1

2
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 CASE LIST
I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

1. Aala v. Uy, G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017

2. The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728,
January 21, 2015
3. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Local Government
of Quezon City, G.R. No. 194388, November 7, 2018
4. Maza, et al. v. Hon. Evelyn Turla, G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017
5. Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 211559, 211567, 212570, and 215634,
October 15, 2019
6. Marantan v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 206354, March 13, 2019)

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

7. Cordillera Global Network v. Paje, G.R. No. 215988, April 10, 2019
8. Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019
9. Department of Public Works and Highways v.
CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint Venture, G.R. No. 179732,
September 13, 2017
10. Aala v. Uy, G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017
11. The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728,
January 21, 2015

Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments

12. Mercury Drug Corporation and Rolando Del Rosario v. Spouses

Richard Huang et. al.; G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017

Doctrine of the Law of the Case

13. Presidential Decree No. 1271 Committee v. De Guzman, G.R. Nos.

187291 & 187334, December 5, 2016

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Speedy Disposition of Cases

14. Re: Elvira N. Enalbes, A.M. No. 18-11-09-SC, January 22, 2019

II
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

15. First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. v. Philippine Bank of

Communications G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018
16. Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc., G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014
17. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corp.,
G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019
18. Amoguis v. Ballado, G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018
19. Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po, G.R. No. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017
20. Heirs of Dragon v. The Manila Banking Corp., G.R. No. 205068, March
6, 2019
21. Cotoner-Zacarias v. Spouses Revilla, G.R. No. 190901, November 12,
2014
22. Department of Finance v. Yambao, G.R. Nos. 220632 and 220634,
November 6, 2019
23. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform v. Heirs of Abucay,
G.R. Nos. 186432 & 186964, March 12, 2019
24. Claret School of Quezon City vs. Sinday, G.R. No. 226358, October 9,
2019
25. Terp Construction Corporation vs. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 221771, September 18, 2019
26. City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority, G.R. Nos. 184203
& 187583 November 26, 2014
27. Jaka Investments Corp. v. Urdaneta Village Association, Inc., G.R. Nos.
204187 & 206606, April 1, 2019

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 III
CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 1
General Provisions

Section 2 - In what courts applicable.

28. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 174379,
August 31, 2016

Section 6 - Construction

29. Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435
August 9, 2017
30. Alfonso Cortal et. al. v. Inaki Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107.
August 30, 2017
31. National Power Corp. v. Southern Philippines Power Corp. G.R. No.
219627 July 4, 2016
32. Dr. Joseph Malixi, et al., V. Dr. Glory Baltazar, G.R. No. 208224,
November 22, 2017

RULE 2
Cause of Action

Section 2 - Cause of action, defined

33. Republic v. Moldex Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 171041, February 10, 2016
34. Manila Electric Company vs. Nordec Philippines, G.R. Nos. 196020 &
196116, April 18, 2018
35. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and Philippine National Bank v. Spouses
Ledesma, G.R. No. 211176, February 06, 2019
36. Villamor v Umale, G.R No. 172843, September 24, 2014

Section 5 - Joinder of causes of action

37. Belo Medical Group Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo, G.R. No.
185894. August 30, 2017

6
 RULE 3
Parties to Civil Actions

Section 2 - Parties in interest

38. National Power Corporation v. Provincial Government of Bataan, G.R.

No. 180654, March 06, 2017
39. Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, G.R. No.
170631, February 10, 2016
40. Piedad v. Bobilles, G.R. No. 208614, November 27, 2017
41. Power Generation Employees Association-NPC v. National Power
Corp., G.R. No. 187420, August 9, 2017
42. Samuel Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 208426, September 20,
2017
43. Teodulfo Lao Jr. v. LGU of Cagayan de Oro, G.R. No. 187869.
September 13, 2017

Section 7 - Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.

44. Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po, G.R. Nos. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017
45. GSIS Family Bank Employees Union v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 210773,
January 23, 2019
46. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. vs. Reyes, G.R. No’s. 152797, 189315, and
200684, September 18, 2019

Section 9 – Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded

47. Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v. COA, G.R.
No. 185444, January 13, 2015

Section 11 - Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.

48. Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019

Section 16 - Death of party; duty of counsel.

49. Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center v. Asiamed Supplies and
Equipment Corp., G.R. No. 205638, August 23, 2017
50. Tuano y Hernandez v. People G.R. No. 205871 (Resolution) June 27,
2016
51. Tuano vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205871, September 28,
2016

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 RULE 4
Venue of Actions

Section 4 - When Rule not applicable.

52. Hygienic Packaging Corp. v. Nutri-Asia, Inc., G.R. No. 201302, January
23, 2019
53. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.,
G.R. No. 188146, February 01, 2017

RULE 6
Kinds of Pleadings

Section 11 - Third, (fourth, etc.)-party complaint.

54. Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Clarges Realty Corporation,

G.R. No. 170060, August 17, 2016

RULE 7
Parts of a Pleading

Section 3 - Signature and address

55. Alfonso Cortal et. al. v. Inaki Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107.
August 30, 2017

Section 4 - Verification

56. Home Guaranty Corporation vs. La Savoie Development Corporation,

G.R. No.: 168616, January 28, 2015
57. Alfonso Cortal et. al. v. Inaki Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107.
August 30, 2017
58. Teodulfo Lao Jr. v. LGU of Cagayan de Oro, G.R. No. 187869.
September 13, 2017
59. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. APO Cement Corporation, G.R.
No. 193381, February 08, 2017

Section 5 - Certification against forum shopping

60. Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014

61. Stronghold Insurance Company vs. Spouses Rune and Lea Stroem,
G.R. No.: 204689, January 21, 2015
62. Home Guaranty Corporation vs. La Savoie Development Corporation,
G.R. No.: 168616, January 28, 2015

8
63. Dynamic Builders & Construction Co., Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr., G.R. No.
174202, April 7, 2015
64. In Re: Ferrer, A.C. No. 8037, February 17, 2016
65. City of Taguig v. City of Makati G.R. No. 208393 June 15, 2016
66. Belo Medical Group Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo, G.R. No.
185894. August 30, 2017
67. Department of Public Works and Highways v.
CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint Venture, G.R. No. 179732.
September 13, 2017
68. Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 190324; June 6,
2018
69. Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Spouses Barbarona, G.R. No. 195814,
April 4, 2018
70. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. vs. Reyes, G.R. No’s. 152797, 189315, and
200684, September 18, 2019

RULE 8
Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings

Section 2 - Alternative causes of action or defenses

71. Olivarez Realty Corporation v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251, July 9, 2014

Section 10 - Specific denial

72. Department of Public Works and Highways v.

CMC/MONARK/PACIFIC/Hi-Tri Joint Venture, G.R. No. 179732.
September 13, 2017

RULE 9
Effect of Failure to Plead

Section 1 - Defenses and objections not pleaded

73. Moncayo Integrated Small Scale Miners Association v. Southeast

Mindanao Gold Mining Corp, et al., G.R. No. 149638, December 10,
2014
74. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio, G.R. No. 198587, January 14,
2015
75. Capablanca v. Heirs of Bas, G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017
76. Taar v. Lawan, G.R. No. 190922, October 11, 2017

9
Section 3 - Default; declaration of

77. Spouses Manuel v. Ong, G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014
78. Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corp., G.R. No. 193494, March
12, 2014

RULE 9
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

Section 7 - Filing of amended pleadings.

79. Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganybayan, G.R. No. 195295,

October 5, 2016

RULE 13
Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers

Section 2 - Filing and service, defined.

80. Mercedes S. Gatmaytan v. Francisco Dolor and Hermogena Dolor, G.R.

No. 198120, February 20, 2017
81. Bracero v. Arcelo, G.R. No. 212496, March 18, 2015

Section 9 - Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions.

82. Republic of the Philippines v. Benjohn Fetalvero, G.R. No. 198008,

February 04, 2019

RULE 14
Summons

Section 6 - Service in person on defendant

83. Spouses Manuel v. Ong, G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014

Section 7 - Substituted service.

84. Pavlow v. Mendenilla, G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017

85. People General Insurance Corp v. Guansing G.R. No. 204759,
November 14, 2018

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Section 11 - Service upon domestic private juridical entity

86. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative,

G.R. No. 172204, July 2, 2014

Section 14 - Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are

unknown.

87. De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., G.R. No. 194751, November

26, 2014

Section 20 - Voluntary appearance

88. Sunrise Garden Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 158836, 158967,
160726 & 160778, September 30, 2015

RULE 15
Motions

Section 4 - Hearing of motion.

89. Valderrama v. People, G.R. No. 220054, March 27, 2017

90. City of Dagupan v. Maramba, G.R. No. 174411, July 2, 2014
91. Laude vs. Ginez-Jubalde, G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015.

RULE 16
Motion to Dismiss

Section 1 - Grounds.

92. Guillermo v. Philippine Information Agency, G.R. No. 223751, March

15, 2017
93. Alvarado v. Ayala Land, G.R. No. 208426, September 20, 2017
94. Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongbian, G.R. No. 197530, July 9,
2014
95. Shell Foundation, Inc. v. Tomas M. Fredeluces, G.R. No. 174333, April
20, 2016
96. Lui Enterprise, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corp., G.R. No. 193494, March
12, 2014

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 RULE 17
Dismissal of Actions

Section 1 - Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff

97. Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014

RULE 18
Dismissal of Actions

Section 1 - When conducted.

98. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Roberto and Teresita

Genuino, G.R. No. 208792, July 22, 2015

Section 2 - Nature and purpose.

99. Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 210266, June 7, 2017

Section 4 - Appearance of parties.

Section 5. Effect of failure to appear.

100. National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Asoque, G.R. No. 172507,
September 14, 2016

RULE 19
Intervention

Section 1 - Who may intervene

101. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 174379,
August 31, 2016

RULE 23
Depositions Pending Action

Section 1 - Depositions pending action, When may be taken

102. Santamaria v. Cleary G.R. Nos. 197122 &197161 June 15, 2016

12
 RULE 27
Production or Inspection of Documents or Things

Section 1 - Motion for production or inspection; Order

103. Eagleridge Development Corporation vs. Cameron Granville 3 Asset

Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204700; April 10, 2013
104. Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset
Management, Inc. G.R. No. 204700 (Resolution), November 24, 2014
105. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R.
Nos. 205045 & 205723, January 25, 2017

RULE 30
Trial

Section 5 - Order of Trial

106. Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 204594, November 7, 2018

RULE 32
Trial by Commissioner

Section 2 - Reference ordered on Motion.

Section 3 - Order of reference; powers of the commissioner
Section 9 - Report of Commissioner

107. National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Asoque, G.R. No. 172507,
September 14, 2016

RULE 33
Demurrer to Evidence

Section 1 - Demurrer to evidence.

108. Republic vs. Gimenez and Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016.

RULE 35
Summary Judgments

Section 3 - Motion and Proceedings thereon.

109. Olivarez Realty Corporation v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251, July 9, 2014

13
 RULE 36
Judgments, Final Orders and Entry thereof

Section 1 - Rendition of judgments and final orders.

110. Philippine National Bank vs. Heirs of Entapa, G.R. No. 215072,
September 7, 2016

Section 2 - Entry of judgments and final orders.

111. Mercedes S. Gatmaytan v. Francisco Dolor and Hermogena Dolor, G.R.

No. 198120, February 20, 2017

RULE 37
New Trial or Reconsideration

Section 1 - Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or
reconsideration

112. Valderrama v. People, G.R. No. 220054, March 27, 2017

113. Alejandro Ceprado, Jr. v. Nationwide Security and Allied Services,
G.R. No. 175198, September 23, 2015

RULE 38
Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other Proceedings

Section 1 - Petition for Relief from Judgment, Order, or Other proceedings

114. City of Dagupan v. Maramba, G.R. No. 174411, July 2, 2014

115. Madarang v. Spouses Morales, G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014

Section 3 - Time for filing petition; contents and verification.

116. Madarang v. Spouses Morales, G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014

RULE 39
Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments

Section 1 - Execution upon Judgments or Final orders

117. Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corp., G.R. Nos. 208205 & 208212, June
1, 2016
118. Chiquita Brands, Inc. v. Omelio, G.R. No. 189102, June 07, 2017

14
119. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation Inc v. Cynthia de Jesus, G.R. No.
203943, August 30, 2017
120. Republic of the Philippines v. Benjohn Fetalvero, G.R. No. 198008,
February 04, 2019

Section 2 - Discretionary execution

121. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano, G.R. No. 188243, January 24,
2018

Section 6 - Execution by motion or by independent action.

122. Piedad v. Bobilles, G.R. No. 208614, November 27, 2017

Section 9 - Execution of judgments for money, how enforced

123. Mercury Drug Corporation and Rolando Del Rosario v. Spouses

Richard Huang et. al.; G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017

Section 13 - Property exempt from execution

124. Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic G.R. No. 189516 June 8, 2016

Section 33 - Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption

period; by whom executed or given.

125. Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 209452, July 26,
2017

Section 47 - Effect of Judgments or Final Orders

126. Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po, G.R. Nos. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017
127. Escobar v. People, G.R. No. 205576, November 20, 2017
128. Presidential Decree No. 1271 Committee v. De Guzman, G.R. Nos.
187291 & 187334, December 5, 2016Gadrinab v. Salamanca, G.R. No.
194560, June 11, 2014
129. Gadrinab v. Salamanca, G.R. No. 194560, June 11, 2014
130. Webb v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 194469, September 18, 2019
131. Pryce Corp. v. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 172302, February 18,
2014

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 RULE 40
Appeal from Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts

Section 7 - Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.

132. Cruz v. Spouses Christensen, G.R. No. 205539, October 4, 2017

RULE 41
Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts

Section 1 - Subject of Appeal

133. Spouses Limso v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. Nos. 158622, 169441,
172958, 173194, 196958, 197120 & 205463, January 27, 2016

Section 2 - Modes of Appeal

134. Teodulfo Lao, Jr. et. al. v. LGU of Cagayan De Oro, et. al., G.R. No.
187869. September 13, 2017
135. Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development
Co., G.R. No. 196795; March 7, 2018

RULE 42
Petitions for Review from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Court of Appeals

Section 1. How appeal taken; Time for filing

136. Magat Sr, et. al. v. Tantrade Corporation and Pablo Borja, Jr., G.R. No.
205483, August 23, 2017

RULE 43
Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the
Court of Appeals

Section 1 - Scope

137. Metro Bottled Water Corp. v. Andrada Construction & Development

Corp., Inc., G.R. No. 202430, March 6, 2019
138. Taar v. Lawan, G.R. No. 190922, October 11, 2017
139. Belo Medical Group Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo, G.R. No.
185894, August 30, 2017

16
140. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. vs. Reyes, G.R. No’s. 152797, 189315, and
200684, September 18, 2019
141. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. G&P Builders Incorporated,
et al., G.R. No. 189509, November 23, 2015.
142. Office of the Ombudsman v. Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr., G.R. No.
208976, February 22, 2016
143. CE Construction Corp. v. Araneta Center, Inc., G.R. No. 192725
August 9, 2017
144. Ornales v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No.
214312, September 5, 2018
145. Ombudsman v Leovigildo Delos Reyes Jr.(G.R No. 208976 October 13,
2014

Section 3 - Where to appeal

146. Department of Public Works and Highways v.

CMC/MONARK/PACIFIC/Hi-Tri Joint Venture, G.R. No. 179732.
September 13, 2017
147. Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435,
August 9, 2017 .

Section 6 - Contents of the Petition

148. Alfonso Cortal et. al. v. Inaki Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107.
August 30, 2017
149. Viva Shipping Lines, Inc V. Keppel Philippines Marine, Inc., G.R. No.
177382., February 17, 2016

PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

RULE 44
Ordinary Appealed Cases

Section 10 - Time of filing Memoranda in Special Cases

150. Buena, Jr. v. Benito G.R. No. 181760 October 14, 2014

Section 13. Contents of Appellant’s brief

151. Philippine National Construction Corp. v. Asiavest Merchant Bankers

(M) Berhad, G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015

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 RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Section 1 - Filing of Petition with Supreme Court

152. Villasana v. People, G.R. No. 209078, September 4, 2019

153. DST Movers Corp. v. People's General Insurance Corp., G.R. No.
198627, January 13, 2016
154. Toquero v. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., G.R. No. 213482, June 26,
2019
155. Aquilina Granada, et al. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184092,
February 22, 2017
156. Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center v. Asiamed Supplies and
Equipment Corp., G.R. No. 205638 August 23, 2017 .
157. William G. Kwong Management, Inc. v. Diamond Homeowners &
Residents Association, G.R. No. 211353, June 10, 2019
158. Cordillera Global Network v. Paje, G.R. No. 215988, April 10, 2019
159. Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019
160. BNL Management Corp. v. Uy, G.R. No. 210297, April 3, 2019
161. Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. v. Sulpicio Lines,
Inc. G.R. No. 196072, G.R. No. 208603, September 20, 2017
162. Malabanan v. Malabanan Jr., G.R. 187225, March 6, 2019
163. Torres y Salera v. People, G.R. No. 206627, January 18, 2017
164. Crispino v. Tansay, G.R. No. 184466, December 5, 2016
165. Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. 205035, November 16,
2016
166. Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongbian, G.R. No. 197530, July 9,
2014
167. Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. v. Fuentes, G.R. No.
169303, February 11, 2015
168. Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. DMCI Project
Developers, Inc., G.R. No. 173137, January 11, 2016.
169. Republic vs. Gimenez and Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016
170. Padilla, Jr. vs. Malicsi, G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016
171. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 174379,
August 31, 2016
172. Loria v. Muñoz, Jr., G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014
173. Noell Whessoe, Inc v. Independent Testing Consultant, Inc., G.R. No.
199851, November 07, 2018
174. Quirino T. Dela Cruz vs. National Police Commission G.R. No. 215545,
January 07, 2019
175. People of the Philippines v. Nady Magallano, Jr. Y Flores G.R. No.
220721, December 10, 2018

18
176. Degamo v. Office of the Ombudsman G.R. No. 212416, December 05,
2018
177. Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 187794, November 28, 2018
178. Lucido v People, G.R. No. 217764, August 7, 2017
179. CE Luzon Geothermal Power Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. Nos. 197526 & 199676-77, July 26, 2017
180. Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 209452, July 26,
2017
181. Mendoza v. Valte, G.R. No. 172961, September 7, 2015
182. Ligtas v. People, G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015
183. Visayan Electric Co., Inc. v. Alfeche, G.R. No. 209910, November 29,
2017
184. Pascual vs. Burgos, G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016
185. Republic of the Philippines v. Benjohn Fetalvero, G.R. No. 198008,
February 04, 2019
186. Lopez v. People G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016
187. Tankeh v. Development of the Philippines, G.R. No. 171428, November
11, 2013
188. Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013
189. Concha v. People, G.R. No. 208114, October 3, 2018
190. Villamor v. Umale, G.R No. 172843, September 24, 2014
191. Rodriguez v. Your Own Home Development Corp. , G.R. No. 199451,
August 15, 2018
192. Ebuenga v. Southfield Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 208396; March 14, 2018

Section 2 – Time for filing; extension

193. Department of Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Diaz,

G.R. No. 206331, June 4, 2018

Section 4 - Contents of Petition

194. Cordillera Global Network v. Paje, G.R. No. 215988, April 10, 2019
195. Orient Freight International, Inc. v. Keihin-Everett Forwarding Co.,
Inc., G.R. No. 191937, August 9, 2017
196. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 174379,
August 31, 2016
RULE 47
Annulment of Judgments or Finals Orders and Resolutions

Section 2 - Grounds for Annulment

197. Castro v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014

19
198. Tortal v. Taniguchi, G.R. No. 212683, November 12, 2018
199. Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014

RULE 50
Dismissal of Appeal

Section 1 - Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal.

200. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.,

G.R. No. 188146, February 01, 2017
201. Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corp., G.R. No. 193494, March
12, 2014
202. Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 204594, November 7, 2018

Section 2 - Dismissal of Improper Appeal to the Court of Appeals

203. City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority, G.R. Nos. 184203
& 187583 November 26, 2014
204. Republic v. Ortigas and Co. Limited Partnership, G.R. No. 171496,
March 3, 2014

Section 3 - Withdrawal of Appeal

205. In re: CA-G.R. CV No. 94656 v. Mortel, A.C. No. 10117 (Resolution),
July 25, 2016

RULE 51
Judgment

Section 8 - Questions that may be decided

206. Oriental Assurance Corp. v. Ong, G.R. No. 189524, October 11, 2017
207. Heirs of Loyola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 188658, January 11, 2017

RULE 52
Motion for Reconsideration

Section 2 - Second Motion for Reconsideration.

208. Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168406, January 14, 2015

20
 RULE 53
New Trial

Section 1. Period for filing; ground

209. Crispino v. Tansay, G.R. No. 184466, December 5, 2016

RULE 56
Original and Appealed Cases

B
Appealed Cases

Section 6 - Disposition of Improper Appeal

210. Arreza vs. Toyo, G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019

211. Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganybayan, G.R. No. 195295,
October 5, 2016

IV
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
RULE 57
Preliminary Attachment

Section 1 - Grounds upon which attachment may issue

212. Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganybayan, G.R. No. 195295,

October 5, 2016

RULE 58
Preliminary Injunction

Section 1 - Preliminary injunction defined; classes

213. Dynamic Builders & Construction Co., Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr., G.R. No.
174202, April 7, 2015

Section 3 - Grounds for issuance of Preliminary Injunction

214. Power Generation Employees Association-NPC v. National Power

Corp., G.R.187420,August 9, 2017
215. Bicol Medical Center v. Botor, G.R. No. 214073, October 04, 2017

21
216. Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising
Ventures Corp, G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016
217. Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. vs. Lim, G.R. No.
172948, October 5, 2016
218. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office v. De Leon, G.R. Nos. 236577 &
236597, August 15, 2018

Section 4 - Verified application and Bond for Preliminary Injunction or

Temporary Restraining Order

219. Teodulfo Lao, Jr. et. al. v. LGU of Cagayan De Oro, et. al., G.R. No.
187869. September 13, 2017

Section 5 - Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; Exception

220. Evy Construction and Development Corp. v. Valiant Roll Forming

Sales Corp., G.R. No. 207938, October 11, 2017
221. First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. v. Philippine Bank of
Communications, G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018

Section 6 - Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of,

Injunction or Restraining order.

222. Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. vs. Lim, G.R. No.
172948, October 5, 2016

RULE 60
Replevin

Section 2 - Affidavit and Bond

223. Enriquez v. The Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 210950,
August 15, 2018

R.A. 9262
Issuance of Protection Order

224. Pavlow v. Mendenilla, G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017

22
 V
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
RULE 63
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

Section 1 - Who may file petition

225. City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority, G.R. Nos. 184203
& 187583 November 26, 2014
226. Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo, G.R. No.
185894. August 30, 2017

RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections and the Commission on Audit

Section 1 - Scope

227. Oriondo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211293, June 4, 2019

228. The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728,
January 21, 2015

Section 3 - Time to file Petition

229. Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v.

Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185444, January 13, 201
230. Rotoras v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211999, August 20, 2019
231. City of General Santos v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 199439, April
22, 2014

RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

Section 1 - Petition for Certiorari.

232. De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, 11 January 2016

233. Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 224974, July 03, 2017
234. Heirs of Zoleta v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205128
August 9, 2017
235. Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435,
August 9, 2017
236. Binay v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 213957-58, August 7, 2019

23
237. Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising
Ventures Corp, G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016
238. Madarang v. Spouses Morales, G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014
239. The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728,
January 21, 2015
240. GSIS Family Bank Employees Union v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 210773,
January 23, 2019
241. Jovita S. Manalo vs. Ateneo De Naga University, Tabora and Bernal,
G.R. No. 185058, November 9, 2015
242. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20,
2016
243. Pemberton v. De Lima, G.R. No. 217508. April 18, 2016
244. Maricel S. Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 206758,
February 17, 2016
245. Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. vs. Department of Education, G.R.
No. 188720. February 23, 2016
246. Celso F. Pascual, Sr. v. Caniogan Credit and Development
Cooperative, G.R. No. 172980, July 22, 2015
247. Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019
248. Lim vs. Lim, G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019
249. Batac v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 216949, July 3, 2019
250. Esteva v. Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Manning, Inc., G.R. No. 225899, July
10, 2019
251. BDO Unibank, Inc. v. Choa, G.R. No. 237553, July 10, 2019
252. Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013
253. City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority, G.R. Nos. 184203
& 187583 November 26, 2014
254. Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018

Section 2 - Petition for Prohibition

255. Dynamic Builders & Construction Co., Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr., G.R. No.
174202, April 7 2015

Section 3 - Petition for Mandamus

256. Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019
257. Lihaylihay v. Tan, G.R. No. 192223, July 23, 2018
258. Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 211559, 211567, 212570, and 215634,
October 15, 2019
259. Buena, Jr. v. Benito,G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014
260. Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 222731. March 8, 2016

24
261. In The Matter Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence And
Fiscal Autonomy Movement Vs. Abolition Of Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF) And Reduction Of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January
21, 2015

Section 4 - When and where to file the petition

262. ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon, G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015

Section 5 - Respondents and costs in certain cases

263. Lim vs. Lim, G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019

Section 6 - Order to comment

264. Lim vs. Lim, G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019

Section 7 - Expediting proceedings; Injunctive relief

265. De Ocampo vs. Radio Philippines Network, Inc., G.R. No. 192947,
December 9, 2017

RULE 67
Expropriation

Section 1. The complaint

266. Republic v. Ortigas and Co. Limited Partnership, G.R. No. 171496,
March 3, 2014
267. National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Asoque, G.R. No. 172507,
September 14, 2016

Section 2 - Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized

government depository

268. National Power Corporation vs. Posada, G.R. No. 191945, March 11,
2015

Section 5 - Ascertainment of compensation

269. National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Asoque, G.R. No. 172507,
September 14, 2016

Section 8 - Action upon Commissioners’ Report

25
270. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano, G.R. No. 188243, January 24,
2018

R.A. 8974
An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for
National Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes

271. Republic v. Heirs of Fernandez, G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015

RULE 70
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Section 1 - Who may institute proceedings, and when.

272. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corp.,
G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019
273. Cruz v. Spouses Christensen, G.R. No. 205539, October 4, 2017
274. Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development
Co., G.R. No. 196795; March 7, 2018

RULE 71
Contempt

Section 3 - Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing

275. Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. v. Sulpicio Lines,

Inc. G.R. No. 196072, G.R. No. 208603, September 20, 2017
276. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr. v. Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017
277. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Judge Tirso Velasco and
Dolores Molina, G.R. No. 109645, January 21, 2015
278. Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative
(POPARMUCO) v. Inson, G.R. No. 189162, January 30, 2019
279. Webb v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 194469, September 18, 2019
280. Oca v. Custodio, G.R. No. 199825, July 26, 2017
281. David Yu Kimteng v. Atty. Walter T. Young, G.R. No. 210554, August
5, 2015

26
 VI
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF
DECEASED PERSONS

RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estates

Section 4 - Liability of Distributees and Estate

282. Onofre Andres v. PNB,G.R. No. 173548 , October 15, 2014

RULE 102
Writ of Habeas Corpus

Section 1 - To what Habeas Corpus extends

283. In re Salibo v. Warden, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015

Section 2 - Who may grant the writ

284. In re Salibo v. Warden, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015

Section 4 - When writ not allowed or discharge authorized

285. Osorio v. Navera, G.R. No. 223272 (Resolution), February 26, 2018

A.M. No. 07-09-12-SC

Writ of Amparo

286. Sanchez v. Darroca, G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019

287. De Lima v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528, February 19, 2013

RULE 108
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

Section 2 - Entries Subject to Cancellation or Correction

288. Miller v. Miller, G.R. No. 200344, August 28, 2019

27
 R.A. 9048
Act Authorizing the C/MCR or Consul General to Correct a Clerical or
Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname
in the Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order

289. Republic v. Gallo, G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018

VII
THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

RULE 110
Prosecution of Offenses

Section 1. Institution of criminal actions

290. De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016

291. Reynes v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), G.R. No. 223405,
February 20, 2019
292. People v. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
293. Napoles v. De Lima G.R. No. 213529 July 13, 2016

Section 5 - Who must prosecute criminal actions

294. Valderrama v. People, G.R. No. 220054, March 27, 2017

Section 6 - Sufficiency of Complaint or Information

295. People of the Philippines vs. Feliciano, et. al., G.R. No. 196735, August
3, 2016

Section 14 - Amendment or Substitution

296. Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018

RULE 111
Prosecution of Civil Action

Section 1 - Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions

297. Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals Inc., G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014

RULE 112
Preliminary Investigation

28
Section 1 - Preliminary investigation defined; when required.

298. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Price Richardson Corp., G.R.

No. 197032, July 26, 2017
299. Marantan v. Department of Justice G.R. 206354, March 13, 2019
300. Pemberton v. De Lima, G.R. No. 217508. April 18, 2016
301. Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang, G.R. No. 206958,
November 8, 2017

Section 2 - Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations

302. Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December

7, 2016

Section 3 – Procedure

303. Reyes v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 208243, June 5, 2017
304. Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 &
210141-42, July 31, 2018
305. Mendoza v. People. G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014
306. Marantan v. Department of Justice G.R. 206354, March 13, 2019
307. Tupaz v. Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas G.R. 212491-92,
March 6, 2019

Section 4 - Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review

308. De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016

Section 5 - When warrant of arrest may issue

309. Maza, et al. v. Hon. Evelyn Turla, G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017
310. Napoles v. De Lima G.R. No. 213529 July 13, 2016

Section 6. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.

311. Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018

RULE 113
Arrest

Section 5 - Arrest without Warrant; when lawful

312. People of the Philippines v. Casio, G.R. No. 211465, December 3, 2014
313. Villasana v. People, G.R. No. 209078, September 4, 2019

29
314. Veridiano y Sapi v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 07, 2017
315. Aparente y Volcan v. People, G.R. No. 205695, September 27, 2017
316. Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019
317. Lapi y Mahipus v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019
318. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
209387, January 11, 2016

RULE 114
Bail

Section 5 - Bail, when discretionary

319. Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 237172, September 18, 2019

Section 17 - Bail, where filed

320. Tejano v. Marigomen, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492, September 26, 2017

Section 22. Cancellation of bail

321. Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang, G.R. No. 206958,
November 8, 2017

RULE 115
Rights of Accused

Section 1 - Rights of accused at the trial

322. Kim Liong v. People, G.R. No. 200630, June 4, 2018

RULE 116
Arraignment and Plea

Section 1 - Arraignment and Plea; how made

323. People v. Palema y Vargas, G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019

Section 11 - Suspension of Arraignment

324. ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon, G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015
325. Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018

RULE 117
Motion to Quash

30
Section 3 – Grounds

326. Osorio v. Navera, G.R. No. 223272 (Resolution); February 26, 2018

Section 4 - Amendment of complaint or information

327. Dio v. People G.R. No. 208146 June 8, 2016

RULE 119
Trial

Section 23 - Demurrer to Evidence

328. BDO Unibank, Inc. v. Choa, G.R. No. 237553, July 10, 2019

RULE 120
Judgment

Section 4 - Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.

329. Osorio v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 207711, July 2, 2018

RULE 121
New Trial or Reconsideration

Section 1 - New Trial or Reconsideration

330. Abubakar v. People, G.R. Nos. 202408, 202409 & 202412, June 27, 2018

RULE 122
Appeal

Section 1 - Who may appeal

331. Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang, G.R. No. 206958,
November 8, 2017

Section 3 - How appeal taken

332. Lapi y Mahipus v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019
333. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Judge Tirso Velasco and
Dolores Molina, G.R. No. 109645, January 21, 2015

31
Section 11 - Effect of appeal by any of several accused

334. People v. Yanson, G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019

RULE 124
Procedure in the Court of Appeals

Section 18 - Application of certain rules in Civil Procedure to Criminal

Cases

335. People v Escobar, G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017

RULE 126
Search and Seizure

Section 13 - Search incident to lawful arrest

336. People v. Yanson, G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019

337. People v. Cogaed, G.R No. 200334, July 30, 2014

VIII
REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE

RULE 128
General Provisions

Section 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

338. Villasana v. People, G.R. No. 209078, September 4, 2019

339. People v. Dimaano y Tipdas, G.R. No. 174481, February 10, 2016
340. Lescano y Carreon v. People, G.R. No. 214490, January 13, 2016
341. Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. National Power Corp., G.R. Nos. 181683 &
184568, October 7, 2015
342. People v. Opiniano y Verano, G.R. No. 181474, July 26, 2017
343. People of the Philippines v Victor Cogaed, G.R No. 200334, July 30,
2014

RULE 130
Rules of Admissibility

A
Object (Real) Evidence

32
Section 1 - Object as evidence

344. People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 225325, August 28, 2019

345. People v. Banding, G.R. No. 233470, August 14, 2019
346. People v. Ternida y Munar, G.R. No. 212626, June 3, 2019
347. Veriño y Pingol v. People, G.R. No. 225710, June 19, 2019
348. Aparente y Volcan v. People, G.R. No. 205695, September 27, 2017
349. People v. Cabellon y Cabanero, G.R. No. 207229, September 20, 2017
350. People v. Saragena, G.R. No. 210677 August 23, 2017 .
351. People v. Comoso y Turemutsa, G.R. No. 227497, April 10, 2019
352. People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 225210; August 7, 2019
353. People v. Jaafar y Tambuyong, G.R. No. 219829, January 18, 2017
354. People v. Caiz y Talvo G.R. No. 215340 July 13, 2016
355. People v. Merando y Aves, G.R. No. 232620, August 5, 2019
356. People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 229053, July 17, 2019
357. People v. Pangan, G.R. No. 206965, November 29, 2017
358. People of the Philippines v Roberto Holgado, G.R No. 207992, August
11, 2014

B
Documentary Evidence

1
Best Evidence Rule

Section 3 - Original document must be produced; exceptions.

359. Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 209452, July 26,
2017

3
Parol Evidence Rule

Section 9 - Evidence of Written Agreements

360. Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset

Management, Inc. G.R. No. 204700 (Resolution), November 24, 2014
361. Spouses Paras v. Kimwa Construction, G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015

C
Testimonial Evidence

1
Qualification of Witnesses

33
Section 20 - Witnesses; their qualifications

362. Ricalde v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015
363. People v. Corpuz y Flores, G.R. No. 208013, July 03, 2017
364. People v. Dimapilit y Abellado, G.R. No. 210802 August 9, 2017

Section 21 - Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity

365. People v. Corpuz y Flores, G.R. No. 208013, July 03, 2017

3
Admissions and Confessions

Section 32 - Admission by Silence

366. Reynes v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), G.R. No. 223405,

February 20, 2019

5
Testimonial Knowledge

Section 36 - Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay

excluded

367. DST Movers Corp. v. People's General Insurance Corp., G.R. No.
198627, January 13, 2016
368. People of the Philippines vs. Feliciano, et. al., G.R. No. 196735, August
3, 2016
369. Lopez v. People G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016
370. Concha v. People, G.R. No. 208114, October 3, 2018

6
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

Section 42 - Part of the Res Gestae

371. People v. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014

Section 44 - Entries in official records.

372. DST Movers Corp. v. People's General Insurance Corp., G.R. No.
198627, January 13, 2016

34
 7
Opinion Rule

Section 49 - Opinion of Expert Witness

373. Tortona v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018

RULE 131
Burden of Proof and Presumptions

Section 1 - Burden of Proof

374. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20,
2016
375. Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 204594, November 7, 2018)

Section 3 - Disputable presumptions

376. Tortona v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018

377. Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 191972, January 26, 2015
378. Arreza vs. Toyo, G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019
379. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Avon Products Manufacturing,
Inc., G.R. Nos. 201398-99 & 201418-19, October 3, 2018
380. People of the Philippines v Mark Jason Chavez, G.R No. 207940,
October 22, 2014
381. People v. Chavez y Bitancor, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014

RULE 132
Presentation of Evidence

A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC

Judicial Affidavit Rule

382. Lim vs. Lim, G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019

B
Authentication and Proof of Documents

Section 19 - Classes of documents

383. Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019

Section 20 – Proof of Private Document

35
384. Imperial v. Heirs of Spouses Bayaban, G.R. No. 197626, October 3,
2018)

Section 23 - Public documents as evidence

385. William G. Kwong Management, Inc. v. Diamond Homeowners &

Residents Association, G.R. No. 211353, June 10, 2019
386. Rodriguez v. Your Own Home Development Corp. , G.R. No. 199451,
August 15, 2018

Section 24 - Proof of Official Record

387. Racho v. Seiichi Tanaka, G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018
388. Arreza vs. Toyo, G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019

Section 25 - What attestation of copy must state

389. Arreza vs. Toyo, G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019

Section 31 - Alterations in document, how to explain

390. Republic v. Heirs of Fernandez, G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015

C
Offer and Objection

Section 34 - Offer of evidence

391. Republic vs. Gimenez and Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016
392. Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 209452, July 26,
2017

Section 36 – Objection

393. Amoguis v. Ballado, G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018

RULE 133
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

Section 2 - Proof beyond reasonable doubt

394. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019

395. People v. Balao y Lopez, G.R. No. 207805, November 22, 2017
396. Capistrano Daayata, et al. v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 205745,
March 08, 2017

36
397. Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019
398. People v. San Jose y Gregorio, G.R. No. 206916, July 03, 2017
399. People v. Nuñez, G.R. No. 209342, October 4, 2017
400. People v. Asaytuno, Jr., G.R. No. 245972 December 2, 2019
401. Benito vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.: 204644, February 11,
2015
402. Macayan, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015
403. People v Sagana y Guzman, G.R. No.208471, August 2, 2017
404. People v Borja, G.R. No. 199710, August 2, 2017
405. People v. Divinagracia, Sr., G.R. No. 207765, July 26, 2017
406. People v. Segundo y Iglesias, G.R. No. G.R. No. 205614, July 26, 2017
407. People v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 228828, July 24, 2019
408. People v. Que y Utuanis; G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018

Section 4 - Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient

409. Bacerra y Tabones v. People, G.R. No. 204544, July 03, 2017
410. Cirero y Ustelo v. People, G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014
411. People vs. Baron, G.R. No. 213215, January 11, 2016
412. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20,
2016
413. People v. Opiniano y Verano, G.R. No. 181474, July 26, 2017
414. People v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 228828, July 24, 2019
415. People v. Chavez y Bitancor, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014

Section 5 - Substantial evidence

416. Office of the Ombudsman v. Fetalvero, Jr., G.R. No. 211450, July 23,
2018

RULE 137
Disqualification of Judicial Officers

Section 1 – Disqualification of Judicial Officers

417. Chavez v. Marcos, G.R. No. 185484, June 27, 2018

IX
REVISED RULES ON
SUMMARY PROCEDURE

418. Chinatrust (Phils.) Commercial Bank v. Turner, G.R. No. 191458, July
03, 2017

37
419. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua, Sr., G.R. No. 169588, October
7, 2013

X
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
420. Abogado, et.al. v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
et.al., G.R. No. 246209, September 3, 2019

XI
A.O. NO. 07
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

421. Lee v. Sales, G.R. No. 205294, July 4, 2018

422. Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018

XII
R.A. 9285
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SYSTEM

423. Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. v. Sulpicio Lines,

Inc. G.R. No. 196072, G.R. No. 208603, September 20, 2017
424. Lanuza, Jr. v. BF Corporation, G.R. No. 174938 October 1, 2014
425. Camp John Hay Development Corp. v. Charter Chemical and Coating
Corp., G.R. No. 198849, August 7, 2019
426. Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. DMCI Project
Developers, Inc., G.R. No. 173137, January 11, 2016

XIII
INTRA-CORPORATE DISPUTE
427. Belo Medical Group Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo, G.R. No.
185894. August 30, 2017
428. Villamor v Umale, G.R No. 172843, September 24, 2014

38
 I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Aala v. Uy
G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017

FACTS:

Engr. Crisanto M. Aala and Col. Jorge P. Ferido, both residents of Tagum
City, filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte an
Opposition/Objection to City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. In their
Opposition/Objection, Aala and Ferido asserted that said city ordinance violated
Sections 130(a), 198(a) and (b), 199(b), and 201 of the Local Government Code of
1991. They alleged that the proposed ordinance divided Tagum City into different
zones, classified real properties per zone, and fixed its market values depending
on where they were situated without taking into account the "distinct and
fundamental differences and elements of value" of each property.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte declared as invalid

Sections III C 1, 2, and 3, Sections III D (1) and (2), and Sections G 1(b) and 4(g) of
City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum
City passed a Resolution declaring the same city ordinance as valid. It argued that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan failed to take action on the city ordinance within
30 days from its receipt. Hence, under Section 56(d) of the Local Government Code
of 1991, City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 enjoys the presumption of validity. Said
city ordinance was later on published in Trends and Time, a newspaper of general
circulation in Tagum City.

Alarmed by the impending implementation of City Ordinance No. 558, s-

2012, petitioners filed before this Court an original action for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus. The Petition included a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.

In their Petition, petitioners seek to nullify the ordinance on the ground that
respondents enacted it with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners invoke this
Court's original jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution in
view of the need to immediately resolve the issues they have raised.

Petitioners raise the sole substantive issue of whether respondents

committed grave abuse of discretion in preparing, enacting, and approving City

39
Ordinance No. 558, s-2012, which imposes exorbitant real property taxes in
violation of the equal protection clause, due process clause, and the rule on
uniformity in taxation.

On the other hand, respondents attack the propriety of the remedy of which
petitioners have availed themselves. Respondents argue that petitioners should
have exhausted administrative remedies. They further argue that in directly filing
their Petition before this Court, petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts.

ISSUE:

Does this case fall under the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts?

RULING:

No.

The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to

restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained
before the lower courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to
prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the
congestion of the Court's dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter" it must remain as
a "court of last resort." This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of
dealing with causes in the first instance."

As expressly provided in the Constitution, this Court has original

jurisdiction "over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus." However, this Court has emphasized that the power to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus does not exclusively pertain to this
Court. Rather, it is shared with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts.
Nevertheless, "this concurrence of jurisdiction" does not give parties unfettered
discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is
determinative of the appropriate venue where petitions for extraordinary writs
should be filed. Parties cannot randomly select the court or forum to which their
actions will be directed.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that

reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate

40
in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the
trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special
civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is
competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that
may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground
or further reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some
confusions of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court of first
instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court
promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.
Consequently, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be
obtained in the lower courts. This holds especially true when questions of fact are
raised. Unlike this Court, trial courts and the Court of Appeals are better equipped
to resolve questions of fact. They are in the best position to deal with causes in the
first instance.

In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the

doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed
when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of
constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case
involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the
essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7)
when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order
complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as
an inappropriate remedy. None of the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts are present in this case. Significantly, although petitioners raise questions
of law, other interrelated factual issues have emerged from the parties' arguments,
which this Court deems indispensable for the proper disposition of this case.

In order to resolve these factual issues, we will be tasked to receive evidence

from both parties. However, the initial reception and appreciation of evidence are
functions that this Court cannot perform. These functions are best left to the trial
courts. This Court is not a trier of facts. The factual issues in this case should have
been raised and ventilated in the proper forum.

EFFECT OF THE NEWS RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC.

41
 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. They were posted on
the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "Team Buhay" with a
check mark, or "Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. During oral arguments, respondents conceded
that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners
also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.

On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity

as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials
addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer
ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being
oversized.

COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate

removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense
against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silent on the
remedies available to petitioners.

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of

free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. Respondents filed their comment arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before this court is not
the proper remedy to question the notice and letter of respondents; and (2) the
tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC pursuant
to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence,
respondents claim that the issuances ordering its removal for being oversized are
valid and constitutional.
ISSUE:

42
 Whether petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in
directly filing their petition before this court.

RULING:

No.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has
"full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over special
civil actions for certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons
or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the
petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions to
this doctrine:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues
of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct
resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches
of the government.

In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only

petitioners’ right to freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in
future similar cases. The case before this court involves an active effort on the part
of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has become a rare occasion
when private citizens actively engage the public in political discourse.

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental

importance. In these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental
constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to
constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from the
paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial
protection. In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount
right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression which warrants invocation
of relief from this court. The principles laid down in this decision will likely
influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the context
of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one’s
chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general,
in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the
right to vote necessarily includes the right to free speech and expression. The
protection of these fundamental constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the
immediate resort to this court.

43
 Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases
of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on
this matter. Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court.
In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that
can rule with finality on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
or performed acts contrary to the Constitution through the assailed issuances.

Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case
was filed during the 2013 election period. Although the elections have already
been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution.
Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this
court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC
is a constitutional body. In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of
COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower courts, any ruling on their
part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place
in the same situation. Besides, this court affords great respect to the Constitution
and the powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court
would be in the best interest of respondents, in order that their actions may be
guided accordingly in the future.

Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the
injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom of
expression. In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic
right constitute an exceptionally compelling reason to justify the direct resort to
this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is
sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare
and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal
was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." It is not, however, necessary
that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to
this court. While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case
falls under the recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court
directly.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

A.M. 19-10-20-SC has no effect on the ruling.

44
 Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
v. Local Government of Quezon City
G.R. No. 194388, November 7, 2018

FACTS:

Sometime in July 2007, MWSS received several Final Notices of Real

Property Tax Delinquency from the Local Government of Quezon City, covering
various taxable years, at P237,108,043.83 on the real properties owned by MWSS
in Quezon City. The Local Government of Quezon City warned it that failure to
pay would result in the issuance of warrants of levy against its properties.

On August 7, 2007, the Treasurer's Office of Quezon City issued Warrants

of Levy on the properties due to MWSS's failure to pay.

On September 10, 2007, the Local Government of Quezon City listed

properties owned by MWSS for auction sale.

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition TRO prayer by MWSS. Argued that
its real properties in Quezon City were exclusively devoted to public use, and thus,
were exempt from real property tax.

CA issued TRO stopping auction sale. Writ of Preliminary Injunction

issued. CA denied petition. Lifted the injucction. CA said MWSS need not exhaust
administrative remedies as what involve is a purely legal question. CA did not
dismiss on this ground. CA said since MWSS was not a municipal corporation, it
could not invoke the immunity granted in Section 133(o) of the Local Government
Code. Found that even if MWSS was an instrumentality of the government, it was
not performing a purely governmental function. Thus, no immunity. CA said
taxed properties were not part of the public dominion, but were even made the
subject of concession agreements between MWSS and private concessionaires due
to its privatization in 1997. Proprietary functions; thus, subject to real property tax.
QC issued warrants of levy. MWSS went to the SC. SC issued TRO.

ISSUE:

Is there a violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts?

RULING:

No.

45
 The principle of the hierarchy of courts is a judicial policy designed to
restrain direct resort to Supreme Court if relief can be granted or obtained from
the lower courts. As this Court explained in Aala v. Uy: The doctrine on hierarchy
of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from directly
resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The
logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands
upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's
dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter" it must remain as a "court of last resort."
This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of dealing with causes in
the first instance."

There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would
not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the
higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The doctrine of the hierarchy of courts, however, is often invoked in direct

resorts to this Court. Hence, the exceptions to the rule are more tailored to the
specific functions and discretion of this Court: Immediate resort to this Court may
be allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine
issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when
the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when
the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is
of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional
organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public
welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the
order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was
considered as an inappropriate remedy.

It is doubtful whether the Court of Appeals could apply the same rationale
when the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts is invoked. In any case, it has full
discretion on whether to give due course to any petition for certiorari directly filed
before it. In this case, it allowed petitioner's direct resort to it on the ground that
the issue presented was a pure question of law. No error can be ascribed to it for
passing upon the issue.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING

No effect on the ruling of the case.

46
 Maza, et al. v. Hon. Evelyn Turla
G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order ,and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casiño,
and Rafael V. Mariano are former members of the House of Representatives. Liza
represented Gabriela Women's Party (Gabriela), Saturnino and Teodoro
represented Bayan Muna Party-List (Bayan Muna), while Rafael represented
Anakpawis Party-List (Anakpawis). Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo,
Deputy Provincial Chief of the Nueva Ecija Criminal Investigation and Detection
Team, referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, three
(3) cases of murder against petitioners and 15 other persons, who were allegedly
responsible for the death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe.
His findings show that the named individuals conspired, planned, and
implemented the killing of the supporters of AKBAYAN Party List (AKBAYAN),
a rival of Bayan Muna and Gabriela.

Inspector Palomo recommended that a preliminary investigation be

conducted and that an Information for each count of murder be filed against the
19 individuals. On July 18, 2008, Presiding Judge Evelyn A. Atienza-Turl iissued
an Order on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla held that "the proper procedure in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed in the Palayan cases"
and ordered remanding the cases back to the provincial prosecutors.

Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order of remanding the case back to the
prosecutors had no basis in law, jurisprudence, or the rules. Since she had already
evaluated the evidence submitted by the prosecutors along with the Informations,
she should have determined the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants or the dismissal of the Palayan cases. Petitioners assert that under
the Rules of Court, in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, Judge Turla
could "order the prosecutor to present additional evidence [or] set the case for
hearing so she could make clarifications on the factual issues of the case. Moreover,
petitioners argue that the setting aside of the Joint Resolution establishes the non-
existence of probable cause against them. Thus, the cases against them should have
been dismissed. Petitioners also aver that the documents submitted by the
prosecution are neither relevant nor admissible evidence. The documents "do not

47
establish the complicity of the petitioner party-list representatives to the death of
the supposed victims."

On May 29, 2009, respondents filed their Comment through the Office of
the Solicitor General, raising the following arguments: 1) Petition before this Court
violates the principle of hierarchy of courts; 2) Petitioners should have filed their
petition before the Court of Appeals since it also exercises original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and 3) Petitioners failed to justify a direct
resort to this Court. On the allegation that Judge Turla reneged on her
constitutional duty to determine probable cause, respondents countered that she
did not abandon her mandate. Her act of remanding the cases to the public
prosecutors "is a confirmation of her observance of the well-settled principle that
such determination of probable cause is an exclusive executive function of the
prosecutorial arm of our government."

ISSUE:

Did petitioners violate the principle of hierarchy of courts in bringing

their petition directly before this Court?

RULING:

No.

This petition did not violate as it is an exception to the principle of hierarchy

of courts.

The Court thoroughly explained the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in The Diocese
of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections: The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an
iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance and
assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed directly with it
for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
clearly and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by
petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine: 1) When there are
genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate
time; 2) When the issues involved are of transcendental importance; 3) When cases
of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court; 4) When the constitutional
issues raised are better decided by this court; 5) Exigency in certain situations
would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court; 6) When the filed
petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; 7) When there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and 8) When the
petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the

48
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or
the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was
considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past, questions similar to
these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts included citizens' right to bear arms, government contracts involving
modernization of voters' registration lists, and the status and existence of a public
office. It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the
same time to justify a direct resort to this court.

In First United Constructors Corp. v. Poro Point Management Corp. (PPMC), et

al., the Court reiterated that it "will not entertain a direct invocation of its
jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort
to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari."

In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances warrants the exercise

of this Court's jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners were
incumbent party-list representatives. The possibility of their arrest and
incarceration should the assailed Orders be affirmed, would affect their
representation of their constituents in Congress.

Although the circumstances mentioned are no longer present, the merits of

this case necessitate this Court's exercise of jurisdiction.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Maza, et al. v. Hon. Evelyn Turla (G.R. No. 187094,
February 15, 2017) is not affected by the new rules.

49
 Acosta vs. Ochoa
G.R. Nos. 211559, 211567, 212570, and 215634, October 15, 2019

FACTS:

These are consolidated Petitions assailing the constitutionality of certain

provisions of RA 10591 or the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition
Regulation Act, and their corresponding provisions in the 2013 Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) for allegedly violating petitioner’s right to bear arms,
right to property and right to privacy.

The PNP, by virtue of RA 10591 and its IRR, centralized all firearms
licensing applications and renewals at its headquarters at Camp Crame, QC. The
pro forma application form for firearms registration contained a paragraph on the
“Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection” stating that the applicant
undertakes to renew the registration of his firearms on or before the expiration of
the same and that the applicant gives his consent and authorizes the PNP to
inspect the firearm at the his residence and to confiscate or forfeit the same in favor
of the government for failure to renew the registration.

Licensed firearm owners Acosta and Dela Paz filed before the SC a Petition
for Prohibition, assailing that engineers should form part of the professionals
enumerated under Section 7.3 of the IRR, which provides for those are not required
to submit threat assessment certificates because they are considered to be in
imminent danger due to the nature of their profession. They also assailed section
7.9 of the IRR which provides that members of law enforcement agencies must
apply for a PTCFOR-LEA, in order to be authorized to carry the corresponding
government-issued firearm outside of residence.

Peaceful Responsible Owners of Guns, Inc. (PROGUN), a registered non

stock, nonprofit corporation that aims to represent the interests of legitimate and
licensed gun owners in the philippines, filed its own Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus before the SC assailing the centralization of all
firearms licensing, renewal, and testing at Camp Crame, QC, to the detriment of
those who would be coming from places far from Metro Manila; the requirement
to waive their right to privacy, and allow the police to enter their dwellings in
violation of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution on the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, among others.

Guns and Ammo Dealers Association of the Philippines (Gun and Ammo),
allegedly an umbrella organization of about 50 members who are authorized
firearms dealers in the Philippines filed its Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari

50
before the SC on the grounds that the PNP’s refusal or failure to establish regional
and provincial offices where individual applicants may may obtain the
requirements for firearm licenses allegedly deprive its members of the profits from
their firearm businesses, as they have no licensed costumers to sell their firearms
to and that the centralization of firearms licensing in Camp Crame, QC harms
individual applicants from the provinces and in violation of their right to due
process.

ISSUE:

Were the petitions correctly filed before the Supreme Court?

RULING:

No. Petitioners directly sought recourse from the Supreme Court, in

violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Under this doctrine, recourse must first be sought from the lower courts
sharing concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. This is to ensure that every
level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient
manner. The doctrine is, ultimately, a constitutional filtering mechanism designed
to enable the Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned
to it by the highest law of the land.

The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution. Direct course to
it should be allowed only when the issue involved is one of law. The exercise of
the power of judicial review of the Supreme Court is subject to four requisites: (1)
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have standing to challenge; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case, and that it can only
resolve pure questions of law. These limitations, when properly and strictly
observed, should aid in the decongestion of the Court’s workload.

Here, to assail the constitutionality of some of the provisions of RA 10591

and its IRR, petitioners filed actions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus –
actions that could have been brought before a regional trial court. In Ynot vs. IAC,
the Court interpreted the constitutional provision on its jurisdiction to “‘review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court
may provide’, final judgements and orders of lower courts in , among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures” This means that the
resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

51
 In any case, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad dictum.
In several instances where the Court was confronted with cases of national interest
and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed
with the judicial determination of the cases.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case is not affected by the new rules.

52
 Marantan v. Department of Justice
G.R. No. 206354, March 13, 2019

FACTS:

News outlets reported that on January 6, 2013, a shootout occurred in

Atimonan, Quezon between the combined forces of the Philippine National Police
(police personnel) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines' First Special Forces
Battalion (armed forces personnel) on one (1) side, and 13 fully armed men riding
a convoy of vehicles on the other. While the investigation was ongoing, and before
all the involved police and armed forces personnel filed their affidavits recounting
the incident, then Department of Justice Secretary Leila De Lima (Department of
Justice Secretary De Lima) made public pronouncements on the Atimonan
Encounter, reportedly mentioning Marantan's name.

The Department of Justice convened a Panel of Prosecutors (the Panel) to

conduct the preliminary investigation. In its Omnibus Resolution, the Panel found
probable cause to charge petitioner, along with his co-respondent police officers,
with the crime of multiple murder. It found evidence that they had killed the
victims in conspiracy, enumerating the reasons and factual basis for such
conclusion. It found that the checkpoint itself was highly suspicious and irregular.
Moreover, the physical evidence did not support the claim that there was a
Shootout—it belied the possibility that the victims fired at the officers from within
their vehicles, or that there was a legitimate firefight. Petitioner insists that he has
compelling reasons to justify the non-application of the principles of hierarchy of
courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies due to respondent Department
of Justice Secretary De Lima's alleged prejudgment of the case. Thus, petitioner
prayed in his Memorandum that this Court annul an aside the preliminary
investigation and Omnibus Resolution, along with Department of Justice Office
Order No. 208, Subpoena, and Letter-Denial.

ISSUES:

Is the filing of this case an exception to the rule on judicial hierarchy and
rule on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

RULING:

No. Generally, the rule on hierarchy of courts may be relaxed when

"dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded
by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be

53
patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."
For all other cases, the parties must have exhausted the remedies available before
the lower courts. A petition filed in violation of the doctrine shall be dismissed.
This Court fails to see how public welfare, public policy, or the broader interest of
justice demands the exercise of our jurisdiction here. In the same vein, this Court
does not see why petitioner's prayer could not have been granted by the Court of
Appeals, which has concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, this case is dismissible due to
petitioner's failure to adhere to the rule on judicial hierarchy. Similarly, petitioner
failed to file a motion for reconsideration before filing his petition for certiorari.
This case is dismissible for petitioner's failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies.

Petitioner's claim that filing a motion for reconsideration would be useless

is highly speculative and fails to convince. He names the risk of having the motion
for reconsideration as being treated as a counter-affidavit. Likewise, the proximity
of the date of preliminary conference does not excuse him from filing a motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, petitioner has no basis to invoke an exception to
the rule on exhaustion of administrative reliefs.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

NO EFFECT: Basic Concepts of Jurisdiction: Hierarchy of Courts and Exhaustion

of Remedies

54
 Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Cordillera Global Network v. Paje

G.R. No. 215988, April 10, 2019

FACTS:

A few years after the construction of SM City Baguio, the company

undertook to expand its existing mall on Luneta Hill (the Expansion Project) to
increase parking and commercial spaces.

The DENR-Cordillera Administrative Region, with clearance from then

DENR Secretary Paje, granted SM Investments Corporation's request for a permit
to cut and earth-ball the Benguet pine, Alnus trees, and saplings that would be
affected by the Expansion Project. Subsequently, the City Planning and
Development Office of Baguio City granted locational clearance for the Expansion
Project.

Cordillera Global Network and Adajar, et al. filed two environmental cases,
which were later on consolidated. They both alleged that the cutting or earth-
balling of the 182 trees on Luneta Hill would severely damage the environment
and health of Baguio City residents. They also assailed the regularity of the permits
issued, further claiming that the Expansion Project violated zoning and
environmental laws.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the consolidated cases. It held that
Cordillera Global Network and Adajar, et al. possessed the necessary personality
to file the environmental cases under the principle of transcendental importance.
However, their cases did not fall under any of the exceptions to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and upheld the findings of the
Regional Trial Court. It dismissed Cordillera Global Network and Adajar, et al.'s
claim that the case fell under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies since there was no patent illegality. It pointed out that
despite not being parties to the applications for the environmental compliance
certificates, tree-cutting and earth-balling permits, and building permits, they still
should have come to the appropriate administrative tribunals to resolve questions
of fact.

Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

55
 Petitioners assert that since they were never made parties to the application
for the amended Environmental Compliance Certificate, they are not bound by the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Both private and public
respondents claim otherwise.

ISSUE:

Should the petition be dismissed for its failure to observe the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?

RULING:

No.

The general rule is to first exhaust the available administrative remedies

before a party can bring the case to a court for judicial review." In connection with
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, courts will hold off from determining a
controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative
agency, particularly when its resolution demands the "special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact."

However, Pagara v. Court of Appeals emphasized that the rule on

exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It may be
disregarded when any of the following exceptions are present: It is not applicable
(1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the
latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. Said principle may also be
disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, when
there is no due process observed or where the protestant has no other recourse.

Article II, Section 6 of Department of Environment and Natural Resources

Administrative Order No. 2003-30 provides:

Section 6. Appeal. —

56
 Any party aggrieved by the final decision on the [Environmental
Compliance Certificate]/[Certificate of Non-Coverage] applications
may, within 15 days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal on
the following grounds:

a. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the deciding

authority, or
b. Serious errors in the review findings.

The [Department of Environment and Natural Resources] may

adopt alternative conflict/dispute resolution procedures as a means
to settle grievances between proponents and aggrieved parties to
avert unnecessary legal action. Frivolous appeals shall not be
countenanced.

The first sentence of Section 6 shows that the remedy of appeal is only
available to a party that applied for an environmental compliance certificate or
certificate of non-coverage. This is bolstered by the period provided for the filing
of an appeal—within 15 days from receipt of such decision—since only a party to
the application is entitled to receive it. However, as respondents posit,
stakeholders are not precluded from filing an appeal as stated in Section 6's last
sentence.

It is not disputed that petitioners were never a party to the application of

environmental compliance certificates, both the original and amended, for the
Expansion Project. Hence, they were never furnished a copy of the Decision on the
Environmental Compliance Certificate, which would trigger the start of the 15-day
appeal period provided for under Section 6.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No effect on ruling.

57
 Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III
G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019

FACTS:

The Social Security Commission issued Resolution No. 262-s. 2013, which
provided an increase in: (1) the Social Security System members' contribution rate
from 10.4% to 11%; and (2) the maximum monthly salary credit from P15,000.00 to
P16,000.00. The President of the Philippines approved the increase. The Social
Security Commission likewise issued Resolution No. 711-s. 2013, which approved,
among others, the increase in contribution rate and maximum monthly salary
credit.

Subsequently, the Social Security System, through President and Chief

Executive Officer Emilio S. De Quiros, Jr., issued Circular No. 2013-010, which
provided the revised schedule of contributions that would be in effect in January
2014. Per the circular, the employer and the employee shall equally shoulder the
0.6% increase in contributions. Thus, the employer would pay a contribution rate
of 7.37% (from 7.07%); the employee, 3.63% (from 3.33%).

Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
questioning the validity of the assailed issuances.

ISSUE:

Is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applicable?

RULING:

In connection with acts of administrative agencies, ripeness is ensured

under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Courts may only take
cognizance of a case or controversy if the petitioner has exhausted all remedies
available to it under the law. The doctrine ensures that the administrative agency
exercised its power to its full extent, including its authority to correct or reconsider
its actions. It would, thus, be premature for courts to take cognizance of the case
prior to the exhaustion of remedies, not to mention it would violate the principle
of separation of powers. Thus, in Rule 65 petitions, it is required that no other
plain, speedy, or adequate remedy is available to the party.

Here, it is clear that petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative

remedies.

58
Petitioners allege that they "have no appeal nor any plain, speedy[,] and adequate
remedy under the ordinary course of law except through the instant Petition."

However, Sections 4 and 5 of the Social Security Act are clear that the Social
Security Commission has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the law
regarding coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties. The law further
provides that the aggrieved party must first exhaust all administrative remedies
available before seeking review from the courts.

SECTION 5. Settlement of Disputes. — (a) Any dispute arising under

this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties
thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the
Commission, and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by
the Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers duly
authorized by the Commission and decided within the mandatory
period of twenty (20) days after the submission of the evidence. The
filing, determination and settlement of disputes shall be governed
by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission.

(b) Appeal to Courts. — Any decision of the Commission, in the

absence of an appeal therefrom as herein provided, shall become
final and executory fifteen (15) days after the date of notification,
and judicial review thereof shall be permitted only after any party claiming
to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his remedies before the Commission.
The Commission shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action
involving any such decision and may be represented by an attorney
employed by the Commission, or when requested by the
Commission, by the Solicitor General or any public prosecutor.
(Emphasis supplied)

Here, nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a case before the
Social Security Commission or asked for a reconsideration of the assailed
issuances. Moreover, petitioners did not even try to show that their Petition falls
under one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies:

However, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of

exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule. It may
be disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when
the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the

59
 administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12)
when no administrative review is provided by law, (13) where the
rule of qualified political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot. (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is settled in

jurisprudence. As early as 1967, this Court has recognized the requirement that
parties must exhaust all administrative remedies available before the Social
Security Commission. The Social Security Commission, then, must be given a
chance to render a decision on the issue, or to correct any alleged mistake or error,
before the courts can exercise their power of judicial review.

Thus, petitioners have prematurely invoked this Court's power of judicial

review in violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Here, respondent Social Security Commission qualifies as an administrative

tribunal, given sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact. Thus, under the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction, petitioners should have first filed their case before respondent Social
Security Commission.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No effect on ruling.

60
 Department of Public Works and Highways v.
CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint Venture
G.R. No. 179732. September 13, 2017

FACTS:

DPWH and CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri J.V. (the Joint Venture) executed

a contract for road improvement component loan in Zamboanga del Sur. DPWH
hired BCEOM French Engineering Consultants to oversee the project. While the
project was ongoing, the Joint Venture’s truck and equipment were set on fire.
Thereafter, a bomb exploded at Joint Venture’s hatching plant. The Joint Venture
made several written demands for extension and payment of the foreign
component of the Contract. There were efforts between the parties to settle the
unpaid Payment Certificates. BCEOM recommended the payment of outstanding
monies due to Joint Venture citing that they finished 80% of the project when the
same was halted. To enforce this claim, the Joint Venture filed a complaint before
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), the administrative
agency tasked with resolving issues pertaining to the construction industry.
Meanwhile, Joint Venture sent a "Notice of Mutual Termination of Contract" to
DPWH requesting for a mutual termination of the contract subject of the
arbitration case due to its diminished financial capability due to DPWH's late
payments, changes in the project involving payment terms, peace and order
problems, and previous agreement by the parties. DPWH acting secretary
accepted the same.

The CIAC promulgated an award directing DPWH to pay Joint Venture but
denied its claim for price adjustment due to delay. The CA sustained the award
hence DPWH filed this petition for review arguing that the filing of the claim
before CIAC was premature, since under CIAC rules, there must be an exhaustion
of administrative remedies first before government contracts are brought to it for
arbitration.

ISSUE:

Is the complaint filed by the JV before the CIAC premature?

RULING:

No, the complaint filed by the JV before the CIAC is not premature.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the concerned

administrative agency must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its

61
jurisdiction before an action is brought before the courts, otherwise, the action will
be declared premature.

The pertinent provision on available administrative remedies in this case

can be found in Sub-Clause 67.1 of the Conditions of Contract. The CIAC found
and correctly ruled that respondent had duly complied with the contractual
obligation to exhaust administrative remedies provided for under sub-clause 67.1
of the Conditions of Contract before it brought the case before the tribunal. A total
of 17 demand letters were sent to DPWH to no avail. To require respondent to wait
for the DPWH Secretary's response while respondent continued to suffer
financially would be to condone petitioner's avoidance of its obligations to
respondent. Hence, even assuming that sub-clause 67.1 was not applicable, the
case would still fall within the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies since strict application of the doctrine will be set aside
when requiring it would only be unreasonable under the circumstances.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The New Rules have no specific effect with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

62
 Aala v. Uy
G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017

FACTS:

Engr. Crisanto M. Aala and Col. Jorge P. Ferido, both residents of Tagum
City, filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte an
Opposition/Objection to City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. In their
Opposition/Objection, Aala and Ferido asserted that said city ordinance violated
Sections 130(a), 198(a) and (b), 199(b), and 201 of the Local Government Code of
1991. They alleged that the proposed ordinance divided Tagum City into different
zones, classified real properties per zone, and fixed its market values depending
on where they were situated without taking into account the "distinct and
fundamental differences and elements of value" of each property.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte declared as invalid

Sections III C 1, 2, and 3, Sections III D (1) and (2), and Sections G 1(b) and 4(g) of
City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum
City passed a Resolution declaring the same city ordinance as valid. It argued that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan failed to take action on the city ordinance within
30 days from its receipt. Hence, under Section 56(d) of the Local Government Code
of 1991, City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 enjoys the presumption of validity. Said
city ordinance was later on published in Trends and Time, a newspaper of general
circulation in Tagum City.

Alarmed by the impending implementation of City Ordinance No. 558, s-

2012, petitioners filed before this Court an original action for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus. The Petition included a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.

In their Petition, petitioners seek to nullify the ordinance on the ground that
respondents enacted it with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners invoke this
Court's original jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution in
view of the need to immediately resolve the issues they have raised.

Petitioners raise the sole substantive issue of whether respondents

committed grave abuse of discretion in preparing, enacting, and approving City
Ordinance No. 558, s-2012, which imposes exorbitant real property taxes in
violation of the equal protection clause, due process clause, and the rule on
uniformity in taxation.

63
 On the other hand, respondents attack the propriety of the remedy of which
petitioners have availed themselves. Respondents argue that petitioners should
have exhausted administrative remedies. They further argue that in directly filing
their Petition before this Court, petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts.

ISSUE:

Does this case fall under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies?

RULING:

No.

Under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, aggrieved

taxpayers who question the validity or legality of a tax ordinance are required to
file an appeal before the Secretary of Justice before they seek intervention from the
regular courts.

Parties are generally precluded from immediately seeking the intervention

of courts when "the law provides for remedies against the action of an
administrative board, body, or officer." The practical purpose behind the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies is to provide an orderly procedure by
giving the administrative agency an "opportunity to decide the matter by itself
correctly and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts."

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, like the doctrine on

hierarchy of courts, is not an iron-clad rule. It admits of several well-defined
exceptions. Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals has held that
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed in the
following instances:

(1) [W]hen there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved
is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal and
amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of
the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when
the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the
President, bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it
would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private
land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy

64
and adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention; and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the
complainant; (12) when no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where
the rule of qualified political agency applies; and (14) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

In this case, however, the issues involved are not purely legal. There are
factual issues that need to be addressed for the proper disposition of the case. In
other words, this case is still not ripe for adjudication.

To question the validity of the ordinance, petitioners should have first filed
an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. However, petitioners justify direct resort
to this Court on the ground that they are entangled in a "catch-22 situation." They
believe that filing an appeal before the Secretary of Justice would merely delay the
process and give the City Government of Tagum ample time to collect real
property taxes.

The questioned ordinance was published in July 2012. Had petitioners

immediately filed an appeal, the Secretary of Justice would have had enough time
to render a decision. Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991 gives the
Secretary of Justice 60 days to act on the appeal. Within 30 days from receipt of an
unfavorable decision or upon inaction by the Secretary of Justice within the time
prescribed, aggrieved taxpayers may opt to lodge the appropriate proceeding
before the regular courts.

The "catch-22 situation" petitioners allude to does not exist. Under Section
166 of the Local Government Code of 1991, local taxes "shall accrue on the first (1st)
day of January of each year." When the questioned ordinance was published in
July 2012, the City Government of Tagum could not have immediately issued real
property tax assessments. Hence, petitioners had ample time within which to
question the validity of the tax ordinance.

In cases where the validity or legality of a tax ordinance is questioned, the

rule that real property taxes must first be paid before a protest is lodged does not
apply. Taxpayers must first receive an assessment before this rule is triggered.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC.

65
 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. They were posted on
the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "Team Buhay" with a
check mark, or "Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. During oral arguments, respondents conceded
that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners
also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.

On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity

as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials
addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer
ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being
oversized.

COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate

removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense
against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silent on the
remedies available to petitioners.

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of

free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. Respondents filed their comment arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before this court is not
the proper remedy to question the notice and letter of respondents; and (2) the
tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC pursuant
to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence,
respondents claim that the issuances ordering its removal for being oversized are
valid and constitutional. Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Respondents insist that petitioners

66
should have first brought the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or any of its
divisions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of exhaustion of administrative

remedies

RULING:

No.

The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in

this case. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear
that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the "prerequisite
that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch [or
in this case, organ of government] before a court may come into the picture.
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium,
had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter
threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation
is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech. In the context of this case, exhaustion of
their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs
the violation of their freedom of speech.

Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order.

Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable, the current controversy is within the exceptions to the principle. In
Chua v. Ang, this court held: On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to
immediately: (a) when there is a violation of due process; (b) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question; (c) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on
the part of the administrative agency concerned; (e) when there is irreparable
injury; (f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when
to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h)
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings; (j) when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention."

67
 The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present
case. First, petitioners allege that the assailed issuances violated their right to
freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church and state. This is
a purely legal question. Second, the circumstances of the present case indicate the
urgency of judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH Law as well
as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of administrative
remedies in this case would be unreasonable.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

A.M. 19-10-20-SC has no effect on the ruling.

68
 Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments

Mercury Drug Corporation and Rolando Del Rosario v. Spouses Richard

Huang
G.R. No. 197654. August 30, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercury Drug was the registered owner of a six (6)-wheeler truck
driven by petitioner Del Rosario, which figured in an accident with respondent
Stephen Huang's car. As a result of the tragic incident, Stephen suffered serious
spinal cord injuries. He is now a paraplegic. Stephen and his parents, respondents
Spouses Huang, filed a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against
Mercury Drug and Del Rosario. RTC found Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly
and severally liable for actual damages, compensatory damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees and litigation fees. The CA and SC
affirmed the same. The judgment attained finality and its entry was accordingly
made, where the total amount awarded to Stephen is ₱40,434,062.00. Stephen and
his parents moved for the execution of judgment before RTC, the same was
granted despite opposition from petitioners. The Writ of Execution was issued but
petitioners moved for its quashal as it allegedly contravened the tenor of the
judgment.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA arguing that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the execution of the judgment
despite clerical errors in the computation of life care cost and loss of earning
capacity. The CA denied the petition ruling that the perceived error in the
computation of the award and correction entailed a substantial amendment of the
judgment sought to be enforced, which will be violative of the doctrine of
immutability of judgment. The MR was denied. Thus, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari before the SC pointing out, in particular, that the amounts of life care
cost and loss of earning capacity reflected in the dispositive portion and the writ
of execution do not correspond to those stated in the body of the decision.
Petitioners insist that the clerical errors committed by the court falls as an
exception to the doctrine of immutability of judgment.

ISSUE:

Do the alleged clerical errors in the life care costs and loss of earning
capacity warrant an exception to the doctrine of immutability of judgment?

RULING:

69
 No, the alleged clerical errors in the life care costs and loss of earning
capacity warrant do not an exception to the doctrine of immutability of
judgment.

A final and executory judgment produces certain effects. Winning litigants

are entitled to the satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution. On the
other hand, courts are barred from modifying the rights and obligations of the
parties, which had been adjudicated upon. They have the ministerial duty to issue
a writ of execution to enforce the judgment. It is a fundamental principle that a
judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and unalterable. The
primary consequence of this principle is that the judgment may no longer be
modified or amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose of the
modification or amendment is to correct perceived errors of law or fact. This
principle known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment is a matter of sound
public policy, which rests upon the practical consideration that every litigation
must come to an end.

The rationale behind the rule as explained in SSS v. Isip, the doctrine of
immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) to
avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make
orderly the discharge of judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist.
Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

The doctrine of immutability of judgment, however, is not an iron-clad rule.

It is subject to several exceptions, namely: (1) [T]he correction of clerical errors; (2)
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void
judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

Clerical errors or ambiguities in the dispositive portion of a judgment may

result from inadvertence. These errors can be rectified without violating the
doctrine of immutability of judgment provided that the modification does not
affect the substance of the controversy. Clerical errors are best exemplified by
typographical errors or arithmetic miscalculations. They also include instances
when words are interchanged. Clerical errors also contemplate inadvertent
omissions that create ambiguity. In determining whether there are clerical errors
or ambiguities in the dispositive portion of the judgment that should be rectified,
courts should refer primarily to "the court's findings of facts and conclusions of

70
law as expressed in the body of the decision." The parties' pleadings may also be
consulted if necessary.

"Nunc pro tunc" is a Latin phrase that means "now for then." A judgment
nunc pro tunc is made to enter into the record an act previously done by the court,
which had been omitted either through inadvertence or mistake. It neither
operates to correct judicial errors nor to "supply omitted action by the court." Its
sole purpose is to make a present record of a "judicial action which has been
actually taken." nunc pro tunc judgments or orders can only be rendered if none
of the parties will be prejudiced. Parties seeking the issuance of nunc pro tunc
judgments or orders must allege and prove that the court took a particular action
and that the action was omitted through inadvertence. On the other hand, courts
must ensure that the matters sought to be entered are supported by facts or data.
This may be accomplished by referring to the records of the case. Nunc pro tunc
orders can only be issued when there is evidence that the judicial act in question
was previously made.

The doctrine of immutability of judgment is premised upon the existence

of a final and executory judgment. It is, therefore, inapplicable where the judgment
never attains finality, as in the case of void judgments. Void judgments produce
"no legal [or] binding effect. Hence, they are deemed non-existent. They may result
from the "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter" or a lack of jurisdiction over
the person of either of the parties. They may also arise if they were rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A void
judgment is in legal effect no judgment. B[y] it no rights are divested. From it no
rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon, it
[is] equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under
it and all claims flowing out of it are void. A void judgment never acquires the
status of a final and executory judgment. A direct attack may be brought either
through a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
or through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. A void
judgment may also be challenged collaterally "by assailing its validity in another
action where it is invoked."

The happening of a supervening event is likewise a ground to set aside or

amend a final and executory judgment. This exception was explained in Natalia
Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, thus: One of the exceptions to the principle of
immutability of final judgments is the existence of supervening events.
Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final
and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has
acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to
or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time. Parties must

71
establish two (2) conditions in order to properly invoke the exception on
supervening events. First, the fact constituting the supervening event must have
transpired after the judgment has become final and executory. It should not have
existed prior to the finality of the judgment. Second, it must be shown that the
supervening event "affects or changes the substance of the judgment and renders
its execution inequitable."

Aside from these well-known exceptions, several cases have also been
excluded from the application of the doctrine of immutability of judgment in the
interest of substantial justice. The exception sometimes applied when a party's
liberty is involved or when there are special and compelling circumstances. For
instance, judgments of conviction that have attained finality were modified to
correct an erroneous penalty previously imposed. Judgments may also be
modified or amended to supply operational matters that are deemed necessary to
carry out the decision into effect.

In this case, there are no clerical errors or ambiguities regarding the

computation of life care cost and loss of earning capacity awarded to respondent
Stephen. The trial court deemed it adequate and proper to award such amount as
life care cost, and loss of earning capacity based on evidence presented during trial
from the testimonies of respondent Stephen’s doctors regarding to his future
medical expenses. On the award of loss of earning capacity, it also considered
other equally important factors such as respondent Stephen's capacity prior to the
injury, physical conditions, disposition to labor, and his professional habits.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect to the Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments.

72
 Doctrine of the Law of the Case

Presidential Decree No. 1271 Committee v. De Guzman

G.R. Nos. 187291 & 187334, December 5, 2016

FACTS:

Gloria Rodriguez De Guzman (Rodriguez) acquired properties derived

from OCT Nos. 123 and 128. The Register of Deeds of Baguio issued a total of nine
(9) TCTs. These titles were among those issued under the reopening of Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O Rec. No. 211 which involved the settlement and
the adjudication of claims to private lands in Baguio Townsite Reservation.

At the time Rodriguez acquired said properties, the Court was yet to rule
on Republic v. Marcos. Said case rendered null and void all titles issued as a result
of the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O Rec. No. 211. However,
P.D. 1271 was later on issued, which provided that innocent third parties could
have their properties validated upon compliance with certain conditions.

Consequently, Rodriguez filed separate applications for validation for

seven (7) of her titles: T-12826, T-12827, T-12828, T-12829, T-12830, T-12831, and T-
12832. Pending her applications for validation, Rodriguez filed before the RTC a
Petition seeking to correct the caption of Resurvey Subdivision Plan (LRC) No. RS-
288-D and the technical descriptions of TCT Nos. T-12828, T-12829, T-12830, T-
12831, and T-12832 to conform to the resurvey plan. This was docketed as LRC
Case No. 445-R. RTC granted Rodriguez's Petition.

Sometime in 2002, a certain Corazon Delizo and Consuelo Delizo requested

the Land Registration Authority to investigate Rodriguez's TCT Nos. T-12826 and
T-12827 for being issued irregularly. The Land Registration Authority docketed
the request as Task Force Titulong Malinis (TM) No. 02-001.

The Task Force Titulong Malinis found that there was an expansion of the
land area covered by Rodriguez's TCT Nos. T-12826 and T-12827. It likewise
discovered that the mother title was cancelled through a letter from Rodriguez
seeking the issuance of new TCT under subdivision plan (LRC) Ps-281-D. Thus,
the Baguio Validation Committee disapproved Rodriguez's applications for
validation on account of the expanded areas above the original size covered by the
mother titles. The Land Registration Authority Administrator directed the
cancellation and the expunging of the invalidated titles.

73
 Rodriguez filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with application for
a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to question the Baguio
Validation Committee's Resolution. The same was dismissed. It found that the
Baguio Validation Committee did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying Rodriguez’s applications for
validation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-12826 to T-12832. However, on
TCT Nos. T-12824 and T-12825, it found that Rodriguez did not apply for the
validation of these properties and, thus, the Baguio Validation Committee could
not have acted on these properties. CA also held that there is no conclusiveness of
judgment in LRC Case No. 455-R as the RTC did not determine if there was a
fraudulent expansion of the lands covered by Rodriguez’s TCT, as opposed to
their applications for validation.

Rodriguez filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration and a Supplemental

Motion for Partial Reconsideration which the CA partially granted. It still
disallowed the validation of Rodriguez's applications for TCT Nos. T-12826 and T-
12827, but allowed the validation of Rodriguez's applications for TCT Nos. T-
12828, T-12829, T-12830, T-12831, and T-12832.

Rodriguez then filed before this Court her Petition for Review on Certiorari
questioning the CA's disapproval of her application for validation for TCT Nos. T-
12826 and T-12827.

ISSUE:

Is the Doctrine of the Law of the Case applicable in this case?

RULING:

No.

The doctrine of the "law of the case" provides that questions of law
previously determined by a court will generally govern a case through all its
subsequent stages where "the determination has already been made on a prior
appeal to a court of law resort. If an appellate court has determined a legal issue
and has remanded it to the lower court for further proceedings, another appeal in
that same case should no longer differently determine the legal issue previously
passed upon. Similar to res judicata, it is a refusal to reopen what has already been
decided.

The law of the case does not apply to bar any ruling on TCT Nos. T-12826
and T-12827.

74
 First, there is no attempt to change any legal finding with regard to TCT
Nos. T-12824 and T-12825 that would warrant the calling for its application.

Second, the ruling of the CA on TCT Nos. T-12824 and T-12825 is not a
ruling that can bind or limit this Court on another matter. The Supreme Court is
the final arbiter of all legal questions brought before it. This Court's decision
constitutes the final disposition of the case. This Court's judgment, when final,
binds lower courts, not the other way around. It is the lower courts that are bound
by, and cannot alter or modify, doctrine.

Third, the facts that constitute the controversy pertaining to TCT Nos. T-
12824 and T-12825 are different from those involving TCT Nos. T-12826 and T-
12827. The ruling accorded to the former cannot apply to the latter.

Rodriguez did not file any application for the validation of the properties
covered by TCT Nos. T-12824 and T-12825 before the Baguio Validation
Committee. Hence, if these titles are governed by Marcos and the requirement of
validation under P.D. 1271, these titles are void and are of no effect unless
validated. This is not the case for TCT Nos. T-12826 and T-12827. These titles were
given application numbers VA(B) No. 6590 and VA(B) No. 6591, respectively.
Rodriguez submitted applications for TCT Nos. T-12826 and T-12827 to the Baguio
Validation Committee for its evaluation and decision.

Rodriguez claims that the findings of fact of the CA did not explicitly state
that the Land Management Bureau transmitted the applications to the other
members of the Baguio Validation Committee. Besides this statement, she presents
no other evidence to support the claim that the files pertaining to her applications
were not before the Baguio Validation Committee. However, her act of submitting
the applications to the Baguio Validation Committee is already an
acknowledgment of the Committee's jurisdiction to decide on the matter. In effect,
Rodriguez placed her applications within the Committee's power.

Thus, the ruling on TCT Nos. T-12824 and T-12825 cannot apply to TCT
Nos. T-12826 and T-12827.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC.

75
 Speedy Disposition of Cases

Re: Elvira N. Enalbes

A.M. No. 18-11-09-SC, January 22, 2019

FACTS:

This administrative matter originated from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by

complainants Elvira N. Enalbes among others against former Chief Justice Teresita
J. Leonardo-De Castro (Chief Justice De Castro), charging her with gross ignorance
of the law, gross inefficiency, gross misconduct, gross dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In their Complaint-Affidavit, complainants state that on September 4, 2012,

Spouses Eligio P. Mallari and Marcelina I. Mallari (the Mallari Spouses) filed
before this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order. The Petition was filed against: (1) the Court of
Appeals First Division represented by then Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
(Presiding Justice Reyes), Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Rodil V.
Zalameda; and (2) the Court of Appeals Special Former Fourth Division of Five
represented by Presiding Justice Reyes, Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam, Soccoro
B. Inting, Edwin D. Sorongon, and Agnes Reyes-Carpio. On January 25, 2013, the
Mallari Spouses filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court against
the Philippine National Bank and the Court of Appeals Special Former Fourth
Division of Five. Both Petitions were assigned to this Court's First Division and
were raffled to then Chief Justice De Castro.

Complainants filed a complaint for gross ignorance of the law, gross

inefficiency, gross misconduct, gross dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service against CJ de Castro. They aver that despite the lapse of
more than five (5) years, respondent failed to decide on both Petitions of Spouses
Mallari. Complainants maintain that respondent's failure to promptly act on the
Petitions resulted in a violation of the spouses' constitutional right to speedy
disposition of their cases.

ISSUE:

Whether Chief Justice de Castro should be held administratively liable

for failing to decide on the two petitions despite the lapse of five years.

RULING:

76
 No.

To hold a magistrate administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law,

it is not enough that his or her action was erroneous; it must also be proven that it
was driven by bad faith, dishonesty, or ill motive.

Both the 1987 Constitution and the Internal Rules state that the 24- month
period for deciding on or resolving a case is reckoned from the date of its
submission for resolution. The 24-month period does not run immediately upon
the filing of a petition before this Court, but only when the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum has been submitted.

While the 24-month period provided under the 1987 Constitution is

persuasive, it does not summarily bind this Court to the disposition of cases
brought before it. It is a mere directive to ensure this Court's prompt resolution of
cases, and should not be interpreted as an inflexible rule.

The 24-month period for the Supreme Court to decide on cases, as provided
under Article 8, Section 15 of the Constitution and Rule 13, Section 1 of the Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court is merely directory in nature. Failure to render a
decision within this period would not deprive the corresponding courts of
jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid. It is a mere directive to ensure this
Court's prompt resolution of cases, and should not be interpreted as an inflexible
rule.

Accordingly, respondent's failure to promptly resolve the Mallari Spouses'

Petitions does not constitute gross ignorance of the law warranting administrative
liability.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC has no effect on the ruling.

77
 II
JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction

First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. v. Philippine Bank of

Communications
G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018

FACTS:

First Sarmiento obtained from Philippine Bank of Communications

(PBCOM) a P40,000,000.00 loan, which was secured by a real estate mortgage
(REM). PBCOM then filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the REM
because First Sarmiento failed to pay the loan with accrued interests.

First Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for annulment of real estate

mortgage with the RTC. However, the Clerk of Court refused to accept the
Complaint in the absence of the mortgaged properties' tax declarations, which
would be used to assess the docket fees. First Sarmiento then filed an “Urgent
Motion to Consider the Value of Subject Matter of the Complaint as Not Capable
of Pecuniary Estimation” with the Executive Judge. The motion was granted and
it was ruled that the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation. In the
meantime, the extrajudicial foreclosure ensued and the properties were sold to
PBCOM as the highest bidder. First Sarmiento then filed a Complaint for
annulment of real estate mortgage.

PBCOM opposed and asserted that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction
over First Sarmiento's Complaint because the action for annulment of mortgage
was a real action; thus, the filing fees filed should have been based on the fair
market value of the mortgaged properties.

Thereafter, the RTC dismissed First Sarmiento’s Complaint for lack of

jurisdiction. When the MR was denied, First Sarmiento sought direct recourse to
the Supreme Court via Petition for Review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Is the action for annulment of real estate mortgage filed by First

Sarmiento an action incapable of pecuniary estimation?

78
RULING:

Yes.

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not

capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of
first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought
like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.

Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla likewise stressed that if the primary cause
of action is based on a claim of ownership or a claim of legal right to control,
possess, dispose, or enjoy such property, the action is a real action involving title
to real property.

A careful reading of petitioner's Complaint convinces this Court that

petitioner never prayed for the reconveyance of the properties foreclosed during
the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession over them.
Rather, it assailed the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that it
entered into with respondent because it supposedly never received the proceeds
of the P100,000,000.00 loan agreement. In Bumayog v. Tumas, this Court ruled that
where the issue involves the validity of a mortgage, the action is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation. In the more recent case of Russell v. Vestil, this Court, citing
Bumayog, held that an action questioning the validity of a mortgage is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation. It is not disputed that even if the Complaint
were filed a few days after the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold at
auction to respondent as the highest bidder, the certificate of sale was only issued
to respondent after the Complaint was filed.

Considering that petitioner paid the docket fees as computed by the clerk
of court, upon the direction of the Executive Judge, this Court is convinced that
the Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the Complaint for annulment
of real estate mortgage. Furthermore, even if it is assumed that the instant case
were a real action and the correct docket fees were not paid by petitioner, the case

79
should not have been dismissed; instead, the payment of additional docket fees
should have been made a lien on the judgment award.

In light of the foregoing, this Court reaffirms that the nature of an action is
determined by the principal relief sought in the complaint, irrespective of the other
causes of actions that may also crop up as a consequence of the principal relief
prayed for. The contrary rule espoused in Home Guaranty is thereby set aside.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC has no effect on the ruling.

80
 Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014

FACTS:

In 1988, Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals Inc., through Ramon
Garcia, entered into a deed of absolute sale and purchase of shares of stock. The
deed was for the sale and purchase of stock from various corporations, including
an “A” share in Alabang Country Club, Inc and proprietary membership in Manila
Polo Club, Inc, which are in the name of Antonio. The contract was allegedly
entered into to prevent these shares of stock from being sold at public auction to
pay the outstanding obligations of Antonio.

On September 6, 1989, the share in Alabang Country Club Inc and

proprietary membership in Manila Polo Club, Inc which were included in the
contract of sale between Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, were sold at public auction
to Philippine Investment System Organization.

An information for estafa was filed against Antonio Garcia with the RTC. The
complaint against him alleged that the latter misrepresented to Ferro Chemicals,
Inc that the shares subject of the contracts entered into were free from all liens and
encumbrances, when in truth and in fact, the accused well knew that the shares
had already been garnished in July 1985 and subsequently sold at a public auction
in 1989.

The RTC acquitted Garcia of the said charge for insufficiency of evidence. It
ruled that the Ferro Chemicals was aware of the status of the subject club shares,
thus, the element of false pretense is wanting. Ferro Chemicals appealed the civil
aspect of the case to the CA.

The notice of appeal alleged that the same is without prejudice to the filing
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the criminal aspect. In its Rule 65
petition filed with the Supreme Court, the People of the Philippines alleged that
the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it rendered an acquittal based on affidavits not at all
introduced in evidence by either of the parties. It alleged that the aggrieved party
was deprived of their substantive right to due process.

ISSUE:

81
 Did the RTC have jurisdiction over the estafa case? (Note: This was never raised
as an issue in all stages of the proceedings, but the SC resolved the matter)

RULING:

No, the RTC has no jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is vested by law. In criminal

cases, the imposable penalty of the crime charged in the information determines
the court that has jurisdiction over the case. The law in force at the time was B.P
129, before it was amended by R.A 7961.

Under the said law, the first level courts has exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and
two months or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including its civil liability. Garcia was charged with estafa through other deceits
under Art 318 of the RPC. The crime is punishable with aresto mayor, or
imprisonment of one month and one day to six months.

With this, the RTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The
lack of jurisdiction resulted in voiding all of the trial court’s proceedings and the
judgment issued. Even though the issue was never raised in the pleadings of the
parties, it is settled that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or
waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not
raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that
the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case.

The lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties’ silence on the matter.
The failure of the parties to raise the matter of jurisdiction cannot be construed as
a waiver of the parties. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be waived by
the parties. Thus, the assailed decision is void, considering that it originates from
a void decision of the Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Garcia v Ferro Chemicals, Inc. (G.R. No. 172505, October 1,
2014) is not affected by A.M 19-10-20-SC. It is still settled that jurisdiction is
vested by law and cannot be subject to a waiver of the parties. Furthermore, lack
of jurisdiction by the court rendering decision still results to a void decision, and
can be the subject of review even if the same was not raised on appeal.

82
 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs.
Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation
G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019

FACTS:

Cebu City Zoning Board (CCZB) required respondent to construct a one-

level parking area consisting of 26 parking lots. While making a deep excavation,
respondent discovered telephone lines, cables, and manholes underground, which
had been placed by petitoner PLDT sometime in 1983, preventing respondent from
excavating the land.

In April 2003, respondent applied for exemption from the parking

requirement. CCZB denied the exemption and required respondent to pay the
parking exemption fee of P3,735,600. On April 26, 2004, respondent demanded
PLDT to remove the telephone lines, cables, and manholes or to shoulder the
exemption fee. On May 28, 2004, respondent made a final demand, but PLDT
refused to comply. Respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against PLDT.

In its Answer, PLDT alleged that it did not encroach on respondent’s

property as they were properly positioned along side and underneath a public
sidewalk. It later filed an Amended Anser, arguing that the case should be
dismissed since the action for forcible entry had prescribed; that an action for
forcible entry based on stealth should be reckoned from the discovery of the
alleged unlawful entry, not the last demand to vacate. Moreover, PLDT argued
that the area in question was part of public domain, it being a sidewalk. Assuming
that the property did belong to respondent, PLDT averred that it had the right of
eminent domain.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities granted respondent’s ejectment

complaint. The same was affirmed by the RTC and CA. PLDT filed before the SC
a Petiton for Review on Certiorari.

Petitoner maintains that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case since
respondent’s action for forcible entry based on stealth should be reckoned from
the discovery of the unlawful entry, not from the last demand to vacate.
Respondent argues that petitioner can no longer raise the MTCC’s lack of
jurisdiction as an issue at this stage of the proceedings since, in its Answer before
the MTCC, it only raised the issue of jurisdiction over its person, not the
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

ISSUE:

83
 Is the issue on lack of jurisdiction deemed waived?

RULING:

No.

The precedent set in Tijam is based on the doctrine of equity, which applies
only in cases where jurisdiction was raised at the very last minute when the parties
have already gone through long years of litigation. The long delay in raising lack
of jurisdiction is unfair to the party pleading laches because he or she was misled
into believe in that this defense would no longer be pursued.

In this case, petitioner is not barred from raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction. It raised the issue when it filed its Amended Answer with leave of
court before the MTCC. Thus, the issue of the court’s jurisdiction was seasonable
raised.

Nevertheless, even if this Court disregard the Amended Answer,

petitioner’s contention is not deemed barred by laches since it immediately
questioned the court’s jurisdiction without allowing trial to stretch into years. The
unique circumstances in Tijam are absent in this case. Raising the lack of
jurisdiction a little under a year, or even after the lapse of 4 years, will not operate
as estoppel against a party. Thus, as petitoner seasoanbly raised the court’s lack of
jurisdiction, there is neither waiver of the jurisdictional issue not estoppel against
the petitioner.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

There is no effect on the ruling.

84
 Amoguis v. Ballado
G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018

FACTS:

On November 24, 196, the Ballado Spouse entered into Contracts with
owner and developer St. Joseph Realty, Ltd. (St. Joseph Realty) to buy on
installment parcels of land, which were designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2, and were
located in Block No. 1, Dadiangas Heights Subdivision, General Santos City. The
Ballado Spouses initially paid a total of P500.00 for the lots, and had to pay P107.13
and P97.15 per month for Lot Nos. 1 and 2, respectively, both for 180 months
starting on December 30, 1969. St. Joseph Realty characterized the contracts as
contracts to sell and provided for automatic rescission and cancellation.

The Ballado Spouses amortized until 1979 when Crisanto Pinili (Pinili), St.
Joseph Realty's collector, refused to receive their payments. They erected a small
house made of light materials for their caretaker. Pinili informed them that it was
an eyesore and was against the rules of the subdivision. He advised to suspend
the payment for the lots, and directed the Ballado Spouses to remove the small
house before payments could continue. He also promised to return and collect
after he had put their records in order, but he never did. Francisco informed St.
Joseph Realty that the small house had already been taken down, but Pinili still
did not come to collect. On February 17, 1987, the Ballado Spouses discovered that
St. Joseph Realty rescinded their contracts. They found out that St. Joseph Realty
had sent written demands to pay to the address of Lot Nos. 1 and 2, and not to
their residence as declared in the contracts.

Meanwhile, on February 9, 1987, St. Joseph Realty sold Lot Nos. 1 and 2 to
Epifanio Amoguis (Epifanio), father of Gregorio Amoguis (Gregorio) and Tito
Amoguis (Tito) (collectively, the Amoguis Brothers). On August 18, 1987, titles
were issued in the Amoguis Brothers' names.

Ballado confronted the Amoguis Brothers when he saw that the barbed
fences, which he had installed around the lots, were taken down. Epifanio told
him that he bought the lots from St. Joseph Realty. Thereafter, the Amoguis
Brothers took down Francisco's mango and chico trees.

Compelled by these events, the Ballado Spouses filed a Complaint for

damages, injunction with writ of preliminary injunction, mandatory injunction,
cancellation and annulment of titles, and attorney's fees. They also prayed for
a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Amoguis Brothers from erecting walls
around the lots.

85
 St. Joseph Realty filed its Answer. It was its affirmative defense that the
Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case, and that jurisdiction was
properly vested in the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. The Regional
Trial Court ruled in favor of the Ballado Spouses, and against St. Joseph Realty and
the Amoguis Brothers.

Only the Amoguis Brothers timely filed their appeal brief. The Amoguis
Brothers argued that the Regional Trial Court should have considered valid the
rescission or cancellation of the contract to sell, and that they should not have been
declared as buyers in bad faith. They contended that the evidence presented by
the Ballado Spouses should not have been considered as it was not formally
offered. They averred that in case there was no valid rescission or cancellation of
contract, St. Joseph Realty should have been ordered to pay them the cost of their
improvements, attorney's fees, litigation expense, and moral and exemplary
damages. They did not raise the Regional Trial Court's lack of jurisdiction. On
September 26, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, affirming the
Regional Trial Court Decision.

Though not raised, the Court of Appeals discussed at the outset the issue of
jurisdiction. Since the Ballado Spouses wanted St. Joseph Realty to comply with
the provisions of the contracts to sell, the Complaint was for specific performance.
The subject matter of the case involved subdivision lots. Therefore, jurisdiction
was lodged with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board The Court of
Appeals ruled, however, that since neither St. Joseph Realty nor the Amoguis
Brothers raised the issue of jurisdiction before the Regional Trial Court, they must
be considered estopped from raising it on appeal.

ISSUE:

Can lack of jurisdiction be lost by waiver or estoppel?

HELD:

As a general rule lack of jurisdiction cannot be lost through waiver,

however in present case petitioners are already estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Laches had already set in.

As the Court of Appeals discussed motu proprio, Presidential Decree No.

957 instituted the National Housing Authority as the administrative body with
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the trade and business of subdivision and
condominium developments. It provided for mechanisms where entities can

86
apply for licenses to develop and sell subdivision lots or condominiums with the
intent of curbing fraud instigated on purchasers of real estate. A performance bond
is also required of these entities to guarantee their undertaking under the
subdivision and condominium plans. For greater transparency, their subdivision
and condominium plans must likewise be registered. The following transactions,
however, were beyond the administrative body's regulatory supervision, and
were exempt from license and performance bond requirements:

(a) Sale of a subdivision lot resulting from the partition of land

among co-owners and co-heirs.
(b) Sale or transfer of a subdivision lot by the original purchaser
thereof and any subsequent sale of the same lot.
(c) Sale of a subdivision lot or a condominium unit by or for the
account of a mortgagee in the ordinary course of business when
necessary to liquidate a bona fide debt.

Presidential Decree No. 1344 was later on enacted to add to the National Housing
Authority's jurisdiction. It was no longer just a licensing body for subdivision and
condominium developers. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 gave
authority to the National Housing Authority to hear and decide cases:

Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 provided that appeals from decisions of
the National Housing Authority shall be made to the President of the Philippines
within 15 days from receipt.

In between the approval of Presidential Decree Nos. 957 and 1344, the Maceda
Law was approved.

Subject matter jurisdiction is a court's or tribunal's power to hear and determine

cases of a general class or type relating to specific subject matters. This jurisdiction
is conferred by law.To determine a court's or an administrative body's jurisdiction
over a subject matter, allegations in the complaint must be examined.6The nature
of the action, as reflected in the allegations in the complaint, and the reliefs sought
determine jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is immaterial whether the
claimant has a right to the relief sought.

Presidential Decree No. 957 was approved on July 12, 1976, 11 years before the
Ballado Spouses filed their complaint. This means that the law mandating the
jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority, which later on became the House
and Land Use Regulatory Board, had long been in effect when petitioners filed
their Answer and participated in trial court proceedings. It behooved them to raise

87
the issue of jurisdiction then, especially since St. Joseph Realty, their co-
respondent, raised it in its Answer albeit superficially and without any discussion.

According to Presidential Decree No. 1344, exclusive original jurisdiction for

specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman is lodged with the National Housing Authority.

It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the
special law.

The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because of Section
41 of PD No. 957, earlier quoted, is also unacceptable. We do not read that
provision as vesting concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial Court and the
Board over the complaint mentioned in PD No. 1344 if only because grants of
power are not to be lightly inferred or merely implied. The only purpose of this
section, as we see it, is to reserve to the aggrieved party such other remedies as
may be provided by existing law, like a prosecution for the act complained of
under the Revised Penal Code.

Presently, jurisprudence still dictates that when a buyer wants to compel a

developer to conform with the terms of the contract it executed, jurisdiction lies
with the Housing and Land Use and Regulatory Board.

The Ballado Spouses' rights and interests lie not just as buyers of any property, but
buyers of subdivision lots from a subdivision developer. From the circumstances
between St. Joseph Realty and the Ballado Spouses, there is no doubt that the then
National Housing Authority had jurisdiction to determine the parties' obligations
under the contracts to sell and the damages that may have arisen from their breach.
The Ballado Spouses' Complaint should have been filed before it. The National
Housing Authority also had jurisdiction over the injunction and annulment of
titles sought against petitioners as these were incidental to St. Joseph Realty's
unsound business practices.

Where there is no jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null
and void. A void judgment has absolutely no legal effect, "by which no rights are
divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any
one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void."
However, this Court has discussed with great nuance the legal principle
enunciated in Tijam. Estoppel by laches bars a party from invoking lack of
jurisdiction in an unjustly belated manner especially when it actively participated
during trial.

88
Estoppel by laches has its origins in equity. It prevents a party from presenting his
or her claim "when, by reason of abandonment and negligence, he [or she] allowed
a long time to elapse without presenting [it]."

In estoppel by laches, a claimant has a right that he or she could otherwise exercise
if not for his or her delay in asserting it. This delay in the exercise of the right
unjustly misleads the court and the opposing party of its waiver. Thus, to claim it
belatedly given the specific circumstances of the case would be unjust.

In Tijam, this Court ruled that long delay in raising lack of jurisdiction is unfair to
the party pleading laches because he or she was misled into believing that this
defense would no longer be pursued. A delay of 15 years in raising questions on
subject matter jurisdiction was appreciated by this Court as estoppel by laches.

In summary, Tijam applies to a party claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction

when:

(1) there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant;

(2) the statutory right was not invoked;
(3) an unreasonable length of time lapsed before the claimant
raised the issue of jurisdiction;
(4) the claimant actively participated in the case and sought
affirmative relief from the court without jurisdiction;
(5) the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which
forum possesses subject matter jurisdiction;
(6) irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who
relied on the forum and the claimant's implicit waiver.

Tijam applies in this case. The allegations, determinative of subject matter

jurisdiction, were apparent on the face of the Complaint. The law that determines
jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority had been in place for more than a
decade when the Complaint was filed. St. Joseph Realty raised lack of jurisdiction
in its Answer. Petitioners sought affirmative relief from the Regional Trial Court
and actively participated in all stages of the proceedings. Therefore, there was no
valid reason for petitioners to raise the issue of jurisdiction only now before this
Court.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING

It has no effect.

89
 Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po
G.R. No. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017

FACTS:

This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City,

initially registered under the name of Roberto Aboitiz. This parcel of land
originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno. On July 31, 1973, Mariano executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno. On May 5, 1978, Ciriaco
sold the two (2) lots to Victoria Po (Victoria). The parties executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale. On July 15, 1982, Mariano died and was survived by his five (5)
children.

In 1990, Peter Po discovered that Ciriaco “had executed a quitclaim dated

August 7, 1989 renouncing his interest in favor of Roberto. In the quitclaim, Ciriaco
stated that he was “the declared owner of Lot Nos. 2835 and 2807.

The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the

Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in which
Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses
Po as consideration for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses
Po were left with after the quitclaim. However, also in 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also
sold to Roberto. The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds of
absolute sale in favor of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the
lot as part of a subdivision called North Town Homes. On April 19, 1993, Roberto
filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835, the trial court granted
the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The
lot was immediately subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose.

On November 19, 1996, the Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land
and to declare nullity of title with damages.

The Spouses Aboitiz argue that Branch 55, Regional Trial Court did not
have jurisdiction to nullify the final and executory Decision of Branch 28, Regional
Trial Court in LRC Case No. N-208. They claim that that it is the Court of Appeals
that has jurisdiction to annul judgments of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the action for reconveyance
and annulment of title filed by the Spouses Po?

90
RULING:

Yes.

Except for actions falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Courts, the Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions
involving "title to, or possession of, real property." Section 19 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title is an action involving

the title to real property.

The complaint of the Spouses Po is clearly an action for reconveyance and

annulment of title. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is provided in Section 9 of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 129:

Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall

exercise:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts.

While the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to annul judgments of the

Regional Trial Courts, the case at bar is not for the annulment of a judgment of a
Regional Trial Court. It is for reconveyance and the annulment of title.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po (G.R. No. 208450 & 208497, June
5, 2017) is not affected by the New Rules.

91
 Heirs of Dragon v. The Manila Banking Corp.
G.R. No. 205068, March 6, 2019

FACTS:

From 1976 to 1982, Dragon obtained several loans from Manila Banking,
which were evidenced by four (4) Promissory Notes. The total principal amount
of his loans was P6,945,642.00. In 1987, Manila Banking was placed under
receivership by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The bank's receiver sent Dragon
several demand letters requiring him to pay his outstanding loans. Dragon failed
to pay his outstanding obligation. Thus, Banking filed before the Regional Trial
Court a Complaint for collection of sum of money. The Regional Trial Court issued
its Decision in favor of Manila Banking. Both parties filed Motions for
Reconsideration of the Regional Trial Court. Notably, in his Reply and
Supplemental Opposition to Manila Banking's Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
Dragon raised for the first time the issue of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over
the Complaint. He alleged that Manila Banking willfully and deliberately evaded
payment of the correct docket fees for the amounts it claimed. The Regional Trial
Court denied both parties' Motions. The Court of Appeals denied both parties'
Motions for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals found that the deficient
payment of docket fees did not automatically result in the case's dismissal as the
trial court may still allow payment of the difference within a reasonable period,
but before the expiry of the reglementary period. The deficiency could also be a
lien on the judgment award. It ruled that the claimed interests, penalties, and
attorney's fees could not be determined with certainty until the resolution of the
case. The Heirs of Dragon filed their Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the Complaint of respondent
The Manila Banking Corporation in view of the insufficient payment of docket
fees?

RULING:

No.

The general rule is that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. A
party is only estopped from raising the issue when it does so "in an unjustly
belated manner especially when it actively participated during trial. In this regard,

92
this Court has consistently held that a party may be estopped from questioning
the lack of jurisdiction due to insufficient payment of filing or docket fees, if the
objection is not timely raised. The jurisdictional objection had been available to
petitioners long before then, but they failed to timely raise it. Nonetheless, the
circumstances of this case warrant an examination of the rules and principles on
payment of docket fees.

Under Rule 141, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, filing fees must be paid in
full at the time an initiatory pleading or application is filed. Payment is
indispensable for jurisdiction to vest in a court. The amount must be paid in full.
Nonetheless, in Magaspi v. Ramolete despite insufficient payment of filing fees, a
complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was deemed docketed as
there had been an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be
paid[.]"However, this Court declined to apply Magaspi in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals. There, the counsel deliberately did
not specify the amount of damages in the complaint's prayer even though at least
P78 million was alleged in the body. It later even amended the same complaint to
remove all mentions of damages in the body. The Court serves warning that it will
take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice. To put a stop to this
irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered
in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply
with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi
case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and
reversed. Moreover, the filing party must show that there was no intention to
defraud the government of the appropriate filing fees due it.

Moreover, in its defense, respondent claims that it did not willfully conceal
the amount it sought to collect from petitioners, as its Complaint "clearly states
"that it intended to collect both the principal amount, plus interests, penalties, and
attorney's fees up to the date of actual payment. In effect, respondent claims that
it had stated the amount of its claim accurately to assess the filing fees it should
pay. Yet, respondent blatantly did not comply with the requirement in Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 11-94 that the total aggregate amount,

93
including interest claimed, should be specified in the body and prayer of a
complaint.

Respondent alleges that it could not determine with certainty the accrued
interests, penalties, and attorney's fees petitioners are liable for. However,
Respondent itself, in multiple pleadings, stated that as of April 3, 2002, it had
computed the outstanding interests, penalties, and attorney's fees owed it in the
amount of P41,082,626.98. Clearly, respondent is perfectly capable of estimating
the accrued interests, penalties, and charges it demanded as of the date it filed its
Complaint. But despite respondent's demand letters containing computations of
accrued interests, penalties, and attorney's fees, none of these computations were
mentioned in the Complaint, either in its body or prayer.

Lastly, in multiple pleadings, respondent reasons that it has not defrauded

the government because the court may simply recoup the filing fees in the form of
a lien over the judgment award in the event that it be awarded all the amounts it
is allegedly owed. However, the rule on after-judgment liens applies to instances
of incorrectly assessed or paid filing fees, or where the court has discretion to fix
the amount to be awarded.

What respondent forgets is that the payment of correct docket fees cannot
be made contingent on the result of the case. Otherwise, the government and the
judiciary would sustain tremendous losses, as these fees "take care of court
expenses in the handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of equipment,
salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc., computed as to man hours used in
handling of each case."

In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, in interpreting the third rule laid down

in Sun Insurance regarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading, this
Court held that the same refers only to damages arising after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. Further, nowhere in any of respondent's
pleadings filed before any court did respondent manifest its willingness, to the
Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals or to this Court, that it will be
paying additional docket fees when required. In none of its pleadings did
respondent allude to paying any additional docket fee if so ordered; instead, it left
it to the courts to constitute a lien over a hypothetical award, to which it was not
entitled, as both lower courts have already held.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

NO EFFECT, Jurisdiction, Payment of docket fees.

94
 Cotoner-Zacarias v. Spouses Revilla
G.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent Alfredo and Paz Castillo- Revilla (Revilla spouses) filed a case
for annulment of title on the ground of forgery against petitioner Amanda
Cotoner-Zacarias (Amanda). In their complaint, the spouses alleged that Paz
Castillo-Revilla entered into a contract of loan with petitioner in 1983. By way of
security, the parties verbally agreed that Amanda would take physical possession
and cultivate respondent spouses unregistered lot in Cavite. The earnings would
be used to pay the loan and realty taxes and upon full payment thereof, Amada
would return the property to the Revilla spouses.

In 1995, however, the respondent spouses discovered that petitioner

Amanda fraudulently executed a document entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupa" before the Provincial Assessor of Cavite wherein it alleged that the
respondents sold the property to her. The document was included in the pleadings
which were served before them in relation to a land registration case filed by
spouses Sun, the alleged buyer of the subject property. Consequently, respondent
spouses demanded from Amanda the cancellation of the Kasulatan and all
subsequent transfers of the property, its reconveyance, and the restoration of its
tax declaration in their name. Their demand was left unheeded which prompted
them to file this case. In defense, Amanda denied the allegations in the pleading
claiming that respondent voluntarily executed the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
in her favor and respondent cause of action already prescribed.

After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent spouses. On appeal,

Amanda claimed that the judgment of the lower court is void for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner contended that Revilla spouses failed to pay the correct
dockets fees because they based the amount on the alleged claim for actual
damages of P50,000 and not on the value of the property as alleged in the
supplemental pre-trial brief amounting to P12,000,000.00.

ISSUE:

Did the court acquire when respondents Revilla spouses paid filing fees
based on the ₱50,000.00 claim for damages in the complaint but stated in their
supplemental pre-trial brief that the property is valued at ₱12,000,000.00?

RULING:

95
 Yes.

Respondents Revilla spouses paid the proper docket fees, thus, the trial
court acquired jurisdiction. It is true that it is not simply the filing of the complaint
or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. As mandated by Supreme Court Circular No. 7 of 1988, all complaints,
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees
in any case.

In the case at bar, the complaint filed by the Spouses Revilla only asked for
actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00. While Spouses Revilla mentioned the
amount of P12,000,000.00 as actual damages in the pre-trial, said amount was not
stated in the complaint and neither was it awarded by the lower court in its
judgment. Considering that the complaint was not formally amended by the
spouses to increase the amount of actual damages being sought, the trial court was
not stripped of its jurisdiction to try the case since the Spouses Revilla correctly
paid the docket fees based merely on what was prayed for in the complaint. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint and the averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Hence, the mere
mentioning by the Spouses Revilla of the amount of P12,000,000.00 during the pre-
trial is inconsequential.

EFFECT OF THE RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of AMADA COTONER-ZACARIAS v. SPS. ALFREDO

REVILLA AND HEIRS OF PAZ REVILLA is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC.

96
 Department of Finance vs. Yambao
G.R. Nos. 220632 and 220634, November 6, 2019

FACTS:

Yambao, then a Customs Operation Officer III of the Bureau of Customs,

was accused of falsification of public documents and perjury. An investigation was
conducted on Yambao’s lifestyle, assets, and properties acquired during her
tenure at the Bureau of Customs. The Office of the Ombudsman found that the
evidence presented was insufficient to prove Yambao’s non-filing of her SALN
and that the discrepancies in her disclosure was done without any deliberate intent
to falsify.

Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration which the Office of the

Ombudsman denied. Thus, petitioner filed a Petitioner for Certiorari under Rule
65 on the ground that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion
by disregarding jurisprudential parameters in determining probable cause.

ISSUE:

Can the Supreme Court, through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
interfere with the exercise of the Office of the Ombudsman’s discretion in
determining the existence of probable cause when there is no showing that it
acted in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner?

RULING:

No.

Special civil actions for certiorari do not correct errors of fact or law that do
not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Thus, as a general rule, this Court does
not interfere with the exercise of the Office of the Ombudsman’s discretion in
determining the existence of probable cause when there is no showing that it acted
in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner.

The office of the Ombudsman, as an independent constitutional body, has

the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing
of a criminal case against an accused. This function is executive in nature.

The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter. It

requires probing into the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the

97
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which she was
prosecuted. The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate.
Thus, it is in a better position to assess the strength or weaknesses of the evidence
on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of
facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC has no effect on the ruling.

98
 Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
v. Heirs of Abucay
G.R. Nos. 186432 & 186964, March 12, 2019

FACTS:

On October 14, 1983, the Spouses Redemptor and Elisa Abucay (Spouses
Abucay) purchased a 182-hectare parcel of land from Guadalupe Cabahug
(Cabahug). Sometime in 1986, 22.8409 hectares of the lot were declared covered
under the Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
27. Emancipation patents were then issued to the farmer-beneficiaries On June 28,
2002, Rena B. Abucay, Rhea B. Abucay-Beduya, Ris B. Abucay-Buante, Elver B.
Abucay, Redelisa Abucay-Agustin, and Rhota B. Abucay (collectively, the Heirs of
Spouses Abucay) filed before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator a
Complaint for the proper determination of just compensation. The Heirs of
Spouses Abucay alleged that they inherited the 182-hectare property upon their
parents' death and enjoyed its ownership and possession. They claimed that they
did not receive any just compensation for the 22 hectares of the property that was
placed under the Operation Land Transfer Program. The Certificate of Deposit
worth P103,046.47-issued in 2001 by the Land Bank of the Philippines as
compensation-was not only inadequate, but was also issued to Cabahug, the
property's previous owner. Thus, they prayed, among others, that they be paid
P2,000,000.00 as just compensation.

Regional Adjudicator Diloy declared the emancipation patents issued to the

farmer-beneficiaries void. Following this, the Heirs of Spouses Abucay filed
another Complaint for the cancellation of original certificates of title and
emancipation patents. In his June 16, 2005 Decision, Regional Adjudicator Diloy
similarly canceled the original certificates of title and voided the emancipation
patents issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. In its May 10, 2006 Decision, the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board reversed Regional
Adjudicator Diloy's June 16, 2005 Decision and declared itself wanting of
jurisdiction over the appeal. It found that the nature of the action filed by the Heirs
of Spouses Abucay was an Operation Land Transfer protest, an agrarian law
implementation case under the primary jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the consequent appeal, to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Secretary.

ISSUE:

Is the case for cancellation of registered emancipation patents within the

jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform?

99
RULING:

Yes.

The Department of Agrarian Reform has taken cognizance of cases

involving either the issuance or cancellation of certificates of land ownership
award and emancipation patents. Cases involving registered certificates of land
ownership awards, emancipation patents, and titles emanating from them are
agrarian reform disputes, of which the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board takes cognizance. Meanwhile, cases involving unregistered ones are
agrarian law implementation cases, put under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Directors and the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

In 2009, however, Congress amended the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law through Republic Act No. 9700. Under the new Section 24, all cases
involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of land
ownership awards, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are
now within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Secretary. He or she takes jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of titles
issued under any agrarian reform program, whether registered with the Land
Registration Authority or not.

At the time of the Complaint's filing on April 26, 2004, the 2003 Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure governed the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. Rule II
provided that adjudicators have exclusive original jurisdiction over registered
certificates of land ownership award and emancipation patents, while the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has appellate jurisdiction,
more specifically, those involving the correction, partition, cancellation,
secondary and subsequent issuances of Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land
Registration Authority However, it is "not sufficient that the controversy simply
involves the cancellation of a [certificate of land ownership award] already
registered with the Land Registration Authority. What is of primordial
consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute between the parties."

Indeed, the emancipation patents involved here have already been

registered with the Land Registration Authority, and the grant of the Complaint
filed by respondents will result in the cancellation of these registered
emancipation patents. Nonetheless, respondents primarily assailed in their
Complaint the land coverage under the Operation Land Transfer Program because

100
the original owner, Cabahug, had not been properly notified of it. Specifically, they
contended that the notices were erroneously sent to Cabahug's father, Sotero
Cabahug. The Complaint, therefore, is essentially an Operation Land Transfer
protest, which is an agrarian law implementation case belonging to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary's jurisdiction. Here, the controversy
does not involve negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
the tenurial arrangement's terms or conditions. Respondents alleged that
emancipation patents should not have been issued to begin with since no notice of
coverage was sent to Cabahug. In other words, they contend that the property was
not properly acquired through the Operation Land Transfer Program. The
controversy involves the administrative implementation of the agrarian reform
program, which, as mentioned, is under the Department of Agrarian Reform
Secretary's jurisdiction. Since the Complaint filed by respondents involves an
agrarian law implementation case, Regional Adjudicator Diloy had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of it. At that time, he should have referred the case to the proper
office of the Department of Agrarian Reform for appropriate action.

However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9700, the exclusive and
original jurisdiction over cases for cancellation of registered emancipation patents
now belongs to the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES:

NO EFFECT: JURISDICTION OF THE DAR against the Jurisdiction of the

DARAB.

101
 Claret School of Quezon City vs. Sinday
G.R. No. 226358, October 9, 2019

FACTS:

Sinday, the wife of one of Claret’s longtime drivers, narrated that Claret
engaged her multiples times as a releasing clerk in its book sale, as a filing clerk,
and as a secretary. Later on, she was asked to sign a Probationary Employment
Contract under which her tenure would expire 15 days after the contract expired.
She was told that this was due to the change in school administration. After her
dismissal, she continued working for Claret as a substitute teacher aid, but when
the permanent teacher returned, she stopped working. Sinday filed a complained
for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter claiming that she had been a regular
employee as she performed various jobs that were usually necessary and desirable
in the usual business of Claret. Claret, on the other hand, denied the claims
averting that she was merely a part-time fixed- term employee. The Labor Arbiter
held that the repeated hiring of Sinday for around 3 years conferred her regular
employment status. The NLRC, on the other hand, reversed the decision ruling
that her employment was merely part-time contractual, not regular. Sinday filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the CA, who reversed the decision of the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Can the Supreme Court resolve questions of fact in a petition for review of
a Court of Appeal’s certiorari decision in a labor case?

RULING:

Yes. As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, in a petition
for review of a Court of Appeal’s certiorari decision in a labor case, the Court only
resolves whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the
basis of whether the NLRC’s decision on the merits of the case was correct.
Nevertheless, this is not a hard and fast rule. Judicial review in labor cases may
also resolve questions of facts when the factual findings and conclusion of the
labor tribunals are contradictory or inconsistent with those of the CA. When there
is variance in the findings of the labor tribunals, as in this case, it becomes
imperative that the facts be re-examined to arrive at the correct conclusion,

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

There is no effect on the ruling.

102
 Terp Construction Corporation vs.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank
G.R. No. 221771, September 18, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner with Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation, and Planters

Development Bank (Planters) agreed to raise funds to develop a housing project
through the issuance of bonds worth P400 million. The three companies entered
into a Contract of Guaranty in which they agreed that Terp Construction would
sell the bonds and convey funds generated into an asset pool. Home Insurance
Guaranty Corporation, as guarantor, would pay investors the value of the bond at
maturity plus 8.5% interest per year.

Banco Filipino purchased the bonds for P100 million and asked for
additional interest other than the guaranteed 8.5% per annum, based on the letters
written by Terp Construction Senior Vice President Escalona. When the bonds
matured, Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation paid Banco Filipino interest
earnings of 8.5% per annum. Banco Filipino then sent a demand letter to petitioner
demanding the additional interest on its investment in compliance with its
agreement in their letters.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for declaration of nullify of interest against

Banco Filipino. It alleged that it only agrees to pay the 7% addition interest on the
condition that all the asset pool funds would be released to it or pay the additional
interest, but such funds were never released. Banco Filipino, on the other hand,
alleged that it was induced into buying the bonds after Escalona committed to pay
the additional interest.

The RTC ruled that petitioner was not obligated to pay the additional
interest and that the acts of Escalona were not binding on petitioner. The CA set
aside the decision of the RTC, ruling that both parties agreed to the payment of
additional interest.

After the denial of the CA of its Motion for Reconsideration, Petitioner filed
a Petition for Review on Certiorari submitting that while a petition under Rule 45
is generally limited to questions of law, its case falls under one of the recognized
exceptions since the factual findings of the trial court and the CA are conflicting.

103
ISSUE:

Are factual questions proper in this case in view of the conflicting factual
findings of the RTC and CA?

RULING:

No. As a general rule, only questions of law may be brought in a petition

for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court will not disturb the factual
findings of the lower courts if they are supported by substantial evidence except
when, among other exceptions, the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the
trial court. However, a party cannot merely claim that it falls under the exceptions.
It must be demonstrated that a review of the factual findings is necessary.

Here, petitioner claims that its case falls under the exceptions since the
factual findings of the trial court are in conflict with the factual findings of the CA.
The CA’s reversal of the trial court’s factual findings, however, is not sufficient
reason to warrant the Court’s review.

The CA is trier of facts. Its factual findings, even if contradictory to those of

the trial court, may be binding on the Supreme Court when they are supported by
substantial evidence.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

There is no effect on the ruling.

104
 City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority
G.R. Nos. 184203 & 187583 November 26, 2014

Facts:

These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of Lapu-
Lapu and the Province of Bataan separately filed against the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA).

In a 1998, PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief against petitioner City
of Lapu-Lapu in order to determine its tax-exempt status under the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995. During the pendency of the case, petitioner Province
of Bataan also demanded from PEZA the payment of realty taxes. In response,
PEZA requested the Province to suspend the assessment and collection until its
petition for declaratory relief against the City of Lapu-Lapu be resolved. The
petitioner Province did not agree. Due to PEZA’s default in the payment of the tax,
petitioner sent a notice of delinquency and soon after a notice of sale against the
properties of PEZA. In response, PEZA filed an injunction case against petitioner
Province.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Province. Thereafter, PEZA filed before the
CA a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 arguing that the Provincial Treasurer of
Bataan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the notice of delinquency
and notice of sale because it is exempt from payment of real property taxes. In
defense, petitioner Province moved for the dismissal of the action for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner contended that PEZA sought a reversal of the RTC decision
in a local tax case, hence, CTA has jurisdiction over the action. CA took cognizance
of the case and decided in favor or PEZA.

Issue:

Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the PEZA’s petition for
certiorari against the Province of Bataan?

Ruling:

No.

The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Petition

for Cetriorai. According to Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9282, the Court of Tax Appeal has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over local
tax cases decided by Regional Trial Courts. In addition, the Court held in The City

105
of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo, that the Court of Tax Appeals, not the Court of
Appeals, has the exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
assailing interlocutory orders issued by Regional Trial Courts in a local tax case.

In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it

can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is
deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. If this
Court were to sustain that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the
CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA
and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely the
split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of
justice.

In this case, the petition for injunction filed before the RTC of Pasay was a
local tax case originally decided by the trial court in its original jurisdiction. Since
the PEZA assailed a judgment, not an interlocutory order, of the RTC, the PEZA’s
proper remedy was an appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals. Notwithstanding, the
Court of Tax Appeals and not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over both
remedies. Since the filing of appeal in the wrong court does not toll the period to
appeal, then, the denial of the petition for injunction became final and executory.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of CITY OF LAPU-LAPU VS. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC

ZONE AUTHORITY is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC.

106
 Jaka Investments Corp. v. Urdaneta Village Association, Inc.
G.R. Nos. 204187 & 206606, April 1, 2019

FACTS:

Ayala Land, Inc. (Ayala Land), the successor-in-interest of Makati

Development Corporation, is the developer and seller of lots in Urdaneta Village,
Makati City. The Urdaneta Village Association, Inc. (the Association) is its duly
organized homeowners' association. All parcels of land sold by Ayala Land in
Urdaneta Village are subject to uniform restrictions, which are annotated on the
transfer certificates of title covering the lots. The uniform restrictions, among
others read: The property described in this certificate of title is subject to the
restrictions enumerated in Annex A of the sale executed by Makati Development
Corporation in favor of the registered owner which shall remain in force for fifty
years from June 1, 1958. Jaka Investments bought three (3) lots in Urdaneta Village,
Later, the Association's Board of Governors held a meeting, where it approved the
extension of the Association's corporate life and the term of the Deed Restrictions,
both for another 25 years: A. Amendment of the Articles of Incorporation
(extension of corporate life), state that: The foregoing restrictions shall remain in
force for twenty-five years from June 1, 2008. However, the Association may, by
majority rule, from time to time, add new ones, amend or abolish building and
architectural restrictions specified in Part III. These restrictions may be reviewed every
ten years or more often, if necessary. Jaka Investments filed before the Regional Trial
Court a Petition for the cancellation of restrictions, claiming that upon the
expiration of the term of restrictions on June 1, 2008, the legal or contractual basis
for the restrictions ceased. Since the annotations became unlawful limitations on
petitioner's rights as the lots' owner, they should be canceled under Section 108 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree.

