are limited to the following situations: (a) where the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle parked on the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks
inside a vehicle; (c) flashes a light into the vehicle without opening its doors; (d) where the occupants
of the vehicle are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicle
is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a
fixed area.
In short, inspections at checkpoints are confined to visual searches. An extensive search of
the vehicle is permissible only when the officer conducting the search had probable cause to
believe prior to the search that he will find inside the vehicle to be searched the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime.
In this case, there was no direct evidence on the identity of the culprit as of the time of the
search simply because the officers still had to know who Rose was from among the passengers.
Also, the officers did not immediately effect the arrest of the accused appellant once she had
identified herself as Rose, and the only explanation for this was that they still had to check if her bag
had really contained marijuana. As earlier noted, they claimed seeing her transferring from one bag
to another the block-shaped bundle, wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape, but their vaunted
suspicion of the contents being marijuana was SPO2 Felizarte's afterthought justification
considering that the contents of the bundle were not then visible on plain sight. It is noteworthy in
this regard that the contents would be revealed as marijuana only after the barangay captain had
opened the bag.
The arrest of Rosemarie did not justify the search of the personal belongings because the
arrest did not precede the search. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. Accordingly, there
should first be a lawful arrest before the warrantless search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed. As such, the search made against Rosemarie would be valid only if sufficient probable cause
to support it existed independently of the arrest.
The conclusion is inevitable that both the warrantless arrest of Rosemarie and the
warrantless search of her personal effects were unreasonable. The consequence is to invalidate the
search. The marijuana seized from her should be deemed inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the
exclusionary rule enunciated under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution. With the
confiscated marijuana being the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Rosemarie should be
acquitted because the evidence adduced against her was entirely inadmissible.

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 DANILO DE VILLA Y GUINTO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 224039, 11 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The ‘plain view’ doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which
he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the air. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must
be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

In this case, all the elements of the plain view doctrine were established. First, the police officers
were conducting a routine checkpoint when they flagged down Danilo on board his motorcycle. The
police officers noticed that Danilo, as abovementioned, was committing several traffic infractions, thus
the police officers had a prior justification for their act of flagging down Danilo and their subsequent
intrusion. Second, upon asking Danilo for his registration papers, Danilo opened his utility box, and the
two (2) sachets of shabu were plainly visible to the police officers. The discovery of the sachets was
inadvertent and the illicit items were immediately apparent. Lastly, PO2 Hamilton Salanguit (PO2
Salanguit) confiscated the sachets containing white crystalline substance since it appeared that the
same could be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

FACTS

From the narratives of prosecution's witnesses, police officers from Tuy (Batangas) Police
Station were conducting a checkpoint in Barangay Rizal when they flagged down a Green Honda
Wave motorcycle driven by Danilo with his wife Josefina Maria de Villa as back rider. Danilo was not
wearing helmet and shoes, and was only clad in sando. PO2 Salanguit approached Danilo and
thereupon noticed that the motorcycle did not have a license plate. He asked Danilo to show his
driver's license, but the latter could not present the same. PO2 Salanguit then requested Danilo to
show the registration papers. Danilo opened the motorcycle's utility box and took out a plastic
containing the LTO — issued license plate (WG-7720) as well as the photocopies of the motorcycle's
expired registration papers under the name of Alex Dayandayan which he handed to SPO1 Plata. At
this instance, PO2 Sanlanguit saw two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
inside the utility box which he confiscated. Immediately, the police officers bodily searched Danilo
and ordered him to empty the contents of his pocket. From Danilo’s right pocket, two (2) more plastic
sachets were recovered. PO2 Salanguit then marked the confiscated sachets.

Afterwards, Danilo and his wife, along with the seized items and the motorcycle, were
brought to the barangay hall where Danilo was photographed with the seized plastic sachets; and an
Inventory of the Property Seized/Confiscated was prepared by PO2 Salanguit and signed by the
Department of Justice representative, a media representative and the Barangay Chairman.
Thereafter, the seized items were brought by PO2 Salanguit and SPO1 Plata to the Batangas
Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for forensic examination which yielded a positive result for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a prohibited drug.

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 On the other hand, based on the version of the defense, Danilo and his wife went to Balayan,
Batangas — using the motorcycle of his friend Alexander Dayandayan — to purchase goods. While
they were traversing Barangay Rizal in Tuy, Batangas, they noticed a police patrol car was tailing
them, and eventually flagged them down. A police officer whose nameplate reads “SPO1 Buhay,”
alighted and asked him why the vehicle did not have a license number. Danilo answered that it was
inside the utility box which he immediately opened to retrieve the license plate and the registration
papers. He handed them to SPO1 Buhay, but a certain police officer named Romasanta approached
and told them that it is better to go to the police station for further investigation. At the Tuy police
station, they entered a room where a police officer inspected his pocket and the goods they bought
from Balayan, Batangas. At that point, Danilo’s wife was permitted to leave in order to get the original
copy of the Certificate of Registration from their house. Danilo was then transferred to another room
by SPO1 Plata who asked him about a person who was not known to him. After staying in the room
for four (4) hours, Danilo was directed to board the patrol car, along with an old person and a media
man, and proceeded to the barangay hall. There, he was photographed, with the plastic sachets of
shabu placed on top of the table, in the presence of the barangay chairman, the media representative,
and the DOJ representative. When they returned to the police station, Danilo was informed that he is
being charged with illegal possession of shabu.

RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the existence of all the elements
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

On appeal, the CA agreed with the RTC and affirmed Danilo’s conviction. Hence the instant
appeal.

ISSUE
Is Danilo’s guilt for violation of Section 11 (3) of R.A. No. 9165 proven beyond reasonable
doubt?

RULING

YES. As correctly ruled by the CA, all the elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
were duly proven by the prosecution. Moreover, there is no question that there was a valid
warrantless arrest of Danilo and seizure of the illegal drugs.

It is undeniable that the seizure of the prohibited items in this case was valid under the "plain
view" doctrine. In People v. Lagman, the Court laid down the following parameters for the application
of this doctrine: Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have
that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.
The ‘plain view’ doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which
he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion
or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the air. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object
must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

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 In this case, all the elements of the plain view doctrine were established. First, the police
officers were conducting a routine checkpoint when they flagged down Danilo on board his
motorcycle. The police officers noticed that Danilo, as abovementioned, was committing several
traffic infractions, thus the police officers had a prior justification for their act of flagging down Danilo
and their subsequent intrusion. Second, upon asking Danilo for his registration papers, Danilo opened
his utility box, and the two (2) sachets of shabu were plainly visible to the police officers. The
discovery of the sachets was inadvertent and the illicit items were immediately apparent. Lastly, PO2
Hamilton Salanguit (PO2 Salanguit) confiscated the sachets containing white crystalline substance
since it appeared that the same could be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure.

As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General and settled by the CA, non-
participation of the PDEA does not automatically affect and validity of a buy-bust operation.
Especially as in the case where there was no buy-bust operation, but an in flagrante delicto arrest and
seizure by reason of a routine checkpoint operation.

In the case of People v. Sta. Maria, it is thus clear that the PDEA is merely the lead agency, but
is not the sole agency in the investigation and prosecution of drug-related cases. There is nothing in
RA 9165 which even remotely indicates the intention of the legislature to make an arrest made
without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest
inadmissible. Thus, Danilo's argument that his arrest and the seizure of the illegal drugs is not legal
due to the non-participation of the PDEA must necessarily fail.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SIEGFREDO OBIAS, JR., Y ARROYO
A.K.A. "BOBOY", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 222187, FIRST DIVISION, March 25, 2019, DEL CASTILLO, J.

To be reasonable and valid, the search must be witnessed primarily by the lawful occupant of the place
or any member of his family. It is only in their absence, that two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
and who are residents of the place searched, may be witnesses to the search. The order of preference
cannot be disregarded, interchanged or intercalated.

Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the drug is in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other
hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or
when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it [was] found. Exclusive
possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control
and dominion over the place where the contraband is located is shared with another.

FACTS:

NBI Legaspi District Office had conducted surveillance and test buy operations on a certain Boboy
Obias who was dealing with shabu, a prohibited drug, at his rest house and cock farm situated at
Diamond Street, Villa Grande Homes Subdivision, Concepcion Grande, Naga City. Pursuant thereto,
the NBI applied for and secured Search Warrant Nos. 2008-021 and 2008-022 dated 11 September
2008 from Executive Judge Jaime E. Contreras to search the above-described premises and seize any
shabu as well as drug paraphernalia such as aluminum foils, water pipes, lighters with fluid, burner
with acetone and tanita weighing scale that may be found thereat.
At around 9:30 P.M. of 13 September 2008, with assistance from the Philippine National Police (PNP),
and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), NBI agents led by Special Investigator III Felipe
Jessie Jimenez, Jr. proceeded to the said address to serve the two (2) Search Warrants against Boboy
Obias, the accused-appellant. The team invited Barangay Chairman Elmer Baldemoro and some
barangay tanods of Concepcion Grande, media reporters from ABS-CBN Naga City, GMA 7 Network
and Weekly Digest, and Assistant City Prosecutors Joveliza P. Soriano and Cyril Manzano. The team
first secured the perimeter area and compound subject of the search warrants and thereafter served
the same on accused-appellant.

All persons inside the premises were gathered in the receiving area of the rest house, while the search
party (consisting of Special Investigator III Felipe Jessie S. Jimenez, Jr., Barangay Chairman
[Baldemoro], PDEA agent Christopher Viana, media representatives, ACP Soriano, and other NBI
agents) brought along accused-appellant during the conduct of the search. In the course of the search,
they found several plastic sachets of white crystalline substance as well as assorted drug
paraphernalia in certain portions of the subject premises, viz.: inside a bedroom in the elevated
portion, inside a makeshift bedroom located under the house ("sirong"), inside the kitchen, and
several particles of white crystalline substance on the grass near the cock shelter. The search was
videotaped and photographed by Special Investigator III Edwin E. Romano as well as by the media
personnel. Sometime later, after the light switch was located, another search was conducted in the
kitchen area where they found hidden under a stove a cigarette pack colored green and the contents
thereof were later marked as 'MBL-ITEM A-30' and series.

306
Thereafter, the seized items were photographed, sealed in plastic, and then marked by Special
Investigator IV Manuel Mario B. Lanoza with his initials 'MBL' in the presence of accused-appellant
and other members of the search party. Special Investigator III Rowan Victor M. Estrellano prepared
the Inventory Sheets of the seized items which were signed by Barangay Chairman Baldemoro, the
three (3) media representatives and by ACP Soriano as representative of the Department of Justice.
However, accused-appellant refused to sign the said inventory sheets; neither did he acknowledge
receipt of a copy of the search warrants against him.

The NBI submitted a return to the issuing court, presenting accused-appellant and the seized items
from his rest house and cock farm. The items were then withdrawn for the purpose of chemical
examination at the crime laboratory. Upon receipt of the specimens at 10:00 A.M. of 14 September
2008, Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Edsel Villalobos of the PNP Camarines Sur Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office examined the submitted specimens and then issued Chemistry Report D-44-2008
certifying that the white crystalline substances proved positive for the dangerous drug
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.Thus, in two Informations filed before the RTC of Naga
City, appellant was separately charged with violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of RA 9165.

The RTC convicted the appellant of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling. The CA ruled that the conduct of the search
was made in accordance with the procedure provided in Section 8 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
All the prosecution witnesses attested that appellant personally witnessed the search. It held that
being the owner of the cock farm and the rest house, appellant clearly had full control and dominion
over the place where the seized items were recovered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred that the conduct of the search was made in accordance with the
procedure provided in the Rules of Court

RULING:

It is well settled that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a
competent judicial authority. it must be emphasized that a search warrant validly and lawfully issued
by a competent authority does not provide unbridled freedom to the peace officer in the manner of
implementing the same. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court cautions that: Section. 8. Search of
house, room or any other premises to be made in presence of two witnesses - No search of a house,
room or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or
any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. Thus, to be reasonable and valid, the search must be witnessed
primarily by the lawful occupant of the place or any member of his family. It is only in their absence,
that two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion and who are residents of the place searched, may
be witnesses to the search. The order of preference cannot be disregarded, interchanged or
intercalated.

In his final bid for reversal of his conviction, appellant contends that the search was illegally and
irregularly conducted and violative of his constitutional rights. Appellant argues that the members of
the raiding team were freely roaming around the house and the surrounding yard, unaccompanied
by any of the required witnesses, in violation of the spirit and letter of the law, as enunciated

307
in Quintero v. National Bureau of Investigation. Moreover, he asserts that the search was conducted
without his presence since he was forced to stay inside the receiving area.

appellant's averment that the search was not made in his presence has no basis; besides, it cannot
prevail and overturn the positive, straightforward and consistent testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that the search was done in the presence of the appellant himself. In fact, appellant himself
admitted that he accompanied the search team throughout the conduct of the search. his is, in fact,
confirmed implicitly by accused-appellant himself who testified that he 'was forced' to go with the
team. More revealing is the fact that his personal presence was proven by the photographs and video
footages taken during the search. Next, appellant disclaims ownership of the place searched. He
alleged that the seized illegal items were found not in his actual possession but inside the bedroom
of the rest house occupied by Boyet and Tabor Alejandria.

It remains unrefuted that, at the time of the search, appellant was the owner and possessor of the
rest house based on established facts and evidence. As owner of the cock farm and the rest house,
appellant clearly had full control and dominion over all the rooms located therein, including the
bedroom where the thing seized were located. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the
immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists
when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it [was] found. Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the
place where the contraband is located is shared with another.

O. Provisional remedies in criminal cases (Rule 127)

P. Revised Guidelines on Continuous Trial (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC)
Q. The Rule on Cybercrime Warrants (A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC)

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VIII. EVIDENCE
A. General concepts
1. Proof vs. evidence
2. Burden of proof vs. burden of evidence

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOJO BACYAAN, et. al.

G.R. No. 238457, 18 September 2019, THIRD DIVISION, (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, the findings of the trial
courts deserve utmost respect. In this case, appellants invariably interposed alibi and denial as their
defenses. Needless to say, these are inherently weak defenses as they constitute self-serving, negative
evidence and may easily be fabricated. These cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight that the
declaration of the prosecution witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

FACTS
Jojo Bacyaan (Bacyaan), et. al. were charged with the crimes of robbery with homicide and
serious illegal detention. These two cases were consolidated before the RTC. On arraignment, Jojo
Bacyaan, et. al. entered their respective pleas of not guilty.
Giovanni Cuadro (Cuadro) testified that on the 31st of May 2017, he boarded the JMK bus
along Ayala Avenue, Makati City. When the bus reached EDSA-Ayala Flyover, six armed men declared
a hold-up. He identified Bacyaan as the one who announced the hold-up, while Ryan (Guevarra) and
Ronnie Fernandez (Fernandez) were the ones who divested himself and the other passengers of their
personal belongings including money. When the bus reached Caloocan City, the policemen flagged it
down. As passengers tried to escape, Bacyaan shot a passenger and the bus driver, which led to their
deaths.
Thereafter, Bacyaan, et. al. grabbed a passenger to be used as a shield. They also grabbed
Cuadro and two female passengers outside the bus as they looked for a vehicle to commandeer. They
saw a Mitsubishi Adventure van with the driver inside, boarded it, pointed the gun at the driver, and
ordered him to look for an exit route. Bacyaan, et. al. exchanged shots with the pursuing policemen
until the vehicle finally ditched into a gutter. According to Cuardo, he escaped through a broken
windshield and saw Bacyaan, et. al. commandeering a dumb truck to escape.
Police Officer I Engracio Baluya (Baluya) also testified that a concerned citizen approached
him and reported that the accused had boarded a dumb truck. Together with his team, Baluya
pursued appellants and another exchange of gunshots ensued until the driver of the dumb truck
jumped out causing the vehicle to stop.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a verdict of conviction. The trial court held that
Bacyaan, et. al.’s bare defenses of alibi and denial cannot be appreciated against the positive
identification of appellants as well as the categorical and consistent testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.

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 The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the trial court’s ruling of conviction for the crime of
robbery with homicide but dismissed the criminal case for serious illegal detention. It held that the
detention of the victims was only incidental to the main crime of robbery; hence, it was deemed
absorbed.

ISSUE
Did the RTC err in disregarding the defense of Bacyaan, et al. and convicting them of the crime
charged?

RULING
NO. It is settled that “when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their
respective testimonies, the trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are
often accorded finality, unless it appears that the lower courts had overlooked, misunderstood or mis
appreciated some fact or circumstance of weight, which, if properly considered, would alter the result
of the case.
The Court ruled in People v. Dela Cruz, the well-entrenched rule is that the matter of assigning
values to the testimonies of witnesses is best discharged by the trial court, and appellate courts will
not generally disturb the findings of the trial court in this respect. The reason is quite simple: the trial
judge is in a better position to determine the conflicting testimonies of witnesses after having heard
them and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.
In this case, the Court found no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the RTC, as affirmed
by the CA, as it was not shown that the lower courts had overlooked, misunderstood, or mis
appreciated facts or circumstances of weight that could have altered the result of the case.

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 3. Equipoise rule
B. Admissibility
1. Requisites (Rule 128)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO and JULIUS L. LACANILAO
G.R. No. 240053, 09 October 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Although
the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it
may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is compelling reason. The Court
finds no reason to depart from its practice to liberally construe procedural rules for the orderly
administration of substantial justice.

Here, a strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the grant of
reprieve by the Indonesian authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony, being the victim, is vital in
the prosecution of the pending criminal cases that were filed against Cristina and Julius. Hence, the
taking of testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.
.
FACTS
Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia. Believing that the
job was a ray of hope, Mary Jane resorted to borrowing money for placement fee from her relatives.

Mary Jane, together with Cristina, eventually left the Philippines for Malaysia. However, to
Mary Jane's dismay, she was informed upon their arrival in Malaysia that the job intended for her
was no longer available. After spending a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to Indonesia
with a promise that she will have a job upon her return in Malaysia. Upon Mary Jane's arrival in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, she was apprehended by the police officers for allegedly carrying 2.6
kilograms of heroin inside her luggage. She was accordingly charged and convicted with drug
trafficking before the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. She was sentenced to death by
firing squad. Mary Jane is detained at the Wirogunan Penitentiary in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Cristina and Julius were arrested. Thereafter, they were
charged with qualified trafficking in person and were likewise charged in two separate Informations
with the crime of illegal recruitment and estafa filed before the trial court.

Representatives from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) went to
Wirugonan Prison to interview Mary Jane. She executed a document known as "Sinumpaang Salaysay
ni Mary Jane Fiesta Veloso".

On the basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government requested the Indonesian
Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian
Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her
testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius. A few hours before the scheduled execution

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of Mary Jane, the President of Indonesia, His Excellency Joko Widodo, granted her an indefinite
reprieve. The Indonesian authorities however imposed conditions relative to the taking of Mary
Jane's testimony.

Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant
Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories." It averred that the taking of Mary
Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon written interrogatories is allowed under Rule
23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is out of the country and will not be able to testify
personally before the court due to her imprisonment. The OSG averred that Cristina and Julius will
still have an opportunity to examine Mary Jane by propounding their own set of written
interrogatories through the designated consular officer who will be taking the deposition; moreover,
they were not precluded from objecting to the questions and answers. Cristina and Julius objected to
the motion asserting that the deposition should be made before and not during the trial. Also, they
argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary
Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.

The trial court granted the prosecution's motion. Undeterred, Cristina and Julius filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the Resolution of the trial
court. Aggrieved, the OSG filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

ISSUES

(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in granting the writ of Certiorari?
(2) May Mary Jane's testimony be validly acquired through deposition by written
interrogatories?

RULING

(1) YES. A writ of Certiorari is limited in scope and narrow in character. It is available only to
correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
In other words, Certiorari is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of procedure or
mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. Thus, any alleged errors committed by the
trial court within the bounds of its jurisdiction and in the exercise of its discretion are mere errors of
judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and
not by a petition for Certiorari.

It must be emphasized that the errors imputed against the trial court by Cristina and Julius in
their Petition for Certiorari pertained only to its appreciation of the factual milieu, and the application
of pertinent law and rules. Plainly, their Petition for Certiorari did not contain factual allegations that
can support a finding of grave abuse of discretion. These alleged errors, if at all, amounted only to
erroneous exercise of the lower court's judgment, an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction,
which does not justify Cristina's and Julius's resort to a Certiorari proceeding.

Indubitably, there was absence of any proof that the grant of the taking of deposition through
written interrogatories by the trial court was made in an arbitrary, whimsical, and capricious
manner. There was no patent abuse of discretion which was so gross in nature thereby amounting to

312
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all
in contemplation of law. What was only apparent in the instant case was that the trial court properly
considered the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the plight of Mary Jane, in relation to
applicable rules and jurisprudence. Clearly, there was an honest effort on the part of the trial court
to support its ratiocination and conclusion based on facts and law.

(2) YES. In denying the State's motion for deposition through written interrogatories and
effectively requiring the presence of Mary Jane before the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the CA
appeared to have strictly and rigidly applied and interpreted Section 15, Rule 119 without taking into
consideration the concomitant right to due process of Mary Jane and the State as well as the prejudice
that will be caused.

The peculiar circumstances obtaining in the present case made it impossible for Mary Jane to
appear before the RTC. Just like when Mary Jane was recruited by Cristina and Julius and taken
advantage of because of her poor condition, the same scenario is being repeated because Cristina and
Julius are again taking advantage of Mary Jane's dire circumstances which they themselves put her
in, by depriving her opportunity to speak and obtain justice for herself. The Court of Appeals did not
take into account the fact that the case of the prosecution against Cristina and Julius can only be
erected through the testimony of Mary Jane herself.

Moreover, there are several instances wherein the Court has relaxed procedural rules to
serve substantial justice because of any of the following reasons: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a
deposition of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave offense by final
judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the testimony of such
witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable
to testify in open court because he is imprisoned in another country.

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Although
the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds
that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is compelling reason. The
Court finds no reason to depart from its practice to liberally construe procedural rules for the orderly
administration of substantial justice. A strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very
purpose for the grant of reprieve by the Indonesian authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony,
being the victim, is vital in the prosecution of the pending criminal cases that were filed against
Cristina and Julius. Hence, the taking of testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written
interrogatories is in order.

Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional right
to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius. True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to
confront Mary Jane face to face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the terms and
conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-

313
examine Mary Jane by way of written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their
constitutional right.
Finally, it must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the recognized exceptions
to the right to confrontation. In the case at bar, it will not be amiss to state that Mary Jane's deposition
through written interrogatories is akin to her dying declaration. There is no doubt that Mary Jane will
be answering the written interrogatories under the consciousness of an impending death - or
execution by a firing squad to be exact.

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 2. Exclusionary rules
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
JAIME SISON, LEONARDO YANSON, AND ROSALIE BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 238453, 31 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The police officers here proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and arrest on the basis of a solitary
tip: the radio message that a certain pickup carrying three (3) people was transporting marijuana.
Exclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the very nature of probable cause.
A single hint hardly amounts to "the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched."

FACTS
The Municipal Police Station of M'lang, North Cotabato received a radio message about a
silver gray Isuzu pickup was transporting marijuana. The team set-up a check point. The tipped
vehicle reached the checkpoint and was stopped by the team of police officers on standby. The team
leader asked the driver about inspecting the vehicle. The driver alighted, and, at an officer's prodding,
opened the pickup's hood. Two (2) sacks of marijuana were discovered beside the engine.
An Information was filed against Sison, Yanson, and Bautista before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Kabacan, Cotabato City, charging them with violation of Section 4 of Dangerous Drugs Act.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Yanson, Sison, and Bautista (Yanson et al.) of the crime
charged. It sustained the search conducted on the tipped vehicle as a valid warrantless search
because, according to the same, Yanson et al. consented anyway. Further, there were apparent
inconsistencies with their testimonies. It also ruled that the three of them are engaged in a
conspiracy.
Yanson, in an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), contended that the two (2) sacks of
marijuana supposedly seized from him, Bautista, and Sison are inadmissible evidence since the police
officers did not have probable cause to conduct a search on their vehicle. The radio message,
according to him, is the sole basis of the belief of the alleged transportation and cannot be a sole basis
of probable cause. In the absence of probable cause, it should be limited only to visual search. He
could not have freely consented to the search because he was surrounded by police officers and could
not feel secure in declining.

He also said that he was entitled to benefit from the favorable amendatory provisions of
Republic Act No. 9165. Yanson claimed that the police officers who arrested them failed to faithfully
comply with Section 21, particularly when they failed to mark and seal the two (2) sacks of marijuana
allegedly found under the pickup's hood. He also contended that he was not engaged in conspiracy
with his co-accused, that he was simply a passenger who had no knowledge of whatever materials
lay under the pickup's hood.
The Court of Appeals (CA) denied his appeal.

315
ISSUE
Is Leonardo Yanson's guilt for illegally transporting marijuana established beyond
reasonable doubt?

RULING
NO. In determining the existence of probable cause, bare suspicion is never enough. While
probable cause does not demand moral certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify conviction, it
requires the existence of "a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged." In People v. Coaged, law enforcers "must not rely on a single
suspicious circumstance." What is required is the "presence of more than one seemingly innocent
activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."
The police officers here proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and arrest on the basis of a
solitary tip: the radio message that a certain pickup carrying three (3) people was transporting
marijuana. Exclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the very nature of
probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to "the existence of such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched." To maintain
otherwise would be to sanction frivolity, opening the floodgates to unfounded searches, seizures, and
arrests that may be initiated by sly informants.
As to the alleged consent given by Yanson, Jurisprudence has settled that "[m]ere passive
conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which amounts to
no consent at all." The validity of a supposedly consented warrantless search is contingent on the
totality of the attendant circumstances. This may entail an inquiry into the environment in which the
consent was ostensibly given, such as "the presence of coercive police procedures." He was under the
coercive force of armed law enforcers.
Since the marijuana is produced from an illegal search, it should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. This exclusionary rule is a protection against erring officers who
deliberately or negligently disregard the proper procedure in effecting searches, and would so
recklessly trample on one's right to privacy. In cases involving drugs, the confiscated article
constitutes the corpus delicti of the crime charged.
His co-accused, Sison and Bautista, must also be acquitted. Rule 122, Section 11 (a) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure says that as a rule, the effects of an appeal can only bind the
accused who appealed his or her conviction. However, when an appellate court renders a favorable
judgment, the effects of such favorable judgment extends even to those who did not appeal, to the
extent that such effects apply to their specific contexts.

316
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- REY BARRION Y SILVA, Accused-
Appellant.
G.R. No. 240541, SECOND DIVISION, January 21, 2019, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the
apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses,
albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness of these efforts must be examined on a
case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is for the Court to be convinced that the failure to comply
was reasonable under the given circumstances. Thus, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual
serious attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient
time – beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused
until the time of his arrest – to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand, knowing fully well that they would have to strictly comply with the chain of
custody rule.

In this case, there was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of the inventory and
photography was not witnessed by a media representative. While SPO1 Umali acknowledged the
absence of a media representative during the conduct of inventory, he failed to offer any reasonable
justification for the same.

FACTS:

An Information was filed before the RTC charging Rey Barrion of the crime of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs. On August 10, 2011police successfully implemented a buy-bust operation against
Barrion, during which one plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was recovered from
him. PO2 Dan Gonzales then marked the seized item at the place of arrest, and thereafter, brought it
to the police station along with Barrion. Thereat, PO2 Gonzales placed the seized item in a bigger
plastic sachet and marked the same accordingly. The seized item was then inventoried in the
presence of Rodel Limbo, a DOJ representative, and Teresita Reyes, a barangay councilor.Finally, the
seized item was brought to the crime laboratory, where, upon examination, the contents thereof
tested positive for 0.04 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

The RTC found Barrion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the
RTC ruling. Hence, this appeal seeking that Barrion's conviction be overturned.

ISSUE:

Whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs seized has been compromised in view of
absence of a media representative during the conduct of the inventory. (Yes)

RULING:

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165,it is essential
that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, warrants an acquittal.

317
To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to
account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law
requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be
conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same.

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as
certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "a
representative from the media and the [DOJ], and any elected public official"; or (b) if after the
amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media." The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to
ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence."

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the same has
been regarded "not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive
law." Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance
with the chain of custody procedure may not always be possible. As such, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that:
(a) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. The foregoing is based on the saving clause found in Section 21
(a), Art II of the IRR of RA 9165, which was later adopted into the text of RA 10640. However, for the
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must duly explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.

Anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the
apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses,
albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness of these efforts must be examined on a
case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is for the Court to be convinced that the failure to
comply was reasonable under the given circumstances. Thus, mere statements of unavailability,
absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified
grounds for non-compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time – beginning from the moment they have received the information
about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest – to prepare for a buy-bust operation
and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand, knowing fully well that they would
have to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule.

In this case, there was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of
the inventory and photography was not witnessed by a media representative. While SPO1
Umali acknowledged the absence of a media representative during the conduct of inventory,
he failed to offer any reasonable justification for the same. As already discussed, mere
statements claiming that they tried to call the media representative, without, however,
showing that they exerted earnest efforts to secure his presence, are insufficient to trigger
the operation of the saving clause. In view of this unjustified deviation from the chain of

318
custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the item purportedly seized from Barrion was compromised, which
consequently warrants his acquittal.

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 3. Judicial notice and judicial admissions (Rule 129)
MASAKAZU UEMATSU v. ALMA BALINON
G.R. No. 234812, 25 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In fine, there is forum shopping when a party files two or more cases involving the same parties,
causes of action and reliefs. Notably, forum shopping is one of the grounds for the dismissal of a case. In
this case, the identity of parties in the Dissolution case and in the Motion to Account (filed in the PPO
case) cannot be denied. Both of these cases involved Masakazu Uematsu and Alma. Moreover, the rights
and reliefs asserted by Masakazu Uematsu in the Dissolution case pertained to the same ones that he
declared in the Motion to Account.

FACTS
The case emanated from a Petition for the issuance of a permanent protection order (PPO)
and plea for issuance of temporary restraining order under R.A. No. 9262 (PPO case) filed by Alma
Balinon against Masakazu Uematsu. Alma asserted that she filed the case due to the physical,
emotional, mental and sexual abuses committed against her by Masakazu Uematsu, her common-law
spouse who was a drug dependent.
In the Decision of the Regional Trial Court Tagum (RTC-Tagum), the petition for the PPO case
was granted. Almost three years after the finality of the PPO case, Masakazu Uematsu filed a
complaint with RTC-Lapu-Lapu for the dissolution of co-ownership, liquidation, and accounting
(Dissolution case) against Alma.
While the Dissolution case was pending, Masakazu Uematsu filed with the RTC-Tagum a
Motion to Account, praying that Alma be ordered to account all the proceeds of their closed
businesses and sold properties. However, despite the 15-day extension period granted her, Alma
failed to file her comment. In its Order, RTC-Tagum directed Alma to explain why she should not be
sanctioned for her failure to comply with the directive of the court within a period of five days.
RTC-Tagum then found Alma guilty of indirect contempt. Consequently, Alma filed a notice of
appeal, which RTC-Tagum denied. After which, Alma filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA).
CA decreed that Masakazu Uematsu’s Motion to Account must be dismissed because he
committed forum shopping when he filed it despite the pendency of the Dissolution case before the
RTC-Lapu-Lapu. It noted that: (1) there was forum shopping considering that these two actions
pertained to the same parties, the rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for arose from the same facts;
(2) and any ruling in them would amount to res judicata. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Did Masakazu Uematsu commit forum shopping when he filed the Motion to Account before
the RTC-Tagum even if he pursued it during the pendency of his Dissolution case with the RTC-Lapu-
Lapu?

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RULING
YES. In fine, there is forum shopping when a party files two or more cases involving the same
parties, causes of action and reliefs. Notably, forum shopping is one of the grounds for the dismissal
of a case. The rule against it aims to avoid the rendition of two competent courts of separate and
opposite rulings which may arise because a party-litigant takes advantage and tries his or her luck
into seeking relief until a result in one’s favor is attained.
In this case, the identity of parties in the Dissolution case and in the Motion to Account (filed
in the PPO case) cannot be denied. Both of these cases involved Masakazu Uematsu and Alma.
Moreover, the rights and reliefs asserted by Masakazu Uematsu in the Dissolution case pertained to
the same ones that he declared in the Motion to Account.
To stress, in the Dissolution case, Masakazu Uematsu prayed that: (1) an order be issued
against Alma in order for their co-ownership to be wound up and accounted, and for Alma to turn
over papers and effects affecting the co-ownership; and (2) for the affairs to be settled and
distribution to be made to them. In said case, Masakazu Uematsu listed real properties located in
Tagum City, which, he claimed to have been purchased because of his and Alma’s lending business
and which were subject of their supposed co-ownership.
On the other hand, in his Motion to Account filed in the PPO case, M prayed for the court to
order Alma to account all the proceeds of his and Alma’s closed business and sold properties.
Interestingly, Masakazu Uematsu listed the same properties in the Motion to Account as those he
listed in the Dissolution case. He also similarly stated in the Motion to Account that these properties
were acquired by his and Alma’s joint efforts or in other words, were co-owned by them.
In sum, it cannot be mistaken that the Dissolution case and the Motion to Account (in the PPO
case) were practically pursuant to the same facts and reliefs asked for, that is, for an accounting of
the co-owned properties of the parties. They are so interrelated that any disposition made in any of
them, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata. Evidently, the subsequent
filing of the Motion to Account despite the pendency of the Dissolution case was unnecessary and
vexatious; thus, it should have been dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping.

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 C. Object (Real) Evidence (Rule 130, A)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALTANTOR DELA TORRE y CABALAR
G.R. No. 225789, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Strict adherence to the chain custody rule must be observed. The sheer ease of planting drug
evidence vis-à-vis the severity of the imposable penalties in drugs cases compels strict compliance with
the chain of custody rule. As an exception, the IRR of R.A. 9165 offers a saving clause allowing leniency
whenever justifiable grounds exist which warrant deviation for established protocol so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
However, the repeated breach of the chain of custody rule in this case had cast serious
uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. The metaphorical chain did not link at all,
albeit it unjustly restrained petitioner's right to liberty. Verily, therefore, a verdict of acquittal is in order

FACTS
Altantor dela Torre y Cabalar (Dela Torre) was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Article II of
R.A. 9165. Acting on the report of a confidential informant, a buy-bust team was dispatched at
Dagupan City.
Seized from Dela Torre were the marked money and the plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance. PO3 Calimlim immediately marked the plastic sachet with his initials.
Thereafter, they brought Dela Torre and the seized items to the Magsaysay Barangay Hall before two
barangay kagawads. In their presence, PO3 Calimlim and SPO1 Ferrer inventoried the seized items.
PO3 Calimlim personally delivered the seized drug to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing.
Forensic chemist Malojo did the test and based on the results found the item positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug known as shabu.
Dela Torre denied the charge and claimed he was framed. He also contended that he only
learned that he was being charged with the sale of illegal drugs a year after.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a verdict of conviction. The trial court found that
the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that Dela Torre was caught in flagrante delicto
selling shabu to PO3 Calimlim.
On appeal, Dela Torre argued that the buy-bust operation did not follow the chain of custody
requirements. First, the records do not show that the marking of the seized item was done in the
presence of Dela Torre or his chosen representative. Second, the inventory was conducted in the
barangay hall, rather than the place of arrest. Moreover, there was no representative from the media
and the Department of Justice present at the signing of physical inventory.
However, the OSG defended the verdict of conviction. They relied on pertinent jurisprudence
saying that substantial compliance with the legal requirements on handling the seized item is
sufficient, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value are preserved. It added that mere lapses in
procedure do not invalidate a seizure.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the lower court.

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ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming the trial court's verdict of conviction despite the attendant
procedural deficiencies relative to the marking, inventory and photograph of the seized item?

RULING
YES. In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The
prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally sold by the accused is the
same substance presented in court. To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution
must account for each link in its chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
o6cer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
This is the chain of custody rule. It came to fore due to the unique characteristics of illegal
drugs which render them indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration,
or substitution either by accident or otherwise.
The arresting officers' testimonies, on the face, bear how the chain of custody here had been
breached in several instances. First, the venue for making the inventory was not properly complied
with. Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) requires that the inventory be
conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation, thus it must be done at the place of the arrest.
In the present case, the inventory was conducted at the barangay hall. Without any explanation as to
the distance from the nearest police station or nearest office of the apprehending team.
Second, PO3 Calimlim and SPO1 Ferrer both testified that there was neither a representative
from the media nor from the DOJ during the conduct of the post- operation procedures. No
explanation was given for their absence. The presence of both representatives, together with the
accused and a barangay official, is mandated by the law. Failure to comply with this requirement shall
result in the acquittal of the accused.
Finally, the photograph requirement was not complied with at all. Though the prosecution
offered in evidence pictures marked as Annex "G", these pictures are not of the items seized. What
can be seen in Annex "G" are two pictures: a mug shot of the appellant, and one where a man is writing
on a piece of paper. What the law requires is a photograph of the seized item, which is absent in this
case. These photos do not even show the presence of the appellant or the witnesses.
Indeed, the repeated breach of the chain of custody rule here had cast serious uncertainty on
the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. The metaphorical chain did not link at all, albeit it
unjustly restrained petitioner's right to liberty. Verily, therefore, a verdict of acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. XANDRA SANTOS y LITTAUA

G.R. NO. 243627, 27 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

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DOCTRINE OF THE CASE
The law requires that the inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused or
the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required
witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amended of RA 9165 by RA 1040, a representative from the media
AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official; or (b) if after the amendment of
RA 9165 by RA 19640, an elected public official and a representative of NPS OR the media. The law
requires the presence of these witnesses primarily to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody
and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
In this case, the arresting officer’s acts of performing the marking, inventory, and photography
of the seized items not at the place of the arrest but at the police station were justified as a crowd was
already forming at the place of arrest. This notwithstanding, the Court observes that there were still a
deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of inventory and photography was not witnessed
by a representative from the NPS or media.
FACTS
Around 6:30 in the evening of January 16, 2016, acting on the information received from a
confidential informant, operatives from the Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Task Group
of the Valenzuela City Police successfully conducted a buy-bust operation against Xandra Santos y
Littaua along Bisig Street, Valenzuela City. One plastic sachet containing 0.20 gram of white
crystalline substance was recovered from her. When Santos was searched after her arrest, the police
officers found one more plastic sachet containing 0.10gram of the same substance from her
possession.
As noisy people started to crowd the place of arrest, officers immediately brought accused–
appellant back to the police station where they marked, inventoried, and photographed the seized
items in her presence as well as that of Kagawad Roberto Dawat of Barangay Bisig. Subsequently, the
seized items were brought to the Philippine National Police- Northern Police District crime
laboratory where, after examination, their contents tested positive for shabu.
ISSUE
Did the police officers comply with the rule on chain of custody?
RULING
NO. In cases of Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under R.A. No. 9165,
it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drugs be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drugs itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.
Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, warrants an acquittal.
The law requires that the inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain
required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amended of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 1040, a
representative from the media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official;
or (b) if after the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 19640, an elected public official and a
representative of NPS OR the media. The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily to
ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence.

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 In this case, the arresting officer’s acts of performing the marking, inventory, and
photography of the seized items not at the place of the arrest but at the police station were justified
as a crowd was already forming at the place of arrest. This notwithstanding, the Court observes that
there were still a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of inventory and
photography was not witnessed by a representative from the NPS or media.
Further, the sheer statement of PO3 Vizconde that representatives from the DOJ and the
media had been contacted but were simply unavailable, without more, cannot be deemed reasonable
enough to justify a deviation from the mandatory directives of the law. As earlier stated, mere claims
of unavailability, absent a showing that actual and serious attempts were employed to contact the
required witnesses, are unacceptable as they fail to show that genuine and sufficient efforts were
exerted by police officers.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODEL VELASCO y LUZON

G.R. No. 231787, 19 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To convict an accused for illegal possession of an explosive devise under P.D. No. 1866, as
amended, jurisprudence has held that two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established: (a)
the existence of the subject firearm or explosive, and (b) the negative fact that the accused had no license
or permit to own or possess the firearm or explosive.
The Court ruled that the prosecution was not able to establish an unbroken chain of custody.
There was no evidence presented as to how the investigator handled and stored the evidence, and the
precautions.

FACTS
Rodel Velasco y Luzon (Velasco) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9516.
The evidence for the prosecution that PO3 Taguba and PO1 Bacani are police officers assigned
at the La Loma Police Sstation. At around 1:20A.M., they were with their supervisors conducting
“Oplan Sita” at Brgy. Sto Domingo, Quezon City. Then they noticed a Daewoo Racer car without any
plate number attached in front. So they signaled the car to stop. When the car stopped, they noticed
in plain view that a gun tucked at the waistline of one of the passengers in the name of Robert Alegre.
This prompted them to alight from the vehicle. PO3 Taguba frisked the accused and found in his
possession one (1) MK2 fragmentation grenade. Hence, they arrested the accused and his
companions.
PO3 Rodillas of the Explosives Ordinance Disposal Division of the Quezon City Police District
(QCPD) testified that upon the receipt from the Police Station 1, QCPD of the hand grenade with
marking of “RD” and “JT” was a live fragmentation grenade capable of exploding.
On the other hand, the Velasco denied the allegations and averred that on the night of March
20, 2012, he was inside his house located in Malabon City when his friends Lapena and Alegre invited
him to attend a birthday party at Blumentritt. They rode a car which he remembers to have a plate
number. On the way to their destination, they were stopped by a mobile car and asked to alight from

325
the car. Thereafter, they were frisked, and no hand grenade was found in his possession. But they
were brought to the police station and only upon the inquest proceeding when he learned that he
was being charged of illegal possession of explosives.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the Velasco of violating Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866,
as amended by R.A. No. 9516. The Court of Appeal affirmed the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Did RTC and CA err in convicting Velasco of violating Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended
by R.A. No. 9516?

RULING
YES. The Court reverses the conviction of Velasco as the prosecution failed to establish the
guilt of Velasco beyond reasonable doubt.
To convict an accused for illegal possession of an explosive devise under P.D. No. 1866, as
amended, jurisprudence has held that two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established:
(a) the existence of the subject firearm or explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the
subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the
same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused had no license or permit to own or possess the
firearm or explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or certification of a
representative of the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has
no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive.
While it is beyond serious dispute that Velasco had no license or permit to possess a
fragmentation hand grenade, thus satisfying the second requisite stated above, a close examination
of the evidence on record reveals that the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to establish
that the MK-2 fragmentation hand grenade identified and admitted into evidence during the trial was
the same object allegedly retrieved from the person of Velasco.
Simply stated, the prosecution was clearly unsuccessful in establishing an unbroken chain of
custody of the allegedly confiscated fragmentation hand grenade, creating serious doubt as to the
corpus delicti of the crime charged.
In the instant case, the prosecution's witness, PO1 Bacani testified that after the apprehension
of Velasco, the fragmentation hand grenade was turned over to the investigator. However, the
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses and the documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution are completely silent as to how the investigator handled and stored the evidence, and
the precautions.
Base on the evidence on record, including the testimony of PO3 Rodillas, is silent as to how
the fragmentation hand grenade was exactly transferred to him. The latter merely testified that he
received a request from Police Station 1 of the QCPD for the issuance of a certification. In other words,
the chain of custody of the evidence is unclear.

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 It is elementary that in a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt
is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Court is left with no alternative but to acquit
Velasco of the crime charged against him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILLIAM RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 233535, 01 July 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Del Castillo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the law applicable at the time of the commission of the
crime charged, provides that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized items must
be witnessed by three insulating witnesses (i.e. an elected public official, a representative from the
media, and a representative from the DOJ). They must also sign the inventory and be given copies of the
same.

Here, although present during the physical inventory and taking of photographs, the crew
members of Imbestigador did not sign the inventory sheet. As to the barangay tanods, who were present
and who signed the inventory sheets, their presence is immaterial because barangay tanods are not
elected public officials. Also, no DOJ representative was present at that time.

FACTS
The Manila Police District, District Anti-Illegal Drugs (DAID) buy-bust team, together with the
crew members of the investigative program, Imbestigador ng Bayan (Imbestigador) and the CI,
proceeded to the pension house on M.G. Del Pilar Street where William Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and
alias Dang were residing.

After Dang introduced PO3 Fred Martinez (PO3 Martinez) to Rodriguez, PO3 Martinez then
handed the marked money to Rodriguez, who, in turn, gave PO3 Martinez one plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance. Upon receiving the sachet, PO3 Martinez gave the pre-
arranged signal to the buy-bust team who, together with the crew members of Imbestigador, rushed
in and arrested Rodriguez. On one hand, due to the commotion, Dang was able to get away.

PO3 Martinez then recovered the buy-bust money and five unsealed plastic sachets on top of
the table. Barangay Tanods Sonny Boy Rodriguez and Joseph Caeg were called to the scene to sign
the inventory because the crew members of Imbestigador refused to sign. Photographs of the
evidence were also taken.

Rodriguez denied the accusations but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) gave more weight and
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses than to Rodriguez’s defenses of denial and
frame-up. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's Decision. Unfazed, Rodriguez filed the instant
appeal.

ISSUE
Is Rodriguez guilty of violating R.A. No. 9165?

RULING

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 NO. Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the law applicable at the time of the commission of
the crime charged, provides that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized items
must be witnessed by three insulating witnesses (i.e. an elected public official, a representative from
the media, and a representative from the DOJ). They must also sign the inventory and be given copies
of the same.

According to the case of People v. Ramos, the absence of these required witnesses does not
per se render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 must be adduced. Therefore, police officers are compelled to convince the Court that they
exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure.

The physical inventory and the taking of photographs of the seized items were allegedly
witnessed by the crew members of Imbestigador and Barangay Tanods Sonny Boy Rodriguez and
Joseph Caeg. Their presence, however, cannot be considered substantial compliance. To begin with,
although present during the physical inventory and taking of photographs, the crew members of
Imbestigador did not sign the inventory sheet. As to the barangay tanods, who were present and who
signed the inventory sheets, their presence is immaterial because barangay tanods are not elected
public officials. Also, no DOJ representative was present at that time.

Thus, strictly speaking, the rule requiring the insulating witnesses to be present during the
physical inventory and the taking of the photographs and to sign the inventory sheet was not
complied with.

Unfortunately, neither justification was offered by the prosecution nor did it show that
earnest efforts were exerted to secure the presence of insulating witnesses – which creates doubt as
to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Hence, the Court was constrained to acquit
the Rodriguez based on reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAN DUMANJUG y LOREÑA

G.R. No. 235468, 01 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of
apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of RA 9165 allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In this
connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should already be physically present at
the time of the conduct of the physical inventory of the seized items which, as aforementioned, must be
immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation.
Here, it is not disputed that the inventory and photographing of evidence that was conducted in
the presence of Dumanjug, the DOJ representative, i.e., Ronaldo Bedrijo, the media representative, i.e.,
Rey Brangan, and the Barangay Kagawad, i.e., Celso Montilla, were not conducted immediately after the

328
seizure and confiscation of the illegal drug at the place of the supposed buy-bust operation, i.e., the
boarding house of Dumanjug. Instead, the inventory and photographing of evidence in the presence of
the required witnesses were commenced after the buy-bust operation was terminated and in another
location — the Regional Office of the PDEA.

FACTS
On 6 December 2010, Agent Robin Beniga Tibayan (Agent Tibayan) of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) received an information from a walk-in Confidential Informant
(informant) that Dan Dumanjug (Dumanjug) was selling shabu in Fort Poyohon, Butuan City. Agent
Tibayan immediately informed OIC Regional Director Joel Plaza, who then instructed Agent Subang
to verify the information received. On 7 December 2010, after the verification turned out positive,
Agent Subang, as the Team Leader, formed a team and conducted a briefing for a buy-bust operation
to be conducted against Dumanjug. Agent Tibayan was designated as the poseur-buyer and was
handed with a P500.00 bill marked with "RT" while Agent Myrian A. Balbada (Agent Balbada) was
designated as the arresting officer. The team immediately proceeded to Fort Poyohon.
When Agent Tibayan and the informant reached the boarding house of Dumanjug, the latter
told them to go upstairs. Upon reaching the second floor, Dumanjug asked the informant how much
he was going to buy to which the informant replied, "Only P500.00 worth, boss." Dumanjug then went
inside his room and went he came back he handed over one (1) small sachet of shabu. After checking
that it was a genuine shabu, Agent Tibayan handed the marked P500-bill to Dumanjug. Agent Tibayan
then made a "drop" call to Agent Baldaba — the pre-arranged signal indicating that the transaction
ha[d] been consummated. A few minutes thereafter, Agent Balbada and the backup team arrived at
the scene. After introducing themselves as PDEA operatives and informing Dumanjug of his
Constitutional rights and the reason for his arrest, Dumanjug was handcuffed. At the scene, Agent
Tibayan marked the small sachet of shabu that was bought from Dumanjug as "RT-1." In Dumanjug's
room, the team saw in plain sight a weighing scale, eyeglass casing containing four (4) disposable
lighters, empty sachets, aluminum foil and a Nokia cellular phone. No markings were made on the
said items after Agent Subang assessed that the scene was quite dangerous.
Dumanjug was then taken to the PDEA Office where he was thoroughly searched. At the same
time, the pieces of evidence were photographed, marked and inventoried in the presence of
Dumanjug, the barangay kagawad of Fort Poyohon and representatives from the media and the
Department of Justice. A Request for Laboratory Examination on the shabu specimen and a Request
for Drug Test for Dumanjug were also prepared by Agent Tibayan which were personally submitted
by him to the PNP Crime Laboratory on that same day. The result of the said examination yielded
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is commonly known as "shabu."
Both the RTC and the CA convicted Dumanjug of with violation of Sections 5 and 15 of R.A.
No. 9165 for being caught in flagrante delicto of selling the sachet of shabu.

ISSUE
(1) Should the conviction be sustained?
(2) Are there any justifiable grounds to excuse the buy-bust team's failure to observe the
mandatory requirements set under Section 21 of RA 9165?
RULING

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 (1) NO. Dumanjug was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. In order to convict a person charged with the crime
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required
to prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous
drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. While it is true that a buy-bust
operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug
peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless also requires strict compliance with procedures laid
down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded.
In all drugs cases, therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any
prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or
recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the
identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to make a
finding of guilt.
In this connection, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 lays down the procedure that police
operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The
provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after
seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of
whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
This must be so because with "the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for
entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of
marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks,
and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great."
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and
confiscation. The said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned required
witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Court has previously stressed that the presence of the three witnesses at the time of
seizure and confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the
warrantless arrest; they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can
be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs
immediately after seizure and confiscation.
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three
witnesses, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness
the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been
finished — does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate
against the planting of drugs.

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 In the instant case, it is not disputed that the inventory and photographing of evidence that
was conducted in the presence of Dumanjug, the DOJ representative, i.e., Ronaldo Bedrijo, the media
representative, i.e., Rey Brangan, and the Barangay Kagawad, i.e., Celso Montilla, were not conducted
immediately after the seizure and confiscation of the illegal drug at the place of the supposed buy-
bust operation, i.e., the boarding house of Dumanjug. Instead, the inventory and photographing of
evidence in the presence of the required witnesses were commenced after the buy-bust operation
was terminated and in another location — the Regional Office of the PDEA.
As noted by the CA in the assailed Decision, "[t]he inventory and the taking of photographs of
the seized items were, however, not done at the crime scene. It was established by the prosecution
that when they reached the PDEA Office, the team marked the other confiscated items, made
inventory of all the marked items, including the marked sachet of shabu, and took photographs for
the necessary documentation of the process." The CA also noted that there was a "failure of the
apprehending team to immediately conduct a physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items" and that "gaps were observed in the strict compliance in the 'chain of custody rule'[.]" As
factually found by the RTC in its Omnibus Decision based on the testimonies of Agents Tibayan and
Balbada, not a single photograph was taken during the alleged buy-bust operation.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory
and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the
place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-
bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In
this connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should already be physically
present at the time of the conduct of the physical inventory of the seized items which, as
aforementioned, must be immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement
that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by
its nature, a planned activity. Verily, a buy-bust team normally has enough time to gather and bring
with them the said witnesses.
(2) NONE. There is no justifiable ground in the instant case that warrants the non-observance
of the mandatory requirements set by Section 21 of RA 9165.
First, the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses, offer conflicting reasons as to how the
buy-bust team arrived at the decision to conduct the inventory and photographing of the evidence in
the PDEA Regional Office and not at the crime scene.
Second, from the testimony of Agent Balbada herself, it becomes apparent that the supposed
convergence of roughly two hundred (200) persons in the vicinity of the crime scene, aside from
being uncorroborated, is in itself an incredible and implausible tale.
Bearing in mind that the area is not a big residential area, only containing four to five houses,
and that the boarding house is accessible only through one alley, it is not hard to see that the
uncorroborated allegation that more or less two hundred (200) people converged at the crime scene
is dubious and unbelievable, to say the least. In fact, the testimonies of Agents Tibayan and Balbada
reveal that after the buy-bust operation, the buy-bust team was able to easily leave the vicinity of the
crime scene. If indeed a multitude of onlookers and loiterers numbering two hundred (200) persons
converged at the venue of the buy-bust, considering that there was only one alley in the area, the buy-
bust team would have experienced some difficulty in leaving the area, which was not the case.

331
 Third, even if Agent Balbada's incredible testimony on the convergence of two hundred (200)
persons in the vicinity of the crime scene was to be believed, there is still no justifiable reason to
conclude that it was "quite dangerous" to hold the inventory and photographing of the evidence in
the presence of the required witnesses at the place of the alleged buy-bust operation.
To stress, the buy-bust operation was not conducted outdoors; it was conducted in an
enclosed area, i.e., the second floor of Dumanjug's boarding house. Hence, the conducting of
inventory and photographing of evidence would have been left completely unaffected and
unhampered by the presence of loiterers located outside the boarding house. Further, it was not
alleged whatsoever that these supposed loiterers showed any intention to enter the boarding house
and interfere with the buy-bust operation. Nor are there any allegations that these persons were
armed and posed any significant threat to the conduct of the buy-bust operation. In fact, it must be
stressed that during the buy-bust operation, the buy-bust team was able to spend some time
inspecting the room located on the second floor of the boarding house, closely examine the drug
specimen recovered, and undertake the marking of the sachet. This obviously shows that there was
no serious danger posed whatsoever to the buy-bust team and that the inventory and photographing
of the evidence could have also been conducted immediately after the confiscation of the drugs at the
crime scene.
Considering the foregoing, the Court concludes that the prosecution's theory on the
infeasibility of conducting the inventory and photographing of the evidence in the presence of the
required witnesses immediately after the confiscation of the illegal drug at the place of the buy-bust
operation due to the area being "quite dangerous" on account of the convergence of roughly two
hundred (200) persons in the vicinity is a farfetched and implausible piece of fiction that deserves no
consideration whatsoever.
In sum, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending team's
deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti have thus been seriously compromised. In light of this, Dumanjug must perforce be
acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO MARTIN y ISON

G.R. No. 231007, 01 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Strict adherence to the chain of custody rule must be observed; the precautionary measures
employed in every transfer of the seized drug item, proved to a moral certainty. The sheer ease of
planting drug evidence vis-à-vis the severity of the imposable penalties in drugs cases compels strict
compliance with the chain of custody rule.
Here, PO3 Gavino and PO2 Songalia did not at all offer any explanation which would have
excused the buy-bust team's stark failure to comply with the chain of custody rule here. Consequently,
the condition for the saving clause to become operational was not complied with. For the same reason,
the proviso "so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved,"
does not come into play.

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FACTS
On February 17, 2010, around 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, PO3 Alfredo Gavino received a
report from a confidential informant that Antonio Martin (appellant) was involved in the illegal sale
of dangerous drugs and that he (confidential informant) could buy these drugs from appellant later
in the day. PO3 Gavino relayed this information to his superior Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Francisco
Mateo II. PCI Mateo then directed PO3 Gavino to verify the information and launch a buy bust
operation. PCI Mateo handed two (2) pieces of P100.00 bill to PO1 Jonathan Manuel for ultraviolet
dusting.
Around 6 o'clock in the evening, PO1 Manuel handed to PO3 Gavino the two pieces P100.00
bill dusted with ultraviolet powder. PCI Mateo called his men to firm up the buy bust operation on
appellant. The confidential informant was tasked as poseur buyer, and PO3 Gavino and PO2 Jherome
Songalia as arresting officers. PO3 Gavino gave the P100.00 bills to the confidential informant.
Thirty (30) minutes later, PO3 Gavino and PO2 Songalia proceeded to Lacson Colleges. The
confidential informant who arrived earlier was already talking with appellant. PO3 Gavino and PO2
Songalia positioned themselves about eight (8) meters away. Although they could not hear the
conversation between the confidential informant and appellant, they could clearly see what was
happening. After a while, they saw the confidential informant scratch his head indicating that the sale
was already consummated. PO3 Gavino and PO2 Songalia immediately closed in.
PO3 Gavino frisked appellant and recovered from the latter the buy bust money. He also
recovered from the confidential informant a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance. Thereafter, PO3 Gavino arrested appellant, informed him of his constitutional rights, and
brought him to the police station.
At the police station, PO3 Gavino turned over appellant and the seized items to the
investigation officer. In appellant's presence, they marked the plastic sachet with "ANG-1,"
representing PO3 Gavino's initials. They also conducted a physical inventory of the seized items in
the presence of appellant, media representatives Cris Yambot and Melvin Yambot, Barangay
Councilor Venancio M. Castillo, and the Acting Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of San
Leonardo. Cris Yambot took photos of appellant together with the other witnesses.
Thereafter, the investigating officer prepared a request for laboratory examination of the
contents of the plastic sachet and another request for appellant's drug test and ultraviolet fluorescent
powder test. PO3 Gavino took appellant and the plastic sachet to the crime laboratory. It was Forensic
Chemist Jebie Timario who personally received the plastic sachet and appellant's urine sample.
Per Chemistry Report No. D-019-2010 (NEPCLO), Forensic Chemist Timario found the
contents of the plastic sachet positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous
drug.
The trial court convicted Ison for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The CA affirmed such ruling.
ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals err when it affirmed Ison's conviction for violation of Section 5,
Article II, RA 9165 (illegal sale of dangerous drugs)?
RULING

333
 YES. In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The
prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally possessed by the accused is
the same substance presented in court.
To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for each link in
its chain of custody enumerates the links in the chain of custody that must be shown for the
successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, i.e., first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.
This is the chain of custody rule. It came to fore due to the unique characteristics of illegal
drugs which render them indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration,
or substitution either by accident or otherwise.
Ison was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs allegedly committed on February 17,
2010. The applicable law is RA 9165 before its amendment in 2014.
Section 21 of RA 9165 prescribes the standard in preserving the corpus delicti in illegal drug
cases, viz.:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.
The first link speaks of seizure and marking which should be done immediately at the place
of arrest and seizure. It also includes the physical inventory and photograph of the seized or
confiscated drugs which should be done in the presence of the accused, a media representative, a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official.
Here, appellant was arrested at the Lacson Colleges. The arresting officers then boarded him
into an owner type jeep to be taken to the police station. En route, the seized item remained
unmarked. It was exposed to switching, planting, and contamination during the entire trip.
Investigating officer PO3 Sevilla only marked the drug item after it was turned over to him at the
police station. By that time, it was no longer certain that what was shown to him was the same item
seized from appellant. PO3 Gavino did not offer any justification for this procedural lapse. Notably,

334
PO3 Gavino flip-flopped on who supposedly marked the seized item. He initially testified it was PO3
Sevilla. But later, he claimed that he did the marking himself.
Second. None of the prosecution witnesses testified that a photograph of the seized drug was
taken at all. What was photographed was appellant together with the alleged witnesses to the
inventory. But the sachet purportedly seized from appellant was not photographed. Again, no
explanation was offered for this omission. Even the photo allegedly taken of appellant together with
the witnesses was not presented nor offered as documentary evidence.
Third. No DOJ representative was present during the inventory. PO3 Gavino's testimony
reveals that the persons who witnessed the inventory were media representatives Cris Yambot and
Melvin Yambot, Barangay Councilor Venancio M. Castillo, and the acting clerk of court of the
Municipal Trial Court of San Leonardo. But the DOJ representative was conspicuously absent.
Fourth. As for the third and fourth links, they were as severely broken as the first. To begin
with, there was absolutely no showing how the alleged seized item was stored after it was examined
by PCI Timario. No evidence, testimonial nor documentary, was offered to identify the person to
whom PCI Timario gave the specimen after examination and where the same was kept until it was
retrieved by PCI Timario and presented in court. Indubitably, this is another breach in the chain of
custody rule.
Indeed, the multiple violations of the chain of custody rule here cast serious uncertainty on
the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. The metaphorical chain did not link at all, albeit, it
unjustly restrained appellant's right to liberty. Verily, therefore, a verdict of acquittal is in order.
Strict adherence to the chain of custody rule must be observed; the precautionary measures
employed in every transfer of the seized drug item, proved to a moral certainty. The sheer ease of
planting drug evidence vis-à-vis the severity of the imposable penalties in drugs cases compels strict
compliance with the chain of custody rule.
The Court have clarified though that a perfect chain may not be possible to obtain at all times
because of varying field conditions. In fact, the IRR of RA 9165 offers a saving clause allowing
leniency whenever justifiable grounds exist which warrant deviation from established protocol so
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
Unfortunately, however, PO3 Gavino and PO2 Songalia did not at all offer any explanation
which would have excused the buy-bust team's stark failure to comply with the chain of custody rule
here. Consequently, the condition for the saving clause to become operational was not complied with.
For the same reason, the proviso "so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved," does not come into play.
As amply discussed, the chain of custody here had been breached many times over; the
metaphorical chain, irreparably broken. Consequently, the identity and integrity of the seized drug
item were not deemed to have been preserved. Perforce, appellant must be unshackled, acquitted,
and released from restraint.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BABYLYN MANANSALA y CRUZ

G.R. No. 229509, 03 July 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Del Castillo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

335
 The Chain of Custody Rule is embodied in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. The Court understands
that strict compliance with the above-mentioned rule is not always possible. However, in case of non-
compliance therewith, the prosecution is mandated to prove that (a) there was justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved.
Here, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to comply with the rule requiring the presence
of the three insulating witnesses. As can be gleaned from the testimony of P03 Taruc, only one out of the
three required witnesses was present at the time of seizure and apprehension.

FACTS
Babylyn Manansala (Manansala) was criminally charged for violations of Section 5 and 11 of
R.A. No. 9165. The prosecution anchored its case mainly on the testimony of PO3 John Alfred Taruc
(PO3 Taruc). PO3 Taruc provided that a confidential informant came to their office. Acting on the
information given, PO3 Taruc and other police officers executed a buy-bust operation. When the sale
was consummated between PO3 Taruc and Manansala, Manansala was arrested. An inventory of the
seized items was then made in the presence of one media representative named Rene Crisostomo.
The seized items were turned over for laboratory examination. The results of the laboratory test
confirmed that the substance seized was shabu. On the other hand, Manansala denied the accusations.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC
upheld the validity of the buy-bust operation because it found no ill motive on the part of the police
officers to falsely accuse appellant.
On appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA), Manansala contended that the prosecution failed
to prove the integrity of the seized shabu as the apprehending officers did not strictly comply with
the Chain of Custody Rule. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Undeterred, Manansala instituted the
instant appeal insisting that her guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE
Was the Chain of Custody Rule under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 complied with?

RULING
NO. It is axiomatic of course, that to secure the conviction of the appellant, all the elements of
the crime charged against her must be proven. And among the fundamental principles to which
undivided fealty is given is that, in a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 5 and Section 11 of
R. A. No. 9165, as amended, the State is mandated to prove that the illegal transaction did in fact take
place; and there is no stronger or better proof of this fact than the presentation in court of the actual
and tangible seized drug itself mentioned in the inventory, and as attested to by the so-called
insulating witnesses named in the law itself.
Hence, it is the prosecution's burden to establish the integrity of the dangerous drug, this
being the corpus delicti of the case. This presupposes that an unbroken chain of custody over the
subject illegal drug, from the time of its confiscation until its presentation in court, must be clearly
and sufficiently proved.

336
 The Chain of Custody Rule is embodied in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 Plainly stated,
"the provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after
seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of
whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same and the
seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination."
The Court understands that strict compliance with the above-mentioned rule is not always
possible. However, in case of non-compliance therewith, the prosecution is mandated to prove that
(a) there was justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items were properly preserved.
Here, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to comply with the rule requiring the
presence of the three insulating witnesses. As can be gleaned from the testimony ofP03 Taruc, only
one out of the three required witnesses was present at the time of seizure and apprehension.
The Court, in a plethora of cases, has repeatedly stressed that the presence of the required
insulating witnesses at the time of the inventory is mandatory, and that their presence thereat serves
both a crucial and a critical purpose. Indeed, under the law, the presence of the so-called insulating
witnesses is a high prerogative requirement, the non-fulfillment of which casts serious doubts upon
the integrity of the corpus delicti itself - the very prohibited substance itself - and for that reason
imperils and jeopardizes the prosecution's case.

337
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LYNDON CANETE and PETERLOU PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 242018, 03 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Court in People v. Musor held that the phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation"
- pertaining to the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items - meant compliance with
the procedure at the place of apprehension. Only if this is not practicable that the IRR allows the
inventory and photographing at the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team. This also means that the three required witnesses should already be physically present at
the time of apprehension - a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team
considering that the operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.