On December 16, 2008, the Association filed its Opposition to the Petition
with Motion to Dismiss. Maintaining that this was an intra- corporate dispute on
the validity of the uniform restrictions' term extension, the Association argued that
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, not the trial court, had exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the case. The Regional Trial Court ruled against the
Association's and Ayala Land's oppositions. Despite agreeing that the issue was
intra-corporate, the trial court still held that it had jurisdiction over the case. The
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's rulings and dismissed Jaka
Investments' Petition for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Can the Court, in a petition for review under Rule 45, review questions
of fact from the HLURB? [Case issues: (1) whether or not the extension of the

107
Deed Restrictions is valid; and (2) whether or not petitioner Jaka Investments
Corporation is estopped from assailing the validity of the Deed Restrictions'
extension]

RULING:

No. As for the second and third issues, their resolution would necessarily
involve an examination of evidence presented by the parties. These are questions
of facts, which cannot be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. In Heirs of Pedro Mendoza v. Valte:

Resolving questions of fact is a function of the lower courts. This court is a

collegiate body. It does not receive evidence nor conduct trial procedures that
involve the marking of documentary evidence by the parties and hearing the direct
and cross-examination of each and every witness presented for testimonial
evidence.

The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board is the appropriate

government agency to resolve whether the extension of the Deed Restrictions is
valid, and whether petitioner is estopped to question it. It has the technical
expertise to analyze contracts between petitioner and respondent Association.
In Spouses Chua v. Ang, this Court declared that the agency, "in the exercise of its
powers, .is empowered to interpret and apply contracts, and determine the rights
of private parties under these contracts."

This Court reminds litigants, counsels, and judges alike on the doctrine of
primary administrative jurisdiction. Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc. instructs:
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience,
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

There is no effect. The case involves basic concepts of Jurisdiction (Primary

Jurisdiction, Hierarchy of Courts).

108
 III
CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 1
General Provisions

Section 2 - In what courts applicable.

E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco

G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner is an American corporation and is the assignee the inventors of

losartan. Losartan is being marketed in the Philippines by Merck, Sharpe, and
Dohm Corporation (Merck) under the brand names Cozaar and Hyzaar. On July
1987, petitioner filed a patent application before the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks, and Technology Transfer. On December 2000, petitioner requested
for an office action on the patent application. The patent examiner replied that
petitioner’s application was already abandoned as of September 1988. Petitioner’s
counsel then filed a petition for revival of its patent application but was denied for
having been filed out of time. Petitioner appealed to respondent Director-General
of IPO but was also denied. Thus, a petition for review was filed with the CA and
was granted. The OSG, acting for IPO, moved for reconsideration while
Therapharma, Inc. moved for leave to intervene and admit its motion for
reconsideration alleging that the decision affected its vested right to sell its own
losartan product under the brand name Lifezar in the Philippines which was
already approved by the BFAD.

The CA granted the intervention of Therapharma. Petitioner sought for the

CA to reconsider the intervention but was denied. The CA eventually reversed its
decision hence, denying the petition. Petitioner thus filed a petition for review on
certiorari via Rule 45 with the SC arguing, among others, that intervention should
not have been allowed on appeal since the revival of a patent application is ex
parte and is strictly a contest between the examiner and the applicant under the
IPO rules and that the disallowance of any intervention is to ensure the
confidentiality of the proceedings.

ISSUE:

Must the CA follow the IPO rules?

109
RULING:

No, the CA must not follow the IPO rules.

Sec. 2, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that it shall apply in all
the courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court. Thus, the Court
of Appeals is not bound by the rules of procedure in administrative agencies. The
procedural rules of an administrative agency only govern proceedings within the
agency. Once the Court of Appeals has given due course to an appeal from a ruling
of an administrative agency, the proceedings before it are governed by the Rules
of Court.

In this case, Therapharma filed its motion for leave to intervene with the
CA where the petition to revive patent application was appealed by petitioner.
Further, Sec. 7(7.1)(b) of the Intellectual Property Code clearly provides that the
decisions of the Director General in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction in
respect of the decisions of the Director of Patents, and the Director of Trademarks
shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Thus, it is the Rules of Court, not the IPO rules, which governs the CA’s
proceedings in appeals from the decisions of the Director General of the
Intellectual Property Office regarding the revival of patent applications.

Thus, the CA must follow the Rules of Court and not the IPO rules.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

Sec. 1, Rule 43 and Sec. 2, Rule 1 is not affected by the New Rules.

110
Section 6 - Construction

Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435 August 9, 2017

FACTS:

In his Affidavit-Complaint (Complaint) dated 6 August 2008, petitioner

Joson charged private respondents before the Ombudsman with violation of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended. At the time of filing the Complaint, Joson was then Nueva
Ecija's Vice Governor and its Sangguniang Panlalawigan's Presiding Officer, while
Umali was Nueva Ecija's Governor. Agtay, Abesamis, and Pancho served as
Nueva Ecija's Provincial Trade and Industry Officer, OIC-Provincial
Administrator, and Treasurer, respectively. Pallanan was the former Provincial
Administrator of Nueva Ecija.

Joson alleged that on 21 September 2006, a Memorandum of Agreement

was executed by the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija and Ryan Angelo
Sweets and Catering Services (Ryan Angelo Catering), which was owned by
Cleopatra Gervacio (Cleopatra). Under this Agreement, Ryan Angelo Catering's
services for two (2) years “shall include regular serving of meals for breakfast,
lunch, dinner, and snacks at the canteen and the convention center, special meals
and catering services shall be provided as may be required." Joson claimed that
another caterer was hired during Umali's oath-taking ceremony. However, Agtay
asked Ryan Angelo Catering, through Cleopatra, for a receipt of P1,272,000.00
under the name of the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija, Joson claimed that
Agtay made this request to make it appear that Ryan Angelo Catering actually
catered and to justify the withdrawal of P1,344,000.00 from the treasury of Nueva
Ecija's provincial government.

On 4 December 2009, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Francis

Euston R. Acero (Prosecutor Acero) of the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution
dismissing all charges against Umali, Abesamis, Agtay, Pancho, and Pallanan. On
the violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, Prosecutor Acero held that
the evidence was insufficient to prove undue injury on Cleopatra or on the
Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija. On the violation of Article 213 of the
Revised Penal Code, Prosecutor Acero found that there was not enough evidence
to prove that private respondents committed fraud to use public funds for their
personal benefit.

On the violations of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713,
and Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code, Prosecutor Acero held that there was

111
no sufficient evidence that could establish private respondents' prohibited
material or pecuniary interest in the unnamed caterer. On the allegation of grave
misconduct, Prosecutor Acero found that Joson was not able "to demonstrate that
[private] respondents, in the performance of their functions, have engaged in
intentional wrongdoing or have committed a deliberate violation of a rule of law
or standard of behavior."
Joson moved for reconsideration, which was denied for being filed out of time.
Hence, on 15 July 2011, Joson filed this Petition for Certiorari against the Office of
the Ombudsman, Umali, Agtay, Abesamis, Pancho, and Pallanan.

ISSUE:

Does the petitioner’s late filing of his motion for reconsideration bars him
from instituting a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65?

RULING:

No.

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal

construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.
Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not
on technicalities.

Under the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, an aggrieved party may file

a motion for reconsideration (a) within 5 days from receipt of notice of the assailed
decision in a criminal case or (b) within 10 days from receipt of the Ombudsman's
decision in an administrative case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
filed beyond the required period. Nonetheless, this Court has allowed the
relaxation of procedural rules to ensure the realization of substantial justice in
several instances.

The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate

the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. Although a motion for reconsideration is required before this
Court can entertain a petition for certiorari, this rule admits of certain exceptions,
which were enumerated in Tan vs CA, one of which is present in this case; (a)
[W]here the order is a patent nullity, as where the Court a quo had no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised

112
and passed upon by [the] lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial [c]ourt is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where
the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest
is involved.

Even if this Court grants an exception to this case, the petition will still fail
on other procedural grounds and on its merits.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC.

113
 Alfonso Cortal et. al. v. Inaki Larrazabal Enterprises
G.R. No. 199107. August 30, 2017

FACTS:

Respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises (Larrazabal Enterprises)

owned three (3) parcels of land. In 1988, these three (3) parcels were placed under
the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended by
Executive Order No. 228. Pursuant to the Scheme, Emancipation Patents and new
transfer certificates of title were issued to farmer-beneficiaries, petitioners
included. In 1999, Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these
parcels and cancellation of the TCTs against the DAR and the petitioners before
the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, DARAB alleging that no price had been
fixed, much less paid, for the expropriation of its properties, in violation of the just
compensation requirement under PD No. 27, as amended. Petitioners denied non-
payment of just compensation by presentation of LBP certificates deposited in
respondent’s accounts.

The Regional Adjudicator ruled that there was nothing in record to show
that just compensation was fixed or paid for the parcels hence, ordered for
respondent to be restored to ownership of the lots. On appeal, DARAB reversed
the decision due to prescription, and gave credence to the Landbank certificates.
On MR, DARAB reversed its decision. On petition for review before the CA, the
Court ruled dismissed the same on numerous grounds: (1) The name of
Raymundo Codilla indicated in the motion for extension of time to file petition for
review as one of the petitioners was not indicated in the petition for review and in
the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, (2) the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to show any competent evidence of
identity of the petitioners, (3) petitioners failed to attach the copy of the Complaint
filed by respondent, and (4) counsel for the petitioners did not indicate the place
of issue of his IBP number. Petitioners thus elevated the matter to the SC.

ISSUE:

Was the dismissal of the petition for review proper?

RULING:

No, the dismissal of the petition for review was not proper.

Procedural rules "are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases

[so] [c]ourts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules."

114
They provide a system for forestalling arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or
whimsicality in dispute settlement. Thus, they are not to be ignored to suit the
interests of a party. Their disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance on
a "policy of liberal construction." Still, this Court has stressed that every party
litigant must be afforded the fullest opportunity to properly ventilate and argue
his or her case, "free from the constraints of technicalities." Rule 1, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court expressly stipulates their liberal construction to the extent that
justice is better served: “Section 6. Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.” Procedural rules may be
relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons so as "to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with
the procedure prescribed." This Court has noted that a strict application of the
rules should not amount to straightjacketing the administration of justice and that
the principles of justice and equity must not be sacrificed for a stern application of
the rules of procedure.

In Obut v. Court of Appeals: “What should guide judicial action is the

principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his complaint of defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities.” Nevertheless, alluding to the "interest of substantial
justice" should not automatically compel the suspension of procedural rules.
While they may have occasionally been suspended, it remains basic policy that the
Rules of Court are to be faithfully observed. A bare invocation of substantial justice
cannot override the standard strict implementation of procedural rules.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights.

In Barnes v. Padilla, this Court relaxed the 15-day period to perfect an appeal
to serve substantial justice; and identified situations justifying a liberal application
of procedural rules: [T]his Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on Section 6, Rule 1.

115
 National Power Corporation v.
Southern Philippines Power Corporation
G.R. No. 219627, July 04, 2016

FACTS:

The consortium of ALSONS Power Holdings Corporation and TOMEN

Corporation entered into an Energy Conversion Agreement with the National
Power Corporation for a 50-megawatt bunker- C fired diesel-generating power
project in General Santos City. Under the Energy Conversion Agreement, the
consortium will design, build, and operate a bunker-C fired diesel-generating
power station (Power Station), which will convert the fuel supplied by the
National Power Corporation into electricity that will, in turn, be delivered to
National Power Corporation. Southern Philippines Power Corporation assumed
the obligations of the consortium to the Energy Conversion Agreement through
the Accession Undertaking.

Southern Philippines Power Corporation filed before the Energy

Regulatory Commission a Petition for Dispute Resolution praying that it be
allowed to declare a capacity nomination of 110% of the nominal capacity without
the consent of National Power Corporation; that it be allowed to supplement the
energy sources of the Power Station with additional engines as may be necessary
without the consent of National Power Corporation; and that National Power
Corporation be ordered to pay unpaid fees from 2005 to 2008.

The National Power Corporation filed an Answer praying for the dismissal
of the Petition. Southern Philippines Power Corporation filed a Supplemental
Petition praying for payment of the unpaid fees for the period of 2005 to 2010 and
was granted. The Commission's Order denied the National Power Corporation's
Motion for Reconsideration for being filed out of time. The Court of Appeals, in
its Decision, denied the National Power Corporation's Petition for Review and
affirmed the Energy Regulatory Commission's Order. It also denied
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals err in upholding the denial of the Energy
Regulatory Commission of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration purely on a
technicality

116
RULING:

Yes.

The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the denial by the Energy

Regulatory Commission of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration purely on a
technicality. As held by the Court in Fortich v. Corona, it is a basic tenet that
procedural rules are necessary to facilitate an orderly and speedy adjudication of
disputes. Thus, courts and litigants alike are enjoined to strictly abide by the rules.
Nonetheless, this Court has, in exceptionally meritorious cases, suspended the
technical rules of procedure "in order that litigants may have ample opportunity
to prove their respective claims, and that a possible denial of substantial justice,
due to legal technicalities, may be avoided.”

Here, petitioner has shown a clear and persuasive reason for this Court to
relax the rules. The Energy Regulatory Commission previously allowed petitioner
to file its other pleadings through a private courier (such as LBC) despite its
prescribed mode on the filing of pleadings being either personally or by registered
mail. This liberality extended by the Commission on petitioner's earlier filings
gave it a reasonable ground to believe that its filing of a motion for reconsideration
through the same private courier would be considered sufficient compliance with
the Energy Regulatory Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Unfortunately, the Motion for Reconsideration reached the Commission four (4)
days beyond the due date. Petitioner's delay in filing the motion for
reconsideration was far from being intentional and dilatory. Petitioner simply
followed its usual mode of filing its pleadings, which had been previously
acceptable to the Commission. The Energy Regulatory Commission itself adopts a
liberal policy in the construction of its Rules of Practice and Procedure "to secure
the most expeditious and least expensive determination of every proceeding on its
merits."

Hence, the Commission should have given due course to petitioner's

Motion for Reconsideration, given petitioner's satisfactory explanation for missing
the deadline.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

A.M. 19-10-20-SC has no effect on the ruling.

117
 Dr. Joseph Malixi, et al., V. Dr. Glory Baltazar
G.R. No. 208224, November 22, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioners were employees of Bataan General Hospital. In their Complaint,

petitioners questioned the validity of Dr. Baltazar's appointment and
qualifications. They alleged that her appointment was "without any basis,
experience[,] or expertise[.]". Civil Service Commission ruled in favor of the
respondent, Dr. Baltazar. The CA also dismissed the appeal by reason of the
following: 1) the dates when the assailed decision was received and when the
motion for reconsideration thereto was filed are not indicated; 2) the attached
October 17, 2011 Decision and July 17, 2012 Resolution are mere photocopies; 3)
petitioner's counsel's [Mandatory Continuing Legal Education] date of compliance
is not indicated; and 4) there are no proofs of competent evidence of identities.

Petitioners maintain that they indicated the important dates in their appeal
before the Court of Appeals and that they attached certified true copies of the
assailed Decision and Resolution. However, they admit that they failed to indicate
the date of their counsel's Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE )
compliance and to provide proof of "competent evidence of identities."

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the petition based on procedural
grounds?

RULING:

Yes. In the case of Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan, the

Supreme Court held that in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court may
disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on its merits. Rules of
procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial justice. Hence, the Court may
opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolve substantial issues raised by the parties.

It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently
held that cases shall be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all
parties for ventilation of their causes and defense, rather than on technicality or
some procedural imperfections. In so doing, the ends of justice would be better
served. The dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and
the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for
they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby

118
defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and
rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.

As well as in the case of Parañaque Kings Enterprise, Inc. v. CA, the

Supreme Court has ruled that when non-compliance with the Rules was not
intended for delay or did not result in prejudice to the adverse party, dismissal of
appeal on mere technicalities — in cases where appeal is a matter of right — may
be stayed, in the exercise of the court's equity jurisdiction. It does not appear that
respondents were unduly prejudiced by petitioner's nonfeasance. Neither has it
been shown that such failure was intentional.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No effect.

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 RULE 2
Cause of Action

Section 2 - Cause of action, defined

Republic v. Moldex Realty, Inc.

G.R. No. 171041, February 10, 2016

DOCTRINE: A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening

events, the conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist.

FACTS:

Luis Erce, Rosa Cinense, and Maria Clara Erce Landico applied for the
registration of parcels of land in Alulod, Cavite before the RTC of Naic Cavite.
Applicants eventually sold two lots with a total land area of 40,000 square meters
to Moldex Realty, Inc. Applicants were then substituted by Moldex Realty in the
application for registration pending before the RTC. To prove its title, Moldex
Realty, Inc. presented the testimonies of Manaloto and Pio Atis. The RTC rendered
the Decision granting the application. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing the Republic of the Philippines appealed the RTC’s Decision before
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals however affirmed the Decision of the
RTC. The OSG then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Court of Appeal’s Decision. Subsequently, the Supreme Court
received a Manifestation and Motion from Moldex Realty stating that although it
had already been issued a favorable decision by the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals, it opted to withdraw its application for registration of the
properties in its name. Hence, the case had become moot and academic.

ISSUE:

Whether the Supreme Court still has jurisdiction to try the case despite
respondent’s withdrawal of its application for land registration.

HELD:

No.

Respondent’s withdrawal of its application for registration has rendered

the case moot and academic. A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue
of supervening events, the conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court
ceases to exist. There is no longer any justiciable controversy that may be resolved

120
by the court. The Supreme Court refuses to render advisory opinions and resolve
issues that would provide no practical use or value. Thus, courts generally "decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.” The controversy
ended when respondent filed that Manifestation. A ruling on the issue of
respondent’s right to registration would be nothing but an advisory opinion.

It is true that this court does not always refuse to assume jurisdiction over a case
that has been rendered moot and academic by supervening events. Courts assume
jurisdiction over cases otherwise rendered moot and academic when any of the
following instances are present:

(1) Grave constitutional violations;

(2) Exceptional character of the case;
(3) Paramount public interest;
(4) The case presents an opportunity to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; or
(5) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

None of these circumstances are present in this case.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Bank of the REPUBLIC V. MOLDEX REALTY, INC.
(G.R. No. 171041; 10 February 2016) is not affected by the new rules.

121
 Manila Electric Company vs. Nordec Philippines
G.R. Nos. 196020 & 196116, April 18, 2018

FACTS:

Meralco was contracted to supply electricity to Marvex Industrial

Corporation (Marvex) under an Agreement for Sale of Electric Energy. It installed
metering device at Marvex’s premises. Marvex was billed according to the
monthly electric consumption recorded in its meter. An inspection by the Meralco
service inspectors of Marvex’s electric metering facilities and found that the main
meter terminal and cover seals have been tampered with. A second inspection
found that the meters have again been tampered with. Meralco assessed Marvex a
differential billing in the total amount of Php 496,386.29. Meralco sent two demand
letters and disconnected Marvex’s electric service when it did not pay.

Subsequently, Nordec, the new owner of Marvex, sued Meralco for

damages with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction alleging that
Meralco’s service inspector conducted the inspections without their consent or
approval and that the inspectors gave an unnamed Nordec employee a Power
Field Order that did not mention the alleged defects in the metering devices. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed the Nordec’s complaint finding that there was no
contractual relationship between Nordec and Meralco, since the service contract
was between Meralco and Marvex. Thus, Nordec had no cause of action against
Meralco. Nordec appealed to the Court of Appeals. The decision of the RTC was
reversed by the CA finding that there was a contractual relationship between
Nordec and Meralco. Nordec stepped into Marvex’s shoes and assumed its rights
and obligations as its assignee or successor-in-interest when Nordec bought
Marvex. Meralco filed its Petition for Review assailing the decision of the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether Nordec Philippines has a cause of action against Manila Electric

Company.

HELD:

Yes.

A cause of action "is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another." For a cause of action to exist, there must be, first, a plaintiff's legal right;

122
second, defendant's correlative obligation; and third, an injury to the plaintiff as a
result of the defendant's violation of plaintiff's right.

The beneficial users of an electric service have a cause of action against this
distribution utility. In Manila Electric Company v. Spouses Chua, it was the
beneficial users who were awarded damages due to the unjust disconnection of
the electric supply, even though the service contract with Meralco was registered
in the name of another person.

Further, Meralco is deemed to have knowledge of the fact that Nordec was
the beneficial user of Marvex's service contract with Meralco. It admits that the
inspections of the metering devices were conducted in the presence of Nordec's
maintenance personnel and with the consent of its manager.It further admits that
it corresponded with Nordec regarding the differential billing, and entertained
Nordec's demand for an explanation on the finding of tampering and the
recomputation of the amount to be paid by Nordec. Clearly, Meralco knew that it
was dealing with Nordec as the beneficial user of the electricity supply.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling of the Court in this case is not affected by the new rules.

123
 Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas and Philippine National Bank
v. Spouses Juanito and Victoria Ledesma
G.R. No. 211176, February 06, 2019

FACTS:

This case involves the determination of whether the Bangko Sentral ng

Pilipinas and the Philippine National Bank are liable to the sugar producers for
the refund of excess payments under Republic Act No. 7202, or the Sugar
Restitution Law.In their Complaint, the Ledesma Spouses stated that they were
farmers engaged in sugar farming in Negros Occidental, with sugar productions
from crop year 1974 to 1975 to crop year 1984 to 1985. Within this period, they
were among those who suffered losses in sugar farming operations due to the
actions of government-owned and controlled agencies, including the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Philippine National Bank. The Ledesma Spouses
obtained several crop loans from the Philippine National Bank. After full payment
of the loans, there was an excess payment of P353,529.67. The Ledesma Spouses
argued that under Republic Act No. 7202, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the
Presidential Commission on Good Government should compensate them for their
losses and refund the excess payment from the sugar restitution fund.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court, dismissed the complaint for the reason
of prematurity and/or lack of cause of action against the herein defendants
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and Philippine National Bank (PNB), without
prejudice to its refiling by the plaintiffs once the Sugar Restitution Fund under
R.A. No. 7202 or any fund for that purpose is already set up and ready for
distribution. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals found the Ledesma Spouses' case
meritorious. It held that there is no dispute as to the Ledesma Spouses' inclusion
in the coverage of Republic Act No. 7202. However, the Court of Appeals clarified
that until the sugar restitution fund is established, payment to the Ledesma
Spouses and other sugar producers under Republic Act No. 7202 would have to
be held in abeyance. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Philippine National
Bank separately filed Motions for Reconsideration, both of which were denied by
the Court of Appeals. Hence, they filed separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari
before this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent has a cause of action to file a suit against the petitioner

RULING:

124
 No.

The money to be used to compensate these sugar producers should come

from the sugar restitution fund. Without the fund, there is no restitution to speak
of at all.Petitioner Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas cannot effect the restitution since
neither the Presidential Commission on Good Government nor other government
agencies have turned over funds to it for the sugar producers' compensation.
Likewise, petitioner Philippine National Bank is not beholden to respondents. All
claims for restitution shall be filed with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Petitioner
Philippine National Bank's role was merely that of a lending bank. Under Republic
Act No. 7202 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, lending banks are not
obligated to compensate sugar producers for their losses. Restitution falls under
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the establishment of a sugar restitution
fund. This Court agrees with the trial court that the Complaint states no cause of
action against petitioners. A cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or
omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the
plaintiff. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) The existence of a legal right in
the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty on the part of the defendant, and (3) an act
or omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiffs right with consequential
injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. Here, the second and third
elements are lacking. Without the sugar restitution fund, petitioners have no
correlative legal duty to compensate respondents for their losses. They committed
neither a delict nor a wrongful act or omission in violation of respondents'
rights.This Court have once held that orders or judgments of this kind, subject to
the performance of a condition precedent, are not final until the condition is
performed. Before the condition is performed or the contingency has happened,
the judgment is not effective and is not capable of execution. In truth, such
judgment contains no disposition at all and is a mere anticipated statement of what
the court shall do in the future when a particular event should happen. For this
reason, as a general rule, judgments of such kind, conditioned upon a contingency,
are held to be null and void. A judgment must be definitive. By this is meant that
the decision itself must purport to decide finally the rights of the parties upon the
issue submitted, by specifically denying or granting the remedy sought by the
action. And when a definitive judgment cannot thus be rendered because it
depends upon a contingency, the proper procedure is to render no judgment at all
and defer the same until the contingency has passed.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The new rules has no effect on the ruling.

125
 Villamor v Umale
G.R No. 172843, September 24, 2014

FACTS:

MC Home Depot occupied a prime property (Rockland area) Pasig. The

property was part of the area owned by Mid-Pasig Development Corporation
(Mid-Pasig) On March 1, 2004, Pasig Printing Corporation (PPC) obtained an
option to lease portions of Mid-Pasig’s property, including the Rockland area.
Subsequently, PPC’s board of directors issued a resolution waiving all its rights,
interests and participation in the option to lease contract in favor of the law firm
of Atty. Alfredo Villamor (Villamor) PPC received no consideration for the waiver
in favor of Villamor’s law firm.

On November 22, 2004, PPC, represented by Villamor, entered into a

memorandum of agreement with MC Home Depot, where the latter would
continue to occupy the area as PPC’s sublessee for four years, renewable for four
years. In compliance with the MOA, MC Home Depot issued 20 post-dated checks
representing the rental payments for one year. The checks were given to Villamor
who did not turn the amount over to PPC upon encashment.

Hernando Balmores, a stockholder of PPC, wrote a letter to PPC’s directors

(petitioners) informing them that Villamor should be made to deliver to PPC and
account for MC Home Depot’s checks. Due to the alleged inaction of the directors,
Balmores filed with the RTC an intra-corporate controversy complaint under the
Interim Rules for Intra-Corporate Controversies (Interim Rules) against
petitioners for the alleged fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the interest of
the corporation and its stockholders. He alleged that because of the inaction of the
petitioners, PPC’s assets were dissipated, lost, wasted and destroyed. Respondent
Balmores prayed that a receiver be appointed, and that the petitioners be
prohibited from encumbering transferring or disposing PPC’s properties,
including MC Home Depot’s checks. He also prayed for the annulment of the
board’s resolution waiving PPC’s rights in favor of Villamor’s law firm.
The RTC denied the Balmores’ prayer for appointment of a receiver or the
creation of a management committee. According to the trial court, there was no
clear and positive showing of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of PPC’s
assets that was prejudicial to the interests of the minority stockholders, amongst
others. The failure of the board to recover said amount does not indicate of
mismanagement resulting in dissipation of the assets.

Balmores filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, assailing
the denial of his prayer for appointment of a receivership or management

126
committee. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court. It issued an order
placing PPC under receivership and creating an interim management committee.
The CA classified the assailed trial court order as interlocutory and hence, non-
appealable. In justifying its decision to place PPC under receivership and to create
a management committee, the Court of Appeals stated that the board’s waiver of
PPC’s rights in favor of Villamor’s law firm without any consideration and its
inaction on Villamor’s failure to turn over the proceeds of rental payments to PPC
warrant the creation of a management committee. The circumstances resulted in
the imminent danger of loss, waste, or dissipation of PPC’s assets.

A petition for Review on certiorari was filed with the SC. The directors of the
PPC argue that the CA erred in characterizing Balmores’ suit as a derivative suit
as PPC, the proper party to the case, was not impleaded. Hence, the appointment
of a receiver or management committee was not valid.

ISSUE:

Is Balmores, and not the corporation, the proper party to bring the instant
suit?

RULING:

No.

Balmores is not the proper party to the suit as the cause of action belongs to
the corporation.

Corporations have a personality that is separate and distinct from their

stockholders and directors. A wrong to the corporation does not necessarily create
an individual cause of action. With this, Balmores is not the proper party to bring
the suit as he has no cause of action which is personal to him. A cause of action
must pertain to complainant if he or she is to be entitled to the reliefs sought.

In another case, the Supreme Court held that where the acts complained of
constitute a wrong to the corporation itself, the cause of action belongs to the
corporation and not to the individual stockholder or member. Although in most
every case of wrong to the corporation, each stockholder is necessarily affected
because the value of his interest therein would be impaired, this fact of itself is not
sufficient to give him an individual cause of action since the corporation is a
person distinct and separate from him, and can and should itself sue the
wrongdoer.

127
 In this case, respondent Balmores did not allege any cause of action that is
personal to him. His allegations are limited to the facts that PPC's directors waived
their rights to rental income in favor of Villamor's law firm without consideration
and that they failed to take action when Villamor refused to turn over the amounts
to PPC. These are wrongs that pertain to PPC. Therefore, the cause of action
belongs to PPC — not to respondent Balmores or any stockholders as individuals.
For this reason, respondent Balmores is not entitled to the reliefs sought in the
complaint. Only the corporation, or arguably the stockholders as a group, is
entitled to these reliefs, which should have been sought in a proper derivative suit
filed on behalf of the corporation.

Hence, it is not only respondent Balmores' failure to implead PPC that is fatal
to his action, as petitioners point out. It is the fact that he alleged no cause of action
that pertains personally to him that disqualifies him from the reliefs he sought in
his complaint. On this basis alone, the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course
to respondent Balmores' petition for certiorari, reversing the trial court's decision,
and issuing a new order placing PPC under receivership and creating an interim
management committee.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Villamor, Jr. v Umale (G.R. No. 172843, September 24, 2014)
is not affected by A.M 19-10-20 SC. The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure still
requires that the proper party to a suit must have a cause of action, that is, a right
which is violated by an act or omission of another. Hence nothing is to be
changed.

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Section 5 - Joinder of causes of action

Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo

G.R. No. 185894. August 30, 2017

FACTS:

Santos, a stockholder of record for 25 shares in Belo Medical Group,

requested for an inspection of the corporate books. Belo, another stockholder of
record of Belo Medical Group, opposed to granting Santos’ request alleging that:
(1) Santos is not the true owner of the 25 shares and is merely a trustee for said
shares in favor of Belo; and, (2) Santos’ request for inspection is done in bad faith
as he allegedly requests it to work in favor of a competitor company which Santos
is also a stockholder. Being caught in the disputing claims of Belo and Santos, Belo
Medical Group filed a Complaint for Interpleader with RTC, alleging that while
Santos appeared to be a registered stockholder, there was nothing on the record to
show that he had paid for the shares under his name. Subsequently, Belo Medical
Group filed a Supplemental Complaint for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. In its Supplemental Complaint, Belo Medical Group relied on
Section 74 of the Corporation Code to deny Santos' request for inspection.

The Complaint and Supplemental Complaint were raffled to the RTC of

Makati, a special commercial court, thus classifying them as intra-corporate.
However, Belo argued that the proceedings should not have been classified as
intra-corporate because while their right of inspection as shareholders may be
considered intra-corporate, "it ceases to be that and becomes a full-blown civil law
question if competing rights of ownership are asserted as the basis for the right of
inspection."

The trial court characterized the dispute as "intrinsically connected with the
regulation of the corporation as it involves the right of inspection of corporate
records." Included in Santos and Belo's conflict was a shareholder's exclusive right
to inspect corporate records. In addition, the issue on the ownership of shares
requires the application of laws and principles regarding corporations.

However, RTC dismissed the Complaint for Interpleader as Belo Medical

Group failed to sufficiently allege conflicting claims of ownership over the subject
shares. Finally, the Complaint for Declaratory Relief was struck down as improper
because it sought an initial determination on whether Santos was in bad faith and
if he should be barred from inspecting the books of the corporation. Only after
resolving these issues can the trial court determine his rights under Sections 74
and 75 of the Corporation Code. The act of resolving these issues is not within the

129
province of the special civil action as declaratory relief is limited to the
construction and declaration of actual rights and does not include the
determination of issues.

ISSUE:

Is the RTC correct in dismissing the complaint for declaratory relief?

RULING:

Yes, the RTC is correct in dismissing the complaint for declaratory relief.

Two cases were filed by Belo Medical Group: the Complaint for
interpleader and the Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Relief. Under Rule
2, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, a joinder of cause of action is allowed, provided
that (c) the joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by
special rules.

Assuming this case continues on as an interpleader, it cannot be joined with

the Supplemental Complaint for declaratory relief as both are special civil actions.
However, as the case was classified and will continue as an intra-corporate
dispute, the simultaneous complaint for declaratory relief becomes superfluous.
The right of Santos to inspect the books of Belo Medical Group and the
appreciation for his motives to do so will necessarily be determined by the trial
court together with determining the ownership of the shares of stock under Santos'
name.

The trial court may make a declaration first on who owns the shares of stock
and suspend its ruling on whether Santos should be allowed to inspect corporate
records. Or, it may rule on whether Santos has the right to inspect corporate books
in the meantime while there has yet to be a resolution on the ownership of shares.
Remedies are available to Belo Medical Group and Belo at any stage of the
proceeding, should they carry on in prohibiting Santos from inspecting the
corporate books.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on Section 5(b), Rule 2.

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 RULE 3
Parties to Civil Actions

Section 2 - Parties in interest

National Power Corporation v. Provincial Government of Bataan

G.R. No. 180654, March 06, 2017

FACTS:

For resolution is respondents' Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's

Decision, which granted the petition of National Power Corporation (Napocor),
and set aside the Court of Appeals' Resolution. The Decision further remanded
"the case to the Regional Trial Court so that the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation [PSALM Corporation] and the National Transmission
Corporation [TRANSCO] may be impleaded as proper parties."

On March 28, 2003, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) received

a notice of franchise tax delinquency from the respondent Provincial Government
of Bataan for P45.9 million covering the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. The Province
based its assessment on Napocor's sale of electricity that it generated from two
power plants in Bataan. Rather than pay the tax or reject it, Napocor chose to
reserve its right to contest the amounts of franchise tax stated in the notice,
including the computation pending the decision of the Supreme Court in National
Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, a case where the issue of Napocor's
exemption from the payment of local franchise tax was then pending.

Ignoring Napocor's view, the Province issued a "Warrant of Levy” on 14

real properties that it used to own in Limay, Bataan. On March 2004, the Province
caused their sale at public auction with itself as the winning bidder. Shortly after,
Napocor received a copy of the Certificate of Sale of Real Property covering the
auctioned properties for P60,477,285.22, the amount of its franchise tax
delinquency, including surcharges and interest. Thus, Napocor filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mariveles, Bataan, a petition for declaration of
nullity of the foreclosure sale with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
against the Province, the provincial treasurer, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The RTC dismissed Napocor's petition, stating that the franchise tax was not based
on ownership of property but on Napocor's exercise of the privilege of doing
business within Bataan. Napocor appealed this decision to the CA but the Province
moved to dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. The CA gratned the same. Hence, Napocor filed by registered mail a Petition

131
for Review on Certiorari, assailing the correctness of the Court of Appeals'
dismissal of its appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner avers that "the instant case is not dismissible on the ground of
lack of cause of action." Petitioner asserts that it "has a valid cause of action against
respondents for the nullification of the foreclosure sale" since, as found by this
Court, it is not the proper party subject to the local franchise tax being imposed by
respondents. On respondents' claim of estoppel, petitioner submits that as a
government-owned and controlled corporation, it is "protected by the principle
that estoppel does not lie against the government as it is not bound by the errors
committed by its agents." Moreover, petitioner maintains that it has consistently
invoked that it is not liable for the local franchise tax being collected by
respondents because "it has ceased to operate its electric transmission functions
upon effectivity of the EPIRA in 2001." Allegedly, this has been its stand from the
time it filed its complaint with the Regional Trial Court. Lastly, petitioner counters
that it does not need to present "evidence to prove its position that it no longer
owned or operated the business subject to local franchise tax," and that the
properties, which respondent Provincial Government of Bataan levied on, did not
belong to it.

ISSUE:

Is Napocor the real party in interest?

RULING:

Yes.

NAPOCOR is a real party in interest.

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by

the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

In the instant case, petitioner's complaint has sought not only the
nullification of the foreclosure sale but also a declaration from the trial court that
it is exempt from the local franchise tax. The action began when respondent
ignored petitioner's claim for exemption from franchise tax, and pursued its
collection of the franchise tax delinquency by issuing the warrant of levy and
conducting the sale at public auction – where the Provincial Government of Bataan
was declared as purchaser – of the transmission assets, despite the purported prior
mutual agreement to suspend administrative remedies for the collection of taxes.
The assets were sold to enforce collection of a franchise tax delinquency against

132
the petitioner. Petitioner thus had to assail the correctness of the local franchise tax
assessments made against it by instituting the complaint with the Regional Trial
Court; otherwise, the assessment would become conclusive and unappealable.

Certainly, petitioner is a real party in interest, which stands to gain or lose

from the judgment that the trial court may render.

EFFECT OF A.M. 19-10-20-SC (NEW RULES) ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of National Power Corporation v. Provincial Government

of Bataan (G.R. No. 180654, March 06, 2017) is not affected by the new rules.

133
 Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar
G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016

FACTS:

Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita

Street. A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number PKM 195 was travelling along
the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van
swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian
came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital. Upon investigation, it was found
that the registered owner of the van was Caravan. Caravan shouldered the
hospitalization expenses of Reyes. Despite medical attendance, Reyes died two (2)
days after the accident. Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal
aunt and the person who raised her since she was nine (9) years old, filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint for damages against Bautista
and Caravan.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the person exercising substitute parental authority is a real

party in interest in an action based on quasi-delict for the death of the child. - Yes

HELD:

Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual

loss and is, thus, a real party in interest in this case.

"To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action

must be prosecuted, he [or she] must appear to be the present real owner of the
right sought to be enforced." Respondent's capacity to file a complaint against
petitioner stems from her having exercised substitute parental authority over
Reyes.

Both of Reyes' parents are already deceased. Reyes' paternal grandparents

are also both deceased. The whereabouts of Reyes' maternal grandparents are
unknown. There is also no record that Reyes has brothers or sisters. It was under
these circumstances that respondent took custody of Reyes when she was a child,
assumed the role of Reyes' parents, and thus, exercised substitute parental
authority over her. As Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised the full extent of the
statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent. Article 233 of the Family Code
provides for the extent of authority of persons exercising substitute parental

134
authority, that is, the same as those of actual parents: “Art. 233. The person
exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents.”

In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Tapdasan, Jr. v. People,

and Aguilar v. Commercial Savings Bank, this court allowed natural parents of
victims to recover damages for the death of their children. Inasmuch as persons
exercising substitute parental authority have the full range of competencies of a
child's actual parents, nothing prevents persons exercising substitute parental
authority from similarly possessing the right to be indemnified for their ward's
death.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling of the Court in this case is not affected by the new rules.

135
 Piedad v. Bobilles
G.R. No. 208614, November 27, 2017

FACTS:

Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment of an

absolute deed of sale against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles (Candelaria) and
Mariano Bobilles (Mariano). The case raffled to Branch 9, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Cebu City, presided over by Judge Benigno Gaviola (Judge Gaviola).

On 19 March 1992, the RTC ruled in Piedad's favor and declared the deed
of sale as null and void for being a forgery. Candelaria and Mariano appealed the
trial court Decision, but on 15 September 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the RTC ruling. The Court of Appeals Decision became final
and executory on 1 November 1998. On 22 October 2001, Judge Gaviola issued an
order for the issuance of a writ of demolition.

On 4 December 2001, Judge Gaviola issued a Writ of Demolition against

Candelaria and Mariano and referred it to Sheriff Antonio A. Bellones (Sheriff
Bellones) for its implementation. That same day, in the same case, Candelaria filed
a Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad. Judge
Gaviola ordered that the petition be heard independently and that it be raffled to
another branch. Candelaria's Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Simeon Piedad was eventually docketed as S.P. Proc. No. 457-T and
raffled to Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, presided over by Judge
Gaudioso D. Villarin (Villarin).

On 12 July 2010, the Heirs of Piedad filed with the RTC, Branch 29, Toledo
City a Motion Praying that an Order Be Issued to Sheriff Antonio Bellones to
Resume the Unfinished Writ of Execution and/or Writ of Demolition. In his Order
dated 15 May 2012, Presiding Judge Ruben F. Altubar (Judge Altubar) of the RTC,
Branch 29, Toledo City denied the motion. He opined that since more than 12 years
had passed since the Court of Appeals’s Decision became final and executory, the
execution should have been pursued through a petition for revival judgment, not
a mere motion.

ISSUE:

Did the petitioners duly establish their personality to file the petition as
heirs of Simeon Piedad?

RULING:

136
 Yes.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may be a

party in interest in a civil action:

Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party

who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Rule 3, Section 16 then provides for the process of substitution of parties

when the original party to a pending action dies and death does not extinguish the
claim.

Petitioners claim to be Piedad's children; thus, they assert that they are the
real parties in interest to the action begun by their father. On the other hand,
respondents claim that petitioners did not properly substitute Piedad upon his
death; hence, they failed to substantiate their personality to move for the revival
of judgment.

Respondents fail to convince. Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized

as Piedad's rightful heirs not only by the Court of Appeals but also by this Court.
In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Exec. Judge Estrera, petitioners filed an
administrative case in their capacity as Piedad's heirs and this Court
acknowledged their standing to sue in this capacity. The same is also true in the
assailed Court of Appeals 15 September 1998 Decision where petitioners filed their
appeal as Piedad's heirs and their personality to represent their father was never
questioned or assailed.

This Court upheld petitioners' personality to sue in Heirs of Simeon Piedad

and sees no reason to deny them the same recognition in the case at bar when the
current case is merely an offshoot of their father's original complaint for nullity of
deed of sale.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No effect.

137
 Power Generation Employees Association-NPC v. National Power Corp.
G.R. No. 187420, August 9, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to permanently enjoin the

implementation of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement (the “Agreement”)
jointly executed by National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) and the Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM), and to declare this
Agreement void for being contrary to EPIRA.

Petitioners filed this Petition directly with the Supreme Court pursuant to
Section 78 of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) to enjoin the
implementation of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement.

ISSUE:

May the petitioners question the validity of the Operation and Maintenance
Agreement despite not being one (1) of the contracting parties?

RULING:

No.

They may not question it since they are not real parties in interest.

Actions must be instituted by the real parties-in-interest. Otherwise, the

action may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. A real party-in-interest is
defined under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court as:

Section 2. Parties-in-Interest.—A real party-in-interest is the party

who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law
or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest.

Petitioners, not being privy to the Operation and Maintenance Agreement,

have no cause of action against respondents. They are not the real parties in
interest to question its validity.

Provisional reliefs, such as a temporary restraining order or a writ of

preliminary injunction, are ancillary writs issued by the court to protect the rights

138
of a party during the pendency of the principal action. Rule 58, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court provides for the grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.

To issue an injunctive writ, the applicant must establish his or her right
sought to be protected. Petitioners allege that while they were not privy to the
Operation and Maintenance Agreement, they will be affected by its
implementation as NAPOCOR employees since they are "the ones engaged in the
operations and maintenance of the unsold generation plants."

The Petition, however, fails to show how NAPOCOR employees will be

affected by the Operation and Maintenance Agreement's implementation.
Petitioners have not shown how, as NAPOCOR’s employees, they will be affected
by respondent NAPOCOR’s submission of its budget for respondent PSALM’s
approval.

If there was indeed an encroachment of the NAPOCOR Board of Directors’

prerogative under its Charter to approve its own budget,65 the Board of Directors
would be the proper party to question the validity of Article XVI of the Operation
and Maintenance Agreement.

Petitioners have likewise failed to show how they, as NAPOCOR

employees, will be affected by the remittance of respondent NAPOCOR’s
revenues to respondent PSALM. None of them has alleged how the remittance
would affect their wages, salaries, and benefits or their working conditions.
Otherwise stated, petitioners have not claimed any right sought to be protected or
any direct injury they will suffer if the revenues are remitted.

Petitioners have not established how they will benefit by enjoining the
implementation of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement. They have not
established the injury they will suffer if this Agreement is not enjoined.

Otherwise stated, petitioners have not claimed any right sought to be

protected or any direct injury they will suffer if the revenues are remitted. Thus,
this Petition is dismissed for lack of cause of action.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by the new rules.

139
 Samuel Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc.
G.R. No. 208426, September 20, 2017

FACTS:

Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Capitol) owned a parcel of land
in Quezon City. The entire land was levied by the city treasurer for unpaid real
estate taxes. It was subjected to a tax delinquency sale of which Alvarado won as
the highest bidder. A certificate of sale of delinquent property was issued to him.
Respondents Ayala Land Inc. and members of Capitol, Ayala Hillside Estates
Homeowners’ Association Inc. filed a complaint in RTC assailing the validity of
the tax sale, impleading defendants Alvarado and the city treasurer, among others.
Alvarado filed an answer, and subsequently a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of failure to comply with condition precedent, failure to state cause of action, and
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. These grounds were also invoked as a
defense in Alvarado’s answer. RTC denied the motion on the ground that it was
filed out of time and that the filing of an answer precludes a motion to dismiss.
However, the RTC conceded that the rule preventing the consideration of motions
to dismiss filed after the filing of answers admitted exceptions, but noted that the
grounds pleaded by Alvarado still did not warrant the dismissal of the complaint.
CA affirmed the same.

ISSUE:

Is the RTC correct in denying the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure
of cause of action based on the ground that respondent is not the registered owner
of the auctioned property?

RULING:

No, the RTC is not correct in denying the motion to dismiss on the ground
of failure of cause of action based on the ground that respondent is not a real party
in interest in the case.

In Aguila, Jr. v. Court of Appeals: A real party in interest is one who would
be benefited or injured by the judgment, or who is entitled to the avails of the suit.
This ruling is now embodied in Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Any decision rendered against a person who is not a real party in
interest in the case cannot be executed. Hence, a complaint filed against such a
person should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

140
 A person having legal interest over such property, even a non-owner, may
bring an action under Section 267 of the Local Government Code (for the
invalidation of tax delinquency sale), for as long as his or her substantive rights
have been impaired. The right to file an action under Section 267 is not barred
merely on account of a plaintiff's not being the owner of the property sold.

Respondents have alleged substantive rights impaired by the sale of the

subject property to petitioner. They have each averred the requisite legal interest
for bringing an action under Section 267 of the Local Government Code.
Respondents represent different categories of plaintiffs, each with unique rights in
relation to the lot put up for a tax delinquency sale. Their respective rights equally
deserve protection and it is their Complaint's allegation that these rights were
violated by the actions of the persons they impleaded as defendants: the Quezon
City Treasurer; the Quezon City Register of Deeds; petitioner, the buyer; and other
individuals who effected the assailed sale.

Capitol is a juridical entity with its own, distinct personality. Consistent

with Article 46 of the Civil Code, it may "acquire and possess property" such as
the lot put up for a tax delinquency sale. As owner, it exclusively enjoyed the entire
bundle of rights associated with dominion over this parcel. As members and
shareholders, individual respondents held the right to use and enjoy, as well as
the limited right to possess Capitol's premises and facilities. Any right of dominion
that Capitol held over the parcel was ultimately for their and other members'
benefit. It was in this capacity as members that they initiated the Complaint
assailing the validity of the tax delinquency sale.

The QC LGU officers were duty- bound to ensure that the requisites for tax
levies and delinquency sales were satisfied and diligently heeded. Their failure to
do so, whether deliberately or negligently, indicates an actionable act or omission
impelling respondents' action. Thus, respondents came before the Regional Trial
Court as real parties in interest, who satisfactorily alleged causes of action.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on Section 2, Rule 3.

141
 Teodulfo Lao, Jr. et. al. v. LGU of Cagayan De Oro, et. al.
G.R. No. 187869. September 13, 2017

FACTS:

The City Council of Cagayan De Oro passed Resolution which states that it
would consider Erwin See's unsolicited proposal "for the redevelopment of Agora
Complex into a Modern Integrated Terminal, Public Market, and Vegetable
Landing Area." See is the president of MEGA Integrated Agro-Livestock Farm
Corporation (Mega Farm). The redevelopment would be under a build-operate-
transfer (BOT) scheme. On the basis of the Resolution, the city government caused
a bidding to compete with Mega Farm’s proposal. None were made. Thereafter,
Mega Farm and the newly elected Mayor Jaraula executed a BOT Contract for the
Redevelopment of Agora Complex (Agora Complex BOT Contract) even if no
ordinance was passed by the City Council granting authority to Mayor Jaraula to
sign in behalf of the City. The terms and conditions of this Contract were allegedly
different from those in the draft contract submitted as resolution by the city
government.

Petitioners Teodulfo Lao and other city councilors, as public officers and in
their personal capacities, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the Agora
Complex BOT Contract, and a TRO against the City Government, and its officers
in proceeding with the Contract. Respondent contends that petitioners are not real
party in interest in this case as they will not suffer a direct, personal, and
substantial injury, nor are they parties to the contract.

The RTC denied the issuance of TRO and dismissed the complaint due to
petitioner’s lack of personality to file the suit. MR was denied hence, this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Are petitioners real parties in interest?

RULING:

Yes, petitioners are real parties in interest.

Petitioners are members of the City Council of Cagayan De Oro. They may
file a case to question a contract entered into by the city mayor allegedly without
the City Council's authority.

142
 Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court defines the real party in interest that
may institute a case: A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. The real party in
interest which may file a case, questioning the validity of a contract entered into
by the city mayor, who is alleged to have no authority to do so, is the city itself. It
is the local government unit which stands to be injured or benefited by any
judgment that may be made in this case. The city councilors merely represent the
city in the suit.

City councilors may file a suit for the declaration of nullity of a contract on
the basis that the city mayor had no authority to do so because the city mayor's
authority to bind the city to obligations must emanate from the City Council.
Under Title III, Chapter III, Article I, Section 455 (b) (1) (vi) of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the city mayor may sign
all bonds, contracts, and obligations on behalf of a city only upon authority of the
sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance. As the City Council is
the source of the mayor's power to execute contracts for the city, its members have
the authority, interest, and even duty to file cases in behalf of the city, to restrain
the execution of contracts entered into in violation of the Local Government Code.
The Court likened the same to a stockholder of a corporation is permitted to
institute derivative or representative suits as nominal party plaintiff for the benefit
of the corporation which is the real party in interest, more so may plaintiffs as city
councilors exclusively empowered by the city charter to "make all appropriations
for the expenses of the government of the city" and who were the very source of
the authority granted to the city mayor to enter into the questioned transactions
which authority was later revoked by them be deemed to possess the necessary
authority, and interest, if not duty, to file the present suit on behalf of the City and
to prevent the disbursement of city funds under contracts impugned by them to
have been entered into by the city mayor without lawful authority and in violation
of law. Here, it is undisputed that petitioners are members of the City Council and
have alleged that the contract entered into by the previous mayor was without the
authority of the City Council in violation of the requirement in Title III, Chapter
III, Article I, Section 455 (b) (1) (vi) of the Local Government Code. Clearly, as they
are part of the very body in which authority is allegedly being undermined by the
city mayor, they have the right and duty to question the basis of the mayor's
authority to sign a contract which binds the city.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

143
Section 7 - Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.

Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po

G.R. No. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017

FACTS:

This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City,

initially registered under the name of Roberto Aboitiz. This parcel of land
originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno. On July 31, 1973, Mariano executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno. On May 5, 1978, Ciriaco
sold the two (2) lots to Victoria Po (Victoria). The parties executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale. On July 15, 1982, Mariano died and was survived by his five (5)
children.

In 1990, Peter Po discovered that Ciriaco “had executed a quitclaim dated

August 7, 1989 renouncing his interest in favor of Roberto. In the quitclaim, Ciriaco
stated that he was “the declared owner of Lot Nos. 2835 and 2807.

The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the

Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in which
Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses
Po as consideration for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses
Po were left with after the quitclaim. However, also in 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also
sold to Roberto. The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds of
absolute sale in favor of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the
lot as part of a subdivision called North Town Homes. On April 19, 1993, Roberto
filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835, the trial court granted
the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The
lot was immediately subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose.

On November 19, 1996, the Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land
and to declare nullity of title with damages.

The Spouses Aboitiz argue that the Mariano Heirs are indispensable parties
who should have been impleaded in this case.

ISSUE:

Are the Mariano heirs indispensable parties?

RULING:

144
 No.

Rule 3, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 7. Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties. - Parties in interest

without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants.

An indispensable party is the party whose legal presence in the proceeding

is so necessary that "the action cannot be finally determined" without him or her
because his or her interests in the matter and in the relief "are so bound up with
that of the other parties."

The property owners against whom the action for reconveyance is filed are
indispensable parties. No relief can be had, and the court cannot render a valid
judgment, without them. The property has been sold to respondents Jose, Ernesto,
and Isabel. Thus, they are indispensable parties.

On the other hand, the Mariano Heirs, as the alleged sellers of the property,
are not indispensable parties. They are at best necessary parties, which are covered
by Rule 3, Section 8 of the Rules of Court:

Section 8. Necessary Party. - A necessary party is one who is not

indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to
be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action.

Necessary parties may be joined in the case "to adjudicate the whole
controversy," but the case may go on without them because a judgment may be
rendered without any effect on their rights and interests.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

145
 GSIS Family Bank Employees Union v. Villanueva
G.R. No. 210773, January 23, 2019

FACTS:

On June 6, 2011, President Aquino signed into law Republic Act No. 10149,
or the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. The law created the Governance
Commission for Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations (Governance
Commission).

On January 15, 2013, representatives of the Governance Commission

clarified, as reply to letters sent by GSIS Family Bank, that said bank was a
government financial institution under Republic Act No. 10149.

On January 30, 2014, petitioner GSIS Union filed before this Court a Petition
for Certiorari, asserting that GSIS Family Bank is a private bank; thus, it is not
covered by the provisions of Republic Act No. 10149 despite the Government
Service Insurance System owning the majority of GSIS Family Bank's shares of
stock, the bank did not automatically fall within the ambit of Republic Act No.
10149. Petitioner stresses that as a private corporation established under the
Corporation Code, GSIS Family Bank and its employees are covered by the
applicable provisions of the Labor Code, not the Civil Service Law.

Respondent Secretary Cesar L. Villanueva, Chairman of the Governance

Commission for Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations, filed his
Comment, where he brings up petitioner's failure to implead several indispensable
parties. He states that despite the Governance Commission being a collegial body
with five members, only he was impleaded in the Petition as the Governance
Commission's chair. He also stresses that GSIS Family Bank is governed by a Board
of Directors, yet petitioner only impleaded its President and Board Chairman.

ISSUE:

Whether the other four members of the Governance Commission are

indispensable parties who must be impleaded in the petition

RULING:

Yes.

The Governance Commission is composed of five (5) members. The

chairperson, with a rank of Cabinet Secretary, and two (2) other members, with

146
the rank of Undersecretary, are appointed by the President. The Department of
Budget and Management and the Department of Finance Secretaries sit as ex-
officio members.

As a collegial body, all members of the Governance Commission should

have been impleaded as indispensable parties in the Petition, since no final
determination of the action can be reached without them. As it is, petitioner's
failure to implead all members of the Governance Commission should lead to the
outright dismissal of this Petition as their non-inclusion is debilitating since this
Court cannot exercise its juridical power when an indispensable party is not
impleaded.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

147
 Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. vs. Reyes
G.R. Nos. 152797, 189315, and 200684, September 18, 2019

FACTS:

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) distributed 25 Certificate of

Land Ownership Award for portions of Hacienda Looc to certain farmer-
beneficiaries. When the rights and interests over the property were transferred to
Manila Southcoast, the latter filed a Petition before the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) seeking to cancel the 25 Certificates. The farmers moved for the
Petition’s dismissal. Before the resolution of the petition, several farmers entered
into amicable settlements with Manila Southcoast. 15 certificates were cancelled
based on the allegedly executed waivers. The farmers appealed but the same was
denied. Fil-Estate, a company that acquired, through a joint venture agreement,
the 10 other lots with an area totaling 1,219.0133 hectares covered by the
certificates, filed a Petition praying that the 10 lots be excluded from the coverage
of CARP. The affected farmers questioned the validity of the cancellation
proceedings, claiming that they were denied due process and that some waivers
had been falsified. However, Del Mundo, et al., who are other farmers affected by
this decision, failed to join the petition to appeal this decision of the Regional
Adjudicator.

The DAR Regional Director issued an order granting Fil-Estate’s Petition

and ordering that 10 lots be excluded from the coverage of the CARP. The affected
farmers appealed before the Agrarian Reform Secretary. It declared that 70
hectares of the 1,219.0133-hectare parcel of land are covered land under the CARP.
Fil-Estate filed before the CA a Petition for Partial Review which was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 47497. While this was pending, the farmers appealed their case
before the Office of the President. They also filed a Petition to Re-Open Case before
the DAR Secretary, but the same was denied. The Office of the President dismissed
the farmer’s appeal, upholding the decision of DAR that majority of the lots in
question had an average slop of 18% and were agriculturally underdeveloped. The
farmers filed a Petition for Review before the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal

Meanwhile, Del Mundo, et al. and 6 other farmer-beneficiaries filed a

separate Petition for Review before the CA claiming that the Order which had their
lots excluded from the coverage of the CARP is not binding upon them since they
were denied due process. Moreover, the Order which had their Certificates of
Land Ownership Award cancelled did not attain finality as to their case. Citing the
community of interest principle, they claim that while they did not file an appeal,
they should benefit from the appeal filed by other farmer- beneficiaries.

148
 Manila Southcoast, on the other hand, argues that the cancellation of the
Certificates had become final and executory at to their case, since they failed to
appeal the Order of the Regional Adjudicator. The CA affirmed the DARAB’s
decision that the cancellation of the Certificates of Del Mundo, et al. had attained
finality as to them for their failure to appeal from the Regional Adjudicator’s
Order. Del Mundo, et al. concede that they failed to appeal the orders. However,
they claim that the appeal filed by the other farmer beneficiaries should be
considered as an appeal of all the farmer-beneficiaries under the community of
interest principle.

ISSUE:

Is the requirement of impleading all indispensable parties applicable to

appeals?

RULING:

The rule on indispensable parties only applies to original actions, not

appeals. The reversal of the judgment on appeal would only bind the parties in the
appealed case but not those who were not made parties.

As an exception, however, the Court has cited communality of interest

among parties, where a reversal of the judgment on appeal operates as a reversal
to all the parties – even those who did not appeal – if it is shown that their right
and interests are inseparable or so interwoven and dependent on each other. The
rule has also been applied in instances when an injustice might result from a
reversal as to less than all the parties.

The rule on communality of interest does not apply here. The rule refers to
the fact of a reversal of a judgment on parties who did not appeal. Del Mundo
cannot rely upon this rule to recover an appeal which they had already lost.

Even if the rule were applicable, there is no showing that Del Mundo, et
al.’s right and interests are inseparable or so interwoven and dependent on the
rights and interests of the parties who filed an appeal.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

149
Section 9 – Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded

Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta

and Gastardo v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 185444, January 13, 2015
FACTS:

This is a Petition for Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule XI, Section of the 1997
Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit (COA), which seeks to
annul the decisions of the COA disallowing the payment of retainer fees to
petitioner law firm.

In 2001, the officers of the Clark Development Corporation (CDC), a GOCC,

approached the petitioner law firm for assistance in handling its labor cases. CDC
sought the acquiescence of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) for the engagement of the petitioner. On May 20, 2002, Government
Corporate Counsel Valdez reconsidered the request and approved the
engagement of petitioner and thereafter issued a pro-forma retainership contract.
In the meantime, petitioner commenced rendering legal services to CDC. At this
point, CDC had yet to secure authorization from the OGCC or concurrence of the
COA on the retainership contract. On July 13, 2005, CDC requested COA for its
concurrence on the contract. State Auditor informed CDC that the request cannot
be acted upon unless they obtained OGCC’s final approval of the contract. On
December 22, 2005, OGCC denied the request for final approval but ruled that the
law firm was entitled to payment on the basis of quantum meruit. On November 9,
2006, COA’s General Counsel issued a “Third Indorsement” denying CDC’s
request for clearance for failure to obtain OGCC’s approval and COA’s
concurrence. On December 4, 2006, the law firm appealed the “Third
Indorsement” to the COA. CDC also filed an MR. On September 27, 2007, COA
denied the law firm’s appeal. On November 5, 2008, COA denied the separate
MRs. Thus, petitioner law firm filed the present Petition for Certiorari on
December 19 2008.

ISSUES:

(1) Is the petitioner law firm is the real party-in-interest?

(2) Should Clark Development Corporation’s Board of Directors have been

impleaded as a necessary party?

150
RULINGS:

(1) Yes. Petitioner is a real party-in-interest, as defined in Rule 3, Section 2 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: SEC. 2. Parties in interest.— A real party
in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Petitioner does not have a "mere incidental interest, "and its interest is not
"merely consequential." The issue at hand, however, relates to the assailed
decision and resolution of respondents, which disallowed the disbursement
of public funds for the payment of legal fees to petitioner. The net effect of
upholding or setting aside the assailed Commission on Audit rulings
would be to either disallow or allow the payment of legal fees to petitioner.
Petitioner, therefore, stands to either be benefited or injured by the suit, or
entitled to its avails. It is a real party-in-interest.

(2) Yes. Clark Development Corporation’s Board of Directors, on the other

hand, should have been impleaded in this case as a necessary party. A
necessary party is defined as "one who is not indispensable but who ought
to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already
parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject
of the action."

The actions of the Board of Directors precipitated the issues in this case. If
the petition is granted, then the officers are relieved of liability to petitioner.
If the rulings of respondents are upheld, then it is the Board of Directors
that will be liable to petitioner. Any relief in this case would be incomplete
without joining the members of the Board of Directors.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

151
Section 11 - Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.

Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III

G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019

FACTS:

The Social Security Commission issued Resolution No. 262-s. 2013, which
provided an increase in: (1) the Social Security System members' contribution rate
from 10.4% to 11%; and (2) the maximum monthly salary credit from P15,000.00 to
P16,000.00. The President of the Philippines approved the increase. The Social
Security Commission likewise issued Resolution No. 711-s. 2013, which approved,
among others, the increase in contribution rate and maximum monthly salary
credit.

Subsequently, the Social Security System, through President and Chief

Executive Officer Emilio S. De Quiros, Jr., issued Circular No. 2013-010, which
provided the revised schedule of contributions that would be in effect in January
2014. Per the circular, the employer and the employee shall equally shoulder the
0.6% increase in contributions. Thus, the employer would pay a contribution rate
of 7.37% (from 7.07%); the employee, 3.63% (from 3.33%).

Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
questioning the validity of the assailed issuances.

ISSUE:

Is the President of the Philippines properly impleaded in the case?

RULING:

No.

To begin with, former President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, as President

of the Philippines, is improperly impleaded here.

The president is the head of the executive branch, a co-equal of the judiciary
under the Constitution. His or her prerogative is entitled to respect from other
branches of government. Inter-branch courtesy is but a consequence of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

152
 As such, the president cannot be charged with any suit, civil or criminal in
nature, during his or her incumbency in office. This is in line with the doctrine of
the president's immunity from suit.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

153
Section 16 - Death of party; duty of counsel.

Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center v.

Asiamed Supplies and Equipment Corp.,
G.R. No. 205638, August 23, 2017

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45, praying that
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside.

Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center (DHLFMC) and respondent

Asiamed Supplies and Equipment Corporation (Asiamed) entered into a Contract
of Sale. DHLFMC agreed to purchase from Asiamed machines for the price of
P31,000,000.00. The machines were delivered where Anthony Dee and VP
Alejandro Mateo signed a Sales Invoice and two Delivery invoices upon receipt.
Asiamed later on filed a complaint against DHLFMC and Anthony Dee for sum of
money for failing to pay the total amount. In their answer, they alleged that it was
a conditional Sale. RTC rendered a decision finding that the parties had entered
into a Contract of Sale rendering both petitioners jointly and severally liable. The
petitioners appealed to the CA and Anthony Dee passed away during the
pendency of the case without the court being informed by his counsel of such fact,
in violation of Rule 3, section 16 of the Rules of Court. CA affirmed RTC’s decision
and also grant the Motion for Substitution and Appointment of Administrator of
estate of Anthony Dee.

ISSUE:

Can the CA grant the respondent Asiamed to procure the appointment of

an administrator for the estate of the deceased petitioner Anthony Dee?

RULING:

Yes.

The CA can grant the respondent to procure the appointment of

administrator of the estate. Since the counsel of Anthony Dee failed to inform the
court of his death, the substitution and appointment requested by the respondent
is valid.

154
 The CA’s order that respondent be allowed to procure an administrator for
the estate of petitioner Anthony was based on Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a

party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court
within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof and to
give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be
a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives

to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the
one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered
as costs.

Petitioners fail to show how the application of the Rules of Court was an
error of law. The only basis for petitioners' objection to the order requiring the
appointment of an administrator for the estate of petitioner Anthony is a liberal
interpretation of the rules. Thus, their argument fails.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

155
 Tuano vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 205871, September 28, 2016

FACTS:

The RTC found the accused Tuano guilty for violation of RA 9165. The CA
affirmed RTC’s conviction and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration
filed by the accused. On petition for review on certiorari, the SC sustained the
accused’s conviction. The accused moved for its reconsideration. On February 25,
2015, the SC required respondent to comment on the motion, to which a Comment
was filed on April 20, 2015. The accused, through his counsels, filed a Reply thereto
on September 22, 2015 after a motion for extension to file the same was granted.
On June 27, 2016, the SC issued the resolution reconsidering its previous resolution
hence, acquitted the accused. The Order of Release was issued and sent to the
Bureau of Corrections. On July 22, 2016, the SC received a letter from the Bureau
informing it that the accused already died on March 1, 2015. The SC then resolved
to set aside the June 27, 2016 resolution acquitting the accused and dismissed the
case. Meanwhile, the counsels for the accused was ordered by the SC to show
cause as to why they did not inform the court of the accused’s death during the
pendency of the case and why they should not be subjected to disciplinary action.

ISSUE:

Are the counsels for the accused obliged to inform the court of the
accused’s death?

RULING:

Yes, the counsels for the accused are obliged to inform the court of the
accused’s death.

Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that whenever a party to
a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the
duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of
the fact thereof and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action. Although Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is directly
applied more often in civil actions for the substitution of the deceased party, the
rule that the counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of the death of
his or her client also properly applies in criminal actions. Regardless of the nature
of the action, courts cannot be expected to assume the death of the party without
the counsel’s proper manifestation. Furthermore, the rules presume that “the

156
attorney for the deceased party is in a better position than the attorney for the
adverse party to know about the death of his [or her] client.”

Here, the case is criminal in nature but the counsels for the accused are
nevertheless bound to inform the court of the accused’s death in compliance with
Sec. 16, Rule 3. However, the counsels for the accused were grossly remiss in this
duty. The accused already died on March 1, 2015. However, his counsels
continued to file pleadings on his behalf, including a Motion for Extension of Time
to File Reply and a Reply on September 22, 2015. It was only through the letter
from the Bureau of Corrections did the Court find out that accused had already
died — 1 year, 4 months, and 15 days from its occurrence.

Thus, the counsels for the accused are obliged to inform the court of the
accused’s death in compliance with Sec. 16, Rule 3.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

157
 Tuano y Hernandez v. People
G.R. No. 205871, September 28, 2016

FACTS:

Accused Ruel Tuano y Hernandez was charged with violation of Article II,
Section 11(3) of Republic Act No. 9165 for having in his possession one (1) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet with 0.064 grams of shabu. After trial on the
merits, the RTC convicted the accused. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
in toto the ruling of the RTC. The Court acquitted accused for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, an Order of
Release was issued and sent to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections.

Thereafter, the Court received from the Director General of the Bureau of
Corrections a letter informing this Court that accused died on March 1, 2015, prior
to the issuance of this Court's June 27, 2016 Resolution. A certified machine copy
of accused's Death Certificate was attached to the letter. On August 22, 2016, this
Court received a memorandum from the Division Clerk of Court requesting
instructions on the proper date of finality of this Court's June 27, 2016 Resolution,
in light of accused's death prior to the Resolution's issuance.r The Court notes that
counsels for accused should have informed this Court of the death of their client
in accordance with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Are counsels for accused grossly remiss in the duty conferred under
Section 16, Rule 3?

RULING:

Yes.

Counsels for accused were grossly remiss in this duty. Although Rule 3,
Section 16 of the Rules of Court is directly applied more often in civil actions for
the substitution of the deceased party, the rule that the counsel of the deceased
party must inform the court of the death of his or her client also properly applies
in criminal actions. Regardless of the nature of the action, courts cannot be
expected to assume the death of the party without the counsel's proper
manifestation. Furthermore, the rules presume that "the attorney for the deceased
party is in a better position than the attorney for the adverse party to know about
the death of his or her client. As officers of the court and as protectors of the legal

158
interests of their clients, counsels have a duty to properly act in case of their clients'
death by notifying the Court of this development.

Accused died on March 1, 2015. However, his counsels continued to file

pleadings on his behalf, including a Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply
dated September 16, 2016 and a Reply dated September 22, 2015. It was only
through the July 15, 2016 letter of the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections
did this Court find out that accused had already died:—one (1) year, four (4)
months, and 15 days after its occurrence. This Court notes that accused was
represented by the Public Attorney's Office. Notwithstanding their heavy case
workload and the free legal assistance, they provide to indigents and low-income
persons, however, counsels from the Public Attorney's Office are still obliged to
pursue their cases with competence and diligence. This is consistent with their
commitment to public service.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

159
 RULE 4
Venue of Actions

Section 4 - When Rule not applicable.

Hygienic Packaging Corp. v. Nutri-Asia, Inc.

G.R. No. 201302, January 23, 2019

FACTS:

From 1998 to 2009, Hygienic supplied Nutri-Asia with plastic containers for
its banana catsup products. Every transaction was covered by a Purchase Order
issued by Nutri-Asia. Also, Hygienic issued Sales Invoices and Delivery Receipts
to cover these transactions.

On July 29, 2009, Hygienic filed a Complaint for sum of money against
Nutri-Asia before the Regional Trial Court of Manila pursuant to the stipulation
of the parties as stated in the Sales Invoices submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Courts of the City of Manila in any legal action arising out of
their transaction.

In its Complaint, Hygienic alleged that Nutri-Asia agreed to pay Hygienic

30 days after every delivery of plastic containers. However, Nutri-Asia refused to
pay for the goods delivered from December 29, 2007 to January 22, 2009 after their
payment became due, despite oral and written demands from Hygienic.

In its Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim, Nutri-Asia argued that the

case should be dismissed as Hygienic failed to comply with a condition precedent
prior to its filing of the Complaint, which is that Hygienic should have first
referred the matter to the Arbitration Committee under the Terms and Conditions
of the Purchase Order. Nutri-Asia alleged that the venue was also improperly laid
since the Regional Trial Court of Manila was not the proper venue for the
institution of Hygienic's personal action. The Complaint should have been filed
either before the trial courts of San Pedro, Laguna or Pasig City, where the
principal places of business of Hygienic and Nutri-Asia are located, respectively.
The venue of actions as stated in the Sales Invoices could not bind Nutri-Asia since
it did not give its express conformity to that stipulation.

The Regional Trial Court held that the venue was properly laid. It
considered the signatures of Nutri-Asia's representatives in the Sales Invoices as
the company's concurrence that any dispute would be raised before the courts of

160
Manila. Nutri-Asia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, the Regional
Trial Court denied the Motion.

Thus, Nutri-Asia filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
which granted the Petition in favor of Nutri- Asia. The Court of Appeals held that
since the signature of Nutri-Asia's employee in the Sales Invoices was only for the
receipt of goods, Nutri-Asia did not agree to be bound by the venue stipulation in
the Sales Invoices. Meanwhile, Hygienic did not deny that an arbitration clause
was written on the Purchase Orders. Since Hygienic availed of the advantages and
benefits of the purchase orders when it acted on them, it is thus estopped from
rebuffing the arbitration clause. The Court of Appeals held that Nutri-Asia should
have submitted its Counter-Claim to arbitration for resolution. Hygienic filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, Hygienic filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari against Nutri-Asia

before this Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the provision on the Hygienic’s Sales Invoice as regards the venue
of action, and the provision on the referral to arbitration stated in Nutri-
asia’s Purchase Order are binding on the parties

2. Whether the venue was properly laid

RULINGS:

1. No. Parties are allowed to constitute any stipulation on the venue or mode of
dispute resolution as part of their freedom to contract under Article 1306 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Upon examination of the Sales Invoices and the
Purchase Orders, this Court cannot consider the documents as contracts that
would bind the parties as to the venue of dispute resolution.

A closer look at the Sales Invoices issued by petitioner reveals that above the
signature of respondent's representative is the phrase, "Received the above
goods in good order and condition." Clearly, the purpose of respondent's
representative in signing the Sales Invoices is merely to acknowledge that he
or she has received the plastic containers in good condition.

A scrutiny of the Purchase Orders issued by respondent also reveals that above
the signature of petitioner's representative is the phrase "Acknowledged By
(Supplier)." Moreover, the Purchase Orders included a note stating that the

161
 "Purchase Order must be DULY acknowledged to facilitate payment." The act
of signing the Purchase Orders, then, was limited to acknowledging
respondent's order and facilitating the payment of the goods to be delivered. It
did not bind petitioner to the terms and conditions in the Purchase Orders,
which included the arbitration clause.

Petitioner and respondent may have entered into a contract of sale with respect
to petitioner's merchandise. However, the case records do not show that they
have a contract in relation to the venue of any civil action arising from their
business transaction.

For there to be a contract, there must be a meeting of the minds between the
parties. Here, no evidence shows that petitioner and respondent had a meeting
of minds and agreed to submit any future issue either to the trial court or to
arbitration. Since there is no contractual stipulation that can be enforced on the
venue of dispute resolution, the venue of petitioner's personal action will be
governed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. No. Venue is "the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or

proceeding should be brought." In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural
law. A party's objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the objection shall be
deemed waived. When the venue of a civil action is improperly laid, the court
cannot motu proprio dismiss the case.

It has been consistently held that an action for collection of sum of money is a
personal action. Taking into account that no exception can be applied in this
case, the venue, then, is "where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, ...
at the election of the plaintiff." For a corporation, its residence is considered
"the place where its principal office is located as stated in its Articles of
Incorporation."

In its Complaint, petitioner stated that its principal place of business is on San
Vicente Road beside South Superhighway, San Pedro, Laguna. Meanwhile,
respondent admitted in its Answer that its principal office is at 12/F
Centerpoint Building, Garnet Road corner Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City. Considering that the amount petitioner claims falls within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, petitioner may file its Complaint
for sum of money either in the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna or in
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.

162
Petitioner's erroneous belief on the applicability of the venue stipulation in the
Sales Invoices led it to file an action before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
This error is fatal to petitioner's case. Although respondent did not file a
Motion to Dismiss on this ground, it cited the improper venue as one of the
affirmative defenses in its Answer.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals is partly correct in ruling that on the
issue of venue, the trial courts committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing
the complaint to stand and stay in Manila. Petitioner did not agree to be
restricted to a venue in Manila and was never obliged to observe this unilateral
statement in the sales invoices. However, contrary to the Court of Appeals'
finding on the validity of the arbitration clause, this Court cannot give the
stipulation any effect as discussed earlier.

This Court reminds litigants that while the rules on venue are for the
convenience of plaintiffs, these rules do not give them unbounded freedom to
file their cases wherever they may please.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

163
 Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 188146, February 01, 2017

FACTS:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of

Appeals' Decision and Resolution in CA, which reinstated the Order that declared
Royal Ferry Services Inc. insolvent made by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 24.

Royal Ferry Services Inc. (Royal Ferry) is a corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine law. According to its Articles of Incorporation, Royal
Ferry's principal place of business is located at 2521 A. Bonifacio Street, Bangkal,
Makati City. However, it currently holds office at Room 203, BF Condominium
Building, Andres Soriano corner Solano Streets, Intramuros, Manila.

On December 23, 2005, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas

Shell) filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Formal Notice of Claim and
a Motion to Dismiss.

In the Notice of Claim, Pilipinas Shell asserted that Royal Ferry owed them
the amount of P2,769,387.67. In its Motion to Dismiss, Pilipinas Shell alleged,
among others, that the Petition was filed in the wrong venue. It argued that the
Insolvency Law provides that a petition for insolvency should be filed before the
court with territorial jurisdiction over the corporation's residence. Since Royal
Ferry's Articles of Incorporation stated that the corporation's principal office is
located at 2521 A. Bonifacio St., Bangkal, Makati City, the Petition should have
been filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and not before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.

Respondent argues, among others, that the Regional Trial Court of Manila
obtained jurisdiction because in its Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, respondent
alleged that its principal office was then found in Manila. On the other hand,
petitioner argues that filing the petition before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
was a patent jurisdictional defect as the Regional Trial Court of Manila did not
have territorial jurisdiction over respondent's residence.

Petitioner contends that the residence of a corporation depends on what is

stated in its articles of incorporation, regardless of whether the corporation
physically moved to a different location. On the other hand, respondent posits that
the fiction of a corporation's residence must give way to uncontroverted facts.

164
ISSUE:

Was the Petition for Insolvency properly filed?

RULING:

YES.

The Petition for Insolvency was properly filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.

With the enactment of Republic Act No. 10142, otherwise known as the
Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010 (FRIA), the Insolvency Law
was expressly repealed on July 18, 2010. The FRIA is currently the special law that
governs insolvency. However, because the relevant proceedings in this case took
place before the enactment of the FRIA, the case needs to be resolved under the
provisions of the Insolvency Law. Insolvency proceedings are defined as the
statutory procedures by which a debtor obtains financial relief and undergoes
judicially supervised reorganisation or liquidation of its assets for the benefit of its
creditors.

Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law, while venue is a matter of

procedural law. Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the Insolvency Law vests
jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance—now the Regional Trial Court.

Jurisdiction is acquired based on the allegations in the complaint. The

relevant portion of respondent's Petition for Voluntary Insolvency reads:
Petitioner was incorporated on 18 October 1996 with principal place of business in
2521 A. Bonifacio Street, Bangkal, Makati City. At present and during the past six
months, [Royal Ferry] has held office in Rm. 203 BF Condo Building, Andres
Soriano cor. Solana St., Intramuros, Manila, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, where its books of accounts and most of its remaining assets are
kept.

Section 14 of the Insolvency Law specifies that the proper venue for a
petition for voluntary insolvency is the Regional Trial Court of the province or city
where the insolvent debtor has resided in for six (6) months before the filing of the
petition. In this case, the issue of which court is the proper venue for respondent's
Petition for Voluntary Insolvency comes from the confusion on an insolvent
corporation's residence.
Petitioner contends that the residence of a corporation depends on what
is stated in its articles of incorporation, regardless of whether the corporation

165
physically moved to a different location. On the other hand, respondent posits
that the fiction of a corporation's residence must give way to uncontroverted
facts.
In Young Auto Supply v Court of Appeals: A corporation has no residence in
the same sense in which this term is applied to a natural person. But for practical
purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its
principal office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation. . . The
Corporation Code precisely requires each corporation to specify in its articles of
incorporation the "place where the principal office of the corporation is to be
located which must be within the Philippines". . . The purpose of this requirement
is to fix the residence of a corporation in a definite place, instead of allowing it to
be ambulatory.

Young Auto Supply dealt with the venue of a corporation's personal action by
applying the provisions of the Rules of Court. Nonetheless, the Rules of Court also
provides for when its provisions on venue do not apply. As there is a specific law
that covers the rules on venue, the Rules of Court do not apply. The law places a
premium on the place of residence before a petition is filed since venue is a matter
of procedure that looks at the convenience of litigants.

Despite being in the same region, Makati and Manila are treated as two
distinct venues. To deem them as interchangeable venues for being in the same
region has no basis in law.

Respondent is a resident of Manila. The law should be read to lay the venue
of the insolvency proceeding in the actual location of the debtor's activities. If it is
uncontroverted that respondent's address in its Articles of Incorporation is no
longer accurate, legal fiction should give way to fact. Thus, the Petition was
correctly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

166
 RULE 6
Kinds of Pleadings

Section 11 - Third, (fourth, etc.)-party complaint.

Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Clarges Realty Corporation

G.R. No. 170060, August 17, 2016
FACTS:

DBP, as a mortgagee, was able to acquire a piece of land after a foreclosure

sale, the title of which was with annotations of mortgage in favor of PNB and a tax
lien. DBP sold the land in a public auction to which Clarges Realty Corporation
(CRC) won as the highest bidder. DBP and CRC executed a deed of sale upon
payment of the bid price, stipulating that a clean title will be delivered to the latter.
Meanwhile, the assets and liabilities of DBP, including the land sold to CRC, were
transferred to an Asset Privatization Trust (APT) pursuant to Proc. No. 50 where
APT assumed the payment of the tax liability on the land and have the tax lien be
cancelled in the title. But due to the existing annotations in the title, CRC filed an
action for specific performance and damages against DBP to compel the latter to
deliver a clean title. During trial, CRC was able to cancel the mortgage annotation
while DBP and APT were able to cancel the tax lien, but only partially. A new title
was issued in favor of CRC still with an annotation of partially cancelled tax lien.
CRC already rested its case when DBP moved for leave of court to file a third party
complaint to implead APT as a third party defendant for assuming direct and
personal obligation to pay the taxes and to have the partially reduced tax lien to
be cancelled. The RTC nevertheless denied the motion even if the claim against
APT is connected with CRC’s claim because it would cause unreasonable delay
and entail unnecessary costs. The RTC eventually ruled in favor of CRC, which
was affirmed by the CA on appeal. DBP hence filed a petition for certiorari
insisting that the third party complaint should have been admitted and impleaded
APT as a third party defendant because by virtue of Proc. No. 50, APT assumed
the obligations and liabilities attached to these assets, including the obligation to
pay the unpaid taxes corresponding to the tax lien. Thus, it became legally and
physically impossible for petitioner to deliver a clean title to respondent since the
obligation had devolved to the APT.

ISSUE:

Can DBP insist in filing a third-party complaint?

RULING:

167
 No, DBP cannot insist in filing a third-party complaint.

Sec. 11, Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that a third- (fourth-, etc.)
party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
against a person not a party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.)-party
defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect
of his or her opponent's claim. The admission of a third party complaint lies within
the sound discretion of the trial court. If leave to file a third party complaint is
denied, then the proper remedy is to file a separate case, not to insist on the
admission of the third party complaint all the way up to this Court. The third party
complaint is actually independent of and separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s
complaint.When leave to file the third party complaint is properly granted, the
Court renders in effect two judgments in the same case, one on the plaintiff’s
complaint and the other on the third party complaint. When he finds favorably on
both complaints, as in this case, he renders judgment on the principal complaint
in favor of plaintiff against defendant and renders another judgment on the third
party complaint in favor of defendant as third party plaintiff, ordering the third
party defendant to reimburse the defendant whatever amount said defendant is
ordered to pay plaintiff in the case. Failure of any of said parties in such a case to
ap peal the judgment as against him makes such judgment final and executory. By
the same token, an appeal by one party from such judgment does not inure to the
benefit of the other party who has not appealed nor can it be deemed to be an
appeal of such other. Applying the rules in this case, the APT would have been a
valid third party defendant. APT is the transferee of the assets and liabilities of
DBP pursuant to Proc. No. 50. The tax lien over the property here is one such
liability, and DBP may ask, as it did the APT, for contribution for the payment of
the unpaid tax and the tax lien’s consequent cancellation. However, DBP need not
await for contribution from the APT before it can fulfill its obligation to deliver a
clean title to the property to CRC. DBP, as a mortgagee, can very well pay the tax
liability and cause the cancellation of the tax lien. With DBP capable of having the
tax lien cancelled, it cannot insist on the admission of its third party complaint
against the APT.

EFFECT OF A.M. 19-10-20-SC ON THE RULING:

Sec. 11, Rule 6 is affected by the New Rules. The New Rules added a second
paragraph in Sec. 11 stating the causes for denial of admission of a third- (fourth-,
etc.) party complaint, as follows: (a) the third- (fourth-, etc.) defendant cannot be
located within thirty (30) calendar days from the grant of such leave; (b) matters
extraneous to the issue in the principal case are raised; or (c) the effect would be to
introduce a new and separate controversy into the action. Instead, the court shall
require the defendant to institute a separate action.

168
 RULE 7
Parts of a Pleading

Section 3 - Signature and address

Bar Matter No. 287

Alfonso Cortal et. al. v. Inaki Larrazabal Enterprises

G.R. No. 199107. August 30, 2017

FACTS:

Respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises (Larrazabal Enterprises)

owned three (3) parcels of land. In 1988, these three (3) parcels were placed under
the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended by
Executive Order No. 228. Pursuant to the Scheme, Emancipation Patents and new
transfer certificates of title were issued to farmer-beneficiaries, petitioners
included. In 1999, Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these
parcels and cancellation of the TCTs against the DAR and the petitioners before
the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, DARAB alleging that no price had been
fixed, much less paid, for the expropriation of its properties, in violation of the just
compensation requirement under PD No. 27, as amended. Petitioners denied non-
payment of just compensation by presentation of LBP certificates deposited in
respondent’s accounts.

The Regional Adjudicator ruled that there was nothing in record to show
that just compensation was fixed or paid for the parcels hence, ordered for
respondent to be restored to ownership of the lots. On appeal, DARAB reversed
the decision due to prescription, and gave credence to the Landbank certificates.
On MR, DARAB reversed its decision. On petition for review before the CA, the
Court ruled dismissed the same on numerous grounds: (1) The name of
Raymundo Codilla indicated in the motion for extension of time to file petition for
review as one of the petitioners was not indicated in the petition for review and in
the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, (2) the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to show any competent evidence of
identity of the petitioners, (3) petitioners failed to attach the copy of the Complaint
filed by respondent, and (4) counsel for the petitioners did not indicate the place
of issue of his IBP number. Petitioners thus elevated the matter to the SC.

169
ISSUE:

Must the petition be dismissed on the ground of failure of counsel for the
petitioners to indicate the place of issue of his IBP number?

RULING:

No, the petition must not be dismissed on the ground of failure of counsel
for the petitioners to indicate the place of issue of his IBP number.

Bar Matter No. 287 requires the inclusion of the 'number and date of
[lawyers'] official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year'; in lieu of this, a lawyer
may indicate his or her lifetime membership number".

However, indicating the place of issue of the official receipt is not even a
requirement. While its inclusion may certainly have been desirable and would
have allowed for a more consummate disclosure of information, its non-inclusion
was certainly not fatal. As with the other procedural lapses considered by the
Court of Appeals, its non-inclusion could have very easily been remedied by the
Court of Appeals' prudent allowance of time and opportunity to petitioners and
their counsel.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

170
Section 4 - Verification

Home Guaranty Corporation vs. La Savoie Development Corporation

G.R. No. 168616, January 28, 2015

FACTS:

La Savoie is engaged in the business of real estate development, subdivision

and brokering. Because of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, La Savoie found itself
unable to pay its obligations to its creditors. Thus, on April 25, 2003, La Savoie filed
before the RTC a "petition for the declaration of state of suspension of payments
with approval of proposed rehabilitation plan" under the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. With La Savoie's compliance and finding
its "petition to be sufficient in form and substance," the RTC judge issued the Stay
Order staying the enforcement of all claims against La Savoie. Following such
issuance La Savoie's creditors — Planters Development Bank, Philippine Veterans
Bank, and Robinsons Savings Bank — filed their Comments and/or Oppositions.
Home Guaranty Corporation filed an Opposition even though it was not a creditor
of Petitioner. It asserted that it had a material and beneficial interest in the petition.

Home Guaranty Corporation noted that through the "La Savoie Asset Pool
Formation and Trust Agreement", La Savoie obtained financing for some of its
projects through a securitization process in which Planters Development Bank as
nominal issuer issued P150 million in asset participation certificates dubbed as the
"La Savoie Development Certificates” to be sold to investors. The projects financed
by these certificates consisted of the development of real properties in different
locations. The same properties were conveyed in trust by La Savoie, as trustor, to
Planters Development Bank, as trustee, and constituted into the La Savoie Asset
Pool. The LSDC certificates were covered by a guaranty extended by Home
Guaranty Corporation through a "Contract of Guaranty" entered into by Home
Guaranty Corporation with La Savoie and Planters Development Bank. Section 17
of the Contract of Guaranty designates Home Guaranty Corporation to "undertake
financial controllerships of the Projects." Thus, in its Opposition, Home Guaranty
Corporation noted that it was "charged with the duty of ensuring that all funds
due to the Asset Pool are collected, and that funds are disbursed for the purposes
they were intended for." Home Guaranty Corporation added that in the course of
its business, La Savoie collected a total amount of P60,569,134.30 from the buyers
of some of the properties covered by the Asset Pool. This amount, however, was
not remitted by La Savoie to the trust. Thus, La Savoie's investors placed a call on
the guaranty. Home Guaranty Corporation argued that it and the investors on the
LSDC certificates had "preferential rights" over the properties making up the Asset
Pool as these were conveyed as security or collaterals for the redemption of the

171
LSDC certificates. Thus, they should be excluded from the coverage of La Savoie's
Petition for Rehabilitation.

The RTC issued an order denying the petition for rehabilitation and lifting
the stay order. La Savoie filed an appeal to the CA. During the appeal, the guaranty
was made, and it argued that all of the properties comprising the Asset Pool
should be excluded from the rehabilitation proceedings in view of the Deed of
Assignment and Conveyance executed in its favor by Planters Development Bank.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Thus, this petition for review
under Rule 45. La Savoie ascribes procedural infirmities against Home Guaranty
Corporation's Petition. It claimed that Atty. Danilo C. Javier, the officer who
signed the Petition's verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not
authorized to do so.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Danilo C. Javier was authorized to sign the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping of Home Guaranty Corporation's Petition

RULING:

Yes. Atty. Danilo C. Javier was authorized to sign the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of Home Guaranty Corporation.

As pointed out by Home Guaranty Corporation, its board of directors

issued Board Resolution No. 30, Series of 2001, specifically authorizing the
President of petitioner to designate the officer to institute the appropriate legal
actions. It was pursuant to this resolution that Atty. Danilo C. Javier, Home
Guaranty Corporation's then Officer-in-Charge and Vice President for Legal, was
made signatory to the present Petition's verification and Certification of non-
forum shopping.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The revised rules now require that a proof of authority to sign the verification
and execute the certification should be attached to the pleading.

172
 Alfonso Cortal et. al. v. Inaki Larrazabal Enterprises
G.R. No. 199107. August 30, 2017

FACTS:

Respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises (Larrazabal Enterprises)

owned three (3) parcels of land. In 1988, these three (3) parcels were placed under
the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended by
Executive Order No. 228. Pursuant to the Scheme, Emancipation Patents and new
transfer certificates of title were issued to farmer-beneficiaries, petitioners
included. In 1999, Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these
parcels and cancellation of the TCTs against the DAR and the petitioners before
the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, DARAB alleging that no price had been
fixed, much less paid, for the expropriation of its properties, in violation of the just
compensation requirement under PD No. 27, as amended. Petitioners denied non-
payment of just compensation by presentation of LBP certificates deposited in
respondent’s accounts.

The Regional Adjudicator ruled that there was nothing in record to show
that just compensation was fixed or paid for the parcels hence, ordered for
respondent to be restored to ownership of the lots. On appeal, DARAB reversed
the decision due to prescription, and gave credence to the Landbank certificates.
On MR, DARAB reversed its decision. On petition for review before the CA, the
Court ruled dismissed the same on numerous grounds: (1) The name of
Raymundo Codilla indicated in the motion for extension of time to file petition for
review as one of the petitioners was not indicated in the petition for review and in
the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, (2) the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to show any competent evidence of
identity of the petitioners, (3) petitioners failed to attach the copy of the Complaint
filed by respondent, and (4) counsel for the petitioners did not indicate the place
of issue of his IBP number. Petitioners thus elevated the matter to the SC.

ISSUE:

Must the petition be dismissed on the ground of incomplete signatories in

the verification and certification of non-forum shopping and the signatories’
failure to present a competent evidence of identity on its execution?

173
RULING:

No, the petition must not be dismissed on the ground of incomplete

signatories in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping and the
signatories’ failure to present a competent evidence of identity on its execution

Rule 7, Sections 4 and 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure articulate the
basic rules concerning the verification of pleadings and their accompaniment by a
certification of non-forum shopping. An affiant verifies a pleading to indicate that
he or she has read it and that to his or her knowledge and belief, its allegations are
true and correct and that it has been prepared in good faith and not out of mere
speculation. Jurisprudence has considered the lack of verification as a mere formal,
rather than a jurisdictional, defect that is not fatal. Thus, courts may order the
correction of a pleading or act on an unverified pleading, if the circumstances
would warrant the dispensing of the procedural requirement to serve the ends of
justice.

The difference between non-compliance to a verification, and non-

compliance with a certificate of non-forum shopping as enunciated in Altres v.
Empleo, as to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby. Verification is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a

defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons." The certification against forum shopping must be signed by
all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances,
however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and
invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in
the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

174
 In Heirs of Agapito Olarte v. Office of the President, where the certification of
non-forum shopping, signed by only two (2) of four (4) petitioners, was condoned
considering that the petitioners shared a common interest over the lot subject of
that case.

In the same vein, the inclusion of Codilla in the Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review but not in the Petition for Review and in the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping should not have been fatal to
petitioners' appeal. The defective verification amounted to a mere formal defect
that was neither jurisdictional nor fatal and for which a simple correction could
have been ordered by the CA. Petitioners here, too, are acting out of a common
interest. Even assuming that a strict application of the rules must be maintained,
the CA could just as easily have merely dropped Codilla as a party instead of
peremptorily and indiscriminately foreclosing any further chance at relief to those
who had affixed their signatures.

Equally not fatal to petitioners' appeal was their supposed failure to show
competent evidence of identities in their petition's verification and certification of
non- forum shopping. Rule IV, Section 2 (b) (2) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice stipulates that a notary public is not to perform a notarial act if the
signatory to the document subject to notarization is not personally known to the
notary or otherwise identified through a competent evidence of identity.

As is evident from Rule IV, Section 2 (b) (2) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, the need for a competent evidence of identity is not an absolute
requirement. It is imperative only when the signatory is not personally known to
the notary. When the signatory is personally known to the notary, the presentation
of competent evidence of identity is a superfluity.

In this case, it is true that the notary public failed to categorically indicate
that petitioners were personally known to him. However, the CA’s bare reference
to petitioners’ inadequate proof of identity does not justify the outright denial of
their appeal. The CA failed to absolutely discount the possibility that petitioners
may have been personally known to the notary public, especially considering that,
by that advanced stage in litigating their claims, they must have already verified
several pleadings, likely before the same notary public.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

175
 Teodulfo Lao, Jr. et. al. v. LGU of Cagayan De Oro, et. al.
G.R. No. 187869. September 13, 2017

FACTS:

The City Council of Cagayan De Oro passed Resolution which states that it
would consider Erwin See's unsolicited proposal "for the redevelopment of Agora
Complex into a Modern Integrated Terminal, Public Market, and Vegetable
Landing Area." See is the president of MEGA Integrated Agro-Livestock Farm
Corporation (Mega Farm). The redevelopment would be under a build-operate-
transfer (BOT) scheme. On the basis of the Resolution, the city government caused
a bidding to compete with Mega Farm’s proposal. None were made. Thereafter,
Mega Farm and the newly elected Mayor Jaraula executed a BOT Contract for the
Redevelopment of Agora Complex (Agora Complex BOT Contract) even if no
ordinance was passed by the City Council granting authority to Mayor Jaraula to
sign in behalf of the City. The terms and conditions of this Contract were allegedly
different from those in the draft contract submitted as resolution by the city
government.

Petitioners Teodulfo Lao and other city councilors, as public officers and in
their personal capacities, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the Agora
Complex BOT Contract, and a TRO against the City Government, and its officers
in proceeding with the Contract. Petitioners questioned the execution and the
contents of the Agora Complex BOT Contract. They alleged that it was issued in
bad faith and with fraudulent maneuvers between Mega Farm and the City
Government and that Mega Farm was unqualified to take the redevelopment of
the Complex, among other reasons.

The RTC denied the issuance of TRO and dismissed the complaint. MR was
denied hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Respondents contend that the petition must be dismissed because the
attached verification and certificate of non-forum shopping were improperly
notarized, there being no statement that the affiants were either personally known
to the notary public or that competent evidence of their identities was presented.

ISSUE:

Must the petition be dismissed on the ground of defective verification

and certificate of non-forum shopping?

176
RULING:

No, the petition must not be dismissed on the ground of defective

verification and certificate of non-forum shopping.

Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules), an individual

who appears before a notary public to take an oath or affirmation of a document
must, among others, be personally known to or be identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity, as provided in Section 12 of the same
rules.

Here, neither the petition's Verification and Compliance with Non-Forum

Shopping Law nor its Affidavit of Proof of Service contains any statement that
their respective affiants were personally known to the notary public or have
presented competent evidence of identity pursuant to Rule II, Section 12 of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The omission is also evident in the Affidavit of
Proof of Service attached to petitioners' Reply. In all these instances, the notary
public was Atty. Manolo Z. Tagarda, Sr. (Atty. Tagarda), who also serves as
counsel for petitioners.

Notaries public must observe "the highest degree of care" in ensuring

compliance with the basic requirements of the Notarial Rules. Notaries public
who fail to indicate in notarized documents that the affiants are personally known
to them or have presented competent evidence of their identities violate not only
the Notarial Rules, but also Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Atty. Tagarda should show cause why he should not be made
administratively liable for failure to comply with the Notarial Rules and the Code
of Professional Responsibility. As for the petition itself, the defect of the failure to
show that competent evidence of identity was presented may be overlooked in
view of the merits of the case.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

177
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. APO Cement Corporation
G.R. No. 193381, February 08, 2017

FACTS:

This resolves a Petition for Review, seeking to reverse and set aside the
Court of Tax Appeals En Banc's Decision, which affirmed the Second Division's
Resolution, granting respondent's Motion to Cancel Tax Assessment; and
Resolution, denying respondent's motion for reconsideration.

On September 1, 2003, the Bureau of Internal Revenue sent Apo Cement

Corporation (Apo Cement) a Final Assessment Notice (FAN) for deficiency taxes
for the taxable year 1999. Apo Cement protested the FAN, but Bureau issued the
Final Decision on Disputed Assessment, denying the Apo Cement's protest.
Consequently, Apo Cement filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax
Appeals. In 2009, the Court of Tax Appeals (Second Division) granted Apo
Cement's Motion to Cancel Tax Assessment. It found Apo Cement a qualified tax
amnesty applicant under Republic Act No. 9480; and fully compliant with the
requirements of the law, the Department Order No. 29-07, and Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 19-2008. The Commissioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied in the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc
Resolution. Hence, the petitioner filed its Petition for Review with the Court.

Through the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping

attached to the present Petition, Deputy Commissioner Estela V. Sales of the Legal
and Inspection Group of the Bureau of Internal Revenue states that the contents of
the Petition are true and correct of her own "knowledge and belief based on
authentic records."

In the Court's Resolution, dated December 8, 2010, the petitioner was

directed to submit a sufficient verification within five (5) days from notice. But, the
petitioner did not comply. Petitioner would argue however that while the
verification still stated "belief," it was qualified by "based on authentic records."
Hence, "the statement implies that the contents of the petition were based not only
on the pleader's belief but ultimately they are recitals from authentic records."

ISSUE:

Was the verification by the Deputy Commissioner defective?

178
RULING:

YES. The verification was defective.

In Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court has held that, mere belief is insufficient
basis and negates the verification which should be on the basis of personal
knowledge or authentic records. Verification is required to secure an assurance
that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and
correct and not merely speculative. Additionally, the third paragraph of Rule 7,
Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly treats
pleadings with a verification based on "information and belief' or "knowledge,
information and belief," as unsigned.

In Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Hon. Presiding Judge of

RTCNegros Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City, the Court explained that the
amendment in the rules was made stricter so that a party cannot be allowed to
base his statements on his belief. Otherwise, the pleading is treated as unsigned
which produces no legal effect. The court, though, in its discretion, may give the
party a chance to remedy the insufficiency.

A pleading, therefore, wherein the verification is merely based on the

party's knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of
the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied.

An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in

its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same
was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this
Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report
to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary
action. (5a)

In this case, petitioner did not submit a corrected verification despite the
order of this Court. This alone merits the denial of the petition outright.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

179
Section 5 - Certification against forum shopping

Ching v. Cheng
G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014

FACTS:

Antonio Ching owned several business and properties, among which was Po
Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing Properties) His total assets are alleged to have been
more than 380 Million. Although he was unmarried, he had children from two
women. One was Ramon Ching, who alleges to be the only child of Ramon Ching
with his common-law wife Lucina Santos. On the other hand, Joseph and Jaime
Cheng claim to be Antonio’s illegitimate children with his housemaid, Mercedes
Igne.

In 1996, Antonio was murdered. Ramon allegedly induced Mercedes and her
children, Joseph and Jaime, to sign a waiver to Antonio’s Ching’s estate in
consideration of P22.5 million, which was never paid. Ramon executed an affidavit
of settlement of estate, naming himself as sole heir and adjudicating upon himself
the entirety of Antonio’s estate.

On October 7, 1988, Joseph and Jaime Cheng and Mercede Igne (the Chengs)
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the
RTC of Manila. (first case) The complaint was later amended to implead Po Wing
Properties, to which Ramon was a stockholder. The amended complaint was for
Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates
of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Document. Po Wing filed a motion for dismiss on the
ground for lack of jurisdiction. The same was granted, but the Chengs and Lucina
were given 15 days to file the appropriate pleading (amended complaint) which
they failed to do so.

On April 19, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina filed a complaint for "Annulment
of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title
Issued by Virtue of Said Documents" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties
(second case) Subsequently, the Chengs and Lucina filed a motion to dismiss their
complaint, praying that it be dismissed without prejudice. This was granted by the
court on the ground that summons were not yet served on Ramon Ching and Po
Wing Properties, and they had not yet filed any responsive pleading. The
dismissal was made without prejudice.

This prompted Ramon and Po Wing properties to file a motion for

reconsideration, arguing that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under

180
the “two-dismissal rule” under Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure, in view of the
previous dismissal of the first case.

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in the second case,
the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Disinheritance and Declaration
of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra judicial Agreement, Deed of
Absolute Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties. (third case)
A motion to dismiss was filed by Ramon and Po Wing on the ground of res
judicata, litis pendentia, forum-shopping and failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action.

An omnibus order was issued resolving both the motion for reconsideration
in the second case and the motion to dismiss in the third case. The trial court
denied both motions, ruling that the dismissal of the second case was without
prejudice and hence, would not bar the filing of the third case. A motion for
reconsideration in the third case was filed. While the same was pending, Ramon
and Po Wing filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the dismissal of
the second case without prejudice. The CA denied the petition. The petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Did the respondents (Chengs and Lucina) commit forum-shopping when

they filed the third case while the motion for reconsideration of the second case
was still pending?

RULING:

Yes, forum-shopping was committed.

Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings

involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the
two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action,
and reliefs sought.
When respondents filed the third case, petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the second case was still pending. Clearly, the
order of dismissal was not yet final since it could still be overturned upon
reconsideration, or even on appeal to a higher court. The second case, therefore,
was still pending when the third case was filed. The prudent thing that

181
respondents could have done was to wait until the final disposition of the second
case before filing the third case. In their haste to file the third case, however, they
unfortunately transgressed certain procedural safeguards, among which are the
rules on litis pendentia and res judicata.

Hence, when respondents filed the third case, they engaged in forum
shopping. Any judgment by the court on the propriety of the dismissal of the
second case will inevitably affect the disposition of the third case. It is settled that
once there is a finding of forum shopping, the penalty is summary dismissal not
only of the petition pending before this Court, but also of the other case that is
pending in a lower court. Accordingly, the grant of this petition would inevitably
result in the summary dismissal of the third case. Any action, therefore, which
originates from the third case pending with any court would be barred by res
judicata.

However, considering the severity of the penalty of the rule against forum-
shopping, the case at hand must be re-examined. In this case, the dismissal of the
first case became final and executory upon the failure of the respondent’s counsel
to file the appropriate pleading. They filed the correct pleading in the second case
but eventually sought for its dismissal on the suspicion that their counsel is not
amply protecting their interest as the case is not moving for three years. The filing
of the third case therefore, was not precisely to obtain a favorable result but an
attempt to protect their rights. Thus, if the twin dismissal rule shall be applied and
the third case be disallowed to continue, the ends of substantial justice will not be
served. Courts of justice must always endeavor to resolve cases on their merits,
rather than summarily dismiss these on technicalities.

With this, it is ruled that the rule on forum shopping will not strictly apply
when it can be shown that (1) the original case has been dismissed upon request
of the plaintiff for valid procedural reasons; (2) the only pending matter is a motion
for reconsideration; and (3) there are valid procedural reasons that serve the goal
of substantial justice for the fresh new· case to proceed.

The third case filed apparently contains the better cause of action for the
plaintiffs and is now being prosecuted by a counsel that they are more comfortable
with. Substantial justice will be served in this manner and serves as reason that the
petition should be denied.

EFFECT OF A.M. 19-10-20 SC (NEW RULES) ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Ching and Po Wing Properties v. Joseph Cheng (G.R. No.
175507, October 8, 2014) is affected by A.M 19-10-20 SC. The 2019 proposed

182
 amendments to the 1997 rules of procedure remains to require a certification
against non-forum shopping to be annexed with the pleadings and to be filed
simultaneously therewith. It requires that the plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim,
that (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to
the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if
there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed. Under the new rules, however, the 5-day requirement was qualified to
pertain to 5-calendar days.

The new rules also provided that the authorization to act on behalf of a party,
whether in the form of a secretary’s certificate or a special power of attorney,
should be attached to the pleading. The old and new rules state that if the acts of
the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum-shopping,
the same shall be a ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as cause for administrative sanctions.

183
 Stronghold Insurance Company vs. Spouses Rune and Lea Stroem
G.R. No. 204689, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

Respondent Spouses entered into an Owners-Contractor Agreement with

Asis-Leif & Company, Inc. (Asis-Leif) for the construction of a two-storey house
on the lot owned by them. P ursuant to the agreement, Asis-Leif secured a
performance bond in the amount of ₱4,500,000.00 from Stronghold Insurance
Company, Inc. Stronghold and Asis-Leif, through Ms. Ma. Cynthia Asis-Leif,
bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the Spouses Stroem the agreed
amount in the event that the construction project is not completed. Asis-Leif failed
to finish the construction in the projected time despite the repeated demand of the
Spouses. The Spouses then rescinded the agreement and had an appraiser evaluate
the progress of the construction time. Stronghold sent a letter to Asis-Leif
requesting that the company settle its obligations with the Spouses Stroem
however no response was received from Asis-Leif. This prompted the Spouses to
file a complaint for breach of contract and for sum of money with a claim for
damages against Asis-Leif, Ms. Cynthia Asis-Leif, and Stronghold. Only
Stronghold was served summons. Ms. Cynthia Asis-Leif allegedly absconded and
moved out of the country. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses.
Both Stronghold and the Spouses appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC but increased the amount of attorney’s fees. Thus, this petition.

Stronghold argued that the lower courts should have dismissed the case in
view of the arbitration clause in the agreement and considering that Republic Act
No. 876 explicitly confines the court’s authority only to pass upon the issue of
whether there is an agreement providing for arbitration. Also, Stronghold’s
liability under the performance bond is limited only to additional costs for the
completion of the project. Spouses Stroem argue that Stronghold committed forum
shopping warranting dismissal of the case when the latter filed the present petition
despite the pendency of the Spouses Stroem’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
of the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 20, 2012. Adding to this, they
argued that the parties to the Agreement are ALB/Ms. Asis-Leif and Spouses
Stroem, while the parties to the Bond are Spouses Stroem and Stronghold. The
considerations for the two contracts are likewise distinct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is forum shopping in the case.

RULING:

184
 Yes.

This court has enumerated the elements of forum-shopping: "(a) identity of

parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the
two cases issuch that any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other case." Rule 42, Section
2 in relation to Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court mandates petitioner to
submit a Certification Against Forum Shopping and promptly inform this court
about the pendency of any similar action or proceeding before other courts or
tribunals. The rule’s purpose is to deter the unethical practice of pursuing
simultaneous remedies in different forums, which "wreaks havoc upon orderly
judicial procedure." Failure to comply with the rule is a sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.

Records show that petitioner’s duly authorized officer certified the

following on January 21, 2013: I further certify that: (a) I have not commenced any
other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of my knowledge, no
such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
or different Divisions thereof, or any tribunal or agency; (c) if I should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency, I undertake to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and such
tribunal or agency of the fact within five (5) days therefrom.

Petitioner failed to carry out its duty of promptly informing this court of
any pending action or proceeding before this court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

185
 Home Guaranty Corporation vs. La Savoie Development Corporation
G.R. No. 168616, January 28, 2015

FACTS:

La Savoie is engaged in the business of real estate development, subdivision

and brokering. Because of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, La Savoie found itself
unable to pay its obligations to its creditors. Thus, on April 25, 2003, La Savoie filed
before the RTC a "petition for the declaration of state of suspension of payments
with approval of proposed rehabilitation plan" under the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. With La Savoie's compliance and finding
its "petition to be sufficient in form and substance," the RTC judge issued the Stay
Order staying the enforcement of all claims against La Savoie. Following such
issuance La Savoie's creditors — Planters Development Bank, Philippine Veterans
Bank, and Robinsons Savings Bank — filed their Comments and/or Oppositions.
Home Guaranty Corporation filed an Opposition even though it was not a creditor
of Petitioner. It asserted that it had a material and beneficial interest in the petition.
Home Guaranty Corporation noted that through the "La Savoie Asset Pool
Formation and Trust Agreement", La Savoie obtained financing for some of its
projects through a securitization process in which Planters Development Bank as
nominal issuer issued P150 million in asset participation certificates dubbed as the
"La Savoie Development Certificates” to be sold to investors. The projects financed
by these certificates consisted of the development of real properties in different
locations. The same properties were conveyed in trust by La Savoie, as trustor, to
Planters Development Bank, as trustee, and constituted into the La Savoie Asset
Pool. The LSDC certificates were covered by a guaranty extended by Home
Guaranty Corporation through a "Contract of Guaranty" entered into by Home
Guaranty Corporation with La Savoie and Planters Development Bank. Section 17
of the Contract of Guaranty designates Home Guaranty Corporation to "undertake
financial controllerships of the Projects." Thus, in its Opposition, Home Guaranty
Corporation noted that it was "charged with the duty of ensuring that all funds
due to the Asset Pool are collected, and that funds are disbursed for the purposes
they were intended for." Home Guaranty Corporation added that in the course of
its business, La Savoie collected a total amount of P60,569,134.30 from the buyers
of some of the properties covered by the Asset Pool. This amount, however, was
not remitted by La Savoie to the trust. Thus, La Savoie's investors placed a call on
the guaranty. Home Guaranty Corporation argued that it and the investors on the
LSDC certificates had "preferential rights" over the properties making up the Asset
Pool as these were conveyed as security or collaterals for the redemption of the
LSDC certificates. Thus, they should be excluded from the coverage of La Savoie's
Petition for Rehabilitation.

186
 The RTC issued an order denying the petition for rehabilitation and lifting
the stay order. La Savoie filed an appeal to the CA. During the appeal, the guaranty
was made, and it argued that all of the properties comprising the Asset Pool
should be excluded from the rehabilitation proceedings in view of the Deed of
Assignment and Conveyance executed in its favor by Planters Development Bank.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Thus, this petition for review
under Rule 45. La Savoie pointed out that (as of the time of the filing of its
Comment) another case between Home Guaranty Corporation and La Savoie,
docketed as Civil Case No. 05314, was pending before the Makati City Regional
Trial Court. In its reply, Home Guaranty Corporation acknowledged the pendency
of Civil Case No. 05314. It, however, pointed out that it could not have been guilty
of forum shopping as the present case is an offshoot of a Petition for Corporate
Rehabilitation while Civil Case No. 05314 is an action for injunction, mandamus,
specific performance, and sum of money with application for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether Home Guaranty Corporation engaged in forum shopping.

RULING:

Yes.

It is not disputed that there is identity of parties in the present Petition and
in Civil Case No. 05314. Home Guaranty Corporation, however, argues that it
could not have been guilty of forum shopping as the relief it sought via Civil Case
No. 05314 is different from the relief it is seeking in the present Appeal from the
Court of Appeals' Decision giving due course to La Savoie's Petition for Corporate
Rehabilitation. The divergence in specific reliefs sought notwithstanding, Home
Guaranty Corporation's bases for these reliefs are the same. In Civil Case No.
05314, Home Guaranty Corporation asked that La Savoie cease collecting
payments and that collected payments be remitted to it because it supposedly now
owns the real estate development projects of La Savoie that form part of the Asset
Pool. In the present Appeal, Home Guaranty Corporation asks that the properties
forming part of the Asset Pool be excluded from corporate rehabilitation
proceedings because it, and no longer La Savoie, is the owner of these properties.
Thus, in both cases, Home Guaranty Corporation is invoking the same right and
is proceeding from the same cause of action, i.e., its supposed ownership. True,
there is divergence in the details of the specific reliefs it is seeking, but Home
Guaranty Corporation is seeking the same basic relief, i.e., the recognition of its
alleged ownership. The exclusion of the properties from corporate rehabilitation

187
proceedings and the remittance to it of payments are mere incidents of this basic
relief. Accordingly, in simultaneously pursuing the present case and Civil Case
No. 05314, Home Guaranty Corporation engaged in forum shopping. It is worth
emphasizing that the present Petition or Appeal, being a mere offshoot of La
Savoie's original Petition for Rehabilitation, is not the act constitutive of forum
shopping. Forum shopping was committed not through the filing of this Appeal
but through the filing of Civil Case No. 05314 before the Regional Trial Court.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

188
 Dynamic Builders & Construction Co., Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr.
G.R. No. 174202, April 7, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner joined the bid for the construction of an infrastructure known as

“Construction Shoreline Protection Project”. Its bid proposal was found to be not
substantially responsive, so it filed a request for reconsideration. Such was denied
as the post-evaluation examination results showed its failure in its Financial
Contracting Capability. Petitioner then filed a formal protest with Mayor
Presbitero, who reiterated that it had a negative Financial Contracting Capability.
Their motion for reconsideration being denied, petitioner filed with the RTC a
petition for certiorari, and with the SC a petition for prohibition with application
for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Mayor Presbitero’s
decision.

For petitioner, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 implicitly allows it to

simultaneously file a petition for certiorari before the RTC assailing the protest
case on the merits, and another petition before the SC for injunctive remedies. On
the other hand, public respondents counter that this is a violation of the rules
against splitting a single cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping,
that petitioner availed of an improper remedy, and disregarded the rule on
hierarchy of courts.

ISSUES:

Is there a violation of the rules on forum shopping?

RULING:

Yes, there is a violation of the rules on forum shopping. Rule 7, Section 5 of

the Rules of Court requires the plaintiff or principal party to certify under oath
that he or she has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any
court. Forum shopping is present when, in two or more cases pending, there is
identity of (1) parties (2) rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for and (3)
the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered
in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.

The second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184
simply means it does not preclude a direct filing before the SC in proper cases,
“only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to

189
justify an exception to the policy.” The Rules of Court provides for original
concurrent jurisdiction by the RTC, the CA, and the SC in entertaining petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus. However, parties must adhere to the
principle of hierarchy of courts.

In this case, petitioner asked the SC to enjoin the same decision and
resolution sought to be set aside in the petition before the RTC. Since petitioner
seeks the same relief through two separate petitions filed before separate courts,
there is a violation of the rule against forum shopping.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Dynamic Builders v. Presbitero, Jr. (G.R. No. 174202,
April 7, 2015) is not substantially affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. Although there
are some amendments introduced to the provision under the same rule and
section, these amendments only pertain to the following: 1) the report shall be
made within 5 calendar days; and 2) the authorization of the affiant to act on
behalf of a party should be attached to the pleading.

190
 In re: Ferrer
A.C. No. 8037, February 17, 2016

FACTS:

Dionisio Donato T. Garciano (Garciano), then Mayor of Baras, Rizal, sought

to appoint Rolando Pilapil Lacayan (Lacayan) as Sangguniang Bayan Secretary,
replacing Nolasco Vallestero (Vallestero). This met some opposition but Garciano
insisted. Vallestero, Robles, and other Sangguniang Bayan members filed a
"complaint for mandamus and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction"
against Garciano and other municipal officials before the Regional Trial Court of
Morong, Rizal. They sought for the payment of their respective salaries. The court
ruled in favor of Vallestero and ordered Garciano, et al. to release the funds and
pay Vallestero's salaries and other benefits but Garciano, et al. did not heed the
order; hence, they were found liable for indirect contempt.

Garciano, et al., through their counsel, Atty. Ferrer, filed a Petition for
Certiorari (First Petition) before the Court of Appeals which was raffled to the
Eleventh Division. Days after, another Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order (Second Petition) was filed before the Court of Appeals which was then
21

raffled to the Third Division. On the same day, Garciano, et al. filed before the
Court of Appeals Eleventh Division an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw
Petition Under Rule 17 Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. This was granted.

The Court of Appeals Third Division dismissed the Second Petition with
prejudice due to the deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping. The
Court of Appeals found that Garciano, et al., through Atty. Ferrer, filed two (2)
Petitions for Certiorari successively. Included in its decision is the indorsement of
Atty. Ferrer’s case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and
appropriate disciplinary action.

In his Comment, he states that he acted in good faith in the simultaneous

filing of the Second Petition and the urgent ex-parte Motion to withdraw Garciano,
et al.'s First Petition. He alleges that he withdrew the First Petition the same day
he filed the Second Petition and that there was an urgent need to file the Second
Petition as the First Petition was verified by only one petitioner instead of four. He
adds that by filing the Motion to withdraw the First Petition on the same day as
the filing of the Second Petition, he substantially complied with the rule against
forum shopping. Moreover, he states that forum shopping takes place when, as a
result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other
than appeal or certiorari) in another. Atty. Ferrer further asserts that the filing of

191
the case took place before only one forum — the Court of Appeals — and that no
forum shopping could be considered to have taken place.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer should be held

administratively liable for violating the rule against forum shopping.

RULING:

Yes.

In Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., this court enumerated the
instances where forum shopping takes place: There is forum shopping "when a
party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court."
The different ways by which forum shopping may be committed were explained
in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company: Forum shopping can be committed
in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with
the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground
for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause
of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved
(where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting causes of action,
where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).

Respondent filed multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with
the same prayer. All the elements necessary for the commission of forum shopping
are present.

The Court of Appeals correctly held that respondent could have easily filed
a manifestation that the other petitioners had yet to verify the First Petition.
Respondent's reason that the failure of other petitioners to verify the First Petition
may imperil the issuance of a temporary restraining order cannot justify the willful
violation of the rule against forum shopping.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

192
 City of Taguig v. City of Makati
G.R. No. 208393, June 15, 2016

FACTS:

City of Taguig asserted that the areas comprising the Enlisted Men's
Barangays, or EMBOs, as well as the area referred to as Inner Fort in Fort Bonifacio,
were within its territory and jurisdiction. The RTC ruled in favor of Taguig.

City of Makati filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It assailed RTC's
Decision as having been rendered without jurisdiction and in violation of due
process. It claimed that the Decision was rendered after the judge had retired and
was merely antedated to make it appear that it was rendered before he retired. At
the same time, Makati filed before the RTC its Motion for Reconsideration Ad
Cautelam.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Makati's Petition for Annulment of

Judgment: (1) for being functus officio and/or moot; (2) for being premature; and
(3) for forum shopping. Court of Appeals likewise ruled that in filing a Motion for
Reconsideration and Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Makati effectively split
a single cause of action and thereby engaged in forum shopping.

ISSUE:

Did the City of Makati engage in forum shopping for simultaneously

pursuing a Petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision, and a Motion for
Reconsideration of the same Decision?

RULING:

Yes, simultaneously pursuing an appeal (or motion for reconsideration)

and a petition for annulment of judgment is an act of forum shopping. In the case
of Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development Corporation
the Court explained that, forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes
two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in
order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same
or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action.

193
 Respondent City of Makati pursued two (2) simultaneous remedies: a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 120495); and a Motion for Reconsideration
(later, an Appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98377). There is identity of parties
in both cases: the cities of Makati and Taguig.

The Rules of Court, the code governing judicial procedure, prescribes the
remedies (actions and special proceedings) that may be availed of for the myriad
reliefs that persons may conceivably have need of and seek in this jurisdiction. But,
that the adjective law makes available several remedies does not imply that a party
may resort to them simultaneously or at his pleasure or whim. There is a sequence
and a hierarchical order which must be observed in availing of them. Impatience
at what may be felt to be the slowness of the judicial process, or even a deeply held
persuasion in the Tightness of one's cause does not justify short-cuts in procedure,
or playing fast and loose with the rules thereof.

The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed
to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple petitions or
complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, which tend to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds
to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

194
 Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo
G.R. No. 185894. August 30, 2017

FACTS:

Santos, a stockholder of record for 25 shares in Belo Medical Group,

requested for an inspection of the corporate books. Belo, another stockholder of
record of Belo Medical Group, opposed to granting Santos’ request alleging that:
(1) Santos is not the true owner of the 25 shares and is merely a trustee for said
shares in favor of Belo; and, (2) Santos’ request for inspection is done in bad faith
as he allegedly requests it to work in favor of a competitor company which Santos
is also a stockholder. Being caught in the disputing claims of Belo and Santos, Belo
Medical Group filed a Complaint for Interpleader with RTC, alleging that while
Santos appeared to be a registered stockholder, there was nothing on the record to
show that he had paid for the shares under his name. Subsequently, Belo Medical
Group filed a Supplemental Complaint for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. In its Supplemental Complaint, Belo Medical Group relied on
Section 74 of the Corporation Code to deny Santos' request for inspection.

The Complaint and Supplemental Complaint were raffled to the RTC of

Makati, a special commercial court, thus classifying them as intra-corporate.
However, Belo argued that the proceedings should not have been classified as
intra-corporate because while their right of inspection as shareholders may be
considered intra-corporate, "it ceases to be that and becomes a full-blown civil law
question if competing rights of ownership are asserted as the basis for the right of
inspection."

The trial court characterized the dispute as "intrinsically connected with the
regulation of the corporation as it involves the right of inspection of corporate
records." Included in Santos and Belo's conflict was a shareholder's exclusive right
to inspect corporate records. In addition, the issue on the ownership of shares
requires the application of laws and principles regarding corporations.

However, RTC dismissed the Complaint for Interpleader as Belo Medical

Group failed to sufficiently allege conflicting claims of ownership over the subject
shares. Finally, the Complaint for Declaratory Relief was struck down as improper
because it sought an initial determination on whether Santos was in bad faith and
if he should be barred from inspecting the books of the corporation. Only after
resolving these issues can the trial court determine his rights under Sections 74
and 75 of the Corporation Code. The act of resolving these issues is not within the
province of the special civil action as declaratory relief is limited to the

195
construction and declaration of actual rights and does not include the
determination of issues.

Belo Medical Group directly filed a petition before the SC under Rule 45 on
the basis that the appeal is based purely on questions of facts. Meanwhile, Belo
filed a Petition for Review before the CA under Rule 43. Santos contends that Belo
and Belo Medical Group have the same interest. Belo, owner of 90% of the shares
of stock of the corporation, dictates Belo Medical Group’s actions, which were
ultimately for Belo’s benefit and interests. The CA thus dismissed Belo’s Petition
for Review and ruled that the pending case before this Court was the more
appropriate vehicle to determine the issues.

ISSUE:

Did Belo Medical Group commit forum shopping?

RULING:

No, Belo Medical Group did not commit forum shopping.

Forum shopping exists when parties seek multiple judicial remedies

simultaneously or successively, involving the same causes of action, facts,
circumstances, and transactions, in the hopes of obtaining a favorable decision. It
may be accomplished by a party defeated in one forum, in an attempt to obtain a
favorable outcome in another, "other than by appeal or a special civil action for
certiorari." Forum shopping trivializes rulings of courts, abuses their processes,
cheapens the administration of justice, and clogs court dockets.

When willful and deliberate violation is clearly shown, it can be a ground

for all pending cases' summary dismissal with prejudice and direct contempt.

Belo Medical Group filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 before this Court to appeal against the Joint Resolution of the trial court. It did
not file any other petition related to the case, as indicated in its verification and
certification against forum shopping. It was Belo, a defendant in Belo Medical
Group's Complaint, who filed a separate appeal under Rule 43 with the Court of
Appeals primarily to protect her counterclaims. Belo and Belo Medical Group both
filed their respective Petitions for Review. The Court of Appeals already ruled that
litis pendencia was present when Belo and Belo Medical Group filed their
respective petitions on the same date before different fora. The two petitions
involved the same parties, rights and reliefs sought, and causes of action. This is
a decision this Court can no longer disturb.

196
 Neither Belo Medical Group nor Belo can be faulted for willful and
deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping. Their prompt compliance
of the certification against forum shopping appended to their Petitions negates
willful and deliberate intent.

Belo Medical Group was not remiss in its duty to inform this Court of a
similar action or proceeding related to its Petition. It promptly manifested before
this Court its receipt of Belo's Petition before the Court of Appeals. Belo Medical
Group and Belo manifested before this Court that Belo filed a Rule 43 petition to
protect her counterclaims and to question the same Joint Resolution issued by the
trial court. Both did so within five (5) days from discovery, as they undertook in
their respective certificates against forum-shopping.

The issue of forum shopping has become moot. The appeal under Rule 43
filed by Belo has been dismissed by the Court of Appeals on the ground of litis
pendentia. The purpose of proscribing forum shopping is the proliferation of
contradictory decisions on the same controversy. This possibility no longer exists
in this case.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

197
Department of Public Works and Highways v. CMC/MONARK/PACIFIC/HI-
TRI JOINT VENTURE
G.R. No. 179732. September 13, 2017

FACTS:

DPWH and CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri J.V. (the Joint Venture) executed

a contract for road improvement component loan in Zamboanga del Sur. DPWH
hired BCEOM French Engineering Consultants to oversee the project. While the
project was ongoing, the Joint Venture’s truck and equipment were set on fire.
Thereafter, a bomb exploded at Joint Venture’s hatching plant. The Joint Venture
made several written demands for extension and payment of the foreign
component of the Contract. There were efforts between the parties to settle the
unpaid Payment Certificates. BCEOM recommended the payment of outstanding
monies due to Joint Venture citing that they finished 80% of the project when the
same was halted. To enforce this claim, the Joint Venture filed a complaint before
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), the administrative
agency tasked with resolving issues pertaining to the construction industry.
Meanwhile, Joint Venture sent a "Notice of Mutual Termination of Contract" to
DPWH requesting for a mutual termination of the contract subject of the
arbitration case due to its diminished financial capability due to DPWH's late
payments, changes in the project involving payment terms, peace and order
problems, and previous agreement by the parties. DPWH acting secretary
accepted the same.

The CIAC promulgated an award directing DPWH to pay Joint Venture.

The CA sustained the award hence DPWH filed this petition for review. However,
the Joint Venture contends that the petition suffers from a fatal defect in its
certification against non-forum shopping having been signed only by petitioner's
counsel, Atty. Valderama from the OSG.

ISSUE:

Must the petition filed by DPWH be dismissed for non-compliance with

the rule on certification against non-forum shopping?

RULING:

No, the petition filed by DPWH must not be dismissed despite non-
compliance with the rule on certification against non-forum shopping.

198
 The Court has long enforced the strict procedural requirement of
verification and certification against non-forum shopping. It is settled that
certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party or principal
and not by counsel. In Anderson v. Ho, this Court explained that it is the party who
is in the best position to know whether he or she has filed a case before any courts.
However, this Court ruled before that: "the lack of a certification against forum
shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not cured by its submission after
the filing of the petition." Nevertheless, exceptions exist, as in the case at bar, and
it is more prudent to resolve the case on its merits than dismiss it on purely
technical grounds.

It is clear in this case that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Valderama, was not
clothed with authority to sign on petitioner's behalf. However, in Resolution dated
December 10, 2007, this Court noted petitioner's Manifestation that after the
petition was posted, the verification page signed by DPWH Secretary Hermogenes
E. Ebdane was submitted to the Office of the Solicitor General. In the same
Resolution, this Court granted the Office of the Solicitor General's motion to admit
the attached verification and to substitute and attach it to the petition.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

199
 Philippine Ports Authority v. The City of Davao, Sangguniang Panglungsod
ng Davao City, City Mayor of Davao City, City Treasurer of Davao City, City
Assessor of Davao City, and Central Board of Assessment Appeals
G.R. No. 190324, June 6, 2018

FACTS:

The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) received a letter the City Assessor of
Davao for the assessment and collection of real property taxes against its
administered properties located at Sasa Port. It appealed the assessment via
registered mail to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) through the
Office of the City Treasurer of Davao. While the appeal was pending, the City of
Davao posted a notice of sale delinquent real properties. The LBAA denied
dismissed the appeal of PPA for having been filed out of time and for lack of
jurisdiction. The PPA appealed before the CBAA but was denied. It thus filed an
appeal before the Court of Tax Appeals. It also filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, arguing that the City of Davao's taxation of its properties
and their subsequent auction and sale to satisfy the alleged tax liabilities were
without or in excess of its jurisdiction and contrary to law. It argued that it had no
other speedy and adequate remedy except to file a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the appeal because it found that PPA
committed forum shopping, as the petition raised the same facts and issues as in
its appeal before the CTA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition before the Court of Appeals was properly
dismissed for forum shopping.

HELD:

Yes.

To reverse a court determination that a party has violated the rule against
forum shopping, this party must show that one or more of the requirements for
forum shopping does not exist. To this end, petitioner attempts to differentiate the
petition filed with the Court of Appeals from the appeal filed with the Court of
Tax Appeals.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it submitted only its own arguments. Neither

its petition before the Court of Appeals nor its appeal before the Court of Tax
Appeals was attached to the petition filed with the Court. Without any of these

200
texts, this Court is in no position to determine that the elements of forum shopping
are absent here.

Thus the rule against forum shopping was violated when petitioner filed its
Petition for Certiorari despite its pending appeal before the Court of Tax Appeals.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

201
 Eversley Childs Sanitarium, represented by Dr. Gerardo Aquino, Jr. Chief of
Sanitarium, v. Spouses Anastacio and Perla Barbarona
G.R. No. 195814, April 4, 2018

FACTS:

Eversley is a public health facility operated by the Department of Health to

administer care and treatment to patients with leprosy and to provide basic health
services to other patients. Since 1930, it has occupied a portion of a parcel of land
in Mandaue City, Cebu.

The Spouses Barbarona allege that they are the owners of the lot when they
acquired such lot from the Spouse Gonzales. The Spouses Barbarona filed a
complaint for ejectment before the MTC against the occupants.

The MTC ruled in favor of the Sps. Barbarona. The occupants appealed to
the RTC which affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. RTC then denied
Eversley’s Motion for Reconsideration. Eversley filed for a Petition for Review
with the CA, arguing that MTC had no jurisdiction over the action and that RTC
erred in not recognizing the subsequent invalidation of the Spouses’ certificate of
title. The CA denied the appeal. Eversley then filed a Petition for Review before
the Supreme Court. It likewise prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to restrain the immediate execution
of the assailed judgment and to prevent impairing the operations of the
government hospital. While the Petition was pending, Spouses Barbarona moved
for Leave to File Comment/Manifestation informing the Court the Eversley still
had a pending and unresolved Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of
Appeals, in violation of the rule against forum shopping.

Eversley filed its Reply and submitted a Manifestation explaining that the
CA issued a Resolution denying its Motion for Reconsideration despite earlier
filing of a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw its Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Eversley is guilty of forum shopping for filing a Petition
for Review despite its Manifestation of withdrawal of its Motion for
Reconsideration in the Court of Appeals.

HELD:

202
 No.

There is forum shopping when a party files different pleadings in different

tribunals, despite having the same "identities of parties, rights or causes of action,
and reliefs sought." Consistent with the principle of fair play, parties are prohibited
from seeking the same relief in multiple forums in the hope of obtaining a
favorable judgment. The rule against forum shopping likewise fulfills an
administrative purpose as it prevents conflicting decisions by different tribunals
on the same issue.

In filing complaints and other initiatory pleadings, the plaintiff or petitioner

is required to attach a certification against forum shopping, certifying that (a) no
other action or claim involving the same issues has been filed or is pending in any
court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency, (b) if there is a pending action or claim,
the party shall make a complete statement of its present status, and (c) if the party
should learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, that he or
she will report it within five (5) days to the tribunal where the complaint or
initiatory pleading is pending.

The Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals clearly provide that a subsequent
motion for reconsideration shall be deemed abandoned if the movant filed a
petition for review or motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
before this Court. Rule VI, Section 15 of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
is provided for precisely to prevent forum shopping. It mandates that once a party
seeks relief with this Court, any action for relief with the Court of Appeals will be
deemed abandoned to prevent conflicting decisions on the same issues. Had the
Court of Appeals applied its own Internal Rules, Eversley's Motion for
Reconsideration would have been deemed abandoned.

Eversley's Motion for Reconsideration having been deemed abandoned

with its filing of a Motion for Extension of Time before The Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals' Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, thus, has
no legal effect. It is as if no motion for reconsideration was filed at all. In this
particular instance, Eversely did not commit a fatal procedural error.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

203
 Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. vs. Reyes
G.R. No’s. 152797, 189315, and 200684, September 18, 2019

FACTS:

Portions of Hacienda Looc, an 8,650.7778-hectare property in Batangas,

were offered to be sold to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the
Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme of RA 6657. Through this agreement, physical
possession was transferred to the DAR. It then distributed 25 Certificate of Land
Ownership Award.

Meanwhile, the rights and interest over Hacienda Looc were transferred to
Manila Southcoast, who was able to register portions of Hacienda Looc in its name.
Manila Southcoast filed a Petition before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)
seeking to cancel the 25 Certificates of Land Ownership Award and the
reconveyance of the excluded areas. The farmers moved for the Petition’s
dismissal. Before the resolution of the petition, several farmers entered into
amicable settlements with Manila Southcoast. 15 certificates were cancelled based
on the allegedly executed waivers. The farmers appealed but the same was
denied.

Fil-Estate, a company that acquired, through a joint venture agreement, the

10 other lots with an area totaling 1,219.0133 hectares covered by the certificates,
filed a Petition praying that the 10 lots be excluded from the coverage of CARP.
The affected farmers questioned the validity of the cancellation proceedings,
claiming that they were denied due process and that some waivers had been
falsified.

The DAR Regional Director issued an order granting Fil-Estate’s Petition

and ordering that 10 lots be excluded from the coverage of the CARP. The affected
farmers appealed before the Agrarian Reform Secretary. It declared that 70
hectares of the 1,219.0133-hectare parcel of land are covered land under the CARP.

Fil-Estate filed before the CA a Petition for Partial Review which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47497. While this was pending, the farmers appealed
their case before the Office of the President. They also filed a Petition to Re-Open
Case before the DAR Secretary, but the same was denied. The Office of the
President dismissed the farmer’s appeal, upholding the decision of DAR that
majority of the lots in question had an average slop of 18% and were agriculturally
underdeveloped. The farmers filed a Petition for Review before the CA. The CA
dismissed the appeal

204
 Fil-Estate argues that the farmers committed willful and deliberate forum
shopping. It avers that the 3 pleadings filed by the farmers raised the same
allegations and prayed for the same reliefs: (1) in their appeal before the Office of
the President, seeking the denial of Fil-Estate’s application for exemption; (2) in
the Comment before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47497; and (3) in their
Petition to Re-Open Case before the DAR.

ISSUE:

Is there Forum Shopping?

RULING:

No.

The provision regarding forum shopping is intended to cover only

initiatory pleadings or incipient applications asserting a claim for relief. A claim
for relief that is derived only from or is necessarily connected with the main action
or complaint such as an answer with compulsory counterclaim is not covered by
the rule requiring a certificate against forum shopping. Likewise, a comment to a
petition filed before an appellate tribunal, not being an initiatory pleading, does
not require a certificate against forum shopping.

A comment to a petition is not an initiatory pleading or an incipient

application asserting a claim for relief as contemplated in Rule 7, Section 5. Thus,
the farmers cannot be said to have committed forum shopping when they filed
their Comment to Fil-Estate’s Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 47497.

Similarly, they are not guilty for forum shopping when they filed a Petition
to Reopen the Case before the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform. RA 6657 echoes
the social justice provisions found in the Constitution. Section 2 lists among the
objectives of agrarian reform the just distribution of all agricultural lands subject
to certain conditions. It also recognizes, among others, the participatory rile of all
stakeholders by allowing farmers, farm workers, etc. to participate in the planning,
organization, and management of the CARP.

Section 50 of RA 6657 vests the DAR with primary jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters and over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform. Jurisprudence has held that the jurisdiction over the administrative
implementation of agrarian laws exclusively belongs to the DAR Secretary.

205
 Thus, DAR is not constrained by the technical rules of procedure and
evidence. It may employ all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case
in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end,
it is empowered to issue the necessary rules and regulations.

Therefore, the Agrarian Reform Secretary did not exceed the scope of his
jurisdiction in issuing the MArcg 25, 1998 Order. The DAR, through its secretary,
has primary jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, including the investigation of acts that he or she believes are directed
toward the circumvention of the objectives of the CARP.

In reading the CARP, as a social welfare legislation, should be more than

just an inquiry into the literal meaning of the law. In interpreting tenancy and labor
legislations, the broad consideration is the ultimate resolution of doubts in favor
of the tenant or worker.

Thus, in this case, there is no merit in Fil-Estate’s argument that, in light of

Proclamation No. 1520, the 10 lots are excluded from the coverage of the CARP.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

206
 RULE 8
Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings

Section 2 - Alternative causes of action or defenses

Olivarez Realty Corporation v. Castillo

G.R. No. 196251, July 9, 2014

FACTS:

The subject property is a parcel of land located in Batangas, covered by two

TCTs registered in the name of Benjamin Castillo and Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA). Castillo entered into a contract of conditional sale with petitioner
Olivarez Realty Corporation, represented by Dr. Olivarez, upon certain terms and
conditions.

After the execution of the deed of conditional sale, petitioner immediately

took possession of the land but failed to comply with the stipulations in the
contract. This prompted Castillo to file a complaint against it. Castillo alleged that
he was convinced into selling the property to petitioner in the representation that
the corporation shall be responsible in clearing the property of the tenants and in
paying them disturbance compensation. He further alleged that Dr. Olivarez
solely prepared the deed of conditional sale and that he was made to sign the
contract with its terms not adequately explained to him in Tagalog.

After the all pleadings were filed, Castillo moved for summary judgment
and/or judgment on the pleadings. The trial court rendered summary judgment
in favor of Castillo and such decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In this
petition for review on certiorari, petitioner maintains that Castillo availed himself
of the irreconcilable reliefs of reformation of instrument and rescission of contract.
Thus, the trial court should have dismissed the case outright.

ISSUE:

Is a prayer for irreconcilable reliefs a ground to dismiss the complaint?

RULING:

No.

A plaintiff may allege two or more claims in the complaint alternatively or

hypothetically, either in one cause of action or in separate causes of action per

207
Section 2, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It is the filing of two separate
cases for each of the causes of action that is prohibited since the subsequently filed
case may be dismissed under Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
on splitting causes of action.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

208
Section 10 - Specific denial

Department of Public Works and Highways v. CMC/MONARK/PACIFIC/HI-

TRI JOINT VENTURE
G.R. No. 179732. September 13, 2017

FACTS:

DPWH and CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri J.V. (the Joint Venture) executed

a contract for road improvement component loan in Zamboanga del Sur. DPWH
hired BCEOM French Engineering Consultants to oversee the project. While the
project was ongoing, the Joint Venture’s truck and equipment were set on fire.
Thereafter, a bomb exploded at Joint Venture’s hatching plant. The Joint Venture
made several written demands for extension and payment of the foreign
component of the Contract. There were efforts between the parties to settle the
unpaid Payment Certificates. BCEOM recommended the payment of outstanding
monies due to Joint Venture citing that they finished 80% of the project when the
same was halted. To enforce this claim, the Joint Venture filed a complaint before
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), the administrative
agency tasked with resolving issues pertaining to the construction industry.
Meanwhile, Joint Venture sent a "Notice of Mutual Termination of Contract" to
DPWH requesting for a mutual termination of the contract subject of the
arbitration case due to its diminished financial capability due to DPWH's late
payments, changes in the project involving payment terms, peace and order
problems, and previous agreement by the parties. DPWH acting secretary
accepted the same.

The CIAC promulgated an award directing DPWH to pay Joint Venture.

The CA sustained the award hence DPWH filed this petition for review. Petitioner
insists that respondent is not yet entitled to the claim for equipment and financial
losses because there is no determination by the Engineer of the costs incurred, as
required under Clause 69.4 of the Conditions of Contract. In its Answer before
CIAC, petitioner denied respondent's claims for additional costs under Clause
69.4. Petitioner stated that its denial will be explained more specifically in its
Affirmative Defenses. However, a perusal of petitioner's Affirmative Defenses
reveals that no such qualification was made.

ISSUE:

Is it proper for CA to award the claim of respondents for equipment and

financial losses even if no determination was yet made by the Engineer of the costs
incurred?

209
RULING:

Yes, it is proper for CA to award the claim of respondents for equipment

and financial losses even if no determination was yet made by the Engineer of the
costs incurred.

The situation was an assumed risk of petitioner as employer and is, thus,
compensable under Clause 20.4 of the Conditions of Contract, which includes
rebellion, revolution, insurrection, or military or usurped power, or civil war.
Moreover under Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the "defendant must
specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and,
whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he
relies to support his denial." There are three (3) modes of specific denial provided
for under the Rules: (1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the
complaint, the truth of which the defendant does not admit, and whenever
practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to
support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as
is true and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by stating that the
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of a material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of a denial.

In Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong, this Court held that using "specifically" in a

general denial does not automatically convert that general denial to a specific one.
The denial in the answer must be definite as to what is admitted and what is
denied, such that the adverse party will not have to resort to guesswork over "what
is admitted, what is denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as
sufficient to form a belief."

The petitioner only tackled the issue on the claim for additional costs in the
Joint Affidavit of petitioner's witnesses. This Court finds that petitioner failed to
specifically deny the claims of respondent and had, therefore, admitted such
claims. This Court agrees that respondent was able to establish its claims before
the CIAC. Petitioner must compensate respondent for the costs it incurred without
any fault on respondent's part.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

210
 RULE 9
Effect of Failure to Plead

Section 1 - Defenses and objections not pleaded

Moncayo Integrated Small Scale Miners Association, Inc.

(MISSMA) v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.
G.R. No. 149638 & G.R. No. 149916, December 10, 2014

FACTS:
This case is a consolidation of two petitions for review assailing the decision
of the CA which annulled and set aside DENR Secretary’s decision for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. The first petition was filed by MISSMA and
the second was filed by DENR Secretary Antonio Cerilles.
In 1985, the Bureau of Forest Development issued a prospecting permit to
Marcopper Mining covering 4,941 hectares of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve. Thereafter, Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences issued an Exploration
Permit (EP133) covering same area. In 1994, Marcopper assigned EP133 to
respondent SMGMC, then, its application for Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) for the said area was published. Adverse claims were filed
against the MPSA, based on DAO No. 66 declaring 729 hectares of the Forest
Reserve as open for small-mining purposes. In 1997, DENR constituted a panel of
arbitrators which upheld the validity of EP133 and dismissed all adverse claims.
On appeal, the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) set aside the decision of the
arbitrators dated January 6, 1998. SMGMC and other adverse claimants
questioned MAB’s decision before the SC, but was later remanded to the CA.
Meanwhile, independent of the MAB decision and appeal to the CA, The
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao (PMRB) proposed to declare a
People’s Small Scale Mining Area in accordance with MAB decision. Oppositions
were filed. PMRB dismissed the oppositions for lack of merit. On September 20,
1999, DENR Secretary Cerilles affirmed PMRB’s decision. MRs were denied.
SMGMC filed a Petition under Rule 43 before the CA. On July 31, 2000, CA denied
the petition based on litis pendencia, considering that a pending case before the
court assailing MAB’s decision involved prejudicial question. SMGC filed an MR.
On August 27, 2001, CA granted the MR and annulled DENR Secretary’s decision.
Hence, these two petitions were filed assailing CA’s decision. Petitioners argued
that CA should not have amended its decision considering that it already found
SMGMC guilty of forum shopping and litis pendencia.
ISSUE:

211
 May CA disregard the findings of forum shopping and litis pendencia and
dwell on the merits of the case?
RULING:
(NOTE: The Supreme Court did not make a categorical answer on the issue as
developments after the petitions mooted the case)
Forum Shopping and Litis Pendencia
Litis Pendencia exists when the following elements are present: (a) the
identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment
in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other. The existence of litis pendencia also means that the rule against forum
shopping was violated.
The Court of Appeals' July 31, 2000 decision denied SMGMC's petition on the
ground of litis pendencia and forum shopping considering the then pending case
docketed as G.R. No. 132475 assailing the January 6, 1998 MAB decision
recognizing DAO No. 66 by excluding the 729-hectare area. The Court of Appeals
August 27, 2001 amended decision "maintain that matters pertaining to the
petitioner's rights over the subject 729-hectare gold rush area have been decided
by the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB), which decision is now with the Supreme
Court for review," but it nevertheless annulled the DENR Secretary's decision "for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in excess of his jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the court stated that there is no need to decide on whether
there was forum shopping or litis pendencia since the ruling in another case Apex
Mining v. SMGMC mooted these petitions.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC did not affect the ruling in this case. The concepts of Litis
Pendencia and Forum Shopping are both embodied in the Present and Amended
Rules.

212
Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) v. Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio, Montassah B.
Sacar-Adiong, Rouen Ruth A. Cristobal, and Loraine S. Schneider-Cruz
G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari involving petitioner, Saudia, a
foreign corporation established and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia which has a Philippine Office located in Makati City. Respondents,
who were recruited and hired as Flight Attendants since the 1990s continued their
service with Saudia until they were separated from service in 2006. Respondents
alleged that they informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies to process their
maternity leaves. Initially, their leaves were approved but was later disapproved,
requiring them to file their resignation letters instead. Saudia’s call for resignation
was based on its “Unified Contract,” which provides that the employment of a
Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void. Respondents contended
that the Unified Contract took effect on September 2006, after the filing and
approval of their maternity leaves. Faced with the dilemma of losing benefits,
respondents, nonetheless, submitted their resignation letters.
On November 2007, respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Saudia before the Labor Arbiter. Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter and claimed that all the determining points of the contract referred
to foreign law, thus, complaint must be dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed the
decision and reinstated the complaint. Petitioner then filed a Rule 65 petition
before the CA which was denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Is the complaint against Saudia, a foreign corporation, dismissible on the
ground of forum non conveniens?
RULING:
No.
Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest
Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law.
Forum non conveniens literally translates to “the forum is inconvenient.” It is
a concept in private international law and was devised to combat the “less than
honorable” reasons and excuses that litigants use to secure advantages, annoy, and
harass defendants, avoid overcrowded dockets, and select a “friendlier” venue.
Thus, the doctrine of forum non conveniens addresses the same rationale that the
rule against forum shopping does, albeit on a multijurisdictional scale

213
 Decisions would show that the matter of jurisdiction rests on the sound
discretion of a court. Neither the mere invocation of forum non conveniens nor the
averment of foreign elements operates to automatically divest a court of
jurisdiction. Rather, a court should renounce jurisdiction only after vital facts are
established to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance. As the propriety of applying forum non conveniens is contingent on a
factual determination, it is, therefore, a matter of defenses.
The second sentence of Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is exclusive in its recital of the grounds for dismissal that are exempt
from the omnibus motion rule: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2)
litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription. Dismissal on account of forum
non conveniens is a fundamentally discretionary matter. It is, therefore, not a matter
for a defendant to foist upon the court a his or her own convenience; rather, it must
be pleaded at the earliest possible opportunity. In pleading such, the rule is: Forum
non conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be
pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.
All told, the considerations for the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Philippine tribunals have been satisfied. First, all the parties are based in the
Philippines and all the material incidents transpired in this jurisdiction. Thus, the
parties may conveniently seek relief from Philippine tribunals. Second, Philippine
tribunals are in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts. Third, Philippine tribunals are in a position to enforce their decisions.
Therefore, there is no compelling basis for ceding jurisdiction to a foreign
tribunal. Quite the contrary, the immense public policy considerations attendant
to the case behoove Philippine tribunals to not shy away from their duty to rule
on the case.
EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC did not amend Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure but retained the non-waivable defenses that the court may use to
motu proprio dismiss a complaint. Forum non conveniens is not one of those, hence,
it must be properly pleaded and proved to obtain a dismissal of the case, if
necessary.

214
 Capablanca v. Heirs of Bas
G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017

FACTS:

A sale of real property was made between Pedro Bas (Pedro) and Faustina
Manreal (Faustina), from which followed a series of transfer transactions that
culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto Bas (Norberto). When Norberto
died, he was succeeded by his only heir, Lolita Bas (Lolita). Upon learning that a
TCT was issued in the names of Pedro’s heirs, Lolita sought to nullify the same so
that she can register the real property in her name. In their Answer, the heirs of
Pedro only raised the argument that Pedro could not have made the sale for being
illiterate thereby making the sale a spurious one.

The RTC dismissed the case but was subsequently reversed by the CA on
the ground that Lolita has no cause of action as there must first be a judicial
declaration of heirship issued in her favor. The ground of lack of cause of action
was not raised by the defendant during trial in the lower court.

ISSUE:

Is the dismissal by the Court of Appeals on the ground of lack of cause

of action on Lolita’s part proper considering that it was never raised by
defendants?

RULING:

No, the dismissal is not proper. Respondents never raised their objection to
petitioner's capacity to sue either as an affirmative defense or in a motion to
dismiss. Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states that defenses and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.

Thus, it was erroneous for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that there was no prior judicial declaration of petitioner's heirship
to Norberto.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in Capablanca v. Heirs of Bas (G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017) is not
affected by A.M. 19-10-20 SC. Section 1 of Rule 9 under both the old and new
rules is the same. The provision under the old rules was also not renumbered
under the new rules

215
 Taar v. Lawan
G.R. No. 190922, October 11, 2017

FACTS:

Narcisa, Alipio, Fortunata, and Pantaleon inherited two (2) tracts of land.
Narcisa sold her share to the Adaoag Spouses and to the Gragasin Spouses. Later,
Pantaleon, Alipio, Fortunata, the Adaoag Spouses, and the Gragasin Spouses
executed an agreement to partition the second parcel of land, which was approved
in a decision by the CFI.

Herein petitioners, successors-in-interest of Pantaleon, Alipio, and

Fortunata, prepared a subdivision plan and applied for free patents over the
property. The respondents in turn filed a verified protest alleging that their
predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, physical, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land since 1948. Petitioners countered that
respondents occupied the property as tenants.

In his Order, DENR Director Sibbaluca found that the respondents were the
actual occupants of the property, cancelling the subdivision plan, and denying
petitioners' free patent applications. Neither of the parties filed an appeal or
moved for reconsideration, hence, the decision attained its finality. Free patents
were issued to respondents.

Petitioners filed before the Secretary of the DENR a Petition to Annul

Director Sibbaluca's Order. In a decision by then Secretary Reyes of the DENR, the
free patents and the certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents were
cancelled. On appeal, the OP, through Executive Secretary Ermita, reversed
Secretary Reyes' Decision and reinstated Director Sibbaluca's Order. The OP held
that Secretary Reyes erred in reversing Director Sibbaluca’s Order as it had already
attained finality. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their Motion was
denied.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed
the petition for certiorari outright for being an inappropriate remedy. Hence, this
petition. Petitioners insist that their predecessors-in-interest were declared ipso
jure owners of the property by the CFI. Therefore, the principle of res judicata bars
private respondents from asserting title to the property. On the other hand, private
respondents contend that they are not bound by the Decision of the CFI. They
assert that the principle of res judicata does not apply because there is no identity
of parties and subject matter. Respondents insist that petitioners are bound by
Director Sibbaluca's Order, which had already attained finality.

216
ISSUE:

Does the CFI Decision bar the respondents from applying for free patents
over the property?

RULING:

No, the respondents are not barred for applying free patents. The rule on
res judicata states that a final judgment or decree rendered on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies, in all other subsequent actions or suits and on all points and matters
determined in the first suit. Parties invoking the application of res judicata must
establish the following elements: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.In this case,
only the first three elements of res judicata are present. There is no identity or
substantial identity of parties and identity of subject matter between the CFI
decision and private respondents' free patent applications. The CFI decision
involved an agreement between petitioners' predecessors-in-interest and the
respondents were not parties to the agreement. It was not shown that
respondents or their predecessors-in-interest shared a common interest with any
of the parties to the agreement.However, assuming that there is identity or
substantial identity of parties, there is no identity of subject matter between the
CFI decision and private respondents' free patent applications. Although both
relate to the same property, the CFI decision was simply an agreement
partitioning the bigger parcel of land, which embraced the smaller portion
claimed by petitioners and private respondents. On the other hand, private
respondents' free patent applications involved the establishment of their rights
as the purported occupants and cultivators of the property.

Hence, the principle of res judicata does not apply.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Taar v. Lawan (G.R. No. 190922, 11 October 2017) is
not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. Both old and new Rules embody the same
principle of res judicata.

217
Section 3 - Default; declaration of

Spouses Manuel v. Ong

G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014
FACTS:

Respondent Ramon Ong filed an accion reivindicatoria case against

petitioners Benedict and Sandra Manuel. The petitioners failed to file their
answers; hence, they were declared on default. Following this, Ong moved for the
ex parte presentation of evidence, which the Regional Trial Court granted. Upon
knowledge thereof, petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of default claiming
that there was no proper service of summons. The service was not made in their
formal address. The spouses claimed that it is the siblings of petitioner Sandra
Manuel who resided in Lower Bacong, Itogon, Benguet, while they resided in
Ambiong, La Trinidad, Benguet. They surmised that the sheriff Sales and his
companions mistook petitioner’s siblings as the defendants in the case. They
further alleged that they only subsequently received via registered mail copies of
a compliance and manifestation filed by Ong and the Regional Trial Court's order
scheduling the ex parte presentation of evidence.

In defense, respondent claimed that there was proper service of summons

as stated in the sheriff’s return. Based on the return, the first attempt to serve the
summons was made in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet. The Spouses
Manuel, however, requested that service be made at another time considering that
petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother was then critically ill. A month later, the sheriff
attempted another personal service. After the sheriff personally explained to
petitioner Sandra Manuel the content of the summons and the complaint, the latter
refused to sign and receive the documents. Thus, the sheriff tendered them to
petitioner Sandra Manuel and advise her to file their answer within fifteen days.

ISSUE:

Are the petitioners entitled to relief from order of default?

RULING:

No, petitioners are not entitled to the relief sought because their motion to
lift the order of default is pro forma. According to Montinola, Jr. v. Republic Planters
Bank, the three requisites that must be satisfied by a motion in order to warrant the
setting aside of an order of default for failure to file answer, are:
(1) it must be made by motion under oath by one that has knowledge of the facts;

218
(2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence; and
(3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of a meritorious defense.

In this case, the CA noted that petitioner’s motion to lift order of default
was not made under oath and it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit
specifying the facts which would show that their non-filing of an answer within
fifteen days period was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
For, failing both in making their motion under oath and in attaching an affidavit of
merits, the Spouses Manuel's motion to lift order of default must be deemed pro-
forma. It is not even worthy of consideration.

The exception that an affidavit of merit is not necessary where a motion to

lift an order of default is grounded on the very root of the proceedings, such as
where the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the defendants, does not apply
in this case since the motion itself was not under oath.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of SPOUSES BENEDICT AND SANDRA MANUEL

v. RAMON ONG is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. Section 5 of Rule 14 of the
new rule only explained what tendering is or how it is done.

219
 Lui Enterprises, Inc. vs. Zuellig Pharma Corporation
G.R. No. 193494; March 12, 2014

FACTS:

Lui Enterprises, Inc. (Lui) and Zuellig Pharma Corp. (Zuellig) entered into
a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel of land located in Davao City in 1995. In
2003, Zuellig received a letter from Philippine Bank of Communication (PBCom).
Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig to
pay directly to it. Zuellig promptly informed Lui of the claim of PBCom but Lui
insisted on its right to collect the rent on the leased property.

Due to the conflicting claims of Lui and PBCom over the rental payments,
Zuellig filed a complaint for interpleader before the RTC-Makati. Zuellig prayed
that Lui and PBCom be ordered to litigate their conflicting claims. Lui filed a
motion to dismiss. Zuellig filed its Opposition to the motion to dismiss arguing
that the motion to dismiss should be denied for having been filed late since
summons was served on Lui on July 4, 2003. Thus, it had until July 19, 2003 to file
the motion to dismiss. Lui however filed the motion on July 23, 2003.

The RTC-Makati found that Lui failed to file its motion to dismiss within
the reglementary period. Thus, the trial court declared Lui in default. One year
after the issuance of order of default, Lui filed a motion to set aside order of default
on the ground of excusable negligence. Lui argued that its failure to file a motion
to dismiss on time was caused by the negligence of Lui’s former counsel.

ISSUE:

Should the motion to set aside order of default be granted on the ground
of excusable negligence of Lui’s counsel to file the motion to dismiss within the
reglementary period?

RULING:

No.

When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he

or she is required to answer within 15 days from the day he or she was served with
summons. The defendant may also move to dismiss the complaint within the time
for but before filing the answer. Fifteen days is sufficient time for a defendant to
answer with good defenses against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint.
Thus, a defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from service of summons

220
either presents no defenses against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint or
was prevented from filing his or her answer within the required period due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.

After notice of the declaration of default but before the court renders the
default judgment, the defendant may file, under oath, a motion to set aside order
of default. The defendant must properly show that his or her failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Excusable negligence is
“one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.”

In this case, we find that Lui’s failure to answer within the required period
is inexcusable. Lui’s counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not
immediately take steps to remedy its default and took one year from discovery to
file a motion to set aside order of default. In its motion to set aside order of default,
Lui only conveniently blamed its counsel without offering any excuse for the late
filing. This is not excusable negligence.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC has an effect on the ruling. Under A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC, the period to file an Answer is now increased from 15 days to 30 calendar days
after service of summons. Thus, with the amended provision, Lui would not have
been in default considering he filed his motion 19 days after service of summons.

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 RULE 10
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

Section 7 - Filing of amended pleadings.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 195295, October 5, 2016

FACTS:

The Marcos children are the registered owners of a parcel of land in

Cabuyao, Laguna (Cabuyao property). When EO No. 14 took effect, the PCGG,
acting for petitioner, filed a complaint against private respondents, spouses
Marcos and their children, in order to recover all properties illegally acquired by
them during their incumbency as public officers. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
notice of lis pendens over the Cabuyao property. Private respondents moved for
the cancellation of the notice on the ground that the Cabuyao property is not
among the properties being sought to be recovered in the complaint. Petitioner
then filed a motion for leave to admit an amended complaint, which is identical to
the previously admitted complaint, attaching therewith an amended list of
properties sought to be recovered, which now specifically includes the Cabuyao
property and is accordingly underscored therein. However, the Sandiganbayan
denied its admission simply on the ground that petitioner failed to indicate the
amendments in the complaint with proper markings. As a result of said denial, the
notice of lis pendens over the Cabuyao property was cancelled because petitioner
has no actionable right over the subject property that need to be protected as the
same is not involved in the instant case.

ISSUE:

Is the denial of the motion for leave to admit the amended complaint
proper?

RULING:

No, the denial of the motion for leave to admit the amended complaint is
not proper.

Sec. 7, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that when any pleading
is amended, a new copy of the entire pleading, incorporating the amendments,
which shall be indicated by appropriate marks, shall be filed. This procedural rule,
which requires that amendments to a pleading be indicated with appropriate

222
marks, has for its purpose the convenience of the Court and the parties but failure
to use the appropriate markings for the deletions and intercalations will not affect
any substantive right and its absence cannot cause the denial of any substantive
right. On the other hand, Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that
in an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the
plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may
record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property
is situated notice of the pendency of the action. The notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for
the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect
the rights of the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.

In this case, Sandiganbayan denied the admission of the amended

complaint simply on the ground of failure to comply with Sec. 7, Rule 10. This
displays an utter lack of understanding of the function of this procedural rule.
Moreover, petitioner did not fail to comply with Rule 10, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court. There were no portions in the body of the amended complaint itself that
needed to be underscored or marked, considering that the text was identical to the
text of the admitted complaint. The list of assets attached reveals that it was
amended to include the Cabuyao property. That entry was underscored to reflect
the amendment. The amended complaint should have been admitted had the
Sandiganbayan simply read the proposed amendments correctly. Consequently,
there should have been no more need to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the
Cabuyao property because the same is now considered the subject of litigation in
accordance with Sec. 14, Rule 13.

Thus, the denial of the motion for leave to admit the amended complaint is
improper because the amended petition was properly marked with the
amendments and even in its failure to do so, the failure to comply with the rule
does not affect any substantive rights.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

Sec. 7, Rule 10 is not affected by the New Rules. Whereas, Sec. 14, Rule 13 is now
designated as Sec. 19, Rule 13 in the New Rules, with amendments only for the
purpose of addressing gender sensitivity.

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 RULE 13
Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers

Section 2 - Filing and service, defined.

Mercedes S. Gatmaytan v. Francisco Dolor and Hermogena Dolor

G.R. No. 198120, February 20, 2017

FACTS:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, praying that the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA), Sixth Division, be reversed and set aside and that the CA
be directed to resolve petitioner Mercedes S. Gatmaytan's appeal on the merits.

The RTC’s Decision resolved an action for reconveyance against Gatmaytan

and in favor of the plaintiff spouses, now respondents Francisco and Hermogena
Dolor. Gatmaytan insists that the RTC’s March 27, 2006 Decision has not attained
finality as the April 14, 2006 service was made to her counsel's former address (at
No. 117 West Avenue, Quezon City) as opposed to the address (at Unit 602, No.
42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City) that her counsel
indicated in a June 8, 2004 Notice of Change of Address filed with the RTC
Gatmaytan adds that the RTC noted the change of address in an Order of the same
date, and directed that, from then on, service of papers, pleadings, and processes
was to be made at her counsel's updated address at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun
Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City.

In its assailed Decision, the CA dismissed Gatmaytan's appeal, noting that

the assailed Decision of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 223, had
already attained finality. In its assailed Resolution, the CA denied Gatmaytan's
Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Was service to Gatmaytan’s counsel at the updated address completed?

RULING:

Yes, service to Gatmaytan’s counsel’s updated address was completed.

When a party is represented and has appeared by counsel, service shall, as

a rule, be made upon his or her counsel. As Rule 13, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of

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Civil Procedure provides: Section 2. Filing and Service, Defined. — xxx Service is
the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. If any
party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel
or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.
Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy
of any paper served upon him by the opposite side.

In Delos Santos v. Elizalde, the Court explained the reason for equating
service upon counsels with service upon the parties themselves: To reiterate,
service upon the parties' counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the
parties themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not considered
service upon their lawyers. The reason is simple—the parties, generally, have no
formal education or knowledge of the rules of procedure, specifically, the
mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal remedies; thus, they may also be
unaware of the rights and duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of a decision.
More importantly, it is best for the courts to deal only with one person in the
interest of orderly procedure—either the lawyer retained by the party or the party
him/herself if s/he does not intend to hire a lawyer.

Rule 13, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three (3)
modes of service of judgments or final orders: first, personal service; second,
service by registered mail; and third, service by publication. On the other
hand, Rule 13, Section 10 specifies when the first two (2) modes - personal service
and service by registered mail - are deemed completed, and notice upon a party is
deemed consummated: Section 10. Completeness of Service. — Personal service is
complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the
expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides.
Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or
after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster,
whichever date is earlier.

The Court sustains petitioner's position that the service made on her
counsel's former address was ineffectual. The Court finds however, that petitioner
failed to discharge her burden of proving the specific date - allegedly June 1, 2006
- in which service upon her counsel's updated address was actually made. Having
failed to establish the reckoning point of the period for filing her Motion for
Reconsideration, the Court cannot sustain the conclusion that petitioner insists on,
and which is merely contingent on this reckoning point: the Court cannot conclude
that her Motion for Reconsideration was timely filed. Having failed to discharge
her burden of proof, the Court is constrained to deny her Petition.

225
 The Court says that the petitioner is correct in saying that the 15-day period
must be reckoned from the date when service was made at the updated address.
To hold otherwise would be to condone a glaring violation of her right to due
process. It is to say that she might as well not be given notice of the Decision
rendered by the RTC. In this respect, the Court sustains petitioner. The Court,
however, finds itself unable to sustain her claim that the 15-day period must be
reckoned from June 1, 2006.

As basic as the previously-discussed principles on appeal as a statutory

privilege, finality of judgments, and service of papers, is the principle that "a party
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it." A mere allegation will never
suffice: "a mere allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of
proving the allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence." Logically, a party
who fails to discharge his or her burden of proof will not be entitled to the relief
prayed for.

This court's grant of relief to petitioner is contingent on her ability to prove

two (2) points: first, that the RTC was bound to make service at her counsel's
updated address; and second, that service at this address was made on June 1,
2006, and not on an earlier date. While petitioner has successfully shown that
service to her counsel's former address was ineffectual, she failed to prove that
service on her counsel's updated address was made only on June 1, 2006.

In Cortes v. Valdellon, the Court noted the following as acceptable proofs of

mailing and service by a court to a party: (1) certifications from the official Post
Office record book and/or delivery book; (2) the actual page of the postal delivery
book showing the acknowledgment of receipt; (3) registry receipt; and (4) return
card.

Petitioner could have produced any of these documents or other similar

proof to establish her claim. She did not. All she has relied on is her bare allegation
that delivery was made on June 1, 2006. It is as though belief in this allegation
necessarily follows from believing her initial claim that service to her counsel's
former address was ineffectual.

Lacking evidentiary basis, petitioner's contention that service upon her

counsel's updated and correct address was made only on June 1, 2006 cannot be
sustained. As her plea for relief hinges on this singular detail, we are constrained
to deny such. Bereft of any avenue for revisiting the RTC’s March 27, 2006
Decision, its findings and ruling must stand.

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 EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Mercedes S. Gatmaytan v. Francisco Dolor and

Hermogena Dolor (G.R. No. 198120, February 20, 2017) is not affected by A.M.
19-10-20-SC. Section 9, Rule 13 of the new rules, which provides that “services by
electronic means and facsimile shall be made if the party concerned consents to
such modes of service,” merely adds other manners of serving judgment, final
orders or resolutions. Section 10, Rule 13 of the new rules provides that “service
is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or or any other court
submission. If a party has appeared by counsel, service upon such party shall be
made upon his or her counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party and
the party’s counsel is ordered by the court,” Hence, if a party appears by counsel
service shall be made upon counsel, unless the court orders service upon both
the counsel and the party. In addition, the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 13 is
a new insertion. It provides for instances when a party is represented by several
counsels. Service upon one of them, the designated lead counsel or any one of
the is there is no designation, is sufficient.

227
 Bracero v. Arcelo
G.R. No. 212496, March 18, 2015

FACTS:

Nestor Bracero was the defendant in a complaint for quieting of

title/ownership, recovery of possession with damages filed by the heirs of
Victoriano Monisit. Bracero was declared in default for failure to file an answer.
The trial court ruled in favor of the heirs and served Bracero with a copy of the
Decision on May 4, 2009. The period to appeal lapsed and the heirs filed a motion
for execution. The Writ of Execution was issued on October 7, 2009 without
opposition. On January 8, 2010, Bracero received the Notice to Vacate on
Execution. On the same day, his counsel filed the Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ
on the ground that counsel was not furnished a copy of the Decision. This was
denied by the RTC, and on appeal, the denial was affirmed by the CA who found
that petitioner’s counsel was furnished a copy of the motion for execution.

Petitioner’s counsel, among others, alleged that he could not have filed an
opposition since petitioner was declared in default and had lost standing to file
any motion. He also could not have appealed the RTC Decision since he was not
furnished with its copy.

ISSUE:

Is counsel’s receipt of the motion for execution effective as official notice of

the previous decision that he was not furnished with?

RULING:

Yes, counsel’s receipt of a motion for execution is effective as official notice.

Rule 13, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states in part that if any party has appeared
by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them,
unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Notice sent directly
to client is not notice in law. Nevertheless, this rule admits of exceptions.

It has been held that “relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was
due to his own negligence.” In this case, petitioner, through his counsel, did not
file an answer to the Complaint. After the trial court declared petitioner in default
for failure to file an answer, his counsel did not file an opposition to or motion to
lift the Order declaring him in default. After petitioner’s counsel was furnished a

228
copy of the motion for execution, he did not immediately file an opposition to the
motion or raise the ground that he was not furnished a copy of the Decision.

Jurisprudence reiterates that ‘litigants who are represented by counsel

should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome
of their cases.” Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights, and
a party should periodically keep in touch with his counsel, check with the court,
and inquire about the status of the case. Hence, petitioner is estopped from
claiming lack of notice.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Bracero v. Arcelo (G.R. No. 212496, March 18, 2015)
is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC, although there were changes made to the
provision. Under the New Rules of the same section number, if a party appears by
counsel, service shall be made upon the counsel, unless the court orders service
upon both the counsel and the party. Previously, the unless clause only provided
“unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court”. The New Rules
have no effect on this ruling, estoppel being a concept that affects the substantial
rights of the parties and can be used to defeat technicalities.

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Section 9 - Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions.

Republic of the Philippines v. Benjohn Fetalvero

G.R. No. 198008, February 04, 2019

FACTS:

Benjohn Fetalvero owned a 2,787-square meter parcel of land in Iligan City,

Lanao del Norte. In 1999, the DPWH, Region X took 569 square meters from
Fetalvero's property to be used in its flood control project. Despite negotiations,
the parties failed to agree on the amount of just compensation.

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the OSG, filed before
the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for expropriation against Fetalvero.
Subsequently, the OSG sent a letter to Atty. Earnest Anthony L. Lorea (Atty.
Lorea), the Legal Staff Chief of the DPWH, Region X. In its letter, the OSG
deputized Atty. Lorea to assist it in the case. Also, the OSG entered its appearance
as counsel for the Republic, and informed the trial court that it authorized Atty.
Lorea to appear on its behalf. It emphasized that since it "retained supervision and
control of the representation in the case and had to approve withdrawal of the
case, non-appeal, or other actions which appear to compromise the interest of the
Government, only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will
bind the Republic."

On June 27, 2008, the trial court issued an Order and referred the case to the
Philippine Mediation Center for mediation. On September 1, 2008, Atty. Lorea and
Fetalvero entered into a Compromise Agreement, wherein they agreed that,
among others, the price per square meter is PHP 9,500.00 per square meter or a
total of PHP 13,566,000.00 which latter is the amount to be paid in full by the
plaintiff to the defendant not later than September, 2009. The trial court issued an
Order approving the Compromise Agreement. On November 6, 2008, the Republic
received a copy of the Order.

In a letter, Jaime A. Pacanan, Assistant Secretary and Central Right of Way

Committee Chair of the DPWH, Manila, requested advice from the OSG regarding
the Compromise Agreement's legality. The OSG replied that the government
cannot be bound by the Compromise Agreement since it was not submitted to its
office for review, which is a condition under the deputation letter and the Notice
of Appearance.

Meanwhile, Fetalvero filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Order for a Writ
of Garnishment for the satisfaction of the trial court's Order approving the

230
compromise. The Republic opposed the Motion. The trial court granted Fetalvero's
Motion. The trial court further held that since the OSG received a copy of the trial
court's Order, the judgment was valid and binding on the Republic. Further,
government funds in official depositaries remain government funds only if there
was no appropriation by law. The trial court found that funds were already
appropriated "for payment of the road-rights-of-way." Hence, Fetalvero's Motion
should be granted. The Republic moved for reconsideration, but its Motion was
denied by the trial court.

The Republic filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. The
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, denying the Petition for lack of merit. It
found that the OSG received a copy of the trial court's Order, but did not file any
pleading or action to assail it. Hence, the Republic, through the OSG, filed before
this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari against Fetalvero.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Compromise Agreement is void for not having being
submitted to the OSG for review

RULING:

No.

When Atty. Lorea entered into mediation, he only did so on behalf of the
principal counsel, the Solicitor General. Mediation necessarily involves bargaining
of the parties' interests, and a compromise agreement is one of its consequences.
Under the reservation in the Notice of Appearance, Atty. Lorea must submit the
resulting Compromise Agreement to then Solicitor General for review and
approval, especially since the amount respondent claims is significantly larger
than what he was allegedly only entitled to get. Without the Solicitor General's
positive action on the Compromise Agreement, it cannot be given any effect and
cannot bind the Solicitor General's client, the government.

OSG's deputized counsel is "no more than the 'surrogate' of the Solicitor General
in any particular proceeding" and the latter remains the principal counsel entitled
to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and decisions. The appearance
of the deputized counsel did not divest the OSG of control over the case and did
not make the deputized special attorney the counsel of record.

The underlying justification for compelling service of pleadings, orders,

notices and decisions on the OSG as principal counsel is one and the same. As the

231
lawyer for the government or the government corporation involved, the OSG is
entitled to the service of said pleadings and decisions, whether the case is before
the courts or before a quasi-judicial agency such as respondent commission.

Nonetheless, despite the lack of the Solicitor General's approval, this Court
holds that the government is still bound by the Compromise Agreement due to
laches. The Solicitor General is assumed to have known of the Compromise
Agreement since, as principal counsel, she was furnished a copy of the trial Order,
which referred the case to mediation. Even if she did not know that Atty. Lorea
signed a Compromise Agreement, she was later informed of it through the copy
of the trial court's Order, which approved the Compromise Agreement. The
Solicitor General received the Order; yet, she filed no appeal or motion to contest
the Order or the Compromise Agreement's validity.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

With the amendment, the service of pleadings and other motions, notices,
orders, judgments, and other court submissions may be made personally, by
registered mail, accredited courier, electronic mail, facsimile transmission and
other electronic means as authorized by court or as provided for in the
international conventions to which the Philippines is a party.

The amendment adds that personal service may be done to the authorized
representative of the party or the party’s counsel, but the authorized
representative must be named in the appropriate pleading or motion. If the
manner of service is by electronic means and facsimile, then such may only be
done if the party concerned consents to such mode of service.

Moreover, under the amended Section 10 of A.M. 19-10-20-SC, there is a

presumption that a party was given notice of a court setting if such notice appears
on the records to have been mailed at least 20 calendar days prior to the scheduled
date of hearing and if the addressee is from within the same judicial region of the
court where the case is pending, or at least 30 calendar days if the addressee is
from outside the judicial region, subject to proof to the contrary.

For judgments and final orders, service is done personally or by registered

mail. There is a new addition the service may be done by accredited courier upon
ex parte motion of any party, and said movant party shall bear the expense for the
same.

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 RULE 14
Summons

Section 6 - Service in person on defendant

Spouses Manuel v. Ong

G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent Ramon Ong filed an accion reivindicatoria case against

petitioners Benedict and Sandra Manuel. The petitioners failed to file their
answers; hence, they were declared on default. Following this, Ong moved for the
ex parte presentation of evidence, which the Regional Trial Court granted. Upon
knowledge thereof, petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of default claiming
that there was no proper service of summons. The service was not made in their
formal address. The spouses claimed that it is the siblings of petitioner Sandra
Manuel who resided in Lower Bacong, Itogon, Benguet, while they resided in
Ambiong, La Trinidad, Benguet. They surmised that the sheriff Sales and his
companions mistook the petitioner's siblings as the defendants in the case. They
further alleged that they only subsequently received via registered mail copies of
a compliance and manifestation filed by Ong and the Regional Trial Court's order
scheduling the ex parte presentation of evidence.

In defense, the respondent claimed that there was proper service of

summons as stated in the sheriff’s return. Based on the return, the first attempt to
serve the summons was made in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet. The
Spouses Manuel, however, requested that service be made at another time
considering that petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother was then critically ill. A month
later, the sheriff attempted another personal service. After the sheriff personally
explained to petitioner Sandra Manuel the content of the summons and the
complaint, the latter refused to sign and receive the documents. Thus, the sheriff
tendered them to petitioner Sandra Manuel and advise her to file their answer
within fifteen days.

ISSUE:

Was the jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners validly acquired?

RULING:

233
 Yes, jurisdiction over the persons of both petitioners was validly acquired
because of the personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra
Manuel, made by the sheriff. Under Rule 14, section 6 of the 1997 Rules of
Procedure, tendering summons is itself a means of personal service. The Rules are
clear in what it requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit
tender is sufficient should the defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is
determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of the
defendant, not the locus of service. Personal service of summons has nothing to do
with the location where summons is served. A defendant's address is
inconsequential. Thus, Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed
variance of address.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of SPOUSES BENEDICT AND SANDRA MANUEL v.

RAMON ONG is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. Section 5 of Rule 14 of the
new rule only explained what tendering is or how it is done.

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Section 7 - Substituted service.

Pavlow v. Mendenilla
G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017

FACTS:

On March 11, 2005, petitioner Pavlow, an American citizen and President

of Quality Long Term Care of Nevada, Inc., married Maria Sheila, a Filipino, in
civil rites in Quezon City. Thereafter, they cohabited as husband and wife.

Barely three (3) months into their marriage, on May 31, 2005, Maria Sheila
filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Pavlow for slight physical injuries. On June 3,
2005, Maria Sheila filed an Amended Complaint-Affidavit to include 15

maltreatment in relation to the Anti-VAWC Law as a ground.

Mendenilla, Maria Sheila’s mother, filed with the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court a Petition for Maria Sheila's benefit, praying for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order or Permanent Protection Order under the Anti-
VAWC Law.

Judge Giron-Dizon issued a Temporary Protection Order in favor of Maria

Sheila. Issued along with this Order was a Summons addressed to Pavlow. Deputy
Sheriff Arturo M. Velasco (Deputy Sheriff Velasco) recounted that when service of
summons with the Temporary Protection Order attached was attempted on
September 7, 2005, Pavlow was out of the country. Thus, summons was served
instead through his employee, Tolentino, who also resided at Pavlow's own
residence in Unit 1503, Grand Tower Condominium, 150 L.P. Leviste St., Makati
City.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the issuance of the Temporary

Protection Order, and the suspension of the enforcement of the Temporary
Protection Order and raised as principal ground the Regional Trial Court's
supposed lack of jurisdiction over his person as summons was purportedly not
properly served on him.

ISSUE:

Was the summons properly served to the petitioner?

RULING:

235
 Yes.

Jurisprudence has long settled that, with respect to residents temporarily

out of the Philippines, the availability of extraterritorial services does not preclude
substituted service. Resort to substituted service has long been held to be fair,
reasonable and just. This Court has noted that a contrary, restrictive view is that
which defeats the ends of justice. It has been emphasized that residents who
temporarily leave their residence are responsible for ensuring that their affairs are
in order, and that, upon their return, they shall attend to exigencies that may have
arisen.

Section 1 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly states that while it governs

petitions for the issuance of protection orders under the Anti-VAWC Law, "[t]he
Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily." In the silence of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC,
service of summons - the means established by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
for informing defendants and/or respondents of the filing of adverse actions, and
for the acquisition of jurisdiction over their persons - remains efficacious.

If personal service is impracticable within a reasonable time, substituted

service may be resorted to in lieu of personal service. Rule 14, Section 7 states:
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office
or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in Pavlow v. Mendenilla (G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017) is affected
by A.M. NO. 19-10-20-SC. Under the new rules, substituted service is now under
Section 6, Rule 14. Although substantially similar, the new rules added a definition
of a competent person, which includes, but is not limited to one who customarily
receives correspondences for the defendant. In addition, the new rules added two
(2) more modes by which substituted service may be effected, as follows: (1) by
leaving copies of the summons, if refused entry upon making his or her authority
and purpose known, with any of the officers of the homeowners’ association or
condominium corporation, or its chief security officer in charge of the community
or building where the defendant may be found, or (2) by sending an electronic
mail to the defendant’s electronic mail address, if allowed by the court.

236
 People General Insurance Corp v. Guansing
G.R. No. 204759, November 14, 2018

FACTS:

On February 4, 2006 Lizaso, Guansing's employee, was driving Guansing's

truck, when he hit the rear portion of Yokohama Isuzu Crosswind. The strong
impact caused the Isuzu Crosswind to hit other vehicles, rendering it beyond
repair. Yokohama's Isuzu Crosswind was insured with People's General Insurance
Corporation. Yokohama filed a total loss claim under her insurance policy, which
paid the full amount of P907,800.00 as settlement. Thus, PGIC claimed to have
been subrogated to all the rights and interests of Yokohama against Guansing.

PGIC sought reimbursement of the total amount paid to Yokohama from

Guansing. Despite repeated demands, Guansing failed to reimburse the amount
claimed, prompting PGIC to file a complaint for a sum of money and damages
against Guansing and Lizaso. The sheriff served the summons on Guansing's
brother, Reynaldo Guansing. The sheriff's return did not explain why summons
was served on his brother instead of Guansing.

Guansing filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction

over his person alleging that he did not personally receive the summons. People's
General Insurance Corporation argued that summons was properly served since
substituted service was an alternative mode of service. The RTC denied the Motion
to Dismiss for lack of merit. Guansing filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was also denied.

On January 28, 2007, Guansing filed a one (1)-page Answer containing a

general denial of the material allegations and causes of action in PGIC's
Complaint. He also reiterated that the RTC had no jurisdiction over his person.
PGIC filed a Motion to Render Judgment on the Pleadings, which was granted by
the RTC. The RTC ruled against Guansing, and ordered him to pay PGIC the
remaining cost of the Crosswind, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

The Trial Court denied Guansing’s Motion for Reconsideration. On appeal,

the CA ruled in favor of Guansing and remanded the case to the RTC. The CA held
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over him because summons was
improperly served on his brother. Moreover, the sheriff did not provide an
explanation on why the summons was not personally served upon him.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by PGIC.

ISSUES:

237
 (1) Did the Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent Edgardo Guansing through service of summons;

(2) Is Edgardo Guansing, in filing his Answer and other subsequent pleadings,
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.

RULING:

(1) No. As a general rule, personal service is the preferred mode of service of
summons. Substituted service is the exception to this general rule. Failure
to serve summons means that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant.

Courts may allow substituted service based on what the sheriff’s return
contains.

For the sheriff to avail of substituted service, they must strictly comply with
the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules
which are laid down in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals:

1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service - The party relying on

substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot
be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service.

2) Specific Details in the Return - The sheriff must describe in the

Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant
and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail
in the Return.

3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion – If the substituted service

will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should be left
with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein."
A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the
age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have
enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons.

4) A Competent Person in Charge - If the substituted service will be

done at defendant's office or regular place of business, then it should
be served on a competent person in charge of the place.

In this case, the basis for resorting to substituted service on respondent

Guansing's brother is not provided for in the Sheriffs Return.

238
 The Sheriffs Return also did not contain a specific narration of the serious
efforts to attempt to serve the summons on the person of respondent
Guansing.

Although Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Rules of Court provides that there
is a disputable presumption that "official duty has been regularly
performed," in this case, presumption of regularity does not apply.

To enjoy the presumption of regularity, a sheriffs return must contain: (1)

detailed circumstances surrounding the sheriffs attempt to serve the
summons on the defendant; and (2) the specifics showing impossibility of
service within a reasonable time.Based on these requirements, a sheriffs
return is merely pro forma.

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, this Court explained that the presumption of

regularity in the issuance of the sheriff's return does not apply to patently
defective returns. In the case at bar, the Sheriffs Return contained no
statement on the efforts or attempts made to personally serve the summons.
It was devoid of details regarding the service of summons. Thus, it was
defective.

In this case, the sheriff should have established the impossibility of prompt
personal service before he resorted to substituted service. Impossibility of
prompt personal service is established by a sheriffs failure to personally
serve the summons within a period of one (1) month. Within this period, he
or she must have had at least three (3) attempts, on two (2) different dates,
to personally serve the summons. Moreover, he or she must cite in the
sheriffs return why these attempts are unsuccessful.

Sheriffs are tasked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with
care, diligence, and promptness so as not to affect the speedy disposition of
justice. They are compelled to give their best efforts to accomplish personal
service of summons on a defendant. Based on the Sheriffs Return in this
case, the sheriff clearly failed to meet this requirement.

Thus, absent proper service of summons, the court cannot acquire

jurisdiction over the defendant unless there is voluntary appearance.

(2) YES. Generally, defendants voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction

when they participate in the proceedings despite improper service of
summons.

239
 By filing numerous pleadings, respondent Guansing has confirmed that
notice has been effected, and that he has been adequately notified of the
proceedings for him to sufficiently defend his interests. His filing of these
pleadings amounts to voluntary appearance. He is considered to have
submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction, which is equivalent to a valid
service of summons.

Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance

in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

In Navale et al. v. Court of Appeals et al.:

Defects of summons are cured by voluntary appearance and by the filing of

an answer to the complaint.

A defendant [cannot] be permitted to speculate upon the judgment of the

court by objecting to the court’s jurisdiction over its person if the judgment
is adverse to it, and acceding to jurisdiction over its person if and when the
judgment sustains its defense.

Any form of appearance in court by the defendant, his authorized agent or

attorney, is equivalent to service except where such appearance is precisely
to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.

The CA erred when it ruled that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
Guansing, moreso, when it remanded the case for further proceedings with
a directive for the proper service of summons. A decision remanding the
case for further proceedings serves no purpose if the court never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in the first place.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case was not affected by the new rules as such amendments are
similar to the jurisprudential guidelines provided in Manotoc v. CA. But there is
need to be informed on the changes on how personal service and substituted
service is effected and the change on their corresponding section in Rule 14.

240
Section 11 - Service upon domestic private juridical entity

Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative

G.R. No. 172204, July 2, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent cooperative caused the annotation of its adverse claim on the

certificates of title of the farmer-beneficiaries with whom it was negotiating. This
action was prompted by the act of petitioner corporation in entering into contract
to buy the agricultural properties of the same famer-beneficiaries during
negotiations with respondent. Contracts of sale were subsequently executed in
favor of petitioner and the TCTs issued in their name carried the respondent’s
annotation. Respondent’s vice president then sent two letters to petitioner
informing it of the former’s claim to the properties. Petitioner did not respond and
instead filed a consolidated petition for the cancellation of adverse claims on its
TCTs with the RTC Tagaytay. It served a copy of the petition by registered mail to
respondent’s official address at “Barangay Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna.” Because
the respondent could not be found at that address, petitioner allegedly attempted
to serve it personally to respondent but failed for the same reason. RTC then issued
an order declaring petitioner’s substituted service by registered mail to have been
effected and allowed it to present evidence ex parte. Upon learning of the case,
respondent filed a manifestation and motion alleging that it never received a copy
of the summons and petition. It also moved for a copy thereof to be sent to “No.
160, Narra Avenue, Looc, Calamba, Laguna” which the court allowed. This
notwithstanding, the RTC eventually granted the petition for the cancellation of
annotation. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the lower court for
respondent’s presentation of evidence. Petitioner argues that respondent was
sufficiently served with summons and a copy of its petition because it allegedly
sent these documents to the latter’s official address as registered with the
Cooperative Development Authority, in compliance with Article 51 of the
Cooperative Code mandating that all notices and communications shall be sent to
such address.

ISSUE:

Was the summons on the petition for cancellation of annotations of

adverse claims properly served on respondent cooperative?

RULING:

241
 No. Proper court procedures shall be determined by the Rules as
promulgated by this court. The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters
relating to cooperatives' activities as administered by the Cooperative
Development Authority. However, they are not procedural rules that will govern
court processes. Such provision requiring cooperatives to have an official address
to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot take the place of the
rules on summons under the Rules of Court concerning a court proceeding. This
is not to say that the notices cannot be sent to cooperatives in accordance with the
Cooperative Code. Notices may be sent to a cooperative's official address.
However, service of notices sent to such address in accordance with the
Cooperative Code may not be used as a defense for violations of procedures,
especially when such violation affects another party's rights. Section 11, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity.
It provides that summons may be served upon a juridical entity only through its
officers. The enumeration is exclusive and service upon persons other than those
enumerated officers is invalid. This provision of the rule does not limit service to
the officers' places of residence or offices. If summons may not be served upon
these persons personally at their residences or offices, summons may be served
upon any of the officers wherever they may be found. In this case, petitioner
served summons upon respondent by registered mail and, allegedly, by personal
service at the office address indicated in respondent's Certificate of Registration.
Summons was not served upon respondent's officers. It was also not published in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Respondent was, therefore, not validly served
with summons.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

This ruling in the case of Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (G.R. No. 172204, July 2, 2014) is affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the old rules has been renumbered to Section 12, Rule 14 of
the new rules. The amended provision is the same insofar as it provides to which
officers the service may be made but it added that service on them shall be
“wherever they may be found, or in their absence or unavailability, on their
secretaries.” If it cannot be made on the officers or their secretaries, then service
shall be effective “upon the person who customarily receives the correspondence
for the defendant at its principal office.” Additionally, the amended provision
adds that “in case the domestic juridical entity is under receivership or liquidation,
service of summons shall be made on the receiver or liquidator, as the case may
be.” Finally, the amended rule provides that “should there be a refusal on the part
of the persons above-mentioned to receive summons despite at least 3 attempts on
2 different dates, substituted service may already be made electronically, if
allowed by the court, as provided under Section 6, Rule 14” of the new rules.

242
Section 14 - Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are
unknown.

Aurora De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation

G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition seeks the review of CA decision denying petitioner De
Pedro’s action for annulment of RTC decision, which, in turn nullified her
certificate of title. This case originated from respondent Romasan’s complaint for
nullification of free patent and original certificates of title, filed against several
defendants, one of which is De Pedro. Thereafter, summons was issued by the
court, however, attempts to personally serve summons on De Pedro failed. The
officer’s return provides:
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th and 18th day of February, 1999, I have
served a copy of the summons with complaint and annexes dated January 29,
1999 issued by Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo
City upon defendants in the above-entitled case on the following:
1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO — Unserved for the reason that according to the
messenger of Post Office of Pasig there is no person in the said given address.
Romasan filed a motion to serve summons by publication which RTC
granted. The summons was published thrice in People’s Balita. The RTC further
granted Romasan’s motion to declare all defendants in default and to present
evidence ex parte. Thereafter, RTC issued an order on January 7, 2000 declaring as
nullity the titles and free patents issued to De Pedro.
On March 30, 2000, De Pedro filed a motion for new trial alleging that her
counsel received notice of the decision on March 16, 2000. De Pedro argued that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because of the improper and
defective service of summons. RTC denied the motion for new trial as it was filed
beyond the 15-day period within which to file the motion, thus, the decision
became final and executory.
De Pedro filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA alleging grave abuse
of discretion against the RTC. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the denial
of motion for new trial. The denial was affirmed by SC. Thereafter, on October 11,
2006, De Pedro filed before the CA a petition for annulment of the January 7, 2000
decision of RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The petition for annulment
of judgment was denied.

243
ISSUE:
Did the court properly acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant?
RULING:
No, the service of summons by publication was not valid, thus, the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of defendant.
The courts acquire jurisdiction over complainants or petitioners as soon as
they file their complaints or petitions. Over the persons of defendants or
respondents, courts acquire jurisdiction by a valid service of summons or through
their voluntary submission. Jurisdiction over the parties is required regardless of
the type of action — whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly.
Jurisdiction over the parties is required in actions in personam because they seek to
impose personal responsibility or liability upon a person. Courts need not acquire
jurisdiction over parties on this basis in in rem and quasi in rem actions. Actions in
rem or quasi in rem are not directed against the person based on his or her personal
liability. Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon
the whole world. Quasi in rem actions are actions involving the status of a property
over which a party has interest. Quasi in rem actions are not binding upon the
whole world. They affect only the interests of the particular parties. However, to
satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the parties in in rem
and quasi in rem actions is required.
Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be
notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests. Violation of due
process rights is a jurisdictional defect. Thus, in Montoya v. Varilla: “… Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.” Hence, regardless of the
nature of the action, proper service of summons is imperative. A decision rendered
without proper service of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction.
In this case, summons was served by publication. A look into the content of
the sheriff's return will determine if the circumstances warranted the deviation
from the rule preferring personal service of summons over other modes of service.
The sheriff's return must contain a narration of the circumstances showing efforts
to personally serve summons to the defendants or respondents and the
impossibility of personal service of summons. A sheriff's return enjoys the
presumption of regularity in its issuance if it contains (1) the details of the
circumstances surrounding the sheriff's attempt to serve the summons personally
upon the defendants or respondents; and (2) the particulars showing the
impossibility of serving the summons within reasonable time. It does not enjoy the

244
presumption of regularity if the return was merely pro forma. Failure to state the
facts and circumstances that rendered service of summons impossible renders
service of summons and the return ineffective. In that case, no substituted service
or service by publication can be valid.
In this case, the return shows no detail of the sheriff's efforts to serve the
summons personally upon petitioner. The summons was unserved only because
the post office messenger stated that there was no "Aurora N. De Pedro" in the
service address. The return did not show that the sheriff attempted to locate
petitioner's whereabouts. Moreover, it cannot be concluded based on the return
that personal service was rendered impossible under the circumstances or that
service could no longer be made within reasonable time. The lack of any
demonstration of effort on the part of the sheriff to serve the summons personally
upon petitioner is a deviation from this court's previous rulings that personal
service is the preferred mode of service, and that the sheriff must narrate in his or
her return the efforts made to effect personal service. Thus, the sheriff's return in
this case was defective. No substituted service or service by publication will be
allowed based on such defective return.
The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a
violation of due process rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional
defect. The case would have been dismissible had petitioner learned about the case
while trial was pending. At that time, a motion to dismiss would have been proper.
After the trial, the case would have been the proper subject of an action for
annulment of judgment.
EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC affected the rules with respect to the return. In the
1997 Rules of Procedure, the rule is found in Rule 14, Section 4. Under the amended
rules, it can be found in Section 21, Rule 14. The amended rule moreover, provides
for guidelines on what the return should contain in case substituted service of
substituted service. These are the following: (1) The impossibility of prompt
personal service within a period of thirty (30) calendar days from issue and
receipt of summons; (2) The date and time of the three (3) attempts on at least (2)
two different dates to cause personal service and the details of the inquiries made
to locate the defendant residing thereat; and (3) The name of the person at least
eighteen (18) years of age and of sufficient discretion residing thereat, name of
competent person in charge of the defendant’s office or regular place of business,
or name of the officer of the homeowners’ association or condominium
corporation or its chief security officer in charge of the community or building
where the defendant may be found.

245
Section 20 - Voluntary appearance

Sunrise Garden Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 158836, 158967, 160726 & 160778, September 30, 2015

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Barangay of Cupang in Antipolo City was to construct a

city road to connect Barangay Cupang and Marcos Highway. Sunrise Garden
Corporation (SUNRISE) was an affected landowner in such project. Through its
Chair of the Board of Directors, SUNRISE executed an Undertaking wherein it
would construct the city road at its own expense, subject to reimbursement
through tax credits. The city road project, thus, became a joint project of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo, Barangay Cupang, Barangay Mayamot,
and SUNRISE.SUNRISE's contractor began to position its construction equipment.
However, armed guards, allegedly hired by Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.,
(HARDROCK) prevented SUNRISE's contractor from using an access road to
move the construction equipment. SUNRISE then filed a Complaint for damages
with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
against HARDROCK. The trial court accordingly issued a temporary restraining
order. However, HARDROCK continued to block the movement of the
construction equipment prompting the trial court to issue a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

Meanwhile, informal settlers started to encroach on the area of the

proposed city road. SUNRISE, thus, filed a Motion and Manifestation praying for
the amendment of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction to include all persons or
group of persons from interfering with the construction of the city road, which the
trial court later on granted.Thereafter, armed guards of K-9 Security Agency (K9),
allegedly hired by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. (FARED), blocked
SUNRISE's contractor's employees and prevented them from proceeding with the
construction. A Motion to cite K9 in contempt was filed by SUNRISE. K9, joined
by FARED, opposed the Motion to cite them in contempt, raising the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over their persons, hence, they cannot be bound by the
Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction. SUNRISE, on the other hand, argues
that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over them because they voluntarily
appeared in court to argue why they should not be cited in contempt.

ISSUE:

Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over FARED?

246
RULING:

No, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over FARED.

While Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary
appearance is equivalent to service of summons, the same rule also provides that
"[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance." In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi, et
al., this court discussed that voluntary appearance in court may not always result
in submission to the jurisdiction of a court. Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the
defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes
exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general
proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion
to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance,
such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the
court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its
authority. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that special appearance
operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance. Accordingly,
objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be
explicitly made and failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion
seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution. The
appearance of respondents should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance
because it was for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The
records of this case show that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised at the
first instance and repeatedly argued by respondents in their pleadings.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in Sunrise Garden Corporation v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos.

158836, 158967, 160726 & 160778, September 30, 2015) is affected by A.M. 19-10-20-
SC. Section 23, Rule 14 of the new rules now provides that “The defendant’s
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant shall be deemed a voluntary appearance.” Under
the new rules, raising the ground of lack of jurisdiction together with other
grounds shall be deemed as voluntary appearance.

247
 RULE 15
Motions

Section 4 - Hearing of motion.

Valderrama v. People
G.R. No. 220054, March 27, 2017

FACTS:

The city prosecutor filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 43 four (4) Informations for grave oral defamation against Deogracia
M. Valderrama (Valderrama), pursuant to a complaint filed by Josephine ABL
Vigden (Vigden).

During the trial on April 12, 2012, Vigden was present but the private
prosecutor was absent despite notice. On motion of the defense, the Metropolitan
Trial Court considered the prosecution to have waived its right to present further
evidence and required a formal offer of its documentary evidence within five (5)
days. The prosecution failed to formally offer its evidence within five (5) days from
the hearing.

On May 8, 2012, Vigden filed a Very Urgent Motion to Reconsider (Motion

to Reconsider) explaining that the private prosecutor failed to appear because he
had to manage his high blood pressure. The motion to reconsider was granted.

Valderrama argues that the Metropolitan Trial Court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the patently defective Motion to Reconsider. She
argues that the motion does not contain any notice addressed to the accused and
does not indicate the date and time it was to be heard by the court in violation of
Section 5 Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Did the filing of the motion to reconsider comply with the requirements
imposed by Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15?

RULING:

No. Respondent did not set a hearing for the Motion to Reconsider. Instead,
she simply submitted it for Metropolitan Trial Court's immediate consideration.
Thus, the notice attached to the pleading stated:

248
 GREETINGS:

Please submit the foregoing Motion for immediate consideration and

resolution of the Honorable Court upon receipt hereof. City of Parañaque for
Quezon City
May 7, 2012.

This notice did not comply with Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of
Court. These requirements are mandatory. Except for motions which the court
may act on without prejudice to the adverse party, all motions must set a
hearing. This includes motions for reconsideration.

The jurisprudence confirms that the requirements laid down in Sec. 5 Rule
15 of the Rules of Court that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned,
and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If
not religiously complied with, they render the motion pro forma. As such the
motion is a useless piece of paper that will not toll the running of the prescriptive
period.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in Valderrama v. People (G.R. No. 220054, March 27, 2017) is
affected by A.M. NO. 19-10-20-SC. Under the new rules, the original Section 4 on
hearing of motion is deleted. Thus, the violation of Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 in this
case no longer holds true. The new Sections 4 and 5 now enumerate which motions
are litigious and non-litigious. A Motion for Reconsideration, which is the subject
matter in the case at bar, is a litigious motion. Under the amendment, there is no
need to comply with the 3-day notice, since there is generally no hearing on a
motion, unless the court, in its discretion and if deemed necessary for resolution,
sets the litigious motion for hearing. What is only needed now is to ensure service
of the motion or to give notice thereof on the other party and to provide the court
proof of the same.

249
 City of Dagupan v. Maramba
G.R. No. 174411, July 2, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent Ester Maramba constructed a commercial fish center on a

property she leased from the DENR. Later on, petitioner city caused the
demolition thereof without giving direct notice to Maramba and with threat of
taking over the property. Respondent filed a complaint for injunction and
damages in the amount of PhP10 Million. On July 30, 2004, Judge Laron of the trial
court ruled in favor of Maramba and awarded a total of PhP 11 Million as
damages. Petitioner city received a copy of the said decision on August 11, 2004
and filed a motion for reconsideration on August 26. Maramba filed an opposition
on the ground that the motion was not set for hearing. Petitioner’s motion was
denied by the trial court on October 21, 2004. On October 25, petitioner received a
copy of such denial and filed a petition for relief on October 29 alleging excusable
negligence on the part of the City Legal Officer’s failure to include a notice of
hearing in its motion for reconsideration. Such petition was denied by the trial
court but was later on granted by Judge Castillo after reconsideration.

Upon appeal, the initial decision of the trial court was reinstated on the
ground that petitioner's motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing and
was a mere scrap of paper that did not toll the period to appeal. According to the
Court of Appeals, the July 30, 2004 decision penned by Judge Laron had already
become final and executory. Consequently, the 60-day period for filing of the
petition for relief should be reckoned from the date the petitioner learned of this
judgment or on August 11, 2004. Therefore, there was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Judge Castillo in granting the petition despite the fact that it was filed
on the 83 day from receipt of judgment. Aggrieved, petitioner filed this present
rd

petition and argues that its motion for reconsideration was timely filed, tolling the
prescriptive period to appeal. Since the July 23, 2004 decision was not yet final, the
subsequent modification was proper. It also argued that despite counsel’s
oversight, procedural rules should be suspended when its strict application would
cause grave injustice as shown in this case.

ISSUE:

Did the lack of notice of hearing in petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration render it defective thus failing to toll the reglementary period
of appeal and thereby rendering the July 30, 2004 decision already final and
executory?

250
RULING:

No.

As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and

does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading. The requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be
sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court. However, the Court held
that when the adverse party has actually had the opportunity to be heard, and has
indeed been heard through pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the
purpose behind the rule is deemed duly served. Moreover, this court has relaxed
procedural rules when a rigid application of these rules only hinders substantial
justice. In this case, Maramba was able to file an opposition to petitioner city's
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the motion was not set for hearing.
In its one-page opposition, Maramba did not address the substantive issues raised
by petitioner city in its motion for reconsideration such as the excessive award of
actual damages. Nevertheless, this opposition was an opportunity to be heard for
Maramba on the matters raised by petitioner city in its motion for reconsideration.
The purposes behind the required notice of hearing — provide the time to study
the motion for reconsideration and give an opportunity to be heard — were
satisfied when Maramba filed an opposition to the motion. Hence, the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner city, despite lack of notice of hearing, is deemed
proper and had the effect of suspending the running of the reglementary period
of appeal.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of City of Dagupan v. Maramba (G.R. No. 174411, July
2, 2014) is affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. Section 4 and 5 of the new rules
enumerates which motions are litigious and non-litigious. Non-litigious motions
shall not be set for hearing and shall just be resolved by the court within five (5)
calendar days from receipt thereof while litigious motions only require service and
proof of service with the opposing party having five (5) calendar days from receipt
to file its opposition thereto. The court is required to resolve said motion within
fifteen (15) calendar days from its receipt or expiration of the period to file such
opposition. Moreover, Section 6 of the new rules also provides that hearing on
litigious motions is only discretionary. Hence, the mandatory requirement that
motions must be set for hearing and that the other party must be given notice
thereof at least 3 days before the hearing on the motion. under the old rules no
longer applies.

251
 Laude vs. Ginez-Jubalde
G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015.

FACTS:

Sometime in 2014, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) was killed at the

Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-
year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). A complaint for
Murder was filed by Jennifer’s siblings before the Olongapo City Office of the City
Prosecutor.

Afterwards, the Public Prosecutor filed an Information for Murder against

Pemberton before the RTC in Olongapo City, to which a warrant of arrest was
issued. Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Ginez-Jubalde and was then
arraigned.

On the same day, Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City
Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage.

Judge Ginez-Jubalde denied Petitioners Urgent Motion for lack of merit.

Petitioners argue that Judge Ginez-Jubalde committed grave abuse of

discretion tantamount to an excess or absence of jurisdiction when she dismissed
their Urgent Motion based on technicalities. In particular, they argue that the
three-day rule on Motions under Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court is not
absolute, and should be liberally interpreted when a case is attended by exigent
circumstances. Furthermore, Petitioners advance the rationale behind the three-
day notice rule is satisfied when there is an opportunity to be heard, which was
present in this case since Pemberton’s counsel were able to make comments during
the hearing on the Motion, and that the rights of Pemberton were not
compromised in any way.

ISSUE:

Should the three-day notice rule be liberally construed in favor of

Petitioners?

RULING:

No.

252
 The failure of Petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is
unjustified. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory
rule that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three
(3) days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the motion
defective consistent with protecting the adverse party’s right to procedural due
process.

While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the
requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and
the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither
cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process rights.

In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given
sufficient time to study Petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to
procedural due process.

The arguments of Petitioner do not cure the Motion’s deficiencies. Even

granting that Pemberton’s counsel was able to comment on the motion orally
during the hearing, it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study and prepare
for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

There is a substantial effect. The new Section 4 and 5 of Rule 15 under the
New Rules enumerates which motions are litigious and non litigious. There is no
need to comply with the 3-day notice rule, since, with the amendment, there is
generally no hearing on a motion, unless the court, in its discretion, sets the same
for hearing if necessary. What is only needed now is to ensure service of the motion
or to give notice thereof on the other party and to provide the court proof of the
same.

253
 RULE 16
Motion to Dismiss

Section 1 - Grounds.

Guillermo v. Philippine Information Agency

G.R. No. 223751, March 15, 2017

FACTS:

Miguel "Lucky" Guillermo (Guillermo) and AV Manila Creative

Production, Co. (AV Manila) filed a Complaint for a sum of money and damages
before the Regional Trial Court. Guillermo and AV Manila alleged that in the last
few months of the Administration of Former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (Arroyo Administration), then Acting Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways Victor Domingo (Acting Secretary Domingo),
consulted and discussed with Guillermo and AV Manila the urgent need for an
advocacy campaign (Campaign). The purpose of the Campaign was to
counteract the public's negative perception of the performance of the outgoing
Arroyo Administration.

After all the deliverables had been delivered, petitioners followed up on

the payment from the Philippine Information Agency. Despite several demands,
no payments were made.

Petitioners said that they made demands through letters dated August 19,
September 20, and October 12, 2010, to various officials of the Philippine
Information Agency, under the Administration of Former President Benigno
Aquino III. However, respondents refused and failed to pay the amount of
Php25,000,000.00.

The Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the Complaint for
failure to state a cause of action and for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Regional Trial Court of Marikina granted the Office of the Solicitor
General's Motion to Dismiss, Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court
Order dismissing petitioners' Complaint. The Court of Appeals found that the
Complaint sought to enforce a legal right based on a contract.

ISSUE:

Whether the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action.

254
RULING:

Yes, the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action. To determine the sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to dismiss,
only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered, in relation to
whether its prayer may be granted. To sufficiently state a cause of action, the
Complaint should have alleged facts showing that the trial court could grant its
prayer based on the strength of its factual allegations.

To support the foregoing prayer, the Complaint attempted to lay down

the elements of a contract between the petitioners on one hand, and respondents
on the other. Thus, it alleged a series of communications, meetings, and
memoranda, all tending to show that petitioners agreed to complete and deliver
the "Joyride" project, and that respondents agreed to pay ₱25,000,000.00 as
consideration.

Assuming that the Complaint's factual allegations are true, they are not
sufficient to establish that the Regional Trial Court could grant its prayer.

The Complaint attempts to establish a contract that involves expenditure

of public funds. As pointed out by respondents, contracts involving the
expenditure of public funds have additional requisites to be valid, which are: (a)
appropriation before entering into contract; and (b) certificate showing
appropriation to meet contract.

The Complaint, however, completely ignored the foregoing requisites for

the validity of contracts involving expenditure of public funds. Thus, the
Regional Trial Court could not order the enforcement of the alleged contract on
the basis of the Complaint, and the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure
to state a cause of action.

In determining the sufficiency of a cause of action for resolving a motion

to dismiss, a court must determine, hypothetically admitting the factual
allegations in a complaint, whether it can grant the prayer in the complaint.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in Guillermo v. Philippine Information Agency (G.R. No. 223751,

March 15, 2017) is affected by A.M. NO. 19-10-20-SC. Rule 16 has been entirely
deleted under the new rules. Under the new rules, Section 12 of Rule 8 now
provides that the defense that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of

255
action shall be raised as an affirmative defense in the answer and not through a
motion to dismiss. The amendment provides that failure to raise the affirmative
defense at the earliest possible opportunity shall be a waiver thereof, without
prejudice only to the non-waivable grounds. Thereafter, courts are now required
to rule on the affirmative defense within 30 days from filing thereof, upon its
own initiative. Applying the amendments in the case at bar, the OSG should now
raise the ground that the pleading states no cause of action as an affirmative
defense in its Answer and not through a Motion to Dismiss.

256
 Samuel Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc.
G.R. No. 208426, September 20, 2017

FACTS:

Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Capitol) owned a parcel of land
in Quezon City. The entire land was levied by the city treasurer for unpaid real
estate taxes. It was subjected to a tax delinquency sale of which Alvarado won as
the highest bidder. A certificate of sale of delinquent property was issued to him.
Respondents Ayala Land Inc. and members of Capitol, Ayala Hillside Estates
Homeowners’ Association Inc. filed a complaint in RTC assailing the validity of
the tax sale, impleading defendants Alvarado and the city treasurer, among others.
Alvarado filed an answer, and subsequently a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of failure to comply with condition precedent, failure to state cause of action, and
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. These grounds were also invoked as a
defense in Alvarado’s answer. RTC denied the motion on the ground that it was
filed out of time and that the filing of an answer precludes a motion to dismiss.
However, the RTC conceded that the rule preventing the consideration of motions
to dismiss filed after the filing of answers admitted exceptions, but noted that the
grounds pleaded by Alvarado still did not warrant the dismissal of the complaint.
CA affirmed the same.

ISSUE:

Is the RTC correct in denying the motion to dismiss after an answer has
been filed is proper

RULING:

No, the RTC is not correct in denying the motion to dismiss on the ground
that the answer has already been filed.

Rule 16, Section 1 is unequivocal: a motion to dismiss is filed "within the

time for but before filing the answer." Rule 16, Section 4 states that if a motion to
dismiss is denied, the defendant shall then file an answer within the remaining
period of the 15 days that he or she originally had to file it but in no case less than
five (5) days. In the answer, affirmative defenses, which take the form of
"confession and avoidance" may also be raised. After the answer, no new defenses
may be raised. As a general rule, Rule 9, Section 1 stipulates "defenses and
objections not pleaded . . . in the answer are deemed waived.” The exception as
provided in Rule 9 Section 1, “However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,

257
that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause,
or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the
court shall dismiss the claim.”

Two (2) categories of motions to dismiss may be recognized under the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure: first, those that must be filed ahead of an answer, and
second, those that may be entertained even after an answer has been filed. Motions
to dismiss under the first category may plead any of the 10 grounds under Rule
16, Section 1. Those under the second category may only plead four (4) of Rule 16,
Section 1’s 10 grounds.

Out of Rule 16, Section 1's 10 grounds, four (4) survive the anterior filing of
an answer: lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata,
and prescription. Common to all these four (4) grounds that survive the filing of
an answer is that they persist no matter the resolution of the merits of the case by
the court. A judgment issued by a court without jurisdiction is null and void.
Judgments on a similar prior case will be redundant. Thus, res judicata and litis
pendencia can be raised even after an answer has been filed. Prescription attaches
regardless of the resolution of the case on the merits. Apart from the exceptions
recognized in Rule 9, Section 1, jurisprudence has also clarified that, despite the
prior filing of an answer, an action may still be dismissed on a ground which only
became known subsequent to the filing of an answer.

The prior filing of an answer, therefore, serves as a bar to the consideration

of Rule 16, Section 1’s six (6) other grounds. However, the grounds stated in a
belatedly filed motion to dismiss may still be considered provided that they were
pleaded as affirmative defenses in an answer. There is then no waiver of the
previously pleaded defenses. The complaint may be dismissed even for reasons
other than the non-waivable defenses. The belatedly filed motion to dismiss is not
a useless superfluity. It is effectively a motion for the court to hear the grounds for
dismissal previously pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer, pursuant to
Rule 16, Section 6.

Pleading grounds for dismissal in an answer suffice to effect a situation "as

if a motion to dismiss had been filed”: Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative
defenses. — If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal
provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer
and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if
a motion to dismiss had been filed.

258
 EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

Rule 16 has been repealed in the 2020 Revised Rules of Court. The
amendments under Section 12(1), Rule 15 has included motion to dismiss as one
of the prohibited motions, except if the grounds are those considered non-
waivable under the new Section 1, Rule 9. As such all other grounds under the old
Section 1, Rule 16 are no longer allowed to be assailed in a motion to dismiss.
However, these grounds or defenses may be raised as an affirmative defense in
the answer of the defendant. Lastly, since the grounds of res judicata, litis
pendencia, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and prescription are non-
waivable rights, they may be raised at any time during the proceedings.

As applied in this case, the motion to dismiss filed by Alvarado must be

denied in so far as the grounds of failure to comply with condition precedent and
failure to state cause of action are concerned because these are non-waivable
grounds for dismissal. However, this does not preclude the court from ruling on
the merits of these grounds because they were accordingly pleaded as a defense
in Alvarado’s answer.

259
 Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc v. Chiongbian
G.R. No. 197530, July 9, 2014

FACTS:

In 1996, Aboitiz Shipping Corporation (ASC) owned by the Aboitiz family,

Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc. (CAGLI) of the Gothong family, and William Lines,
Inc. (WLI) owned by the Chiongbian family entered into an agreement to pool
their resources and merge business under the name WG&A, Inc. (WG&A). Said
agreement provides that all disputes shall be settled through arbitration. It also
contained Annex SL-V stipulating that WLI shall acquire certain inventories of
CAGLI in exchange for a certain amount and WG&A shares. When the balance
remained unpaid in 2001, CAGLI demanded payment or return of excess
inventories from WG&A. The latter allegedly returned the inventories and
attached copy of delivery receipts signed by CAGLI’s representatives as proof.

In 2002, the Chiongbian and Gothong families decided to leave WG&A and
sold their interest to the Aboitiz family. A share purchase agreement (SPA) was
entered into by petitioner AEV and respective shareholders of WLI and CAGLI.
The SPA also provided that all disputes shall be settled through arbitration.
WG&A was then renamed to Aboitiz Transport Shipping Corporation (ATSC).

In 2008, CAGLI resumed making demands for the payment/return of said

inventories and filed its first complaint for arbitration against Chiongbian, ATSC,
ASC and AEV before the RTC Cebu Branch 20. AEV filed a motion to dismiss
which the court sustained on the ground of failure to state a cause of action because
there was no agreement binding AEV and CAGLI to arbitrate. CAGLI did not
contest the dismissal but withdrew the first complaint as to the remaining
defendants. ATSC filed for reconsideration of the order allowing the withdrawal.

In 2010, while the first complaint was pending, CAGLI and Benjamin
Gothong filed a second complaint for arbitration before RTC Cebu Branch 10
against the same defendants in the first complaint with respect to the same subject
matter. AEV filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint on the ground of
forum shopping, res judicata, litis pendentia and failure to state a cause of action.
The court denied AEV’s motion to dismiss and its subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Thus, AEV filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
assailing such orders.

ISSUE:

260
 Does CAGLI’s filing of the second compliant for arbitration constitute
forum shopping and is barred by res judicata?

RULING:

Yes. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (1) the
identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (2) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two cases such that judgment
in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other.

In turn, prior judgment or res judicata bars a subsequent case when the
following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a
judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is — between the first and the second
actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.

Applying the cited concepts and requisites, the Court found that the second
complaint is barred by res judicata and constitutes forum shopping for the
following reasons:

a. Between the first and second complaints, there is identity of parties.

Although Gothong was included as plaintiff in the second complaint,
this court has clarified that absolute identity of parties is not required
for purposes of forum shopping and as long as there is substantial
identity of parties.
b. There is identity in subject matter and cause of action as both complaints
are applications for the same relief (arbitration) and are grounded on the
right to be paid for or to receive the value of excess inventories as spelled
out in Annex SLV
c. The order of RTC Cebu Branch 20 which dismissed the first complaint
with respect to AEV attained finality when CAGLI did not question the
order.
d. The parties did not dispute that order of RTC Cebu Branch 20 was
issued by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties.
e. The dismissal of the first complaint with respect to AEV was a judgment
on the merits. Dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action may operate as res judicata on a subsequent case involving the
same parties, subject matter, and causes of action, provided that the
order of dismissal actually ruled on the issues raised. Here, RTC Cebu

261
 Branch 20 made a definitive determination that CAGLI had no right to
compel AEV to subject itself to arbitration vis-a-vis it's claims under
Annex SL-V.

In sum, the requisites for res judicata have been satisfied and the second
complaint should, thus, have been dismissed. From this, it follows that CAGLI
committed an act of forum shopping in filing the second complaint. Nevertheless,
the Court found that at the time of the filing of the second complaint, AEV had
already been discharged from the proceedings relating to the first complaint and
it was no longer pending as to AEV at the time of the filing of the second
complaint. Accordingly, the second complaint could not have been barred by litis
pendentia.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongbian (G.R. No.
197530, July 9, 2014) is affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. Section 1, Rule 16 of the old
rules was deleted and incorporated instead in Section 12, Rule 8 and Section 12,
Rule 15 of the new rules. Under the new rules, failure to state a cause of action is
no longer a ground to dismiss the complaint. A motion to dismiss based on the
such ground is now considered a prohibited a motion under Section 12 of Rule 15.
The remedy of the movant is to raise it as an affirmative defense pursuant to
Section 12 of Rule 8. However, even without this amendment, the old rules
recognize that the grounds for a motion to dismiss may be used as affirmative
defenses.

Despite the foregoing, the non-waivable defenses of res judicata and litis
pendentia are still available as grounds for a motion to dismiss under Section 12,
Rule 15 of the new rules. Section 1, Rule 14 of the same also provides that the court
may already dismiss the case if such grounds are apparent even without filing a
motion to dismiss.

Section 5, Rule 7 of the old rules which deals with forum shopping as a
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice remains the same. The new
rules merely inserted a paragraph requiring proof of authority to execute the
certification to be attached to the pleading.

262
 Shell Foundation, Inc. v. Tomas M. Fredeluces
G.R. No. 174333, April 20, 2016

FACTS:

On December 1, 2000, a Complaint for damages was filed against Shell

Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. before the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. Tomas M. Fredeluces, Marcos B. Corpuz,
Jr., Reynaldo M. Samonte, Norma M. Samonte, Ambrocio Villanueva, Salvacion
A. Bon, Ramiro A. Bon, Luzviminda B. Andillo, Ludivico F. Bon, Elmo Areglo,
Rose A. San Pedro, Dante U. Santos, Sr., Miguel Santos, Efren U. Santos, Ric U.
Santos, Simon Marce, Jr., Joel F. Salinel, Bebiana San Pedro, and Marina Santos
(Fredeluces, et al.) alleged that having resided in the area even prior to 1998, they
were lawful residents of Sitio Agusuhin. They allegedly constructed their houses
and introduced improvements in Sitio Agusuhin, such as fruit trees and other
seasonal plants. However, "[f]or the direct benefit of the defendants Fredeluces, et
al. were "effectively evicted"from their homes in "total disregard"of their rights.

Instead of answering the Complaint, Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and

Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. moved to dismiss the complaint based on the
grounds of litis pendentia, failure to state a cause of action, and lack of cause of
action, arguing that: That the plaintiffs — namely, Dante U. Santos, Sr., Efren U.
Santos, Miguel Santos, Ric U. Santos, and Bebiana San Pedro — earlier filed against
them a Complaint for sum of money which had substantially similar causes of
36

action and relief sought, rendering the subsequently filed Complaint for damages
dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia. That Fredeluces, et al. were praying for
payment of damages corresponding to the value of the land they previously
occupied, a right that did not belong to them because they never owned the land
in Sitio Agusuhin considering that Sitio Agusuhin belonged to the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227; hence, lands in Sitio
Agusuhin are government property not subject to private ownership. That Tomas
M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon never resided in Sitio Agusuhin thus were not
entitled to any compensation and, therefore, lacked a cause of action against Shell
Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc.

Fredeluces, et al. opposed the Motion to Dismiss and prayed for its denial
arguing that: Plaintiffs, in filing their Motion to Dismiss, hypothetically admitted
the factual allegations in their Complaint. Corollarily, the trial court may not
inquire into the truth of the allegations and may only resolve the Motion to
Dismiss based on the facts as alleged in the Complaint. That Dante U. Santos, Efren
U. Santos, Miguel Santos, Ric U. Santos, and Bebiana San Pedro claimed that they
had allegedly revoked the Special Power of Attorney that they executed in favor

263
of Atty. Renato H. Collado before the lawyer filed the Complaint for sum of money
on their behalf. It follows that the Complaint for sum of money was filed without
their authority and should be deemed not to have been filed. Litis pendentia,
therefore, should not apply. Although expressly admitting they never owned Sitio
Agusuhin, that they "were peacefully settled in the area and [had] introduced
improvements" when Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell
Foundation, Inc. "summarily evicted" them. It is for their "unlawful eviction" from,
not ownership of, Sitio Agusuhin for which Fredeluces, et al. demand payment of
damages.

The Motion to Dismiss was heard and was granted. Between the Complaint
for sum of money and the Complaint for damages, the trial court found identity
of parties, causes of action, and reliefs sought. The trial court likewise held that the
Complaint for damages failed to state a cause of action as Fredeluces, et al.
effectively prayed for payment of just compensation, a relief they cannot avail
themselves of because they do not own the land in Sitio Agusuhin.

In resolving the issue of whether Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon

were former residents of Sitio Agusuhin, the trial court relied on the Affidavit of a
certain Robert Hadji (Hadji), a former resident of Sitio Agusuhin and Pilipinas
Shell Foundation, Inc.'s Community Coordinator in the site. Hadji stated in his
Affidavit that Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon never resided in Sitio
Agusuhin. While the resolution of the issue would generally require presentation
of evidence during trial, the trial court said that Fredeluces, et al. did not even
bother to attend the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss to present evidence contrary
to the allegations of Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell
Foundation, Inc. Failing to present such contrary evidence, Tomas M. Fredeluces
and Ludivico F. Bon should be deemed non-residents of Sitio Agusuhin and,
therefore, were not entitled to any compensation.

The RTC’s decision was however reversed by the Court of Appeals. In contrast
with the trial court, the Court of Appeals appreciated in evidence a Revocation of
Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed by Dante U. Santos, Efren U. Santos,
Miguel Santos, Ric U. Santos, and Bebiana San Pedro. The Complaint for sum of
money was, thus, filed without their authority, and there was no litis pendentia so
as to bar the filing of the Complaint for damages on December 1, 2000.

Despite Fredeluces, et al.'s admission that they did not own the parcels of land
they occupied in Sitio Agusuhin, the Court of Appeals nonetheless held that
Fredeluces, et al. may file a complaint for damages for having been "adversely
affected by [Shell Philippines Exploration B.V.'s] construction works."

264
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondents Fredeluces, et al.'s Complaint for damages should be
dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia; and,
2. Whether the Complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action.

RULING:

The Supreme Court granted the Petition. The Complaint for damages
should have been dismissed as to respondent Bebiana San Pedro on the ground
of litis pendentia. As for the rest of respondents, their Complaint failed to state a
cause of action.

First, only one suit may be instituted for a single cause of action. When there
is more than one suit pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, litis pendentia exists and a motion to dismiss may be filed on this ground.

Litis pendentia has the following elements: first, "[i]dentity of parties, or at

least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions;" second,
"[i]dentity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts;" and third, "[i]dentity with respect to the two preceding particulars
in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case."

The first element of litis pendentia — identity of parties — is absent with

respect to respondents Dante U. Santos, Efren U. Santos, Miguel Santos, and Ric
U. Santos. They executed the Revocation and Cancellation of Special Power of
Attorney and withdrew the authority they had earlier granted Atty. Renato M.
Collado to file a case in their behalf. With the Complaint for sum of money having
been filed without the authority of respondents Dante U. Santos, Efren U. Santos,
Miguel Santos, and Ric U. Santos, they should be deemed non-plaintiffs in the
Complaint for sum of money. Consequently, the pendency of the Complaint for
sum of money did not bar them from filing the Complaint for damages on
December 1, 2000. The same cannot be said for respondent Bebiana San Pedro who
was a party plaintiff both in the Complaint for sum of money and in the Complaint
for damages as she did not sign any document similar to the Revocation and
Cancellation of Special Power of Attorney. Thus, the Complaint for sum of money
was filed with her authority and was pending when the Complaint for damages
was subsequently filed before the same trial court.

265
 The second element of litis pendentia likewise exists with respect to
respondent Bebiana San Pedro. There is substantial identity of rights asserted and
reliefs sought between the Complaint for sum of money and the Complaint for
damages. Defendants allegations show that the Complaint for sum of money and
the Complaint for damages similarly assert the supposed right of respondents as
possessors of parcels of land they previously occupied in Sitio Agusuhin;
Complaints similarly allege that petitioners had an obligation to respect the
supposed right of respondents when petitioners commenced the construction of
the concrete gravity structure; Complaints allege a similar violative act: petitioners
allegedly failed to sufficiently compensate respondents for their eviction from Sitio
Agusuhin. Because of the substantial identity of parties, causes of action, and
reliefs sought in the Complaint for sum of money and Complaint for damages, all
the elements of litis pendentia are present with respect to respondent Bebiana San
Pedro. Judgment in any of the Complaints would be res judicata in the other, i.e., a
final and executory judgment in any of the Complaints would be "conclusive of
the rights of the parties or their privies . . . on the points and matters in issue in the
first suit."

Second, Failure to state a cause of action goes into the sufficiency of the
allegation of the cause of action in the complaint. In this respect, a pleading
sufficiently states a cause of action if it "contain[s] in a methodical and logical form,
a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his [or her] claim[.]"Ultimate facts are the "important and
substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty,
or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant."
Allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law in a pleading are omitted
for they are unnecessary in determining whether the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the action.

In filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of

action, a defendant "hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint." Since allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law are
omitted in pleadings, "[t]he hypothetical admission is . . . limited to the relevant
and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible
therefrom." However, it is mandatory that courts "consider other facts within the
range of judicial notice, as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence" in resolving
motions to dismiss.

There are exceptions to the rule on hypothetical admission. In Dabuco v.

Court of Appeals: There is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of allegations if
their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if such allegations are legally impossible,
or if these refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record or

266
document included in the pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also,
inquiry is not confined to the complaint if there is evidence which has been
presented to the court by stipulation of the parties, or in the course of hearings
related to the case.

Even assuming the truth of the ultimate facts alleged in the Complaint for
damages, the Complaint states no cause of action. Respondents failed to allege any
circumstance showing that they had occupied Sitio Agusuhin under claim of
ownership for the required number of years. In their Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss, respondents admitted that they do not own Sitio Agusuhin. The property
belongs to the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, pursuant to Republic Act No.
7227; hence, it is a government property the possession of which, however long,
"never confers title [to] the possessor[.]" It follows that respondents may not ask
compensation equivalent to the value of the parcels of land they previously
occupied in Sitio Agusuhin. The right to demand compensation for deprivation of
property belongs to the owner. Moreover, respondents may not claim damages
equivalent to the value of the structures they built and the improvements they
introduced in Sitio Agusuhin. Having admitted that they do not own Sitio
Agusuhin, they were possessors in bad faith who lose whatever they built,
planted, or sown on the land of another without right to indemnity.

Specifically with respect to respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico

F. Bon, the allegation that they resided in Sitio Agusuhin prior to the constmction
of the concrete gravity structure may not be hypothetically admitted. Based on the
evidence available during the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss, which were never
controverted, respondents Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon were indeed
non-residents of Sitio Agusuhin prior to the construction of the concrete gravity
structure. Thus, respondents should be deemed to have admitted that they never
resided in Sitio Agusuhin prior to the construction of the concrete gravity
structure.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

Had the case been filed in the present, the following facts of the case would
have been different in view of the amendments on the Rules of Civil Procedure by
A.M. NO. 19-10-20-SC:

1. Petitioners could not have filed a motion to dismiss based on failure to state
a cause of action as this is no longer allowed in the amended rules. Instead,
such ground for a motion to dismiss should have been interposed as
affirmative defense in petitioner’s Answer to the complaint. This
notwithstanding petitioner could still have moved for dismissal, at any

267
 time, on the ground of litis pendentia since this is allowed even in the
amended rules. Notably, even if petitioner failed to move for dismissal on
the ground of litis pendentia, should such ground be apparent, the court may
motu proprio dismiss the case pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9.

2. Should petitioner interposed as affirmative defense failure to state a cause

of action and litis pendentia in its Answer, a motion for preliminary hearing
or hearing on the affirmative defenses is now prohibited since the rules
itself, as amended, requires the court to resolve such ground for dismissal
pleaded as affirmative defense within 30 calendar days from filing of
answer. But since petitioner included litis pendentia as affirmative defense,
the court may conduct a summary hearing within 15 calendar days from
filing of answer and the court shall resolve the affirmative defense of litis
pendentia within 30 calendar days from termination of summary hearing

3. Since the amended rules now require the inclusion of evidentiary facts in
the complaint apart from the ultimate facts, the hypothetical admission of
material allegations of facts which pleading an affirmative defense of
failure to state cause of action entails would now not only be limited to
ultimate facts, but also to the hypothetical admission of evidentiary facts.
This, however, admits of certain exceptions as provided in the case of
Dabuco v. Court of Appeals.

268
 Lui Enterprises, Inc. vs. Zuellig Pharma Corporation
G.R. No. 193494; March 12, 2014

FACTS:

Lui Enterprises, Inc. (Lui) and Zuellig Pharma Corp. (Zuellig) entered into
a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel of land located in Davao City in 1995. In
2003, Zuellig received a letter from Philippine Bank of Communication (PBCom).
Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig to
pay directly to it. Zuellig promptly informed Lui of the claim of PBCom but Lui
insisted on its right to collect the rent on the leased property.

Due to the conflicting claims of Lui and PBCom over the rental payments,
Zuellig filed a complaint for interpleader before the RTC-Makati. Zuellig prayed
that Lui and PBCom be ordered to litigate their conflicting claims. Lui filed a
motion to dismiss. According to Lui, an earlier filed nullification of deed of dation
in payment case pending with the RTC-Davao barred the filing of the interpleader
case. Lui filed this nullification case against PBCom with respect to several
properties it dationed to the bank in payment of its obligations. The property
leased by Zuellig was among those allegedly dationed to PBCom.

ISSUE:

Will the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the RTC-

Davao bar the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in RTC-Makati?

RULING:

No. Litis pendentia is Latin for a “pending suit.” It exists when another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. The
requisites of litis pendentia are: (1) Identity of parties or at least such as represent
the same interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) Identity in the two cases
should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in

the nullification of deed of dation in payment case and the interpleader case.
Zuellig is not a party to the nullification case filed in the Davao trial court.

There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui filed
the first case to nullify the deed of dation in payment it executed in favor of

269
PBCom. Zuellig subsequently filed the interpleader case to consign in court the
rental payments and extinguish its obligation as lessee. The interpleader case was
necessary and was not instituted to harass either Lui or PBCom. Thus, the pending
nullification case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.

Since two requisites of litis pendentia are absent, the nullification of deed
of dation in payment case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC has no effect on the ruling.

270
 RULE 17
Dismissal of Actions

Section 1 - Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff

Ching v. Cheng
G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014

FACTS:

Antonio Ching owned several business and properties, among which was Po
Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing Properties) His total assets are alleged to have been
more than 380 Million. Although he was unmarried, he had children from two
women. One was Ramon Ching, who alleges to be the only child of Ramon Ching
with his common-law wife Lucina Santos. On the other hand, Joseph and Jaime
Cheng claim to be Antonio’s illegitimate children with his housemaid, Mercedes
Igne.

In 1996, Antonio was murdered. Ramon allegedly induced Mercedes and her
children, Joseph and Jaime, to sign a waiver to Antonio’s Ching’s estate in
consideration of P22.5 million, which was never paid. Ramon executed an affidavit
of settlement of estate, naming himself as sole heir and adjudicating upon himself
the entirety of Antonio’s estate.

On October 7, 1988, Joseph and Jaime Cheng and Mercede Igne (the Chengs)
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the
RTC of Manila. (first case) The complaint was later amended to implead Po Wing
Properties, to which Ramon was a stockholder. The amended complaint was for
Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates
of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Document. Po Wing filed a motion for dismiss on the
ground for lack of jurisdiction. The same was granted, but the Chengs and Lucina
were given 15 days to file the appropriate pleading (amended complaint) which
they failed to do so.

On April 19, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina filed a complaint for "Annulment
of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title
Issued by Virtue of Said Documents" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties
(second case) Subsequently, the Chengs and Lucina filed a motion to dismiss their
complaint, praying that it be dismissed without prejudice. This was granted by the
court on the ground that summons were not yet served on Ramon Ching and Po
Wing Properties, and they had not yet filed any responsive pleading. The
dismissal was made without prejudice.

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 This prompted Ramon and Po Wing properties to file a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under
the “two-dismissal rule” under Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure, in view of the
previous dismissal of the first case.

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in the second case,
the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Disinheritance and Declaration
of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra judicial Agreement, Deed of
Absolute Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties. (third case)
A motion to dismiss was filed by Ramon and Po Wing on the ground of res
judicata, litis pendentia, forum-shopping and failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action.

An omnibus order was issued resolving both the motion for reconsideration
in the second case and the motion to dismiss in the third case. The trial court
denied both motions, ruling that the dismissal of the second case was without
prejudice and hence, would not bar the filing of the third case. A motion for
reconsideration in the third case was filed. While the same was pending, Ramon
and Po Wing filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the dismissal of
the second case without prejudice.

The CA rendered the decision in the certiorari case dismissing the petition.
The appellate court ruled that Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties’ reliance on
the "two-dismissal rule" was misplaced since the rule involves two motions for
dismissals filed by the plaintiff only. In this case, it found that the dismissal of the
first case was upon the motion of the defendants, while the dismissal of the second
case was at the instance of the plaintiffs. With this, a petition for review on
certiorari was filed with the SC.

Ramon and Po Wing argue that the dismissal of the second case was with
prejudice since the non-filing of an amended complaint in the first case operated
as a dismissal on the merits. They also argue that the second case should be
dismissed on the ground of res judicata since there was a previous final judgment
of the first case involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action.

Meanwhile, respondents argue that the petition for review should be

dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping and litis pendentia. They argue that
the two-dismissal rule and res judiciata do not apply as 1) the failure to amend a
complaint is not a dismissal, and (2) they only moved for dismissal once which
was in the second case.

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ISSUE:

As per the two-dismissal rule, did the dismissal of the second case
operate to bar the filing of the third case?

RULING:

No.

Under Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, a case can be dismissed at the
instance of the plaintiff. In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance
of the plaintiff, not the defendant, which is governed by Rule 16.

As a general rule, dismissals under Sec.1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice

except when it is in the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal.
However, in the case at bar, the dismissal of the second case was without
prejudice. The first case was filed as an ordinary civil action but was later amended
to include new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a special
proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by the defendants
(petitioners) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the trial court
allowed Atty. Obias (respondents’ counsel) a period of 15 days to file an
appropriate pleading, which is merely an act of acquiescing to a request made by
the plaintiff’s counsel that had no bearing to the dismissal of the case. Since there
was already a dismissal prior to plaintiff’s default to file the appropriate pleading,
the trial court’s instruction for it to be filed will not reverse the dismissal. More so
if the plaintiff fails to file the appropriate pleading, it will not cause the dismissal
of the case anew, but the order dismissing the case stands.

With this, when the respondents filed the second case, they were merely
refilling the same claim that was previously dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.
Their motion to dismiss the second case is considered as the first dismissal at the
plaintiff’s instance. Since no responsive pleading was filed, the trial court is
without discretion to deny the dismissal, as the same is guaranteed as a matter of
right under Rule 17.

When the third case was filed on substantially the same claim, there were
already two dismissals – one at the instance of the plaintiff and one by the
defendants. While there are two dismissals on the same claim, it does not
necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim is barred by Rule 17, Sec. 1. In
granting the dismissal of the second case, the trial court specifically ordered the
dismissal without prejudice.

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 EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties v. Joseph Cheng, et al.
(G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014) is not affected by A.M 19-10-20-SC. Rule 17, Sec.
1 states that a complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary
judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming
the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when
filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based
on or including the same claim.

274
 RULE 18
Dismissal of Actions

Section 1 - When conducted.

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Roberto and Teresita Genuino

G.R. No. 208792, July 22, 2015

FACTS:

Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) filed a Complaint for Sum of

Money/Judgment on the Deficiency against the Spouses Genuino before the RTC
of Makati. Spouses Genuino filed their Answer. However, when BPI received the
copy of the Answer, it failed to file any Reply. Hence, RTC dismissed the case
without prejudice for lack of interest to prosecute under Rule 17, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court. In its Motion for Reconsideration, BPI explained that the case
folder was misplaced in the office bodega together with the records of terminated
cases. The bank submits that with the issuance of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, "it is no
longer proper to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute starting August 16, 2004
due to the non-filing by the plaintiff of a Motion to Set Case for Pre Trial
Conference but instead the Clerk of Court should issue an Order setting the case
for Pre Trial Conference."

ISSUE:

Was the failure of BPI to file a motion to set case for pre-trial conference
warrants the dismissal of the Complaint?

RULING:

Yes.

While it is true that A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC provides that the Clerk of Court
should set the date of pre-trial, the plaintiff should not be rewarded for his or her
negligence.

Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the
duty to set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. Under
Section 3 of Rule 17, failure to comply with the said duty makes the case
susceptible to dismissal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time
or failure to comply with the rules.

275
 Nevertheless, nowhere in the text of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does it remove
the plaintiff’s duty under Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court to set the case for
pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed. Nowhere does it repeal
Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court that allows dismissals due to plaintiff’s
fault, including plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Rules for no justifiable cause.
Nowhere does it impose a sole burden on the trial court to set the case for pre-trial.

Reading A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC together with Rule 17, Section 3 and Rule 18,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court accommodates the outright dismissal of a complaint
upon plaintiff’s failure to show justifiable reason for not setting the case for pre-
trial within the period provided by the Rules. Thus, trial courts must consider the
facts of each case.

This court has allowed cases to proceed despite failure by the plaintiff to
promptly move for pre-trial when it finds that "the extreme sanction of dismissal
of the complaint might not be warranted". It must be stressed that even if the
plaintiff fails to promptly move for pre-trial without any justifiable cause for such
delay, the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted
if no substantial prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special
and compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule clearly
unjustified.

BPI’s explanation of misfiling by previous counsel’s secretary of the case

records together with terminated cases in the office bodega cannot be considered
as justifiable cause for its failure to set the case for pre-trial. Also, petitioner BPI is
one of the oldest and more established banks in the country. There is reasonable
expectation that it has the necessary organizational structures, system flows, and
procedures to address urgent matters and meet litigation deadlines.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Roberto and Teresita
Genuino (G.R. No. 208792, July 22, 2015) is affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. Section 1,
Rule 18 has been modified which now provides that after the last responsive
pleading has been served and filed, the branch clerk of court shall issue, within
five (5) calendar days from filing, a notice of pre-trial which shall be set not later
than sixty (60) calendar days from the filing of the last responsive pleading.

With the amendment, there is no need for the plaintiff to file or the clerk of
court to await the lapse of the period to file an ex-parte motion to set case for
pretrial, before a notice of pre trial shall be issued.

276
Section 2 - Nature and purpose.

Cruz v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 210266, June 7, 2017

FACTS:

At around 7:30 PM, April 18, 2006, Cruz allegedly bought two (2) bottles of
Calvin Klein perfume worth US$96.00 from Duty Free Philippines Fiesta Mall.
Danilo Wong (Wong), the cashier at the Perfume Section, testified that Cruz paid
for the purchase using a Citibank Visa credit card. The transaction was approved,
although Wong doubted the validity of the credit card since the number at the
back was not aligned.

At around 8:00 p.m., Cruz allegedly tried to purchase a pair of Ferragamo

shoes worth US$363.00. Ana Margarita Lim (Lim), the cashier on duty, facilitated
the sales transaction. Cruz paid for the purchase using a Citibank Visa credit card
bearing the name "Gerry Santos," with credit card number 4539 7207 8677
7008. When Lim asked for Cruz's Duty Free shopping card, Cruz presented a
shopping card with the name of "Rodolfo Garcia." Lim asked for another
identification card, and Cruz gave her a driver's license bearing the name "Gerry
Santos."

Lim proceeded to the mall's Electronic Section to swipe the credit card for
approval. The card was approved, but she noticed that the last four (4) digits of
the card were not properly embossed and its validity date started in November
2006. She called Citibank to verify the credit card.

Upon verification, Citibank informed Lim that the credit card was
counterfeit and that the real Gerry Santos was the Head of Citibank's Fraud Risk
Management Division. Lim was advised to transfer the matter to the Security
Department.

Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 8484. However,
petitioner argues that according to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, the corpus delicti or the
alleged counterfeit credit card is inadmissible since it was not marked and
identified during pre-trial.

ISSUE:

Is the counterfeit credit card admissible in evidence?

277
RULING:

Yes.

The rule is that no evidence shall be allowed during trial if it was not
identified and pre-marked during trial. This provision, however, allows for an
exception: when allowed by the court for good cause shown. There is no hard and
fast rule to determine what may constitute "good cause," though this Court has
previously defined it as any substantial reason "that affords a legal excuse."

The trial court retains its discretion to allow any evidence to be presented
at trial even if not previously marked during pre-trial. Here, the trial court allowed
the presentation of the counterfeit credit card at trial due to the prosecution's
explanation that during pre-trial, the counterfeit credit card was still in the
Criminal Investigation and Detective Group's custody

The prosecution was able to present and mark during pre-trial Citibank's
certification that the access device used was counterfeit. It is this certification that
makes the possession and use of the access device illegal. Therefore, the trial court
determined that the access device could still be presented at trial since it merely
formed part of an exhibit that had already been presented and marked during pre-
trial.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Cruz v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 210266,
June 7, 2017) is affected by A.M. NO. 19-10-20-SC. Although evidence not marked
during pre-trial is still admissible in evidence if allowed by the court for good
cause shown, Section 2 of Rule 18 of the new rules imposes a requirement for the
parties to reserve evidence not available during the pre-trial. If it is a documentary
evidence, as in the case at bar, the reservation shall be made by giving a particular
description of the evidence. Hence, it is a requirement for the prosecution to
reserve the evidence of the counterfeited credit card not available during the pre-
trial in the aforementioned manner.

278
Section 4 - Appearance of parties.
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear.

National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Asoque

G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016

FACTS:

Respondent Spouses Asoque are registered owners of a parcel of land.

Petitioner NPC entered into a portion of respondent spouses’ property in order to
install electric transmission lines. The spouses allowed NPC to do so on the
understanding that the latter will pay the value of the land occupied and the
plantation therein which will be destroyed. The spouses demanded from NPC the
payment for the value of the land occupied and the plantation destroyed but the
latter only paid the value of the plantation claiming that it is only obliged to pay
10% of the market value of the property subject to a right-of-way under RA 6395.
According to NPC, since the spouses already accepted the payment for the value
of the improvements, it found that there is no more need to initiate expropriation
proceedings and continue with the construction. However, the spouses filed an
action for payment of just compensation and damages against NPC to recover the
value of the land occupied by the latter.

The pre-trial was scheduled on May 8, 2000. NPC filed a motion to postpone
the pre-trial but was not acted upon by the court until May 8, 2000. At the pre-trial
proper, the spouses arrived late but NPC did not attend. The pre-trial was reset to
May 24, 2000 but NPC still failed to attend therein thus the court allowed the
spouses to present their evidence ex parte and dismissed NPC’s counterclaim.
Meanwhile, NPC once again moved for the postponement of the pre-trial but was
only filed on May 25, 2000, a day after the scheduled pre-trial, hence, was denied
for being filed out of time.

The court ruled in favor of the spouses and ordered NPC to pay them the
market value of the land and plantation as determined by the commissioner.
NPC’s appeal to the CA was denied, prompting it to elevate the matter to SC. NPC
argued that it was denied due process when the court allowed the spouses to
present evidence ex parte arguing that the order resetting the pre-trial on May 24,
2000 was only received by NPC on May 22, 2000, or only 2 days before the
scheduled pre-trial, hence, NPC’s counsels were not able to make arrangements to
be able to attend therein as they were all out of town at those times.

ISSUE:

279
 Was NPC denied due process when the court allowed the spouses to
present evidence ex parte?

RULING:

No, NPC was not denied due process when the court allowed the spouses
to present evidence ex parte.

Sec. 4, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that it shall be the duty
of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a
party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative
shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing. While Sec. 5 thereof provides
that the failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be
with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part
of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex
parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. A pretrial cannot be
taken for granted for it serves a vital objective: the simplification and expedition
of the trial, if not its dispensation. Nonappearance of a party may only be excused
for a valid cause. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may
be allowed “to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on
the basis thereof.”

On the other hand, Sec. 1, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that
a motion is an application for relief other than by a pleading. However, in cases of
a motion for postponement, it should never be presumed to be granted and it
should be filed on or before the lapse of the day sought to be postponed.

In this case, NPC and its counsel were absent during the first pre-trial
setting on May 8, 2000. Had NPC and its counsel appeared on the first setting, they
would have been reasonably notified then and there of the second pretrial
resetting on May 24, 2000 and would have had the opportunity to ask for a later
date. Nonetheless, NPC’s counsel should have tried to inquire from the court the
next schedule of the pretrial. NPC alleges that it filed a motion for postponement
of the first pretrial setting. This notwithstanding, it was still its duty to appear at
the pre-trial first set on May 8, 2000 because a motion for postponement should
never be presumed to be granted. NPC indeed filed another motion to postpone
the May 24, 2000 pre-trial but it was filed only 1 day after the scheduled pretrial
sought to be postponed, on May 25, 2000. The trial court was, therefore, justified
in denying NPC’s motion for postponement for having been filed out of time.
Further, assuming its counsel was unable to appear at the second pretrial setting,
NPC could and should have sent a representative on May 24, 2000 to ask for

280
postponement of the second pretrial setting. Thus, under the circumstances,
NPC cannot claim that it was denied due process.

Thus, NPC was not denied due process when the court allowed the spouses
to present evidence ex parte.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 18 are affected by the New Rules. Under Sec. 4, Rule 18
of the New Rules, the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear is not only
on the pre-trial, but also on the court-annexed mediation (CAM) and judicial
dispute resolution (JDR), if necessary. Further, the valid causes to be excused from
non-appearance at the pre-trial, CAM and JDR is now limited to three (3) causes:
(1) acts of God; (2) force majeure; and, (3) duly substantiated physical disability.
Lastly, the requirement for written authorization of representatives remains the
same and was merely re-phrased in the New Rules.

As for Sec. 5, Rule 18 of the New Rules, failure of respective parties’

counsels to appear, not just failure of the plaintiff and defendant, also merits
sanctions. In order to merit sanctions under this section, it must be shown that the
parties were duly notified and that they have no valid cause for non-appearance.
Further, where plaintiff is allowed to present evidence ex parte, the same must be
presented within 10 days from the termination of the pre-trial and the court will
render judgment on the basis of the evidence offered.

On the other hand, Sec. 1, Rule 15 is not affected by the New Rules.
However, Sec. 4, Rule 15 of the New Rules now provides that a motion for
postponement is among those motions which are non-litigious where the court
may act upon without prejudicing the rights of adverse parties. It shall not be set
for hearing and shall be resolved by the court within five (5) calendar days from
receipt thereof. Nevertheless, despite no more need for hearing, the principles
enunciated in the above case remain that motions for postponement cannot be
presumed to be granted and that it must be filed before the lapse of the day sought
to be postponed. Further, Sec. 12, Rule 15 of the New Rules provides for condition
before the motion will be accepted, as will be discussed herein.

However, the motion for postponement contemplated in the new Sec. 4

only pertains to allowable motions for postponement based on the grounds
enumerated in Sec. 12, Rule 15 of the New Rules. Accordingly, the Sec. 12, Rule 15
of the New Rules provides that motion for postponement is a prohibited motion,
except if it is based on acts of God, force majeure or physical inability of the witness
to appear and testify.

281
 In addition, Sec. 12, Rule 15 of the New Rules provides the consequence for
a granted motion for postponement based on the exceptions, where the moving
party shall be warned that the presentation of its evidence must still be terminated
on the dates previously agreed upon. Further, it sets a condition that the official
receipt evidencing payment of postponement fee must accompany the motion for
postponement before it will be accepted by the clerk of court, to wit: “A motion
for postponement, whether written or oral, shall, at all times, be accompanied by
the original official receipt from the office of the clerk of court evidencing payment
of the postponement fee under Section 21(b), Rule 141, to be submitted either at
the time of the filing of said motion or not later than the next hearing date. The
clerk of court shall not accept the motion unless accompanied by the original
receipt.”

282
 RULE 19
Intervention

Section 1 - Who may intervene

E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco

G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016
FACTS:

Petitioner is an American corporation and is the assignee the inventors of

losartan. Losartan is being marketed in the Philippines by Merck, Sharpe, and
Dohm Corporation (Merck) under the brand names Cozaar and Hyzaar. On July
1987, petitioner filed a patent application before the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks, and Technology Transfer. On December 2000, petitioner requested
for an office action on the patent application. The patent examiner replied that
petitioner’s application was already abandoned as of September 1988. Petitioner’s
counsel then filed a petition for revival of its patent application but was denied for
having been filed out of time. Petitioner appealed to respondent Director-General
of IPO but was also denied. Thus, a petition for review was filed with the CA and
was granted. The OSG, acting for IPO, moved for reconsideration while
Therapharma, Inc. moved for leave to intervene and admit its motion for
reconsideration alleging that the decision affected its vested right to sell its own
losartan product under the brand name Lifezar in the Philippines which was
already approved by the BFAD and that petitioner is threatening to file legal action
against it in case it insists in continuing to sell losartan.

The CA granted the intervention of Therapharma. Petitioner sought for the

CA to reconsider the intervention but was denied. The CA eventually reversed its
decision hence, denying the petition. Petitioner thus filed a petition for review on
certiorari via Rule 45 with the SC arguing, among others, that intervention should
not have been allowed on appeal since the revival of a patent application is ex
parte and is strictly a contest between the examiner and the applicant under the
IPO rules and that the disallowance of any intervention is to ensure the
confidentiality of the proceedings.

ISSUE:

Must Therapharma be allowed to intervene?

RULING:

Yes, Therapharma must be allowed to intervene.

283
 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a court ha the discretion to
determine whether to give due course to an intervention. Sec. 1, Rule 19 of the 1997
Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is
so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or
not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding. The only questions the court need to consider
in a motion to intervene are whether the intervenor has standing to intervene,
whether the motion will unduly delay the proceedings or prejudice rights already
established, and whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate
action.

In assessing whether to grant the intervention, the CA considered

Therapharma, Inc.’s legal interest in the case and its other options for the
protection of its interests. This was within the discretion of the CA under the Rules
of Court. Therapharma, Inc. was able to show that it had legal interest to intervene
in the appeal of petitioner’s revival of its patent application. While its intervention
may have been premature as no patent has been granted yet, petitioner’s own
actions gave rise to respondent Therapharma, Inc.’s right to protect its losartan
product.

Thus, Therapharma must be allowed to intervene because its legal interest

will be affected by the pending action filed by petitioner.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

284
 RULE 23
Depositions Pending Action

Section 1 - Depositions pending action, When may be taken

Santamaria v. Cleary
G.R. Nos. 197122 & 197161, June 15, 2016

FACTS:

Cleary, an American citizen with office address in California, filed a

Complaint for specific performance and damages against Miranila Land
Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go, Ingrid Sala Santamaria, Astrid Sala
Boza, and Kathyrn Go-Perez before the RTC of Cebu. The Complaint involved
shares of stock of Miranila, for which Cleary paid US$191,250.00. Cleary sued in
accordance with the Stock Purchase and Put Agreement he entered into with
Miranila Land Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go, Santamaria, Boza, and
Go-Perez. Paragraph 9.02 of the Agreement provides: Any suit, action or
proceeding with respect to this Agreement may be brought in (a) the courts of the
State of California, (b) the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, or (c) the courts of the country of Corporation’s incorporation, as Cleary
may elect in his sole discretion, and the Parties hereby submit to any such suit,
action proceeding or judgment and waives any other preferential jurisdiction by
reason of domicile.Cleary elected to try the case in Cebu. Santamaria, Boza, and
Go-Perez filed their respective Answers with Compulsory Counterclaims. In his
pre-trial brief, Cleary stipulated that he would testify “in support of the allegations
of his complaint, either on the witness stand or by oral deposition.” Moreover, he
expressed his intent in availing himself “of the modes of discovery under the
rules.” Cleary moved for court authorization to take deposition. He prayed that
his deposition be taken before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in Los
Angeles and be used as his direct testimony. Santamaria and Boza opposed the
Motion and argued that the right to take deposition is not absolute. They claimed
that Cleary chose the Philippine system to file his suit, and yet he deprived the
court and the parties the opportunity to observe his demeanor and directly
propound questions on him. Moreover, Go-Perez argued that oral deposition in
the United States would prejudice, vex, and oppress her and her co-petitioners
who would need to incur costs to attend. The Court of Appeals granted Cleary’s
Petition for Certiorari and reversed the trial court’s ruling. It held that Rule 23,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions, and that it is
immaterial that Cleary is the plaintiff himself.