As revealed by the records, at the time the drug was allegedly seized and confiscated from Canete
and Pimentel, only the police officers were present. Likewise, at the time the item was marked inside the
service vehicle of the buy-bust team, there were yet no other witnesses to observe the same. This is a
blatant disregard of the safeguards intended by the law, which is to place disinterested "insulating
witnesses" at the earliest point of contact where the evil of planting of evidence is most present.

FACTS

On 17 January 2012, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Provincial Office of
Pagadian City received a report from a confidential informant regarding drug activities. The buy-bust
team proceeded to the target area. The confidential informant went out of the billiard hall with
Peterlou Pimentel (Pimentel), and introduced Agent Calangi, a poseur buyer, as an interested buyer
of shabu. Pimentel then called Lyndon Canete (Canete) from the billiard hall. Pimentel gave the buy-
bust money to Canete and returned inside the billiard hall.

Canete went across the road. After about five minutes, Canete returned and handed to Agent
Calangi something wrapped in cigarette foil. Upon inspection, Agent Calangi found the foil to contain
a sachet of shabu. He then placed the foil and sachet inside his pocket and immediately proceeded to
the buy-bust team's location. The buy-bust team decided to return to the billiard hall. Agent Calangi
immediately approached and held Canete and identified himself as a PDEA agent. Another agent
approached and held Pimentel. Both were bodily searched and placed on handcuffs after being
informed of the cause of their arrest and their Miranda rights. During the search, Agent Calangi
recovered from Canete the P300.00 buy-bust money. The team proceeded to their service vehicle,
where Agent Calangi marked the confiscated evidence.

The buy-bust team proceeded to the PDEA Office in Pagadian City. However, due to a power
interruption, the team had to go instead to the Provincial Intelligence Branch Office to conduct an
inventory of the evidence. Present during the inventory were Canete and Pimentel, media
representative, elected official and Department of Justice (DOJ) Representative. The investigator took
a photograph of the evidence. A letter-request for laboratory examination was likewise prepared and
submitted.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Canete and Pimentel guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC
Decision in toto.

338
ISSUES

(1) Are there lapses in effecting the seizure of the dangerous drug?
(2) Would the lapses warrant an acquittal on the part of Canete and Pimentel?

RULING

(1) YES. The Court in People v. Musor held that the phrase "immediately after seizure and
confiscation" - pertaining to the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items - meant
compliance with the procedure at the place of apprehension. Only if this is not practicable that the
IRR allows the inventory and photographing at the nearest police station or the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team. This also means that the three required witnesses should already be
physically present at the time of apprehension - a requirement that can easily be complied with by
the buy-bust team considering that the operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.

First. As revealed by the records, at the time the drug was allegedly seized and confiscated
from Canete and Pimentel, only the police officers were present. Likewise, at the time the item was
marked inside the service vehicle of the buy-bust team, there were yet no other witnesses to observe
the same. This is a blatant disregard of the safeguards intended by the law, which is to place
disinterested "insulating witnesses" at the earliest point of contact where the evil of planting of
evidence is most present. Where the prosecution and defense are polarized on the version of events,
it is the neutral testimony of the insulating witnesses that will be controlling in providing the courts
with a true account of the facts as they unfolded.

Second. Following the pronouncements in Musor, the authorities failed to follow the
requirement that the inventory and photographs be done at the place of apprehension. The CA
committed grave error in this regard when it held that the apprehending team was free to conduct
the inventory and photographing elsewhere and not necessarily where the seized item was marked.
And, even assuming that the performance of such procedure was impracticable at the billiard hall,
again following Musor, the buy-bust team, without justifiable reason or cause, still bypassed the
nearest PNP and PDEA stations by still choosing to go to Camp Abelon.

(2) YES. The requirements laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR are couched
in strict and mandatory terms. Failure to comply with the procedure found therein is excusable only
if the following requisites obtain: (1) that there exist "justifiable grounds;" and (2) that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. The
existence of such lapses has shifted the burden on the prosecution to establish the requisites through
competent evidence.

In sum, the series of lapses committed by the apprehending team has created serious doubt
on whether the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged. With the very identity and
integrity of the corpus delicti placed in serious doubt, the Court is duty-bound to acquit Canete and
Pimentel.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

339
 ROSELINE KASAN y ATILANO and HENRY LLACER y JAO
G.R. No. 238334, 03 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Court has clarified that a perfect chain of custody may be impossible to obtain at all times
because of varying field conditions. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 offers a
saving clause allowing leniency whenever justifiable grounds exist which warrant deviation from
established protocol so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.

Here, the prosecution failed to substantiate their claim of “security reasons”. The condition for
the saving clause to become operational was not complied with.

FACTS

Makati police officers arrested Roseline Kasan (Kasan) alias “Penny” and Henry Llacer
(Llacer) alias “Bakulaw” for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. Per report of the
confidential informant, "alias Bakulaw" and "alias Penny" were engaged in illegal drug activities in
the area. The police officers coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for
narcotics operation and formed a buy-bust team with SPO1 Pacis as designated poseur buyer and
SPO2 Ladiana, as immediate back-up.

SPO1 Pacis, together with the informant, walked toward the spot where "Bakulaw" and
"Penny" were allegedly selling drugs. The informant introduced PO1 Pacis to "Penny" as a buyer of
the shabu.

"Bakulaw" took out one plastic sachet of shabu and handed it to SPO1 Pacis. SPO1 Pacis took
the plastic sachet and slid it in his right pocket. Thereupon, SPO1 Pacis tapped "Bakulaw's" shoulder
and grabbed him and "Penny." He introduced himself as a police officer. As soon as SPO2 Ladiana saw
the pre-arranged signal, he immediately closed in. SPO1 Pacis apprised "Bakulaw" and "Penny" of
their constitutional rights.

For security reasons, they brought “Bakulaw” and “Penny,” and the seized items to the
barangay hall of Brgy. Olympia, Makati City. Since there were no available barangay officials there,
the team proceeded instead to the barangay hall of Brgy. West Pembo, Makati City. There, they
conducted the inventory and photograph in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Rodrigo Neri. The
seized items were subsequently turned over to case investigator then to the crime laboratory.

The trial court found both Roseline Kasan and Henry Llacer guilty of violation of Section 5 of
R.A. No. 9165. In addition, it found Henry Llacer guilty of violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165. The
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE

Are there procedural deficiencies in the chain of custody compliance?

RULING

340
 YES. In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The
prosecution is tasked to establish that the substance illegally possessed by the accused is the same
substance presented in court. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling,
storage, labelling, and recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it
is offered in evidence. To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account
for each link in its chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. The chain of custody
rule came to fore due to the unique characteristics of illegal drugs which render them indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution, by accident or otherwise.

On its face, the joint affidavit of arrest of SPO1 Pacis and SPO2 Ladiana bears the following
procedural deficiencies in the chain of custody of the drugs in question:

First. The seized drugs were not marked, inventoried, or photographed at the place of arrest.
Kasan and Llaser got arrested at the corner of Osmenia and JB Roxas Sts., Brgy. Olympia, Makati City.
It was only after two hours from the time of arrest that the seized items were finally marked by SPO1
Pacis. All through the two-hour gap, the drug items were exposed to switching, planting and
contamination while in transit. The police officers invoked "security reasons" to justify their failure
to mark, inventory, and photograph the drug items at the situs criminis. Standing alone, such bare
allegation should be rejected. What exactly these "security reasons" were and why the place of arrest
was considered to be risky for marking and inventory or taking of photographs –are material details
which the arresting officers failed to present during the trial.

Second, only an elected official was present at the time of the inventory and taking of
photograph. R.A. No. 9165, as amended, requires an elected public official and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media during inventory and taking of photographs. The law
requires the presence of these witnesses primarily to ensure not only the compliance with the chain
of custody rule but also to remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.

People v. Sipin enumerated some of the valid justifications for noncompliance with the
witness requirement, (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote
area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the
elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4)
earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official
within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault
of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time
constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets,
prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the
offenders could escape.

The arresting officers here did not even bother to explain why they only managed to secure
a barangay kagawad to witness the inventory and taking of photographs. It is incumbent upon the
prosecution to account for the absence of the other required witness, by presenting a justifiable

341
reason therefor, or at the very least, by showing that the apprehending officers truly exerted genuine
and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of these witnesses.

Third, the parties' stipulation to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist did not
contain the vital pieces of information, thus leaving a huge gap in the chain of custody of the seized
drugs.

In People v. Pajarin, the Court ordained that the parties’ stipulation to dispense with the
testimony of the forensic chemist should include that the forensic chemist would have testified that
he had taken the precautionary steps required to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized item, thus: (1) that the forensic chemist received the seized article as marked, properly
sealed, and intact; (2) that he resealed it after examination of the content; and (3) that he
placed his own marking on the same to ensure that it could not be tampered with pending
trial.

Here, the parties’ stipulation to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist did not
contain the vital pieces of information required.

Finally, the fourth link was also broken because of the absence of the testimony from any
prosecution witness on how the drug items were brought from the crime laboratory and submitted
in evidence to the court below.

Indeed, the repeated breach of the chain of custody rule here had cast serious uncertainty on
the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. The court has clarified that a perfect chain of custody
may be impossible to obtain at all times because of varying field conditions. In fact, the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 offers a saving clause allowing leniency whenever justifiable
grounds exist which warrant deviation from established protocol so long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

Here, the prosecution failed to substantiate their claim of “security reasons”. The condition
for the saving clause to become operational was not complied with.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

RESSURRECCION RESSURRECCION y ROBLES et al.
G.R. No. 231361, 03 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more
importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest such that they are required to be at or near the
intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the
seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation.”

In the present case, the apprehending team did not conduct the buy-bust operation or the
inventory post-operation in the presence of the required witnesses. Cruz testified that no person from
the media or any elected public official was present during the buy-bust operation or during the post-
operation inventory. This testimony was never challenged by the prosecution during his cross
examination. Neither did the prosecution witnesses offer a version which would contradict the same.

342
The prosecution did not also address the issue in their pleadings and instead relied only on the
presumption that police officers performed their functions in the regular manner.

FACTS
PO1 Richie Gaerlan (PO1 Gaerlan), a member of the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations
Task Force of the Marikina City Police, was informed about an ongoing sale of shabu by alias Jonjon,
later identified as Jonathan Manuel (Manuel).

PO1 Gaerlan immediately went to the place to verify the information. Manuel said that he ran
out of stock, and instructed PO1 Gaerlan and the informant to go to the house of a certain alias
"nanay" in San Mateo, Rizal.

The police officers proceeded with the informant to the house of alias "nanay". At the gate,
they were met by the doorman who asked them "Magkano bibilhin ninyo?" to which they answered
"Tres lang." The doorman allowed them to enter the house and pointed them to an older woman, later
identified as accused Ressureccion R. Ressurreccion (Ressurreccion). PO1 Gaerlan and the informant
approached her to give her the marked money. While they were waiting, PO1 Gaerlan noticed that
there were several persons seated in front of a table who were repacking suspected shabu. Manuel
was packing the suspected shabu inside sachets, accused Jerry U. Robles (Robles) was cutting plastic
sachets, Aniceto G. Decena (Decena) was heat sealing the plastic sachets using an improvised burner,
and they would then pass all the packed suspected shabu to Carol Alcantara (Alcantara).
Ressurreccion approached the table and put the marked money on the top of the table. Alcantara
then gave Ressurreccion three plastic sachets containing suspected shabu. Ressurreccion, in turn,
gave the plastic sachets to PO1 Gaerlan.

PO1 Gaerlan then stepped outside and removed his bull cap to signal the consummation of
the sale. The other police operatives rushed to the house but someone shouted "raid!" so PO1 Gaerlan
immediately went back inside and arrested Ressurreccion. The other accused tried to escape but they
were apprehended by the other members of the team and were subsequently informed of their
constitutional rights.

PO1 Afios put the necessary markings on the seized Items. The team brought the suspects to
the San Mateo Police Station to be blottered, while the specimens were brought to the Eastern Police
District Crime Laboratory for examination. From the San Mateo Police Station, all the accused were
brought to the Marikina Police Station and then to the Amang Rodriguez Medical Center for medical
check-up. Ressurreccion was also taken to Camp Crame for powder dust testing. Based on the
Physical Science Report of Forensic Chemical Officer, 30 heat-sealed plastic sachets contained
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu and that Ressurreccion tested positive for the presence of
a bright ultra-violet fluorescent powder on both her hands.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Joselito Cruz (Cruz) and Alcantara, together with
the other accused, of the crime of SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUG Section 5, paragraph 1 of Article II of
R.A. No. 9165. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of RTC.

ISSUE
Did the police officers comply with the three-witness requirement rule during the buy bust
operation?

343
RULING
NO. Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of
the alleged crimes, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the
integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence:

(1) The seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or
confiscation; and
(2) That the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the
accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from
the media, and ( d) a representative from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

In People v. Tomawis, the Court elucidated that the purpose of the law in mandating the
presence of the required witnesses is to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or
loss of the seized drug. The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the
inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest such that they are required to
be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and
photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation.” It is
at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the
time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of
the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating
witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up.

In the present case, the apprehending team did not conduct the buy-bust operation or the
inventory post-operation in the presence of the required witnesses. Cruz testified that no person
from the media or any elected public official was present during the buy-bust operation or during the
post-operation inventory. This testimony was never challenged by the prosecution during his cross
examination. Neither did the prosecution witnesses offer a version which would contradict the same.
The prosecution did not also address the issue in their pleadings and instead relied only on the
presumption that police officers performed their functions in the regular manner.

The Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items void and invalid provided that the prosecution needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a)
there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved.
Here, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the deviation of apprehending
team from the rules laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. The integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of this, the accused-appellants must perforce
be acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARMIE NARVAS y BOLASOC

G.R. No. 241254, 08 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, it requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried
and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) that the physical inventory and

344
photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her: representative or counsel,
(b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
In this case, the requirement of photographing of the evidences was not properly complied with.
Also, there was no representative of the media and DOJ. Only an elected public official was present as
witness to sign the inventory. Furthermore, the marked plastic sachets were highly irregular as they did
not bear the date, time and place the pieces of evidences they were supposedly confiscated.

FACTS
PO2 Christopher Idos (P02 ldos), who was at Sta. Barbara Police Station, was instructed by
the desk officer to conduct a buy-bust operation in Villa Sta. Barbara. In line with the operation, the
buy-bust team prepared two (2) bills worth Five Hundred Pesos (500) each. PO2 Idos acted as the
poseur-buyer and PO1 Quibrantos acted as the back-up. The team, consisting of PO2 Idos and PO1
Quibrantos, proceeded to the place of operation.
PO2 Idos told the bystanders that he wanted to buy shabu. One of the bystanders, the accused
Armie Narvas y Bolasoc (Narvas) obliged, going in and coming out of his house carrying two (2)
plastic sachets. He handed to the police officers said plastic sachets. In exchange, PO2 Idos gave the
marked money consisting of the two bills. The moment Narvas took the marked money, the police
officers arrested him.
PO2 Idos searched Narvas, which yielded two (2) more plastic sachets. PO1 Quirantos took
the items and gave them to the investigator. SPO1 Bauzon conducted an inventory of the items seized.
Thereafter, photographs were taken. PO2 Idos placed the markings "CVI-1" and "TVI-2" on two (2)
plastic sachets, while PO1 Quibrantos placed the markings on the other two.
At the police station, SPOI Bauzon prepared the request for laboratory examination. He then
submitted the specimen to the crime laboratory. The plastic sachets were received by PCI Roderos
and PO2 Tahon. After the conduct of laboratory examination, the specimens were found to be positive
for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. As a result, an information
of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs were filed against him.

ISSUE
Is Narvas criminally liable for the crime of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs?

RULING
NO. Under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, it requires that: (1) the seized items be
inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) that the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her:
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d)
a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies

345
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In this case, the requirement of photographing of the evidences was not properly complied
with. It casts doubt that it was immediately made after seizure since the one who took the
photographs was not present in the supposed buy-bust operation as he received the plastic sachets
at the police station.
Also, there was no representative of the media and DOJ. Only an elected public official was
present as witness to sign the inventory. Furthermore, the marked plastic sachets were highly
irregular as they did not bear the date, time and place the pieces of evidences they were supposedly
confiscated.
Considering that there was no explanation by the prosecution of the impossibility to follow
the chain of custody, the actions made by the police officers no longer enjoy the presumption of
regularity of functions. This being so, Narvas should be acquitted of the crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANSARI SARIP y BANTOG

G.R. No. 231917, 08 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A scrutiny of PO2 Barranda’s testimony showed that Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not
followed. It must be remembered that the non-compliance of the procedure set forth may only be
allowed in certain circumstances.
Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for noncompliance with
the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to
demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that, during the proceedings before the trial court, it
must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of the
law.

FACTS
A confidential informant went to the City Special Operations Group (CSOG) and informed the
office that a certain person was selling shabu at Barangay 31, Santo Nino. Acting on the information,
the police officers formed a buy-bust team and called the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) for the pre-operational number of the operation.

Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to Barangay 31, Santo Nino. When the sale with
Ansari Sarip (Sarip) was consummated, the police officers arrested Sarip. The poseur-buyer then
turned over the plastic sachet of suspected shabu to PO2 Jerry Baranda (PO2 Baranda) and the latter
put the said plastic sachet inside his pocket before putting a handcuff on the appellant.

During the body search, PO2 Baranda was able to retrieve the marked money from Sarip's
pocket. At that time, PO2 Baranda and the rest of his team decided to conduct the marking and the
inventory at the office because a lot of people started to congregate on the area.

At the office, PO2 Baranda marked the plastic sachet with his initials "JB." He also prepared
the seized items and the request letter for laboratory examination, drug test on Sarip, and the check

346
of the presence of ultraviolet markings on appellant. Thereafter, PO2 Baranda brought Sarip and the
plastic sachet with white crystalline substance to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office (RCLO)
for examination. Sarip's urine sample tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu),
and the results of the examination conducted by Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Charity Peralta Caceres
on the seized item showed that the white crystalline substance inside the plastic sachet was shabu.

Consequently, an Information was filed against Sarip for the violation of R.A. No. 9165. For
his defense, Sarip denied the allegations against him. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Sarip
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence,
Sarip brought the instant case before the Supreme Court arguing that the police officers failed to
observe the chain of custody required by law and for there to be an exception to the rule on the chain
of custody, the police officers must have valid reasons behind such procedural lapses.
ISSUE

Is Sarip guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING

NO. A scrutiny of PO2 Barranda’s testimony showed that Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not
followed. It must be remembered that the non-compliance of the procedure set forth may only be
allowed in certain circumstances. These circumstances may include the following:
(1) The attendance of the witnesses was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote
area;
(2) Their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by
an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf;
(3) The elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended;
(4) Earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and elected public
official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Could prove futile through
no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or
(5) Time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of
confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required
witnesses even before the offenders could escape. Aside from that, earnest effort to secure the
attendance of the necessary witnesses must also be proven.

Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for noncompliance
with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to
demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that, during the proceedings before the trial court, it
must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of the
law.

Furthermore, a careful examination of the records would show that the inventory receipt was
not presented as evidence. Thus, it cannot be determined whether or not during the physical
inventory and photograph of the items seized, the representatives required by law are present. Such
was also not testified to that the police officers complied with the same provisions of the law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN ORCULLO y SUSA

G.R. No. 229675, 08 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio, J.)

347
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE
Under Section 21 of RA 9165, the conduct of physical inventory and taking of photograph of the
seized items in drugs cases must be in the presence of at least three (3) witnesses, particularly: (1) the
accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and seized or his/her representative or
counsel; (2) any elected public official, and (3) a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice.
In this case, there were only the accused and the barangay kagawad, who witnessed the conduct
of the inventory.
FACTS
An Information was filed charging John Susa Orcullo (Orcullo) with a violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Upon arraignment,
Orcullo entered a plea of not guilty.
The prosecution presented three witnesses. The first witness was IO1 Jake Million (IO1
Million). According to him, on October 29, 2010, while he was in his office, a regular confidential
informant of Intelligence Agent 1 Liwanag Sandaan (IA1 Sandaan) arrived at the office and reported
the alleged drug trade activities of alias “Jen” in Quezon Avenue near the Lung Center. Sandaan
assisted the informant and they called alias “Jen” to set a deal for 25 grams of shabu. When the
transaction was consummated, IO1 Million and the other agents rushed to the scene and effected the
arrest of Orcullo. On cross examination, IO1 Million testified that they did not prepare the inventory
at the place of the arrest and that they did not prepare the inventory at the place of the arrest.
The second witness of the prosecution was IO1 Joanna Marie Betorin (IO1 Betorin) who
admitted that the markings on the seized sachets of shabu were made in the office and not at the
crime scene because there were many people at the crime scene and their team leader ordered them
to proceed to the office for their safety and security. IO1 Betorin added Kagawad Jose Ruiz of
Barangay Pinyahan was present to witness the taking of photographs and to sign the inventory when
they arrived at their office.
The third witness of the prosecution was Sheila Esguerra (Esguerra) who is a forensic
chemist. Esguerra testified that a request for examination with a brown envelope containing five (5)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets was submitted to her office. Acting on the request, she found
that the specimen was positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Orcullo guilty. Orcullo appealed before the Court of
Appeals (CA). However, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the matter was brought
before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Is Orcullo guilty for violating R.A. No. 9165?

RULING

348
 NO. The Court found that there is doubt as to the identity and integrity of the alleged seized
shabu and so, Orcullo should be acquitted.
As of the time the alleged crime was committed, the requirements of the chain of custody rule
were enumerated in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Under this section, the conduct of physical inventory
and taking of photograph of the seized items in drugs cases must be in the presence of at least three
(3) witnesses, particularly: (1) the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated
and seized or his/her representative or counsel; (2) any elected public official, and (3) a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice. The three witnesses, thereafter, should
sign copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In this case, there were only the accused and
the barangay kagawad, who witnessed the conduct of the inventory.
Furthermore, in the case of People v. Lim, the Court ruled that when the apprehending or
seizing officers failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, they must state
the justification or explanation as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items.
In People v. Sipin, the Court enumerated what constitute justifiable reasons. These may
include (1) the attendance of the three required witnesses was impossible because the place of the
arrest was a remote area; (2) the safety of the apprehending officers during the inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or
any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the
punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or
media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of
being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug
operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
Applying the rulings in the abovementioned cases, the Court found that not only was there
non-observance of the three-witness rule, there was also no justifiable reason offered for its non-
observance in this case. The failure to comply with these requirements put in question the integrity
and evidentiary value of the shabu.
The Court also found that there is doubt as to whether the shabu allegedly seized from the
applicant is the same shabu subjected to laboratory examination and presented in the RTC. The
prosecution did not present the evidence custodian to whom the alleged seized shabu was delivered
after the laboratory examination. The absence of the testimony of the evidence custodian likewise
presents a break in the links in the chain of custody of the evidence. Given the foregoing, Orcullo
should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

JAN JAN TAYAN y BALVIRAN and AIZA SAMPA y OMAR
G.R. No. 242160, 08 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The requirement of having an elected public official and representatives from the media and the
DOJ to personally witness the marking, inventory, and photographing of the seized illegal drugs is not a

349
burden imposed upon police officers in the conduct of legitimate buy-bust operations. On the contrary,
it serves to protect them from accusations of planting, switching, or tampering of evidence in support to
the government's strong stance against drug addiction.

FACTS
A regular confidential informant of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) reported
about the alleged illegal drug activities of accused Jan Jan Tayan y Balviran (Tayan) in Quezon City.
He gave the tip to I02 Arteche and represented that he would be able to facilitate a drug deal with
him. Acting as the team leader, I02 Arteche formed a team of six police operatives to conduct a buy-
bust operation IOI Asaytono as the poseur-buyer who also put together the buy-bust money
consisting of one P500 bill marked with the initials "JBA."

They asked Tayan if he brought the illegal drugs. In response, Tayan told him that they would
just have to wait for his companion who is in possession of the items. A woman, later identified as
Aiza Sampa (Sampa), came and walked towards Tayan's direction. IO1 Asaytono handed the buy-
bust money to Tayan who, in turn, gave the plastic sachet to him. IOI Asaytono brought out his
handkerchief as pre-arranged signal that the transaction was completed. He introduced himself as a
PDEA agent, apprised Tayan of his constitutional rights and effected the arrest. Meanwhile, Sampa
was apprehended by I02 Arteche.

IOI Asaytono marked the medium-sized heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu with "JBAEXHA2/24/14" and signed thereon.
When the entrapment team arrived at Camp Vicente Lim, its members conducted the inventory and
photographing in the presence of Tayan, Sampa and media representative Ding Bermudez and
prepared the letter-request for laboratory examination. However, Bermudez merely signed the
certificate of inventory and was not able to see the conduct of inventory itself.

IO1 Asaytono brought the letter-request and the seized evidence to the crime laboratory.
They were received by the forensic chemist who placed the confiscated substance inside a bigger re-
sealable zipper storage bag. Upon quantitative and qualitative analysis, the confiscated item tested
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

ISSUE
Is there proof beyond reasonable doubt for Tayan and Sampa to be convicted?

RULING
NO. It is undisputed that the apprehending team did not faithfully observe Section 21 insofar
as securing the presence of the representative from the media, the representative from the DOJ, and
the elected public official during the marking, physical inventory, and photograph taking of the seized

350
prohibited drug immediately at the place of seizure and confiscation. In fact, as testified to by IOI
Asaytono, the entrapment team did not strive to obtain a representative from the DOJ to witness the
marking and inventory by reason of unavailability which was never proved by convincing evidence.
Moreover, the only witness secured by the apprehending team - media representative Ding
Bermudez - did not actually see the conduct of the inventory since he only signed in the certificate of
inventory and reviewed its contents.

The requirement of having an elected public official and representatives from the media and
the DOJ to personally witness the marking, inventory, and photographing of the seized illegal drugs
is not a burden imposed upon police officers in the conduct of legitimate buy-bust operations. On the
contrary, it serves to protect them from accusations of planting, switching, or tampering of evidence
in support to the government's strong stance against drug addiction.

Furthermore, the photographing of the items was not made at the place of seizure. The photos
were taken substantially after the seizure in Camp Vicente Lim. Thus, they must be acquitted as the
chain of custody was broken and there is no explanation given as to the deviate from this procedure.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANILO GARCIA MIRANDA

G.R. No. 218126, 10 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is readily apparent that not even one of the three (3) required witnesses, a media
representative and a DOJ representative and an elected official, were present during the inventory. A
barangay tanod is not one (1) of those witnesses required by law to be present.

FACTS
Because a male informant gave a tip that a certain Danilo Miranda (Miranda) will be selling
shabu or illegal drugs in Paranaque City, the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force
conducted a buy-bust operation to catch the seller. After the successful entrapment operation, the
items were marked in the presence of a barangay tanod since the barangay hall was close by. No
other witnesses were made to sign.
Since Miranda was in possession of packs shabu that was more than what was sold, an
information for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs was filed against him.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Miranda guilty of violations of Sections 5 and 11, both
of RA 9165, ruling that Miranda’s imputation of ill-motive on the police officers are mere suspicion.
It upheld the presumption of regular performance of the police officers’ discharge of their duty.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision, concluding that the respective elements
of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous drugs were proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

351
ISSUE
Was the prosecution able to prove beyond reasonable doubt Miranda's guilt for illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs?

RULING
YES. Under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, the inventory and photography should be done in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or
counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely, "a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official." A barangay tanod is not one (1) of those
witnesses required by law to be present. This is a fatal lapse. Also, the prosecution did not even
explain why they were not able to secure the presence of the three (3) witnesses.
Furthermore, the absence of the testimony from any prosecution witness on how the drug
items were brought from the crime laboratory and submitted in evidence to the court below.
Lastly, the saving clause which allows leniency whenever justifiable grounds exist to depart
from the chain of custody cannot be invoked since there was no attempt by the prosecution to justify
the absence of the three required witnesses during the inventory. Thus, Danilo Miranda should be
acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MIKE OMAMOS y PAJO

G.R. No. 223036, 10 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

"Marking" means the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer places his/her initials and
signature on the seized item. The failure of the arresting officers to immediately mark the seized drugs
engendered serious doubts on whether the marijuana leaves bought by the poseur-buyer from appellant
were indeed the very same ones indicated in the Chemistry Report.
In drug related cases, it is of paramount necessity that the forensic chemist testifies on the
details pertaining to the handling and analysis of the dangerous drug submitted for examination i.e.
when and from whom the dangerous drug was received; what identifying labels or other things
accompanied it; description of the specimen; and the container it was in. Further, the forensic chemist
must also identify the name and method of analysis used in determining the chemical composition of the
subject specimen.

FACTS
A team of police officers in Cagayan de Oro City were tipped by an informant that Mike
Omamos (Omamos) would be selling dried marijuana leaves from Bukidnon so they commenced an
entrapment operation. The buy-bust operation was a success.

352
 Thereafter, although the money used for the sale of marijuana was marked, the marking of
the dangerous drugs was made not immediately after the seizure of the drugs but only upon its
delivery to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Also, it was stipulated by the parties to
dispense with the testimony of the Forensic Chemist of the PNP.
Because of this, Omamos questioned the legality of the operation arguing that the chain of
custody rule was not observed.

ISSUE
Did the arresting officers comply with the chain of custody rule?

RULING
NO. In drug-related cases, the following four links in the chain of custody must be proved: (1)
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the dangerous drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the dangerous drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the dangerous drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the marked
dangerous drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
As to the first one, "Marking" means the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer places
his/her initials and signature on the seized item. The failure of the arresting officers to immediately
mark the seized drugs engendered serious doubts on whether the marijuana leaves bought by the
poseur-buyer from appellant were indeed the very same ones indicated in the Chemistry Report. Too,
there was no mention of appellant's presence during the marking.
As to the fourth, in drug related cases, it is of paramount necessity that the forensic chemist
testifies on the details pertaining to the handling and analysis of the dangerous drug submitted for
examination i.e. when and from whom the dangerous drug was received; what identifying labels or
other things accompanied it; description of the specimen; and the container it was in. Further, the
forensic chemist must also identify the name and method of analysis used in determining the
chemical composition of the subject specimen.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty arises only when the
records do not indicate any irregularity or flaw in the performance of official duty. Applied to
dangerous drugs cases, the prosecution cannot rely on the presumption when there is a clear
showing that the apprehending officers unjustifiably failed to comply with the requirements laid
down in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. In any case, the
presumption of regularity cannot be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused. Thus, the accused must be acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNELLO REFE y GONZALES

G.R. No. 233697, 10 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (A.B. Reyes, JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

353
 Failure to fully comply with the statutory requirement on the chain of custody of the seized
evidence taints the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. This holds especially true "when
the amount of the dangerous drug is minute due to the possibility that the seized item was tampered."

Here, the quantity of the seized illegal drugs was 0.0488 gram, which exposes it to more risk of
evidence planting and contamination. Despite the miniscule quantity of the seized illegal drugs, the
arresting team in this case took several liberties in the application of Section 21 of R.A. No 9165 with no
explanation at all as to why they failed to observe the requirements of the law. This reckless regard of
the rules cannot be sanctioned by the Court.

FACTS
A criminal information for possession of illegal drugs was filed against Arnello Refe to which
he pleaded not guilty. According to the prosecution, P500.00 worth of shabu was retrieved from
Arnello by Police Officer 1 Rolly Lama (PO1 Lama) in a drug buy-bust operation conducted in
Barangay Nagsanga, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte. PO1 Llama proceeded to mark the plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance, with the initials of the accused: "AGR."

Present during the marking were the barangay officials of Nagsanga, specifically: Barangay
Captain Rogelio Menor (Barangay Captain Menor), Barangay Kagawad Claridel Q. Bulosan, and
Barangay Tanod Pablo B. Garaza, Jr.

Upon finishing the marking, the police officers took Arnello to the police station where they
conducted the inventory. The inventory, or the Acknowledgment Receipt of Property/Articles Seized,
was prepared in the presence of Arnello and the barangay officials. Arnello and the witnesses to the
inventory, except for Barangay Kagawad Bulosan, signed the document. PO1 Llama likewise took a
photograph of the marked money, together with the plastic sachet marked with "AGR."

Following the completion of the documents, PO1 Llama went to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory in Laoag City to submit the evidence for analysis and examination. The plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance, marked as "AGR," was received by PO1 Julius Surell
(PO1 Surell). PO1 Surell then turned over the specimen to P/Insp. Amiely Ann L. Navarro (P/Insp.
Navarro) for the conduct of the necessary laboratory examination which yielded positive for shabu.

Arnello, for his part, denied the accusations against him and denied that a buy-bust operation
took place.

In its decision, the RTC gave more credence to the prosecution witnesses, who testified as to
the conduct of the buy-bust operation. The trial court held that allegations of frame-up and extortion
are common defenses, which are easily concocted and fabricated. Furthermore, the RTC found that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence were preserved. Arnello purportedly failed
to overcome the presumption of regularity on the part of the police officers who handled the seized
evidence.

ISSUE
Was the guilt of Arnello proven beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING

354
 NO. The records of the case reveal substantial inadequacies in the police officers' compliance
with the requirements on the chain of custody, pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. The
prosecution was also unable to provide a justifiable ground for this non-compliance.

The statutory requirements are clear. The apprehending officers must immediately conduct
a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the following: (a) the accused
or the person from whom the items were confiscated, or his representative or counsel; (b) a
representative from the media; (c) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and (d)
any elected public official. They must also sign the inventory and be furnished with their own copy
thereof.

The Court has consistently recognized the policy behind requiring the presence of these
persons during the inventory. The presence of the witnesses prevents switching, planting, or
contaminating the seized evidence, which taints the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
dangerous drugs. In line with this, jurisprudence requires the apprehending officers to immediately
mark the seized items upon their confiscation, or at the "earliest reasonably available opportunity,"
because this serves as the primary reference point in establishing the chain of custody.

While noncompliance with these requirements is excusable, this only applies when the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. The prosecution
must also provide a credible justification for the arresting officers' failure to comply with the
procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

In this case, it is evident that the arresting officers did not strictly observe the statutory
requirements for the chain of custody.

First, the inventory and taking of photographs were not immediately conducted at the place
of arrest. Only the marking of the plastic sachet allegedly taken from Arnello was performed right
after the arrest, while the inventory and photograph were taken in the police station.

From the testimony of PO1 Llama, it is clear that the inventory and taking of photographs
were not immediately conducted at the place of arrest. PO1 Llama testified that the apprehending
team went back to the police station for this purpose. While Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 allows the
inventory to be done at the nearest police station, or at the nearest office of the arresting team,
whichever is practicable, there was no showing that the Pasuquin Police Station was the nearest
office from the place of Arnello's arrest in Barangay Nagsanga.

Second, the arresting officers did not conduct the inventory and take photographs of the
seized items in the presence of a DOJ representative 53 and a media representative. Those present
during the marking and inventory were all representatives of the barangay, which only complied
with the required presence of an elective official as witness. Worse, Barangay Captain Menor testified
that he did not observe the actual marking of the seized plastic sachet, and the preparation of the
inventory.

Barangay Captain Menor merely relied on the representations of the police officers that the
evidence marked was the same item seized from Arnello. The seized evidence was already marked
when Barangay Captain Menor was asked to sign the inventory at the police station. Hence, his

355
presence, or that of the other barangay officials, could not have prevented the planting, tampering,
or contamination of evidence.
Finally, the prosecution did not present any justification for these procedural lapses on the
part of the police officers. There was also no showing that earnest efforts were made to comply with
the mandated procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Noncompliance, or even approximated
compliance in certain instances, is inexcusable, especially when there is no adequate explanation on
the part of the prosecution.

Failure to fully comply with the statutory requirement on the chain of custody of the seized
evidence taints the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. This holds especially true
"when the amount of the dangerous drug is minute due to the possibility that the seized item was
tampered." Here, the quantity of the seized illegal drugs was 0.0488 gram, which exposes it to more
risk of evidence planting and contamination. Despite the miniscule quantity of the seized illegal
drugs, the arresting team in this case took several liberties in the application of Section 21 of R.A. No
9165 with no explanation at all as to why they failed to observe the requirements of the law. This
reckless regard of the rules cannot be sanctioned by the Court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDSON BARBAC RETADA

G.R. No. 239331, 10 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving the police officers'
compliance with Section 21, RA 9165 and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-
compliance. The police officers' mere allegation that there were other people in the buy-bust area
without any indication that these people posed a threat to them or that such occurrence would
substantially affect the success of their operation is a frail justification.

All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense of sale of illegal drugs
due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-bust team in the seizure,
custody, and handling of the seized drug, thus the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug have
been compromised. Accordingly, Retada should be acquitted of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs

FACTS
On April 7, 2012, after confirming that one Edson Retada (Retada) is engaged in illegal drug
activities, Police Inspector Christopher Castro conducted a buy-bust briefing. It was agreed that PO2
Catubig would act as poseur-buyer while PO2 Dela Peña and PO1 Dialemas were the immediate back-
up. PO1 Mansueto, PO2 Fernandez and PO1 Ferrater were also present during the briefing.

PO1 Mansueto (who conducted the test buy), informed the team that Retada was in Chicken
Inasal in Poblacion. Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. Upon arrival thereat,
PO2 Catubig saw Retada standing near the Chicken Inasal in front of MLhuillier. PO2 Catubig
approached the accused and told the latter that he was going to buy shabu. PO2 Catubig gave two (2)
pieces of Php200.00 marked money to the accused. In exchange thereof, Retada gave one (1) plastic
sachet of shabu to PO2 Catubig and got the money. PO2 Catubig raised his right hand as the pre-
arranged signal to inform the other members of the team that the sale has been consummated. PO2
Dela Peña and PO1 Dialemas immediately approached them. PO2 Catubig arrested the accused and
the latter was apprised of his constitutional rights.

356
 Upon arrival at the police station, PO2 Catubig made a thorough body search on the accused
and recovered on the latter one (1) plastic sachet of suspected shabu, buy-bust money, coins in
different denominations and a cellphone.

Two separate Informations were filed against Retada for violation of Sections 5 and 11 (3),
Article II of RA 9165. In its decision, the RTC ruled that the defense of alibi and frame-up of the
accused must simply fail. It further ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the arresting officers'
compliance with the procedural safeguards under RA 9165. 12 The prosecution clearly established
an unbroken chain of custody.

In the assailed Decision dated November 29, 2017, the CA affirmed Retada's conviction.

ISSUE
Was Retada's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 (3) of RA 9165 proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING
NO. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is
essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with moral
certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on their identity, the prosecution has to
show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody
from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

In this connection, the Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the
applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that (1) the seized
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation ; and (2) the
physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d)
a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of the
conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be immediately done at the place of
seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team
considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.

While the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible and that the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not
ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void, this has always been with the caveat
that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

However, in the case at bar, the police officers utterly failed to comply with the requirements
of Section 21.

357
 First, although there were two elected officials present during the inventory at the police
station, the two other mandatory witnesses were not present. To reiterate, the law requires that the
following witnesses should be present during the physical inventory and photography of the seized
drugs: (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ. 27 However, only two
councilors were present. Thus, it is clear that they failed to comply with the mandatory requirement
of the law. Also, the mere fact that they tried to contact a media representative and a DOJ
representative when they arrived at the police station is not the earnest effort that is contemplated
by the law.

Second, they did not conduct the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items at
the place of arrest. Instead, they delayed the proceedings and supposedly accomplished them only at
the police station. When asked why they did so, they offered a flimsy excuse that there were several
persons in the place where they conducted the buy-bust operation.

It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving the police officers'
compliance with Section 21, RA 9165 and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-
compliance. The police officers' mere allegation that there were other people in the buy-bust area
without any indication that these people posed a threat to them or that such occurrence would
substantially affect the success of their operation is a frail justification.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense of sale of illegal drugs
due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-bust team in the
seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug, thus the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drug have been compromised. Accordingly, Retada should be acquitted of the crime of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs.

Also, the elements of illegal possession of drugs were not satisfactorily proven by the
prosecution. The successful prosecution of illegal possession of drugs necessitates the following facts
to be proved, namely: (a) the accused was in possession of the dangerous drugs, (b) such possession
was not authorized by law, and (c) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in
possession of the dangerous drugs. For both offenses, it is crucial that the prosecution establishes the
identity of the seized dangerous drug in a way that the integrity thereof has been well-preserved
from the time of seizure or confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence
in court. In this case, the prosecution utterly failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized drug were preserved.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNELLO REFE y GONZALES

G.R. No. 233697, 10 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Reyes, A., Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Failure to fully comply with the statutory requirement on the chain of custody of the seized
evidence taints the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. This holds especially true "when
the amount of the dangerous drug is minute due to the possibility that the seized item was tampered."
In this case, it is evident that the arresting officers did not strictly observe the statutory
requirements for the chain of custody.

358
FACTS
Police Officer 1 Rolly Llama (PO1 Llama), Senior Police Officer 1 Jonathan Caldito (SPO1
Caldito), and SPO1 Frederick Bulosan (SPO1 Bulosan) were together with their Chief of Police, Police
Senior Inspector Rommel Ramos (PSI Ramos) at the station when they received a report that Arnello
Refe y Gonzales (Refe) was selling shabu in Barangay Nagsanga.
The police officers validated the report and coordinated with the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs
Special Operations Task Group and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for their buy-
bust operation to catch and arrest Refe.
SPO1 Caldito, SPO1 Bulosan, and PO1 Llama were selected to partake in the buy-bust team.
The prosecution alleged that Refe had handed PO1 Llama the plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance and in turn PO1 Llama paid the marked P500.00 bill prompting officer to signal
to the buy-bust team, and arrest the accused. SPO1 Caldito frisked Refe to recover the marked money.
PO1 Llama then marked the sachet with the initials of the accused “AGR” in the presence of
the Barangay Captain Rogelio Menor, Barangay Kagawad Claridel Bulosan, and Barangay Tanod
Pablo Garaza, Jr. The police officers then took Refe to the police station to conduct inventory in the
presence of both Refe and the barangay officials. Refe and the witnesses to the inventory, except
Barangay Kagawad Bulosan, signed the document. After which, the evidence was submitted to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Laoag City for analysis and examination, proving that
the substance in the sachet was shabu. Refe was subjected to a drug test for which he tested negative.
On the other hand, Refe denied the accusations against him and alleged that at the time of the
supposed buy-bust operation, he had just put his child to sleep and was on his way to his live-in
partner when the police officers, one of which he recognized as his neighbor SPO1 Bulosan, forcibly
boarded him inside a Hilux vehicle and took him to his house as they searched his place while he
remained outside and handcuffed. The police had not found anything and took him to the police
station where he was beaten and detained for five days. According to Refe, he had caused the
suspension of PO1 Llama, SPO1 Bulosan, and SPO1 Caldito by filing administrative complaints against
them.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of prosecution. The trial court held that
allegations of frame-up and extortion are common defenses and are easily concocted and fabricated.
Moreover, the trial court also held the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence.
On appeal, Refe argued that the police officers failed to comply with several statutory
requirements in the conduct of the supposed buy-bust operation and had failed to offer a reasonable
explanation to justify their non-compliance with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

ISSUE
Is Refe guilty of violating R.A. No. 9165?

RULING

359
 NO. The statutory requirements are clear. The apprehending officers must immediately
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items: at the place where the search warrant
is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures.
Such should be done in the presence of the following: (a) the accused or the person from
whom the items were confiscated, or his representative or counsel; (b) a representative from the
media; (c) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and (d) any elected public official.
They must also sign the inventory and be furnished with their own copy thereof.
While noncompliance with these requirements is excusable, this only applies when the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. The prosecution
must also provide a credible justification for the arresting officers' failure to comply with the
procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
In this case, it is evident that the arresting officers did not strictly observe the statutory
requirements for the chain of custody.
First, the inventory and taking of photographs were not immediately conducted at the place
of arrest. Only the marking of the plastic sachet allegedly taken from Arnello was performed right
after the arrest, while the inventory and photograph were taken in the police station.
Second, the arresting officers did not conduct the inventory and take photographs of the
seized items in the presence of a DOJ representative and a media representative. Those present
during the marking and inventory were all representatives of the barangay, which only complied
with the required presence of an elective official as witness. Worse, Barangay Captain Menor testified
that he did not observe the actual marking of the seized plastic sachet, and the preparation of the
inventory.
Finally, the prosecution did not present any justification for these procedural lapses on the
part of the police officers. There was also no showing that earnest efforts were made to comply with
the mandated procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Noncompliance, or even approximated
compliance in certain instances, is inexcusable, especially when there is no adequate explanation on
the part of the prosecution.
Failure to fully comply with the statutory requirement on the chain of custody of the seized
evidence taints the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. This holds especially true
"when the amount of the dangerous drug is minute due to the possibility that the seized item was
tampered."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JORDAN CASACLANG DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 229053, 17 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In order that there may be conscionable non-compliance, two (2) requisites must be satisfied:
first, the prosecution must specifically allege, identify, and prove "justifiable grounds"; second, it must
establish that despite non-compliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs and/or
drug paraphernalia were properly preserved. Satisfying the second requisite demands a showing of
positive steps taken to ensure such preservation.

360
 Prosecution witness PO1 Santillan attempted to justify the absence of the third-party witnesses,
testifying that time constraints and the uncertainty of accused-appellant's appearance at the meeting
place had prevented the team from securing their presence. However, his own testimony belies this
claim. He narrated that he recognized accused-appellant from the week-long surveillance he had
conducted prior to the buy-bust operation. Certainly, this ample amount of time had given him several
opportunities to coordinate with any person qualified to be a witness. Consequently, the prosecution
cannot claim that the deviation from the strict requirements of the law was justified.

FACTS
According to the prosecution, PO1 Jethiel F. Vidal (PO1 Vidal) phoned the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office. They discussed the buy-bust operation that the Task
Group had planned to carry out in order to entrap Jordan Casaclang Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), a 20-year-
old high school student suspected of selling marijuana.

That same day, a team of four led by Police Senior Inspector Elpidio Cruz, with PO1 Vidal, PO1
Valerio, and PO1 Santillan, the designated poseur-buyer, conducted the entrapment. PO1 Santillan
saw Dela Cruz come out of Pangasinan National High School and walked toward him. The former
recognized Dela Cruz from the week-long surveillance conducted earlier.

Dela Cruz, who supposedly knew PO1 Santillan from the confidential informant's description,
approached him and asked, “Are you the one?” to which the police officer answered, "Yes, I am the
one referred to by your contact." POI Santillan handed the marked bills, in exchange, Dela Cruz gave
him two plastic sachets of suspected marijuana.

PO1 Santillan then grabbed Dela Cruz, introduced himself as a police officer, and arrested
him. The police officers then brought Dela Cruz to the police station. PO1 Santillan testified that he
possessed the confiscated items from the time he took them from Dela Cruz until he eventually turned
them over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for testing.

After conducting a laboratory examination, Senior Inspector Malojo-Todefio confirmed that

the confiscated items were indeed marijuana. She testified that she turned them over to the evidence
custodian, PO2 Manuel, who corroborated this on trial.

In his defense, Dela Cruz disclaimed any knowledge of the illegal sale and possession of drugs.
He testified that he attended his classes. By lunch break, he went to a nearby canteen where three
unidentified men in civilian clothes invited him to the municipal hall. When he said he did not do
anything wrong, they assured him that they would only talk to him, and eventually asked about the
pending theft case against him. They brought him to the police station, where he was interrogated
and accused of stealing cutting wires.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Dela Cruz guilty of illegal possession and illegal sale of
dangerous drugs and held that POI Santillan's testimony had sufficiently established all the elements
of the crimes charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision.

ISSUE

361
 Does the absence of an elective official, a representative from the media, and a representative
from the Department of Justice during the buy-bust operation warrant Dela Cruz's acquittal?

RULING
YES. Lescano v. People explained the specific requirements under Section 21 (1) of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended: physical inventory and photographing. Section
21 (1) is specific as to when and where these actions must be done.

As to when, it must be "immediately after seizure and confiscation." As to where, it depends

on whether the seizure was supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was served, the
physical inventory and photographing must be done at the exact same place that the search warrant
is served. In case of warrantless seizures, these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or
at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable."

Moreover, Section 21 (1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the physical
inventory and photographing: first, the accused or the person/s from whom the items were seized;
second, an elected public official; and third, a representative of the National Prosecution Service.

There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first, there are two
alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to the representative
of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the media may be present in his or her place.

In this case, none of the three (3) people required by Section 21 (1), as originally worded, was
present during the physical inventory of the seized items. The Court has repeatedly emphasized, the
mere marking of the seized paraphernalia is insufficient to comply with the specific requirements
laid down in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
What is critical in drug cases is not the bare conduct of inventory, marking, and
photographing. Instead, it is the certainty that the items allegedly taken from the accused retain their
integrity, even as they make their way from the accused to an officer effecting the seizure, to an
investigating officer, to a forensic chemist, and ultimately, to courts where they are introduced as
evidence. What is prone to danger is not any of these end points but the intervening transitions or
transfers from one point to another.

Republic Act No. 10640 did introduce amendments that permit deviations from the law's
express requirements when there are justifiable grounds. Thus, in order that there may be
conscionable non-compliance, two (2) requisites must be satisfied: first, the prosecution must
specifically allege, identify, and prove "justifiable grounds"; second, it must establish that despite
non-compliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs and/or drug paraphernalia
were properly preserved. Satisfying the second requisite demands a showing of positive steps taken
to ensure such preservation.

Prosecution witness PO1 Santillan attempted to justify the absence of the third-party
witnesses, testifying that time constraints and the uncertainty of accused-appellant's appearance at
the meeting place had prevented the team from securing their presence. However, his own testimony
belies this claim. He narrated that he recognized accused-appellant from the week-long surveillance
he had conducted prior to the buy-bust operation. Certainly, this ample amount of time had given

362
him several opportunities to coordinate with any person qualified to be a witness. Consequently, the
prosecution cannot claim that the deviation from the strict requirements of the law was justified.

Similarly, the prosecution cannot seek refuge in the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made
in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or
prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. Noncompliance with the procedure laid down
in Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act "negates the presumption of regularity
accorded to acts undertaken by police officers in the pursuit of their official duties.”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PILAR BURDEOS y OROPA

G.R. No. 218434, 17 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 21 and 21 (a) of RA 9165 are the summation of the chain of custody rule. It consists of
four (4) connecting links:
One. The seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;

Two. The turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer;

Three. The turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and

Four. The turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to
the court.

In the case at hand, the prosecution failed to prove that the drugs seized from Pilar were the
same items presented in court. First, the marking of the seized drug was not done immediately after the
seizure at the place of arrest. Second, the required witnesses were not present. Third, in their respective
testimonies, the police officers pointed to each other as the custodian of the seized drug at every
instance. Fourth, the prosecution was silent on whether who received the seized item when it was
delivered to the crime laboratory. Lastly, the prosecution did not present an answer as to how the seized
item was stored in the crime laboratory pending its delivery to the court for presentation as evidence
and who actually delivered it to the court for the purpose of presenting it as evidence.

FACTS
Pilar Burdeos y Oropa (Pilar) was charged for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

The prosecution’s version was that Chief Superintendent Alfredo Valdez (Chief Valdez)
received a text message about rampant illegal drug activities in Muntinlupa. After confirmation of
Pilar’s illegal drug activity, the task force immediately planned a buy-bust operation on her.

Police Officer Eddie Guevarra (PO Guevarra) was designated as poseur-buyer and Police
Officer Rondivar Hernaez (PO Hernaez) as immediate back up. At around 10 o’clock in the evening,
the buy-bust team and PO Guevarra proceeded to Pilar’s house. The informant introduced PO

363
Guevarra to Pilar as a taxi driver interested to buy shabu. PO Guevarra then handed the buy-bust
money to Pilar and then the latter took a plastic sachet from her pocket and handed it to the former
who flicked his lighter to signal that the sale had been consummated. Thereafter, Pilar was arrested.

The buy-bust team then brought Pilar to the police station where the seized items were
marked, inventoried, and photographed in her presence and a civilian named Dennis De Lumban (De
Lumban). PO Guevarra and PO Hernaez brought the request for laboratory examination of the seized
plastic to the crime laboratory. After the examination, the contents of the plastic sachet was found to
be positive for ephedrine, a dangerous drug.

Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) convicted Mario of with
violation of Sections 5 of R.A. No. 9165. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES
(1) Was the chain of custody complied with?
(2) Assuming in the negative, did the saving clause to operate to cure procedural infirmities,
if any, pertaining to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug?

RULING
(1) NO. Section 21 and 21 (a) of RA 9165 are the summation of the chain of custody rule. It
consists of four (4) connecting links:

One. The seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;

Two. The turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer;

Three. The turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and

Four. The turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist
to the court.

In the case at hand, the prosecution failed to prove that the drugs seized from Pilar were the
same items presented in court. The four (4) links consisting the chain of custody rule had never at
any point joined into one unbroken chain.

First, the marking of the seized drug was not done immediately after the seizure at the place
of arrest. The marking was only done by PO Guevarra when the buy-bust team went back to the police
station. It was clearly exposed to switching, planting, and contamination.

Second, the required physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs immediately
after the seizure or confiscation shall be done in the presence of the accused, a media representative,
a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected local official was not complied
with. Both prosecution witnesses testified that the inventory and photograph of the seized item were
done only in the presence of Pilar herself and a certain civilian named Lumban.

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 Third, in their respective testimonies, the police officers pointed to each other as the
custodian of the seized drug at every instance. Indubitably, this inconsistency marks another breach
of the chain of custody rule. Every person who takes possession of seized drugs must show how it
was handled and preserved while it remains in his or her custody to prevent any switching or
replacement.

Fourth, the prosecution was silent on whether who received the seized item when it was
delivered to the crime laboratory.

Lastly, the prosecution did not present an answer as to how the seized item was stored in the
crime laboratory pending its delivery to the court for presentation as evidence and who actually
delivered it to the court for the purpose of presenting it as evidence.

Indeed, the repeated breach of the chain of custody rule here was a fatal flaw which had
destroyed the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.

(2) NO. Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 provides that
the non-compliance with the requirement under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

In People v. Jugo, the Court found that for the saving clause to apply, the prosecution must
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.

Here, both POs Guevarra and Hemaez offered no explanation which would have excused the
buy-bust team's stark failure to comply with the chain of custody rule. In other words, the condition
for the saving clause to become operational was not complied with. For the same reason, the proviso
"so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved," too, will
not come into play.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HAVIB GALUKEN y SAAVEDRA

G.R. No. 216754, 17 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires that the seized items be inventoried and photographed
immediately after seizure or confiscation and the physical inventory and photographing must be done
in the presence of (a) the accused, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from media, and (d)
a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ). The three witnesses should be physically present
at the time of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items, which must be immediately done at the
place of seizure and confiscation.

Here, the police officers completely disregarded the requirements of Section 21. None of the
required witnesses was present at the place of arrest. The police officers merely called-in a Barangay
Kagawad and media representative when they were already at the police station.

FACTS

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 Havib Galuken y Saavedra (Havib) was charged with violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165).

The version of the prosecution was that Investigating Officer 1 Roderick Falle (IO1 Falle), the
designated buyer poseur and the informant proceeded to the area, where Havib was waiting. On the
other hand, Investigating Officer 1 Cielito E. Llano, who was designated as the arresting officer, and
his two (2) companions followed IO1 Falle and the informant.

When they reached the area, the CI introduced IO1 Falle as his cousin who wanted to buy
shabu. The informant negotiated with Havib. The latter immediately pulled form his pocket two (2)
transparent plastic bags containing shabu and after examining and confirming that the contents of
the bags were actually shabu, IO1 Falle handed the marked money.

IO1 Falle lighted a cigarette, as a pre-arranged signal to his alert his other companions. Havib
ran but IO1 Llano was able to apprehend him.

The buy-bust team then bought Havib and the confiscated items at the police station where
IO1 Falle marked the two (2) sachets. The police officers likewise prepared an inventory receipt
signed by Barangay Poblacion Kagawad Pamplona (Kagawad Pamplona) and took photographs of
the seized items.

In the evening of the same day, I01 Falle, Investigating Officer 3 Adrian Alvariño (IO3
Alvariño), IO1 Llano brought Havib to Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office
but the two (2) sachets remained in the custody of IO1 Falle.

The following day, IO1 Falle and IO1 Llano delivered the sachets to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory Office for examination. Police Officer 2 Edmund Delos Reyes
(PO2 Delos Reyes). On the same day, PO2 Delos Reyes endorsed the sachets for laboratory
examination to Police Inspector Lily Grace Mapa (PI Mapa), a Forensic Chemist. The latter personally
examined the items, which yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. After the
examination, she turned over the sachets to Police Officer 2 Sotero Tauro, Jr. (PO2 Tauro), the
evidence custodian of the Laboratory Office.

The Regional Trial Court found Havib guilty as charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE

Did the CA erred in finding Havib guilty of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs?

RULING

YES. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is
essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with moral
certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on their identity, the prosecution has to
show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody
from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence in crime.

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 Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires that the seized items be inventoried and photographed
immediately after seizure or confiscation and the physical inventory and photographing must be
done in the presence of (a) the accused, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from media,
and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ). The three witnesses should be
physically present at the time of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items, which must be
immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation.

Here, the police officers completely disregarded the requirements of Section 21. None of the
required witnesses was present at the place of arrest. The police officers merely called-in a Barangay
Kagawad and media representative when they were already at the police station. Thus, it is clear that
they failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of the law.

Moreover, the police officers did not conduct the marking, inventory, and photography of the
seized items at the place of arrest.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

JOSE BENNY VILLOJAN JR. y BESMONTE alias “Jay-ar”
G.R. No. 239635, 22 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

There are four (4) links in the chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of
the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. To
prove that the illegal drugs presented in court are the very same drugs seized from accused, the
prosecution must establish that there had been no break in any of the four (4) links in the chain.

The Court keenly notes that here, the second link had been seriously breached. Conspicuously,
missing from P02 Baldevia's sworn statement and testimony are the material details of the supposed
turn-over of the seized drugs to the investigating officer at the police station before their submission for
laboratory examination.

FACTS

The name of Jose Benny Villojan y Besmonte alias "Jay-ar" (Jay-ar) appeared on the drug
watch list of San Jose Police Force in Antique. The San Jose Police Force successfully launched a test-
buy operation on Jay-ar, resulting in a consummated sale of marijuana between the police and Jay-
ar. Two (2) days later, a buy bust-team was organized to entrap Jay-ar. He was subsequently arrested
after recovering from his pocket a tea bag of marijuana leaves and a P50.00 bill.

The police proceeded with the marking and inventory of the seized items in the presence of
Provincial Prosecutor Cezar Dan T. Alecando, John Pagunsan of 106.9 Hot PM, Peter Zaldivar of
Barbaza Coop TV, and Barangay Kagawad Arman Leong-on. PO2 Rocky Luzarita took photos of Jay-
ar. PO2 Franklin Alonsagay also took photos of the witnesses while signing the inventory receipt. Jay-
ar was later brought to the San Jose Police Station.

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 Meantime, per request for laboratory examination issued by Deputy Chief of Police PI, PO2
Baldevia brought the confiscated nine (9) tea bags of marijuana leaves to the crime laboratory. The
request and the items were received by PO1 Marlon Grejaldo, a Police Community Non-
Commissioned Officer (PCNO), who recorded the items in the logbook and turned them over to PCI
Omero for laboratory examination. PCI Omero did the physical, chemical, and confirmatory
examinations on the specimen which yielded positive results for marijuana.

After the tests, PCI Omero secured the items inside a sealed plastic bag and turned them over
for safekeeping to custodian POI Genus David. PCI Omero's findings were contained in his Chemistry
Report. A separate Chemistry Report was also submitted by PCI Omero for the specimen obtained
during the earlier test-buy operation launched on Jay-ar. PCI Omero retrieved from POI David the
previously seized marijuana tea bags for presentation in court.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Jay-ar guilty as charged, ruling that the prosecution was
able to establish with moral certainty that Jay-ar was in possession of, and had sold to a police officer
during the buy-bust operation, tea bags containing dried marijuana leaves. The Court of Appeals (CA)
sustained the verdict of conviction.

ISSUE

Was the prosecution able to prove Jay-ar’s guilt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
RA 9165?

RULING

NO. In both cases of violation of Article 5 (illegal sale) and violation of Article 11 (illegal
possession), the chain of custody over the dangerous drug must be shown to establish the corpus
delicti.

The chain of custody rule performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved so much so that unnecessary doubts as to their identity are
removed. This is done through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs
from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court. The chain of custody
requires that law enforcers or any person who came in possession of the seized drugs must observe
the procedure for proper handling of the seized substance to remove any doubt that it was changed,
altered, modified, or planted before its presentation in court as evidence. The chain of evidence is
constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling, and recording, and must exist from the time
the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence.

There are four (4) links in the chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable,
of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of
the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the
court. To prove that the illegal drugs presented in court are the very same drugs seized from accused,
the prosecution must establish that there had been no break in any of the four (4) links in the chain.

368
 The Court keenly notes that here that the second link had been seriously breached.
Conspicuously, missing from P02 Baldevia's sworn statement and testimony are the material details
of the supposed turn-over of the seized drugs to the investigating officer at the police station before
their submission for laboratory examination. The second link involves the turn-over of the
confiscated drugs to the police station, the recording of the incident, and the preparation of the
necessary documents such as the request for laboratory examination of the seized drugs. Since it is
not remote that the handling police officer came in contact with the seized drugs during this
procedure, it is, therefore, necessary that such officer/s be identified and accounted for and made to
explain about the steps he/she/they had undertaken to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the illegal drugs were not compromised while in his/her/their possession.

In light of the prosecution's failure to establish with moral certainty the identity and the
unbroken chain of custody of the dangerous drugs seized from Jay-ar, a verdict of acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANALYN ADVINCULA y PIEDAD

G.R. No. 201576, 22 July 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Carandang, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The links in the chain of custody that must be established by the prosecution was summarized
in the case of People v. Kamad:

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemists for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

In the case at hand, although P02 Caballero testified with regard to the seizure and marking of
the illegal drug recovered from Analyn and his turnover of the illegal drug seized to the investigating
officer, he failed to establish the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination.

FACTS

An Information was filed against Analyn Advincula y Piedad (Analyn) for selling, delivering
or giving away methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in violation of Republic Act No. 9165
(R.A. No. 9165). The evidence for the prosecution showed that acting on an information from a
civilian informant (CI), Police Sub Inspector Johnny Gaspar (PSI Gaspar) planned a buy-bust
operation against Analyn alias “Potsie” who was allegedly engaged in selling illegal drugs. Police
Officer 2 Jackson Caballero (PO2 Caballero) was designated as the poseur-buyer.

PO2 Caballero, PO2 Reynaldo Mallari (PO2 Mallari), and the CI proceeded to the target area.
Upon arrival thereat, the CI pointed Analyn to the policemen. Thereafter, PO2 Caballero approached
Analyn and told her that he will buy shabu. PO2 Caballero handed the marked money to Analyn who
took from her pocket one plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.

369
After Analyn handed the plastic sachet to PO2 Caballero, the latter immediately executed the pre-
arranged signal by removing his cap.

PO2 Caballero introduced himself as a policeman and arrested Analyn. While at the crime
scene, he marked the plastic sachet with the initials of Analyn then placed it inside his pocket as they
proceeded to the police precinct.

Qualitative examination was conducted on the confiscated item gave positive result to the
tests for shabu.

For her defense, Analyn contended that she and her daughter were sitting in her husband’s
parked kuliglig when two policemen arrived and invited her to the precinct. At the precinct, the police
asked for her name and detained her.

Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) convicted Mario of with
violation of Sections 5 of R.A. No. 9165. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Is Analyn guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5, Article II of R.A. 9165?

RULING

NO. It is important that the State establishes with moral certainty the integrity and identity
of the illicit drugs sold as the same as those examined in the laboratory and subsequently presented
in court as evidence. This rigorous requirement, known under R.A. No. 9165 as the chain of custody,
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. Failure to
prove the preservation of the integrity of the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases will lead to the
acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

In order to remove all doubts concerning the identity of the evidence, the prosecution must
establish to the very least substantial compliance with the chain of custody requirement. The links in
the chain of custody that must be established by the prosecution was summarized in the case of
People v. Kamad:

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemists for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.

In the case at hand, although P02 Caballero testified with regard to the seizure and marking
of the illegal drug recovered from Analyn and his turnover of the illegal drug seized to the
investigating officer, he failed to establish the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug
to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination.

Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove that the item confiscated by PO2 Caballero is
the same item presented in court.

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 As the crime was committed on February 9, 2009, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is
applicable. It mandates that the conduct of physical inventory and photographing of the seized items
must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official, and (3) a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.

In the case presented before the court, the lapses of the arresting police officers are significant
and cannot be ignored. There was no photograph and inventory of the seized items, and no
representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media, and any elected public official
during the marking of the shabu. Furthermore, no explanation/justification was given by the buy-
bust team why they did not comply or observe the rule laid down in Section 21. With a broken chain
of custody together with the non-compliance by the police officers of Section 21 cited above, there is
serious doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti which constitutes a fatal procedural flaw that
destroys the reliability of the corpus delicti.

For failure of the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt the unbroken chain of
custody of the drugs seized from Analyn, acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELVIE BALTAZAR y CABARUBIAS

G.R. No. 229037, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

People v. Gayoso enumerates the links in the chain of custody that must be shown for the
successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, i.e., first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.
Here, SPO1 Eufemio testified that he handed the plastic sachet to SPO3 Calapano. Yet, it was not
shown how SPO3 Calapano handled the seized item before it was given to or retrieved by PSI Bonifacio
for qualitative examination. During this time, the seized item was once again open to tampering and
switching. It cannot be said, therefore, that the integrity and identity of the seized items were deemed
preserved.

FACTS
Elvie Baltazar (Baltazar) was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. An
information was received from a police asset that Baltazar was selling shabu along Agham Road in
Quezon City. Hence, in a buy bust operation, a police officer slid a P500.00 bill in Baltazar’s pocket.
In turn, the latter gave the police officer a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
Thereafter, they went to the police station to inventory the seized items in from of the investigating
officer, the accused, and a media representative.

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 On arraignment, Baltazar pleaded not guilty. She argued that she was in Old Balara, Quezon
City buying viand when two men approached and forced her to get into the car. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) found Baltazar guilty of the offense charged.
On appeal, Baltazar argued that the prosecution failed to strictly comply with the chain of
custody rule under Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165. The
apprehending team did not secure the attendance of representatives from the barangay and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to witness the inventory. Also, the prosecution failed to show how the
seized items were examined, the manner by which the PSI Bonifacio handled the specimen, and the
safeguards taken while the seized items remained in her possession. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling of the lower court.

ISSUE
Did the CA err when it affirmed Baltazar’s conviction for violation of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs?

RULING
YES. To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for each
link in its chain of custody. People v. Gayoso enumerates the links in the chain of custody that must
be shown for the successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, i.e., first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.
The first link speaks of seizure and marking which should be done immediately at the place
of arrest and seizure. It also includes the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized
or confiscated drugs which should be done in the presence of the accused, a media representative, a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and an elected public official.
In this case, the drug item was not marked at the place where it was seized. Moreover, no DOJ
representative and elected public official was present during the inventory. Among the three
required witnesses, only a media representative was present during the inventory.
The prosecution tried to explain the absence of a barangay representative during the
inventory, by claiming that because it was already 8:30 o'clock in the evening when Baltazar got
arrested and brought to the police station, there was no more barangay official present at the
barangay hall. It bears emphasis, however, that as early as 5 PM in the afternoon, the apprehending
team already knew they would conduct a buy-bust operation on Baltazar. By that time, they should
have already alerted the barangay officials regarding the need for at least one (1) of them to be
present during the inventory in case the buy-bust operation on Baltazar pushed through. At any rate,
other elected public official, not necessarily a barangay elected official, could have also been alerted
and invited to witness the inventory. As it was, the buy-bust team failed to secure their presence
during the inventory itself. In any event, another representative who was not present during the
inventory was from the DOJ.

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 The second link pertains to the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer. In this case, the seized item was not actually turned over to the
investigating officer. This is another breach of the chain of custody.
The third and fourth links pertain to the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination and the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.
Here, SPO1 Eufemio testified that he handed the plastic sachet to SPO3 Calapano. Yet, it was
not shown how SPO3 Calapano handled the seized item before it was given to or retrieved by PSI
Bonifacio for qualitative examination. During this time, the seized item was once again open to
tampering and switching. It cannot be said, therefore, that the integrity and identity of the seized
items were deemed preserved.
Indeed, the multiple violations of the chain of custody rule here cast serious uncertainty on
the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. The metaphorical chain did not link at all, albeit, it
unjustly restrained Baltazar’s right to liberty. Verily, therefore, a verdict of acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

WILLIAM CEPEDA y DULTRA and LOREN BY DULTRA and LOREN DY y SERO
G.R. No. 229833, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It therefore becomes imperative that all police officers strictly comply with the requirements
laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR. In case of any deviation with the mandatory procedure,
however, a conviction may still be secured if the following requisites are established by the prosecution:
(1) the existence of "justifiable grounds;" and (2) that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. Thus, once it becomes evident that lapses
in procedure occurred, the prosecution bears the onus to recognize such lapses and accordingly justify
the same. Without such justification, there would be no occasion to apply the saving mechanism.

This case failed to demonstrate such a justification. The testimonies are completely silent with
respect to the presence of a representative of the Department of Justice, as required under the law, and
neither was there an attempt to explain why there was a failure to secure such witness.

FACTS

The evidence of the prosecution presented IO3 Aguilar, IO2 Orcales, IAI dela Cerna as
witnesses. Their testimonies showed that a female confidential informant (CI) handled by dela Cerna,
came to the PDEA office and gave an information that an “alias Bebang” (or hereinafter Dy) is engaged
in selling illegal drugs. After which, dela Cerna relayed the information he received to their Regional
Director who then instructed dela Cerna to form and lead a team for the conduct of a buy-bust
operation. Thereafter, the buy-bust operation proceeded. The CI led Orcales to a wooden two-storey
house where the CI then called out Dy. Dy appeared at the small terrace on the second floor just right
outside the main door, and invited the CI and Orcales to come upstairs. Upon reaching Dy, the CI
introduced Orcales to Dy as a friend who wanted to buy shabu worth Php500.00. She then called out

373
"Loloy" (or hereinafter Cepeda) who came out from the end room of the house. When Cepeda reached
Dy, he got a sachet of shabu from his left pocket and handed it to Orcales who extended his hand to
receive the sachet. The CI and Dy continued their casual talk for a little more time after which the CI
and Orcales went down the house. Upon reaching the ground, Orcales made a missed call to Aguilar.
When Aguilar received the missed call, she informed the rest of the team, and they all rushed to the
house of Bebeng. They arrested Cepeda and searched his body and they discovered from his right
pocket the buy-bust money and in the left pocket another sachet of shabu.

Afterwards, before conducting the inventory, they called for the presence of a barangay
kagawad and a mediaman from Bombo Radyo, and upon their arrival, Aguilar conducted an
Inventory at the crime scene of the seized items witnessed by a barangay kagawad and media
personality while pictures were being taken.

On the other hand, according to the version of the defense, Dy and Cepeda were in their house
at Osmena Extension, Cagayan de Oro City. While watching television, they felt the house shaking and
they heard thudding sounds and they sensed that there were many people going upstairs. Cepeda
peeped through the window to find out what was going on outside, and he saw somebody (they came
to know later as dela Cerna) entering the house through the window of the room of his son Werlan
Cepeda and the latter's wife Jenny Sumagang Cepeda, who were already lying down. Cepeda also saw
armed persons kicking the door of their house uttering in a loud voice, "PDEA ni, raid ni" (We are
PDEA agents, this is a raid).

Cepeda and Dy came to know the names of some of the persons who forcibly entered their
house to be Aguilar, dela Cerna, and Orcales, when the said persons took the witness stand. They
claimed that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses relative to a woman who is familiar with
Dy and to which Dy had a conversation is a lie. Cepeda saw Orcales for the first time only when
Orcales took the witness to testify in these cases.

Moreover, the only items they discovered was the income of Cepeda from his driving
consisting of Pl.00, P5.00 and PI0.00, and the latter's license, and there was not even a Pl00.00 bill as
his income as motorela driver do not even reach Php 500.00 a day. He was not selling shabu because
he had no shabu. The testimony of Aguilar that the P500.00 buy-bust money and a sachet of shabu
were recovered from his pocket was a lie. The testimony of Orcales that Cepeda is selling shabu is
also a lie.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Dy and Cepeda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Sections 5 and 11, respectively, Article II, Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC judgment in toto.
The Public Attorney's Office filed an Entry of Appearance with Notice of Appeal, informing the CA of
Dy's intention to pursue an appeal with the Court. Cepeda, however, no longer appealed his
conviction.

ISSUE

Is Dy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165?

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RULING

NO. Firstly, the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 were not faithfully
complied with. Case law is firm in that the procedure enshrined in Section 21 is a matter of
substantive law and cannot be ignored at the whim of law enforcement agents.

Secondly, the prosecution did not present justifiable grounds for such non-compliance.
Notwithstanding the clear import of the records, the prosecution, despite the opportunity to do so,
failed to explain the reason behind the lapses in procedure. Thus, given the unjustified breaches of
Section 21, there arises reasonable doubt as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti.

In the same vein, there being merit in the appeal, the Court, in the interest of substantive
justice, finds the need to revisit the conviction of Cepeda despite his failure to perfect an appeal
before the Court.

Dangerous drugs cases are unique. The fungible nature of the corpus delicti in such cases
requires the adoption of special rules in order to ensure moral certainty in the conviction of the
accused. It therefore becomes imperative that all police officers strictly comply with the
requirements laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR. In case of any deviation with the
mandatory procedure, however, a conviction may still be secured if the following requisites are
established by the prosecution: (1) the existence of "justifiable grounds;" and (2) that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. Thus,
once it becomes evident that lapses in procedure occurred, the prosecution bears the onus to
recognize such lapses and accordingly justify the same. Without such justification, there would be no
occasion to apply the saving mechanism.

This case failed to demonstrate such a justification. The testimonies are completely silent
with respect to the presence of a representative of the Department of Justice, as required under the
law, and neither was there an attempt to explain why there was a failure to secure such witness.
Instead, what surfaces is the fact that the witnesses were summoned only after the fact; that it was
only after the actual buy-bust and subsequent seizure of the items that the witnesses were called.

Further, the prosecution dismally failed to discharge its burden of establishing justifiable
grounds in light of the lapses in procedure. Hence, there being no justifiable grounds established,
there is no more occasion to determine compliance with the second prong of the saving clause, i.e.,
the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.

Without question, Dy's conviction rests on the same set of facts and circumstances as the
conviction of Cepeda, her co-accused before the CA. Hence, the supervening acquittal of Dy in the
instant appeal must likewise be extended to Cepeda.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CORAZON NAZARENO y FERNANDEZ @ “CORA” and

JEFFERSON NAZARENO y FERNANDEZ @ “TOTO”
G.R. No. 231875, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

375
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The saving clause under Section 21 (a) of RA 9165 commands that non- compliance with the
prescribed requirement shall not invalidate the seizure and custody of the items provided that: 1) such
non-compliance is justified; and 2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officers. More, the justifiable ground for non- compliance must be proven
as a fact because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.

Based on P03 Villareal's testimony, the inventory and photograph were not done before any
media representative or representative from the DOJ. Additionally, the prosecution failed to
acknowledge the absence of the representatives from media and DOJ, let alone, offer any explanation
therefor.

FACTS

Based on the version of the Prosecution, PO3 Bornilla and PO3 Villareal conducted a
surveillance in the area of Purok 1, Block 8, Barangay Bayanan, Muntinlupa City. They determined
whether a possible buy-bust operation could be conducted against appellant Corazon Nazareno
(Cora) and her son appellant Jefferson Nazareno (Toto). Thereafter, the buy-bust operation
proceeded. PO3 Bomilla, PO3 Villareal and the confidential informant proceeded to appellants' house.
When asked, PO3 Bomilla said he wanted to buy shabu worth P300. Toto took the P300 and told PO3
Bomilla to wait. He walked across the street to a store and called out to his mother, Cora. The latter
came out and Toto handed the P300 to her. Cora took something from the breast portion of her blouse
and gave it to Toto. Toto returned to PO3 Bomilla and handed him a piece of paper which contained
a small transparent plastic sachet of suspected shabu. As pre- arranged, PO3 Bomilla reversed his
bullcap. PO3 Villareal immediately closed in. PO3 Bomilla accosted Toto and directed PO3 Villareal
to arrest Cora. The marked P300 was recovered from Cora. Both appellants were apprised of their
constitutional rights and brought to the police station.

At the police station, the seized items were marked "CN," photographed, and inventoried.
Following the request for examination, the substance was delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory in
SPD, Makati City for chemical testing. The same yielded positive results for shabu.

On the version of the defense, Cora and Toto denied the charge. They testified that on the day
of the buy-bust operation, Cora went home after cleaning the Multipurpose Hall of Purok 8. When
she noticed it was about to rain, she returned to the Multipurpose Hall to tum off the lights. On her
way back, two (2) men later identified as PO3 Bomilla and PO3 Villareal alighted from a vehicle and
introduced themselves to her as police officers. They invited her to the police station for questioning.
When she refused, they shoved her into their parked vehicle. They informed her of the report they
received regarding her business of peddling drugs in the area.

On the other hand, Toto was at home with his wife and son on when someone suddenly kicked
their door open, introduced themselves as police officers, dragged him out of the house, and forced
him and Cora into a parked vehicle.

376
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a verdict of conviction against Cora and Toto of
violation of Section 5 of Republic Act 9165 (RA 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC.

Cora and Toto now seek affirmative relief from the Court and plead anew for their acquittal.

ISSUES

(1) Is the arrest of Cora and Toto valid?

(2) Are Cora and Toto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 Article II of RA
9165?
RULING

(1) YES. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides instances when
warrantless arrest may be affected, thus: “(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” Here, appellants were
arrested during a buy-bust operation where they were caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. In
People v. Rivera, the Court reiterated the rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation does
not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest, in line with the
provisions of Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Revised Rules of Court.

(2) NO. In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The
prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally possessed by the accused is
the same substance presented in court. The case is governed by RA 9165 prior to its amendment in
2014. Section 21 of RA 9165 prescribes the standard in preserving the corpus delicti in illegal drug
cases.

As required, the physical inventory and photograph of the seized or confiscated drugs
immediately after seizure or confiscation shall be done in the presence of the accused, a media
representative, a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected local official.

The saving clause under Section 21 (a) of RA 9165 commands that non- compliance with the
prescribed requirement shall not invalidate the seizure and custody of the items provided that: 1)
such non-compliance is justified; and 2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officers. More, the justifiable ground for non- compliance
must be proven as a fact because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.

Based on P03 Villareal's testimony, the inventory and photograph were not done before any
media representative or representative from the DOJ. Additionally, the prosecution failed to
acknowledge the absence of the representatives from media and DOJ, let alone, offer any explanation
therefor. In fact, the prosecution was conspicuously silent on this point. Hence, considering the
prosecution neither acknowledged nor explained its non- compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165,
the saving clause was not triggered. Accordingly, there is no point anymore in determining if the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs had been satisfied.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERT PEREZ FLORES

377
 G.R. No. 241261, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as
certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official; or
(b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media.

In this case, the Court finds that the police officers were justified in conducting the markings,
inventory, and photography of the seized items at the police station instead of the place of arrest,
considering that there were a lot of people at the latter area in view of the ongoing town fiesta activities
in Ginatilan, Cebu. Nonetheless, it appears that the inventory and photography of the seized items were
not conducted in the presence of representatives either from the DOJ or the media, contrary to the
express mandate of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640.

FACTS

The prosecution alleged that the police officers from the Ginatilan Police Station, Cebu,
successfully implemented a buy-bust operation against Flores, during which two sachets of white
crystalline substance were recovered from him. As there were many people gathered due to a
motocross contest at the area where the buy-bust operation was conducted, the police officers took
Flores and the seized items to the police station where he was body searched in the presence of two
barangay councilors, during which eight more sachets were recovered from him. The markings,
inventory, and photography of the seized items were then conducted in the presence of Flores, as
well as the aforesaid barangay councilors. Thereafter, the seized items were brought to the crime
laboratory where, upon examination, the contents thereof yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

In defense, Flores denied the charges against him, claiming instead, that he went to Ginatilan,
Cebu to work as a make-up artist for a beauty pageant event at the town fiesta. As he was waiting for
his brother to fetch him at a gas station, a man in civilian clothes who was on board a motorcycle
suddenly approached him and told him not to move. A few moments later, a patrol car arrived and
he was dragged inside; after which, he was taken to the municipal hall where his bag was searched,
but no contraband was found therein.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Court of Appeal
(CA) affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

Is Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002?

378
RULING

NO. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of' the crime. The law further requires that the inventory
and photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were
seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to
the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640,
an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media. The
law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily to ensure the establishment of the chain of
custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance
with the chain of custody procedure may not always be possible. As such, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that:
(a) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved.

In this case, the Court finds that the police officers were justified in conducting the markings,
inventory, and photography of the seized items at the police station instead of the place of arrest,
considering that there were a lot of people at the latter area in view of the ongoing town fiesta
activities in Ginatilan, Cebu. Nonetheless, it appears that the inventory and photography of the seized
items were not conducted in the presence of representatives either from the DOJ or the media,
contrary to the express mandate of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640.

As earlier stated, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for these witnesses'
absence by presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at the very least, by showing that genuine and
sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure their presence. Accordingly,
since it was not properly shown that genuine and earnest efforts were made to comply with the
witness requirement of the chain of custody rule, the Court is constrained to hold that there was an
unjustified deviation from the same, resulting in the conclusion that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from Flores were compromised. Perforce, his acquittal is
warranted under these circumstances.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAYSON MERANDO y AVES

G.R. No. 232620, 05 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In People v. Cadungog, the Court held that since "a buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity, the buy-bust team has enough time and opportunity to bring with them, at the time of the buy-
bust or immediately thereafter, the said witnesses."

379
 Here, the arresting officers had about 19 hours to secure the presence of the third-party
witnesses. They first received the report on accused-appellant's allegedly rampant selling of drugs at
around 7:00 p.m. on April 8, 2013. Only at around 2:00 p.m. the next day were they again informed that
accused-appellant was spotted at the market on Magsaysay Street. Despite that leeway, they failed to
secure the presence of a representative from the media, a representative from the Department of Justice,
and an elected official.

FACTS
According to the prosecution, a confidential informant reported that a certain "Begote," later
identified as Jayson Merando (Merando), was rampantly selling illegal drugs along Magsaysay Street,
Pasig City.

Acting on the information, Chief Inspector Castillo organized a buy-bust team. The following
day, PO1 Reyes proceeded to the market while the rest of the team followed. When they reached the
market, the informant approached a man and introduced him to PO1 Reyes as Begote. Begote asked
PO1 Reyes what he wanted from him, to which the officer replied that he wanted to buy marijuana.
Begote then told PO1 Reyes that he still had one (1) left and demanded payment.

After receiving the marked P100.00 bill, Begote handed PO1 Reyes one (1) plastic sachet
containing suspected dried marijuana leaves. Upon exchange, PO1 Reyes turned his cap to signify
that the sale had been consummated. As PO2 Anggati approached the scene, PO1 Reyes held Begote's
arm and introduced himself as a police officer.

At the place of arrest and in Begote's presence, PO1 Reyes signed the plastic sachet containing
suspected marijuana and marked it. In the same place, PO1 Reyes photographed and inventoried the
seize item. With the seized items in his custody, PO1 Reyes and his team proceeded to the Barangay
Hall and asked two barangay officials to sign the inventory. The contents of the sachet tested positive
for marijuana.

Merando was charged with violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Merando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the illegal
sale of dangerous drugs in violation of Article II, Section 5 of RA. 9165. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed Merando's conviction.

ISSUE
Did the CA correctly uphold the conviction of Merando for violating Article II, Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9165?

RULING
NO. A perusal of the records reveals that the prosecution offered no justifiable reason for
their failure to strictly comply with the mandate of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. The dangerous drug
seized from an accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. "Its existence must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt."

More to the point, the transacted drugs must not only be proven to actually exist, but must
also be ascertained to be the same drug examined and presented in court. Since prosecutions under

380
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act primarily revolve around the identity and integrity of the
corpus delicti, compliance with its guidelines on the custody and disposition of the dangerous drugs
seized is vital.

Here, the buy-bust operation allegedly happened on April 9, 2013, before R.A. No. 9165 was
amended by RA.10640. Consequently, the original version of Section 21 applies. Section 21 requires
the presence of the accused, representatives from the Department of Justice and the media, and an
elected public official during the actual seizure of the evidence and their subsequent inventory and
photographing.

Here, the Regional Trial Court found that none of the required third-party witnesses were
present. The prosecution merely testified that after having marked, photographed, and inventoried
the suspected marijuana seized at the place of arrest, PO1 Reyes and his team brought accused-
appellant to the barangay hall. There, PO1 Reyes presented accused-appellant, the buy-bust money,
the sachet of suspected marijuana, and the inventory of seized evidence to barangay officials,
Magudadayao and Novero, who then signed the inventory.

Moreover, in People v. Cadungog, the Court held that since "a buy-bust operation is, by its
nature, a planned activity, the buy-bust team has enough time and opportunity to bring with them,
at the time of the buy-bust or immediately thereafter, the said witnesses."

Here, the arresting officers had about 19 hours to secure the presence of the third-party
witnesses. They first received the report on accused-appellant's allegedly rampant selling of drugs at
around 7:00 p.m. on April 8, 2013. Only at around 2:00 p.m. the next day were they again informed
that accused-appellant was spotted at the market on Magsaysay Street. Despite that leeway, they
failed to secure the presence of a representative from the media, a representative from the
Department of Justice, and an elected official.

Lastly, it is also worth noting that the apprehending team failed to photograph the seized
items at the place of arrest simultaneously with the conduct of inventory. Both the RTC and the CA
found that it was only at the police station where the seized items were photographed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOMAR CASTILLO y MARANAN

G.R. No. 238339, 07 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The absence of witnesses during seizure and marking casts reasonable doubt on the actual
origin and identity of the drugs introduced in evidence as those allegedly seized from accused-appellant.
It casts reasonable doubt on accused-appellant's guilt for the offenses with which he is charged.
In this case, after the alleged confiscation of items from accused-appellant, the buy-bust team
went inside their vehicle parked near the place of arrest, and there did the marking. This claim alone
acknowledges the ostensibly clandestine conduct of the police officers. No other person could attest to
how they conducted themselves at the place of the arrest and, ultimately, in the isolation of their own
vehicle.

381
FACTS
A week prior to October 26, 2006, the Lipa City Police Station obtained information that
Castillo was selling illegal drugs. After SPO2 Yema had confirmed the tip with the barangay captain
and Castillo's neighbors, a buy bust team was formed. At 12:00 noon on October 26, 2006, the team,
together with a civilian asset, conducted the buy-bust operation against Castillo. Assigned to be the
poseur-buyer, the asset was given the marked money consisting of a one-piece P100.00 bill and a one
piece P200.00 bill.
Upon seeing Castillo, the asset approached him while the police officers watched from their
vehicle about 10 meters away from the basketball court. The officers saw the asset hand over the
marked money to Castillo. Castillo, in turn, pulled out of his pocket a plastic playing cards case and
from it, took out a small sachet, which he gave to the asset. After the exchange, the asset touched his
head, signaling that the transaction had been consummated.
At the signal, the police officers alighted from the vehicle and approached the asset and
Castillo. The asset gave the plastic sachet to SPO2 Yema while SPO1 Quinio seized the marked money
from Castillo. After a body search on Castillo, SPO2 Yema recovered four (4) plastic sachets
containing crystalline substances suspected to be shabu, which were all placed inside a plastic case
of playing cards.
The officers brought the items inside their vehicle, which was still parked near the place of
arrest. There, SPO2 Yema marked the plastic sachet subject of the buy-bust and the other four (4)
plastic sachets recovered from the body search. Afterwards, the officers brought Castillo to the Lipa
City Police Station. There, the seized items were photographed along with the marked money and
Castillo. The seized items were also inventoried, as witnessed by Limbo, the Department of Justice
representative, Barangay Chair Christopher Latayan (Barangay Chair Latayan), SPO2 Yema, and
Castillo, who all signed the Certificate of Inventory. SPO2 Yema and SPO1 Quinio then prepared and
signed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest.
SPO2 Pera also prepared a Letter-Request for Laboratory Examination of the substances
seized. Police Officer Cesario Mandahuyan brought the letter-request, together with the seized items,
to the Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. Upon examination, the forensic chemist, Police Senior
Inspector Marino, reported that the confiscated substances yielded positive results for shabu.
Castillo was charged with violations of Section 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act (illegal possession of and illegal sale of dangerous drugs). A buy bust operation was formed,
apprehending Castillo in the operations.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses
charged. The prosecution established the elements of the crimes charged. The appeal is denied by
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA held that prosecution failed to establish the police officers' compliance
with the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act's chain of custody requirements, the irregularities in
the seized items' marking and the belated presence of the Department of Justice representative, only
arriving at the police station when the inventory had already been prepared.

ISSUE
Did the prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt Castillo's guilt for violation of Article
II, Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act?

382
RULING
NO. For there to be a successful prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, punished
under Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements must be
established: first, the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and
second the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In both illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused comprise the corpus
delicti of the charges. Thus, their identity and integrity must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
It is the prosecution's duty to ensure that the illegal drugs offered in court are the very same items
seized from the accused. Complying with the chain of custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed." Section 21 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act outlines the rules governing the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized,
and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia.

Compliance with the chain of custody requirements under Section 21 protects the integrity
of confiscated drugs in four (4) aspects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second,
the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or
items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances
or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them.
Furthermore, there are four (4) links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item that need
to be established: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
The seizure and marking of the dangerous drugs from the accused to the apprehending officer
form the first crucial link in the chain of custody. While the marking of the dangerous drugs seized
from the accused does not explicitly form part of the chain of custody requirements under Section
21, it is indispensable in ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs
have been preserved. Such significance impels the presence of third-party witnesses during the
actual seizure and marking, which must immediately follow seizure, to ensure that whatever items
are subsequently inventoried, photographed, examined, and presented in court are the same
substances that were initially obtained from the accused.
The absence of witnesses during seizure and marking casts reasonable doubt on the actual
origin and identity of the drugs introduced in evidence as those allegedly seized from accused-
appellant. It casts reasonable doubt on accused-appellant's guilt for the offenses with which he is
charged.
In this case, after the alleged confiscation of items from accused-appellant, the buy-bust team
went inside their vehicle parked near the place of arrest, and there did the marking. This claim alone
acknowledges the ostensibly clandestine conduct of the police officers. No other person could attest
to how they conducted themselves at the place of the arrest and, ultimately, in the isolation of their
own vehicle.

383
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LARRY SULTAN y ALMADA
G.R. No. 225210, 07 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Moreover, Section 21 mandates the conduct of inventory and taking of photographs
"immediately after seizure and confiscation," which means that these must be done at the place of the
arrest. Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, the
physical inventory and photographing of the “seized items may be done” at the nearest police station or
at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable." Evidently, the
barangay hall, as in this case, is not an alternative.

FACTS
According to the prosecution, Superintendent Rapiz was informed that a certain Larry Sultan
(Sultan) was engaging in the illegal trade of shabu. Accordingly, a buy-bust operation was assembled
and PO2 Hechanova was designated as poser-buyer. Upon arrival to the meeting place at the Sea
Breeze Hotel, Bacolod City, PO2 Hechanova met Sultan at the entrance wherein Sultan received the
P1, 000.00 marked money and handed over an elongated sachet containing white crystalline
substance to PO2 Hechanova.

Thereafter, Sultan was arrested, and was then brought to the barangay hall where the
inventory and photographing of the seized items were made in the presence of the punong barangay
and a kagawad. Subsequently, PO2 Hechanova requested the laboratory examination of the seized
sachets' contents at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory Office. PO2 Albarico received
the specimen, after which he gave it to Chief Inspector Puentespina who examined the seized items,
which tested positive for shabu.

Testifying for the defense, Sultan denied possessing and selling the shabu. He claimed that he
was at the Sea Breeze Hotel booking a room with Batungara when he met up with Elibaldo, who
expressed his desire to pay his debt. Upon arrival, Elibaldo was accompanied by two strangers who
arrested him. He was then brought to a JMP building, for the purpose of bargaining but it did not
made sense to Sultan. Hence, he was brought to the barangay where his bag was opened and which
according to him did not include shabu.

The RTC found Sultan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 for the sale of
dangerous drugs, and Section 11, for the illegal possession on dangerous drugs. Upon appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in toto. It dismissed as trivial the prosecution's failure to identify who
had custody of the seized evidence at all times. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Can Sultan be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove the unbroken chain of custody?

RULING
YES. The Court granted the appeal and acquitted Sultan. When Section 5, for the sale of
dangerous drugs, and Section 11, for the illegal possession on dangerous drugs are violated, the
corpus delicti is the illicit drug seized from the accused. It is of paramount importance that the
existence of the drug, the corpus delicti of the crime, be established beyond doubt. Its identity and
integrity must be proven to have been safeguarded. The chain of custody under Section 21 of

384
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act carries out this purpose as it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No.
10640, outlines the requirements for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or
surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. It requires that the physical inventory and taking of
photographs of the seizure items must be in the presence of the accused, an elected public official
and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign
copies of the inventory. The required witnesses must not only be present during the inventorying
and photographing, but as early as the seizure of items. Noncompliance with Section 21 engenders
doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti. When the corpus delicti is cast in doubt, an accused's guilt
is also cast in doubt-warranting acquittal.

In this case, the prosecution failed to show the police officers' strict compliance with Section
21. Two (2) barangay officials witnessed the marking, inventorying, and photographing of the seized
items. Beyond that, no representatives from both the media and the Department of Justice were
present.

Moreover, Section 21 mandates the conduct of inventory and taking of photographs

"immediately after seizure and confiscation," which means that these must be done at the place of
the arrest. Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act, the physical inventory and photographing of the “seized items may be done” at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable." Evidently,
the barangay hall, as in this case, is not an alternative.

While deviations may be condoned under justifiable grounds, the prosecution must plead and
prove that justifiable ground. Here, the prosecution has never bothered to prove, let alone plead, any
justifiable situation. Hence, the Court is constrained to acquit the accused-appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARK ANDREW PAZ y ROCAFORD

G.R. No. 233466, 07 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Marking is the placing by the arresting officer of the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on the items after they have been seized. It is the starting of the custodial link and such is vital
since the succeeding handlers thereof will use the markings as reference. For the marking and inventory
to be fully complied with in the chain of custody, it must be done (a) in the presence of apprehended
violator, and (b) immediately upon confiscation. Here, there is no showing that the marking was
accomplished in the presence of Paz. All that was established was that, while at the PDEA office, IO1
Silverio marked the sachets with "RBS-1 05/09/13" and "RBS-2 05/09/13," while the other details are
left out for this Court to speculate.

FACTS
In an Information filed, a certain Mark Andrew Paz y Rocaford (Paz) was accused of violating
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, for selling Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.

385
 Paz was caught selling shabu for P40, 000.00 to Intelligence Officer 1 (IO1) Silverio, who was
a poseur-buyer in his buy bust operation together with IO1 Delgado and IO2 Lopez. In Paz’s defense,
he contends that he was framed up.

Despite Paz’s defense, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found for the three PDEA Investigative
Officers, and held that the prosecution duly proved and established the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs and that Paz was caught in flagrante delicto.

Persistent, Paz appealed his case to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC ruling
against him. CA found that there were indeed obvious flaws in the compliance with the procedures
laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, but stated that the lapses are not fatal and will not render
seized items inadmissible as evidence. Hence the appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Did the Investigative Officers duly comply with the chain of custody rule in Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 as amended by R.A. No. 10640?

RULING
NO. Despite the amendment of R.A. No. 10640 to Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 that only two (2)
witnesses are required during the conduct of physical inventory, the original three (3) witness rule
under R.A. No. 9165 is applicable at the time Paz committed the offense charged.

Marking is the placing by the arresting officer of the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on the items after they have been seized. It is the starting of the custodial link and such is
vital since the succeeding handlers thereof will use the markings as reference. For the marking and
inventory to be fully complied with in the chain of custody, it must be done (a) in the presence of
apprehended violator, and (b) immediately upon confiscation.

Here, there is no showing that the marking was accomplished in the presence of Paz. All that
was established was that, while at the PDEA office, IO1 Silverio marked the sachets with "RBS-1
05/09/13" and "RBS-2 05/09/13," while the other details are left out for this Court to speculate.

The Court found that Silverio also did not comply with the Section 21 of RA 9165 due to the
absence of a representative from the DOJ and the media and only Barangay Kagawad Ruiz’s signature
appeared in the document for the required witnesses.

It is not enough for the apprehending officers to merely mark the seized sachets of shabu; the
buy-bust team must also conduct a physical inventory and take photographs of the seized items in
the presence of the witnesses as provided by law. The prosecution must show earnest efforts were
made to comply with the three witness rule and the Court finds that such was not done. As previously
enumerated by the Court in People vs. Lulu Battung u Namar, the possible circumstances to which the
absence of the excused are:

a. Their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area;

b. their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened
by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in
his/her behalf;

386
 c. the elected officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to
apprehended;

d. earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected
public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
proved futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who faced the threat of being
charged with arbitrary detention; or

e. Time constraints and confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining
the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
The Court held that the poseur-buyer did not satisfy any of the above-mentioned
circumstances. Based on the Courts finding, there is indeed a doubt on the marking of the seized
items, hence, such casts doubt on the chain of custody performed by the apprehending officers in the
case at Bar. The prosecutions failure to comply with the chain of custody rule is equivalent to its
failure to establish the corpus delicti and, therefore, its failure to prove that crime was indeed
committed. In view of the foregoing, the Court reversed and set aside the rulings of the RTC and CA
and hereby acquits Paz.

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES v. PATRICIO HONASAN y GRAFIL, et al.

G.R. No. 240922, 07 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

“The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at
the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.”

Here, when I01 Estrellado was asked as to who gave him the plastic sachets, he gave the names
of Bonifacio and Honasan. He clarified that one sachet came from Bonifacio, while the other was given
to him by Honasan. However, when he marked the two plastic sachets at the area with his initials, he
did so without identifying which of the two sachets was received from Honasan and which was from
Bonifacio. In other words, the Supreme Court can no longer identify which sachet came from Bonifacio
and which came from Honasan.

FACTS
Patricio Honasan (Honasan) was charged in two separate Informations with violations of
Section 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165. These cases were consolidated with a criminal cases wherein
Honasan’s co-accused, Noel Carpio (Noel) and Bonifacio Oseo (Bonifacio) were charged with illegal
sale of shabu. Upon arraignment, Honasan pleaded not guilty to all charges. Trial on the merits
ensued.

According to the prosecution, through a confidential informant, a test-buy operation against

Honasan, Noel and Bonifacio was conducted in the place where the accused were having a drinking
spree. Said operation yielded a positive result as IO1 Arnel Estrellado (IO1 Estrellado) was able to
buy one sachet of suspected shabu. The operatives went back to the premises where the test-buy took
place. While another transaction was transpiring, someone from the alley shouted “Dakop Owie,
dakop!” which meant that they were being arrested. Honasan attempted to escape but he failed to do
so. On the other hand, Noel and Bonifacio were able to escape.

387
 Thereafter, IO1 Estrellado marked the sachets with "AEE-A-7/28/10" and "AEE-B-7/28/10."
Photographs were also taken while the sachets were being marked. After the marking, the operatives
went to the Bulan Municipal Police Station with appellant and the seized items. IO1 Estrellado took
custody of the sachets while en route to the station. At the station, an inventory was conducted on
the items seized from appellant and Bonifacio. Also, a certificate of inventory was prepared and
signed by IO1 Estrellado and the other witnesses present during the inventory. The examination of
the contents of the sachets all yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, an illegal drug.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued its decision, finding Honasan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of shabu, and of illegal sale of shabu. Meanwhile, Noel Carpio was
acquitted. It ruled that it is of no moment that the PDEA agents failed to accomplish the chain of
custody form as the chain of custody of evidence was sufficiently established by the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision with modification. The CA held that
Honasan was caught in flagrante delicto selling illegal drugs in a valid buy-bust operation.

ISSUE
Did the lower court and the appellate court correctly find Honasan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged?

RULING
NO. In this case, the Supreme Court finds procedural lapses concerning the chain of custody
that put into question the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti.

In People vs. Salonga, the SC held that “the marking of the evidence serves to separate the
marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized
from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence.”

Here, the prosecution miserably failed to establish that the dangerous drugs presented in
court were the very same drugs allegedly received and seized by I01 Estrellado from Honasan. During
the trial, when I01 Estrellado was asked as to who gave him the plastic sachets, he gave the names of
Bonifacio and Honasan. He clarified that one sachet came from Bonifacio, while the other was given
to him by Honasan. However, when he marked the two plastic sachets at the area with his initials, he
did so without identifying which of the two sachets was received from Honasan and which was from
Bonifacio. In other words, the Supreme Court can no longer identify which sachet came from
Bonifacio and which came from Honasan.

Also, there was no representative from the DOJ during the inventory and taking of
photographs. Estrellado’s testimony that they requested for a DOJ representative through a text is a
hearsay as its probative value is not based on his personal knowledge. Requesting the presence of a
DOJ representative through a mere text message can hardly be considered as an earnest effort.
Without the justification offered by the PDEA agents for their non-compliance with the requirement
of an unbridled chain of custody, the trial court and the CA erred in convicting the appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EUTIQUIO BAER

388
 G.R. No. 228958, 14 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that
follows such operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or
recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity
of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to make a finding of
guilt.
Virtually every procedural requirement mandated under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
(R.A. No. 9165) was violated by the authorities in the instant case.

FACTS
In two separate Information, Eutiquio Baer (Baer) was charged for violation of Sections 5 and
11 (illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
The version of the prosecution was that the members of the Provincial Anti-Narcotics Unit
(PANU) and barangay officials Cerilo Gaviola (Gaviola) and Marcelo Estoque (Estoque), went to Brgy.
Iniguihan, Leyte to serve a search warrant against Baer. Upon arrival, they told him that they will
search his rented stall inside the public market by virtue of a search warrant, the contents of which
they read to Baer.
Baer admitted that there were prohibited drugs in his place and thereafter escorted the team
to his bedroom and handed them a locked steel box. Since the steel box was locked, a member of the
team obtained a key from Virgilio Notarte (Notarte), who was detained at the municipal building.
When the box was opened, it was found to contain seven big plastic sachets and 142 sealed decks of
suspected shabu. The police officers confiscated those articles and made an inventory of the seized
items, signed Baer and the witnesses to the search. A certification of search was also prepared.
After the search, the team brought Baer and the seized items to the municipal building where
the confiscated items were marked by SPO1 Agustin Dela Cruz (SPO1 Dela Cruz). Thereafter, the
seized items were forwarded to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for qualitative
examination. The report showed that the subject specimens tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. On the other hand, the testimonies of the defense witnesses, Baer and Raul
Solante (Solante), presented a different version of the events.
Both Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) convicted Baer for illegal
possession, while acquitting him of the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE
Is the chain of custody rule complied with?

RULING
NO. There is reasonable doubt as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug
specimen.

389
 In all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that
follows such operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated
or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the
identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to make a
finding of guilt.
In this connection, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, lays down the procedure that police
operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The same
provision further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items
and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation. The phrase
"immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing
of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension
In the instant case, the authorities swept aside the compulsory procedures mandated under
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
First and foremost, the inventory and marking of the evidence allegedly retrieved were not
done immediately after the seizure of the drug specimens. The CA found that there was "failure [on
the part] of the police officers to immediately mark the prohibited drugs after they were seized from
accused-appellant's rented stall[.]"
Second, the CA likewise factually found that the inventory was not conducted at or near the
place of the apprehension. The CA found that the "accused-appellant and the seized drugs were
brought to the municipal building, where the inventory was prepared." Further, even assuming for
the sake of argument that the authorities were justified in holding the inventory elsewhere, the IRR
of R.A. No. 9165 allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the apprehending
team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. Here,
the inventory and marking were done in the municipal building and not in the nearest police station
or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
Third, the evidence on record readily reveals that the authorities did not photograph the
evidence allegedly seized. In fact, no photographs of the operation nor the drug specimens were
offered into evidence.
Fourth, the operation was conducted only "[i]n the presence of the police officers and
barangay officials[.]" The prosecution failed to acknowledge and, more so, justify this clear infraction
of the law.
Fifth, as acknowledged by the CA itself, the "Receipt of Confiscated Articles was also prepared,
signed by the police officers and the barangay officials who witnessed the search.
Sixth, as testified by SPO1 Dela Cruz, he marked the confiscated sachets by inscribing only his
initials, i.e., AD, and signature.
It is apparent that virtually every procedural requirement mandated under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 was violated by the authorities in the instant case.
Hence, how the CA can hold that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug
specimens were duly preserved by the prosecution is totally beyond comprehension.
Regrettably, both the RTC and CA seriously overlooked the long-standing legal tenet that the
starting point of every criminal prosecution is that the accused has the constitutional right to be

390
presumed innocent. It is thus immaterial, in this case or in any other cases involving dangerous drugs,
that the accused put forth a weak defense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEY NABUA y CAMPOS

G.R. No. 235785, 14 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), the apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after the seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Here, an inventory and photograph of seized items were only made in the presence of Jose Nabua
(Nabua) and three barangay officials. The arresting officers failed to give any justifiable explanation for
the absence of the other required witnesses.

FACTS
An Information was filed against Nabua, Paul Saturnino (Saturnino) and Gideon Baltazar
(Baltazar) for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The prosecution’s evidence show that
on October 20, 2013, Police Chief Inspector Orly Pagaduan (P/C Inspector Pagaduan) received a
report from an informant that a certain “alias Boyet” was selling illegal drugs. He then organized a
buy bust operation.
The informant told Nabua that he found a buyer of shabu and to meet in front of Ortega’s
store. Thereafter, the informant introduced Senior Police Office 1 Roberto Vargas (SPO1 Vargas) to
Nabua as the interested buyer. Nabua handed to SPO1 Vargas one heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing while crystalline substance. The latter, in turn, gave the former the buy-bust
money. SPO1 Vargas scratched his neck to signal the consummation of the sale. Nabua was, then,
arrested and informed of his constitutional rights. Saturnino and Baltazar were found on board
Nabua’s vehicle.
SPO1 Vargas marked and seized the plastic sachets. He also prepared an inventory of the
seized items in the presence of Barangay Captain Eduardo Peralta and two Barangay Tanods. He,
thereafter, brought the items to the Crime Laboratory Office. Forensic Chemist PSI Theresa Manuel
received the request and specimens and conducted a qualitative examination. The specimens were
found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) found Nabua guilty as charged.
Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Is the chain of custody rule complied with?

391
RULING
NO. In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The
prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally possessed by the accused is
the same substance presented in court.
To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for each link in
its chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. This is the chain of custody rule.
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the standard in preserving the corpus delicti in illegal
drug cases, viz:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after the seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 commands that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Here, an inventory and photograph of seized items were only made in the presence of Nabua
and three barangay officials. Evidently, no media representative and DOJ representative were
present during the inventory and photograph of the seized items. The arresting officers failed to give
any justifiable explanation for the absence of these witnesses. The arresting officers failed to give any
justifiable explanation for the absence of these witnesses.
The presence of media representative and DOJ representative would have preserved an
unbroken chain of custody. Moreover, they failed to perform their positive duty to secure through
earnest efforts the presence of these representatives. This is certainly a serious lapse of procedure.
Another gap in the chain of custody happened when the seized drug was delivered to the
crime laboratory. There was nothing on record showing how the seized drug was handled before,
during, and after it came to the custody of forensic chemist PSI Manuel’s possession. No evidence was
presented as to how PSI Manuel took steps in preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drug.
The breaches in chain of custody rule here were fatal flaws effectively destroying the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.
A perfect chain of custody may be impossible to obtain at all times because of varying
conditions. Section 21(a) of Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165
offers a saving clause allowing leniency under justifiable grounds. There are twin conditions for the

392
saving clause to apply: a) the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses;
and b) the integrity and value of seized evidence had been preserved.
Here, the prosecution failed to offer any explanation which would otherwise excuse the buy-
bust team’s failure to comply with the chain of custody rule. Thus, the saving clause would not apply.
Suffice it to state that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot substitute for compliance and mend the broken links. There can be no presumption of
regularity in this case when records were replete with details of the policemen's serious lapses.
For to allow the presumption to prevail notwithstanding clear errors on the part of the police
is to negate the safeguards precisely placed by law to ensure that no abuse is committed. Here, the
presumption was amply overturned by compelling evidence of the serious breaches of the chain of
custody rule.

ROWENA SANTOS y COMPRADO and RYAN SANTOS y COMPRADO v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 242656, 14 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Here, the police officers were also able to strictly comply with the requirements laid down in
Section 21 (1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165).

FACTS
Two separate criminal Information were filed against Rowena Santos (Rowena) and Ryan
Santos (Ryan) for violation of Section 11, Article II or (R.A. No. 9165). Several police officers attended
an operational briefing at the Intelligence Section of Naga City Police in connection with the
implementation of three search warrants issued against Gomer Aquiban (Gomer), Rowena, Ryan,
Ronnie Santos (Ronnie) and Romeo Santos (Romeo).
Thereafter, the team, composed of around ten members proceeded to Sagrada Familia, Naga
City. Upon arrival, Police Officer 1 Joker Albao (PO1 Albao) went to the house of Ryan and promptly
informed the latter of the search warrant. Ryan was handcuffed and was transferred to the room of
Rowena where both accused were informed of the contents of the warrant.
While converged at Rowena's house, they waited for the arrival of the mandatory witnesses:
Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Perry Boy Solano (Solano), media representative Adiel
Auxillo (Auxillo), and Barangay Kagawad Ma. Celina Breñis (Breñis). In the presence of Police Officer
3 Louie Ordoñez (PO3 Ordoñez), Rowena and the mandatory witnesses, the police officers began
searching and found several assorted cellphones, some cash, and empty plastic sachets of sachet.

393
 They likewise found money and sachets of shabu in Ryan’s house which PO1 Albao marked
in the presence of Ryan, the mandatory witnesses, and police officers. PO3 Ordoñez prepared the
Receipt of Property Seized and Certification. The mandatory witnesses also affixed their respective
signatures on both documents. The entire inventory proceeding was also photographed.
They proceeded to the Naga Police Station for booking and recording. PO3 Ordoñez turned
all the seized items over to Police Officer 3 August Florece (PO3 Florece).
PO3 Florece brought the specimens to the provincial crime laboratory for examination. The
laboratory examination of the seven items yielded a positive result for the presence of dangerous
drugs.
Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) found Rowena and Ryan
(petitioners) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
ISSUE
Is the chain of custody rule complied with?
RULING
YES. At the outset, the Court notes that the issues raised in the Petition are factual and
evidentiary in nature, which are outside the Court's scope of review in Rule 45 petitions. Still, the
Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming petitioners' guilt for violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
The petitioners argue that the corpus delicti had not been fully established and that the chain
of custody rule was not followed, thus the integrity of the dangerous drugs was not ensured and their
identity was not established with moral certainty.
The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of seized dangerous drugs under
Section 21 (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides that the apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti and an
unbroken chain of custody.
The Court has explained in a catena of cases the four (4) links that should be established in
the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove all the links that should be established in the
chain of custody.
Moreover, the police officers were also able to strictly comply with the requirements laid
down in Section 21. They conducted the physical inventory and photography of the seized items in

394
the presence of petitioners, a representative from the media, a representative of the DOJ and a
barangay official at the place where the search was conducted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SHAGER LACDAN y PARTO

G.R. No. 232161, 14 August 2019, (LAZARO-JAVIER, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for each link in its
chain of custody. The first link speaks of seizure and marking, which should be done immediately at the
place of arrest and seizure. It also includes the physical inventory and photograph of the seized or
confiscated drugs which should be done in the presence of the accused, a media representative, a
representative from the DOJ, and an elected public official.

In the instant case, PO2 Gallega’s testimony, on its face, bears how the first link in the chain of
custody had been breached. Only media representative Ding Bermudez was present during the
inventory, but a DOJ representative and an elected public official were not around. PO2 Gallega failed
to explain why these two representatives were not found during the inventory.

FACTS
Shager P. Lacdan (Lacdan) was charged with the violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of Republic Act No.
9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165).

The version of the prosecution was that PO2 Alexander Gallega (PO2 Gallega) received a
report from a confidential informant that Lacdan was involved in illegal drug activities. The buy-bust
team proceeded to San Pedro, Laguna where Lacdan resided. After the confidential informant
introduced PO2 Gallega to Lacdan, the former gave the marked money to the latter, who in turn,
handed one plastic sachet of suspected shabu. On signal, the back-up team immediately closed in. The
buy-bust team brought Lacdan and the seized items to the police station. Per the Chemistry Report,
Forensic Chemist Donna Villa Huelgas (Huelgas) found the specimens positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.

On the other hand, the version of the defense states that while Lacdan was seated outside his
house, he noticed a motorcycle roaming around the area, looking for a certain Jerome Dedala. One of
the passengers, PO2 Gallega asked him about Dedala’s whereabouts and when he could not tell them,
they handcuffed and brought him to the police station.

The trial court found Lacdan guilty as charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE
Was the chain of custody rule complied with?

RULING
NO. To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for each
link in its chain of custody. People v. Gayoso enumerates the links in the chain of custody that must be
shown for the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, i.e. first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;

395
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
from the forensic chemist to the court.

The first link speaks of seizure and marking, which should be done immediately at the place
of arrest and seizure. It also includes the physical inventory and photograph of the seized or
confiscated drugs which should be done in the presence of the accused, a media representative, a
representative from the DOJ, and an elected public official.

PO2 Gallega’s testimony, on its face, bears how the first link in the chain of custody had been
breached. Only media representative Ding Bermudez was present during the inventory, but a DOJ
representative and an elected public official were not around. PO2 Gallega failed to explain why these
two representatives were not found during the inventory.

About the second link, none of the prosecution witnesses testified to whom the seized items
were turned over at the police station. It was not clear whether the same was turned over to the
investigating officer at all, if there was any.

As to the third link, PO2 Gallega testified that he turned over the plastic sachet to the receiving
clerk of the crime laboratory, who, nonetheless, was never named, let alone presented to the court.

As to the fourth link, after Forensic Chemist Huelgas examined the specimen, she claimed to
have returned the same to the evidence custodian and later retrieved it from the latter for
presentation in court. It was not shown, however, how the evidence custodian handled and stored
the seized item before the same was retrieved for presentation in court. The multiple violations of
the chain of custody rule here cast serious uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the corpus
delicti. Verily, therefore, a verdict of acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALAN BANDING y ULAMA

G.R. No. 233470, 14 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

From the language of Section 21, the mandate to conduct inventory and take photographs
"immediately after seizure and confiscation" necessarily means that these shall be accomplished at the
place of arrest. When this is impracticable, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
9165 allows for two (2) other options:

Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures.

Here, the prosecution witnesses testified that the physical inventory and the taking of
photographs were conducted in their office in Camp Karingal. They opted to go there for two (2)
reasons: (1) because accused appellant "is a notorious drug pusher"; and (2) because a commotion was
brewing at the place of the arrest. However, there was no showing that Camp Karingal was the nearest
police station or office from the area where the prohibited drug was allegedly confiscated-much less
that it was practical.

396
FACTS
An Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), charging Alan Banding y
Ulama (Banding) with violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. On arraignment, Banding pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial then
ensued.

According to the prosecution, a confidential informant apprised Police Officer 2 Ofelia Inway
(PO2 Inway) about the illegal drug activities of a certain “Al.” Acting on the tip, police officers formed
a buy-bust team. On the next day after receiving the confidential information, the buy-bust team
proceeded to the target area. Soon after, a man whom they later identified as Banding arrived. Upon
consummation of the sale, Banding was arrested.

To step away from the commotion in the area, the team proceeded to their station in Camp
Karingal, Quezon City for the physical inventory. While in transit, PO2 Inway took custody of the
seized item. At the police station, PO2 Inway immediately turned over the seized item and the buy-
bust money to PO3 Wilfredo Corona (PO3 Corona).

PO3 Corona conducted the physical inventory of the seized item in the presence of Banding,
the rest of the buy-bust team, and a media personnel. Thereafter, PO2 Inway then submitted the
seized item, along with requests for laboratory examination and drug tests, to Engineer Leonard M.
Jabonillo (Engr. Jabonillo) of the Quezon City Police District Crime Laboratory Station Office. Engr.
Jabonillo's Chemistry Report indicated that the seized item yielded positive results for shabu.

The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish that a valid buy-bust operation took
place and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were properly preserved. Among
others, it held that a clerical error-particularly, writing marijuana instead of shabu, in the inventory
receipt does not tarnish the police officers' credibility.

Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Decision. It held that "[t]he integrity of the evidence
is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the
evidence has been tampered with." Sustaining the presumption of regularity of the police officers, it
found that Banding failed to show that they did not properly discharge their duties.

ISSUE
Should Banding be acquitted?

RULING
YES. Here, the arrest having been effected on September 20, 2010, the applicable law is
Republic Act No. 9165, as originally worded.

From the language of Section 21, the mandate to conduct inventory and take photographs
"immediately after seizure and confiscation" necessarily means that these shall be accomplished at
the place of arrest. When this is impracticable, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic
Act No. 9165 allows for two (2) other options:

397
 Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures.

To sanction noncompliance, the prosecution must prove that the inventory was conducted in
either practicable place. Here, the prosecution witnesses testified that the physical inventory and the
taking of photographs were conducted in their office in Camp Karingal. They opted to go there for
two (2) reasons: (1) because accused appellant "is a notorious drug pusher"; and (2) because a
commotion was brewing at the place of the arrest.

However, there was no showing that Camp Karingal was the nearest police station or office
from the area where the prohibited drug was allegedly confiscated-much less that it was practical.
This Court takes judicial notice that Camp Karingal is more than a 17-kilometer car ride away from
the place of arrest and seizure.

Furthermore, the prosecution witnesses testified that only a media representative was
present during the physical inventory and the taking of photographs. Although they requested the
presence of a barangay official, their invitation was allegedly unheeded. They invoke substantial
compliance with the rule, as there was an effort to secure the attendance of an elected official.

Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 sanctions
noncompliance when there are justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

The Court underscores that this was not a spontaneous arrest, but rather, a pre-planned and
organized buy-bust operation. Yet, even the arresting team's supposed attempt to secure the
presence of a barangay official remained unsubstantiated at this stage. There was also no such effort
to secure a Department of Justice representative at all. Additionally, the prosecution itself admitted
that accused-appellant did not sign the inventory receipt. This casts doubt that the dangerous drug
allegedly seized from accused-appellant was the same drug delivered to P03 Corona for
documentation.

Further destroying the prosecution's case is the lack of proof as to how the prosecution
handled the seized item for seven (7) months after confiscation. It is not for this Court to speculate
on how the law enforcers dealt with the seized item during this appreciable amount of time until
Chief Inspector Rodis reexamined it. We cannot dismiss as mere "clerical error" the discrepancies
between the inventory receipt and chemistry reports.

The inventory receipt labeled the seized item as marijuana, while the chemistry reports
indicate it was shabu. Irregularities are also glaring in the marking and the weight of the seized item-
all of which are utterly inexcusable and cast serious doubts on the origin of the item supposedly
confiscated from accused-appellant.

This discrepancy and the gap in the chain of custody immediately affect proof of the corpus
delicti without which the accused must be acquitted.

VALMORE VALDEZ y MENOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

398
 G.R. No. 238349, 14 August 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as
certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, a
representative from the media AND the Department of Justice, and any elected public official; or (b) if
after the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, an elected public official and a representative
of the National Prosecution Service OR the media. The law requires the presence of these witnesses
primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence."

Anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves that
the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses,
albeit they eventually failed to appear.

In this case, there is a deviation from the witness requirement without sufficient justification.
An examination of the Physical Inventory of Evidence contains only the signatures of JO2 Lim, SPO3
Moran, Valdez, and another person whose identity was not established during the course of trial.

FACTS

Valmore Valdez (Valdez) was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The prosecution alleged that Jail Officer 2 Edgardo B. Lim (JO2 Lim) was conducting a head
count of the inmates at the City Jail when he noticed that Valdez, an inmate, was near the jail gate and
acting suspiciously while holding a plastic bucket. JO2 Lim conducted a pat-down frisking on the
former and discovered plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance in the front portion of
his brief.

JO2 Lim then brought Valdez to the jail investigator for preparation of documents and
respective markings of the confiscated items. Thereafter, JO2 Lim brought Valdez and the marked
items to the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs – Special Operation Task Group, where they were turned over
to Senior Police Officer 3 Fernando C. Moran (SPO3 Moran). SPO3 Moran then prepared the physical
inventory of evidence, requested for laboratory examination, and took photographs of Valdez and
the seized items. Subsequently, SPO3 Moran forwarded the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for laboratory examination. Upon qualitative examination, the submitted specimens tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC found
that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crime, as well as the corpus delicti
of the crime through the positive testimony of JO2 Lim.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction. It found that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti had been preserved and the post-seizure procedure under Section 21 of

399
R.A. No. 9165 had been complied with, considering that the marking, inventory, and photography of
the seized items were conducted in the presence of Valdez, the request for laboratory examination
was prepared, and the seized items were personally brought by the investigator to the crime
laboratory for qualitative examination.

ISSUE
Should Valdez be convicted for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs?

RULING

NO. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA No. 9165,
it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering
that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove
the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.

The law requires that the inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain
required witnesses, n namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, a
representative from the media AND the Department of Justice, and any elected public official; or (b)
if after the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service OR the media. The law requires the presence of
these witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any
suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence."

Anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves
that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such
witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness of these efforts must be
examined on a case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is for the Court to be convinced that the
failure to comply was reasonable under the given circumstances. Thus, mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as
justified grounds for non-compliance.

In this case, there is a deviation from the witness requirement without sufficient justification.
An examination of the Physical Inventory of Evidence contains only the signatures of JO2 Lim, SPO3
Moran, Valdez, and another person whose identity was not established during the course of trial.

However, no such justification was given, as in fact, the prosecution did not even acknowledge
that there was a deviation from the witness requirement in the first place. In view of the foregoing,
the Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly
seized from Valdez were compromised, thereby necessitating his acquittal from the crime charged.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MELVIN DUNGO y OCAMPO

G.R. No. 229720, 19 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

400
 In a physical inventory of the items seized, marking "means the placing by the apprehending
officer or the police poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the dangerous drug seized." Since
marking "is the starting point in the custodial link," it is "vital that the seized contraband be immediately
marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference." This is also
to "ensure that the objects seized are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually offered in
evidence.
The Court ruled that the marking of the seized items were made at the place of arrest but the
inventory was at the police station. Yet neither of the barangay officials were presented at the court on
to testify their presence during the inventory. The Court also ruled that the chain of custody rule was
broken when the police officer who brought the seized item to the crime laboratory was not even part
of the buy-bust operation and was not able to personally testify. This posed a doubt on the integrity of
the seized item.

FACTS
Appellant Melvin Dungo y Ocampo (Dungo) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Article II, Section 5, Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165).
On 2 September 2009, a confidential informant went to the police in Sto. Tomas Pampanga to
report that a certain “Ogag” was selling illegal drugs from his residence. The police officers planned
a buy-bust operation in coordination with Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and
Barangay San Matias Punong Barangay Valeriano Lingat (PB Lingat). PO2 Lugtu was to act as poseur-
buyer with PO3 Canda as back-up and arresting officer, while the rest of the team were to provide
perimeter security.
At the target site, the confidential informant and PO2 Lugtu went to meet Ogag. When they
spotted Ogag, PO2 Lugtu was introduced who as one who wanted to buy shabu. PO2 Lugtu handed a
P500 bill to Ogag, who, in turn, gave him two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu. At that point, PO2 Lugtu signaled and Ogag was arrested, frisked, and informed
of his rights. PO3 Canada then called PCI Canda to witness the search and seizure of the evidence.
They seized the P500 bill used in the transaction and two plastic sachets which was marked. Upon
arrival to the police station, the seized items were turned over to the SPO4 Fernandez. According to
PO3 Canda, they prepared the Turn Over Receipt and Confiscation Report and the latter was signed
by representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), media, and the barangay. Subsequently, the
seized items were brought to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory by PO2 Gonzales. It
was confirmed as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Dungo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. The Court of Appeal affirmed in toto the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Did the prosecution prove Dungo’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING

401
 NO. Since it is the dangerous drugs that comprise the corpus delicti, its identity "must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt." In other
words, no less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish the corpus delicti in every
case under RA 9165.
The duty of the prosecution then is to establish "proof that the identity and integrity of the
prohibited or regulated drug, has been preserved by accounting for each link in the chain of custody
over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of
the corpus delicti."
The chain of custody starts immediately after seizure when the apprehending officers are
required to do a physical inventory of the items seized. Marking "means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the police poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the dangerous
drug seized."
Since marking "is the starting point in the custodial link," it is "vital that the seized contraband
be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as
reference." This is also to "ensure that the objects seized are the same items that enter the chain and
are eventually offered in evidence, as well as to protect innocent persons from dubious and concocted
searches, and the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence."
The Court has interpreted the requirement of "immediately after seizure" broadly. It even
allows for marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. However, it has
also warned that the apprehending team "must prove that they exerted efforts to comply with the
mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable."
In this case, the marking was done immediately after seizure at the place of arrest, but the
inventory was done at the police station, as testified to by PO2 Lugtu. The Confiscation Report was
also prepared at the police station. There were also no photographs taken at the scene, only at the
police station.
Both PO3 Canda and PO2 Lugtu testified that the marking was witnessed by the Chief of Police
and a Barangay Kagawad. The Office of the Solicitor General, likewise, acknowledged that Kagawad
Joseph Lingat and Kagawad Vener Lugtu witnessed the inventory and signed the Confiscation Report.
PB Lingat himself admitted during trial that he was not present during the inventory nor did he sign
any document pertaining to the procedure.
Yet, neither of the kagawads were presented in court, or their testimonies offered as evidence,
and no explanation has been offered why this was so. Their testimonies would have sufficed as they
were the ones with personal knowledge of the inventory, not PB Lingat, who was not present at the
time of confiscation and inventory. PB Lingat only testified to issuing the certification that the police
officers coordinated with the barangay for the buy-bust operation.
Next, there is the matter of turnover to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The person who delivered
the specimen to the crime laboratory — PO2 Gonzales — is not a member of the buy-bust team, nor
is he the investigator in charge of the case. There is no explanation who this person is, when PCI
Fernandez turned over the specimen to him, or why he was the one who brought the specimen to the
crime laboratory. Moreover, PO2 Gonzales did not testify in court, nor his testimony offered as
evidence, on his part in the custody of the evidence.
Additionally, PCI Timario admitted having no knowledge as to whether the specimen he
examined was the one confiscated during the buy-bust operation. All these omissions have been left

402
without any acknowledgment, explanation, and justification by the prosecution, leaving a broken
chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs. Thus, there is already doubt if the specimen presented in
the trial court is the same one seized from Dungo during the buy-bust operation. Hence, the Court
ruled that appellant Dungo is acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRISPIN MAMUYAC, JR. y PALMA

G.R. No. 234035, 19 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The failure to immediately mark the seized items, taken together with the absence of a
representative from the media to witness the inventory, without any justifiable explanation, casts doubt
on whether the chain of custody is truly unbroken. In this case, the chain of custody was broken when
the seized items was in the pocket of the police officer from the time of seizure until the alleged marking
and inventory at the police station.

FACTS
Crispin Mamuyac, Jr. y Palma (Mamuyac) was charged for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act 9165 (R.A. No. 9165).
PO1 Rosal testified that he was at the police station when an informant came reporting the
selling of illegal drugs in Brgy. 10 Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte by Mamuyac. PO1 Rosal was then assigned
as the poseur-buyer and the rest of the group acted as the back-up.
At the place of operation, PO1 Rosal and the informant proceeded to the house of the accused
where they proceeded with the sale. PO1 Rosal brought out the five hundred peso buy-bust money
and handed the same to the accused. To signal the police the consummation of the act, PO1 reached
his cell phone to call.
However, the accused may have sensed that he is a police officer, so he ran towards their
living room. He was chased by the police, but the accused cocked a gun, eventually, he surrendered.
PO2 Garan recovered the buy-bust money. From the time of the apprehension of the accused [until]
accused was brought to the police station, PO1 Rosal was in possession of the confiscated item. At the
police station, he made markings on the plastic sachet, "CPM1." After which, he turned it over to PO2
Garan, being the chief investigator. An inventory was then prepared by PO2 Garan.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted appellant of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. The RTC ruled that the arrest of appellant is legal, and the buy-bust operation is valid. Although
the RTC recognized that the prosecution was not able to strictly comply with Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165, it declared that non-compliance was not fatal to the case of the prosecution. Upon appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's verdict of conviction despite the
marking, inventory, and photograph of the seized item was made only at the police station and not

403
immediately at the place of arrest, and despite the explicit refusal of Barangay Chairman Palalay to
sign the inventory receipt?

RULING
YES. The Court ruled that the prosecution clearly failed to comply with the requirements of
the chain of custody rule. As of 2 April 2014, when the alleged crime was committed, the effective law
enumerating the requirements of the chain of custody rule was Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 as well as
its Implementing Rules and Regulations. On 15 July 2014, R.A. No. 10640 amended Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165. R.A. No. 10640 now requires only two more witnesses, other than the accused or his/her
counsel, to be present during the conduct of the physical inventory and taking of photograph of the
seized items.
The Court further ruled that the prosecution failed to prove appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution was already lacking in the number of witnesses required by
Section 21, and failed to give justifications for the absence of any of the three other witnesses. This
lack is further emphasized after Brgy. Chairman Palalay asserted that he did not affix the signature
appearing on the Inventory Receipt.
Apart from the non-observance of the three- witness rule, there is doubt as to whether the
shabu allegedly seized from the appellant is the same shabu subjected to laboratory examination and
presented in the RTC. The Court found that PO1 Rosal was candid enough to testify that he placed in
his pocket the miniscule amount of seized shabu. The seized shabu was in his pocket from the time of
seizure until the alleged marking and inventory at the police station. In a similar case, the Court
considered such act as "doubtful and suspicious," "reckless," "dubious," "fraught with dangers," as
well as "blatantly irregular."
The burden of proving the guilt of the appellant lies on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution. The Court cannot allow the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty to
overthrow the presumption of innocence of the accused in the absence of proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JEFFREY VICTORIA y TARIMAN

G.R. No. 238613, 19 August 2019, SECOND DIVISON (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The chain of custody rule came to fore due to the unique characteristics of illegal drugs which
render them indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration, or substitution
either by accident or otherwise.
In this case, the Court ruled that the chain of custody was repeatedly violated. The Court ruled
that the prosecution breached the chain custody for failure to mark the seized items at the place of
arrest, for failure to conduct the inventory and taking of the photographs of the seized items, for failure
of the arresting officer to mark the sachet upon arrest, and for failure to prove how the specimen was
handled.
FACTS

404
 Jeffrey Victoria y Tariman (Victoria) was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II, for the
sale of dangerous drugs of R.A. No. 9165 or otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
A confidential informant informed the police that a certain Jeffrey Victoria was selling shabu
at Sta. Ana, Taytay Rizal. The police officers conducted a buy-bust operation with PO3 Loyola as team
leader, PO1 Lico as poseur-buyer, and PO1 Pangilinan as back-up. At the place of operation, PO1 Lico
approached appellant and gave him the P100.00 buy-bust money. At that point, PO3 Loyola and the
rest of the team arrested the appellant. After informing appellant of his constitutional rights, the
police officers brought him to the police headquarters.
On cross, PO1 Lico testified that they did not secure the presence of any barangay official or
media to witness any part of the operation. Moreover, PO1 Lico did not know whether an inventory
was conducted and who brought the specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for all
the elements of the crime was sufficiently established and the chain of custody was duly observed.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's verdict of conviction despite the
attendant procedural deficiencies relative to the marking, inventory, and photograph of the seized
item?