ISSUE:

285
 Did the Court of Appeals err in granting the Petition for Certiorari and
reversing the trial court’s denial of respondent’s Motion for Court Authorization
to Take Deposition?

RULING:

No. Petitioners argue that the deposition sought by respondent is not for
discovery purposes as he is the plaintiff himself. To support their contention, they
cite Northwest v. Cruz, where this Court held that Rule 132 of the Rules of Court —
on the examination of witnesses in open court — should be observed since the
deposition was only to accommodate the petitioner’s employee who was in the
United States, and not for discovery purposes. Jurisprudence has discussed how
“under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double
function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not necessarily contemplated
— and a method of presenting testimony.” The taking of depositions has been
allowed as a departure from open-court testimony. Jonathan Landoil International
Co., Inc. v. Spouses Mangundadatu is instructive: The Rules of Court and
jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a
mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used
without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand.

In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes, we allowed the taking of the witnesses’

testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the trial. Thus,
“depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever
necessary or convenient.” There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the
period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after
pre-trial.” There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of
executing final and executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have
become numerous or complicated.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The amended rule deleted the provision on taking deposition with leave of
court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property
which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been
served, and the same was just changed to upon ex parte motion of a party. By
stating that the deposition may be had upon ex party motion of a party, then the
provision “at the instance of any party” should necessarily be deleted, for being
redundant.
RULE 27

286
 Production or Inspection of Documents or Things

Section 1 - Motion for production or inspection; Order

Eagleridge Development Corporation vs. Cameron Granville

3 Asset Management, Inc.
G.R. No. 204700; April 10, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation (EDC), and sureties

Naval and Oben are the defendants in a collection suit initiated by Export and
Industry Bank (EIB) pending before RTC-Makati.

By virtue of a Deed of Assignment, EIB transferred EDC’s outstanding

obligation to respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. (Cameron),
a special purpose vehicle. Thereafter, Cameron filed its Motion to Substitute/Join
EIB, which was granted by the trial court. Petitioners then filed a Motion for
Production/Inspection of the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreements (LSPA)
referred to in the Deed of Assignment. Respondent Cameron opposed the motion
and argued that petitioners have not shown "good cause" to produce the LSPA
and that the same is allegedly irrelevant to the case a quo. The RTC denied
petitioners’ motion for failure to show “good cause” and for failure to show that
the LSPA is material.

ISSUE:

Is the LSPA mentioned in the Deed of Assignment relevant and material

to warrant the grant of the Motion for Production/Inspection under Rule 27?

RULING:

Yes.

The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of the

modes of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only
the parties, but also the court to discover all relevant and material facts in
connection with the case pending before it.

Although the grant of a motion for production is admittedly discretionary

on the part of the trial court judge, nevertheless, it cannot be arbitrarily or
unreasonably denied because to do so would bar access to relevant evidence that

287
may be used by a party-litigant and hence, impair his fundamental right to due
process. The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of
documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness and
practicability.

In the present case, as respondent Cameron’s claim against the petitioners

relies entirely on the validity of the Deed of Assignment, it is incumbent upon
respondent Cameron to allow petitioners to inspect all documents relevant to the
Deed, especially those documents which, by express terms, were referred to and
identified in the Deed itself. The LSPA, which pertains to the same subject matter-
the transfer of credit to respondent is manifestly useful to petitioner’s defense.

Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when
part of a writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same
subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or record
is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding
may also be given in evidence. Since the Deed of Assignment was produced in
court by respondent, petitioner must be given the opportunity to examine the
whole document.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

288
 Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management,
Inc. G.R. No. 204700 (Resolution), November 24, 2014

FACTS:

This case stemmed from a collection case between petitioners Eagleridge

Development Corporation and respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset
Management Corporation. The collection case was originally between petitioners
and Export and Industries Bank (EIB). During its pendency, EIB was substituted
by respondent pursuant to a deed of assignment issued by the former whereby it
transferred all petitioners’ loan obligation in favor of the latter. Petitioners
questioned the validity of the deed of assignment alleging that it failed to comply
with the mandatory requirements of the Special Purpose Vehicle Act and it
referred to Cameron Granville Asset Management (SPV-AMC), Inc., as the
assignee, and not respondent. By reason thereof, they filed a motion for production
against respondent to inspect the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA)
between respondent and EIB. The lower courts dismissed the motion, on appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed the decision. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

In this motion for consideration, respondent raised the following grounds:

1) the motion for production of the LSPA has been filed out of time, even beyond
the protracted pre-trial period from September 2005 to 2011; 2) the LSPA is
immaterial or irrelevant to the case since the lower court’s order of substitution
settled the issue of respondent’s standing before the court and its right to fill in the
shoes of EIB 3) the production of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence rule
under Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court; and 4) the LSPA is a
privileged/confidential bank documents and under the Special Purpose Vehicle
Act, the only obligation of both the assignor and the assignee is to give notice to
the debtor that its account has been assigned/transferred to a special purpose
vehicle . It does not require of the special purpose vehicle or the bank to disclose
all financial documents included in the assignment/sale/transfer.

ISSUES:

(1) Is the production of the LSPA material and relevant in or to determine

petitioner’s liability?

(2) Is the LSPA is a privileged and confidential document?

(3) Is the motion for production or inspection of documents available only up

to the pre-trial stage?

289
RULING:

(1) Yes, the LSPA is material to determine the actual amount paid by the
assignee for the transfer of the debt. Under Section 13 of the Special Purpose
Vehicle Act, in the transfer of the non-performing loans to a special purpose
vehicle, the provisions on subrogation and assignment of credits under the
New Civil Code shall apply. In relation thereto, Article 1634 of the Civil
Code provides that when a credit or other incorporeal right in litigation is
sold, the debtor shall have a right to extinguish it by reimbursing the
assignee for the price the latter paid therefor xxx. The debtor may exercise
his right within thirty days from the date the assignee demands payment
from him. Based on the provisions, the debtor may extinguish its debt by
paying the transferee transfer price plus the cost of money up to the time of
redemption and the judicial costs.

In the case at bar, the deed of assignment was silent on actual amount of the
transfer price. Hence, it becomes necessary to verify the amount of the
consideration from the LSPA. Since petitioners’ right to redemption begins
to run only from the time that they were informed of the actual price paid
for the transfer of their debt, then the LSPA is relevant and material in the
case.

(2) No, respondent failed to discharge the burden of showing that the LSPA is
a privileged document. Rule 130, Section 24 of the Rules of Court describes
the types of privileged communication. Further, other privileged matters
based on jurisprudence are the following: "(a) editors may not be compelled
to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled
to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained
in tax census returns; (d) bank deposits" (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act); (e) national security matters and intelligence
information; and (f) criminal matters.

LSPA does not fall in any of these classes of information, moreover, the
privilege is not absolute, and the court may compel disclosure where it is
indispensable for doing justice. In this case, Respondent did not present any
law or regulation that considered bank documents such as the LSPA as
classified information. The Special Purpose Vehicle Act does not explicitly
declare these financial documents as privileged matters. Further, as
discussed, petitioners are not precluded from inquiring as to the true
consideration of the assignment, precisely because the same law in relation
to Article 1634 allows the debtor to extinguish its debt by reimbursing the

290
 assignee-special purpose vehicle of the actual price the latter paid for the
assignment. Lastly, according to the Civil Code, an assignment of a credit
produces no effect as against third persons, unless it appears in a public
instrument.

Thus, it strains reason why the LSPA, which by law must be a public
instrument to be binding against third persons such as petitioners-debtors,
is privileged and confidential.

(3) No, discovery mode of production/inspection of document may be availed

of even beyond pre-trial upon a showing of good cause. According to Rule
27, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, upon motion of any party showing
good cause therefor the court in which an action is pending may order any
party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing,
by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control.

Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery
mode of production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule
only requires leave of court "upon due application and a showing of due
cause”. Since the Court have determined that the LSPA is relevant and
material to the issue on the validity of the deed of assignment raised by
petitioners in the court a quo, and allowing its production and inspection
by petitioners would be more in keeping with the objectives of the
discovery rules.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling of EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN vs. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3
ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. The
amendments in the old and new provisions under Section 1, Rule 27 are the same
except for the amendment to address gender sensitivity.

291
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Miguel Corporation
G.R. Nos. 205045 & 205723, January 25, 2017

FACTS:

These consolidated cases consider whether "San Mig Light" is a new brand or a
variant of one of San Miguel Corporation's existing beer brands, and whether the
Bureau of Internal Revenue may issue notices of discrepancy that effectively
changes "San Mig Light" 's classification from new brand to variant. The issues
involve an application of Section 143 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code
(Tax Code), as amended, on the definition of a variant, which is subject to a higher
excise tax rate than a new brand. This case also applies the requirement in Rep.
Act No. 9334 that reclassification of certain fermented liquor products introduced
between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2003 can only be done by an act of
Congress.

Petitioner CIR questions the denial of its Motion for Production of Documents and
Objects. It argues that this motion may be filed after pre-trial or during the
pendency of the action since Rule 27, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure does not explicitly provide that it must be availed of before trial or pre-
trial. Further, it contends that all requisites for filing the motion were satisfied.
Assuming the Motion was belatedly filed, it should have been granted in the
higher interest of justice.

Respondent counters that the Motions, which were filed only after the Court of
Tax Appeals Division rendered judgment, were belatedly filed since this mode of
discovery must be availed of before trial. Rule 27, Section 1 used the phrase, "in
which an action is pending"; thus, this defines which court has authority to resolve
the motion and does not define when the motion must be made. Respondent
contends that this remedy must be availed of before trial in order to facilitate and
expedite case preparations. Respondent adds that petitioner also failed to comply
with the requisites for the motion. Specifically, the Motion did not adequately
describe the contents of the documents to be produced to show their materiality
and relevance to the case. Respondent further submits that the documents and
objects are immaterial and irrelevant to the issues. The documents petitioner
sought to have respondent produce are referred to as having to do with the taste,
alcohol content, and calories of "San Mig Light," when the Tax Code definition of
variant has nothing to do with these matters. Respondent submits that in filing the
Motions after judgment, petitioner was effectively seeking new trial, which it may
only avail itself of with "newly discovered" evidence

ISSUE:

292
 (1) May a motion for production of documents and objects be availed of after
the court has rendered judgment?

(2) Did the petitioner comply with all requisites of a motion for production of
documents and objects under Rule 27, such as a showing of good cause?

RULING:

(1) YES. Rule 27, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. - Upon motion of
any party showing good cause therefore, the court in which an action is
pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the
purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the
property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order
shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and
taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and
conditions as are just.

Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court does not provide when the motion
may be used. Hence, the allowance of a motion for production of document
rests on the sound discretion of the court where the case is pending, with
due regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of equity and
justice.

The scope of discovery must be liberally construed, as a general rule, to

serve its purpose of providing the parties with essential information to
reach an amicable settlement or to expedite trial. "Courts, as arbiters and
guardians of truth and justice, must not countenance any technical ploy to
the detriment of an expeditious settlement of the case or to a fair, full and
complete determination on its merits."

In Eagleridge Development Corporation v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset

Management, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a motion for production of
documents may be availed of even beyond the pre-trial stage, upon
showing of good cause as required under Rule 27. It allowed the production

293
 of documents because the petitioner was able to show "good cause" and
relevance of the documents sought to be produced, and the trial court had
not yet rendered its judgment.

(2) NO. In this case, petitioner filed its Motion for Production of Documents
after the Court of Tax Appeals Division had rendered its judgment.
According to the Court of Tax Appeals Division, the documents sought to
be produced were already discussed in the Commissioner's Memorandum
dated October 21, 2010 and were already considered by the tax court when
it rendered its Decision. If petitioner believed that the evidence in the
custody and control of respondent "would provide a better illumination of
the outcome of the case," it should have sought their production at the
earliest opportunity as it had been already aware of their existence.
Petitioner's laxity is inexcusable and is a fatal omission.

Under these circumstances, there was indeed no further need for the
production of documents and objects desired by petitioner. These pieces of
evidence could have served no useful purpose. On the contrary, the
production of those documents after judgment defeats the purpose of
modes of discovery in expediting case preparation and shortening trials.

We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc
in affirming the Division's denial of petitioner's Motion for Production of
Documents.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

294
 RULE 30
Trial

Section 5 - Order of Trial

Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic

G.R. No. 204594, November 7, 2018

FACTS:

This case involves a 2,791-square-meter parcel of land (Tramo property)

located on Aurora Boulevard (Tramo), Pasay City, currently in Sindophil's
possession. Sindophil anchors its right to the Tramo property on Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 132440, which was purportedly issued by the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Complaint
for revocation, annulment, and cancellation of certificates of title before the Pasay
City Regional Trial Court, and impleaded Sindophil as one of the defendants.

In its Complaint, the Republic alleged that per TCT No. 10354, issued by the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City, the Tramo property was initially registered under
the name of Teodoro on November 12, 1964. Teodoro then sold it to a certain
Reynaldo Puma (Puma), causing the cancellation of TCT No. 10354 and the
issuance of TCT No. 128358. Subsequently, Puma sold it to a certain Lourdes Ty
(Ty). Puma's TCT No. 128358 was cancelled and TCT No. 129957 was issued to Ty.
Finally, on May 3, 1991 Ty sold the property to Sindophil, causing the cancellation
of TCT No. 129957 and the issuance of TCT No. 132440 to Sindophil on March 24,
1993

Despite the issuance of certificates of title over the Tramo property, the
Republic claimed that TCT No. 10354 in the name of Teodoro was spurious or of
doubtful authenticity.

In their Answer Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil countered that the
Republic was estopped from questioning the transfers considering that it had
allowed the series of transfers and even accepted the "tremendous amount[s] paid"
as capital gains tax. They added that the Complaint was filed because of the
Register of Deeds' "personal grudge" against them because they had questioned a
consulta issued by the Register of Deeds before the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority. They also contended that they were innocent purchasers
for value and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, reconveyance should not
lie.

295
 During trial, only the Republic was able to present its evidence. Defendants
Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil were all deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence when they failed to present any evidence or witness despite
several settings. The parties were then ordered to file their respective memoranda;
but instead of filing a memorandum, Sindophil filed a Motion to Re-Open Case,
praying that it be allowed to present evidence. As to why it failed to present
evidence during trial, Sindophil explained that its witness, Sindophil President
Victoria Y. Chalid (Chalid), suffered a stroke which prevented her from testifying
during trial

During trial, only the Republic was able to present its evidence. In its
November 13, 2009 Decision, It ruled in favor of the Republic and voided the
certificates of title issued to defendants Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil. It
found that the Tramo property claimed by Teodoro under TCT No. 10354 was
derived from TCT No. 6735 registered in the name of the Republic. However, no
annotation of the supposed transfer to Teodoro was annotated on TCT No. 6735.
On the claim of defendants that they were innocent purchasers for value, the
Regional Trial Court said that this defense was "just a mere [assertion] and was
never supported by any documents." It stated that defendants failed to discharge
the burden of proving that they were purchasers in good faith and for value, thus,
rejecting their argument.

Sindophil, together with Teodoro, appealed before the Court of Appeals.

However, for failure to file their appellants' brief within the required period, the
Court of Appeals deemed the appeal abandoned and consequently dismissed it.

ISSUE:

Did the Regional Trial Court err in deciding the case despite Sindophil's
filing of a Motion to Re-Open Case?

HELD:

No.

The order of trial is governed by Rule 30, Section 5 of the Rules of Court,
with item (f) specifically governing the reopening of a case to introduce new
evidence. Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at
the first instance, all the evidence he relies upon and such evidence cannot be given
piecemeal. The obvious rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises
to the other party and the consequent delay in the administration of justice.

296
 A party's declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence
prevents him from introducing further evidence; but where the evidence is
rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the
burden of evidence from one party to the other; or where the evidence sought to
be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence, the party's right to
introduce further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party
may avail of the remedy of certiorari.

Largely, the exercise of the court's discretion under the exception of Section
5 (f), Rule 30 of the Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts i.e., on whether
the evidence would qualify as a "good reason" and be in furtherance of "the interest
of justice." For a reviewing court to properly interfere with the lower court's
exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the lower court's action was
attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this term
as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all
in contemplation of the law. Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and
unsupported imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond
allegations that merely constitute errors of judgment or mere abuse of discretion.

While the general rule is rightly recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure
authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change the order of the trial, and "for
good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties "to offer evidence
upon their original case”. However, the court for good reasons, may, in the
furtherance of justice, permit the parties to offer evidence upon their original case,
and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of discretion appears,
Generally, additional evidence is allowed when . . .; but it may be properly
disallowed where it was withheld deliberately and without justification. The
introduction of new evidence even after a party has rested its case may, therefore,
be done but only if the court finds that it is for good reasons and in the furtherance
of justice. The admission is discretionary on the part of the court and, as explained
in Republic, may only be set aside if the admission was done with grave abuse of
discretion.

To recall, Sindophil filed an Urgent Motion to Reset Hearing with Notice of

Change of Address one (1) day before its scheduled initial presentation of
evidence. On motion by the Solicitor General, representing the Republic, the
Regional Trial Court denied the Motion to Reset Hearing for having been filed on
short notice and deemed as waived Sindophil's right to present evidence. The

297
parties were then ordered to file their respective memoranda thirty (30) days from
notice, after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision.

Thereafter, Sindophil filed a motion for extension, praying for an additional

fifteen (15) days or until February 26, 2009, to file its memorandum. The Regional
Trial Court granted the motion in its February 24, 2009 Order. However, despite
the grant of extension, Sindophil did not file the required memorandum. Instead,
it filed the Motion to Re-Open Case more than a month later or on March 31, 2009.
In its Motion to Re-Open Case, Sindophil alleged that its witness, Sindophil
President Chalid, had previously suffered a stroke that rendered her indisposed
to take the stand.

The stroke suffered by Sindophil's President was not a good reason to

reopen the case. In its Pre-Trial Brief, Sindophil indicated the Register of Deeds of
Pasay City as its other witness. It could have very well presented the Register of
Deeds first while Chalid recovered from her stroke. Why it did not do so is only
known to Sindophil. Furthermore, while illness is a valid ground for postponing
a hearing it does not appear that Sindophil raised Chalid's stroke as a ground to
postpone its initial presentation of defense evidence. The illness was only alleged
in the Motion to Re-Open Case filed on March 31, 2009, more than three (3) months
after the scheduled presentation of evidence on December 10, 2008. The excuse,
therefore, appears to be an afterthought. Neither can Sindophil claim that it was
not given equal opportunity to present its case. Atty. Obligar, counsel for
Sindophil, admitted that he never objected to the motions for extension to file
formal offer of evidence filed by the Republic. Even if this Court believes that he
did not object to the extensions "as a gesture of consideration bearing in mind the
work load and bulk of cases being attended to by the [Office of the Solicitor
General he was still not entitled to expect that the Office of the Solicitor General
would grant him the same leniency by not objecting to the Motion to Reset the
initial presentation of defense evidence. Litigation is primarily an adversarial
proceeding. Counsels are to take every opportunity, so long as it is within the
bounds of the law, to advocate their clients' causes.Furthermore, contrary to
Sindophil's claim, the Regional Trial Court entertained the Motion to Re-Open
Case that it even set the Motion for clarificatory hearing and oral argument.
However, Atty. Obligar again absented himself during the scheduled hearing.
Given the foregoing, the Regional Trial Court did not gravely abuse its discretion
in deciding the case despite the filing of the Motion to ReOpen Case.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

298
 RULE 32
Trial by Commissioner

Section 2 - Reference ordered on Motion.

Section 3 - Order of reference; powers of the commissioner
Section 9 - Report of Commissioner

National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Asoque

G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner NPC entered into a portion of respondent spouses’ property in

order to install electric transmission lines. The spouses allowed NPC to do so on
the understanding that the latter will pay the value of the land occupied and the
plantation therein which will be destroyed. The spouses demanded from NPC the
payment for the value of the land occupied and the plantation destroyed but the
latter only paid the value of the plantation claiming that it is only obliged to pay
10% of the market value of the property subject to a right-of-way under RA 6395.
According to NPC, since the spouses already accepted the payment for the value
of the improvements, it found that there is no more need to initiate expropriation
proceedings and continue with the construction. However, the spouses filed an
action for payment of just compensation and damages against NPC to recover the
value of the land occupied by the latter.

The court authorized the spouses to present evidence ex parte after NPC
failed to attend the scheduled pre-trials. The spouses presented the evidence to the
court-appointed commissioner, who is the branch clerk of court, who thereafter
reported on the prevailing market values of the land and the plantation. The court
ruled in favor of the spouses and ordered NPC to pay them the market value of
the land and plantation as determined by the commissioner.

NPC’s appeal to the CA was denied, prompting it to elevate the matter to

SC. NPC argued that the trial court’s appointment of a commissioner and the
latter’s appraisal of the fair market value of the property and the improvements
made were defective and ultra vires. It contends that Rule 18, Section 2(f) of the
Rules of Court does not give the Commissioner such authority but merely allows
him to assist in defining the issues to be resolved during the trial. NPC also points
out that the order of appointment merely designated a commissioner to receive
respondents’ evidence and nothing more. There is likewise no showing that the
Commissioner took an oath before performing his function, as required by the
Rules.

299
ISSUE:

Is the appointment of a commissioner proper?

RULING:

Yes, the appointment of a commissioner is proper.

When an inverse condemnation is filed, the provisions for the appointment

of commissioners under Rule 32 — not Sections 5, 6, 7, or 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court — will be followed. Accordingly, Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 32 of the Rules of
Court provides that when the parties do not consent, the court may, upon the
application of either or of its own motion, direct a reference to a commissioner in
the following cases: (a) When the trial of an issue of fact requires the examination
of a long account on either side, in which case the commissioner may be directed
to hear and report upon the whole issue or any specific question involved therein;
(b) When the taking of an account is necessary for the information of the court
before judgment, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. (c) When a
question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise,
in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. When a
reference is made, the clerk shall forthwith furnish the commissioner with a copy
of the order of reference. The order may specify or limit the powers of the
commissioner, and may direct him to report only upon particular issues, or to do
or perform particular acts, or to receive and report evidence only and may fix the
date for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of his report. Subject
to other specifications and limitations stated in the order, the commissioner has
and shall exercise the power to regulate the proceedings in every hearing before
him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient
performance of his duties under the order. He may issue subpoenas and
subpoenas duces tecum, swear witnesses, and unless otherwise provided in the
order of reference, he may rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The trial or
hearing before him shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the court.

After the hearing before the Commissioner, the Commissioner must file a
written report, which may contain his or her factual findings and conclusions of
law pursuant to Sec. 9, Rule 32 which states that upon the completion of the trial
or hearing or proceeding before the commissioner, he shall file with the court his
report in writing upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference.
When his powers are not specified or limited, he shall set forth his findings of fact
and conclusions of law in his report. He shall attach thereto all exhibits, affidavits,

300
depositions, papers and the transcript, if any, of the testimonial evidence
presented before him.

In this case, the court appointed the branch clerk of court as the
commissioner for purposes of determining the market values of the land and the
plantation. Absent any express limitation in the order of reference, the court-
appointed commissioner, may make factual findings and recommendations on the
valuation of the property. Indeed, the Commissioner’s recommendation could
have been necessarily rejected had it been an ultra vires act. Besides, the
proceedings before the court were not for expropriation — for which NPC itself
claims that there is no need — but were for recovery of just compensation and
damages initiated by the spouses. Hence, Rule 67, Section 5 on the ascertainment
of the just compensation to be paid was no longer applicable.

Thus, the appointment of a commissioner is proper.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

301
 RULE 33
Demurrer to Evidence

Section 1 - Demurrer to evidence.

Republic vs. Gimenez and Gimenez

G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016

FACTS:

The Republic, through the PCGG, instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance,

Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses
before the

Sandiganbayan. The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired

by them as dummies, agents, or nominees of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda Marcos.

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the

positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the
Gimenez Spouses. The Republic presented the testimonies of witnesses testified
on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez
Spouses.

The Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further
evidence." Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until
March 29, 2006 "to file its formal offer of evidence."

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days
or until April 28, 2006, within which to file its formal offer of evidence. The Motion
was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same date.

On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until
May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. This Motion was
granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8, 2006.

Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the

Republic.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan
noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding
repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated its

302
presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of
its Formal Offer of Evidence.

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated

May 30, 2006. He argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was
no evidence to support its cause of action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to
Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to prosecute. Through her
own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.

Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June
15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed
Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the

Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the
Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss.

The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Is the Sandiganbayan correct in granting Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to

Dismiss based on demurrer to evidence?

RULING:

NO.

The Supreme Court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer
to evidence: A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the
law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence
together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn
therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to
evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable
when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his
favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has
failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there
is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be
sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.

The Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner

was cursory. Its main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to

303
Evidence was that there was no evidence to consider due to petitioner’s failure to
file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off the totality of evidence on which
petitioner built its case.

Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this

court finds it clear from the second assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan
did not even consider other evidence presented by petitioner during the 19 years
of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner’s testimonial evidence
without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the
testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses. The court cannot arbitrarily disregard
evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence which tests the
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.

To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally

offer documentary evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.

However, the procedure found in the third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court which provides that "if the motion to dismiss is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed the movant shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence" shall not apply. Due process now requires
that we remand the case to the Sandiganbayan. Respondents may, at their option
and through proper motion, submit their Comment. The Sandiganbayan should
then rule on the admissibility of the documentary and object evidence covered by
the Formal Offer submitted by petitioner. Respondents then may avail themselves
of any remedy thereafter allowed by the Rules.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

304
 RULE 35
Summary Judgments

Section 3 - Motion and Proceedings thereon.

Olivarez Realty Corporation v. Castillo

G.R. No. 196251, July 9, 2014

FACTS:

The subject property is a parcel of land located in Batangas, covered by two

TCTs registered in the name of Benjamin Castillo and Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA). Castillo entered into a contract of conditional sale with petitioner
Olivarez Realty Corporation stipulating that petitioner shall pay a down payment
of PhP 5 Million. The contract also provided that petitioner, with the full assistance
of Castillo, shall file the action against PTA to void the latter’s title with the
remaining balance to be paid in monthly installments beginning the month when
the decision in such action is rendered. Because there were legitimate tenants
occupying the land, the contract also provided that petitioner is to pay them
“disturbance compensation”, while Castillo is to clear the land of the tenants
within 6 months from the signing of the deed of conditional sale.

Petitioner took possession of the subject property but only paid half of the
agreed down payment and did not file any action against PTA. Neither did it clear
the land of the tenants nor did it pay them disturbance compensation, thus
prompting Castillo to file a complaint against it. In its answer, petitioner admitted
the said allegations but claims that it withheld subsequent payments because
Castillo failed to assist them in filing the action and in clearing the property of the
tenants. After the pleadings were filed, Castillo moved for summary judgment
and/or judgment on the pleadings. The trial court rendered summary judgment
in favor of Castillo and such decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Are there genuine issues of material fact in the case requiring the conduct
of a full-blown trial?

RULING:

No.

305
 Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the answer filed fails to tender
any issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations in the complaint. On the
other hand, in a summary judgment, the answer filed tenders issues as specific
denials and affirmative defenses are pleaded, but the issues raised are sham,
fictitious, or otherwise not genuine. An issue of material fact exists if the answer
or responsive pleading filed specifically denies the material allegations of fact set
forth in the complaint or pleading. If the issue of fact "requires the presentation of
evidence, it is a genuine issue of fact". However, if the issue "could be resolved
judiciously by plain resort" to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other
papers on file, the issue of fact raised is sham, and the trial court may resolve the
action through summary judgment.

Considering that Olivarez Realty Corporation’s answer tendered an issue,

Castillo properly availed himself of a motion for summary judgment. However,
the issues tendered by the answer are not genuine issues of material
fact. Petitioner corporation cannot refuse to fully pay the purchase price on the
ground the no court case was filed against PTA because the deed of conditional
sale is clear that petitioner is responsible for initiating court action against PTA.
Neither can it invoke that Castillo failed to “fully assist” the corporation in filing
the case as Castillo cannot assist petitioner when it did not file the action in the
first place. Petitioner’s refusal to pay the purchase price due to PTA’s adverse
claim cannot also be invoked as it knew of this adverse claim and even obligated
itself to commence the action against PTA. This defense, therefore, is sham.

As demonstrated, there are no genuine issues of material fact in this case.

These are issues that can be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings,
affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file. As such, summary judgment was
proper.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Olivarez Realty Corporation v. Castillo (G.R. No.
196251, July 9, 2014) is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. Section 3, Rule 35 of the
new rules retained the same grounds on the basis of which summary judgment
maybe rendered. It only deleted the provision providing for the period within
which to serve the motion in accordance with the amended Rule 15 and added that
the order denying or granting the motion shall not be subject of an appeal or
petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus before judgment.

306
 RULE 36
Judgments, Final Orders and Entry thereof

Section 1 - Rendition of judgments and final orders.

Philippine National Bank vs. Heirs of Entapa

G.R. No. 215072, September 7, 2016

FACTS:

Caridad Entapa and her children executed a SPA in favor of Joseph

Gonzaga for the purpose of entering into legal transactions on their behalf.
Gonzaga executed a real estate mortgage over a lot owned by Entapa as a security
for a loan obtained from PNB. Gonzaga failed to pay the loan. Thus, the lot was
foreclosed and was sold in a public auction where PNB won as the highest bidder.
Despite knowledge that the lot was already foreclosed, one of the heirs of Entapa
requested for a recomputation and reconstruction of the loan which was granted
provided that the heir deposit 20% of the recomputed amount, to which the heir
obliged and paid. Thereafter, it was found by the heirs that the lot was occupied
by 5 families who are now title holders of the lot as beneficiaries of the CARP. The
heirs requested for an explanation on this matter from PNB and for it to file a case
to annul the titles given to the 5 families. When the heirs inquired DAR, it was
found that the lot was voluntarily offered for sale by PNB. This prompted the heirs
to file an action to recover the deposit paid to PNB.

The RTC rendered its Decision having a total of 4 pages, where the first 3
pages narrated the facts of the case and the last page stating the ruling that PNB is
liable to the heirs of Entapa and ordered it to pay the latter. PNB appealed the
Decision to CA praying that the RTC Decision be set aside for failure to comply
with Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the 1987
Constitution. The CA rendered its Decision nullifying the RTC Decision and
remanding the same to the RTC for proper observance of provisions of the Rules
and Constitution. Dissatisfied, PNB elevated matter to SC by certiorari alleging
that the CA made an adjudication on the merits of the case by finding PNB liable
to the heirs of Entapa even it eventually nullified the RTC Decision and even
ordered it to be remanded.

ISSUE:

1. Is the RTC Decision void?

2. Is the CA absolutely precluded from making an adjudication on the
merits of a case where the Decision must be nullified?

307
RULING:

First Issue - Yes, the RTC Decision is void.

Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that a judgment or final
order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court. This provision is
grounded from Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Thus, a court must state the
factual and legal basis for its decisions; otherwise, its decisions are void. The
constitutional requirement that the basis of the decision of our courts should be
clearly articulated and made legible to the parties does not merely assure fairness.
It is likewise crucial to assure the public that the judiciary arrives at its conclusions
on the basis of reasonable inference from credible and admissible evidence and the
text of law and our jurisprudence. Not only will fully coherent and cogent reasons
have greater chances to convince the litigants of their chances on appeal; they also
make appeals possible. After all, appellate courts cannot be assumed to have so
much omniscience that they can read what the trial judge has not written.

In this case, the CA, in nullifying the RTC Decision, stated that it contained
no reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions nor did it cite any legal
authority or principle to support its conclusion that PNB is liable. The CA found
that the RTC merely narrated the factual circumstances of the case in the first 3
pages of the Decision and directly declared the liability of the PNB to pay the heirs
in the 4 and last page of the Decision.
th

Thus, the RTC Decision is void for failure to comply with Sec. 1, Rule 36.

Second issue - No, the CA is not absolutely precluded from making an

adjudication on the merits of a case where the Decision must be nullified.

Obiter dictum is “an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of

law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it.” It is a “a remark
made, or opinion expressed . . . upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument.” It “lacks the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be
regarded as such.”

308
 In this case, it was alleged that the CA erred in adjudicating on the merits
of the case even after it has ruled to nullify the RTC Decision and remand the same
to the lower court. However, nothing in the CA Decision was found to have
declared any liability of PNB. And even if the CA had adjudicated upon the merits
of the case, any discussion would have been considered obiter dictum since the
entire case was remanded to the RTC.

Thus, the CA is not absolutely precluded from making an adjudication on

the merits of a case where the Decision must be nullified because such adjudication
may just be considered as an obiter dictum.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

309
Section 2 - Entry of judgments and final orders.

Mercedes S. Gatmaytan v. Francisco Dolor and Hermogena Dolor

G.R. No. 198120, February 20, 2017

FACTS:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, praying that the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA), Sixth Division, be reversed and set aside and that the CA
be directed to resolve petitioner Mercedes S. Gatmaytan's appeal on the merits.

The RTC’s Decision resolved an action for reconveyance against Gatmaytan

and in favor of the plaintiff spouses, now respondents Francisco and Hermogena
Dolor. Gatmaytan insists that the RTC’s March 27, 2006 Decision has not attained
finality as the April 14, 2006 service was made to her counsel's former address (at
No. 117 West Avenue, Quezon City) as opposed to the address (at Unit 602, No.
42 Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City) that her counsel
indicated in a June 8, 2004 Notice of Change of Address filed with the RTC
Gatmaytan adds that the RTC noted the change of address in an Order of the same
date, and directed that, from then on, service of papers, pleadings, and processes
was to be made at her counsel's updated address at Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun
Condominium, Timog Avenue, Quezon City.

In its assailed Decision, the CA dismissed Gatmaytan's appeal, noting that

the assailed Decision of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 223, had
already attained finality. In its assailed Resolution, the CA denied Gatmaytan's
Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Has the RTC’s March 27, 2006 Decision already attained finality thus,
precluding the filing of petitioner Mercedes S. Gatmaytan's appeal with the Court
of Appeals?

RULING:

YES.

The RTC’s March 27, 2006 Decision already attained finality.

310
 This elementary rule finds basis in "public policy and sound practice that at
the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi- judicial
agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law." Basic rationality
dictates that there must be an end to litigation. Any contrary posturing renders
justice inutile, reducing to futility the winning party's capacity to benefit from the
resolution of a case.

In accordance with Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
unless a Motion for Reconsideration is timely filed, the judgment or final order
from which it arose shall become final: Section 2. Entry of Judgments and Final
Orders. — If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within
the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final order shall forthwith be
entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of finality of the
judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of its entry. The record shall
contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final order and shall be signed by
the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final order has become final and
executory.

In turn, Rule 37, Section 1, in relation to Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, allows for 15 days from notice of a judgment or final order
within which a Motion for Reconsideration may be filed.

Rule 37, Section 1 reads: Section 1. Grounds of and Period for Filing Motion for
New Trial or Reconsideration. — Within the period for taking an appeal, the
aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order
and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting
the substantial rights of said party: (a)Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by
reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
(b)Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered, and produced at the trial, and which if presented would
probably alter the result.

Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for
reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that
the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision
or final order is contrary to law

For its part, Rule 41, Section 3 reads: Section 3. Period of Ordinary Appeal.
— The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant

311
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial
or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Reckoning the date when a party is deemed to have been given notice of
the judgment or final order subject of his or her Motion for Reconsideration
depends on the manner by which the judgment of final order was served upon the
party himself or herself.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

312
 RULE 37
New Trial or Reconsideration

Section 1 - Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or
reconsideration

Valderrama v. People
G.R. No. 220054, March 27, 2017

FACTS:

The city prosecutor filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 43 four (4) Informations for grave oral defamation against Deogracia
M. Valderrama (Valderrama), pursuant to a complaint filed by Josephine ABL
Vigden (Vigden).

During the trial on April 12, 2012, Vigden was present but the private
prosecutor was absent despite notice. On motion of the defense, the Metropolitan
Trial Court considered the prosecution to have waived its right to present further
evidence and required a formal offer of its documentary evidence within five (5)
days. The prosecution failed to formally offer its evidence within five (5) days from
the hearing.

On May 8, 2012, Vigden filed a Very Urgent Motion to Reconsider (Motion

to Reconsider) explaining that the private prosecutor failed to appear because he
had to manage his high blood pressure. The motion to reconsider was granted.

Valderrama argues that the Metropolitan Trial Court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the patently defective Motion to Reconsider. She
argues that the motion was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period
required under Section 1 Rule 37 Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Was the motion filed beyond the reglementary period?

RULING:

Yes. This Court notes that the Motion to Reconsider was filed outside the
period allowed by the rules as set in Rule 37, Section 1 of the Rules of Court:

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 Section 1. Grounds of and Period for Filing Motion for New Trial or
Reconsideration. — Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved
party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and
grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting
the substantial rights of said party.

The period for taking an appeal is 15 days. Thus, respondent had 15 days
to file her Motion to Reconsider. This period is non-extendible. Failing to question
an order or decision within the period prescribed by law renders the order or
decision final and binding.

The Metropolitan Trial Court issued its Order on April 12, 2012 and
required the prosecution to formally offer its documentary evidence within five
(5) days from that date. The prosecution failed to formally offer its evidence within
five (5) days from the hearing. It also failed to file the Motion to Reconsider within
15 days. The prosecution had 15 days from April 12, 2012, or until April 27, 2012
to file its Motion to Reconsider. The private prosecutor filed her Motion to
Reconsider only on May 8, 2012, or 26 days after the Metropolitan Trial Court
issued its Order.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

No specific effect on the ruling.

314
 Alejandro Ceprado, Jr. v. Nationwide Security and Allied Services
G.R. No. 175198, September 23, 2015

FACTS:

The Office of the Regional Director of the DOLE conducted a regular

inspection of Uniden's Cabuyao plant pursuant to its visitorial and enforcement
powers. Certain violations of labor standards laws are allegedly committed
against the security personnel stationed at Uniden. Regional Director Martinez
declared the labor inspector's findings "final and conclusive" in the Order dated
April 19, 2001 and directed Nationwide Security and Uniden to solidarily pay 40
security personnel the aggregate amount of P1,600,134.40 representing wage
differentials and other salary-related benefits, with each security personnel
receiving P40,003.36.

Nationwide Security filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Acting on such,

Regional Director Martinez reversed his April 19, 2001 Order and recomputed the
wage differentials due to the security personnel, specifically for Ceprado, Jr. et al.
Regional Director Martinez ruled that they were collectively entitled to P46,218.10.

Ceprado, Jr. et al. then wrote the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
praying that the Resolution of Regional Director Martinez be set aside. They
alleged that upon verification of case records, Nationwide Security and Uniden
neither appealed nor filed a motion for reconsideration of the April 19, 2001 Order.
Thus, the April 19, 2001 Order already became final and executory and may no
longer be disturbed.

ISSUE:

Did the failure to furnish the adverse party of the motion for
reconsideration toll the running of the reglementary period for filing an appeal?

RULING:

No. The Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in labor standards cases,
requires a written notice of every motion for reconsideration to be served on the
adverse party as compliance with the requirement of due process. Motions for
reconsideration not served on the other party are pro forma and are "mere scrap[s]
of paper" not to be acted upon by the court. Motions for reconsideration not served
on the other party do not toll the running of the reglementary period for filing an

315
appeal, and the judgment sought to be reconsidered becomes final and executory
upon lapse of the reglementary period.

As respondent failed to furnish petitioners a copy of its Motion for

Reconsideration of the April 19, 2001 Order, Regional Director Martinez had no
jurisdiction to act on the Motion for Reconsideration. The Resolution of Regional
Director Martinez granting the Motion for Reconsideration is null and void for
want of jurisdiction.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in Alejandro Ceprado, Jr. v. Nationwide Security and Allied Services
(G.R. No. 175198, September 23, 2015) is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. The new
rules only cover Rules 6 to 35, thereby not affecting Rule 37.

316
 RULE 38
Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other Proceedings

Section 1 - Petition for Relief from Judgment, Order, or Other proceedings

City of Dagupan v. Maramba

G.R. No. 174411, July 2, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent Ester Maramba constructed a commercial fish center on a

property she leased from the DENR. Later on, petitioner city caused the
demolition thereof without giving direct notice to Maramba and with threat of
taking over the property. Respondent filed a complaint for injunction and
damages in the amount of PhP10 Million.

On July 30, 2004, Judge Laron of the trial court ruled in favor of Maramba
and awarded a total of PhP 11 Million as damages. Petitioner city received a copy
of the said decision on August 11, 2004 and filed a motion for reconsideration on
August 26. Maramba filed an opposition on the ground that the motion was not
set for hearing. Petitioner’s motion was denied by the trial court on October 21,
2004. On October 25, petitioner received a copy of such denial and filed a petition
for relief on October 29 alleging excusable negligence on the part of the City Legal
Officer’s failure to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration.
Such petition was denied by the trial court but was later on granted by Judge
Castillo after reconsideration. The damages awarded were reduced to Php 75,000
as this was the only amount Maramba was able to prove as the appraised value of
the improvements made on the property. Upon appeal, the initial decision of the
trial court was reinstated.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed this present petition and submits that the
petition for relief was correctly granted as its counsel's mistake amounted to
extrinsic fraud and argues that to give the plaintiff much more than it was able to
prove is a deprivation of its property without due process. On the other hand,
Maramba maintains that petitioner city is bound by the mistake of its counsel in
failing to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Can the mistake of the petitioner’s counsel in failing to include a notice of

hearing in its motion for consideration be considered extrinsic fraud that would
be a ground for the availment of a petition for relief?

317
RULING:

Yes. Excusable negligence as a ground for a petition for relief requires that
the negligence be so gross "that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against it." This excusable negligence must also be imputable to the party-
litigant and not to his or her counsel whose negligence binds his or her
client. Nevertheless, this court has relaxed this rule on several occasions such as:
(1) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the
client's liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require.

Fraud as a ground for a petition for relief from judgment pertains to

extrinsic or collateral fraud or that which prevents a party from fully and fairly
presenting his case or defense. On the other hand, mistake as used in Rule 38
means mistake of fact and not mistake of law. However, mistake can be of such
nature as to cause substantial injustice to one of the parties. It may be so palpable
that it borders on extrinsic fraud.

In the case herein, the mistake of petitioner’s counsel was fatal considering
that the trial court awarded a total amount of PhP11 million in favor of Maramba
based merely on her testimony without any document presented to substantiate
her claimed costs. The gross disparity between the award of actual damages and
the amount actually proved during the trial, the magnitude of the award, the
nature of the "mistake" made, and that such negligence did not personally affect
the legal officer of the city all contributed to a conclusion that the mistake or
negligence committed by counsel bordered on extrinsic fraud. Hence, the trial
court correctly granted the petitioner’s petition for relief.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of City of Dagupan v. Maramba (G.R. No. 174411, July
2, 2014) is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. Section 1, Rule 38 remains the same
under the new rules.

318
 Madarang v. Spouses Morales
G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014

FACTS:

Spouses Bartolome loaned PhP 500,000 from Spouses Morales and

mortgaged their house and lot located at Quezon City to the latter to secure their
obligation. The former died without having paid their loan which prompted
Spouses Morales to file a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
property against petitioner who represented herself as Lita Bartolome and
convinced Spouses Morales to lend them money. The trial court ruled in favor of
the defendants.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision
which was subsequently denied for being pro forma. They received a copy of this
denial on June 24, 2010. On August 11, 2010, petitioner filed a notice of appeal
which was also denied by the trial court for being filed out of time. The trial court
ruled that because the defendant’s counsel received a copy of the denial on June
24, 2010, they had only until July 9 to appeal the decision.

Petitioner then filed for a petition for relief from judgment blaming their 80-
year-old lawyer, arguing that the failure to appeal within the reglementary period
was a mistake and an excusable negligence due to their former lawyer's old age.
They add that because they personally received a copy of the decision only on
August 11, 2011, the period to file an appeal must be counted from that date and
not on the day their “ailing counsel” received the copy. The trial court denied the
petition for relief. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals which the latter denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Can negligence due to old age of the petitioner’s former counsel be

considered a valid ground for filing a petition for relief from judgment?

RULING:

No. Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition
for relief from judgment may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, the
negligence must be so gross "that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have

319
guarded against." This is to prevent parties from reviving the right to appeal
already lost through inexcusable negligence.

Petitioners argue that their former counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal
within the reglementary period was "a mistake and an excusable negligence due
to their former counsel's age." This argument stereotypes and demeans senior
citizens. It asks this court to assume that a person with advanced age is prone to
incompetence. There is also no showing that the negligence could not have been
prevented through ordinary diligence and prudence. As such, they are bound by
their counsel's negligence.

Petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal, considering that
their former counsel received a copy of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's decision on June 24, 2010. Since they filed their
notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, the trial court correctly denied the notice
of appeal for having been filed out of time.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Madarang v. Spouses Morales (G.R. No. 199283, June
9, 2014) is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. Section 1, Rule 38 of the new rules
remains the same.

320
Section 3 - Time for filing petition; contents and verification.

Madarang v. Spouses Morales

G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014

FACTS:

Spouses Bartolome loaned PhP 500,000 from Spouses Morales and

mortgaged their house and lot located at Quezon City to the latter to secure their
obligation. The former died without having paid their loan which prompted
Spouses Morales to file a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
property against petitioner who represented herself as Lita Bartolome and
convinced Spouses Morales to lend them money. In its decision dated December
22, 2009, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. Petitioner Madarang
received a copy of the decision on January 29, 2010.

On February 8, 2010, petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of

the trial court’s decision which was subsequently denied on May 25, 2010 for being
pro forma. She received a copy of this denial on June 24, 2010. On August 11, 2010,
petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was also denied by the trial court on
August 13, 2010 for being filed out of time.

On September 24, 2010, petitioner filed for a petition for relief from
judgment blaming their 80-year-old lawyer who failed to file the notice of appeal
within the reglementary period. On April 27, 2011, the trial court denied the
petition because it was filed beyond the 60-day period from the finality of the
court’s decision. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals which the latter denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Was the petition for relief from judgment filed on time?

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court agrees that the petition for relief from judgment
was filed out of time. However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-day period
to file a petition for relief from the date of finality of the trial court's decision. Rule
38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day period
must be counted after petitioner learns of the judgment or final order. The period
counted from the finality of judgment or final order is the six-month period. The
double period required is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. A

321
petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is
dismissed outright. This is because a petition for relief from judgment is an
exception to the public policy of immutability of final judgments.

In this case, petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of the trial court's
decision on January 29, 2010. Although petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, this motion was pro forma for not specifying the findings or
conclusions in the decision that were not supported by the evidence or contrary to
law. Their motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period to appeal.
Thus, the decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on February 13,
2010. Petitioners had six (6) months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12,
2010, to file a petition for relief from judgment. Since petitioners filed their petition
for relief from judgment on September 24, 2010, the petition for relief from
judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from finality of judgment. Hence, the
trial court should have denied the petition for relief from judgment on this ground.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in the case of Madarang v. Spouses Morales (G.R. No. 199283, June
9, 2014) is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC. Section 3, Rule 38 of the new rules
remains the same.

322
 RULE 39
Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments

Section 1 - Execution upon Judgments or Final orders

Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corporation

G.R. Nos. 208205 & 208212, June 1, 2016

FACTS:

In 1959, Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) entered into an

agreement with Pasay City for the reclamation of the foreshore lands along Manila
Bay. The Republic sued for recovery of possession and damages on the ground
that the contract is outside the commerce of man as it is owned by the Republic
(Republic v. CA). The Supreme Court (SC) upheld the Republic’s arguments but it
nevertheless recognized the RREC already undertook partial work for which it
incurred expenses. Thus, despite the nullity of the agreement and RREC’s failure
to reclaim any land, the SC still awarded RREC compensation for the work it had
actually done based on quantum meruit, and it pegged the value at P10,926,071.29
plus interest from 1962 until fully paid, to be split between Pasay and RREC.

The decision of the SC in Republic v. CA became final and executory on July

27, 1999. RREC and Pasay City filed before a Motion for Execution with the SC.
The SC denied the motion on the ground that IT was not the proper forum for
executing a final and executory judgment. Pasay then filed before the RTC a
Motion for Execution and RREC joined Pasay City in filing a Motion for Execution
(After Adjustment of Quantum Meruit Compensation). The Republic opposed the
said motion, arguing that RREC and Pasay City’s Motion for Execution
contravenes this Court’s Decision in Republic v. CA. The RTC denied RREC and
Pasay City’s motion and ruled that that the writ of execution must conform to the
judgment to be executed. The RTC issued a writ and Sheriff De Jesus issued a
Notice of Execution and Notice to pay against the Republic for P49,173,064,201.17
instead of the P10.9 million ordered by the SC, basing his computation on a
formula that that set the Philippine peso today at P51.58 for every one (1) peso in
1962, with compounding interests. The Republic filed a Very Urgent Motion to
Quash the Writ of Execution and Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay but was
denied. Motion for Reconsideration likewise denied. On appeal by certiorari the
CA declared the Writ of Execution, Notice of Execution, and Notice to Pay as null
and void.

ISSUE:

323
 Whether or not the CA erred in declaring the writ of execution, Notice of
Execution, and Notice to Pay as null and void

RULING:

No, the Court of Appeals did not err and it correctly declared the Writ of
Execution and Sheriff De Jesus’ Notice null and void.

Republic v. Court of Appeals has long been final and executory. This Court
judiciously examined and exhaustively discussed the issues raised in RREC’s
Petition. These are the same arguments now being raised. RREC’s relentless
pursuit of this case vexes this Court. The Court’s decision must be respected
pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, the ruling in Republic v. CA is the settled
law of the case.

The SC’s final and executory decision cannot be amended. It cannot be done
by the trial court, much less by its sheriff. A judgment, once final, is immutable
and unalterable. In Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, this
Court’s Decision may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. This Court’s final and
executory decision cannot be amended. It cannot be done by the trial court, much
less by its sheriff. The sheriff’s execution of judgment is a purely ministerial phase
of adjudication. In implementing the writ, the sheriff must strictly conform to the
letter of the judge’s order.

324
 Chiquita Brands, Inc. v. Omelio
G.R. No. 189102, June 07, 2017

FACTS:

A complaint for damages was filed by Filipino plantation workers against

petitioner et. al. for allegedly suffering permanent injuries while being exposed to
a pesticide (DBCP) used by them while working. The parties entered into a
compromise agreement and the RTC approved the Compromise Agreement by
way of judgement on compromise.

Due to various reasons, the case was transferred to another RTC which
subsequently issued orders and writs of execution that goes against the provisions
of the Compromise Agreement. Petitioner herein seeks to nullify the said orders
and writs for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Is the court allowed to issue writs of execution that goes against the
provisions of a judicially approved compromise agreement?

RULING:

No, a writ of execution that varies the respective obligations of the parties
under a judicially approved compromise agreement is void and courts can neither
amend nor modify the terms and conditions of a compromise validly entered into
by the parties. A writ of execution derives its validity from the judgment it seeks
to enforce and must essentially conform to the judgment's terms. It can neither be
wider in scope nor exceed the judgment that gives it life. Otherwise, it has no
validity. Thus, in issuing writs of execution, courts must look at the terms of the
judgment sought to be enforced. Courts can neither modify nor impose terms
different from the terms of a compromise agreement that parties have entered in
good faith. To do so would amount to grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the
compromise agreement has already received judicial imprimatur, thus, it has the
effect of res judicata between the parties pursuant to Article 2037 of the New Civil
Code. Hence, issuing a writ of execution that varies the respective obligations of
the parties under a judicially approved compromise agreement is void

325
 Magsaysay Maritime Corporation et. al. v. Cynthia de Jesus
G.R. No. 203943. August 30, 2017

FACTS:

Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay), the local manning agent of

Princess Cruise Lines, Limited, hired Bernardine De Jesus (Bernardine) as an
Accommodation Supervisor for the cruise ship Regal Princess. Bernardine
disembarked from Regal Princess after his employment contract ended, but was
soon diagnosed with Aortic Aneurysm, and he had a coronary angiography. He
underwent a Left Axillofemoral Bypass, but he died soon thereafter. Respondent
Cynthia De Jesus (Cynthia), Bernardine's widow, filed a complaint against
Magsaysay for payment of death benefits, among others.

LA granted Cynthia’s complaint, and directed Magsaysay to pay the

former. NLRC denied appeal. Magsaysay thus filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA. Meanwhile, Magsaysay offered to partially pay the award to Cynthia and
they executed a conditional satisfaction of the judgment award, which provides
that the settlement is without prejudice to Magsaysay’s Petition for Certiorari
pending before the CA and Cynthia undertakes to return the amount paid in case
the CA reverses the award, while Magsaysay undertakes to pay the balance of the
award in case the CA sustains it. However, in an Affidavit of Heirship, Cynthia
was prohibited from seeking further redress against Magsaysay. The CA
dismissed the petition for being moot and academic by virtue of the settlement
made by Magsaysay. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Did the payment of money judgment render the petition for certiorari
before the CA moot and academic?

RULING:

Yes, the CA properly dismissed Magsaysay’s petition for being moot and
academic. While the general rule is that a valid compromise agreement has the
power to render a pending case moot and academic, being a contract, the parties
may opt to modify the legal effects of their compromise agreement to prevent the
pending case from becoming moot. However, a conditional settlement of a
judgment award may be treated as a compromise agreement and a judgment on
the merits of the case if it turns out to be highly prejudicial to one of the parties.

326
 In Leonis Navigation v. Villamater, it was held that execution of the final and
executory decision or resolution of the NLRC shall proceed despite the pendency
of a petition for certiorari, unless it is restrained by the proper court. While Career
Philippines Ship Management Inc v. Madjus holds that the "Conditional Satisfaction
of Judgment" is valid, hence, the "conditional" settlement of the judgment award
insofar as it operates as a final satisfaction thereof to render the case moot and
academic. In Philippine Transmarine Carriers Inc. v. Legaspi, this Court ruled against
the employer in Career Philippines not because the parties entered into a conditional
settlement but because the conditional satisfaction of judgment was “highly
prejudicial to the employee.” The agreement stated that the payment of the
monetary award was without prejudice to the right of the employer to file a
petition for certiorari and appeal, while the employee agreed that she would no
longer file any complaint or prosecute any suit of action against the employer after
receiving the payment. Ultimately, in Philippine Transmarine, the Court ruled that
since the agreement in that case was fair to the parties in that it provided available
remedies to both parties, the certiorari petition was not rendered moot despite the
employer's satisfaction of the judgment award, as the respondent had obliged
himself to return the payment if the petition would be granted.

In the instant case, the parties indeed entered into a compromise agreement
when they executed a Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment Award which
provides that the settlement is without prejudice to Magsaysay’s Petition for
Certiorari pending before the CA and Cynthia undertakes to return the amount
paid in case the CA reverses the award, while Magsaysay undertakes to pay the
balance of the award in case the CA sustains it. This conditional settlement could
not have rendered the pending certiorari action as moot and academic. However,
in an Affidavit of Heirship, Cynthia stated: “That I understand that the payment
of the judgment award of US$79,200.00 or its peso equivalent plus of
Php3,370,514.40 includes all my past, present and future expenses and claims, xxx That
I have no further claims whatsoever in any theory of law against the Owners of "REGAL
PRINCESS" because of the payment made to me. That I certify and warrant that I will not
file any complaint or prosecute any suit or action in the Philippines, United States of
America, Liberia, Kuwait, Panama, United Kingdom or any other country against the
shipowners and/or the released parties herein after receiving the payment of US$79,200.00
or its peso equivalent of Php3,370,514.40”This prohibition on the part of Cynthia to
pursue any of the available legal remedies should the CA or this Court reverse the
judgment award of the labor tribunals or prosecute any other suit or action in
another country puts the Cynthia at a grave disadvantage. Thus, Career Philippines
is applicable and CA did not err in treating the conditional settlement as an
amicable settlement, effectively rendering the Petition for Certiorari moot and
academic.

327
 Republic of the Philippines v. Benjohn Fetalvero
G.R. No. 198008, February 04, 2019

FACTS:

Benjohn Fetalvero owned a 2,787-square meter parcel of land in Iligan City,

Lanao del Norte. In 1999, the DPWH, Region X took 569 square meters from
Fetalvero's property to be used in its flood control project. Despite negotiations,
the parties failed to agree on the amount of just compensation.

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the OSG, filed before
the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for expropriation against Fetalvero.
Subsequently, the OSG sent a letter to Atty. Earnest Anthony L. Lorea (Atty.
Lorea), the Legal Staff Chief of the DPWH, Region X. In its letter, the OSG
deputized Atty. Lorea to assist it in the case. Also, the OSG entered its appearance
as counsel for the Republic, and informed the trial court that it authorized Atty.
Lorea to appear on its behalf. It emphasized that since it "retained supervision and
control of the representation in the case and had to approve withdrawal of the
case, non-appeal, or other actions which appear to compromise the interest of the
Government, only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will
bind the Republic."

On June 27, 2008, the trial court issued an Order and referred the case to the
Philippine Mediation Center for mediation. On September 1, 2008, Atty. Lorea and
Fetalvero entered into a Compromise Agreement, wherein they agreed that,
among others, the price per square meter is PHP 9,500.00 per square meter or a
total of PHP 13,566,000.00 which latter is the amount to be paid in full by the
plaintiff to the defendant not later than September, 2009. The trial court issued an
Order approving the Compromise Agreement. On November 6, 2008, the Republic
received a copy of the Order.

In a letter, Jaime A. Pacanan, Assistant Secretary and Central Right of Way

Committee Chair of the DPWH, Manila, requested advice from the OSG regarding
the Compromise Agreement's legality. The OSG replied that the government
cannot be bound by the Compromise Agreement since it was not submitted to its
office for review, which is a condition under the deputation letter and the Notice
of Appearance.

Meanwhile, Fetalvero filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Order for a Writ
of Garnishment for the satisfaction of the trial court's Order approving the
compromise. The Republic opposed the Motion. The trial court granted Fetalvero's
Motion. The trial court further held that since the OSG received a copy of the trial

328
court's Order, the judgment was valid and binding on the Republic. Further,
government funds in official depositaries remain government funds only if there
was no appropriation by law. The trial court found that funds were already
appropriated "for payment of the road-rights-of-way." Hence, Fetalvero's Motion
should be granted. The Republic moved for reconsideration, but its Motion was
denied by the trial court.

The Republic filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. The
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, denying the Petition for lack of merit. It
found that public funds may be seized or garnished if they were already allocated
by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the
government. Hence, the Republic, through the OSG, filed before this Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari against Fetalvero.

Petitioner asserts that, among others, assuming respondent proves that he

has a claim, the latter cannot seize government funds by virtue of a writ of
execution or garnishment. He must first file it before the Commission on Audit
under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445.

ISSUE:

Whether government funds may be seized under a writ of execution or a

writ of garnishment in satisfaction of court judgments

RULING:

No. The general rule is that government funds cannot be seized by virtue
of writs of execution or garnishment. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and
public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.

Here, the trial court already found that there is an appropriation intended
by law for payment of road-rights-of-way. Respondent even called the attention
of the court of the existence of the fund intended for payment of the road-rights-
of-way. Even petitioner admitted the approval of allocation for payment of road
right of way projects within Region 10 under SAA-SR 2009-001538. Since there is
an existing appropriation for the payment of just compensation, and this Court
already settled that petitioner is bound by the Compromise Agreement,
respondent is legally entitled to his money claim. However, he still has to go

329
through the appropriate procedure for making a claim against the Government.

Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 orders all judges of lower courts to

observe utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of
execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies. This Court
has emphasized that it is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of State
liability, the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be
pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Presidential
Decree No. 1445 or the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. All money
claims against the Government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit
which must act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the
claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect sue
the State thereby (Presidential Decree No. 1445, Sections 49-50).

Thus, the finding that government is liable in a suit to which it consented

does not translate to enforcement of the judgment by execution. Only when the
Commission on Audit rejects the claim can the claimant elevate the matter to this
Court on certiorari and, in effect, sue the state

Here, respondent failed to show that he first raised his claim before the
Commission on Audit. Without this necessary procedural step, respondent's
money claim cannot be entertained by the courts through a writ of execution.

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Section 2 - Discretionary execution

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano

G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018

FACTS:

Respondents Manzano et al. are owners of 4 parcels of land planted with

rubber trees in Isabela, Basilan. Respondents voluntarily offered their lands to the
DAR for agrarian reform under CARP. DAR issued Administrative Order No. 05-
98 to implement and fill in the details of Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Administrative Order No. 05-98 provides
for the formula in computing just compensation for rubber lands under Republic
Act No. 6657, taking into consideration the factors laid down in Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657. DAR endorsed the matter of land valuation to Landbank.
The DAR then endorsed the matter of land valuation to the LBP. The issue of the
valuation reached the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB).
Dissatisfied with the PARAB’s determination in the total of P2,944,797.26 for the
four (4) lots, respondents filed with the RTC an action for determination of just
compensation. Meanwhile, Landbank deposited the judgment award, through
cash and Landbank bonds, as provisional compensation for the acquired
properties.

Meanwhile, respondents filed a motion for execution pending appeal,

pursuant to Rule 39, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. The RTC granted the motion
for execution pending appeal and ordered the payment of 6% legal interest
reckoned from the date of judgment or order until fully paid. LBP filed an Urgent
Verified Motion/Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals arguing that the RTC’s
order granting respondents’ motion for execution pending appeal violated judicial
courtesy.

ISSUE:

Is the granting of the motion for execution pending appeal proper?

RULING:

Yes. Under Rule 39, Section 2 (a), a judgment appealed before the Court of
Appeals may still be executed by the Regional Trial Court, provided there are good
reasons for the judgment's execution.

331
 The Regional Trial Court found that respondents have been deprived of
their land since 1999. They were dispossessed of the beneficial use, fruits, and
income of their properties, which were taken from them 19 years ago without
compensation. Thus, the denial of the execution pending appeal will infringe on
their constitutional right against taking of private property without compensation.
Moreover, the just compensation for respondents' properties is not wholly payable
in cash. Sixty-five percent (65%) of the payment is in bonds, which will mature
only after 10 years. By then, the monetary value of the properties would no longer
be the same. Denying the execution pending appeal can also stall the payment of
respondents' properties through the filing of frivolous motions and appeals.

In their motion for execution pending appeal, respondents "indicated

[their] willingness to return any amount in the event that the just compensation
fixed by [the Regional Trial Court] is modified by the appellate court." This
addresses petitioner's sole objection against execution pending appeal.

332
Section 6 - Execution by motion or by independent action.

Piedad v. Bobilles
G.R. No. 208614, November 27, 2017

FACTS:

Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment of an

absolute deed of sale against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles (Candelaria) and
Mariano Bobilles (Mariano). The case raffled to Branch 9, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Cebu City, presided over by Judge Benigno Gaviola (Judge Gaviola).

On 19 March 1992, the RTC ruled in Piedad's favor and declared the deed
of sale as null and void for being a forgery. Candelaria and Mariano appealed the
trial court Decision, but on 15 September 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the RTC ruling. The Court of Appeals Decision became final
and executory on 1 November 1998. On 22 October 2001, Judge Gaviola issued an
order for the issuance of a writ of demolition.

On 4 December 2001, Judge Gaviola issued a Writ of Demolition against

Candelaria and Mariano and referred it to Sheriff Antonio A. Bellones (Sheriff
Bellones) for its implementation. That same day, in the same case, Candelaria filed
a Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad. Judge
Gaviola ordered that the petition be heard independently and that it be raffled to
another branch. Candelaria's Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Simeon Piedad was eventually docketed as S.P. Proc. No. 457-T and
raffled to Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, presided over by Judge
Gaudioso D. Villarin (Villarin).

On 12 July 2010, the Heirs of Piedad filed with the RTC, Branch 29, Toledo
City a Motion Praying that an Order Be Issued to Sheriff Antonio Bellones to
Resume the Unfinished Writ of Execution and/or Writ of Demolition. In his Order
dated 15 May 2012, Presiding Judge Ruben F. Altubar (Judge Altubar) of the RTC,
Branch 29, Toledo City denied the motion. He opined that since more than 12 years
had passed since the Court of Appeals’s Decision became final and executory, the
execution should have been pursued through a petition for revival judgment, not
a mere motion.

ISSUE:

Was the motion to revive judgment timely filed?

333
RULING:

Yes. Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the two (2)
ways of executing a final and executory judgment: Section 6. Execution by motion
or by independent action. — A final and executory judgment or order may be
executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse
of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations.

Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court must be read in conjunction with
Articles 1144 (3) and 1152 of the Civil Code, which provide:

Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten

years from the time the right of action accrues:

(3) Upon a judgment.

Article 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the

fulfillment of obligation declared by a judgment commences from
the time the judgment became final.

Thus, the prevailing party may move for the execution of a final and
executory judgment as a matter of right within five (5) years from the entry of
judgment. If no motion is filed within this period, the judgment is converted to a
mere right of action and can only be enforced by instituting a complaint for the
revival of judgment in a regular court within 10 years from finality of judgment.

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeal's ruling on the nullity of the deed of
absolute sale executed between Piedad and respondents became final and
executory on November 1, 1998. Judge Gaviola, upon motion, then issued an order
for the issuance of a writ of demolition on October 22, 2001.

However, the writ of demolition was never served on respondents due to

their dilatory tactics and the gross ignorance of the law and undue delay caused
by Judges Estrera and Villarin. The case only began to gain traction on July 12,
2010, when petitioners filed their motion for the revival of judgment. But by this
time, almost 12 years had passed since the Court of Appeals September 15, 1998
Decision became final and executory. This led Branch 29, RTC, Toledo City, where

334
the case was transferred from Branch 9, RTC, Cebu City, to deny the motion in its
Order dated May 15, 2012 for being the wrong remedy.

Despite diligent efforts and the final and executory nature of the Decision,
petitioners have yet to regain possession of what is legally their own. These
circumstances clearly demonstrate that the failure to execute the judgment was
due to respondents' refusal to follow the several writs ordering them to vacate the
premises. It would be unfair for the Court to allow respondents to profit from their
defiance of valid court orders.

It is likewise emphasized that if manifest wrong or injustice would result

with the strict adherence to the statute of limitations or doctrine of laches, it would
be better for courts to rule under the principle of equity. Petitioners filed a motion
for execution well within the five (5)-year period prescribed by Rule 39, Section 6
of the Rules of Court. However, their efforts were thwarted by respondents'
machinations and Judges Estrera's and Villarin's illegal acts of issuing restraining
orders against a coequal court. Nonetheless, petitioners continued to persevere
and filed several motions before Judge Villarin, which the judge proceeded to
ignore.

In a long line of cases, the execution of a final and executory judgment was
allowed even if prescription has already set in, if the delay was caused by the
judgment obligor for his or her benefit or advantage.

335
Section 9 - Execution of judgments for money, how enforced

Mercury Drug Corporation and Rolando Del Rosario v. Spouses Richard

Huang
G.R. No. 197654. August 30, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercury Drug was the registered owner of a six (6)-wheeler truck
driven by petitioner Del Rosario, which figured in an accident with respondent
Stephen Huang's car. As a result of the tragic incident, Stephen suffered serious
spinal cord injuries. He is now a paraplegic. Stephen and his parents respondents
Spouses Huang filed a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against
Mercury Drug and Del Rosario. RTC found Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly
and severally liable for actual damages, compensatory damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees and litigation fees. The CA and SC
affirmed the same. The judgment attained finality and its entry was accordingly
made, where the total amount awarded to Stephen is ₱40,434,062.00. Stephen and
his parents moved for the execution of judgment before RTC, the same was
granted despite opposition from petitioners. The Writ of Execution was issued but
petitioners moved for its quashal as it allegedly contravened the tenor of the
judgment.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA arguing that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the execution of the judgment
despite clerical errors in the computation of life care cost and loss of earning
capacity. The CA denied the petition and its MR was likewise denied. Thus,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the SC pointing out, in particular,
that the amounts of life care cost and loss of earning capacity reflected in the
dispositive portion and the writ of execution do not correspond to those stated in
the body of the decision.

ISSUE:

Does the writ of execution conform to the judgment sought to be enforced?

RULING:

Yes, the writ of execution conforms to the judgment sought to be enforced.

336
 Another effect of a final and executory judgment is that winning litigants
are entitled to the satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution. A writ
of execution must substantially conform to the judgment sought to be enforced. A
writ of execution that exceeds the tenor of the judgment is patently void and
should be struck down. Upon a finding of its invalidity, the case may be remanded
to the lower court for the issuance of the proper writ.

The case not falling within any of the exceptions to the doctrine of
immutability of judgments, it becomes the court's ministerial duty to issue a writ
of execution, which must "conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive
part of the decision," The manner of execution of a judgment cannot depend upon
the choice or discretion of a party.

In this case, the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC neither varied nor
departed from the terms of the judgment in any manner. It was faithful to what
the trial court decreed. However, the dispositive portion of the judgment did not
specify how the damages should be paid--- installments or amortized. In the
absence of any directive in the body or in the dispositive portion of the decision
that the judgment award should be amortized or paid in periodic installments, the
manner of its execution shall be subject to the Rules of Court. The manner of
execution of judgments for money is specifically governed by Rule 39, Section 9 of
the Rules of Court.

337
Section 13 - Property exempt from execution

Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic
G.R. No. 189516 June 8, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B.

Otamias (Colonel Otamias) were married and had five (5) children. Edna and
Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity. Their children remained
with Edna. Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the
Provost Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Edna demanded monthly support equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias'

retirement benefits. Colonel Otamias executed an Affidavit he also executed a
Deed of Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and pension benefits in
favor of Edna and their children. The Deed of Assignment was considered by the
parties as a compromise agreement. Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003. The
agreement was honored until January 6, 2006. Edna alleged that the Armed Forces
of the Philippines suddenly decided not to honor the agreement between Colonel
Otamias and his legitimate family. In a letter dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Pension and Gratuity Management Center (AFP-PGMC)
informed Edna that a court order was required for the AFP-PGMC to recognize
the Deed of Assignment. In another letter dated April 17, 2006, the AFP-PGMC
reiterated that it could not act on Edna's request to receive a portion of Colonel
Otamias' pension "unless ordered by the appropriate court.”

Heeding the advice of the AFP-PGMC, Edna, on behalf of herself and

Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed a case.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that the AFP Finance Center cannot
be directed to automatically deduct the amount of support needed by the
legitimate family of Colonel Otamias even though there was a Deed of Assignment
executed, in which he effectively waived his right to claim his retirement benefits
that are exempt from execution?

RULING:

Yes. Based on the Family Code, Colonel Otamias is obliged to give support
to his family, petitioners in this case. However, he retired in 2003, and his sole

338
source of income is his pension. Judgments in actions for support are immediately
executory, yet under Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, his pension cannot
be executed upon. However, considering that Colonel Otamias has waived a
portion of his retirement benefits through his Deed of Assignment, resolution on
the conflict between the civil code provisions on support and Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638 should be resolved in a more appropriate case.

339
Section 33 - Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption
period; by whom executed or given.

Section 33, Rule 39

Gotesco Properties v. Solidbank Corporation

(now Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company)
G.R. No. 209452, July 26, 2017

FACTS:

In 1995, Gotesco obtained from Solidbank a term loan of P300 million

through its President, Mr. Jose Go (Mr. Go). To secure the loan, Gotesco was
required to execute a Mortgage Trust Indenture (Indenture) naming Solidbank-
Trust Division as Trustee.

The Indenture obliged Gotesco to mortgage several parcels of land in favor

of Solidbank. One (1) of the lots mortgaged and used as a collateral was a property
located in San Fernando, Pampanga. A stipulation in the Indenture also
irrevocably appointed Solidbank-Trust Division as Gotesco's attorney-in-
fact. Under the Indenture, Gotesco also agreed to "at all times maintain the Sound
Value of the Collateral." When the loan was about to mature, Gotesco found it
difficult to meet its obligation and Gotesco sent a letter to Solidbank proposing to
restructure the loan obligation. The loan restructuring agreement proposed to
extend the payment period to seven (7) years. The suggested period included a
two (2)-year grace period.

In its February 9, 2000 letter, Solidbank informed Gotesco of a substantial

reduction in the appraised value of its mortgaged properties. Based on an
appraisal report submitted to Solidbank, the sound value of the
mortgaged properties at that time was at P381,245,840.00. Since the necessary
collateral to loan ratio was 200%, Solidbank held that there was a deficiency in the
collateral, which Gotesco had to address. Solidbank required Gotesco to replace
or add to the mortgaged properties. Gotesco construed the February 9, 2000 letter
as Solidbank's implied agreement to the loan restructuring proposal.
However, Gotesco found it unnecessary to address the alleged deficiency in the
collateral. It insisted that the aggregate sound value of the
mortgaged properties had not changed and was still at P1,076,905,000.00.

340
 Solidbank sent a demand letter dated June 7, 2000 to Gotesco as the loan
became due. Despite having received this demand letter, Gotesco failed to pay the
outstanding obligation. Solidbank then filed a Petition for the Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of the lot through Atty. Wilfrido Mangiliman (Atty. Mangiliman), a
notary public. The public auction was held on August 31, 2000 and Solidbank was
declared the winning bidder.

On February 5, 2001, Gotesco filed a complaint for Annulment of

Foreclosure Proceedings, Specific Performance, and Damages against Solidbank,
Atty. Mangiliman, and the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later
on, Solidbank also filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession. The two (2) cases were consolidated before Branch 42, Regional Trial
Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.

Gotesco assailed the validity of the foreclosure proceeding claiming that it

was premature and without legal basis. According to Gotesco, the jurisdictional
requirements prescribed under Act No. 3135 were not complied with.
First, Solidbank did not furnish Gotesco copies of the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure, notice of sale, and certificate of sale. Even assuming the original
period for loan payment was not extended, the prerequisites for the foreclosure
proceeding provided in the Indenture were not met.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, Solidbank alleged, among others, that

it never entered into a restructuring agreement with Gotesco and that Solidbank
complied with the publication and posting requirements laid down by Act No.
3135.

The RTC dismissed Gotesco's complaint for the annulment of the

foreclosure proceeding and granted the Writ of Possession in Solidbank's favor.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA also declared Gotesco in default.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitoner claims, among others, that Section 3 of Act No. 3135 was violated.
The publication of the Notice of Sale in Remate was defective. Petitioner is of the
opinion that the Notice of Sale should have been published in newspapers
"published, edited and circulated" in the same city or province where the
foreclosed property was located. Since the land being sold was situated at San

341
Fernando, Pampanga and Remate was printed and published in Manila, petitioner
suggests that the publication requirement was violated. Consequently, since the
foreclosure proceeding was void, there was no basis for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession. Possession of the property must revert back to petitioner.

Respondents contends that, Section 3 of Act No. 3135 was complied

with. Remate is a newspaper of general circulation. It is among the newspapers
accredited by the RTC where a notice of sale can be published. Respondent holds
that the Writ of Possession was validly issued because its issuance was ministerial.

ISSUES:
1. Was the requirement of notice and its publication properly complied with?
2. Was the Writ of Possession properly issued?

RULING:

1. YES, the requirement of notice and its publication was properly complied
with. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the Notice of Sale be a)
physically posted in three (3) public places and b) be published once a week
for at least three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the city where the property is situated. Here, petitioner mistakenly claims
that since the foreclosed property was located in Pampanga, the publication
of the Notice of Sale could only be published in a newspaper printed in the
same city. If notices are only published in newspapers printed in the city
where the property is located, even newspapers that are circulated
nationwide will be disqualified from announcing auction sales outside their
city of publication. This runs contrary to the spirit of the law which is to
attain wide enough publicity so all parties interested in acquiring the
property can be informed of the upcoming sale. The crucial factor is not
where the newspaper is printed but whether the newspaper is being
circulated in the city where the property is located. Markedly, what the law
requires is the publication of the Notice of Sale in a "newspaper of general
circulation," which is defined as: To be a newspaper of general circulation,
it is enough that "it is published for the dissemination of local news and
general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying
subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals" . . . The newspaper need
not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general circulation. Verily,
there is clear emphasis on the audience reached by the paper; the place of
printing is not even considered. As to the validity of the foreclosure
proceeding, the SC rules in the affirmative.

342
2. YES, the writ of possession was properly issued. Generally, the purchaser
in a public auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of
possession during the redemption period. It is ministerial upon the trial
court to issue such writ upon an ex parte petition of the purchaser. However,
this rule admits an exception. The last sentence of Rule 39, Section 33 of
the Rules of Court is instructive: “xxx The possession of the property shall
be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless
a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
obligor.” Further, Fernandez v. Spouses Espinoza already ruled that a
pending case assailing the validity of the foreclosure proceeding is
immaterial This case does not fall under the exception. Since it is the
petitioner, and not a third party, who is occupying the property, the
issuance of the Writ of Possession is ministerial. There is also no merit to
petitioner's argument that the Writ of Possession should not be issued while
the complaint for the annulment of the foreclosure proceeding is still
pending. As the winning bidder, respondent is entitled to the Writ of
Possession.

343
Section 47 - Effect of Judgments or Final Orders

Spouses Aboitiz v. Spouses Po

G.R. No. 208450 & 208497, June 5, 2017

FACTS:

This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City,

initially registered under the name of Roberto Aboitiz. This parcel of land
originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno. On July 31, 1973, Mariano executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno. On May 5, 1978, Ciriaco
sold the two (2) lots to Victoria Po (Victoria). The parties executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale. On July 15, 1982, Mariano died and was survived by his five (5)
children.

In 1990, Peter Po discovered that Ciriaco “had executed a quitclaim dated

August 7, 1989 renouncing his interest in favor of Roberto. In the quitclaim, Ciriaco
stated that he was “the declared owner of Lot Nos. 2835 and 2807.

The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the

Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in which
Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses
Po as consideration for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses
Po were left with after the quitclaim. However, also in 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also
sold to Roberto. The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds of
absolute sale in favor of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the
lot as part of a subdivision called North Town Homes. On April 19, 1993, Roberto
filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835, the trial court granted
the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The
lot was immediately subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose.

On November 19, 1996, the Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land
and to declare nullity of title with damages.

The Spouses Aboitiz insist that there is already a finding by the Regional
Trial Court in LRC Case No. N-208 that Ciriaco merely held the property in trust
for the Mariano Heirs Thus, Ciriaco could not have validly sold the property to
the Spouses Po. They claim that these findings are binding on the whole world
because land registration proceedings are actions in rem.

ISSUE:

344
 Is the land registration court's finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the
property in trust for the Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case?

RULING:

No. Res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and
(ii) conclusiveness of judgment, respectively covered under Rule 39, Section 47 of
the Rules of Court, paragraphs (b) and (c).

Res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment proscribes the filing of
another action based on "the same claim, demand, or cause of action." It applies
when the following are present: (a) there is a final judgment or order; (b) it is a
judgment or order on the merits; (c) it was "rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and parties"; and (d) there is "identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action" between the first and second actions.

Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment applies when

there is an identity of issues in two (2) cases between the same parties involving
different causes of action. Its effect is to bar "the relitigation of particular facts or
issues" which have already been adjudicated in the other case.

In this case, the Spouses Po allege that the registration was done through
fraud. They contend that they were unaware and were thus unable to contest the
registration and prove their claim over the property. Aside from several tax
receipts, the Spouses Po formally offered as evidence, among others, the Deed of
Sale executed by Mariano in Ciriaco's favor, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Ciriaco in their favor, and the Tax Declaration under Victoria's name.
Additionally, they also submitted their Memorandum of Agreement with Ciriaco
and the Quitclaim executed by Ciriaco in favor of the Spouses Aboitiz. These
documents were not considered by the land registration court when it issued the
title in favor of the Spouses Aboitiz. The Spouses Po also offered the Application
of Original Registration of Title of the Spouses Aboitiz to prove that the Spouses
Aboitiz only submitted to the land registration court the cancelled tax declarations
of Ciriaco, instead of the tax declaration of the Spouses Po.

Thus, the ruling of the land registration court cannot be so conclusive as to

deny the Spouses Po the remedy afforded to them by law. The action for
reconveyance allows them to prove their ownership over the property. Hence,
they are not precluded from presenting evidence that is contrary to the findings in
the land registration case.

345
 Escobar v. People
G.R. No. 205576, November 20, 2017

FACTS:

Manuel Escobar (Escobar) was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for

ransom of Mary Grace Cheng-Rosagas (Mary Grace), daughter of Filipino-Chinese
businessman Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two (2) other victims. Robert was the
owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines, a manufacturing company of foams and
mattresses.

Robert paid the ransom of PhP15M. Mary Grace and the other two victims
were released more than 12 hours since they were abducted.

Cubillas, the driver of the group of kidnappers, became a state witness. He

executed an extrajudicial confession and implicated respondent Escobar as an
adviser for Villaver (the group leader).

Escobar filed a petition for bail (First Bail Petition), which was denied by
the Regional Trial Court in the Order4 dated October 6, 2008 and by the Court of
Appeals in the Decision dated March 8, 2011. A subsequent development in the
accused's case compelled him to file a second petition for bail (Second Bail
Petition). On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied this on the ground of
res judicata.

ISSUE:

Is res judicata applicable to bail?

RULING:

No. res judicata is not applicable to bail.

Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right
to bail if the offense charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment" before conviction by the Regional Trial Court. However, if the
accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment-"regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution" and when evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's
prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court.

346
 In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death,
reduced to reclusion perpetua. Escobar's bail is, thus, a matter of judicial
discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt is not strong.

The Regional Trial Court denied Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the
ground of res judicata. The Court of Appeals overturned this and correctly ruled
that his Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata.

Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the
dispute between the parties or their successors-in-interest. Trinidad v. Marcelo
declares that res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a
principle in civil law and "has no bearing on criminal proceedings." Indeed, while
certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under
Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Further, an interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case

being criminal in nature, does not give rise to res judicata. . As in Trinidad, even if
we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in this case to contemplate "res
judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same will still not apply. Double
jeopardy requires that the accused has been convicted or acquitted or that the case
against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his express consent.
Here, while there was an initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has
not been convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.

An interlocutory order "settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral

matter arising in an action"; in other words, something else still needs to be done
in the primary case-the rendition of the final judgment. Res judicata applies only
when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case; it cannot be availed of in an
interlocutory order even if this order is not appealed.

347
 Presidential Decree No. 1271 Committee v. De Guzman
G.R. Nos. 187291 & 187334, December 5, 2016

FACTS:

Gloria Rodriguez De Guzman (Rodriguez) acquired properties derived

from OCT Nos. 123 and 128. The Register of Deeds of Baguio issued a total of nine
(9) TCTs. These titles were among those issued under the reopening of Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O Rec. No. 211 which involved the settlement and
the adjudication of claims to private lands in Baguio Townsite Reservation.

At the time Rodriguez acquired said properties, the Court was yet to rule
on Republic v. Marcos. Said case rendered null and void all titles issued as a result
of the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O Rec. No. 211. However,
P.D. 1271 was later on issued, which provided that innocent third parties could
have their properties validated upon compliance with certain conditions.

Consequently, Rodriguez filed separate applications for validation for

seven (7) of her titles: T-12826, T-12827, T-12828, T-12829, T-12830, T-12831, and T-
12832. Pending her applications for validation, Rodriguez filed before the RTC a
Petition seeking to correct the caption of Resurvey Subdivision Plan (LRC) No. RS-
288-D and the technical descriptions of TCT Nos. T-12828, T-12829, T-12830, T-
12831, and T-12832 to conform to the resurvey plan. This was docketed as LRC
Case No. 445-R. RTC granted Rodriguez's Petition.

Sometime in 2002, a certain Corazon Delizo and Consuelo Delizo requested

the Land Registration Authority to investigate Rodriguez's TCT Nos. T-12826 and
T-12827 for being issued irregularly. The Land Registration Authority docketed
the request as Task Force Titulong Malinis (TM) No. 02-001.

The Task Force Titulong Malinis found that there was an expansion of the
land area covered by Rodriguez's TCT Nos. T-12826 and T-12827. It likewise
discovered that the mother title was cancelled through a letter from Rodriguez
seeking the issuance of new TCT under subdivision plan (LRC) Ps-281-D. Thus,
the Baguio Validation Committee disapproved Rodriguez's applications for
validation on account of the expanded areas above the original size covered by the
mother titles. The Land Registration Authority Administrator directed the
cancellation and the expunging of the invalidated titles.

Rodriguez filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari to question the

Baguio Validation Committee's Resolution. The same was dismissed. CA also held
that there is no conclusiveness of judgment in LRC Case No. 455-R as the RTC did

348
not determine if there was a fraudulent expansion of the lands covered by
Rodriguez’s TCT, as opposed to their applications for validation.

Rodriguez filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration and a Supplemental

Motion for Partial Reconsideration which the CA partially granted. Rodriguez
then filed before this Court her Petition for Review on Certiorari questioning the
CA's disapproval of her application for validation for TCT Nos. T-12826 and T-
12827.

ISSUE:

Can res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment be employed to validate

TCT Nos. T-12828, T-12829, T-12830, T-12831, and T-12832

RULING:

NO. TCT Nos. T-12828 to T-12832 cannot be validated based on res

judicata by conclusiveness of judgment.

Res judicata by bar by prior judgment precludes the filing of a second case
when it has the same parties, same subject, and same cause of action, or otherwise
prays for the same relief as the first case. On the other hand, res judicata by
conclusiveness of judgment precludes the questioning of a fact or issue in a second
case if the fact or issue has already been judicially determined in the first case
between the same parties.

In LRC Case No. 445-R, the RTC granted Rodriguez's Petition to correct the
caption of Resurvey Subdivision Plan (LRC) No. RS-288-D and the technical
descriptions of the properties in the TCT based on Section 108 of P.D. 1529.

The CA, acting on the Motion for Reconsideration and eventually reversing
its ruling, applied res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment. It declared the
Baguio Validation Committee barred from determining whether there was a
fraudulent expansion of the areas covered by the TCT. The CA found that the issue
of whether there was a fraudulent expansion had already been resolved; thus, the
applications for validation 'may no longer dispute this finding.

The CA committed an error too obvious for this Court to neglect. Its
conclusions are not only contrary to the facts; they are also not in accord with
existing doctrine.

349
 The RTC did not determine whether there was a fraudulent expansion of
the properties covered by the TCT. What the trial court stated was that no
collateral attack can be made on the TCT. Rather than substantially rule on the
validity of the titles, the RTC in LRC Case No. 445-R held that the procedure could
not accommodate the objections of the Solicitor General.

A collateral attack cannot be made on a TCT to maintain the "integrity and

guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title." Nonetheless, the issuance of a
TCT does not mean it can no longer be questioned when it has been acquired
through fraud. The validity of a TCT may still be put to issue, provided it must be
directly done through a court action seeking to annul or set it aside.

The RTC's denial of the Office of the Solicitor General's opposition on the
ground that it is a collateral attack on the TCT is not a judgment on the validity of
the TCTs. It made no finding on the validity of the titles based on Republic v.
Marcos. It did not consider any evidence of fraud.

Since there is no judicial determination of fraud, res judicata by

conclusiveness of judgment cannot apply. The ruling in LRC Case No. 445-R
cannot bar the issue of whether there was a fraudulent expansion of the property
covered by TCT Nos. T-12828, T-12829, T-12830, T-12831, and T-12832. These TCT
may still be questioned in a direct action seeking its nullification.

It is, thus, of no moment that the judgment in LRC Case No. 445-R became
final and executory and has been executed. What may no longer be questioned is
the correction of the caption of the resurvey plan and the technical descriptions on
the TCT, not the validity of those TCT. The Office of the Solicitor General cannot
be faulted for no longer appealing the ruling of the RTC. It is erroneous to declare
that the government is already barred by estoppel by laches in failing to appeal
the case.

350
 Gadrinab v. Salamanca
G.R. No. 194560, June 11, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondents are siblings and heirs of the late Spouses Talao.
The spouses died intestate and left a parcel of land in Sta. Ana, Manila. Salamanca
filed a complaint for partition against her siblings before the RTC Manila. Upon
being referred to mediation, the parties entered into a compromise agreement and
stipulated that the subject property will be sold and the amount shall be divided
among them. RTC Manila approved the compromise agreement which became
final and executory.

Petitioner then filed a motion for execution of the compromise agreement.

Because of subsequent disagreements between the heirs pending execution,
respondent Salamanca moved that the property be physically partitioned instead
of having it sold. Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the judgment on
the compromise agreement had already become final and executory and had the
effect of res judicata. RTC Manila granted the motion for physical partition. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on the ground that the proposed physical
partition of the subject lot is just another way of enforcing the court's decision and
will not vary the parties' agreement nor affect their right over the property.

ISSUE:

Is judgment on a compromise agreement considered a judgment on the

merits and has the effect of res judicata?

RULING:

Yes. In a compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations.

A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits of the
case. It has the effect of res judicata. These principles are impressed both in our law
and jurisprudence. There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata.
The first rule refers to "bar by prior judgment," which means that actions on the
same claim or cause of action cannot be relitigated. The second rule refers to
"conclusiveness of judgment." This means that facts already tried and determined
in another action involving a different claim or cause of action cannot anymore be
relitigated. Moreover, under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability
of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.

351
 Doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgment apply
whether judgment is rendered after a full-blown trial or after the parties
voluntarily execute a compromise agreement duly approved by the court.
Therefore, courts cannot entertain actions involving the same cause of action,
parties, and subject matter without violating the doctrines on bar by prior
judgment and immutability of judgments, unless there is evidence that the
agreement was void, obtained through fraud, mistake or any vice of consent, or
would disrupt substantial justice.

This case involves "bar by prior judgment." Respondents cannot file another
action for partition after final judgment on compromise had already been rendered
in a action for partition involving the same parties and property. There was no
issue as to the fact that the parties freely entered into the compromise agreement.
There was also no dispute about the clarity of its terms. Some of the parties simply
do not wish to abide by the compromise agreement's terms. Hence, the court did
not see how substantial justice will be served by disturbing a previous final
judgment on compromise when failure of its execution was caused by the parties
themselves.

352
 Webb vs. Gatdula
G.R. No.194469, September 18, 2019

FACTS:

This is an offshoot of the rape-homicide case Lejano v. People where herein

petitioner Webb, among others, was charged with the crime of rape with homicide
for allegedly raping Carmel Vizconde (Carmela), then killing her, her mother, and
her sister in 1991.

While the criminal case was pending before the trial court, Webb filed a
Motion to Direct the NBI to Submit Semen Specimen to DNA Analysis. In an April
20, 2010 Resolution, Supreme Court granted the request to order a testing on the
semen specimen found in Carmela’s cadaver, in view of the Rules on DNA
Evidence.

However, the NBI claimed that the specimen was no longer in its custody.
It alleged that the specimen had been submitted as evidence to the trial court when
its Medico-Legal Chief, Dr. Cabanayan, testified. The trial court denied this claim
explaining that what were marked in evidence were photographs of the slides
containing the vaginal smear, not the slides themselves.

Due to the missing specimen, Webb filed a a Petition for Indirect Contempt.
He prays that the impleaded former and current NBI officers be cited for indirect
contempt for impeding, degrading, and obstructing the administration of justice
and for disobeying the April 20, 2010 Resolution of the SC.

About two weeks after the filing of the Petition for Indirect Contempt, the
Supreme Court ruled on Lejano, the criminal case. In finding that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, Webb was acquitted of the crime
charged.

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the respondents, argues

that the Petition for Indirect Contempt is rendered moot upon the promulgation
of Lejano since the non-production of the specimen is merely incidental to the
determination of petitioner’s innocence. It argues that there is no violation of due
process because the State is not required to preserve the specimen unless there was
bad faith on the part of the prosecution.

ISSUE:

Is the action barred by the decision of the Supreme Court in Lejano?

353
RULING:

No. The doctrine of res judicata bars the re-litigation of the same claim
between the parties or the same issue on a different claim between the same
parties. It rests upon the principle that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate
the same issue more than once. It exists as an obvious rule of reason, justice,
fairness, expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquility.

To properly invoke res judicata, the following elements must concur: (1) the
judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject
mater, and causes of action.

The principle of res judicata, a civil law principle, is not applicable in

criminal cases. While certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be
applied in criminal cases, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from
the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Thus, in this case, the ruling of the Court in Lejano cannot preclude
petitioner’s filing of the contempt action. Even if the principle of res judicata were
applied, this action is still not precluded by the finality of the decision in the
criminal case because the last element is absent. Clearly, respondents in this
contempt action are not parties to the criminal case. Moreover, the issue and the
cause of action here are different from the criminal case.

Here, the action seeks to cite respondent in contempt, while in the criminal
case, the accused sought to reverse his conviction. Respondents argue that the
complaint is rendered moot, concluding that the judgment regarding the loss of
the specimen bars the contempt case because the DNA testing is no longer of
practical value to petitioner.

To be clear, contempt of court simply asks whether respondents willfully

defied this Court’s order. Their reasoning only tends to weaken the authority of
the Court. In sum, there is a lack of identity of parties, issues, and cause of action
between the criminal case and the contempt action. As such, the judgment in the
criminal case will not preclude this case’s resolution.

354
 Pryce Corp. vs. China Banking Corp.
G.R. No. 172302; February 18, 2014

FACTS:

This case originated from a petition for corporate rehabilitation filed by

petitioner Pryce Corporation (Pryce) with the RTC-Makati. In its disposition, the
court found Pryce eligible to be placed in a state of corporate rehabilitation. The
disposition likewise identified the assets to be held and disposed of by Pryce and
the manner by which its liabilities shall be paid and liquidated.

Respondent China Bank elevated the case to the CA, contending that the
rehabilitation plan’s approval impaired the obligations of contract. Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI), another creditor of Pryce, filed a separate petition with
the CA assailing the same order by the rehabilitation court.

The CA 7 Division granted China Bank’s petition and reversed and set
th

aside the rehabilitation court’s order. The CA 1 Division also granted BPI’s
st

separate petition. However, on reconsideration, the CA 1 Division ruled that the

st

rehabilitation court’s order is valid. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the
CA 1 Division.
st

Meanwhile, Pryce also appealed to the SC, assailing the Decision of the CA
7 Division granting China Bank’s petition. Pryce argued that the issue on the
th

validity of the rehabilitation court orders is now res judicata, submitting that the
ruling in BPI vs. Pryce Corporation docketed as G.R. No. 180316 contradicts the
present case.

ISSUE:

Is the issue on the validity of the rehabilitation court order now res judicata
in light of BPI vs. Pryce Corporation?

RULING:

Yes. According to the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment or decree

on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the
former suit.” The elements of res judicata are: (a) the former judgment was final;
(b) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (c) the judgment was based on the merits; and (d) between the first and

355
the second actions, there was an identity of parties, subject matters, and causes of
action.

Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment. Bar by prior judgment exists “when, as between the
first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to
be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.” On the
other hand, the concept of conclusiveness of judgment finds application “when a
fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and
adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.” This principle only
needs identity of parties and issues to apply.

In this case, the elements of res judicata through bar by prior judgment are
present. On the element of identity of parties, res judicata does not require absolute
identity of parties as substantial identity is enough. Substantial identity of parties
exists “when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and
a party in the second case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case.”
Parties that represent the same interests in two petitions are, thus, considered
substantial identity of parties for purposes of res judicata. Definitely, one test to
determine substantial identity of interest would be to see whether the success or
failure of one party materially affects the other.

In the present case, China Bank and BPI are creditors of Pryce and are both
questioning the rehabilitation court’s approval of the amended rehabilitation plan.
Thus, there is substantial identity of parties since they are litigating for the same
matter and in the same capacity as creditors of Pryce.

356
 RULE 40
Appeal from Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts

Section 7 - Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.

Cruz v. Spouses Christensen

G.R. No. 205539, October 4, 2017

FACTS:

Cruz alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land in San Juan City
which she inherited from her mother, Javier. She alleged that Susan Christensen
had been occupying the property during her mother’s lifetime, pursuant to a
verbal lease agreement. Cruz tolerated Susan’s occupancy but later demanded
Susan to vacate the property and to pay all her unpaid rentals. After barangay
mediation failed, a Certificate to File Action was issued on August 11, 2005. Three
years later, Cruz sent Susan a final demand letter demanding that she pay the
unpaid rentals and vacate the property within 15 days from receipt. Susan refused
to vacate and pay the accrued rentals. Thus, a complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed on.

The MeTC dismissed the Complaint as it found that the registry receipts
and return cards as proof of the receipt of the demand letter, must first be
authenticated through an affidavit of service. On appeal, the RTC reversed the
MeTC decision. On appeal, the respondents contended that Cruz was unable to
prove Susan's actual receipt of the demand letter and that Cruz's filing of her
memorandum 9 days beyond the 15-day period before the RTC should have been
ground to dismiss her appeal. The CA reversed the RTC and held that the filing of
a memorandum of appeal within 15 days from the receipt of the order is
mandatory and that the registry receipts and return cards are insufficient proof of
receipt. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Did the RTC err when it did not dismiss the appeal considering that Cruz’s
Memorandum of Appeals was not filed within the required period?

357
RULING:

No. Procedural rules of even the most mandatory character may be

suspended upon a showing of circumstances warranting the exercise of liberality
in its strict application.

Rule 40, Section 7(b) of the Rules of Court states that:

Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the
appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors
imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the
adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellant's
memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum.

Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for

dismissal of the appeal.

The rule requiring the filing of the memorandum within the period
provided is mandatory. Failure to comply will result in the dismissal of the appeal.
Rule 40, Section 7 is likewise jurisdictional since the RTC can only resolve errors
that are specifically assigned and properly argued in the memorandum. Thus,
dismissals based on this rule are premised on the non-filing of the memorandum.
A trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over an appeal where the errors have
not been specifically assigned.

In this case, Cruz’s Memorandum of Appeal was filed late but was
nonetheless given due course by the RTC. Thus, the jurisdictional defect was cured
since Cruz was able to specifically assign the MTC's errors, which the RTC was
able to address and resolve. Procedural defects should not be relied on to defeat
the substantive rights of litigants. Even procedural rules of the most mandatory
character may be suspended where "matters of life, liberty, honor or property"
warrant its liberal application.

Hence, liberality in the application of Rule 40, Section 7 is warranted in this

case in view of the potential inequity that may result if the rule is strictly applied.
The RTC did not err in not dismissing the appeal of petitioner.

358
 RULE 41
Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts

Section 1 - Subject of Appeal

Spouses Limso v. Philippine National Bank

G.R. Nos. 158622, 169441, 172958, 173194, 196958, 197120 & 205463,
January 27, 2016

FACTS:

Limso took out a loan secured by real estate mortgages from Philippine
National Bank in the amount of P700 Million. Limso had difficulty in paying their
loan. In 1999, they requested that their loan be restructured. After negotiations,
Spouses Limso and PNB executed a Conversion, Restructuring and Extension
Agreement. The principal obligation in the restructured agreement totalled ₱1.067
billion. This included ₱217.15 million unpaid interest. Despite the restructuring of
their loan, they were still unable to pay despite demands. Philippine National
Bank filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before
the Sheriff’s Office in Davao City.

After the foreclosure sale, but before the Sheriff could issue the Provisional
Certificate of Sale, Spouses Limso and Davao Sunrise filed a Complaint in the RTC
for Reformation or Annulment of contract against Philippine National Bank,
praying for the declaration of nullity of the unilaterally imposed interest rates in
the contract. Limso also filed also prayed for the issuance of an injunction to enjoin
the execution of the Provisional Certificate of Sale. The court granted the
injunction. PNB filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA assailing the issuance of
the injunction, which the CA granted. The RTC thereafter granted the complaint
declaring the interest rates in the contract void. PNB appealed the decision of the
RTC to the CA. While the case was pending before the CA, PNB filed applications
for damages on the injunction bond and to be appointed as receiver, which were
denied by the CA through resolutions. Thereafter, the petitioners filed a Rule 45
petition to appeal such resolutions.

ISSUES:

Whether or not resolutions issued by the CA which denied the application

for damages on the injunction bond, and appointment as receiver by petitioners
are appealable. – No

HELD:

359
 The assailed Resolutions are interlocutory orders and are not appealable.

The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the

commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter but is
not a final decision of the whole controversy. A "final" judgment or order is one
that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in
respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
evidence presented on the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order
that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription.

CA-G.R. CV No. 79732-MIN originated from Civil Case No. 28,170-2000,

which involved the issues regarding the interest rates imposed by Philippine
National Bank. Hence, the denial of Philippine National Bank’s applications did
not determine the issues on the interest rates imposed by Philippine National
Bank.

The proper remedy for Philippine National Bank would have been to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 or, in the alternative, to await the outcome of
the main case and file an appeal, raising the denial of its applications as an
assignment of error.

360
Section 2 - Modes of Appeal

Teodulfo Lao, Jr. et. al. v. LGU of Cagayan De Oro, et. al.
G.R. No. 187869. September 13, 2017

FACTS:

The City Council of Cagayan De Oro passed Resolution which states that it
would consider Erwin See's unsolicited proposal "for the redevelopment of Agora
Complex into a Modern Integrated Terminal, Public Market, and Vegetable
Landing Area." See is the president of MEGA Integrated Agro-Livestock Farm
Corporation (Mega Farm). The redevelopment would be under a build-operate-
transfer (BOT) scheme. On the basis of the Resolution, the city government caused
a bidding to compete with Mega Farm’s proposal. None were made. Thereafter,
Mega Farm and the newly elected Mayor Jaraula executed a BOT Contract for the
Redevelopment of Agora Complex (Agora Complex BOT Contract) even if no
ordinance was passed by the City Council granting authority to Mayor Jaraula to
sign in behalf of the City. The terms and conditions of this Contract were allegedly
different from those in the draft contract submitted as resolution by the city
government.

Petitioners Teodulfo Lao and other city councilors, as public officers and in
their personal capacities, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the Agora
Complex BOT Contract, and a TRO against the City Government, and its officers
in proceeding with the Contract. Petitioners questioned the execution and the
contents of the Agora Complex BOT Contract. They alleged that it was issued in
bad faith and with fraudulent maneuvers between Mega Farm and the City
Government and that Mega Farm was unqualified to take the redevelopment of
the Complex, among other reasons.

Respondents filed an urgent motion to dismiss and bill of particulars citing

lack of jurisdiction of RTC. They reasoned that RA 8975 does not allow RTC to
issue TROs against government, or any entity acting under the government’s
direction to stop the acts enumerated therein, nor did the case fall under the
exception in Section 3 of the same act. The hearing for the TRO became instead a
hearing for the motion to dismiss. They contend that RA 8975 does not apply
because the contract was not a national government contract but a local
government contract, but even if it was, the same is within the exception as it
involved constitutional violations. The RTC denied the issuance of TRO and
dismissed the complaint. MR was denied hence, this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Respondents contend that the

361
petition must be dismissed because the petition raises both questions of facts and
law, which is not allowed under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Did the petitioner properly avail of the remedy under Ruled 45?

RULING:

Yes, the petition properly availed of the remedy under Ruled 45.

Under Rule 41, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, there are three (3) modes of
appeal from a judgment or final order of the Regional Trial Court: (1) ordinary
appeal, (2) petition for review under Rule 42, and (3) appeal by certiorari. In all
cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

Direct resort to this Court by way of petition for review on certiorari is

permitted when only questions of law are involved. There is a question of law
when there is doubt as to which law should be applied to a particular set of facts.
Questions of law do not require that the truth or falsehood of facts be determined
or evidence be received and examined. Matters of evidence more properly pertain
to the trial courts as the trier of facts and the appellate courts as the reviewer of
facts.

As correctly pointed out by public respondents, among the four (4) errors
that petitioners assign to the Regional Trial Court, two (2) are questions of fact.
The nullity of the Agora Complex BOT Contract due to the mayor's alleged lack of
authority to sign it and the local government's alleged failure to determine the
project proponent's financial capacity require the reception and examination of
evidence. These issues are questions of fact not cognizable in a petition for review
under Rule 45.

Nonetheless, whether or not the Regional Trial Court correctly denied the
issuance of the temporary restraining order and dismissed the complaint due to
its lack of jurisdiction and petitioners' standing is a question of law which may be
resolved by this Court.

362
 Intramuros Administration vs.
Offshore Construction Development Company
G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018

FACTS:

Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government, which

it administered to Offshore Construction. Three properties were leased for five
years, renewable every five years upon mutual agreement. Offshore Construction
occupied and introduced improvements in the leased premises. However,
Intramuros and the Department of Tourism halted the projects due to Offshore’s
non-conformity with PD 1616. Offshore filed a complaint with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against Intramuros and
DOT. Eventually parties executed a compromise agreement where they agreed to
continue the lease contracts. Offshore failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees
despite demand letters. On March 26, 2010, Offshore received Intramuros’ latest
demand letter. Intramuros filed a complaint for Ejectment before the MTC of
Manila. MTC dismissed the complaint for forum shopping and that it had no
jurisdiction over the case. Intramuros appealed the order of the MTC before the
RTC. The RTC affirmed the order of the MTC in toto. Intramuros filed its Petition
for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not direct resort to the Supreme Court was proper.

HELD:

Yes. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable. One of these

exceptions is the exigency of the situation being litigated. A direct recourse to the
Supreme Court can be taken for a review of the decisions, final orders or
resolutions of the RTC, but only on questions of law. Under Section 5 of Article
VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to (2) Review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (e) All cases in which only an error
or question of law is involved. This kind of direct appeal to this Court of RTC
judgments, final orders or resolutions is provided for in Section 2(c) of Rule 41,
which reads: SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. - (c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases
where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

363
 RULE 42
Petitions for Review from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Court of Appeals

Section 1. How appeal taken; Time for filing

Mario Magat, Sr. et. al. v. Tantrade Corporation and Pablo Borja, Jr.
G.R. No. 205483. August 23, 2017

FACTS:

Tantrade filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Juliana

Magat before the MTC. MTC found Juliana liable, and ordered her to pay
Tantrade. Juliana appealed before the RTC but passed away during its pendency
and was thus substituted by her heirs, now petitioners in this case. RTC affirmed
the MTC decision in toto.

One (1) day before the lapse of the 15-day period to file a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners filed their Urgent
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review under Rule 42 (First
Motion for Extension). They asked for an additional 15 days from May 24, 2011, or
until June 8, 2011, to file their appeal. They justified their First Motion for
Extension by citing financial constraints. They explained that they were still
reeling from expenses due to the long hospitalization and death of Juliana, and
thus, could not immediately finance their appeal. Petitioners' counsel further
stated that petitioners' inability to finance their appeal had also prevented him
from timely preparing the Petition for Review. Despite their declared financial
difficulties, petitioners managed to pay the docket and other fees and to make a
deposit for costs, as required for a Petition for Review under Rule 42. These were
done alongside the filing of their First Motion for Extension. CA denied the motion
for extension.

Two (2) days before the expiration of the 15-day extension that petitioners
originally prayed for in the First Motion for Extension, petitioners filed their
Second Urgent Motion for Extension of Time (Second Motion for Extension). They
had not yet received a copy of the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution (for their
first motion for extension) by this time. They sought another 15-day extension, or
until June 23, 2011, to file their Petition for Review. Petitioners' counsel explained
that petitioners remained hard-pressed with their finances. A day before the end
of the second 15-day extension they prayed for, petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals their Petition for Review under Rule 42. The same was denied by the CA
for being filed out of time, even their MR. Hence this petition.

364
ISSUE:

Must petitioner’s motion for extension be granted?

RULING:

Yes, petitioner’s motion for extension should be granted.

Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals taken to the
Court of Appeals from decisions of Regional Trial Courts rendered in the exercise
of their appellate jurisdiction. Its Section 1 specifies the period for filing petitions
for review: “Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket
and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days.”

It is evident from the last two (2) sentences of Section 1 that motions for
extension to file Rule 42 petitions are permissible. Rule 42 takes a particularly
liberal stance with regard to the period for filing petitions. It explicitly enables
extensions, while other modes of appeal do not. In contrast with Rule 42, Rule 40,
or the rules on appeals to the Regional Trial Courts from the Municipal Trial
Courts, and Rule 41, or the rules on appeals to the Court of Appeals of decisions
of the Regional Trial Courts rendered in the exercise of their original jurisdiction,
make no similar reference to any extension to file such appeals. They even
proscribe motions for extension to file motions for new trial or reconsideration.

Rule 42 enables not just one (1) but two (2) extensions of 15 days each. An
initial extension may be given, provided that it is sought through a proper motion,
docket and lawful fees are paid, and a deposit for costs is made before the
expiration of the reglementary period. After this initial extension, Rule 42 permits
a second extension of another 15 days. This second extension shall, however, only
be "for the most compelling reason."

The grants of both first and second extensions are addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court of Appeals. Mere compliance with the requirements of
timely filing a proper motion, tendering payment and making a deposit, and
averring compelling reasons does not guarantee the Court of Appeals' solicitude.

365
 There are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those
setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is
doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who
seeks to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules . . . [T]he perfection
of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the
judgment of the court final and executory.

[E]xceptional circumstances or compelling reasons may have existed in the

past when we either suspended the operation of the Rules or exempted a particular
case from their application. But, these instances were the exceptions rather than
the rule, and we invariably took this course of action only upon a meritorious plea
for the liberal construction of the Rules of Court based on attendant exceptional
circumstances. These uncommon exceptions allowed us to maintain the stability
of our rulings, while allowing for the unusual cases when the dictates of justice
demand a correspondingly different treatment. Under this unique nature of the
exceptions, a party asking for the suspension of the Rules of Court comes to us
with the heavy burden of proving that he deserves to be accorded exceptional
treatment. Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least be
accompanied by an explanation of why the party-litigant failed to comply with the
rules and by a justification for the requested liberal construction.

This Court finds petitioners here to have effectively pleaded grounds that
warrant the extensions prayed for. Petitioners in this case substituted as heirs for
a deceased party. They crossed islands to file their appeal before the Court of
Appeals. They had to contend with their financial difficulties. Yet, they were able
to meet the periods required under Rule 42 for their motions for extension to file
their petition for review. It was reversible error, if not callousness, on the part of
the Court of Appeals to have summarily dismissed their appeal. Justice and the
letter of the law demand that this case be reinstated and remanded.

366
 RULE 43
Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies to the Court of Appeals

Section 1 - Scope

Metro Bottled Water Corp. v.

Andrada Construction & Development Corp., Inc.,
G.R. No. 202430, March 6, 2019

FACTS:

Metro Bottled Water and Andrada Construction entered into a

Construction Agreement for the construction of a reinforced concrete
manufacturing plant in Gateway Business Park. The project was to be completed
within 150 calendar days or by October 10, 1995. On May 10, 1995, Metro Bottled
Water extended the period of completion to November 30, 1995 upon Andrada
Construction's request, due to the movement of one (1) bay of the plant building,
weather conditions, and change orders. On August 6, 2001, Andrada Construction
filed a Request for Arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission, alleging that Metro Bottled Water refused to pay its unpaid work
accomplishment amounting to P7,954,961.10, with interest of P494,297.31.In its
Answer, Metro Bottled Water denied the allegations and counterclaimed for cost
to complete and correct the project in the amount of P5,231,452.03 and liquidated
damages in the amount of P1,663,884.36, among others.

The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, in its decision, found

that Andrada Construction was entitled to unpaid work accomplishment. It,
however, denied Metro Bottled Water's counterclaims. The Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission also found that there was no delay in the completion
since Metro Bottled Water validly granted an extension. The Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission also clarified that Metro Bottled Water failed to
substantiate its allegation of payroll padding.

Metro Bottled Water filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review
assailing the Arbitral Award. Respondent counters that petitioner assails the
competence of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission on its findings
of fact. This, it points outs, is not among the grounds for which petitioner may
appeal the arbitral award. It argues that petitioner agreed to be bound by
arbitration proceedings in an administrative agency "vested with special powers
to determine issues in construction contracts, agreements, and projects." It

367
maintains that this Court may only entertain questions of law and that the arbitral
tribunal's factual findings are "regarded with full respect, if not finality.

Petitioner argues that it indeed raised questions of law when it questioned

respondent's entitlement to recover its claims despite its admission that there was
no written approval by petitioner, as required by the Construction Agreement and
the Civil Code. It also points out that while the arbitral tribunal's factual findings
are entitled to great respect, they may still be reviewed by the Court of Appeals
and this Court when there is a conflict in the application of law, jurisprudence, or
the contract between the parties. It reiterates its arguments in the Petition and
asserts that respondent "erroneously raised arguments on equity" when the
provisions of law are clear.

ISSUE:

Can the findings of fact of the CIAC be reviewable by the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43?

Ruling:

No.

The Construction Industry Arbitration Law provides for a narrow ground

by which the arbitral award can be questioned in a higher tribunal. Section 19 states:
SECTION 19. Finality of Awards. — The arbitral award shall be binding upon the parties.
It shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the
Supreme Court.

To standardize appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, Rule 43 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure provides that appeals "may be taken to the Court of
Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law." The
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission is among the quasi-judicial
agencies explicitly listed in the rule.

While there is uniformity between appeals of the different quasi-judicial

agencies, Rule 43 does not automatically apply to all appeals of arbitral awards.
Thus, in CE Construction v. Araneta Center, however, this Court emphasized that
Rule 43 must be read together with the Construction Industry Arbitration Law,
which provides that appeals of arbitral awards must only raise questions of law.
Thus, even if Rule 43 now provides that appeals may be brought before the Court
of Appeals, these appeals must still be confined to questions of law: This is not to

368
say that factual findings of CIAC arbitral tribunals may now be assailed before the
Court of Appeals. Section 3's statement "whether the appeal involves questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law" merely recognizes variances in the
disparate modes of appeal that Rule 43 standardizes: there were those that enabled
questions of fact; there were those that enabled questions of law, and there were
those that enabled mixed questions of fact and law. Rule 43 emphasizes that
though there may have been variances, all appeals under its scope are to be
brought before the Court of Appeals. However, in keeping with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Law, any appeal from CIAC arbitral tribunals must remain
limited to questions of law.

The ratio is such: Consideration of the animating purpose of voluntary

arbitration in general, and arbitration under the aegis of the CIAC in particular,
requires us to apply rigorously the above principle embodied in Section 19 that the
Arbitral Tribunal's findings of fact shall be final and unappealable. Voluntary
arbitration involves the reference of a dispute to an impartial body, the members
of which are chosen by the parties themselves, which parties freely consent in
advance to abide by the arbitral award issued after proceedings where both parties
had the opportunity to be heard. The parties here had recourse to arbitration and
chose the arbitrators themselves; they must have had confidence in such
arbitrators. The Court will not, therefore, permit the parties to relitigate before it
the issues of facts previously presented and argued before the Arbitral Tribunal,
save only where a very clear showing is made that, in reaching its factual
conclusions, the Arbitral Tribunal committed an error so egregious and hurtful to
one party as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of
jurisdiction.

Thus, the general rule is that appeals of arbitral awards by the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission may only be allowed on pure questions of law.
Even the Construction Industry Arbitration Law does not provide for any instance
when an arbitral award may be vacated.

369
 Taar v. Lawan
G.R. No. 190922, October 11, 2017

FACTS:

Narcisa, Alipio, Fortunata, and Pantaleon inherited two (2) tracts of land.
Narcisa sold her share to the Adaoag Spouses and to the Gragasin Spouses. Later,
Pantaleon, Alipio, Fortunata, the Adaoag Spouses, and the Gragasin Spouses
executed an agreement to partition the second parcel of land, which was approved
in a decision by the CFI.

Herein petitioners, successors-in-interest of Pantaleon, Alipio, and

Fortunata, prepared a subdivision plan and applied for free patents over the
property. The respondents in turn filed a verified protest alleging that their
predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, physical, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land since 1948. Petitioners countered that
respondents occupied the property as tenants.

In his Order, DENR Director Sibbaluca found that the respondents were the
actual occupants of the property, cancelling the subdivision plan, and denying
petitioners' free patent applications. Neither of the parties interposed an appeal or
moved for reconsideration, hence, the decision attained its finality. Respondents'
applications for free patent were approved, and the were issued free patents and
certificates of title.

Petitioners filed before the Secretary of the DENR a Petition to Annul

Director Sibbaluca's Order. In a decision by then Secretary Reyes of the DENR, the
free patents and the certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents were
cancelled. Private respondents appealed Secretary Reyes' Decision before the
Office of the President (OP).

The OP, through Executive Secretary Ermita, reversed Secretary Reyes'

Decision and reinstated Director Sibbaluca's Order. The OP held that Secretary
Reyes erred in reversing Director Sibbaluca’s Order as it had already attained
finality. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their Motion was denied.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari outright for being an inappropriate remedy. Instead of filing
an original action for certiorari, they should have filed a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was
denied.

370
 Petitioners claim that the CA erred in dismissing their petition for certiorari,
while the respondents assert that the CA correctly dismissed the petition for
certiorari alleging that petitioners raised errors of judgment, and not errors of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Did the CA err in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners?

RULING:

No. The CA did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an

extraordinary remedy. Its scope of review is narrow, limited only to errors of
jurisdiction. Errors of judgment can only be reviewed through an appeal. Errors
of judgment may involve a court's appreciation of the facts and conclusions of
law drawn from such facts. If a court acts within its jurisdiction, then any alleged
errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more
than mere errors of judgment. On the other hand, errors of jurisdiction are those
where the act or acts complained of were done without jurisdiction, in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The mere allegation of grave abuse of discretion in a petition
for certiorari does not mean that the petition will automatically be given due
course. The general invocation of grave abuse of discretion is insufficient.

In this case, petitioners' allegation that the OP gravely abused its

discretion in failing to appreciate the merits of the CFI decision involves an error
of judgment, not of jurisdiction. Assuming that the issue raised by petitioners
pertains to an error of jurisdiction, there is no showing that the OP exercised its
power in an "arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility." Petitioners could have taken an appeal from the OP’s Orders
by filing a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which governs
appeals from judgments rendered by quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of
quasi-judicial powers. Well-settled is the rule that a petition for certiorari cannot
be used as a substitute for a lost appeal "especially if one's own negligence or
error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse." Hence, the CA did
not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright.

371
 Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo
G.R. No. 185894. August 30, 2017

FACTS:

Santos, a stockholder of record for 25 shares in Belo Medical Group,

requested for an inspection of the corporate books. Belo, another stockholder of
record of Belo Medical Group, opposed to granting Santos’ request alleging that:
(1) Santos is not the true owner of the 25 shares and is merely a trustee for said
shares in favor of Belo; and, (2) Santos’ request for inspection is done in bad faith
as he allegedly requests it to work in favor of a competitor company which Santos
is also a stockholder. Being caught in the disputing claims of Belo and Santos, Belo
Medical Group filed a Complaint for Interpleader with RTC, alleging that while
Santos appeared to be a registered stockholder, there was nothing on the record to
show that he had paid for the shares under his name. Subsequently, Belo Medical
Group filed a Supplemental Complaint for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. In its Supplemental Complaint, Belo Medical Group relied on
Section 74 of the Corporation Code to deny Santos' request for inspection.

The Complaint and Supplemental Complaint were raffled to the RTC of

Makati, a special commercial court, thus classifying them as intra-corporate.
However, Belo argued that the proceedings should not have been classified as
intra-corporate because while their right of inspection as shareholders may be
considered intra-corporate, "it ceases to be that and becomes a full-blown civil law
question if competing rights of ownership are asserted as the basis for the right of
inspection."

The trial court characterized the dispute as "intrinsically connected with the
regulation of the corporation as it involves the right of inspection of corporate
records." Included in Santos and Belo's conflict was a shareholder's exclusive right
to inspect corporate records. In addition, the issue on the ownership of shares
requires the application of laws and principles regarding corporations.

However, RTC dismissed the Complaint for Interpleader as Belo Medical

Group failed to sufficiently allege conflicting claims of ownership over the subject
shares. Finally, the Complaint for Declaratory Relief was struck down as improper
because it sought an initial determination on whether Santos was in bad faith and
if he should be barred from inspecting the books of the corporation. Only after
resolving these issues can the trial court determine his rights under Sections 74
and 75 of the Corporation Code. The act of resolving these issues is not within the
province of the special civil action as declaratory relief is limited to the

372
construction and declaration of actual rights and does not include the
determination of issues.

Belo Medical Group directly filed a petition before the SC under Rule 45 on
the basis that the appeal is based purely on questions of facts. However, Santos
contends that Belo Medical Group that the petition must be dismissed as it is the
wrong mode of appeal, where the proper appeal should be under Rule 43 as it
involves an intra-corporate controversy.

ISSUE:

1. Is Rule 45 the proper remedy to be taken by Belo Medical Group?

2. If Rule 45 is not the proper remedy in the case, must the petition be
dismissed?

RULING:

1. No, Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to be taken by Belo Medical Group.

A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC promulgated by this Court En Banc laid down the
rules on modes of appeal in cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and
Exchange Commission: (1) All decisions and final orders in cases falling under the
Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. (2) The petition for review shall be taken within 15 days from
notice of the decision or final order of the Regional Trial Court. Upon proper
motion and the payment of the full amount of the legal fee prescribed in Rule 141
as amended before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of 15 days within which to file the petition for
review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling
reasons and in no case to exceed 15 days.

On the other hand, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court allows for appeals to the
Court of Appeals to raise questions of fact, of law, or a mix of both. Hence, a party
assailing a decision or a final order of the trial court acting as a special commercial
court, purely on questions of law, must raise these issues before the Court of
Appeals through a petition for review. A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC mandates it. Rule 43
allows it.

Belo Medical Group argues that since it raises only questions of law, the
proper mode of appeal is Rule 45 filed directly to this Court. This is correct

373
assuming there were no rules specific to intra-corporate disputes. Considering that
the controversy was still classified as intra-corporate upon filing of appeal, special
rules, over general ones, must apply.

2. No, the petition must not be dismissed despite availing of the wrong
mode of appeal under Rule 45.

Based on the policy of judicial economy and for practical considerations,

this Court will not dismiss the case despite the wrong mode of appeal utilized. For
one, it would be taxing in time and resources not just for Belo Medical Group but
also for Santos and Belo to dismiss this case and have them refile their petitions
for review before the Court of Appeals. There would be no benefit to any of the
parties to dismiss the case especially since the issues can already be resolved based
on the records before this Court. Also, the Court of Appeals already referred the
matter to this Court when it dismissed Belo's Petition for Review. Remanding this
case to the Court of Appeals would not only be unprecedented, it would further
delay its resolution.

374
 Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. vs. Reyes
G.R. No’s. 152797, 189315, and 200684, September 18, 2019

FACTS:

Portions of Hacienda Looc, an 8,650.7778-hectare property in Batangas,

were offered to be sold to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the
Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme of RA 6657. Through this agreement, physical
possession was transferred to the DAR. It then distributed 25 Certificate of Land
Ownership Award.

Meanwhile, the rights and interest over Hacienda Looc were transferred to
Manila Southcoast, who was able to register portions of Hacienda Looc in its name.
Manila Southcoast filed a Petition before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)
seeking to cancel the 25 Certificates of Land Ownership Award and the
reconveyance of the excluded areas. The farmers moved for the Petition’s
dismissal. Before the resolution of the petition, several farmers entered into
amicable settlements with Manila Southcoast. 15 certificates were cancelled based
on the allegedly executed waivers. The farmers appealed but the same was denied.

Fil-Estate, a company that acquired, through a joint venture agreement, the

10 other lots with an area totaling 1,219.0133 hectares covered by the certificates,
filed a Petition praying that the 10 lots be excluded from the coverage of CARP.
The affected farmers questioned the validity of the cancellation proceedings,
claiming that they were denied due process and that some waivers had been
falsified.

The DAR Regional Director issued an order granting Fil-Estate’s Petition

and ordering that 10 lots be excluded from the coverage of the CARP. The affected
farmers appealed before the Agrarian Reform Secretary. He declared that 70
hectares of the 1,219.0133-hectare parcel of land are covered land under the CARP.

The farmers appealed their case before the Office of the President. They also
filed a Petition to Re-Open Case before the DAR Secretary, but the same was
denied. The Office of the President dismissed the farmer’s appeal, upholding the
decision of DAR that majority of the lots in question had an average slop of 18%
and were agriculturally underdeveloped. The farmers filed a Petition for Review
before the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal

Fil-Estate argues that the proper remedy to assail the decisions of the
Agrarian Reform Secretary is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, not an appeal to the office of the President, following Section 54 of RA 6657.

375
The farmers counter that an appeal before the Office of the President is the proper
remedy pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

ISSUE:

Can the decision of the Agrarian Reform Secretary be assailed through an

appeal before the Office of the President?

RULING:

Yes. There are 2 modes of appeal that may be taken from the decisions,
resolutions, and final orders of the DAR depending on the subject matter of the
case. For matters falling within the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the appeal should
be lodged before the CA by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the case may be elevated to the Office of the
President depending on whether the rules provide for such mode of appeal.

The Secretary of Agrarian reform has jurisdiction over all matters involving
the administrative implementation of RA 6657. Applications for exemption from
coverage under Section 10 of RA 6657 have been classified as Agrarian Law
Implementation Cases, which fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform.

Jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, on the other hand, is lodged before the
DARAB. Agrarian Implementation cases are not within its jurisdiction.

The Rule for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases provide a mode of appeal
from the decisions of the Secretary of Agrarian reform to the Office of the
President. On the other hand, the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB states that
appeals from the decisions of the DARAB may be brought to the CA pursuant to
the Rules of Court.

Here, Fil-Estate applied for exemption from coverage under Section 10 of

RA 6657. Certainly, this is a matter that fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Agrarian Reform Secretary. Therefore, the farmers did not err in elevating the case
to the Office of the President before filing a petition for review before the CA.

376
In relation to A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC

Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. G & P Builders Incorporated, et al.
G.R. No. 189509, November 23, 2015

FACTS:

Respondent G & P Builders, Incorporated (G & P) filed a Petition for

Rehabilitation before the Misamis Oriental Regional Trial Court. Among the
allegations in the Petition is that G & P "obtained a loan from Metrobank and
mortgaged twelve (12) parcels of land as collateral. G & P's loan obligation
amounted to P52,094,711.00 at the time of the filing of the Petition before the trial
court.

However, while the rehabilitation proceedings were pending, Metrobank

and G & P executed a Memorandum of Agreement (first MOA), where the parties
agreed that four (4) out of the 12 parcels of land mortgaged would be released and
sold. The sale of the parcels of land amounted to P15,000,000.00. Pursuant to the
first MOA, the amount was deposited with Metrobank "for subsequent disposition
and application in conformity with the Court approved Rehabilitation Plan.

The trial court approved the first MOA as a compromise agreement

between parties. G & P entered into compromise agreements with its other
creditors as approved by the rehabilitation court. G & P filed a motion to extend
the period within which the rehabilitation court may approve or deny a
rehabilitation plan.

Metrobank entered into a Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement with Elite
Union Investments Limited (Elite Union). Metrobank sold G & P's loan account
for P10,419,000.00.

Subsequently, Metrobank's counsel withdrew his appearance before the

rehabilitation court. Elite Union moved to be substituted for Metrobank.

Before the rehabilitation court could grant the motions, G & P, Elite Union,
and Spouses Victor and Lani Paras executed a Memorandum of Agreement
(second MOA). Elite Union sold all its rights, titles, and interests over G & P's
account to Spouses Victor and Lani Paras for the amount of P10,419,000.00.