RULING
YES. In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The
prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally possessed by the accused is
the same substance presented in court.
To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for each link in
its chain of custody: first , the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. This is known as the chain of custody rule.
In this case, the prosecution had breached the chain of custody in several instances. First, the
seized item was not marked at the place of the arrest. Second, the inventory and photograph
requirements were not complied with either. PO1 Pangilinan did not explain this omission. Third, it
was not arresting officer PO3 Loyola who marked the sachet but investigating officer PO1 Marundan.
Notably, the latter was not even presented by the prosecution to testify on how he handled the seized
item. This is another break in the chain of custody. Finally, PCI Cejes merely confirmed the existence
of the specimen, but did not testify on how the specimen was handled.
The Court ruled that a perfect chain may be impossible to obtain at all times because of
varying field conditions. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 offers a
saving clause allowing leniency whenever justifiable grounds exist which warrant deviation from

405
established protocol so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. The prosecution's witnesses, however, did not even offer any excuse for the deviation
from the strict requisites of the law.
The repeated breach of the chain of custody rule here had cast serious uncertainty on the
identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. The metaphorical chain did not link at all, albeit it unjustly
restrained petitioner's right to liberty. Verily, therefore, a verdict of acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOMER WISCO y FAILANO

G.R. No. 237977, 19 August 2019, EN BANC (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs, the following links should be established:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

Here, as to the first link, records show that not all of the witnesses required under Section 21(1)
of R.A. No. 9165 were present during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs. As
to the second link, the Court, however, notes the discrepancy that PO3 Bulosan's name and signature do
not appear in the Chain of Custody Form as the immediate recipient of the seized drugs after PO1 Rosal.
As to the third link, the prosecution failed to present P02 Bacud in court to testify on how he handled
the seized drugs in his custody prior to turning them over to the crime laboratory. Lastly, as to the fourth
link, Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Amiely Ann Navarro testified that after she examined the seized
drugs, she delivered them to P03 John Edwin Padayao (P03 Padayao). However, P03 Padayao did not
testify in court.

FACTS
Nomer Wisco Y Failano (Wisco) was charged with the crime of violation of Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). It was alleged that a
confidential informant went to Pasuquin Municipal Police Station and reported the rampant selling
of shabu by Wisco in Barangay 4, Poblacion, Ilocos Norte. SPO1 Caldito verified this through text
message and confirmed that Wisco was indeed involved in the sale of illegal drugs.

Upon proceeding to the target area, PO1 Rosal and the informant went ahead of the team. At
the area, Wisco was already waiting and asked what PO1 Rosal and the informant needed. Wisco in
turn brought out two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and handed one
sachet to PO1 Rosal. Wisco, then recognizing him to be a police officer, immediately ran away towards
the direction where SPO1 Caldito was positioned. SPO1 Caldito was able to intercept him after a brief
chase.

Immediately after his apprehension, Wisco was frisked. PO1 Rosal then marked the plastic
sachet containing suspected shabu bought from Wisco as "AR" and the second plastic sachet seized
as "ARl" at the place of the arrest and in the presence of Barangay Chairman Armando Aguinaldo and
two (2) Barangay Kagawads.

406
 Once the inventory was concluded, PO3 Bulosan, and others, proceeded to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for submission of the seized item for laboratory analysis. PO3 Mervin Reyes received the
items from PO2 Bacud. He turned the items over to Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Amiely Ann
Navarro for examination. It was determined that the two (2) plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. She
then prepared the Final Chemistry Report and turned over the specimens to the evidence custodian,
PO3 John Edwin Padayao, for safekeeping.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Wisco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment, hence the appeal.

ISSUE
Is Wisco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165?

RULING
NO. To establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs, the following links should be
established: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

Applying the above-stated rules, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish all of
the links in the chain of custody.

As to the first link, records show that not all of the witnesses required under Section 21(1) of
R.A. No. 9165 were present during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs.
Neither did the prosecution adduce a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine
and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses.

As to the second link, PO1 Rosal testified that he handed over the seized drugs to PO3
Lumiowel Bulosan (PO3 Bulosan). On the other hand, PO3 Bulosan alleged that he received the seized
drugs from PO1 Rosal. The Court also notes the discrepancy that PO3 Bulosan's name and signature
do not appear in the Chain of Custody Form as the immediate recipient of the seized drugs after PO1
Rosal.

As to the third link, the prosecution failed to present PO2 Bacud in court to testify on how he
handled the seized drugs in his custody prior to turning them over to the crime laboratory. Further,
while the parties agreed to stipulate on the testimony of PO3 Reyes that he received the seized drugs
from PO2 Bacud at the crime laboratory, there was no stipulation as to how he handled the seized
drugs in his custody before turning them over to the forensic chemist. Thus, the absence of testimony
or stipulation as to how PO3 Reyes handled the seized drugs in his custody resulted in a gap in the
third link in the chain of custody.

As to the fourth link, Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Navarro testified that after she
examined the seized drugs, she delivered them to PO3 Padayao for safekeeping and retrieved them
thereafter for delivery to the court. Thus, there was a change of custody of the seized drugs which

407
necessitated PO3 Padayao's testimony. However, he did not testify in court. Consequently, the Court
is in serious doubt as to whether the drugs seized by PO1 Rosal from the accused are the same as
those brought in court.

Thus, in view of the gaps in the chain of custody and the resulting doubt as to the identity of
the drugs allegedly seized from Wisco, the Court is constrained to acquit Wisco of the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO DOCTOLERO, JR.

G.R. No. 243940, 20 August 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

As part of the chain of custody procedure, the apprehending teFADam is mandated, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel,
as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of R.A. No 9165 by R.A. No.
10640, a representative from the media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official; or (b) if after the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, an elected public official and a
representative of the NPS OR the media.

The arrest of Doctolero transpired after the effectivity of R.A. No. 10640. Thus, the witnesses
required in this case are an elected public official and a representative of the NPS OR the media.
Although the inventory and photography of the seized items were conducted in the presence of Brgy.
Chairman Dela Rosa and Brgy. Ex-O Abadam, both elected public officials, records are bereft of evidence
to show that a representative of the NPS or the media was also present thereat. No explanation has been
offered for their absence and no testimony has been given to prove that there were genuine and earnest
efforts exerted to secure their presence, as jurisprudentially required

FACTS
After receipt of a confidential information, Chief Police Senior Inspector Edwin Caracas (Chief
Caracas), formed a buy-bust team composed to conduct surveillance in the area. After coordination
with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the Marikina City Police, the buy-bust
team agreed to conduct its entrapment operation the following day.

The following day, the team proceeded to the target area. When the sale was consummated,
the rest of the buy-bust team rushed into the scene. However, Doctolero ran towards another house
where he remained hiding until Barangay Chairman Mary Jane Dela Rosa (Brgy. Chairman Dela Rosa)
and Barangay Ex-O Rolando Abadam (Brgy. Ex-O Abadam) were summoned to convince him to
surrender to the police. Thereafter, Doctolero was taken to the barangay office where SPO1
Fortunato prepared an inventory and marked the confiscated plastic containing white crystalline
substance. At the police station, SPO1 Fortunato brought the confiscated substance to the crime
laboratory officer.

An Information was filed against Doctolero. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Doctolero
guilty of the violation of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The RTC
held that while it is true that the inventory was signed only by elected officials, i.e., Brgy. Chairman
Dela Rosa and Brgy. Ex-O Abadam, the presence of a representative from the media or the National

408
Prosecution Service (NPS), as required under R.A. No. 10640, can be dispensed with, considering that
at two (2) o'clock in the early morning, the time when Doctolero was arrested, the presence of the
member of the NPS or the media cannot be secured. Court of Appeals (CA). CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE
Is Doctolero guilty of violating R.A. No. 9165?

RULING
NO. As part of the chain of custody procedure, the apprehending team is mandated,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the
seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the
amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, a representative from the media AND the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official; or (b) if after the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by RA
10640, an elected public official and a representative of the NPS OR the media.

The Court acknowledged that strict compliance with the chain of custody procedure may not
always be possible. During such eventualities, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply
with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid,
provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for
noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.

The arrest of Doctolero transpired after the effectivity of R.A. No. 10640. Thus, the witnesses
required in this case are an elected public official and a representative of the NPS OR the media.

In this case, although the inventory and photography of the seized items were conducted in
the presence of Brgy. Chairman Dela Rosa and Brgy. Ex-O Abadam, both elected public officials,
records are bereft of evidence to show that a representative of the NPS or the media was also present
thereat. No explanation has been offered for their absence and no testimony has been given to prove
that there were genuine and earnest efforts exerted to secure their presence, as jurisprudentially
required. In fact, there was not even an attempt to contact these witnesses, especially given the fact
that the police officers received the confidential information from their asset a day before they
conducted the entrapment operation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOESON AGUILAR Y CIMAFRANCA

G.R. No. 243793, 27 November 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Carandang, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 2, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his or her guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to establish
Aguilar's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Their version of the buy-bust operation and the identity and
integrity of the seized drug specimens are all questionable. Therefore, Aguilar is entitled to an acquittal.

FACTS

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 The Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (PAIDSOTG) of the Negros
Oriental Provincial Police Office received a tip from a confidential informant that a certain "Tanton"
was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs in Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City.

A briefing was conducted for the buy-bust operation against "Tonton." Police Officer 1
Crisanto Paggoy (PO1 Panggoy) was designated as the poseur buyer, Police Officer 1 William Vera
Cruz (PO1 Vera Cruz) as his back-up and photographer, and the rest of the PAIDSOTG as perimeter
security. PO1 Panggoy prepared the P500.00 bill as buy-bust money by marking it with "CP" and
bundled it together with cut-up manila paper to make it appear that it was P20,000.00.

Before 6:00 p.m., PO1 Panggoy, PO1 Vera Cruz, and the rest of the buy bust operation team
proceeded to Barangay Looc. PO1 Panggoy waited for "Tonton'' in front of a basketball court by the
road. When he saw "Tonton," he approached him and asked for the shabu. "Tonton'' asked him to
show the money, and so PO1 Panggoy quickly flashed it to him. "Tonton '' then took out two heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and gave them to PO1
Panggoy. PO1 Panggoy examined the contents of the sachet and handed the buy-bust money to
"Tonton." When "Tonton'' was about to turn his back to leave, PO1 Panggoy held him. He arrested
him and informed him of his constitutional rights in a Visayan dialect. PO1 Panggoy asked “Tonton”
for his real name which the latter revealed was Jaeson Aguilar Cirmafranca (Aguilar).

When the back-up team arrived, PO1 Panggoy turned Aguilar over to PO1 Vera Cruz. PO1
Panggoy marked the two sachets with Aguilar's initials and signed them. Upon seeing that there were
a number of people gathering around the area, the buy-bust operation team brought Aguilar to the
Dumaguete City police station together with the confiscated items, which were in PO1 Panggoy's
possession.

At the police station, PO1 Panggoy conducted an inventory of the sachets and the buy-bust
money, and prepared an inventory of the property seized in the presence of Aguilar, media
representative Juancho Gallarde (Gallarde), Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Anthony
Benlot (Benlot), and Barangay Captain Angelita Ragay (Ragay). All of them signed the inventory,
together with PO3 Ongy. PO1 Vera Cruz took photographs during the inventory.

An information for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 was filed against Aguilar. He
entered a plea of not guilty.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Aguilar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and sentenced him to a penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The
RTC held that the prosecution was able to establish that Aguilar sold dangerous drugs. With respect
to the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug specimens, the RTC ruled that they were not
compromised.

Aguilar appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC
judgement in toto. Hence, Aguilar appealed the ruling of the CA to this Court.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in upholding the conviction of Aguilar?

RULING

410
 YES. According to PO1 Panggoy, the payment he gave to Aguilar consisted of one P500.00 bill
and bogus money made of cut manila paper. He explained that the bogus money was as thick as a
bundle of P510,000.00, albeit the payment due to Aguilar was only P20,000.00. It is incredulous that
PO1 Panggoy's payment was handed to him even though the bulk of it consists of cut-out manila
paper and, therefore, evidently fake. That Aguilar would part with the dangerous drugs after PO1
Panggoy merely flashed the payment to him is doubtful considering the sum involved. The police's
version of a legitimate buy-bust operation lacks credence. The Court thus finds the veracity of the
prosecution's version of what transpired on August 18, 2015 questionable.

Further, Section 21 of R.A. 9165, as amended by R.A. 10640, was not complied with. Section
21(1) states:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
and custody over said items.
Time and again, the Court held that the prosecution has the positive duty to demonstrate
observance with the chain of custody rule under Section 21 "in such a way that during the trial
proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the
requirements of law." In case of non-compliance, the prosecution must establish that:

(1) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and

(2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The reason
for the procedural lapses and the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as fact.

In People v. Cariño, this Court held that there is non-compliance with Section 21 if the
Inventory/Receipt of Property Seized was already prepared when the witnesses arrived and they
merely signed it after comparing the seized items with the inventory. This undermines the purpose
of requiring the presence of the witnesses, which is to prevent switching, planting, or contamination
of evidence.

Similarly, the witnesses in this case, namely Gallarde, Benlot, and Ragay, all testified that the
items were already prepared and the inventory was filled out when they arrived. They simply
compared the entries with the seized items which were already on the table before signing the
inventory. The prosecution did not explain why they adopted this procedure. As such, the Court
cannot brush aside their non-compliance with Section 21.

411
 Section 2, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that the accused is entitled to
an acquittal, unless his or her guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to
establish Aguilar's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Their version of the buy-bust operation and the
identity and integrity of the seized drug specimens are all questionable. Therefore, Aguilar is entitled
to an acquittal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO DORIA y PEREZ

G.R. NO. 227854, 09 October 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous
drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. While it is true that a buy-bust operation
is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and
distributors, the law nevertheless also requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to
ensure that rights are safeguarded.
In the instant case, it is beyond serious dispute that all of the mandatory procedures required
under Section 21 of RA 9165 have been violated by the buy-bust team.

FACTS
Romeo Doria (Doria) was charged with two sets of Information for illegal sale and possession
of dangerous drugs.
The evidence of the prosecution established that the members of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) of Dagupan City conducted a conference meeting about having a buy-bust operation
against a certain Marcelina Doris (Marcelina) who a known drug peddler. Thereafter, the team
proceeded to the area of operation. PO2 Michael De Vera (PO2 De Vera) looked for Marcelina who
was also known as Mamang. Romeo Doria (Doria) replied that Marcelina was not around and
suddenly told PO2 De Vera in Pangasinan dialect, "Siak lay pangaliwan mo," which means "Just buy
it from me.” After PO2 De Vera handed to Doria the marked money, the latter brought out two (2)
plastic sachets of suspected shabu. As a result, PO2 De Vera made the pre-arranged signal in order to
arrest Doria. Upon the arrest of Doria, he was informed of his constitutional rights. The police officers
made a confiscation receipt of the items recovered from Doria at the place of the incident. Later, Doria
was brought to the police station. PO2 De Vera marked the five (5) plastic sachets of suspected shabu
with, "MCV-1" to "MCV-5." PO2 De Vera said that he could not remember if he marked the other seized
items, but the police officers took photographs of the items and of Doria. A Request for Laboratory
Examination of the seized items was prepared and signed. The Request for Laboratory Examination,
together with the five (5) plastic sachets of suspected shabu, were submitted by PO2 De Vera to the
PNP Crime Laboratory. It was found all the items to be positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
On the other hand, Doria testified for the defense and denied the allegations against him.

412
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Doria of both charges. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE
Is Doria guilty of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs?
RULING
NO. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous
drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. While it is true that a buy-bust
operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug
peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless also requires strict compliance with procedures laid
down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded.
In this connection, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the
commission of the alleged crimes, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to
maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the
physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d)
a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Section 21 of RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and
confiscation. The said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned required
witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place
of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-
bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
In this connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should already be physically
present at the time of apprehension — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-
bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Verily, a buy-
bust team normally has enough time to gather and bring with them the said witnesses.
In the instant case, it is beyond serious dispute that all of the mandatory procedures required
under Section 21 of RA 9165 have been violated by the buy-bust team.
First and foremost, not even one of the required witnesses witnessed the buy-bust operation
and the inventory and photographing of the alleged drug specimen supposedly retrieved from Doria.
Second, the inventory receipt produced by the prosecution, i.e., the handwritten Confiscation
Receipt, contains the lone signature of PO2 De Vera. To reiterate once more, Section 21 of RA 9165
requires the signatures of the accused and/or his/her representative and the three required
witnesses.
Third, while testifying that the Confiscation Receipt was prepared at the place of the incident,
in the same breath, the prosecution's main witness, PO2 De Vera, testified that the recording,

413
disposition, and inventory of the supposedly confiscated drug specimen were conducted at the
Dagupan City Police Station (DCPS) and not at the place of apprehension.
Fourth, in further engendering serious doubt as to the integrity of the specimen allegedly
retrieved from the person of Doria, PO2 De Vera himself acknowledges that with respect to some of
the plastic containers allegedly confiscated from Doria's left pocket, he "did not place any marking,
however we took pictures on the said recovered items, sir."
The Court stresses that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the inventory,
which should be conducted immediately at the place of apprehension, is mandatory because such
rule serves an essential purpose. without the insulating presence of the representative from the
media or the DOJ and any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils
of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted
reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the
subject sachet that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus, adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items." For this provision to be effective, however, the
prosecution must first (1) recognize any lapses on the part of the police officers and (2) be able to
justify the same. In this case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify, its
unabashed deviations from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165.
Breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti would
necessarily have been compromised.
In sum, the prosecution miserably failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending
team's deviations from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of this, Doria must be acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JEFFREY FAYO y RUBIO

G.R. No. 239887, 02 October 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged
crimes, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the
confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and
photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b)
an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the authorities failed to comply with Section 21 of RA
9165 when they conducted the subject buy-bust operation. A careful review of the records shows that

414
the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses do not offer any justifiable reason for the deviations they
have incurred.

FACTS
Jeffrey Fayo (Fayo) was charged with two sets of Information for illegal sale and possession
of dangerous drugs. When arraigned, Fayo pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
According to the prosecution, the Chief of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation
Task Group conducted a meeting and informed the operatives that a confidential informant can
accompany any one of them to buy illegal drugs from Fayo who is a known pusher. As such, the police
officers conducted a buy-bust operation.
When PO1 Jonathan P. Bueno (PO1 Bueno) received the sachet from Fayo, he executed the
pre-arranged signal to alert his fellow operatives. PO1 Bueno then introduced himself as a police
officer. While being apprehended Fayo tried to reach for something from his waistline, but was
stopped by another police officer. Upon frisking Fayo, it was discovered that Fayo was reaching for a
calibre .45 gun, also, Fayo had a grenade in his backpack. PO1 Bueno confiscated from Fayo an
additional four (4) transparent plastic sachets all containing the same white crystalline substance
believed to be shabu. At the place of arrest, PO1 Bueno, in front of Fayo, marked the seized items
affixing his signature in all of the specimens.
The buy-bust operatives requested for the presence of Punong Barangay Bobby L. Bobis
(Bobis), but the latter advised him to just proceed to the barangay hall. Upon arrival at the barangay
hall, Fayo was presented to Bobis, in whose presence an inventory of the seized items was made, as
well as the taking of photographs of the confiscated items.
After marking, inventory and photographing, Fayo was brought to the office. The seized items
were examined and they tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Fayo denied the charges against him.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Fayo guilty of illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of Fayo. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE
Is Fayo guilty of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs?
RULING
NO. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous
drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. While it is true that a buy-bust operation
is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and
distributors, the law nevertheless also requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to
ensure that rights are safeguarded.
In this connection, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the
commission of the alleged crimes, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to
maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the

415
physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d)
a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Court cannot stress enough that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the
inventory and photographing of the seized evidence at the place of seizure or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team is mandatory, and that the law
imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose which is to prevent
or insulate against the planting of drugs.
Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items."
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the authorities failed to comply with Section 21 of
RA 9165 when they conducted the subject buy-bust operation.
First, it is beyond dispute that there was no representative from the NPS or media who
witnessed the inventory of the alleged seized evidence and the photographing of the same. As readily
acknowledged by the RTC, "no representative from the National Prosecution Service and/or media
came."
A careful review of the records shows that the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses do
not offer any justifiable reason why the presence of a representative from the NPS or media was not
obtained.
Second, it is also an admitted fact that the inventory and photographing of the allegedly seized
drug specimen were undertaken at the Barangay Hall and not at the place of the seizure or the nearest
police station/office of the apprehending team. To emphasize, RA 9165 restrictively enumerates the
places where the inventory and photographing of the seized drug specimen can be done: (1) at the
place of seizure; (2) at the nearest police station; or (3) at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius — when the law makes
an enumeration, those not included are excluded. Clearly, the law does not allow the inventory and
photographing to be done at the barangay hall or office of any of the witnesses.
Needless to say, the prosecution's sheer justification that the barangay captain insisted that
the inventory and photographing be done in the barangay hall is a lame and unavailing excuse that
deserves scant consideration. The elected public official is merely a witness to the inventory and
photographing of the seized drug specimens. He/she does not have the authority to prevail and
dictate upon the apprehending team as to where the inventory and photographing should take place.
Further, the Guidelines on the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Section 21 of RA 9165
as amended by RA 10640 likewise state that "[t]he elected public official is any incumbent public
official regardless of the place where he/she is elected." Hence, the authorities are not limited to
seeking assistance from the local barangay captain. Therefore, if the barangay captain would not
agree to witness the inventory and photographing at the place of seizure, then the apprehending team
could have secured the presence of any other public official.
Hence, the apprehending team's decision to undertake the inventory and photographing in
the barangay hall based solely on the insistence of the barangay captain is unwarranted.

416
 Considering the foregoing premises, with the noncompliance of the requirements mandated
under Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, not being justified, the seizures and custody of the alleged
drug specimens are rendered void. Therefore, the conviction of Fayo for violations of Sections 5 and
11 of RA 9165 does not have a leg to stand on.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

NIDA GUILLERMO Y DE LUNA AND DESIREE GUILLERMO Y SOLIS
G.R. No. 229515, November 27, 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Carandang, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Be it noted that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
prove as probable under the circumstances.

According to the prosecution, the subject of the sale is P350,000.00 worth of shabu. The alleged
buy-bust money, as testified by IO1 Tactac and IO2 Advincula, consisted of two genuine 500-peso bills
placed on the top and at the bottom of the boodle money consisting of cut newspapers in the size of a
peso bill. It is incredulous that the boodle money is sandwiched between two genuine 500-peso bills,
which cannot be stacked neatly like new and crisp 500-peso bills without Desiree noticing it. Cut-out
newspapers cannot even approximate the color scheme of any genuine money bill.

FACTS
IA1 Joshua Arquero (IA1 Arquero) and his team conducted a buy-bust operation against a
certain alias "Nida," alias "Jojo," and alias "Randy" based on information given by a confidential
informant regarding the drug activities of said individuals.

During the briefing, IA1 Arquero said that the subject of the sale was P350,000.00 worth
of shabu. According to Intelligence Officer Grace Tactac (IO1 Tactac), she was ordered by IA1 Arquero
to withdraw two pieces of genuine 500-peso bills from their logistics money. The two 500-peso bills,
with serial numbers FD236082 and FD236083, were marked by IO1 Tactac with "GLT" on the lower
portion of the money. The two genuine bills were placed on the top and at the bottom of the boodle
money made out of newspapers and then placed inside an orange paper bag.

Through the confidential informant, Nida allegedly agreed to meet at Tropical Hut in
Monumento. Accordingly, they met at the agreed place. Nida asked IO1 Tactac if the money was ready.
The latter answered in the affirmative. As testified by IO1 Tactac, Nida, however, had no opportunity
to see the alleged buy-bust money nor count the same.

Thereafter, Nida went home to get the items. After several minutes, Nida texted the
confidential informant to transfer to the 7-11 convenience store near Tropical Hut. After IOI Tactac
informed IA1 Arquero of the change of venue, the former and the confidential informant proceeded
to 7-11.

After about 20 minutes, Nida arrived with another female companion, later identified as
herein accused Desiree, who was carrying a child and a blue paper bag. Nida then told Desiree to
hand over the blue paper bag to IO1 Tactac, who examined the contents of the blue paper bag which
contained a "White Horse" plastic. Inside the plastic is a DVD cover of "The Expendables." Inside the
DVD cover were 11 plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. Upon seeing the contents

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of the blue paper bag, IO1 Tactac handed the orange paper bag to Desiree. IO1 Tactac executed the
pre-arranged signal of loosening her ponytail.

IO1 Tactac introduced herself as a Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) agent. IO2
Advincula then arrived and arrested Nida. Thereafter, the rest of the buy-bust team arrived.

IO1 Tactac marked the 11 plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance at the PDEA
office, and thereafter made an inventory of the same. IO1 Lorilla prepared the Request for Laboratory
Examination of the seized items and the Request for Drug Test of both the accused. After
examination, the seized items yielded positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
or shabu, as evidenced by Chemistry Report.

Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a Decision finding Nida and Desiree guilty of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs. The trial court found that the prosecution was able to establish the sale
of shabu between IO1 Tactac and Nida and the eventual delivery of shabu by Desiree. The trial court
further ruled that there is no evidence that would show that the PDEA operatives were impelled by
improper motive, as such, the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties
will be considered in their favor.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) found that the integrity of the seized items was not
compromised and the chain of custody was not broken. Hence, this recourse to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Was the prosecution able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs?

RULING
NO. There is a reasonable doubt as to whether there was even a sale that transpired between
IO1 Tactac and the accused because of the highly questionable nature of the buy-bust money for the
Court to believe that there was a legitimate buy-bust operation that was conducted by the police.

Be it noted that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can prove as probable under the circumstances.

According to the prosecution, the subject of the sale is P350,000.00 worth of shabu. The
alleged buy-bust money, as testified by IO1 Tactac and IO2 Advincula, consisted of two genuine 500-
peso bills placed on the top and at the bottom of the boodle money consisting of cut newspapers in
the size of a peso bill. It is incredulous that the boodle money is sandwiched between two genuine
500-peso bills, which cannot be stacked neatly like new and crisp 500-peso bills without Desiree
noticing it. Cut-out newspapers cannot even approximate the color scheme of any genuine money
bill. Further, it is highly impossible that a sale of dangerous drugs between the poseur-buyer and the
seller would be consummated without a specific quantity of dangerous drugs agreed beforehand. For
drug pushers, shabu is a very precious commodity that even a speck of it has money value.

In addition to the questionable conduct of the buy-bust operation, it is also essential that the
identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous
drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the integrity of

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the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, which therefore warrants an acquittal.

After going over the records of this case, the prosecution was not able to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items because it was not shown that the marking of the
seized items was done in the presence of the accused and/or his representative. Another procedural
lapse committed by the PDEA officers is the fact that there was no DOJ representative present when
the inventory and taking of photographs of the seized items were done. Another break in the chain
of custody that tainted the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items was the failure of the
prosecution to identify the person who received and brought the request for laboratory examination
along with the seized items to the crime laboratory.

The Court is not unmindful of the fact that police officers have in their favor the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, the said presumption only applies when
the officers are shown to have complied with the standard conduct of official duty as provided for by
law. It cannot prevail over the Constitutional presumption of innocence, and cannot, by itself,
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot work in
favor of the PDEA officers since the records of the case is replete with major flaws in the preservation
of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items as required under R.A. 9165.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CAROL T. YGOY

G.R. No. 215712, 07 August 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In order to secure the conviction of any person charged with the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, it is imperative for the Prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the
drugs in order to prove the identity of the drugs presented in court beyond reasonable doubt. In short,
the Prosecution must prove (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
The records reveal glaring lapses in the observance of the chain of custody rule committed by
the arresting officers. Aside from the apprehending police officers failing to mark the confiscated items
immediately after the apprehension of the accused-appellant, no inventory and no photograph of the
confiscated items were taken. There was also no indication of the presence of any representative of the
media or of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and of an elected public official during the buy-bust
operation and at the time of the recovery of the evidence from the accused at the area of operation.

FACTS
Based on the version of the prosecution, the members of the Drug Enforcement Unit, Cebu
City Police Office, hatched a plan to conduct a buy-bust operation against a certain Carol Ygoy (Ygoy),
operating at Barangay Cabantan St., Mabolo, Cebu City. SPO1 Elmo Rosales (Rosales) was designated
as poseur buyer and was given the dusted buy bust money. He will be accompanied with their asset.
Subsequently, after the briefing at the office, the team members immediately left for Cabantan. Upon
reaching the area, Rosales posted himself a few meters away from the gate of Ygoy’s rented house,
while their asset approached Ygoy who was standing two meters outside the gate.

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 Upon consummation of the drug deal, Rosales introduced himself to Ygoy that he is a police
officer and that she is under arrest. The latter, however, ran inside her house, but Rosales and the
rest of the team followed her. She was trapped inside her room where another person was sniffing
shabu. Rosales then directed the accused to empty her pockets and saw the Php 100.00 dusted buy-
bust money at her left front side pocket, while on the right front side pocket, they recovered two
plastic packets of white crystalline substance. Rosales confiscated these items and brought the
arrested persons and the confiscated items to their office.
Ygoy, the buy-bust money, the plastic packet of shabu and the two letter-requests, for
laboratory examination were brought to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory by PO2 Gil Garcia at
around 11:00 PM, and were received by PO1 Rosales, the clerk on duty. The prosecution witnesses
identified Ygoy, the buy-bust money and the plastic packet of shabu bearing the initials of the
accused-appellant (CTY).
The accused was transferred to the Chemistry Section and was referred to P/Senior Inspector
Mutchit G. Salinas (Salinas) for examination of her hands which tested positive of fluorescent powder.
In addition to that, after getting the sample from the contents and subjecting the same to the color
test and confirmatory test, the result showed that the sample taken was positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found and declared Ygoy guilty of violating Section 5 and
Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), affirmed the
conviction of the accused-appellant for the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 but acquitted her
of the violation of Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165.

ISSUE
Is Ygoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165?

RULING
NO. In order to secure the conviction of any person charged with the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, it is imperative for the Prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody over
the drugs in order to prove the identity of the drugs presented in court beyond reasonable doubt. In
short, the Prosecution must prove (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
Pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, the chain of custody rule requires that the marking
of the seized items should be done in the presence of the apprehended violator and immediately upon
confiscation to ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones
offered in evidence.
The records reveal glaring lapses in the observance of the chain of custody rule committed
by the arresting officers. Aside from the apprehending police officers failing to mark the confiscated
items immediately after the apprehension of the accused-appellant, no inventory and no photograph
of the confiscated items were taken. There was also no indication of the presence of any
representative of the media or of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and of an elected public official
during the buy-bust operation and at the time of the recovery of the evidence from the accused at the
area of operation.

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 It is true that the last paragraph of Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 9165 (IRR) stipulates a saving mechanism, and thereby clarifies that not every case
of non-compliance with the statutory safeguards can prejudice the Prosecution's case. Even so, the
Prosecution must recognize and explain the lapse or lapses in observing the prescribed procedures
in order to have such a saving mechanism apply.
Herein, the State did not attempt to establish that the peculiar circumstances of the case had
warranted the application of the saving mechanism provided in the IRR of R.A. No. 9165. In fact, the
State did not even tender any plausible explanation to disclose that the failure to make markings, or
to take the inventory and photograph of the seized item, had been by force of circumstances then
obtaining on the ground. The State did not also justify why the attendance of the representative of
media or of the DOJ representative or of an elected public official had not been ensured during the
buy-bust operation.
With the chain of custody having been compromised, the accused-appellant could not be held
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Even if we disbelieved and rejected her mere denial and her
allegation of being the victim of a vicious frame-up, the unexplained procedural lapses committed by
the buy-bust team sufficed to create in the mind of a neutral judge a reasonable doubt of her guilt.

ROSANA HEDREYDA y LIZARDA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 243313, 27 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, A., JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 laid down the procedure that must be observed and
followed by police officers in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs. In 2014, R.A. No. 10640
amended R.A. No. 9165, specifically Section 21 thereof, to further strengthen the anti-drug campaign of
the government. A comparison of the provisions shows that the amendments introduced by R.A. No.
10640 reduced the number of witnesses required to be present during the inventory and taking of
photographs from three to two - an elected public official AND a representative of the National
Prosecution Service (DOJ) OR the media. These witnesses must be present during the inventory stage
and are, likewise, required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, to ensure
that the identity and integrity of the seized items are preserved and that the police officers complied
with the required procedure. Failure of the arresting officers to justify the absence of any of the required
witnesses, i. e. , the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected official, shall constitute a
substantial gap in the chain of custody.

FACTS
Rosana Hedreyda y Lizarda (Lizarda) was charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Police Officer 2 Mateo F. Cailo (PO2 Cailo) testified that he was on duty when he received a
report from a concerned citizen that an illegal drug trade was rampantly and openly going on at Amil
Compound in Barangay San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna. After he relayed the information to Police
Chief Inspector Arnold Formento, the latter directed him and PO2 Melmar B. Viray (PO2 Viray) to

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respond to the said report. PO2 Cailo and PO2 Viray then proceeded to the location. According to P02
Cailo, while they were standing near a store conducting their surveillance, they saw Lizarda at a
distance of two meters, examining and flicking with her fingers a transparent plastic sachet
containing white powdery substance suspected to be shabu. This prompted them to approach. After
they introduced themselves as police officers and informed her that she was being arrested for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, they asked Lizarda to take out the contents of her pocket to which
the latter obliged. They found in her possession another plastic sachet containing powdery substance.
The seized sachets were marked by P02 Cailo with "RLH" and "RLH-1," the initials of Lizarda. They
then brought Lizarda to the police station where a physical inventory of the seized illegal drugs was
conducted in her presence and a media representative who took photographs of the same. After the
request for laboratory examination was prepared and the drug dependency test conducted, the
seized illegal drugs were brought by PO2 Cailo and PO2 Viray to the crime laboratory for
examination. PO2 Cailo handed over the seized drugs to the crime laboratory receiving clerk, PO3
Randy Legaspi, who then gave it to Forensic Chemist Donna Villa Huelgas who found both specimens
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Lizarda guilty of the offense charged. The trial court
held that the evidence presented by the prosecution has proven that the requirements of the law
were substantially complied with and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs
were properly preserved.
The CA affirmed the conviction and held, among others, that the failure of the police officers
to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized dangerous drugs were preserved."

ISSUE
Should Lizarda’s conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized
under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 be upheld?

RULING
NO. Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 laid down the procedure that must be observed and
followed by police officers in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs. In 2014, R.A. No. 10640
amended R.A. No. 9165, specifically Section 21 thereof, to further strengthen the anti-drug campaign
of the government. A comparison of the provisions shows that the amendments introduced by R.A.
No. 10640 reduced the number of witnesses required to be present during the inventory and taking
of photographs from three to two - an elected public official AND a representative of the National
Prosecution Service (DOJ) OR the media. These witnesses must be present during the inventory stage
and are, likewise, required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, to
ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized items are preserved and that the police officers
complied with the required procedure. Failure of the arresting officers to justify the absence of any
of the required witnesses, i. e. , the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected official,
shall constitute as a substantial gap in the chain of custody.
Since the offense subject of this petition was committed before the amendment introduced
by R.A. No. 10640, the old provisions of Section 21(a) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) should apply. Section 21(a) states that physical inventory and the taking of photographs must

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be made in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or counsel and the following
indispensable witnesses: (1) an elected public official; (2) a representative from the DOJ; and (3) a
representative from the media.
As culled from the records and highlighted by the testimonies of the witnesses themselves,
only one out of three of the required witnesses was present during the inventory stage. There was
no elected public official and no representative from the DOJ. It, likewise, bears stressing that PO2
Cailo himself admitted on direct examination that he could no longer recall the name of the media
representative who was present during the inventory. Neither was it shown nor alleged by the
arresting officers that earnest efforts were made to secure the attendance of the other witnesses.
To the Court's mind, the lower courts relied so much on the narration of the prosecution
witnesses that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were preserved without taking
into account the weight of these unjustified lapses. The prosecution cannot simply invoke the saving
clause found in Section 21 - that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been
preserved- without justifying its failure to comply with the requirements stated therein. Even the
presumption as to regularity in the performance by police officers of their official duties cannot
prevail when there has been a clear and deliberate disregard of procedural safeguards by the police
officers themselves.
The prosecution's failure to justify its noncompliance requirements found in Section 21,
specifically, the presence of the three required witnesses during the actual inventory of the seized
items, is fatal to its case. The absence of these witnesses during the inventory stage constitutes a
substantial gap in the chain of custody. Such absence cannot be cured by the simple expedient of
invoking the saving clause. There being a substantial gap or break in the chain, it casts serious doubt
on the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. As such, Lizarda must be acquitted.

ELIZABETH SARANILLAS-DELA CRUZ and HENRY DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 193862, 1 October 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The strict compliance with the procedural safeguards provided by Section 21 is required of the
arresting officers. The right of persons from unlawful or unreasonable incrimination must be enforced.
Yet, the law recognizes that a departure from the safeguards may become necessary and permits the
departure from strict compliance only upon justifiable ground for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs and items are preserved by the seizing officer.
Here, the lapses on the part of the seizing officers broke the chain of custody of the confiscated
contraband, and rendered the shabu actually presented as evidence against the accused unreliable as
evidence of corpus delicti. The convictions cannot be allowed to stand.
FACTS
An informant went to Police Station 1, Galas, Quezon City. The informant informed the police
officers that a male and two females were engaged in selling illegal drugs at Brgy. Tatalon, Quezon
City. As such, the police officers decided to conduct a buy-bust operation whereby PO1 Jose Teraña
(PO1 Teraña) was designated as a poseur-buyer and was given one hundred pesos as buy bust
money.

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 Upon arrival at the place given by the informant, PO1 Teraña and the informant informed
Elizabeth Saranillas-Dela Cruz (Elizabeth) of their intent to buy. When Elizabeth demanded money,
PO1 Teraña gave the buy bust money. Then, Elizabeth handed over a small sachet containing
crystalline substance. PO1 Teraña made the pre-arranged signal for the back-up men and Elizabeth
together with Henry Dela Cruz (Henry), who was with Elizabeth at that time were arrested.
Thereafter, Elizabeth and Henry were brought to the headquarters and the sachets containing
white crystalline power recovered from them were marked. These sachets were then brought to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for examination. It was found out that the sachets
contained Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
As a result, Informations were filed against Elizabeth and Henry for illegal sale and possession
of dangerous drugs.
On the other hand, Elizabeth and Henry denied the charges against them.
Both the trial court and the appellate court found Elizabeth and Henry guilty as charged.

ISSUE
Are Elizabeth and Henry guilty of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs?

RULING
NO. In order to secure the conviction of any person charged with the crimes of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165, it is imperative for
the Prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody vis-a-vis the drugs as the means to prove
the identity of the drugs presented in court beyond reasonable doubt. In short, the Prosecution must
comply with its heavy burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt by competently and sufficiently
showing the concurrence of the elements of the offenses, namely: (a) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
To ensure the establishment of the chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165
pertinently states:
“(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.”

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 The strict compliance with the procedural safeguards provided by Section 21 is required of
the arresting officers. The right of persons from unlawful or unreasonable incrimination must be
enforced. Yet, the law recognizes that a departure from the safeguards may become necessary, and
has incorporated a saving clause which provides that:
"Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items."
A review of the records warrants the finding that the arresting officers took for granted the
above-prescribed procedures, and departed from them without hesitation.
PO1 Terañas alleged that he marked the seized items, but he did so only at the police station.
He did not tender any justification for having done the marking only at the police station instead of
at the crime scene. Still, the belated marking at the police station was not the only departure from the
authorized procedure undertaken. He marked the seized items without the presence of the accused,
or of the latter's representative. There could be occasions when the observance of the chain of
custody rule might be relaxed, such as when the marking of the seized items would be justifiably
undertaken at the police station instead of at the place of arrest because of risks to the persons of the
arresting lawmen, but even in such situation the marking should still be done in the presence of the
accused.
Moreover, PO1 Terañas did not give any justification why he did the marking in the absence
of the accused or of the latter's representative, and he rather seemed to dismiss the requirement for
such presence as but a slight operation need that he could entirely ignore.
Further departures from the prescribed procedures by the arresting lawmen should be
noted. For one, the arresting team did not ensure the presence of the representative from either
media or the Department of Justice, and that of an elective official prior to the operation against the
accused although Section 21, supra, required such presence. The objective for requiring the
attendance of the elective official was to have him sign the copy of the inventory of the items seized
and be given a copy thereof. But even that requirement for the inventory was disobeyed not only
because there was no such elective official procured to be present but also because no inventory was
made. Worse, the lawmen did not offer to justify their several departures from the procedures.
In keeping with the language and spirit of the law, the law permits the departure from strict
compliance only upon justifiable ground for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drugs and items are preserved by the seizing officer. The lapses on the part of the seizing
officers broke the chain of custody of the confiscated contraband, and rendered the shabu actually
presented as evidence against the accused unreliable as evidence of corpus delicti. The convictions
cannot be allowed to stand.

EDWIN GEMENTIZA MATABILAS v. NOEL ZAPANTA y LUCAS

G.R. No. 230227, 06 November 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Zalameda, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Non-compliance with the witness requirement may be permitted if the prosecution proves that

425
the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses,
albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness of these efforts must be examined on a
case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is for the Court to be convinced that the failure to comply
was reasonable under the given circumstances. Thus, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual
serious attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient
time — beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the
necessary arrangements beforehand, knowing fully well that they would have to strictly comply with
the chain of custody rule.

In this case, there was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of inventory and
photography was not witnessed by a representative of the DOJ.

FACTS

The prosecution alleged that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of September 6, 2012, acting on
a tip received from a confidential informant, several officers of the Kidapawan City Police Station
successfully conducted a buy-bust operation against Edwin Matabilas (Matabilas) at the Villanueva
Subdivision in Kidapawan City, Cotabato, during which one (1) plastic sachet containing 0.05 gram
of white crystalline substance was recovered from him. After the arrest, police officers immediately
conducted the requisite marking, inventory, and photography of the seized item in the presence of
Matabilas himself, as well as Ruel C. Anima (Anima), a kagawad of Barangay Poblacion, Kidapawan
City, and Romnick Cabaron (Cabaron), a member of radio station DXND. Thereafter, the seized item
was brought to the Philippine National Police Provincial Crime Laboratory of the Province of
Cotabato, where after examination, its contents tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a dangerous drug. In defense, Matalibas denied the charge against him, claiming that he was
just looking for potential customers of coconuts when two (2) police officers suddenly approached,
conducted a futile search on his person and motorcycle, then forcibly brought him to the store of a
certain Clifton Cris Simene, where they falsely made it appear that a P500.00 bill and a sachet
containing white crystalline substance were recovered from his possession.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Matabilas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Sale
of Dangerous Drugs. Giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it held that all
the elements of the alleged crime had been duly established, and that there was proper compliance
with the chain of custody rule.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed Matabilas’ conviction.

ISSUE

Did the CA err in affirming Matabilas’ convicted of the crime charged?

RULING

YES. While findings of facts of the trial court, including its calibration of the testimonies of
witnesses, its assessment of their credibility, and attribution of probative weight, are entitled to great
respect, if not conclusive effect absent any showing that it had overlooked circumstances that would

426
have affected the final outcome of the case, in this situation, however, there was an unjustified
deviation from the mandatory witness requirement as provided under the chain of custody rule.

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165 it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants an acquittal. As part of the chain of custody
procedure, the law requires, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized
items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same. In this regard, case law
recognizes that "marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team." Hence, the failure to immediately mark the
confiscated items at the place of arrest neither renders them inadmissible in evidence nor impairs
the integrity of the seized drugs, as the conduct of marking at the nearest police station or office of
the apprehending team is sufficient compliance with the rules on chain of custody.

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well
as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official;
(b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media.

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the
same has been regarded "not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law."
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance with the
chain of custody procedure may not always be possible. As such, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable
ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. It should, however, be emphasized that for the saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must duly explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the justifiable
ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist.

Anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves
that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such
witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness of these efforts must be
examined on a case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is for the Court to be convinced that the
failure to comply was reasonable under the given circumstances. Thus, mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as
justified grounds for non-compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have received the information
about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust operation
and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand, knowing fully well that they would
have to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule.

In this case, there was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of inventory

427
and photography was not witnessed by a representative of the DOJ. This may be easily gleaned from
the Inventory of Confiscated Drugs/Seized which only confirms the presence of an elected public
official and a media representative. Notably, it was even admitted by PO1 Bada on cross-examination
that police officers could have easily obtained the presence of a DOJ representative since the City
Prosecution Office was just near the police station, but they still nonetheless failed to do so. As earlier
stated, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for the absence of a required witness by
presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at the very least, by showing that genuine and sufficient
efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure his/her presence. Here, the absence of a
DOJ representative during the conduct of inventory and photography of the seized drugs was not
acknowledged by the prosecution, much less justified. In view of such unjustified deviation from the
chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the item purportedly seized from Matabilas was compromised, which consequently warrants
his acquittal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNEL AMBROSIO Y NIDUA a.k.a. “ARNEL”

G.R. No. 234051, 27 November 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Zalameda, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The following links should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug from the
forensic chemist to the court.
In this case, there is a glaring gap in the fourth link of the chain. The trial court dispensed with
the testimony of the forensic chemist in view of the stipulation entered into by the prosecution and the
defense during the pre-trial conference.
FACTS
A buy-bust operation was conducted against Arnel Ambrosio (Ambrosio). After parting with
the marked money as payment, Ambrosio handed two (2) plastic sachets allegedly containing
marijuana. After executing the pre-arranged signal, the poseur-buyer introduced himself as a Makati
Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) operative, and placed Ambrosio under arrest.
The seized items and the request were later brought to the Southern Police District Crime
Laboratory. Pursuant to Chemistry Report, the submitted specimens tested positive for the presence
of marijuana.
Thereafter, Ambrosio was indicted for violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the accused for the offenses charged. Aggrieved,
Ambrosio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE

428
 Did the CA correctly find Arnel Ambrosio guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of
illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs under R.A. No. 9165?
RULING
NO. In the prosecution of a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be
able to establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment.
In turn, for the successful prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it must be
established that the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs without authority of law, and the
accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.
In both cases, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drugs seized from the accused
be established beyond reasonable doubt, and that the prohibited drugs offered in court as exhibit are
the same as those recovered from the accused. This requirement is known as the chain of custody
rule.
The following links should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.
In this case, there is a glaring gap in the fourth link of the chain. The trial court dispensed with
the testimony of the forensic chemist in view of the stipulation entered into by the prosecution and
the defense during the pre-trial conference.
It has been held in People v. Pajarin that in case the parties stipulate to dispense with the
attendance and testimony of the forensic chemist, it should be stipulated that the forensic chemist
was to testify that he or she took the precautionary steps required in order to preserve the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized item, thus:
(1) That the forensic chemist received the seized article as marked, properly
sealed, and intact;
(2) That he or she resealed it after examination of the content; and
(3) That he or she placed his or her own marking on the same to ensure that it
could not be tampered with pending trial.
An examination of the Order dated 25 September 2013, wherein the testimony of the forensic
chemist was dispensed with, does not show that the aforesaid conditions were stipulation on.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR SUMILIP y TILLO

G.R. No. 223712, 11 September 2019, SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

429
 Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that
police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs in order to ensure that their integrity and
evidentiary value are preserved. The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict
compliance with the requirements of Section 21of RA9165 may not always be possible. However, the
prosecution must satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b)
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
In this case, no justification for the police officers’ lapses or a satisfactorily detailed account of
measures taken to preserve the allegedly seized marijuana’s identity was given. Hence, Sumilip cannot
be convicted of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
FACTS
According to the prosecution, at about 1:00 pm on July 4, 2009, a confidential informant
reported to PO2 Annague that a certain “Victor Sumilip” (Sumilip) was selling illegal drugs along
Ancheta Street, Catbangen, San Fernando City, La Union. A buy-bust team was then formed with PO2
Annague as the designated poseur-buyer and PO3 Batnag as back-up. A P500.00 bill was prepared as
the buy-bust money.
The buy-bust operation was successful. Sumilip and the marijuana were taken to the San
Fernando Police Station. There, PO2 Annague marked, inventories and photographed the seized
marijuana in te presence of Sumilip and some barangay officials. Thereafter, the marijuana was
brought to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for examination.
Sumilip was charged with violation of Section 5 of RA No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Act for the illegal sale of the dangerous drugs.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Sumilip of the charge of illegal sale of the
dangerous drugs. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Is Sumilip guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs?
RULING
NO. The Court of Appeals glossed over the police officers’ glaring failure to comply with the
Comprehensive Dangerous Act’s chain of custody requirements.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure
that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs in order to ensure that their integrity
and evidentiary value are preserved. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and take
photographs of the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items
were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy of the same; and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory
within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination purposes.
In the case of People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that without the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the DOJ or any elected public official during the seizure and
marking of the seized drugs, the evils of switching, ‘planting’ or contamination of the evidence that
had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)

430
again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation
of the said drugs that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the presence of such witnesses would
have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21of RA9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 provide that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not automatically render void and invalid the
seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. In other words, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its
IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided
that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
In this case, the marking, inventory, and taking of photographs of the allegedly seized
marijuana were not done immediately after the apprehension. Rather, the police officers took time
to transfer to the San Fernando Police Station. Only barangay officials were claimed by the
prosecution to be present during the belated marking, inventory, and taking of photographs. There
was no Department of Justice Representative. Neither was there a media representative. Worse, there
is no showing that even those barangay officials were present during the actual apprehension. Yet,
just as glaring is the prosecution’s failure to specify any justification for the police officers’ lapses or
a satisfactorily detailed account of measures they had taken to preserve the allegedly seized
marijuana’s identity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL ZAPANTA y LUCAS

G.R. No. 230227, 06 November 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Zalameda, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The chain of custody rule requires the testimony for every link in the chain, describing how and
from whom the seized evidence was received, its condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain, and the precautions taken to ensure its integrity.

Given the procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized drugs the
prosecution presented as evidence before the Court. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the
elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of Bungo.

FACTS

One afternoon, the Taytay police station formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
against one “Noel Bungo” (Bungo). Together with the civilian asset, a member of the buy-bust team,
acting as poseur-buyer, went to Bungo’s house while the rest of the team strategically positioned
themselves nearby. Bungo asked the asset if they were buying, and upon positive confirmation, took
out one (1) plastic sachet with suspected shabu and gave it to the poseur-buyer. In exchange, the buy-

431
bust money was handed over to Bungo. Afterwards, the poseur-buyer executed the prearranged
signal which eventually led to Bungo's arrest. The arresting officers recovered from the accused-
appellant a plastic sachet with suspected shabu inside a coin purse and the buy-bust money. The buy-
bust team went to the police station where the officer of the case marked the seized items. The
request for laboratory examination, together with the sachets containing suspected shabu, were
forwarded to the Eastern Police District Laboratory for qualitative examination. Per Laboratory
Report, the specimens were found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu. Bungo
denied the charges against him and argued that he was framed.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that the prosecution sufficiently established all the
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The lone testimony of the prosecution witness established
a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation from the initial contact between the poseur-
buyer and the seller, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the
consummation of sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of sale. This was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals (CA).

ISSUE

Did the CA correctly find Bungo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165?

RULING

NO. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (a) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
Similarly, the prosecution must establish the following elements to convict an accused with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs: (a) that accused was in possession of an item or object identified as
dangerous drugs; (b) such possession was not authorized by law and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.

Jurisprudence teaches that in these cases, it is essential that the identity of the seized drug be
established with moral certainty. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on such identity, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. Further, under Section 21 of
RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the apprehending officers are required,
immediately after seizure, to physically inventory and photograph the confiscated items in the
presence of the accused, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official, who are required to sign the copy of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In this case, there are glaring deficiencies which are not in
accord with the rule set out under the law.

There was no showing that a physical inventory and photograph-taking of the seized items
were conducted. In fact, there was neither receipt of inventory nor photograph of the seized items
offered as evidence by the prosecution. There was also no showing that the presence of a
representative from the media, the DOJ and any elected public official was secured to witness the
conduct of the inventory. The mere marking of the seized drugs, unsupported by a physical inventory
and taking of photographs, and in the absence of the necessary personalities under the law, fails to
approximate compliance with the mandatory procedure under Sec. 21 of RA 9165.

432
 The Court had laid down the links that must be established in the chain of custody of the
confiscated item in a buy-bust operation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court." The chain of
custody rule requires the testimony for every link in the chain, describing how and from whom the
seized evidence was received, its condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain, and
the precautions taken to ensure its integrity.

As to the first link, the sole prosecution witness, PO1 Allen Gleg Cadag (PO1 Cadag), testified
that the marking was done not at the place of arrest but at the police station by an unnamed officer,
for which the prosecution did not offer any justifiable reason.

As to the second and third link, There is no testimony as to the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. PO1 Cadag testified that he turned
over the illegal drug he purchased from accused-appellant to PO1 Dennis Montemayor (PO1
Montemayor). However, as PO1 Montemayor was killed in a police operation, no other witness was
presented to prove custody of the illegal drugs from the time of seizure until the marking at the police
station. Anent the third link, PO1 Cadag testified that they brought the seized items to the crime
laboratory for examination but there was no testimony as to who actually delivered the said items.
As to the fourth link, records are bereft of any evidence as to the proper safeguards undertaken by
those who handled the shabu after they were examined and until they were presented in court.

In spite of the failure to strictly adhere to Section 21 of RA 9165, the same provision provides
a saving clause. It states that non-compliance with the requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team, shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said
items. Said clause "applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and
thereafter cited justifiable grounds." In this case, the saving clause failed to remedy the lapses
committed by the police officers. There was no justification provided as to why no inventory and
taking of photograph of the seized items were made. Neither was there any showing that earnest
efforts were made to secure the attendance of a representative from the DOJ, the media, and an
elected public official, to witness the inventory.

Given the procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized drugs
the prosecution presented as evidence before the Court. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove
the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of Bungo.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. XANDRA SANTOS y LITTAUA

G.R. NO. 243627, 27 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The law requires that the inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused or
the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required
witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amended of RA 9165 by RA 1040, a representative from the media

433
AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official; or (b) if after the amendment of
RA 9165 by RA 19640, an elected public official and a representative of NPS OR the media. The law
requires the presence of these witnesses primarily to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody
and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
In this case, the arresting officer’s acts of performing the marking, inventory, and photography
of the seized items not at the place of the arrest but at the police station were justified as a crowd was
already forming at the place of arrest. This notwithstanding, the Court observes that there were still a
deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of inventory and photography was not witnessed
by a representative from the NPS or media.
FACTS
Around 6:30 in the evening of January 16, 2016, acting on the information received from a
confidential informant, operatives from the Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Task Group
of the Valenzuela City Police successfully conducted a buy-bust operation against Xandra Santos y
Littaua along Bisig Street, Valenzuela City. One plastic sachet containing 0.20 gram of white
crystalline substance was recovered from her. When Santos was searched after her arrest, the police
officers found one more plastic sachet containing 0.10gram of the same substance from her
possession.
As noisy people started to crowd the place of arrest, officers immediately brought accused–
appellant back to the police station where they marked, inventoried, and photographed the seized
items in her presence as well as that of Kagawad Roberto Dawat of Barangay Bisig. Subsequently, the
seized items were brought to the Philippine National Police- Northern Police District crime
laboratory where, after examination, their contents tested positive for shabu.
ISSUE
Did the police officers comply with the rule on chain of custody?
RULING
NO. In cases of Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under R.A. No. 9165,
it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drugs be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drugs itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.
Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, warrants an acquittal.
The law requires that the inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain
required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amended of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 1040, a
representative from the media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official;
or (b) if after the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 19640, an elected public official and a
representative of NPS OR the media. The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily to
ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence.
In this case, the arresting officer’s acts of performing the marking, inventory, and
photography of the seized items not at the place of the arrest but at the police station were justified
as a crowd was already forming at the place of arrest. This notwithstanding, the Court observes that

434
there were still a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of inventory and
photography was not witnessed by a representative from the NPS or media.
Further, the sheer statement of PO3 Vizconde that representatives from the DOJ and the
media had been contacted but were simply unavailable, without more, cannot be deemed reasonable
enough to justify a deviation from the mandatory directives of the law. As earlier stated, mere claims
of unavailability, absent a showing that actual and serious attempts were employed to contact the
required witnesses, are unacceptable as they fail to show that genuine and sufficient efforts were
exerted by police officers.

435
 CHARBEN OLIVEROS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 238971, 28 August 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical
inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation
of the same. Nonetheless, non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the
apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses,
although they eventually failed to appear.

In this case, it appears that the inventory and photography of the items seized from Duarte were
not conducted in the presence of representatives from the DOJ and the media. The prosecution should
have already noted the absence of the representatives from the DOJ and the media and interrogated
PO1 Galauran, or any other witness for that matter, on whether or not earnest efforts were exerted in
ensuring the presence of all the required witnesses during the conduct of the inventory and photography.

FACTS
The prosecution alleged that around five (5) o’clock in the morning of January 20, 2014, police
officers PO1 Willy P. Galauran (PO1 Galauran) and PO2 Wilson P. Tan (PO2 Tan) went to Don Jose St.,
Caloocan City after receiving a report of a shooting incident.

Upon arriving thereto, they saw a man lying on the ground with a gunshot wound whom they
identified as Charben Duarte (Duarte). As they approached him, they noticed a gun tucked on his
waist. They further conducted a body search and later discovered a grenade, a plastic sachet
containing crystalline substance, and various drug paraphernalia.

The police officers then seized Duarte's belongings, marked the same, informed him of his
constitutional rights, and took him to the hospital for the treatment of his gunshot wound. Thereafter,
the police officers went back to their office and turned over the seized sachet and paraphernalia to
the Station of Anti-Illegal Drugs - Special Operation Unit (SAID). At the SAID, they conducted a
physical inventory in the presence of PO1 Galauran, Barangay Kagawad Rendon Ulderico (Kgd.
Ulderico), and Duarte. Finally, the seized sachet and paraphernalia were examined, and tested
positive of shabu.

Two separate Informations for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession
of Drug Paraphernalia were filed against Duarte.
In a joint decision, Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Duarte guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC, however, acquitted him for violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law for failure of
the prosecution to identify the corpus delicti of the crime. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC
ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Is Duarte guilty of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165?

RULING
NO. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized

436
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure,
the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items
be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same.

Nonetheless, due to varying field conditions, the Court recognizes that strict compliance may
not always be possible. Non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the
apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses,
although they eventually failed to appear.

In this case, it appears that the inventory and photography of the items seized from Duarte
were not conducted in the presence of representatives from the DOJ and the media, as evinced from
the Receipt of Physical Inventory, which only showed a signature from Kgd. Ulderico, an elected
public official, contrary to the mandatory procedure laid down in R.A. No. 9165.

The prosecution should have already noted the absence of the representatives from the DOJ
and the media and interrogated PO1 Galauran, or any other witness for that matter, on whether or
not earnest efforts were exerted in ensuring the presence of all the required witnesses during the
conduct of the inventory and photography.

Absent any determination of earnest efforts, the Court is constrained to hold that there was
an unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule, resulting in the conclusion that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Duarte were compromised. Perforce, his
acquittal is warranted under these circumstances.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ISIDRO RAMOS y BONDOC

G.R. No. 225325, 28 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to
be done as soon: as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team.

Here, the apprehending officers admitted that they did not mark, photograph, or inventory the
seized items immediately after confiscation. Instead, they waited to complete this first step until they
arrived at the police station, around 20 minutes away from the scene of the buy-bust operation. When
asked why, PO3 Yco testified that they did not bring pens to mark the items. PO2 Navarro, for his part,
testified that they could not immediately mark the items since the required witnesses were not present
then. Hence, the acquittal of Ramos is proper.

FACTS
Two separate Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Isidro
Ramos y Bondoc (Ramos) for the violation of R.A. No. 9165.

437
 According to the prosecution, a confidential informant went to the police station where PO2
Arlan Q. Navarro (PO2 Navarro) was stationed and reported that a known drug pusher named "Billy"
was selling shabu.

A buy-bust operation was then planned, in which PO2 Navarro was designated as the poseur-
buyer. Thereafter, the police officers proceeded to Don Tomas Avenue in Barangay Quebiawan,
where Billy was located. The informant approached Billy and told him that PO2 Navarro wanted to
buy shabu. Billy handed a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance to PO2
Navarro in exchange for the marked P500.00 bill. Afterwards, PO2 Navarro threw his cigarette to
signal that the transaction had been consummated, prompting PO3 Agustin Yco, Jr. (PO3 Yco) to
approach.

PO3 Yco and PO2 Navarro introduced themselves as police officers and informed Billy of his
constitutional rights. PO3 Yco confiscated 17 heat-sealed sachets, containing white crystalline
substance, as well as the marked money, which he gave to PO2 Navarro.

The items were not immediately marked after seizure, PO2 Navarro explained, as none of the
required witnesses under the law were then present. PO3 Yco, meanwhile, testified that the markings
were not placed at the time of arrest because he and PO2 Navarro did not bring pens. Instead, PO2
Navarro said he put the seized items in a plastic container, separating the sachet he had bought from
Ramos from the sachets found in Ramos' left pocket.

At the police station, Ramos was turned over to PO2 Zaragoza. Meanwhile, in the presence of
Barangay Kagawad Palo, media representative Talao, and Department of Justice representative
Villanueva, PO2 Navarro removed the sachets from their respective plastic containers. The sachet he
bought from Ramos was marked with his initials, "AQN," while the other 17 sachets were marked
with the initials "AC-v;." PO2 Navarro and PO3 Yco later signed a Confiscation.

The RTC found Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

ISSUE
Did the prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt that Isidro Ramos y Bondoc is guilty
of violating R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act?

RULING
NO. Before a court may convict someone for the crimes of illegal possession and sale of drugs,
it must be certain that dangerous drugs were seized, and that the "drugs examined and presented in
court were the very ones seized." The prosecution must show that the apprehending team followed
the stringent requirements on the custody of the seized drugs, as provided under Section 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. It states, in part:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign their copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.

438
 The prosecution here failed to show that the buy-bust team had strictly complied with the
requirements under Section 21. Thus, it failed to prove accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

The first step in the mandatory procedure for chain of custody is the immediate marking,
physical inventory, and photographing of the seized items, which must be done in the presence of
certain witnesses. Although the law states that the apprehending officers may conduct the physical
inventory and photographing at the nearest police station, or their nearest office, this Court has
clarified that this is an exception to the rule-allowed only in cases of warrantless seizures, when
immediate marking, inventory, and photographing are not practicable.

Here, the apprehending officers admitted that they did not mark, photograph, or inventory
the seized items immediately after confiscation. Instead, they waited to complete this first step until
they arrived at the police station, around 20 minutes away from the scene of the buy-bust operation.
When asked why, PO3 Yco testified that they did not bring pens to mark the items. PO2 Navarro, for
his part, testified that they could not immediately mark the items since the required witnesses were
not present then.

Assuming that the apprehending team in this case really could not have immediately marked
the seized drugs because they had no marker or because the required witnesses were absent, both
circumstances were entirely of their own making. If these rendered the immediate marking
impracticable, such impracticability was their fault and cannot be used as an excuse to not
immediately mark the items. If anything, the lack of foresight that led to these circumstances shows
that the team did not exert genuine effort to comply with the chain of custody rule.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO LOZANO Y LEANADO

G.R. No. 227700, 28 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, Jr. J., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It may be true that absent clear and convincing evidence of ill-motive on the part of the police
officers, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails. However, such
presumption obtains only where there is no clear deviation from the regular performance of duty. The
presumption arises only when nothing in the record suggests that the police officers deviated from the
standard conduct of official duty required by the applicable law.
Here, as stated above, the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the clear and
simple requirements of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. Hence, such presumption cannot be applied.

FACTS
Reynaldo Lozano y Leonardo (Lozano) was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale, Illegal
Possession, and Illegal Use of Dangerous Drugs. The prosecution alleged that pursuant to a
confidential informant about Lozano's drug activities at Bisig ng Nayon, Caloocan City, a buy bust
operation was conducted against Lozano.