Elite Union's Motion for were granted by the rehabilitation court. The next
day, G & P and Elite Union filed a Joint Motion for the court to approve the second
MOA. They also prayed that partial judgment be rendered based on the

377
agreement. The rehabilitation court granted the Motion and rendered a Partial
Judgment based on the agreement.

G & P filed a Motion for the Release of Unapplied Deposit with Metrobank
on November 27, 2006. Metrobank opposed the Motion and claimed that the
deposit was not covered by the contract transferring G & P's loan obligation to
Elite Union. According to Metrobank, the release of titles was conditioned on the
understanding that the proceeds would "be applied exclusively in favor of
Metrobank.

The rehabilitation court granted G & P's Motion and ordered the release of
unapplied deposit with Metrobank. Metrobank moved for reconsideration but the
motion was denied. Metrobank then filed before the CA a Petition for Review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

The CA reversed and set aside the Order of the rehabilitation court.
According to the Court of Appeals, G & P has no interest nor personality in asking
for the release of the deposit since the loan account was finally sold to Spouses
Victor and Lani Paras.The CA also observed that the Petition should have been
dismissed outright since the assailed Order was a mere interlocutory order and
could not be assailed through a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:

Is the CA correct in stating that trial court Orders are interlocutory orders,
thus, not appealable to the CA via Rule 43?

RULING:

YES.

A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC provides that all decisions and final orders in cases
falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules
of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No.
8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

This court has laid down the test to determine whether an order is final or
merely interlocutory: "Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is
final."

378
 It has been held that an interlocutory order does not terminate or finally
dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court
before the case is finally decided on the merits. It refers to something between the
commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is
not the final decision on the whole controversy. Conversely, a final order is one
which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the case. An order is final
if the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. It is interlocutory if
the order simply resolves matters incidental to the main case and still leaves
something to be done on the part of the court relating to the merits of the case.

In this case, the assailed orders of the trial court are interlocutory in nature.
The orders pertained to an incidental matter: entitlement to the P15,000,000.00
deposit as proceeds of the sale of properties that secured respondent G & P's loan
obligation. In contrast, the main proceeding before the commercial court concerns
the approval of the rehabilitation plan under the Interim Rules. To resolve the
merits of the case, the trial court, sitting as commercial court, must either approve
or disapprove the rehabilitation plan, depending on the feasibility of the proposed
plan to rehabilitate the corporation.

Petitioner committed a procedural error when it filed a Petition for Review

before the Court of Appeals instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. The distinction is important because the remedy against
an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65.

379
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr.
G.R. No. 208976, February 22, 2016

FACTS:

The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) maintains On-line

Lottery Terminals in its main office and in provincial district offices. Respondent
Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr. (Delos Reyes) served as the PCSO’s Central Operations
Department Division Chief. Following an account validation and verification to
reconcile accounts due to substantial outstanding balances, it was found that
"there was a deliberate delay in the submission of the periodic sales report; that
the partial remittance of total sales were made to cover previous collections; and
that the unremitted collections were attributed to persons all employed by [PCSO]
as Lottery Operations Assistants II, and Elizabeth Driz, the Assistant Division
Chief. Delos Reyes and Driz were criminally charged before the Office of the
Ombudsman with malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, and administratively charged with dishonesty and gross
neglect of duty. They were preventively suspended for 90 days.

After the submission of the parties' pleadings, the Office of the

Ombudsman found Delos Reyes and Driz guilty of grave misconduct and gross
neglect of duty, and ordering their dismissal from service. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by Delos Reyes but was denied thus the filing of the
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Reversing the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision, the CA ordered the
reinstatement of respondent with full backwages and without loss of seniority
rights. Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review
on certiorari with the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision being reinstated.

In his Motion for Reconsideration, Delos Reyes prays that the court
reconsider its ruling based on the following grounds: first, there is no substantial
evidence to warrant the finding that he is guilty of grave misconduct and gross
neglect of duty; and second, the Court of Appeals was correct "in allowing the
petition for certiorari in the interest of substantial justice” since PCSO, "the very
institution that initiated this case, sought to exculpate [Delos Reyes] from the
administrative charges filed against him[.]"

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the
respondent availed the wrong remedy of petition for certiorari considering that (1)
there was no grave abuse of discretion in this case and (2) there was an adequate
remedy available to him under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

380
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Delos Reyes erred in resorting to petition for

certiorari in assailing the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision

RULING:

Yes. The liberal application of the rules cannot be invoked to justify a

flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure. Appeals of decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be appealed to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It is only when there is grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman that this court will
entertain review of the assailed ruling or order. The rules and jurisprudence
require the dismissal of the petition before the Court of Appeals.

Herein, respondent Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr. relies heavily on PCSO's

Comment before the Court of Appeals and on PCSO's statements that
support his innocence of the administrative charges. However, he forgets
the settled rule that "[findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman[,]
when supported by substantial evidence] are conclusive." As we found in
our October 13, 2014 Resolution, respondent failed to show arbitrariness on
the part of the Office of the Ombudsman to warrant judicial intervention.

381
 CE Construction v. Araneta Center
G.R. No. 192725, Aug 09, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner CECON was a construction contractor, which, for more than 25

years, had been doing business with respondent ACI, the developer of Araneta
Center, Cubao, Quezon City. In June 2002, ACI sent invitations to different
construction companies, including CECON, for them to bid on a project identified
as "Package #4 Structure/Mechanical, Electrical, and Plumbing/Finishes
(excluding Part A Substructure)," a part of its redevelopment plan for Araneta
Center Complex. The project would eventually be the Gateway Mall. As described
by ACI, "the Project involved the design, coordination, construction and
completion of all architectural and structural portions of Part B of the Works[;] and
the construction of the architectural and structural portions of Part A of the Works
known as Package 4 of the Araneta Center Redevelopment Project." As part of its
invitation to prospective contractors, ACI furnished bidders with Tender
Documents. The Tender Documents described the project's contract sum to be a
"lump sum" or "lump sum fixed price" and restricted cost adjustments. CECON
submitted its bid, indicating a tender amount of P1,449,089,174.00. This amount
was inclusive of "both the act of designing the building and executing its
construction." Its bid and tender were based on schematic drawings, i.e.,
conceptual designs and suppositions culled from ACI's Tender Documents.
CECON's proposal "specifically stated that its bid was valid for only ninety (90)
days, or only until 29 November 2002." This tender proposed a total of 400 days,
or until January 10, 2004, for the implementation and completion of the project.
CECON offered the lowest tender amount. However, ACI did not award the
project to any bidder, even as the validity of CECON's proposal lapsed on
November 29, 2002. ACI only subsequently informed CECON that the contract
was being awarded to it. ACI elected to inform CECON verbally and not in
writing. In a phone call on December 7, 2002, ACI instructed CECON to proceed
with excavation works on the project. Despite ACI's undertaking, no formal
contract documents were delivered to CECON or otherwise executed between
ACI and CECON. Apart from shifting its arrangement with CECON from design-
and--construct to construct only, ACI introduced other changes to its
arrangements with CECON. CECON underscored two (2) of the most notable of
these changes which impelled it to seek legal relief. With many changes to the
project and ACI's delays in delivering drawings and specifications, CECON
increasingly found itself unable to complete the project on January 10, 2004. It
noted that it had to file a total of 15 Requests for Time Extension from June 10, 2003
to December 15, 2003, all of which ACI failed to timely act on. Exasperated,
CECON served notice upon ACI that it would avail of arbitration. As negotiations

382
seemed futile, on December 29, 2004, CECON filed with the CIAC a Motion to
Proceed with arbitration proceedings. ACI filed an Opposition. After its
Opposition has been denied, ACI filed a Manifestation and Motion seeking the
CIAC's clearance for the parties to enter into mediation. Mediation was then
instituted with Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez acting as mediator. After mediation failed,
an arbitral tribunal was constituted through a March 16, 2005 Order of the CIAC.

The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal October 25, 2006 Decision awarded a total sum
of P217,428,155.75 in favor of petitioner CE Construction Corporation (CECON).
This sum represented adjustments in unit costs plus interest, variance in take-out
costs, change orders, time extensions, attendance fees, contractor-supplied
equipment, and costs of arbitration. This amount was net of the countervailing
awards in favor of respondent Araneta Center, Inc. (ACI), for defective and
incomplete works, permits, licenses and other advances. The Court of Appeals
April 28, 2008 Decision modified the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal October 25, 2006
Decision by awarding a net amount of P82,758,358.80 in favor of CECON.The
Court of Appeals July 1, 2010 Amended Decision adjusted this amount to
P93,896,335.71.Aggrieved at the Court of Appeals' ruling, CECON tiled the
present Petition insisting on the propriety of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal's
conclusions and findings. It prays that the assailed Court of Appeals decisions be
reversed and that the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal October 25, 2006 Decision, as
modified by its December 28, 2006 Order, be reinstated.

ISSUE:

Can the CA assail the arbitral awards made by CIAC Arbitral Tribunal?

RULING:

NO.

Section 19 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Law establishes that

CIAC arbitral awards may not be assailed, except on pure questions of law.
Consistent with CIAC's technical expertise is the primacy and deference accorded
to its decisions. There is only a very narrow room for assailing its rulings.

Section 19 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Law establishes that

CIAC arbitral awards may not be assailed, except on pure questions of law:

Section 19. Finality of Awards. - The arbitral award shall be binding

upon the parties. It shall be final and unappealable except on
questions of law which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court.

383
 Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure standardizes appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies. Rule 43, Section 1 explicitly lists CIAC as among the quasi-
judicial agencies covered by Rule 43. Section 3 indicates that appeals through
Petitions for Review under Rule 43 are to "be taken to the Court of Appeals ...
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
and law."

This is not to say that factual findings of CIAC arbitral tribunals may now
be assailed before the Court of Appeals. Section 3's statement "whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law" merely
recognizes variances in the disparate modes of appeal that Rule 43 standardizes:
there were those that enabled questions of fact; there were those that enabled
questions of law, and there were those that enabled mixed questions fact and law.
Rule 43 emphasizes that though there may have been variances, all appeals under
its scope are to be brought before the Court of Appeals. However, in keeping with
the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, any appeal from CIAC arbitral
tribunals must remain limited to questions of law.

384
 Ornales v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
G.R. No. 214312, September 5, 2018

FACTS:

On November 14, 2005, Roberto Ricalde (Ricalde), Modesto De Leon (De

Leon), Alicia Mangubat (Mangubat), and Lenelita Balboa (Balboa) filed a
complaint affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman. They accused members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of violating Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 9184, or the Government
Procurement Reform Act, when they authorized Bendaña to enter into a direct
contract with Amellar Solutions. The accused members were Niego Suayan,
Melecio Vidal, Christopher Jones Bello, Ivan Ornales, Shirley Atienza, Eguia,
Magnaye, Vergara, De Castro, and Ornales . In their joint Counter-Affidavit, the
Sangguniang Bayan members denied violating Republic Act No. 3019, and alleged
good faith and lack of malice in issuing the assailed resolutions. They claimed that
they merely relied on the Committee's recommendations and that whatever lapses
there may have been were procedural in nature, which did not cause undue injury
to the municipality. On February 7, 2013, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon issued a Joint Resolution, indicting the Sangguniang Bayan members for
violating Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3, paragraphs (e) and
(g) of Republic Act No. 3019. It also recommended that they be found guilty of
grave misconduct. It pointed out that in authorizing Bendaña to enter into a direct
contract with Amellar Solutions, the Sangguniang Bayan members usurped the
functions of the Bids and Awards Committee, thereby violating Article 177 of the
Revised Penal Code, or usurpation of authority or official functions. It likewise
found that the Sangguniang Bayan members dispensed with the required public
bidding under the law when they authorized Bendaña to enter into a direct
contract with Amellar Solutions, violating both Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 9184.

Due to the re-election of some Sangguniang Bayan members to the same

positions, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon applied the
condonation doctrine to the administrative charges against them. However, it
affirmed its previous finding of probable cause against the Sangguniang Bayan
members in the criminal case. Ornales, Eguia, Vergara, De Castro, and Magnaye
assailed the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon's February 7, 2013 Joint
Resolution and October 7, 2013 Order with a Petition for Certiorari filed before the
Court of Appeals. They also impleaded the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon in their petition. On April 15, 2014, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals averred that it only had
jurisdiction over issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative

385
disciplinary cases and that jurisdiction over the Office of the Ombudsman's
issuances in criminal cases lay with the Supreme Court.

Ornales, Eguia, Vergara, De Castro, and Magnaye moved for the

reconsideration of the Court of Appeals April 15, 2014 Resolution, but their motion
was denied in the Court of Appeals September 8, 2014 Resolution. On October 8,
2014, Ornales, Eguia, Vergara, De Castro, and Magnaye filed a Petition for Review
before this Court. Petitioners also point out that the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing their case outright for lack of jurisdiction when it actually had
jurisdiction to determine the other issue of whether there was substantial evidence
to hold petitioner Magnaye guilty of grave misconduct, which is administrative in
nature. Nonetheless, they insist that the Court of Appeals should not have let form
prevail over substance because of public respondent's grave abuse of discretion in
finding probable cause against them. They maintain that the agreement with
Amellar Solutions was a form of alternative procurement, which did not need to
undergo competitive public bidding. Thus, there was no probable cause to indict
them for usurping authority or official functions; for causing undue injury to the
government; or for giving any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference.

ISSUE:

Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the present case?

HELD:

No.

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989,

granted this Court appellate jurisdiction over orders, directives, or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases:

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - (1) All provisionary orders
of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. A
motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and
shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds: (1) New evidence has
been discovered which materialy affects the order, directive or decision; (2) Errors
of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days
from filing: Provided, that only one motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained. Findings of fact by the [office] of the Ombudsman when supported
by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing

386
the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1)
month's salary shall be final and unappealable. In all administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten ( 10) days from receipt
of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the

Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.

However, Fabian v. Desierto struck down Section 27 of Republic Act No.

6770 for being unconstitutional as it increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction
without this Court's advice and consent, contrary to the prohibition imposed in
Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. In Fabian, the Court held that appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. In so holding, the Court en Banc, through Mr. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, declared unconstitutional Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 or the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, which provided that decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Such provision was held
violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution, as it expanded the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and consent. The Court also
took note of the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, it held that "[u]nder
the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review
on certiorari, but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in
Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was
precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies." The Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-
judicial agency falling under Rule 43.

Thus, as a quasi-judicial agency, decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman

in administrative disciplinary cases may only be appealed to the Court of Appeals
through a Rule 43 petition. While Republic Act No. 6770 may have been silent on
the remedy available to a party aggrieved with the Office of the Ombudsman's
finding of probable cause in a criminal case, Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario clarified that the
remedy in this instance is not an appeal, but a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court before this Court: True, the law is silent on the remedy of an
aggrieved party in case the Ombudsman found sufficient cause to indict him in

387
criminal or non-administrative cases. We cannot supply such deficiency if none
has been provided in the law. We have held that the right to appeal is a mere
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in
accordance with, the provisions of law. Hence, there must be a law expressly
granting such privilege. The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy
of an aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. As we ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party is
given the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such right of appeal is not
granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in
criminal cases, like finding probable cause to indict accused persons.

However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of

the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This
Court has repeatedly pronounced that the Office of the Ombudsman's orders and
decisions in criminal cases may be elevated to this Court in a Rule 65 petition,
while its orders and decisions in administrative disciplinary cases may be raised
on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in
denying the petition questioning public respondent's finding of probable cause for
lack of jurisdiction. Thus, petitioners' failure to avail of the correct procedure with
respect to the criminal case renders public respondent's decision final.
Furthermore, the present case fails even on its merits.

388
 Ombudsman v Leovigildo Delos Reyes Jr.
G.R No. 208976 (Resolution) , October 13, 2014

FACTS:

To generate more funds in line with its mandate, the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) maintains On-line Lottery Terminals in its main office
and provincial district offices. The PCSO’s Central Operations Department, where
the Delos Reyes (respondent) serves as Division Chief, manages the terminals in
the main office.

Because of the presence of substantial outstanding balances, validation and

verification were done in Delos Reyes’ division. It was found that an agency was
committing a deliberate delay in the submission of periodic sales report and partial
remittances were made to cover previous collections. After conducting its own
investigation, the PCSO Legal Department recommended filing formal charges
against Delos Reyes and Elizabeth Driz, as Assistant Division Chief, for dishonest
and gross neglect of duty. It was alleged that the Lottery Operation Assistants
turned over the lotto proceeds and lotto ticket sales report to Delos Reyes, or in his
absence, to Driz. If both were absent, the proceeds will be placed in the vault under
Delos Reyes’ control and deposited the next banking day. Upon the filing of the
formal administrative charges with the Office of the Ombudsman, Delos Reyes
and Driz were preventively suspended.

The Ombudsman rendered decision finding Delos Reyes and Driz guilty of
grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty, thus ordering their dismissal from
service. Delos Reyes filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, who granted the
same due to failure to prove Delos Reyes’ guilty with substantial evidence. It then
ordered PCSO to reinstate Delos Reyes.

The Ombudsman and the PCSO (petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court. They argued that the petition for certiorari under Rule
65 filed by Delos Reyes with the CA, was the wrong remedy to assail the decision
of the Office of the Ombudsman. The proper remedy is a petition for review under
Rule 43. However, since the petition was filed out of time, certiorari shall not lie as
it is not a substitute for a lost appeal.

ISSUE:

Is a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari the proper remedy to assail the decision
of the Office of the Ombudsman?

389
RULING:

No. The Court of Appeals erred in granting respondent’s petition for

certiorari.

It is settled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in

administrative disciplinary cases should be appealed to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari lies to assail the Office of
the Ombudsman’s decision when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
It must be shown that the Office of the Ombudsman exercised its power "in an
arbitrary or despotic manner — which must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law — in order to exceptionally warrant judicial
intervention."

The remedy of certiorari from an unfavorable decision or resolution of the

Office of the Ombudsman is available only in the following situations:

a) in administrative cases that have become final and unappealable where

respondent is exonerated or where respondent is convicted and the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month salary; and

b) in criminal cases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination

of probable cause during preliminary investigation.

Appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary cases of the Office of

the Ombudsman should be taken to the CA by way of petition for review under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 43 prescribes the manner of
appeal from quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Ombudsman, was formulated
precisely to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies. Thus, certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43 is an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Petitioner failed to file an appeal with the CA within fifteen days from notice
of the assailed decision. As noted by the CA, he filed her petition for certiorari only
after 52 days from receiving the denial of her motion for reconsideration by the
Ombudsman. Such remedy cannot prosper as certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be
resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

390
 In this case, the remedy of an appeal via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was
available to respondent; however, he still opted to file a petition for certiorari in
complete disregard of the rules. The rules and jurisprudence necessitated the
dismissal of the petition before the Court of Appeals. In addition, the petition for
certiorari was filed 60 days from the receipt of the copy of the denial of
respondent’s motion for reconsideration, which was beyond the 15-day period to
file an appeal provided in the rules. Liberal application of the rules cannot be
invoked to justify a flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure.

391
Section 3 - Where to appeal

Department of Public Works and Highways v. CMC/MONARK/PACIFIC/HI-

TRI JOINT VENTURE
G.R. No. 179732. September 13, 2017

FACTS:

DPWH and CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri J.V. (the Joint Venture) executed

a contract for road improvement component loan in Zamboanga del Sur. DPWH
hired BCEOM French Engineering Consultants to oversee the project. While the
project was ongoing, the Joint Venture’s truck and equipment were set on fire.
Thereafter, a bomb exploded at Joint Venture’s hatching plant. The Joint Venture
made several written demands for extension and payment of the foreign
component of the Contract. There were efforts between the parties to settle the
unpaid Payment Certificates. BCEOM recommended the payment of outstanding
monies due to Joint Venture citing that they finished 80% of the project when the
same was halted. To enforce this claim, the Joint Venture filed a complaint before
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), the administrative
agency tasked with resolving issues pertaining to the construction industry.
Meanwhile, Joint Venture sent a "Notice of Mutual Termination of Contract" to
DPWH requesting for a mutual termination of the contract subject of the
arbitration case due to its diminished financial capability due to DPWH's late
payments, changes in the project involving payment terms, peace and order
problems, and previous agreement by the parties. DPWH acting secretary
accepted the same.

The CIAC promulgated an award directing DPWH to pay Joint Venture.

The CA sustained the award hence DPWH filed this petition for review. Petitioner
contends that Court of Appeals gravely erred in rendering the assailed decision
because it completely ignored, overlooked, or misappreciated facts of substance,
which, if duly considered, would materially affect the outcome of the case.
Petitioner argues that the present case is an exception to the rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

ISSUE:

Is the finding of facts by the CIAC subject to review?

392
RULING:

No, finding of facts by the CIAC is not subject to review absent the most
compelling reasons.

Rule 43 Section 3 of the Rules of Court states that an appeal under this Rule
may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein
provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. As a general rule, findings of fact of CIAC, a quasi-
judicial tribunal which has expertise on matters regarding the construction
industry, should be respected and upheld. In National Housing Authority v. First
United Constructors Corp., this Court held that CIAC's factual findings, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, will not be overturned except as to the most compelling
of reasons. The all too-familiar rule is that the Court will not, in a petition for
review on certiorari, entertain matters factual in nature, save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons, like when such factual findings were drawn from
a vacuum or arbitrarily reached, or are grounded entirely on speculation or
conjectures, are conflicting or are premised on the supposed evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record or when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken or absurd. This conclusion is made more compelling by the fact that the
CIAC is a quasi-judicial body whose jurisdiction is confined to construction
disputes. Indeed, settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative agencies
and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction
is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In this instance there was absence of a compelling reason to overturn the

finding of facts by the CIAC. The subsequent affirmation of the CA rendered it
final.

393
 Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435, August 9, 2017

FACTS:

In his Affidavit-Complaint (Complaint) dated 6 August 2008, petitioner

Joson charged private respondents before the Ombudsman with violation of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended. At the time of filing the Complaint, Joson was then Nueva
Ecija's Vice Governor and its Sangguniang Panlalawigan's Presiding Officer, while
Umali was Nueva Ecija's Governor. Agtay, Abesamis, and Pancho served as
Nueva Ecija's Provincial Trade and Industry Officer, OIC-Provincial
Administrator, and Treasurer, respectively. Pallanan was the former Provincial
Administrator of Nueva Ecija.

Joson alleged that on 21 September 2006, a Memorandum of Agreement

was executed by the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija and Ryan Angelo
Sweets and Catering Services (Ryan Angelo Catering), which was owned by
Cleopatra Gervacio (Cleopatra). Under this Agreement, Ryan Angelo Catering's
services for two (2) years “shall include regular serving of meals for breakfast,
lunch, dinner, and snacks at the canteen and the convention center, special meals
and catering services shall be provided as may be required." Joson claimed that
another caterer was hired during Umali's oath-taking ceremony. However, Agtay
asked Ryan Angelo Catering, through Cleopatra, for a receipt of P1,272,000.00
under the name of the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija, Joson claimed that
Agtay made this request to make it appear that Ryan Angelo Catering actually
catered and to justify the withdrawal of P1,344,000.00 from the treasury of Nueva
Ecija's provincial government.

On 4 December 2009, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Francis

Euston R. Acero (Prosecutor Acero) of the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution
dismissing all charges against Umali, Abesamis, Agtay, Pancho, and Pallanan. On
the violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, Prosecutor Acero held that
the evidence was insufficient to prove undue injury on Cleopatra or on the
Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija. On the violation of Article 213 of the
Revised Penal Code, Prosecutor Acero found that there was not enough evidence
to prove that private respondents committed fraud to use public funds for their
personal benefit.

On the violations of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713,
and Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code, Prosecutor Acero held that there was
no sufficient evidence that could establish private respondents' prohibited
material or pecuniary interest in the unnamed caterer. On the allegation of grave

394
misconduct, Prosecutor Acero found that Joson was not able "to demonstrate that
[private] respondents, in the performance of their functions, have engaged in
intentional wrongdoing or have committed a deliberate violation of a rule of law
or standard of behavior."

Joson moved for reconsideration, which was denied for being filed out of
time. Hence, on 15 July 2011, Joson filed this Petition for Certiorari against the
Office of the Ombudsman, Umali, Agtay, Abesamis, Pancho, and Pallanan.

On November 14, 2011, public respondent Office of the Ombudsman filed

its Comment. It maintains that petitioner should have elevated the administrative
case to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It argues that the
dismissal of private respondents' cases was based on sufficient basis; hence, it did
not commit grave abuse of discretion

ISSUE:

Is it proper to resort to Rule 65 instead of Rule 43?

RULING:

NO.

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

In administrative complaints, the Office of the Ombudsman's decision may

be appealed to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43. In Fabian v. Hon. Desierto, SC
declared Section 27 of The Ombudsman Act unconstitutional for increasing the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in violation of the proscription under
Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. SC further held in Fabian that "appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

With respect to the dismissal of the administrative charge for gross

misconduct, the Court finds that the same has already attained finality because
Joson failed to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The
assailed ruling of the Ombudsman absolving the private respondents of the
administrative charge possesses the character of finality and, thus, not subject to
appeal. Here, petitioner's failure to avail of the correct procedure with respect to
the administrative case renders the Office of the Ombudsman's decision final.

395
 Though final and unappealable in the administrative level, the decisions of
administrative agencies are still subject to judicial review if they fail the test of
arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, or
when such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence
of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion.

Specifically, the correct procedure is to file a petition for certiorari before

the CA to question the Ombudsman's decision of dismissal of the administrative
charge. Joson, however, failed to do this. Hence, the decision of the Ombudsman
exonerating the private respondents from the charge of grave misconduct had
already become final.

In any event, the subject petition failed to show any grave abuse of
discretion or any reversible error on the part of the Ombudsman to compel this
Court to overturn its assailed administrative ruling.

396
Sections 6 and 7, Rule 43

Alfonso Cortal et. al. v. Inaki Larrazabal Enterprises

G.R. No. 199107. August 30, 2017

FACTS:

Respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises (Larrazabal Enterprises)

owned three (3) parcels of land. In 1988, these three (3) parcels were placed under
the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended by
Executive Order No. 228. Pursuant to the Scheme, Emancipation Patents and new
transfer certificates of title were issued to farmer-beneficiaries, petitioners
included. In 1999, Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these
parcels and cancellation of the TCTs against the DAR and the petitioners before
the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, DARAB alleging that no price had been
fixed, much less paid, for the expropriation of its properties, in violation of the just
compensation requirement under PD No. 27, as amended. Petitioners denied non-
payment of just compensation by presentation of LBP certificates deposited in
respondent’s accounts.

The Regional Adjudicator ruled that there was nothing in record to show
that just compensation was fixed or paid for the parcels hence, ordered for
respondent to be restored to ownership of the lots. On appeal, DARAB reversed
the decision due to prescription, and gave credence to the Landbank certificates.
On MR, DARAB reversed its decision. On petition for review before the CA, the
Court ruled dismissed the same on numerous grounds: (1) The name of
Raymundo Codilla indicated in the motion for extension of time to file petition for
review as one of the petitioners was not indicated in the petition for review and in
the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, (2) the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to show any competent evidence of
identity of the petitioners, (3) petitioners failed to attach the copy of the Complaint
filed by respondent, and (4) counsel for the petitioners did not indicate the place
of issue of his IBP number. Petitioners thus elevated the matter to the SC.

ISSUE:

Did petitioners properly and accordingly avail of the remedy under Rule
43?

397
RULING:

Yes, petitioner properly and accordingly availed of the remedy under Rule
43.

Judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are appealed to the

Court of Appeals through petitions for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 43 appeals shall be taken through the filing of a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, within 15 days from notice of the
appealed action. Rule 43, Section 6 specifies the required contents of Rule 43
petitions: Section 6. Contents of the Petition. — The petition for review shall (a)
state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or
agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the
facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified
true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other
supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping
as provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the
specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein.

Rule 43, Section 7 stipulates that failure to comply with these requisites may
be sufficient ground for dismissing the appeal: Section 7. Effect of Failure to
Comply with Requirements. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of
the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful
fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and
the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for
the dismissal thereof. The remedy sought by petitioner was proper since DARAB
is a quasi-judicial body.

Rule 43, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that a verified
petition for review must "be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or
a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed
from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record
referred to therein and other supporting papers."

In Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court explained that

appending a copy of an original complaint is not even required. Given this Rule's
generic reference to "copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto," The [Court of Appeals] will ultimately determine if the supporting
documents are sufficient to even make out a prima facie case. If the [Court of
Appeals] was of the view that the petitioner should have submitted other

398
pleadings, documents or portions of the records to enable it to determine whether
the petition was sufficient in substance, it should have accorded the petitioner, in
the interest of substantial justice, a chance to submit the same instead of dismissing
the petition outright. Clearly, this is the better policy. Quintano equally holds true
here. Though Quintano was concerned with a Rule 65 petition and this case with
a Rule 43 petition, the crucial procedural rule here is substantially the same as that
in which Quintano hinged. As with Rule 65's generic reference to "copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto," Rule 43 also only
references "material portions of the record referred to . . . and other supporting
papers."

To be sure, the determination of what is sufficiently pertinent to require

inclusion in a pleading is not a whimsical exercise. Air Philippines Corporation v.
Zamora laid down guideposts for determining the necessity of the pleadings or
parts of the records. It also clarified that even if a pertinent document was missing,
its subsequent submission was no less fatal: First, not all pleadings and parts of
case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which are
relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the
document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether
said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to
convince the court to give due course to the petition. Second, even if a document is
relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown that
the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached to
the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized
in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the
judgment is attached. Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the
case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon
showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will
serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.

Here, petitioners' failure to attach a copy of the complaint originally filed

by Larrazabal Enterprises before the DARAB should not have been fatal to their
Rule 43 petition. Its inclusion was not absolutely required, as it was certainly not
"the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from." If, in the Court of
Appeals' judgment, it was a material document, the more prudent course of action
would have been to afford petitioners time to adduce it, not to make a justification
out of it for dispossessing petitioners of relief.

399
 Viva Shipping Lines, Inc v. Keppel Philippines Marine, Inc.
G.R. No. 177382., February 17, 2016

FACTS:

On October 4, 2005, Viva Shipping Lines, Inc. (Viva Shipping Lines) filed a
Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City. It was initially denied for failure to comply with the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation and so Viva filed its Amended Petition
which was eventually dismissed for failure to show the company’s viability and
the feasibility of rehabilitation. The Regional Trial Court found that Viva Shipping
Lines’ assets all appeared to be nonperforming.

Aggrieved, Viva Shipping Lines filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. It only impleaded Hon. Adolfo
V. Encomienda, the Presiding Judge of the trial court. It did not implead any of its
creditors, but served copies of the Petition on counsels. Viva Shipping Lines
neither impleaded nor served a copy of the Petition on its former employees or
their counsels. The Court of Appeals dismissed Viva Shipping Lines’ Petition for
Review. It found that Viva Shipping Lines failed to comply with procedural
requirements under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals ruled that due to the failure of
Viva Shipping Lines to implead its creditors as respondents, “there are no
respondents who may be required to file a comment on the petition, pursuant to
Section 8 of Rule 43.” Viva Shipping Lines moved for reconsideration but was
denied.

Petitioner contends that Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate

Rehabilitation mandates a liberal construction of procedural rules, which must
prevail over the strict application of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. According to
petitioner, this court disfavors dismissals based on pure technicalities. Also, the
immediate dismissal of its Petition for Review is contrary to the purpose of
corporate rehabilitation to rescue and rehabilitate financially distressed companies

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner Viva Shipping

Lines’ Petition for Review on procedural grounds

RULING:

No. It is true that Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the
“[r]ules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing

400
a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.”
However, this provision does not negate the entire Rules of Court by providing a
license to disregard all the other provisions.

Rule 43 prescribes the mode of appeal for corporate rehabilitation cases. But
here, petitioner did not comply with some of these requirements. First, it did not
implead its creditors as respondents. Instead, petitioner only impleaded the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, contrary to Section 6(a) of Rule 43.
Second, it did not serve a copy of the Petition on some of its creditors, specifically,
its former employees. Finally, it did not serve a copy of the Petition on the Regional
Trial Court.

The right to appeal is not a natural right[,] nor a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law.” In line with this, liberality in corporate
rehabilitation procedure only generally refers to the trial court, not to the
proceedings before the appellate court.

The party who seeks to avail [itself] of [an appeal] must comply with the
requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. Rules of
procedure are required to be followed, except only when for the most persuasive
of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice. For the courts
to exercise liberality, petitioner must show that it is suffering from an injustice not
commensurate to the thoughtlessness of its procedural mistakes. Not only did
petitioner exercise injustice towards its creditors, its Rule 43 Petition for Review
did not show that the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing its Amended
Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation.

401
 PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

RULE 44
Ordinary Appealed Cases

Section 10 - Time of filing Memoranda in Special Cases

Buena, Jr. v. Benito

G.R. No. 181760 October 14, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent Dr. Sangcad D. Benito (Dr. Benito) filed a petition for

mandamus against petitioner Regional Director Anacleto B. Buena, Jr. (Regional
Director Buena) to compel the latter to attest to his permanent appointment as
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent. Respondent claimed that the position
of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent does not belong to the Career
Executive Service, hence, it was petitioner's ministerial duty to attest to his
appointment. In defense, petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition on two
grounds. First, petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy since respondent
does not possess the career executive service eligibility required for Career
Executive Service. Second, respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing a petition for mandamus. Respondent should first appeal the refusal
of attestation to the Civil Service Commission proper.

RTC took cognizance of the petition and ruled in favor of respondent. On

appeal, CA directed the parties to file their respective memoranda. Petitioner filed
a manifestation, requesting representation by the Office of the Solicitor General
and an additional 30 days to file a memorandum. However, the 30th day to file the
memorandum lapsed without the Regional Office filing the required
memorandum. Consequently, CA declared the Regional Office's appeal
abandoned and dismissed.

In this appeal, the Associate Solicitor handling the case assumed

responsibility for the non-filing of the memorandum, citing her alleged heavy
workload as an excuse.

402
ISSUE:

Did the CA err in dismissing the Civil Service Commission Regional Office
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao's appeal for its failure to file the
required memorandum?

RULING:

No, the CA did not err in dismissing the Civil Service Commission’s appeal
for failure to file the required memorandum. Rule 44, Section 10 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, expressly states that the failure of the appellant to file his
memorandum within the period therefor may be a ground for dismissal of the
appeal. Further, Rule 50, Section 1 reiterates that the appellant's failure to file the
required memorandum within the reglementary period is a ground for the Court
of Appeals to dismiss the appeal.

In this case, the Court of Appeals ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda. Instead of filing the memorandum, the Regional Office requested
additional 30 days to file the pleading. The additional period requested lapsed
without the Regional Office filing the required memorandum. The Court of
Appeals, therefore, correctly dismissed the appeal. That the case was not properly
calendared in the list of due dates of the Associate Solicitor and his overwhelming
workload do not justify counsel's failure to file the memorandum on behalf of the
Regional Office. We have ruled that heavy workload is no excuse for failure to
comply with the reglementary periods under the Rules.

403
Section 13. Contents of Appellant’s brief

Philippine National Construction Corp. v.

Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad
G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015

FACTS:

PNCC and Asiavest Holdings caused the incorporation of an associate

company Asiavest-CDCP through which they entered into contracts to construct
rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia. PNCC obtained various
guarantees and bonds from Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad (ASIAVEST
MBMB) to guarantee the due performance of its obligations. Meanwhile, the
failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract prompted the
State of Pahang to demand payment against ASIAVEST MBMB's performance
bonds. Consequently, the corporation demanded indemnity from PNCC.

ASIAVEST MBMB filed a Complaint for recovery of sum of money against

PNCC before the RTC of Pasig. The trial court declared PNCC in default for failure
to file any responsive pleading and allowed ASIAVEST MBMB to present its
evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of ASIAVEST MBMB
ordering PNCC to pay the sum of Malaysian Ringgit 3,915,053.54 or its equivalent
in Philippine Peso. PNCC's appeal was dismissed by the CA for raising pure
questions of law exclusively cognizable by this court.

ISSUES:

Was there error on the part of the Court of Appeals in dismissing the appeal
on the ground that it raised pure questions of law and in not finding the propriety
of impleading two Malaysian Corporations (Asiavest Holdings and Asiavest-
CDCP) for petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of
Court?

RULING:

The Court ruled in the negative.

A question of law exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts," while a question of fact exists "when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts." Questions of fact

404
require the examination of the probative value of the parties' evidence. This
petition originated from a default judgment against petitioner who was not able
to present evidence before the trial court. Necessarily, the errors raised from the
trial court involved only questions of law.

Petitioner insists that the issue on the propriety of impleading two Malaysian
Corporations as well as their participant liability involves a question of fact.
Respondent counters that this was not assigned as an error before the Court of
Appeals.

Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court enumerates the required contents
of an appellant’s brief. In paragraph (e), the appellant’s brief must include “a clear
and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for
its judgment.” In its appellant's Brief before the Court of Appeals, petitioner only
assigned two errors: (1) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, and (2) that the trial court deprived the defendant-appellant of
his day in court.

The argument on the two Malaysian corporations was raised by petitioner

for the first time in its Motion to Lift Order of Default which was denied by the
RTC. There was no showing that petitioner questioned said order of the RTC on
appeal. In any event, this court has held that it is essential, to boot, that the party
demonstrate that he has a meritorious cause of action or defense, otherwise,
nothing would be gained by setting the default order aside.

405
 RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Section 1 - Filing of Petition with Supreme Court

Villasana v. People
G.R. No. 209078, September 4, 2019

FACTS:

Jojo Villasana was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. PO3
Martinez received a confidential information that Jojo Villasana and Nida
Villasana were rampantly selling drugs. A team was at once formed to conduct
surveillance operations. At about 11:30 p.m. that day, the team proceeded to the
target area on board three vehicles. Around 10 to 15 minutes later, they saw,
through the van's tinted front windshield, Villasana coming out of an alley around
5 to 6 meters away. He was holding a plastic sachet while talking to a woman. The
Police officers approached him discreetly. After verifying that Villasana was
indeed holding shabu, PO3 Martinez arrested him and confiscated the sachet. The
woman, however, was able to escape. Villasana and the seized drug were brought
to the Marulas Barangay Hall, where an inventory was made. The inventory was
signed by Kagawad Mendez and a certain Artemus Latoc, a former official. PO3
Martinez marked the confiscated item with Villasana's initials, "JCV," in the
"office." RTC convicted Villasana. CA held that there was a valid warrantless arrest
because Villasana "was caught in flagrante delicto of having in his possession an
illegal drug." It also found that the police officers had probable cause to apprehend
Villasana, as he matched the description given by the informant, and was also
found at the place specified by the informant. In any case, CA held that Villasana
was already estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest since he failed to
move for the quashing of the Information before his arraignment. Neither did he
raise the issue of his warrantless arrest prior to or during the proceedings before
the trial court.

ISSUE:

Can factual issues be raised in a Rule 45 petition?

RULING:

Exceptionally, yes. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court is
not a trier of facts. It is not our function to review evidence all over again.

406
Furthermore, the factual findings of the trial court, especially when upheld by the
Court of Appeals, are generally given great weight considering the trial court's
unique position to directly observe witness' demeanor on the stand. A departure
from the general rule, however, may be warranted where facts of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misconstrued, or misapplied. From all
indications — the time of the arrest being 11:30 p.m., PO3 Martinez's location, and
the tinted front windshield of the van through which he was looking — it was
highly doubtful that PO3 Martinez saw, let alone deciphered, the contents of the
sachet. It is settled that "reliable information" provided by Police assets alone is
not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The circumstances in this case, if
properly appreciated, would lead to a conclusion different from what was arrived
at by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

407
 DST Movers Corp. v. People's General Insurance Corp.
G.R. No. 198627, January 13, 2016

FACTS:

An accident occurred involving a Honda civic driven by Adeline Dela Cruz,

a truck allegedly belonging to DST Movers, and a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by
Harrison Valdez . It was alleged that the truck hit the Honda Civic and pushed it
forward, thereby hitting the Mitsubishi Lancer. The driver of the truck then
allegedly escaped. An investigation report was prepared by PO2 Tomas describing
the involved Honda civic and Mitsubishi Lancer, their drivers, and damaged
sustained but on the trucks description the driver was stated as unidentified and
the damaged was undetermined. The Honda Civic was covered by PGIC’s
insurance and paid its owner the entire amount of the insurance.

PGIC then filed a complaint for sum of money against DST movers. In its
answer DST Movers acknowledged that it was the owner of the truck, however it
claimed that the truck did not make any trips on the day of the alleged accident.
They supported their claims with copies of invoices and receipts and vouchers
relating to repairs and maintenance procedures that were undertaken on the truck
on specific dates which included the date when the accident occurred. The MTC
ruled in favor of PGIC. DST Movers insisted that its liability was not established
by a preponderance of evidence. Specifically, it faults the MTC for ruling in favor
of PGIC despite how its version of events was supported by nothing more the
Traffic Accident Investigation Report. It asserts that reliance on this Report was
misplaced as it was supposedly “improperly identified [and] uncorroborated.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court may determine preponderance of

evidence under a Rule 45.

HELD:

No.

A Rule 45 petition pertains to questions of law and not to factual issues.

Rule 45, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is unequivocal: SECTION
1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on

408
certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.

Seeking recourse from this court through a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 bears significantly on the manner by which this court shall treat
findings of fact and evidentiary matters. As a general rule, it becomes improper
for this court to consider factual issues: the findings of fact of the trial court, as
affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this court. "The
reason behind the rule is that the Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its duty
to review, evaluate, and weigh the probative value of the evidence adduced before
the lower courts."

A determination of whether a matter has been established by a

preponderance of evidence is, by definition, a question of fact. It entails an
appreciation of the relative weight of the competing parties' evidence. Such
determination is a "query [that] necessarily invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy
of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole
and the probabilities of the situation."

409
 Toquero v. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 213482, June 26, 2019
FACTS:

Toquero was employed by Crossworld Marine Services, Inc. (Crossworld)

on behalf of its principal, Kapal Cyprus, Ltd., as a fitter for vessel MV AS
VICTORIA.

On April 24, 2012, while on board the vessel, Toquero was assaulted by his
fellow seafarer, Jamesy Fong (Fong). According to Toquero, he was instructed by
the master of vessel to check and repair a generator. Fong, who was an oiler, was
ordered to assist him. Later on, Fong recalled their prior altercation and challenged
Toquero to a fistfight. Toquero ignored Fong and continued working. Suddenly,
Fong hit the back of Toquero's head with a big and heavy metal spanner, knocking
him unconscious. He was given first aid treatment at the ship clinic, where his vital
signs were monitored.

Toquero was later hospitalized in Lome, Togo, Africa, where he was

evaluated by a neurosurgeon, Dr. Tchamba Bambou. The Medical Certificate
"noted a large lacerated wound with a large depression on the left parietal area."
Toquero underwent urgent craniectomy, debridement, and evacuation of
hematoma, which left a hole in his skull. He was discharged from the hospital on
May 10, 2012 and later on repatriated to the Philippines.

Upon Toquero’s return to the Philippines, he underwent series of medical

treatment by the company-designated physician and Toquero’s chosen
physicians.

As a result, Toquero asked Crossworld for his sickness allowance, but this
was rejected. He then filed a Complaint against Crossworld for sickness allowance,
money claims, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. However, he
accordingly amended his Complaint to include a claim for total permanent
disability benefits upon learning that that the company-designated physician had
declared him fit for sea duty.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit but ruled that
Toquero was entitled to the award of US$5,000.00 in the interest of justice and
equity and for humanitarian considerations. On appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision and ordered
Crossworld to pay Toquero sickness allowance and attorney's fees equivalent to
10% of the judgment award. Toquero filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court
of Appeals but such petition was dismissed. Hence, this Petition for Review on

410
Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Can petitioner Toquero raise questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition?

RULING:

Yes.

Only questions of law should be raised in petitions for review on certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts and a review
of appeals is not a matter of right.

Nevertheless, this Court admits of exceptions subject to its sound judicial

discretion. In Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., findings of fact by the Court of Appeals
may be reviewed by this Court:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on

speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record.

For this Court to review the facts of the case, these exceptions must be
alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties.

While petitioner concedes that his Petition raises questions of fact, he

alleges that it falls under several exceptions. Petitioner alleges that: (1) the Court
of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (2) its
judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; and (3) the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence

411
 Aquilina Granada, et al. v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 184092, February 22, 2017

FACTS:

This resolves the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and

Petition for Certiorari, which assail the Decision and the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, finding petitioners Venancio R. Nava, Susana B. Cabahug,
Aquilina B. Granada, Carlos Bautista, Felipe Pancho, and Jesusa Dela Cruz guilty
of violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

On November 5, 1993, Teresita Lagmay, Eden Jane Intencion, and Mabini

Reyes of the Commission on Audit, Region XI, Davao City, submitted a Joint-
Affidavit with an attached Special Audit Report to the Commission on Audit
Director, Region XI, Davao City. The Special Audit Report disclosed that the
various school forms and construction materials purchased by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, now Department of Education, Division Office of
Davao for the Elementary School Building Program were priced above the
prevailing market prices, leading to a loss of P613,755.36 due to overpricing. The
auditors recommended the refund of the excess amount, and the filing of a
criminal or administrative action against the public officials who participated in
the transactions. On July 25, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, found
that there was sufficient evidence to indict several Department of Education,
Culture and Sports officials for violating Section 3(g) and (e) of Republic Act No.
3019. Consequently, petitioners entered separate pleas of not guilty during their
respective arraignments. Petitioners Nava, Cabahug, Granada, and Dela Cruz
were subsequently charged with Violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019
in an Information filed. On January 12, 2009, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by Nava, Cabahug, Granada, and Dela Cruz. Nava filed
a petition for certiorari, while Cabahug, Granada and Dela Cruz filed their
respective petitions for review of the Sandiganbayan Decision and Resolution.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor claims that Nava erred in filing a
special civil action pursuant to Rule 65 when the proper remedy should have been
an appeal under Rule 45. The Office of the Special Prosecutor states that Nava's
Petition asks for a re-examination of the evidence presented, which is not proper
in a petition for certiorari.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor also posits that Nava's Petition cannot
be considered as a petition for review, as the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for
review is limited to errors of law. It then points out that the issues raised in Nava's

412
Petition are primarily questions of fact, but "with [an] allegation that there was
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Nava insists
that his Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was not a substitute for a lost appeal
since it was timely filed. Nava further insists that while the remedy of appeal
under Rule 45 was available to him, the same was insufficient as it was limited to
questions of law. Nava claims that the assailed Decision and Resolution were
based on a fraudulent audit, surmises, and speculations.

ISSUE:

Was Nava's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 the proper
remedy to take?

RULING:

NO.

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 was not the proper remedy
to take.

Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides the mode of appeal from
judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:

SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party

desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.

Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al. emphasized that the proper remedy to take from a
judgment of conviction by the Sandiganbayan is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45:

At the outset it must be emphasized that the special civil action of

certiorari is not the proper remedy to challenge a judgment
conviction rendered by the [Sandiganbayan]. Petitioner should have
filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended

by Republic Act No. 8249, decisions and final orders of the

413
 Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court provides that "[a] party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment, final order or resolution of the . . . Sandiganbayan . . .
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition . . . shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth." Section 2
of Rule 45 likewise provides that the petition should be filed within
the fifteen-day period from notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration
filed in due time after notice of judgment.

Herein, the assailed Decision and Resolution convicted Nava and the other
petitioners of the crime of entering into a manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
contract or transaction on behalf of the government. Thus, the proper remedy to
take is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Nonetheless, inasmuch as Nava's Petition was filed within the 15-day

period provided under Section 2 of Rule 45, this Court treated it as an appeal and
did not dismiss it outright. While procedural rules should be treated with utmost
respect since they serve to facilitate the adjudication of cases in support of the
speedy disposition of cases mandated by the Constitution, "[a] liberal
interpretation . . . of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances."

414
 Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center v. Asiamed Supplies and
Equipment Corp., G.R. No. 205638 August 23, 2017

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45, praying that
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside.

Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center (DHLFMC) and respondent

Asiamed Supplies and Equipment Corporation (Asiamed) entered into a Contract
of Sale. DHLFMC agreed to purchase from Asiamed machines for the price of
P31,000,000.00. The machines were delivered where Anthony Dee and VP
Alejandro Mateo signed a Sales Invoice and two Delivery invoices upon receipt.
Asiamed later on filed a complaint against DHLFMC and Anthony Dee for sum of
money for failing to pay the total amount. In their answer, they alleged that it was
a conditional Sale. RTC rendered a decision finding that the parties had entered
into a Contract of Sale rendering both petitioners jointly and severally liable. The
petitioners appealed to the CA but denied it. As understood by the Court of
Appeals, petitioners' main argument was that the Contract of Sale had been
rescinded because a loan from Planters Bank was not approved. However, the
Court of Appeals found that the text of the Contract of Sale did not support this
contention. Further, even assuming that the Planters Bank loan approval was a
condition for the effectivity of the Contract of Sale, petitioners did not prove that
Planters Bank did not approve the loan. On petitioner Anthony's liability, the
Court of Appeals held that petitioners were estopped from raising the separate
juridical personality of DHLFMC as a defense for Anthony. This was in
consideration of petitioners' denial of the allegation that DHLFMC "[was] an entity
representing itself to be a corporation duly organized and existing," stating that
they "never represented that [petitioner] DHLFMC [was] a corporate entity duly
organized and existing."

The Court of Appeals also granted respondent Asiamed's motion for

substitution, allowing it to procure the appointment of an administrator for the
estate of petitioner Anthony, who passed away during the pendency of the case.
Thus, petitioners filed this present Petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution. In the Resolution this Court denied the petition for failure of
petitioners to show any reversible error in the assailed Decision and Resolution.
Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration

ISSUE:

Is Rule 45 the proper remedy in this case?

415
RULING:

NO. Rule 45 is not the proper remedy.

Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. It is a general rule that factual findings of the Regional Trial
Court are conclusive, especially when they have been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court. Although
jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to this rule, exceptions must be
alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so this Court may evaluate and
review the facts of the case.

Here, the Court of Appeals made a factual determination that the effectivity
of the Contract of Sale did not depend on any alleged loan application from
Planters Bank. It relied on the evidence presented, particularly the Contract of Sale,
which did not mention any loan from Planters Bank. Petitioners assail this
determination, insisting that respondent was aware that the Contract of Sale was
conditional. Petitioners cite the testimony during cross-examination of
respondent's vice president for sales, Edward Dayao (Dayao), where he said that
he "was told that there was supposed to be a P200 million loan with Planters
[Bank]." Petitioners cite respondent's vice president for operation, Onofre Reyes
(Reyes), who testified that Dayao directed him to modify the earlier agreement
with petitioner Anthony, in light of the alleged disapproved loan. However, the
above mentioned letter drafted by Reyes pertaining to the modification of the
earlier agreement remained unsigned.67 Nonetheless, petitioners refer to the draft
as evidence that rescission was being undertaken and argue that respondent's
demand for the balance of the obligation was consequently premature.68

Petitioners have failed to show how the Court of Appeals' factual

determination based on the evidence presented is an error of law. Indeed,
petitioners' argument that respondent was aware of the conditionality of the
contract hinges on an appreciation of evidence. Petitioners have failed to allege,
substantiate, or prove any exception to the general rule allowing only questions of
law to be raised in a petition for review so that this Court may evaluate and review
the evidence presented and the facts of the case.

416
 William G. Kwong Management, Inc. v. Diamond Homeowners & Residents
Association
G.R. No. 211353, June 10, 2019

FACTS:

Diamond Subdivision is a residential subdivision with several commercial

establishments operating within it such as beer houses, karaoke bars, night clubs,
and other drinking joints. Because of these, patrons, customers, and many other
people freely come in and out of Diamond Subdivision. Such unrestricted access
to the subdivision, however, also exposed its residents to incidents of
robbery, akyat-bahay, prostitution, rape, loud music, and noise that would last until
the wee hours of the morning. Diamond Homeowners & Resident Association
(Diamond Homeowners) raised these peace and security issues with the Angeles
City Council.

Subsequently, the Angeles City Council issued Ordinance No. 132, series of
2003, reclassifying Diamond Subdivision as exclusively residential and prohibited
the further establishment and operation of any business except for those already
existing. However, this Ordinance was not complied with as more beer gardens
and nightclubs were still put up.

Among those affected was William G. Kwong (Kwong). A resident of

Diamond Subdivision for more than 38 years, he runs 3 motels in the subdivision
under his company, William G. Kwong Management, Inc. Seeking to address his
security concerns, Kwong proposed to his neighbors that guard posts with
telephone lines be set up at the entry and exit points on the street where he resides
to screen all incoming and outgoing visitors. However, the other residents of
Diamond Subdivision also wanted their security concerns addressed. Thus, to
safeguard the whole subdivision, Diamond Homeowners proposed the "No
Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy (the Policy). Kwong, however, contested the
Policy. When Diamond Homeowners did not heed his objection, Kwong filed
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional Office a Complaint
for the issuance of a cease and desist order with application for a temporary
restraining order.

The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional Office ruled in
favor of Kwong and issued a Cease and Desist Order and a Temporary Restraining
Order. The records were later forwarded to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board Arbiter for final disposition. It lifted the Cease and Desist Order and
dismissed Kwong's Complaint. On appeal before the Board of Commissioners of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the Arbiter's ruling was reversed.

417
The Office of the President affirmed the Board of Commissioners' Decision in toto.
It noted that the factual findings of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board,
as the administrative agency with the technical expertise on the matter, were
entitled to great respect. Diamond Homeowners elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals granted Diamond
Homeowners' Petition and set aside the Office of the President's Decision. Hence,
this petition.

Petitioners argue that the factual findings of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board should be respected as it is the agency with the technical know-
how on matters involving the development of subdivisions. Respondent,
however, denies that the agency's special competence was disregarded, pointing
out that even the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional Office found
that the Policy was justified.

ISSUE:

Can the Court entertain questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition?

RULING:

Yes.

Petitioners are correct that the factual findings of administrative agencies

with special competence should be respected if supported by substantial
evidence. However, this Court finds that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board's findings were not disregarded. To begin with, the proper procedure was
followed. The matter was brought before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, which exercised jurisdiction and ruled on the merits of the case. The
appellate process then took place from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board Arbiter to the Board of Commissioners, to the Office of the President, to the
Court of Appeals, and now, to this Court. However, because the factual findings
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter and the Board of
Commissioners are conflicting, they cannot be deemed conclusive as to preclude
any examination on appeal. On one hand, the Arbiter found that the Policy did not
prohibit or impair the use of the roads. He noted that there was no evidence
showing that persons were being refused access or asked to pay for its use. He also
found no evidence of any damage to petitioners' business. He lent credence to
respondent's allegation that there was a need for the protection and security of its
residents, which must be prioritized over the convenience of motel patrons. These
findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, the Board of
Commissioners and the Office of the President ruled that there was no evidence

418
of peace and security issues within Diamond Subdivision. It held that subjecting
the subdivision roads to the Policy converts them to private roads, which are
inaccessible, not open to the public, and under respondent's control. Since the
factual findings are conflicting, they cannot be deemed conclusive as to preclude
any examination on appeal and, therefore, cannot bind this Court. As such, this
Court may determine what is more consistent with the evidence on record. While
only questions of law may be raised in Rule 45 petitions, this rule is not without
exceptions. In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Company: The Rules of Court states
that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only questions
of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are
not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to
once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the
lower courts. However, the general rule for petitions filed under Rule 45 admits
exceptions. Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr. lists down the recognized exceptions:

When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee:, (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10)
The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence
on record. These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review
filed before this Court involving civil, labor, tax, or criminal
cases. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Since the findings of the lower tribunals are conflicting as to whether there were
security concerns within Diamond Subdivision that would warrant the issuance
of the Policy, this Court may exercise its discretion to resolve this factual issue.

419
 Cordillera Global Network v. Paje
G.R. No. 215988, April 10, 2019

FACTS:

A few years after the construction of SM City Baguio, the company

undertook to expand its existing mall on Luneta Hill (the Expansion Project) to
increase parking and commercial spaces.

The DENR-Cordillera Administrative Region, with clearance from then

DENR Secretary Paje, granted SM Investments Corporation's request for a permit
to cut and earth-ball the Benguet pine, Alnus trees, and saplings that would be
affected by the Expansion Project. Subsequently, the City Planning and
Development Office of Baguio City granted locational clearance for the Expansion
Project.

Cordillera Global Network and Adajar, et al. filed two environmental cases,
which were later on consolidated. They both alleged that the cutting or earth-
balling of the 182 trees on Luneta Hill would severely damage the environment
and health of Baguio City residents. They also assailed the regularity of the permits
issued, further claiming that the Expansion Project violated zoning and
environmental laws.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the consolidated cases. It held that
Cordillera Global Network and Adajar, et al. possessed the necessary personality
to file the environmental cases under the principle of transcendental importance.
However, their cases did not fall under any of the exceptions to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and upheld the findings of the
Regional Trial Court. It dismissed Cordillera Global Network and Adajar, et al.'s
claim that the case fell under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies since there was no patent illegality. It pointed out that
despite not being parties to the applications for the environmental compliance
certificates, tree-cutting and earth-balling permits, and building permits, they still
should have come to the appropriate administrative tribunals to resolve questions
of fact.

Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Private
respondents claim that petitioners raised questions of fact improper in a petitioner
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

420
ISSUE:

Should the petition be dismissed for raising questions of fact in a petition

for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:

No.

It is well-established that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not

a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion." The Rules of Court requires that
only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45, as factual
questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's
function to weigh all over again evidence that were already considered in the
lower courts.

However, these rules do admit of 10 exceptions, as listed in Medina v.

Mayor Asistio, Jr.: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures . . .; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible . . .; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
. . .; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts . . .; (5) When
the findings of fact are conflicting . . .; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee . . .; (7) The findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. . .; (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based . . .; (9)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents . . .; and (10) The finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record . . . .

Pascual v. Burgos instructs that parties must prove with convincing

evidence that their case clearly falls under the exceptions to the rule.

Upon careful review, this Court finds that this case falls under the
exceptions in Medina, particularly: "(4) [w]hen the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts"; and "(8) [w]hen the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based[.]"

421
 Constantino v. People
G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019

FACTS:

An Information was filed against Atty. Constantino and Saliganan,

charging them with falsification of a public document. The Information stated that
Constantino made it appear that testator Severino participated in the execution of
the Last Will and Testament, when in fact he did not so participate, and making it
appear that the testator Severino and the attesting witnesses, Dr. Eliezer Asuncion,
Mary Balintona and Dr. Justino Balintona acknowledge the Last Will and
Testament before Atty. Constantino while in truth they never appeared to
acknowledge the same.

Atty. Constantino narrated that in the morning of September 9, 2001, he

brought 3 typed copies of the Last Will and Testament to Severino's house for
signing. Together in the room were Severino, Atty. Constantino, his wife Editha
and son Bernard Christian, the Balintona Spouses, Cu, Saliganan, and one other
person.

The 3 instrumental witnesses present—the Balintona Spouses and Cu—

then signed the document, after which Atty. Constantino affixed his signature.
Addressing the absence of Dr. Asuncion, whose name was indicated as an
instrumental witness, Atty. Constantino assured Severino that only 3 witnesses
were needed for the document. He then allegedly instructed Severino to leave the
document as it was and "not make any erasures or crossing-out on it in order not
to make it dirty." Atty. Constantino took a copy of the document and gave the
other two to Severino.

On his way out, Atty. Constantino alleged that Saliganan took his copy of
the document, telling him that Dr. Asuncion had already arrived. Sometime later,
Saliganan returned the copy, but Atty. Constantino stated that he did not check if
Dr. Asuncion had signed it.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Atty. Constantino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of falsification of a public document under Article 171(2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Atty. Constantino appealed before the Court of Appeals but
said court affirmed the RTC’s decision. Atty. Constantino moved for
reconsideration, but his Motion was denied. Hence, he filed this Petition.

422
ISSUE:

Can petitioner raise questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:

Yes.

In criminal cases, courts must evaluate the evidence in relation to the

elements of the crime charged. Thus, the finding of guilt is always a question of
fact.

The Petition before this Court, however, is one filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 45 mandates that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari. Thus, this Court generally gives great respect to
the factual findings of the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the
witnesses' demeanor during trial and assess their testimonies.

Considering that criminal cases involve the constitutional right to liberty

and the constitutional guarantee of the presumption of innocence, appeals of
criminal cases before this Court are not necessarily treated in the same manner as
appeals in civil cases.

Appeals of criminal cases confer upon the reviewing court full jurisdiction
and render it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment from which
an appeal arose, increase the penalty, and cite the appropriate penal law provision.

Thus, this Court may still review the factual findings of the trial court "if it
is not convinced that [such findings] are conformable to the evidence of record and
to its own impressions of the credibility of the witnesses." Significant facts and
circumstances may have been overlooked, which, if properly considered, could
affect the result of the case.

Here, however, the factual findings are not disputed. Severino executed a
Last Will and Testament on September 9, 2001, which was notarized by petitioner.
The Joint Acknowledgment indicated that the Balintona Spouses, Cu, and Dr.
Asuncion were all present as witnesses and personally appeared before petitioner.
This makes it appear that Dr. Asuncion signed the document in the presence of
petitioner when, in reality, he did not. It was later discovered that Dr. Asuncion
signed it after it had been notarized. Neither party disputes this sequence of
events.

423
 The prosecution's theory, however, is that a falsity in a public document
occurred because petitioner failed to delete Dr. Asuncion's name in the Joint
Acknowledgment. Petitioner's main defense, on the other hand, is that he ordered
the testator, Severino, not to delete Dr. Asuncion's name. This Court is, thus,
confronted with the legal question of whether petitioner, as a notary public,
falsified a public document, punishable under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal
Code, when he failed to delete Dr. Asuncion's name in the Joint Acknowledgment
upon notarization.

424
 BNL Management Corp. v. Uy
G.R. No. 210297, April 3, 2019

FACTS:

BNL Management owned 6 condominium units at the Imperial Bayfront

Tower Condominium. Petitioner BNL Management, through its president, David,
wrote a letter to the building administrator of Imperial Bayfront, and brought up
concerns over (1) the general cleanliness and maintenance of common areas; (2)
security; (3) building insurance; (4) encroachment on two (2) of the parking spaces;
and (5) the annotation of the parking spaces on the mother title. As a response, the
Building Administrator explained that the failure to annotate ownership of the
parking spaces was due to BNL Management not submitting the necessary
documents to the Association. It added that the maintenance issues were due to
lack of funds as a result of BNL Management's nonpayment of association dues.

Later on, BNL Management received a letter containing a breakdown of its

arrears in the payment of association dues from November 1996 to June 1999. It
likewise received Second Notice and Third Notice of Billings from the Association.
However, these demands remained unheeded. As a result, the Association
resolved to disconnect the electricity and water services of BNL Management.

BNL Management and David filed before the Regional Trial Court a
Complaint against Uy, et al. for damages and specific performance with
preliminary mandatory/prohibitory injunction. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the Complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Can the Court review questions of fact in a petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:

No.

First, as to the party first at fault, the common finding of the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals is that it was petitioners who failed to comply
with their obligation to timely pay association dues.

425
As the Regional Trial Court found:

Indeed, a homeowner association depends on the dues paid by its

members for its operation and delivery of services to its members. It
is therefore incumbent upon it to devise ways and means on how to
collect the association dues from its members.

In the instant case, defendants are justified in cutting off plaintiffs'

water and electric services pursuant to paragraph 5 of the House
Rules and Regulations of the IBTCA which provides:

"Non-payment of Association Dues, deposits for utilities and capital

expenditures and other special assessments promulgated by the
association that may result to any disruption or interruption of the
operation, administration, security, janitorial, utilities and other
services for lack of operational funds and/or capital shall empower
the association to limit or totally out (sic) the services and/or utilities
to delinquent unit owner/tenant; and/or prevent the unit
owner/tenants to their entry and avoid (sic) of the facilities of the
common area, property, machinery and equipment of the
corporation."

The said House Rules was (sic) in accordance with the Master Deed
and Declaration of Restriction[s] of IBTCA as required by Sec. 9 of
RA 4726[.]

It must be noted that the cutting off of the utility services in plaintiffs'
units was the last option that the association has to compel plaintiff
to pay its dues. It is rather unfair and ran (sic) counter to the idea of
fair play for plaintiff to demand enjoyment of the services without
paying what is required of him, (sic) thereby unjustly enriching itself
at the expense of another.

The Court of Appeals, for its part, held:

In the instant case, BNL failed to overcome the presumption of good

faith. From the communication between BNL and IBTCA, it is
evident that IBTCA exerted all efforts to address BNL's complaints
which it cites as the reason for its deliberate non-payment of dues.
IBTCA repeatedly explained that there was a lack of funds to resolve
the problems pointed out by BNL. The issue of lack of sufficient
funds would have been settled if BNL had at least partially paid its

426
 outstanding balance of PhP 180,981.90 sometime during the three-
year grace period given by IBTCA. There was no lack of effort or
explanation on the part of IBTCA to address BNL's concerns. In fact,
it even gave BNL several notices of billing with a warning of the
consequences of its failure to settle its pending obligation, all of
which were ignored by BNL. Thus, there can be no bad faith
attributed to defendants-appellees as they were constrained to
implement the House Rules and Regulations, as mandated by the
declaration of restrictions attached to the Master Deed.

This Court can no longer review this finding, being a question of fact.
Questions of fact are not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as they dwell on the truth or falsity of facts. Hence,
this Court would have to evaluate the evidence presented. In contrast, questions
of law are those which occur when there is "doubt or difference . . . on what the
law is on a certain state of facts."

Here, the conclusion of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
that petitioners were first in fault was based on evidence presented by the parties,
and for this Court to review their conclusions would require weighing the
probative value of the parties' evidence.

Petitioners fail to present a compelling reason for this Court to review these
factual findings. They have not shown how the lower courts failed to appreciate
the evidence they presented, or that their findings are wholly lacking in basis in
the record, or that they have committed a misapprehension of facts.

427
 Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. v. Sulpicio Lines Inc.
G.R. No. 196072. September 20, 2017

FACTS:

Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. (Steamship) was a

Bermuda-based Protection and Indemnity Club, managed outside London,
England. It insures its members-shipowners against "third party risks and
liabilities" for claims arising from (a) death or injury to passengers; (b) loss or
damage to cargoes; and (c) loss or damage from collisions. Sulpicio insured its fleet
of inter-island vessels with Steamship including M/V Princess of the World,
evidenced by a Certificate of Entry and Acceptance issued by Steamship. M/V
Princess of the World was gutted by fire while on voyage from Iloilo to
Zamboanga City, resulting in total loss of its cargoes. DILG declared the same to
be “accidental” in nature. Sulpicio claimed indemnity from Steamship under the
insurance policy. The same was denied by Steamship on the ground that Sulpicio
was grossly negligent in conducting its business regarding safety, maintaining the
seaworthiness of its vessel, and proper training of its crew. Sulpicio filed a
complaint with the RTC for specific performance. Steamship filed a motion to
dismiss and/or to refer case to arbitration pursuant to R.A. No. 9285, or ADR Law,
and to Rule 47 of the 2005/2006 Club Rules, which provided for arbitration in
London of disputes between Steamship and its members. RTC denied the motion
and was affirmed by the CA. Hence, Steamship filed a petition for review via Rule
45.

Sulpicio contends that the petition must be dismissed because: (1) it is

merely couched as a Rule 45 Petition, but is actually a Rule 65 Petition for it
contained arguments dealing with “grave abuse of discretion” allegedly
committed by the CA; (2) that the Petition’s Verification and Certification Against
Forum Shopping is defective because it was signed and executed by Steamship’s
lawyer; and, (3) the issue of whether or not Sulpicio has been furnished with the
Club’s Rulebook, which contained the arbitration clause, is factual and beyond the
realm of a Rule 45 petition.

ISSUES:

1. Did Steamship properly avail of the remedy under Rule 45?

2. Did Steamship comply with the rules on verification and certificate of non-
forum shopping?

428
RULING:

1. Yes, Steamship properly availed of the remedy under Rule 45.

An appeal from a final disposition of the CA is a petition for review

under Rule 45, and not under Rule 65. A Rule 45 petition is the proper
remedy to reverse a decision or resolution of the Court of Appeals even if
the error assigned is grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of
law. "The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the
resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is
that there should be no appeal. Allegations in the petition of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals do not ipso facto render the
intended remedy that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In Microsoft Corporation v. Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, the

Supreme Court ruled that a petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of
jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment
committed by the court. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or
mistakes in the court's findings. Where a court has jurisdiction over the
person and subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the
case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed
in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Certiorari
under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

In this case Steamship seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of

judgment of the Court of Appeals. These errors pertain to Steamship's
allegations of the Court of Appeals' failure to rule that a valid arbitration
agreement existed between the parties and to refer the case to arbitration. It
does not impute any error with respect to the Court of Appeals' exercise of
jurisdiction. As such, the Petition is simply a continuation of the appellate
process where a case is elevated from the trial court of origin, to the Court
of Appeals, and to this Court via Rule 45.

2. Yes, Steamship complied with the rules on verification and certificate of

non- forum shopping.

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that a petition for review must
be verified and must contain a sworn certification against forum shopping.
"A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading
and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his [or her] personal
knowledge or based on authentic records." While a certification against

429
forum shopping is a petitioner's statement "under oath that he [or she] has
not . . . commenced any other action involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions, or any other
tribunal or agency[.]"

In case the petitioner is a private corporation, the verification and

certification may be signed, for and on behalf of this corporation, by a
specifically authorized person, including its retained counsel, who has
personal knowledge of the facts required to be established by the
documents. Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement. On the
other hand, a certification not signed by a duly authorized person renders
the petition subject to dismissal. Moreover, the lack of or defect in the
certification is not generally curable by its subsequent submission or
correction. However, there are cases where this Court exercised leniency
due to the presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons, such as
the prima facie merits of the petition. In some cases, the subsequent
submission of proof of authority of the party signing the certification on
behalf of the corporation was considered as substantial compliance with the
rules and the petition was given due course.

In this case, the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping

were signed by Steamship’s counsel pursuant to the Special Power of
Attorney vested upon him by Steamship. Court holds that there is
substantial compliance with the rules on verification and certification
against forum shopping. Steamship's subsequent submission of the
Secretary's Certificates showing Davis' authority to execute the Power of
Attorney in favor of Del Rosario & Del Rosario cured the defect in the
verification and certification appended to the petition. Under the
circumstances of this case, Steamship's counsel would be in the best
position to determine the truthfulness of the allegations in the petition and
certify on non-forum shopping considering that "it has handled the case for
. . . Steamship since its inception."

430
 Malabanan v. Malabanan Jr.
G.R. 187225, March 6, 2019

FACTS:

In a Deed of Absolute Sale, Spouses Melinda and Jose Malabanan, acquired

a 310-square meter lot, a portion of a 2,000-square meter land. On October 13, 1984,
Melinda left the Philippines to work in Libya. Unfortunately, Jose was murdered
on June 12, 1985 prompting her to return home on June 25, 1985. She then returned
to Libya on August 19, 1985, and only came home on November 8, 1990. Later on,
Melinda discovered that their Transfer Certificate of Title had long been canceled
through a string of transactions, and that the property was registered under the
name of Spouses Dominador III and Guia Montano (the Montano Spouses).
Through this, she discovered a series of transactions: A Special Power of Attorney
was allegedly executed by her husband, Jose Malabanan, authorizing her father-
in-law Francisco Malabanan, Jr. to mortgage, lease or sell their property. It was
sold by Francisco and he later bought back the same, as a result, the TCT No. T-
195283 was canceled and a new TCT No. T-198039 was issued in the name of
Francisco Malabanan, Jr., married to Adelfina Mendoza on September 18, 1985.
When Melinda's mother-in-law, Adelfina Mendoza (Adelfina) died, her family
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of her estate. The property, then covered by
TCT No. T-198039, was adjudicated to Ramon Malabanan (Ramon), who was
Jose's brother. Melinda filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for
Annulment of Title with Damages against Spouses Ramon and Prescila Malabanan
(the Malabanan Spouses) and Francisco Malabanan (Francisco). On June 17, 1994,
Ramon sold the property to the Montano Spouses, with whom Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-467540 was issued. Melinda later filed an Amended Complaint to
implead the Montano Spouses. She argued that the Special Power of Attorney was
void as her signature in it was forged, and that she and Jose remained the real
owners of the property. Francisco and the Malabanan Spouses, in their Amended
Answer with Counterclaim, countered that Francisco and Adelfina bought the
property for their son, Jose, and Melinda as an advance on Jose's legitime.
Francisco, they added, paid for the construction of the house on the property. The
Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Melinda. It found that she has proved her
ownership over the property, which was fraudulently transferred through
Francisco's clever scheme. The trial court gave credence to the expert witness'
testimony that Melinda's signature was forged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
set aside the trial court's ruling and ordered the Complaint's dismissal. It gave
weight to Francisco's claim that the property was an advance on Jose's legitime.

ISSUE:

431
 Do the conflicting findings of the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
automatically warrant recourse to the Supreme Court?

RULING:

No. This Court's appellate review is discretionary. A question of fact, which,

in this case, is the determination of whether the property formerly covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-188590 was conjugal, generally cannot be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari. A question of fact exists when there is doubt
on the truth of the allegations and the issue entails a review of the evidence
presented. Moreover, the findings of the Court of Appeals are generally binding
on this Court. These rules allow certain exceptions enumerated in Pascual v.
Burgos: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
Here, while the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court, this does not at once permit a factual review, but simply presents a prima
facie basis for such. In Pascual: While the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court, this alone does not automatically warrant a
review of factual findings by this court. “xxx The lower courts' disagreement as to
their factual findings, at most, presents only prima facie basis for recourse to this
court: One such exception, of course, is where — as here — the factual findings of
the Court; of Appeals conflict with those of the Trial Court, but it is one that must
be invoked and applied only with great circumspection and upon a clear showing
that manifestly correct findings have been unwarrantedly rejected or reversed.
Thus, while a conflict in their findings may prima facie provide basis for a recourse
to this Court, only a showing, on the face of the record, of gross or extraordinary
misperception or manifest bias in the Appellate Court's reading of the evidence
will justify this Court's intervention by way of assuming a function usually within
the former's exclusive province. Petitioner urges this Court to review the factual
findings in this case as "some facts or circumstances that may affect the result of
the case have been overlooked." In other words, she alleges that there was a
misapprehension of facts. This Court agrees.

432
 Torres y Salera v. People
G.R. No. 206627, January 18, 2017

FACTS:

Torres was charged with acts of child abuse under Sec. 10(a) of RA. 7610.
The information states that Torres, with intent to harm and humiliate, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse, slap and whip AAA, a 14
year old minor with a T-shirt hitting his neck and shoulder and causing him to fall
down on the stairs of the barangay hall. Upon arraignment, Torres pleaded not
guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

RTC convicted Torres. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision albeit
with modification as to the penalty. Torres moved for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that judgment was rendered based on a

misapprehension of facts. He argues that both the RTC and the CA disregarded
certain material facts, which, if properly considered, would have justified a
different conclusion. In particular, petitioner challenges the credibility of the
prosecution’s witnesses.

On the other hand, respondent argues that the questions raised by

petitioner were questions of fact, which are generally proscribed in a petition for
review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Are the questions raised by petitioner mere questions of fact?

RULING:

YES. It is a fundamental rule that only questions of law may be raised in a

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The factual findings of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding and conclusive
on this Court. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not duty-bound to analyze,
review, and weigh the evidence all over again in the absence of any showing of
any arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error. A departure from the general
rule may only be warranted in cases where the findings of fact of the CA are
contrary to the findings of the trial court or when these are unsupported by the
evidence on record.

433
 The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function properly within
the office of the trial courts. It is a question of fact not reviewable by this Court.
The trial court's findings on the matter are entitled to great weight and given great
respect and "may only be disregarded if there are facts and circumstances which
were overlooked by the trial court and which would substantially alter the results
of the case.

This Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court.
The trial court neither disregarded nor overlooked any material fact or
circumstance that would substantially alter the case. The presence or absence of
one person during the incident is not substantial enough to overturn the finding
that petitioner whipped AAA three (3) times with a wet t-shirt.

We affirm petitioner's conviction. The act of whipping a child three (3) times
in the neck with a wet t-shirt constitutes child abuse.

434
 Crispino v. Tansay
G.R. No. 184466, December 5, 2016

FACTS:

Respondent Anatolia Tansay (now deceased) acquired a parcel of land

known as the Tansay Compound which she subdivided into three lots. By virtue
of two deeds of sale, Anatolia allegedly sold two of the lots – one in favor of
Zenaida and the other in favor of Luz and Caridad, Zenaida’s daughters. When
Zenaida discovered that the titles of the lots were missing, she filed a petition
before the RTC for reconstitution of the certificates of title which was granted.
Meanwhile, Anatolia filed a case for Revocation of Trust, Declaration of Nullity of
Transfer, and Cancellation of Title before the RTC.

RTC found that the deeds of sale could not have been valid as petitioners
did not pay any consideration for the transfer of the properties in their names. In
addition, RTC found that Anatolia never intended to sell the lots despite executing
deeds of sale. Rather, she merely constituted petitioners as trustees of the
properties. Petitioners appealed before the CA.

During the pendency of the appeal, Anatolia died. Petitioners then filed an
Urgent Motion to Remand Records of the Case for the Re-Opening of Trial. They
anchored their motion on an Affidavit allegedly executed by Anatolia after the
RTC had rendered its Decision, confirming the previous sales. CA denied the
Urgent Motion. It considered the same as a motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence under Rule 53.

Later on, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision in toto. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, assailing, among others, the propriety of the CA’s Resolution in
treating their motion to remand as a motion for new trial, but was denied. Hence,
this Petition.

ISSUE:

Is appeal to the CA’s final decision the proper remedy in assailing the
Urgent Motion?

RULING:

YES.

435
 The remedy against an interlocutory order is not appeal but a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This would entail
compliance with the strict requirements under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Aggrieved parties would have to prove that the order was issued without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and that there is neither appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

This notwithstanding, a special civil action for certiorari is not the only
remedy that aggrieved parties may take against an interlocutory order, since an
interlocutory order may be appealed in an appeal of the judgment
itself. In Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals it was held:

Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is appealable, as above

pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on
appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken
from the final judgment rendered in the case.

The CA’s Resolution dated July 25, 2006, which denied petitioners' motion
to remand, was an interlocutory order. It did not finally dispose of the case because
the appellate court still had to determine whether the deeds of sale executed by
Anatolia were valid. Rather than availing of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
under Rule 65, petitioners opted to wait for the CA to render its decision before
challenging the July 25, 2006 Resolution.

Petitioners did not commit any procedural infirmity in assailing the

interlocutory order in an appeal of the CA’s decision. Though petitioners could
have filed a petition for certiorari, they would have been burdened to prove that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to remand.
Moreover, petitioners still had the option to assail the July 25, 2006 Resolution in
an appeal of the Court of Appeals' final decision.

436
 Spouses Miano v. MERALCO
G.R. No. 205035, November 16, 2016

FACTS:

Sps. Miano have two electric meters, one to service their residence and the
other to service their sari-sari store. Upon inspection by MERALCO personnel, it
was discovered that there were two jumpers on their meter service connection.
MERALCO disconnected the electrical service for their residence and issued a
billing differential in the amount of ₱422,185.20. Later on, MERALCO also
disconnected the electrical service for their sari-sari store because it was found that
Sps. Miano drew electricity from their sari-sari store to service their residence. Due
to their non-payment of the billing differential, MERALCO refused to reconnect
their electricity service.

Sps. Miano filed a Complaint against MERALCO. RTC dismissed the

Complaint and ordered them to settle the billing differential. On appeal, the CA
modified the RTC's Decision and ruled that due to MERALCO's failure to notify
Sps. Miano prior to disconnection, MERALCO should pay Sps. Miano damages.
MERALCO was also ordered to restore their electricity connection. Nonetheless,
the CA ordered Sps. Miano to pay the billing differential. In their Petition for
Review on Certiorari, Sps. Miano prayed for the reversal of the order to pay the
billing differential.

ISSUE:

Is the appeal to the SC proper?

RULING:

NO. The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this
Court is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion." The Rules of Court
further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under
Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari.
It is not this Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has
already been considered in the lower courts.

However, the general rule for petitions filed under Rule 45 admits
exceptions:
1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures;
2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

437
3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6) When the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
7) The findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
10) The finding of fact of the CA is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

Petitioners admit that the only issue for resolution before this Court is a
question of fact, yet they claim that it falls under the exceptions to the general rule.
They assert that the judgment of the CA is premised on a misappreciation of facts,
or on the supposed absence of evidence that is contradicted by the evidence on
record.

None of the exceptions to justify the re-evaluation of the findings of fact of

both the trial court and the CA are present in this case. On the contrary, the
findings of fact by the RTC are well-supported by the evidence on record.

The RTC found that the disconnection of Sps. Miano's electricity supply
was based on sufficient and reasonable grounds. The trial court ruled that Sps.
Miano failed to controvert charges of violations and differential billings against
them, since they were not able to overturn the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty with their mere denials. While the CA modified the
RTC’s decision by awarding damages, the CA, however, upheld the trial court's
finding that MERALCO was entitled to the billing differential. In conclusion, we
do not find any compelling reason to reverse the findings of the CA.

438
 Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc v. Chiongbian
G.R. No. 197530, July 9, 2014

FACTS:

In 1996, Aboitiz Shipping Corporation (ASC) owned by the Aboitiz family,

Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc. (CAGLI) of the Gothong family, and William Lines,
Inc. (WLI) owned by the Chiongbian family entered into an agreement to pool
their resources and merge business under the name WG&A, Inc. (WG&A). Said
agreement provides that all disputes shall be settled through arbitration. It also
contained Annex SL-V stipulating that WLI shall acquire certain inventories of
CAGLI in exchange for a certain amount and WG&A shares. When the balance
remained unpaid in 2001, CAGLI demanded payment or return of excess
inventories from WG&A. The latter allegedly returned the inventories and
attached copy of delivery receipts signed by CAGLI’s representatives as proof.

In 2002, the Chiongbian and Gothong families decided to leave WG&A and
sold their interest to the Aboitiz family. A share purchase agreement (SPA) was
entered into by petitioner AEV and respective shareholders of WLI and CAGLI.
The SPA also provided that all disputes shall be settled through arbitration.
WG&A was then renamed to Aboitiz Transport Shipping Corporation (ATSC).

In 2008, CAGLI resumed making demands for the payment/return of said

inventories and filed its first complaint for arbitration against Chiongbian, ATSC,
ASC and AEV before the RTC Cebu Branch 20. AEV filed a motion to dismiss
which the court sustained on the ground that there was no agreement binding
AEV and CAGLI to arbitrate. CAGLI did not contest the dismissal but withdrew
the first complaint as to the remaining defendants. ATSC filed for reconsideration
of the order allowing the withdrawal.

In 2010, while the first complaint was pending, CAGLI and Benjamin
Gothong filed a second complaint for arbitration before RTC Cebu Branch 10
against the same defendants in the first complaint with respect to the same subject
matter. AEV filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint on the ground of
forum shopping, res judicata, litis pendentia and failure to state a cause of action.
The court denied AEV’s motion to dismiss and its subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Thus, AEV filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
assailing such orders.

439
ISSUE:

Is petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 the correct remedy in

assailing the court’s denial of AEV’s motion to dismiss the second complaint?

RULING:

No. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal

and appeal may only be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case. As such, no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order.
It is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the merits for a
contrary rule would delay the administration of justice and unduly burden the
courts. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory in character. Thus,
where a motion to dismiss is denied, the proper recourse is for the movant to file
an answer. Nevertheless, where the order denying the motion to dismiss is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
movant may assail such order via a Rule 65.

Since AEV availed of the improper remedy, this court is well in a position
to dismiss the present petition. Nevertheless, there have been instances when a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was treated by this court as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, such as in cases where the subject of the
recourse was one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a
court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In
this case, the RTC Cebu Branch 10’s orders are assailed for having been made with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in that it chose
to continue taking cognizance of the second complaint, despite there being
compelling reasons for its dismissal. As such, the court treated the said petition as
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and gave it due course.

440
 Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. v. Fuentes
G.R. No. 169303, February 11, 2015

FACTS:

Fuentes was hired as a security guard by Protective sometime in November

1999. At the time of Fuentes' employment, Protective assigned him to Picop
Resources, Inc. During the year 2000, A complaint for robbery committed by a
band was filed against Fuentes and others. Immediately upon filing of the
complaint, Fuentes was detained. Thereafter, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Surigao del Sur issued the Resolution dismissing the Complaint
against Fuentes. It found during preliminary investigation that there was no
probable cause to warrant the filing of an Information against Fuentes.

Fuentes then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of

salaries, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, 13th month pay,
service incentive leave and damages against Protective, Picop, Ernie S. Dolina and
Wilfredo Fuentes before the National Labor Relations Commission. Fuentes
claimed that right after the criminal complaint for robbery against him was
dismissed, he demanded to return to work but he was refused entry by a certain
Mr. Espinosa on the ground that Fuentes was a member of the NPA and that his
position had already been filled up by another security guard. Protective claims
that as was usual and routine, Fuentes should have reported to his Team Leader
or Officer-in-Charge. Since the incident of July 20, 2000, private respondent has
not yet reported to his Team Leader or to any of the officers of Protective. The
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Protective saying that as borne out
by the record, complainant was not dismissed from the service much less illegally
by the respondents PMSAI and/or Ernie S. Dolina. Complainant's claim that
respondents refused to admit him back to work after it was found out that he was
innocent of the charges against him is not supported by relevant and/or material
evidence. Moreover, complainant even failed to state with sufficient definiteness
and/or clarity the time and date when he allegedly reported for work after the
dismissal of his case on 15 August 2001.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Decision

of Labor Arbiter Legaspi and found that Fuentes was illegally dismissed.
Protective filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission.
Protective asserted that the evidence and the records showed that Fuentes was
never dismissed because he had been missing until the day he filed the Complaint
with the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition. It held that
Protective failed to discharge its burden to prove a just cause for dismissal. It said

441
that the whereabouts of private respondent were available from official records.
Thus, the claim of petitioner that private respondent "simply vanished" has no
evidentiary support. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari
assailing the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, which
reversed the findings of Labor Arbiter Legaspi.

HELD:

No. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law

may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this
Court being bound by the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. The rule,
however, is not without exception. Thus, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals
may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court in the following instances, none
of which obtain in the instant petition:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74
Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95
Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
(Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting
(Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.); (6) When the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970];
Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,);
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242
[1970]).

In labor cases, if the petitioner before this court can show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission, the assailed
Court of Appeals ruling (in the Rule 65 proceedings) will be reversed. "Labor
officials commit grave abuse of discretion when their factual findings are arrived

442
at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence." If the petitioner can show that "the
labor tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard of evidence
material to the controversy, the factual findings of the National Labor Relations
Commission may be subjected to review and ultimately rejected.

In addition, if the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter are in direct conflict
with the National Labor Relations Commission, this court may examine the
records of the case and the questioned findings in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.

It is the petitioner's burden to justify the existence of one of the exceptions

to the general rule for this court to conduct a factual review. In this case, we find
that petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

443
 Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. DMCI Project Developers Inc.
G.R. No. 173137, January 11, 2016

North Luzon Railways Corporation vs. DMCI Project Developers Inc.

G.R. No. 173170, January 11, 2016

FACTS:

BCDA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Philippine

National Railways (PNR) and other foreign corporations to construct a railroad
system from Manila to Clark with possible extensions to Subic Bay and La Union
and later, possibly to Ilocos Norte and Nueva Ecija. The JVA contains an
arbitration clause. Also, part of the agreement is for BCDA to establish North
Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail) for purposes of constructing, operating,
and managing the railroad system, which was complied by BCDA. In 1996, the
JVA was amended (AJVA) to include DMCI as a party/investor of Northrail,
through DMCI-PDI as nominate party. They also entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) wherein it was agreed that the initial seed capital of P600
million shall be infused to Northrail, of that amount, P200 million shall be DMCI's
share, which shall be converted to equity upon Northrails privatization. Later,
D.M. Consunji, Inc.'s share was increased to P300 million.

Upon BCDA and Northrail’s request, DMCI-PDI deposited P300 million

into Northrails account with Landbank. Later, Northrail withdrew from the
Securities and Exchange Commission its application for increased authorized
capital stock. Moreover, according to DMCI-PDI, BCDA applied for Official
Development Assistance from Obuchi Fund of Japan.This required Northrail to be
a 100% government-owned and controlled corporation. DMCI-PDI started
demanding from BCDA and Northrail the return of its P300 million deposit.
DMCI-PDI cited Northrail's failure to increase its authorized capital stock as
reason for the demand. BCDA and Northrail refused to return the deposit. DMCI-
PDI served a demand for arbitration to BCDA and Northrail, citing the arbitration
clause in the JVA. BCDA and Northrail failed to respond.

DMCI-PDI filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati a Petition to

Compel Arbitration against BCDA and Northrail, pursuant to the alleged
arbitration clause in the JVA. BCDA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
there was no arbitration clause that DMCI-PDI could enforce since DMCI-PDI was
not a party to the JVA containing the arbitration clause. Northrail filed a separate
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over it
and that DMCI-PDI had no cause for arbitration against it. The RTC of Makati
denied BCDA's and Northrail's Motions to Dismiss and granted DMCI-PDI's

444
Petition to Compel Arbitration. BCDA filed a Rule 45 Petition before the Supreme
Court, assailing the RTC Order granting DMCI-PDI's Petition to Compel
Arbitration.

ISSUE:

Is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 the correct remedy?

RULING:

YES. BCDA and Northrail invoked the correct remedy. Rule 45 is applicable
when the issues raised before this court involved purely questions of law. There is
a question of law when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a
certain set of facts. The test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. Meanwhile, there is a
question of fact when there is doubt as to the truth or falsehood of facts. The
question must involve the examination of probative value of the evidence
presented.

BCDA and Northrail primarily ask us to construe the arbitration clause in

the Joint Venture Agreement. They assert that the clause does not bind DMCI-PDI
and Northrail. This issue is a question of law. It does not require us to examine the
probative value of the evidence presented. The prayer is essentially for this court
to determine the scope of an arbitration clause.

EFFECT OF A.M. 19-10-20-SC (NEW RULES) ON THE RULING:

There is no effect. No amendments were introduced by the New Rules to

Rule 45. The provision is the same.

445
 Republic vs. Gimenez and Gimenez
G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016

FACTS:

The Republic, through the PCGG, instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance,

Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses
before the
Sandiganbayan. The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by
them as dummies, agents, or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda Marcos.

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the

positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the
Gimenez Spouses. The Republic presented the testimonies of witnesses testified
on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez
Spouses.

The Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further
evidence." Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until
March 29, 2006 "to file its formal offer of evidence."

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days
or until April 28, 2006, within which to file its formal offer of evidence. The Motion
was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same date.

On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until
May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. This Motion was
granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8, 2006.

Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the

Republic.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan
noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding
repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated its
presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of
its Formal Offer of Evidence.

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated

May 30, 2006. He argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was
no evidence to support its cause of action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to

446
Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to prosecute. Through her
own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.

Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June
15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed
Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the

Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the
Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss.

The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Is a Petition for Review on Certiorari the proper remedy?

RULING:

YES. Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and

damages for ill-gotten wealth are also called civil forfeiture proceedings. Republic
Act No. 1379 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be
instituted against public officers or employees. The Supreme Court already settled
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over civil forfeiture cases, which was re-
affirmed in the case of Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan. Civil forfeiture proceedings are
different from plunder cases since a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a
cause of action separate and different from a plunder case. In a prosecution for
plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. On the other hand, all that the
court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the
disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by
the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions
of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act
committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal
wealth. To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings
under Republic Act No. 1379 is the same with other civil cases — preponderance
of evidence. In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner
correctly filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court since Section 1 of the Rule provides that the mode of appeal from judgments,
final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan is through a verified petition for
review on certiorari.

447
 Padilla, Jr. vs. Malicsi
G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner purchased a parcel of land in 1984 and was covered by a TCT. In

1998, petitioner discovered that respondent constructed houses on his lot.
Petitioner repeatedly demanded for respondent to vacate the lot and pay rentals
for the period they occupied the same but the latter refused. Petitioner thus filed
an action to recover said lot. In his Answer, respondent alleged that he believed in
all honesty and good faith that the lot belonged to De Mossessgeld and only
possessed the land after receiving permission from the latter and that the land will
be eventually sold to them after full payment of the price. During the pendency of
the case, petitioner manifested to the court that he will exercise his option to sell
the land to respondent pursuant to Art. 448 of the New Civil Code and made the
corresponding offer, but the latter rejected it. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner
upon finding that respondent is not a builder in good faith when he merely relied
on the representations of De Mossessgeld without conducting due diligence in
checking the ownership with the Registry of Deeds. On appeal, the CA reversed
the RTC ruling upon giving credence on respondent’s allegation that he is a
builder in good faith by relying on De Mossessgeld’s representation. This ruling
was arrived at by the CA after applying the rulings in Sarmiento vs. Agana and
Macasaet vs. Macasaet, where the issue on the status of a builder in good faith was
intertwined with the disputing parties’ family relations in that mere reliance on
the representations of a family member as to the ownership of and permission to
possess a property suffices to support good faith.

Petitioners elevated the case to the SC via petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 alleging that respondent failed to substantiate his claim of being a
builder in good faith. In his comment, respondent maintains that the question of
whether he is a builder in good faith has already been settled by the CA, and that
there is no reason to deviate from its findings.

ISSUE:

May the petition under Rule 45 filed by petitioner involving question of

facts prosper?

RULING:

Yes, the petition under Rule 45 filed by petitioner involving question of

facts may prosper.

448
 The Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be raised in
petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of
an appeal by certiorari. However, these rules admit exceptions. Medina v. Mayor
Asistio, Jr. lists down 10 recognized exceptions: (1) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact
of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record. However, that the findings of the Court of
Appeals and of the trial court are opposite does not warrant this Court’s automatic
review of factual findings. This only presents a prima facie basis for recourse to
this Court.

In this case, the RTC found that respondent is not a builder in good faith
because on his mere reliance on the representations of De Mossessgeld, a stranger.
However, the CA found otherwise by applying 2 precedent cases. However, the 2
precedent cases relied upon by the CA have peculiar circumstances which justify
the ruling therein that mere reliance on the representations of a family member
suffices to prove good faith. These circumstances are not present in this case
because the representations relied upon by respondent was from a stranger and
not a family member. Hence, the CA was manifestly mistaken in making its
inferences. Clearly, this case falls within the exceptions in the Medina case.

Thus, the petition under Rule 45 filed by petitioner involving question of

facts may prosper because it falls within the exceptions in the Medina case,
particularly that the inference made is manifestly mistaken and that the findings
of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court.

449
 E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco
G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner is an American corporation and is the assignee the inventors of

Losartan. Losartan is being marketed in the Philippines by Merck, Sharpe, and
Dohm Corporation (Merck) under the brand names Cozaar and Hyzaar. On July
1987, petitioner filed a patent application before the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks, and Technology Transfer. On December 2000, petitioner requested
for an office action on the patent application. The patent examiner replied that
petitioner’s application was already abandoned as of September 1988. Petitioner’s
counsel then filed a petition for revival of its patent application but was denied for
having been filed out of time. Petitioner appealed to respondent Director-General
of IPO but was also denied. Thus, a petition for review was filed with the CA and
was granted. The OSG, acting for IPO, moved for reconsideration while
Therapharma, Inc. moved for leave to intervene and admit its motion for
reconsideration alleging that the decision affected its vested right to sell its own
Losartan product under the brand name Lifezar in the Philippines which was
already approved by the BFAD.

The CA granted the intervention of Therapharma. Petitioner sought for the

CA to reconsider the intervention but was denied. The CA eventually reversed its
decision hence, denying the petition. Petitioner thus filed a petition for review on
certiorari via Rule 45 with the SC arguing, among others, that the intervention was
improper. On the other hand, respondents commented that the petition raises
questions of fact which is not allowed under Rule 45, and that the proper remedy
should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Did petitioner properly avail of the remedy under Rule 45?

RULING:

Yes, petitioner properly availed of the remedy under Rule 45.

The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to correct

errors of jurisdiction. Courts lose competence in relation to an order if it acts in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A petition for
review under Rule 45, on the other hand, is a mode of appeal intended to correct
errors of judgment. Errors of judgment are errors committed by a court within its

450
jurisdiction. This includes a review of the conclusions of law of the lower court
and, in appropriate cases, evaluation of the admissibility, weight, and inference
from the evidence presented.

Intervention results in an interlocutory order ancillary to a principal action.

Its grant or denial is subject to the sound discretion of the court. Interlocutory
orders, or orders that do not make a final disposition of the merits of the main
controversy or cause of action, are generally not reviewable. The only exception is
a limited one, in that when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and
where it can be shown that the court acted without, in excess, or with such grave
abuse of discretion that such action ousts it of jurisdiction.

The question of whether intervention is proper is a question of law. Settled

is the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of
fact arises when there is doubt as to the truth or falsity of certain facts. A question
of law, on the other hand, arises when “the appeal raises doubt as to the applicable
law on a certain set of facts.” The test often used by this Court to determine
whether there is a question of fact or a question of law “is not the appellation given
to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence,
in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.”

The question of whether the Court of Appeals may resolve a motion for
intervention is a question that assails an interlocutory order and requests a review
of a lower court’s exercise of discretion. Generally, a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie to raise this issue in a limited manner. There
must be a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion for the writ of certiorari to be
issued. However, when the Court of Appeals has already resolved the question of
intervention and the merits of the case, an appeal through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy.

In this case, the CA already resolved the motion for leave for intervention
filed by Therapharma by granting the same. Hence, the issue no longer devolved
on whether or not the CA may resolve the motion, but on the propriety of its
resolution granting the motion. Further, it already resolved on the merits of the
case by rendering an amended decision denying the petition for revival of patent
application, thereby reversing its previous decision granting it. These issues
already pertain to errors of judgment which may be reviewed via Rule 45.

Thus, petitioner properly availed of the remedy under Rule 45 because

what it assailed is the resolution of the CA granting the intervention.

451
 Loria v. Muñoz, Jr.
G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr. (Muñoz) has been engaged in

construction under the name, “Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr. Construction.” In 2000,
petitioner Carlos Loria(Loria) visited him in his office and induced him to advance
P2,000,000 for a subcontract river-dredging project. Respondent accepted the
proposal and requested Allied Bank to release P3,000,000.00 from his joint account
with his business partner, Christopher Co, to a certain Grace delos Santos (delos
Santos). Loria then obtained the money from delos Santos. Despite the advance
made by respondent, the project was completed without him subcontracting it.
Because of the refusal of petitioner to return the money, respondent filed a
collection case against him. RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered him to
return the P2,000,000. On appeal, CA sustained the decision of RTC claiming that
respondent’s testimony regarding the petitioner’s receipt of the amount was
supported a check voucher and acknowledgement petitioner signed.

In this appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner maintains that
the lower courts erred in ruling for respondent since the latter failed to prove
petitioner’s receipt of P3,000,000 through a certain Grace delos Santos. In his
comment, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the appeal since the petition
raises questions of fact and law that the trial and appellate courts have already
passed upon and resolved in his favor.

ISSUE:

Does the initial receipt of P3,0000,00 by respondent Loria a question of fact

not proper in a petitioner for review on certiorari?

RULING:

Yes, petitioner’s contention that respondent failed to prove his initial

receipt of P3,000,000.00 is a question of fact which the trial and appellate courts
have already resolved. Questions of fact are those questions which require the
Court to rule on “the truth or falsehood of alleged facts”. Under Rule 45, Section 1
of the Rules of Court, the petition should only raise questions of law- questions as
to the applicable law given a set of facts. However, these are the exceptions:

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or

conjectures;

452
 (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on mis appreciation of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee;
(7) the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
(9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by respondent; and
(10) the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.

In the case at bar, both CA and RTC agree that respondent by

preponderance of evidence proved the receipt of petitioner of the money.
Petitioner also failed to convince the Court why the issue falls in any of the
exemptions. Hence, the petition must be dismissed.

453
 Noell Whessoe, Inc v. Independent Testing Consultant, Inc.
G.R. No. 199851, November 07, 2018

FACTS:

Sometime in June 1998, Petrotech, a subcontractor of Liquigaz, engaged the

services of Independent Testing Consultants to conduct non-destructive testing on
Liquigaz's piping systems and liquefied petroleum gas storage tanks located in
Barangay Alas-Asin, Mariveles, Bataan.

Independent Testing Consultants conducted the agreed tests. It later billed

Petrotech, on separate invoices for its services. However, despite demand,
Petrotech refused to pay. Independent Testing Consultants filed a Complaint for
collection of sum of money with damages against Petrotech, Liquigaz, and Noell
Whessoe. It joined Noell Whessoe as a defendant, alleging that it was Liquigaz's
contractor that subcontracted Petrotech.

In its Answer, Liquigaz argued that Independent Testing Consultants had

no cause of action against it since there were no contractual relations between them
and that any contract that Independent Testing Consultants had was with its
subcontractors.

The Regional Trial Court later declared Petrotech in default for failure to
appear during the pre-trial conference.

In its March 7, 2005 Decision, the Regional Trial Court found Liquigaz,
Noell Whessoe, and Petrotech solidarity liable to Independent Testing
Consultants. It ruled that Liquigaz was liable considering that it was the entity
which directly benefited from Independent Testing Consultants' services. It
likewise held that Noell Whessoe, as the main contractor of the project, could not
escape liability. Petrotech, as the subcontractor of the project, was also held liable.

Only Noell Whessoe and Liquigaz appealed to the Court of Appeals. Thus,
the Regional Trial Court March 7, 2005 Decision became final as to Petrotech.

In its April 28, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional
Trial Court March 7, 2005

Noell Whessoe filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by

the Court of Appeals in its December 7, 2011 Resolution. Hence, it filed this
Petition before this Court asserting that it should not have been made solidarity

454
liable to respondent Independent Testing Consultants since it had no privity of
contract with the latter.

ISSUE:

Is a question of fact, be subject to review?

RULING:

As a general rule, only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The distinction between a
question of fact and a question of law is settled. There is a question of law if the
issue can be determined without reviewing or evaluating the evidence on record.
Otherwise, the issue raised is a question of fact.

Appeal is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. This Court
may, in its discretion, entertain questions of fact if they fall under certain
exceptions, summarized in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr. : (1) When the conclusion is
a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact
of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record.

But the presence of any of the exceptions to the general rule, however, does
not automatically place the case under this Court's review. This Court explained
in Pascual v. Burgos that the party claiming an exception "must demonstrate and
prove" that a review of the factual findings is necessary.

Petitioner has not alleged that it raised a question of fact, much less allege
that this case falls under any of the exceptions. This would have merited the denial
of the Petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. Petitioner, however, argues
that this case falls under the considerations stated in Rule 45, Section 6 of the Rules
of Court: Section 6. Review discretionary. — A review is not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and

455
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of the reasons which will
be considered:
(a) When the court a quo has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; or
(b) When the court a quo has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court, as to
call for an exercise of the power of supervision.

In particular, petitioner alleges that: (a) The Court of Appeals has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and/or has
decided a question of substance in a way not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of the Honorable Court when it held that petitioner Noell
Whessoe is solidarity liable with respondent Petrotech for the claims for
respondent ITCI; (b The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings and/or has decided a question of
substance in a way not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the
Honorable Court when it denied petitioner Noell Whessoe's counterclaims.

A quick perusal of the parties' evidence reveals that the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals may have erred in finding that petitioner was still
liable to respondent Independent Testing Consultants for its unpaid fees. If not
corrected, the assailed judgments may result in grave injustice to petitioner.

456
 Quirino T. Dela Cruz vs. National Police Commission
G.R. No. 215545, January 07, 2019

FACTS:

For unlawfully arresting Sonny Villarias solely on the basis of a call from a
woman claiming he illegally fired a gun, and upon being pointed to, while he was
inside his house doing nothing and for searching his house against his will without
legal grounds, Special Police Officer 4 Quirino Dela Cruz (SPO4 Dela Cruz), Police
Officer 1 Ariel Cantorna (PO1 Cantorna) were found by the NAPOLCOM guilty
of grave misconduct.

SPO4 Dela Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the
National Police Commission December 15, 2010 Resolution. In its Resolution, the
National Police Commission found that SP04 Dela Cruz neither presented newly
discovered evidence nor cited errors of law or irregularities that would affect the
assailed Decision. Further, it found that he filed the Motion on September 21, 2010,
well beyond the ten (10)-day non-extendible period after he received the Decision
on September 8, 2010.

Undaunted, SPO4 Dela Cruz filed before the Civil Service Commission an
Appeal, which was dismissed. In its September 11, 2012 Decision, the Civil Service
Commission found that the Appeal had been filed out of time, as SPO4 Dela Cruz
did so on January 14, 2011, beyond the fifteen (15)-day period after the Decision
for review was promulgated on December 15, 2010. Thus, the questioned
Resolution had attained finality.

SPO4 Dela Cruz moved for reconsideration, insisting that he filed his
Appeal within the allowable period, but it was denied for lack of merit. In its July
9, 2013 Resolution, the Civil Service Commission said the Motion failed to provide
substantial evidence under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service to establish that he had timely perfected his appeal

SPO4 Dela Cruz filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review, but
it was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals explained that, while
technical rules of procedure may be relaxed on occasion, he must first exert effort
to establish the basis for it. In this case, he merely alleged that he had timely filed
his Appeal to merit relaxation of the rules, without documentary proof.

Thus, SPO4 Dela Cruz filed before this Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari. He insists that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that his Appeal
was filed beyond the allowable period. He points out that the Civil Service
Commission reckoned his period for appeal from the Resolution’s promulgation
date, December 15, 2010, as opposed to the date he said he actually received it,
which was on January 4, 2011. Moreover, SPO4 Dela Cruz points out that when

457
the National Police Commission held him liable for grave misconduct, it
committed reversible error as it did not expound on his alleged grave misconduct
and summarily disregarded the evidence he presented in his defense. He also
argues that the evidence Villarias submitted was insufficient to justify SPO4 Dela
Cruz ‘s dismissal.

Thus, the issues raised by SPO4 Dela Cruz for this Court’s resolution are:

First, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it sustained the Civil
Service Commission’s dismissal of SPO4 Dela Cruz ‘s appeal for having been filed
out of time; and

Second, whether or not the evidence presented to the National Police

Commission was sufficient to establish SPO4 Dela Cruz ‘s liability for grave
misconduct.

ISSUES:

1. Are the issues raised by SPO4 Dela Cruz are proper for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
2. Is relaxation of procedural rules is warranted in this case

RULING:

1. NO. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari shall
only pertain to questions of law. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind
this Court. While several exceptions to these rules were provided by
jurisprudence, they must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so
this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the case.

Both of SPO4 Dela Cruz ‘s arguments are questions of fact not proper for
review in this case. The date he received the assailed National Police Commission
Resolution is a question of fact that was resolved by the Civil Service Commission.
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, the Civil Service Commission might have
resolved his motion for reconsideration differently, had SPO4 Dela Cruz
substantiated his claim with evidence that he received the National Police
Commission Resolution on January 4, 2011. Yet, SPO4 Dela Cruz failed to do so. It
is not this Court’s role to review the evidence to resolve this question. Further,
SPO4 Dela Cruz has not addressed the December 15, 2010 Resolution of the
National Police Commission, which found that his motion for reconsideration was
filed out of time. Thus, the January 12, 2010 Decision would have already attained
finality when he failed to timely seek its reconsideration, regardless of whether the
December 15, 2010 Resolution was received on January 4, 2011.

458
 Similarly, whether there was sufficient evidence to find SPO4 Dela Cruz
liable of grave misconduct is also an evidentiary matter, which this Court will not
look into. He claims that the judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts to
persuade this Court to review the case’s factual questions. However, he has failed
to sufficiently substantiate this claim to convince this Court to look into the
evidence.

2. NO. The relaxation of procedural rules is warranted only if compelling and

justifiable reasons exist.

In Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company [650 Phil. 174 (2010)], the Court
held:

The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of a case

from their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose
of justice requires it.

Procedural rules, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard
since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the Bill of Rights
inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that “all persons shall have a right
to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.” There have been some instances wherein this Court
allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was “never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.”
A liberal interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted
to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.

This is not a case that calls for relaxation of the rules. This Court will not
tolerate abuse of police authority over civilians. Where a police officer has been
shown to have committed atrocities against a civilian, such as in this case, and is
punished for his actions, he will find no relief in this Court.

459
 People of the Philippines v. Nady Magallano, Jr. Y Flores
G.R. No. 220721, December 10, 2018

FACTS:

In its May 3, 2013 Decision, the Regional Trial Court found Magallano and
Tapar guilty of murder. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and were ordered to indemnify Batongbakal 's heirs. The Regional Trial
Court gave much weight to Pineda's testimony pointing to Magallano and Tapar
as Batongbakal's killers. It found Pineda's testimony to be "straightforward,
credible and consistent.

Magallano and Tapar filed separate Appeal Briefs before the Court of
Appeals. In their Appeal Brief, Magallano dwelt on the supposed
inconsistencies in Pineda's testimony. While Tapar also stressed that Pineda's
testimony contained "serious inconsistencies and contradictions”. He pointed out
that Pineda's late revelation to police investigators that he witnessed the attack on
Batongbakal was contrary to human nature, since the natural tendency is to
immediately disclose what one knew.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General maintained that the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Magallano and Tapar conspired
to kill and actually killed Batongbakal. It emphasized that the Regional Trial
Court's ruling that Pineda was a credible witness should be respected by the Court
of Appeals since it was the trial court that personally observed Pimentel's
demeanor as a witness. The Office of the Solicitor General also underscored that
Pineda's failure to immediately execute a sworn testimony did not detract from
his credibility. It likewise stated that Magallano and Tapar failed to allege that
Pineda had an improper motive to testify against them. In its December 12, 2014
Decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Regional Trial Court.

The Court of Appeals gave much weight to the Regional Trial Court's
assessment of Pineda's testimony, justifying that the trial court had a front row
seat in observing him and his demeanor while testifying. Hence, it "can be
expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and
which witness to disbelieve." As for Pineda's late submission of his sworn
statement and failure to aid the victim, the Court of Appeals again concurred with
the Regional Trial Court's ruling, and affirmed that different people react
differently. Moreover, it held that there was no standard response to a strange or
frightening experience such as witnessing a murder. On January 12, 2015,
Magallano and Tapar filed a Notice of Appeal.
On October 21, 2015, the Court of Appeals elevated the case records to this Court.

ISSUE:

460
 Can the credibility of Pineda’s testimony which is a factual finding of the
lower court be changed on appeal?

RULING:

No. Trial courts have the advantage of personally scrutinizing the conduct
and attitude of witnesses when giving their testimonies. Thus, "assignment of
values to the testimony of a witness is virtually left, almost entirely, to the trial
court which has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness on the
stand." Due to their unique position, the trial courts factual findings and
appreciation of the witnesses' testimonies are given much respect, more so when
their conclusions are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Factual findings of trial
courts will only be disturbed on appeal if it is convincingly shown that they
"overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight
and substance."

Also this Court has consistently held that there is no standard form of
behavior when confronted by a shocking incident. Not every witness to a crime
can be expected to act reasonably and conformably with the expectations of
mankind, because witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicit[s]
different reactions from witnesses, and for which no clear-cut, standard form of
behavior can be drawn.

As for the supposed inconsistencies in Pineda's testimony, People v. Nelmida,

et al. explained, "An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a
crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction." The Court of Appeals thus held:

What commands greater importance is that there is no inconsistency in

Pineda's complete and vivid narration as far as the principal occurrence and
positive identification of accused-appellants as the victim's assailants.

461
 Degamo v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 212416, December 05, 2018

FACTS:

The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council requested

the release of P961,550,000.00 to the Negros Oriental provincial government to
finance the rehabilitation of various infrastructures damaged by
Typhoon Sendong and a 6.9-magnitude earthquake. The Office of the President,
through Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., approved the request.

The Department, through its Regional Office No. VII, issued on June 5, 2012
Special Allotment Release Order which covered the approved amount. It also
issued a Notice of Cash Allocation worth P480,775,000.00, or 50% of the approved
sum.

In a June 18, 2012 letter to Budget and Management Secretary Abad, Public
Works and Highways Secretary Singson requested the Department not to indicate
the recipient local government unit in the Special Allotment Release Order yet,
since the Department of Public Works and Highways needed to evaluate the local
government units capability to implement projects prior to the release of a fund.
Thus, Abad ordered Budget Undersecretary Re1ampagos to withdraw the
previously issued Special Allotment Release Order and Notice of Cash Allocation.

In a June 19, 2012 letter-advice, Relampagos informed Governor Degamo

that the Department is withdrawing the Special Allotment Release Order because
its release did not comply with the guidelines on large-scale fund releases for
infrastructure projects. He said this withdrawal was effective until the Department
of Public Works and Highways could determine that the local government units
are able to implement the projects.

On June 29, 2012, the Department's Regional Office VII Director

advised Degamo that the Special Allotment Release Order had been
withdrawn, and ordered the provincial government to return and deposit
P480,775,000.00, the previously released amount, to the National Treasury.

On July 16, 2012, Degamo informed Relampagos that the provincial

government would not be returning the funds, and claimed that he was illegally
withdrawing funds unbeknownst to higher authorities.

On December 26, 2012, Degamo filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
a Complaint for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions against
Relampagos. He alleged that when Relampagos wrote the June 19, 2012 letter-

462
advice, Relampagos falsely posed himself to have been authorized by President
Aquino III. Degamo added that Relampagos usurped the official functions of the
Executive Secretary, who had the sole authority to write and speak for and on
behalf of the President.

In its April 19, 2013 Resolution, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the
Complaint. It found no probable cause to charge Relampagos with Usurpation of
Authority or Official Functions since he signed the letter in his own name and
under the words, "By Authority of the Secretary." There was also no positive
express, and explicit representation made. Neither did Relampagos act under
pretense of official position, nor without legal authority.

Thus Degamo filed for a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.

Hence, on May 7, 2014, Degamo filed this Petition for Certiorari, arguing
that public respondent, the Office of the Ombudsman, gravely abused its
discretion when it held that there was no probable cause to indict private
respondent Relampagos of the crime charged.

On February 24, 2015, petitioner filed his Consolidated Reply. He avers that
public respondent's findings are subject to this Court's power of judicial review.
He maintains that private respondent's cancellation of the Special Allotment
Release Order and Notice of Cash Allocation is contrary to law and the rulings
in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. and Araullo v. Aquino. The Department, he asserts,
"relinquishes its jurisdiction, disposition and control of public funds once a Notice
of Cash Allocation is issued." Thus, private respondent no longer had authority to
cancel both documents pertaining to the calamity fund already deposited to the
provincial government's account.

ISSUE:
Did the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Complaint for lack of probable cause

RULING:

NO. This Court has adopted a policy of non-interference with public

respondent's determination of probable cause. In Dichaves v. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al.: As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office
of the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman
wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and
government employees. The rule on non-interference is based on the respect for

463
the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office
of the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is,
therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence
on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of
facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.

Moreover, in a special civil action for certiorari, this Court cannot correct
errors of fact or law not amounting to grave abuse of discretion. This Court may
review public respondent's exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers,
but only upon a clear showing that it abused its discretion in an "arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner," as held in Joson v. Office of the
Ombudsman:

An allegation of grave abuse of discretion must be substantiated before this

Court can exercise its power of judicial review. As held in Tetangco v. Ombudsman:
It is well-settled that the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's
determination of whether or not probable cause exists except when it commits
grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is
exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation
of law.

Without proof of grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not interfere
with public respondent's determination of probable cause.

464
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 187794, November 28, 2018

FACTS:

The assailed judgments dismissed the Presidential Commission on Good

Government's complaint against Luis S. Hofileña, Sr. (Luis), Alberto A.
Yaptinchay (Alberto), Jose G. Cuaycong, Simplicio Ciocon, Carolina Yaptinchay-
Hofileña and et al. for insufficiency of evidence. Pioneer Glass Manufacturing
Corporation (Pioneer Glass) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
mining silica and producing glass products from silica.
From 1963 to 1977, Development Bank and Pioneer Glass entered into a total of 12
industrial loan and guarantee agreements. This loan was for the purchase of
machinery and construction of a building and warehouse for its silica processing
business.

On February 27, 1987, as part of the government's program to rehabilitate

select government financial institutions, Development Bank transferred some of
its assets and liabilities to the National Government through a Deed of
Transfer. Pioneer Glass was one (1) of the 283 non-performing accounts included
in the transfer.

On October 8, 1992, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No.

13 creating the Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, The
Committee was headed by the Chair of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government as chairperson and the Solicitor General as vice-chair.

On April 4, 1994, the Committee sent President Ramos its Terminal Report.
It included Pioneer Glass among the 130 companies or accounts with behest
loans. It explained that a loan account was classified as positive or behest "if at
least two (2) or more attributes of a 'behest' loan are present in the loan account.

On August 13, 2003, Presidential Commission on Good Government Legal

Consultant Rene B. Gorospe filed an Affidavit-Complaint against several officials
of Pioneer Glass and Development Bank for violating Section 3, paragraphs (e) and
(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Affidavit-Complaint alleged that "the undue and undeserved

accommodation of Pioneer Glass as shown by Development Bank's grant and
approval of loan was grossly disadvantageous to the government and the Filipino
people warrant the prosecution of those responsible therefor.”On August 15, 2006,

465
the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. The Office of the Ombudsman found nothing questionable or irregular
with Development Bank's approval of Pioneer Glass' loan applications or its
guarantees in favor of Pioneer Glass because the loans and guarantees were
backed by numerous properties as collateral. It also noted that the guarantees and
transactions between Pioneer Glass and Development Bank were audited by the
Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which found
them to be above-board. The Presidential Commission on Good Government
moved for the reconsideration reiterating that Pioneer Glass was undercapitalized
and that its loan and guarantee agreements were under collateralized, leading to
the damage and prejudice of the government. On May 16, 2008, the Office of the
Ombudsman denied the motion emphasizing that there was no evidence
presented to support the allegation that Pioneer Glass and Development Bank
conspired to cause injury to the government. On June 4, 2009, petitioner
Presidential Commission on Good Government filed its Petition for
Certiorari before this Court.

ISSUE:

Did the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing the complaint against Pioneer Glass Manufacturing Corporation and
the officials of Development Bank of the Philippines for insufficiency of evidence

RULING:

NO. This Court generally does not interfere with public respondent Office
of the Ombudsman's finding or lack of finding of probable cause out of respect for
its constitutionally granted investigatory and prosecutory powers. Dichaves
v. Office of the Ombudsman pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman's power
to determine probable cause is executive in nature and with its power to
investigate, it is in a better position than this Court to assess the evidence on hand
to substantiate its finding of probable cause or lack of it. Nonetheless, despite this
well-established principle, petitioner asks this Court to interfere with public
respondent's assessment purportedly on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
However, disagreeing with public respondent's findings does not rise to the level
of grave abuse of discretion. A court or tribunal is said to have committed grave
abuse of discretion if it performs an act in "a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction." Ultimately, for the petition to
prosper, it would have to prove that public respondent "conducted the
preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty under the law."

466
 Lucido v People
G.R. No. 217764, August 7, 2017

FACTS:

In August 2007, in Leyte, AAA, an eight-year old child, was placed by her
parents in the custody of their neighbor Lucido, alias Tonyay. The arrangement
was made upon the request of Lucido that AAA stay with her since she was
living alone. During AAA's stay with Lucido, the child suffered repeated
physical abuse in the latter's hands, which included
strangulation, beating, pinching, and touching of her sex organ by Lucido. AAA
was also threatened by Lucido that she would be stabbed if she tells anyone
about what was being done to her.

One of Lucido's neighbors, Hinampas, noticed the abrasions on AAA's

neck and observed that she was limping as she walked. The child then related
that she was choked and beaten on her leg by Lucido. AAA's parents learned of
her plight, prompting FFF to go to Lucido's residence and take AAA back with
the help of a barangay tanod. A subsequent physical examination conducted by
Dr. Abiera of Hilongos District Hospital confirmed AAA's story.

Lucido denied that she pinched, beat and hit AAA and that she inserted
her finger into AAA's vagina. She claimed that she usually cleaned AAA's vagina
and bathed her with hot water. She, likewise, denied that she brought AAA to
Bato for sexual intercourse. Lucido imputed ill motive on Hinampas, whom she
claimed to be her enemy, in instituting the complaint against her. Lucia Mancio
Lusuegro, a neighbor of Lucido and AAA's parents testified that she heard AAA
cry only once outside the house of Lucido. She never heard any commotion that
Lucido maltreated AAA. Estrella Sanchez testified that the accusation of child
abuse and prostitution was not true. She claimed that the filing of the case against
Lucido was instigated by Hinampas, with whom Lucido had a quarrel.

The RTC convicted Lucido of child abuse. The CA affirmed Lucido's

conviction, but modified the penalty imposed by applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. Lucido's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in the
CA in a Resolution.

In its petition to the SC, the petitioner contends that the prosecution was
not able to prove the infliction of physical injuries on the child. She avers that

467
Hinampas' testimony of having heard the victim being maltreated several times
by Lucido is incredible, exaggerated, and unworthy of belief. Petitioner also
imputes ill-motive on AAA in falsely testifying against her after having been
scolded for damaging petitioner's cellphone. The respondent, then, argues that
the petition must be denied because it raises questions of fact, which could not
be done in a petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Can the Supreme Court take cognizance of cases which raise factual issues
in a petition for review under Rule 45?

RULING:

NO, the Court cannot take cognizance of cases which raise factual issues in
a petition for review under Rule 45.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. As a rule, “only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.” It is not the
function of this Court to review and weigh anew the evidence already passed upon
by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals absent any showing of
arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error.

Here, the issues submitted by petitioner — the prosecution's failure to

prove that the abuse suffered by the victim had prejudiced her normal
development and want of credibility of the prosecution witnesses — are
fundamentally factual. Petitioner did not present any substantive or compelling
reason for the SC to apply the exception in this case.

Thus, the petition is denied. The decision and resolution of the CA are
affirmed.

468
CE Luzon Geothermal Power Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
G.R. Nos. 197526 & 199676-77, July 26, 2017

FACTS:

Before this Court are two (2) consolidated Petitions for Review concerning
the prescriptive period in filing judicial claims for unutilized creditable input tax
or input Value Added Tax (VAT).The first petition docketed was filed
by CE Luzon Geothermal Power Company, Inc. (CE Luzon) against the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR). The second petition was instituted by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, against CE Luzon.

CE Luzon is a domestic corporation engaged in the energy industry. It

owns and operates the CE Luzon Geothermal Power Plant, which generates
power for sale to the Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development
Corporation by virtue of an energy conversion agreement. CE Luzon is a VAT-
registered taxpayer. In the course of its operations, CE Luzon incurred
unutilized creditable input tax amounting to P26,574,388.99 for taxable year
2003. This amount was duly reflected in its amended quarterly VAT returns.
CE Luzon then filed before the BIR an administrative claim for refund of its
unutilized creditable input tax. Without waiting for the CIR to act on its claim,
or for the expiration of 120 days, CE Luzon instituted before the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) a judicial claim for refund of its first quarter unutilized creditable
input tax on March 30, 2005. Meanwhile, on June 24, 2005, CE Luzon received
the CIR's decision denying its claim for refund of creditable input tax for the
second quarter of 2003. On June 30, 2005, CE Luzon filed before the CTA a
judicial claim for refund of unutilized creditable input tax for the second to
fourth quarters of taxable year 2003. The CIR asserted, among others,
that CE Luzon failed to comply with the invoicing requirements under the law.

In the Decision, the CTA Second Division partially granted CE Luzon's

claim for unutilized creditable input tax. It ruled that both the administrative
and judicial claims of CE Luzon were brought within the two (2)-year
prescriptive period. However, the CTA Second Division disallowed the amount
of P3,084,874.35 to be refunded as CE Luzon was only able to substantiate
P22,647,638.47 of its claim. The CTA Second Division ordered the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to issue a tax credit certificate or to refund CE Luzon the
amount of P22,647,638.47 representing CE Luzon's creditable input tax for
taxable year 2003.

469
 CE Luzon and the CIR then filed their respective Petitions for Review
before the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. The CTA En Banc partially
granted CE Luzon's Petition for Review. The CTA En Banc ordered the CIR to
issue a tax credit certificate or to refund CE Luzon the amount of P23,489,514.64,
representing CE Luzon's duly substantiated creditable input tax for taxable year
2003. However, the CTA En Banc rendered an Amended Decision, setting aside
its Decision dated July 20, 2010. The CTA En Banc ruled that CE Luzon failed to
observe the 120-day period of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Hence, it was barred from claiming a refund of its input VAT for taxable year
2003. The CTA En Banc held that CE Luzon's judicial claims were prematurely
filed. CE Luzon should have waited either for the CIR to render a decision or for
the 120-day period to expire before instituting its judicial claim for refund.
CE Luzon moved for partial reconsideration.

On June 27, 2011, the CTA En Banc rendered a second Amended Decision,
partially granting CE Luzon's claim for unutilized creditable input tax but only for
the second quarter of taxable year 2003 and only up to the extent of P3,764,386.47.

CE Luzon filed before the SC a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging

the second Amended Decision dated June 27, 2011 of the Court of Tax Appeals En
Banc.

The CIR assails the June 27, 2011 Amended Decision and December 1,
2011 Resolution of the CTA En Banc insofar as it granted CE Luzon's second
quarter claim for refund of VAT for taxable year 2003. According to the CIR,
taxpayers should comply with the provisions of Sections 236, 110 (A), 113, and
114 of the NIRC when claiming a refund of unutilized creditable input tax. They
should also meet the requirements enumerated under the relevant BIR
regulations. Moreover, it must be proven that the input tax being claimed is
attributable to zero-rated sales. The CIR asserts that CE Luzon failed to comply
with these requirements.

On the other hand, CE Luzon argues that the CIR is estopped from
questioning CE Luzon's non-compliance with the documentation requirements
under the law. It points out that its administrative claim for input VAT for the
second quarter of taxable year 2003 was denied by the CIR based on the finding
that CE Luzon presumptively opted to carry over its excess input tax to the
succeeding taxable quarters.

470
 CE Luzon further contends that non-submission of complete documents
is not fatal to a judicial claim for refund of input tax. The CTA is not bound by
the conclusions and findings of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Finally, CE Luzon asserts that it has proven its entitlement to a refund of

input VAT for the second quarter of 2003. First, its judicial claim for refund was
timely filed. Second, its sales were effectively zero-rated transactions under R.A.
No. 9136. Third, although it opted to carry over its excess input tax, its actual
claim was deducted from the total excess input VAT and was not part of what
was carried over to the succeeding taxable quarters. CE Luzon adds that the CIR
did not identify which documents it failed to submit.