439
 The prosecution narrated that SPO1 Llantino and the informant walked along an alley where
they met with Lozano, where the latter allegedly sold two plastic sachets containing shabu to the
former. Subsequently, SPO1 Llantino and other police officers, brought Lozano and the confiscated
items to their station, wherein the seized items were marked in the presence of a media
representative, a certain Ka Maeng Santos.

However, Lozano’s testimony told an entirely different version. Lozano alleged that he was
buying rice at a store near his house when six persons, one of them in police uniform, suddenly
grabbed and frisked him. After taking his money, Lozano was brought to the far end of Bisig ng Nayon,
where they entered a house and arrested two females allegedly for possession of shabu. Lozano and
the two females were then boarded in a van and brought to the police station.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) found Lozano guilty. Both
courts heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ duty.

ISSUE

Did the courts a quo correctly convict Lozano of the charges?

RULING
NO. The Court found Lozano’s appeal meritorious. For the prosecution of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs to prosper, the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt,
to wit: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment. On the other hand, conviction for a charge of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs may prosper if the following elements are proven, to wit: (a) the
accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession
was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
In both instances, jurisprudence states that it is essential that the State establish with moral
certainty the identity of the prohibited drug, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an
integral part of the corpus delicti of said offenses.
Certainly, this requirement is not a mere procedural matter which can be simply brushed
aside by simple allegation of substantial compliance or presumption of regularity in the conduct of
an official duty. As held in People v. Alcuizar, this requirement necessarily arises from the illegal
drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.
In this case, the court found unjustified deviations from the mandatory procedure laid down
in the chain of custody rule, which create clouds of doubt with regard to the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items presented in court. The records, including the courts a quo's assailed
decisions, are strikingly silent as to the presence of two of the three mandatory witnesses during the
inventory of the seized items.
Here, the prosecution submitted that the inventory at the police station was conducted in the
presence of a certain Ka Maeng Santos, a media representative. It is undisputed that no DOJ
representative and elective public official were present. Neither was there an explanation offered for
such non-compliance nor an allegation that earnest efforts were done to prevent such critical
procedural lapse.

440
 It may be true that absent clear and convincing evidence of ill-motive on the part of the police
officers, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails. However, such
presumption obtains only where there is no clear deviation from the regular performance of duty.
The presumption arises only when nothing in the record suggests that the police officers deviated
from the standard conduct of official duty required by the applicable law.
Here, as stated above, the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the clear and
simple requirements of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. Hence, such presumption cannot be applied. From
the foregoing, the Court is constrained to rule for the reversal of Lozano's conviction on the ground
of reasonable doubt. The unexplained procedural lapses committed by the apprehending officers
militate against the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti of the offenses charged
against him.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENNIS SARABIA y REYES
G.R. No. 243190, 28 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
Considering that the very corpus delicti is the drug specimen itself, establishing the integrity of the
specimen is imperative. Hence, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in establishing
Sarabia's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Here, the Court found that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have been
seriously compromised due to the failure of the prosecution to preserve an unbroken chain of custody of
the drug specimens and the police officers' unjustified non-observance of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. In
light of this, Sarabia must perforce be acquitted.

FACTS

Dennis Sarabia y Reyes (Sarabia) was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and possession
of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. No. 9165 for
allegedly selling a plastic sachet containing 0.0392 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
commonly called shabu, and for allegedly possessing six plastic sachets containing 3.219 grams of the
same substance.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Sarabia guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes
charged. The RTC believed that the prosecution was able to fulfill its burden of proof in establishing
all the essential elements of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11
of R.A. No. 9165. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s conviction.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming the conviction of Sarabia for violation of R.A. No. 9165?
RULING
NO. In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the
law. Considering that the very corpus delicti is the drug specimen itself, establishing the integrity of
the specimen is imperative. Hence, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in establishing

441
Sarabia's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In the conduct of buy-bust operations, the law provides that: (1) the seized items be
inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical
inventory, which includes the marking of the evidence, and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of
whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the
allegedly seized drug specimens. According to the prosecution's version of events, after the buy-bust
was conducted, on July 1, 2013, the allegedly seized drug specimens were transmitted by one SPO3
Diosdado Mamotos to Police Inspector Amiely Navarro (PI Navarro), a forensic chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory. PI Navarro allegedly examined the specimens and thereafter transmitted the same
to the evidence custodian, PO3 John Edwin Padayao.

Instead of presenting the witness herself to testify on the transmittal and examination of the
allegedly seized drug specimens, the prosecution decided to submit before the RTC a document
entitled "Proffer Testimony (Police Inspector Amiely Ann L. Navarro)." The said document,
containing the testimony of PI Navarro was executed, not by PI Navarro herself, but by the Assistant
City Prosecutor Daryl U. Fajardo (ACP Fajardo).

Upon presentment before the RTC, the admission of this "Proffer Testimony" was vehemently
objected to by the defense. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to present PI Navarro
herself on the witness stand to testify as regards the circumstances of the transmittal and
examination of the subject specimens. Instead, during the trial hearing on September 9, 2016, when
PI Navarro was presented by the prosecution, she merely identified the document without testifying
as to how the custody of the subject specimens was transmitted to her and the procedures she
undertook in examining the subject specimens and maintaining their condition. The RTC gravely
erred in admitting the "Proffer Testimony," considering that it is hearsay evidence.

The Court found that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have been
seriously compromised due to the failure of the prosecution to preserve an unbroken chain of
custody of the drug specimens and the police officers' unjustified non-observance of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165. In light of this, Sarabia must perforce be acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABUBACAR ABDULWAHAB y MAMA

G.R. No. 242168, 01 September 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Jardeleza, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The law, in exceptional circumstance, also allows non-compliance with the procedure where the
following requisites are present: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule
on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending team.

After careful review of the case, the Court finds the deviations from the rule chain of custody
unjustified. The prosecution failed to offer, much less prove, justifiable reasons for the absence of two of

442
the necessary witnesses, and to show that it undertook genuine and sufficient efforts to secure their
presence.

FACTS

According to the prosecution, an informant arrived at the office of PO2 Leonor to relay
intelligence on the illegal drug activities in Quiapo of one alias Muslim. After which, a buy-bust
operation proceeded wherein Muslim, who was later identified as appellant (Mama) allegedly sold
and delivered shabu to a posed buyer. Thereafter, Mama was arrested.

In his defense, Mama stated that he was at Carriedo near the LRT station to buy housing for
his cellphone. After bargaining with the store owner, a man suddenly held his hands. Another man
subsequently approached him and poked a gun on the right side of his body. He was then dragged
into a vehicle. He did not know the place where he was brought and detained. Thereafter, he was
brought outside his detention cell to the vehicle he boarded and made to stand beside it. He was made
to hold a plastic containing something like tawas in which an officer told him “eto, hawakan mo para
ma-piktyuran ka.”

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE

Did the non-compliance of the police officers with the procedure in Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 warrant the drugs to be inadmissible evidence?

RULING

YES. The following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt for a conviction in a
prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Proof that the transaction
actually occurred, coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti is essential.
Therefore, the prosecution must also establish the integrity of the dangerous drug, because the
dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the case. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug
with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody
from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the
crime, provides that the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.

The law, in exceptional circumstance, also allows non-compliance with the procedure where
the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from
the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending team.

443
 After careful review of the case, the Court finds the deviations from the rule chain of custody
unjustified. The prosecution failed to offer, much less prove, justifiable reasons for the absence of two
of the necessary witnesses, and to show that it undertook genuine and sufficient efforts to secure
their presence.

During the cross-examination, PO3 Villanueva testified that among the three necessary
witnesses, only a media representative was present. The record is bereft of any explanation to
account for the absence of a representative from the DOJ and an elected public official. Thus, the
conviction of Mama cannot be upheld.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HILARIO DE CASTRO y SANTOS alias "DACOY"

G.R. No. 243386, 02 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of the
conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be immediately done at the place of
seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team
considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
Here, Court points out that, as testified by PO3 Amodia, none of the three required witnesses was
present at the time of arrest of the accused and the seizure of the drugs. Neither were they present during
the inventory of the seized drugs at the police office. Based on the testimony of PO3 Amodia, it is obvious
that the police officers merely tried to "call-in" the three witnesses after the conduct of the buy-bust
operation already.
FACTS
Two separate Informations were filed against Hilario De Castro (De Castro) for violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act R.A No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
During the buy-bust information, the Informant told De Castro that they (the Informant and
PO3 Amodia) wanted to buy P300.00 worth of shabu. PO3 Amodia handed De Castro the buy-bust
money. When the sale was consummated, PO3 Amodia executed the pre-arranged signal.
PO3 Amodia arrested the De Castro and informed De Castro of his constitutional rights, and
the reason for De Castro's arrest at the place of arrest and seizure PO3 Amodia marked the plastic
container. The police brought De Castro to the Crime Investigation Division Office (CID Office) for
proper inventory and documentation, to avoid commotion.
At the CID Office, the police prepared the Certificate of Inventory; several attempts to
summon representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and an elected public
official were futile, thus, the police were forced to proceed with the inventory even without the
representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and an elected public official. Both
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) found De Castro guilty as charged.

ISSUE
Is the chain of custody rule complied with?

444
RULING
NO. The Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the applicable
law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that (1) the seized items be
inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d)
a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of the
conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be immediately done at the place of
seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team
considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
While the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible; and the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void, this has always been with the caveat
that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
However, in this case, it is evident that the police officers blatantly disregarded the
requirements laid down under Section 21 and they had no valid excuse for their deviation from the
rules. The Court points out that, as testified by PO3 Amodia, none of the three required witnesses was
present at the time of arrest of the accused and the seizure of the drugs. Neither were they present
during the inventory of the seized drugs at the police office. Based on the testimony of PO3 Amodia,
it is obvious that the police officers merely tried to "call-in" the three witnesses after the conduct of
the buy-bust operation already.
In addition, they offered nothing but a flimsy excuse for their deviation from the
requirements laid down under Section 21. They merely alleged that they transferred to the police
station because people started to come out and there might be a possible commotion. They even
admitted that they did not bring the necessary documents at the place of arrest when in fact, this
should already be standard practice for police officers in conducting buy-bust operations.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO GARCIA y ANCHETA

G.R. No. 230983, 04 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for each link in its
chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized by the forensic chemist to the court.

445
 In this case, the chain of custody was broken from its incipience until its final stages. Hence,
Garcia was acquitted.

FACTS

Edgardo Garcia (Garcia) was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art II of the Comprehensive
Drugs Act of 2002. According to PO3 Yaris, the police station received a confidential information
stating that Garcia was selling shabu. Thus, the police conducted a buy-bust operation with him as
poseur-buyer and PO3 Bayan as back-up.

During the transaction, as he was able to secure the item, he arrested Garcia. After the arrest,
he conducted a body search and recovered the buy-bust money, a cellular phone, two lighters, and a
Swiss knife. Ten minutes later, when the media representative and the barangay captain arrived at
the place of arrest, PO3 Yaris then laid the seized items and proceeded to mark and inventory it in
their presence.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Garcia guilty, finding that all the elements of the crime
were sufficiently established, the chain of custody was duly observed, and the corpus delicti was
positively identified.

On appeal, Garcia questioned the identity of the corpus delicti, and the lack of DOJ
representative during the inventory of the confiscated items. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s
ruling, stating that Garcia raised the alleged broken chain of custody for the first time on appeal.

ISSUES

(1) Can Garcia question the alleged broken chain of custody for the first time on appeal?
(2) Was there a broken chain of custody in this case?

RULING

(1) YES. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review. Thus, even
if appellant challenged the arresting officers' compliance with the chain of custody rule for the first
time on appeal, the Court is not barred from reviewing whether there was indeed unjustified
deviation from the rule.

(2) YES. Garcia was charged with unauthorized sale of dangerous drug allegedly committed
on July 4, 2013; thus, the governing law is R.A. No. 9165. The law states that “immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof;”.

To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for each link in
its chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the

446
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.

First, as admitted by the prosecution witnesses themselves, the seized item was not
immediately marked upon the arrest of appellant. The Court held in People v. Ramirez, that marking
of the seized item immediately after seizure is vital to ensure its integrity and veracity by preventing
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.

Second, there was no representative from the DOJ to witness the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items. No valid reason was offered for this omission. The Court held in
People v. Lim, that mere statements of unavailability of the required witnesses, by themselves do not
excuse non-compliance with Section 21, RA 9165.

Finally, the prosecution did not present any witness to testify on how the forensic chemist
handled the specimen during laboratory examination and how the evidence custodian preserved it
thereafter. Indeed, the chain of custody was broken from its incipience until its final stages.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEAN NOEL DIZON

G.R. No. 223562, 04 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Absence of one of the required witnesses is already a breach of the chain of custody rule. A
perfect chain may be impossible to obtain thus R.A. No. 9165 offers a saving clause allowing leniency
whenever justifiable grounds exist which warrant deviation from established protocol so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. In this case, the prosecution,
however, offered no explanation why a media representative was not present during the documentation
of such pieces of evidence

FACTS
Lean Noel Dizon (Dizon) was charged with two separate Informations for violation of
Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 for the selling of shabu to a police poseur-buyer and for possession of shabu without authority
of law.
On the evening of the town fiesta, the informant and PDEA Agent Oledan went to the place
where Dizon lived to conduct a buy-bust operation. When the sale of illegal drugs was consummated
between the informant and Dizon, the latter was arrested.
The confiscated items were marked in the nipa hut outside of Dizon’s house and a partial
inventory was initiated. The marking and partial inventory were done in the presence of Dizon, two
Barangay officers, and a Department of Justice (DOJ) representative. Photographs of the seized item
were also taken. Thereafter, Dizon was taken to the NBI office where his arrest was entered in the
blotter.

447
 The inventory was resumed in the NBI office and a media representative was asked to sign
the inventory. The items were then delivered for Laboratory examination by Oledan, who had been
in possession of the items the whole time. The laboratory report came back positive for shabu.
Dizon completely denied the allegations against him and in his defense, argued that he was
only kidnapped by such police officers and was forced to be used as a “police asset” to buy shabu from
a certain Brian but since Dizon refused, he was taken to the NBI office and urine samples were taken
from him. However, Dizon did not present any documentary evidence.
The trial court found Dizon guilty and the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the
lower court.
ISSUE
Did the PDEA officers preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs?

RULING
NO. Compliance with the chain of custody rule determines the integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of appellant’s liberty. Although appellant himself has not
raised this issue here or even below, the Court is not deterred from taking cognizance thereof.
The law requires that the physical inventory and photography of the seized drugs must be
done immediately after the seizure, in the presence of the accused, a media representative, a
representative from the DOJ and any local official.
Both witnesses confirmed that the required inventory and photography were done at the
place of arrest and in the presence of elected officials and a DOJ representative. One required witness
was missing: a representative from media. Absence of one of the required witnesses is already a
breach of the chain of custody rule.
A perfect chain may be impossible to obtain thus R.A. No. 9165 offers a saving clause allowing
leniency whenever justifiable grounds exist which warrant deviation from established protocol so
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The
prosecution, however, offered no explanation why a media representative was not present during
the documentation of such pieces of evidence. Thus, the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crime
cannot be upheld and there is clear violation of the chain of the custody rule regarding seizure of
illegal drugs. Hence, an acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GERARDO LABINI y GRAJO @ "JERRY"

G.R. No. 229212, 04 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION (CARPIO, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The non-observance of the three-witness rule, coupled with the prosecution's failure to offer any
explanation or justification for its non-compliance, is a clear violation of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended, and its implementing rules and warrants the acquittal of appellant from the offenses charged
for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

448
 In this case, the prosecution only explained why the apprehending officers failed to mark the
seized evidence and conduct the inventory of the items at the place where the buy-bust operation took
place. However, there was no explanation why only Chairperson Ureña was present during the
inventory, which constitutes non-compliance with the three-witness rule. Hence, Jerry was acquitted.

FACTS
Gerardo Labini (Jerry) was charged with violation of the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002
in three separate Informations. A buy-bust operation was conducted against Jerry. The informant,
who accompanied the buy-bust team, introduced Police Officer Pagaduan to Jerry. After the exchange
of the marked money and the shabu, Pagaduan gave the pre-arranged signal and his team rushed to
the scene. Pagaduan ordered the appellant to empty his pockets. Jerry took a red toothbrush case,
which contained two sachets of shabu.

Pagaduan testified that a lot of people came to the street due to the commotion. Hence, the
team secured the specimens and took the appellant to the barangay hall where the inventory of the
items seized took place, which was witnessed by the chairperson. From the barangay hall, the team
went back to their office for the preparation of the request for laboratory examination of the sachets
seized and for the medical and urine testing of appellant. The crystalline substance tested positive
for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).

Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) found Jerry guilty for
selling and possession of dangerous drugs but was acquitted for use of dangerous drugs. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody.

ISSUE
Is the chain of custody rule complied with?

RULING
NO. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime on 19 August 2011, the prevailing law
that enumerates the requirements of the chain of custody rule was Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
Section 21 of said law requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation. Under
the IRR, if the immediate physical inventory and photographing are not practicable, the buy-bust
team should conduct the same as soon as it reaches the nearest police station, or the nearest office of
the apprehending officer or team. The inventory must be done in the presence of the accused or his
representative or counsel, a representative of the DOJ, the media, and an elected public official, who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Clearly, the three required witnesses should be physically present at the time of the
apprehension of the accused or immediately thereafter, a requirement that the buy-bust team can
easily comply with because a buy-bust operation, by its nature, is a planned activity. This means that
the buy-bust team has enough time and opportunity to bring with them, or immediately after the
buy-bust operation, the said witnesses.

449
 In this case, the prosecution only explained why the apprehending officers failed to mark the
seized evidence and conduct the inventory of the items at the place where the buy-bust operation
took place. However, there was no explanation why only Chairperson Ureña was present during the
inventory, which constitutes non-compliance with the three-witness rule.
The non-observance of the three-witness rule, coupled with the prosecution's failure to offer
any explanation or justification for its non-compliance warrants the acquittal of appellant from the
offenses charged for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDIDATO MAMARINTA and JACK BATUAN

G.R. No. 243589, 09 September 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Carandang, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640, states that failure to strictly follow
the chain of custody rule will not render the seizure and custody of the items void only if the prosecution
satisfactorily proves the following that: (1) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (2) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
In this case, the failure of the prosecution to prove that they exerted genuine efforts in securing
the presence of the required witnesses renders their non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended, inexcusable. Consequently, the acquittal of accused-appellants is in order.

FACTS
A confidential informant told the police that a notorious pusher of illegal drugs with the alias
of Gerald was in the area. Thus, an entrapment team was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation.
During the buy-bust operation, PO1 Nidoy, Jr. received one transparent sachets white
crystalline substance from Mamarinta. PO1 Bueno then arrested Batuan and ordered him to bring
out the contents of his pockets, the buy-bust money and a heat-sealed transparent sachet containing
white crystalline substance.
While in the area of the arrest, PO1 Nidoy, Jr. marked the sachets he received and confiscated
from Mamarinta. PO1 Bueno also marked the sachet he confiscated from Batuan. They called the
media and the barangay officials. However, only the barangay kagawad arrived. The police officers
then photographed and presented the confiscated items to Mamarinta and Batauan. They also
prepared an inventory in front of the two accused and the barangay kagawad for them to sign. Both
Mamarinta and Batuan pleaded not guilty.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the two guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Court
found that all the confiscated items were properly identified and formally offered in evidence by the
prosecution. Likewise, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the two. The CA agreed with
the RTC that the chain of custody requirement was substantially complied with.

ISSUE
Was there substantial compliance of the chain of custody requirement?

450
RULING
NO. R.A. No. 10640 applies in this case since the law became effective on July 23, 2014 and
the operation took place on July 19, 2015. As stated in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by
R.A. 10640, failure to strictly follow the chain of custody rule will not render the seizure and custody
of the items void only if the prosecution satisfactorily proves the following that: (1) there is a
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved.

In People v. Gamboa, it was reiterated that the prosecution must explain the reason for the
procedural lapses and that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact. With
respect to the absence of the required witnesses, the prosecution must show that the apprehending
officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure their presence. Mere statements of
unavailability are insufficient to justify non-compliance.

In this case, the only witness present during the conduct of the inventory in this case was
Brgy. Kgwd. Guevarra. That being the case, the prosecution failed to prove that they exerted genuine
efforts in securing the presence of the required witnesses. Their non-compliance with Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165, as amended, is inexcusable. In People v. Miranda, the Court held that "the procedure in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects." Consequently, the acquittal of accused-appellants is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROSEMARIE GABUNADA y TALISIC

G.R. No. 242827, 09 September 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In this case it would initially appear that the policemen complied with the witness requirement,
however, a more circumspect examination of the records would show that Dela Cruz, the media
representative, was not present during the conduct of inventory and photography of the seized items. In
fact, Dela Cruz himself admitted on re-direct and re-cross examination that one of the arresting police
officers merely brought the aforementioned inventory form to him for his signature, two (2) days after
the buy-bust, inventory, and photography occurred.

As discussed, the witness requirement mandates the presence of the required witnesses during
the conduct of the inventory, so as to ensure that the evils of switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence will be adequately prevented. Hence, non-compliance therewith puts the onus on the
prosecution to provide a justifiable reason therefor, to which they did not provide.

FACTS

Rosemarie Gabunada y Talisic (Gabunada) was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The prosecution alleged that a buy-bust operation against
Gabunada was successful by recovering one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
Incidental to her arrest, another four (4) other plastic sachets also containing white crystalline
substance was retrieved from her.

451
 In the presence of Gabunada and barangay kagawad, the seized sachets were marked,
inventoried, and photographed. Afterwards, they were taken to the police headquarters for paper
works and the seized items were brought to the crime laboratory for examination. The inventory of
seized items contains the signature of a barangay kagawad and a media representative, Ernie Dela
Cruz.

Gabunada denied the charges against her, and claims that she was framed-up. Both the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes charged.

ISSUES

(1) Were the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items preserved due to the
arresting officers' substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule?
(2) Was the absence of a representative from the DOJ or the media not fatal?

(3) Was there a proper compliance with the witness requirement under R.A. 9165, as
amended by R.A. 10640?

RULING

(1) YES. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence. As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law
requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be
conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same.

In this regard, case law recognizes that "marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates
even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team." Hence, the failure to
immediately mark the confiscated items at the place of arrest neither renders them inadmissible in
evidence nor impairs the integrity of the seized drugs, as the conduct of marking at the of the crime
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team is sufficient compliance with the rules on
chain of custody.

(2) NO. The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to ensure the
establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence." Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field
conditions, strict compliance with the chain of custody procedure may not always be possible.

It should, however, be emphasized that for the saving clause to apply, the prosecution must
duly explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist. Thus, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to
contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance.

(3) NO. In this case it would initially appear that the policemen complied with the witness
requirement, however, a more circumspect examination of the records would show that Dela Cruz,
the media representative, was not present during the conduct of inventory and photography of the

452
seized items. In fact, Dela Cruz himself admitted on re-direct and re-cross examination that one of
the arresting police officers merely brought the aforementioned inventory form to him for his
signature, two (2) days after the buy-bust, inventory, and photography occurred.

As discussed, the witness requirement mandates the presence of the required witnesses
during the conduct of the inventory, so as to ensure that the evils of switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence will be adequately prevented. Hence, non-compliance therewith puts the
onus on the prosecution to provide a justifiable reason therefor, to which they did not provide.

In view of this unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore
constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from
Gabunada were compromised, which consequently warrants her acquittal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN GALISIM y GARCIA

G.R. No. 231305, 11 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for each link in its
chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized by the forensic chemist to the court. This is the chain of custody rule. It came to fore due to the
unique characteristics of illegal drugs which render them indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily
open to tampering, alteration, or substitution either by accident or otherwise.

Unquestionably, the chain of custody in this case was broken from the time the illegal drugs were
confiscated up to their presentation in court. The repeated breach of the chain of custody rule had cast
serious uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. The metaphorical chain did not
link at all, albeit it unjustly restrained Garcia's right to liberty. Verily, therefore, a verdict of acquittal is
in order.

FACTS
Based on the version of the prosecution, P/Insp. Castillo formed a team to conduct buy-bust
operation in Villa Monique, Pasig City. P/Insp. Castillo relayed to the team an information from a
confidential informant that three (3) individuals namely: Alias Macalone, Alias Atoy, and Alias Igtad,
were selling dangerous drugs in Villa Monique. Subsequently, the buy-bust operation proceeded
wherein they arrested Alvin Galisim y Garcia for allegedly selling illegal drugs to the poseur-buyer.

On the version of the defense, at the time of the buy-bust operation, he was resting in his
house. His wife woke him up to buy milk for their child. On his way to buy infant’s milk, two persons,
a male and a female, wearing civilian clothes arrested him. He was, thereafter, dragged out of the
valley, brought inside a car, and mauled. Inside the car, appellant was asked to just point to a person
who sold drugs, so he can be released. The police officers mauled and strangled him when he was
unable to give them a name. Thereafter, they took him out of the detention cell. Three plastic sachets

453
consisting of one bullet and two white crystalline substance were shown him, and then they forced
him to sign on the tape attached to the plastic sachets.

The Trial Court convicted Garcia for violation of Section 5 and 11, Article R.A. No. 9165. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. Garcia now seeks affirmative relief from the
Court and prays anew for his acquittal.

ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's verdict of conviction despite the
attendant procedural infirmities relative to the chain of custody over the corpus delicti?

RULING
YES. To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for each
link in its chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of
the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. This is the chain of
custody rule. It came to fore due to the unique characteristics of illegal drugs which render them
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration, or substitution either by
accident or otherwise.

The arresting officers' testimonies, on their face, bear how the chain of custody here had been
breached in several instances.

First, PO3 Maynigo failed to mention in his testimony that representative from the media,
DOJ, or an elected Barangay Official witnessed the conduct of the post-operation procedures. No
explanation was given for their absence. The presence of the three (3) required representatives,
together with the accused, is mandated by law. Failure to comply with this requirement shall result
in the acquittal of the accused.

Second, the photograph requirement was not complied with. The buy-bust team took
photographs of the seized items at the EPD's office in Pasig City and not at the place of arrest. What
the law requires is that the drugs must be photographed at the place of apprehension and/or
seizure in the presence of the three (3) required witnesses. While the procedure may be conducted
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, substantial
compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 may be allowed if attended with good with sufficient reason.
Here, the prosecution did not give any valid explanation on why this condition was not accomplished.

Third, the handling of the corpus delicti from the investigating officer to the forensic chemist
was not sufficiently established. PO3 Maynigo testified that when he delivered the seized items to
their office in EPD Pasig City, they showed them to investigating officer PO3 Cruz. The latter prepared
drug and laboratory requests dated February 20, 2011. But PO3 Cruz never got hold of the items, yet,
he peremptorily issued the requests. It was in fact PO3 Maynigo who actually brought the items from
EPD Pasig City to EPD Crime Laboratory, Marikina City, on the following day.

Finally, the fourth link was likewise not sufficiently established. Absent any testimony on the
management, storage, and preservation of the illegal drugs subject of seizure after its qualitative

454
examination, the fourth link in the chain of custody of the illegal drugs could not be reasonably
established. In this case, both the prosecution and defense dispensed with forensic chemist PCI
Cariño's testimony during the hearing on September 15, 2011.

Unquestionably, the chain of custody here was broken from the time the illegal drugs were
confiscated up to their presentation in court. The repeated breach of the chain of custody rule had
cast serious uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. The metaphorical chain did
not link at all, albeit it unjustly restrained Garcia's right to liberty. Verily, therefore, a verdict of
acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ORLANDO RAMOS ORDIZ

G.R. No. 206767, 11 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In the conduct of buy-bust operations, the law provides that: (1) the seized items be inventoried
and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and
photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b)
an elected public official , (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the
Department of Justice, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof.

As borne by the evidence of the prosecution, no inventory and photographing were conducted
whatsoever. As testified by the prosecution's witnesses, after the alleged drug transaction, Ordiz was
immediately apprehended and brought to the police station. In fact, the record is silent as to whether
any inventory receipt or certificate of inventory was executed. To make matters worse, none of the
required witnesses was present during the buy-bust operation.

FACTS

As gathered from the testimonies of the prosecution’s witness presented during the trial, a
buy-bust operation was conducted by members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) against
accused Orlando Ordiz who was reported to be selling shabu in the Capitol area. Ordiz was arrested
after having a transaction of selling shabu to the poseur-buyer. Thereafter, he was informed of his
constitutional rights and brought to the police station, along with the suspected shabu and the
recovered buy-bust money.

For Ordiz’s defense, he stated that while he was eating at a nearby eatery, police officers were
having a drinking spree at a table in front of him. The police officer told accused to come over and
when he did, he was asked about the incident involving Abendan's store which was ransacked. When
he denied any knowledge about the said incident, the police officer called someone on his cellular
phone. After some time, police officers arrived and took him to the police station.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Ordiz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, as amended. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s conviction of Ordiz. Hence, this
appeal before the Court of Last Resort.

455
ISSUE

Is Ordiz guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165?

RULING

NO. The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to
be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked
up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the same.

Applying the foregoing discussion in the instant case, it is plain to see that the prosecution
failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the allegedly seized drug specimen.

As readily admitted by the RTC in its Decision, "at the outset, it is noted that neither the
Forensic Chemical Officer, PSI Medardo Palapo, nor the custodian was presented to identify the
Chemistry Report.” Through the testimony of SPO1 Ursal, Jr., the prosecution merely established that
there was a request to examine the allegedly seized specimen and that the specimen was transferred
from the police station to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. In sum, there is absolutely no
evidence establishing how the specimen was stored and maintained while in the custody of the PNP.

Furthermore, in the conduct of buy-bust operations, the law provides that: (1) the seized
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the
physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official , (c) a representative from the media, and (d)
a representative from the Department of Justice, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

As borne by the evidence of the prosecution, no inventory and photographing were

conducted whatsoever. As testified by the prosecution's witnesses, after the alleged drug transaction,
Ordiz was immediately apprehended and brought to the police station. In fact, the record is silent as
to whether any inventory receipt or certificate of inventory was executed. To make matters worse,
none of the required witnesses was present during the buy-bust operation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONALDO SALENGA Y GONZALES

G.R. No. 239903, 11 September 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Jardeleza, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules, clearly require the inventory
and photograph of the seized items "immediately after seizure and confiscation" in the presence of the
three necessary witnesses.

456
 It is undisputed that the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were conducted
at the police station and not at the place of arrest, and in the presence of only appellant, PO2 Lagos, and
a media representative by the name of Manny Alcala. The reason given by PO2 Lagos that "the crowd is
getting bigger" is but a hollow excuse insufficient to justify non-compliance with the rules. Likewise, no
explanation, much less a justifiable reason, was offered to explain the absence of the necessary witnesses
nor was there a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure their presence during the arrest
and inventory.

FACTS
According to the prosecution, a confidential informant arrived at the Office of the District
Anti-Illegal Drugs in Taguig City to report the drug dealing activities of a certain Michelle. The police
were able to arrange a deal with Michelle for the sale of shabu for P1, 000.00. Thereafter, the buy-
bust operation proceeded. Michelle told them that she would not be able to meet them and instead
would be sending a certain Barok, who turned out to be the appellant (Salenga). Thereafter, Salenga
was arrested after selling one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of alleged shabu to the poseur
buyer.

For the defense of Salenga, he claimed that he was framed by the police officers. He alleged
that at the time of the buy-bust operation, he went to Jollibee at the Petron gas station to buy food.
Thereafter, appellant was suddenly approached by four armed men. They were handcuffed and
frisked. Once in the police station, the police officers took their statements and asked them if they
could afford to settle the case in the amount of P50, 000.00. Since he told the officers that he cannot
afford the said amount, he was then informed that the charge against him would push through.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salenga guilty of violation of Section 5 and 11 of Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Judgment. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE
Is there a failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR)?

RULING
YES. As shown in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the applicable law at the commission
of the crime, and its implementing rules, clearly require the inventory and photograph of the seized
items "immediately after seizure and confiscation" in the presence of the three necessary witnesses
- the representatives from the DOJ and the media, and any local public official - at the place of
apprehension, or if not practicable, at the nearest police station or office. In both instances, these
witnesses must already be present at the time of the apprehension and seizure, a requirement that
can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the operation, by its very nature,
is a planned activity.

The law, however, also allows non-compliance in exceptional cases. Immediate physical
inventory and photograph of the confiscated items at the place of arrest may be excused in instances
when the safety and security of the apprehending officers and the witnesses required by law or of
the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action of those
who have the resources and capability to mount a counter-assault. The Court also held that the
absence of the necessary witnesses does not per se render the seized items inadmissible.

457
 It is undisputed that the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were
conducted at the police station and not at the place of arrest, and in the presence of only appellant,
PO2 Lagos, and a media representative by the name of Manny Alcala. The reason given by PO2 Lagos
that "the crowd is getting bigger" is but a hollow excuse insufficient to justify non-compliance with
the rules. Likewise, no explanation, much less a justifiable reason, was offered to explain the absence
of the necessary witnesses nor was there a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure
their presence during the arrest and inventory.

The rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground,
but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit and coupled with a statement on the steps
they took to preserve the integrity of the seized item. Clearly, compliance is absent in this case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIVIC COHAYCO y REVIL

G.R. No. 241324, 11 September 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under R.A. No. 9165, it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.

In this case, the Court finds that the police officers were justified in conducting the markings,
inventory, and photography of the seized items at the PDEA Satellite Office instead of the place of arrest.
Nonetheless, it appears that the inventory and photography of the seized items were not conducted in
the presence of a DOJ representative, as evinced by the Inventory of Seized Items/Confiscated Non-
Drugs, which only showed signatures from barangay officials and media representatives, contrary to
the mandatory procedure laid down in RA 9165.

FACTS

According to the prosecution, through a buy-bust operation, the police were able to arrest
Cohayco and confiscate shabu from the accused. Thereafter, the seized items were marked,
inventories, and photographed. The items were then brought to the crime laboratory where, after
examination, the contents thereof yielded positive for shabu.

In defense, Cohayco stated that she was just looking for her five-year old son when two men
riding a motorcycle stopped in front of her, restrained her, and then took her to the police station.
She claimed that when they searched her, they did not find anything, so they brought her to the crime
laboratory.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Cohayco guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), stating that the seized items were properly established,
thereby preserving their integrity and evidentiary value. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the

458
RTC’s decision.

ISSUE

Is Cohayco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165?

RULING

YES. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under R.A. No.
9165, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well
as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No.
10640, "a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official"; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media."

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance
with the chain of custody procedure may not always be possible. As such, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that:
(a) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. The foregoing is based on the saving clause found in Section 21
(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, which was later
adopted into the text of R.A. No. 10640.

In this case, the Court finds that the police officers were justified in conducting the markings,
inventory, and photography of the seized items at the PDEA Satellite Office instead of the place of
arrest. Nonetheless, it appears that the inventory and photography of the seized items were not
conducted in the presence of a DOJ representative, as evinced by the Inventory of Seized
Items/Confiscated Non-Drugs, which only showed signatures from barangay officials and media
representatives, contrary to the mandatory procedure laid down in R.A. No. 9165.

Taghoy acknowledged that only barangay officials and media representatives were present
during the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items. At this point, the prosecution
should have noted the absence of the DOJ representative and further interrogated its witnesses on
the matter in order to determine if, at the very least, earnest efforts were exerted in ensuring the
presence of this DOJ representative during the conduct of inventory and photography.

Absent any determination of earnest efforts, the Court is constrained to hold that there was
an unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule, resulting in the conclusion that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Cohayco were compromised. Perforce,
her acquittal is warranted under these circumstances.

459
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NIÑA CARRY y EMMANUEL
G.R. No. 245391, 11 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

It is a matter of record that only appellant and media representative Maeng Santos were present
to witness the inventory of the seized items. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals even noted the
absence of any elected official and representative from the DOJ during inventory. No explanation was
offered for this omission.

FACTS

According to the prosecution, PO3 Arguelles testified that two confidential informants
reported to him the illegal drug-selling activity of "Niña”. To entrap appellant, DAID-SOTG Chief PCI
Romeo C. Ricalde organized a buy-bust team and designated PO3 Arguelles as poseur-buyer. The buy-
bust operation proceeded in which Niña was arrested.

On the other hand, according to the version of the defense, Niña claimed she walked inside a
convenience store across the street to have a snack. All of a sudden, about ten men approached and
asked her to empty her bag. Although nothing illegal was found in her possession, they made her
board a vehicle and brought her to the Langaray Police Station. There, she was made to contact a
relative. She called and asked help from her father. When the latter arrived, the men who arrested
her asked her father for P500, 000.00 in exchange for her release. But since her father was not able
to produce the amount, she was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Niña guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.
Appellant now seeks for a verdict of acquittal from the Court.

ISSUE

Did the CA err in affirming the trial court's verdict of conviction despite the attendant
procedural deficiencies relative to the inventory of the seized items?

RULING

YES. In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The

460
prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally possessed by the accused is
the same substance presented in court.

Here, appellant is charged with unauthorized sale of dangerous drug allegedly committed on
January 7, 2012. The governing law, therefore, is R.A. No. 9165 before its amendment in 2014.

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the standard in preserving the corpus delicti in illegal
drug cases, viz: “The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.”

It is a matter of record that only appellant and media representative Maeng Santos were
present to witness the inventory of the seized items. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
even noted the absence of any elected official and representative from the DOJ during inventory. No
explanation was offered for this omission.

Although the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 offers a saving clause
allowing leniency whenever there are justifiable grounds to deviate from established protocol so long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved, the prosecution
offered no such explanation here. It merely stated that no elected official and representative from the
DOJ were available at that time.

In fine, the condition sine qua non for the saving clause to become operational was not
complied with. For the same reason, the proviso "so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved", too, will not come into play. Absent any acceptable explanation
for the deviation from the procedural requirements of the chain of custody rule, the corpus delicti
cannot be deemed preserved.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHAEL ROXAS y CAMARILLO

G.R. No. 242817, 16 September 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The law requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain
required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640,a
representative from the media AND the DOJ, and any elected public official; or (b) if after the
amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, an elected public official and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service (NPS) OR the media.

Verily, when the police officers testified that there was no DOJ representative available, the
prosecution should have inquired whether the arresting officers exerted earnest efforts in securing the
presence of such witness. Also, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for the absence of a

461
required witness by presenting a justifiable reason therefor, or at the very least, by showing that genuine
and sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure his/her presence.

FACTS

Michael Roxas (Roxas) was accused of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. The
operatives of the District Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Group (DAID-SOTG) successfully
implemented a buy-bust operation against Roxas. One plastic sachet containing suspected
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was recovered from him.

In defense, Roxas denied the charges against him, claiming instead that in the afternoon of
the buy-bust, he was watching a basketball game with his stepson when four police officers suddenly
arrived and arrested him for no reason at all. He admitted that he did not file any charges against the
police officers for fear of retaliation.

The RTC found Roxas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

Roxas filed for an appeal, stating as his defense that the police officers failed to immediately
inventory and photograph the seized drug, and the absence of a Department of Justice (DOJ)
personnel during the inventory-taking would render that evidence inadmissible.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruling in toto. Hence, this
appeal seeking that Roxas’ conviction be overturned.

ISSUE

Is Roxas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165?

RULING

NO. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under R.A. No. 9165,
it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering
that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove
the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, warrants an acquittal.

To establish the identity of the dangerous drugs with moral certainty, the prosecution must
be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to
their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well
as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No.
10640,a representative from the media AND the DOJ, and any elected public official; or (b) if after the
amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, an elected public official and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service (NPS) OR the media.

462
 Thus, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the
required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance.

Verily, when the police officers testified that there was no DOJ representative available, the
prosecution should have inquired whether the arresting officers exerted earnest efforts in securing
the presence of such witness. Also, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for the absence
of a required witness by presenting a justifiable reason therefor, or at the very least, by showing that
genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure his/her presence.

In view of this unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore
constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the item seized from Roxas were
compromised, which consequently warrants his acquittal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VERNIE ANTONIO y MABUTI

G.R. No. 243936, 16 September 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Carandang, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Since Vernie was arrested after the effectivity of R.A. No. 10640, the witnesses required in this
case are: (a) elected public official and (b) a representative of the NPS or the media.

No explanation was given as to the absence of a representative from the NPS or the media.
Neither was there any statement to prove that genuine and earnest efforts were exerted to secure their
presence.

FACTS

Vernie Antonio Mabuti (Vernie) was accused, for selling (for the amount of 500php) and
possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of the
Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

During the trial, the prosecution presented several witnesses, including an informant, who
reported about the illegal drug business ran by Vernie. A buy-bust operation was planned out with
the informant. Through this, Vernie was arrested. The police found two more sachets of shabu and
submitted them for inventory.

In his defense, Vernie alleged that he was taking a rest beside his tricycle when a group
wearing civilian clothes invited him to their office.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Vernie to be guilty. It was held that all the elements of
illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu were proven by the prosecution. It also ruled that the
prosecution was able to establish an unbroken chain of custody showing that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items were not compromised at any stage. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed Vernie’s conviction.

463
ISSUE

Were the corpus delicti and other documents presented by the prosecution enough to prove
Vernie’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING

NO. The corpus delicti in this case are: (1) one sachet of shabu sold to the poseur buyer; and
(2) the two additional sachets confiscated from Vernie. It is, therefore, necessary that the identity and
integrity of the dangerous drugs are established beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the shabu
presented in court must be the same shabu seized from him during the buy- bust operation and the
body search after his arrest.

Although the Court acknowledges that strict compliance with the chain of custody procedure
may not always be possible, it must be stressed that for the saving clause to apply, the prosecution
must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses. Further, the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist.

Since Vernie was arrested after the effectivity of R.A. No. 10640, the witnesses required in
this case are: (a) elected public official and (b) a representative of the NPS or the media. While the
police officers testified that the inventory was conducted at the police station and not at the place of
arrest, the records do not show why Chairwoman Brillante was the only witness present during the
inventory. No explanation was given as to the absence of a representative from the NPS or the media.
Neither was there any statement to prove that genuine and earnest efforts were exerted to secure
their presence.

The police officers received the confidential information about Vernie's illegal activities at
around 3:00 a.m., while the arrest of Vernie transpired at 3:00 p.m. The police officers had more or
less 12 hours of preparation - from the time they received the information until the arrest of the
accused - to comply with-the requirements under R.A. No. 10640.

The prosecution evidence also left unanswered questions about the forensic chemist's
handling of the seized plastic sachets. The report is not authenticated and is therefore hearsay
evidence because he had no personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the preparation
of the Chemistry Report. Thus, the corpus delicti in this case is inadmissible to prove that the seized
articles are dangerous drugs.

NOR JELAMIN MUSA, IVAN USOP BITO, and MONSOUR ABDULRAKMAN ABDILLA v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 242132, 25 September 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

464
 While Musa et al. may, in theory, still be held liable for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 by virtue of the variance doctrine as enunciated in Section
4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, the chain of custody rule was not observed; hence, the integrity and
probative value of the corpus delicti were not preserved thereby raising reasonable doubt as to the
charge of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

This is illustrated by the fact that there were no records showing that the seized item from the
time it was in the custody of PO3 Cubillan until it was given to Police Inspector Ryan Pelayre Bajade (PI
Bajade), the forensic chemist, for qualitative examination was turned over directly to PI Bajade or if
there were other personalities who handled the specimen.

FACTS

An Information was filed against Nor Jelamin Musa, Ivan Usop Bito and Monsour
Abdulrakman Abdilla (Musa et al.), charging them with a violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.

The prosecution alleged that Musa et al. were caught transporting illegal drugs by the police
officers wherein Musa et al. were riding a multi-cab vehicle, which had evaded a checkpoint. The
officers chased and eventually caught them beside a hut near the vehicle. The police officers alleged
that they had managed to collect the drugs from Musa et al. and have placed the markings on the
seized drugs upon their arrival at the police station.

Thereafter, the Receipt/Inventory of Property/ies Seized was prepared by the police officers
and witnessed by Vice Mayor Katrina Orencia (Vice Mayor Orencia), Kagawad Ermian Limbadan
(Kagawad Limbadan) of Brgy. Tibanban, Governor Generoso, and Peter Z. Macado (Macado), a media
personality from Mati City. Photographs of the confiscated drugs were also taken in the presence of
Musa et al. and the witnesses.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Musa et al. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. The trial court upheld that the arrest was the result of a hot pursuit operation and
thus the question of where they were apprehended was immaterial. Upon appeal, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction as it found merit in the testimonies of the police officers and
that the chain of custody of the seized substance had been observed.

ISSUE

Did the CA wrongfully affirm the conviction of the Musa et al.?

RULING

YES. The Court finds that the findings of fact of the trial court was misappreciated. Firstly, the
Court clarifies that the term “transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or
convey,” thus emphasizing that the movement of the dangerous drug was an essential element in this
context.

Applying this in the case at bar, the Court finds insufficiency in totality of the evidence offered
by the prosecution to prove its theory that Musa et al. transported 18.4349 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses made clear

465
that the identities of Musa et al. as the persons who were driving and/or riding the multi-cab
purportedly used to transport illegal drugs have not been established with absolute certainty, thus
raising reasonable doubt that Musa et al. were in fact transporting illegal drugs as charged.

Moreover, the inconsistent testimonies of the police officers as to what had transpired at the
checkpoint, among others, raise serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution evidence. In view of
the foregoing statements, the Court entertains reasonable doubt that Musa et al. transported illegal
drugs as charged.

Secondly, while Musa et al. may, in theory, still be held liable for Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 by virtue of the variance doctrine as
enunciated in Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, the chain of custody rule was not observed;
hence, the integrity and probative value of the corpus delicti were not preserved thereby raising
reasonable doubt as to the charge of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

This is illustrated by the fact that there were no records showing that the seized item from
the time it was in the custody of PO3 Cubillan until it was given to Police Inspector Ryan Pelayre
Bajade (PI Bajade), the forensic chemist, for qualitative examination was turned over directly to PI
Bajade or if there were other personalities who handled the specimen.

Furthermore, although the inventory was witnessed by two barangay officials and a member
of the media, there was no representative from the DOJ. This constitutes a non-compliance with the
required witnesses rule which may only be permitted if the prosecution proves that the
apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure their presence.

In the case at bar, the prosecutors failed to establish such justification and therefore the
conviction of Musa et al. is found unsupported and thus declared erroneous on the part of the CA.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHARLES ROALES y PERMEJO

G.R. No. 233656, 02 October 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The mere allegation that a representative of the media was summoned, but none appeared
hardly constitutes as a justifiable ground for such non-appearance. Evidently, the only one present to
witness the inventory and the marking of the seized items was an elected public official, i.e., Chairman
Bobis. Taking all the above-mentioned in mind, the Court finds it appropriate to acquit the appellant in
this case as his guilt has not been established against reasonable doubt.

FACTS
Two separate Informations were filed against Charles Roales (Charles) for the illegal sale and
possession of shabu. Upon being arraigned, Roales entered a plea of not guilty.

An operation against alias “Charlie” was conducted in Pasig City. The team proceeded to the
target area where they saw a man standing in front of a store and smoking a cigarette. Than man was
identified by the confidential informant to be Charles. After the consummation of the sale, PO1 Sanoy
removed his bull cap, which was the pre-arranged signal, and the team rushed to the scene.

466
 The team conducted an inventory at the place of arrest in the presence of Charlie and
Barangay Chairman Bobby Bobis, the elected barangay official. However, no one from the media
arrived. The inventory report as well as the photos of the conduct of the inventory were taken.

Afterwards, PO1 Sanoy brought Charlie to the SAID-SOTFG and turned over the seized
evidence to Police Officer 3 Nelson Cruz who prepared the necessary documents. The evidence
delivered by PO1 Sanoy to PSI Vicente for examination tested positive for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.

On the other hand, the version of the defense states that, he was falsely charged. According
to him, he was front of his house when six men in civilian clothes arrived and suddenly handcuffed
him.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Charlie to be guilty as charged. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE
Is Charles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A.
9165?

RULING
NO. In cases that involve the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the illicit
drugs confiscated from the accused comprise the corpus delicti of the charges. It is of paramount
importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt, and that
it must be proven with certainty that the substance bought and seized during the buy-bust operation
is exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the court.

In this regard, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides for the chain of custody rule,
outlining the procedure that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs in order to
ensure that their integrity and evidentiary value are preserved.

Republic Act No. 10640 (R.A. No. 10640), a law amending Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, mandates that the conduct of physical inventory and photographing of the seized items must
be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official, and (3) a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The present case is governed by R.A. No. 10640 since the buy-bust operation took place on
18 July 2015 after this law took effect. In the present case, the absence of a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media was not justifiably explained by the prosecution. An
examination of the records of the case reveals that no explanation whatsoever was also given as to
why no such attempts were made. The same goes for the absence of a representative of the media.
The mere allegation that a representative of the media was summoned, but none appeared hardly
constitutes as a justifiable ground for such non-appearance. Evidently, the only one present to
witness the inventory and the marking of the seized items was an elected public official, i.e., Chairman
Bobis.

467
 Taking all the above-mentioned in mind, the Court finds it appropriate to acquit the
appellant in this case as his guilt has not been established against reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ONNI ADDIN

G.R. No. 223682, 09 October 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Citing Ramos v. People, the Court pointed out that the police officers are compelled not only to
state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted
earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their
actions were reasonable.

In this case, the prosecution failed to at least allege and then prove any specific reason to explain
the absence of the representative from the DOJ and any elected public official present during the taking
of inventory and photographs. Further, there was no attempt to justify the absence of these witnesses.
Additionally, the police officers did not show that they exerted earnest efforts to secure the presence of
the other required representatives.

FACTS
As alleged by the prosecution, a confidential informant went to the Special Anti-Illegal Drugs
Unit at Camp Karingal with the information that a certain Onni Addin (Addin) has been selling drugs
at Barangay Culiat. After assessing the information, a buy-bust operation was planned.

When the transaction with Addin was completed, the team rushed to the target area while
Addin tried to escape. However, he was apprehended by the police officers in the end. At the police
station, SPO1 Jeffrey Flores (SPO1 Flores) prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination, a Joint
Affidavit of Arrest, an Affidavit of Attestation and the Inventory of Property Seized. The inventory
was witnessed by Addin’s relatives and a member of the media, Vener Santos (Santos). The seized
item tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Hence, an information
was filed charging Addin with a violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

On the other hand, Addin denied the allegations against him, insisting that he was engaged in
the business of selling vegetables and of operating a videoke outlet. He presented witnesses who
corroborated his version of story.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Addin guilty as charged. The RTC noted that although
the inventory of the seized item was not done in the crime scene, the same was justifiable since the
police officers found the area dangerous. It pointed out that unlike the marking of the seized items,
the inventory need not be performed at the crime scene since no search warrant was involved.

When the case was brought before the Court of Appeals (CA), it affirmed the decision of the
RTC. It emphasized that based on the testimonies, the evidence confiscated from the accused at the
time of buy-bust operation was the same one tested, introduced and testified to; hence, the integrity
of the evidence was preserved. Hence, the current petition.

ISSUE

468
 Was Addin guilty of violating R.A. No. 9165?

RULING
NO. The Court found that the police officers failed to observe the procedure in relation to the
seizure and custody of dangerous drugs or the chain of custody as provided in Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165. The said section mandates that the marking, photographing and inventory of the seized items
be done in the presence of representatives from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official.

In this case, the police only managed to secure the presence and signature of a representative
from the media to serve as additional witness. No explanation was provided why the presence of a
representative from the DOJ and any elected public official was not secured.

Citing Ramos v. People, the Court pointed out that the police officers are compelled not only
to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted
earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances,
their actions were reasonable.

In this case, the prosecution failed to at least allege and then prove any specific reason to
explain the absence of the representative from the DOJ and any elected public official present during
the taking of inventory and photographs. Further, there was no attempt to justify the absence of these
witnesses. Additionally, the police officers did not show that they exerted earnest efforts to secure
the presence of the other required representatives.

Hence, there was no justifiable ground advanced by the prosecution to excuse the absence of
the said witnesses. This lapse casted doubt upon the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
item. Wherefore, Addin should be acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JENNY TECSON y AVECILLA

G.R. No. 243786, 09 October 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In this regard, case law recognizes that marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates
marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending tram. Hence, the failure to
immediately mark the confiscated items at the place of arrest neither renders them inadmissible in
evidence nor impairs the integrity of the seized drugs, as the conduct of marking at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team is sufficient compliance with the rules on chain of custody.

FACTS
The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) conducted a buy-bust operation against
Tecson, from whom one transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance was
recovered.

469
 Tecson was immediately brought to the PDEA office in Quezon City, where the officers
marked, inventoried, and photographed the seized item in the presence of the accused, a barangay
kagawad, and a media representative. The seized item was then brought to the PDEA Laboratory
Service.
In her defense, Tecson argued that she was illegally arrested, for the police demanded an
amount of one million in exchange for her release.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the
elements of the crime charged and that the integrity of the seized drug was established in accordance
with the chain of custody rule.
Tecson appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that she should be acquitted since the
requisite marking, inventory, and photography of the drugs were not conducted at the place of arrest,
nor were the same witnessed by a representative of the Department of Justice. The CA affirmed
Tecson’s conviction.

ISSUE
Was the chain of custody rule violated?

RULING
NO. In cases of Illegal Sale and/or Possession of Dangerous under R.A. No. 9165, it is essential
that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants an acquittal.
To establish moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain
of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the
crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking,
physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the same.
In this regard, case law recognizes that marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates
marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending tram. Hence, the failure to
immediately mark the confiscated items at the place of arrest neither renders them inadmissible in
evidence nor impairs the integrity of the seized drugs, as the conduct of marking at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team is sufficient compliance with the rules on chain of custody.
Moreover, the absence of a DOJ representative as a witness is not fatal since the crime took
place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 10640, which merely requires that the inventory and
photography of the seized drugs be witnessed by an elected public official and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media, which was complied with in this case.

ROWENA PADAS y GARCIA @ “WENG” v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

470
 G.R. No. 244327, 14 October 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Gesmundo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

This Court has ruled that even if the prosecution had proven the illegal sale of a dangerous drug,
it is still charged to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti. Thus, even if there was a sale, the corpus
delicti could not be proven if the chain of custody was defective.

In this case, however, the prosecution offered no justification as to the absence of a

representative from the DOJ and the elected public official. The prosecution did not even recognize their
procedural lapses or give any justifiable explanation on why the apprehending team did not conduct the
inventory, marking, and taking of photographs of the seized evidence in the presence of an elected public
official and a DOJ representative.

FACTS

According to the evidence of the Prosecution, PO1 Villanueva and SPO2 Sanchez went to
Bohol Street, Balic Balic, Sampaloc on board a tricycle to conduct a surveillance in order to familiarize
themselves with the area. As they were about to leave, while still on board the tricycle, they allegedly
saw a woman taking out, one heated-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance. The woman, later identified as Rowena Garcia, was showing the plastic sachet to an
unidentified man.

They then alighted from the tricycle and arrested Rowena. PO1 Villanueva marked the plastic
sachets and the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized evidence were conducted
at the place of arrest in the presence of Crisostomo, a media representative. Subsequently, PO1
Villanueva brought Rowena and the seized evidence to the police station.

Upon the evidence of the Defense, Rowena testified that a police officer placed his hand on
her shoulder and forced her to board a vehicle while she was washing clothes in front of her house.
Inside the vehicle, she was ordered to empty her pockets. Afterwards, the police officers took her
money, bracelet and earrings.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Rowena guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. It ruled that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 by the
police officers was not fatal, especially because the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence were preserved. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in toto. Rowena filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

Is the arresting officer’s non-compliance with the requirements for the proper custody of
seized dangerous drugs under Section 21, R.A. No. 9165 fatal?

471
RULING

YES. Apart from showing the presence of the elements of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, it is imperative to show that the substance illegally possessed and sold by the accused is the
same substance offered and identified in court. This requirement is known as the Chain of Custody
Rule under R.A. No. 9165 created to safeguard doubts concerning the identity of the seized drugs.

Before its amendment by R.A. No. 10640, R.A. No. 9164 required the apprehending team, after
seizure and confiscation, to immediately conduct a physical inventory of, and photograph, the seized
drugs in the presences of (a) the accused or the persons from who such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (b) a representative from the media (c) a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and (d) an elected public official. These four
witnesses must all sign the copies of the inventory and obtain a copy thereof.

In this case, no DOJ representative and elected public official were present at the time of the
physical inventory, marking, and taking of photographs of the evidence seized from Rowena.
Additionally, PO1 Villanueva testified that Crisostomo, the media representative, was not present
when Rowena was arrested and the seized evidence were marked. Crisostomo merely signed the
inventory after the marking of the evidence. It is therefore unclear whether he witnessed the actual
physical inventory of the seized drugs.

Nevertheless, there is a saving clause under the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 in case of non-
compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule. This saving clause, however, applies only where the
prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses the benefit
of invoking the presumption of regularity and bears the burden of proving – with moral certainty –
that the illegal drug presented in court is the same drug that was confiscated from the accused during
the arrest.

In this case, however, the prosecution offered no justification as to the absence of a

representative from the DOJ and the elected public official. The prosecution did not even recognize
their procedural lapses or give any justifiable explanation on why the apprehending team did not
conduct the inventory, marking, and taking of photographs of the seized evidence in the presence of
an elected public official and a DOJ representative.

This Court has ruled that even if the prosecution had proven the illegal sale of a dangerous
drug, it is still charged to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti. Thus, even if there was a sale, the
corpus delicti could not be proven if the chain of custody was defective. The prosecution’s failure to
prove the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized were preserved is fatal to the case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO LACDAN y PEREZ and

ROMUALDO VIERNEZA y BONDOC
G.R. No. 208472, 14 October 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Carandang, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

472
 Before the amendment of R.A. No. 9165, it is mandated that the apprehending team,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, must conduct a physical inventory and photographed the
seized item, with witnesses namely: a representative from the media, a representative from the DOJ and
any elected public official.

Yet, the inventory was conducted in Camp Vicente Lim or around 20 kilometers away from San
Pedro, Laguna where the buy-bust was conducted. Moreover, the inventory was witnessed by only the
accused, a representative by the media and an elected official. On top of this, no photograph of the illicit
drug was taken. No explanation for the irregularity was presented.

FACTS
An Information was filed against Eduardo and Romualdo Vierneza charging them with
violation of Sec. 5 in relation to Sec. 26 of R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act), involving
the sale of 10.03 grams of shabu.

The Regional Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency in Calamba, Laguna has
received a tip from a confidential informant that a drug sale was underway involving 10.03 grams of
shabu. Allegedly, a police officer posed as a buyer and was introduced by the confidential informant
to the accused. Thereafter, the accused were brought to Camp Vicente Lim, and the crystalline
substance was brought to the crime laboratory for testing.

The accused presented a different scenario. For Lacdan, he testified at the time of the incident,
he received a call from a certain “Karen” to meet her in a Sogo Hotel. When he went there he was met
by Karen and another person who pointed a gun at him. Thereafter, one of those men poked a gun at
him and forced him to ride the vehicle. These testimonies were corroborated by two other witnesses.

However, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the accused. It found that all the elements
for illegal the sale of shabu were established. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
decision of the RTC, holding that all the elements of the crime have been met and that there is also
the observance of the chain of custody rule.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in upholding the conviction for the violation of the chain of custody for buy-
bust operations?

RULING
YES. The SC held that the buy-bust operation was conducted in a questionable manner. The
Court pointed out that when the crime allegedly took place, it was 6 a.m., and the sun should be up
and therefore bright. The use of the boodle money during that time would have fooled no one, since
only two bills were genuine, while the rest of the bills were newspaper cutouts. This in itself could
have alerted the accused that something was off. The narration of the police officers that the accused
accepted the money without complaints is at best questionable, not credible.

Further, in the case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is essential that the identity of the
substance be established with moral certainty. To establish this moral certainty, it is paramount to
observe the chain of custody. Before the amendment of R.A. No. 9165, it is mandated that the
apprehending team, immediately after seizure and confiscation, must conduct a physical inventory

473
and photographed the seized item, with witnesses namely: a representative from the media, a
representative from the DOJ and any elected public official.

Yet, the inventory was conducted in Camp Vicente Lim or around 20 kilometers away from
San Pedro, Laguna where the buy-bust was conducted. Moreover, the inventory was witnessed by
only the accused, a representative by the media and an elected official. On top of this, no photograph
of the illicit drug was taken. No explanation for the irregularity was presented.

As such, these glaring non-compliance render the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items to be highly compromised, warranting the acquittal of the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NORIN SENDAD y KUNDO

G.R. No. 242025, 11 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION, (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTIRNE OF THE CASE

In cases for Illegal sale and/or Illegal possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165 it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.

In this case, there was a deviation from the required witnesses rule as the conduct of inventory
and photography were not witnessed by a representative from the DOJ. In the inventory of property
seized, it confirms that only an elected public official and a media representative was present. The
absence of the DOJ personnel during the aforesaid conduct was left unacknowledged, much less justified.
As stated, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for this witness’ absence by presenting a
justifiable reason therefor, or at the very least, by showing that genuine and sufficient efforts were
exerted by the apprehending officers to secure his presence. This was clearly absent in this case. Thus,
the unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule warrants her acquittal.

FACTS

Two criminal complaints were filed before the RTC accusing the accused-appellant Norin
Sendad y Kundo (Sendad) of the crimes of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. The
prosecution alleged that at around 1:00 p.m. of January 11, 2013 the members of San Narciso Police
successfully implemented a buy-bust operation against Sendad, during which, two plastic sheets
containing white crystalline substance were recovered from her. After the arrest, Sendad was bodily
searched and four (4) more plastic sachets wrapped in paper suspected to be shabu were taken from
her.

PO3 Relyn Gonzales then marked the 6 plastic sheets he recovered while PO1 Europa marked
the cellphone and then brought Sendad and the seized items to the police station for further
documentation and investigation. Thereat, Sendad and the seized items were turned over to the
investigator and Senior Police Officer 1 John Bacea who conducted the inventory and photography of
the same in the presence of Sendad, a barangay kagawad and a media representative. No DOJ
personnel was present.

474
 Afterwards, the seized items were returned to PO3 Gonzales who kept the same on his person
until the next day when he turned it over to the crime laboratory where, after examination, the
contents thereof yielded positive for shabu, a dangerous drug.

In her defense, Sendad denied the charges and claimed that she was inside Kimsan Plaza to
buy some household supplies when two persons followed her and told her not to resist and shout
and to go with them. She did not know these men and when she was brought to the police station and
was frisked, money was taken from her together with her cell phone and she was also made to sign a
document and was then detained and locked up in a cell. She later found out that she was being
arrested for shabu, which she denied. The guards of the Kimsan Plaza corroborated the story in
another light and said that they knew of no police apprehension or commotion that had occurred on
that day. Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) found Sendad guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, this appeal seeking that Sendad’s conviction be overturned

ISSUE

Did the RTC and CA correctly pronounce Sendad’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING

NO. In cases for Illegal sale and/or Illegal possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165 it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.

To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law
requires inter alia that the marking, physical inventory and photography of the seized items be
conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same. In this regard, case law recognizes
that “marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station
or office of the apprehending team.” Hence, the failure to immediately mark the confiscated items at
the place of arrest neither renders them inadmissible in evidence nor impairs the integrity of the
seized drugs, as the conduct of marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team is sufficient compliance with the rules on chain of custody.

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well
as certain required witnesses namely (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165, a representative from
the media AND DOJ, any elected public official or (b) if after amendment of RA 9165, an elected public
official and a representative of the National Prosecution service or the media. The law requires the
presence of these witnesses primarily to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove
any suspicion of switching, planting or contamination of evidence.

As a general rule, the compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as
the same has been regarded “not merely as a procedural technicality but a matter of substantive law”.

475
This is because the law has been crafted by congress as safety precautions to address potential police
abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment. Nonetheless, strict
compliance with chain of custody procedure may not always be possible. As such, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items void or invalid provided that the prosecution proves that (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. The foregoing is based on the saving clause of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs act.

In this case, there was a deviation from the required witnesses rule as the conduct of
inventory and photography were not witnessed by a representative from the DOJ. In the inventory of
property seized, it confirms that only an elected public official and a media representative was
present. The absence of the DOJ personnel during the aforesaid conduct was left unacknowledged,
much less justified. As stated, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for this witness’
absence by presenting a justifiable reason therefor, or at the very least, by showing that genuine and
sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure his presence. This was clearly
absent in this case. Thus, the unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule warrants her
acquittal.

MELANIE GREFALDO y DE LEON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. NO. 246362, 11 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

With regard to the need to establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty,
strict compliance with the chain of custody procedure is essential. However, failure of the apprehending
team to comply with this rule would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void
and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that there is a justifiable ground for
noncompliance and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
In this case, while there was a deviation from the witness requirement, justification provided for
the absence of the respective representatives from the DOJ and the media was simply accounted to "lack
of material time”.