ISSUE:

Is CE Luzon Geothermal Power, Inc. entitled to the refund of input Value

Added Tax for the second quarter of taxable year 2003? Has it substantiated its
claim?

RULING:

YES, CE Luzon Geothermal Power, Inc. is entitled to refund.

In a Rule 45 petition, only questions of law may be raised. This Supreme

Court is not a trier of facts. The determination of whether CE Luzon duly
substantiated its claim for refund of creditable input tax for the second quarter of
taxable year 2003 is a factual matter that is generally beyond the scope of a Petition
for Review on Certiorari. Unless a case falls under any of the exceptions, this Court
will not undertake a factual review and look into the parties' evidence and weigh
them anew.

In the Petition docketed as G.R. Nos. 199676-77, the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue failed to establish that this case is exempted from the general
rule. Hence, this Court will no longer disturb the Court of Tax Appeals' findings
on the matter.

471
 Gotesco Properties v. Solidbank Corporation (now Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company)
G.R. No. 209452, July 26, 201

FACTS:

In 1995, Gotesco obtained from Solidbank a term loan of P300 million

through its President, Mr. Jose Go (Mr. Go). To secure the loan, Gotesco was
required to execute a Mortgage Trust Indenture (Indenture) naming Solidbank-
Trust Division as Trustee.

The Indenture obliged Gotesco to mortgage several parcels of land in

favor of Solidbank. One (1) of the lots mortgaged and used as a collateral was a
property located in San Fernando, Pampanga. A stipulation in the Indenture also
irrevocably appointed Solidbank-Trust Division as Gotesco's attorney-in-
fact. Under the Indenture, Gotesco also agreed to "at all times maintain the
Sound Value of the Collateral." When the loan was about to
mature, Gotesco found it difficult to meet its obligation and Gotesco sent a letter
to Solidbank proposing to restructure the loan obligation. The loan restructuring
agreement proposed to extend the payment period to seven (7) years. The
suggested period included a two (2)-year grace period.

In its February 9, 2000 letter, Solidbank informed Gotesco of a substantial

reduction in the appraised value of its mortgaged properties. Based on an
appraisal report submitted to Solidbank, the sound value of the
mortgaged properties at that time was at P381,245,840.00. Since the necessary
collateral to loan ratio was 200%, Solidbank held that there was a deficiency in
the collateral, which Gotesco had to address. Solidbank required Gotesco to
replace or add to the mortgaged properties. Gotesco construed the February 9,
2000 letter as Solidbank's implied agreement to the loan restructuring proposal.
However, Gotesco found it unnecessary to address the alleged deficiency in the
collateral. It insisted that the aggregate sound value of the
mortgaged properties had not changed and was still at P1,076,905,000.00.

Solidbank sent a demand letter dated June 7, 2000 to Gotesco as the loan
became due. Despite having received this demand letter, Gotesco failed to pay
the outstanding obligation. Solidbank then filed a Petition for the Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of the lot through Atty. Wilfrido Mangiliman (Atty. Mangiliman), a
notary public. The public auction was held on August 31, 2000
and Solidbank was declared the winning bidder.

472
 On February 5, 2001, Gotesco filed a complaint for Annulment of
Foreclosure Proceedings, Specific Performance, and Damages against Solidbank,
Atty. Mangiliman, and the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later
on, Solidbank also filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession. The two (2) cases were consolidated before Branch 42, Regional Trial
Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.

Gotesco assailed the validity of the foreclosure proceeding claiming that

it was premature and without legal basis. According to Gotesco, the
jurisdictional requirements prescribed under Act No. 3135 were not complied
with. First, Solidbank did not furnish Gotesco copies of the petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure, notice of sale, and certificate of sale. Even assuming the
original period for loan payment was not extended, the prerequisites for the
foreclosure proceeding provided in the Indenture were not met.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, Solidbank alleged, among others,

that it never entered into a restructuring agreement with Gotesco and that
Solidbank complied with the publication and posting requirements laid down
by Act No. 3135.

The RTC dismissed Gotesco's complaint for the annulment of the

foreclosure proceeding and granted the Writ of Possession in Solidbank's favor.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA also declared Gotesco in default.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner insists, among others, that Section 3 of Act No. 3135 was
violated. The law requires that the Notice of Sale be posted for not less than 20
days before the day of the auction sale. According to the Affidavit of Posting by
Janet Torres, Atty. Mangiliman's law clerk, the Notice of Sale was posted on
August 15, 2000. Since the auction sale was conducted on August 31, 2000, the
20-day period was not followed.

Respondent argues that petitioner cannot raise for the first time on appeal
the allegation that the Notice of Sale was defective for being posted less than 20
days before the auction sale.

473
 ISSUE:
Can the issue of the defectiveness of the notice of sale be raised for the
first time on appeal?

RULING:

NO, this issue may no longer be raised for the first time on appeal.

The SC has reiterated that the practice of raising new issues on appeal
violates due process, hence it cannot stand. The object of a Notice of Sale in an
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding is to inform the public of the nature and
condition of the property to be sold and the time, place, and terms of the auction
sale. Mistakes or omissions that do not impede this objective will not invalidate
the Notice of Sale.
In this case, records show that petitioner only raised this argument in the
Petition for Review submitted before the SC. The alleged defect was not raised
before the lower courts. Notably, this is not the first time petitioner raised a new
issue on appeal. In any case, the alleged defect in the posting is superficial. The
Notice of Sale was posted on August 15, 2000, while the auction sale took place
on August 31, 2000. The Notice of Sale was posted for 16 days, only four (4) days
less than what the law requires.
Thus, petitioner cannot assail the defectiveness of the notice of sale for the
first time on appeal.

474
 Mendoza v. Valte
G.R. No. 172961, September 7, 2015

FACTS:

In 1978, Reynosa Valte (Valte) filed a free patent application for a parcel of
land in San Isidro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. The application listed Procopio Vallega
and Pedro Mendoza (Mendoza) as witnesses who would testify to the truth of the
allegations in Valte's application. The Bureau of Lands approved Valte's
application and issued Free Patent No. 586435 and the Cabanatuan City Register
of Deeds issued OCT No. P-10119.

Later in 1982, Mendoza and Jose Gonzales (Gonzales) filed a protest against
Valte's application, claiming to be the lawful owners and possessors since 1930.
They alleged that Valte procured Free Patent No. 586435 by means of fraud,
misrepresentation, and connivance. Their evidence was grounded mostly on the
Sinumpaang Salaysay of the Barangay Captain and officials and the statements of
their two (2) witnesses.

Valte countered that her father bought the land in 1941, and her mother
ceded the land to her in 1978. She then processed titling in her name. She, through
her administrator, Pacifico M. Vizmonte, maintained that Mendoza and Gonzales
were tenants with no preferential right over the land. She presented her free patent
application and the Joint Affidavit of Procopio Vallega and Mendoza where
Mendoza recognized Valte's exclusive claim and possession over the land.

The DENR Secretary found Mendoza and Gonzales to be mere tenants of

the land and dismissed the protest. The Office of the President reversed the
decision of the DENR and ruled in favor of Mendoza and Gonzales. The Court of
Appeals reversed the Office of the President Decision and reinstated the Decision
of the DENR. It also denied reconsideration. Hence, Mendoza and Gonzales filed
this Petition.

ISSUE:

Does this case falls within the exceptions that allow the examination of
questions of fact before the Supreme Court?

RULING:

No. A petition for review filed under Rule 45 may raise only questions of
law. The factual findings by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial

475
evidence, are generally conclusive and binding on the parties and are no longer
reviewable unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions. This court is not
a trier of facts and we are not duty bound to re-examine evidence.

The existence or non-existence of fraud in an application for free patent

depends on a finding of fact insofar as the presence of its requirements. As
observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Mendoza admitted against his
interest when he stated in his Joint Affidavit that respondent "has continuously
occupied and cultivated the land." Unless it can be shown that irregularity tainted
the free patent proceedings conducted before the Director of Lands, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stands.

Resolving questions of fact is a function of the lower courts. This court is a

collegiate body. It does not receive evidence nor conduct trial procedures that
involve the marking of documentary evidence by the parties and hearing the direct
and cross-examination of each and every witness presented for testimonial
evidence.

476
 Ligtas v. People
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015

FACTS:

Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft to which he pleaded not guilty.
According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner of the abaca
plantation where they found Ligtas to have harvested about 1,000 kilos of abaca.
Ligtas argued that he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late husband,
Andres Pacate since 1993. Andres Pacate installed him as tenant of the land
involved in the criminal case.

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the DARAB of Sogod, Southern

Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession. The DARAB rendered the Decision
ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land.

While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally
offered as evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB
Decision was considered by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and without
any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.

The Regional Trial Court held that the prosecution was able to prove the
elements of theft. Ligtas' defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and
substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and
Anecita Pacate duly corroborated by any witness. His defense of alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification by prosecution witnesses. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE:

May questions of fact be raised in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:

Yes, in this particular case, a question of fact may be raised in a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the case is
justified "when certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by
the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that

477
they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the
accused to acquittal."

The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or

not, is generally a question of fact. To be precise, however, the existence of a
tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented corresponding
to the statutory elements of tenancy.

The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision

when it held that all the essential elements of the crime of theft were duly proven
by the prosecution despite petitioner having been pronounced a bona fide tenant
of the land from which he allegedly stole. A review of the records of the case is,
thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.

We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship

is conclusive and binding on courts if supported by substantial evidence. The
existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between
petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of the element that the
taking was done without the owner's consent. The DARAB Decision implies that
petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution,
therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.

478
 Visayan Electric Co., Inc. v. Alfeche
G.R. No. 209910, November 29, 2017

FACTS:

The Regional Trial Court ruled that the proximate cause of the injury
suffered by the Alfeches and Manugas was the negligence of M. Lhuillier. It noted
that based on Engr. Banaag's testimony, M. Lhuillier installed its signage long after
VECO moved its poles. Thus, it was its negligence in installing and positioning its
signage, which led to the abrasion of VECO's power line and, ultimately, the fire.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court decision
and found VECO liable in M. Lhuillier's stead. The Court of Appeals gave greater
credence to the testimonies of Rabor and Engr. Lauronal, considering them to be
impartial witnesses. It noted that the relocation of the posts came before the fire,
occasioned by the road widening and drainage projects. Thus, VECO transferred
the poles and the lines to a distance of merely eight (8) inches from M. Lhuillier's
signboard. This, in turn, caused the abrasion of power lines and the fire. Following
the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, VECO filed the present
Petition.VECO insists that it is M. Lhuillier, and not itself, which should be held
liable for the fire.

ISSUE:

Is Petition for Review under Rule 45 is the proper remedy?

RULING:

Yes. The case before this Court is replete with factual issues. Ordinarily, it
is not for this Court to review factual issues in petitions such as the present Rule
45 Petition which may only raise questions of law. This rule, however, admits
certain exceptions:

1. when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;

2. when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or

conjectures;

3. when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of
fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

479
 4. when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

5. when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues
of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;

6. when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a

misapprehension of facts;

7. when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;

8. when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

9. when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; and

10. when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence
on record.

The findings of the Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeals differ
in this case. The Regional Trial Court found that "had not defendant [M.] Lhuillier
installed its signage in such a manner that it will come in contact with the
secondary lines of defendant VECO, there could have been no short circuit which
caused the fire." On the other hand, the Court of Appeals found that "one VECO
post was affected by the road widening work. Due to the transfer, the VECO wire
already touched the signboard of M. Lhuillier pawnshop." In the interest of
arriving at a definite determination of the attendant liabilities, this Court exercises
its power of review.

480
 Pascual vs. Burgos
G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016

FACTS:

Ernesto and Remedios Pascual (Pascual Spouses) and Benito Burgoes, et al.
co-owned a fishpond in Bulacan which, through the call of Burgos, et al. was
apportioned into 17% (to Burgos, et al.) and 83% (to the Pascual Spouses). The
Pascual spouses were also ordered to pay Burgos, et al. their unpaid shares in the
income of the property since 1945. The Pascual Spouses did not immediately
comply with the order leading to opening their share for public auction and selling
their share to Marcial Meneses for Php 95,000.

The Pascual Spouses appealed to the trial court to allow them to redeem
their rights and interest provided that the price at which the fishpond was sold
was unconscionably low. The trial court allowed the defendants to redeem their
rights within a period of 90 days after the court’s decision. Burgos, et al. appealed
to the CA. The CA reversed the trial court’s decision, and ordered the trial court
to disallow redemption of the property and to consolidate ownership upon
Respondents. The CA reversed the factual findings of the trial court. Remedios
Pascual filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA decision which
reversed and set aside the trial court decision.

ISSUE:

Will the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Pascual Spouses prosper?

RULING:

NO.

Review of appeals filed before this court is "not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion. The Rules of Court require that only questions of law
should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45. The Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate
courts are final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon the Supreme Court
when supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts
will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.

However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to

these rules have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that
were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.:

481
 (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

Parties praying that the Supreme Court review the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals must demonstrate and prove that the case clearly falls under the
exceptions to the rule. They have the burden of proving to this court that a review
of the factual findings is necessary. Mere assertion and claim that the case falls
under the exceptions do not suffice.

482
 Republic of the Philippines v. Benjohn Fetalvero
G.R. No. 198008, February 04, 2019

FACTS:

Benjohn Fetalvero owned a 2,787-square meter parcel of land in Iligan City,

Lanao del Norte. In 1999, the DPWH, Region X took 569 square meters from
Fetalvero's property to be used in its flood control project. Despite negotiations,
the parties failed to agree on the amount of just compensation.

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the OSG, filed before
the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for expropriation against Fetalvero.
Subsequently, the OSG sent a letter to Atty. Earnest Anthony L. Lorea (Atty.
Lorea), the Legal Staff Chief of the DPWH, Region X. In its letter, the OSG
deputized Atty. Lorea to assist it in the case. Also, the OSG entered its appearance
as counsel for the Republic, and informed the trial court that it authorized Atty.
Lorea to appear on its behalf. It emphasized that since it "retained supervision and
control of the representation in the case and had to approve withdrawal of the
case, non-appeal, or other actions which appear to compromise the interest of the
Government, only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will
bind the Republic."

On June 27, 2008, the trial court issued an Order and referred the case to the
Philippine Mediation Center for mediation. On September 1, 2008, Atty. Lorea and
Fetalvero entered into a Compromise Agreement, wherein they agreed that,
among others, the price per square meter is PHP 9,500.00 per square meter or a
total of PHP 13,566,000.00 which latter is the amount to be paid in full by the
plaintiff to the defendant not later than September, 2009. The trial court issued an
Order approving the Compromise Agreement. On November 6, 2008, the Republic
received a copy of the Order.

In a letter, Jaime A. Pacanan, Assistant Secretary and Central Right of Way

Committee Chair of the DPWH, Manila, requested advice from the OSG regarding
the Compromise Agreement's legality. The OSG replied that the government
cannot be bound by the Compromise Agreement since it was not submitted to its
office for review, which is a condition under the deputation letter and the Notice
of Appearance.

Meanwhile, Fetalvero filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Order for a Writ
of Garnishment for the satisfaction of the trial court's Order approving the
compromise. The Republic opposed the Motion. The trial court granted Fetalvero's

483
Motion. The trial court further held that since the OSG received a copy of the trial
court's Order, the judgment was valid and binding on the Republic. Further,
government funds in official depositaries remain government funds only if there
was no appropriation by law. The trial court found that funds were already
appropriated "for payment of the road-rights-of-way." Hence, Fetalvero's Motion
should be granted. The Republic moved for reconsideration, but its Motion was
denied by the trial court.

The Republic filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. The
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, denying the Petition for lack of merit. It
found that the OSG received a copy of the trial court's Order, but did not file any
pleading or action to assail it. Hence, the Republic, through the OSG, filed before
this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari against Fetalvero.

ISSUE:

1. Whether petitioner availed of the proper remedy of certiorari in assailing the

judgment of the trial court
2. Whether petitioner availed of the proper remedy under Rule 45 in assailing
the judgment of the Court of Appeals

RULING:

No. Petitioner only resorted to a petition for certiorari when it failed to

appeal the case within the reglementary period. It is elementary in remedial law
that the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is cause for dismissal of the petition
for certiorari and it has been repeatedly stressed that a petition for certiorari is not
a substitute for a lost appeal. This is due to the nature of a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari which lies only where there is no appeal, and no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. "We have time and again
reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari can not be allowed when
a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that
remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

No. Petitioner's second claim is a question of fact improper in a petition for

review under Rule 45. Seeking recourse from this court through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 bears significantly on the manner by which this
court shall treat findings of fact and evidentiary matters. As a general rule, it
becomes improper for this court to consider factual issues. The findings of fact of

484
the trial court, as affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on
this court. The reason behind the rule is that this Court is not a trier of facts and it
is not its duty to review, evaluate, and weigh the probative value of the evidence
adduced before the lower courts. Moreover, a judgment on compromise
agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res judicata, and is
immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of
consent. The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying
decisions that have already attained finality, even if the purpose of the
modification is to correct errors of fact or law.

485
 Lopez v. People
G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner Ariel Lopez (Lopez) was charged with violation of Presidential

Decree No. 533 that with intent to gain and with grave abuse of confidence and
without the knowledge and consent of the complainant, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously took, stole and carried away one (1) female carabao valued at Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, more or less, belonging to Teresita D. Perez, to the
latter's damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount. Lopez pleaded not guilty
during his arraignment.

During trial, Mario Perez (Perez) testified that he purchased the female
carabao from a certain Enrique Villanueva. The purchase was evidenced by a
Certificate of Transfer of Large Cattle. Teresita Perez (Teresita) testified that
Barangay Police Moralde informed her and Perez, her husband, that Lopez stole
their carabao. Subsequently, a confrontation took place at the barangay police
station. During the confrontation, Lopez admitted to taking the carabao and
promised to pay indemnification. Police Officer III Leo Lozarito (PO3 Lozarito)
corroborated Teresita's testimony and stated that a request for Lopez's appearance
was issued, but no custodial investigation was conducted. He claimed that he
simply allowed Lopez and Teresita to "confront each other." He also stated that
Lopez wanted to settle by paying for the carabao, but the parties were unable to
agree on the price.

In his Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner reiterates the arguments

raised in his appeal before the Court of Appeals. Petitioner argues that the
prosecution failed to prove Mario and Teresita Perez's ownership of the lost
carabao. Alderete had no personal knowledge of the lost carabao's appearance, or
where it grazed.

ISSUE:

Should the Court deny the Petition for review on certiorari for raising
questions of fact

RULING:

The Court should give due course to the Petition because it falls under the
exceptions as to when this Court may entertain questions of fact. The general rule
is that a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari should only raise questions of

486
law. As provided under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court: Filing of petition
with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other
provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by
verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its
pendency.

However, there are instances when this Court allows questions of fact in a
Rule 45 petition for review. These instances include the following: (1) when there
is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculations;
(3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual
findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the
Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) when the facts set forth by the petitioner
are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.

In this case, petitioner asks this Court to review the evidence and argues
that the prosecution was unable to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There
is a question of law "when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts" and there is a question of fact "when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts.

Thus, petitioner raises a question of fact. Nevertheless, this Court gives due
course to the Petition because it falls under the exceptions as to when this Court
may entertain questions of fact. A review of the record shows that the trial court
and the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts, and their findings are
contradicted by the evidence presented.

487
 Tankeh vs. Development Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 171428; November 11, 2013

FACTS:

Respondent Ruperto Tankeh (Ruperto) is the president of Sterling Shipping

Lines, Inc. He applied for a loan from public respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) for the partial financing of the purchase of M/V Golden Lilac.
According to petitioner Dr. Alejandro Tankeh (Alejandro), Ruperto informed him
that he was operating a new shipping line business and that Ruperto told him that
he would be given 1,000 shares to be a director of the business.

Thereafter, Alejandro signed the promissory note evidencing the subject

loan. In 1983, Alejandro wrote a letter to Ruperto saying that he was severing all
ties and terminating his involvement with Sterling Shipping Line. Alejandro
remained as a debtor of DBP.

Alejandro then filed several Complaints against respondents, praying that

the promissory note be declared null and void and that he be absolved from any
liability from the mortgage of the vessel and the note in question. In the
Complaints, Alejandro alleged that private respondents had exercised deceit and
fraud in causing him to bind himself jointly and severally to pay DBP the amount
of the mortgage loan.

The trial court ruled in favor of Alejandro. On appeal, the CA reversed the
trial court’s decision. After the motion for reconsideration of Alejandro was denied
by the CA, he filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
In the Petition, Alejandro stated that the CA seriously erred and gravely abused
its discretion in acting and deciding as if the evidence stated in the Decision of the
RTC did not exist. He averred that the CA unreasonably ignored the ample
evidence on record proving the fraud and deceit perpetrated by the respondent.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that Alejandro had chosen the wrong
remedy. They alleged that the proper remedy is a special civil action of certiorari
and not a Petition for Review on Certiorari since petitioner raised questions of fact
which requires the review or evaluation of evidence. However, this is not the
function of the Supreme Court as it is not a trier of facts.

ISSUE:

Is Rule 45 the correct remedy considering the petitioner only raised

questions of fact?

488
RULING:

Yes. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors in

jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an
error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correctable through the original civil action of certiorari. Even if the findings of the
court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment, appeal is the
remedy.

In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of

judgment of the CA. These errors pertain to the petitioner’s allegation that the
appellate court failed to uphold the findings of facts of the lower court. He does
not impute any error with respect to the CA’s exercise of jurisdiction. As such, this
Petition is simply a continuation of the appellate process where a case is elevated
from the trial court of origin, to the CA, and the SC via Rule 45.

In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari,
this Court has the discretion to treat a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45
Petition for Review on Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the Petition is filed within
the reglementary period for filing a Petition for review; (2) when errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the
relaxation of the rules. When this Court exercises this discretion, there is no need
to comply with the requirements provided for in Rule 65.

In this case, petitioner filed his Petition within the reglementary period of
filing a Petition for Review. His Petition assigns errors of judgment and
appreciation of facts and law on the part of the Court of Appeals. Thus, even if the
Petition was designated as one that sought the remedy of certiorari, this Court may
exercise its discretion to treat it as a Petition for Review in the interest of substantial
justice.

489
 Republic vs. Bayao
G.R. No. 179492; June 5, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Department of Agriculture-Regional Field Unit XII (DA-RFU XII)

is a government office mandated to implement the laws, policies, plans, programs,
rules and regulations of the Department of Agriculture (DA) in its regional area,
while respondents are officials and employees of DA-RFU XII.

Due to E.O. No. 304, which provides that all departments, bureaus, and
offices of the national government in SOCCSKARGEN shall transfer their regional
seat of operations to Koronadal City, the DA Undersecretary issued a
Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the administrative, finance and
operations base of RFU XII from Cotobato City to Koronadal City. Private
respondents opposed the implementation of said Memorandum citing reasons
such as the huge costs the physical transfer will entail and the plight of employees
who have already settled and established their homes in Cotobato City. Despite
the clamor of private respondents, the order to transfer the regional office from
Cotobato City to Korondal City remained.

This prompted respondents to file a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer

for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order with the RTC. The trial court granted respondents’ Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Petitioner went to the CA via Rule 65. The CA dismissed
the Petition for Certiorari for failure of petitioner to resort to a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed trial court order. Hence, the present Petition under
Rule 45. Respondents alleged that a Petition via Rule 45 is not the proper remedy
since the CA Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for failure of the
petitioners to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not a “final order or resolution”
contemplated by Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Is Rule 45 the proper remedy to assail the Resolution of the CA dismissing

the petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari for failure to file a Motion for
Reconsideration?

RULING:

Yes. A dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a Petition via Rule 65 for failure
to file a Motion for Reconsideration may be assailed via Rule 45.

490
 Unlike a Petition via Rule 45 that is a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an
original or independent action. Consequently, the Resolutions of the CA
dismissing the Petition via Rule 65 and denying reconsideration are final
resolutions contemplated under Rule 45. These resolutions would attain finality if
these are not elevated on appeal via Rule 45. As a result, the trial court order would
also become unassailable.

491
 Concha v. People
G.R. No. 208114, October 3, 2018

FACTS:

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela filed two (2) criminal
Informations against Marlon Caliguiran (Caliguiran), Alvin Tamang, Concha, and
Managuelod, charging them with two (2) counts of carnapping under Republic
Act No. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. On January 21, 2009, Concha
and Managuelod were arraigned and both pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial
ensued.

The prosecution presented Michael Macutay (Macutay), Eugenio Cacho

(Cacho), and SPO4 Juan C. Anapi (SPO4 Anapi) as its witnesses, whose
testimonies corroborated as follows:

A Honda Wave motorcycle with plate number BI-8085 owned by Cacho

was forcibly taken by the four (4) accused from his nephew, Macutay, who was
then driving it. The prosecution narrated that on February 15, 2006, Macutay
parked the passenger van owned by one Aileen Cacho at Cacho's house in Centro,
Tumauini. Cacho thereafter lent the motorcycle with sidecar to Macutay to go
home to Liwanag, Tumauini. Macutay drove the motorcycle, while his uncle,
Junior, and his cousins, Jayson and Jake, were aboard the sidecar.

On February 21, 2006, the Tumauini police proceeded to Macutay's house

in Liwanag and asked him to accompany them to Cabagan Police Station to
identify the persons suspected to be responsible for the crime. At the police station,
the police presented to Macutay five (5) persons that they had apprehended.
Macutay pointed to Managuelod, Concha, and Caliguiran as the persons who
robbed him. He claimed that Managuelod was the one who declared "holdup" and
drove the motorcycle, while Concha wore the t-shirt they got from him. On the
other hand, the defense presented Concha and Managuelod as its witnesses.

Regional Trial Court found Concha and Managuelod guilty of carnapping

based on Macutay's testimony. It held that Macutay "was able to identify the
culprits who committed the robbery in the lineup at the Philippine National Police
Station at Cabagan, Isabela."

Upon the testimony of the witness Michael Macutay, it is sufficiently

proven that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening of February 15, 2006, the accused
Romeo Managuelod and Melky Concha, together with their companions Alvin

492
Tamang and Romeo Caliguiran, held at gun point Michael Macutay and took
away from the latter the Honda Wave Motorcycle.The Court had carefully studied
the testimony of Michael Macutay who himself witnessed the incident complained
of and it is of the firm belief that the evidence [proffered] therein is credible
evidence by reason of the natural, straightforward, spontaneous, consistent and
frank manner in which the witness testified before the Court. In the view of [the]
Court, Michael Macutay is a credible witness whose testimony is worthy of
credence.

On June 30, 2011, Concha and Managuelod filed an appeal before the Court
of Appeals and prayed for the reversal of the Regional Trial Court November 10,
2010 Joint Decision. They argued that the out-of-court identification was not valid
as it was conducted through a police show-up, not a lineup, since only the four (4)
suspects were presented to Macutay for identification.

Since the prosecution was able to establish the existence of all the elements
of carnapping through the testimonies of its witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the appeal before it should be dismissed. On March 5, 2013, Concha and
Managuelod moved for reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals
in its July 5, 2013 Resolution.

On July 30, 2013, Concha and Managuelod filed a Petition for Review.
Petitioners justify their filing of a Rule 45 Petition by stating that the Court of
Appeals based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts and that it failed to
consider relevant facts, which if taken into account, could sustain a different
conclusion. Petitioners emphasize that SPO4 Anapi's testimony revealed that only
the four (4) accused were presented to Macutay for identification. Byy doing so,
the police "grossly suggested to the witness that the persons shown to him were
the perpetrators of the crime charged in effect, no police lineup was conducted.

Moreover, Macutay supposedly failed the totality of circumstances test,

which is used to determine if an out-of-court identification is admissible. The
prosecution allegedly "failed to establish that [Macutay] had the opportunity to
view the faces of the perpetrators." He was not even sure if the object used to
intimidate him during the carnapping incident was a gun. Also, his disposition
during the ordeal—scared and confused—could have diminished his degree of
attention.Petitioners add that there was no proof that Macutay described the
perpetrators to the police when he reported the incident on February 16, 2006. He
was only able to identify them during the out-of-court identification on February
21, 2006. The significant lapse of time from the day of the incident to the day of
identification makes the authenticity and accuracy of the carnappers' description
open to question. Since Macutay's out-of-court identification was tainted with

493
impermissible suggestion, it follows then that his in-court identification was
tainted as well. For failing to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
petitioners should be acquitted.

ISSUE:

Is the petition filed under Rule 45 proper

HELD:

Yes. It is a settled doctrine that this Court will only entertain questions of
law in a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court: Section 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.

Nonetheless, this Court admits certain exceptions to this rule, upon a

showing of the existence of any of the following circumstances: (1) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculations; (3)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual
findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the
Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) when the facts set forth by the petitioner
are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.

Admittedly, petitioners raise questions of fact in their Petition for Review

on Certiorari. They want this Court to examine the validity of the out-of-court
identification conducted by the police—the main reason why they were found
guilty of carnapping.

A careful scrutiny of the records shows that both the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts of this case. This Court hereby
takes cognizance of their Petition.

494
 Villamor v. Umale
G.R No. 172843, September 24, 2014

FACTS:

MC Home Depot occupied a prime property (Rockland area) Pasig. The

property was part of the area owned by Mid-Pasig Development Corporation
(Mid-Pasig) On March 1, 2004, Pasig Printing Corporation (PPC) obtained an
option to lease portions of Mid-Pasig’s property, including the Rockland area.
Subsequently, PPC’s board of directors issued a resolution waiving all its rights,
interests and participation in the option to lease contract in favor of the law firm
of Atty. Alfredo Villamor (Villamor) PPC received no consideration for the waiver
in favor of Villamor’s law firm.

On November 22, 2004, PPC, represented by Villamor, entered into a

memorandum of agreement with MC Home Depot, where the latter would
continue to occupy the area as PPC’s sublessee for four years, renewable for four
years. In compliance with the MOA, MC Home Depot issued 20 post-dated checks
representing the rental payments for one year. The checks were given to Villamor
who did not turn the amount over to PPC upon encashment.

Hernando Balmores, a stockholder of PPC, wrote a letter to PPC’s directors

(petitioners) informing them that Villamor should be made to deliver to PPC and
account for MC Home Depot’s checks. Due to the alleged inaction of the directors,
Balmores filed with the RTC an intra-corporate controversy complaint under the
Interim Rules for Intra-Corporate Controversies (Interim Rules) against
petitioners for the alleged fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the interest of
the corporation and its stockholders. He alleged that because of the inaction of the
petitioners, PPC’s assets were dissipated, lost, wasted and destroyed. Respondent
Balmores prayed that a receiver be appointed, and that the petitioners be
prohibited from encumbering transferring or disposing PPC’s properties,
including MC Home Depot’s checks. He also prayed for the annulment of the
board’s resolution waiving PPC’s rights in favor of Villamor’s law firm.

The RTC denied the Balmores’ prayer for appointment of a receiver or the
creation of a management committee. According to the trial court, there was no
clear and positive showing of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of PPC’s
assets that was prejudicial to the interests of the minority stockholders, amongst
others. The failure of the board to recover said amount does not indicate of
mismanagement resulting in dissipation of the assets.

495
 Balmores filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, assailing
the denial of his prayer for appointment of a receivership or management
committee. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court. It issued an order
placing PPC under receivership and creating an interim management committee.
The CA classified the assailed trial court order as interlocutory and hence, non-
appealable. In justifying its decision to place PPC under receivership and to create
a management committee, the Court of Appeals stated that the board’s waiver of
PPC’s rights in favor of Villamor’s law firm without any consideration and its
inaction on Villamor’s failure to turn over the proceeds of rental payments to PPC
warrant the creation of a management committee. The circumstances resulted in
the imminent danger of loss, waste, or dissipation of PPC’s assets.

A petition for Review on certiorari was filed with the SC. According to the
directors, assuming that a receiver or management committee may be appointed
in the case, it is the Regional Trial Court only and not the Court of Appeals that
must appoint them. Respondent Balmores argues that the petition raises a
question of fact which is improper for a Rule 45 petition.

ISSUE:

Was a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari properly availed of in this

case?

RULING:

Yes, the petitioner correctly availed of a Rule 45 petition. Under Rule 45,
only questions of law may be raised. There is a question of law "when there is
doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain [set] of facts." The test is
"whether the appellate court can determine the issue-raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence." Meanwhile, there is a question of fact when there is
"doubt... as to the truth or falsehood of facts." The question must involve the
examination of probative value of the evidence presented. In this case, petitioners
raise issues on the correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusions. Specifically,
petitioners ask (1) whether respondent Balmores' failure to implead PPC in his
action with the trial court was fatal; (2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly
characterized respondent Balmores' action as a derivative suit; (3) whether the
Court of Appeals' appointment of a management committee was proper; and (4)
whether the Court of Appeals may exercise the power to appoint a management
committee. These are questions of law that may be determined without looking
into the evidence presented. The question of whether the conclusion drawn by the
Court of Appeals from a set of facts is correct is a question of law, cognizable by
this court. Petitioners, therefore, properly filed, a petition for review under Rule
45.

496
 Rodriguez v. Your Own Home Development Corp.
G.R. No. 199451, August 15, 2018

FACTS:

This case originated from a low-cost housing project in Occidental

Mindoro, which YOHDC entered into with its partner, Archangel Corporation.
Iris' husband, Tarcisius Rodriguez (Tarcisius), was hired as the project
coordinator/manager.

Tasked to find land suited for the project, Tarcisius found a property owned
by Rosa Rosillas (Rosillas) and proceeded to negotiate with her. According to
YOHDC, Rosillas agreed to sell the land for P1,200,000.00. However, Tarcisius
misrepresented to the partner corporations that Rosillas had asked for
P4,000,000.00 instead. Rosillas was paid P1,200,000.00 in two (2) installments.
Despite this, Tarcisius still requested for two (2) more checks in Rosillas' name,
each for P500,000.00, insisting that the land was acquired for P4,000,000.00. Thus,
YOHDC issued Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) Check Nos.
1181043810 and 1181043843 (Rosillas' Checks). Aside from this, Tarcisius also
requested for two (2) more checks to pay the surveyor of Rosillas' property,
Engineer Senen Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), in the amount of P254,400.00 each.

Tarcisius received all four (4) checks. However, instead of delivering them
to Rosillas and Delos Reyes, Tarcisius and his wife, Iris, (collectively, the
Rodriguez Spouses), deposited two (2) checks — one of Rosillas' Checks and one
of Delos Reyes' Checks — totaling P754,400.00 in their personal Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) Account No. 3293-0730-06. The other two (2) checks were
deposited in the Rodriguez Spouses' other personal bank account, BPI Account
No. 0065-0506-25.

YOHDC eventually discovered the irregularities on Rosillas' and Delos

Reyes' checks after it received reports of project anomalies, such as padding of
expenses and overpricing.

YOHDC demanded from Tarcisius the amount of the checks which he

failed to return. Tarcisius then requested to settle YOHDC's claim by way of
transferring properties. However, no settlement was reached with Tarcisius, so
YOHDC pursued its claim against the banks.

YOHDC first sought reimbursement from Metrobank, which advised it to

direct its claim against BPI. BPI suggested that YOHDC course its documents
through Metrobank. Pursuant to Metrobank's instructions, YOHDC submitted

497
Rosillas' and Delos Reyes' Checks and affidavits to Metrobank, which, in turn,
forwarded them to BPI. BPI then advised the Rodriguez Spouses to deposit the
amount of P1,508,800.00 in their BPI bank account so that it could respond to
YOHDC's complaint.

The Rodriguez Spouses complied and deposited the amount of

P1,508,800.00 in their BPI Account No. 3293-0994-39. However, they requested BPI
to suspend its action on YOHDC's claim and instructed it not to deduct the amount
until they have clarified the matter. BPI denied this request and sent Metrobank
Special Clearing Receipt No. 065273 to reimburse the amounts of the four (4)
checks totaling P1,508,000.00. Thereafter, Metrobank credited the amount to
YOHDC.

These events prompted the Rodriguez Spouses to file a Complaint for

Damages against YOHDC, BPI, Metrobank, Rosillas, and Delos Reyes, among
others. The Rodriguez Spouses claimed that Rosillas' Checks were received by
Rosillas' agent, Godofredo Syquioco (Syquioco). As for Delos Reyes' Checks, the
Rodriguez Spouses asserted that Delos Reyes received P424,000.00 from the
proceeds of Metrobank Check Nos. 181043813 and 181043841. They claimed that
all four (4) checks were encashed through BPI with the assistance of Iris.

On August 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case against
Rosillas, Delos Reyes, Metrobank, and BPI. However, it noted that in Delos Reyes'
Answer dated July 9, 1995, he admitted receiving portions of the proceeds of his
Checks in the amount of P424,000.00.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified in its July 18, 2011 Decision the
Regional Trial Court August 13, 2007 Decision. It found that the principle against
unjust enrichment did not apply. It did not lend credence to Delos Reyes'
admission in his Answer regarding an Acknowledgement dated June 9, 1995,
which he allegedly signed (Delos Reyes' Acknowledgement). It found that the
document is a private document, the execution and authenticity of which were not
proven as required by the rules of evidence.

Instead, the Court of Appeals lent credence to the evidence presented by

YOHDC, consisting of payment receipts to Delos Reyes, and Delos Reyes' duly
notarized Affidavit dated March 14, 1995 (Delos Reyes' Affidavit), which stated
that he never received, encashed, or deposited the checks.

She argues that in Delos Reyes' Answer filed with the Regional Trial Court,
he admitted the existence of his Acknowledgment and receipt of the amount of
P424,000.00. She also points out that there is no substantial disparity between the

498
numbers of Delos Reyes' Checks and the numbers of the checks stated in Delos
Reyes' Acknowledgment.

She claims that the subsequent execution of his July 9, 1995 Answer and of
his June 9, 1995 Acknowledgment constitutes an abandonment of his March 14,
1995 Affidavit, where he denied the receipt or encashment of his Checks.

ISSUE:

Is the Petition for Review under Rule 45 is proper?

HELD:

No. In the first place, Iris raised a factual issue which is not proper in a
Petition for Review on Certiorari. Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
(Emphasis supplied)

This Court does not review factual findings in Rule 45 Petitions. It only
entertains questions of law — those which ask to resolve which law applies on a
given set of facts. It does not rule on questions which determine "the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts."

In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co.: The Rules of Court states that a
review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law
should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the
proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to once again
analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.

The question of whether Delos Reyes has been paid the amount of
P424,000.00 is a question of fact. It does not simply ask to resolve which law
properly applies given the set of facts in this case. It requires a review of the
evidence and the determination of the truth or falsity of the parties' allegations.
Clearly, Iris is raising a question of fact which is not proper in the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari.

499
 Ariel Ebuenga v. Southfield Agencies, Inc., Wilhemsen Ship Management
Holding LTD., and Capt. Sonny Valencia
G.R. No. 208396, March 14, 2018

FACTS:

Ebuenga was hired by Southfield Agencies as a chief cook aboard

Wilhemsen’s vessel, MTV Super Adventure. Two months into his engagement,
Ebuenga wrote a letter to the respondents that he be repatriated immediately as
soon as possible to attend to a family problem. Ebuenga was repatriated. Without
consulting Southfield’s designated physician, Ebuenga had himself checked at St.
Luke’s Medical Center where he underwent an MRI. It revealed that he was
afflicted with Multilevel Disk Desiccation and was advised to undergo physical
therapy. When he returned to his province, he consulted a doctor who issued a
Disability Report finding him permanently disabled and no longer fit to work as a
seafarer. Consequently, he filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits. The
Labor Arbiter dismissed Ebuenga’s complaint. The NLRC also denied Ebuenga’s
appeal. The CA also found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC and
denied Ebuenga’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Ebuenga filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate

the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC in
Ebuenga’s Petition for Review on Certiorari.

HELD:

No. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition. It

should be careful not to substitute its own appreciation of the facts to those of the
tribunals which have previously weighed the parties' claims and even personally
perused the evidence.

In a Rule 45 review, The Court considers the correctness of the assailed CA

decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake
under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law
raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to
view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled
upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of
whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC

500
decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly
aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the
NLRC decision challenged before it.

A party who files a Rule 45 Petition and asserts that his or her case warrants
this Court's review of factual questions bears the burden of proving two (2) things:
1) the basic exceptionality of his or her case such that this Court must go out of its
way to revisit the evidence; and 2) the specific factual conclusion that he or she
wants this Court to adopt in place of that which was made by the lower tribunals.
These exceptions are not occasioned by their mere invocation. This dual burden
requires a party to not merely plead or aver. He or she must demonstrate and
prove. His or her evidentiary task persists before this Court precisely because he
or she pleads this Court to sustain different factual conclusions.

501
Section 2 – Time for filing; extension

Department of Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARMPC) v.

Carmencita Diaz, Represented by Mary Catherine M. Diaz; Emma Cabigting;
and Nina T. Samaniego
G.R. No. 206331, June 4, 2018

FACTS:

Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego worked for the Agrarian Reform Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (the Cooperative) as Accounting Clerk, Loan Officer and
Verifier, and Lending Supervisor, respectively. The three filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against the Cooperative in connection with the termination of
their employment after an investigation regarding anomalous transactions they
were allegedly involved in. The Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaint. On
appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA’s findings. A petition for Certiorari before the
CA was filed questioning the award for damages by the respondents. The Court
of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari finding that the respondents were
illegally dismissed however, it denied the petitioner’s claim for unpaid salaries
during preventive suspension and moral damages. The Cooperative’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the CA on September 12, 2012. On April 5, 2013,
the Cooperative filed before the Supreme Court and Urgent Motion to Attached
Petition with an attached Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
respondents.

Atty. Ferdinand O. Tamaca (Atty. Tamaca), counsel for the Cooperative,

alleges that a copy of the Court of Appeals September 12, 2012 Resolution was
"misplaced at his office during the holiday season last December when it was
served at his office." Further, he claims that he was staying in his province during
that period and was busy preparing for elections in Carigara, Leyte. He likewise
admits that due to his secretary's resignation, he failed to know that the Court of
Appeals May 11, 2012 Decision had become final and that the period to appeal had
already lapsed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for review before the Court of Appeals was
properly dismissed for being filed out of time.

502
HELD:

Yes. Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court clearly provides for the period
within which a petition for review must be filed: Section 2. Time for filing; extension.
- The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial
or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed
and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit
for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may
for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to
file the petition.

Failure to file a petition for review on certiorari, or a motion for extension

to file it, within the period prescribed under Rule 45, Section 2 results in a party's
loss of right to appeal. It is settled that appeal, being a mere statutory right, must
"be exercised in the manner and according to procedures laid down by
law." Failure to file one's appeal within the reglementary period is fatal to a party's
cause, "precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case."
The lapse of more than six (6) months from petitioner's receipt of the September
12, 2012 Resolution until the filing of the Petition on April 5, 2013 is beyond the
contemplation of Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. Evidently, no reasonable
attempt has been made by petitioner to comply with the mandatory requirement
of filing within the reglementary period. Atty. Tamaca's excuses of failing to
monitor the date of the receipt of the Court of Appeals September 12, 2012
Resolution and his electoral activities do not deserve any consideration from this
Court.

503
Section 4 - Contents of Petition

Cordillera Global Network v. Paje

G.R. No. 215988, April 10, 2019

FACTS:

A few years after the construction of SM City Baguio, the company

undertook to expand its existing mall on Luneta Hill (the Expansion Project) to
increase parking and commercial spaces. The DENR-Cordillera Administrative
Region, with clearance from then DENR Secretary Paje, granted SM Investments
Corporation's request for a permit to cut and earth-ball the Benguet pine, Alnus
trees, and saplings that would be affected by the Expansion Project. Subsequently,
the City Planning and Development Office of Baguio City granted locational
clearance for the Expansion Project.

Cordillera Global Network and Adajar, et al. filed two environmental cases,
which were later on consolidated. They both alleged that the cutting or earth-
balling of the 182 trees on Luneta Hill would severely damage the environment
and health of Baguio City residents. They also assailed the regularity of the permits
issued, further claiming that the Expansion Project violated zoning and
environmental laws.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the consolidated cases. It held that
Cordillera Global Network and Adajar, et al. possessed the necessary personality
to file the environmental cases under the principle of transcendental
importance. However, their cases did not fall under any of the exceptions to the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeals and upheld the findings of the Regional Trial Court. It dismissed
Cordillera Global Network and Adajar, et al.'s claim that the case fell under the
exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies since there was no
patent illegality. It pointed out that despite not being parties to the applications
for the environmental compliance certificates, tree-cutting and earth-balling
permits, and building permits, they still should have come to the appropriate
administrative tribunals to resolve questions of fact.

Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Private respondents SM Prime Holdings, Inc. and Shopping Center

Management Corporation assert that the Petition should be dismissed outright for
its defective Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping. It points out

504
that of the 202 or so claimed petitioners, only 30 actually signed the document.
Further, 2 of the 30 signatories were not even plaintiffs in either the first or second
environmental case before the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Should the petition be dismissed for having a defective verification and

certification against forum shopping?

RULING:

No.

The requirements for verification can be found in Section 4, Rule 7 of the

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 45, Section 4(e) further provides that the petition should "contain a
sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 42."

Finally, Rule 45, Section 5 sets forth that the petitioner's failure to comply
with any of the enumerated formal requirements is sufficient ground for the
petition's dismissal.

This Court, as emphasized in Altres v. Empleo, has consistently applied the

substantial compliance rule when it comes to a supposedly defective verification
and certification against forum shopping attached to a petition. Altres, citing Tan
v. Ballena, mentioned that the purpose of a verification was to assure this Court
that a petition contains allegations that are true, and that it was filed in good faith.
Thus, the signing of the verification by some petitioners already served the
purpose contemplated by the verification. However, when it comes to the
certification against forum shopping, Altres ruled that the non-signing petitioners
shall be dropped from the petition: Altres then provided guidelines, as culled from
jurisprudence, on low to resolve noncompliance with the requirement and
defective submissions of verification and certification against forum shopping:

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form
the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-
compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and
certification against forum shopping:

505
 1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-
compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein

does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court
may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be
served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who

has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance

therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling
reasons".

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the

plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign
will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed

by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable
or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of
record to sign on his behalf. (Citations omitted)

Here, there were around 200 petitioners in the 2 environmental cases on

appeal before this Court; yet, only 30 petitioners signed the Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping. However, contrary to private respondents

506
SM Prime Holdings, Inc. and Shopping Center Management Corporation's
assertions, the failure of all petitioners to sign the document is not a sufficient
ground for the Petition's outright dismissal. Jurisprudence confirms that
petitioners substantially complied with the verification requirement. The 30
signatories provided the guarantee that: (1) they had ample knowledge as to the
truth of the allegations in the Petition; and (2) the Petition was made in good faith.

For the certification against forum shopping, Altres stated the general rule
that non-signing petitioners will be dropped as parties to the case. Nonetheless,
there is an exception: when all petitioners share a common interest, the signature
of 1 petitioner in the certification against forum shopping is enough to satisfy the
substantial compliance rule. Here, petitioners all share a common interest, which
is to declare the cutting or earth-balling of the trees affected by the Expansion
Project illegal. Hence, the signature of 30 petitioners to the certification against
forum shopping amounts to substantial compliance with the requirement under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The old and amended rules are the same with respect to the requirement in
the verification in stating that the “affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct based on personal knowledge or authentic
records.”

It is likewise reiterated under the third paragraph of the amended rule that
“the signature of the affiant shall further serve as a certification of the truthfulness
of the allegations in the pleading.”

Lastly, an additional requirement was made under the amended rules. It

requires the affiant to state that “(b) The pleading is not filed to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and (c) the factual
allegations therein have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will
likewise have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.”
These requirements are similar to those mentioned under the amended Rule 7,
Section 3.

507
 Orient Freight International, Inc. v. Keihin-Everett Forwarding Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 191937, August 9, 2017

FACTS:

Orient Freight International, Inc. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari

under Rule 45 with the SC assailing the Decision and Resolution of CA, which
affirmed RTC Decision. The RTC found that petitioner Orient Freight
International, Inc.'s negligence caused the cancellation of Keihin-Everett
Forwarding Company, Inc.'s contract with Matsushita Communication Industrial
Corporation of the Philippines.

Keihin-Everett filed its Comment thereon, arguing that the petition does
not contain the names of the parties in violation of Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules
of Court.

ISSUE:

Is the failure to state the names of the parties in this Petition for Review, in
accordance with Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, a fatal defect?

RULING:

NO. It is not a fatal defect.

The petition does not violate Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court for
failing to state the names of the parties in the body. The names of the parties are
readily discernable from the caption of the petition, clearly showing the appealing
party as the petitioner and the adverse party as the respondent. The Court of
Appeals had also been erroneously impleaded in the petition. However, the
Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, et al. ruled that inappropriately
impleading the lower court as respondent does not automatically mean the
dismissal of the appeal. This is a mere formal defect.

508
 E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. vs. Francisco
G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner is an American corporation and is the assignee the inventors of

losartan. Losartan is being marketed in the Philippines by Merck, Sharpe, and
Dohm Corporation (Merck) under the brand names Cozaar and Hyzaar. On July
1987, petitioner filed a patent application before the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks, and Technology Transfer. On December 2000, petitioner requested
for an office action on the patent application. The patent examiner replied that
petitioner’s application was already abandoned as of September 1988. Petitioner’s
counsel then filed a petition for revival of its patent application but was denied for
having been filed out of time. Petitioner appealed to respondent Director-General
of IPO but was also denied. Thus, a petition for review was filed with the CA and
was granted. The OSG, acting for IPO, moved for reconsideration while
Therapharma, Inc. moved for leave to intervene and admit its motion for
reconsideration alleging that the decision affected its vested right to sell its own
losartan product under the brand name Lifezar in the Philippines which was
already approved by the BFAD.

The CA granted the intervention of Therapharma. Petitioner sought for the

CA to reconsider the intervention but was denied. The CA eventually reversed its
decision hence, denying the petition. Petitioner thus filed a petition for review on
certiorari via Rule 45 with the SC arguing, among others, that the intervention was
improper because the IPO rules prohibit motions for intervention. On the other
hand, respondents commented that petitioner failed to comply with Sec. 4, Rule
45 which makes the petition dismissible, the petition raises questions of fact which
is not allowed under Rule 45, and that the proper remedy should be a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner filed a consolidated reply to respondent’s
comments and attached additional documents.

ISSUE:

Must the petition be dismissed?

RULING:

No, the petition must not be dismissed.

Sec. 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that the petition shall be
filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being

509
indicated as such by the petitioner and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing
party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading
the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate
the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was
received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the
reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the
judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a
quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions
of the record as would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification
against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42.

If a petition fails to attach material portions of the record, it may still be

given due course if it falls under certain exceptions. Although Rule 45, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court requires that the petition “be accompanied by . . . such material
portions of the record as would support the petition,” the failure to do so will not
necessarily warrant the outright dismissal of the complaint.

The Court recognized three guideposts for the CA to consider in

determining whether or not the rules of procedures should be relaxed, as follows:

First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached
to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it.
The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the
material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima
facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course
to the petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need

not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [sic] found in
another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations
in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that
only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may
still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that
petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher
interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits

510
 In support of its petition for review on certiorari, petitioner attached the CA
decision, resolution granting the motion for leave to intervene, and amended
decision. The CA resolution and amended decision quoted extensive portions of
its rollo in support of its rulings. These conclusions were sufficient to convince this
Court not to outright dismiss the petition but to require respondents to first
comment on the petition. Upon filing of its consolidated reply, petitioner was able
to attach additional documents in compliance with the third procedural guidepost.
Petitioner, therefore, has substantially complied with Rule 45, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court.

Thus, the petition must not be dismissed because there has been substantial
compliance with Sec. 4, Rule 45.

511
 RULE 47
Annulment of Judgments or Finals Orders and Resolutions

Section 2 - Grounds for Annulment

Castro v. Gregorio
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014

FACTS:

Atty. Jose Castro filed a petition to adopt respondents Jose Maria Jed
Lemuel Gregorio (Jéd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina). In 2000, the RTC
approved the adoption and a certificate of finality was issued 2006. In 2007,
petitioner Rosario Castro and Joanne Castro filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of judgement of the approval by the RTC of the adoption of
respondents Jed and Regina. Petitioners alleged that they are the legitime family
of Jose and that they only discovered the adoption proceeding in 2005. They
claimed that Jose committed fraud in the proceeding by submitting a fraudulent
affidavit of consent of Rosario and falsified birth certificates of respondents. Lastly,
petitioner Joanne’s consent was not obtained because Atty. Castro blatantly lied
during the trial that he and Rosario did not have any children.

CA denied the petition. The court contended that there was no explicit
provision in the statute that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter should
be personally notified of the hearing. Further, the alleged fraud was also
perpetrated during the trial. Hence, it cannot be classified as extrinsic fraud which
is required in an action for annulment of judgment.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the petition for annulment for
failure of petitioners to :
(1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction; and
(2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud?

RULING:

a) Yes, the petition for annulment of judgement should be granted based on

lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud. Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the Court of Appeals to annul
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial

512
Courts. Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two
grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud,
which must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which
must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or laches.

Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the parties.
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The petition was filed in 2000, thus, Republic Act
No. 8552 applies. Under the law, it is mandatory for the adopter to first obtain the
written consent of his spouse and any of his children who are 10 years of age or
older, if he wants to adopt his children out of wedlock. Since the law expressly
provides that the consent of the spouse and children are necessary for the validity
of adoption, then personal service of should have been effected to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice.

In the case at bar, Atty. Castro tried to circumvent the law by submitting a
fraudulent affidavit of consent and manifesting in trial he and Rosario were
childless. For failure to obtain the consent of his wife and legitimate child, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

b) Yes, there was extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act
of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside of the trial of the
case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the
case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.

In this case, badges of fraud were present. First, the petition for adoption
was filed in the RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte where none of the parties reside.
Second, Atty. Castro used the process of delayed registration to acquire the birth
certificate of respondents. Lastly, Atty. Castro blatantly lied to the trial court when
he declared that his motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario,
were childless, to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. All these tactics were
employed by Atty. Castro, not only to induce the trial court in approving his
petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from participating in the
proceedings or opposing the petition.

When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation

of any other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless
of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or
perjured testimony during the trial.

513
 Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to
participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he
failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other
conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial court granted the decree of
adoption under fraudulent circumstances.

514
 Tortal v. Taniguchi
G.R. No. 212683, November 12, 2018

FACTS:

On June 8, 1999, Tortal married Taniguchi (Taniguchi). They lived in a 250

m house and lot in BF Homes, Parañaque City which was registered in the name
2

of Tortal.

On April 11, 2000, Taniguchi filed a petition for the nullity of her marriage
with Tortal.

On August 25, 2003, the Regional Trial Court granted the petition and
annulled Tortal and Taniguchi's marriage. In the same decision annulling their
marriage, the Regional Trial Court declared the house and lot to be Taniguchi's
exclusive property. Tortal did not move for the reconsideration of this decision.
Hence, it became final and executory on October 14, 2005.

While the petition for nullity of marriage was pending, Sales filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money against Tortal. Sales and Tortal
eventually entered into a compromise agreement, which was approved by the
Regional Trial Court of Calauag.

On December 3, 2003, Tortal and Taniguchi's house and lot was levied upon
in accordance with the Regional Trial Court of Calauag's Compromise Judgment.

On May 24, 2005, Taniguchi filed a Complaint for Reivindication of Title,

Annulment of Levy and Sale in Execution, Injunction, Damages and Attorney's
Fees against Tortal and Sales. On September 14, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City granted Taniguchi's application for injunction and enjoined the
Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City from cancelling the TCT and from issuing a
new one in Sales' favor.

On October 28, 2011, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City nullified
the levy and the sale of the house and lot to Sales, and made permanent the
injunction against the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City.

Tortal and Sales appealed the Regional Trial Court October 28, 2011
Decision but on December 13, 2013, the Court of Appeals dismissed their appeal
and upheld the assailed Decision.

515
 The Court of Appeals rejected Tortal's allegations about the supposed
defects of the Regional Trial Court August 25, 2003 Decision nullifying his
marriage with Taniguchi. It pointed out that this Decision had long become final
and executory.

It likewise rejected Tortal's assertions that Taniguchi had no right to acquire

property because she was not a Filipino citizen. It also stressed that Tortal should
have assailed the Regional Trial Court August 25, 2003 Decision nullifying his
marriage with a petition for annulment of judgment, not in the present case which
only questioned the nullity of the levy and sale of the house and lot to Sales.
Nonetheless, it asserted that the period for filing a petition for annulment of
judgment had likewise long passed.

Only Tortal moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals

December 13, 2013 Decision, but on May 14, 2014, the Court of Appeals denied his
motion. In his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, petitioner Tortal
maintains that the Regional Trial Court August 25, 2003 Decision nullifying his
marriage with respondent was null and void as there was no valid service of
summons on him. He further claims that substituted service of summons by
publication was improperly complied with; thus, the Regional Trial Court never
obtained jurisdiction over him.

ISSUE:

Can Tortal assail a final and executory judgment nullifying his marriage
with respondent Taniguchi in his appeal of the Court of Appeals December 13,
2013 Decision

RULING:

NO. If indeed summons was not properly served on petitioner, then his
remedy was to file a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. An action for the annulment of judgment is an equitable
recourse that is independent of the case and is allowed only in exceptional cases,
such as when there is no more available or other adequate remedy.

A petition for the annulment of judgment of Regional Trial Courts may be

given due course if it is sufficiently proven that the "ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner."
Furthermore, Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides
only two (2) grounds for an action for annulment or judgment: extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud cannot be considered a valid

516
ground in an action under Rule 47 "if it was availed of, or could have been availed
of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief."

Rule 47, Section 3 then provides that an action for annulment of judgment,
if based on extrinsic fraud, should be filed within four (4) years from discovery of
the fraud, or if based on lack of jurisdiction, then before the action is barred by
laches or estoppel. In the action for the nullity of his marriage with respondent,
petitioner claims that respondent deliberately indicated a non-existent address,
instead of his real address; thus, he never received the summons and the Regional
Trial Court failed to acquire jurisdiction over him.

However, instead of directly assailing the Regional Trial Court August 25,
2003 Decision, which granted the nullity of his marriage in an action for annulment
of judgment, petitioner chose to tackle the issue in his appeal of the Regional Trial
Court October 28, 2011 Decision, which nullified the levy and sale by auction of
the house and lot to Sales. This is clearly not the correct remedy. The Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing his appeal and in upholding the Regional Trial
Court October 28, 2011 Decision, striking down the levy and sale by auction, thus:

Still and all, appellant Tortal is not left without any recourse. If, indeed, he
believes that the RTC, Br. 260 erred in awarding the property to appellee despite
being a Japanese national, he should have filed a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

517
 Santos v. Santos
G.R No. 187061, October 8, 2014

FACTS:

In July 27, 2007, the RTC of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J.
Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T.
Santos (Ricardo) had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive
death for purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September
17, 2008.

In his petition, Ricardo alleged that Celerina went to Hongkong to work as

a domestic helper and was never heard of two months after she left Tarlac, where
they resided temporarily. Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate
Celerina. He went to Celerina’s parents’ house in Cubao but they too did not know
their whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other relatives and friends but
no one can give him any information. It was claimed that it was almost 12 years
from the date of the petition since Celerina left, and that she passed away.

On November 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment

before the CA on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina
claimed that she learned about Ricardo’s petition only sometime in October 2008,
when she could no longer avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief, or other appropriate remedies. Furthermore, she alleged that she was never
a resident of Tarlac City as she resides in Quezon City where she and Ricardo have
their conjugal dwelling. She also never worked as a domestic helper abroad, nor
was absent for 12 years. It was Ricardo, according to her account, who left their
conjugal dwelling to cohabit with another woman.

The CA issued a resolution dismissing Celerina’s petition for being the

wrong remedy. According to them, the proper remedy was to file a sworn
statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with
Art 42 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Can a petition for annulment of judgment be availed of as a remedy by a

party declared presumptively dead, when she alleges to have never
disappeared?

RULING:

518
 Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the RTC’s judgment,
order or resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal or
petition for relief are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. In her
petition, Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo’s petition for
declaration of presumptive death were false. The court also did not acquire
jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office were not given copies of Ricardo’s petition. These are proper
allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, which are sufficient grounds
for annulment of judgment.

Furthermore, the Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a

spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the
present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a
justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of the first. The same law
provides that the presumptively dead spouse has a remedy of terminating the
subsequent marriage by mere reappearance and filing of an affidavit of
reappearance.

The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them

certain admissions, presumptions and conditions. The filing of an affidavit of
reappearance is an admission on the part the first spouse that his or her marriage
to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead. Furthermore, the choice of proper remedy is also important
for purpose of determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities of
the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the

termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was
declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. The
law provides the second marriage may also be terminated by filing an action in
court to prove the reappearance of the absentee, and obtain a declaration of
dissolution or termination of subsequent marriage.

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the
termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She
contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only
terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of
her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article

42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage

519
shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such
marriage will be the same as in valid marriages. If it is terminated by mere
reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring
presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.

It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent
marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in
relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for
bigamy. However, a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
may be filed solely by the husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina is a
real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an
action to nullify the second marriage, this remedy is not available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage
but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice.
Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.

520
 RULE 50
Dismissal of Appeal

Section 1 - Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal.

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.

G.R. No. 188146, February 01, 2017

FACTS:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of

Appeals' Decision and Resolution in CA, which reinstated the Order that declared
Royal Ferry Services Inc. insolvent made by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 24. Royal Ferry Services Inc. (Royal Ferry) is a corporation duly organized
and existing under Philippine law. According to its Articles of Incorporation,
Royal Ferry's principal place of business is located at 2521 A. Bonifacio Street,
Bangkal, Makati City. However, it currently holds office at Room 203, BF
Condominium Building, Andres Soriano corner Solano Streets, Intramuros,
Manila.

On December 23, 2005, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas

Shell) filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Formal Notice of Claim and
a Motion to Dismiss. In the Notice of Claim, Pilipinas Shell asserted that Royal
Ferry owed them the amount of P2,769,387.67. In its Motion to Dismiss, Pilipinas
Shell alleged that the Petition was filed in the wrong venue. It argued that the
Insolvency Law provides that a petition for insolvency should be filed before the
court with territorial jurisdiction over the corporation's residence. Since Royal
Ferry's Articles of Incorporation stated that the corporation's principal office is
located at 2521 A. Bonifacio St., Bangkal, Makati City, the Petition should have
been filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and not before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. Further, petitioner alleges that respondent's Appellant's
Brief has failed to comply with Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), (e), (f),
and (h) of the Rules of Court:

(a) First, the Appellant's Brief is bereft of page references to the

record in its "Statements of Facts and of the Case" and its discussion
supporting its assignment of errors, in violation of Section 13 (c), (d)
and (f) of Rule 44.
(b) Second, the Appellant's Brief failed to include a statement of the
issues of fact or law to be submitted to [the Court of Appeals] for
judgment, in violation of Section 13(e), Rule 44.

521
 (c) Third, the Appellant's Brief does not contain the page of the report
on which the citation of authorities is found, in violation of Section
13(f), Rule 44.
(d) Fourth, the table of cases is not alphabetically arranged, in
violation of Section 13(a), Rule 44.
(e) Fifth, the Appellants Brief does not contain, as an appendix, a
copy of the judgment or final order appealed from, in violation of
Section 13(h), Rule 44.

On the other hand, respondent argues, among others, that it has

substantially complied with the requirements under the law. It claims that the
absence of page references to the record in its "Statements of Facts and of the Case"
has not automatically resulted in the dismissal of the appeal. Further, as the
records of this case are not voluminous, the Court of Appeals was not
inconvenienced by the lapse. Respondent likewise claims that although the
Appellant's Brief did not specifically contain the phrase "statement of issues," the
three errors in issue were identifiable through a reading of the Brief. It claims that
its failure to append a copy of the trial court Order has been mooted because the
Court of Appeals has issued the Resolution requiring them to submit copies of the
assailed Order. Lastly, respondent argues that it only cited five (5) cases in the
Brief. Hence, a citation of authorities was unnecessary.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals err in taking cognizance of Royal Ferry's appeal
despite its violation of Rule 44, Section 13 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:

NO. On the issue of the formal defects of respondent's appeal, the Supreme
Court upholds the Court of Appeals Decision to rule on the merits of the case.The
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in deciding to rule on the merits.
The term "may" in Rule 50, Section 1 of the Rules of Court means that the Court of
Appeals has discretion to dismiss an appeal based on the enumerated grounds.
The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion when it decided that the interest of
justice would be better served by overlooking the pleading's technical defects.
Time and again, the Court has declared that dismissal on purely technical grounds
is frowned upon. It is judicial policy to determine a case based on the merits so
that the parties have full opportunity to ventilate their cause and defenses. did not
err in taking cognizance of the appeal.

522
 Lui Enterprises, Inc. vs. Zuellig Pharma Corporation
G.R. No. 193494; March 12, 2014

FACTS:

Lui Enterprises, Inc. (Lui) and Zuellig Pharma Corp. (Zuellig) entered into
a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel of land located in Davao City in 1995. In
2003, Zuellig received a letter from Philippine Bank of Communication (PBCom).
Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig to
pay directly to it. Zuellig promptly informed Lui PBCom’s claim but Lui insisted
on its right to collect the rent on the leased property.

Due to the conflicting claims of Lui and PBCom over the rental payments,
Zuellig filed a complaint for interpleader before the RTC-Makati. Zuellig prayed
that Lui and PBCom be ordered to litigate their conflicting claims. Lui filed a
motion to dismiss. Zuellig filed its Opposition to the motion to dismiss. The trial
court declared Lui in default. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) found Lui’s
appellant brief insufficient for lack of subject index, page references to the record,
table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited, and the statement of issues in Lui’s
appellant brief.

ISSUE:

Did the CA err in dismissing Lui’s appeal for lack of subject index, page
references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited, and the
statement of issues in its appellant brief?

RULING:

No. Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court of Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee,
dismiss an appeal should the appellant’s brief lack sufficient requirements under
Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f). These requirements are the
subject index of the matter in brief, page references of the record, and a table of
cases alphabetically arranged and with the textbooks and statutes cited.

The subject index serves as the brief’s table of contents. Instead of

“thumbing through the appellant’s brief” every time the CA Justice encounters an
argument or citation, the Justice deciding the case only has to refer to the subject
index for the argument or citation he or she needs. This saves the CA time in
reviewing the appealed case. Page references to the record guarantee that the facts
stated in the appellant’s brief are supported by the record. A statement of fact

523
without a page reference to the record creates the presumption that it is
unsupported by the record and, thus, may be stricken or disregarded altogether.
As for the table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited, this is required so that the
Court of Appeals can easily verify the authorities cited "for accuracy and aptness."

Lui’s appellant brief lacked a subject index, page references to the records,
and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1, the CA
correctly dismissed Lui’s appeal.

524
 Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic
G.R. No. 204594, November 7, 2018

FACTS:

This case involves a 2,791-square-meter parcel of land (Tramo property)

located on Aurora Boulevard (Tramo), Pasay City, currently in Sindophil's
possession. Sindophil anchors its right to the Tramo property on Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 132440, which was purportedly issued by the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Complaint
for revocation, annulment, and cancellation of certificates of title before the Pasay
City Regional Trial Court, and impleaded Sindophil as one of the defendants.

In its Complaint, the Republic alleged that per TCT No. 10354, issued by the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City, the Tramo property was initially registered under
the name of Teodoro on November 12, 1964. Teodoro then sold it to a certain
Reynaldo Puma (Puma), causing the cancellation of TCT No. 10354 and the
issuance of TCT No. 128358. Subsequently, Puma sold it to a certain Lourdes Ty
(Ty). Puma's TCT No. 128358 was cancelled and TCT No. 129957 was issued to Ty.
Finally, on May 3, 1991 Ty sold the property to Sindophil, causing the cancellation
of TCT No. 129957 and the issuance of TCT No. 132440 to Sindophil on March 24,
1993. Despite the issuance of certificates of title over the Tramo property, the
Republic claimed that TCT No. 10354 in the name of Teodoro was spurious or of
doubtful authenticity.

In their Answer Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil countered that the Republic
was estopped from questioning the transfers considering that it had allowed the
series of transfers and even accepted the "tremendous amount[s] paid" as capital
gains tax. They added that the Complaint was filed because of the Register of
Deeds' "personal grudge" against them because they had questioned a consulta
issued by the Register of Deeds before the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority. They also contended that they were innocent purchasers for value and,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, reconveyance should not lie.

During trial, only the Republic was able to present its evidence. Defendants
Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil were all deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence when they failed to present any evidence or witness despite
several settings. The parties were then ordered to file their respective memoranda;
but instead of filing a memorandum, Sindophil filed a Motion to Re-Open Case,
praying that it be allowed to present evidence. As to why it failed to present
evidence during trial, Sindophil explained that its witness, Sindophil President

525
Victoria Y. Chalid (Chalid), suffered a stroke which prevented her from testifying
during trial.

During trial, only the Republic was able to present its evidence. In its
November 13, 2009 Decision, It ruled in favor of the Republic and voided the
certificates of title issued to defendants Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil. It
found that the Tramo property claimed by Teodoro under TCT No. 10354 was
derived from TCT No. 6735 registered in the name of the Republic. However, no
annotation of the supposed transfer to Teodoro was annotated on TCT No. 6735.
On the claim of defendants that they were innocent purchasers for value, the
Regional Trial Court said that this defense was "just a mere [assertion] and was
never supported by any documents." It stated that defendants failed to discharge
the burden of proving that they were purchasers in good faith and for value, thus,
rejecting their argument.

Sindophil, together with Teodoro, appealed before the Court of Appeals.

However, for failure to file their appellants' brief within the required period, the
Court of Appeals deemed the appeal abandoned and consequently dismissed it.

Issue:

Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Sindophil's appeal for failure to
file an appeal brief within the required period?

Held:

No. Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Rules of Court is the basis for dismissing an
appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief within the required period.

With the use of the permissive "may," it has been held that the dismissal is
directory, not mandatory, with the discretion to be exercised soundly and "in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play"and "having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case."

Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure of the
appellant to file the appellants' brief on time. But, the dismissal is directory,
not mandatory. Hence, the court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss the
appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The discretion, however,
must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.

In present case however, Atty. Obligar's excuse is unacceptable. While he is not

526
prohibited from hiring clerks and other staff to help him in his law practice, it is
still, first and foremost, his duty to monitor the receipt of notices such as the Court
of Appeals' resolution directing the filing of the appellant's brief. He cannot blame
his staff or house helpers as it is already settled that the negligence of the clerks
and employees of a lawyer binds the latter. That he is not even sure what
happened to the Resolution shows his carelessness, and this negligence is one that
ordinary diligence could have guarded against. He should have devised a system
in his law office whereby his clerks are to immediately route the notices they
receive to the handling lawyer because the reglementary period for filing an
appeal brief runs from their receip. Under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals
exercised its discretion soundly by deeming Sindophil's appeal as abandoned and,
consequently, dismissing the appeal.

527
Section 2 - Dismissal of Improper Appeal to the Court of Appeals

City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority

G.R. Nos. 184203 & 187583 November 26, 2014

FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of Lapu-
Lapu and the Province of Bataan separately filed against the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA).

In a 1998, the petitioner City of Lapu-Lapu, through its Office of Treasurer,

sent a letter to respondent PEZA demanding the payment of real property taxes
for the period from 1992 to 1998 regarding their properties in Mactan Economic
Zone. In response, PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of
Pasay City, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from payment of real
property taxes under The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995. The RTC ruled in
favor of respondent. Consequently, petitioner appealed the decision with the CA.
CA noted that the questions raised by petitioner City were (1) whether the trial
court had jurisdiction over the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief; (2) whether
the PEZA is a government agency performing governmental functions; and (3)
whether the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes. Since only pure
questions of law were raised, CA dismissed the petition. CA contended that the
proper remedy should be an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In this appeal, petitioner argues that its appeal involved mixed questions of
fact and law. Further, it insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the
PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief. According to the City, the case involves real
property located in the City of Lapu-Lapu. The petition for declaratory relief
should have been filed before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Lapu-Lapu.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals commit an error in dismissing the petitioner’s

appeal for raising pure questions of law?

RULING:

No, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the City of Lapu-Lapu’s
appeal pursuant to Rule 50, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. Under the Rules, an
improper appeal before the CA is dismissed outright and shall not be referred to
the proper court. An appeal from the decision of the RTC where only pure

528
questions of law are involved should be filed before the Supreme Court under
Rule 45. A question of fact exists when there is doubt as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. On the other hand, there is a question of law if the appeal raises
doubt as to the applicable law on a certain set of facts.

In the case at bar, the issue of whether the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
had jurisdiction over the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief is a question of law,
jurisdiction being a matter of law. The issue of whether the PEZA is a government
instrumentality exempt from payment of real property taxes is likewise a question
of law since this question is resolved by examining the provisions of the PEZA’s
charter as well as other laws relating to the PEZA. Hence, the dismissal was
proper.

529
 Republic vs. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership
G.R. No. 171496; March 3, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) is the

owner of a parcel of land located in Pasig City. Upon the request of DPWH, Ortigas
caused the segregation of its property into 5 lots and reserved 1 portion for road
widening for the C-5 flyover project. It designated Lot 5-B-2-A, a 1,445-square-
meter portion of its property, for the road widening of Ortigas Avenue.

The C-5 Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only 396
square meters of the 1,445-sqaure-meter allotment for the project. Consequently,
Ortigas further subdivided Lot 5-B-2-A into 2 lots: Lot 5-B-2-A-1, which was the
portion used for the road widening, and Lot 5-B-2-A-2, which was the unutilized
portion of Lot 5-B-2-A.

In 2001, Ortigas filed with the RTC a petition for authority to sell to the
government Lot 5-B-2-A-1. The RTC issued an order authorizing the sale to
petitioner Republic. The Republic then filed an opposition, alleging that Ortigas’
property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing
Section 50 of PD 1529. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the RTC. Thereafter, the Republic filed a notice of appeal, which was
also denied by the CA.

ISSUE:

Is the appeal to the CA proper considering that the only issue is

applicability of Section 50 of PD 1529?

RULING:

No. Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals taken
from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only pure questions
of law are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In which case, the appeal shall
not be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed outright.

Appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely
questions of law must, in all cases, be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by notice of appeal
from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is proper if the appellant raises questions of

530
fact or both questions of fact and questions of law. There is a question of law when
the appellant raises an issue as to what law shall be applied on a given set of facts.
Questions of law do not involve examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the court is required
to examine the truth or falsity of the facts presented. A question of fact invites a
review of evidence.

The sole issue raised by Republic to the CA is whether Ortigas’ property

should be conveyed to it only by donation, in accordance with Section 50 of PD
1529. This question involves the interpretation and application of the provision. It
does not require the Court of Appeals to examine the truth or falsity of the facts
presented. Neither does it invite a review of the evidence. The issue raised before
the Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question purely of law. The proper mode of
appeal is through a petition for review under Rule 45. Hence, the Court of Appeals
did not err in dismissing the appeal on this ground.

531
Section 3 - Withdrawal of Appeal

In re: CA-G.R. CV No. 94656 v. Mortel

A.C. No. 10117, July 25, 2016

FACTS:

The Court of Appeals issued a Notice for Atty. Mortel to file an appellant's
brief on behalf of his client, Angelita De Jesus, within the reglementary period of
45 days from notice. Atty. Mortel recently moved out of his office at Herrera
Tower, Makati City due to the high cost of maintenance. Looking for a new
office, he requested to use the address of his friend's law firm as his address on
record, Atty. Marcelino Ferdinand V. Jose (Atty. Jose), Managing Partner of MFV
Jose Law Office, granted this request sometime in August 2010. Atty. Mortel’s
address on record was then listed at Unit 2106, Philippine AXA Life Center, 1286
Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, the same address as MFV Jose Law Office.

On August 16, 2010, instead of heeding the Court of Appeals Notice to file
the appellant's brief, Atty. Mortel moved to withdraw Angelita De Jesus' appeal in
light of an amicable settlement on the disputed property. After the Motion to
Withdraw Appeal was filed, he stopped communicating with MFV Law Office
and instructed De Leon his messenger to do the same. In the Resolution dated
September 20, 2010, the Court of Appeals directed Atty. Mortel to secure and
submit Angelita De Jesus' written conformity to the Motion to Withdraw Appeal
within five (5) days from notice. Atty. Mortel did not comply. In the Resolution
dated November 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals again directed Atty. Mortel to
comply with the September 20, 2010 Resolution and warned him of disciplinary
action should he fail to secure and submit Angelita De Jesus' written conformity
to the Motion within the reglementary period. Atty. Mortel still did not comply.

Atty. Mortel filed before the Court of Appeals an Omnibus Motion and
Manifestation with Profuse Apologies. In his Comment dated March 7, 2014, Atty.
Mortel argues that he honestly believed that the case was already closed and
terminated in light of his Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Atty. Mortel avers that he
did not expect that a requirement of conformity of the client would be needed in
as much as the act of counsel binds the client. According to him, the filing of a
motion to withdraw appeal is a matter of right, which did not need his client's
conformity. Thus, he did not bother to visit MFV Jose Law Office again or send his
messenger to check with the law firm if there were resolutions or orders for him.

ISSUE:

532
 Does the filing of a motion to withdraw appeal result in automatic
withdrawal of the appeal?

RULING:

No, filing a motion to withdraw appeal does not result in automatic

withdrawal of the appeal. Respondent attempts to escape liability by invoking
Rule 50, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, which states that withdrawal of appeal is
a matter of right before the filing of the appellee's brief. He claims to have honestly
believed that the filing of the motion had the effect of withdrawal of
appeal. Thinking that the case had been closed and terminated, he forgot all about
it.

Filing a motion to withdraw appeal does not result in automatic

withdrawal of the appeal. The next-level court, before which a motion to withdraw
appeal is filed, still needs to resolve this motion. A motion prays for a relief other
than by a pleading. As the court may either grant or deny a motion, or otherwise
defer action on it until certain conditions are met, lawyers have the obligation to
apprise themselves of the court's resolution, and not to simply second-guess it.

Thus, respondent cannot excuse himself from complying with the Court of
Appeals' July 20, 2010 Notice simply because he "believed that the case has long
been closed and terminated" when he filed the Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance. Respondent could not
safely assume that the case had already been closed and terminated until he
received the Court of Appeals resolution on the matter.

533
 RULE 51
Judgment

Section 8 - Questions that may be decided

Oriental Assurance Corp. v. Ong

G.R. No. 189524, October 11, 2017

FACTS:

JEA Steel imported from South Korea 72 steel sheets in coils which were
transported to Manila on board a vessel and evidenced by Bill of Lading. Upon
arrival of the vessel in Manila, the 72 coils were discharged and stored under the
custody of the arrastre contractor, Asian Terminals. The coils were loaded on the
trucks of Ong and delivered to JEA Steel's plant. Eleven of the coils were found to
be in damaged condition, dented or deformed.

JEA Steel filed a claim with Oriental for the value of the 11 damaged coils,
pursuant to a Marine Insurance Policy. Oriental paid JEA Steel and subsequently
demanded indemnity from Ong and Asian Terminals (respondents), but they
refused to pay. Oriental filed a complaint before the RTC for sum of money against
respondents.

Ong countered that the 11 coils were already damaged when they were
loaded on board his trucks and transported to the consignee. Asian Terminals
claimed, among others, that Oriental's claim was barred for the latter's failure to
file a notice of claim within the 15-day period provided in the Gate Pass and in the
Management Contract between the Philippine Ports Authority and Asian
Terminals.

The RTC dismissed the case. On appeal, the CA likewise dismissed the case
on the ground of prescription. According to the CA, it can resolve the issue of
prescription despite not being assigned as an error on appeal as it was already
raised, although not tackled, in the lower court.

ISSUE:

Did the CA gravely err in passing upon the issue of prescription even
though it was not an assigned error in the appeal?

RULING:

534
 No. The CA properly passed upon the issue of prescription. Rule 51, Section
8 of the Rules of Court provides that:

“No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings
therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or
closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in
the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.”

In this case, the issue of whether or not Oriental's claim has prescribed was
raised in the RTC and evidence was presented by Asian Terminals. However, this
matter was no longer discussed by the RTC in its decision in view of its finding
that Oriental failed to clearly establish that respondents were responsible for the
damaged coils.

The issue of prescription is closely related to, and determinant of, the
propriety of the lower court's ruling, absolving respondents from liability for the
damaged goods and dismissing Oriental's complaint. Thus, there was no error on
the part of the CA in passing upon the issue of prescription.

535
 Heirs of Loyola v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 188658, January 11, 2017

FACTS:

The Heirs of Teodora Loyola, filed a Complaint for annulment of free patent
and original certificate of title, reconveyance of ownership and possession, and
damages against respondent Alicia Loyola. Alicia was the wife of the Heir’s
deceased cousin Gabriel Loyola, who was given permission to use part of the
subject property.

The Heirs claimed that the property, which Alicia was allegedly able to
obtain through fraud or misrepresentation, was inherited by Teodora from her
parents, and in turn, were inherited by the Heirs from her.

During trial, the Heirs relied on testimonial evidence to prove their claim
over the property. As for the documentary evidence, the Heirs could only present
a tax declaration issued in 1948 to prove their claim over the property.

RTC did not rule on the merits. Instead, it dismissed the case without
prejudice for failure to implead an indispensable party. The Heirs moved for
reconsideration but the Motion was denied. The Heirs then filed an appeal before
the CA.

CA upheld the RTC’s dismissal of the case. It found that the RTC erred in
finding that there was a failure to implead an indispensable party. Nevertheless,
the CA found that the evidence presented by the Heirs was insufficient to
overcome the presumption of regularity of the free patent and original certificate
of title issued to Alicia. It found that the Heirs failed to submit evidence showing
that Teodora alone inherited the property when testimonies revealed that she had
a brother. Likewise, they failed to prove that they were legally related to or were
the only heirs of Teodora. They did not even prove that she had died, and that she
had the power to validly transmit rights over the property to them. The Heirs
moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied.

Hence, this Petition. Petitioners claim that the CA committed grave abuse
of discretion in going beyond the issues raised on appeal.

ISSUE:

536
 Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion when it went beyond the issue of
dismissal and ruled on the sufficiency of petitioners' evidence before the RTC?

RULING:

NO. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. At most, it may
have committed an error of procedure, as petitioners question its ruling on the
merits of the case and not just on the issue of dismissal for failure to implead
indispensable parties.

As a general rule, only matters assigned as errors in the appeal may be

resolved. Rule 51, Section 8 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 8. Questions that May Be Decided. — No error which does

not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of
the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be
considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely
related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in
the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical
errors.

This provision likewise states that the CA may review errors that are not
assigned but are closely related to or dependent on an assigned error. The CA is
allowed discretion if it "finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a
complete and just resolution of the case." Inasmuch as the CA may consider
grounds other than those touched upon in the decision of the trial court and
uphold the same on the basis of such other grounds, the CA may, with no less
authority, reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis of grounds other than
those raised as errors on appeal.

Petitioners' appeal primarily focused on the RTC’s dismissal of the

Complaint for failure to implead an indispensable party. Nonetheless, the CA
correctly ruled on whether petitioners were able to prove their claim. It had the
discretion to properly consider this separate issue in order to arrive at a complete
resolution of the case.

Ordinarily, this case should have been remanded to the RTC to make the
proper factual determination. However, due to judicial economy, or "the goal to
have cases prosecuted with the least cost to the parties," the CA correctly reviewed
the case in its entire context.

537
 Moreover, petitioners are incorrect in saying that their appeal before the CA
focused only on the procedural issue of dismissal. Petitioners prayed that the CA
rule on both the procedural and substantive issues. They sought its authority to
consider the facts and evidence presented during the trial and to render a decision
based on the merits. Thus, petitioners cannot now claim that the CA exceeded its
jurisdiction in ruling on the merits after consideration of the facts and evidence
just because the decision was unfavorable to them. They have invoked the
jurisdiction of the CA, and thus, are now bound by it.

538
 RULE 52
Motion for Reconsideration

Section 2 - Second Motion for Reconsideration.

Club Filipino, Inc. v. Benjamin Bautista, et al.

G.R. No. 168406, January 14, 2015
FACTS:

Club Filipino Employees Association (CLUFEA) is a union representing the

employees of petitioner, Club Filipino, Inc. Due to a bargaining deadlock,
CLUFEA filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB. On May 26, 2001, CLUFEA
staged a strike. On May 31, petitioner filed before the RAB a Petition to Declare
CLUFEA’s strike illegal. LA declared CLUFEA’s strike as illegal and procedurally
infirm. The NLRC denied CLUFEA’s appeal. On September 22, 2003, a Petition for
Certiorari was filed with the CA. The CA granted the petition and declared the
decision of LA as null and void.
On June 23, 2005, Club Filipino filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with
the SC. In a Resolution dated July 13, 2009, the SC denied the petition and
sustained the CA’s finding that the LA acted with grave abuse of discretion. On
August 17, 2009, Club Filipino filed an MR which SC denied with finality on
September 9, 2009. On September 14, Club Filipino filed a Motion for Leave to
file and admit the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. On November 3,
Club Filipino filed a Motion for Leave to file and admit further pleading/motion
alleging that the SC failed to consider its Supplemental MR in its September 9
Resolution. On January 11, 2010, the Motion for Leave was granted. However, on
October 26, 2010, an entry of judgment was already issued for the July 13
Resolution, declaring that the case already become final and executory. The Entry
of Judgment was received by Club Filipino on November 10, 2010. 9 days later,
Club Filipino filed a manifestation that the court prematurely issued the entry of
judgment as it has not yet resolved its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
On October 18, 2011, Club Filipino filed a very urgent Motion to Resolve the
Supplemental MR since the respondents filed a Motion for Execution of the July
13, 2009 Resolution.

ISSUE:

539
 Did the filing of Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prevent the July
13, 2009 Resolution from becoming final and executory?

RULING:
NO. The filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration did not
prevent the Court’s July 13, 2009 Resolution from becoming final and
executory. As a general rule, the filing of second motions for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution is prohibited. Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
provides: Section 2. Second motion for Reconsideration – No second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained. For the Court to entertain second Motions for Reconsideration, it must
present “extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first
obtained.” Once leave to file is granted, the second Motion for Reconsideration is
no longer prohibited. The rationale for the rule was explained in Ortigas and
Company Limited Partnership v. Judge Velasco, thus: “Piece-meal” impugnation of a
judgment by successive motions for reconsideration is anathema, being precluded
by the salutary axiom that a party seeking the setting aside of a judgment, act, or
proceeding must set out in his motion all grounds therefor, and those not so
included are deemed waive and cease to be available for subsequent motions. For
all litigations must come to an end at some point, in accordance with established
rules of procedure and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the court granted leave to the petitioner Club Filipino,
Inc. to file the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in the Resolution dated
January 11, 2010. The Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, therefore, is no
longer prohibited. However, the grant of leave to file the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration did not prevent the July 13, 2009 resolution from being final and
executory. A decision or resolution of the court is deemed final and executory after
the lapse of 15 days from the parties’ receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution.
The grant of leave to file the second Motion for Reconsideration does not toll this
15-day period. It only means that the Entry of Judgment first issued may be lifted
should the second motion for reconsideration be granted. Thus, this case became
final and executory on October 26, 2009, after the lapse of the 15 day from
th

petitioner Club Filipino’s receipt of the Resolution denying its first Motion for
Reconsideration. Entry of Judgment, therefore was in order.

540
 RULE 53
New Trial

Section 1. Period for filing; ground

Crispino v. Tansay
G.R. No. 184466, December 5, 2016

FACTS:

Respondent Anatolia Tansay (now deceased) acquired a parcel of land

known as the Tansay Compound which she subdivided into three lots. By virtue
of two deeds of sale, Anatolia allegedly sold two of the lots – one in favor of
Zenaida and the other in favor of Luz and Caridad, Zenaida’s daughters. When
Zenaida discovered that the titles of the lots were missing, she filed a petition
before the RTC for reconstitution of the certificates of title which was granted.
Meanwhile, Anatolia filed a case for Revocation of Trust, Declaration of Nullity of
Transfer, and Cancellation of Title before the RTC.

RTC found that the deeds of sale could not have been valid as petitioners
did not pay any consideration for the transfer of the properties in their names. In
addition, RTC found that Anatolia never intended to sell the lots despite executing
the deeds of sale. Rather, she merely constituted petitioners as trustees of the
properties. Petitioners appealed before the CA.

During the pendency of the appeal, Anatolia died. Petitioners then filed an
Urgent Motion to Remand Records of the Case for the Re-Opening of Trial. They
anchored their motion on an Affidavit allegedly executed by Anatolia after the
RTC had rendered its Decision, confirming the previous sales. CA denied the
Urgent Motion. It considered the same as a motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court and ruled that the
Confirmation of Previous Sales was "not the kind of newly discovered evidence
contemplated by the Rules that would warrant a new trial."

Later on, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision in toto. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Petitioners come to this Court through
a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking a ruling on the power of the CA to
receive evidence under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.
No. 7902.

541
ISSUE:

Is the CA correct in treating petitioners' motion to remand as a motion for

new trial, and in doing so, is the CA limited to motions based on newly discovered
evidence?

RULING:

YES. This Court finds that the CA correctly treated petitioners' motion to
remand as a motion for new trial under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court.

The CA, pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Section 9 of B.P. 129,
as amended, is empowered to receive evidence to resolve factual issues raised in
cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction. However, Section 9 of
B.P. 129, as amended, should be read and construed together with the CA’s
internal rules.

In this case, petitioners filed an ordinary appeal from the RTC. At the time
the CA ruled on petitioners' motion to remand, the 2002 Internal Rules of the CA
was in effect:

SECTION 3. Power of the Court to Receive Evidence. - The Court may

receive evidence in the following cases:

a. In actions falling within its original jurisdiction, such as:

(1) certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rules 46 and 65 of
the Rules of Court; (2) action for annulment of judgment or final
order under Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; (3) quo warranto under
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court; (4) habeas corpus under Sections 2
and 12, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court;
b. In appeals in civil cases where the court grants a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 53
of the Rules of Court;
c. In appeals in criminal cases where the court grants a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence pursuant to Section 12,
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court; and
d. In appeals involving claims for: damages arising from
provisional remedies. (Emphasis supplied)

Although the CA has the power to receive evidence pursuant to its

expanded powers under Section 9 of B.P. 129, this power is not without limit. The

542
CA cannot simply accept additional evidence from the parties. If the interpretation
were otherwise, then there would be no end to litigation.

Hence, in appeals in civil cases, the CA may only receive evidence when it
grants a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. This notwithstanding, the
CA cannot accept any kind of evidence in a motion for new trial. A motion for new
trial under Rule 53 is limited to newly discovered evidence.

The document petitioners seek to present before the appellate court does
not fall under the concept of newly discovered evidence.

Newly discovered evidence has a specific meaning under the law. Under
Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, the following criteria must be satisfied for evidence
to be considered newly discovered: (a) the evidence could not have been
discovered prior to the trial in the court below by exercise of due diligence; and (2)
it is of such character as would probably change the result.

The document denominated as Confirmation of Previous Sales was

allegedly executed three years after the RTC rendered its decision. Hence, it could
not have been discovered by petitioners prior to trial by the exercise of due
diligence.

However, the document is not of such character that would probably

change the lower court's judgment. The nature of the deeds of sale executed would
not have been affected even if the Confirmation of Previous Sales was admitted in
evidence since the validity of a contract is determined by law and not by the
stipulation of the parties. Furthermore, the CA can determine whether the deeds
of sale were valid independent of said document. Thus, the CA correctly denied
petitioners' motion to have the Confirmation of Previous Sales admitted in
evidence.

543
 RULE 56
Original and Appealed Cases

B
Appealed Cases

Section 6 - Disposition of Improper Appeal

Arreza v. Toyo
G.R. No. 213198. July 1, 2019

FACTS:

Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese

citizen, were married in Quezon City. After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a
Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of Konohana-ku, Osaka
City, Japan received on February 4, 2011. It was later recorded in Tetsushi's family
register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu.

Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry.In support of
her Petition, Genevieve submitted a copy of their Divorce Certificate, Tetsushi's
Family Register, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce, and
an English translation of the Civil Code of Japan, among others.

After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial
Court set the case for hearing on October 16, 2012. On the day of the hearing, no
one appeared to oppose the Petition. After the jurisdictional requirements were
established and marked, trial on the merits ensued.

The RTC denied the Genevieve’s petition. It decreed that while the pieces of
evidence presented by Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement was
accepted by the local government of Japan, she nevertheless failed to prove the
copy of Japan's law. The Regional Trial Court noted that the copy of the Civil Code
of Japan and its English translation submitted by Genevieve were not duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila,
or the Department of Foreign Affairs. Genevieve filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was later on denied. Thus, Genevieve filed before this
Court the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

544
 Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in not treating the English
translation of the Civil Code of Japan as an official publication in accordance with
Rule 131, Section 3 (gg) of the Rules of Court since it was printed "under
authorization of the Ministry of Justice. That it is an official publication, she points
out, makes it a self-authenticating evidence of Japan's law under Rule 132, Section
25 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in not
considering the English translation of the Japan Civil Code as a learned treatise
and in refusing to take judicial notice of its authors' credentials.

ISSUE:

May the Supreme Court choose not to dismiss the Rule 45 petition
involving questions of facts?

RULING:

Yes.

Settled is the rule that, generally, this Court only entertains questions of law
in a Rule 45 petition. Questions of fact, like the existence of Japan's law on divorce,
are not within this Court's ambit to resolve. Nonetheless, in Medina v. Koike, this
Court ruled that while the Petition raised questions of fact, "substantial ends of
justice warrant that the case be referred to the [Court of Appeals] for further
appropriate proceedings":

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and
Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are
essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before
the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that
is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
xxx xxx xxx
Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as
above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to the [Court of Appeals] under
paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.

This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that
an appeal likewise "may" be dismissed when there is error in the choice or mode
of appeal.

Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either
dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the [Court of Appeals], the question of fact

545
involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case
be referred to the [Court of Appeals] for further appropriate proceedings. It bears
to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of
law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its
prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the
existence of the courts.

546
 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

RULE 57
Preliminary Attachment

Section 1 - Grounds upon which attachment may issue

Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 195295, October 5, 2016

FACTS:

The Marcos children are the registered owners of a parcel of land in

Cabuyao, Laguna (Cabuyao property). When EO No. 14 took effect, the PCGG,
acting for petitioner, filed a complaint against private respondents, spouses
Marcos and their children, in order to recover all properties illegally acquired by
them during their incumbency as public officers. Thereafter, petitioner sought for
an order of preliminary attachment over the Cabuyao property alleging that the
registration of the property in Marcos children’s names when they were still
minors was obviously done to conceal the truth that former President Marcos was
the true owner.

The Sandiganbayan denied the application for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary attachment because petitioner’s allegations were couched in general
terms and devoid of particulars upon which to discern whether or not to issue a
writ. It found that the Cabuyao property was never concealed, removed, or
disposed of by the Marcoses since it remains registered in their names up to the
present, and petitioner was easily able to identify and locate the property by the
mere checking of its title with the Registry of Deeds.

ISSUE:

Must petitioner’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

attachment be granted?

RULING:

Yes, petitioner’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

attachment must be granted.

Sec. 1, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that at the

commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or

547
any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases,
among others: xxx (b) in an action for money or property embezzled or
fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an
officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course
of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a
willful violation of duty; (c) In an action to recover the possession of property
unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or converted, when the property, or any
part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being
found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person. Procedural rules are not
mere technicalities that can be disregarded at whim by the parties or by our courts.
Neither should they be applied so mechanically without any appreciation of their
purpose and object.

In this case, the allegations in the admitted complaint fall within Section
1(b) and (c) of Rule 57. Given the peculiarities of the Marcos cases, the allegations
of former President Marcos taking advantage of his powers as President, gravely
abusing his powers under martial law, and embarking on a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth suffice to constitute the case as one under Rule 57.
The allegation that the Cabuyao property was registered under the names of the
Marcos children when they were still minors is sufficient to allege that the
Cabuyao property was concealed, thus satisfying Rule 57, Section 1(c) of the Rules
of Court. These allegations have substantially met the requirements of the law for
the issuance of a preliminary attachment. Hence, it was improper for the
Sandiganbayan to deny the application on the mere ground of failure to present
particular allegations which would support the issuance of the writ.

Thus, petitioner’s application for the writ of preliminary attachment must

be granted because its allegations therein are sufficient for the issuance of said
writ.

548
 RULE 58
Preliminary Injunction

Section 1 - Preliminary injunction defined; classes

Dynamic Builders & Construction Co., Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr.

G.R. No. 174202, April 7, 2015

FACTS:

The Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental published an invitation to

bid for the construction of an infrastructure known as “Construction Shoreline
Protection Project” which petitioner joined. Petitioner’s bid proposal was found to
be not substantially responsive, so it filed a request for reconsideration which was
denied due to its Financial Contracting Capability. Petitioner then filed a formal
protest with Mayor Presbitero, who reiterated that petitioner had a negative
Financial Contracting Capability. Their motion for reconsideration being denied,
petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for certiorari, and before the SC a petition
for prohibition with application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
assailing Mayor Presbitero’s decision.

The SC ordered the party to maintain the status quo as of September 18, 2006
effective immediately until further orders. On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed
a verified petition to cite respondents for contempt, alleging that respondents did
not cease work on the project in disregard of this court’s status quo order.

ISSUE:

Is there a violation of the status quo order?

RULING:

No, there was no violation of the status quo order. The status quo should
be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. The status quo usually
preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested
status which preceded the actual controversy. The status quo ante litem is,
ineluctably, the state of affairs which is existing at the time of the filing of the case.
The ordinary meaning of status quo is “the existing state of affairs,” while status
quo ante refers to “the state of affairs that existed previously.”

549
 Relying in good faith on the ordinary meaning of status quo as
differentiated from status quo ante, respondents pushed through with the
construction, which had been the existing state of affairs at the time the September
18, 2006 Resolution was issued. Such was consistent with Republic Act No. 8975's
policy that “the State shall ensure the expeditious and efficient implementation
and completion of government infrastructure projects to avoid unnecessary
increase in construction, maintenance and/or repair costs and to immediately
enjoy the social and economic benefits therefrom.” Hence, there was no violation
of the order and the contempt charge must be dismissed.

550
Section 3 - Grounds for issuance of Preliminary Injunction

Power Generation Employees Association-NPC v. National Power Corp.,

G.R.187420, August 9, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to permanently enjoin the

implementation of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement (the “Agreement”)
jointly executed by National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) and the Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM), and to declare this
Agreement void for being contrary to EPIRA.

Petitioners filed this Petition directly with the Supreme Court pursuant to
Section 78 of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) to enjoin the
implementation of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement.

ISSUE:

Is the Petition for Injunction under Section 78 of EPIRA to question the

validity of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement between respondents
PSALM and NAPOCOR proper?

RULING:

YES. The Petition for Injunction under Section 78 of EPIRA is proper.

Sec. 78 vests upon the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to restrain or enjoin
the implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA. In other words, the Court
exercises jurisdiction on all questions involving the enforcement of the provisions
of the EPIRA. Thus, no restraint or injunction whether permanent or temporary,
could be issued by any court except by the Supreme Court.

The Operation and Maintenance Agreement is a contract that preserves the

implementation of EPIRA. Thus, it is covered by Section 78.

In Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court explained that

provisional remedies found in the Rules of Court are within the Supreme Court’s
constitutional prerogative to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and
procedure.

551
 Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, all courts have the inherent power to
issue temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction. When
Congress passes a law that prohibits other courts from exercising this power, it
encroaches upon the Supreme Court’s power to promulgate rules of procedure, in
violation of the separation of powers.

However, Carpio-Morales dealt only with temporary restraining orders,

not permanent injunctions. The injunction contemplated in EPIRA is not a mere
interlocutory action by a court but a permanent remedy.

Thus, Section 78 of EPIRA can still apply to this case.

552
 Bicol Medical Center v. Botor
G.R. No. 214073, October 04, 2017

FACTS:

Road Lot No. 3 is a service road which leads to the Camarines Sur Provincial
Hospital (converted to the Training and Teaching Hospital). The CamSur
Provincial Government donated about 5 hectares of land to the Ministry of Health,
now DOH, as shown by a TCT. The Training and Teaching Hospital and Road Lot
No. 3 were included in this donation. The Hospital subsequently became Bicol
Medical Center (BMC).

BMC issued a Memorandum ordering the rerouting of traffic inside the

BMC Compound. This rerouting scheme closed the steel gate for vehicles and
pedestrians. The gate closure drew a lot of criticism from the community. Atty.
Botor wrote to Mayor Bongat, asking for the reopening or dismantling of the gate
for being a public nuisance. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City passed a
resolution authorizing Mayor Bongat to dismantle the gate. However, instead of
dismantling it, Mayor Bongat filed a Petition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against BMC.

The RTC denied Naga City’s application for injunctive relief, ruling that
Naga City failed to prove a clear and unmistakable right to the writ prayed for. In
a petition for certiorari filed with the CA, the CA granted the petition and
emphasized that only a prima facie showing of an applicant's right to the writ is
required in an application for writ of injunctive relief.

ISSUE:

(1) Did the CA err in directing the RTC to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction on the closure of Road Lot No. 3?
(2) Was the CA correct in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction based
on a prima facie evidence presented by the respondents?

RULING:

(1) Yes. Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the instances
when a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued. Jurisprudence has likewise
established that the following requisites must be proven first before a writ of
preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued: (1)
the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a
right in esse; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there

553
is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury.

Based on records, the respondents failed to establish prima facie proof of

their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No. 3. Whatever right they sought to
establish by proving the public nature of Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted by the
DOH's certificate of title and the City Engineer's categorical statement that the
road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of BMC was not
included in the list of city roads under Naga City's control. Instead of merely
relying on a tax map and claims of customary use, Naga City or respondents
should have presented a clear legal right to support their claim over Road Lot
No. 3. Respondents likewise cannot rely on the supposed customary use of Road
Lot No. 3 by the public to support their claimed right of unfettered access to the
road because customary use is not one (1) of the sources of legal obligation.

A clear legal right which would entitle the applicant to an injunctive writ
contemplates a right clearly founded in or granted by law. Any hint of doubt or
dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive
relief. Hence, absent a particular law or statute establishing Naga City's
ownership or control over Road Lot No. 3, the DOH's title over the BMC
compound must prevail over the unsubstantiated claims of Naga City and
respondents. The writ should not have been issued.

(2) Yes. Rule 58, Section 5 requires a full and comprehensive hearing for
the determination of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, giving the applicant an opportunity to prove that great or irreparable
injury will result if no writ is issued and allowing the opposing party to comment
on the application. On the other hand, a temporary restraining order that is heard
only with the evidence presented by its applicant is ex parte, but it is issued to
preserve the status quo until the hearing for preliminary injunction can be
conductedThe CA erred in limiting prima facie evidence merely to the evidence
presented by Naga City and respondents and in disregarding altogether
petitioners' evidence, which had the effect of squarely rebutting Naga City and
respondents' assertions. The CA failed to appreciate the nature of the ancillary
remedy of a writ of preliminary injunction as against the ex parte nature of a
temporary restraining order. Both of the parties’ evidence should be considered.
Hence, the CA erred in disregarding petitioners’ evidence in the determination
of prima facie evidence.

554
 DPWH v. City Advertising Ventures Corp.
G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016

FACTS:

Respondent City Advertising Ventures Corp. entered into a lease

agreement with MERALCO for the use of 5,000 of MERALCO’s lampposts to
display advertising banners. Under this contract, respondent obtained sign
permits from the cities of Quezon, Pasay and Makati. It also likewise obtained
permits for setting up pedestrian overpass banners.

When Typhoon Milenyo hit, several billboards in Metro Manila were blown
by strong winds and fell. In its wake, PGMA issued A.O. No. 160 directing the
DPWH to assess all billboards and determine those that are hazardous and pose
imminent danger and to abate and dismantle the same. A.O. No. 160-A was later
on issued. Said order specified the legal grounds and procedures for the
prohibition and abatement of billboards and signboards constituting public
nuisance or other violations of law.

DPWH proceeded to dismantle billboards. During its operations, it was

able to remove 250 of City Advertising Ventures Corporation's lamppost banners
and frames, 12 pedestrian overpass banners, 17 pedestrian overpass frames, and
36 halogen lamps.

Respondent then filed before the RTC a Complaint against DPWH for
violation of A.O. No. 160, Tort, and Injunction with Prayer for TRO, Preliminary
Injunction, and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.

RTC granted the TRO and later on issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
It also denied the subsequent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration filed by
DPWH and MMDA. DPWH and MMDA filed a petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. CA denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Did the RTC violate legally acceptable standards in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of respondent?

RULING:

555
 NO. A writ of preliminary injunction is issued in order to prevent
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Thus, it will be issued only upon
a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is violated. Moreover, an urgent
necessity for its issuance must be shown by the applicant.

Rule 58, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure identifies the
instances when a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued. The requisites of
preliminary injunction whether mandatory or prohibitory are the following:

(1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a
right in esse;
(2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury
to the applicant; and
(4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

In satisfying these requisites, parties applying for a writ of preliminary

injunction need not set out their claims by complete and conclusive evidence.
Prima facie evidence suffices.

Clearly, a writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and interlocutory

order issued as a result of an impartial determination of the context of both parties.
It entails a procedure for the judge to assess whether the reliefs prayed for by the
complainant will be rendered moot simply as a result of the parties' having to go
through the full requirements of a case being fully heard on its merits. Although a
trial court judge is given a latitude of discretion, he or she cannot grant a writ of
injunction if there is no clear legal right materially and substantially breached from
a prima facie evaluation of the evidence of the complainant. Even if this is present,
the trial court must satisfy itself that the injury to be suffered is irreparable.

In this case, respondent satisfied the standards for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The RTC acted in keeping with these standards and did
not gravely abuse its discretion in extending temporary relief to respondent.

Respondent's lease agreement with MERALCO and its having secured

permits from local government units, for the specific purpose of putting up
advertising banners and signages, gave it the right to put up such banners and
signages. Respondent had in its favor a property right, of which it cannot be

556
deprived without due process. This is respondent's right in esse, that is, an actual
right. It is not merely a right in posse, or a potential right.

While Petitioners counter that:

(1) As per MMDA Regulation No. 04-004 respondent had no right to

put up banners without securing the required MMDA clearances;
(2) Sidewalks and streetlight posts, being outside the commerce of
men, cannot be spaces for respondent's commercial activities;
and
(3) Respondent's contract with MERALCO Financing Services
Corporation has since expired, petitioners, however, may
subsequently and after trial prove that they are correct.

However, at the point when the RTC was confronted with respondents prayer
for temporary relief, all that respondent needed was a right ostensibly in existence.
Precisely, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued "before parties’ claims can be
thoroughly studied and adjudicated.”

Petitioners' own arguments demonstrate the need for litigation. When the
RTC extended provisional relief, it did not yet have the benefit of exhaustive
litigation. That it acted without such benefit is not something for which it can be
faulted. It did not gravely abuse its discretion then, because it did not yet need to
engage in full litigation.

Respondent adequately averred and showed a material and substantial

invasion of its ostensible right, for which the writ or preliminary injunction was
necessary lest that invasion persist and it be made to suffer irreparable injury.

As respondent pointed out, the filing of its Complaint was precipitated by

the removal of no less than 250 of its lamppost banners and frames, as well as 12
of its pedestrian overpass banners, 17 pedestrian overpass frames, and 36 halogen
lamps. All these were done in the span of less than two (2) weeks. Petitioners do
not dispute this. Moreover, nowhere does it appear that petitioners intended to
restrict themselves to the removal of the aforementioned. On the contrary, their
incessant attempts at having the RTC’s writ of preliminary injunction lifted are
indicative of their sheer resolve to dismantle more. Respondent was left with no
justifiable recourse but to seek relief from our courts.

Petitioners' admitted and pronounced course of action directly obstructed

respondent's ability to avail itself of its rights under its lease agreement and the
permits it secured from local government units. What petitioners sought to restrict

557
was the very essence of respondent's activity as a business engaged in advertising
via banners and signages.

Petitioners prevented and threatened to prevent respondent from engaging

in its cardinal business activity. Their admitted actions and apparent inactions
show that the well-defined due process mechanisms outlined by A.O. No. 160 and
160-A were not followed. Confronted with acts seemingly tantamount to
deprivation of property without due process of law, the RTC acted well within its
competence when it required petitioners to temporarily desist, pending a more
complete and circumspect estimation of the parties' rights.

558
 Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. vs. Lim
G.R. No. 172948, October 5, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner is a corporation engaged in copper smelting and refining.

Respondents were former senior officers of petitioner and currently are holding
500 shares each therein. Respondents wrote petitioner and demanded to inspect
its corporate books and records. When asked the purpose of the inspection of
certain records not ordinarily inspected by stockholders, respondents answered
they wished to ensure that petitioner’s business transactions were “above board”
and “entered into for the best interest of the company.” Petitioner filed a petition
for preliminary injunction against respondents seeking to restrain the latter from
demanding inspection of its confidential and inexistent records alleging that the
right of a stockholder to inspect corporate books and records is limited in that any
demand must be made in good faith or for a legitimate purpose. Respondents,
however, allegedly have no legitimate purpose in this case. The RTC granted the
petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction against respondents.
Respondents moved for the dissolution of the writ arguing that no irreparable
injury is caused to petitioner which justifies the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, but was denied on the ground that respondents failed to submit any
affidavit or counter-bond pertaining to irreparable damage and compensation of
damages that may be suffered if the injunction is dissolved. On petition for
certiorari, the CA reversed RTC’s ruling and ordered that the injunction be lifted
and cancelled.

ISSUE:

Is petitioner entitled to injunctive relief against respondents?

RULING:

No, petitioner is not entitled to injunctive relief against respondents.

For an action for injunction to prosper, the applicant must show the
existence of a right, as well as the actual or threatened violation of this right.
Specifically, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, Sec. 3, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court provides that preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established: (a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the
act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts either
for a limited period or perpetually; (b) that the commission, continuance or non-

559
performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably
work injustice to the applicant; or (c) that a party, court, agency or a person is
doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done
some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
On the other hand, Sec. 74 of the Corporation Code provides that a stockholder
has the right to inspect the records of all business transactions of the corporation
and the minutes of any meeting at reasonable hours on business days, but is
subject to certain limitations. However, these limitations are expressly provided
as defenses in actions filed under Sec. 74.

In this case, petitioner invokes its right to raise the limitations provided
under Section 74 of the Corporation Code. However, petitioner provides scant
legal basis to claim this right because it does not raise the limitations as a matter
of defense. The clear provision in Section 74 of the Corporation Code is sufficient
authority to conclude that an action for injunction and, consequently, a writ of
preliminary injunction filed by a corporation is generally unavailable to prevent
stockholders from exercising their right to inspection. Specifically, stockholders
cannot be prevented from gaining access to the (a) records of all business
transactions of the corporation; and (b) minutes of any meeting of stockholders or
the board of directors, including their various committees and subcommittees.

Thus, petitioner is not entitled to injunctive relief against respondents

because there is no right entitled to petitioner which can be violated.

560
 Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office v. De Leon
G.R. Nos. 236577 & 236597, August 15, 2018

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Petitioner Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office prays for the
issuance of a status quo ante order or a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation and Presiding Judge Maximo M. De Leon (Judge De Leon).

This case arose from the Equipment Lease Agreement executed on January
25, 1995 by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming
and Management Corporation. The Equipment Lease Agreement provided that
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, as lessee, will lease the lottery
equipment and accessories of the Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation, as lessor, for the operation of its online lottery in Luzon. The term of
the Equipment Lease Agreement was eight (8) years or until 2003.

On November 14, 1997, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the
Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation amended the Equipment Lease
Agreement "to reduce the original number of required terminals from 2,000 to
1,250 terminals." Several cases were filed in court causing the 8-year term of the
Equipment Lease Agreement to commence in 1999. With the 4-year delay, the
Equipment Lease Agreement would end in 2007. On December 29, 2004, the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation executed another lease agreement, amending the
Equipment Lease Agreement. One of the provisions in the Amendments to
Equipment Lease Agreement was on the extension of the lease duration to another
eight (8) years or until 2015.

In 2011, the Equipment Lease Agreement was investigated by the

Philippine Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. The investigation was conducted due
to an alleged "lapse in financial judgment". After investigation, the Philippine
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee recommended that the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office proceed with the renegotiation of the rental fee "to ensure that
the basis for the fees is commensurate to the cost of the subject of the lease and that
the amount thereof is not unduly burdensome to the public."

Pursuant to the Philippine Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's

recommendation, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office sought the
renegotiation of the lease rental rate with the Philippine Gaming and Management

561
Corporation, and Pacific Online. Pacific Online conceded for the reduction of the
lease rental to 7.85% of the gross lotto sales. Since the Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation declined to reduce the rental rate of 10% of the gross
lotto sales, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office allowed Pacific Online to
provide lottery equipment for the on-line lottery operations in Luzon.

On June 8, 2012, while the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement

was still in effect, the Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation filed a
Petition for Indirect Contempt with Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. The
Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation argued that the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office "violated a Court order confirming its exclusive right."

On the other hand, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and its Board
and Officials filed contended that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over
the case and that the Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation "has no
exclusive right as the sole supplier of on-line lottery equipment to [the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office] in Luzon territory."

On July 12, 2012, then Acting Presiding Judge Rommel Baybay (Judge
Baybay) issued a Resolution granting the Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation's application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office moved for reconsideration.

On November 14, 2012, Judge Baybay issued a Reso1ution, denying the

June 26, 2012 Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam and the July 9, 2012 Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss filed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and its
Board and Officials.

On January 18, 2013, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and its
Board and Officials filed a Petition for Certiorari against Judge Baybay before the
Court of Appeals. They alleged that Judge Baybay committed grave abuse of
discretion when he denied their Motion to Dismiss and granted the Philippine
Gaming and Management Corporation's application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

Meanwhile, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine

Gaming and Management Corporation executed a Supplemental and Status Quo
Agreement on August 13, 2015. They agreed to extend the term of the Equipment
Lease Agreement from August 22, 2015 to August 21, 2018.

II. STATUS QUO

562
 The parties shall dismiss all pending judicial and civil actions between them
but shall continue with the arbitration proceedings until resolved with finality, for
the purpose of determining territorial exclusivity. [The Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation] shall no longer claim any damages from the
[Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office], Board and officials in said arbitration
proceedings, without prejudice to the claim for performance, if warranted.

Except as otherwise provided, upon the execution of this Agreement, the

parties agree to maintain the status quo existing as provided in the Interim
Settlement for a period of three years from 22 August 2015.47 (Emphasis in the
original)

Pursuant to the Interim Settlement, and the Supplemental and Status Quo
Agreement, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and its Board and Officials
filed on January 20, 2016 two (2) motions to dismiss: (1) a Manifestation with
Motion to Dismiss48 before the Court of Appeals; and (2) a Consolidated Motion
to Revive and to Dismiss Cases Based on Status Quo Agreement49 before Branch
143, Regional Trial Court, Makati City.50 They sought to dismiss the Petition for
Certiorari against Judge Baybay docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 128259 pending
before the Court of Appeals and the Indirect Contempt cases docketed as SCA
Case Nos. 12-530 and 12-1011 pending before the Makati City Regional Trial Court.

Meanwhile, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and its Board and
Officials filed a Request to Direct Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation to Amend its Memorials Pursuant to the Parties' August 13, 2015
Status Quo Agreement dated January 21, 2016 before the International Chamber
of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration. They alleged that the Philippine
Gaming and Management Corporation's Memorials "raised several issues that fall
outside the limited scope of 'exclusivity issue'."

On March 30, 2016, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and its Board
and Officials immediately filed a Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration
before the Court of Appeals. They prayed for the reversal of the March 1, 2016
Resolution of the Court of Appeals because the Supplemental and Status Quo
Agreement's validity was being questioned by the Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation before the International Chamber of Commerce,
International Court of Arbitration. They stressed that the Supplemental and Status
Quo Agreement was the basis of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and
its Board and Officials' filing of the Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss.

563
 On July 11, 2017, the Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation
filed a new application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction . After the conduct of the summary hearing on the
Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's application for Temporary
Restraining Order, Judge De Leon, the new presiding judge of Branch 143, granted
the Temporary Restraining Order application in a July 21, 2017 Order.

Petitioner alleges that respondent Judge De Leon committed grave abuse of

discretion. Petitioner argues that respondent Judge De Leon should have denied
or deferred action on respondent Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation's application for Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary
Injunction considering that the latter already instituted a similar application before
the International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration. In
granting the application, respondent Judge De Leon violated Section 28(l) of the
International Chamber of Commerce Rules and Rule 5.15 of the Special Rules of
Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution. Petitioner also notes that the Philippine
Gaming and Management Corporation's application was filed without a verified
petition, in violation of Rule 5.5 of the Supreme Court Administrative Matter No.
07-11-08 or the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution.

Petitioner avers that contrary to respondent Judge De Leon's findings,

respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation "has no right to be
protected by the writ." Respondent Judge De Leon ruled that the Interim
Settlement is the source of the Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's
right, which needed to be protected. However, he also held that the Supplemental
and Status Quo Agreement already supplemented the Interim Settlement. This
was also admitted by respondent Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation.

Finally, petitioner alleges that respondent Judge De Leon violated its

freedom to contract. By issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, "the [Regional
Trial Court] has practically, without authority, extended already [the Philippine
Gaming and Management Corporation's Equipment Lease Agreement] beyond 22
August 2018." It will have to adjust its timetables for the procurement of the
Nationwide On-line Lottery System and will need another 10 months for the test
run. As a result, it will be forced to extend the unfavorable lease agreement with
respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation until the
procurement of a new provider.

ISSUE:

564
 Did Presiding Judge Maximo M. De Leon committed grave abuse of
discretion when he granted respondent Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation's application for injunctive relief?

HELD:

Yes. This Court finds that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse
of discretion in granting respondent Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation's application for injunctive relief. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
issued "to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated."

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior

to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As an
ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may therefore be
resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose
during the pendency of the principal action.

The issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is governed by Rule 58,

Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A

preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act
or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.

In Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) v. City Advertising

Ventures Corporation, this Court held that "for a writ of preliminary injunction to be
issued, the applicant must show, by prima facie evidence, an existing right before
trial, a material and substantial invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary
injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable injury."

565
 To recapitulate, the original contract between petitioner and respondent
Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation is the Equipment Lease
Agreement with a term of eight (8) years-from 1995 to 2003. On November 14,
1997, the Equipment Lease Agreement was amended to extend the term until 2007.
On December 29, 2004, the Equipment Lease Agreement was further amended.
The parties executed the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement, which
extended the term of the lease to another eight (8) years-from August 23, 2007 to
August 22, 2015.

It was during the effectivity of the Amendments to Equipment Lease

Agreement that petitioner "allowed (Pacific Online] to supply a number of lottery
equipment for its Luzon operation."

On December 11, 2013, while the Amendments to Equipment Lease

Agreement was still in effect, petitioner and respondent Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation entered into an Interim Settlement and agreed to bring
the exclusivity issue before an arbitral tribunal. Thus, on March 12, 2014,
respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation initiated the
arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce.

While the arbitration case was pending, petitioner and respondent

Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation executed a Supplemental and
Status Quo Agreement, extending the term of the Equipment Lease Agreement to
another three (3) years "to ensure unhampered lotto operation."

From the brief outline of the aforestated facts, it is evident that respondent
Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's basis for its Writ of
Preliminary Injunction application is its purported exclusive rights for the period
beyond what was agreed upon in the extended Amendments to Equipment Lease
Agreement. To emphasize, respondent Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation's exclusive rights, if any, extend only until August 21, 2018. After the
expiration of the Supplemental and Status Quo Agreement, it can no longer claim
any alleged right to exclusively provide on-line lottery equipment in Luzon.

This Court finds that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting respondent Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation's application for injunctive relief.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior

to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As an
ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may therefore be

566
resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose
during the pendency of the principal action.

Respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's claim of

exclusive rights, as stated in the Interim Settlement and which was brought to
arbitration, pertained to its rights under the Amendments to Equipment Lease
Agreement, which will expire on August 21, 2018. It failed to provide proof that
the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement was extended beyond August
21, 2018. It cannot claim that it has alleged exclusive rights to be protected and that
it will suffer irreparable injury if petitioner continued with the Nationwide On-
line Lottery System bidding process. This is precisely because the bidding was for
the next supplier of the Nationwide On-line Lottery System for a period of five (5)
years after August 21, 2018 or commencing on August 22, 2018. Additionally, with
the Regional Trial Court's confirmation of the arbitral tribunal's Final Award, the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is deemed lifted and petitioner may now proceed
with the bidding process of the Nationwide Online Lottery System for Luzon.

567
Section 4 - Verified application and Bond for Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order

Teodulfo Lao, Jr. et. al. v. LGU of Cagayan De Oro, et. al.
G.R. No. 187869. September 13, 2017

FACTS:

The City Council of Cagayan De Oro passed Resolution which states that it
would consider Erwin See's unsolicited proposal "for the redevelopment of Agora
Complex into a Modern Integrated Terminal, Public Market, and Vegetable
Landing Area." See is the president of MEGA Integrated Agro-Livestock Farm
Corporation (Mega Farm). The redevelopment would be under a build-operate-
transfer (BOT) scheme. On the basis of the Resolution, the city government caused
a bidding to compete with Mega Farm’s proposal. None were made. Thereafter,
Mega Farm and the newly elected Mayor Jaraula executed a BOT Contract for the
Redevelopment of Agora Complex (Agora Complex BOT Contract) even if no
ordinance was passed by the City Council granting authority to Mayor Jaraula to
sign in behalf of the City. The terms and conditions of this Contract were allegedly
different from those in the draft contract submitted as resolution by the city
government.

Petitioners Teodulfo Lao and other city councilors, as public officers and in
their personal capacities, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the Agora
Complex BOT Contract, and a TRO against the City Government, and its officers
in proceeding with the Contract. Petitioners questioned the execution and the
contents of the Agora Complex BOT Contract. They alleged that it was issued in
bad faith and with fraudulent maneuvers between Mega Farm and the City
Government and that Mega Farm was unqualified to take the redevelopment of
the Complex, and that Agora Complex BOT Contract would require that the Agora
Complex be made an exclusive terminal for public utility vehicles in violation of
the "constitutional right of citizens to free enterprise" does not entitle them to a
temporary restraining order.

The RTC denied the issuance of TRO and dismissed the complaint. MR was
denied hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:

Did the RTC correctly deny the issuance of TRO?

568
RULING:

Yes, the RTC correctly denied the issuance of TRO.

RTC denied the TRO on the basis of lack of jurisdiction pursuant to RA

8975, but it still retains jurisdiction over the main cause of action to nullify or
implement a national government contract. Republic Act No. 8975 expressly
prohibits the issuance by all courts, other than this Court, of any temporary
restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, or preliminary mandatory injunctions
against national government projects. This prohibition shall apply in all cases,
disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but not limited
to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders
involving such contract/project. However, this prohibition shall not apply when
the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless
a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will
arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which
bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide that
the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.

If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and
void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to
the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without
prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
Among the "national government projects" covered by the prohibition in Section
3 of Republic Act No. 8975 are projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as
amended, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-Transfer Law. National
government projects is defined in Section 2(a) of R.A. 8975 as all current and future
national government infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts,
including projects undertaken by government-owned and - controlled
corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate- and-Transfer Law,
and other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or
installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction,
completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair and rehabilitation,
regardless of the source of funding.

The party seeking a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining

order as an exception to Republic Act No. 8975 must discharge the burden of
proving a clear and compelling breach of a constitutional provision. In GV
Diversified International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the issuance
of a temporary restraining order against the opening of sealed bids for a "Build

569
and Transfer Contract" with Cagayan De Oro City was found to be in violation of
Republic Act No. 8975.

While conclusive proof of the right to be protected is not necessary, there

must still be a clear presentation of the existing basis of facts which shows the right
being threatened. There must be an existing basis of facts affording a present right
which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear
showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively
established.

Here, the alleged breach of petitioners' ostensible rights was neither clear
nor compelling as to warrant an exception from Republic Act No. 8975. Petitioners'
claim that the Agora Complex BOT Contract would require that the Agora
Complex be made an exclusive terminal for public utility vehicles in violation of
the "constitutional right of citizens to free enterprise" does not entitle them to a
temporary restraining order. Apart from mere allegations, they have not pointed
to any grave injustice or irreparable injury to constitutional rights that would be
sustained if no injunctive reliefs are issued against the execution of the Agora
Complex BOT Contract. The trial court correctly denied the prayer for a temporary
restraining order.

570
Section 5 - Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; Exception

Evy Construction and Development Corp. vs. Valiant Roll Forming Sales
Corp.
G.R. No. 207938, October 11, 2017

FACTS:

Evy Construction purchased a parcel of land covered by a TCT from Ang

and Uyan who executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed). At the time of the sale,
no lien or encumbrance was annotated on the title, except for a notice of adverse
claim filed by Ang. The Register of Deeds (RD) subsequently annotated a Notice
of Levy on Attachment on the TCT. This annotation was by virtue of the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment issued by the RTC in Civil Case No. 13442 (Civil Case).

Evy Construction registered the Deed with the RD and a new TCT was
issued in its name. However, it contained the annotation of the prior Notice of
Levy on Attachment. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in the Civil Case
in favor of Valiant. A Writ of Execution and a Notice of Levy were issued against
the subject property.

Evy Construction filed a Notice of Third-Party Claim in the Civil Case,

informing the court that it had already filed with the sheriff an Affidavit of
Title/Ownership. Valiant posted an Indemnity Bond to answer for any damages
that Evy Construction may suffer should the execution proceed. By virtue of the
Writ of Execution, the Sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property
of Ang's properties, including the subject property. A Certificate of Sale was
eventually issued to Valiant as the winning bidder of the property.

Evy Construction filed with the RTC a Complaint with application for TRO
and/or preliminary injunction to enjoin the RD from compelling it to surrender its
copy of the new TCT. In the hearing for its application for the issuance of TRO,
Evy Construction claimed that it would suffer great and irreparable injury if the
RD were restrained from compelling it to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of
the new TCT.

The RTC issued an Order denying the application for the issuance of TRO
for having no legal basis. On a Petition for Certiorari filed by Evy Construction
with the CA, the CA held that Evy Construction failed to sufficiently establish its
right to the issuance of TRO.

571
 Petitioner argued among others that it was denied due process when its
application for preliminary injunction was denied in the same summary
proceeding as the denial of its application for TRO and that, as the registered
owner of the property, it has the undeniable right to the full use and possession of
it. On the other hand, respondent counters that the application for preliminary
injunction was never actually set for hearing or resolved by the trial court; thus, it
was misleading for petitioner to argue that it was denied due process by the trial
court.