FACTS
An Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner Melanie Grefado y De Leon (De
Leon) for the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs pursuant to Section 11, Article II of RA
9165.
The prosecution alleged that members of the Antipolo City Police went to La Colina
Subdivision in Barangay Mambugan, Antipolo City to investigate reports of illegal gambling activities
in the area where De Leon was seen acting suspiciously thereby prompting the officers to approach
her. Thereafter, two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance fell from her right pocket.
Suspecting that the sachets contained illicit drugs, the officers introduced themselves as police and
arrested her. Subsequently, the officers seized and marked the sachets and brought De Leon to the
police station in San Jose, Antipolo City, where they photographed and inventoried the seized items

476
without witnesses and forwarded the same to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory. After
examination from the crime laboratory, the contents were determined to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
De Leon denied the charges against her claiming that she was on board her motorcycle
heading to her friend's house in La Colina Subdivision when several male individuals abruptly
surrounded her outside the subdivision and forced her to board one of their motorcycles to the
Antipolo City Police Station. Thereat, she was detained and had only learned of the drug-related
charge against her during inquest proceedings.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found De Leon guilty beyond reasonable doubt giving
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and finding that the elements of the alleged
crime had been sufficiently proven. The trial court found that De Leon's defenses of denial and frame-
up were not substantiated and thus was not given merit.
Upon appeal, De Leon argued that the trial court erred in relying on the dubious testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the failure of the police officers to comply with the
witness requirement under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. However, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the ruling of the trial court as it found petitioner's defense refutable for lack of evidence and
further ruled that the police officers' non-compliance with the witness requirement under RA 9165
was admissible due to the time constraints of the situation and because the integrity and evidentiary
value of the illegal drugs remained intact thereat.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming the conviction of the De Leon in light of the police officers' non-
compliance with the witness requirement under RA 9165?
HELD
YES. Pursuant to RA 9165 governing cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, the Court held that the identity of the dangerous drug must be established with
moral certainty due to the fact that the dangerous drug itself is an integral part of the corpus delicti
of the crime and failure to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and thus warrants an acquittal.
The Court held that accounting for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the
drugs are seized to their presentation in court as evidence is essential to establish the identity of the
dangerous drug with moral certainty. Pursuant to the chain of custody procedure, the law requires
that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately
after seizure and confiscation or as case law provides, marking upon arrival at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team.
Furthermore, the law requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or
counsel, as well as certain required witnesses. In the case at bar, the required witnesses include a
representative from the media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official.
The rationale behind this witness requirement is to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody
and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
As a general rule, the strict compliance with the chain of custody procedure is necessitated
as the same has been regarded as a matter of substantive law not merely as a procedural technicality.

477
However, failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with this rule would not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that there is a justifiable ground for noncompliance and that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
In this case, while there was a deviation from the witness requirement, justification provided
for the absence of the respective representatives from the DOJ and the media was simply accounted
to "lack of material time”.
The Court finds this justification inadmissible citing People v. Lim where it held that the
absence of the required witnesses must be justified based on acceptable reasons such as the
impossibility of their attendance on account of the remoteness of the place of arrest; on account of
threats to their safety by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for
and in his/her behalf; the involvement of elected official in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ and media representatives and an
elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code proved
futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary
detention or; time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of
confidential assets, preventing the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required
witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
Applying this in the present case, the Court does not find that the police officers exerted
genuine and sufficient efforts to comply with the witness requirement as while the officers
discovered petitioner's possession of illegal drugs spontaneously and without prior anticipation, they
failed to provide any plausible explanation as to why the constraints of time impaired their ability to
secure the proper witnesses within the period allotted under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
As such, there is reasonable doubt as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal
drugs remained intact and thus the Court ordered the acquittal of De Leon.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NORMAN ANGELES Y MIRANDA

G.R. No. 224223, 20 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To ensure establishment of the chain of custody, RA 10640 amending RA 9165 state: The
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, conduct physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized or
his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: […]
Here, the prosecution utterly failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense charged. The law
enforcers ignored the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. They violated the chain
of custody by failing to comply with the witness requirement under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Records
reveal that only a media representative witnessed the alleged inventory of the seized shabu. Likewise, it
is apparent that not a single photograph of the seized sachet of 0.05 gram shabu was presented.

FACTS

478
 Norman Angeles y Miranda was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 for willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly selling, delivering and giving away to PO1 Raul Paran 0.05 gram of shabu
during a buy-bust operation. Miranda pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, citing that no buy-
bust operation took place and that he was illegally charged.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Miranda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the illegal
sale, ruling that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not suffer any discrepancy; thus,
they should be given full weight and credit. It further found that all the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs were proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, and that the chain of
custody over the seized sachet with shabu was properly established.

Miranda appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the chain of custody was broken
from the beginning when the prosecution failed to present the Confidential Informant (CI) who
handed the sachet of shabu to PO1 Paran for marking purposes. Thus, the police officers failed to
comply with the requirements under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and to provide an
explanation for noncompliance thereto.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) pointed out that the chain of custody was never
broken, asserting that it is common knowledge and practice that law enforcement agencies do not
allow their CI to be presented in court since it will expose their cover and identities; thus, the agency
will lose their assets. OSG highlighted that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were more
than sufficient to prove that an illegal sale of shabu took place.

The CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, upholding the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses’ testimonies that established the chain of custody of the subject seized sachet of shabu –
from its confiscation from the appellant until it was forwarded to the crime laboratory. Also, it ruled
that the operation was not an instigation, and that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto during
a valid entrapment operation. Aggrieved, Miranda appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Were the integrity and evidentiary value of the sachet containing shabu duly preserved?

RULING

NO. To successfully prosecute a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The
delivery of the illicit drugs to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by the seller
successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.

In cases involving dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti;
thus, its identity and integrity must be shown by the State to have been preserved. Consequently, the
prosecution has to account for all the links in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug from the
moment of seizure from the accused until it is presented in court as proof of corpus delicti. Hence, the

479
necessity of observing the chain of custody requirement under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). These specific procedural requirements must be
followed by the law enforcers and the prosecution must adduce evidence that has to be observed in
proving the elements of the defined offense. The intention of the law is to prevent abuse by the law
enforcers who have all the power and control during an operation.

To ensure establishment of the chain of custody, Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165 specifies
that: The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof. This is complemented with Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 and R.A. No. 10640 amending R.A. No. 9165. From the foregoing rules, it is
crystal clear that as part of the chain of custody, the law requires that the marking, physical inventory,
and photography of the confiscated drugs must be conducted immediately after seizure, although
jurisprudence recognize that “marking upon immediate confiscation contemplated even marking at
the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.”

Here, the prosecution utterly failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense charged. The law
enforcers ignored the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. They violated the
chain of custody by failing to comply with the witness requirement under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
Records reveal that only a media representative witnessed the alleged inventory of the seized shabu.
Likewise, it is apparent that not a single photograph of the seized sachet of 0.05 gram shabu was
presented. The records are bereft of any slight indication that photographs of the sachet of shabu
were duly taken during inventory. It can also be noted that PO1 Paran and PO1 Bilog did not even
state in their Sinumpaang Salaysay that they conducted an inventory of the seized item. PO1 Paran’s
statements in the Sinumpaang Salaysay being inconsistent with his testimonies in open court that he
himself conducted the inventory of the 0.05 gram of shabu in the presence of the media
representative.

By failing to follow even the simplest witness requirement under Section 21 and the
questionable inventory of the seized item, the police officers cannot be presumed to have regularly
exercised their duties during the buy-bust operation. Although it is well-settled that non-compliance
may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and
sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses, records disclose that no plausible
explanations as forwarded by the prosecution as to why no representative from the National
Prosecution Service nor an elected public official was not present during the inventory and
photography of the confiscated shabu.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NASSER LUMINDA y EDTO

G.R. No.229661, 20 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs,
the prosecution must prove: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. More so, to remove any unnecessary doubt on

480
the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the
same and account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
Without the testimonies and stipulations stating the details on when and how the seized sachet
of shabu was brought from the crime laboratory to the court, and the specifics on who actually delivered
and received the same from the crime laboratory to the court, it cannot be ascertained whether the
seized item presented in evidence was the same one confiscated from appellant upon his arrest.

FACTS
Nasser Luminda y Edto (Luminda) was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II or RA
9165 or the Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.
On or about June 21, 2011 in Quezon City, an informant went to the Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special
Operations Task Group (DAID-SOTG) of the Quezon City Police District and Informed Police Chief
Inspector Richard Ang (PCI Ang) about the illegal activities in the area of Philcoa and Commonwealth
in Quezon City.
Through such information, PCI Ang formed the buy-bust team where PO2 Cabling was
designated as the buyer and PO2 Nepuscua as back-up arresting officer. The informant and PO2
Cabling proceeded in front of Jollibee, while PO2 Nepuscua went inside and posed as customer. The
informant approached Luminda, introduced PO2 Cabling, and whispered to him that PO2 Cabling was
going to buy 500 pesos worth of shabu. Luminda took out something from his pocket and handed it
to PO2 Cabling. On the other hand, PO2 Cabling, while handling to Luminda the marked money,
removed his cap, the pre-arranged signal. Immediately, the back-up police officers arrested the
appellant. Po2 Nepusca recovered from Luminda the buy-bust money. As the rain was pouring
heavily that night, the buy-bust team decided to proceed to their office and mark the evidence thereat.
At the office, the police officer marked the seized item in the presence of the investigator, PO1
Warlito P. Cagurungan and media representative, Rey Argana of Police Files Tonite. Luminda was
also present during the conduct of the inventor, but he refused to sign the document. Meanwhile,
PO2 Cabling turned over the seized item to PO1 Cagurungan and signed the Chain of Custody Form.
Po1 Cagurungan prepared the Arrest and Booking Sheet, Request for Drug Test/Dependency
Examination, Request for Laboratory Examination and Physical Examination. He also took a
photograph of appellant and the seized item. Thereafter, PO2 Cabling and PO1 Cagurungan brought
the appellant and the seized item to the crime laboratory for examination. The result of the
laboratory examination conducted by PCI Maridel Martinez, the Forensic Chemist showed that the
seized item of white crystalline substance was positive for the presence of shabu, an illegal drug.

ISSUE
Did the RTC err in admitting in evidence the allegedly seized illegal drug despite the
prosecution’s failure to establish every link in the chain of custody?

RULING

481
 YES. From the testimonies of the witness, it is readily apparent that there are several
breaches in the chain of custody.
First, the venue of the inventory was not properly complied with. Both the marking and the
inventory were conducted in Camp Karingal, without any explanation as to the distance from the
nearest police station or nearest office of the apprehending team. The only explanation given was
that the police officers were simply avoiding any unrest or disturbance in Jollibee. To the Court’s
mind, though, neither the heavy rainfall nor the possibility of commotion in the area will justify the
deviation.
Second, both PO2 Cabling and PO2 Nepusca admitted that there was neither a representative
from the DOJ nor a barangay official during the conduct of the post-operation procedures. And yet,
the prosecution was silent on why the required witnesses were unavailable.
Third, the SC finds that among the people who came into direct contact with the seized drug
item, only PO2 Cabling actually testified to identify it. The testimony of the forensic chemist PCI
Martinez was dispensed with due to lack of stipulations required for the proper and effective
dispensation of the testimony of the forensic chemist.
Here, the stipulations between the prosecution and the defense did not cover the manner the
specimen was handled before it came in the possession of PCI Martinez and after it left possession.
In fact, they only referred to the analytic results of the laboratory examination on the specimen
without mentioning how it was handled. The prosecution also failed to present the investigator PO1
Cagurungan, as well as the evidence custodian, or the person to whom the alleged seized was
delivered after the laboratory examination. The evidence custodian, in particular, could have testified
on the circumstances under which he or she received the item, what he or she did with them during
the time that the items is or her custody, or what happened during the time that the items were
transferred to the trial court. The absence of the testimony of the evidence custodian obviously
presents a break in the links in the chain of custody of the evidence.

ROMEO ASIS y BRIONES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. NO. 241602, 20 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Establishing the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, by accounting for each
link of the chain of custody, is essential to the conviction of crimes on Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs as the dangerous drug itself proves integral to the corpus delicti of the crime. Failure to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants an acquittal.
In this case, the Court held that it had become incumbent upon the prosecution to account for
the absence of a required witness by presenting a justifiable reason or by showing that genuine and
sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure his presence; however, no such
justification was presented and thus the Court concluded that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
item purportedly seized from petitioner was compromised, which consequently warrants his acquittal.

FACTS

482
 An Information charged the Romeo Asis (Asis) with the crime of Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs whereby the prosecution alleged that the operatives successfully implemented a
search warrant at the residence of Asis where a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
which was suspected to be shabu was found, warranting the arrest of the petitioner subsequent to
the search, marking, inventory and photograph of the seized item in the presence of petitioner and
Barangay Chairman Ranilo Jerez, Sr., Barangay Kagawad Salvador Alvarez, and media representative
Jonathan Magistrado of ABS-CBN Naga as witnesses. Asis and the seized item were then brought to
the PDEA Regional Office where the required documentations were processed and the seized item
was brought to the crime laboratory that examined the contents of the seized object which tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
Asis denied the charges against him, claiming that at the time prior to his arrest, he was
sleeping with his family inside their house when the operatives suddenly arrived and forcibly entered
his residence. Thereafter, he and his family were instructed to stay outside the house while their
house was searched rendering him unable to have witnessed the supposedly recovery of the plastic
sachet containing shabu.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found that the prosecution, through its presented testimonial
and documentary evidence, had established beyond reasonable doubt that Asis is guilty for the
charges against him. Furthermore, the RTC held that the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu
seized were preserved.
Asis appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court stating that the prosecution had proven
the existence of all the elements of the crime charged, and that, despite the absence of a Department
of Justice (DOJ) representative during the conduct of the search and the later inventory and
photography of the seized item, its integrity and evidentiary value were nevertheless preserved.

ISSUE
Is identity of the dangerous drug established with moral certainty?
RULING
NO. RA 9165 governs the cases on Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and provides that
establishing the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty is essential to the conviction as
the dangerous drug itself proves integral to the corpus delicti of the crime. In so doing, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody, which compliance is
regarded not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law. By virtue of the
chain of custody procedure, the law requires that the marking, physical inventory, and photography
of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same or at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. Furthermore, the law requires that the said
inventory and photography must be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom
the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, in this
case, a representative from the media AND the DOJ, and any elected public official. The rationale
behind requiring witnesses is to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any
doubt of potential switching, planting, or contamination of evidence
However, the law provide that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
chain of custody procedure would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as
void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that there is a justifiable ground

483
for noncompliance and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. Furthermore, in regard to the requirement of witnesses, non-compliance may be
permitted if the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient
efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses.
In view of the foregoing requirements, the Court held that failure to prove the integrity of the
corpus delicti, through addressing lapses in the requirements in the procedure, renders the evidence
for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence,
warrants an acquittal. Applying this in this case, the Certificate of Inventory shows that the inventory
of the seized items was not done in the presence of a DOJ representative, as signatures of the same
were lacking. Testimonies of the PDEA operatives who were members of the team that implemented
the search warrant confirmed the absence of the DOJ representative.
The Court held that it had become incumbent upon the prosecution to account for the absence
of a required witness by presenting a justifiable reason or by showing that genuine and sufficient
efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure his presence; however, no such
justification was presented and thus the Court concluded that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the item purportedly seized from petitioner was compromised, which consequently warrants his
acquittal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSEPH STA. CRUZ y ILUSORIO

G.R. NO. 244256, 25 November 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Reyes, J. Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The miniscule amount of the confiscated illegal drug involved calls for the rigid compliance with the
rule is expected from the apprehending officers. Buy-bust teams should be meticulous in compliance
with the chain of custody to preserve the integrity of the seized shabu most especially where the weight
of the seized item is a miniscule amount that can be easily planted and tampered with. Without the
insulating presence of the three witnessed during the seizure, marking and physical inventory of the
sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, planting or contaminating of the evidence arise as to negate the
integrity and credibility of the seized drugs that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti.
In this case, the chain of custody was not followed. The inventory was not conducted immediately
after seizure, and such inventory was not done in the presence of the witnesses required. There was no
reason given why the inventory had to be done at the police station, as well as there was no justifiable
grounds alleged as to why the presence of the witness cannot be secured.

FACTS
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Joseph Sta. Cruz y Ilusorio (Sta. Cruz) with
illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Shabu), as well as the illegal sale of such
shabu.
The police investigators received a confidential tip that a certain Sta. Cruz was engaged in
illegal drug trade. Acting on this information, a buy-bust team was formed. Allegedly, Sta. Cruz was
in possession of 0.03 grams of white crystalline substance, which he sold to a poseur-buyer in the

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person of Police Officer Bagain. Sta. Cruz was arrested and the shabu gathered from him was
inventoried at the police station. This was done in the presence of a media representative only.
During arraignment, Sta. Cruz pleaded not guilty. He countered that during the alleged time
he supposedly sold shabu to PO Bagain, he was actually filling the soil by the entry way of his mother’s
residence. When he took a break, he went outside and watched people playing Mahjong. During this
time, he saw several police officer passing by the area, who later on returned and held his arms and
tried to bring him with them. He initially resisted, but on the fear of being hurt, he acceded.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), however, found Sta. Cruz guilty. The Court is under the
opinion that the mere possession of illegal drugs is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, holding that the prosecution was able to
demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs were not compromised.
Aggrieved, Sta. Cruz appealed, hence this petition.
ISSUE
Did the buy-bust team fail to follow the procedures mandated by the rule in chain of custody
for drug cases?
RULING
YES. For drug cases, it is clear that the items seized must be inventoried and photographed
immediately after seizure or confiscation. Furthermore, this inventory and photography must be
done in the presence of the accused or his representative/counsel, an elected public official, a
representative from the media, and a representative from the Department of Justice. From the
information alone, it was clear that the inventory was committed not immediately after seizure, but
at the police station. Moreover, this was done without the presence of the accused, the representative
from the DOJ nor a public official.
Chain of custody is a procedural mechanism that ensures the identity and integrity of the
corpus delicti are clear and free from any unnecessary doubt or uncertainty. Should the required
immediate inventory of the seized item is not possible, this fact must be alleged and proved in the
presence of the three required witnesses to the physical inventory. Further, should it prove to be
difficult to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses, the earnest effort to secure their
attendance must also be proven. In this case, both instances were not alleged nor proved. There was
no reason given why the inventory had to be done at the police station, as well as there was no
justifiable grounds alleged as to why the presence of the witness cannot be secure.
The miniscule amount of the confiscated illegal drug involved calls for the rigid compliance
with the rule is expected from the apprehending officers. Buy-bust teams should be meticulous in
compliance with the chain of custody to preserve the integrity of the seized shabu most especially
where the weight of the seized item is a miniscule amount that can be easily planted and tampered
with. Without the insulating presence of the three witness during the seizure, marking and physical
inventory of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, planting or contaminating of the evidence
arise as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seized drugs that were evidence herein of the
corpus delicti.

485
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. XANDRA SANTOS Y LITTAUA,
G.R. NO. 243627, 27 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The general rule is that the compliance of the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as
the same has been regarded not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law.
However, failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render
the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution proves that
there is justifiable ground for non-compliance and the integrity and evidentiary rule of the seized items
are properly preserved
Here, the non-compliance with the mandates was not justified by the arresting officers. The
Court is impelled to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized
from Xandra, which constitute the corpus delicti of the crimes charged, have been compromised. Hence,
her acquittal is in order.

FACTS
Two Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) charging Xandra Santos Y
Littaua (Xandra) for violation of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act, for illegal possession and illegal sale of drugs.
The prosecution alleges that an information was received from a confidential informant that
the operatives from the Station Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Group of Valenzuela Police
conducted a buy-bust operation against Xandra Santos Y Littaua (Xandra). From the buy-bust
operation, 1 plastic sachet containing 0.20 grams of white crystalline substance was seized and after
the arrest when Xandra was searched, another plastic sachet containing 0.10 grams of white
crystalline substance was found in her possession.
Thereafter, Xandra was brought to the police station where the seized substances were
marked, inventoried and photographed in her presence and a certain Kagawad Dawat. The seized
items were then brought to the Philippine National Police wherein such items were tested and
confirmed to be shabu. The RTC held that the Xandra was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged.
On appeal, Xandra argued that there was non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody
such that the markings of the drugs were not made immediately after the place of arrest and there
was no representative from the media or the National Prosecution Service (NPS) during the
inventory. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of Xandra. It held that the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses pertained to insignificant matters not
relating to the actual conduct of the buy-bust operation, and that there was substantial compliance
with the chain of custody rule considering that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
drugs were properly preserved.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Did the police officers comply with the rule on chain of custody?

486
RULING
NO. In cases for illegal sale and/or illegal possession of dangerous drugs it is essential that
the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the state insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence warrants an acquittal.
The general rule is that the compliance of the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined
as the same has been regarded not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive
law. However, failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
proves that there is justifiable ground for non-compliance and the integrity and evidentiary rule of
the seized items are properly preserved.
In this case, the arresting officers’ acts of performing the marking, inventory and photography
of the seized items not at the place of arrest but at the police station were justified as a crowd was
already forming at the place of arrest. This notwithstanding, the Court observes that there was still a
deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of inventory was not witnessed by the NPS
or the media. The sheer statement of the police officer that representatives from the Department of
Justice and the media had been contacted but were simply unavailable, without more cannot be
deemed reasonable enough to justify a deviation from the mandatory directives of the law. Mere
claims of unavailability, absent a showing that actual and serious attempts were employed to contact
the required witnesses are unacceptable as they fail to show that genuine and sufficient efforts were
exerted by police officers. The Court is impelled to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the items purportedly seized from Xandra, which constitute the corpus delicti of the crimes
charged, have been compromised; hence, her acquittal is perforce in order. Hence, an acquittal is in
order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONALD JAIME DE MOTOR y DANTES and LYNIEL TORINO y
RAMOS
G.R. No. 245486, 27 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as
certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a
representative from the media AND the DOJ, and any elected public official; or (b) if after the
amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service OR the media.

In this case, there was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of the inventory
and photography were not witnessed by a representative from the DOJ. In view of such unjustified
deviation from the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from accused-appellant were compromised, which
consequently warrants his acquittal.

487
FACTS

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed before the RTC accusing accused-
appellant, among others, with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
The prosecution alleged conducted a buy-bust operation against Ronald Jaime De Motor y Dantes (De
Motor) during which five (5) sachets containing dried marijuana leaves were recovered from him.
Upon frisking accused-appellant, police officers found four (4) more sachets containing dried
marijuana leaves inside one of his pockets. The officers then marked a total of nine (9) sachets and
thereafter brought De Motor to their headquarters, where they inventoried and photographed the
seized items in the presence of De Motor himself, as well as Pablo V. Levita (Levita), the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Mataas na Lupa, and Michael Dominic Flores (Flores), a member of radio station
88.7. The seized items were then brought to the Philippine National Police-Batangas Provincial Crime
Laboratory, where, after examination, tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug. Two (2)
Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) accusing De Motor with the crimes of
Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

The RTC found De Motor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE

Was De Motor rightly convicted of the crime charged?

RULING

NO. In view of unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore
constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from
accused-appellant were compromised, which consequently warrants his acquittal.
In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove
the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants an acquittal.

To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law
requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be
conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same.

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well

488
as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a
representative from the media AND the DOJ, and any elected public official; or (b) if after the
amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service OR the media. The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to
ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence.

In this case, there was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of the
inventory and photography were not witnessed by a representative from the DOJ. This may be easily
gleaned from the Inventory of Confiscated Drugs/Seized 43 which only confirms the presence of an
elected public official, i.e., Levita, and a representative from the media, i.e., Flores.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGELIO DIVINAGRACIA, JR. y DORNILA, a.k.a. “Ensol”
and ROSWORTH SY y BERSABAL, a.k.a. “Roro"
G.R. No. 240230, 28 November 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Reyes, J. Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Non-compliance with the mandatory procedure under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and
its IRR does not per se render the confiscated drugs inadmissible, as the desire for a perfect and unbroken
chain of custody rarely occurs, but only triggers the operation of the saving clause enshrined in the IRR
of R.A. No. 9165.

In this case, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort
to secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 must be adduced.
Unfortunately, the prosecution did not do so.

FACTS

Two (2) Informations were filed against Rogelio Divinagaricoa, Jr. alias Ensol and Rosworth
Sy alias Roro (accused-appellants) which charged them with violation of Section 5, Article II, of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs; and against Roro for violation of Section 12, Article II, of Republic Act
No. 9165, for the possession of a drug paraphernalia.

According to the prosecution, a confidential information was given to the Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operation Task Group of Parañaque City that a certain alias Ensol (later on identified
as Divinigarcia) was selling marijuana. The police officers conducted a buy-bust operation which
yield to the arrest of the accused-appellants. From them, the police officers were able to seize a glass
pipe which contained suspected marijuana. The glass pipe was marked with the initials of one of the
police offices. The Receipt/Inventory was likewise signed by the said officer together with a certain
Kagawad Villar, a barangay Kagawad. The police officers also took pictures of the proceedings and
the seized items. Upon examination of the seized items, they resulted positive for the presence of
marijuana, a dangerous drug.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision finding the accused-appellants guilty. The Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the RTC.

489
ISSUE

Are the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165?

RULING:

NO. The law commands that the seized drugs must be inventoried and photographed
immediately after seizure and that the same must be conducted in the presence of the accused or his
representative or counsel, and three other witnesses, namely: (a) a representative from the media;
(b) a representative of the DOJ; and (c) an elected public official.

Compliance with the requirements forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or

tampering of evidence in any manner. Non-compliance, on the other hand, is tantamount to failure in
establishing the identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, thus, engendering the acquittal of an accused." Such stringent requirement was
placed as a safety precaution against potential abuses by law enforcement agents who might fail to
appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those suspected to be involved in the sale, use or
possession of illegal drugs.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the police officers failed to comply with the three-
witness rule under Section 21 of RA 9165. The prosecution never hid this fact nor made any attempt
to deny that only Kagawad Villar witnessed the inventory of the confiscated items. However, the
prosecution takes exception to the three-witness rule on the ground that it had been able to
sufficiently prove the integrity of the drugs seized from the accused-appellants as well as the
unbroken chain of custody of the same.

To be sure, non-compliance with the mandatory procedure under Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 and its IRR does not per se render the confiscated drugs inadmissible, as the desire for a
perfect and unbroken chain of custody rarely occurs, but only triggers the operation of the saving
clause enshrined in the IRR of R.A. No. 9165.

However, for the above saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved. Stated otherwise, before a deviation from the mandatory procedural requirements under
Section 21 may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) justifiable grounds must be
shown to exist warranting a departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the apprehending
team must prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items had been properly
preserved. However, in order for such saving mechanism to apply, the prosecution must first
recognize the lapse or lapses in the prescribed procedures and then explain the lapse or lapses. Also,
the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they exist

In this case, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient
effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 must be adduced.
Unfortunately, the prosecution did not do so. As a matter of fact, it did not offer any explanation why
representative from the media and DOJ were not present at the place and time of the seizure, as well

490
as in the inventory and photographing of the same. Considering that the first prong of the saving
clause — presence of justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, was not complied with, any and all
evidence tending to establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs become immaterial. Even the
identification of the seized evidence in court during the trial became ambiguous and unreliable,
rendering the proof of the links in the chain of custody of the corpus delicti unworthy of belief.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GIOVANNI DE LUMEN y LADLAGARAN

G.R. No. 240749, 11 December 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Principally, the chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must
be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence. To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make
evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the
evidence is what it claims it to be.

In Giovanni’s case, there was no showing that a proper inventory and taking of pictures of the
drug paraphernalia were undertaken by the police operatives. PO1 Estrada simply testified that they
confiscated the drug paraphernalia from him and Arcangel and then brought them to the Scene of the
Crime Operatives for laboratory test.

Yet, there is no evidence as to how the illegal articles were stored or preserved, how they were
delivered to the laboratory, and who actually received them. Worse, the prosecution failed to prove how
such items reached the court. The Court is thus left with absolutely no guarantee of the integrity of the
sachets containing illegal drugs other than the self-serving assurances of the police operatives.

FACTS

On September 11, 2009, PO2 Victor Tampis (PO2 Tampis) conducted a buy-bust operation in
the house of Maura Aranzaso (Maura) following the numerous complaints they received about the
illegal activities of Maura. In preparation, PO2 Tampis, the designated poseur-buyer, placed his
initials "VOT" on the three pieces of P100-bill as buy-bust money. PO2 Lord Allan Poniente (PO2
Poniente), PO1 Amor Estrada (PO1 Estrada), and SPO3 Jose Mendoza Eusebio (SPO3 Eusebio), among
others, served as the back-up officers.

At the entrance of Maura's house, the confidential informant introduced PO2 Tampis to
Maura as a "scorer" of shabu. PO2 Tampis bought one plastic sachet of suspected shabu from Maura
and handed the marked money to her.

The sale having been consummated, PO2 Tampis introduced himself as a police officer,
arrested Maura, and retrieved the marked money from the latter. When a commotion ensued, PO2
Poniente and PO1 Estrada immediately rushed to the scene where they saw Giovanni de Lumen
(Giovanni) and Arcangel Lapiz (Arcangel) sniffing shabu inside Maura’s residence.

They arrested them and recovered the following drug paraphernalia: one strip of aluminum
foil with traces of white crystalline substance; two disposable lighters; four pieces of rolled aluminum

491
foil with traces of white crystalline substance; and three transparent plastic sachets with traces of
white crystalline substance.

After the conduct of the inventory, the seized items were submitted to the crime laboratory
for examination. The buy-bust item confiscated from Maura, as well as the drug paraphernalia
recovered in the possession of the Giovanni and Arcangel, tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Maura and Giovanni guilty as charged.

The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the conviction of the Giovanni, but acquitted Maura on the
ground of reasonable doubt.

ISSUE

Is the guilt of Giovanni proven beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING

NO. Central to this issue is the determination of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence.

Principally, the chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must
be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence. To establish a chain of custody sufficient to
make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude
that the evidence is what it claims it to be.

Simply put, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could
reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims it to be.

Here, what is involved are disposable and fungible objects such as aluminum foil, lighters,
and aluminum tooters which are highly susceptible to substitution and alteration. Given the nature
of these items, stricter compliance with the rule on the chain of custody is expected. Unfortunately,
the present case failed to pass this scrutiny.

Under Section 21 of RA 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, the apprehending team shall, after seizure and confiscation, immediately conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, (a) a representative from the media
and (b) the DOJ, and (c) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
same, and the seized items must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from
confiscation for examination.

To further ensure the integrity of the seized items, the prosecution must account for the
following links: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the

492
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

The extant case is tainted with grave violations of Section 21.

First, the records show that not all of the witnesses required under Section 21(1) were
present during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized drug and drug paraphernalia.
Noticeably, the only person who arrived and witnessed the "preparation of the inventory" and signed
the Receipt of the Property Seized was the Barangay Captain. Evidently, the DOJ representative and
the media representative were not around.

Second, none of the witnesses testified to whom the seized items were turned over at the
police station. The prosecution only averred that the police operatives brought all the accused and
the confiscated items to the police station in General Trias for inquest and preparation of the
necessary documents. It was not clear, however, whether the illicit drugs and paraphernalia were
turned over to the investigating officer at all, if there were any.

Third, the prosecution likewise failed to present P02 Poniente, the police officer who
supposedly delivered the Request for Laboratory Examination and the items to the laboratory. He
could have narrated how he handled the items in his custody prior to turning them over to the crime
laboratory. The absence of testimony or stipulation as to how P02 Poniente handled the illegal drugs
and paraphernalia obviously resulted in a gap in the chain of custody.

Fourth, no testimonial or documentary evidence was given whatsoever as to how the items
were kept while in the custody of the forensic chemist until it was transferred to the court. As in the
other links, it was not shown how the forensic chemist handled and stored the seized items before
the same were retrieved for presentation in court. Neither was there any stipulation that the evidence
custodian preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of such items.

In sum, the events of September 11, 2009 should be taken and appreciated as a whole even
as they gave rise to two criminal cases against Giovanni and his co-accused Maura.

The reasons for acquitting Maura for selling drugs like the prosecution's complete failure to
introduce the drugs she allegedly sold to P02 Tampis and the police operative's own admission that
he failed to ask Maura to sign the inventory, seriously cast doubt, not only to her own guilt, but more
so on the soundness and reliability of the measures taken or the procedures followed by the buy-bust
team.

These circumstances cast a heavy shadow on the integrity of the operation and the police
operatives themselves.

In Giovanni’s case, there was no showing that a proper inventory and taking of pictures of the
drug paraphernalia were undertaken by the police operatives. PO1 Estrada simply testified that they
confiscated the drug paraphernalia from him and Arcangel and then brought them to the Scene of the
Crime Operatives for laboratory test.

493
 Yet, there is no evidence as to how the illegal articles were stored or preserved, how they
were delivered to the laboratory, and who actually received them. Worse, the prosecution failed to
prove how such items reached the court.

The Court is thus left with absolutely no guarantee of the integrity of the sachets containing
illegal drugs other than the self-serving assurances of the police operatives.

This is precisely the situation that the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act seeks to prevent.
The very process that Section 21 requires is plain, standardized, and even run-of-the-mill, guarantee
that the integrity of the seized drugs and/or drug paraphernalia is preserved. All that law enforcers
have to do is follow the law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOMAR GAON y HALOG

G.R. No. 241789, 05 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The law requires that immediately after seizure and confiscation, the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items must be conducted in the presence of the accused or his representatives.
An evident lapse is the failure for the police officers to take the signature of Jomar or his
representative in the Certificate of Inventory. In addition, there were only two witnesses, that is, a media
representative and a barangay kagawad, who were present in the conduct of the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items.

FACTS

After a buy-bust operation, Jomar Gaon (Jomar) was charged with the crimes if illegal sale
and possession of dangerous drugs, to which he pleads not guilty to both.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Jomar, ruling that the prosecution proved the
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
Jomar brought up the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming that the prosecution failed
to sufficiently establish the identity of the corpus delicti as there were inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the police officers as to the handling of the seized items after confiscation.
However, the OSG opined that the seized items do not need be placed in a container as the
seized drugs were already contained in heat-sealed sachets. Also, the law does not require that the
certificate of inventory must indicate the markings and weight of the seized items.
The CA upheld the ruling of the RTC, hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Was Jomar’s guilt established beyond reasonable doubt?

494
RULING

NO. In the charges of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, the paramount
consideration is the identity and integrity of the dangerous drug, which is the corpus delicti of the
offense. It is imperative, therefore, to utilize a mode of authenticating evidence. The chain of custody
requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are
removed.

To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous

whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the times it came into possession of the police officers
until it was rested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in
evidence.

Also, the law requires that immediately after seizure and confiscation, the physical inventory
and photograph of the seized items must be conducted in the presence of the accused or his
representatives. An evident lapse is the failure for the police officers to take the signature of Jomar
or his representative in the Certificate of Inventory. In addition, there were only two witnesses, that
is, a media representative and a barangay kagawad, who were present in the conduct of the physical
inventory and photograph of the seized items. Also, the presence of the three witnesses must be
secured not only during the inventory, but also more importantly at the time of the warrantless
arrest. This criterion for conviction was not met in this case, leaving the Court with no other option
but to pronounce an acquittal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDFINLAND PONTERO y HECHANOVA AND

EDILBERTO PONTERO y HECHANOVA
G.R. No. 243791, 05 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires that the apprehending team shall physically inventory and
photograph the seized drugs not only in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel, but
also of three additional witnesses, namely: a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
public official.
In this case, the Court finds that the arresting officer failed to comply with certain provisions of
R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules without any justifiable reasons, this, putting into question the
integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs seized from Edfinland and Edilberto. The
presence of representative from the media and the DOJ was not obtained despite the fact that a buy-bust
operation is supposedly pre-planned.

FACTS

After a buy-bust operation, Edilberto Pontero y Hechanova (Edilberto) was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and Paraphernalia, while his

495
brother, Edfinland Pontero y Hechanova (Edfinland) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt with
Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
They appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), stating that there was direct contravention of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 because of the following: (1) the confiscated items were marked,
inventoried and photographed only at the barangay hall and not immediately after its seizure at the
place of the arrest; (2) the markings of the confiscated items were confusing and it would be
impossible to determine which of the items seized belong to whom as their initials were the same;
and, (3) the chain of custody was not sufficiently established because the police officer who received
the seized items was not presented as a witness.
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) ruling, stating the
following: (1) the fact that the items were marked at the barangay hall was insignificant; (2) the police
officer who marked the evidence declared that the markings did not prevent him from properly
identifying the evidence and attributing them to the corresponding appellant; and, (3) the non-
presentation of the police officer who received the seized items as a witness was not a crucial point
against the prosecution. Hence, the Edilberto and Edfinland filed this petition.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming Edfinland and Edilberto’ conviction?

RULING
YES. In order to be convicted for the Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, and Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, it is essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms
an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.
The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs so as to
obviate any unnecessary doubts on their identity on account of switching, planting or contamination
of the evidence.
In People v. Kamad, the Court recognized the following links that must be established in the
chain of custody:
(1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer;
(2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer;
(3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and
(4) the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist
to the court.
Furthermore, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires that the apprehending team shall
physically inventory and photograph the seized drugs not only in the presence of the accused or his

496
representative or counsel, but also of three additional witnesses, namely: a representative from the
media and the DOJ, and any elected public official.
In this case, the Court finds that the arresting officer failed to comply with certain provisions
of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules without any justifiable reasons, this, putting into question
the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs seized from Edfinland and Edilberto. The
presence of representative from the media and the DOJ was not obtained despite the fact that a buy-
bust operation is supposedly pre-planned.
Indeed, the chain of custody here had been repeatedly breached. The Court is constrained to
conclude that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the items seized have been compromised for
failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds, which would excuse Edfinland and
Edilberto’s transgression. Thus, Edfinland and Edilberto must be acquitted of the charges against
them.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SAMUEL PILOT y MAPALO

G.R. No. 238398, 10 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The prosecution witness Barangay Kagawad Mario Cascayan’s testimony states that he did not
witness the recovery of the marked P500 bill from the person of Mapalo and that he did not personally
witness when the police officers were conducting an inventory of the alleged seized items; the same fails
to comply with the required duties of an elected official as provided in R.A. No. 9165.
As a result of the police officers’ non-compliance with Section 21, R.A. No. 9165, the Court finds
it necessary to acquit Mapalo for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

FACTS

On March 16, 2015, PO1 Rabanal as the designated poseur-buyer conducted a buy-bust
operation against Samuel Pilot Mapalo, in which the former gave the latter a P500 bill in exchange
for a small plastic bag containing 0.0406 gram of shabu before signaling to the police officers on
stand-by and arrest.
An Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which found Mapalo to be
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
Aggrieved, Mapalo elevated the case with the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming that (1) there
was no representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or media representative present to
witness the inventory, and (2) that the prosecution witness Barangay Kagawad Mario Cascayan’s
own testimony admits that the latter did not personally witness the inventory of the seize items.

ISSUE

Did the RTC and the CA gravely err in finding Mapalo guilty of the crime charged despite the

497
police officers’ failure to physically inventory and photograph the drugs in the presence of the NPS
or media representative, and Barangay Kagawad Mario Cascayan, in accordance with Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations?

RULING

YES. The prosecution failed to prove Mapalo’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

First, the police officers failed to comply with the requirements of the chain of custody rule
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. In order to have the proper disposition of the confiscated, sized,
and/or surrendered drugs, there must be; “a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory”.
Such provision was further elaborated on in R.A. No. 10640, Section 21(a), which states; “with an
elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory”.

Second, recent jurisprudence has expounded on the policy by consistently ruling that the
prosecution must at least adduce a justifiable reason for non-observance of the rules or show a
genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witness, in accordance with the rules on evidence,
which the prosecution failed to do in the case at bar.

Lastly, the prosecution witness Barangay Kagawad Mario Cascayan’s testimony states that
he did not witness the recovery of the marked P500 bill from the person of Mapalo and that he did
not personally witness when the police officers were conducting an inventory of the alleged seized
items; the same fails to comply with the required duties of an elected official as provided in R.A. No.
9165.
As a result of the police officers’ non-compliance with Section 21, R.A. No. 9165, the Court
finds it necessary to acquit Mapalo for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTHONY DE OCAMPO y FABIAN AND

ARVIN ESGUERRA y BARAGOLA
G.R. No. 245494, 05 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence. Here, the prosecution utterly failed to sufficiently establish the chain
of custody.

498
FACTS

After a buy-bust operation, Anthony and Arvin were charged in four separate Informations:
(1) Baragola for illegal possession of one pipe and one disposable lighter, a paraphernalia used in
consuming a dangerous drug; (2) Baragola for illegal possession of 2 kinds of dangerous drugs; (3)
Fabian for illegal possession of a dangerous drug; and, (4) Fabian and Bargola for conspiring and
confederating with one another to sell and deliver a dangerous drug. Both Anthony and Arvin pleaded
not guilty to the respective charges against them. Thereafter, the cases were consolidated and jointly
tried.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) acquitted Esguerra for illegal possession, convicted De
Ocampo for illegal possession and convicted both Esguerra and De Ocampo for illegal sale of
prohibited drugs.
Anthony and Arvin brought up the case to the CA, emphasizing the alleged questionable
narrative regarding the buy-bust operation and the failure of the prosecution to prove the elements
of the offenses they were convicted of. They stated that the apprehending officers failed to properly
mark the seized items and to secure them in a sealed container. Further, the inventory was only
sighed by a barangay official and a police officer, not even Anthony and Arvin’ signatures were to be
found in the inventory. However, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

Did the CA err in affirming Anthony and Arvin’ conviction for the offenses charged?

RULING:

YES. To secure the conviction of Illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
prove that:

(a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous drug;

(b) such possession was not authorized by law; and,

(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

On the other hand, to secure conviction of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution
must prove:

(a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.

Anthony and Arvin were charged as co-conspirators in the sale of a dangerous drug. In the
prosecution of drug related cases, the identity of the dangerous drug must be established with moral

499
certainty. Failure to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, warrants an
acquittal.

To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence. Here, the prosecution utterly failed to sufficiently establish the
chain of custody.

First, although the apprehending officers were justified in marking and conducting the
inventory and photograph for the seized items at the police station, they nonetheless failed to comply
with the required two witnesses rule, particularly the presence of a representative from the National
Prosecution Service or the media. Their presence is a safeguard against planting of evidence and
frame-up.

Second, there was no turnover of the seized items to the investigating officer. The
investigating officer must certainly have possession of the illegal drugs to conduct the proper
investigation and prepare the necessary documents for the developing criminal case. In this case, the
seized items remained in the custody of a police officer while the request for laboratory examination
was being prepared until their transfer to the forensic chemist. Such procedural breach necessarily
affects the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Surely, the court cannot close its eyes
to the lapses committed by the apprehending police officers.

In sum, the prosecution here utterly failed to establish the elements of either illegal
possession or sale of dangerous drugs by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANNABELLE BACULIO and FLOYD ORIAS

G.R. No. 233802, 20 November 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the physical inventory and photographing shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, be done in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official. Moreover, the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served,
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures.
Here, a representative from DOJ was not present. Moreover, there was no definite statement as
to where the marking of the seized items took place.

FACTS
A buy-bust operation was planned per instruction of PDEA Deputy Regional Director Senior
Police Officer III Benjamin S. Amacanin (SPO3 Amacanin) on the basis of a tip regarding the drug
peddling activities of Floyd Orias (Orias) and Annabelle Baculio (Baculio).

Investigating Officer I Elvis Taghoy, Jr. (IOI Taghoy) was designated as poseur-buyer, while
IOI Paul G. Avila (IOI Avila) was tasked as the arresting officer.

500
 Upon arrival at the target area, IOI Taghoy and the confidential informant sat down beside
Orias. Then, the confidential informant asked Orias if they could purchase shabu. Orias answered in
the positive and demanded P500.00 from 101 Taghoy. The latter handed the P500.00 bill to Orias,
who then handed the money to Baculio. Baculio then took out from her right pocket two heat-sealed
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu; she handed one sachet
to Orias, who in turn, gave it to IO1 Taghoy.
After examining the contents of the sachet, IO1 Taghoy executed the pre-arranged signal,
putting his hand in his pocket to make a missed call to IOI Avila through his cellphone. IOI Nestle
Carin (IOI Carin) frisked Baculio and recovered from her the marked money and a sachet of shabu.
These were turned over to IOI Avila, who then proceeded to the physical inventory and
marking of the seized items. Avila marked the sachet bought by IOI Taghoy and the sachet recovered
from Baculio. He also marked the six sachets containing residue recovered from the buy-bust
operation. Nelson Jumilla (Jumilla), a barangay kagawad, Luz Boro, a barangay tanod, and Richard de
la Cruz, a member of the media witnessed the physical inventory and marking in the presence of Orias
and Baculio in Orias' house.
Pictures were likewise taken during the operation and in the PDEA office where the team
brought the arrested persons. At the PDEA office, IOI Avila prepared the letter-request. He and IOI
Taghoy brought the arrested persons and the seized sachets with suspected shabu to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. The specimen submitted was later confirmed to be positive for shabu, a
dangerous drug.
Baculio and Orias were charged with violation of .Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 (R.A. No. 9165) otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,” as
amended.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Baculio and Orias guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
illegal sale of dangerous drug. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) sustained their conviction. Hence,
the present appeal.

ISSUE
Was the chain of custody over the seized item duly observed in accordance with Section 21,
Article II of R.A. 9165?

RULING
NO. Well-settled is the rule that to sustain a conviction for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof
that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti
or the illicit drug as evidence.
The corpus delicti of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs is
the dangerous drugs seized from the accused; thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity and
identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved. It must be established that
the subject of the sale which was acquired from the accused-appellants during the buy-bust operation
must be the exact same item presented before the court. This is where the chain of custody
requirement in drugs cases comes into play to ensure that doubts concerning the identity of the
seized drugs are removed.
Under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the physical inventory and photographing
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, be done in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or

501
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official. Moreover, the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served, or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures.
While the Court recognizes that strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 may not always, be possible under varied field conditions, and testimony about a
perfect chain is not always possible to obtain, jurisprudence specifically requires a more exacting
standard before narcotic substances are accepted as evidence.
Based on the records of the case, the provisions of Section 21 were not observed. Although
both IOI Avila and IOI Taghoy testified that there was a marking of the evidence, there was no definite
statement as to where the marking of the seized items took place. There is nothing in their Joint
Affidavit that point to the actual place of marking. The testimonies of the affesting officers, IOI Avila
and IOI Taghoy, failed to explicitly demonstrate as to what point during the arrest and the exact place
where the marking of the seized items was undertaken.
More importantly, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses disclosed that there was non-
compliance as to the presence of the mandatory witnesses to the inventory as decreed under Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165. Specifically, the prosecution witnesses testified that a barangay kagawad, a
barangay tanod, and a media representative witnessed the inventory of the seized items. However,
their testimonies and the records do not show that all the mandatory witnesses required during the
conduct of the inventory, i.e., a representative from the DOJ, were present.
With regard to the contention of the OSG that R.A. No. 9165 only requires the presence of an
elected public official, media representative, and a member of the DOJ during the inventory of the
seized items and not in the conduct of the entrapment operations the court held that said witnesses
were also required to be present during the buy-bust operation and at the time of the recovery and
confiscation of the drugs.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense of sale of illegal drug
due to the numerous gaps in the chain of custody. Thus, the prosecution was not able to overcome
the presumption of innocence of Baculio and Orias. Consequently, they must perforce be acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLOS MABALO y ANGELES

G.R. No. 233872, 05 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Contrary to the assessment of the RTC and CA, the lapses committed by the buy-bust team did
not constitute “substantial compliance” of the law. These were evident violations of the procedure which
was designed precisely to safeguard against abuses.
Here, there was no explanation or excuse proffered by the prosecution for the deviation from the
mandatory procedure. This evident failure to follow the prescribed procedure under Section 21 casts
serious doubts on the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. Clearly, the reliance of the
RTC and CA on the presumption of regularity of official duty, at the expense of the constitutionally-
protected right of the accused to be presumed innocent, is grossly misplaced.

FACTS

502
 PO1 Edward Pineda received a confidential information regarding the drug pushing activities
of a certain alias “Carlos”. A buy-bust operation was planned by police officers. They were able to
consummate the transaction but acused-appellant Carlos eluded arrest and managed to escape, along
with the P500 marked money.
The police officers returned to their office, with the confiscated plastic sachet containing the
suspected shabu. A Confiscation Receipt was thereafter executed in the presence of the elected
Barangay Captain Louie Cunanan, PO1 Pineda and PO2 Nunag.
The item was brought by PO1 Pineda to the crime laboratory. There, it was revealed that the
substance was positive for methlamphetamine hydrochloride.
In his defense, the accused claimed that he was just coming from work when certain
individuals in civilian clothes invited him to the police station. He was informed that he has a pending
warrant of arrest but no warrant was shown to him.
Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals (CA) ruled guilty.

ISSUE
Is Carlos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged?

RULING
NO. It is of prime importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt and that it must be proven with exactitude that the substance bought during the
buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the court. The rationale
for this requirement is the great possibility of abuse in drug cases.
The phrase “immediately after seizure and confiscation” means that the three required
witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension - a requirement that can
easily be complied with by buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a
planned activity.
Simply put, the buy-bust team has enough time and opportunity to bring with them said
witnesses. The reason for requiring the three witnesses at the time of apprehension is simple: it is at
the time of arrest - or at the time of the drugs’ “seizure and confiscation”- that the presence of the
three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that
would insulate against the police practice of planting evidence.
Contrary to the assessment of the RTC and CA, the lapses committed by the buy-bust team
did not constitute “substantial compliance” of the law. These were evident violations of the procedure
which was designed precisely to safeguard against abuses.
Here, there was no explanation or excuse proffered by the prosecution for the deviation from
the mandatory procedure. This evident failure to follow the prescribed procedure under Section 21
casts serious doubts on the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. Clearly, the reliance
of the RTC and CA on the presumption of regularity of official duty, at the expense of the
constitutionally-protected right of the accused to be presumed innocent, is grossly misplaced.
To emphasize, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the
stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will
defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARK LESTER BASCO y MITRA @ “TIKYO”

G.R. No. 244376, 5 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

503
 In every drugs case, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and
the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is essential, therefore that the
identity and integrity of the seized drug be established with moral certainty.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs due to the buy-bust team’s multiple unexplained breaches of procedure in the seizure, custody and
handling of the seized drug.

FACTS
A police asset reported to PO3 Espiritu and PO2 Valencia that alias “Tikyo” was engaged in
selling drugs. Acting on the report, the police officers conducted surveillance operations. However,
these were unsuccessful because the police were not able to verify the identity of Mark and did not
see him selling drugs.

Police Asset Lunal reported and informed PO3 Espiritu and PO2 Valencia that he could buy
drugs from Mark, thus, they formed a Buy Bust Team. The Buy Bust Team first went to the Barangay
Hall and met Kagawad Bautista, who guided the team to the alley where Mark’s house was located.

At the alley, Mark asked PO1 Gonzales the quantity of shabu he wanted to buy. PO1 Gonzales
said he wanted P500 worth of shabu, handed the marked money in exchange for a plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance.

PO3 Espiritu and PO2 Valencia immediately approached, handcuffed, and informed Mark of
his Miranda rights. PO1 Gonzales turned over the plastic sachet at the exit of the alley, to PO2 Valencia
who placed his initials on it. They proceeded to the Police Station where PO3 Espirity prepared the
request for Drug Test and Laboratory Examination.

PO2 Valencia placed the plastic sachet in a bigger plastic sachet and placed his initials. PO1
Gonzales prepared the Inventory of Confiscated and Seized Items and took pictures. PO3 Espiritu,
Kagawad Bautista, radio station disk jockey Lyn Sunga, and Mark signed the inventory. PO2 Valencia
brought the seized item to the crime lab where PO1 Bereña received it and turned it over to PSI
Llacuna for examination. The report yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. From the
Crime Laboratory, PO2 Valencia and PO1 Gonzales brought Mark to Granja Hospital for medical
examination.

Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals (CA) found Mark guilty for violating
R.A. No. 9165.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in finding Mark guilty of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs?

RULING
YES. In every drugs case, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgement of conviction. It is essential,
therefore that the identity and integrity of the seized drug be established with moral certainty.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs due to the buy-bust team’s multiple unexplained breaches of procedure in the seizure, custody
and handling of the seized drug.

504
 In order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on its identity, the prosecution has to show an
unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody from the
moment the drug is seized up to its presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
The applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that
(1) the seized item be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and
(2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media,
and (d) a representative from the DOJ.
Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of the
conduct of the inventory of the seized item - a requirement that can easily be complied with by the
buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
First, none of the required witnesses were present at the marking, inventory, and
photographing of the seized shabu. The law clearly requires that the three required witnesses should
already be physically present at the time of the conduct of the inventory of the seized item.
However, in the case at bar, none of them was present at the required place and time. The
gross ignorance and deliberate disregard of law by the police officers is emphasized even more by
the fact that they did not invite the proper witnesses required by Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.
Instead, they invited an appointed public official rather than an elected public official and a
Radio DJ from an FM Radio Station. Their obvious and inexcusable negligence is likewise stressed by
the fact that they had more than sufficient time to properly comply with the requirements of Section
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Second, whether there really was a buy-bust operation is even doubtful. The police officers
did not even take pictures of the witnesses who were allegedly present. The prosecution was not able
to overcome the presumption of innocence of Mark.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROLANDO BALBOA y VELA @ REYNALDO TAN

G.R. No. 243954, 05 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The procedure laid down in Section 21 is mandatory, and nothing less than strict compliance is
expected from the apprehending officers. Procedural lapses may only be permitted under justifiable
circumstances, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
The records reveal that the apprehending team made no attempt to summon a representative
from the National Prosecution Service (NPS) and no reason was given for such failure. PO2 Mangat
testified that their team leader tried to contact a representative from the media but the latter is not
available. This contravenes the two-witnesses rule under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

FACTS
Police Chief Inspector Renato B. Castillo gathered the members of Pasig City Police Anti-
Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Group because they received a confidential information that a
certain Raynaldo Tan is involved in shabu.

PO2 Mangat and the informant surveilled to the target area wherein they observed several
people going in and out of Rolando Balboa, aka Reynaldo Tan’s house at an unusual hour. The two
reported back to PCI Castillo. They planned and conducted the buy-bust operation where the
informant approached the appellant and told him that they wanted to score “halagang-tres.” PO2

505
handed the P300 buy-bust money in exchange for a small plastic sachet which contains a white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.

The team came rushing towards appellant and PO2 Mangat was able to confiscate four more
plastic sachets and informed Rolando of his violations and constitutional rights.

The defense posited that the informant, Jeffrey asked for help so that they could sell a grinder
and grill. Rolando agreed to help and rode on the motorcycle of Jeffrey’s companion. He was brought
to the motorpool and there, the companion instructed him to go inside and mention his name. Once
inside, he was immediately handcuffed, photographed with plastic sachets spread on the table, and
brought to a hospital for a medical check-up. He was returned to the motorpool where he was
detained and only found out that he was charged with selling and possession of illegal drugs.

Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals (CA) found Rolando guilty.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in finding Rolando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II,
Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165?

RULING
NO. The procedure laid down in Section 21 is mandatory, and nothing less than strict
compliance is expected from the apprehending officers. Procedural lapses may only be permitted
under justifiable circumstances, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.
The records reveal that the apprehending team made no attempt to summon a representative
from the National Prosecution Service (NPS) and no reason was given for such failure. PO2 Mangat
testified that their team leader tried to contact a representative from the media but the latter is not
available. This contravenes the two-witnesses rule under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
To justify non-compliance with the two-witnesses rule, the Court requires that earnest efforts
or serious attempts be made to secure the attendance of said witnesses. The apprehending team
failed to offer justifiable grounds to excuse the foregoing procedural lapses. The procedure outlined
in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was put in place as safety precautions to address potential
police abuses, especially considering that the penalty involved may be life imprisonment.
Thus, it cannot be simply brushed aside as simple procedural technicality.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEPING MACAPANGKAT y SAROZONG

G.R. No. 2333741, 05 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In Illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused comprise the
corpus delicti of the charge. In this case, the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the
seized shabu from the time it was recovered from Macapangkat up to the time it was presented in court.

FACTS
A confidential agent informed IO1 Balbin that a certain Peping was selling shabu. The police
later organized a buy-bust operation. The sale was consummated and Macapangkat was arrested.

506
 They informed him of his constitutional rights, searched his body, and recovered the buy-
bust money. IO1 Balbin marked the illegal drug and proceeded to the office.

The arresting team prepared the Booking Sheet, Arrest Report, Joint Affidavit of Arrest,
request for laboratory examinations, and Certificate of Inventory was prepared. IO1 Balbin identified
the shabu seized, marked money, and pictures taken in open court.

P/Insp. Malojo tesitified that she personally received the letter request and specimen,
conducted the laboratory examination, and found it positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

In his defense, Macapangkat denied all accusations and posited that he was threatened and
arrested while he was buying medicines for his daughter. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) handed a
guilty verdict with the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming it.

ISSUE
Was the prosecution able to prove the guilt of Macapangkat beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING
NO. In Illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused comprise
the corpus delicti of the charge. In this case, the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody
of the seized shabu from the time it was recovered from Macapangkat up to the time it was presented
in court.
In the Joint-Affidavit of Arrest of IO1 Balbin and IO2 Clave, it was mentioned that it was only
after Macapangkat was brought to their office, which is in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, when the
proper documentation happened and not immediately upon seizure and arrest.
There is also no justification contained in the Joint-Affidavit of Arrest of why the physical
inventory and photograph were done in Urdaneta City, instead of Dagupan City. It bears stressing
that there were no representatives from the DOJ and the media to witness the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized item.
Hence, the prosecution failed to prove valid causes for noncompliance with the procedure
laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. Worse, there is no showing of any earnest
efforts to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses. It is worthy to note the quantity of the
drug seized which is only 0.2g is an extremely small amount, highly susceptible to planting and
tampering. This is the very reason why strict adherence to Section 21 is a must.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONALDO MARISTELA y CASTALLAS

G.R. No. 242518, 04 December 2019, SECOND DIVISION

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is indispensable that the marking be immediately done upon confiscation or recovery of the
dangerous drugs or related items to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. A broken chain
jeopardizes the identity of the corpus delicti. When the identity of the corpus delicti is jeopardized by
non-compliance with Sec 21, R.A. No. 9165 as amended by R.A. No. 10640, critical elements of the offense
of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs remain wanting. This unexplained non-
compliance justifies an accused’s acquittal.

507
 Here, apparent from the records of the case are the glaring procedural lapses of the arresting
officers in the handling of the seized illegal drugs. First, the inventory and photograph of the illegal
drugs seized were not immediately done at the site but in the Barangay Hall. Second, the seized items
were not immediately marked upon seizure as marking was only done when the operatives reached the
Barangay Hall. Third, only Brgy. Capt. Brillante witnessed the proceedings while the other required
statutory witnesses are not present.

FACTS
Makati Police Station formed a buy-bust operation team based on the information they
received that a certain Ronald was engaged in illegal drug activities.

During the buy-bust operation, Ronaldo resisted the arrest which made PO3 Pacis rushed to
the scene to assist. A P500 marked money and a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance was
obtained during the body search on Ronaldo.

The latter was brought to the Barangay Hall, and it was also there that the seized items were
inventoried and marked by PO1 Pagulayan in the presence of PO3 Pacis and Brgy. Capt, Brillante.

Later on, Ronaldo was brought to the Makati City Police Station. For the preparation of the
Inventory Report and the Request for Laboratory Examination, PO1 Pagulayan turned over the seized
item to the duty investigator. When the preparation was finished, the items were returned to PO1
Pagukayan to be brought to the crime laboratory for examination. The result stated that the items
are positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Ronaldo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
R.A. No. 9165. Aggrieved, he appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the latter denied and
sustained the conviction against Ronaldo. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Can a broken chain of custody exonerate the accused?

RULING
YES. Under the chain of custody rule, links in the handling of the corpus delicti must be
established, viz:
(1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer;

508
 (2) the turnover of the seized illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer;
(3) the turnover of the illegal drug by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and
(4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.

The first link in the chain is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related items immediately
after the seizure and must be made in the presence of the following who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
(1) apprehended violator;
(2) elected public official; and
(3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media.

It is indispensable that the marking be immediately done upon confiscation or recovery of

the dangerous drugs or related items to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. A broken
chain jeopardizes the identity of the corpus delicti. When the identity of the corpus delicti is
jeopardized by non-compliance with Sec 21, R.A. No. 9165 as amended by R.A. No. 10640, critical
elements of the offense of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs remain wanting. This
unexplained non-compliance justifies an accused’s acquittal.

Here, apparent from the records of the case are the glaring procedural lapses of the arresting
officers in the handling of the seized illegal drugs. First, the inventory and photograph of the illegal
drugs seized were not immediately done at the site but in the Barangay Hall. Second, the seized items
were not immediately marked upon seizure as marking was only done when the operatives reached
the Barangay Hall. Third, only Brgy. Capt. Brillante witnessed the proceedings while the other
required statutory witnesses are not present.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARMELO CARPIO Y TARROZA

G.R. No. 233200, 09 September 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure
that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs in order to ensure that their integrity and
evidentiary value are preserved.
In this case, a perusal of the records shows that the police officers did not observe the procedural
requirements and left substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs. The prosecution also

509
failed to prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence, the Court acquitted Carmelo.

FACTS
Carmelo Carpio (Carmelo) was charged with violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal
selling of shabu to SPO1 Rivera who acted as a poseur-buyer and Section 11, R.A. No. 9165 for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Carmelo pleaded not guilty to the charges at his arraignment.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment finding Carmelo guilty as charged. It
observed that the testimony of SPO1 Rivera established the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs; and that Carmelo's defense of denial did not overcome the
positive testimonies of the Prosecution's witnesses and other evidence like the marked money and
the two sachets of shabu seized from him. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC.
Hence, the present case.

ISSUES
(1) Was Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 blatantly disregarded?
(2) Did CA err in holding that Carmelo was raising the issue against the preservation of the
chain of custody for the first time only on appeal and therefore he is estopped from adverting to the
arresting officers' procedural lapses?

RULING
(1) YES. Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining
the procedure that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs in order to ensure that
their integrity and evidentiary value are preserved. The apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and take photographs of the
seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the
same; and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four
(24) hours from confiscation for examination purposes.
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 provide that non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not automatically render void
and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.
In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure
laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that:
(a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and

510
 (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
A perusal of the records shows that the police officers did not observe the procedural
requirements and left substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs.
It appears that SPO1 Rivera instantly confiscated the three sachets of shabu following the
supposed sale but marked the same with his initials in the presence of investigator SPO1 Dalumpines
only upon arrival at the police station instead of at the crime scene itself. The delay in marking the
confiscated items was already irregular without SPO1 Rivera rendering an explanation of why he did
so. We have emphasized that the immediate marking of the seized drugs at the crime scene is crucial
in proving the chain of custody because it is the starting point in the custodial link.
The records further showed that the police officers dispensed with the other safeguard set in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, specifically the taking of the inventory and photographs of the seized
items, and ensuring the presence of the representative of the media or of the Department of Justice,
and the elective official.
Although the taking of photographs was supposedly made, such circumstance does not
appear now to be probable considering that the Prosecution did not formally offer any photographs
as evidence.
Without doubt, the strict compliance with the procedural safeguards provided by Section 21
is required of the arresting officers. Yet, the law recognizes that a departure from the safeguards may
become necessary, and has incorporated a saving clause.
To rely on the saving clause, the Prosecution should prove the concurrence of the twin
conditions, namely: (a) the existence of justifiable grounds for the departure, and (b) the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items.
If the Prosecution fails to tender any justification for the non-compliance with the procedure
prescribed, the Court cannot allow the exception to apply. That is what the Court must do in this case.

(2) YES. There is to be no question that every appeal of a criminal conviction always opens
the entire case for review. The appeal before the CA should be no different. It became incumbent
upon the CA to leave no stone unturned during its review of the convictions because Carmelo did not
waive any errors committed by the trial court.
A criminal appeal is so different from a civil appeal, for the former preserves the right of the
accused not to be punished for crime except upon his guilt being established beyond reasonable
doubt but the latter is not concerned with the proof beyond reasonable doubt. For sure, the lower
courts were shown to have committed grave errors, and it fully became incumbent upon the CA and
the Court itself to undo the injustice that prejudiced Carmelo. Hence, the Court acquitted Carmelo.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GENEVA ATON y PAMALOY
G.R. No. 234037, 05 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To ensure the integrity of the seized item, the prosecution must account for each link in its chain
of custody. Here, the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody.

511
 First, the venue for making the inventory and taking of photograph was not properly complied
with. Section 21(a) of the IRR requires that the inventory and taking of photograph be conducted
immediately after seizure and confiscation, thus it must be done at the place of the arrest.

FACTS
Based on the prosecution, a confidential informant reported that Geneva Aton (Geneva) was
selling illegal drugs. A buy-bust operation was conducted wherein the team scheduled the purchase
of P20,700.00 worth of drugs.

Geneva agreed to meet at Jollibee Anonas corner Kamias Street. The confidential informant
introduced PO3 Pamilar to Geneva as the person interested to buy shabu. Geneva then took a plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance from her pocket and gave it to PO3 Pamilar.

Thereupon, the team closed in and arrested Geneva. Inside Jollibee, PO3 Pamilar marked the
plastic sachet. Geneva was brought to the police station where the seized items and marked money
were turned over to desk officer PO3 Joselito Dela Cruz. SPO1 Jeffrey Flores photographed, prepared
the inventory, and request for examination. The inventory was witnessed by a media representative.
Subsequently, PO2 Pamilar, SPO1 Flores, and PO3 Blanco brought the seized plastic sachet and
request to the crime laboratory. Forensic Chemist Bernardino M. Banac, Jr. received the specimen,
conducted a test, and found it positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. After the examination,
the specimen was re-sealed, placed in a bigger plastic sachet and marked and was given to the
evidence custodian.

However, Geneva’s version was different. Geneva testified that she was cooking at home
when several men suddenly barged in, took her by the shoulder and ordered her to go with them. She
was brought to the police station and locked up in jail. She that said the police asked for P100,000.00
for her release, and that she could not have sold the alleged shabu because she had been locked in
jail.

The trial court rendered a verdict of conviction with the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the
decision, hence this appeal.

ISSUE
Was the chain of custody complied with?

RULING
NO. The governing law is R.A. No. 9165 before its amendment in 2014, Section 21 of which
prescribes the standard in preserving the corpus delicti in illegal drug cases. To ensure the integrity
of the seized item, the prosecution must account for each link in its chain of custody. Here, the
prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody.
First, the venue for making the inventory and taking of photograph was not properly
complied with. Section 21(a) of the IRR requires that the inventory and taking of photograph be
conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation, thus it must be done at the place of the arrest.
Second, the physical inventory and taking of photograph were not done in the presence of a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and local elected official. The prosecution failed
to acknowledge this deficiency, let alone, offer any explanation therefor. PO3 Pamilar did not even
know the name of the media representative who supposedly witnessed the inventory.

512
 Third, who took custody of the seized drug from the place of arrest en route to the police
station? Who turned it over to the police investigator? Again, the prosecution failed to offer any
answer to these questions. More, PO3 Dela Cruz did not take the stand to testify on the circumstances
surrounding his alleged receipt of the seized drug. This failure is another fatal breach in what already
was a broken chain of custody.
Fourth, whatever happened to the confiscated drug after Forensic Chemist Banac, Jr gave the
specimen to the evidence custodian for safekeeping? This question has remained unanswered even
up to this time. Indeed, the repeated breach of the chain of custody rule here was a fatal flaw which
had destroyed the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.
In light of the prosecution’s failure to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with
the chain of custody rule, Geneva’s acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIO MANABAT y DUMAGAY

G.R. No. 242947, 17 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" under Section 21 of RA 9165 means
that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. This also means that three required witnesses should
already be physically present at the time of apprehension — a requirement that can easily be complied
with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.

In the instant case, the witnesses were called and eventually arrived at the scene of the crime
only after Mario was already apprehended by PO2 Barral. The apprehending team cannot justify its
failure to ensure the availability of the witnesses during the apprehension of Mario, considering that the
buy-bust operation was conducted seven (7) days after the day it received information.

FACTS

Mario Manabat y Dumagay (Mario) was charged with violating Section 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165).

According to the prosecution, PO2 Lord Jericho N. Barral (PO2 Barral), received information
from a confidential informant (CI) that certain alias Mario is engaged in the selling of prohibited drugs
in some places in Dipolog City.

After one week, his team conducted a buy-bust operation. They instructed the CI to negotiate
with Mario with PO2 Barral acting as the poseur buyer. The CI agreed and texted that he and Mario
were together and that Mario accepted the request. They agreed to meet at ABC Printing Press.

PO2 Barral proceeded to the place together with SPO2 Roy Vertudes (SPO2 Vertudes), who
acted as back-up. When the CI and Mario arrived on board a motor cab, the former introduced the
latter to Mario as the buyer of shabu. After a short conversation, Mario agreed to sell to PO2 Barral.
PO2 Barral handed a the marked money to Mario, who received the same and in tum handed to PO2
Barral a sachet of shabu from inside a small container in his pocket. Upon receiving the shabu, PO2
Barral immediately held Mario. SPO2 Vertudes came and assisted PO2 Barral in the arrest of Mario.

513
They informed Mario that they were police officers of Dipolog City Police Station. Mario was told of
his constitutional rights in Visayan dialect. Mario revealed that his full name was Mario Manabat.

They called for witnesses to the inventory of items recovered from Mario. Representatives
from DOJ, media and the Barangay of Miputak came. PO2 Barral conducted body search on Mario in
the presence of the witnesses. SPO2 Vertudes made markings on the confiscated items. He also
prepared the certificate of inventory and signed by the witnesses. Photographs were taken during
the conduct of inventory.

On the other hand, the defense posits that there was no buy bust operation conducted against
Mario as he was just grappled by persons near Casa Jose. Thereafter, he was brought to the boulevard
then to the Fish Port then to the ABC Printing Press, the alleged place of arrest.

Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) convicted Mario of with
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Should the conviction of Mario be sustained?

RULING
NO. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous
drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow
to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1)
the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2)
the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d)
a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory
and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the
place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-
bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/ team.
In this connection, this also means that three required witnesses should already be physically present
at the time of apprehension — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team
considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
In the instant case, Court holds that the buy-bust operation was not conducted in accordance
with law.
First, it is not disputed whatsoever that the witnesses were called and eventually arrived at
the scene of the crime only after Mario was already apprehended by PO2 Barral. The apprehending
team cannot justify its failure to ensure the availability of the witnesses during the apprehension of
Mario, considering that the buy-bust operation was conducted seven (7) days after the day it received
information about Mario and was instructed to conduct the buy-bust operation. Simply stated, the

514
apprehending team had more than enough time to ensure that all the mandatory procedures for the
conduct of the buy-bust operation would be sufficiently met.
Second, the Certificate of Inventory that was produced by the prosecution was irregularly
executed. The Certificate of Inventory itself reveals that the document was not signed by Mario or by
his counsel or representative.
Third, the Court notes that the marking of the plastic sachets allegedly recovered was
irregularly done. As incontrovertibly revealed by the photographs of the plastic sachets allegedly
retrieved from Mario, only the date and initials of the seizing officers were inscribed on the
specimens. The time and place of the buy-bust operation, as required under the 1999 Philippine
National Police Drug Enforcement Manual, were not indicated in the markings, in clear contravention
of the PNP's own set of procedures for the conduct of buy-bust operations.
Lastly, it was an error for the RTC to convict Mario by relying on the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties supposedly extended in favor of the police officers. The regularity of the
performance of their duty could not be properly presumed in favor of the policemen because the
records were replete with indicia of their serious lapses.
In sum, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending team's
deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. The integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised.

515
 D. Documentary Evidence (Rule 130, B)
1. Definition
2. Best Evidence rule
3. Secondary evidence
HEIR OF PASTORA T. CARDENAS AND EUSTAQUIO CARDENAS, namely REMEDIOS CARDENAS-
TUMLOS, represented by her Attorney-in-fact JANET TUMLOS-QUIZON, petitioners –versus-
THE CHRISTIAN AND MISSIONARY ALLIANCE CHURCHES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
represented by REO REPOLLO and LEOCADIO DUQUE, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 222614, SECOND DIVISION, March 20, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

According to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, when the original document has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by presenting
secondary evidence. These secondary evidence pertain to: (1) a copy of the lost document, (2) by a recital
of the contents of the lost document in some authentic document, or (3) by a testimony of a witnesses,
in the order stated.
Upon close examination of the evidence on record, the Court holds that CAMACOP was not able to
provide any sufficient secondary evidence to establish the existence and contents of the supposed 1962
Deed of Sale covering the subject property. In other words, CAMACOP failed to present sufficient
evidence proving that a sale indeed occurred between Pastora and CAMACOP over the subject property.

FACTS:

On October 26, 2009, Remedios, heir of Sps. Cardenas, represented by her attorney-in-fact, [Janet],
filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Use of Real Property and Damages against
respondents The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc. (CAMACOP),
ReoRepollo and Leocadio Duque, Jr. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
In her Complaint, Janet alleged that her mother Remedios is the heir of the late [Sps. Cardenas], who
are the registered owners of Lot 90, Psd-37322, with an area of 410 square meters, located at
Poblacion 6, Midsayap, Cotabato [(subject property)], covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-6097 and Tax Declaration No. K-019938 with a [m]arket [v]alue of P550,220.00; and that the
subject property is adjacent to Lot 3924-A, Psd-12-013791 owned by CAMACOP where its church is
located and constructed.
Janet further alleged that sometime in the year 1962, CAMACOP unlawfully occupied the subject
property for their church activities and functions; that CAMACOP continues to unlawfully occupy the
subject property to the damage and prejudice of [Janet]; that their repeated oral and written
demands fell on deaf ears; and that CAMACOP failed to accede to the demands and continues to
occupy the subject property. Thus, her mother Remedios, through her, was constrained to file the
case before the court a quo.
For their part, [the respondents] admitted in their Answer that [Cardenas] is the registered owner of
the subject property, which is adjacent to Lot No. 3924-A, Psd-12-013791 owned by the CAMACOP.
They further aver in their Answer that their occupation of the subject property is not illegal since

516
they had lawfully purchased it from its registered owners [(referring to Pastora)], who
surrendered the owner's duplicate copy to the representative of the church.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. According to the RTC, CAMACOP was able to
provide sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence that the subject property was indeed sold
to it by Pastora.
The CA denied Janet's appeal for lack of merit. The CA held that the Heir of Sps. Cardenas "failed to
overcome the burden of proving her claim by preponderance of evidence and found]that the court a
quo did not err in its appreciation of the evidence and in ruling that there was in fact a sale of the
subject property by the late spouses in favor of CAMACOP. The failure of Janet to prove her claim
makes the appeal vulnerable to denial."
ISSUE:
Whether the Heir of Sps. Cardenas (Remedios, as represented by Janet) has a better right to possess
the subject property. (YES)
RULING:
In asserting that the subject property was sold by Pastora to CAMACOP, the latter relies on the
existence of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed in 1962. CAMACOP however maintains that, since
all of the copies of this alleged Deed of Sale had been supposedly lost, it had to resort to the
presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of this Deed of Sale.
According to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, when the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by
presenting secondary evidence. These secondary evidence pertain to: (1) a copy of the lost document,
(2) by a recital of the contents of the lost document in some authentic document, or (3) by a testimony
of a witnesses, in the order stated.
Hence, in order for respondent CAMACOP to prove the existence and contents of the purportedly lost
Deed of Sale, it was incumbent upon it to present either (1) a copy of the purported Deed of Sale, or
(2) an authentic document containing a recital of the contents of the purported Deed of Sale, or (3) a
witness who can testify as to the existence and contents of the purported Deed of Sale, in that order.
Upon close examination of the evidence on record, the Court holds that CAMACOP was not able to
provide any sufficient secondary evidence to establish the existence and contents of the supposed
1962 Deed of Sale covering the subject property. In other words, CAMACOP failed to present
sufficient evidence proving that a sale indeed occurred between Pastora and CAMACOP over the
subject property.
According to Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either
by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Thus, without any copy of the purported Deed of Sale and any authentic document containing a recital
of the contents of the purported Deed of Sale, CAMACOP should have provided a credible, convincing
witness to prove the existence and contents of the purported Deed of Sale.
No such witness was provided by CAMACOP.

517
The sole witness presented by CAMACOP who allegedly acquired personal knowledge as to the
purported sale transaction between CAMACOP and Pastora is the second witness of CAMACOP, i.e.,
Eudecia M. Repollo (Eudecia).
According to Eudecia, as the then Secretary-Treasurer of CAMACOP, she was the one who paid One
Hundred Twenty Pesos (P120.00), with Ten Pesos (P10.00) allotted for attorney's fees, to Pastora as
consideration for the sale of the subject property and co-signed the purported Deed of Absolute Sale.
Aside from the testimony being self-serving and uncorroborated, it is highly significant to point out
that according to the testimony of Eudecia, the lot purchased by CAMACOP from Pastora refers to a
lot measuring One Hundred Ten (110) square meters only, located beside Lot 3924-A, Psd-12-
01379, which is currently owned and possessed by CAMACOP. To stress, the subject property is a
Four Hundred Ten (410)-square meter lot.
Having said that, the Court does not find that the Heir of Sps. Cardenas has the right to recover
possession of the entire subject property.
In the instant Petition, the Heir of Sps. Cardenas unequivocally stated that "the decision should have
been to award to respondent CAMACOP the 110 square meters and the remaining area after
deducting the 110 square meters to be retained by petitioner." In addition, Janet unambiguously and
unmistakably admitted in the instant Petition that "the 110 square meters x x x rightfully may be
ruled as owned by respondent CAMACOP." In fact, in her prayer for relief, the Heir of Sps. Cardenas
even asks that the One Hundred Ten (110) square meters of the subject property be adjudicated to
CAMACOP. Hence, by express admission by Janet as to the sale of the One Hundred Ten (110)-square
meter portion of the subject property to CAMACOP, the Court allows the latter to retain possession
of the said portion of the subject property.

518
 4. Parol Evidence rule
5. Interpretation of documents
E. Testimonial Evidence (Rule 130, C)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN SANOTA Y SARMIENTO,
DEO DAYTO Y GENORGA AND ROLANDO ESPINELI Y ACEBO
G.R. No. 233659, 10 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Peralta, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt

is a qualitative test not a quantitative one. The proven circumstances must be “consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

In this case, the accused where convicted by reason of circumstantial evidence. The testimony
was sufficient to establish the guilt of all 3 accused, as it was not shown that he had ill-motive which
impelled him to testify against them. His credence was fortified by other prosecution witnesses, who
corroborated his testimony, with object evidence on its material points. Moreover, the prosecution
presented documentary evidence and testimonies connecting the accused to the commission of other
crime of Robber with Homicide perpetrated with the same modus opperandi.

FACTS

John Sanota, Deo Dayto and Rolando Espineli (collectively, accused) were charged with
Robbery with Homicide upon the testimony of Abion. The latter testified that he overheard the
accused planning to commit robbery. He was also with the accused when the crime was committed
because he was invited by Espineli supposedly to go to a party, but instead they went to the house of
the Quiros. He was told to stay put with the guard of the Quiros. Later, he heard a gunshot, and
witnessed Dayto leave with a black thing in his possession. Abion pretended not to know and witness
the incident. However, upon the prodding of his wife, he executed the Sinumpaang Salaysay. The
prosecution was able to gather other witnesses who were able to corroborate the testimony of Abion.

Accused proffered alibis: Espineli claimed that he was on duty as a security guard at Avida
Nuvali; Dayto, stated that he was at a birthday party of his brother; Sonata claimed that he was
gathering wood during the time of the commission of the crime.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the accused. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision of the RTC. According the CA, although there was no direct evidence,
circumstantial evidence suffices to convict them. Hence this appeal. The accused claims that the
testimony of Abion is incredible and circumstantial at best.

ISSUE

519
 Is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict the accused of the crime charged?

RULING

YES. Time and again, the Supreme Court has deferred to the trial court’s factual findings and
evaluation of the credibility of witness, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any
clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that
would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. The trial court’s determination
proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness, their conduct and
attitude under frilling examination thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the
witness; credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honest and candor.

What is important is that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements
of the crime. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to
commit robbery must precede the taking of human life.

Further, the difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves the
relationship of the fact infer to the facts that constitute the offense. Their difference does not relate
to the probative value of the evidence. Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three
(3) requisites that should be established to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The fact from which the inference are derived are proven;

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of

guilt is a qualitative test, not a quantitative one. The proven circumstances must be “consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

In this case, the accused where convicted by reason of circumstantial evidence. The testimony
was sufficient to establish the guilt of all 3 accused, as it was not shown that he had ill-motive which
impelled him to testify against them. His credence was fortified by other prosecution witnesses, who
corroborated his testimony, with object evidence on its material points. Moreover, the prosecution
presented documentary evidence and testimonies connecting the accused to the commission of other
crime of Robber with Homicide perpetrated with the same modus operandi.

520
 1. Qualification of witnesses
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO ALMOSARA
G.R. No. 223512, 24 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Indeed, when the credibility of the eyewitness is at issue, due deference and respect shall be given
to the trial court's factual findings, its calibration of the testimonies, its assessment of their probative
weight, and its conclusions based on such factual findings, absent any showing that it had overlooked
circumstances that would have affected the final outcome of the case. This rule finds an even more
stringent application where the trial court's findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals, as in this
case.

FACTS

Caused by a heated exchange between Arnulfo Cabintoy (Arnulfo) and Antonio Almosara
(Antonio) during a drinking spree, Antonio right then and there repeatedly stabbed Arnulfo. While
Arnulfo was already lying prostrate on the ground, Anthony Almosara (Anthony) joined in and
stabbed Arnulfo once in the stomach. Adolfo Almosara (Adolfo), Antonio’s father, also joined in and
stabbed Arnulfo a total of six (6) times in the back. Thereafter, the Almosaras ran away.

Antonio together with his father Adolfo was charged with murder. Meantime, Adolfo
Almosara died, hence, the case as to him was dismissed. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found
Antonio guilty as charged. Antonio appealed, faulting the trial court for finding him guilty of murder
despite the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE

Did the CA err in affirming Almosara’s conviction for murder?

RULING

NO. Murder requires the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed
him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

There is no question here regarding the presence of the first and fourth elements. The victim
died of hemorrhagic shock as a result of multiple stab wounds per Medico-Legal Report. There is no
evidence showing that Arnulfo and Antonio, or any of the Almosaras for that matter, are related by
affinity or consanguinity. Hence, the killing is not parricide.

As for the second element, it was found that Antonio was one of the four (4) persons who
killed Arnulfo. Children Gregorio (six [6] years old) and Marife (five [5] years old) saw up close the
slaying of their father. Both positively identified Antonio and his relatives as the persons who
repeatedly stabbed their father to death.

521
 Indeed, when the credibility of the eyewitness is at issue, due deference and respect shall be
given to the trial court's factual findings, its calibration of the testimonies, its assessment of their
probative weight, and its conclusions based on such factual findings, absent any showing that it had
overlooked circumstances that would have affected the final outcome of the case. This rule finds an
even more stringent application where the trial court's findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals,
as in this case. More important, Marife and Gregorio are just children who were not shown to have
had any motive to falsely implicate appellant in their father's slaying if truly appellant was innocent.

In light of the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses Gregorio and Marife pertaining to the
material details affecting their father's murder and Antonio’s role in perpetrating it, Antonio’s
defense of denial and alibi must fail.

As to the third element, it was ruled that treachery attended the killing. The essence of
treachery hinges on the aggressor's attack sans any warning, done in a swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. Here, Antonio, without any warning, barged into the victim's premises, went straight to pin
him down to the ground, and repeatedly stabbed him. Antonio continued pinning Arnulfo down to
allow his other relatives who had joined in to freely take turns in stabbing the helpless victim.
Accordingly, the appeal is denied.

522
 2. Testimonial privilege
3. Admissions and confessions
4. Previous conduct as evidence
5. Testimonial knowledge
6. Hearsay and exceptions to the hearsay rule
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAMON QUILLO y ESMANI
G.R. No. 232338, 08 July 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, C.J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Totality of circumstances test is applied to determine the admissibility and reliability of an out-
of-court identification. Here, Gina’s statement is not credible for she could not have known the height of
the assailant as the latter was sitting as the back rider of a running motorcycle. Same goes with Michael,
who was able to give an accurate description for the composite illustration when he only recalled the
rider's skin complexion, height, and the color of the shirt he was wearing. These are general descriptions
that fail to provide a definitive account of the physical appearance of the accused-assailant.

FACTS
On May 28, 2014, Vivien Yap- De Castro along with her companions, were walking along the
street when a black motorcycle of an unknown plate number with two persons on board stopped
beside them. The back rider pointed the gun to Vivien and fired two successive shots immediately
killing the latter.
Later on, Ramon Quillo (Quillo) was identified as the back rider. Quillo contends that on the
day of the incident, he was in Payatas to look for money for his son’s school shoes and afterwards
went to Rodriguez Hospital where his wife was confined.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Quillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Murder. Quillo filed an appeal stating that the RTC erred in finding him guilty because the prosecution
witnesses failed to positively identify him as the perpetrator; there was no sufficient circumstantial
evidence to convict him; and assuming he killed Vivien, no treachery existed. The Court of Appeals
(CA) upheld Quillo’s conviction but modified the monetary award. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE
Did the prosecution witness positively identify Quillo as the assailant?

RULING
NO. In People v. Teehankee, Jr., the Court explained the concept of out-of-court identification
and the factors to consider in determining its admissibility and reliability. Out-of-court identification
is conducted by the police in various ways such as show-ups, mug shots, and line-ups. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during

523
the trial, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz:
(1) The witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) The witness' degree of attention at that time;
(3) The accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) The length of time between the crime and the identification; and
(6) The suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Gina’s statement is not credible for she could not have known the height of the assailant as
the latter was sitting as the back rider of a running motorcycle. Same goes with Michael, who was
able to give an accurate description for the composite illustration when he only recalled the rider's
skin complexion, height, and the color of the shirt he was wearing. These are general descriptions
that fail to provide a definitive account of the physical appearance of the accused-assailant.

Also, the interim period of about one (1) week from the time of the incident and the time they
gave their sworn statement to the authorities and identified Quillo from the police line-up could have
affected their ability to recall the assailant's identity.

In this case, the identification was done through a police line-up. Applying the
totality of circumstances test, the Court find that the out-of-court identification made by the
witnesses is unreliable and cannot be made the basis for Quillo's conviction.

524
 7. Opinion rule
REYNALDO SANTIAGO, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 213760, 01 July 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In People v. Rodriguez, the Court held that the trafficked victim's testimony that she had been
sexually exploited was "material to the cause of the prosecution." Here, AAA's testimony was
corroborated by the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the entrapment operation. They
recalled in detail the steps they had taken to verify the surveillance report and ensure that Santiago was
the same person with whom the confidential informant transacted.

Contrary to Santiago's contention, the testimony of the confidential informant is not

indispensable in the crime of trafficking in persons. Neither is his identity relevant. "It is sufficient that
the accused has lured, enticed, or engaged its victims or transported them for the established purpose
of exploitation."

FACTS
TV5 segment producer Melvin Espenida (Espenida) and his crew went to investigate the
alleged prostitution operations in Tondo, Manila. They had earlier designated a confidential asset,
alias “David” to pose as a customer and transact with the alleged pimps for a night with a minor.

During the transaction, the pimps allegedly asked for P500.00. Consequently, Espenida and
his crew filed a Complaint before the Regional Police Intelligence, reporting about the rampant
human trafficking in the said area. Acting on the said complaint, police operatives conducted an
entrapment operation in those areas.

According to AAA, at around 1:30 a.m. on September 30, 2011, she was about to buy coffee at
Plaza Moriones when Reynaldo Santiago Jr. (Santiago) called her, offering to pay her to spend a night
with a customer. He allegedly promised to pay AAA P350.00 out of the P500.00 that the customer
would pay for the transaction. The team and David arrived at Plaza Moriones. After surveying the
area, David pointed to the pimps, including Santiago, who, upon seeing the police, ran away but were
eventually caught and arrested. During trial, they were positively identified by the police officers in
court as the same people apprehended that night.

An Information was filed against the Santiago charging him of committing acts of trafficking
in persons under Section 4 (c), in relation to Section 6 (c) of Republic Act No. 9208, or the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Santiago.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed Santiago’s conviction. It found that all the elements to
establish that an accused had committed trafficking in persons – the act, the means, and the
exploitative purpose as provided under the Manual on Law Enforcement and Prosecution of
Trafficking in Persons Cases – were present.

Arguing that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, Santiago
points out that the lack of testimony from the confidential informant, David, raises doubts on whether
he truly offered AAA to him.

525
ISSUE
Is Santiago guilty of violating Section 4 (a) of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act?

RULING
YES. In People v. Rodriguez, the Court held that the trafficked victim's testimony that she had
been sexually exploited was "material to the cause of the prosecution."

Here, AAA's testimony was corroborated by the testimonies of the police officers who
conducted the entrapment operation. They recalled in detail the steps they had taken to verify the
surveillance report and ensure that Santiago was the same person with whom the confidential
informant transacted.

Contrary to Santiago's contention, the testimony of the confidential informant is not

indispensable in the crime of trafficking in persons. Neither is his identity relevant. "It is sufficient
that the accused has lured, enticed, or engaged its victims or transported them for the established
purpose of exploitation."

Further, the rule is settled that "what controls is not the designation of the offense but its
description in the complaint or information.”

The Information charged Santiago with violation of Section 4 (c), in relation to Section 6 (c)
of the law. Section 4 (c) punishes the act of "[offering] or [contracting] marriage, real or simulated,
for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling, or trading them to engage in prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage[.]"

However, a perusal of the allegations in the Information reveals that Santiago was sufficiently
charged with the crime of trafficking in persons under Section 4 (a). The provision does not allow
any person: (a) to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage.

The trial court correctly convicted Santiago for violating Section 4 (a), instead of
Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 9208. The Information sufficiently averred that: (1) Santiago
committed an act of qualified trafficking in persons by offering AAA to David for sex or
exploitation; (2) the act was done for a fee; and (3) for prostitution, sexual exploitation,
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude, or debt bondage.

526
 8. Character evidence
F. Burden of proof and presumptions (Rule 131)
FERNANDO N. FERNANDEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 241557, 11 December 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, A. Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt must be adduced by the prosecution otherwise the
accused must be acquitted, even if, on face, he or she appears to be most suspicious or even if there is no
other possible or identifiable perpetrator in the records despite having been a crime committed.

Even a casual observer can see that almost the entire case for the prosecution rests exclusively
on Garino, the victim, and his testimony. No other witness was presented to narrate the events of that
fateful night, even though Garino had a companion.

A more nuanced glance at the antecedent facts will unearth several glaring inconsistencies in
Garino's testimony as well as the evidence on record. While these inconsistencies on their own may not
be enough to completely decimate his testimony, taken together with the fact that the prosecution relied
solely on the alleged victim's narration of events, these show the presence of reasonable doubt
substantial enough to acquit the accused.

FACTS

At around 1:00 a.m., Noel C. Garino (Garino) and an unknown companion were seated inside
a jeepney which was parked in front of the house of Fernando Fernandez (Fernandez), when Garino
saw someone went out of the gate. When they heard a gunshot, they immediately alighted from the
jeepney, and it was then that Garino saw that the person who fired the shot was Fernandez, though
he did not know the latter's name at the time. Fernandez fired his gun a second time, hitting Garino
on his right gluteal area. Garino was then brought to the Ospital ng Makati and underwent immediate
surgery.

Fernandez was then charged for Frustrated Murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Garino presented his doctor, Dr. Sanchez, as a witness, who testified that Garino was near
death when he was taken to the hospital, and had to undergo a second operation because his large
vessel, external iliac vein, and intestines were injured.

When questioned if he knew who his assailant was, Garino testified that he previously saw
him at the salon where he and Barcenas worked. He found out his assailant's name only when
Barcenas visited him at the hospital after his surgery.

Neither Barcenas nor Garino's companion during the night of the shooting was presented as
witness for the prosecution, as only Garino, his brother Albert, who had the incident blottered at the
police station, and Dr. Sanchez were presented to testify.

527
 The RTC rendered a Decision convicting Fernandez of Frustrated Murder.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification Fernandez's conviction.

ISSUE

Is Fernandez guilty of the crime of Frustrated Murder?

RULING

NO. It is a basic and immutable principle in criminal law that an accused individual cannot be
convicted if there is reasonable doubt in his or her commission of a crime.

Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt must be adduced by the prosecution otherwise the
accused must be acquitted, even if, on face, he or she appears to be most suspicious or even if there
is no other possible or identifiable perpetrator in the records despite having been a crime committed.

The RTC and the CA are one in their findings that Fernandez is the actual perpetrator of the
crime against Garino, based on the latter's testimony, which was found as clear, straightforward, and
believable.

As a general rule, the Court is obliged to rely on the observations of the trial court, as the
latter had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude. It has since become imperative that the evaluation of testimonial evidence by
the trial court be accorded great respect by the Court; for it can be expected that said determination
is based on reasonable discretion as to which testimony is acceptable and which witness is worthy
of belief.

Although it is entrenched in this jurisdiction that findings of the trial court on the credibility
of the witnesses are accorded great weight and respect because it had ample opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the declarants at the witness stand, this rule admits exceptions.

One of the exceptions is when a fact or circumstance of weight and influence has been
overlooked, or its significance misconstrued by the trial court sufficient to harbor serious misgivings
on its conclusions.

Even a casual observer can see that almost the entire case for the prosecution rests
exclusively on Garino, the victim, and his testimony. No other witness was presented to narrate the
events of that fateful night, even though Garino had a companion.

A more nuanced glance at the antecedent facts will unearth several glaring inconsistencies in
Garino's testimony as well as the evidence on record. While these inconsistencies on their own may
not be enough to completely decimate his testimony, taken together with the fact that the prosecution
relied solely on the alleged victim's narration of events, these more than show the presence of
reasonable doubt substantial enough to acquit the accused.

528
 Notably, the testimony is anchored on Garino's positive identification of Fernandez as the
culprit who shot him, even though he did not know his name at the time, and only zeroed in on
Fernandez after the incident as a result of Barcenas' own identification.

In this regard, the Court finds Garino's testimony to be highly suspect, and laden with several
inconsistencies which militate against Fernandez's culpability as a suspect.

Our laws proscribe the conviction of the accused if doubt taints the circumstances of the
crime. A man's life and liberty are not aspects to be trifled with, which is why only the most exacting
standard is required in order to find a person criminally liable.

In this case, more than just reasonable doubt is attendant to the circumstances of the crime
alleged. While the Court does not deny that Garino indeed suffered a grievous injury, the Court does
heavily question if Fernandez was the one who inflicted it. This doubt is enough to sway the mind of
the Court and acquit Fernandez.

529
 BDO LIFE ASSURANCE, INC. v. ATTY. EMERSON U. PALAD
G.R. No. 237845, 16 October 2019, THIRD DIVISION (REYES, A., JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Finding of the probable cause on the part of the prosecutor should not be equivalent to finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the mere fact that a lesser scintilla of proof is necessary in
order to find probable cause as to a suspect's involvement does not take away the fact that the burden
is on the part of the accuser to show a substantial probability that an accused's actions or lack thereof
constitute participation in the offense. Here, BDO Life Assurance was unable to show that Palad acted
in concert pursuant to the objective to defraud the company, nor had any knowledge of the scheme.

FACTS
In May 2010, two Personal Accident Insurance claims on the death of spouses Carlos and
Norma Andrada (spouses Andrada) were filed by Alvarado under the name of Carlos Raynel Andrada,
the spouses’ designated beneficiary. To support his claim, Alvarado submitted death certificates of
spouses Andrada, police blotter report of the accident, LTO Certificate of Registration of the vehicle,
and the driver’s license of Juan Ernesto Magadia, the alleged driver of Andradas.
In order to analyze the insurance claims, BDO Life Assurance sought the services of an
external investigator. It was discovered that another claim was filed by the beneficiary son Carlos
Andrada for the damage of the insured vehicle.
In a separate investigation, it was discovered that all the documents submitted by Alvarado
to support his personal accident insurance and motor vehicle claims were fakes. No record of the
incident happened. Alarmed by these, BDO Life Assurance sought the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). It was found out that there were no records of death of the spouses
Andrada. As a result, an entrapment operation was set. During the operation, Palad was presented as
the lawyer of Alvarado.
Consequently, BDO Life Assurance filed for estafa through falsification of documents against
Raynel Thomas Alvarado, et al. and Atty. Emerson Palad as a conspirator. The prosecutor found
probable cause only against Alvarado. However, the prosecutor ruled that there was no proof that
the others dealt and cooperated with Alvarado and Gragas to such degree that they be branded as
conspirators.
Thus, BDO Life Assurance filed a Petition for Review to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which
denied the same. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), it found that there was probable cause to
charge the same felony against Amposta, Olguera, Taniegra, and Palad. Subsequently, Palad filed for
a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by the Court. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that there was no probable cause to indict Palad for
the crime of attempted estafa through falsification of documents, as conspirator.

530
RULING
NO. The Court ruled in favor of Palad. Finding a probable cause on the part of the prosecutor
should not be equivalent to finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the mere fact that a
lesser scintilla of proof is necessary in order to find probable cause as to a suspect's involvement does
not take away the fact that the burden is on the part of the accuser to show a substantial probability
that an accused's actions or lack thereof constitute participation in the offense. Any finding should
still be grounded on reasonable evidence, and not mere conjectures or speculation, which is wanting
in this case.
Conspiracy under the law occurs when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. BDO Life Assurance was unable to
show that Palad acted in concert pursuant to the objective to defraud the company, nor had any
knowledge of the scheme.

Palad was only present during the receiving of the fraudulent proceeds and not during the
steady progression of the falsification and fraud. He was asked merely to accompany Alvarado and
Gragas for reasons even BDO Life Assurance was not able to reasonably show were suspicious.
Palad’s decision to agree to go with Alvarado and Gragas should not prejudice his life, liberty,
security, and peace of mind. While it may have not been the most diligent decision, it is not a criminal
one which would place criminal liability on one who does not deserve it. Thus, the petition is denied.

531
 MOISES G. CORO v. MONTANO B. NASAYAO
G.R. No. 235361, 16 October 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

According to Sec. 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the burden of proof is the duty of a party to
prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required by law.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. An allegation of forgery must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. Since Coro is assailing
the DOAS, he has the burden of making out a clear-cut case that the disputed document is bogus.

FACTS
Moises Coro (Coro) alleged that he was the owner of a parcel of land. Later, he found out that
Montano Nasayao (Nasayao) acquired the said property by way of a forged Deed of Absolute Sale
(DOAS). Coro denied having received money in consideration of the sale nor having appeared before
the notary public.

The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of Coro since the signatures
appearing in the DOAS were genuine and that Coro failed to prove forgery by clear and convincing
evidence. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the testimonies of Coro, his
daughter and stepdaughter do not supplant the presumption of regularity of the deed of sale as a
public instrument. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE
Is the subject Deed of Absolute Sale valid?

RULING
YES. According to Sec. 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the burden of proof is the duty of a
party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence
required by law. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. An allegation of forgery must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
Since Coro is assailing the DOAS, he has the burden of making out a clear-cut case that the disputed
document is bogus.

The CA explained that the standard signature and the one appearing in the deed of sale were
written by one and the same person; no difference stark nor distinguishing is noticeable. To establish
forgery, that the variation between the standard and disputed signatures is due to the operation of a
different personality and not merely an expected and inevitable variation found in the genuine
writing of the same writer. In this case, Coro’s uncorroborated testimony failed to demonstrate that,
based on the foregoing criteria, the questioned signatures were forgeries.

Lastly, the Court also held that the questioned DOAS is notarized. Settled is the rule that a
duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. On its
face, the DOAS is entitled to full faith and credit, and is deemed to be in full force and effect. Coro
failed to overturn this legal presumption.

532
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
G.R. No. 222955, 16 October 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

‘Estoppel by silence' arises where a person, who by force of circumstances is under a duty to
another to speak, refrains from doing so and thereby leads the other to believe in the existence of a state
of facts in reliance on which he acts to his prejudice.

Here, the Court found that IICI was estopped from assailing the validity of the bail bond. By IICI's
silence and failure to notify the RTC despite repeated notice as to the existence of the bail bond in favor
of the accused, Judge Fonacier was made to believe that Enriquez' act of issuing the bail bond was
authorized by IICI. Had IICI been diligent in informing the court and moving for the cancellation of the
bail bond after knowledge of its existence, the RTC could have cancelled it.

FACTS
Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. (IICI) designated FGE as its general agent for the
solicitation of non-life insurance including bonds. It appointed Enriquez as its Operations Manager
for Judicial Bonds with authority to issue bonds in criminal cases up to the maximum amount of P100,
000.00. Thereafter, Enriquez signed a bail posted by Rosita Enriquez (accused) in the amount of
P200, 000.00.

In 2008, IICI revoked Enriquez's authority for failure of remitting proper premiums. The
Court Administrator and the Sandiganbayan were then notified of the revocation of Enriquez's
authority.

For failure of the accused to appear at a hearing, Judge Fonacier forfeited the bond in favor of
the Government, and directed IICI to produce the accused. IICI failed to do so. Considering the
manifestation of the accused's counsel that the accused fled abroad, the RTC gave IICI a period of 30
days to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against the bond. However, IICI filed a
motion to lift and recall forfeiture order which was subsequently denied by Judge Fonacier.

Thus, IICI filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA which granted the petition. The CA ruled
that Judge Fonacier committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE
Did Judge Fonacier err in denying the motion to lift and recall forfeiture order?

RULING
NO. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the Court finds that Judge Fonacier did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.

The Court notes that in IICI's petition before the CA, it indicated as its principal office address
the “8th floor, Cuevas Tower Condominium, Taft Avenue corner Pedro Gil Street, Malate Manila
(Malate, Manila).” IICI's address as stated in its petition before the CA is significant considering that
after IICI revoked the authority of Enriquez as its agent on July 7, 2008, IICI requested the RTC
through its letter dated October 16, 2008 that all writs of execution and orders be forwarded to its
head office at the address stated therein.

533
 On December 9, 2008, the Produce Order issued by the RTC for IICI to bring the accused in
court was sent to Malate, Manila unlike the previous Produce Orders which bore different addresses.
Despite receipt of the Produce Orders, IICI failed to produce the accused in court.

Further, IICI was already deemed to know of the existence of the bail bond when the RTC sent
the Produce Orders at its given address. And yet, IICI still remained silent and failed to bring the
alleged irregularities of the bail bond to the RTC until the filing of its motion to lift and recall forfeiture
order.

In Pasion v. Melegrito, the Court ruled that a party may be estopped from claiming the
contrary of the matter through his or her silence whether the failure to speak is intentional or
negligent as when such silence would result to a fraud on the other party. The Court explained that
the principles of equitable estoppel, sometimes called estoppel in pais, are made part of our law by
Art. 1432 of the Civil Code. Coming under this class is estoppels by silence, which obtains here and as
to which it has been held that:

'Estoppel by silence' arises where a person, who by force of circumstances is under a duty to
another to speak, refrains from doing so and thereby leads the other to believe in the existence of a
state of facts in reliance on which he acts to his prejudice. Silence may support an estoppel whether
the failure to speak is intentional or negligent.

Here, the Court found that IICI was estopped from assailing the validity of the bail bond. By
IICI's silence and failure to notify the RTC despite repeated notice as to the existence of the bail bond
in favor of the accused, Judge Fonacier was made to believe that Enriquez' act of issuing the bail bond
was authorized by IICI. Had IICI been diligent in informing the court and moving for the cancellation
of the bail bond after knowledge of its existence, the RTC could have cancelled it. Further, the RTC
could have prevented the accused from fleeing from the trial of her case.

534
 LYDIA I. AGUIRRE v. DIRECTOR CECILIA R. NIETO,
CIVIL SERVIVE COMMISION OFFICE V LEGASPI CITY
G.R. No. 220262, 28 August 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, Jr. J., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Under Rule 131, Section 3 (v) of the Rules of Court, there is a presumption that a letter duly
directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail. The Supreme Court has consistently
held that while a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the course of mail, this is merely
a disputable presumption subject to controversion and a direct denial thereof shifts the burden to the
party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee.

In this case, Aguirre denies having received the notices. She also found that the CSC Regional
Office V has no records of the alleged pre-hearing conference called by the CSC Region V Legal Service
Division. Likewise, there is no record of the proceedings of the alleged hearing conducted by the CSC.
Such denial has shifted to the CSC the burden of proving that indeed the notices were received by
petitioner. However, there was no evidence adduced by the CSC to that effect.

FACTS
Abundio Elaurza (Elaurza), a Tree Marker of the DENR-CENRO, filed a complaint charging
Lydia Aguirre (Aguirre) of dishonesty. According to Elaurza, Aguirre deducted P480.00 from his
salary to pay for his uniform despite having no memorandum circular to justify such.
Elaurza went to Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) and was
advised to plead to Aguirre not to deduct the cost of the uniform from his salary. Elaurza went to
Aguirre to relay the advice of the PENRO officers. However, instead of giving Elaurza a chance to
explain, Aguirre allegedly uttered defamatory words against him in a loud voice, which were heard
by the other employees. Worse, the uniform was never delivered to Elaurza.
Elaurza filed before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Regional Office V a Formal Charge for
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and discourtesy in the course of official duties against Aguirre.
However, Aguirre never received a notice of the hearing and was not able to present evidence on her
behalf. The CSC found Aguirre guilty of serious dishonesty, discourtesy in the course of official duties,
and grave misconduct.
The DENR Regional Office V received the decision of the CSC. Aguirre came to know of the
CSC decision only when the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) stopped giving her pension.
Having no other remedy to assail the decision, she filed his extraordinary remedy of petition for
Certiorari.
ISSUE

Was due process afforded to Aguirre?

RULING
NO. Under Rule 131, Section 3 (v) of the Rules of Court, there is a presumption that a letter
duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that while a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the course of mail,

535
this is merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion and a direct denial thereof shifts
the burden to the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed
received by the addressee.

In this case, Aguirre denies having received the notices. She also found that the CSC Regional
Office V has no records of the alleged pre-hearing conference called by the CSC Region V Legal Service
Division. Likewise, there is no record of the proceedings of the alleged hearing conducted by the CSC.
Such denial has shifted to the CSC the burden of proving that indeed the notices were received by
petitioner. However, there was no evidence adduced by the CSC to that effect.

Jurisprudence dictates that registry receipt or a certification from the Bureau of Posts are
independent evidence to support the claim that the notices were indeed received by the addressee.

In this case, there are no registry return receipts of the notices of hearing and decision sent
to Aguirre. If it were indeed sent properly to Aguirre, all the registry return receipts should have been
accordingly documented in the records of the CSC Region V.

Given that the formal charge, notices of hearing, and order to comment were not established
to have been received by Aguirre, all sent at the time after she retired in December 2005, clearly, she
was deprived of the opportunity to be heard and present her case.

Needless to state, the acts allegedly committed by Aguirre are not constitutive of grave
misconduct necessitating her dismissal from service. Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules which must be proved by substantial
evidence.
The facts narrated by Elaurza, even when considered in this case, do not show that Aguirre is
guilty of grave misconduct. This finding of absence of liability coupled with the fact that the very
essence of due process has not been granted to petitioner who has spent 41 years in public service
and has already looked forward to her well-deserved retirement when she was deprived of her
retirement benefits without having been accorded due process should not be disregarded.

536
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, -versus- BENJIE CARANTO y AUSTRIA,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 217668, SECOND DIVISION, February 20, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

In the present case, the buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with the mandatory requirements under
Section 21, paragraph 1 of RA 9165.
First, the arresting officers failed to photograph the seized items at the place of arrest and seizure and
at the precinct where the mandatory witnesses were present. Neither did they offer any explanation as
to why they did not take photographs of the seized items.
Second, not one of the three required witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the accused and
marking of the seized items at the place of arrest. The three witnesses were only "called-in" to the police
station to witness the inventory of the seized items and sign the inventory receipt. The belated
participation of the three witnesses after the arrest and seizure defeats the purpose of the law in having
these witnesses so as to prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
In People v. Tomawis, the Court elucidated on the purpose of the law in mandating the presence of the
required witnesses as follows:
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly
at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is
mostneeded, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as
to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately
conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up
as the witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs
were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) provingtheir compliance with Section 21,
RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-compliance. Breaches of the
procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained
by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.
FACTS:
In the afternoon of August 4, 2010, SP04 Romeo Abordo received an information from a Confidential
Informant (CI) that a certain Benjie was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. At that time, Benjie, who
may be found at Dr. Carifio Street, was looking for a prospective buyer of a certain amount of drugs
valued at One Thousand (Pl ,000.00) Pesos. Upon learning this, a buy-bust operation was organized.
After their briefing, the buy-bust team left for Dr. Carino Street. Upon reaching said place, the CI
exchanged text messages with Benjie informing the latter that he was already in the area. Benjie
showed up at the meeting place. After alighting from the vehicle, the CI approached Benjie and
introduced P02 Boado to him as the prospective buyer. Benjie asked for the money. P02 Boado
handed him two (2) Five Hundred (P500.00)-Peso bills and Benjie gave him a plastic sachet
containing shabu. P02 Boado then removed his bull-cap, the pre-arranged gesture for the back-up
team to assist him in the arrest of Benjie.
The back-up team composed of SP02 Tacio and SPOl Lag-ey approached Benjie, introduced
themselves as police officers, and placed him under arrest. Benjie did not resist the arrest. Benjie was

537
frisked for deadly weapons but what was recovered fromwas him a Nokia cellphone and two (2) Five
Hundred (PS00.00)-Peso bills. P02 Boado marked the items on the site with his initials. Benjie was
then brought to Police Station 5 along with the confiscated items including the plastic sachet of shabu
in P02 Boado's possession which were brought for inventory as stated in a Certification thereto. The
following individuals were present during the inventory: herein appellant Benjie; Prosecutor Ruth
Bernabe, the representative of the DOJ; Danilo Patacsil, an elected Barangay official; and Roi Molina
of the BCBC, the media representative. After the inventory, P02 Boado turned over the items to
SPOlTakayen, the designated Evidence Custodian, at Police Station 5. SPO 1 Takayen then requested
P02 Boado to bring the plastic sachet of shabu to Police Senior Inspector Rowena Canlas (PSI Canlas)
of the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Bado, Dangwa.
The petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended. The RTC held
that all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs had been proven by the prosecution. The CA
affirmed Benjie's conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjie's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt (NO)
RULING:
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
outlines the procedure which the police officers must strictly follow to preserve the integrity of the
confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the
physical inventoryand photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused orhis/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media,
and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic
laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.
The Court, however, has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible; and, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not
ipsofacto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid.However, this is with the
caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.
In the present case, the buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with the mandatory requirements
under Section 21, paragraph 1 of RA 9165.
First, the arresting officers failed to photograph the seized items at theplace of arrest and seizure and
at the precinct where the mandatory witnesses were present. Neither did they offer any explanation
as to why they did not take photographs of the seized items.
Second, not oneof the three required witnesses was present at thetime of arrest of the accused and
marking of the seized items at the place of arrest. The three witnesses were only "called-in" to the
police station to witness the inventory of the seized items and sign the inventory receipt. The belated
participation of the three witnesses after the arrest and seizure defeats the purpose of the law in
having these witnesses so as to prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.

538
In People v. Tomawis, the Court elucidated on the purpose of the law in mandating the presence of
the required witnesses as follows:
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is necessary to
protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Using the
language of the Court in People v. Mendoza, without the insulating presence of the representative from
the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the
evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly
heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachet
that was evidence of the corpusdelicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of
theincrimination of the accused.
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more
importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three
witnesses is mostneeded, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would
belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation
is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual
defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-bust operation and
inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.
To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs
must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such that they are required
to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory
and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation."
x xx
Second, the buy-bust team failed to offer any explanation for theirfailure to strictly comply with the
requirements of Section 21.
It is evident that the police officers had more than ample time tosecure the presence of the required
witnesses at the place of arrest and seizure. As admitted by SP02 Tacio, they were conducting a
surveillance of the area on August 3, 2010, a day prior to the actual alleged buy-bust operation. On
said date, they could have already instructed the three mandatory witnesses to join them in their
buy-bust operation the following day.
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) provingtheir compliance with Section
21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-compliance. Breaches of the
procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and
unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the
accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.

539
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAY GODOY MANCAO
G.R. No. 228951, 17 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-Javier, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused
can no longer be proved. Sufficient circumstantial evidence can supplant the absence of direct evidence.
In People v. Beriber, the Court convicted the accused even though no direct testimony was presented by
the prosecution to prove that the accused is guilty of robbery with homicide since the incriminating
circumstances, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain of events enough to arrive at the
conclusion that Mancao was responsible for the killing and robbing the victim.
Here, the first two elements of robbery with homicide were established through circumstantial
evidence. SPO2 Magno testified that the object of the crime was found in Mancao's possession at the time
of his arrest, Pedro Enriquez testified that the necklace Mancao was wearing at the time of his arrest
was the same silver necklace he gifted the victim with.

FACTS
Mancao Jay Godoy Mancao (Mancao) was charged with robbery with homicide. The
prosecution presented Manuel Bernido, Jr. who was about ten meters away when he saw Mancao
suddenly approached the victim, Peter Enriquez, from behind and stabbed the latter in the neck.
Mancao then dragged the victim toward an alley in Barangay 9. Later, Bernido, Jr. saw Mancao
running past his house twice.
The prosecution also presented SP02 Kelvin Magno. He testified that on September 3, 2007,
the San Pedro Police Station received a report that a dead body was found in Barangay 9. He
proceeded to the area and found the lifeless body of Enriquez. His cellphone, silver necklace, silver
bracelet, and wallet containing cash were missing. They followed a trail of blood near the body which
led to the boarding house of the Mancao brothers. Upon seeing the police officers, Wangyu cried and
confessed that Mancao was involved in the robbery and that he assisted his brother in fleeing to Maco,
Davao del Norte.
Mancao denied the charge. He averred that he had been in Compostela Valley since
September 1, 2007 to tend the land of his mother. He was brought to the police station where he was
forced to wear a silver necklace. He discovered later on that he was already being charged with
murder for the death of victim Peter Enriquez.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that even in the absence of eyewitnesses to the actual
taking of the victim's personal belongings, the crime of robbery with homicide was nonetheless
established by circumstantial evidence. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses constituted an
unbroken chain which proved that Mancao, with intent to gain, took the victim's personal property
and by reason of the robbery, killed such hapless victim. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s
ruling. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming Mancao's conviction for robbery with homicide?

540
RULING
NO. The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the
accused can no longer be proved. Sufficient circumstantial evidence can supplant the absence of
direct evidence. In People v. Beriber, the Court convicted the accused even though no direct testimony
was presented by the prosecution to prove that the accused is guilty of robbery with homicide since
the incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain of events
enough to arrive at the conclusion that Mancao was responsible for the killing and robbing the victim.
Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons requires the following elements:
(1) taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the
property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the
robbery, or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
Here, the first two elements of robbery with homicide were established through
circumstantial evidence. SPO2 Magno testified that the object of the crime was found in Mancao's
possession at the time of his arrest, Pedro Enriquez testified that the necklace Mancao was wearing
at the time of his arrest was the same silver necklace he gifted the victim with.
Under Section 3 (g), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, a person found in possession of a thing
taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act.
In the case at bar, Mancao failed to justify his possession of the victim's necklace. Thus the
presumption that he stole the same from the victim and that he is the perpetrator of the crime, stands.
The third element, animus lucrandi was similarly established by the same presumption for
intent to gain is an internal act which is presumed from the unlawful taking by Mancao of the thing
subject of asportation. Since the object of the crime i.e. the victim's necklace was recovered from
Mancao, his intent to gain is presumed.
For the fourth element, eyewitness Manuel Bernido, Jr. testified how Mancao slayed his
victim. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave full credence to Bernido, Jr.’s eyewitness
account of the victim's killing and SPO2 Magno and Pedro Enriquez's identification of the object of
the crime i.e. the victim's necklace found in Mancao's possession.
In any event, the courts below ruled that there is no showing that the witnesses were impelled
by any improper motive to falsely testify against Mancao. The numerous encounters gave Bernido,
Jr. an opportunity to ascertain Mancao's identity. Thus, when he pointed at Mancao during trial, there
can be no doubt that he was positively identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime. In this light,
Mancao's denial and alibi must fail. Denial and alibi cannot prevail over the categorical testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses.

541
 G. Presentation of evidence (Rule 132)
1. Examination of witnesses
DENNIS LOAYON Y LUIS, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 232940, SECOND DIVISION, January 14, 2019, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Notably, the Court, in People v. Miranda, issued a definitive reminder to prosecutors when dealing
with drugs cases. It implored that "since the procedural requirements are clearly set forth in the law,
the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of custody of the drugs/items
seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not the defense raises the same in the proceedings
a quo; otherwise, it risks the possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the
evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the first time on appeal,
or even not raised, become apparent upon further review.

In this case, there was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of inventory and
photography was not witnessed by representatives from the DOJ and the media. This may be easily
gleaned from the Inventory of Seized Properties/Items dated February 24, 2010, which only confirms
the presence of an elected public official, i.e., Brgy. Kagawad Asuncion. Such finding is confirmed by
the testimony of the poseur-buyer, PO2 De Vera on direct and cross-examination.

FACTS:
This case stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC accusing Loayon of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The prosecution alleged that at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of
February 24, 2010, a buy-bust team composed of police officers from the Quezon City Police District
Station 9 (QCPD Station 9) went to Barangay Pansol to conduct a buy-bust operation against a certain
"Awang." However, before the sale transaction between Awang and the poseur-buyer took place,
Awang's companion, later identified as Loayon, shouted "Pulisyan!" after recognizing the poseur-
buyer as a policeman, which prompted Awang and Loayon to run away in different directions. While
Awang was able to elude the buy-bust team, one of the policemen, Police Officer 2 Raymund De Vera
(PO2 De Vera), was able to corner Loayon, resulting in the latter's arrest. He likewise recovered the
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance thrown away by Loayon during the chase.
Thereafter, the buy-bust team, together with Loayon, went to QCPD Station 9 where, inter alia, the
seized item was marked, photographed, and inventoried in the presence of Barangay Kagawad
Rommel Asuncion (Brgy. Kagawad Asuncion). The seized plastic sachet was then brought to the
crime laboratory where, after examination, the contents thereof yielded positive for 0.03 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, a dangerous drug.

In defense, Loayon denied the charges against him, claiming instead, that he just got out of his house
to look for his wife when he saw policemen chasing some people. Suddenly, one of the policemen
apprehended him. He was then taken to QCPD Station 9, where he was detained until the instant
criminal charge was filed against him.

The RTC found Loayon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC found that the
prosecution had established all the elements of the crime charged, noting that the policemen had no
ill motive to inculpate Loayon and build a trumped-up charge against him. It also found that the
policemen substantially complied with the chain of custody rule, thereby preserving the integrity and
evidentiary value of the item seized from Loayon. Aggrieved, Loayon appealed to the CA.

542
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that the policemen's positive identification of Loayon as the
possessor of the seized plastic sachet, which he threw away while he was being chased, shall prevail
over the latter's bare denials, which was uncorroborated by other evidence. Moreover, it observed
that the prosecution was able to prove the crucial links in the chain of custody of the seized item.
Undaunted, Loayon moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Loayon is guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs?

RULING:

No. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.

To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to
account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law
requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be
conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same. In this regard, case law recognizes
that "marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station
or office of the apprehending team." Hence, the failure to immediately mark the confiscated items at
the place of arrest neither renders them inadmissible in evidence nor impairs the integrity of the
seized drugs, as the conduct of marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team is sufficient compliance with the rules on chain of custody.

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as
certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official";
or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "an elected public official and a representative
of the National Prosecution Service or the media." The law requires the presence of these witnesses
primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence."

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the same has
been regarded "not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law."
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance with the
chain of custody procedure may not always be possible. As such, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.

543
Notably, the Court, in People v. Miranda, issued a definitive reminder to prosecutors when dealing
with drugs cases. It implored that "since the procedural requirements are clearly set forth in the law,
the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of custody of the drugs/items
seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not the defense raises the same in the proceedings
a quo; otherwise, it risks the possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the
evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the first time on appeal,
or even not raised, become apparent upon further review.

In this case, there was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of inventory and
photography was not witnessed by representatives from the DOJ and the media. This may be easily
gleaned from the Inventory of Seized Properties/Items dated February 24, 2010, which only confirms
the presence of an elected public official, i.e., Brgy. Kagawad Asuncion. Such finding is confirmed by
the testimony of the poseur-buyer, PO2 De Vera on direct and cross-examination.

As earlier stated, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for these witnesses' absence by
presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at the very least, by showing that genuine and sufficient
efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure their presence. Here, while PO2 De Vera
acknowledged the absence of representatives from the DOJ and the media during the conduct of
inventory and photography, he merely offered the perfunctory explanation that "no one was
available" without showing whether the buy-bust team exerted earnest efforts to secure their
attendance therein. In view of this unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule, the Court is
therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the item purportedly
seized from Loayon was compromised, which consequently warrants his acquittal.

544
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- DON EMILIO CARIÑO Y AGUSTIN
A.K.A. "DON EMILIO CARIÑO AGUSTIN, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 233336, SECOND DIVISION, January 14, 2019, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The Court, in People v. Miranda, issued a definitive reminder to prosecutors when dealing with drugs
cases. It implored that "since the procedural requirements are clearly set forth in the law, the State
retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of custody of the drugs/items seized from
the accused, regardless of whether or not the defense raises the same in the proceedings a quo;
otherwise, it risks the possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the
evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the first time on appeal,
or even not raised, become apparent upon further review."

In this case, it would initially appear that the apprehending policemen complied with the witness
requirement, considering that the Inventory/Receipt of Property Seized contains the signatures of the
required witnesses, i.e., Kagawad Merced, DOJ Representative Astillero, and Media Representative
Gallarde. However, a more circumspect examination of the records would show that these witnesses
arrived after the apprehending policemen had already completed the inventory, and that they were
merely asked to sign the aforesaid inventory form.

FACTS:
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed before the RTC accusing Cariño of the crimes of
Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

The prosecution alleged that on April 24, 2012, policemen of the Special Operations Group of the
Negros Oriental Police Provincial Office successfully conducted a buy-bust operation against a certain
"Dondon," later identified as Cariño, during which one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance was recovered from him. When Cariño was searched incidental to his arrest, the policemen
recovered another plastic sachet containing the same aforesaid substance from him. While waiting
for the arrival of the witnesses – namely, Barangay KagawadChona Merced (Kagawad Merced),
Department of Justice (DOJ) Representative RamonitoAstillero (DOJ Representative Astillero and
Media Representative JuanchoGallarde (Media Representative Gallarde) policemen then conducted
the marking and inventory at the place of arrest in Cariño's presence. Upon the witnesses' arrival
thereat, the policemen presented the Inventory/Receipt of Property Seized to them and they signed
the same. Thereafter, Cariño and the seized items were taken to the police headquarters where the
necessary paperworks for examination were prepared. The seized items were then brought to the
crime laboratory where, after examination, the contents thereof yielded positive for 0.09 and 0.04
gram, respectively, of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

In defense, Cariño denied the charges against him, claiming instead, that he was a former asset of the
policemen who arrested him, and that they framed him up after he begged to be excused from a
surveillance task assigned to him.

The RTC found Cariño guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The RTC found that the
prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that Cariño was arrested after he was caught
in flagrante delicto to be selling shabu, and that after his arrest, another sachet containing shabu was
recovered from him. Cariño moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Aggrieved, he
appealed to the CA.

545
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt
all the elements of the crimes charged against Cariño, and that the conduct of inventory prior to the
arrival of the witnesses, among others, did not tarnish the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items. Hence, this appeal seeking that Cariño's conviction be overturned.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant Don Emilio Cariño y Agustin a.k.a. "Don Emilio Cariño Agustin" is
guilty of the crimes charged?

RULING:
No. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants an acquittal.

To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to
account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law
requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be
conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same. In this regard, case law recognizes
that "marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station
or office of the apprehending team." Hence, the failure to immediately mark the confiscated items at
the place of arrest neither renders them inadmissiblein evidence nor impairs the integrity of the
seized drugs, as the conduct of marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team is sufficient compliance with the rules on chain of custody.

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as
certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official";
or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "an elected public official and a representative
of the National Prosecution Service or the media." The law requires the presence of these witnesses
primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence."

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the same has
been regarded "not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law." This is
because "the law has been crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police
abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment." Nonetheless, the
Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance with the chain of custody
procedure may not always be possible. As such, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly
comply with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.

546
Anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the
apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses,
albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness of these efforts must be examined on a
case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is for the Court to be convinced that the failure to
comply was reasonable under the given circumstances. Thus, mere statements of unavailability,
absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified
grounds for non-compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time – beginning from the moment they have received the information
about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest – to prepare for a buy-bust operation
and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand, knowing fully well that they would
have to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule.

Notably, the Court, in People v. Miranda, issued a definitive reminder to prosecutors when dealing
with drugs cases. It implored that "since the procedural requirements are clearly set forth in the law,
the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of custody of the drugs/items
seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not the defense raises the same in the proceedings
a quo; otherwise, it risks the possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the
evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the first time on appeal,
or even not raised, become apparent upon further review."

In this case, it would initially appear that the apprehending policemen complied with the witness
requirement,considering that the Inventory/Receipt of Property Seized contains the signatures of
the required witnesses, i.e., Kagawad Merced, DOJ Representative Astillero, and Media
Representative Gallarde. However, a more circumspect examination of the records would show that
these witnesses arrived after the apprehending policemen had already completed the inventory, and
that they were merely asked to sign the aforesaid inventory form.

As may be gleaned from the testimonies of the required witnesses themselves, the inventory was not
conducted in their presence as the apprehending policemen already prepared the Inventory/Receipt
of Property Seized when they arrived at the scene of arrest and only made them sign the same. As
discussed, the witness requirement mandates the presence of the witnesses during the conduct of
the inventory, so as to ensure that the evils of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence will
be adequately prevented. Hence, non-compliance therewith puts the onus on the prosecution to
provide a justifiable reason therefor, especially considering that the rule exists to ensure that
protection is given to those whose life and liberty are put at risk. Unfortunately, no such explanation
was proferred by the prosecution to justify this glaring procedural lapse. In view of this unjustified
deviation from the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Cariño were compromised,
which consequently warrants his acquittal.

547
 2. Authentication and proof of documents
CHRISTITA GETIGAN v.
ILDEFONSO DUTTERTE RODIS and CORAZON PERNIA-RODIS
G.R. No. 243065, 04 December 2019, SECOND DIVISION

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In our jurisdiction, a notarial document is given full faith and credence upon its face. It is a prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and there is a conclusive presumption of its
existence and due execution.

In the case at bar, Getigan failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumptive authenticity and due execution of the two Deeds of Sale. The bare denial by Getigan of her
signatures in the two Deeds of Sale and her claim of forgery are insufficient to overthrow the
presumption of regularity.

FACTS
Through a Deed of Sale, the subject property was acquired by Spouses Ildefonso Dutterte
Rodis and Corazon Pernia-Rodis (Spouses Rodis) from Cristita Getigan (Getigan). Another Deed of
Sale was executed in favor of the Spouses Rodis. Both Deeds of Sale were duly notarized.

Later on, Spouses Rodis discovered that Getigan filed a free patent application over the
subject property even if she had already sold it to them.

Consequently, Spouses Rodis filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity or Annulment of

OCT. 120631 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). During the trial, Getigan denied
executing the two deeds of sale over the subject property in favor of the spouses. MCTC dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the deeds of sale were forged, but this was eventually reversed by
the MCTC and it ruled in favor of the spouses.

Aggrieved, Getigan appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). RTC affirmed in toto. Court of
Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Were the Deeds of Sale null and void due to the alleged forged signature of Getigan?

RULING

548
 NO. It bears emphasizing that the two Deeds of Sale were notarized. In our jurisdiction, a
notarial document is given full faith and credence upon its face. It is a prima facie evidence of the
truth of the facts stated therein and there is a conclusive presumption of its existence and due
execution. To overcome the presumption of regularity, there must be evidence that is clear and
convincing, and more than merely preponderant.

In the case at bar, Getigan failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumptive authenticity and due execution of the two Deeds of Sale. The bare denial by Getigan of
her signatures in the two Deeds of Sale and her claim of forgery are insufficient to overthrow the
presumption of regularity. To the Court, a mere disclaimer is insufficient.

Further, amidst her denial of her signatures, Getigan consistently affirmed her authorship of
the signatures during her cross-examination and redirect examination. As a judicial admission, which
she failed to contradict by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that she did not
make the same, it did not require proof.

549
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- MILLER OMANDAM UNABIA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 213346 FIRST DIVISION, February 11, 2019, DEL CASTILLO, J.
Under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, "documents consisting of entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All
other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter."
There was therefore no need to further identify and authenticate Dr. Labis' Medical Certificate. "A public
document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a
notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law,
or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires
no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court."
FACTS:
Respondent Miller OmandamUnabia filed before the RTC a Petition for Correction of Entries on the
Birth Certificate of Mellie UmandamUnabia claiming that his Birth Certificate contained errors in
that the name entered therein was "Mellie UmandamUnabia," when it should properly have been
written as "Miller OmandamUnabia"; that the gender was erroneously entered as "female" instead of
"male"; and that his father's middle initial was erroneously indicated as "U" when it should have been
"O."
To support the claim for change of entry as to gender, a Medical Certificate was presented which was
supposedly issued by a physician of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center, Dr. Andresul A. Labis
(Dr. Labis), which certificate stated that respondent was "phenotypically male"; however, the
physician was not presented in court to testify on his findings and identify the document.
The RTC granted the petition. Petitioner appealed before the CA, arguing that respondent failed to
state a valid ground for change of name; that the petition failed to state the aliases by which
respondent was known; that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and that
respondent failed to present the physician who allegedly issued the medical certificate stating that
respondent was male. But the appeal was dismissed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the grant of the petition for correction of entries was proper. (YES)
RULING:
Under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, "documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave
rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."
There was therefore no need to further identify and authenticate Dr. Labis' Medical Certificate. "A
public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged
before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities
required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court."
Nonetheless, it must be laid down as a rule that when there is a medical finding that the petitioner in
a case for correction of erroneous entry as to gender is phenotypically male or female, the no-sex
change or transplant certification becomes mere surplusage.

550
Finally, suffice it to state that, as correctly declared by the CA, respondent was actually using the
name Miller OmandamUnabia; that "Miller" and "Mellie" and "Omandam" and "Umandam" were
confusingly similar; and that respondent's medical certificate shows that he is phenotypically male.
The CA thus properly held that respondent's birth certificate contained clerical errors in its entries
necessitating its rectification.