ISSUE:

(1) Was petitioner Evy Construction denied due process when its
application for a writ of preliminary injunction was denied in the same proceeding
as its application for a temporary restraining order?

(2) Did the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner Evy Construction's application for injunctive relief?

(3) Did petitioner Evy Construction sufficiently proved its entitlement to

the injunctive relief?

RULING:

(1) No. Petitioner Evy Construction was not denied due process when its
application for a writ of preliminary injunction was denied.

The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary
remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part, or an
incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action
for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action for
injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from,
and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary
injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits
can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or
until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.

While Rule 58, Section 4(d) requires that the trial court conduct a summary
hearing in every application for temporary restraining order regardless of a grant
or denial, Rule 58, Section 5 requires a hearing only if an application for
preliminary injunction is granted. Thus, Section 5 states that "[n]o preliminary

572
injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person
sought to be enjoined." Inversely stated, an application for preliminary injunction
may be denied even without the conduct of a hearing separate from that of the
summary hearing of an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order.

In this case, there was a hearing on the application for temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner's counsel was allowed to
present its arguments and its witness but conceded that the issues before the trial
court were legal in nature. Thus, the trial court resolved that there was no need to
present the witness, which petitioner's counsel accepted without objection.
Petitioner cannot insist on a separate hearing for the application for preliminary
injunction, considering that it accepted that its application would be submitted for
decision without the presentation of its witness.

Hence, petitioner Evy Construction was not denied due process when its
application for a writ of preliminary injunction was denied in the proceeding for
the application of a TRO.

(2) No. The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the application for injunctive relief.

The encumbrances in respondent's favor were annotated when the

property was still registered under Uyan's and Ang's names. The validity of the
liens and the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale are factual matters that have yet
to be resolved by the trial court. The trial court must also determine whether or
not respondent had prior knowledge of the sale.

Thus, no injunctive writ could be issued pending a final determination of

petitioner's actual and existing right over the property. The grant of an injunctive
writ could operate as a prejudgment of the main case.

(3) No. The petitioner failed to prove the urgent and paramount necessity
to enjoin the RD.

An injunctive writ is granted only to applicants with "actual and existing

substantial rights" or rights in esse. Further, the applicant must show "that the
invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage."

Injunctive relief could be granted to prevent grave and irreparable damage

to a business entity's goodwill and business reputation. Injury is considered

573
irreparable if "there is no standard by which its amount can be measured with
reasonable accuracy." However, in applications for provisional injunctive writs the
applicant must also prove the urgency of the application.

In this case, petitioner alleges that the execution sale and the prior
annotations on its title caused crucial investors and buyers to withdraw. This is
the grave and irreparable damage it sought to be protected from. However, the
feared “damage” was caused by the execution sale and the annotations already
made on the title. In other words, petitioner failed to establish the urgent and
paramount necessity of preventing further annotations on the title. Injunctive
relief would have no practical effect considering that the purported damage it
seeks to be protected from has already been done.

Therefore, its proper remedy is not the issuance of an injunctive writ but to
thresh out the merits of its Complaint before the trial court.

574
 First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. v. Philippine Bank of
Communications
G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018

FACTS:

PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the REM by reason

of First Sarmiento’s default in paying the loan it obtained from the former. First
Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage
with the RTC. However, the Clerk of Court refused to accept the Complaint in the
absence of the mortgaged properties' tax declarations, which would be used to
assess the docket fees. First Sarmiento then filed an “Urgent Motion to Consider
the Value of Subject Matter of the Complaint as Not Capable of Pecuniary
Estimation” with the Executive Judge. The motion was granted and it was ruled
that the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation. In the meantime, the
extrajudicial foreclosure ensued and the properties were sold to PBCOM as the
highest bidder.

First Sarmiento then filed a Complaint for annulment of real estate

mortgage with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to enjoin the Ex-Officio Sheriff from proceeding with the
foreclosure or registering the certificate of sale in PBCOM's favor with the Registry
of Deeds of Bulacan.

That same day, Judge Francisco issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order
for 72 hours, enjoining the registration of the certificate of sale with the Registry of
Deeds of Bulacan. The RTC then directed the parties to observe the status quo ante.
The Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Malolos City, Bulacan issued a
certificate of sale to PBCOM.

PBCOM opposed and asserted that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over
First Sarmiento's Complaint. PBCOM also pointed out that the Regional Trial
Court's directive to maintain the status quo order beyond 72 hours constituted an
indefinite extension of the temporary restraining order, a clear contravention of
the rules.

Thereafter, the RTC dismissed First Sarmiento’s Complaint for lack of

jurisdiction. When the MR was denied, First Sarmiento sought direct recourse to
the Supreme Court via Petition for Review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

575
 Is the issuance of a status quo order by a judge contravenes Section 5,
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:

Yes.

Although not raised in the Petition, this Court nonetheless deems it proper
to pass upon the legality of the RTC’S January 4, 2012 Order, which directed the
parties to observe the status quo ante, effectively extending indefinitely its 72-hour
ex-parte temporary restraining order issued on January 2, 2012.

It is clear from Section 5, Rule 58 that a temporary restraining order may be

issued by a trial court in only two (2) instances: first, when great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant even before the application for writ of
preliminary injunction can be heard; and second, if the matter is of extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury. The
executive judge of a multi-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court
may issue a 72-hour temporary restraining order. In both instances, the temporary
restraining order may be issued ex parte.

However, in the first instance, the temporary restraining order has an

effectivity of only 20 days to be counted from service to the party sought to be
enjoined. Likewise, within those 20 days, the court shall order the enjoined party
to show why the injunction should not be granted and shall then determine
whether or not the injunction should be granted.

In the second instance, when there is extreme urgency and the applicant
will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the court shall issue a temporary
restraining order effective for only 72 hours upon issuance. Within those 72 hours,
the court shall conduct a summary hearing to determine if the temporary
restraining order shall be extended until the application for writ of preliminary
injunction can be heard. However, in no case shall the extension exceed 20 days.

If the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within

the given periods, the temporary restraining order is automatically vacated and
the court has no authority to extend or renew it on the same ground of its original
issuance.

Despite the clear wording of the rules, the Regional Trial Court issued a
status quo ante order dated January 4, 2012, indefinitely extending the temporary

576
restraining order on the registration of the certificate of sale with the Registry of
Deeds.

Petitioner applied for a writ of preliminary injunction, yet the Regional

Trial Court did not conduct any hearing for that purpose and merely directed the
parties to observe the status quo ante.

Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals explained the difference

between preliminary injunction and a restraining order as follows:

Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action

or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party
or a court, agency or a person to perform to refrain from performing
a particular act or acts. The basic purpose of restraining order, on the
other hand, is to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the
application for preliminary injunction. In the instant case, no such
preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the TRO earlier issued
automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of
Court. (Citations omitted)

A temporary restraining order cannot be extended indefinitely to take the

place of a writ of preliminary injunction, since a temporary restraining order is
intended only to have a limited lifespan and is deemed automatically vacated
upon the expiration of 72 hours or 20 days, as the case may be. As such, the
temporary restraining order has long expired and, in the absence of a preliminary
injunction, there was nothing to stop the sheriff from registering the certificate of
sale with the Registry of Deeds.

This Court has repeatedly expounded on the nature of a temporary

restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Yet lower courts consistently
interchange these ancillary remedies and disregard the sunset clause inherent in a
temporary restraining order by erroneously extending it indefinitely. Such
ignorance or defiance of basic remedial measures is a gross disservice to the public,
who look towards the court for legal guidance and legal remedy. More
importantly, this cavalier attitude towards these injunctive reliefs might even be
construed as a deliberate effort to look the other way to favor a party, which will
then sully the image of the entire judiciary. Henceforth, this Court will demand
stricter compliance with the rules from the members of the bench as regards their
issuances of these injunctive reliefs.

577
Section 6 - Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of, Injunction
or Restraining order.

Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. vs. Lim

G.R. No. 172948, October 5, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner is a corporation engaged in copper smelting and refining.

Respondents were former senior officers of petitioner and currently are holding
500 shares each therein. Respondents wrote petitioner and demanded to inspect
its corporate books and records. When asked the purpose of the inspection of
certain records not ordinarily inspected by stockholders, respondents answered
they wished to ensure that petitioner’s business transactions were “above board”
and “entered into for the best interest of the company.” Petitioner filed a petition
for preliminary injunction against respondents seeking to restrain the latter from
demanding inspection of its confidential and inexistent records. Petitioner alleged
that the right of a stockholder to inspect corporate books and records is limited in
that any demand must be made in good faith or for a legitimate purpose.
Respondents, however, allegedly have no legitimate purpose in this case. The RTC
granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction against
respondents. Respondents moved for the dissolution of the writ arguing that no
irreparable injury is caused to petitioner which justifies the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, but was denied on the ground that the writ does not
completely result in the unjust denial of petitioner’s right to inspect the books of
the corporation. On petition for certiorari, the CA reversed RTC’s ruling and
ordered that the injunction be lifted and cancelled. Petitioner questions the CA’s
ruling arguing that it disregarded the procedures for dissolution of a writ of
preliminary injunction under Sec. 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court that
required respondent to submit any affidavit or counter-bond pertaining to
irreparable damage among others.

ISSUE:

Is the CA required to observe the rules for dissolution of a writ of

preliminary injunction?

RULING:

No, the CA is not required to observe the rules for dissolution of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

578
 Sec. 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that the application for
injunction or restraining order may be denied, upon a showing of its insufficiency.
The injunction or restraining order may also be denied, or, if granted, may be
dissolved, on other grounds upon affidavits of the party or person enjoined, which
may be opposed by the applicant also by affidavits. It may further be denied, or if
granted, may be dissolved, if it appears after hearing that although the applicant
is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance
thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or person
enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may
suffer, and the former files bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that
he will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the
dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. If it appears that the extent of the
preliminary injunction or restraining order granted is too great, it may be
modified. On the other hand, Sec. 1, Rule 65 provides that when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.

In this case, the CA evaluated the case on the basis of its certiorari powers
under Rule 65. The objective therein is to determine whether the RTC had
exercised grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for dissolution. This is
opposed to a motion for dissolution where the objective is to determine whether
injunction would cause irreparable damage to respondents.

Thus, the CA is not required to observe the rules for dissolution of a writ of
preliminary injunction because the action before it is a petition for certiorari, not a
motion for dissolution.

579
 RULE 60
Replevin

Section 2 - Affidavit and Bond

Enriquez v. The Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the August 13, 2013
Decision and January 14, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Sometime in 2003, Enriquez filed a Complaint for Replevin against Wilfred

Asuten (Asuten) before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Pampanga.
Enriquez applied for a replevin bond from Mercantile Insurance. On February 24,
2003, Mercantile Insurance issued Bond No. 138 for P600,000.00, which had a
period of one (1) year or until February 24, 2004. Enriquez also executed an
indemnity agreement with Mercantile Insurance, where she agreed to indemnify
the latter "for all damages, payments, advances, losses, costs, taxes, penalties,
charges, attorney's fees and expenses of whatever kind and nature". that it would
incur as surety of the replevin bond.

On May 24, 2004, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order dismissing the
Complaint without prejudice due to Enriquez's continued failure to present
evidence. The Regional Trial Court found that Enriquez surrendered the van to
the Bank of the Philippine Islands, San Fernando Branch but did not comply when
ordered to return it to the sheriff within 24 hours from receipt of the Regional Trial
Court March 15, 2004 Order. She also did not comply with prior court orders to
prove payment of her premiums on the replevin bond or to post a new bond. Thus,
the Regional Trial Court declared Bond No. 138 forfeited. Mercantile Insurance
was given 10 days to produce the van or to show cause why judgment should not
be rendered against it for the amount of the bond. On July 12, 2004, the Regional
Trial Court held a hearing on the final forfeiture of the bond where it was found
that Mercantile Insurance failed to produce the van, and that Bond No. 138 had
already expired. In an Order issued on the same day, the Regional Trial Court
directed Mercantile Insurance to pay Asuten the amount of P600,000.00.

Mercantile Insurance wrote to Enriquez requesting the remittance of

P600,000.00 to be paid on the replevin bond.Due to Enriquez's failure to remit the
amount, Mercantile Insurance paid Asuten P600,000.00 on September 3, 2004, in
compliance with the Regional Trial Court July 12, 2004 Order. It was also

580
constrained to file a collection suit against Enriquez with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. In her defense, Enriquez claimed that her daughter-in-law, Asela, filed
the Complaint for Replevin in her name and that Asela forged her signature in the
indemnity agreement. She also argued that she could not be held liable since the
replevin bond had already expired.

Petitioner argues that when respondent paid Asuten on September 3, 2004,

the indemnity agreement was no longer in force and effect since the bond expired
on February 24, 2004. She claims that the indemnity agreement was a contract of
adhesion, and that respondent "intended the agreement to be so comprehensive
and all-encompassing to the point of being ambiguous."

Petitioner contends that even assuming that the indemnity agreement could
be enforced, she should not have been held liable for the full amount of the bond.
Citing Rule 60, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, she argues that a judgment on
replevin is only "either for the delivery of the property or for its value in case
delivery cannot be made and for such damages as either party may prove, with
costs."

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the present action has already
prescribed, considering that Rule 60, Section 10, in relation to Rule 57, Section 20
of the Rules of Court, mandates that any objection on the award should be raised
in the trial court where the complaint for replevin is filed. It argues that since
petitioner only raised the objection before the Court of Appeals, her action should
have been barred.

Respondent likewise points out that the forfeiture of the bond was due to
petitioner's own negligence. It asserts that in the proceedings before the Regional
Trial Court, Enriquez failed to present her evidence, and it was only when she filed
an appeal that she raised her objections.37 It argues that the Guidelines on
Corporate Surety Bonds specify that the expiry of the bond shall be after the court
proceeding is finally decided; hence, the bond was still in effect when respondent
paid Asuten.

ISSUE:

Is petitioner Milagros P. Enriquez liable for the full amount of the bond paid
by respondent The Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. as surety, in relation to a
previous case for replevin filed by petitioner?

HELD:

Yes. Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal property. It is both a

principal remedy and a provisional relief. When utilized as a principal remedy,

581
the objective is to recover possession of personal property that may have been
wrongfully detained by another. When sought as a provisional relief, it allows a
plaintiff to retain the contested property during the pendency of the action.

As a provisional remedy, a party may apply for an order for the delivery of
the property before the commencement of the action or at any time before an
answer is filed. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure for the
application of a writ of replevin. Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the party seeking
the issuance of the writ must first file the required affidavit and a bond in an
amount that is double the value of the property.

Once the affidavit is filed and the bond is approved by the court, the court
issues an order and a writ of seizure requiring the sheriff to take the property into
his or her custody. If there is no further objection to the bond filed within five (5)
days from the taking of the property, the sheriff shall deliver it to the applicant.
The contested property remains in the applicant's custody until the court
determines, after a trial on the Issues, which among the parties has the right of
possession.

In Civil Case No. 10846, petitioner Enriquez filed a replevin case against
Asuten for the recovery of the Toyota Hi-Ace van valued at P300,000.00.4She
applied for a bond in the amount of P600,000.00 with respondent in Asuten's favor.
The Regional Trial Court approved the bond and ordered the sheriff to recover the
van from Asuten and to deliver it to petitioner. While the van was in petitioner's
custody, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case without prejudice for failure
to prosecute. Thus, it ordered the sheriff to restore the van to Asuten. When
petitioner failed to produce the van, the Regional Trial Court directed respondent
to pay Asuten the amount of the bond.

There was no trial on the merits. The Regional Trial Court's dismissal for
failure to prosecute was a dismissal without prejudice to re-filing. In this particular
instance, any writ of seizure, being merely ancillary to the main action,
becomes functus oficio. The parties returned to the status quo as if no case for
replevin had been filed. Thus, upon the dismissal of the case, it was imperative for
petitioner to return the van to Asuten.

The dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute results in the
restoration of the parties' status prior to litigation, as if no complaint was filed at
all. To let the writ of seizure stand after the dismissal of the complaint would be
adjudging Advent as the prevailing party, when precisely no decision on the
merits had been rendered. Accordingly, the parties must be reverted to their status
quo ante. Since Young possessed the subject car before the filing of the replevin
case, the same must be returned to him, as if no complaint was filed at all.

582
 Petitioner argues that she should not have been made liable for the bond
despite her failure to return the van, considering that it was effective only until
February 24, 2004, and that she did not renew or post another bond.

We have held in a long line of cases that said provisions are mandatory and
require the application upon the bond against the surety or bondsmen and the
award thereof to be made after hearing and before the entry of final judgment in
the case; that if the judgment under execution contains no directive for the surety
to pay, and the proper party fails to make any claim for such directive before such
judgment had become final and executory, the surety or bondsman cannot be later
made liable under the bond. The purpose of the aforementioned rules is to avoid
multiplicity of suits.

For this reason, a surety bond remains effective until the action or
proceeding is finally decided, resolved, or terminated. This condition is deemed
incorporated in the contract between the applicant and the surety, regardless of
whether they failed to expressly state it.

Civil Case No. 10846 is a rare instance where the writ of seizure is dissolved
due to the dismissal without prejudice, but the bond stands because the case has
yet to be finally terminated by the Regional Trial Court The peculiar circumstances
in this case arose when petitioner failed to return the van to Asuten, despite the
dismissal of her action. This is an instance not covered by the Rules of Court or
jurisprudence. In its discretion, the Regional Trial Court proceeded to rule on the
forfeiture of the bond. As a result, respondent paid Asuten twice the value of the
van withheld by petitioner. Respondent, thus, seeks to recover this amount from
petitioner, despite the van only being worth half the amount of the bond.

Of all the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of Court, only Rule
60, Section 2, requires that the amount of the bond be double the value of the
property. The other provisional remedies provide that the amount be fixed by
court or be merely equal to the value of the property. Forfeiture of the replevin
bond requires first, a judgment on the merits in the defendant's favor,
and second, an application by the defendant for damages. Neither circumstance
appears in this case. When petitioner failed to produce the van, equity demanded
that Asuten be awarded only an amount equal to the value of the van. The
Regional Trial Court would have erred in ordering the forfeiture of the entire bond
in Asuten's favor, considering that there was no trial on the merits or an
application by Asuten for damages. This judgment could have been reversed had
petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court's May 24, 2004 Order in Civil Case No.
10846. Unfortunately, she did not. Respondent was, thus, constrained to follow
the Regional Trial Court's directive to pay Asuten the full amount of the bond

583
 R.A. 9262
Issuance of Protection Order

Pavlow v. Mendenilla
G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017

FACTS:

On March 11, 2005, petitioner Pavlow, an American citizen and President

of Quality Long Term Care of Nevada, Inc., married Maria Sheila, a Filipino, in
civil rites in Quezon City. Thereafter, they cohabited as husband and wife.

Barely three (3) months into their marriage, on May 31, 2005, Maria Sheila
filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Pavlow for slight physical injuries. On June 3,
2005, Maria Sheila filed an Amended Complaint-Affidavit to include
maltreatment in relation to the Anti-VAWC Law as a ground. The complaint was
dismissed due to Maria Shiela’s failure to substantiate the claims.

Mendenilla, Maria Sheila’s mother, filed with the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court a Petition for Maria Sheila's benefit, praying for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order or Permanent Protection Order under the Anti-
VAWC Law.

Judge Giron-Dizon issued a Temporary Protection Order in favor of Maria

Sheila. Issued along with this Order was a Summons addressed to Pavlow. Deputy
Sheriff Arturo M. Velasco (Deputy Sheriff Velasco) recounted that when service of
summons with the Temporary Protection Order attached was attempted on
September 7, 2005, Pavlow was out of the country. Thus, summons was served
instead through his employee, Tolentino, who also resided at Pavlow's own
residence in Unit 1503, Grand Tower Condominium, 150 L.P. Leviste St., Makati
City.

Petitioner claims, however, that Maria Sheila's prior filing of a criminal

complaint precluded Mendenilla's subsequent filing of a petition for the issuance
of a protection order.

ISSUE:

Has the respondent engaged in forum shopping by filing a petition for the
issuance of a protection order after a criminal complaint under the Anti-VAWC
Law was dismissed by the prosecutor?

584
RULING:

No. Republic Act No. 9262 specifies three (3) distinct remedies available to
victims of acts of "violence against women and their children": first, a criminal
complaint; second, a civil action for damages; and finally, a civil action for the
issuance of a protection order.

As its name denotes, a temporary protection order is a provisional relief. It

shall be effective for 30 days, following a court's "ex parte determination that such
order should be issued." Within these 30 days, a hearing to determine the propriety
of issuing permanent protection order must be conducted. The temporary
protection order itself "shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits
of the issuance of a [permanent protection order]." Following the conduct of a
hearing, a permanent protection order may be issued and "shall be effective until
revoked by a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was
issued."

Furthermore, the mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and

their children is expressly given personality to file a petition for the issuance of a
protection order by Section 9(b) of the Anti-VAWC Law. However, the right of a
mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file such a petition is
suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in this
case, respondent Mendenilla filed her petition after her daughter's complaint-
affidavit had already been dismissed.

More basic, the filing of Maria Sheila's complaint-affidavit did not even
commence proceedings on her own petition for the issuance of a protection order.
Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at the level of the prosecutor, does not
form part of trial. It is not a judicial proceeding that leads to the issuance of a
protection order. Thus, the pendency and subsequent dismissal of Maria Sheila's
Complaint-Affidavit did not engender the risk of either litis pendentia or res
judicata, which would serve the basis of a finding of forum shopping by her
mother.

585
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

RULE 63
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

Section 1 - Who may file petition

City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority

G.R. Nos. 184203 & 187583 November 26, 2014

FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of Lapu-
Lapu and the Province of Bataan separately filed against the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA).

In a 1998, the petitioner City of Lapu-Lapu, through its Office of Treasurer,

sent a letter to respondent PEZA demanding the payment of real property taxes
for the period from 1992 to 1998 regarding their properties in Mactan Economic
Zone. In response, PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of
Pasay City, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from payment of real
property taxes under The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995. The RTC ruled in
favor of respondent. Consequently, petitioner appealed the decision with the CA.
CA noted that the questions raised by petitioner City were (1) whether the trial
court had jurisdiction over the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief; (2) whether
the PEZA is a government agency performing governmental functions; and (3)
whether the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes. Since only pure
questions of law were raised, CA dismissed the petition. CA contended that the
proper remedy should be an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In this appeal, petitioner argues that its appeal involved mixed questions of
fact and law. Further, it insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the
PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief. According to the City, the case involves real
property located in the City of Lapu-Lapu. The petition for declaratory relief
should have been filed before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Lapu-Lapu.

ISSUE:

Does the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City have jurisdiction to
hear, try, and decide the City of Lapu-Lapu’s petition for declaratory relief?

RULING:

586
 No, the RTC of Pasay had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the petition
for declaratory relief against the City of Lapu-Lapu for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, specifically the relief sought.

Under Rule 63, section 1 of the Rules of Court a petition for declaratory
relief may be filed by persons interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation, before breach or
violation, thereof, in the appropriate RTC to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder. Based on the provision, a declaratory judgment may issue only if there
has been “no breach of the documents in question.” If the contract or statute
subject matter of the action has already been breached, the appropriate ordinary
civil action must be filed.

In the case bar, PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for declaratory
relief against the City. The City had already issued demand letters and real
property tax assessment against the PEZA, in violation of the PEZA’s alleged tax-
exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the
subject matter of PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief, had already been
breached. Since a petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy once a
notice of assessment is already issued, then the trial court had no jurisdiction over
the case.

587
 Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo
G.R. No. 185894. August 30, 2017

FACTS:

Santos, a stockholder of record for 25 shares in Belo Medical Group,

requested for an inspection of the corporate books. Belo, another stockholder of
record of Belo Medical Group, opposed to granting Santos’ request alleging that:
(1) Santos is not the true owner of the 25 shares and is merely a trustee for said
shares in favor of Belo; and, (2) Santos’ request for inspection is done in bad faith
as he allegedly requests it to work in favor of a competitor company which Santos
is also a stockholder. Being caught in the disputing claims of Belo and Santos, Belo
Medical Group filed a Complaint for Interpleader with RTC, alleging that while
Santos appeared to be a registered stockholder, there was nothing on the record to
show that he had paid for the shares under his name. Subsequently, Belo Medical
Group filed a Supplemental Complaint for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. In its Supplemental Complaint, Belo Medical Group relied on
Section 74 of the Corporation Code to deny Santos' request for inspection.

The Complaint and Supplemental Complaint were raffled to the RTC of

Makati, a special commercial court, thus classifying them as intra-corporate. RTC
dismissed the Complaint for Interpleader as Belo Medical Group failed to
sufficiently allege conflicting claims of ownership over the subject shares. Belo
Medical Group directly filed a petition before the SC under Rule 45 on the basis
that the appeal is based purely on questions of facts. However, Santos contends
that Belo Medical Group that the petition must be dismissed as it is the wrong
mode of appeal, where the proper appeal should be under Rule 43 as it involves
an intra-corporate controversy.

ISSUE:

Is the dismissal of the complaint interpleader proper?

RULING:

Yes, the dismissal of the complaint in interpleader is proper.

The trial court cannot classify the case based on potentialities. The two
defendants in that case are both stockholders on record. They continue to be
stockholders until a decision is rendered on the true ownership of the 25 shares of
stock in Santos’ name. If Santos’ subscription is declared fictitious and he still
insists on inspecting corporate books and exercising rights incidental to being a

588
stockholder, then, and only then, shall the case cease to be intra-corporate. Hence,
a complaint of interpleader cannot prosper.

Rule 63, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court tells us when a cause of action
exists to support a complaint in interpleader: Whenever conflicting claims upon
the same subject matter are or may be made against a person, who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is
not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves . . . This provision only requires as an indispensable requisite; that
conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the
plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or
an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.

An interpleader merely demands as a sine qua non element that there be

two or more claimants to the fund or thing in dispute through separate and
different interests. The claims must be adverse before relief can be granted and the
parties sought to be interpleaded must be in a position to make effective claims.
Additionally, the fund thing, or duty over which the parties assert adverse claims
must be one and the same and derived from the same source.

The two defendants in this case are both stockholders on record. They
continue to be stockholders until a decision is rendered on the true ownership of
the 25 shares of stock in Santos’ name. If Santos’ subscription is declared fictitious
and he still insists on inspecting corporate books and exercising rights incidental
to being a stockholder, then, and only then, shall the case cease to be intra-
corporate. Hence, a complaint of interpleader cannot prosper.

589
 RULE 64
Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit

Section 1 - Scope

Oriondo v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 211293, June 4, 2019

FACTS:

The Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) Board of Directors adopted

Resolution No. B-7-87 approving the creation of a foundation for the development
of Corregidor. Corregidor Foundation, Inc. was later on incorporated under
Securities and Exchange Commission.

On August 3, 1993, PTA and Corregidor Foundation, Inc. executed a

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to centralize the island’s planning and
development. The PTA agreed to release to the Corregidor Foundation, Inc. its
operating funds based on a budget for its approval. For its part, the Corregidor
Foundation, Inc. agreed to submit a quarterly report on the receipts and
disbursements of Philippine Tourism Authority funds. It additionally agreed to
deposit all collections of revenues in a distinct and separate account in the name
of the island of Corregidor, with the disposition of the funds at the sole discretion
of the Philippine Tourism Authority.

Another Memorandum of Agreement was subsequently entered into by the

PTA and the Corregidor Foundation, Inc. reiterating the provisions of the August
3, 1993 Agreement but added some stipulations providing that the disbursements
of the PTA's funds by Corregidor Foundation, Inc. shall be subject to the audit of
the Internal Auditor of the PTA and the Commission on Audit.

The Commission on Audit, through its Audit Team noted that personnel of
the PTA who were concurrently rendering services in Corregidor Foundation, Inc.
received honoraria and cash gifts in 2003. The Audit Team was of the opinion that
the grant of honoraria to petitioners was contrary to Department of Budget and
Management Circular No. 2003-5. It likewise ruled that the cash gifts given
constituted double compensation prohibited in Article IX-B, Section 8 of the
Constitution.

The Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate of the Commission on Audit

issued Notice of Disallowance disallowing in audit the honoraria and cash gift

590
paid to petitioners. The Adjudication and Settlement Board of the Commission on
Audit denied the appeal filed. The recourse to the Commission on Audit was
likewise denied and it affirmed the decision of the Adjudication and Settlement
Board. The Motion for Reconsideration was again denied, hence, petitioners filed
before this Court a Petition designated as a "Petition for Review on
Certiorari" under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent Commission on Audit first highlighted that the Petition was

erroneously denominated as a "Petition for Review on Certiorari" under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court. "[T]here is no such thing as a Petition for Review under Rule
64," argued respondent Commission. The error notwithstanding, respondent
Commission contends that the Petition should be treated as one for certiorari,
specifically, to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Commission on Audit in disallowing the grant of honoraria and
cash gifts to petitioners.

ISSUE:

Did the petitioners erroneously refer to their Petition as a "Petition for

Review on Certiorari" under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:

Yes.

A petition for review on certiorari is the remedy provided in Rule 45,

Section 1 of the Rules of Court against an adverse judgment, final order, or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court
or other courts whenever authorized by law.

On the other hand, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court pertains to "Review of

Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and
the Commission on Audit." Section 1 of Rule 64 defines the scope of the Rule, while
section 2 refers to "Mode of Review" and provides that the judgments, final orders,
and resolutions of the Commission on Audit are to be brought on certiorari to this
Court under Rule 65.

A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal and a true

review that involves "digging into the merits and unearthing errors of
judgment." However, despite the repeated use of the word "review" in Rule 64, the
remedy is principally one for certiorari that "deals exclusively with grave abuse of
discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous."

591
 That the remedy against an adverse decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission on Audit is a petition for certiorari, not review or appeal, is based on
Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution, thus:

ARTICLE IX
Constitutional Commissions

A. Common Provisions

SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis Supplied)

We agree with respondent Commission that petitioners erroneously

denominated their Petition as a "Petition for Review on Certiorari." Except for the
designation, however, we find that the Petition was filed under Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court given that the Petition refers to Rule 64 and was filed within 30
days from notice of the Resolution dated December 6, 2013 denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission on Audit. Therefore, we shall
resolve the Petition in the exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction under Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the Constitution.

592
 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. They were posted on
the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "Team Buhay" with a
check mark, or "Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted
against it form "Team Buhay." During oral arguments, respondents conceded that
the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also
conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections,
but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.

On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity

as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials
addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer
ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being
oversized.

COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate

removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense
against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silent on the
remedies available to petitioners.

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of

free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. Respondents filed their comment arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before this court is not
the proper remedy to question the notice and letter of respondents; and (2) the
tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC pursuant
to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence,
respondents claim that the issuances ordering its removal for being oversized are
valid and constitutional. Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the

593
ground that the notice and letter are not final orders, decisions, rulings, or
judgments of the COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its adjudicatory
powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petition should be dismissed for not being under Rule 64.

HELD:

No. Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule
65 is applicable specially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion
resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. As a special civil action, there must also be a
showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law.

Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents
do not operate as precedents to oust this court from taking jurisdiction over this
case. All these cases cited involve election protests or disqualification cases filed
by the losing candidate against the winning candidate.

In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office.
Their petition is filed to assert their fundamental right to expression.

Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC’s

exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to acts of
COMELEC in the implementation of its regulatory powers. When it issued the
notice and letter, the COMELEC was allegedly enforcing election laws.

594
Section 3 - Time to file Petition

Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v. Commission on

Audit
G.R. No. 185444, January 13, 2015

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule XI, Section of the 1997
Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit (COA), which seeks to
annul the decisions of the COA disallowing the payment of retainer fees to
petitioner law firm.

In 2001, the officers of the Clark Development Corporation (CDC), a GOCC,

approached the petitioner law firm for assistance in handling its labor cases. CDC
sought the acquiescence of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) for the engagement of the petitioner. On May 20, 2002, Government
Corporate Counsel Valdez reconsidered the request and approved the
engagement of petitioner and thereafter issued a pro-forma retainership contract.
In the meantime, petitioner commenced rendering legal services to CDC. At this
point, CDC had yet to secure authorization from the OGCC or concurrence of the
COA on the retainership contract. On July 13, 2005, CDC requested COA for its
concurrence on the contract. State Auditor informed CDC that the request cannot
be acted upon unless they obtained OGCC’s final approval of the contract. On
December 22, 2005, OGCC denied the request for final approval but ruled that the
law firm was entitled to payment on the basis of quantum meruit. On November 9,
2006, COA’s General Counsel issued a “Third Indorsement” denying CDC’s
request for clearance for failure to obtain OGCC’s approval and COA’s
concurrence. On December 4, 2006, the law firm appealed the “Third
Indorsement” to the COA. CDC also filed an MR. On September 27, 2007, COA
denied the law firm’s appeal. On November 5, 2008, COA denied the separate
MRs. Thus, petitioner law firm filed the present Petition for Certiorari on
December 19 2008.

ISSUE:

Is the Petition for Certiorari filed on time?

RULING:

NO. The petition was filed out of time.

595
 Rule XI, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA states
that: Any decision, order, or resolution of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof
in the manner provided by law, the Rules of Court, and these Rules. The rule is based on
Article IX-A, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution. Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has a reglementary period of 60 days from
receipt of denial of the motion for reconsideration. The Constitution, however,
specifies that the reglementary period for assailing the decisions, orders, or rulings
of the constitutional commissions is 30 days from receipt of the decision, order,
or ruling. For this reason, a separate rule was enacted in the Rules of Court.

Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the guidelines for filing a
petition for certiorari under this rule. Section of the rule specifies that “a judgment
or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
Certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.” The phrase “except as
herein after provided,” specifies that any petition for certiorari filed under this rule
follows the same requisites as those of Rule 65 except for certain provision found
only in Rule 64. One of which is Section 3 or Rule 64 which states:

The petition shall be filed within thirty days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The
filing of a Motion for reconsideration, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the
period herein fixed. If the motion is denied the aggrieved party may
file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be
less than 5 days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.

In this case, petitioner received the decision of the COA on October 16, 2007.
It filed a motion for reconsideration on November 6, 2007, or after 21 days. It
received the notice of denial of its motion on November 20, 2008. The receipt of
this notice gave petitioner 9 days or until November 29 to file the petition. Since
November 29 fell on a Saturday, petitioner could file it on December 1, the next
working day. It however filed the petition on December 19, 2008, which was well
beyond the reglementary period. This court, however, recognizes that there are
certain exceptions that allow a relaxation of the procedural rules.
In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, the Court restated the reasons which may
provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules,
such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the

596
rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Considering that the issues in this case involve the right of petitioner to
receive due compensation on the one hand and respondents’ duty to prevent the
unauthorized disbursement of public funds on the other, a relaxation of the
technical rules is in order.

597
 Rotoras v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 211999, August 20, 2019

FACTS:

Through various resolutions, the governing boards of 21 state universities

and colleges granted honoraria to board members in amounts ranging from
P3,000.00 to P5,000.00 for attendance in board meetings. COA's Regional Legal and
Adjudication Offices issued audit observation memoranda. These resulted in
Notices of Disallowance for the payments of the honoraria on the ground of lack
of legal basis. The association, through then President Gonzales, wrote the COA
Chair on behalf of the 21 state universities and colleges, assailing the Notices of
Disallowance. The matter was referred to the Commission's Legal and
Adjudication Office-National which denied the appeal. The Legal and
Adjudication Office denied the subsequent motions for reconsideration filed by
the Philippine Association of State Universities and Colleges (PASUC) and 9 state
universities and colleges. Thus, the case was elevated to the COA En Banc.

In its November 3, 2011 Decision, the COA En Banc affirmed the rulings of
the Legal and Adjudication Office. In a February 14, 2014 Resolution, COA En
Banc denied the motions for reconsideration filed by PASUC and Bukidnon State
University, through its President Barroso. Ricardo Rotoras, as the president of
PASUC, filed this Petition for Certiorari. In its Comment, respondent claims that
its November 3, 2011 Decision had already become final and executory after
petitioner had belatedly moved for reconsideration. It points out that petitioner
received a copy of the Decision on December 1, 2011, but only filed a Motion on
February 2, 2012, beyond the 30-day period prescribed in the 2009 Revised Rules
of Procedure of the COA. Without the Motion, the Petition for Certiorari filed
before this Court consequently went beyond the 30-day period in Rule 64, Section
3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In his Reply, while petitioner concedes that he
filed his Motion for Reconsideration out of time, he claims that the November 3,
2011 Decision had not yet become final and executory because Barroso, the
Bukidnon State University president, timely filed his Motion. Since he and Barroso
shared "common defenses and justifications", he argues that he should benefit
from Barroso's timely filing.

ISSUE:

Did COA's November 3, 2011 Decision become final and executory after
Rotoras' failure to file his Motion for Reconsideration on time?

RULING:

598
 Yes. Rule X, Sections 9 and 10 of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of
COA provides: Section 9 - A decision or resolution of the Commission upon any
matter within its jurisdiction shall become final and executory after the lapse of 30
days from notice of the decision or resolution. The filing of a petition for certiorari
shall not stay the execution of the judgment or final order sought to be reviewed,
unless the Supreme Court shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem
just; Section 10 - A motion for reconsideration may be filed within 30 days from
notice of the decision or resolution, on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient
to justify the decision; or that the said decision of the Commission is contrary to
law. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Commission shall
be entertained.

In this case, petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration on February 2,

2012, 31 days after the January 2, 2012 deadline. Clearly, the Decision has become
final and executory against it. That a motion for reconsideration was timely
filed by another party is of no moment.

However, in its February 14, 2014 Resolution, respondent did not mention
that petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time. So, respondent
gave due course to petitioner's Motion notwithstanding the procedural infirmity,
which it should have noticed at the time the Motion was filed. Thus, the issue of
whether the November 3, 2011 Decision is final and executory against petitioner
has been rendered moot.

599
 City of General Santos v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014
FACTS:

The city of General Santos enacted Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009 entitled
“An Ordinance Establishing the GenSan Scheme on Early Retirement for Valued
Employees Security (GenSan SERVES)”. It provided for separation benefits for sickly
employees who have not yet reached retirement age.

In a letter, the city's audit team leader, through its supervising auditor, sent
a query on the legality of the ordinance to respondent Commission on Audit's
Regional Director in Cotabato City. The latter agreed that the grant lacked legal
basis and was contrary to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Act.
The Office of General Counsel then issued a COA-LSS Opinion explaining the
subject ordinance partakes of a supplementary retirement benefit plan which
should be by virtue of a law authorizing the same. Otherwise, said ordinance
becomes a nullity. On appeal, the respondent commission denied the appeal and
affirmed the opinion.

ISSUE:

Did the respondent commission act with grave abuse of discretion when it
considered Ordinance No. 08, Series of 2009, in the nature of an early retirement
program requiring a law for its validity?

RULING:

Yes. The court has consistently held that findings of administrative agencies
are generally respected, unless found to have been tainted with unfairness that
amounted to grave abuse of discretion. In which case, Rule 64, Section 2 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be
brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65,
except as hereinafter provided.”

However, not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion

of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion
is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse
of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to

600
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

The Court agrees with respondent but only insofar as the invalidity of
Section 5 of the ordinance is concerned. Consequently, the Commission on Audit
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared the entire ordinance void
and of no effect.

601
 RULE 65
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

Section 1 - Petition for Certiorari.

De Lima v. Reyes
G.R. No. 209330, 11 January 2016

FACTS:

Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry," was a
veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in Palawan. On 24 January 2011,
at around 10:30 am, he was shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in
San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. After a brief chase with police officers,
Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession
admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Edrad, Aranas, Noel, Jr.

On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the

Counter-Terrorism Division of the NBI where he alleged that it was former
Palawan Governor Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. On February 7,
2011, Secretary Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 091 creating a special
panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. The First
Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued the Resolution
dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega's wife, filed
a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the
mastermind of her husband's murder. The Secretary of Justice issued DO No. 710
creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case and to address the offer of additional evidence denied by the First
Panel. The Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of informations on all accused, including former
Governor Reyes.

ISSUES:

Whether or not acts of the Secretary of Justice regarding resolutions of

prosecutors can be subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Yes.

HELD:

Any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or

602
modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable

cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of
Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to
judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against "any

tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. A quasi-
judicial function is "the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." Otherwise stated, an administrative
agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the
rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment
of a court

Even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-

judicial, or ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial
review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, any
question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying
the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

603
 Cruz v. People
G.R. No. 224974, July 3, 2017

FACTS:

Marvin Cruz (Cruz) was charged with Robbery before the RTC and posted
bail through a cash bond. When private complainant. Upon complainant’s signing
of an Affidavit of Desistance, a Motion to Dismiss was filed and the RTC dismissed
the said case. Subsequently, Cruz and his bondsman filed a Motion to Release
Cash Bond (Motion) but was denied by the RTC on the ground that the dismissal
was due to desistance and not acquittal. Cruz filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA arguing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the Motion. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that Cruz
should have filed an appeal, instead of a petition for certiorari, to question the
denial of the Motion. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Is the dismissal of the Motion to Release Cash Bond by the RTC a violation
of the Rules of Court amounting to grave abuse of discretion which may be the
subject of a petition of Certiorari?

RULING:

Yes, the dismissal is not a mere error of judgement but grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the court which makes a petition for certiorari the proper
remedy. Section 22 of Rule 114 provides that bail shall be deemed automatically
cancelled in three (3) instances: (1) the acquittal of the accused, (2) the dismissal of
the case, or (3) the execution of the judgment of conviction. Upon the RTC’s
dismissal of the motion, it was acting in violation of the Rules of Court and non-
compliance therewith constitutes grave abuse of discretion. When a court or
tribunal renders a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the proper
remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. While
jurisprudence dictates that appeal is an available remedy in cases of denials of
petitions for cancellation of cash bond, a party may still file a petition for certiorari
in instances where the lower court commits grave abuse of discretion in excess of
jurisdiction

In the case at bar, considering that the trial court blatantly disregarded Rule
114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, petitioners' remedy was the filing of a petition
for certiorari with the proper court.

604
 Heirs of Zoleta v. Land Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 205128 August 9, 2017

FACTS:

On 29 September 1996, Eliza Zoleta (Eliza), through Venancio Q. Zoleta,

voluntarily offered for sale to the government, under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, a parcel of land. This lot was located in Barangay Casay, San
Francisco, Quezon and had an area of approximately 136 hectares. Pursuant to
Executive Order No. 405, Landbank made a valuation of the land and determined
that only 125.47 hectares of the property's 136 hectares were covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. It valued the covered portion at
P3,986,639.57. Landbank then deposited this amount in the name of Eliza. Eliza
rejected Landbank's valuation. Thus, the matter was endorsed to the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Quezon II.

Regional Adjudicator Miñas rendered a Decision fixing just compensation

at P8,938,757.72. Not satisfied with the amount, Landbank filed a Petition for Just
Compensation before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Lucena City, acting as
Special Agrarian Court. Eliza then filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment
before the Office of Regional Adjudicator Miñas, which was unsuccessfully
opposed by Landbank.

On 16 January 2001, Regional Adjudicator Miñas granted Eliza's motion for

execution and issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution. The
writ of execution, however, was returned unsatisfied. Thus, Regional Adjudicator
Miñas issued an alias writ of execution. The following day, the DARAB Sheriff
issued a Notice of Garnishment and a Notice of Levy on Personal Property.
Landbank sought from the Special Agrarian Court the quashal of the alias writ of
execution and, in the interim, the issuance of a temporary restraining order against
its implementation. In the Resolution dated 27 March 2001, the Special Agrarian
Court denied Landbank's plea as DARAB had never been impleaded by Landbank
as respondent, thereby failing to vest the Special Agrarian Court with jurisdiction
over DARAB.

Unable to obtain relief from the Special Agrarian Court, Landbank filed
before DARAB a "Petition for Certiorari pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 3, Rule
VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure." DARAB granted Land Bank's
petition for certiorari and "annulled" the 16 January 2001 Order and the 15
February 2001 Alias Writ of Execution.

605
 Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 alleging that DARAB exceeded its authority when it
granted Landbank's Petition for Certiorari under Rule VIII, Section 3 of the 1994
Rules.

In its assailed 23 July 2012 Decision, the Court of Appeals held that
DARAB's actions were sustained by its general "supervisory authority" and
appellate jurisdiction over rulings of RARADs and PARADs. In its assailed 9
January 2013 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Was it proper for respondent DARAB to issue its 12 May 2006 Resolution,
which granted respondent Landbank's "petition for certiorari pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 3, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure."

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, and further held that a
perceived abuse cannot be cured by an abuse. Administrative agencies, such as the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), are not courts of
law exercising judicial power. The power to issue writs of certiorari is an incident
of judicial review. Thus, administrative agencies may not issue writs of certiorari
to annul acts of officers or state organs even when they exercise supervisory
authority over these officers or organs.

This Court sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In doing so, this
Court emphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter must be provided by
law. It noted that there was no law that vested DARAB with jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari. Rather than finding constitutional or statutory basis,
DARAB's supposed certiorari power was provided only by its own rules of
procedure.

Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of

action, must exist as a matter of law. It is settled that the authority to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law. It is never
derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in
some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions,
ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly designated.

606
 It is true that the lack of an express constitutional or statutory grant of
jurisdiction disables DARAB from exercising certiorari powers. Apart from this,
however, is a more fundamental reason for DARAB’s disability.

As an administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial but not consummate

judicial power, DARAB is inherently incapable of issuing writs of certiorari. This is
not merely a matter of statutorily stipulated competence but a question that
hearkens to the separation of government’s tripartite powers: executive,
legislative, and judicial.

Not only are mere procedural rules incapable of supplanting a

constitutional or statutory grant of jurisdiction, no amount of textual wrangling
negates the basic truth that DARAB is an administrative agency belonging to the
Executive, and not to the Judicial branch, of our government.

Determining whether an action was made without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion is a judicial question. In a petition
for certiorari where these issues are raised, the public officers or state organs
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers are impleaded as respondents. They
themselves become party-litigants and it is their own legal rights that are the
subject of adjudication. A consideration of law is impelled to delineate their proper
rights and prerogatives. The controversy that ensues is inexorably beyond the
competence of administrative agencies. When presented with such a controversy,
an administrative agency must recuse and yield to courts of law.

Well-meaning intentions at rectifying a perceived breach of authority

cannot be cured by an actual breach of authority.

DARAB’s exercise of the innately judicial certiorari power is an executive

encroachment into the judiciary. It violates the separation of powers; it is
unconstitutional.

With or without a law enabling it, DARAB has no power to rule on

jurisdictional controversies via petitions for certiorari. DARAB’s self-serving grant
to itself of the power to issue writs of certiorari in the 1994 DARAB New Rules of
Procedure is itself a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It must be annulled for running afoul of the Constitution.

607
 Joson v. Ombudsman
G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435, 9 August 2017

FACTS:

In his Affidavit-Complaint (Complaint) dated 6 August 2008, petitioner

Joson charged private respondents before the Ombudsman with violation of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended. At the time of filing the Complaint, Joson was then Nueva
Ecija's Vice Governor and its Sangguniang Panlalawigan's Presiding Officer, while
Umali was Nueva Ecija's Governor. Agtay, Abesamis, and Pancho served as
Nueva Ecija's Provincial Trade and Industry Officer, OIC-Provincial
Administrator, and Treasurer, respectively. Pallanan was the former Provincial
Administrator of Nueva Ecija.

Joson alleged that on 21 September 2006, a Memorandum of Agreement

was executed by the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija and Ryan Angelo
Sweets and Catering Services (Ryan Angelo Catering), which was owned by
Cleopatra Gervacio (Cleopatra). Under this Agreement, Ryan Angelo Catering's
services for two (2) years “shall include regular serving of meals for breakfast,
lunch, dinner, and snacks at the canteen and the convention center, special meals
and catering services shall be provided as may be required." Joson claimed that
another caterer was hired during Umali's oath-taking ceremony. However, Agtay
asked Ryan Angelo Catering, through Cleopatra, for a receipt of P1,272,000.00
under the name of the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija, Joson claimed that
Agtay made this request to make it appear that Ryan Angelo Catering actually
catered and to justify the withdrawal of P1,344,000.00 from the treasury of Nueva
Ecija's provincial government.

On 4 December 2009, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Francis

Euston R. Acero (Prosecutor Acero) of the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution
dismissing all charges against Umali, Abesamis, Agtay, Pancho, and Pallanan. On
the violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, Prosecutor Acero held that
the evidence was insufficient to prove undue injury on Cleopatra or on the
Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija. On the violation of Article 213 of the
Revised Penal Code, Prosecutor Acero found that there was not enough evidence
to prove that private respondents committed fraud to use public funds for their
personal benefit.

On the violations of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713,
and Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code, Prosecutor Acero held that there was
no sufficient evidence that could establish private respondents' prohibited
material or pecuniary interest in the unnamed caterer. On the allegation of grave

608
misconduct, Prosecutor Acero found that Joson was not able "to demonstrate that
[private] respondents, in the performance of their functions, have engaged in
intentional wrongdoing or have committed a deliberate violation of a rule of law
or standard of behavior."

Joson moved for reconsideration, which was denied for being filed out of
time.

For dismissing the criminal and administrative charges against private

respondents, petitioner maintains that the Office of the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the

charges against private respondents?

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

At the onset, this Court reiterates the policy of noninterference with the
Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause. Probable cause is
defined as “the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief
in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.”
Thus, an allegation of grave abuse of discretion must be substantiated before this
Court can exercise its power of judicial review. As held in Tetangco v. Ombudsman:

It is well-settled that the Court will not ordinarily interfere

with the Ombudsman's determination of whether or not probable
cause exists except when it commits grave abuse of discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in
contemplation of law.

In this case, petitioner Joson failed to show that the Office of the
Ombudsman acted in an "arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner."
The Office of the Ombudsman laboriously discussed each and every charge of

609
petitioner by enumerating the elements of each law and pointing out where
petitioner fell short in evidence.

Upon its finding that there is no sufficient evidence to support the charges
against private respondents, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed them in
conformity with Rule II, Section 2 and Rule III, Section 4 of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the Office of the Ombudsman.

610
 Binay v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 213957-58, August 7, 2019

FACTS:

The COA's Special Task Force of LGUs conducted an audit which focused
on Metro Manila LGUs purchase of supplies, materials, and equipment amounting
to P1million and above. The audit revealed that City of Makati, through General
Services Department Head Aspillaga and former Mayor Binay, entered into a
contract with Apollo Medical Equipment and Supplies. Under the contract, the
City of Makati was to purchase from Apollo hospital beds and bedside cabinets
for the Ospital ng Makati. The audit revealed that the contract was awarded to
Apollo without the benefit of public bidding. Instead, the public officials involved
allegedly relied on Apollo's representation that it was the sole and exclusive
Philippine distributor of UGM-Medysis of New Jersey, USA. Later it was
discovered that the beds were not manufactured by UGM-Medysis, but by a
Taiwanese company. Moreover, the manufacturer's invoice for the transaction
showed that the items' actual total cost was well below the amount paid to Apollo.

Two complaints were filed separately by the COA and one Roberto
Brillante (Brillante) before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Overall
Deputy Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict 15
officials for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for
malversation of public funds through falsification. No probable cause was found
against Mayor Binay. On July 4, 2011, two Information were filed before the
Sandiganbayan based on the Ombudsman Resolution. On August 29, 2013, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a Consolidated Resolution, recommending
the inclusion of Mayor Binay as an accused for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. She also recommended that the Information for malversation through
falsification be withdrawn and an amended information for malversation against
Mayor Binay and the other accused be filed. Then Ombudsman Carpio Morales
approved the Consolidated Resolution. Mayor Binay filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but this was denied in the Office of the Special Prosecutor's June
16, 2014 Resolution. Thus, Mayor Binay comes to this Court through a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of ROC.

ISSUE:

Did the Office of the Ombudsman acted without or in excess its jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
issuing the August 29, 2013 Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner

611
Mayor Elenita S. Binay and the June 16, 2014 Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration?

RULING:

No. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition may be filed. In Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, grave
abuse of discretion was defined as ". . . the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."
Mere "disagreement with the Ombudsman's findings is not enough to constitute
grave abuse of discretion." It is necessary for the petitioner to prove "that the
Ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation in such a way that
amounted to a virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law."

This Court does not find that public respondent Office of the Ombudsman
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it determined the existence of probable
cause against petitioner. The May 9, 2011 Resolution had not yet attained finality
when the Ombudsman received the initial finding. Moreover, settled is the rule
that a sitting Ombudsman has the power to revoke or alter the rulings of a
predecessor within the bounds of law. This Court will not interfere with the Office
of the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause except when it acted with
grave abuse of discretion.

612
 DPWH v. City Advertising Ventures Corp.
G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016

FACTS:

Respondent City Advertising Ventures Corp. entered into a lease

agreement with MERALCO for the use of 5,000 of MERALCO’s lampposts to
display advertising banners. Under this contract, respondent obtained sign
permits from the cities of Quezon, Pasay and Makati. It also likewise obtained
permits for setting up pedestrian overpass banners.

When Typhoon Milenyo hit, several billboards in Metro Manila were blown
by strong winds and fell. In its wake, PGMA issued A.O. No. 160 directing the
DPWH to assess all billboards and determine those that are hazardous and pose
imminent danger and to abate and dismantle the same. A.O. No. 160-A was later
on issued. Said order specified the legal grounds and procedures for the
prohibition and abatement of billboards and signboards constituting public
nuisance or other violations of law.

DPWH proceeded to dismantle billboards. During its operations, it was

able to remove 250 of City Advertising Ventures Corporation's lamppost banners
and frames, 12 pedestrian overpass banners, 17 pedestrian overpass frames, and
36 halogen lamps.

Respondent then filed before the RTC a Complaint against DPWH for
violation of A.O. No. 160, Tort, and Injunction with Prayer for TRO, Preliminary
Injunction, and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 06-899.

RTC granted the TRO and later on issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
It also denied the subsequent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration filed by
DPWH and MMDA. DPWH and MMDA filed a petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition which sought to annul the RTC’s decision. CA denied the Petition and
the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition to set aside the
CA’s decision and that the RTC be prohibited from conducting further
proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-899. It also prays that the RTC be ordered to
dismiss Civil Case No. 06-899.

ISSUE:

Did the RTC gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction?

613
RULING:

NO. After seeking relief from the CA through the remedy of a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioners come to this Court through
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The distinctions between Rule 65
and Rule 45 petitions have long been settled. A Rule 65 petition is an original
action, independent of the action from which the assailed ruling arose. A Rule 45
petition, on the other hand, is a mode of appeal. As such, it is a continuation of the
case subject of the appeal.

As it is a mere continuation, a Rule 45 petition (apart from being limited to

questions of law) cannot go beyond the issues that were subject of the original
action giving rise to it.

Rule 45 petitions engendered by prior Rule 65 petitions for certiorari and/or

prohibition are, therefore, bound by the same basic issue at the crux of the prior
Rule 65 petition, that is, "issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion." When
Rule 45 petitions are brought before this Court, they remain tethered to the "sole
office" of the original action to which they owe their existence: "the correction of
errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."

When petitioners sought relief from the CA, what they sought to remedy
was the RTC’s issuance of interlocutory orders pertaining to a temporary relief
extended to respondent, that is, a writ of preliminary injunction. These orders
were not judgments that completely disposed of Civil Case No. 06-899. They were
not the RTC’s final ruling on Civil Case No. 06-899. By the time petitioners sought
redress from the CA (and even at the time of the filing of their appeal before this
Court), the RTC had not yet even ruled on the merits of Civil Case No. 06-899.

The question before the CA was, therefore, limited to the matter of whether
the RTC’s issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. On appeal from the original action brought before the CA, it
is this same, singular issue that confronts us.

This Court cannot, at this juncture, entertain petitioners' prayer that the
RTC be ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 06-899. Ruling on the complete cessation
of a civil action on grounds other than those permitted by Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure compels an examination of the merits of a case. The case must
then be litigated-through trial, reception of evidence, and examination of
witnesses. This entire process will be frustrated were this Court to rule on Civil

614
Case No. 06-899's dismissal on the basis only of allegations made in reference to
provisional relief extended before trial even started.

In ruling on the propriety of the RTC’s issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction, both the CA and this Court are to be guided by the established standard
on what constitutes grave abuse of discretion:

By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave
abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must
be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.

Petitioners prevented and threatened to prevent respondent from engaging

in its cardinal business activity. Their admitted actions and apparent inactions
show that the well-defined due process mechanisms outlined by A.O. No. 160 and
160-A were not followed. Confronted with acts seemingly tantamount to
deprivation of property without due process of law, the RTC acted well within its
competence when it required petitioners to temporarily desist, pending a more
complete and circumspect estimation of the parties’ rights.

Respondent satisfied the standards for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction. The RTC acted in keeping with these standards and did not gravely
abuse its discretion in extending temporary relief to respondent.

615
 Madarang v. Spouses Morales
G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014

FACTS:

Spouses Bartolome loaned PhP 500,000 from Spouses Morales and

mortgaged their house and lot located at Quezon City to the latter to secure their
obligation. The former died without having paid their loan which prompted
Spouses Morales to file a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
property against petitioner who represented herself as Lita Bartolome and
convinced Spouses Morales to lend them money. The trial court ruled in favor of
the defendants. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s decision which was subsequently denied for being pro forma. Her notice of
appeal was also denied by the trial court for being filed out of time.

Petitioner then filed a petition for relief which the trial court denied. She
assailed such denial via petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which the
latter denied finding that the petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of
the order denying the petition for relief from judgment, a prerequisite for filing a
petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues that a motion for reconsideration need not
be filed because the questions they raised in the petition for relief were pure
questions of law.

ISSUE:

Did the petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration prevent her
from availing the remedy of petition for relief?

RULING:

Yes. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
is available to a party before a petition for certiorari is filed. In Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. v. PIGLAS NFWU-KMU, this court ruled that a motion for
reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law alluded to in said section. A motion for reconsideration is required before
a petition for certiorari is filed to grant the court which rendered the assailed
judgment or order an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case.

616
 In this case, petitioners failed to avail themselves of this remedy. Moreover,
the questions they raised in their petition for relief from judgment were not pure
questions of law. They raise the authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome's signatures
on the deed of real estate mortgage and the allegedly excusable negligence of their
counsel. These are questions of fact which put at issue the truth of the facts alleged
in the petition for relief from judgment. Petitioners cannot cite Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals where this court held that "the
filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing of the remedy of certiorari
is not sine qua non when the issues raised is one purely of law.” Thus, the Court
of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari.

617
 The Diocese Of Bacolod vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. NO. 205728, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. They were posted on
the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "Team Buhay" with a
check mark, or "Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted
against it form "Team Buhay." During oral arguments, respondents conceded that
the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also
conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections,
but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.

On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity

as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials
addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer
ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being
oversized.

COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate

removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense
against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silent on the
remedies available to petitioners.

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of

free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. Respondents filed their comment arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before this court is not
the proper remedy to question the notice and letter of respondents; and (2) the
tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC pursuant
to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence,
respondents claim that the issuances ordering its removal for being oversized are
valid and constitutional. Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave

618
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the notice
dated February 22,2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 ordering the removal of
the tarpaulin. It is their position that these infringe on their fundamental right to
freedom of expression and violate the principle of separation of church and state
and, thus, are unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:

No. We are not confronted here with the question of whether the
COMELEC, in its exercise of jurisdiction, gravely abused it. We are confronted
with the question as to whether the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with its
acts threatening imminent criminal action effectively abridging meaningful
political speech.

It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of

COMELEC’s notice and letter on free speech. This does not fall under Article IX-
C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The use of the word "affecting" in this provision
cannot be interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to decide
any and all questions that arise during elections. COMELEC’s constitutional
competencies during elections should not operate to divest this court of its own
jurisdiction. The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII,
Section 5(1) of the Constitution. This provision provides for this court’s original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. This should be read
alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution. Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by
COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of the notice
and letter coming from COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.

During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave
abuse of discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC.
Furthermore, it is this court’s constitutional mandate to protect the people against
government’s infringement of their fundamental rights. This constitutional
mandate outweighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC. It will, thus, be
manifest injustice if the court does not take jurisdiction over this case.

619
 GSIS Family Bank Employees Union v. Villanueva
G.R. No. 210773, January 23, 2019

FACTS:

On June 6, 2011, President Aquino signed into law Republic Act No. 10149,
or the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. The law created the Governance
Commission for Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations (Governance
Commission).

On January 15, 2013, GSIS Family Bank met with representatives of the
Governance Commission, which clarified that GSIS Family Bank was classified as
a government financial institution under Republic Act No. 10149. Emmanuel
Benitez (Benitez), GSIS Family Bank’s President, wrote the Governance
Commission to seek further clarification on several issues, namely: (1) GSIS Family
Bank's impending collective bargaining negotiations with its employees; (2) its
authority to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the GSIS Union; and
(3) its employees' right to strike. The Governance Commission replied that as a
government financial institution, GSIS Family Bank was unauthorized to enter
into a collective bargaining agreement with its employees based on the principle
that the compensation and position classification system is provided for by law
and not subject to private bargaining. The Governance Commission further
clarified that the right to strike of GSIS Family Bank's employees was not
guaranteed by the Constitution, as they were government officers and employees.

On December 20, 2013, counsel for the GSIS Union sent GSIS Family Bank
a demand letter for the payment of Christmas bonus to its members, as stipulated
in their Collective Bargaining Agreement. GSIS Union accused GSIS Family Bank
of evading its contractual obligation to its employees.

On January 30, 2014, petitioner GSIS Union filed before this Court a Petition
for Certiorari, asserting that GSIS Family Bank is a private bank; thus, it is not
covered by the provisions of Republic Act No. 10149. Petitioner contends that GSIS
Family Bank does not perform functions for public needs since it was created by
private individuals in their own private capacities pursuant to the provisions of
the Corporation Code. Petitioner argues that despite the Government Service
Insurance System owning the majority of GSIS Family Bank's shares of stock, the
bank did not automatically fall within the ambit of Republic Act No.
10149. Further, the law's enactment did not automatically convert it into a
government-owned or controlled corporation or a government financial
institution. Finally, petitioner stresses that as a private corporation established
under the Corporation Code, GSIS Family Bank and its employees are covered by

620
the applicable provisions of the Labor Code, not the Civil Service Law. Thus, the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and GSIS Family Bank
cannot be impaired by Republic Act No. 10149.

Respondents Benitez and Atty. Geraldine Marie Berberabe-Martinez (Atty.

Berberabe-Martinez) filed their Comment, pointing out that the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus was fatally defective since respondents do
not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Further, they maintain that the
Collective Bargaining Agreement provided remedies for the enforcement of rights,
of which petitioner supposedly did not avail. Thus, there was a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy available to it, without need to directly resort to this Court with
a Rule 65 petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari is the correct remedy

RULING:

No. Judicial power is the court's authority to settle justiciable controversies

or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts
of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. This Court's judicial
power is anchored on Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

Judicial power includes the power to enforce rights conferred by law and
determine grave abuse of discretion by any government branch or instrumentality.
Jurisprudence has consistently referred to these two as the court's traditional and
expanded powers of judicial review.

Traditional judicial power is the court's authority to review and settle actual
controversies or conflicting rights between dueling parties and enforce legally
demandable rights. On the other hand, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
deliberately expanded this Court's power of judicial review to prevent courts from
seeking refuge behind the political question doctrine and turning a blind eye to
abuses committed by the other branches of government. This Court's expanded
power of judicial review requires a prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion by any government branch or instrumentality. This broad grant of
power contrasts with the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, which is limited to
the review of judicial and quasi-judicial acts. Nonetheless, this Court, by its own
power to relax its rules, allowed Rule 65 to be used for petitions invoking the
courts' expanded jurisdiction.

621
 The Governance Commission possesses neither judicial nor quasi judicial
powers; thus, it cannot review or settle actual controversies or conflicting rights
between dueling parties and enforce legally demandable rights. It is not a tribunal
or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that may properly be the
subject of a petition for certiorari.

Petitioner refers to the Governance Commission's letters to substantiate its

claim that the Governance Commission forbade respondents Benitez and Atty.
Berberabe-Martinez from negotiating the economic terms of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement. However, a careful review of the letters convinces this
Court that they were merely advisory opinions, rendered in response to the
queries of respondents Atty. Berberabe-Martinez and Benitez.

Further, petitioner failed to prove that it had no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law aside from its present Petition. The
Governance Commission is an attached agency of the Office of the President;
hence, petitioner could have elevated the advisories to the Office of the President
to question the Governance Commission's legal opinion.

622
 Jovita S. Manalo vs. Ateneo De Naga University, Tabora and Bernal
G.R. No. 185058, November 9, 2015

FACTS:

Manalo was a regular and permanent full-time faculty member of the

Accountancy Department of Ateneo de Naga University's College of Commerce.
Manalo was also a part-time Manager of the Ateneo de Naga Multi-Purpose
Cooperative. Manalo came into conflict with Bernal, Dean of Ateneo de Naga
University's College of Commerce, which resulted to Bernal writing to Fr. Tabora,
Ateneo de Naga University President, a recommendation to terminate Manalo’s
employment on the grounds of serious business malpractice, palpable dishonesty,
and questionable integrity.

Acting on the charges against Manalo, Fr. Tabora constituted a Grievance

Committee. The Grievance Committee later found Manalo guilty and
recommended her dismissal. Fr. Tabora instead opted to transfer Manalo to teach
Economics in the Department of Social Sciences of Ateneo de Naga University's
College of Arts and Science.

Alleging that her transfer constituted constructive dismissal, Manalo filed

a Complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Quiñones rendered a Decision
finding that Manalo was constructively dismissed and ordered that Manalo be
reinstated to her former position in the Accountancy Department, that the
increases in salaries and benefits effected during the pendency of the case be
applied to Manalo, and that Ateneo de Naga University pay her attorney's fees.

Manalo and Respondents appealed before the NLRC. Labor Arbiter

Quiñones' Decision was affirmed in toto by the NLRC. Respondents then filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the rulings of Labor Arbiter Quiñones and of the
NLRC and ordered Manalo's Complaint dismissed. Manalo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied also by the CA.

Aggrieved, Manalo filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

insisting that the findings of the LA and NLRC are conclusive and binding on the
Court of Appeals and that alternative findings could not have been the basis for
reversing their rulings.

ISSUE:

Are the factual findings of the LA and NLRC binding against the CA?

623
RULING:

NO. As clarified in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations

Commission, judicial review of decisions of the NLRC is permitted through a
petition for certiorari (i.e., special civil action for certiorari) under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, rather than through an appeal, and are filed before the Court of
Appeals (following, of course, the National Labor Relations Commission's denial
of the appropriate Motion for Reconsideration). This is consistent with the
principle of hierarchy of courts. It is only from an adverse ruling of the Court of
Appeals that a party may come to the Supreme court, which shall then be by way
of a petition for review on certiorari (i.e., appeal by certiorari) under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

It is a clear error for petitioner to insist that the figurative hands of the Court
of Appeals were tied just because the findings of the Labor Arbiter and of the
National Labor Relations coincided with each other. Precisely because it was
confronted with a Rule 65 Petition, it was the Court of Appeals' business to
determine whether there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Had it found that there was none, the proper course of action
would have been to dismiss respondents' Rule 65 Petition and to sustain the
rulings of Labor Arbiter Quiñones and of the National Labor Relations
Commission. In the intervening period, however, when the Court of Appeals was
going about its task of arriving at a resolution, petitioner should not fault the Court
of Appeals both for examining the records and evidence at its disposal and for
embarking on its own analysis of whether Labor Arbiter Quiñones and the
National Labor Relations Commission properly performed their duties and were
circumspect in concluding that petitioner was constructively dismissed. A
judicious resolution of the controversy confronting it called for nothing less.

624
 David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016

FACTS:

Private respondent Grace Poe was a certified as a foundling by the Civil

Registrar after she was found abandoned in a church in Iloilo in 1968. She was later
adopted by spouses Fernando Poe and Susan Roces, a fact which was noted by the
Civil Registrar in Poe’s certificate. When she matured as a woman, her physical
attributes are described as having brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge,
straight black hair and an oval-shaped face. She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall.
She married Llamanzares and lived in the US. She was naturalized and granted
American citizenship on October 2001 and was subsequently issued a US passport.
She decided to return to the Philippines in 2005 and took the Oath of Allegiance to
Republic of the Philippines on July 2006. She then filed a petition for retention
and/or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship through RA 9225 with the Bureau
of Immigration (BI), which was granted on July 2006. She was later appointed as
MTRCB Chairman by former Pres. Aquino III in October 2010. Prior to assumption
in said office, Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the US
and Renunciation of American Citizenship and filed it with the BI. She also
executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality in the presence of
Vice Consul Briers on July 2011 and was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality
by Vice Consul Galian on December 2011. She later ran for Senate in the 2013
Elections, where she won and was proclaimed by the COMELEC.

Petitioner Rizalito David, a losing a senatorial candidate, then filed a

Petition for Quo Warranto before the SET, contesting Poe’s qualification alleging
that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen contrary to the requirement under
Art. VI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. The BI and NSO were subpoenaed to
present the documents relevant to Poe’s application for re-acquisition of
citizenship, travel records, and birth certificate. On the other hand, Poe manifested
that her DNA tests failed to provide results which would shed light to the real
identity of her biological parents.

Based on the documents presented by the BI and NSO, the SET ruled to
dismiss the petition and found that Poe is a natural-born Filipino, thus is qualified
to hold office as Senator. Aggrieved by the SET decision, David filed a petition for
certiorari before the SC arguing that SET erred in ruling that Poe is a natural-born
citizen despite having no proof of her biological Filipino parentage. Accordingly,
Sec. 1(2), Art. IV of the 1987 Constitution identifies as citizens those whose fathers
or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. Since it is settled that Poe is a foundling,

625
the burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon her and failure to discharge this
burden necessarily leads to the conclusion that she is not a natural-born Filipino.

ISSUE:

1) Does the SC have the power to review the decisions of SET, which is a
separate constitutional organ?
2) Was there grave abuse of discretion committed by SET when it ruled that
Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen so as to warrant judicial review by certiorari?

RULING:

1) Yes, the SC has the power to review the decisions of SET despite being a
separate constitutional organ.

Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. On the other hand, Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the same provides that
judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. In Libanan v. HRET, the Supreme Court referred to this power of
judicial review in exceptional cases as extraordinary jurisdiction, upon
determination that the Tribunal’s decision or resolution was rendered without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.

Through Sec. 17, Art. VI, the Constitution segregates the electoral tribunals
from all other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. Exclusive, original jurisdiction
over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the elective
officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral
tribunals. It is only before them that post-election challenges against the election,
returns, and qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well of the
President and the Vice President, in the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal)
may be initiated. However, the judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the
scope of any review. Article VI, Section 17’s stipulation of electoral tribunals’ being
the “sole” judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII, Section 1’s express
statement that “judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral

626
Tribunals not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The review is limited to a
determination of whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error in
judgment.

Thus, the SC has the power to review the decisions of SET despite being a
separate constitutional organ.

2) No, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by SET when it ruled
that Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen so as to warrant judicial review by
certiorari.

Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.

A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the

Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent
civil action. The viability of such a petition is premised on an allegation of “grave
abuse of discretion.” The term “grave abuse of discretion” has been generally held
to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Particularly, there is grave abuse of discretion
when a constitutional organ such as the SET or the COMELEC, makes manifestly
gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which
have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which
were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.

In this case, there is no basis for concluding that the SET acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The SET’s conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and
exhaustive reading of the Constitution. Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto
initiated by David, the SET was confronted with a novel legal question: the
citizenship status of children whose biological parents are unknown, considering
that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one’s
father or mother. Acting within this void, the SET was only asked to make a
reasonable interpretation of the law while considering the established personal
circumstances of Poe. It did not insist on burdening Poe with conclusively proving,

627
within the course of the few short months, the one thing that she has never been
in a position to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously
appreciated the implications of all other facts known about her finding. Therefore,
it arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof required
in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof
beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence, but “substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”

Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by SET when it

ruled that Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen so as to warrant judicial review by
certiorari.

628
 Pemberton v. De Lima
G.R. No. 217508. April 18, 2016

FACTS:

A complaint for murder was filed by the PNP-Olongapo and private

respondent Marilou Laude (Laude) against Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton).
Pemberton received a subpoena, giving him 10 days from receipt within which to
file his counter-affidavit but he failed to file within the same period. The City
Prosecutor continued to evaluate the evidence and conducted ocular inspections
in connection with the preliminary investigation. It found probable cause and
ssubsequently filed an Information for murder before the RTC of Olongapo. The
RTC issued a warrant of arrest.

Pemberton filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice

(DOJ) which was denied. Pemberton filed a Petition for Certiorari with application
for issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction with the Supreme
Court, arguing that De Lima as Secretary of Justice (SOJ), committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the ground that he was
denied due process of law as he had no opportunity to address and rebut the
additional evidence presented. The OSG argues that Pemberton is assailing the
judgment of the SOJ which are errors of judgment cannot be remedied by certiorari
and that Pemberton violated the hierarchy of courts by filing his petition with the
SC instead of the Court of Appeals (CA).

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner violated the hierarchy of courts in directly filing

their petition before the Supreme Court

RULING:

Yes, the petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It is not clear
why any action by the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent original jurisdiction
in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, cannot be considered as sufficient for
review of petitioner’s case. Furthermore, the possibility of the conclusion of the
trial of the case against petitioner is not a reason that is special and important
enough to successfully invoke this Courts original jurisdiction. Once there has
been a judicial finding of probable cause, an executive determination of probable
cause is irrelevant.

629
 A direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. The exceptional cases where direct resort to the
Supreme Court is allowed are:

1. When there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed

at the most immediate time;
2. When the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
3. Cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court;
4. The constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court;
5. Time element;
6. The filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
7. When petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
8. The petition includes questions that are “dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the
appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.”

630
 Maricel S. Nonay V. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 206758, February 17, 2016

FACTS:

Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., (Bahia Shipping), for and on behalf of Fred
Olsen Cruise Lines, Ltd., hired Maricel S. Nonay (Nonay) in 2008 as Casino
Attendant/Senior Casino Attendant. Around the middle of February 2010, Nonay
"experienced profuse and consistent bleeding[,] extreme dizziness and . . .
difficulty in breathing." She went to the ship's clinic and was given medication.
Despite this, her headache continued and even worsened. She was later advised
by the ship's physician to rest. However, her condition did not improve. Nonay
was medically repatriated. Bahia Shipping referred her to the company-
designated physician at the Metropolitan Medical Center in Manila. The
obstetrician-gynecologist diagnosed Nonay with "Abnormal Uterine Bleeding
Secondary to a[n] Adenomyosis with Adenomyoma." Nonay was not declared fit
to work by the end of the 120-day period from March 20, 2010, the date of her
repatriation, but she was declared "fit to resume sea duties"within the 240-day
period.

Nonay filed a Complaint "for payment of disability benefit, medical

expenses, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees." She sought to claim
permanent disability benefits based on the collective bargaining agreement she
signed. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Maricel S. Nonay. Bahia Shipping
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's Decision.Bahia Shipping moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was
denied.

Bahia Shipping filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court Appeals
arguing that the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that "[Nonay's] illness is work-related despite substantial
evidence to the contrary[.]” While the Petition for Certiorari was pending before
the Court of Appeals, Bahia Shipping paid Nonay the amount of P3,780,040.00
pursuant to the final and executory Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission.

The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari. It found that
Nonay failed to provide substantial evidence to prove her allegation that her
illness is work-related. Also, it noted their prayer "that Private Respondent be
ordered to return to Petitioners the judgment award less the Php 50,000.00
humanitarian award

631
ISSUE:

Whether the satisfaction of the judgment award rendered the Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals moot and academic

RULING:

No. Payment of the judgment award in labor cases does not always render
a petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals, or a petition for review
on certiorari filed before this court, moot and academic. In Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc., et al. v. Canja, This court held that:

In cases where a petition for certiorari is filed after the expiration of the 10-
day period under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure but within the 60-day period
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA can grant the petition and modify,
nullify and reverse a decision or resolution of the NLRC.

Thus, a petition for certiorari assailing a decision of the National Labor

Relations Commission is allowed even after the National Labor Relations
Commission's Decision has become final and executory, provided that the petition
is filed before the expiration of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65.

The reason for this rule was discussed in Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et al. v.
Villamater and/or The Heirs of the Late Catalino U. Villamater, et al.,:

A petition for certiorari does not normally include an inquiry into the
correctness of its evaluation of the evidence. Errors of judgment, as distinguished
from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil action for
certiorari, which is merely confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. It is, thus, incumbent upon petitioners to satisfactorily establish that the
NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically in order that the extraordinary writ of
certiorari will lie. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must
be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.

The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the
NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion
by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material
to or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot make this determination without
looking into the evidence of the parties. Necessarily, the appellate court can only
evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged to have

632
been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation
to all other evidence on record. Notably, if the CA grants the petition and nullifies
the decision or resolution of the NLRC on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the decision or resolution of the NLRC
is, in contemplation of law, null and void ab initio; hence, the decision or
resolution never became final and executory.

633
 Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. v. Department of Education
G.R. No. 188720. February 23, 2016.

FACTS:

On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, through Former Secretary

Jesli A. Lapus, issued Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 entitled Revised
Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School Level.
The Department Order sought to address the limitations of the guidelines set forth
in D.O. No. 23, S. 2003 and was issued in response to increasing reports of
malpractices by officers or members of PTAs.

Petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation filed the present Petition in the
belief that the above quoted provisions undermine the independence of PTAs and
PTCAs, effectively amend the constitutions and bylaws of existing PTAs and
PTCAs. Apart from these, the Department of Education assails the filing of this
Petition as being violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner argues
that the present petition justifies Petition justifies direct recourse to this court
“considering the pervasive effect of the assailed Department Order to all the
different PTCAs or PTAs across the country.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petition was filed in violation of the principle of hierarchy

of courts

RULING:

The Supreme Court sustained the position of the Department of Education.

On this score alone, the Petition should be dismissed.

Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 was validly issued by the Secretary
of Education pursuant to his statutorily vested rule-making power and pursuant
to the purposes for which the organization of parent-teacher associations is
mandated by statute. Likewise, there was no fatal procedural lapse in the adoption
of Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009.

It is true that petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure fall under the original jurisdiction of this court.
However, this is also true of regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals. This
Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and

634
compelling circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of a writ
of certiorari.

The petitioner’s arguments fail to impress. That the effects of the

Department Order extend throughout the country is a concern that can be
addressed by recourse to the Court of Appeals. Its territorial jurisdiction, much
like this court’s, also extends throughout the country. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals is well-equipped to render reliable, reasonable, and well-grounded
judgments in cases averring grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Recourse to the Court of Appeals is not a futile exercise that results
to nothing more than the clogging of court dockets.

635
 Celso F. Pascual, Sr. v. Caniogan Credit and Development Cooperative
G.R. No. 172980, July 22, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioners Pascual and Terencio were appointed as CCDC’s General

Manager and Collection Manager until they reach the compulsory age of
retirement. However, when their retirement came, Pascual and Terencio
continued to serve their positions. The Board of Directors of CCDC passed a
resolution terminating Pascual's and Terencio's services but they still refused to
vacate their positions.

CCDC then filed a Complaint for Injunction with prayer for issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan. Pascual and Terencio filed a Motion to Dismiss but the RTC
issued an Order denying the same for lack of merit. Pascual and Terencio
challenged the Order before the CA through a Petition for Certiorari. The Petition
was dismissed by the CA which held that it was premature because petitioners
did not file a motion for reconsideration of the impugned RTC Order.

ISSUE:

Was the CA correct in dismissing outright the Petition on the ground of

prematurity?

RULING:

Yes. The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable

before resort to the special civil action for certiorari is made. This is to afford the
court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. An omission to comply
with this procedural requirement justifies a denial of the writ of certiorari applied
for.

We find no exceptional circumstance to justify petitioners' omission to file

a motion for reconsideration. Their allegation that the trial court was unable to
resolve their many motions for a long time is belied by the facts on record.
Furthermore, contrary to petitioners' allegations, we find no "extreme necessity
and urgency" to excuse their direct resort to a certiorari before the CA. Hence, the
CA correctly dismissed petitioners' Rule 65 Petition.

636
 Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III
G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019

FACTS:

The Social Security Commission issued Resolution No. 262-s. 2013, which
provided an increase in: (1) the Social Security System members' contribution rate
from 10.4% to 11%; and (2) the maximum monthly salary credit from P15,000.00 to
P16,000.00. The President of the Philippines approved the increase. The Social
Security Commission likewise issued Resolution No. 711-s. 2013, which approved,
among others, the increase in contribution rate and maximum monthly salary
credit.

Subsequently, the Social Security System, through President and Chief

Executive Officer Emilio S. De Quiros, Jr., issued Circular No. 2013-010, which
provided the revised schedule of contributions that would be in effect in January
2014. Per the circular, the employer and the employee shall equally shoulder the
0.6% increase in contributions. Thus, the employer would pay a contribution rate
of 7.37% (from 7.07%); the employee, 3.63% (from 3.33%).

Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
questioning the validity of the assailed issuances.

ISSUE:

Should the Court grant the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65?

RULING:

No. Petitioners' argument is bereft of merit.

Going into the validity of respondents' actions, petitioners must show that
the assailed issuances were made without any reference to any law, or that
respondents knowingly issued resolutions in excess of the authority granted to
them under the Social Security Act to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion denotes a "capricious, arbitrary[,] and whimsical

exercise of power. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, as not to act at all in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."

637
 Any act of a government branch, agency, or instrumentality that violates a
statute or a treaty is grave abuse of discretion. However, grave abuse of discretion
pertains to acts of discretion exercised in areas outside an agency's granted
authority and, thus, abusing the power granted to it. Moreover, it is the agency's
exercise of its power that is examined and adjudged, not whether its application
of the law is correct.

Section 18 allows the Social Security Commission to fix the contribution rate
subject to several conditions. In relation to Section 18, Section 4(a) prescribes the
powers and duties of the Social Security Commission. It provides:

SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS. — (a) The
Commission. — For the attainment of its main objectives as set forth
in Section 2 hereof, the Commission shall have the following powers
and duties:
(1) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines, such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act;
....
(7) To approve, confirm, pass upon or review any and all actions of
the SSS in the proper and necessary exercise of its powers and duties
hereinafter enumerated.

Here, respondents were only complying with their duties under the Social
Security Act when they issued the assailed issuances. There is no showing that
respondents went beyond the powers under the law that amounts to lack of or in
excess of their jurisdiction.

Petitioners' claims are unsubstantiated and, as such, merit no finding of

grave abuse of discretion. In arguing that the increase in contributions is unduly
oppressive upon the labor sector, petitioners are again asking this Court to inquire
into the wisdom of the policy behind the issuances made by the executive branch.
This, as earlier said, we cannot and will not do.

638
 Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019

FACTS:

Ronald Geralino M. Lim (Ronald) filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor a Complaint for grave threats against his brother Edwin M. Lim
(Edwin).

On August 12, 2013, the case was set for pre-trial. However, because of
Ronald's and his counsel's absence, pre-trial was reset to September 5, 2013. After
Edwin's counsel had fled a Motion for time to submit a counter-affidavit, pre-trial
was again reset to October 17, 2013.

On October 17, 2013, the defense counsel moved that the hearing be set at
10:00 a.m. However, because the private prosecutor was unavailable and the
prosecution needed time to submit their judicial affidavits, pre-trial was reset to
November 21, 2013 at 8:30 a.m.

At the pre-trial on November 21, 2013, the prosecution, among others, moved
that they be allowed to submit the Judicial Affidavits of Ronald and their witnesses
later that day. It explained that it had completed the Judicial Affidavits earlier, but
"for whatever reason," was not able to submit them. Despite the defense counsel's
insistent opposition, the MTC in Cities granted the Motion and gave the
prosecution until 5:00 p.m. that day to submit the judicial affidavits.

Aggrieved, Edwin moved for reconsideration. He argued that the

prosecution was deemed to have waived its right to submit its Judicial Affidavits
when it failed to submit them at least five (5) days before pre-trial. The MTC in
Cities denied Edwin's Motion.

Edwin filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. He contended that the MTC in Cities committed grave
abuse of discretion when it allowed the belated filing of the Judicial Affidavits.

In its Comment, the prosecution contended, among others, that they

contended that a resort to a petition for certiorari was improper since the remedy
of appeal was still available to them.

The RTC ruled that the MTC in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion
when it allowed the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits. Hence,
petitioners filed before the Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, contending,

639
among others, that that the filing of a Petition for Certiorari was improper since
the remedy of appeal was available to respondent.

ISSUE:

Is the Petition for Certiorari proper remedy to question the November 21,
2013 Order of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities?

RULING:

Yes. Settled is the rule that "the remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.” When the remedy of appeal
is available to a litigant, a petition for certiorari shall not be entertained and should
be dismissed for being an improper remedy. Furthermore, under the Rules of
Court, an appeal is a remedy directed against a "judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable." It cannot be availed of against an interlocutory
order.

As ruled in Cruz v. People:

The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have been
committed by lower courts and tribunals. it is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts
and tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. In our judicial system, the writ is
issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals from committing grave abuse of discretion in
excess of their jurisdiction. Further, the writ requires that there is no appeal or other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy available to correct the error. Thus, certiorari may not be
issued if the error can be the subject of an ordinary appeal. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

An essential requisite for filing a petition for certiorari is the allegation that the
judicial tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as a "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." (Citations omitted)

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion in

blatantly disregarding the clear wording of A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, or the Judicial
Affidavit Rule… If the belated submission of judicial affidavits has a valid reason,
the court may allow the delay once as long as it "would not unduly prejudice the
opposing party…” The prosecution’s excuse —"for whatever reason" — cannot be
considered sufficient to allow the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits.

640
 Batac v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 216949. July 3, 2019

FACTS:

Eduardo T. Batac (Batac) filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon a Complaint against Mayor Tumang, Barangay Captain Yabut, and
Martin. He averred that in May 2005, he was informed that his property in
Barangay San Antonio, Mexico, Pampanga was being quarried without his
consent, under the instructions of Mayor Tumang, and using Mayor Tumang's
dump trucks. He wrote Mayor Tumang when he found out that his property was
being quarried without his permission and requested that it be stopped. He also
tried to contact Barangay Captain Yabut through text, but the latter did not reply.

In reply to Batac's letter, Mayor Tumang provided Batac a copy of an

Affidavit executed by Martin, claiming to be a tenant of the quarried property,
asking the local government to quarry it since the lahar deposits on it had been
preventing him from cultivating the land. Martin added that he did not inform
Batac about this request because the land was being processed for land
distribution.

Batac replied that Martin had never been a tenant of his land. Batac sent
several letters to Mayor Tumang, asking for a meeting, but he did not receive any
replies. Batac then sent a demand letter through his lawyer. He claimed that Mayor
Tumang and his co- perpetrators committed the crime of theft and violated
Republic Act No. 3019 and Republic Act No. 6713.

The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause against Mayor Tumang,
Barangay Captain Yabut, and Martin for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019. However, the charges of theft and violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
Section 3 (a) were dismissed. It also found Mayor Tumang and Barangay Captain
Yabut guilty of misconduct and violation of Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 6713.
Mayor Tumang, Barangay Captain Yabut, and Martin filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Resolution, as did Batac.

In its undated Joint Review Order, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed
all charges against Mayor Tumang, Barangay Captain Yabut, and Martin. Then
Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales (Ombudsman Carpio Morales) approved
the Joint Review Order. The Office of the Ombudsman denied Batac's Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, Batac filed a Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:

641
 Is the Petition for Certiorari proper in the case at bar?

RULING:

No. Special civil actions for certiorari do not correct alleged errors of fact or
law that do not constitute grave abuse of discretion. This Court only reviews the
Office of the Ombudsman's determination of whether probable cause exists upon
a clear showing of its abuse of discretion, or when it exercised it in an "arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical[,] or despotic manner."

In Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman, 51 this Court explained the

various policy reasons behind this deference:

“… The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is,
therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand
needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to
the sound judgment of the Ombudsman”

Practicality also leads this Court to exercise restraint in interfering with the
Office of the Ombudsman's fnding of probable cause. Republic v. Ombudsman
Desierto explains:

“[T]he functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions

assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion
on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private [complainant]. (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted) “

Absent the existence of grave abuse of discretion, this Court generally shall
not disturb public respondent Office of the Ombudsman's determination as to
whether probable cause exists in this case.

642
 Esteva v. Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Manning, Inc.
G.R. No. 225899, July 10, 2019

FACTS:

Esteva was hired as a seafarer for nine (9) months by Wilhelmsen Smith Bell
Manning, Inc. (Smith Bell Manning), on behalf of its principal, Wilhelmsen Ship
Management. While he was onboard the vessel, Esteva began to suffer severe back
pains. While the vessel was at Richards Bay, South Africa, Esteva was diagnosed
and declared to have a temporary total disability and unfit for work; and
recommended to undergo immediate repatriation. Wilhelmsen Ship Management
also wrote a letter requesting that Esteva be examined by the company-designated
physician in the Philippines. Esteva returned to the Philippinese and went to the
Metropolitan Medical Center for medical examinations. His x-ray results revealed
that he had osteodegenerative changes in his lumbar spine.
On April 3, 2013, the company-designated physician, Dr. Mylene Cruz-
Balbon (Dr. Cruz-Balbon), issued a Medical Certificate indicating that Esteva was
given medications for Pott's disease. She prescribed that Esteva take at least one
(1) year of treatment. In the Medical Certificate, Esteva's suggested disability
grading was Grade 8, with 2/3 loss of lifting power. On July 19, 2013, Dr. Cruz-
Balbon issued another Medical Certificate confirming the finding of both Pott's
disease and disc protrusion L2-L5.
On September 13, 2013, Esteva consulted another doctor, Dr. Maricar P.
Reyes-Paguia, who issued a Medical Certificate indicating that Esteva was
suffering from several disorders.

In his Complaint, Esteva also stated that on September 17, 2013, he

consulted another doctor, Dr. Alan Leonardo R. Raymundo (Dr. Raymundo), an
orthopedic surgeon. The physician issued a Medical Report, which states to
Esteva that his condition will no longer allow him to return to his previous
occupation as an able- bodied seaman. Thus, Esteva filed a Complaint for total
permanent disability benefits.

Labor Arbiter Romelita N. Rioflorido granted Esteva's claims for disability

compensation, sickness allowance, and attorney's fees. She gave weight to the
findings of Esteva's own doctors that his disability was total and permanent over
that of the company-designated physician. Hence, Smith Bell Manning filed before
the National Labor Relations Commission a Petition for Certiorari.

The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the Labor Arbiter's

findings. Smith Bell Manning filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was

643
denied in the National Labor Relations Commission. Thus, Smith Bell Manning
filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari.

The Court of Appeals annulled the judgments of the Labor Arbiter and the
National Labor Relations Commission. It found that Esteva did not follow the
procedure prescribed in the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Instead of
referring the matter to a third doctor agreed by both parties, he immediately filed
a Complaint for permanent disability benefits. Failing to observe this procedure,
the Court of Appeals gave more credence to the certification issued by the
company-designated physician. Thereafter, Esteva filed before this Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals err in making its own factual determination in the
special civil action for certiorari?

RULING:

No. In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample
authority to conduct its own factual determination when it finds that there was
grave abuse of discretion. In Plastimer Industrial Corporation v. Gopo:

In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to make its
own factual determination. Thus, the Court of Appeals can grant a petition for certiorari
when it finds that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by disregarding evidence
material to the controversy. To make this finding, the Court of Appeals necessarily has to
look at the evidence and make its own factual determination. In the same manner, this
Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual issues when there are conflicting
findings by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted)

Here, despite the factual and evidentiary issues involved, the Court of
Appeals correctly made its own factual determination in resolving respondents'
Petition for Certiorari. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Court of Appeals can
have a factual finding, even if it is contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter and
the National Labor Relations Commission.

644
 BDO Unibank, Inc. v. Choa
G.R. No. 237553, July 10, 2019

FACTS:

Antonio Choa, the accused, being then the President and General Manager
of Camden Industries, Inc., executed several Trust Receipt Agreements in favor of
Equitable PCI Bank (now Banco De Oro- EPCI, Inc. or BDO for Brevity), in
consideration of the receipt by the said accused of the sum of Php7,875,904.96
under the terms of which the accused agreed to sell the same with express
obligation and remit the to the complainant bank and/or turn over the same if not
sold or disposed of, but the accused once in possession of the said good,
misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit the said goods
and/or the proceeds of the sale thereof.

Later, on October 13, 2014, Choa filed a Motion for Leave to file Demurrer to
Evidence, attached to which was his Demurrer to Evidence. Thereafter, the
prosecution filed its Opposition, among others, that it be denied for lack of basis,
maintaining that Choa's civil liabilities could not have been offset by the judgment
award granted to Camden in Civil Case No. 70098, was later on reversed and set
aside by the Court of Appeals, because Choa's civil liabilities stemmed from his
criminal violations of the Trust Receipts Law, thus, compensation is improper.

On November 26, 2014, the trial court issued an Order granting Choa's
Demurrer to Evidence. Based on the records and the witnesses' testimonies, it
found that the prosecution failed to establish Choa's guilt. The prosecution filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Thus, BDO filed before
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, assailing the trial court's orders. The
Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

BDO moved for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion. Hence, BDO filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Does petitioner, BDO Unibank, Inc., have the legal personality to file a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals against the trial court?

RULING:

645
 Yes. Only with regard to its civil aspect. The State has the "inherent
prerogative in prosecuting criminal cases and in seeing to it that justice is served."
Subsumed under this right is the authority to appeal an accused's acquittal.

In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, it was categorically stated that if the criminal case

is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal
aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State.
The capability of the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal
is limited only to the civil aspect of the case…

Worthy of note is the case of People v. Santiago, wherein the Court had the
occasion to bring this issue to rest. The Court elucidated:

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil
liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of
a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is
an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the
State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People
of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such
appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite
the acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that
the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are
the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest
in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision
or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant
should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in name of said complainant.

Here, although petitioner discussed respondent's criminal liability in its

Petition for Certiorari, the totality of its arguments concerns the civil aspect of the
case. Thus, petitioner has the legal personality to file a special civil action
questioning the Regional Trial Court Orders insofar as the civil aspect of the case
is concerned.

646
 Republic vs. Bayao
G.R. No. 179492; June 5, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Department of Agriculture-Regional Field Unit XII (DA-RFU XII)

is a government office mandated to implement the laws, policies, plans, programs,
rules and regulations of the Department of Agriculture (DA) in its regional area,
while respondents are officials and employees of DA-RFU XII.

Due to E.O. No. 304, which provides that all departments, bureaus, and
offices of the national government in SOCCSKARGEN shall transfer their regional
seat of operations to Koronadal City, the DA Undersecretary issued a
Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the administrative, finance and
operations base of RFU XII from Cotobato City to Koronadal City. Private
respondents opposed the implementation of said Memorandum citing reasons
such as the huge costs the physical transfer will entail and the plight of employees
who have already settled and established their homes in Cotobato City. Despite
the clamor of private respondents, the order to transfer the regional office from
Cotobato City to Korondal City remained.

This prompted respondents to file a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer

for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order with the RTC. The trial court granted respondents’ Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Petitioner went to the CA via Rule 65. The CA dismissed
the Petition for Certiorari for failure of petitioner to resort to a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed trial court order. Hence, the present Petition under
Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Is the failure to resort to a Motion for Reconsideration prior to the filing of

a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 fatal in the present case?

RULING:

No. The settled rule is that a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition sine
qua non for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an
opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it
by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule
admits well-defined exceptions: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where
the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari

647
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter
of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack
of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
where public interest is involved.

The second exception is present in this case. The issues in the Petition with
the Court of Appeals have already been raised by petitioner on several occasions
through its pleadings with the trial court. In any case, this Court disregards the
presence of procedural flaws when there is necessity to address the issues because
of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public
service and the serious implications the case may cause on the effective
administration of the executive department.

648
 City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority
G.R. Nos. 184203 & 187583 November 26, 2014

FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of Lapu-
Lapu and the Province of Bataan separately filed against the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA).

In a 1998, PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief against petitioner City
of Lapu-Lapu in order to determine its tax-exempt status under the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995. During the pendency of the case, petitioner Province
of Bataan also demanded from PEZA the payment of realty taxes. In response,
PEZA requested the Province to suspend the assessment and collection until its
petition for declaratory relief against the City of Lapu-Lapu be resolved. The
petitioner Province did not agree. Due to PEZA’s default in the payment of the tax,
petitioner sent a notice of delinquency and soon after a notice of sale against the
properties of PEZA. In response, PEZA filed an injunction case against petitioner
Province.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Province. Thereafter, PEZA filed before the
CA a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 arguing that the Provincial Treasurer of
Bataan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the notice of delinquency
and notice of sale because it is exempt from payment of real property taxes. In
defense, petitioner Province moved for the dismissal of the action for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner contended that PEZA sought a reversal of the RTC decision
in a local tax case, hence, CTA has jurisdiction over the action. CA took cognizance
of the case and decided in favor or PEZA.

ISSUE:

Should the Petition for Certiorai under Rule 65 be treated as Petition for
Review?

RULING:
Yes, petition may be considered as an appeal. Appeal is the remedy to
obtain a reversal or modification of a judgment on the merits. On the other hand,
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent and original action filed to
set aside proceedings conducted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under the Rules, a
petition for certiorari may only be filed if there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

649
 In this case, the petition for injunction filed before the RTC of Pasay was a
local tax case originally decided by the trial court in its original jurisdiction. Since
the PEZA assailed a judgment, not an interlocutory order, of the RTC, the PEZA’s
proper remedy was an appeal. Notwithstanding, the Court in the liberal spirit
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, has treated
petitions for certiorari as an appeal: (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within
the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2)
when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to
justify the relaxation of the rules.

Here, the exceptions apply. First, the petition for certiorari was filed within
the 15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal. Second, the petition for
certiorari raised errors of judgment. The PEZA argued that the trial court erred in
ruling that it is not exempt from payment of real property taxes given Section 21
of Presidential Decree No. 66 and Sections 11 and 51 of the Special Economic Zone
Act of 1995. Third, there is sufficient reason to relax the rules given the importance
of the substantive issue presented in this case. Thus, it may be treated as a Petition
for Review.

650
 Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular
G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018

FACTS:

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
February 26, 2009 Order and Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Ramon D.
Pamular (Judge Pamular) of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija
in Civil Case No. 2618-G. The assailed Order granted the prosecution's Motion to
Amend the Original Information for murder filed against Carlito Samonte
(Samonte) to include Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpus (Corpus) as his co-accused in
the crime charged. Furthermore, it directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against Corpus.
Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte at Corpuz Street,
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecjia on June 4, 2008, causing his death. Samonte was caught in
flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an
Information for murder. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but
pleaded self-defense. Trial on the merits ensued. The wife of the deceased, Mrs.
Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa (Priscilla), filed a complaint-affidavit captioned as
Reply-Affidavit15 dated September 8, 2008 after the prosecution presented its
second witness. She also filed an unsworn but signed Reply to the Affidavit of
Witnesses before First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge Floro
F. Florendo (Florendo). Other affidavits of witnesses were also filed before the
prosecutor's office
Based on one of the affidavits executed by Alexander Lozano (Lozano) on
June 30, 2008, Corpuz was the one who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. In its
October 7, 2008 Resolution, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Priscilla's
complaint and the attached affidavits of witnesses.

Priscilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was opposed by

Corpus. Florendo reconsidered and set aside the October 7, 2008 Resolution. He
also instructed Assistant Public Prosecutor Edwin S. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) to
conduct the review. Bonifacio was not able to comply with the directive to
personally submit his resolution by January 22, 2009, prompting Florendo to order
him to surrender the records of the case as the latter was taking over the resolution
of the case based on the evidence presented by the parties. This order was released
on January 23, 2009 and was received by Bonifacio on the same date.

In his January 26, 2009 Resolution, Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus
for Angelita's murder. He directed the filing of an amended information before the
Regional Trial Court.Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued

651
a Review Resolution dated January 26, 2009, where he reinstated the Regional Trial
Court October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder
complaint against Corpus.The dispositive portion of his Resolution provided:

Meanwhile, Florendo filed an undated Motion to Amend Information,

praying for the admission of the amended information. Corpus and Samonte
opposed this Motion by filing a Joint Urgent Manifestation/Opposition dated
February 2, 2009. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Samonte and
Corpus opposed this through a Vehement Opposition and Omnibus Motion dated
February 4, 2009. They averred that Judge Pamular's action was premature
considering that the Motion to Amend Information has yet to be scheduled for
hearing. Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned. Samonte and Corpus also
claimed that the issuance of a warrant of arrest should be suspended because the
latter intended to appeal through a Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice.

Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review dated February 9,
2009 before the Department of Justice. They also filed a Manifestation and Motion
dated February 9, 2009 with the Regional Trial Court, asking it to desist from
acting further on the Amended Information in view of the Petition for Review filed
with the Department of Justice.

However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular of Branch 33, Regional

Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija issued the assailed February 26, 2009 Order,
which granted the motion to amend the information and to admit the attached
amended information. The assailed Order also directed, among others, the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.

Hence, a direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 with a prayer for an immediate issuance of a temporary restraining
order, was filed by Corpus and Samonte on March 3, 2009. This Petition seeks to
enjoin Judge Pamular from enforcing the February 26, 2009 Order and the warrant
of arrest issued pursuant to the Order, and from conducting further proceedings
in the murder case.

Through its March 9, 2009 Resolution, this Court required respondents to

comment on the Petition. It also granted petitioners' prayer for a temporary
restraining order. Judge Pamular, Florendo, Priscilla, and all other persons acting
on the assailed Regional Trial Court February 26, 2009 Order were enjoined from
implementing it and the warrant of arrest issued pursuant to it.

Priscilla filed her comment on April 3, 2009. She insists that the Regional
Trial Court is correct in granting the motion to admit the amended information

652
because it has no effect on Samonte's case. She claims that the alleged lack of
determination of probable cause before the issuance of a warrant has no basis since
petitioners failed to present evidence or facts that would prove their claim.

Judge Pamular filed his Comment on April 8, 2009. He asserts that he made
a careful perusal of the case records in issuing the assailed order. His independent
judgment on the existence of probable cause was derived from his reading and
evaluation of pertinent documents and evidence. He states that he had set the case
for hearing on February 13, 2009, when both parties were heard and given the
opportunity to argue.

On July 22, 2009, Priscilla filed a Manifestation before this Court. She asserts
that this "present petition questioning the alleged impropriety of the admission of
the amended information as well as the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Mayor Amado Corpu[s], Jr. has no more legal legs to stand on." She claims that
Florendo's January 26, 2009 Resolution was upheld by the Department of Justice.

Priscilla asserts further that the issue regarding the suspension of

proceedings pending resolution by the Department of Justice can now be
considered moot and academic.

Petitioners filed their reply on August 7, 2009.They claim that respondent

judge should have suspended action on the issuance of a warrant considering the
pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.

Petitioners also cite the dispositive portion of Tolentino v. Bonifacio which

directed the respondent judge in that case to desist from proceeding with the trial
until after the Department of Justice would have finally resolved a pending
petition for review.

Petitioners claim that due to the theory of conspiracy in the amended

information, Samonte will have an additional burden of setting up a new defense
particularly on any acts of his co-accused since "the act of one is the act of
all."Petitioners also claim that respondent judge failed to comply with the mandate
of making a prior determination of probable cause before issuing the warrant.
They insist that this mandate "is never excused nor dispensed with by the
respondent [judge]'s self-serving narration of the law (not the required facts)
stated in [his] assailed order."

On the issue of whether the arraignment of Corpus may proceed despite

the lapse of the 60-day maximum period of suspension under Rule 116, Section
11(c), petitioners aver that "[w]hat jurisprudence underscores is not the lapse of
the 60-day period, but the issue of finality of the decision on appeal."The matter
should not only cover the suspension of arraignment but for respondent judge to

653
defer from further proceedings on the amended information pending the final
resolution of the Department of Justice.

ISSUE:

Can the petition under rule 65 proceed without filing a motion for
reconsideration?

HELD:

No. Respondent Priscilla claims that petitioners should have first filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court before resorting to this
Petition. Failure to do so renders it dismissible.

This issue was not addressed by petitioners in their reply or memorandum.

However, petitioners justified their direct recourse before this Court insisting that
their case is anchored on pure questions of law and impressed with public interest.
Thus, they claim that regardless of the rule on hierarchy of courts, their filing of a
petition is not a matter of choice but even mandatory.

Rule 65, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require. (Emphasis supplied)

The plain and adequate remedy pertained to by the rules is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order or decision. Certiorari, therefore, "is not a
shield from the adverse consequences of an omission to file the required motion
for reconsideration."

It is settled that a motion for reconsideration is a "condition sine qua non for
the filing of a Petition for Certiorari." This enables the court to correct "any actual
or perceived error" through a "re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case." To dispense with this condition, there must be a
"concrete, compelling, and valid reason."

654
 Nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court. Apart from bare conclusion,
petitioners failed to present any plausible reason why they failed to file a motion
for reconsideration before filing a petition before this Court. While this issue was
raised by respondent Priscilla in her Comment, this was not sufficiently addressed
by petitioners either in their Reply or Memorandum.

It must be stressed that the filing of a motion for reconsideration, as well as

filing it on time, is not a mere procedural technicality. These are "jurisdictional and
mandatory requirements which must be strictly complied with." Therefore,
petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial
Court before filing this Petition is fatal.

655
Section 2 - Petition for Prohibition

Dynamic Builders & Construction Co., Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr.

G.R. No. 174202, April 7 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner joined the bid for the construction of an infrastructure known as

“Construction Shoreline Protection Project”. Its bid proposal was found to be not
substantially responsive, so it filed a request for reconsideration. Such was denied
as the post-evaluation examination results showed its failure in its Financial
Contracting Capability. Petitioner then filed a formal protest with Mayor
Presbitero, who reiterated that it had a negative Financial Contracting Capability.
Their motion for reconsideration being denied, petitioner filed with the RTC a
petition for certiorari, and with the SC a petition for prohibition with application
for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Mayor Presbitero’s
decision. Public respondents counter, among others, that petitioner availed of an
improper remedy.

ISSUE:

Is prohibition the proper remedy?

RULING:

No, prohibition is not the proper remedy. Prohibition is defined as an

extraordinary remedy available to compel any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person exercising judicial or ministerial functions, to desist from further
proceeding in an action or matter when the proceedings in such tribunal,
corporation, board or person are without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion will prosper as a ground for
prohibition when it is shown that there was capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or that the tribunal, corporation, board
or person has exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.

Further, Rule 65 requires that there be no other plain, speedy, adequate

remedy available, but Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8975 provides for such a
remedy when it gave an exception to the general rule prohibiting lower courts

656
from issuing provisional injunctive relief against national government projects: if
the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless
the temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury
will arise. Lower courts are not prohibited from enjoining administrative acts
when questions of law exist and the acts do not involve administrative discretion
in technical cases.

Prohibition is a preventive remedy and will not lie for acts already
accomplished. In this case, the project had already commenced and had been
ongoing at the time petitioner filed this case. Moreover, public respondent had
jurisdiction to rule on the protest since it was then head of the procuring entity.
Considering that petitioner alleges that this matter is of extreme urgency, it should
have prayed for injunctive relief before the trial court where its petition for
certiorari was pending.

657
Section 3 - Petition for Mandamus

Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid

G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019

FACTS:

This resolves a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure filed by petitioner Roderick D. Sumatra (Sumatra), also known as
Ha Datu Tawahig, praying that respondent Judge Estela Alma Singco (Judge
Singco) and her co-respondents, all public prosecutors from Cebu City, be
compelled to honor a January 3, 2007 Resolution issued by a body known as the
"Dadantulan Tribal Court," and be required to put an end to Sumatra's criminal
prosecution. The Dadantulan Tribal Court absolved Sumatra, a tribal leader of the
Higaonon Tribe, of liability for charges of rape and discharged him from criminal,
civil, and administrative liability.

On November 14, 2006, Lorriane Fe P. Igot (Igot) filed a Complaint-

Affidavit before the Cebu City Prosecutor charging Sumatra with rape. In her
Resolution, Prosecutor I Lineth Lapinid found probable cause to charge Sumatra
with rape and recommended filing a corresponding information. Judge Singco
directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Sumatra, but he would not be
arrested until July 2, 2013.

Following his arrest, Sumatra filed a Motion to Quash and Supplemental

Motion to Quash. These motions cited as bases Sections 15 and 65 of the Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Act, and were predicated on the ground that the Regional Trial
Court had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, asserting that the present
controversy is purely a dispute involving indigenous cultural communities over
which customary laws must apply in accordance with their tribal justice system
and under the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples.
Judge Singco denied the Motion to Quash and Supplemental Motion to Quash.
Sumatra filed this Petition for Mandamus on November 11, 2015. He notes that
Igot had already brought her accusations against him before the concerned
Council of Elders and that the Dadantulan Tribal Court was subsequently formed.
He adds that on January 3, 2007, the Dadantulan Tribal Court issued a Resolution
clearing him and declaring that he "should be spared from criminal, civil, and
administrative liability."

Relying on the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and "other related laws
concerning cases involving indigenous peoples," petitioner maintains that a writ
of mandamus must be issued to compel respondents to "uphold and respect" the

658
Dadantulan Tribal Court Resolution, and "thereby release Sumatra from jail to
stop his continued arbitrary detention."

ISSUE:

Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondents Judge Estela
Alma Singco, City Prosecutor II Fernando Gubalane, City Prosecutor I Lineth
Lapinid, City Prosecutor Nicolas Sellon, and Assistant City Prosecutor Ernesto
Narido, Jr. to desist from proceeding with the rape case against petitioner Roderick
D. Sumatra?

RULING:

No.

For a writ of mandamus to be issued in such a situation, there must be a

concurrence between: (1) a clear, duly established legal right pertaining to
petitioner; and (2) a correlative, ministerial duty imposed by law upon respondent,
which that respondent unlawfully neglects. Additionally, a writ of mandamus, as
with certiorari and prohibition, shall be issued only upon a showing that "there is
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not compel courts of law to desist
from taking cognizance of criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It
expresses no correlative rights and duties in support of petitioner's cause. Thus, a
writ of mandamus cannot be issued. Moreover, one who commits a crime commits
an offense against all the citizens of the state penalizing a given act or omission: a
criminal offense is an outrage to the very sovereignty of the State. The capacity to
prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of the State's police power. It inheres
in "the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common will of the members
of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the
individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of
the exercise of his rights."

The basic precepts underlying crimes and criminal actions make it

improper for the State to yield "disputes" involving criminal offenses to
indigenous peoples' customary laws and practices. To yield criminal prosecution
would be to disregard the State and the Filipino people as the objects of criminal
offenses. The application of customary laws may enable a measure of reparation
for private injuries engendered by criminal offenses, but it will never enable the
consummate recompense owed to the State and the Filipino people. Ultimately
then, yielding prosecution would mean sanctioning a miscarriage of justice.

659
 Viewed through the lens of the requisites for issuing a writ of mandamus,
there is no right or duty to even speak of here. Nowhere in the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act does it state that courts of law are to abandon jurisdiction over criminal
proceedings in favor of mechanisms applying customary laws.
Petitioner derives no right from the Dadantulan Tribal Court to be spared from
criminal liability.

660
 Lihaylihay v. Tan
G.R. No. 192223, July 23, 2018

FACTS:

Danilo A. Lihaylihay (Lihayhay) identified himself as a "Confidential

Informant of the State (CIS) pursuant to R.A. No. 2338 (An Act to Provide for Reward
to Informers of Violations of the Internal Revenue and Customs Laws) duly accredited
and registered as such with the BIR and PCGG. Lihaylihay particularly recalled
sending 2 letters to Atty. Pitargue (former head of the BIR-Presidential
Commission on Good Government Task Force), concerning information on former
President Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.

Almost 20 years later, Lihaylihay demanded to then CIR-Commissioner

Buñag, the payment of 25% informer's reward on the P118,270,243,259.00
supposedly recovered by the Philippine government through compromise
agreements with the Marcoses. He also insisted on the need for the government to
collect Fortune Tobacco Corporation's tax deficiencies amounting to
P97,039,862,933.40, to recover P47,500,000,000,000.00 of Marcos' deposits in
Switzerland, and to deliver to him the informer's rewards corresponding to the
recovery of these. Lihaylihay also wrote to both Secretary Teves and Treasurer
Tan, insisting on his entitlement to an informer's reward.

Without waiting for Secretary Teves' and Treasurer Tan's official actions on
his letters, Lihaylihay filed a petition dubbed a Petition for "Mandamus and
Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of Garnishment." Insisting on his entitlement to
informer's rewards, he prays that Treasurer Tan and Secretary Teves be ordered
to deliver to him the amount of P11,875,000,000,000.00; that the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources be ordered to transfer to him several
government lands; and that the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas be
ordered to garnish in his favor P50,000,000,000.00 worth of jewelry recovered from
former First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos.

ISSUE:

Is Danilo A. Lihaylihay entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel

respondents then Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan, then Secretary of
Finance Margarito B. Teves, the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, and the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to
deliver to him proceeds and properties representing 25% informer's reward
pursuant to Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338?

661
RULING:

No.

One of the situations when a writ of mandamus may issue is when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station. This first situation demands a concurrence between a
clear legal right accruing to petitioner and a correlative duty incumbent upon
respondents to perform an act, this duty being imposed upon them by law. The
legal right must have already been clearly established and cannot be a prospective
entitlement that is yet to be settled. Respondents must also be shown to have
actually neglected to perform the act mandated by law. Also, the duty subject of
mandamus must be ministerial rather than discretionary. Lastly, there must be no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Applying
the requisites, the petition for mandamus must fail.

First, the determination of the entitlement to an informer’s reward is not

ministerial but a discretionary matter which requires a review of evidentiary
matters and an application of statutory principles and administrative guidelines.

Specifically, it demands an exercise of independent judgment on the part of

certain public officers. To note, R.A. No. 2338 is no longer in effect. The grant of an
informer's reward for the discovery of tax offenses is currently governed by Sec.
282 of the NIRC of 1977 and subject to the guidelines of Revenue Regulations No.
016-10. Tracing upon all laws that govern the reward of an informer, it is clear that
the grant of an informer's reward is not a readily demandable entitlement. The
mere consideration of a claim is contingent on several factual findings which
demands proof, the appraisal of which is to be done by certain public officers.
Hence, it demands the exercise of discretion. Accordingly, an information given
by an informer shall merit a reward only when it satisfies certain formal and
qualitative parameters. As a matter of form and procedure, that information must
be voluntarily given, definite, and sworn to. Qualitatively, that information must
be novel and, subsequently, prove itself effective. Therefore, the grant of an
informer's reward depends on the consideration of evidence.

Also, petitioner, too, has not shown that he has a clear legal right to an
informer's reward. Indeed, the very claims that petitioner lodged before former
Internal Revenue Commissioner Buñag and former Secretary Teves could have led
to a determination of his entitlement to an informer's reward. However, he
undercut this process himself by not having the composure to await Secretary
Teves' final official action and by proceeding directly with the present Petition

662
before this Court instead. The impetus for mandamus cannot be a mere
conjectured entitlement which has yet to be settled by the body or officer
authorized to ascertain its propriety. It is not proper for petitioner to plead before
this Court the actual merits of his claims. The very nature of his action forbids it.
"Mandamus will not issue to establish a right, but only to enforce one that is
already established”.

A writ of mandamus is equally unavailing because there is evidently

another "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." This,
of course, is the processing of his claims by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
the Department of Finance, and their final resolution by the Secretary of Finance.
The availability of a more basic recourse ahead of a Petition for Mandamus before
this Court similarly demonstrates that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. Apart from his non-compliance with the specific requirements of Rule
65, Section 3, petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies represents a
distinct ground for dismissing the present Petition as it effectively lacks a cause of
action. The need for petitioner to have previously exhausted administrative
remedies is congruous with the Bureau of Internal Revenue's and the Finance
Secretary's preeminent competence to consider the merits of his claims.

This Court's competence to issue writs of mandamus does not also mean
that petitioner was free to come to this Court and ignore the concurrent jurisdiction
of inferior courts equally competent to entertain petitions for mandamus. It is basic
that "[a]lthough th[is] Court, [the] Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

663
 Buena, Jr. v. Benito
G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014
FACTS:

Respondent Dr. Sangcad D. Benito (Dr. Benito) filed a petition for

mandamus against petitioner Regional Director Anacleto B. Buena, Jr. (Regional
Director Buena) to compel the latter to attest to his permanent appointment as
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent. Respondent claimed that the position
of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent does not belong to the Career
Executive Service, hence, it was petitioner's ministerial duty to attest to his
appointment. In defense, petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition on two
grounds. First, petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy since respondent
does not possess the career executive service eligibility required for Career
Executive Service. Second, respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing a petition for mandamus. Respondent should first appeal the refusal
of attestation to the Civil Service Commission proper.

RTC took cognizance of the petition and ruled in favor of respondent. On

appeal, CA directed the parties to file their respective memoranda. Petitioner filed
a manifestation, requesting representation by the Office of the Solicitor General
and an additional 30 days to file a memorandum. However, the 30th day to file the
memorandum lapsed without the Regional Office filing the required
memorandum. Consequently, CA declared the Regional Office's appeal
abandoned and dismissed.

ISSUE:

Is mandamus the proper remedy?

RULING:

Yes, a petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the petitioner
to attest to the appointment of respondent. Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled.

For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or
duty. In the context of attestation of appointments in the civil service, this court

664
has ruled that the Civil Service Commission's attestation is a ministerial duty once
it finds the appointee eligible for the position. As the held in Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, the Commission "is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of
determining whether or not the person appointed meets all the required
conditions laid down by the law. In this case, respondent Dr. Benito availed
himself of the correct remedy. Given his claim that he possesses the required civil
service eligibility for the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, he
correctly filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Civil Service Commission to
approve his appointment.

True, for mandamus to lie, there should be no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies requires that a party exhaust all administrative remedies
to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter and to
prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. However, one of the
exceptions is when the issue involved is purely a legal question.

In this case, the facts are undisputed. Respondent Dr. Benito is not career executive
service eligible. The question is whether the position for which he was appointed
requires career executive service eligibility. This is a purely legal question which
is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Hence, respondent Dr. Benito did not err in filing a petition for mandamus with
the trial court

665
 Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 222731. March 8, 2016.

FACTS:

Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines Movement (Bagumbayan-

VNP, Inc.) and Former Senator Richard J. Gordon (Gordon) filed this Petition for
mandamus before the Supreme Court to compel respondent Commission on
Elections to implement the Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) security
feature.

Republic Act (RA) No. 8436 authorized the COMELEC to use an automated
election system. It was amended by RA No. 9369. Petitioners allege that under RA
8436 as amended, one of the safeguards or Minimum System Capabilities to ensure
that sanctity of the ballot is the implementation of the VVPAT security feature
Petitioners claim that VVPAT “consists of physical paper records of voter ballots
as voters have cast them on

an electronic voting system.” Through it, the voter can verify if the choices
on the paper record match the choices that he or she actually made in the ballot.
The voter can confirm whether the machine had actually read the ballot correctly.
This will ensure transparency and reduce any attempt to alter the results of the
elections. The COMELEC’s reasons for refusing to issue proper receipts are: first,
the politicians can use the receipts in vote buying; and second, it may increase the
voting time to five to seven hours in election precincts. Thus, the present petition
for mandamus was filed by herein petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC may be compelled, through a writ of

mandamus, to enable the Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail system capability
feature for the 2016 Elections

RULING:

Yes, mandamus lies.

Mandamus is the relief sought “[w]hen any tribunal corporation, board,

officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,” and “there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
Through a writ of mandamus, the courts “compel the performance of a clear legal

666
duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent” by
operation of his or her office, trust, or station.

Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the COMELEC

to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.” One of the laws that the COMELEC must implement is RA No. 8436, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the automated election system
to have the capability of providing a voter-verified paper audit trail.

The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of RA.

8436, as amended, are mandatory. The law is clear. A “voter-verified paper audit
trail” requires the following: (a) individual voters can verify whether the machines
have been able to count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum
should be paper based. There appears to be no room for further interpretation of
a “voter-verified paper audit trail.” The paper audit trail cannot be considered the
physical ballot, because there may be instances where the machine may translate
the ballot differently, or the voter inadvertently spoils his or her ballot.

667
 Acosta vs. Ochoa
G.R. No’s. 211559, 211567, 212570, and 215634, October 15, 2019

FACTS:

These are consolidated Petitions assailing the constitutionality of certain

provisions of RA 10591 or the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition
Regulation Act, and their corresponding provisions in the 2013 Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) for allegedly violating petitioner’s right to bear arms,
right to property and right to privacy.

The PNP, by virtue of RA 10591 and its IRR, centralized all firearms
licensing applications and renewals at its headquarters at Camp Crame, QC. The
pro forma application form for firearms registration contained a paragraph on the
“Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection” stating that the applicant
undertakes to renew the registration of his firearms on or before the expiration of
the same and that the applicant gives his consent and authorizes the PNP to
inspect the firearm at his residence and to confiscate or forfeit the same in favor of
the government for failure to renew the registration.

Licensed firearm owners Acosta and Dela Paz filed before the SC a Petition
for Prohibition assailing that engineers should form part of the professionals
enumerated under Section 7.3 of the IRR, which provides for those who are not
required to submit threat assessment certificates because they are considered to be
in imminent danger due to the nature of their profession. They also assailed
Section 7.9 of the IRR which provides that members of law enforcement agencies
must apply for a PTCFOR-LEA, in order to be authorized to carry the
corresponding government-issued firearm outside of residence.

Peaceful Responsible Owners of Guns, Inc. (PROGUN), a registered non

stock, nonprofit corporation that aims to represent the interests of legitimate and
licensed gun owners in the Philippines, filed its own Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus, assailing the centralization of all firearms licensing,
renewal, and testing at Camp Crame, QC, to the detriment of those who would be
coming from places far from Metro Manila; the requirement to waive their right to
privacy, and allow the police to enter their dwellings in violation of Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution on the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, among others.

Guns and Ammo Dealers Association of the Philippines (Gun and Ammo),
allegedly an umbrella organization of about 50 members who are authorized
firearms dealers in the Philippines files its Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari

668
on the grounds that the PNP’s refusal or failure to establish regional and provincial
offices where individual applicants may obtain the requirements for firearm
licenses allegedly deprive its members of the profits from their firearm businesses,
as they have no licensed costumers to sell their firearms to and that the
centralization of firearms licensing in Camp Crame, QC harms individual
applicants from the provinces and in violation of their right to due process.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioners have a legal standing to file a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
and Mandamus?

RULING:

Yes. Petitioners, Acosta, Dela Paz, and PROGUN have a legal standing to
file the present suit.

Legal standing is the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question. It ensures that the party bringing the case has a personal and substantial
interest in its outcome such that he or she has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. What is essentials is direct injury, as this guarantees
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy which, in turn, assures that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issue upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Associations may likewise sue on behalf of their members, as they are but
a medium through which their individual members seek to make more effective
the expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. However, if they
are to do so, associations must sufficiently establish who their members are, that
their members authorized the associations to sue on their behalf, and that the
members would be directly injured by the challenged governmental acts. In these
cases, there must be an actual controversy, with a clear and convincing
demonstration of special reasons why the truly injured parties may not be able to
sue or that the representation of the association is more efficient for the petitioners
to bring. In addition, there must be a showing of the transcendent nature of the
right involved. Only constitutional rights shared by many and requiring a
grounded level of urgency can be transcendent.

Petitioners Acosta and Dela Paz assail the omission of engineers from
Section 7.3 of the IRR, yet, they never alleged that they are engineers, the person
supposedly injured. Neither did they allege that they were members of any law
enforcement agency allegedly injured by Section 7.9 of the IRR. However, as

669
individual firearms license holders, they are the one who stand to suffer direct
injury should the inspection of their houses be required for firearm registration.

As for PROGUN, it is sufficiently clothed with legal standing to bring on

behalf of its individual members a suit to question a possible violation of their
constitutional right to unreasonable searches.

The same cannot be said for Guns and Ammo because they failed to show
any hindrance to their members to protect their own business interest

670
 IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS.
ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND
REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY.
UDK-15143, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of

mandamus in order to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and
fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress. Mijares alleges that he
is "a Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayer." He filed this petition as part of his
"continuing crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution" because he believes
in the rule of law. He is concerned about the threats against the judiciary after this
court promulgated Priority Development Assistance Fund case on November 19,
2013 and Disbursement Acceleration Program case on July 1, 2014. In the first
week of July 2014, Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Fariñas filed House Bill
No. 4690, which would require this court to remit its Judiciary Development Fund
collections to the national treasury. A week later, or on July 14, 2014, Iloilo
Representative Niel Tupas, Jr., filed House Bill No. 4738 entitled "The Act Creating
the Judicial Support Fund (JSF) under the National Treasury, repealing for the
purpose Presidential Decree No. 1949."

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this
court to grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus.

HELD:

No. The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the
Constitution, is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the
requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The
requisites are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated,
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

671
 Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement that there
must be an actual case or controversy. This Court cannot render an advisory
opinion. We assume that the Constitution binds all other constitutional
departments, instrumentalities, and organs. We are aware that in the exercise of
their various powers, they do interpret the text of the Constitution in the light of
contemporary needs that they should address. A policy that reduces this Court to
an adviser for official acts by the other departments that have not yet been done
would unnecessarily tax our resources. It is inconsistent with our role as final
arbiter and adjudicator and weakens the entire system of the Rule of Law. Our
power of judicial review is a duty to make a final and binding construction of law.
This power should generally be reserved when the departments have exhausted
any and all acts that would remedy any perceived violation of right. The rationale
that defines the extent of our doctrines laying down exceptions to our rules on
justiciability are clear: Not only should the pleadings show a convincing violation
of a right, but the impact should be shown to be so grave, imminent, and
irreparable that any delayed exercise of judicial review or deference would
undermine fundamental principles that should be enjoyed by the party
complaining or the constituents that they legitimately represent. Petitioner’s
allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the proposed bills
abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court, however, must act only
within its powers granted under the Constitution. This court is not empowered to
review proposed bills because a bill is not a law. A proposed bill produces no legal
effects until it is passed into law. Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated
to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality
of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or
issues that are not ripe for judicial determination. The petition, therefore, does not
present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this court’s determination.

Petitioner has no legal standing. This Court adopted the "direct injury" test
in our jurisdiction. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain
a direct injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial
independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite
standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect
the judiciary. This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing
when the issues involved are of "transcendental importance" to the public.
However, this is not present in the case.

Adding to this, the writ of mandamus will issue when the act sought to be
performed is ministerial. An act is ministerial when it does not require the exercise
of judgment and the act is performed in compliance with a legal mandate. In a
petition for mandamus, the burden of proof is on petitioner to show that one is
entitled to the performance of a legal right and that respondent has a

672
corresponding duty to perform the act. Mandamus will not lie "to compel an
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do,
or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law."