551
 3. Offer and objection
MA. MELISSA VILLANUEVA MAGSINO, Petitioner, -verus- ROLANDO N. MAGSINO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205333, SECOND DIVISION, February 18, 2019, REYES, J. JR., J.
Objection to oral evidence must be raised at the earliest possible time, that is after the objectionable
question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable issue becomes apparent only after the
answer was given. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party
making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only
at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made.

In this case, petitioner should have objected during the course of Gates' direct testimony on her
qualifications as an expert witness and explaining the mechanics of the psychological examination
which she conducted on respondent. Petitioner should not have waited in ambush after the expert
witness had already finished testifying. Furthermore, petitioner acted prematurely when it objected to
the psychological report at the time when it is still being identified. Objection to documentary evidence
must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier. Suffice it to say that the identification of the
document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as
evidence for the party presenting it

FACTS:

Respondent and petitioner were married on December 6, 1997 and their union was blessed with two
children - one born in 2002 and the other 2003. Sometime in 2005, Melissa started suspecting that
Rolando was sexually molesting his own children, then aged 3 years old and 2 years old, as she would
often see them playing with their genitalia. When she asked who taught them of such activity, the
children would answer "Papa." Thus, to protect the minors from further abuse, Melissa left the
conjugal dwelling and took the children to their maternal grandparents.

In July 2008, Rolando filed a Petition to Fix the Rights of the Father Pendente Lite with Prayers for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order and Hold Departure against petitioner.

During pre-trial, Rolando manifested that he would be presenting, among other witnesses, Dr.
Cristina Gates (Gates), who will testify on the mental status and fitness of Rolando to exercise
parental authority over the minors.

At the hearing, Gates was presented as an expert witness. She confirmed the technical qualifications
and professional skill stated in her judicial affidavit and curriculum vitae. She also discussed the
findings contained in Rolando's psychological evaluation report. Applying clinical hypnosis,
phenomenological-existential study and historical-contextual approach, Gates opined that Rolando
could not have molested the minors.

Gates was then subjected to cross-examination. But before propounding any questions, Melissa's
counsel, in open court, moved to strike out the direct testimony of Gates on grounds that her expertise
had not been established and that any evidence derived from hypnotically-induced recollection is
inadmissible.

Melissa's counsel filed a Motion to Expunge the testimony of Gates reiterating the doubts on her
expertise and to suppress related evidence particularly the psychological evaluation report by reason
of inadmissibility of hypnotically-induced recollection.

552
The RTC denied the motion to expunge the testimony on the ground of waiver of objection for failure
to timely question the qualifications of the witness. On the motion to suppress psychological
evaluation report, the RTC ruled that the same is premature considering that such documentary
evidence has not yet been formally offered.

The CA ruled that petitioner's counsel failed to make a timely objection to the presentation of Gates'
testimonial evidence. It was observed that no objection was raised during the course of Gates' direct
testimony where she confirmed her qualifications as an expert witness and explained the
psychological examination conducted on respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether the motion to expunge the testimony should be granted. (NO)

RULING:

In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made at the proper
time, and the grounds specified. Grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall be
considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some other ground. Thus, even on appeal,
the appellate court may not consider any other ground of objection, except those that were raised at
the proper time.

Thus, it is basic in the rule of evidence that objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is
formally offered.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made
as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer
unless a different period is allowed by the court.

In other words, objection to oral evidence must be raised at the earliest possible time, that is after
the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable issue becomes
apparent only after the answer was given. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the
witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence
is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary
evidence may be made.

As correctly found by the CA, the objections interposed by petitioner - as to both oral and
documentary evidence - were not timely made.

Petitioner should have objected during the course of Gates' direct testimony on her qualifications as
an expert witness and explaining the mechanics of the psychological examination which she
conducted on respondent. Petitioner should not have waited in ambush after the expert witness had
already finished testifying. By so doing, petitioner did not save the time of the court in hearing the
testimony of the witness that after all according to her was inadmissible. And thus, for her failure to
make known her objection at the proper time, the procedural error or defect was waived.Indeed, the
reason why offer must be made at the time the witness is called to testify and the objection thereto
be made, so that the court could right away rule on whether the testimony is necessary on the ground
of irrelevancy, immateriality or whatever grounds that are available at the onset. Here, petitioner

553
allowed a substantial amount of time to be wasted by not forthrightly objecting to the inadmissibility
of the respondent's testimonial evidence.

Furthermore, objections to documentary evidence should likewise be timely raised. True, petitioner
acted prematurely when it objected to the psychological report at the time when it is still being
identified. Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not
earlier. Because at that time the purpose of the offer has already been disclosed and ascertained.
Suffice it to say that the identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not
constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the
identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is
formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is
formally offered as an exhibit. However, while objection was prematurely made, this does not mean
that petitioner had waived any objection to the admission of the same in evidence. Petitioner can still
reiterate its former objections, this time seasonably, when the formal offer of exhibits was made.

554
 H. Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)
I. Weight and sufficiency of evidence (Rule 133)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLAN CANATOY et al.
G.R. No. 227195, 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances
proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.
Both Soliman and Tan identified in open court the two accused, Canatoy and Mabalato, as the
men running away from the crime scene. These circumstances proven lead to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused were the authors of the crime, especially considering that the same is
corroborated by the extrajudicial confessions of Mabalato and Cartuciano,

FACTS
The prosecution presented witnesses Rebecca Tan (Tan), Mark Lester Soliman (Soliman),
Stephen Go (Go), Dr. Nestor Sator (Dr. Sator), P/Insp. Nathan Alonsabe, Sr. P/Insp. Germano Mallari,
PO1 Joseph Bucayan, SPO4 Mario Monilar (SPO4 Monilar), Atty. Truya, and Prosecutor Tolomeo
Dinoy (Pros. Dinoy), who testified that:
On September 4, 2002, Barbas was inside her room at Ziega Apartment, Barangay Talamban,
Cebu City. At around 9:30 in the morning, Tan, a tenant in the same apartment, saw two men enter
the apartment's gate. Afterwards, Soliman who was staying in the room adjacent to Barbas, heard
two men utter "Ayo, Ayo" in front of Barbas' room and told the latter that they have something to
deliver. Barbas told them to leave it beside the door but they insisted for her to come out so that she
could acknowledge the item. After a short while, Tan and Soliman heard Barbas shouting "Ay!" three
times. Soliman went out of the room and saw two men fleeing from Barbas' room towards the gate.
Soliman called after them who looked back but then continued to run. Tan, who was on the terrace,
also shouted "Hoy!" at the two men who likewise looked back. Both Soliman and Tan later identified
the two men as Canatoy and Mabalato.
Soliman and Tan then checked Barbas' room and they found her lying face down, bathed in
her own blood. They saw a bloodied knife and grey t-shirt near Barbas' body. Tan recalled that one
of the two men whom she saw enter the apartment's gate was wearing a grey t-shirt, but when she
later saw him again fleeing from Barbas' room, he was already wearing a white shirt. Thereafter, Go,
Barbas' boyfriend, as well as members of the Emergency Rescue Unit Foundation (ERUF) and several
police officers arrived. The police recovered, among others, the knife used in killing Barbas from the
crime scene.
Dr. Sator, a medico-legal officer, examined Barbas' body and stated in his report that Barbas
suffered incise wounds and one fatal stab wound at the left shoulder, which pierced the aorta and the
right lung, thereby causing hemorrhage.
In the meantime, the police officers conducted a follow-up operation, which led to the arrest
of Mabalato, Cartuciano and Sato. Several days later, they apprehended Canatoy by virtue of a

555
warrant of arrest. While in detention, Mabalato and Cartuciano expressed their willingness to make
a confession, after they were apprised of their constitutional rights by SPO4 Monilar. Thereafter, they
executed their extrajudicial confessions with the assistance of Atty. Truya.
In his sworn statement, Mabalato admitted that he and Canatoy were hired by Cartuciano to
kill Barbas for a consideration. He then narrated how they planned and executed the
killing. Cartuciano, on the other hand and in his own sworn statement, implicated Sato, whom he
claimed to be his lover, as the person who contacted him more than a week from the incident.
According to Cartuciano, Sato asked him to hire two men to liquidate Barbas and offered to give him
P15, 000.00 as consideration. Hence, he contacted Mabalato and Canatoy and the three accused
devised the plan to kill Barbas. According to Cartuciano, he only accepted P10, 000.00 out of the
consideration offered by Sato and gave the same to Mabalato and Canatoy, refusing to receive the P5,
000.00 intended for him.
The trial court found Mabalato, Cartuciano and Canatoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder. The trial court found that, although no direct evidence was presented, the
circumstantial evidence offered, consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Tan and Soliman, was
sufficient for conviction. The CA affirmed the trial court's conviction.
ISSUE
Did the prosecution establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged?
RULING
YES. The prosecution's case rests mainly on: 1) the testimonies of witnesses Soliman and Tan;
and 2) the extrajudicial confessions of Cartuciano and the deceased Mabalato. The Court rules that
these pieces of evidence were sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Canatoy, along with
his other co-accused and in conspiracy with one another, committed the crime charged.
Although the records show that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Barbas, the
testimonies of Soliman and Tan on collateral facts of the crime, were properly given ample weight by
the trial court and the CA. It is settled that direct evidence is not indispensable for conviction in
criminal cases and that circumstantial evidence may be enough to support a court's decision of guilt.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence will be sufficient to
convict the offender if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inference
is derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that
the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.
Both Soliman and Tan identified in open court the two accused, Canatoy and Mabalato, as the
men running away from the crime scene. The trial court gave credence to the foregoing testimonies
and the circumstances to which they pertain were ruled to have been proven by the prosecution.
Well-established is the rule that factual findings made by the trial court, which had the opportunity
to directly observe the witnesses and to determine the probative value of the testimonies, are entitled
to great weight and respect because the trial court is in a better position to assess the same. These
circumstances proven lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused were the authors of
the crime, especially considering that the same is corroborated by the extrajudicial confessions of
Mabalato and Cartuciano, as discussed below.

556
 Moreover, the extrajudicial confessions of Mabalato and Cartuciano were admissible in
evidence and were credible. In their Briefs, they claimed that these confessions were inadmissible in
evidence as, among others, they were prepared in advance and were extracted by the police officers
through violence, intimidation, torture and false representation.
Extrajudicial confessions, to be admissible in evidence, must be: 1) voluntary; 2) made with
the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; 3) express; and 4) in writing. All these
requirements are applied in this case.
First, the confessions were voluntarily and freely executed. The allegations that they coerced
Mabalato and Cartuciano are baseless and no evidence was presented to support them. Moreover,
the confessions of Mabalato and Cartuciano are replete with details which could possibly be supplied
only by the perpetrators of the crime.
Second, Mabalato and Cartuciano, during the investigation, were duly assisted by Atty. Truya
— a competent and independent counsel, who informed them of their constitutional rights and the
consequences of their confessions.
It has been held that a confession is presumed to be voluntarily and validly made unless the
contrary is proven and that the burden of proof is upon the party who claims the contrary. Evidently,
the presumption must stand here. Moreover, as the confessions of Mabalato and Cartuciano meet the
standards prescribed by the Constitution and the law, they constitute evidence of a high order
because it is presumed that no person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately confess to a
crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.

557
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELEVER JAEN Y MORANTE
G.R. No. 241946. 29 July 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable to criminal
prosecutions as a contrary rule would render convictions virtually impossible given that most crimes,
by their nature, are purposely committed in seclusion and away from eyewitnesses. In the absence of
such direct evidence, the guilt of an accused may nevertheless be proven through circumstantial
evidence if sufficient circumstances, proven and taken together, create an unbroken chain leading to the
reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the author of the crime.
In this case, there was no direct evidence pointing Jaen to be the murder of Manzo. However,
circumstantial evidence points to him being guilty. The two had been together that afternoon, he had
knowledge of the placement to the gun of Cayot, he had an opportunity to access it when asked to start
the car, and his location on the back seat of the car corroborates to the testimony of the individual who
made the bullet trajectory examination that the shooter must have been located in the back seat of the
car.
FACTS
Allegedly, Freddie Cayot, Jr. with his distant relative Elever Jaen y Moranto (Jaen) attended a
ceremony in Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan. After the ceremony, Cayot’s officemate Jacob Manzo
asked him for a ride home. Upon arriving at Manzo’s home, Manzo invited them to have some drinks.
They were later joined by Sgt. Rey Banzon and his nephew. Sometime later, Manzo invited them all
to go to a resto-bar owned by Banzon in Mandaluyong.
When they reached the place, Cayot placed his handgun inside his belt bag, which he tucked
beneath the driver’s seat of his car. After the drinking spree, Cayot asked Jaen to head to the car first,
to start the engine. When they were going home, Cayot was driving; Manzo was sitting in the front
with Jen at the back. When they were near Manzo’s house, Cayot was startled by a series of gunshots
near his ears, and he stopped when he saw blood dripping from Manzo’s head. Cayot asked Jaen what
happened, and where his gun was. Jaen responded that Manzo took it. Cayot, therefore, believed that
Manzo committed suicide. They drove straight to Manzo’s house where Cayot explained the situation.
Afterward, Jaen confessed to him that he was the one who shot Manzo. Consequently, Cayot arrested
him.
During the investigation, the forensic chemist who conducted the bullet trajectory
examination noted that there was a bullet marked in the glove compartment, on the dashboard, and
on the door of the front passenger’s side, and the windshield was detached. It could be inferred that
the possible location of the assailant was inside the car, particularly the rear passenger seat.
RTC found Jaen guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder. Despite the absence of an
eyewitness, the RTC found the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
clearly identified Jaen as the gun wielder.
On appeal, CA affirmed the conviction of the lower court.
ISSUES
(1) May circumstantial evidence be sufficient for conviction?
(2) Is Jaen guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

558
RULING
(1) YES. It is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable to
criminal prosecutions as a contrary rule would render convictions virtually impossible given that
most crimes, by their nature, are purposely committed in seclusion and away from eyewitnesses. In
the absence of such direct evidence, the guilt of an accused may nevertheless be proven through
circumstantial evidence if sufficient circumstances, proven and taken together, create an unbroken
chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the
author of the crime. Circumstantial evidence may be characterized as that evidence that proves a fact
or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It is not a weaker
form of evidence vis-à-vis direct evidence as case law has consistently recognized that it may even
surpass the latter in weight and probative force. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one (1) circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and
(c) The combination of all these circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Aside from the unbroken chain of events leading to the faithful moment where Manzo was
killed, additional circumstances were present. First Jaen knew where the gum was hidden and had
access to it. Second, the model of the gun, being a Berretta 9mm which is a double-action, semi-
automatic, which can shoot burst consecutive shots without prior need to cock the gun. This would
explain why prior to the shot, Cayot did not hear anything. Third, the bullet trajectory examination
corroborates the place of assailant at the back seat of the car.
(2) YES. The following elements must be established to prosecute the crime of Murder: (1)
that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by
any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is
not parricide or infanticide. All of which had been present, Manzo had been killed, by reason of
circumstantial evidence Jaen can be held to be the killer, and the killing was attended by treachery
for being shot from behind and Manzo is not related to Jaen.

559
 CRIZALINA B. TORRES v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 241164, 14 August 2019, THIRD DIVISION (A. Reyes, Jr. J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove guilt of an accused beyond reasonable
doubt, for in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial
evidence to discharge its burden.

In this case, the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently established all
the elements of the crimes charged.

FACTS
Crizalina B. Torres (Torres) allegedly falsified or caused to be falsified her Daily Time Record
(DTR) by falsifying the respective signatures of officers on her DTRs, making it appear: (1) that they
verified the same and that she reported for work despite not doing so; and that (2) she applied for a
leave of absence on an earlier date.

Six (6) criminal cases for Falsification of Documents punishable under paragraphs (1), (2),
(4), and (5) of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) were filed against Torres.

Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Torres guilty beyond reasonable doubt of charges. Court of
Appeals (CA) denied Torres’s appeal, stating that direct evidence is not a condition sine qua
non to
prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt and in the
absence thereof, circumstantial
evidence may be resorted to. The totality of evidence presented by the prosecution established
Torres’s guilt of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE
Did the CA gravely err when it rendered the assailed decision and resolution stating that
direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable
doubt?

RULING
NO. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt, for in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under
conditions where concealment is highly probable.

In crimes involving the falsification of a public document, it is possible that secrecy and other
surreptitious means may have been employed by the perpetrator precisely to conceal the true nature
of a document he claims to be legitimate.

All the elements of the crimes charged were sufficiently established by the prosecution. The
elements of falsification under the aforesaid provision are as follows:

(1) The offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public;

(2) The offender takes advantage of his or her official position; and

560
 (3) The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification under
Article 171 of the RPC.

The totality of evidence presented by the prosecution established that, as to the first element,
at the time of the commission of the crime, Torres was a public officer serving as Intelligence Agent I
at the NBI-WEMRO.

As to the second element, an offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official
position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation
of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. Torres, as an
employee of the NBI-WEMRO, has the duty to make or prepare the subject DTRs.

As to the third element, Torres, established by evidence, falsified the signature appearing on
the subject DTRs, making it appear that the said officers verified her DTRs. Through the subject DTRs,
Torres likewise made untruthful statements in making it appear that she regularly reported for work
in September, October, and November, when she actually stopped showing up for work after
September 21, 2010. Torres likewise altered true dates on her Applications for Leave, making it
appear that she had filed the same on September 17, 2010 when they were actually filed on January
18, 2011. Minguez also testified that he had not seen Torres report for work for six (6) months.
Personnel Division has not received any application for any leave of absence.

561
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EXCEL GURRO y MAGA, et al.
G.R. Nos. 224562-237216, 18 September 2019, THIRD DIVISION, (Reyes, A., Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Direct proof is not necessary to establish the fact of conspiracy. Rather, conspiracy may be
presumed from, and proven by the acts of, the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted
action and community of interests.
In the case at bar, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial
evidence which, when taken together, prove that Wennie conspired with Joel. It is all too apparent that
Wennie's suspicious acts show her complicity to the crime. To begin with, she was the last person seen
with AAA. She and AAA went outside of the house, but the former returned home alone. AAA went missing
thereafter.
Likewise, Wennie's staunch efforts at protecting Joel were indeed questionable.

FACTS
An Information for Kidnapping for Ransom was filed against (Excel). Subsequently, the
prosecution, with leave of court, filed an Amended Information to include Wennie Inting (Wennie)
and Joel Jamindang (Joel) as additional accused.
Later on, a Second Amended Information was filed, alleging the fact of death, and accordingly,
the offense was amended to Kidnapping with Homicide. Excel and Wennie pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged, while Joel pleaded guilty.
On August 2, 2008, Arnel Salvador (Arnel) brought his daughter AAA to the house of Wennie.
Prosecution witness Patrick Mabulac (Patrick) confirmed that he saw AAA at Wennie’s house playing
with the latter’s daughters. Later on, he saw Wennie leave with AAA. Eventually, Wennie returned
alone.
AAA went missing thereafter.
At around 5:00 p.m., the brother of AAA’s mother received a text message from an unknown
person saying, “hawak naming ang anak ninyo. Don’t call the cops. 3 Million, kung hindi papatayin
naming ang anak ninyo.”
Arnel and his wife Helen, together with Helen’s mother, went to Wennie’s house looking for
AAA. When the group had left, Wennie asked Patrick to help her look for AAA. Since Wennie’s
cellphone battery was running low, she borrowed Patrick’s cellphone and inserted her SIM card
therein. After removing her SIM card from Patrick’s phone, Wennie apologized to him, claiming she
accidently deleted all of the messages in his cellphone. Later on, Patrick noticed that Joel’s number
had been deleted from his contact list. Wennie claimed that she might have casually deleted it. Patrick
asked for Joel’s number from the house helper. Later on, Patrick showed Arnel and Helen Joel’s
number and they noticed that it matched that of the kidnapper’s.
Arnel’s family received another text message, ordering him to deposit the money to
Metrobank in the account of one Jackielou Guevarra. Arnel informed the kidnappers that he only have
P186,000,000. After he deposited the money, the kidnappers instructed Arnel that AAA will be
dropped off in Cubao.

562
 However, AAA was never released. Arnel and his family learned that AAA had been killed.
They were instructed to go to a funeral parlor in Laguna to identify her body. Subsequently, Wennie
suddenly left for Samar.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Wennie and Joel as principals, and Excel as an
accomplice for the crime of Kidnapping with Homicide. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling
of the trial court.

ISSUES
(1) Did the prosecution sufficiently establish the guilt of Wennie?
(2) Was Excel an accomplice?

RULING
(1) YES. Once conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective,
thereby rendering them all equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations. This means that each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his/her
confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable
and natural consequences.
Simply stated, their responsibility is not confined to the accomplishment of the particular
purpose of conspiracy, but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of their
intended purpose. In the same vein, the conspirators are deemed to have intended the consequences
of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a
prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result.
Equally important, direct proof is not necessary to establish the fact of conspiracy. Rather,
conspiracy may be presumed from, and proven by the acts of, the accused pointing to a joint purpose,
design, concerted action and community of interests.
In the case at bar, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial
evidence which, when taken together, prove that Wennie conspired with Joel. It is all too apparent
that Wennie's suspicious acts show her complicity to the crime. To begin with, she was the last person
seen with AAA. She and AAA went outside of the house, but the former returned home alone. AAA
went missing thereafter.
Likewise, Wennie's staunch efforts at protecting Joel were indeed questionable.
It was certainly suspicious why Wennie constantly misled Patrick as to Joel's true cellphone
number. Certainly, the acts of Wennie, when taken together, reveal that she acted in concert with Joel
and that their acts emanated from the same purpose or common design showing unity in its
execution. For sure, Joel would not have been able to kidnap AAA if not for the participation of
Wennie.
(2) NO. It must be noted that the prosecution failed to prove, much less allege, any overt act
on Excel's part showing his direct participation in the kidnapping itself. It must be remembered that
for one to be regarded as an accomplice, it must be shown that

563
 (i) he knew the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, and concurred
with the latter in his purpose;
(ii) he cooperated in the execution by previous or simultaneous acts, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious
way; and
(iii) his acts bore a direct relation with the acts done by the principal.
There was no showing that Excel actually cooperated or assisted in kidnapping AAA and
detaining the latter. At best, Excel's participation in the incident was limited to acts committed after
the abduction was already consummated.

564
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TERESITA MONTALBAN y LLANEZA
G.R. No. 235014, 05 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

When she was apprehended, (1) the elective public official and (2) a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media, were not present. It was only during the signing of the
certificate of inventory of the seized items, and when the Montalban’s photo was taken when the media
representative was present.
The absence of three witnesses, and of not bringing these witnesses to the intended place of
arrest when the police operatives could easily do so, do not achieve the purpose of the law in having
these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.

FACTS
PO2 Gallega received an information from the confidential informant regarding the sale of
shabu by Montalban. A surveillance operation was conducted, and a buy-bust team was formed and
the sale was then consummated.

PO2 Gallega then introduced himself as a police officer and arrested Montalban. She was
ordered to empty her pockets and it yielded three plastic sachets containing crystalline substance as
well as the marked money.

PO2 Gallega had custody of the plastic sachet that he bought from Montalban while PO1
Vergara took the latter three plastic sachet. All the markings were made at the place of arrest in the
presence of Montalban.

At the police station, the seized items were inventoried and photographed in the presence of
a media representative and the accused. A request for laboratory examination was prepared, in
which the specimens yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Montalban denied the
charges and raised the defense of frame-up.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) found Montalban guilty of the
crime charged.

ISSUE
Was Montalban’s guilt for violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING
NO. In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the confiscated
drugs constitute the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is essential to
sustain a judgement of conviction. In this case, the negation of the said presumption of regularity
yielded in a substantial gap in the chain of custody of the seized items, which compromised the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
Both testimonies of PO2 Gallega and PO1 Vergara in their respective direct examination
showed non-compliance of the three-witness rule. When she was apprehended, (1) the elective
public official and (2) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media, were not
present. It was only during the signing of the certificate of inventory of the seized items, and when
the Montalban’s photo was taken when the media representative was present.

565
 It must be emphasized that the required three witnesses must be at, or near the intended
place of arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized
and confiscated drugs immediately after seizure and confiscation. The absence of three witnesses,
and of not bringing these witnesses to the intended place of arrest when the police operatives could
easily do so, do not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate
against the planting of drugs.

566
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RYAN ZANORIA y ARCEO and
MEL RICHARD SENO y ABELLANA
G.R. No. 226396, 2 December 2019, THIRD DIVISION RESOLUTION

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Non-compliance with Section 21(1) of RA 9165 tarnishes the integrity and undermines the
evidentiary value of allegedly seized items. Still, there are exceptional circumstances when
noncompliance with Section 21’s requirements does not undermine the seized items’ evidentiary value.
Noncompliance may be condoned so long as the prosecution identifies and proves justifiable grounds
for the deviation, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved.
Proof of positive steps taken to preserve and maintain the item’s integrity satisfies the second requisite.

Even if this Court were to overlook the failure to immediately mark the seized items, other
unjustified deviation from Section 21 persist. First, the prosecution failed to account for the measures
taken to safeguard the supposedly confiscated drug, along with the fact that the police officers and
Zanoria were in transit to a police station that was some seven to eight kilometers away from the crime
scene. Second, no photographs were taken. Third, only Zanoria and a barangay official witnessed the
inventory.

FACTS

Ryan Zanoria y Arceo (Zanoria) and Mel Richard Seno y Abellana (Seno) were charged with
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, punished under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

According to Police testimonies, at around midnight on August 9, 2009, a confidential

informant went to Police Inspector Wilson Abot (P/Insp. Abot) and reported that Zanoria and Seno
were selling illegal drugs at Barangay Pit-os, Cebu City.

Upon arrival at the site, Police Officer 2 Rene Remedios (PO2 Remedios) and the confidential
informant approached Zanoria and Seno, who were then selling drugs. The informant introduced PO2
Remedios as a friend and an interested buyer of shabu. Zanoria then agreed to sell PO2 Remedios
shabu for P300.00 and handed a plastic packet apparently containing shabu. Then and there, PO2
Remedios handed him the P300.00 in exchange.

Thereafter, PO2 Remedios introduced himself as a police officer and arrested Zanoria while
the informant signaled the rest of the team to approach them. Shortly after, P/Insp. Abot arrested
Seno. The officers recovered the P300.00 buy-bust money, a disposable syringe, and a Nokia 2300
mobile phone from Seno. They also recovered a plastic container and a Nokia 3310 mobile phone
from Zanoria.

Zanoria and Seno were then brought to the Talamban Police Station where the seized items
were marked. P/Insp. Abot prepared the certificate of inventory as Pepito Orbeta, a Barangay Pit-os
official, witnessed the inventory. The police officers conducted the marking and inventory of the

567
confiscated items at the police station when several people, some of whom were Zanoria and Seno’s
regular clients, surrounded their security and allegedly compromised them. PO2 Remedios then
delivered the plastic packet and the laboratory examination request to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory, where forensic chemist officer P/Supt. Salinas confirmed the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, in the seized item.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Zanoria and Seno of the crime charged. Zanoria
and Seno both appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). While their appeal was pending, Seno passed
away which the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the criminal case against him and
extinguishing his pecuniary liabilities. The CA affirmed Zanoria’s conviction, ruling that even if there
were apparent departures from Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, these do not
render the evidence inadmissible as long as their integrity and evidentiary value were preserved, as
in this case. Zanoria filed a Notice of Appeal which the CA gave due course.

ISSUE
Was Ryan Zanoria y Arceo proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt on the violation under
Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act?

RULING

NO. Section 21 of the Comprehensive Drugs Act spells out measures to ensure the integrity
of drugs and drug paraphernalia seized during drug operations. Concerning necessary actions
immediately after seizure, Section 21(1) of Republic Act 9165, as originally worded, provides: “The
apprehending team, having initially custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]”

Non-compliance with Section 21 tarnishes the integrity and undermines the evidentiary
value of allegedly seized items. Still, there are exceptional circumstances when noncompliance with
Section 21’s requirements does not undermine the seized items’ evidentiary value. Noncompliance
may be condoned so long as the prosecution identifies and proves justifiable grounds for the
deviation, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. Proof
of positive steps taken to preserve and maintain the item’s integrity satisfies the second requisite.

Even if this Court were to overlook the failure to immediately mark the seized items, other
unjustified deviation from Section 21 persist. First, the prosecution failed to account for the measures
taken to safeguard the supposedly confiscated drug, along with the fact that the police officers and
Zanoria were in transit to a police station that was some seven to eight kilometers away from the
crime scene. Second, no photographs were taken. Third, only Zanoria and a barangay official
witnessed the inventory.

People v. Lim considered instances when the absence of the requisite third-party witnesses
may be excused: “(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area;
(2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the
elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4)

568
earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official
within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault
of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time
constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets,
prevent the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the
offenders could escape.”

Here, no reliable justification for the absence of the representatives from the media and the
Department of Justice was given. Neither was there a showing of genuine and sufficient effort to
secure their presence. Even if the transfer from the place of arrest to the police station may be
justified, this is by no means a blanket authorization to be lackadaisical in the process. The risk of
alteration, tampering, contamination, and substitution persists until the presentation of evidence in
court. At every step of the way, police officers are expected to zealously adhere to precautions on
chain of custody. The third-party witnesses help protect this procedure.

The absence of required third-party witnesses, along with the police officer’s complete and
equally unaccounted failure to take photographs of the item allegedly seized, raised serious doubts
on the integrity of the items that are at the core of Zanoria’s prosecution.

All told, the police officer’s recurrent non-compliance with the requirement of the law grossly
undermined the integrity of the items at the core of Zanoria’s prosecution. This translates to
reasonable doubt on the corpus delicti, an inability to demonstrate the second element for conviction
in cases of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

569
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN CUPCUPIN y MANALANG
G.R. No. 236454, 05 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To repeat, marking of the evidence is an important step because it sets apart and identifies the
illegal drug from all other materials present and/or seized at the locus criminis. It makes the illegal
drug readily identifiable from all the other evidence confiscated from Alvin.
PO1 Pabustan’s inconsistent testimony, however engenders doubt on whether the crucial step
on the marking of evidence was strictly complied with. It, thus, opened the possibility that the drug may
have been switched, tampered with, altered, or substituted.

FACTS
Following the intelligence confirmation that Alvin was connected with the Punzal Group
which operated the drug trade in Tarlac, the Provincial Intelligence Branch of the Philippine National
Police-Tarlac launched a test-buy on Alvin Cupcupin (Alvin).

After it yielded positive results, they conducted a successful buy-bust operation. They were
able to consummate the transaction, apprehend Alvin, and even instructed Alvin to open his car to
which there was another heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet.

PO1 Santiago took pictures of the confiscated items in the presence of Alvin, Barangay
Kagawads Allan Bautista, Jerjohn Viray, and Rolando Santiago, and Media representative Homer
Teodoro of GMA News. There was no DOJ representative because the office was already closed when
they went there earlier that day.

The team proceeded to Camp Macabulos where the requests for examination were made. The
results yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

In his defense, Alvin denied all allegations. He posited that he and his wife were eating at
Shakey’s SM Tarlac when he excused himself to meet someone from the Land Transportation Office
at the parking lot. There, he was suddenly grabbed and arrested. The police also confiscated his
personal belongings and P7,000.00 cash. Both Alvin and his wife testified that the photographs of the
alleged confiscated items were not taken at the SM parking lot but at Camp Macabulos.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Alvin, Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
conviction.

ISSUE
Did the prosecution prove Alvin’s guilt of illegal sale of prohibited drugs?

RULING
NO. The chain of custody requires that any person who came in contact with the seized drug
must observe the procedure for its proper handling in order to remove any doubt that it was changed,
altered, substituted, or modified before its presentation in court.
The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling, and
recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence.
The strict observance of the chain of custody finds even greater significance in buy-bust operations

570
due to serious abuses by law enforcement officers in this mode of apprehension of drug personalities.
The four links in the chain of custody have been defined, viz:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist
to the court.
The prosecution must establish that there had been no break in any of the four links in the
chain.
PO1 Pabustan’s initial testimony that he marked the sachet at the police station and his
sudden shift when he subsequently said he marked it at the parking lot right after the arrest cannot
just be brushed aside lightly.
Contrary to the findings of the trial court and the CA, such inconsistency does not refer to a
more trivial matter. It pertains directly to the identity of the seized prohibited drug.
To repeat, marking of the evidence is an important step because it sets apart and identifies
the illegal drug from all other materials present and/or seized at the locus criminis. It makes the
illegal drug readily identifiable from all the other evidence confiscated from Alvin. PO1 Pabustan’s
inconsistent testimony, however engenders doubt on whether the crucial step on the marking of
evidence was strictly complied with. It, thus, opened the possibility that the drug may have been
switched, tampered with, altered, or substituted.
The arresting team in this case failed to offer a valid justification for his failure to secure the
presence of a DOJ representative as witness to the inventory and photograph of the seized items. It
cannot be overemphasized that the presence of the persons who should witness the post-operation
procedures is necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint
of illegitimacy or irregularity.

571
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAY LEON, JR. Y CAPILI
G.R. No. 238523, 02 December 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Gesmundo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

To secure a conviction in cases involving the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be duly established: (1) [T]he identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object [of the sale], and the consideration; (2) [T]he delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor.

Here, the prosecution successfully established both elements for the charge of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs beyond moral certainty.

For cases involving the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Article II, Section
11 of R.A. No. 9165, the following requisites must be duly established for a successful conviction: “(1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be the prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.”

Nothing in the records show that Leon has the legal authority to possess six plastic sachets of
shabu.

FACTS

On May 9, 2012, Jay Leon, Jr. y Capili (Leon) and Enrique Ramos y Joaquin (Ramos) were
charged, in three separate Informations, with violation of Republic Act No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Leon and Ramos pleaded not guilty to the charges
against them.

According to Police Officer 2 Bembol Quiambo (PO2 Quiambao) and Police Officer 1 Edwin
Cipriano Preligera (PO1 Preligera), they received a report from a confidential informant that an alias
“Jay,” later identified as Leon, was selling illegal drugs in Banga 1st, Plaridel, Bulacan. After surveilling
the area and observing Leon selling a plastic sachet to two men, the station’s police chief formed a
team led by a certain Senior Inspector Ramos, with PO1 Preligera as poseur-buyer and PO2 Quiambao
as backup. PO1 Preligera was given three P1,000.00 bill as buy-bust money, which he marked.
Afterwards, PO1 Preligera coordinated their operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency.

A few hours later, the team headed to Sitio Dapdap in Banga 1st. From their vehicle, PO1
Preligera and the informant walked towards the target area. The informant introduced PO1 Preligera
to Leon as a friend. In turn, Leon asked how much they wanted to buy, to which PO1 Preligera
answered that he wanted P3,000.00 worth and handed Leon the marked money. Leon then took out
a plastic sachet from his belt bag and gave it to PO1 Preligera. Then, PO1 Preligera lit a cigarette to
notify the other team members that the sale had been consummated. As the other officers closed in,
PO1 Preligera introduced himself as a police officer and arrested Leon. He then instructed Leon to
empty his belt bag, which yielded six more plastic sachets, the marked money, and other items.

572
Ramos, who was standing nearby, questioned PO2 Qiambao on Leon’s arrest and the officer’s
identities. Ramos tried to run when the team members introduced themselves as police officers, only
to be restrained by PO2 Quiambao. Upon frisking Ramos, PO2 Quiambao found one plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance and marked it.

PO1 Preligera inventoried the seized items at the place of arrest, as witnessed by Leon,
Marcelino Gabe (Gabe), the media representative, and Ernesto De Dios (De Dios), a barangay official.
Meanwhile, Senior Inspector Ramos took photographs during the inventory. The buy-bust team then
returned to the Plaridel Police Station where the Department of Justice representative, Fiscal Jowell
Jose, signed the inventory. Afterwards, a request for laboratory examination of the seized items was
executed which tested positive for shabu.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Leon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, but acquitted Ramos for lack of evidence. The RTC found
that the elements of crimes charged against Leon were sufficiently established, finding that the
apprehending team faithfully complied with the requirements under Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165.

The Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision affirming the RTC’s findings. It held that the
prosecution has duly proven the elements of the crime of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, and that the buy-bust team substantially complied with Section 21 of RA No. 9164.

ISSUES
Did the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Leon for violations of Article
II, Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165?

RULING

YES. To secure a conviction in cases involving the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
under Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be duly established:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object [of the sale], and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

In People v. Torres, this Court emphasized that what is important in such cases “is the proof
that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.”
In cases prosecuted under the R.A. No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the seized drug itself.

Here, the prosecution successfully established both elements for the charge of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs beyond moral certainty.

For cases involving the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Article II, Section
11 of R.A. No. 9165, the following requisites must be duly established for a successful conviction:

573
 (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be the prohibited
drug;

(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and

(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.”

Nothing in the records show that Leon has the legal authority to possess six plastic sachets of
shabu. People v. Unisa is instructive: “The rule is settled that possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi, which is sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. The burden of evidence is,
thus, shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.”

For Leon’s failure to discharge the burden of explaining why he was in possession of the
dangerous drug, he is deemed to have knowledge of the possession. Thus, all the elements for Article
II, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 were established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, Leon merely interposed an alibi and
denied the accusations against him. In prosecutions for violations of R.A. No. 9165, credence is given
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, especially when they are police officers presumed to
have properly performed their official duties. In the absence of an adequate showing of bad faith, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over an accused’s self-serving
and uncorroborated denial and alibi.

574
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL CARDENAS Y HALILI
G.R. No. 229046, 11 September 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The prosecution cannot rely on the presumption of regularity. It is worth emphasizing that this
burden of proof never shifts.
Indeed, the accused need not present a single piece of evidence in his defense if the State has not
discharged its onus. The accused can simply rely on his right to be presumed innocent. In this connection,
the prosecution therefore, in cases involving dangerous drugs, always has the burden of proving
compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21.

FACTS
Cardenas was charged for illegal sale of 0.62 gram of dried Marijuana Fruiting tops, a
dangerous drug. He pleaded not guilty during arraignment.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Cardenas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's conviction of
Cardenas.

ISSUE
Was Cardenas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged?

RULING
NO. In the instant case, the chain of custody is broken
According to the prosecution's version of events, after the buy-bust was conducted, the team
proceeded to the police station, wherein PO2 Santiago turned over the seized item to PO3 Carranza.
After PO3 Carranza prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination, PO2 Santiago brought the
seized item for physical and chemical examination to the crime laboratory and turned over the same
to Engr. Jabonillo, the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
However, on the witness stand, PO2 Santiago testified that he turned over the alleged seized
drug specimen to one SPO1 Ronaldo Corea (SPO1 Corea). According to PO2 Santiago's testimony, it
was SPO1 Corea who turned over the specimen to PO3 Cananza.
As SPO1 Corea was not presented by the prosecution, the evidence on record is silent as to
how SPO1 Corea handled the specimen, the condition of the specimen at the time the specimen was
handed over to SPO1 Corea, the precautions taken by SPO1 Corea to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item, and how SPO1 Corea transferred possession of the specimen to
PO3 Cananza. In short, the chain of custody of the specimen from PO2 Santiago to SPO1 Corea
and from SPO1 Corea to PO3 Carranza was not firmly established.

575
 Further, according to the prosecution's theory, Engr. Jabonilla examined the alleged seized
drug specimen and subsequently turned over the same to the evidence custodian of the PNP Crime
Laboratory.
However, the evidence on record is silent as to how Engr. Jabonilla exactly managed and
handled the specimen. Worse, the evidence custodian was not even identified and presented as a
witness. The prosecution was not able to establish with clarity and certainty how this anonymous
evidence custodian stored the specimen and ensured the proper condition of the same. The evidence
on record is likewise silent as to how the specimen was transferred back to Engr. Jabonilla, who
alleged retrieved the specimen from the custodian in order to bring the same to the RTC during the
trial. Clearly, the chain of custody of the specimen from Engr. Jabonilla to the evidence
custodian, and from the evidence custodian back to Engr. Jabonilla, was not satisfactorily
established.
In the instant case, the prosecution failed to both recognize and sufficiently justify the non-
observance of section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
Aside from the prosecution's failure to satisfactorily establish the chain of custody, the
integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the prosecution's evidence are also put into
serious doubt due to the indisputable failure of the authorities to observe the mandatory procedural
requirements laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. The law requires the strict observance of
certain special rules that provide for procedural safeguards which ensure moral certainty in the
conviction of the accused.
Concededly, there are instances wherein departure from the aforesaid mandatory
procedures are permissible. However, the prosecution must first (1) recognize any lapses on the
part of the police officers and (2) be able to justify the same.
The prosecution cannot rely on the presumption of regularity
It is worth emphasizing that this burden of proof never shifts. Indeed, the accused need not
present a single piece of evidence in his defense if the State has not discharged its onus. The accused
can simply rely on his right to be presumed innocent. In this connection, the prosecution therefore,
in cases involving dangerous drugs, always has the burden of proving compliance with the
procedure outlined in Section 21.
Epilogue
While the Court now reverses the wrongful conviction of accused appellant Cardenas by
ordering his immediate release, it cannot be said that justice has truly won the day.
For despite the blatant disregard of the mandatory requirements provided under RA 9165,
accused-appellant Cardenas has been made to suffer incarceration for over a decade. There is truth
in the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied.
The Court believes that the menace of illegal drugs must be curtailed with resoluteness and
determination. The Constitution declares that' the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment
by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Nevertheless, by thrashing basic constitutional rights as a means to curtail the proliferation
of illegal drugs, instead of protecting the general welfare, oppositely, the general welfare is viciously
assaulted. In other words, by disregarding the Constitution, the war on illegal drugs becomes a self-

576
defeating and self-destructive enterprise. A battle waged against illegal drugs that resorts to
short cuts and tramples on the rights of the people is not a war on drugs; it is a war against the
people.

577
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GERARDO BUEZA, JR.
G.R. No. 233743, 02 December 2019, THIRD DIVISION RESOLUTION

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, these requisites must be shown to sustain a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Also, the circumstances being considered must be consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is the author of the crime.

Guided by these principles, the Court is convinced that Gerardo Bueza, Jr.’s guilt was established
by the following pieces of circumstantial evidence considered by the RTC and CA: (1) prosecution
witnesses Roberto Bueza and his wife saw and heard the victim and Bueza, Jr. together while having an
argument in the wee hours of the morning; (2) the victim was found dead after he was last seen with
Bueza, Jr.; and, (3) Bueza, Jr. fled to a distant place immediately after the victim’s death. To be sure, the
quantitative requirement under the Rules of Court was satisfied by the number of circumstances present.
More important, these pieces of evidence, taken together, point to the indubitable conclusion that Bueza,
Jr. killed the victim.

FACTS

On April 29, 2010, Gerardo Bueza, Jr. (Gerardo, Jr.), with treachery and evident
premeditation, Gerardo Bueza, Sr., did there and then willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, attack, hit
and stab Gerardo Sr. with a sharp instrument several times, thereby employing means, manner, and
form in the execution thereof which tended directly and especially to insure its commission without
danger to Gerardo, Jr., the result of which attack was that said Gerardo Sr. received several mortal
wounds on his body which directly caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Gerardo, Jr. of parricide for the killing of his father.
In his Brief before the Court of Appeals (CA), Gerardo Bueza, Jr. insists on his innocence, claiming that
the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution failed to establish his identity as the
perpetrator of the crime. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUES

Is Gerardo Bueza, Jr. guilty of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
given the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution?

RULING

578
 YES. Circumstantial evidence “indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must
draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence.” In the Court’s jurisdiction, circumstantial
evidence could establish the commission of the crime and the identity of its perpetrator. The
utilization of circumstantial evidence to support conviction is a recognition of the instances when
direct evidence is not available due to the clandestine nature of the crime or the perpetrator’s desire
to conceal it.

Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, these requisites must be shown to sustain a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence:

(a) there is more than one circumstance;

(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

Also, the circumstances being considered must be consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is the author of the crime.

Guided by these principles, the Court is convinced that Gerardo Bueza, Jr.’s guilt was
established by the following pieces of circumstantial evidence considered by the RTC and CA:

(1) prosecution witnesses Roberto Bueza and his wife saw and heard the victim and Bueza,
Jr. together while having an argument in the wee hours of the morning;

(2) the victim was found dead after he was last seen with Bueza, Jr.; and,

(3) Bueza, Jr. fled to a distant place immediately after the victim’s death. To be sure, the
quantitative requirement under the Rules of Court was satisfied by the number of circumstances
present. More important, these pieces of evidence, taken together, point to the indubitable conclusion
that Bueza, Jr. killed the victim.

The first two circumstances prove that:

(1) Buenza, Jr. was the last person seen with the victim; and

(2) prior to the victim’s death, he and Buenza, Jr. shared unsympathetic feelings towards each
other.

Buenza, Jr. himself testified about the animosity between him and the victim during his direct
examination. Also, the Court has no reasons to discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The records are bereft of any indication that they have reasons to falsely testify against Bueza, Jr.
Moreover, Bueza, Jr.’s flight after the killing of his father is a strong indicium of his guilt. While it is
true that flight should not be automatically equated to guilt, unexplained flight demonstrates guilty
when taken together with all the other pieces of circumstantial evidence attendant in this case.

579
580
 ELDEFONSO VIRTUCIO, JR. y GUIMARANGAN ALIAS “GAGA” AND LEO DOMINGO y LINDAYAO
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 249822, 05 December 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Inting, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Recantations are hardly given much weight, except when there is no other evidence sustaining
a conviction other than the testimony of a witness or witnesses who has or have made contradictory
statements as to material facts.
Analuna’s previous affidavit is more verifiable and convincing than her subsequent affidavit of
retraction because other prosecution evidence corroborate her previous testimony.

FACTS
Analuna Bermejo (Bermejo) and Jemar Mahilum (Mahilum) were on a motorcycle bound for
San Carlos City when another motorcycle appeared from the corner and ran alongside their left.

Bermejo recognized the driver as Eldefonso Virtucio (Virtucio) and the back rider as Leo
Domingo (Domingo), who pulled out a gun and fired. Virtucio and Domingo sped ahead and swerved
to face them, firing more shots. Mahilum was hit once again and the motorcycle fell down. Mahilum
and Bermejo ran towards the sugarcane field. Bermejo stayed hidden but Virtucio and Domingo were
able to kill Mahilum.

Thereafter, Virtucio and Domingo were charged with Murder and Frustrated Murder. After
the prosecution rested its case, Bermejo submitted an affidavit of retraction. On rebuttal, the mother
of Jemar, Emelita Mahilum, testified that the retraction was in exchange for a considerable amount of
money.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Virtucio and Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Court of Appeals (CA) found that evident premeditation and treachery were clearly established.
Virtucio and Domingo moved for reconsideration but were denied for lack of merit. Hence, this
recourse.

ISSUE
Did the RTC and CA err in convicting Virtucio and Domingo?

RULING
NO. CA held that recantations are hardly given much weight, except when there is no other
evidence sustaining a conviction other than the testimony of a witness or witnesses who has or have

581
made contradictory statements as to material facts. It agreed that Analuna’s previous affidavit is
more verifiable and convincing than her subsequent affidavit of retraction because other prosecution
evidence corroborate her previous testimony.
For one, CA took judicial notice of the fact that there was a full moon on August 24, 2010,
jibing with Analuna’s testimony that the moon was bright.
Where there is no showing that the RTC overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or
that it gravely abused its discretion, then the Court need not disturb and interfere with its assessment
of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses. The foregoing rule finds an even more stringent
application where the findings of the RTC are sustained by the CA.

582
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABDIR KHALIL SAID y ARADJI
G.R. No. 237774, 04 December 2019, SECOND DIVISION RESOLUTION

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Under the original provision of Section 21 and its IRR, the apprehending team was required to
immediately conduct a physical inventory and photograph of the seized items after seizure and
confiscation in the presence no less than three witnesses, namely: (1) a representative from the media;
(2) a representative from the Department of Justice; and (3) any elected public official. They must also
sign the inventory and be furnished with their own copy thereof. It follows, therefore, that the three so-
called insulating witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension.

In the present case, there is no showing that the seized sachets were marked in the presence of
the accused-appellant or that he refused to sign the inventory receipt. What is more, the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized item were not executed immediately at the place of
apprehension and seizure.

FACTS

The Police Station of Quezon City received from a regular confidential informant a report that
a certain alias “Khalil” was selling illegal drugs. With the information at hand, the police formed a
buy-bust operation team. PO 2 Mabazza was tasked to coordinate with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency to secure the necessary pre-operation and coordination report. However, he
returned empty-handed due to unavailability of the persons who will sign the documents.

On the day of the buy bust operation, the police officers saw Khalil with two individuals
named Waliyol and Tulawie. Their confidential informant introduced PO2 Macaballug to Khalil as an
interested buyer of “shabu”. When the drugs were handed to PO2 Macaballug, he signalled the other
officers then identified himself as a police officer and placed Khalil under arrest.

PO2 Frias recovered one transparent plastic sachet of crystalline substance from Waliyol’s
front pocket while there was nothing in the possession of Tulawie. After that, PO2 Macaballug marked
the evidence recovered from Khalil, while PO2 Frias marked the items seized from Waliyol. PO2
Mabazza accomplished the Chain of Custody Form and received the turned over confiscated items.

Khalil and his companions were brought to the barangay hall so that photographs of them
could be taken, while the Executive Officer and Baragay Kagawad signed the Inventory of Seized
Properties/ Items.

Afterwards, the accused and his companions, as well as the plastic sachets, were brought to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. The results of the
examination stated that the substance is positive for the presence of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. Only Khalil and Waliyol were charged with the violation of R.A. 9165, the Dangerous
Drugs Law.

583
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that Khalil is guilty beyond reasonable doubt, while
Waliyol is not guilty and the charge against him is dismissed. Aggrieved, Khalil appealed to the Court
of Appeals (CA). CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Were the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence duly preserved?

RULING

NO. The factual circumstances of the case tells that the alleged offense was committed on May
15, 2011. At that time, the effective law enumerating the requirements of the chain of custody rule
was Sec 12 of R.A. No. 9165. It states:

“(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof”

Under the original provision of Section 21 and its IRR, the apprehending team was required
to immediately conduct a physical inventory and photograph of the seized items after seizure and
confiscation in the presence no less than three witnesses, namely:

(1) a representative from the media;

(2) a representative from the Department of Justice; and

(3) any elected public official.

They must also sign the inventory and be furnished with their own copy thereof. It follows,
therefore, that the three so-called insulating witnesses should already be physically present at the
time of apprehension.

Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on items after they have been seized. This is the starting point in the custodial link and is
vital in the chain of custody rule since the succeeding handlers of the seized drugs will use the
markings as reference. The rule requires that the making of the contraband be done in the presence
of the apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation.

In the present case, there is no showing that the seized sachets were marked in the presence
of the accused-appellant or that he refused to sign the inventory receipt. What is more, the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized item were not executed immediately at the place of
apprehension and seizure.

584
585
 CARLOS A. CATUBAO v. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 227371, 02 October 2019, SECOND DIVISION (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The inconsistencies are not trivial or minor, as they do, in fact, touch upon the central fact of the
crime. To reiterate, the existence of the third element of the crime – that the gift was given in
consideration of Catubao doing an act – and is altogether hinged on the testimonies alone of Atty. Perito
and Ragasa. These testimonies, in turn, then have to be credible enough to establish the said element
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Catubao’s version that the money he received was partly a repayment
by Atty. Perito and party “balato” is, to the mind of the Court, more believable.

FACTS
According to the prosecution, estafa cases were filed against Cornelio Ragasa so he hired Atty.
Fernando Perito as his lawyer. The cases were pending before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
in Bacoor, Cavite and accused Carlos Catubao was then the handling prosecutor.
For two years, the cases remained unresolved, prompting Atty. Perito to personally follow
them up with Catubao. The latter would ask him for “pang inom” whenever Atty. Perito makes a
follow up. Before going on a Christmas vacation, Catubao said he needed money for he was leaving
for Samar.
On December 19, 2008, Catubao called Atty. Perito, asking any amount of money for a
drinking session with his friends, and mentioned that P5, 000.00 will do. Atty. Perito informed Ragasa
about it, who handed to the former said amount. Atty. Perito then ordered his secretary to send P4,
000.00 to the accused through LBC Padre Faura. After this, Catubao finally resolved the cases in favor
of Ragasa.
Thereafter, an Information for Direct Bribery was filed against Catubao, upon the complaint
of Ragasa and Atty. Perito. During the arraignment, Catubao pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial and trial
thereafter ensued.
According to the defense, Atty. Perito approached Catubao in October 2008, telling him that
he left his wallet. He asked Catubao a favor since he needed to go home to San Pedro Laguna. Catubao
gave him P1, 000.00. Allegedly, Atty. Perito paid the said amount through the local LBC branch.
However, it was only after Christmas that Catubao went to the LBC branch. He expected to
receive P1, 000.00 only but Atty. Perito sent him P4, 000.00. He immediately called Atty. Perito and
asked him why he sent such amount. The latter replied that he was just repaying the favor that
Catubao extended to him, and that he also won a case.
After trial on the merits, Sandiganbayan convicted Catubao of the crime charged.
Sandiganbayan held that, based on the evidence, Catubao solicited and received a gift from Atty.
Perito to expedite the resolution of the estafa cases of Ragasa pending before him. Thus, Catubao
received a gift in consideration for doing an act, though not constituting a crime in itself, but was
related to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. Hence, the instant appeal.

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ISSUE
Did Sandiganbayan err in convicted Catubao of the crime of Direct Bribery?

RULING
YES. To recall, the crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
consists of the following elements:
(1) That the accused is a public officer;
(2) That he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or
promise;
(3) That such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his
commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing
something which is his official duty to do; and
(4) That the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
The existence of the first element is undisputed, it being established by the prosecution, and
admitted by Catubao himself, that he held the position of Fourth Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Cavite at the time of the incident complained of.
The second element is also undoubtedly present. As the Sandiganbayan found, Catubao
received the amount of P4, 000.00 from Atty. Perito’s client, Cornelio Ragasa. He personally claimed
the amount from the local LBC Branch in Guiuan, Samar while he was there in December 2008.
The fourth element is likewise undoubtedly present because the resolution of the estafa cases
filed against Ragasa indubitably relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
The third element, however, was not duly proven. The third element requires that the gift be
given in consideration of the accused’s commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime,
or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do.
In the present case, apart from the testimonial evidence of Atty. Perito and Ragasa, the
prosecution presented no other evidence that the money was solicited by Catubao and that it was
given in consideration of the latter finally acting on the case. The existence of the third element,
therefore, boils down to the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The
testimonies, however, were so marred by inconsistencies that they are no longer believable.
For instance, Atty. Perito testified that the first time Catubao asked money from him was
around December 16, 17, or 18, 2008. On direct examination, he said that Catubao demanded money
from him via phone call, and that he called Ragasa after to tell him that Catubao was demanding
money. Yet, on cross-examination, Atty. Perito was confused about the supposed incident as to when
Catubao actually demanded money.
Even Ragasa’s testimony was confusing. During his direct examination, his version of the
incident was that Catubao called Atty. Perito while the latter and Ragasa were together in the car.
However, during the cross-examination, he confusing testified that it was in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite; outside the office; in front of the office, at the parking lot.
Ragasa even added that the events he testified to happened around last week of November to
around second week of December 2008, contrary to Atty. Perito’s claim that Catubao demanded
money from him on December 19, 2008.

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 The inconsistencies are not trivial or minor, as they do, in fact, touch upon the central fact of
the crime. To reiterate, the existence of the third element of the crime – that the gift was given in
consideration of Catubao doing an act – and is altogether hinged on the testimonies alone of Atty.
Perito and Ragasa. These testimonies, in turn, then have to be credible enough to establish the said
element beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Catubao’s version that the money he received was partly a
repayment by Atty. Perito and party “balato” is, to the mind of the Court, more believable.
While the Sandiganbayan was not wrong in its exhortation regarding integrity of public
officials, it erred in its reliance on Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713 (R.A. No. 6713), a different
penal law which proscribes public officials from soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift
from any person in the course of their official duties.
Verily, the crime charged against Catubao was Direct Bribery and it has specific elements
which are different from a violation of Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713. While the standard provided in
the latter may be ideal for all public officials, the Sandiganbayan nevertheless erred in adjudging the
guilt of Catubao on the basis of the same standard when, to recall, Direct Bribery requires that the
gift be in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to
refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do.
In other words, while a prosecutor’s receipt of a balato from a party litigant may indeed be
reprehensible from the lens of public service, such act, at the end of the day, is not punishable as
Direct Bribery.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUTH DELA ROSA y LIKINON a.k.a. “SALLY”
G.R. No. 227880, 06 November 2019, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Sworn statements often conflict with testimonies given in open court because the former are
seldom complete or comprehensive accounts of what actually happened. Thus, affidavits taken ex parte
are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.
AAA’s failure to mention the February 2013 incident is understandable given the questions
asked of her in her sworn statement. The records reveal that the examination conducted by PO2 De Leon
involved only the March 2013 incident. Thus, AAA never had the chance to include her encounter with
Kim in February 2013.
FACTS
Two separate Informations were filed charging Ruth Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) with qualified
human trafficking. The prosecution presented AAA, BBB, and Police Officer 2 Elena De Leon (PO2 De
Leon) as its witnesses.
AAA testified that sometime in February 2013, she received a call from Dela Rosa, asking to
meet at a supermarket for an errand. However, upon meeting at the supermarket, the two proceeded
to the Coa Hotel on Friendship road in Angeles City.
In one of the hotel rooms, AAA waited with Dela Rosa and another woman whom she did not
know. A few hours later, a Korean man, whom AAA came to know as Kim Caben, arrived and sent the
unidentified woman home. Dela Rosa then introduced AAA to Kim as her niece, after which AAA was
told to take a bath.
Kim ordered AAA to sit closer to him. When she did, Kim mashed her breasts and ordered her
to lie down on her side. Kim the touched her genitals and had sex with her. Unable to bear it any
longer, AAA asked to be excused.
Upon exiting the hotel, Kim paid Dela Rosa Php 2,200.00, of which Dela Rosa gave AAA Php
700.00. Dela Rosa warned AAA not to tell anyone about what had happened and advised that the girl
comply with Kim’s future requests so as not to embarrass her.
Subsequently, AAA received a text message from Kim, asking if she had “a lady friend” and if
she could “giver her lady friend to him.” With Dela Rosa’s threat in mind, AAA complied. She asked
BBB, then 15 years old, to accompany her to Avante Hotel. In the said hotel, Kim had sex with each of
the girls—AAA first, then BBB.
Around 15 minutes later, police officers barged into the room and arrested Kim.
BBB told PO2 De Leon what happened during an interview the following day. During cross-
examination, BBB noted that it was AAA who asked her to meet with the Korean national.
PO2 De Leon testified that she was the officer who interviewed AAA and BBB at the police
station after Kim’s arrest. Although she testified that she interviewed both AAA and BBB, she did not
mention BBB’s interview in her affidavit. Meanwhile, she recounted that AAA told her that she met
Kim through her aunt “Sally,” who gave AAA’s phone number to Kim. Based on these interviews, the
police conducted an operation to arrest Dela Rosa.

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 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) acquitted Dela Rosa of the charges with respect to BBB. It
found that Dela Rosa had no hand in BBB’s encounter with Kim. BBB admitted that she went to Avante
Hotel only upon AAA’s request. On cross-examination, BBB admitted that Dela Rosa had no
participation in what happened to her.
As for what happened to AAA, the trial court found Dela Rosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of qualified human trafficking.
Dela Rosa appealed her conviction. In her brief, she argued that the prosecution failed to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She questioned AAA’s credibility given her failure to
mention an incident in the sworn statement taken by PO2 De Leon. This omission allegedly
contradicted her testimony in court that Dela Rosa brought her to Coa Hotel and instructed her to
have sex with Kim. This inconsistency, according to Dela Rosa, casts reasonable doubt on her
conviction.
The Office of the Solicitor General, countered in its Brief that AAA’s sworn statement and her
testimony had no material inconsistencies. Her sworn statement was merely responding to standard
questions. Hence, she may not be faulted for failing to disclose other relevant prior events.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
ISSUE
Should Dela Rosa still be convicted for qualified human trafficking, considering the disparity
between the testimony in open court and the sworn statement?
RULING
YES. The trial court’s assignment of probative value to witnesses’ testimonies will not be
disturbed except when significant matters were overlooked, because it “had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witness on the stand. Furthermore, People v. SPO1 Gonzales, Jr. provides
that sworn statements often conflict with testimonies given in open court. This is because sworn
statements are seldom complete or comprehensive accounts of what actually happened.
It has been consistently held that discrepancies or inconsistencies between a witness’s
affidavit and testimony do not necessarily impair his credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and
are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating
officer. What is important is, in the over-all analysis of the case, the trial court’s findings and
conclusions are duly supported by evidence on record.
Affidavits taken ex parte are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open
court. In any event, AAA’s failure to mention the February 2013 incident is understandable given the
questions asked of her in her sworn statement. The records reveal that the examination conducted
by PO2 De Leon involved only the March 2013 incident. Thus, AAA never had the chance to include
her encounter with Kim in February 2013.
Notwithstanding, AAA was still able to recount during trial what transpired in February 2013,
to the trial court’s satisfaction. Thus, the absence of the February 2013 incident from her sworn
statement does not affect her credibility as a witness.

590
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
JUAN CREDO y DE VERGARA and DANIEL CREDO y DE VERGARA
G.R. No. 230778, 22 July 2019, FIRST DIVISION (Carandang, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states that "[c]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to
sustain a conviction if: (i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is
derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction
beyond reasonable doubts.
In this case, the prosecution failed to present sufficient proof of concerted action before, during,
and after the commission of the crime which would demonstrate Daniel and Juan’s unity of design and
objective.

FACTS

Spouses Antonio Asistin (Antonio) and Evangeline Asistin (Evangeline) operated a computer
shop and a store at their residence in Quezon City. Daniel y De Vergara (Daniel) and Juan Credo y De
Vergara (Juan), brothers, are nephews of Evangeline. At around lunch time on March 16, 2004, Daniel,
an assistant at the computer shop, entertained male customers who wanted to rent tapes.

While Evangeline was eating her lunch, Daniel and the two unidentified men suddenly
appeared. One of the unidentified men strangled her and started stabbing her. Evangeline struggled
and resisted until she fell to the floor while that person continued to stab her. Evangeline kicked him
so he would not reach her body. Thereafter, the men who assaulted her left. Evangeline recalled that
she sustained eight stab wounds.

Once the two unidentified men left, Evangeline stood up and saw Antonio standing at the gate
with several stab wounds. Upon seeing Antonio, Evangeline told Daniel to chase the two men who
had just left. According to Evangeline, Daniel did not help her and even watched while she was being
stabbed. He did not go out to chase the two men.
After being stabbed, Antonio was able to walk to the door of the computer shop. Evangeline and Rufo
Baguio (Baguio), a neighbor, allegedly saw Daniel carry Antonio about two feet from the ground and
then drop him, causing his head to hit the ground. Antonio was declared dead on arrival.

Juan and Daniel (collectively, accused-appellants) were charged with murder and frustrated
murder. Juan was additionally charged with violation of Section 32, in relation to Section 36 of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 71668 and Section 264 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 881, and Commission
on Election Resolution No. 6446; and violation of P.D. 1866.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Daniel and Juan guilty of the crime of murder and
frustrated murder, acquitted Juan of the offense of violation of Section 32 in relation to Section 36 of
Republic Act No. 7166 and Section 264 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6446, for lack of evidence, and convicted Juan of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed their respective
convictions.

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ISSUES

(1) Are Juan and Daniel guilty of murder and frustrated murder?
(2) Should Juan be held criminally liable for violation of P.C. 1866?

RULING

(1) NO. Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states that "[c]ircumstantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain a conviction if:
(i) There is more than one circumstance;
(ii) The facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and
(iii) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubts.
In this case, the prosecution failed to present sufficient proof of concerted action before,
during, and after the commission of the crime which would demonstrate Daniel and Juan’s unity of
design and objective.
To the Court’s mind, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when taken as a whole,
failed to present a coherent and consistent narration of the facts. Absent any proof sufficient to
connect or relate Daniel and Juan to the criminal design of killing Spouses Asistin, it cannot be
concluded that Daniel and Juan were in conspiracy with the unidentified aggressors in committing
murder and frustrated murder. With their inconclusive conduct and participation, the Court cannot
conscientiously declare that they were principals or even accomplices in the crimes charged. The
presumption of innocence in their favor has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) NO. Juan's conviction of violation of P.D. 1866, based solely on the testimony of arresting
officer PO2 Guerrero, is erroneous. The Court cannot ignore the possibility that the shotgun,
ammunitions, and knife confiscated from Juan were merely planted. It is too coincidental that at the
very moment the police conducted a follow-up operation and made a protective search at the room
where Juan was staying, he was caught packing a bag filled with the seized items.
As pointed out by the defense, PO2 Guerrero only admitted the fact of Juan's arrest and
nothing more. There was no admission with regard to the confiscation of a shotgun or sumpak,
ammunitions or fan knife from Juan's possession. Juan cannot be convicted solely on the basis of the
self-serving statement of PO2 Guerrero who was not even presented during trial. Even the shotgun
and the ammunitions confiscated were not presented during the trial.
The non-presentation of PO2 Guerrero and the seized items was suspicious, and should have
alerted the lower courts to be more circumspect in examining the records, considering the persistent
claim of Juan of having been a victim of frame-up.

592
 J. Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)

IX. WRIT OF AMPARO (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)

X. WRIT OF HABEAS DATA (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC)
XI. RULES OF PROCEDURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL CASES (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC)
A. Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
B. Writ of continuing mandamus
C. Writ of kalikasan

593