In this case, petitioner has not shown how he is entitled to the relief prayed
for. Hence, this court cannot be compelled to exercise its power of judicial review
since there is no actual case or controversy.

673
Section 4 - When and where to file the petition

ABS-CBN Corporation v. FELIPE GOZON

G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015

FACTS:

Angelo dela Cruz was an OFW who was kidnapped by Iraqi militants. ABS-
CBN conducted live audio-video coverage of and broadcasted the arrival of
Angelo dela Cruz at the NAIA and the subsequent press conference. ABS-CBN
allowed Reuters Television Service to air the footages it had taken under a special
embargo agreement, which provided that no other Philippine subscriber of
Reuters would be allowed to use ABS-CBN footage without the latter’s consent.

GMA-7 was a subscriber to both Reuters and CNN. It received a live video
feed of the coverage of Angelo dela Cruz’s arrival from Reuters which it
immediately carried in its program “Flash Report” together with its live broadcast.
GMA-7 alleged that it did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters
was airing footages of ABS-CBN.

ABS-CBN filed a Complaint for copyright infringement against GMA-7. Dela

Peña-Reyes and Manalastas, Head of News Operations and Program Manager of
GMA, were indicted in the charge, and the Information was filed against them.
Hence, they filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ.

DOJ Secretary Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents and held that good faith
may be raised as a defense in the case. Both parties moved for its reconsideration.
Subsequently, DOJ Acting Secretary Agra issued a Resolution that reversed the
Gonzalez Resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela Peña-Reyes and
Manalastas.

Respondents assailed the Agra Resolution through a Petition for Certiorari.

The CA granted the Petition and reversed the Agra Resolution. The CA held that
Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolution,
hence, a motion for reconsideration was unnecessary since the Agra Resolution
was a patent nullity and it would have been useless under the circumstances.

674
ISSUES:

1) Is a petition for certiorari the correct remedy in assailing Secretary Agra’s

Resolution?

2) Did Secretary Agra commit an error of jurisdiction?

RULING:

1) Yes, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper
when assailing adverse resolutions of the Department of Justice stemming from
the determination of probable cause. However, grave abuse of discretion must be
alleged.

Grave abuse of discretion refers to such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by
or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Generally, a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a

petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the
tribunal or officer to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case. However, exceptions to the rule exist:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the Court a quo had no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial Court is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where
the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to

675
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest
is involved.

As argued by respondents, a second motion for reconsideration would have

been futile since the DOJ had already passed upon the same issues twice. There
was also the need to resolve the matter, as the Information’s filing would lead to
their imminent arrest. Moreover, the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal, provides that no
second motion for reconsideration of the DOJ Secretary’s resolution shall be
entertained. Hence, respondents were correct in filing the Petition for Certiorari.

2) No, Secretary Agra did not commit an error of jurisdiction. An error of

jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.

The full discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary

investigation to ascertain sufficient ground for the filing of information rests with
the executive branch. Hence, it was within Secretary Agra’s jurisdiction to
determine whether there was probable cause to charge respondents.

The evidence necessary to establish probable cause is based only on the

likelihood, or probability, of guilt. Under the Intellectual Property Code, news as
expressed in a video footage is entitled to copyright protection. There is therefore
probable cause that respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas directly
committed copyright infringement of ABS-CBN’s news footage because they
could have prevented the act of infringement had they been diligent in their
functions as Head of News Operations and Program Manager. Good faith cannot
be invoked to argue that no probable cause exists because infringement is malum
prohibitum, hence, intent is completely immaterial. Since there was probable
cause, the CA erred in holding that Secretary Agra committed an error of
jurisdiction.

676
Section 5 - Respondents and costs in certain cases

Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019

FACTS:

Ronald Geralino M. Lim (Ronald) filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor a Complaint for grave threats against his brother Edwin M. Lim
(Edwin).

On August 12, 2013, the case was set for pre-trial. However, because of
Ronald's and his counsel's absence, pre-trial was reset to September 5, 2013. After
Edwin's counsel had fled a Motion for time to submit a counter-affidavit, pre-trial
was again reset to October 17, 2013.

On October 17, 2013, the defense counsel moved that the hearing be set at
10:00 a.m. However, because the private prosecutor was unavailable and the
prosecution needed time to submit their judicial affidavits, pre-trial was reset to
November 21, 2013 at 8:30 a.m.

At the pre-trial on November 21, 2013, the prosecution, among others, moved
that they be allowed to submit the Judicial Affidavits of Ronald and their witnesses
later that day “for whatever reason". Despite the defense counsel's insistent
opposition, the MTC in Cities granted the Motion and gave the prosecution until
5:00 p.m. that day to submit the judicial affidavits.

Aggrieved, Edwin moved for reconsideration. He argued that the

prosecution was deemed to have waived its right to submit its Judicial Affidavits
when it failed to submit them at least five (5) days before pre-trial. The MTC in
Cities denied Edwin's Motion.

Edwin filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. He contended that the MTC in Cities committed grave
abuse of discretion when it allowed the belated filing of the Judicial Affidavits.

The RTC ruled that the MTC in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion
when it allowed the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits. Hence,
petitioners filed before the Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, contending,
among others, that since the Office of the Solicitor General is regarded in criminal
cases as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines, it should have been
given an opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People.

677
ISSUE:

Should the Office of the Solicitor General, being the appellate counsel, be given an
opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People?

RULING:

No. Under the Rules of Court, when a petition for certiorari is filed assailing
an act of a judge, the petitioner in the main action shall be included as a private
respondent, and is then mandated to appear and defend both on his or her own
behalf and on behalf of the public respondent affected by the proceedings. The
public respondent shall not be required to comment on the petition unless
required by the court. Rule 65, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 5. Respondents and Costs in Certain Cases. — When the petition filed
relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private
respondent or respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the
person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall
be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or
their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected
by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the
petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the judge,
court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
impleaded as public respondent or respondents.

Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is

pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment
to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by
either party, the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties.
However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear
or participate in the proceedings therein.

678
Section 6 - Order to comment

Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019
FACTS:

Ronald Geralino M. Lim (Ronald) filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor a Complaint for grave threats against his brother Edwin M. Lim
(Edwin).

On August 12, 2013, the case was set for pre-trial. However, because of
Ronald's and his counsel's absence, pre-trial was reset to September 5, 2013. After
Edwin's counsel had fled a Motion for time to submit a counter-affidavit, pre-trial
was again reset to October 17, 2013.

On October 17, 2013, the defense counsel moved that the hearing be set at
10:00 a.m. However, because the private prosecutor was unavailable and the
prosecution needed time to submit their judicial affidavits, pre-trial was reset to
November 21, 2013 at 8:30 a.m.

At the pre-trial on November 21, 2013, the prosecution, among others, moved
that they be allowed to submit the Judicial Affidavits of Ronald and their witnesses
later that day “for whatever reason". Despite the defense counsel's insistent
opposition, the MTC in Cities granted the Motion and gave the prosecution until
5:00 p.m. that day to submit the judicial affidavits.

Aggrieved, Edwin moved for reconsideration. He argued that the

prosecution was deemed to have waived its right to submit its Judicial Affidavits
when it failed to submit them at least five (5) days before pre-trial. The MTC in
Cities denied Edwin's Motion.

Edwin filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. He contended that the MTC in Cities committed grave
abuse of discretion when it allowed the belated filing of the Judicial Affidavits.

The RTC ruled that the MTC in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion
when it allowed the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits. Hence,
petitioners filed before the Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, contending,
among others, that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over them
as it had failed to serve the summons and copies of the Petition on Certiorari and
Prohibition personally on petitioners. They maintain that under the Rules of
Court, summons shall be served upon respondent himself, not his counsel.

679
ISSUE:

Are summons needed to be issued in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65

of the Rules of Court to acquire jurisdiction over the petitioners?

RULING:

Yes. Contrary to petitioners' postulation, summons need not be issued in a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 65, Section 6 of the Rules of Court states that the court, upon the filing
of a petition for certiorari, shall determine if it is sufficient in form and substance.
Once it finds the petition to be sufficient, it shall issue an order requiring the
respondents to comment on the petition:

SECTION 6. Order to Comment. — If the petition is sufficient in form and

substance to justify such process, the court shall issue an order requiring the
respondent or respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall be served on the respondents in such
manner as the court may direct, together with a copy of the petition and any
annexes thereto….

Compared with an ordinary civil action, where summons must be issued

upon the filing of the complaint, the court need only issue an order requiring the
respondents to comment on the petition for certiorari. "Such order shall be served
on the respondents in such manner as the court may direct, together with a copy
of the petition and any annexes thereto."

Furthermore, it must be stressed that in People's General Insurance

Corporation v. Guansing, this Court reasoned that when a party participates in a
proceeding despite improper service of summons, he or she is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction… By actively participating in the
proceedings, petitioners are deemed to have made a voluntary appearance and
cannot argue that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over them.

680
Section 7 - Expediting proceedings; Injunctive relief

De Ocampo vs. Radio Philippines Network, Inc.

G.R. No. 192947, December 9, 2015

FACTS:

De Ocampo was the complainant in a case for illegal dismissal, unpaid

salaries, damages, and attorney's fees against respondent Radio Philippines
Network, Inc. (RPN-9) and several RPN-9 officers.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered its Decision and found De Ocampo to
have been illegally dismissed and ordered RPN-9 to pay her separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement and full backwages.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Decision

of the LA. RPN-9 filed a Motion for Reconsideration and was denied.

Aggrieved, RPN-9 filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.

The CA issued a temporary restraining order preventing the NLRC from

enforcing its ruling for a period of 60 days. The 60 day period lapsed without a
writ of preliminary injunction being subsequently issued by the CA.

De Ocampo filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution which the

NLRC granted. Conformably, a Writ of Execution was issued.

De Ocampo filed a Motion to Recompute the Monetary Award with Motion

to Issue Alias Writ of Execution seeking recomputation and to increase of the
monetary award given to her.

The Labor Arbiter denied De Ocampo’s Motion due to the fact that the
ruling had become final and executory to which the NLRC affirmed.

De Ocampo filed a Petition for Certiorari insisting that she remains entitled
to additional monetary awards, warranting a recomputation of the amount due to
her.

681
ISSUE:

Does the pendency of a Petition for Certiorari stay the judgment it seeks to
assail?

RULING:

As basic as the principle of finality of judgments is the rule that filing a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent
from further proceeding in the
case. Unlike an appeal, a pending petition for certiorari shall not stay the judgment
or order that it assails.

The 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission,

specifically Section 10, Rule 11 thereof, which were in effect when the material
incidents of this case occurred, explicitly and specifically makes this principle
applicable to decisions of labor arbiters and of the NLRC.

Here, after the filing before the CA of RPN-9's Petition for Certiorari, the
CA issued a temporary restraining order preventing, for a period of 60 days, the
National Labor Relations Commission from enforcing its ruling. However, the
sixty-day period lapsed without a writ of preliminary injunction being
subsequently issued by the CA. Thus, the ruling of the LA, as affirmed by the
NLRC, became final and executory.

682
 RULE 67
Expropriation

Section 1. The complaint

Republic vs. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership

G.R. No. 171496; March 3, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) is the

owner of a parcel of land located in Pasig City. Upon the request of DPWH, Ortigas
caused the segregation of its property into 5 lots and reserved 1 portion for road
widening for the C-5 flyover project. It designated Lot 5-B-2-A, a 1,445-square-
meter portion of its property, for the road widening of Ortigas Avenue.

The C-5 Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only 396
square meters of the 1,445-sqaure-meter allotment for the project. Consequently,
Ortigas further subdivided Lot 5-B-2-A into 2 lots: Lot 5-B-2-A-1, which was the
portion used for the road widening, and Lot 5-B-2-A-2, which was the unutilized
portion of Lot 5-B-2-A.

In 2001, Ortigas filed with the RTC a petition for authority to sell to the
government Lot 5-B-2-A-1. The RTC issued an order authorizing the sale to
petitioner Republic. The Republic then filed an opposition, alleging that Ortigas’
property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing
Section 50 of PD 1529.

ISSUE:

Should the authority to sell be granted?

RULING:

Yes. Ortigas may sell its property to the government. It must be

compensated because its property was taken and utilized for public road
purposes.

Title to the subject lot remains under Ortigas’ name. The government is
already in possession of the property but is yet to acquire title to it. To legitimize
such possession, petitioner Republic of the Philippines must acquire the property
from Ortigas by instituting expropriation proceedings or through negotiated sale,

683
which has already been recognized in law as a mode of government acquisition of
private property for public purpose.

In a negotiated sale, the government offers to acquire for public purpose a

private property, and the owner may accept or reject it. A rejection of the offer,
however, would most likely result merely result in the commencement of an
expropriation proceeding that would eventually transfer title to the government.
Hence, the government’s offer to acquire for public purpose a private property
may be considered as an act preparatory to an expropriation proceeding.
Therefore, a private owner's initiative to segregate a property to accommodate
government needs saves the government from a long and arduous expropriation
proceeding. This is a commendable act on the part of the owner. It must be
encouraged, not dampened by threats of property deprivation without
compensation.

Taking of private property without just compensation is a violation of a

person's property right. In situations where the government does not take the
trouble of initiating an expropriation proceeding, the private owner has the option
to compel payment of the property taken, when justified.

684
 National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Asoque
G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner NPC entered into a portion of respondent spouses’ property in

order to install electric transmission lines. The spouses allowed NPC to do so on
the understanding that the latter will pay the value of the land occupied and the
plantation therein which will be destroyed. The spouses demanded from NPC the
payment for the value of the land occupied and the plantation destroyed but the
latter only paid the value of the plantation claiming that it is only obliged to pay
10% of the market value of the property subject to a right-of-way under RA 6395.
According to NPC, since the spouses already accepted the payment for the value
of the improvements, it found that there is no more need to initiate expropriation
proceedings and continue with the construction. However, the spouses filed an
action for payment of just compensation and damages against NPC to recover the
value of the land occupied by the latter. The court ruled in favor of the spouses
and ordered NPC to pay them the market value of the land and plantation as
determined by the commissioner.

NPC’s appeal to the CA was denied, prompting it to elevate the matter to

SC. NPC insists that the amount of just compensation must be based on 10% of the
market value of the property subject to a right-of-way under RA 6395.
Accordingly, an easement of right of way is different from the concept of taking
under eminent domain which must be paid with just compensation equivalent to
full and fair market value of the property taken.

ISSUE:

May burdening the spouses’ private property with right of way be

equivalent to taking under eminent domain?

RULING:

Yes, burdening the spouses’ private property with right of way may be
equivalent to taking under eminent domain.

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or

appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and

685
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right-of-way.

There is taking in the context of the state’s power of eminent domain when
the following elements are present: (1) The expropriator enters a private property;
(2) The entrance into the private property is indefinite or permanent; (3) There is
color of legal authority in the entry into the property; (4) The property is devoted
to public use or purpose; and (5) The use of property for public use removed from
the owner all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

A right-of-way easement or burden becomes a “taking” under eminent

domain when there is material impairment of the value of the property or
prevention of the ordinary uses of the property for an indefinite period.

In this case, the right-of-way easement resulting in a limitation on property

rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of
the term “expropriation.”

Thus, burdening the spouses’ private property with right of way may be
equivalent to taking under eminent domain.

686
Section 2 - Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized
government depository

National Power Corporation vs. Posada

G.R. No. 191945, March 11, 2015

FACTS:

The National Power Corporation instituted expropriation proceedings for

the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over parcels of land located in Barangay
Marinawa, Bato, Catanduanes owned by respondents Socorro T. Posada, Renato
Bueno, Alice Balin, Adrian Tablizo, Teofilo Tablizo, and Lydia Tablizo. The
expropriation was for the construction and maintenance of its Substation Island
Grid Project. The National Power Corporation offered the price of ₱500.00 per
square meter. In their Answer, respondents objected to the offer and alleged that
the value of the properties was ₱2,000.00 per square meter. The RTC confirmed the
National Power Corporation’s right to expropriate the properties and ordered the
creation of a commission to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid
to respondents. The NPC filed a Notice to Take Possession before the court on the
basis of Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. It alleged that it was entitled to a
Writ of Possession in view of its deposit with the Land Bank of the Philippines in
the amount of ₱3,280.00, alleging that it represented the provisional value of the
properties; the court-appointed commissioners recommended a fair market value
of ₱1,500.00 per square meter. The National Power Corporation opposed the
recommendation of the commissioners. NPC filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for
the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. It also served respondents with a Notice to
Take Possession stating that "it shall enter and take possession of the property on
September 26, 2005." The trial court granted it. Respondents filed a Motion to Lift
and/or Suspend the Issuance of the Writ of Possession, which the trial court
denied. Thereafter, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Grant Defendants Time
to Remove their Houses and Improvements as well as Additional Deposit for Use
in Land Acquisition and Expenses for Transfer of their Respective Residential
Houses. The trial court granted the motion of respondent.

The National Power Corporation failed to deposit the additional amount.

The trial court issued an Order during the November 22, 2006 hearing for the
National Power Corporation to make the necessary deposit. The issue on the
amount of just compensation was also submitted for decision. The trial court
rendered a decision fixing the just compensation in the amount of P2000 per
square meter and recalls its order granting said Motion and cancels the Writ of
Possession. The NPC appealed to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision denying
the appeal. It held that the trial court committed no reversible error "in adopting

687
the recommendation of the appointed commissioners insofar as the value of the
subject property is concerned." NPC filed a MR but was denied. Thus, this petition.
However during the pendency of this case before the SC, National Power
Corporation, through counsel, filed the present Motion to Withdraw Appeal,
praying for the withdrawal of its appeal before this court and, ultimately, for its
Amended Complaint before the trial court to be dismissed.

The National Power Corporation now requests this court for leave to
withdraw this Petition on the ground that it was in the process of acquiring a
vacant lot owned by FICELCO. Considering that eminent domain is the taking of
private property for public use, no expropriation proceeding can continue if the
property to be expropriated will not be for public use.

ISSUE:

Whether the National Power Corporation may be allowed to withdraw its

Petition for Review.

HELD:

Yes. Considering that the National Power Corporation is no longer using

respondents’ properties for the purpose of building the Substation Project, it may
be allowed to discontinue with the expropriation proceedings, subject to the
approval of the court. However, the grant of the Motion to Withdraw carries with
it the necessary consequence of making the trial court’s order of condemnation
final and executory.

The rule, therefore, is that expropriation proceedings must be dismissed

when it is determined that it is not for a public purpose, except when: First, the
trial court’s order already became final and executory; Second, the government
already took possession of the property; and Lastly, the expropriation case already
caused prejudice to the landowner.

The expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property

ceases to be for public use. The state must first file the appropriate Motion to
Withdraw before the trial court having jurisdiction over the proceedings. The
grant or denial of any Motion to Withdraw in an expropriation proceeding is
always subject to judicial discretion.

Respondents have not yet been deprived of their property since the
National Power Corporation was never able to take possession. We cannot
determine whether damages have been suffered as a result of the expropriation.

688
This case needs to be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
respondents have already been prejudiced by the expropriation. The withdrawal
of the Petition before this court will have no practical effect other than to make the
trial court's order of condemnation final and executory. In order to prevent this
absurdity, the National Power Corporation should file the proper Motion to
Withdraw before the trial court. It is now the burden of the National Power
Corporation to plead and prove to the trial court its reasons for discontinuing with
the expropriation. Respondents may also plead and prove damages incurred from
the commencement of the expropriation, if any.

689
Section 5 - Ascertainment of compensation

National Power Corporation vs. Spouses Asoque

G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner NPC entered into a portion of respondent spouses’ property in

order to install electric transmission lines. The spouses allowed NPC to do so on
the understanding that the latter will pay the value of the land occupied and the
plantation therein which will be destroyed. The spouses demanded from NPC the
payment for the value of the land occupied and the plantation destroyed but the
latter only paid the value of the plantation claiming that it is only obliged to pay
10% of the market value of the property subject to a right-of-way under RA 6395.
According to NPC, since the spouses already accepted the payment for the value
of the improvements, it found that there is no more need to initiate expropriation
proceedings and continue with the construction. However, the spouses filed an
action for payment of just compensation and damages against NPC to recover the
value of the land occupied by the latter.

The court authorized the spouses to present evidence ex parte after NPC
failed to attend the scheduled pre-trials. The spouses presented the evidence to the
court-appointed commissioner, who is the branch clerk of court, who thereafter
reported on the prevailing market values of the land and the plantation. The court
ruled in favor of the spouses and ordered NPC to pay them the market value of
the land and plantation as determined by the commissioner.

NPC’s appeal to the CA was denied, prompting it to elevate the matter to

SC. NPC argued that the trial court’s appointment of a commissioner and the
latter’s appraisal of the fair market value of the property and the improvements
made were defective and ultra vires. NPC further stands by its claim that the
amount of just compensation must be based on 10% of the market value of the
property subject to a right-of-way under RA 6395.

ISSUE:

1) Are the court’s proceedings invalid for failure to follow Rule 67?
2) Is the court bound by the provisions of special laws in determining
just compensation?

RULING:

690
 1) No, the court’s proceedings are not invalid for failure to follow Rule
67.

In case of a taking without the proper expropriation action filed, the

property owner may file its own action to question the propriety of the taking or
to compel the payment of just compensation. Among these inverse condemnation
actions is a complaint for payment of just compensation and damages. When an
inverse condemnation is filed, the provisions for the appointment of
commissioners under Rule 32 — not Sections 5, 6, 7, or 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court — will be followed.

Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of a complaint by the expropriator for

eminent domain with the appropriate court. If no such complaint is filed, the
expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements and, hence,
waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67. This includes the appointment
of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. However, when a government
agency itself violates procedural requirements, it waives the usual procedure
prescribed in Rule 67.

In this case, the proceedings before the court were not for expropriation —
for which NPC itself claims that there is no need — but were for recovery of just
compensation and damages initiated by the spouses. Hence, Rule 67, Section 5 on
the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid was no longer applicable.
The non-appointment of three (3) Commissioners in the court a quo does not
render infirm the entire proceedings.

Thus, the court’s proceedings are not invalid for failure to follow Rule 67.

2) No, the court is not bound by the provisions of special laws in

determining just compensation.

Just compensation has been defined as the “fair and full equivalent of the
loss.” The value and character of the land at the time it was taken by government
are the criteria for determining just compensation. “All the facts as to the condition
of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities,
must thus be considered.” Some factors that have been previously considered by
the courts were acquisition cost, current value of like properties, its actual or
potential uses, its size, shape, and location, and the tax declarations on the
property. In this regard, the standards enumerated in statutes such as Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 8974 are merely recommendatory, and courts are not bound to
consider all of them.

691
 Well-settled is the rule that the determination of just compensation for
property taken in expropriation is a judicial prerogative. Such discretion cannot be
curtailed by legislation.

In this case, due to the nature of the easement, which will deprive the
normal use of the land for an indefinite period and expose the spouses’ lives and
limbs to danger, just compensation must be based on the full market value of the
affected property. Hence, Sec. 3(a) of RA 6395 which states that only 10% of the
market value of the property is due the owner of the property subject to a right-
of-way easement is not binding on the Court.

Thus, the court is not bound by the provisions of special laws in

determining just compensation.

692
Section 8 - Action upon Commissioners’ Report

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Manzano

G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018

FACTS:

Respondents Manzano et al. are owners of 4 parcels of land planted with

rubber trees in Isabela, Basilan. Respondents voluntarily offered their lands to the
DAR for agrarian reform under CARP. DAR issued Administrative Order No. 05-
98 to implement and fill in the details of Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Administrative Order No. 05-98 provides
for the formula in computing just compensation for rubber lands under Republic
Act No. 6657, taking into consideration the factors laid down in Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657. DAR endorsed the matter of land valuation to Landbank.
The DAR then endorsed the matter of land valuation to the LBP. The issue of the
valuation reached the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB).

Dissatisfied with the PARAB’s determination in the total of P2,944,797.26

for the four (4) lots, respondents filed with the RTC an action for determination of
just compensation. Meanwhile, Landbank deposited the judgment award, through
cash and Landbank bonds, as provisional compensation for the acquired
properties.

The commissioners recommended that the amount of just compensation be

reckoned from the date the properties were transferred to the Republic of the
Philippines, until fully paid, and that DAR and Landbank pay all legal fees and
costs of the case. RTC adopted the Commissioners’ report and determined the
amount of Php 9,100,711.00 as just compensation for the four (4) lots. Thus, LBP
filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals, seeking for the reversal of
the RTC’s Decision.

Meanwhile, respondents filed a motion for execution pending appeal,

pursuant to Rule 39, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. The RTC granted the motion
for execution pending appeal and ordered the payment of 6% legal interest
reckoned from the date of judgment or order until fully paid. LBP filed an Urgent
Verified Motion/Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals arguing that the RTC’s
order granting respondents’ motion for execution pending appeal violated judicial
courtesy.

693
 LBP alleges that CA erred in accepting the commissioners' recommendation
without conducting a hearing, in directing DAR and Landbank to pay 6% legal
interest, and in granting the motion for execution pending appeal without good
reasons.

ISSUE/S:

First, In determining just compensation, can the Regional Trial Court simply
adopt the Consolidated Commissioners' Report, and whether or not it is mandated
to follow the formula prescribed under R.A. No. 6657, Section 17 in relation to
Administrative Order No. 05-98 and Joint Memorandum Circular No. 07-99;

Second, Should the 6% legal interest be imposed?

RULING:

First issue, Yes. The RTC, as a Special Agrarian Court has the full discretion
to make a binding decision on the value of the properties, and must be respected.

Under Rule 67, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may accept
Commissioners' Report, recommit it to the same commissioners for further report,
set it aside and appoint new commissioners, or accept only a part of it and reject
the other parts.

The determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot

be curtailed or limited by legislation, much less by an administrative rule.

Republic Act No. 6657, Section 57 gives to the Special Agrarian Courts the
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners." In Republic Act No. 6657, Section 16 (f):

Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition and Distribution of Private

Lands. — For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the
following procedures shall be followed:

xxx xxx xxx

(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter
to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation. (Emphasis supplied)

694
 The use of the word "final" in the statute should not be construed to mean
that the Special Agrarian Court serves as an appellate court that must wait for the
administrative agencies to finish their valuation.

There is no need to exhaust administrative remedies through the Provincial

Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, or the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board before a party can go to the
Special Agrarian Court for determination of just compensation.

The final decision on the value of just compensation lies solely on the
Special Agrarian Court. Any attempt to convert its original jurisdiction into an
appellate jurisdiction is contrary to the explicit provisions of the law.

As to the second issue, Yes. While the deposits might have been sufficient
for purposes of the immediate taking of the landholdings, the deposits cannot be
claimed as amounts that would excuse the payment of interest on the unpaid
balance of the compensation due.

Interest should be awarded to the landowner if there is no "prompt and

valid payment." There is no prompt payment if the payment is only partial. Thus,
petitioner's delay in payment makes it liable for legal interest by way of damages.
The legal interest must be applied on the unpaid balance of the compensation due.
Therefore, the amount already received by respondents should be subtracted from
the total judgment, and the rate of legal interest should be calculated from that
amount.

Since the determination of just compensation is an inherently judicial

function, it cannot be curtailed or limited by legislation. The various agrarian
reform laws and the other administrative issuances are merely recommendatory
to the trial court in determining just compensation.

695
 R.A. 8974
An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or
Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and for
Other Purposes

Republic v. Heirs of Fernandez

G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015

FACTS:

The Republic, on behalf of the DPWH, filed a Verified Complaint for

Expropriation against the heirs of Fernandez, who owned a lot in Barangay Tuyo,
Balanga, Bataan. The Republic prayed that a Writ of Possession be issued in its
favor upon the filing of the Petition and the deposit of the value of the properties.
There was a dispute as to the value of the lot, for petitioner presented evidence
that it was P15.00 per square meter while respondents presented evidence that it
was P50.00 per square meter.

The RTC issued an order allowing the Republic to take possession of the
property in view of their payment of P167,475.00. The CA set aside the order, citing
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974. It ruled that it was only upon the payment of
P558,250.00, which was 100% of the zonal value of the property, and the
submission of a certificate of availability of funds that a Writ of Possession may be
issued.

Petitioner alleged that since a Writ of Possession was already issued in its favor
when it made its deposit, the only issue left to be settled was the determination of
just compensation. It also argued that the CA’s Decision was similar to a
temporary restraining order or injunction, which is prohibited by Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8975.

ISSUES:

1) Is the CA correct in setting aside the Writ of Possession for failure to comply
with Sec. 4 of RA 8974?

2) Is the reversal of the issuance of the Writ of Possession similar to an

injunction against the republic?

RULING:

696
 1) Yes, the CA is correct in setting aside the Writ of Possession, which may be
issued only upon full compliance with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974.

Before the state may expropriate private property for a national

infrastructure project, it must first comply with the requisites in Republic Act No.
8974, otherwise known as An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or
Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes. Under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency must, upon filing of
the expropriation complaint, immediately pay the property owner an amount
equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the value of any improvements
or structure on a replacement cost method. The law further mandates that courts
may issue a Writ of Possession only upon the presentation by the implementing
agency of a certificate of availability of funds.

Any payment made by the Republic as to the expropriated property's

provisional value is not equivalent to the payment of the present fair market value
of the property. It only serves as a pre-payment so that the government may take
possession of the property. Moreover, the value need not be judicially determined;
rather, the value has already been set by the current relevant zonal value of the
area as classified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The pre-payment must also
be paid immediately to the owner of the property.

What appears in the zonal values posted by the BIR on their website is the
same document presented by respondents. The incorrect amount paid by
petitioner Republic cannot be considered as sufficient pre-payment since it was
less than the amount required by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974. Hence, the
CA correctly set aside the Writ of Possession.

2) No, the setting aside of an improperly issued Writ of Possession is not the
same as the issuance of an Injunctive Writ. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974
mandates that upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall
immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of
the property and start the implementation of the project. Before the court can
issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present to the court a
certificate of availability of funds from the proper official concerned.

Thus, the court cannot issue a Writ of Possession if the guidelines were not
complied with. There is also nothing that prevents a court from setting aside a Writ
of Possession on appeal when it is found that the guidelines were not complied
with. In contrast, an injunction is a separate proceeding that must be instituted by
a party seeking immediate relief. Before an injunctive writ can be issued, a party

697
must first establish a right to be protected and show a perceived injury if the act
complained of is not enjoined. Moreover, the applicant must follow the procedural
requisites outlined in Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before a preliminary
injunction may be granted by the court.

In this case, the Writ of Possession was set aside by the CA, not as an ancillary
remedy to preserve respondents Heirs of Fernandez's rights, but because the
Republic failed to comply with the requirements of Republic Act No. 8974. As
such, it is not similar to an injunction order.

698
 RULE 70
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Section 1 - Who may institute proceedings, and when.

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Citi Appliance M.C.

Corporation
G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019

FACTS:

Cebu City Zoning Board (CCZB) required respondent to construct a one-

level parking area consisting of 26 parking lots. While making a deep excavation,
respondent discovered telephone lines, cables, and manholes underground, which
had been placed by petitoner PLDT sometime in 1983, preventing respondent from
excavating the land.

In April 2003, respondent applied for exemption from the parking

requirement. CCZB denied the exemption and required respondent to pay the
parking exemption fee of P3,735,600. On April 26, 2004, respondent demanded
PLDT to remove the telephone lines, cables, and manholes or to shoulder the
exemption fee. On May 28, 2004, respondent made a final demand, but PLDT
refused to comply. Respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against PLDT on
October 1, 2004..

In its Answer, PLDT alleged that it did not encroach on respondent’s

property as they were properly positioned along side and underneath a public
sidewalk. It later filed an Amended Answer, arguing that the case should be
dismissed since the action for forcible entry had prescribed; that an action for
forcible entry based on stealth should be reckoned from the discovery of the
alleged unlawful entry, not the last demand to vacate. Moreover, PLDT argued
that the area in question was part of public domain, it being a sidewalk. Assuming
that the property did belong to respondent, PLDT averred that it had the right of
eminent domain.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities granted respondent’s ejectment

complaint. The same was affirmed by the RTC and CA. PLDT filed before the SC
a Petiton for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Is there forcible entry through stealth?

699
RULING:

No. Three elements must be alleged and and proved for a forcible entry suit
to prosper: (1) prior physical possession of the property; (2) that they deprived of
possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (3) the
action was filed within one year from the time the owners or legal possessors
learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property.

Possession in ejectment cases means nothing more than physical or material

possession, not legal possession. It is not required that the complainant is the
owner of the property. The fact of prior physical possession is an indispensable
requirement. It must be alleged and proven that the plaintiff was in prior physical
possession of the property before the defendant encroached on the property.

Here, the complaint shows that respondent failed to allege prior physical
possession over the property. It merely submitted proof of ownership over the
property, which is not sufficient to prove prior physical possession. It cannot
equate possession as an attribute of ownership to the fact of actual prior physical
possession.

Furthermore, the action for forcible entry must fail for being filed beyond
the one-year prescriptive period, which should be reckoned from the date of
discovery of the encroachment, not from the date of the last demand to vacate.
Generally, the prescriptive period for forcible entry is counted from the date of
actual entry into the land – except when this entry was made through stealth, in
which case, the period is reckoned from the time of discovery.

Here, the facts show that respondent discovered the underground cables
and line in April 2003 when its applied for exemption from the parking slot
requirement with the CCZB. Counting from this date, the one-year prescriptive
period to file the forcible entry suit had already lapsed in April 2004. Thus, by the
time the complaint was filed on October 1, 2004, the period had already prescribed.
The MTCC, therefore, no longer had jurisdiction to resolve the case.

700
 Cruz v. Spouses Christensen
G.R. No. 205539, October 4, 2017

FACTS:

Cruz alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land in San Juan City
which she inherited from her mother, Javier. She alleged that Susan Christensen
had been occupying the property during her mother’s lifetime, pursuant to a
verbal lease agreement. Cruz tolerated Susan’s occupancy but later demanded
Susan to vacate the property and to pay all her unpaid rentals. After barangay
mediation failed, a Certificate to File Action was issued on August 11, 2005. Three
years later, Cruz sent Susan a final demand letter demanding that she pay the
unpaid rentals and vacate the property within 15 days from receipt. Susan refused
to vacate and pay the accrued rentals. Thus, a complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed on.

The MeTC dismissed the Complaint as it found that the registry receipts
and return cards as proof of the receipt of the demand letter, must first be
authenticated through an affidavit of service. On appeal, the RTC reversed the
MeTC decision. On appeal, the respondents contended that Cruz was unable to
prove Susan's actual receipt of the demand letter and that Cruz's filing of her
memorandum 9 days beyond the 15-day period before the RTC should have been
ground to dismiss her appeal. The CA reversed the RTC and held that the filing of
a memorandum of appeal within 15 days from the receipt of the order is
mandatory and that the registry receipts and return cards are insufficient proof of
receipt. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Is prior demand necessary to file the unlawful detainer in this case?

RULING:

No. Under Rule 70, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, an action for unlawful
detainer may be brought against a possessor of a property who unlawfully
withholds possession after the termination or expiration of the right to hold
possession. Rule 70, Section 2 of the Rules requires that there must first be a prior
demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate before an
action can be filed.

The jurisdictional requirement of prior demand is unnecessary if the action

is premised on the termination of lease due to expiration of the terms of contract.

701
The jurisdictional requirement of prior demand is unnecessary if the action is
premised on the termination of lease due to expiration of the terms of contract. The
complaint must be brought on the allegation that the lease has expired and the
lessor demanded the lessee to vacate, not on the allegation that the lessee failed to
pay rents. The cause of action which would give rise to an ejectment case would
be the expiration of the lease. Thus, the requirement under Rule 70, Section 2 of a
prior "demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate"
would be unnecessary.

Respondents contend that they had been continuously paying their

monthly rent until sometime in 2002, when petitioner refused to receive it. Thus,
as early as 2002, Cruz already refused to renew respondents' month-to-month
verbal lease. Therefore, respondents' lease had already long expired before
petitioner sent her demand letters. Respondents cannot feign ignorance of
petitioner's demand to vacate since the matter was brought to barangay
conciliation proceedings in 2005.

Therefore, respondents' insistence on the non-receipt of the demand letter

is misplaced.

702
Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction Development Company
G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018

FACTS:

Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government, which

it administered to Offshore Construction. Three properties were leased for five
years, renewable every five years upon mutual agreement. Offshore Construction
occupied and introduced improvements in the leased premises. However,
Intramuros and the Department of Tourism halted the projects due to Offshore’s
non-conformity with PD 1616. Offshore filed a complaint with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against Intramuros and
DOT. Eventually parties executed a compromise agreement where they agreed to
continue the lease contracts. Offshore failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees
despite demand letters. On March 26, 2010, Offshore received Intramuros’ latest
demand letter. Intramuros filed a complaint for Ejectment before the MTC of
Manila. MTC dismissed the complaint for forum shopping and that it had no
jurisdiction over the case. Intramuros appealed the order of the MTC before the
RTC. The RTC affirmed the order of the MTC in toto. Intramuros filed its Petition
for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint
filed by Intramuros Administration.

HELD:

Yes. To determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court,
the allegations in the complaint must be examined. The jurisdictional facts must
be evident on the face of the complaint. There is a case for unlawful detainer if
the complaint states the following:

(1) Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with

or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

703
Physical possession, or de facto possession, is the sole issue to be resolved in
ejectment proceedings. Regardless of the claims or defenses raised by a defendant,
a Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over an ejectment complaint once it has
been shown that the requisite jurisdictional facts have been alleged, such as in this
case. Courts are reminded not to abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
physical possession, as there is a public need to prevent a breach of the peace by
requiring parties to resort to legal means to recover possession of real property.

704
 RULE 71
Contempt

Section 3 - Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing

Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. v. Sulpicio Lines Inc.

G.R. No. 196072. September 20, 2017

FACTS:

Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. (Steamship) was a

Bermuda-based Protection and Indemnity Club, managed outside London,
England. It insures its members-shipowners against "third party risks and
liabilities" for claims arising from (a) death or injury to passengers; (b) loss or
damage to cargoes; and (c) loss or damage from collisions. Sulpicio insured its fleet
of inter-island vessels with Steamship including M/V Princess of the World,
evidenced by a Certificate of Entry and Acceptance issued by Steamship. M/V
Princess of the World was gutted by fire while on voyage from Iloilo to
Zamboanga City, resulting in total loss of its cargoes. DILG declared the same to
be “accidental” in nature. Sulpicio claimed indemnity from Steamship under the
insurance policy. The same was denied by Steamship on the ground that Sulpicio
was grossly negligent in conducting its business regarding safety, maintaining the
seaworthiness of its vessel, and proper training of its crew. Sulpicio filed a
complaint with the RTC for specific performance. Steamship filed a motion to
dismiss and/or to refer case to arbitration pursuant to R.A. No. 9285, or ADR Law,
and to Rule 47 of the 2005/2006 Club Rules, which provided for arbitration in
London of disputes between Steamship and its members. Before RTC ruled on the
motion, Steamship already commenced the arbitration proceedings against
Sulpicio. Thereafter, RTC denied the motion and was affirmed by the CA. Hence,
Steamship filed a petition for review via Rule 45.

Thereafter, Sulpicio filed with the SC a petition for indirect contempt

against Steamship for the latter’s “improper conduct tending directly, or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice” and was
consolidated with the Rule 45 petition. Sulpicio specifically alleged, among others,
that initiating the arbitration was intended to defeat the pending case and oust the
RTC of its jurisdiction and that Steamship settled Sulpicio’s judgment liability in
another case, however, the actual amount reimbursed by Steamship was not the
actual amount covered by the judgment because it was deducted with Sulpicio’s
share in the arbitration costs for arbitration in London imposed by Steamship.

ISSUE:

705
 Does Steamship’s commencement of arbitration even before the Regional
Trial Court had ruled on its motion to dismiss and suspend proceedings constitute
an “improper conduct” that “impedes, obstructs or degrades the administration
of justice”?

RULING:

No, Steamship’s commencement of arbitration even before the Regional

Trial Court had ruled on its motion to dismiss and suspend proceedings does not
constitute an “improper conduct” that “impedes, obstructs or degrades the
administration of justice.”Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice
or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties
litigant or their witnesses during litigation. Contempt of court is defined as a
disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and
dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's
orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due
administration of justice. This Court has thus repeatedly declared that the power
to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation
of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice . .

In Lorenzo Shipping Corp v. Distribution Management Association of the

Philippines, the Court ruled that, “There is no question that in contempt the intent
goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged
contemnor should be considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or
does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party
is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a
contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative of its character.
A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he
believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose,
however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt,
the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.”This
Court finds no clear and contumacious conduct on the part of Steamship. It does
not appear that Steamship was motivated by bad faith in initiating the arbitration
proceedings. Rather, its act of commencing arbitration in London is but a bona fide
attempt to preserve and enforce its rights under the Club Rules. There was no legal
impediment at the time Steamship initiated London arbitration proceedings.
Steamship commenced arbitration even before the Regional Trial Court denied its
Motion to Dismiss.

706
 Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr. v. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Atty. Herminio Harry L. Roque, Jr. filed a Petition to Cite for
Indirect Contempt against respondents Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang, Brig. Gen.
Arthur Ang, and Lt. Col. Harold Cabunoc, for violating Rule 139-B, Section 18 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious
violations of Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Petitioner assails two acts
as violating the confidentiality rule: first, respondents' supposed public threats of
filing a disbarment case against him, and second, respondents' public statement
that they had filed a disbarment complaint. Further, petitioner claims that
respondents' acts put to question his professional and personal reputation.

Respondents argue that the press statements are not among the
contumacious acts prescribed under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Additionally, they claim the following: 1) The subject of the disbarment case
pertains to a serious breach of security of a military zone; 2) The statements were
official statements made in the performance of a public function to address a
public concern; 3) The circumstances, which led to the filing of the disbarment
complaint and the acts alleged therein were witnessed by the public and duly
reported by the media; 4) The filing of the disbarment case was not meant to
malign petitioner as a lawyer, but rather was a response to the events that
transpired at Camp Aguinaldo; 5) The issue is a matter of public interest, which is
a defense in contempt proceedings such as this; 6) With the Laude Murder case
being of public concern, petitioner has attained the status of a public figure,
susceptible of public comment in connection with his actions on the case; 7) In any
case, respondents instituted the disbarment complaint against petitioner in good
faith; and, 8) They are laymen, and are not familiar with the confidentiality rule.

ISSUE:

1. Does a violation of the confidentiality rule constitute contempt of court?

2. Did the respondents' public pronouncements violate Section 18, Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court?
3. May respondents raise public interest as a defense?
4. May respondents be punished for contempt?

RULING:

707
 First Issue - YES. The general rule is that publicly disclosing disbarment
proceedings may be punished with contempt.

Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the

confidentiality rule. This is laid down by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, which provides: Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys
shall be private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court
shall be published like its decisions in other cases.

Law is a profession and not a trade. As part of the legal profession, lawyers
are generally prohibited from advertising their talents, and are expected to rely on
their good reputation to maintain their practice. The Court repeats that, the canons
of the profession tell that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Thus, a good reputation is among
a lawyer's most valuable assets. In Santiago v. Calvo, the Court has held that, the
success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his reputation.
Anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored.

The confidentiality rule is intended, in part, to prevent the use of

disbarment proceedings as a tool to damage a lawyer's reputation in the public
sphere.

Second Issue - NO. The respondent’s public pronouncements did not

violate Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides: Section 18.
Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.
However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions
in other cases.

Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to

keep private and confidential. In Fortun v. Quinsayas, the complainant bears the
distinction of having distributed the actual disbarment complaint to the press. This
case is different as respondent’s threats were made before November 4, 2014, and
there was no proceeding to keep private.

Third Issue - YES. The confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is

not absolute. It is not to be applied under any circumstance, to all disclosures of
any nature.

708
 As a general principle, speech on matters of public interest should not be
restricted. This Court recognizes the fundamental right to information, which is
essential to allow the citizenry to form intelligent opinions and hold people
accountable for their actions. Accordingly, matters of public interest should not be
censured for the sake of an unreasonably strict application of the confidentiality
rule.

The confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings against attorneys"

be kept private and confidential. It is the proceedings against attorneys that must
be kept private and confidential. This would necessarily prohibit the distribution
of actual disbarment complaints to the press. However, the rule does not extend
so far that it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary actions.

Some cases are more public than others, because of the subject matter, or
the personalities involved. Some are deliberately conducted in the public as a
matter of strategy. A lawyer who regularly seeks attention and readily welcomes,
if not invites, media coverage, cannot expect to be totally sheltered from public
interest, himself.

Fourth issue - NO. The Court declines to exercise its contempt power under
the conditions of this case. Contempt power is not designed to insulate a lawyer
from any publicity he may deem undesirable.

On indirect contempt, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 3. Indirect Contempt to be Punished After Charge and

Hearing. - After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as
may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court or in his performance of his

official duties or in the official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or

judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any

709
 manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or

proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under
Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as

such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the

custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held
by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the

court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or
from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.

The power of contempt is exercised to ensure the proper administration of

justice and maintain order in court processes. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the Court
has held that, the power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the
court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the
administration of justice must falter or fail. The power to punish for contempt
should be invoked only to ensure or promote the proper administration of justice.
Accordingly, when determining whether to declare as contumacious alleged
violations of the confidentiality rule, the Court apples a restrictive
interpretation. The Court agrees with respondents, that they should not be faulted
for releasing a subsequent press statement regarding the disbarment complaint
they filed against petitioner. The statements were official statements made in the
performance of respondents' official functions to address a matter of public
concern. It was the publication of an institutional action in response to a serious
breach of security. Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should
not be punished for responding publicly to such public actions. Given the
circumstances, citing respondents in contempt would be an unreasonable exercise
of this Court's contempt power.

710
 Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Judge Tirso Velasco and
Dolores Molina
G.R. No. 109645, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

Molina filed an action for quieting of title and annulment of title before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The subject of the complaint was parcels of
land covered by TCT Nos. 83163, 83164, 83165, and 83167. These titles were
declared null and void by this court in G.R. No. 109645 and G.R. No. 112564. The
action for quieting of title was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-29856. Molina then
moved that the case be consolidated with Civil Case No. Q-93-15920, which was a
Petition for Annulment of Title. TMBC filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. Q-
97-29856, citing res judicata, conclusiveness of judgment, bar by prior judgment,
and forum shopping. In addition, the Regional Trial Court cannot annul and set
aside the Decision of the Supreme Court. Molina opposed and she filed a ‘With
Leave Motion to Admit Amended Complaint’ dated February 24, 1997. TMBC and
Reyes opposed Molina’s Motion. However, the trial court admitted the Amended
Complaint and did not act on TMBC’s Motion to Dismiss. TMBC and Reyes
moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

TMBC and Reyes filed this Joint Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining
order. They argue that public respondent Judge should have dismissed private
respondent Molina’s Complaint dated January 6, 1997 considering that on its face,
it is clear that he has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same as it prays for
the court a quo to annul and set aside the final and executory decisions of the
Honorable Court and the Court of Appeals adjudicating in favor of petitioner
TMBC the ownership and possession of the subject properties, subject matter of
the private respondent Molina’s Complaint and Amended Complaint. TMBC and
Reyes also cite this court’s Decisions in the other cases involving Molina. They
point out that Molina’s Complaint and Amended Complaint should have been
dismissed outright for being a clear case of forum shopping.

ISSUE:

Whether there are grounds to cite Dolores V. Molina and her counsel,
Atty. Cesar Turiano, and Judge Marciano Bacalla in contempt of court.

HELD:

711
 Yes but only Molina shall be liable for contempt. That Molina actually
filed an action for quieting of title, in clear violation of this court’s ruling in G.R.
Nos. 109645 and 112564, constitutes deliberate forum shopping.

Forum shopping is defined as: when a party repetitively avails of several

judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court. Forum shopping consists of the
following elements: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.

All the elements of forum shopping are present in this case. The parties in
G.R. No. 112564 and this case are the same: Molina and TMBC. For the second
element, the test in determining whether the causes of action are the same:
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is
an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same
facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and
a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.

In this case, Molina asserts that the reconstitution case she previously filed
was a special proceeding and did not touch upon the issue of ownership. On the
other hand, Civil Case No. Q-97-29856, an action for quieting of title, involved the
issue of ownership.253 Molina’s arguments do not hold. These two cases involved
relitigating her claim of ownership over the properties covered by the nullified
TCT No. 124088.

Further, the ruling in G.R. Nos.109645 and 112564 is res judicata on this
case. The elements of res judicata are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be
between the first and the second actions: (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of
subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.

These requisites are fulfilled. The former judgment, Ortigas & Company
Limited Partnership v. Velasco, is final and executory. This court had jurisdiction
over the former case, and the judgment was on the merits. Further, although the
causes of action may appear to be different, the end result would be the same: to

712
determine the validity of Molina’s claim of ownership over the properties covered
by the nullified TCT No. 124088.

Apart from the original directive in its Resolution of March 1, 1995, the
Court twice reiterated the admonition that no further pleadings, motions or papers
should be filed in these cases, except only as regards issues directly involved in
the ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ (Re: Dismissal of Respondent Judge). This it did
in its Resolutions dated July 24 and October 25, 1995, respectively.

Evidently, an order of this character is directed to parties who obstinately

refuse to accept the Court’s final verdict and who, despite such verdict and in
defiance of established procedural rules, mulishly persist in still arguing the merits
of their cause. They continue to take up the time of the Court needlessly, by filing
unauthorized, forbidden, even worthless pleadings, motions and papers, serving
no real purpose other than to delay termination of the case.

Evidently, too, the directive against the filing of any further pleadings,
motions or papers is one that exacts observance by all parties concerned, such that
willful and unjustifiable disregard or disobedience thereof constitutes constructive
contempt under Section 3 (b), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The record shows just
such willful disobedience or resistance which is not satisfactorily explained in
Molina’s "Comment/Answer" dated October 11, 1995, submitted on requirement
by the Court. Molina has had more than her day in court. She was accorded more
than ample opportunity to present the merits of her case. Her every argument was
heard and considered. The Court cannot countenance defiance of its authority on
repetitious assertions of the meritoriousness of a party’s cause, no matter how
sincerely or genuinely entertained. There has been a final determination of the
issues in these cases and petitioner has been repeatedly directed to abide thereby.
Her deliberate violation of the orders of the Court are unjustified and inexcusable.
The refusal of petitioner Molina to concede defeat, manifested by her unceasing
attempts to prolong the final disposition of these cases, obstructs the
administration of justice and, therefore, constitutes contempt of Court. Regarding
TMBC and Reyes’ prayer that Atty. Cesar Turiano also be held in contempt, this
court notes that he was not included in the Show Cause Order in the Resolution
dated September 10, 1997. Further, it appears that he withdrew his appearance as
counsel prior to the issuance of the Show Cause Order. Thus, this court shall
refrain from making any pronouncements with regard to Atty. Cesar Turiano.

713
 Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative
(POPARMUCO) v. Inson
G.R. No. 189162, January 30, 2019

FACTS:

For this Court's resolution is a Petition for Contempt filed by

POPARMUCO, a duly organized and registered cooperative of agrarian reform
beneficiaries, against Regional Director Inson of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, Region VII, Cebu City.

Sometime in 2003, a portion of the landholding owned by Polo Coconut

Plantation, Inc. (Polo Coconut) in Polo, Tanjay, Negros Oriental was placed under
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6657.

The Department of Agrarian Reform received from the Land Bank of the
Philippines a Memorandum of Valuation, indicating the amount of P85,491,784.60
as just compensation. After Polo Coconut failed to reply, the Department of
Agrarian Reform conducted summary administrative proceedings to determine
just compensation, in which the previous valuation was affirmed.

Meanwhile, Polo Coconut's title was canceled in favor of the Republic of

the Philippines. A collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was
issued and the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was registered in favor of
POPARMUCO members whom the Department of Agrarian Reform identified as
agrarian reform beneficiaries.

Polo Coconut filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
questioning the propriety of subjecting its property to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. It contended that the City of Tanjay had already
reclassified the area into a mixed residential, commercial, and industrial land. It
also assailed the eligibility of the identified agrarian reform beneficiaries.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Polo Coconut. However, on

September 3, 2008, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals Decision. It
confirmed the acts of the Department of Agrarian Reform and declared the
issuance of TCT and CLOA as valid. The Supreme Court’s Decision became final
and executory.

Almost a year thereafter, 164 alleged regular farmworkers of Polo Coconut

(Alcantara, et al.) filed a Petition for Inclusion as qualified beneficiaries and

714
Exclusion of those named as beneficiaries therein (Petition for
Inclusion/Exclusion). On July 1, 2009, Alcantara, et al. also filed a Petition for
Immediate Issuance of a Cease and Desist Order and/or Injunction. Acting on the
Petition, Regional Director Inson issued a Cease and Desist Order. Inson also
issued Special Order No. 070, series of 2009, creating an independent body to
conduct a revalidation of farmers-beneficiaries in the property.

Hence, POPARMUCO filed before this Court a Petition for Contempt

against respondent Inson, raising the following grounds: 1) Respondent issued a
Cease and Desist Order without any notice in violation of petitioner's members'
constitutional right to due Process; 2) Respondent defied this Court's Decision,
which ruled with finality on the qualification of petitioner's members as
beneficiaries in Polo Coconut's landholding;3) Petitioner's members, as registered
owners of the landholding involved, are entitled to the property as the last step in
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program implementation.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent Regional Director Rodolfo T. Inson is liable for

contempt.

RULING:

No. Petitioner's assertion that respondent's cognizance of the Petition for

Inclusion/Exclusion constituted defiance of the September 3, 2008 Decision does
not lie.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in

opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful
disregard of the court's order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority
of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to
impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act
must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person
cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless
the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so
that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing
is forbidden or required.

The court's contempt power should be exercised with restraint and for a
preservative, and not vindictive, purpose. Only in cases of clear and contumacious
refusal to obey should the power be exercised.

715
 The issue on the qualification of the existing Certificate of Land Ownership
Award holders had long been laid to rest in this Court's final and executory
September 3, 2008 Decision. Still, respondent's erroneous cognizance of the
Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion can only be deemed as grave abuse of discretion,
which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, not a petition for
contempt. No one who is called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.

What is crucial in contempt proceedings is the intent of the alleged

contemnor to disobey or defy the court. In contempt, the intent goes to the
gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor
is considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show
on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith,
is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some
instances, held to be determinative of its character. To constitute contempt, the act
must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.

All told, this Court finds no clear and contumacious conduct on the part of
respondent. His acts do not qualify as a willful disobedience to this Court nor a
willful disregard of its authority.

716
 Webb vs. Gatdula
G.R. No. 194469, September 18, 2019

FACTS:

This is an offshoot of the rape-homicide case Lejano v. People where

petitioner Webb, among others, was charged with the crime of rape with homicide
for allegedly raping Carmel Vizconde (Carmela), then killing her, her mother, and
her sister in 1991.

While the criminal case was pending before the trial court, Webb filed a
Motion to Direct the NBI to Submit Semen Specimen to DNA Analysis. In an April
20, 2010 Resolution, Supreme Court granted the request to order a testing on the
semen specimen found in Carmela’s cadaver, in view of the Rules on DNA
Evidence.

However, the NBI claimed that the specimen was no longer in its custody.
It alleged that the specimen had been submitted as evidence to the trial court when
its Medico-Legal Chief, Dr. Cabanayan, testified. The trial court denied this claim
explaining that what were marked in evidence were photographs of the slides
containing the vaginal smear, not the slides themselves.

Due to the missing specimen, Webb filed a a Petition for Indirect Contempt.
He prays that the impleaded former and current NBI officers be cited for indirect
contempt for impeding, degrading, and obstructing the administration of justice
and for disobeying the April 20, 2010 Resolution of the SC.

In addition, petitioner asserts that the NBI devised a deliberate scheme to

falsely inculpate him, questioning its star witness, Alfaro, who admitted in an
affidavit that she witnessed the crime and identified petitioner. He implicates
respondents Attys. Figueras and Rivera for coaching Alfaro in executing her
dubious affidavit and in the coached identification of petitioner. Petitioner alleges
that these acts amount to improper conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice.

ISSUE:

Can respondents be held in indirect contempt for disobeying the Resolution

of the SC and for the alleged coaching of Alfaro by the respondents?

RULING:

717
 Yes, the respondents can be held in indirect contempt for disobeying the
Resolution of the SC. However, the respondent cannot be held in indirect
contempt for the alleged improper conduct allegedly obstructing the
administration of justice.

Contempt proceedings are sui generis. They may be resorted to in civil,

criminal actins, and independently of any action. It has two-fold aspect: (1) the
proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order;
and (2) to compel his performance of some act or deity required of him by the court
which he refuses to perform. Thus, contempt may be classified as civil or criminal.

Criminal contempt is a conduct that is directed against the dignity and

authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt is one’s failure to fulfill a court order
in a civil action that would benefit the opposing party. It is, therefore, an offense
against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made. Additionally, a
proceeding is criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment. It is directed
against the power and dignity of the court with no element of personal injury
involved. In contrast, a proceeding is civil when the purpose is compensatory or
remedial. It consists in the refusal of a person to do an act that the court had
ordered him to do for the benefit or advantage of a party to an action pending
before the court.

To be held liable for contempt, a person’s act must be done willfully or for
an illegitimate or improper purpose. Thus, the good faith, or lack thereof, of the
person being cited in contempt should be considered. However, intent is a
necessary element only in criminal contempt cases. Because the purpose of civil
contempt proceeding is remedial and not punitive, intent is immaterial. Hence,
good faith or lack of intent to violate the court’s order is not a defense in civil
contempt.

Here, respondents were charged with indirect contempt on two grounds:

(1) disobedience to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a cart; and (2)
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice.

On the first ground, since the order to have the DNA test was made for
petitioner’s benefit, disobedience of or resistance to the order is in the nature of
civil contempt. Petitioner has shown that respondents acted with gross negligence
in safekeeping the specimen in their custody. The facts sufficiently prove that,
indeed, there was willful disobedience on the part of the respondents.

718
 On the second ground, petitioner prays that some of the respondents be
held in contempt for coaching Alfaro. A contempt case in this ground is in the
nature of a criminal contempt. Thus, it must be shown that respondents acted
willfully or for an illegitimate purpose. This implies willfulness, bad faith, or
deliberate intent. Here, respondents were not shown to have planned a deliberate
scheme to inculpate petitioner. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt.
The Court cannot cite a person for criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it
clear that there was intent. Thus, they cannot be held liable for criminal contempt.

719
 Bro. Bernard Oca, et al. v. Laurita Custodio
G.R. No. 199825, July 26, 2017

FACTS:

This indirect contempt case stemmed from an intra-corporate controversy

among the Board of Trustees of petitioner St. Francis School of General Trias,
Cavite, Inc. (St. Francis School).

St. Francis School was established with the assistance of the La Salle
brothers on July 9, 1973 by respondent Laurita Custodio (Custodio), petitioner
Cirila N. Mojica (Cirila), petitioner Josefina Pascual (Josefina), Monsignor Felix
Perez, and Brother Vernon Poore. These five (5) incorporators served as St. Francis
School's Board of Trustees until the latter two (2) passed away. The La Salle
brothers agreed to give the necessary supervision to establish the school's
academic foundation. On September 8, 1988, the incorporators and the La Salle
brothers formalized their arrangement in a Memorandum of Agreement, under
which De La Salle Greenhills (La Salle) would supervise the academic affairs of St.
Francis School to increase enrollment. La Salle appointed supervisors to sit in the
Board of Trustees without voting rights.

In 1998, petitioner Bro. Bernard Oca (Bro. Oca) became a member of St.
Francis School as a La Salle-appointed supervisor. He sat in the Board of Trustees
and was later elected as its Chairman and St. Francis School's President. In 2000,
petitioner Bro. Dennis Magbanua (Bro. Magbanua) was also admitted as a La Salle-
appointed supervisor. He sat as a trustee and was later elected as Treasurer of St.
Francis School.

Sometime in August 2001, the members of the Board of Trustees came into
a disagreement regarding the school's administrative structure and La Salle's
supervision over the school. Cirila, Josefina, Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua wanted
to expand the scope of La Salle's supervision to include matters relating to the
school's finances, administration, and operations. This was opposed by Custodio.

On October 3, 2002, Custodio filed a complaint against petitioners for

violating the Corporation Code with the RTC. She sought to disqualify
Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua as members and trustees of the school and to declare
void all their acts as President and Treasurer, respectively. She likewise prayed for
a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
remaining board members from holding meetings and to prevent Bro. Oca and
Bro. Magbanua from discharging their functions as members, trustees, and officers

720
of St. Francis School. The RTC heard Custodio's prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order. Custodio also filed a Motion for Clarification
praying that the trial court clarify to whom the school's fees should be paid while
her Complaint and Manifestation and Motion were still pending. Petitioners
allegedly manifested that the payment of matriculation fees must be made to
Alejandro. However, Custodio pointed out that Alejandro was not the school
cashier and that the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. was not authorized to receive
payments for St. Francis School. She also manifested that prior to October 8, 2002,
the school cashier was Ms. Herminia Reynante (Reynante).

On October 21, 2002, the RTC issued an Order designating Reynante to act
as school cashier "with authority to collect all fees" and, together with Custodio,
"to pay all accounts." The trial court also directed all parties in the case to submit
a report on and to turn over to Reynante all money previously collected.

On February 21, 2003, petitioners filed an Explanation, Manifestation and

Compliance. They alleged that they partially complied with the October 21, 2002
Order by submitting an accounting on the tuition fee collections and by turning
over to Reynante a manager's check in the amount of P397,127.64 payable to St.
Francis School. The amount allegedly represented the school's matriculation fees
from October to December 2002. However, they alleged that Reynante refused to
accept the check and required that the amount be turned over in cash or in a check
payable to cash. Thus, petitioners placed the check in the custody of the RTC for
safekeeping.

Custodio manifested that petitioners did not even substantially comply

with the October 21, 2002 Order because it excluded from its accounting and
turnover of several amounts. Custodio also claimed that petitioners violated the
trial court order that only she and Reynante were authorized to pay the
outstanding accounts of St. Francis School. Petitioners allegedly made salary
payments to four (4) employees who had resigned.

On March 24, 2003, the RTC issued another Order directing petitioners to
fully comply with its earlier order to submit a report and to turn over to Reynante
all the money they had collected. Petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation,
Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003, praying, among others, that
the trial court issue an order excluding from its March 24, 2003 Order the amounts
which were not covered in its October 21, 2002 Order.

On August 5, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying all motions raised in
petitioners' Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion and
declared that they had not complied with the March 24, 2003 Order.

721
 On August 21, 2003, the RTC issued an Order granting Custodio's
Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002 and issuing a status
quo order allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as school director and
curriculum administrator.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Clarification. They alleged that the bulk of
the money ordered to be turned over to Custodio and Reynante was allotted to St.
Francis School's teachers' retirement fund. Considering that it must be preserved,
petitioners raised several queries. They wanted to know if Custodio and Reynante
would use the money for other purposes other than for the teachers' retirement
benefit and if Custodio and Reynante would be required to file a bond to guaranty
its safekeeping and exclusive use as teacher's retirement compensation. Finally,
they asked who would be held liable in case of Custodio and Reynante's unlawful
use of this fund.

On September 2, 2003, Custodio filed the Petition to Cite Respondents in

Contempt of Court under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. She likewise prayed that
an order be issued reiterating the Orders dated October 21, 2002, March 24, 2003,
and August 5, 2003.

In response to petitioners' Motion for Clarification, the trial court issued an

Order dated October 8, 2003 clarifying that the retirement fund was to be held in
trust by Custodio and Reynante. It also directed Custodio and Reynante to file a
bond of P300,000.00 each. Later, it ordered petitioners to comply with the mandate
in the March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders and directed them to disclose to
the court the total amount of the fund deposited and reserved for teachers'
retirement benefit and its bank details. On October 10, 2003, petitioners filed their
Petition for Certiorari before the CA to question the RTC's Orders dated August 5,
2003, August 21, 2003 and October 8, 2003. Eventually, this was elevated to this
Court and was docketed as G.R. No. 174996.

Meanwhile, trial commenced for the contempt case. Custodio presented as

her lone witness, Joseph Custodio (Joseph), St. Francis School's finance and
property resource development administrator. Petitioners did not present any
witness.

In its Decision dated February 6, 2008, the RTC found petitioners guilty of
indirect contempt for failing to comply with the Orders dated October 21, 2002 and
March 24, 2003 and ordered them to jointly and severally pay a fine of
P30,000.00. It likewise directed them to account for the amount that they had paid

722
the four (4) teachers who had already resigned. The CA affirmed the trial court
Decision.

The CA ruled that defying the trial court orders amounted to contumacious
conduct, which "tended to prejudice St. Francis School's operations due to lack of
operational funds."

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review via Rule 45 arguing, among others,
that they complied with the October 21, 2002 Order in good faith and that the
validity of the March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders were being assailed in a
separate case with this Court. Likewise, they contended that there was reasonable
doubt on their guilt. Petitioners held that to be cited for contempt, the contemnor
must be guilty of willful disobedience. However, they did not disobey the trial
court orders. They insisted that they had complied in good faith because the trial
court October 21, 2002 Order only pertained to the school's matriculation fees and
not any other fees. They claimed that the October 21, 2002 Order was a response
to Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002, which only
requested that the matriculation fees be turned over to Reynante. Thus, they
averred that it was reasonable for them to conclude that the subject of the turnover
was the matriculation fees only.

Custodio filed her Comment arguing, among others, that there was clear
and contumacious defiance of the trial court orders and that the guilt of petitioners
was established beyond reasonable doubt. Custodio posited that petitioners only
remitted the matriculation fees in the amount of P397,127.64. They did not render
a report on the amount or turned over any other amounts. They only partially
complied with the trial court orders. Custodio pointed out that petitioners paid
the salaries of four (4) teachers who had already resigned despite the trial court
order that only Custodio and Reynante were authorized to settle St. Francis
School's accountabilities. Custodio argued that petitioners did not refute the
evidence she presented but merely attested that the orders only pertained to
matriculation fees. Custodio insisted that the trial court March 24, 2003 Order was
a clarification, not an expanded version, of its October 21, 2002
Order. Custodio reasoned that the March 24, 2003 Order was not even among the
orders they questioned in G.R. No. 174996; thus, showing that they were not acting
in good faith. She insisted that their claim of lack of due process was merely an
afterthought after they were directed several times to comply with the trial court
orders.

Similarly, Custodio claimed, that the August 5, 2003 Order of the RTC was
not a violation of petitioners' right to due process. It was issued in connection with
their motion to set aside the March 24, 2003 Order, which was heard. Moreover,

723
the August 5, 2003 Order was a mere reiteration of the March 24, 2003 Order.
Custodio held that the trial court orders are deemed valid and are entitled to
respect while they are not yet reversed by a higher court.
Meanwhile, on December 3, 2014, during the pendency of this indirect
contempt case, this SC issued a Decision in G.R. No. 174996, which found that the
assailed Orders dated August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003 of the RTC were valid.

ISSUE:
Are petitioners guilty of indirect contempt?

RULING:

YES, petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt.

Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or

defiance of its authority, justice, and dignity. It constitutes conduct which "tends
to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute
or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice" or "interfere with
or prejudice parties-litigant or their witnesses during litigation."

There are two (2) types of contempt of court: (i) direct contempt and (ii)
indirect contempt. Direct contempt consists of "misbehavior in the presence of
or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before it." Indirect
contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated under Rule 71,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court, relevant to this case is (b) of the enumeration:

“(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or

judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts
or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto”

724
 In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt
through "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court." To resolve this, it is important to determine whether
petitioners are guilty of willful disobedience and whether petitioners can refuse
to follow the orders of the RTC on the premise that their legality is being
questioned in the SC.

Petitioners insist that they have complied with the October 21, 2002 Order
in good faith as they have already turned over the matriculation fees to
Reynante. They claim that this Order pertained to the matriculation fees only,
excluding any other fees, as it was issued in connection with Custodio's Motion
for Clarification dated October 14, 2002, which requested that the matriculation
fees be turned over to Reynante. Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated
October 14, 2002 allegedly did not cover other fees. However, the October 21,
2002 Order did not pertain to matriculation fees only.

The wording of the October 21, 2002 Order is clear that the amounts do
not pertain only to the matriculation fees but to all collectibles, all fees, and
all accounts. It also states that petitioners were to render a report and turn
over all the amounts they had previously collected. It does not state that only
matriculation fees were to be handed over. Consequently, the RTC did not
unduly expand the scope of the October 21, 2002 Order when it issued its March
24, 2003 Order.

However, despite its clear wording, petitioners still did not comply with
the March 24, 2003 Order. Instead, they filed a Manifestation, Observation,
Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003, praying that the trial court
exclude the other amounts, which were allegedly not included in the October 21,
2002 Order.

The trial court noted that petitioners still had not complied with its March
24, 2003 Order and reiterated that they must submit a report and turn over all
the money they had collected. Still, petitioners refused to comply.

On August 21, 2003, the trial court granted Custodio's Manifestation and
Motion dated October 9, 2002. It issued a status quo order allowing Custodio to
discharge her functions as school director and curriculum administrator because
it found that petitioners had already established a new school. However,

725
petitioners still did not comply despite this Order. Instead, they filed their
September 1, 2003 Motion for Clarification, raising questions on Custodio's use
of the turned over money, Custodio's and Reynante's bonds as guaranty to the
money's exclusive use as teachers' retirement fund, and petitioners' liability in
case of Custodio's misuse of this amount.

The trial court responded to petitioners' Motion for Clarification dated

September 1, 2003 and issued its October 8, 2003 Order, agreeing that the
retirement fund would be merely held in trust by Custodio and Reynante. It also
directed Custodio and Reynante to file a bond of P300,000.00 each. Again, it
ordered petitioners to comply with the mandate in its March 24, 2003 and August
5, 2003 Orders and directed them to inform the court the total amount of the
money deposited and reserved for teachers' retirement and its bank account
details.

Nonetheless, petitioners still did not comply. Instead, they argued in the
contempt proceeding that the March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders were
unlawful and were being questioned in G.R. No. 174996. They claimed that their
availment of legal remedies showed their good faith.

All these acts show petitioners' contumacious refusal to abide by the

orders of the trial court. Their defense that they were denied due process
deserves little consideration. Petitioners had attended hearings and had filed
several pleadings showing that they were given several opportunities to present
their position on the matter. All these were considered before the trial court
rendered its orders. Thus, the SC has ruled that petitioners Oca, Magbanua,
Cirila, and Josefina are guilty of indirect contempt.

726
 David Yu Kimteng v. Atty. Walter T. Young
G.R. No. 210554, August 5, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioners are the majority stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation

which this court ordered to be liquidated. The Respondents are lawyers practicing
under the firm Young Revilla Gambol & Magat. They entered their appearance in
the liquidation proceedings as counsels for the liquidator.

An Opposition was filed against the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol

& Magat on the ground that Revilla was already disbarred in 2009. Petitioners filed
this Petition under Rule 71 to cite respondents in contempt. Petitioners cite San
Luis v. Pineda and United States v. Ney, et al. to support their argument that the use
of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is tantamount to contempt of court.

The firm replied stating that the firm opted to retain Revilla's name as an
act of charity and for sentimental reasons. They explained that they did not intend
to deceive the public and that in any case, the retention of Revilla's name "does not
give added value to the law firm nor does it enhance the standing of the member
lawyers thereof." They further argue that the non-deletion of Revilla’s name in the
Firm's name is no more misleading than including the names of dead or retired
partners in a law firm's name.

ISSUE:

Did the firm commit contempt of court when they continued to use a
disbarred lawyer’s name in their firm name?

RULING:

Yes. Rule 71, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides, among
other grounds, that any person guilty of any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice and assuming to
be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority may be
punished for indirect contempt.

This court has defined contempt of court as a willful disregard or

disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of,
or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an
interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its

727
presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect
due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends
a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of
court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, respondents committed acts that are considered indirect
contempt under Section 3 of Rule 71. In addition, respondents disregarded Canon
3, Rule 3.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when they retained the
name of respondent Revilla in their firm name. Such provision states that “in the
choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The
continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the
firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased.”

Respondents argue that the use of respondent Revilla's name is "no more
misleading than including the names of dead or retired partners in a law firm's
name." But maintaining a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is different
from using a deceased partner's name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows
the use of a deceased partner's name as long as there is an indication that the
partner is deceased. This ensures that the public is not misled. On the other hand,
the retention of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name may mislead the public
into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law.

This court has ruled that the use of the name of a person who is not
authorized to practice law constitutes contempt of court. From the time Revilla
was disbarred in 2009, it appears that no efforts were exerted to remove his name
from the firm name. Thus, Respondents are held liable for contempt of court.

728
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF
DECEASED PERSONS

RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estates

Section 4 - Liability of Distributees and Estate

Onofre Andres v. PNB

G.R. No. 173548, October 15, 2014

FACTS:

Reynaldo Andres inherited a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija. He and his wife
Janette de Leon mortgaged the property in favor respondent Philippine National
Bank (PNB) in 1995. After the spouses defaulted in the payment of the loan, PNB
foreclosed the mortgaged and consolidated title in its name. In 1996, petitioner
Onofre Andres, uncle of Reynaldo, filed a complaint for cancellation of title and
reconveyance over the property claiming that the title in mortgagor’s name was
based on a falsified Deed of Self- Adjudication.

The complaint alleged that Reynaldo, in collusion with his mother,

executed a false Deed of Self-Adjudication of Sole Heir in 1994. The deed stated
that Reynaldo was the sole of heir of his father who died in 1968 and his mother
in 1969, when in fact, the mother was still alive during its execution and the father
died only in 1990. In addition, petitioner claimed that the subject property was
originally owned by his parents Victor and Filomena Andres. In 1965, after the
death of their father, six out of the nine children and their mother executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition with sale over one half of the property pro indiviso in
favor of Reynaldo’s father, Roman. However, the partition was also fictitious since
it was only made for Roman and his wife to acquire a loan. There was no
publication, consideration, and three of the living children did not participate in
the partition.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered to reinstate the certificate
of title in the name of Victor and Filomena Andres. On appeal, CA modified the
decision of RTC and upheld the title of respondent PNB as mortgagee in good
faith. Petitioner argued that PNB is not a mortgagee in good faith since its

729
appraiser Gerardo Pestano failed to consider the two-year period under Rule 74,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court during its investigation.

ISSUE:
Was PNB was negligent in failing to consider Rule 74, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court during its investigation?

RULING:
No.

Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court does not apply in the case at bar.
Under the section, if it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the
settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either
of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person
may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter
provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation.

Here, the two-year period under Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
had lapsed, and petitioner did not allege if any heir or creditor of Roman Andres
and his wife had invoked their right under this provision. Further, the provision
was no longer annotated on the title at the time the title was submitted to PNB as
collateral for the loan. Lastly, the section does not apply to Onofre Andres who
never alleged being an excluded heir or unpaid creditor of his brother Roman
Andres and Roman’s wife. Hence, PNB is a mortgagee in good faith.

730
 RULE 102
Writ of Habeas Corpus

Section 1 - To what Habeas Corpus extends

In re Salibo v. Warden
G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015

FACTS:

Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7, 2009 to

December 19, 2009 for the Hajj Pilgrimage. On August 3, 2010, when he was
already in the Philippines, he learned that police officers suspected him to be
Butukan S. Malang who was one of the accused in the November 23, 2009
Maguindanao Massacre case. Salibo presented himself before the police officers to
clear his name. Despite presenting his passport, boarding passes, and other
documents to support his allegations that he was not the accused, the police
officers still apprehended and detained him.

Salibo filed an Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of
his detention and deprivation of his liberty, maintaning that he was not the
accused Butukan S. Malang, that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant
of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred to by the Warden all point to
Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused. A Writ of Habeas
Corpus was issued, and subsequently, the trial court found that Salibo was not
judicially charged nor validly arrested. Hence, the petition was granted and
Salibo’s immediate release was ordered. On appeal, however, this was reversed
by the CA, who ruled that the orderly course of trial must be pursued and the
usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked. According to the CA,
the proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.

ISSUE:

Is the remedy of habeas corpus availing?

RULING:

Yes.

The remedy of habeas corpus is availing. Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the

731
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The
primary purpose of the writ is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint
as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
is illegal.

It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person
allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the
court. The restraint then has become legal, and the remedy of habeas corpus is
rendered moot and academic. In this case, however, when petitioner Salibo was in
the presence of the police officers, he was neither committing nor attempting to
commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense
that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo
without a warrant.

None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to Salibo.
Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect could not have been
cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant
of Arrest from “Butukan S. Malang” to “Datukan Malang Salibo” will not cure the
lack of preliminary investigation in this case. Since he was deprived of his right to
liberty without due process of law, a petition for habeas corpus is the proper
remedy.

732
Section 2 - Who may grant the writ

In re Salibo v. Warden
G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015

FACTS:

Datukan Malang Salibo was suspected to be Butukan S. Malang who was one
of the accused in the Maguindanao Massacre case. When Salibo presented himself
before the police officers to clear his name, they detained him for a long period of
time. Hence, Salibo filed before the CA the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus.

The CA issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the
Second Vice Executive Judge of the RTC, Pasig City. Finding that Salibo was not
judicially charged nor validly arrested by the police officers, the RTC granted the
petition and Salibo’s immediate release was ordered. On appeal, however, this
was reversed by the CA.

Salibo questioned the appeal to the CA, alleging that although the CA
delegated to the RTC the authority to hear the Return, the RTC’s decision should
be deemed a decision of the CA, hence appeal should have been made before the
SC.

ISSUE:

Is the appeal to the CA proper?

RULING:

Yes. Appeal to the CA is proper. When a superior court issues a writ of habeas
corpus, the superior court only resolves whether the respondent should be
ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the
petition was filed was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty. However,
once the superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by
the Rules of Court, the lower court designated “does not thereby become merely
a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusions are devoid of effect.”
The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the lower court, not
of the superior court. Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision
appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower
court. Hence, in this case, since the CA made the Writ returnable to the RTC,
appeal to the CA was proper.

733
Section 4 - When writ not allowed or discharge authorized

Osorio v. Navera
G.R. No. 223272 (Resolution), February 26, 2018

FACTS:

SSgt. Osorio was charged in two informations for allegedly kidnapping

University of the Philippines Students Karen Empeño and Sherlyn Cadapan.
Warrants of arrest were issued against SSgt. Osorio on December 19, 2011. The
next day, Ssgt. Osorio was arrested and was turned over to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Unit Group in Camp Crame and was detained in
Bulacan Provincial Jail. He was later transferred to the Philippine Army Custodial
Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City where he is currently detained.

Contending that he was illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed
a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals on July 21, 2015
contending that court-martial and not civil courts had jurisdiction to try the
criminal case considering that he was a soldier on active duty and that the offense
charged was allegedly service-connected. He also argued that the Ombudsman
had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation and the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction to try the case because among his co-accused was Major General
Palparan, a public officer with salary grade higher than 28. The Court of Appeals
held that SSgt. Osorio’s confinement was by virtue of a valid judgment or a judicial
process. Ssgt. Osorio’s Motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA. He
then filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

HELD:

No.

The "great writ of liberty" of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." Habeas corpus is an
extraordinary, summary, and equitable writ, consistent with the law's "zealous
regard for personal liberty." Its primary purpose "is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person

734
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient."

The restraint of liberty need not be confined to any offense so as to entitle a

person to the writ. Habeas corpus may be availed of as a post-conviction
remedy or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode.

However, a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person

allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the
court. The restraint then has become legal. Therefore, the remedy of habeas corpus
is rendered moot and academic. Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that

the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with
or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment.

735
 A.M. No. 07-09-12-SC
Writ of Amparo

Sanchez v. Darroca
G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019
FACTS:

Sanchez learned that her estranged husband was among the 7 alleged
members of the New People’s Army who were gunned down by the PNP. When
she went to the funeral home to identify the body, the police officers took photos
of her without her permission. Out of fear, she left without identifying the body.

She went back to the funeral home where 3 police officers threatened to
apprehend and charge her with obstruction of justice if she refused to answer her
questions. Fearing for her safety, she hurried home without confirming the
identity of her husband’s body. Two police officers then went to her house and
showed the photo of a cadaver which she confirmed to be her husband. In the
following days, a police car would frequently drive-by her house and tailed her
and her family, and she also noticed someone shadowing her when she was
outside her house.

This prompted Sanchez to file before the RTC a Petition for Writ if Amparo
against respondents alleging that the police officer’s constant surveillance of her
and her family made them fear for their safety and prevented them from going out
of their house.

In their Verified return, the police officers denied violating or threatening

to violate Sanchez and her family’s right to life, liberty and security. They stressed
that the allegations were grounded on baseless assumptions, hearsay, mistaken
belief, speculations, impressions and feelings.

The RTC denied the petition for failing to substantiate her assertion that she
became a person of interest to the police after identifying the body. This was
because she was unable to specifically allege the police officers’ acts or the acts
which threatened her security and liberty.

ISSUE:

Is hearsay evidence admissible to establish the allegations to warrant the

issue of a writ of Amparo?

736
HELD:

Yes.

The remedy of Writ of Amparo, being a summary proceeding, requires only

substantial evidence to provide rapid judicial relief to the petitioner. It is such
evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be
reasonably inferred.

Additionally, hearsay evidence, which is generally considered inadmissible

under the rules of evidence, may be considered in a writ of Amparo proceeding if
required by the unique circumstances of the case. Although hearsay evidence may
be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, the substantial evidence
rule was not dispensed with. The evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence
was merely relaxed, maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance
that underlie every evidentiary situation by considering the totality of the
obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with other
available evidence in the case.

The totality of petitioner’s evidence undoubtedly showed that she became

a person of interest after she had first visited the funeral home, where her photo
was taken. Respondents try to paint petitioner’s claims as the ramblings of a
paranoid and over suspicious person, but even her daughter confirmed the
numerous times the police drove by their house and being tailed whenever they
set foot outside their house. This shows that petitioner was not merely imagining
the threats against her and her family. It also likewise showed that they were the
subject of surveillance because of their relationship with the suspected member of
the New People’s Army, creating a real threat to their life liberty or security. Thus,
Petition is granted.

737
 De Lima v. Gatdula
G.R. No. 204528, February 19, 2013

FACTS:

Respondent Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in

the RTC-Manila. The Amparo was directed against petitioners De Lima, et al.
Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. “to cease and desist from framing up petitioner
(Gatdula) for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated
Murder against petitioner (Gatdula) in relation to the alleged ambush incident.”

Thereafter, the judge issued summons and order De Lima et al. to file an
Answer. He also set the case for hearing. The hearing was held allegedly for
determining whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During that
hearing, counsel for De Lima et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is
appropriate in Amparo cases.

In an Order, the judge insisted that since no writ has been issued, return is
not the required pleading but answer. The judge noted that the Rules of Court
apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer. The judge then
proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case. Even without a Return nor an
Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda. The court
further decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of
their Answer.

The RTC then rendered a “Decision” granting the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo. It also granted the interim reliefs prayed for. De Lima et al. filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but the same was denied. Thereafter, De Lima et al. filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Did the RTC follow the procedure under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC?

RULING:

No.

The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary

remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security enshrined
in the 1987 Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise

738
of the Supreme Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among
others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Due to the delicate and
urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift but
decisive relief.

It is initiated through a petition to be filed in a Regional Trial Court,

Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. The judge or justice
then makes an "immediate" evaluation of the facts as alleged in the petition and
the affidavits submitted "with the attendant circumstances detailed". After
evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately
dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits
do not show that the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security is under threat or
the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the
writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The
court compels the respondent to appear before a court of law to show whether the
grounds for more permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary.

The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of the writ
through the clerk of court. The Return serves as responsive pleading to the
petition. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from identifying
the issues in the case. Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had
taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the
respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the
actions they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party: (ii) recover
and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning
the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and time
of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought
about the death or disappearance; and (v) bring the suspected offenders before a
competent court.

There will be summary hearing only after Return is filed to determine the
merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is
not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte. After the hearing, the court will render
the judgment within 10 days from the time the petition is submitted for decision.

If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant
the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. The
judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the
continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must
be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions

739
taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the
Supreme Court via Rule 45.

In the present case, the insistence on filing the Answer was inappropriate.
It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for issuance of
Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of
the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose life, liberty and security are
violated or are threatened to be violated. Furthermore, the Rules on Summary
Procedure is not applicable in Amparo proceedings. It is only applicable to
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. Aside from that, it is only applicable to certain civil and
criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. Secondly, there was an
irregularity in the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of
the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have
been properly enjoined. Thirdly, there was an irregularity when the trial court
required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading of De Lima et al. The
Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a
hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum,
on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final
pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot
substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in
facilitating the suit. More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Fourthly, there is an irregularity when the
trial court granted “the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by
the petitioner” in its Decision. The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be
distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege
includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached
affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the
judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate,
if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty
or security. A judgment, which simply grants “the privilege of the writ”, cannot
be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial
succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses
cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo."The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal
that petitioners used in elevating the matter to this Court. The Decision which
granted the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
is not a judgment under Section 18 of the same law. A Decision under Section 6 is
thus an interlocutory order, which cannot be the subject of appeal to the Supreme
Court via Rule 45.

740
 RULE 108
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

Section 2 - Entries Subject to Cancellation or Correction

Miller v. Miller
G.R. No. 200344, August 28, 2019

FACTS:

John Miller (John) and Beatriz Marcaida were legally married. They bore 4
children, namely: Glenn, Charles, Betty, and John Jr. After John's death, Joan Miller
(Joan), through her mother Lennie Espenida (Lennie), filed Petition for Partition
and Accounting of John's estate. Alleging that she is John's illegitimate child with
Lennie, Joan presented her Certificate of Live Birth which showed John to be her
registered father. Glenn filed a separate Petition praying that Joan's Certificate of
Live Birth be cancelled, with a prayer to replace Joan's surname, Miller, with
Espenida. Glenn claimed that John did not acknowledge Joan as a natural child,
pointing out that John's signature was not in her birth certificate. Joan countered
that John openly and continuously recognized her as his child during his lifetime.
Moreover, in his holographic will, he gave Joan a 1/8 share of his estate. RTC ruled
in favor of Joan. CA denied Glenn's appeal, ruling that John's holographic will,
where he gave Joan 1/8 of his estate, sufficiently established his paternity. The
surviving legal heirs of Glenn, substituted the latter, and filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari against Joan and the Local Civil Registrar.

ISSUE:

Is the Court of Appeals correct in allowing Joan Miller y Espenida to

continue using the surname Miller?

RULING:

Yes.

The Supreme Court explained in In re: Barretto v. The Local Registrar of Manila
that, ". . . the summary procedure for correction of entries in the civil registry under
article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to
"innocuous or clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding" or corrections that are not
controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence. Here, petitioners sought
the correction of private respondent's surname in her birth certificate. What

741
petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of correcting
a single letter in private respondent's surname due to a misspelling. Rather,
private respondent's filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her surname
from Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only her
identity, but her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental , this
Court emphasized that "legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack."
Moreover, impugning the legitimacy of a child is governed by Article 171 of the
Family Code, not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

742
 R.A. 9048
Act Authorizing the C/MCR or Consul General to Correct a Clerical
or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or
Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order

Republic v. Gallo
G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018

FACTS:

Gallo has never been known as "Michael Soriano Gallo." She has always
been female. Her parents, married on 23 May 1981, have never changed their
names. To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the
RTC for the correction of her name from "Michael" to "Michelle" and of her
biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In
addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano" her mother's
middle name, "Angangan;" her father's middle name, "Balingao;" and her parent's
marriage date, 23 May 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not
recorded.

The RTC granted Gallo’s petition under Rule 108. The OSG assailed the
RTC’s ruling and argued that the petition should have been made under Rule 103.
Court of Appeals, denied the OSG’s appeal. It found that Gallo availed of the
proper remedy under Rule 108 as the corrections sought were clerical, harmless,
and innocuous. It also stated that Republic Act No. 10172, "the present law on the
matter, classifies a change in the first name or nickname, or sex of a person as
clerical error that may be corrected without a judicial order." It applied this ruling
on the inclusion of Gallo's middle name, her parents' middle names, and the
latter's date of marriage, as they do not involve substantial corrections. As the
petition merely involved the correction of clerical errors, the Court of Appeals held
that a summary proceeding would have succeed. However, OSG believes
otherwise. For it, Gallo wants to change the name that she was given.

Petitioner holds that since the applicable rule is Rule 103, Gallo was not able
to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Section
2 of this Rule. It also argues that the use of a different name is not a reasonable
ground to change name under Rule 103. Finally, petitioner insists that Gallo failed
to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction 38 as Republic Act No. 9048 allegedly now governs the change of first
name, superseding the civil registrar's jurisdiction over the matter.

743
ISSUE:

Is Gallo’s relief governed by R.A. No. 9048, Rule 103 or Rule 108?

RULING:

Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar.

The change in the entry of Gallo's biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court while Republic Act No. 9048 applies to all other corrections
sought. Thus, she should have sought the correction thereof administratively.
Upon scrutiny of the records in this case, this Court rules that Gallo's Petition
involves a mere correction of clerical errors.

R.A. No. 9048 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded

mistake, "which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding. By
qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual
determination made after reference to and evaluation of existing documents
presented.

Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely

correcting the misspelling of her given name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled
as "Michael," especially since the first four (4) letters of these two (2) names are
exactly the same. The differences only pertain to an additional letter "a" in
"Michael," and "le" at the end of "Michelle." "Michelle" and "Michael" may also be
vocalized similarly, considering the possibility of different accents or intonations
of different people. In any case, Gallo does not seek to be known by a different
appellation. The lower courts have determined that she has been known as
"Michelle" all throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her records to
conform to her true given name.

Republic Act No. 9048 was enacted on March 22, 2001 and removed the
correction of clerical or typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108. It also
dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or
typographical mistakes in the civil register, or changes of first name or nickname.
Thus:

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of

First Name or Nickname. — No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city

744
or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical
if it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or
circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used. However, corrections which
involve a change in nationality, age, or status are not considered clerical or
typographical.

The corrections in Gallo’s Certificate of Live Birth regarding her first name,
inclusion of her middle name, inclusion of her parents’ middle names and her
parents’ date of marriage, may be done by referring to existing records in the civil
register. None of it involves any change in Gallo's nationality, age, status, or sex.
Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them
administratively before filing a petition under Rule 108.

However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed
under Rule 108 as this was a substantial change excluded in the definition of
clerical or typographical errors in R.A. No. 9048.

745
 THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

RULE 110
Prosecution of Offenses

Section 1. Institution of criminal actions

De Lima v. Reyes
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016

FACTS:

Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry," was a
veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in Palawan. On 24 January 2011,
at around 10:30 am, he was shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in
San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. After a brief chase with police officers,
Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession
admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Edrad, Aranas, Noel, Jr.

On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the

Counter-Terrorism Division of the NBI where he alleged that it was former
Palawan Governor Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. On February 7,
2011, Secretary Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 091 creating a special
panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. The First
Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued the Resolution
dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega's wife, filed
a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the
mastermind of her husband's murder. The Secretary of Justice issued DO No. 710
creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case and to address the offer of additional evidence denied by the First
Panel. The Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of informations on all accused, including former
Governor Reyes. Governor Reyes filed a petition for Review before the Secretary
of Justice. An information was filed before the court was the petition was pending.

ISSUES:

Whether this Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by
the filing of the information in court, pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul

HELD:

746
 Yes.

Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the
case and any motion to dismiss the case or to determine the accused's guilt or
innocence rests within the sound discretion of the court.

Thus, it would be ill-advised for the Secretary of Justice to proceed with

resolving respondent's Petition for Review pending before her. It would be more
prudent to refrain from entertaining the Petition considering that the trial court
already issued a warrant of arrest against respondent. The issuance of the warrant
signifies that the trial court has made an independent determination of the
existence of probable cause.

Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding
or recommendation by the First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause
exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable cause
has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has
transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of
the preliminary investigation in any other venue has been rendered moot by the
issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.

747
 Reynes v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)
G.R. No. 223405, February 20, 2019

FACTS:

This resolves a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure praying that the Resolution and Order of public respondent Office
of the Ombudsman (Visayas), through Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer
I Michael M. Mernado, Jr. (Atty. Mernado), be set aside for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Carlo L. Reynes (Reynes), manager of Blue Reef Beach Resort Cottages and
Hotel (the resort) located in Barangay Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, alleged
that Barangay Captain Amores collected increased monthly garbage collection
fees amounting to P2,000.00, even without any ordinance or statute, or any other
regulation authorizing its collection, and despite the City of Lapu-Lapu already
collecting its own garbage fees. When Reynes questioned the increase in the
collection fee, Barangay Captain Lucresia M. Amores never gave an explanation
in response; instead, she ordered the cessation of the collection of the resort's
garbage.

Aggrieved, Reynes wrote a letter dated 8 August 2011 to Amores

questioning her authority to levy garbage collection fees, considering that the same
fees were already being paid to the City of Lapu-Lapu alongside business taxes
and fees for licenses, and considering that no public hearing was ever conducted.
Copies of this letter were furnished to the offices of the City Mayor, Vice Mayor,
City Attorney, and City Secretary.

Amores still offered no explanation and, in a meeting, merely told Reynes'

wife that the collection of P2,000.00 was "final and unalterable.” Left with no
alternative, lest the resort's garbage be left uncollected, Reynes relented to paying
P2,000.00 monthly.

Reynes recounted the Barangay's garbage truck driver’s statement,

informing both the resort's supervisor and checker that Barangay Captain Amores
ordered the cessation of garbage collection. This was allegedly upon Kagawad
Maribel Hontiveros' (Hontiveros) instigation, a she was offended by an incident
from two (2) days prior. Referring to an Incident Report prepared by the resort's
staff, Reynes recalled that on June 1, 2014, Kagawad Hontiveros, along with some
companions, tried to enter the resort but was not immediately allowed to enter.
Instead, she was as ked to present an identification card per the resort's standard
procedure.

748
 Reynes filed a complaint for illegal exactions under Article 213 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code against Amores and Hontiveros with the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman dismissed the complaint. Reynes filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court questioning the Ombudsman’s resolution dismissing the
complaint.

ISSUE:

Is there probable cause to warrant a filing of an information against

private respondents?

RULING:

As regards Amores, yes but as regards Hontiveros, no.

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been
defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The
term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does
not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that

more likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense.

Determining whether probable cause exists for the filing of an information

is an executive function. It is not a power that rests in courts. Generally, courts do
not disturb conclusions made by public prosecutors. This is due to the basic
principle of separation of powers. Nonetheless, "grave abuse of discretion taints a
public prosecutor's resolution if he or she arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential
parameters of probable cause." As such, in keeping with the principle of checks
and balances, a writ of certiorari may issue and undo the prosecutor's iniquitous
determination.

749
 A determination of probable cause must be made in reference to the
elements of the crime charged. Liability under Article 213(2) ensues when the
following elements are demonstrated: First, that the offender is a public officer
who is "entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts."
Second, that he or she engages in any of the three (3) specified acts or omissions
under Article 213(2): "demanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums
different from or larger than those authorized by law; failing voluntarily to issue
a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him officially; or
collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise,
things or objects of a nature different from that provided by law."

The evidence sustains a "reasonable belief that private respondent Amores

"demanded the payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized
by law." Petitioner's position is precisely that there was no ordinance or any other
regulation that enabled the levying of garbage collection fees. To demand that he
produce one such ordinance was a farcically futile exercise. Private respondent
Amores violated Article 213(2) by her mere act of demanding payment—
regardless of the amount—because she was, to begin with, not allowed to demand
anything.

However, this Court finds no probable cause to indict private respondent

Hontiveros for illegal exactions. By petitioner's own allegations, private
respondent Hontiveros' involvement arose only after the June 1, 2014 incident
when the resort was supposed to have allowed her entry only after presenting an
identification card. The charge that she induced private respondent Amores to
order ceasing the collection of the resort's garbage, if true, is by no means righteous
conduct that this Court condones. However, insofar as the charge of illegal
exactions is concerned, it does not appear that private respondent Hontiveros
herself acted in concert with private respondent Amore in demanding and
facilitating inordinate collections. It also does not appear that she, by herself or
through someone acting on her instruction, collected or received the amounts
delivered by petitioner.

750
 People v. Feliciano, Jr.
G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014

FACTS:

On December 8, 1994, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity were
having lunch at the Beach House Canteen near the Main Library of the University
of the Philippines when they were attacked by several masked men carrying
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of the sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.

An information for murder was filed against the accused-appellants who

are members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as they were identified by the victims
as the alleged perpetrators of the crime. Upon evaluation of the evidence
presented, the trial court rendered its decision finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The
accused-appellants argue that their constitutional rights were violated when the
information against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of
masks despite the fact that the prosecution presented testimonial evidence that not
all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.

ISSUE:

Did the act of the prosecution in including the aggravating circumstance

of use of masks in the information despite presenting testimonial evidence
contrary thereto violate the accused-appellants right to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against them?

RULING:

No.

Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides that complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense
was committed. Therefore, the test of sufficiency of Information is whether it
enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and
the court to render judgment properly.

751
 Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase
"wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information does not
violate their constitutional rights. It should be remembered that every aggravating
circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an
aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as
such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the
information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible
by the trial court.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to

prove that the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them
from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in
alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment
of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was,
therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the
offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.

752
 Napoles v. De Lima
G.R. No. 213529 July 13, 2016

FACTS:

Arturo Luy, Gertrudes Luy, Arthur Luy, and Annabelle Luy alleged that a
family member, Benhur Luy, had been detained against his will, transferred from
place to place in a bid to cover up the JLN Group of Companies' anomalous
transactions involving Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Secretary
of Justice De Lima directed the NBI Special Task Force to investigate the matter.
This led to a “rescue operation” to release Benhur Luy.

Finding no probable cause against Lim and Napoles, Prosecutor Navera

recommended the dismissal of the complaint for serious illegal detention.
Prosecutor Navera’s recommendation was initially approved by Prosecutor
General Arellano. However, in the Review Resolution Senior Deputy State
Prosecutor and Chair of the Task Force on Anti-Kidnapping Theodore M.
Villanueva (Prosecutor Villanueva) reversed the Resolution. An Information for
serious illegal detention was thereafter filed against Napoles and Lim.
Recommending no bail for Napoles and Lim, Judge Alameda issued a warrant for
their arrest.

ISSUE:

Is there grave abuse of discretion in the filing of Information against

Napoles?

RULING:

No.

The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari,
there was no grave abuse of discretion either in the filing of information in court
or in the issuance of the arrest warrant against Napoles.

As explained in Crespo v. Mogul, the filing of a complaint or information in

Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing
of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by
the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or
was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.

753
 The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the
accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In
turn, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the
accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation, the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action.

While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had
already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be
proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the
Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused, or the right of the People to due process of law.

In this case, however, a petition for certiorari before this Court was not the
"plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" because, the
trial court already acquired jurisdiction over the case. The proper remedy for
Napoles was to proceed to trial and allow the exhaustive presentation of evidence
by the parties.

754
Section 5 - Who must prosecute criminal actions

Valderrama v. People
G.R. No. 220054, March 27, 2017

FACTS:

The city prosecutor filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 43 four (4) Informations for grave oral defamation against Deogracia
M. Valderrama (Valderrama), pursuant to a complaint filed by Josephine ABL
Vigden (Vigden).

During the trial on April 12, 2012, Vigden was present but the private
prosecutor was absent despite notice. On motion of the defense, the Metropolitan
Trial Court considered the prosecution to have waived its right to present further
evidence and required a formal offer of its documentary evidence within five (5)
days. The prosecution failed to formally offer its evidence within five (5) days from
the hearing.

On May 8, 2012, Vigden filed a Very Urgent Motion to Reconsider (Motion

to Reconsider) explaining that the private prosecutor failed to appear because he
had to manage his high blood pressure.

Valderrama filed an opposition arguing that the public prosecutor did not
give his conformity to Vigden's Motion to Reconsider, in violation of Rule 110,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court, and the Motion to Reconsider's Notice of Hearing
"was defective because it was not addressed to the parties, and did not specify the
date and time of the hearing."

The motion to reconsider was granted.

Valderrama argues that the Metropolitan Trial Court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the patently defective Motion to Reconsider. She
argues that the Motion did not bear the conformity of the public prosecutor in
violation of Section 5 Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure requiring all
criminal actions to be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor

ISSUE:

Did the motion violate Section 5 of Rule 110 by not bearing the
conformity of the public prosecutor?

RULING:

755
 Yes.

The public prosecutor's conformity to the Motion to Reconsider is

necessary. Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 5. Who Must Prosecute Criminal Actions. — All criminal actions

commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not
available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease
upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the
Regional Trial Court.

In this case, there is no conformity from the public prosecutor. This

circumstance was not denied by the private respondent. Private respondent
merely claimed that the Office of the City Prosecutor did not object to the filing of
the Motion to Reconsider. The Office of the City Prosecutor was only furnished
with a copy of the Motion to Reconsider and it opens with the phrase “private
complaining witness, through counsel and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, and to this Honorable Court respectfully states…" This is not sufficient. Since
the Motion to Reconsider pertains to the presentation of the prosecution's
evidence, it involves the criminal aspect of the case and, thus, cannot be considered
without the public prosecutor's conforme.

756
Section 6 - Sufficiency of Complaint or Information

People of the Philippines vs. Feliciano, et. al.

G.R. No. 196735, August 3, 2016

FACTS:

Feliciano, Medalla, Soliva, Zingapan, and Alvir were accused for the
murder of Venturina caused by fraternity hazing. In the Information for murder
filed against the accused, the aggravating circumstance of use of masks and/or
other forms of disguise was alleged by the prosecution to establish that the
accused-attackers intended to conceal their identities. During trial, the victim-
witnesses testified that the masks of the attackers fell off which made it possible
for the victims to identify them, particularly Zingapan. In his defense, Zingapan
alleged that he was not present at the time of the hazing incident. The RTC
convicted the accused and was affirmed by both the CA and SC. Zingapan sought
for reconsideration of his conviction arguing that the Information filed against him
is insufficient, which violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE:

Is the Information filed against Zingapan sufficient?

RULING:

Yes.

The Information filed against Zingapan is sufficient.

Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a

complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. This is in relation to one of the constitutional rights of the accused
which is also embodied in Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 which states that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. The purpose of alleging all the circumstances
attending a crime, including any circumstance that may aggravate the accused’s
liability, is for the accused to be able to adequately prepare for his or her defense.
It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he

757
is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime
he is being charged with.

In this case, the Information sufficiently laid down the circumstances

attending Venturina’s alleged murder, and through other circumstances provided
– intent to conceal the accused’s identity. Based on this Information, Zingapan’s
counsel was able to formulate his defense, which was that of alibi. His defense had
nothing to do with whether he might or might not have been wearing a mask
during the hazing incident since his main defense was that he was not there at all.
Zingapan’s right to be informed of the cause or nature of the accusation against
him was not violated. The inclusion of the aggravating circumstance of disguise in
the Informations did not prevent him from presenting his defense of alibi.

Thus, the Information filed against Zingapan is sufficient because it enabled

him to formulate his defense.

758
Section 14 - Amendment or Substitution

Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular

G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018

FACTS:

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
February 26, 2009 Order and Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Ramon D.
Pamular (Judge Pamular) of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija
in Civil Case No. 2618-G. The assailed Order granted the prosecution's Motion to
Amend the Original Information for murder filed against Carlito Samonte
(Samonte) to include Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpus (Corpus) as his co-accused in
the crime charged. Furthermore, it directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against Corpus.

Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte at Corpuz Street,

Cuyapo, Nueva Ecjia on June 4, 2008, causing his death. Samonte was caught in
flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an
Information for murder was filed. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the
killing but pleaded self-defense. Trial on the merits ensued.

The wife of the deceased, Mrs. Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa (Priscilla), filed a
complaint-affidavit captioned as Reply-Affidavit dated September 8, 2008 after the
prosecution presented its second witness. She also filed an unsworn but signed
Reply to the Affidavit of Witnesses before First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge Floro F. Florendo (Florendo). Other affidavits of witnesses were
also filed before the prosecutor's office. Based on one of the affidavits executed by
Alexander Lozano (Lozano) on June 30, 2008, Corpuz was the one who instructed
Samonte to kill Angelito. In its October 7, 2008 Resolution, the Regional Trial Court
dismissed Priscilla's complaint and the attached affidavits of witnesses.

Priscilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was opposed by

Corpus. Florendo reconsidered and set aside the October 7, 2008 Resolution. He
also instructed Assistant Public Prosecutor Edwin S. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) to
conduct the review. Bonifacio was not able to comply with the directive to
personally submit his resolution by January 22, 2009, prompting Florendo to order
him to surrender the records of the case as the latter was taking over the resolution
of the case based on the evidence presented by the parties. This order was released
on January 23, 2009 and was received by Bonifacio on the same date.

In his January 26, 2009 Resolution, Florendo found probable cause to indict
Corpus for Angelita's murder. He directed the filing of an amended information
before the Regional Trial Court.

759
 Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review
Resolution dated January 26, 2009, where he reinstated the Regional Trial Court
October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder complaint
against Corpus.The dispositive portion of his Resolution provided:

Meanwhile, Florendo filed an undated Motion to Amend Information,

praying for the admission of the amended information. Corpus and Samonte
opposed this Motion by filing a Joint Urgent Manifestation/Opposition dated
February 2, 2009.

The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Samonte and Corpus

opposed this through a Vehement Opposition and Omnibus Motion dated
February 4, 2009. They averred that Judge Pamular's action was premature
considering that the Motion to Amend Information has yet to be scheduled for
hearing. Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned. Samonte and Corpus also
claimed that the issuance of a warrant of arrest should be suspended because the
latter intended to appeal through a Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice.

Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review dated February 9,
2009 before the Department of Justice. They also filed a Manifestation and Motion
dated February 9, 2009 with the Regional Trial Court, asking it to desist from
acting further on the Amended Information in view of the Petition for Review filed
with the Department of Justice.

However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular of Branch 33, Regional

Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija issued the assailed February 26, 2009 Order,
which granted the motion to amend the information and to admit the attached
amended information. The assailed Order also directed, among others, the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.

Hence, a direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 with a prayer for an immediate issuance of a temporary restraining
order, was filed by Corpus and Samonte on March 3, 2009. This Petition seeks to
enjoin Judge Pamular from enforcing the February 26, 2009 Order and the warrant
of arrest issued pursuant to the Order, and from conducting further proceedings
in the murder case.

Through its March 9, 2009 Resolution, this Court required respondents to

comment on the Petition. It also granted petitioners' prayer for a temporary
restraining order. Judge Pamular, Florendo, Priscilla, and all other persons acting
on the assailed Regional Trial Court February 26, 2009 Order were enjoined from
implementing it and the warrant of arrest issued pursuant to it.

760

Priscilla filed her comment on April 3, 2009. She insists that the Regional Trial
Court is correct in granting the motion to admit the amended information because
it has no effect on Samonte's case. She claims that the alleged lack of determination
of probable cause before the issuance of a warrant has no basis since petitioners
failed to present evidence or facts that would prove their claim.

Judge Pamular filed his Comment on April 8, 2009. He asserts that he made a
careful perusal of the case records in issuing the assailed order. His independent
judgment on the existence of probable cause was derived from his reading and
evaluation of pertinent documents and evidence. He states that he had set the case
for hearing on February 13, 2009, when both parties were heard and given the
opportunity to argue.

On July 22, 2009, Priscilla filed a Manifestation before this Court. She asserts
that this present petition questioning the alleged impropriety of the admission of
the amended information as well as the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Mayor Amado Corpus, Jr. has no more legal legs to stand on." She claims that
Florendo's January 26, 2009 Resolution was upheld by the Department of Justice
Priscilla asserts further that the issue regarding the suspension of proceedings
pending resolution by the Department of Justice can now be considered moot and
academic.

Petitioners filed their reply on August 7, 2009.They claim that respondent

judge should have suspended action on the issuance of a warrant considering the
pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.

Petitioners also cite the dispositive portion of Tolentino v. Bonifacio, which
directed the respondent judge in that case to desist from proceeding with the trial
until after the Department of Justice would have finally resolved a pending
petition for review.

Petitioners claim that due to the theory of conspiracy in the amended

information, Samonte will have an additional burden of setting up a new defense
particularly on any acts of his co-accused since the act of one is the act of all.
Petitioners also claim that respondent judge failed to comply with the mandate of
making a prior determination of probable cause before issuing the warrant. They
insist that this mandate is never excused nor dispensed with by the respondent
judge's self-serving narration of the law (not the required facts) stated in his
assailed order.

On the issue of whether the arraignment of Corpus may proceed despite

the lapse of the 60-day maximum period of suspension under Rule 116, Section
11(c), petitioners aver that what jurisprudence underscores is not the lapse of the
60-day period, but the issue of finality of the decision on appeal. The matter should
not only cover the suspension of arraignment but for respondent judge to defer

761
from further proceedings on the amended information pending the final
resolution of the Department of Justice.

ISSUE:

Can the information in present case still be amended after the plea?

HELD:

No.

Petitioners question the inclusion of Corpus and the insertion of the phrase
"conspiring and confederating together" in the amended information. They
contend that Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
prohibits substantial amendment of information that is prejudicial to the rights of
the accused after his or her arraignment.

Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may

be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Before an accused enters his or her plea, either formal or substantial

amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court.
After an entry of plea, only a formal amendment can be made provided it is with
leave of court and it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After
arraignment, there can be no substantial amendment except if it is beneficial to the
accused.

Since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can invoke this
rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot invoke this argument because he has not yet been
arraigned. Once an accused is arraigned and enters his or her plea, Section 14
prohibits any substantial amendment especially those that may prejudice his or
her rights. One of these rights includes the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him or her, which is
given life during arraignment.

In a criminal case, due process entails, among others, that the accusation
must be in due form and that the accused is given the opportunity to answer the
charges against him or her. There is a need for the accused to be supplied with the
necessary information as to why he [or she] is being proceeded against and not be

762
left in the unenviable state of speculating why he [or she] is made the object of a
prosecution, it being the fact that, in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the
accused is at stake.

Apart from violating the right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of his or her accusation, substantial amendments to the information
after plea is prohibited to prevent having the accused put twice in jeopardy.

Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.

The Constitutional provision on double jeopardy guarantees the invocation

of the law not only against the danger of a second punishment or a second trial for
the same offense, "but also against being prosecuted twice for the same act where
that act is punishable by . . . law and an ordinance." When a person is charged with
an offense and the case against him or her is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other way without his or her consent, he or she cannot be
charged again with a similar offense. Thus, "this principle is founded upon the law
of reason, justice and conscience."

The constitutionally mandated right against double jeopardy is

procedurally bolstered by Rule 117, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which reads:

Section 7. Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double Jeopardy. — When an

accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.

In substantiating a claim for double jeopardy, the following requisites

should be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2)
the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense as in the first.

763
 With regard the first requisite, the first jeopardy only attaches: (a) after a
valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted,
or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

The test for the third requisite is "whether one offense is identical with the
other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information.”

Also known as "res judicata in prison grey," the mandate against double
jeopardy forbids the "prosecution of a person for a crime of which he [or she] has
been previously acquitted or convicted." This is to "set the effects of the first
177

prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he [or she] shall not thereafter
be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him [or her] for
the same offense.”

People v. Dela Torre underscored the protection given under the prohibition
against double jeopardy: Double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1)
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) against multiple
punishments for the same offense.

An arraignment, held under the manner required by the rules, grants the
accused an opportunity to know the precise charge against him or her for the first
time. It is called for so that he or she is made fully aware of possible loss of
freedom, even of his [or her] life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to
him [or her]. At the very least then, he [or she] must be fully informed of why the
prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him [or her]. Thereafter, the
accused is no longer in the dark and can enter his or her plea knowing its
consequences. It is at this stage that issues are joined, and without this, further
proceedings cannot be held without being void. Thus, the expanded concept of
double jeopardy presupposes that since an accused can be in danger of conviction
after his or her plea, the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy should
already apply.

Any amendment to an information which only states with precision

something which has already been included in the original information, and
therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime charged is only a formal
amendment that can be made at anytime. It does not alter the nature of the crime,
affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity
to meet the new accusation. Thus, the following are mere formal amendments: (1)
new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might

764
impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge
another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3)
additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as
to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial
right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.

On the other hand, a substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts

constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar to
that of the original information except as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte's
co-accused and the insertion of the phrase conspiring and confederating together.
The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of the prosecution that
Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelita. Hence, the amendment is
merely formal.

The records of this present case show that the original information for
murder against Samonte was dated June 5, 2008. Based on Lozano's affidavit dated
on June 30, 2008, Corpus was implicated as the one who instructed Samonte to kill
Angelito. This prompted the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation, which
resulted in the filing of the amended information.

Rule 110, Section 14 similarly provides that in permitting formal amendments
when the accused has already entered his or her plea, it is important that the
amendments made should not prejudice the rights of the accused.

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an

information has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether
any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other.

It is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original information,

Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense. While conspiracy is merely
a formal amendment, Samonte will be prejudiced if the amendment will be
allowed after his plea. Applying the test, his defense and corresponding evidence
will not be compatible with the allegation of conspiracy in the new information.
Therefore, such formal amendment after plea is not allowed.

765
 RULE 111
Prosecution of Civil Action

Section 1 - Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions

Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals Inc.

G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014

FACTS:

In 1988, Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals Inc., through Ramon
Garcia, entered into a deed of absolute sale and purchase of shares of stock. The
deed was for the sale and purchase of stock from various corporations, including
an “A” share in Alabang Country Club, Inc and proprietary membership in Manila
Polo Club, Inc, which are in the name of Antonio. The contract was allegedly
entered into to prevent these shares of stock fron being sold at public auction to
pay the outstanding obligations of Antonio.

On September 6, 1989, the share in Alabang Country Club Inc and

proprietary membership in Manila Polo Club, Inc which were included in the
contract of sale between Garcia and Ferro Chemicals were sold at public auction
to Philippine Investment System Organization.

An information for estafa was filed against Antonio Garcia with the RTC. The
complaint against Antonio Garcia alleged that the latter misrepresented to Ferro
Chemicals, Inc that the shares subject of the contracts entered into were free from
all liens and encumbrances, when in truth and in fact, the accused well knew that
the shares had already been garnished in July 1985 and subsequently sold at a
public auction in 1989.

The RTC acquitted Garcia of the said charge for insufficiency of evidence.
It ruled that the Ferro Chemicals was aware of the status of the subject club shares,
thus, the element of false pretense is wanting. Likewise, no civil indemnity was
awarded to Ferro Chemicals, thus, it appealed the civil aspect of the case to the
CA.

The notice of appeal alleged that the same is without prejudice to the filing
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the criminal aspect. In its Rule 65
petition filed with the Supreme Court, the People of the Philippines alleged that
the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it rendered an acquittal based on affidavits not at all
introduced in evidence by either of the parties. It alleged that the aggrieved party
was deprived of their substantive right to due process.

766
 The petition for certiorari was dismissed. On the other hand, the CA granted
the appeal and awarded Ferro Chemicals, its actual loss with interest and
attorney’s fees. It found that Antonio Garcia failed to disclose the Philippine
Investment and Savings Organization’s lien over the shares.

ISSUE:

Did the act of Ferro Chemicals in filing the notice of appeal before the
CA and the petition for certiorari with the SC, assailing the same trial court
decision amounted to forum shopping?

RULING:

Yes.

Forum shopping is defined as "the act of a litigant who ‘repetitively availed

of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or
already resolved adversely by some other court . . . to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another’." Once that
forum shopping was committed willfully and deliberately by a party or his or her
counsel, the case may be summarily dismissed with prejudice, and the act shall
constitute direct contempt and a cause for administrative sanctions.

The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case
amounts to res judicata in another. Thus, there is forum shopping when the
following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the
two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.

Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping when it filed an appeal

before the Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari before the SC assailing the
same trial court decision. First, there is identity of parties. Petitioner, Antonio
Garcia, and respondent, Ferro Chemicals, Inc., are both parties in the appeal filed
before the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari before this court.

767
 Second, there is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in both
actions. At a glance, it may appear that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. asserted different
rights: The appeal before the Court of Appeals is purely on the civil aspect of the
trial court’s decision while the petition for certiorari before the SC is allegedly only
on the criminal aspect of the case. However, the civil liability asserted by Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. before the Court of Appeals arose from the criminal act. It is in the
nature of civil liability ex delicto. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve the right to
institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto or institute a
separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case. Thus, it is an adjunct of
the criminal aspect of the case.

As to the third requisite, on the assumption that the trial court had
jurisdiction over the case, this court’s decision in affirming the trial court’s decision
acquitting the accused for lack of an essential element of the crime charged
amounts to res judicata in the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense.

If the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial
court acquitting the accused and private complainants failed to reserve the right
to institute a separate civil action, the civil liability ex delicto that is inherently
attached to the offense is likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex
delicto is impliedly instituted with the petition for certiorari assailing the acquittal
of the accused. Private complainant cannot anymore pursue a separate appeal
from that of the state without violating the doctrine of non-forum shopping. When
the trial court’s decision was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition for
certiorari before the SC, the civil aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal.
Thus, the relief prayed for by Ferro Chemicals, Inc., that is, recovery of civil
liability ex delicto, is asserted in both actions before the SC and the Court of
Appeals.

On the other hand, the conclusion is different if private complainant

reserved the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto before the Regional Trial Court or institute a separate civil action prior to
the filing of the criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. In
these situations, the filing of an appeal as to the civil aspect of the case cannot be
considered as forum shopping. This is not the situation in this case.

768
 RULE 112
Preliminary Investigation

Section 1 - Preliminary investigation defined; when required.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Price Richardson Corp.

G.R. No. 197032, July 26, 2017

FACTS:

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed before the

Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against Price Richardson Corp. (Price
Corp.) and seven (7) of its employees for violation of: (a) Article 315(1)(b) of the
Revised Penal Code and (b) Sections 26.3 and 28 of the Securities Regulation Code.
The State Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause finding
that the SEC failed to adduce evidence proving their allegations. Both the DOJ and
then Secretary Raul Gonzalez denied the subsequent Motions for Reconsideration
filed by SEC. Undaunted, they filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals which was also denied whereby the Court found no grave of abuse of
discretion on the part of Secretary Gonzalez in refusing to indict respondent.
Hence, the petition before the Court.

ISSUE: May the courts, as a general rule, pass upon the prosecutor’s
determination of probable cause?

RULING:

No. The determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is an

executive function which pertains to and lies within the discretion of the public
prosecutor and the justice secretary. Courts may only pass upon the prosecutor’s
determination of probable cause only upon a showing of grave abuse of
discretion. A prosecutor gravely abuses his or her discretion in not finding
probable cause by disregarding or overlooking evidence that are sufficient to form
a reasonable ground to believe that the crime was committed and that the
respondent was its author. However, if the public prosecutor does not find
probable cause to charge a person with a crime, he or she does not cause the filing
of an information before the court. The court may not pass upon or interfere with
the prosecutor's determination of the existence of probable cause to file an
information regardless of its correctness. It does not review the determination of
probable cause made by the prosecutor. It does not function as the prosecutor's
appellate court. Thus, it is also the public prosecutor who decides "what
constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.

769
 Marantan v. Department of Justice
G.R. 206354, March 13, 2019

FACTS:

News outlets reported that on January 6, 2013, a shootout occurred in

Atimonan, Quezon between the combined forces of the Philippine National Police
(police personnel) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines' First Special Forces
Battalion (armed forces personnel) on one (1) side, and 13 fully armed men riding
a convoy of vehicles on the other. While the investigation was ongoing, and before
all the involved police and armed forces personnel filed their affidavits recounting
the incident, then Department of Justice Secretary Leila De Lima (Department of
Justice Secretary De Lima) made public pronouncements on the Atimonan
Encounter, reportedly mentioning Marantan's name. The Department of Justice
convened a Panel of Prosecutors (the Panel) to conduct the preliminary
investigation. In its Omnibus Resolution, the Panel found probable cause to charge
petitioner, along with his co-respondent police officers, with the crime of multiple
murder. It found evidence that they had killed the victims in conspiracy,
enumerating the reasons and factual basis for such conclusion. It found that the
checkpoint itself was highly suspicious and irregular. Moreover, the physical
evidence did not support the claim that there was a Shootout—it belied the
possibility that the victims fired at the officers from within their vehicles, or that
there was a legitimate firefight. Petitioner maintains that respondent Department
of Justice Secretary De Lima's public pronouncements showed prejudgment of the
case. This, he claims, tainted his constitutional right to due process to stand before
an impartial tribunal. Petitioner prayed in his Memorandum that this Court annul
an aside the preliminary investigation and Omnibus Resolution, along with
Department of Justice Office Order No. 208, Subpoena, and Letter-Denial.

ISSUE:

Is the preliminary investigation tainted with grave abuse of discretion?

RULING:

No.

The relevant issues in determining whether grave abuse of discretion

attended the preliminary investigation are: (1) whether petitioner had been so
fundamentally deprived of an opportunity to be heard in relation to the purposes
of preliminary investigation; (2) whether the infirmities were so fatal that they
effectively deprived petitioner of any opportunity to be heard during the judicial

770
examination, pre-trial, and trial; and (3) whether there would be a public policy
interest in suspending the criminal action. The process of preliminary
investigation is essentially one (1)-sided, as it serves only to assist the prosecution
to summarily decide whether there was sufficient basis to: (1) charge a person with
an offense; and (2) prevent a harassment suit that both prejudices a respondent
and wastes government resources. During the preliminary investigation, the
prosecution only needs to determine whether it has prima facie evidence to sustain
the filing of the information.

Here, petitioner failed to show any basis to find that the Omnibus
Resolution, which found probable cause to charge him with murder, as erroneous.

The Panel's conclusions appear to have been well-reasoned evidence-based.

The Panel found that the killing was attended by evident premeditation, taking
advantage of superior strength, treachery, and with the aid of armed men. This
was because: (1) the police personnel put a suspicious three (3)-layered checkpoint,
which ensured that the subjects would not be missed, and that no outsiders would
witness the incident; (2) petitioner had been monitoring the movements of the
convoy the day prior to the incident; (3) the police personnel ensured the presence
of the armed forces personnel at the checkpoint operation and capitalized on the
soldiers' capabilities and resources; and (4) the sheer number of bullets fired at the
victims indicated that the police had taken advantage of superior strength of
firearms and manpower.

771
 Pemberton v. De Lima

G.R. No. 217508. April 18, 2016

FACTS:

A complaint for murder was filed by the PNP-Olongapo and private

respondent Marilou Laude (Laude) against Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton).
Pemberton received a subpoena, giving him 10 days from receipt within which to
file his counter-affidavit but he failed to file within the same period. The City
Prosecutor continued to evaluate the evidence and conducted ocular inspections
in connection with the preliminary investigation. It found probable cause and
ssubsequently filed an Information for murder before the RTC of Olongapo. The
RTC issued a warrant of arrest.

Pemberton filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice

(DOJ) which was denied. Pemberton filed a Petition for Certiorari with application
for issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction with the Supreme
Court, arguing that De Lima as Secretary of Justice (SOJ), committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the ground that he was
denied due process of law as he had no opportunity to address and rebut the
additional evidence presented. The OSG argues that Pemberton is assailing the
judgment of the SOJ which are errors of judgment cannot be remedied by certiorari
and that Pemberton violated the hierarchy of courts by filing his petition with the
SC instead of the Court of Appeals (CA).

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Secretary De Lima committed grave abuse of

discretion in sustaining the finding of probable cause against Pemberton

RULING:

No.
Respondent De Lima did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
sustaining the finding of probable cause and the issue has become moot.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
as the investigating officer acts upon probable cause of reasonable belief. Probable
cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less
than evidence which would justify a conviction. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been

772
committed by the suspect. There is no basis to doubt that respondent De Lima
judiciously scrutinized the evidence on record. Based on respondent De Lima‘s
assessment, there was ample evidence submitted to establish probable cause that
petitioner murdered the victim. Foregoing circumstances all taken together leads
to the fair and reasonable inference that respondent is probably guilty of killing
Laude through treachery, abuse of superior strength, and cruelty. Absence of
direct evidence does not preclude a finding of probable cause. . It has been the
consistent pronouncement of the Supreme Court that, in such cases, the
prosecution may resort to circumstantial evidence.
De Lima‘s determination was based on a careful evaluation of evidence
presented.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia the Supreme Court ruled that there are two
kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It
is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom
he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held
for trial. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not
and may not be compelled to pass upon.
A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary
investigation in any other venue is rendered moot by the issuance of a warrant of
arrest and the conduct of arraignment. The filing of the information and the
issuance by the trial court of the respondent’s warrant of arrest has already
rendered this Petition moot. It is settled that executive determination of probable
cause is different from the judicial determination of probable cause.

773
 Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang
G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017

FACTS:

Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. (“Personal Collection”) filed against

Teresita L. Carandang (“Carandang”) a criminal complaint for Estafa with
unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code. An Information was issued against Carandang. However,
upon Carandang’s filing of her Motion for Reinvestigation, the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) recommended that the complaint be dismissed. It also filed a
Motion to Withdraw Information with the Regional Trial Court, stating that the
Office of the City Prosecutor found that there was lack of probable cause to hold
Carandang liable for estafa.

The RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information.

The trial court also noted the general policy of the courts to not interfere in the
conduct of preliminary investigations and to give the investigating officers
sufficient discretion to determine probable cause. It found that no exception
existed in the case that would require the court to intervene in the findings of the
preliminary investigation.

Personal Collection filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the trial court failed to make its own evaluation of the merits of the
case and only relied on Prosecutor Aquiatan-Morales' recommendation that there
was no probable cause to charge Carandang with estafa. Personal Collection also
alleged that it was deprived of due process when the RTC granted Carandang's
Motion to Release Cash Bond, even though Personal Collection did not receive a
copy of this motion.

CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, finding that: (a) the Regional Trial
Court conducted an independent asessment of the facts of the case; (b) Personal
Collection was not deprived of the opportunity to oppose Carandang's Motion to
Release Cash Bond, since under Rule 110, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, the
accused's bail bond shall be automatically cancelled when the accused was
acquitted; and (c) only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
can ask for the reinstatement of the criminal case against Carandang, since a
private offended party's interest in a criminal case was limited to its civil aspect.

ISSUE:

Did the RTC correctly allow the withdrawal of the Information against
Carandang upon a finding that there was a lack of probable cause?

774
RULING:

Yes.

The RTC correctly allowed the withdrawal of the Information against

Carandang. In granting or denying a motion to withdraw an Information, the
court must conduct a cautious and independent evaluation of the evidence of the
prosecution and must be convinced that the merits of the case warrant either the
dismissal or continuation of the action. However, courts are not absolutely barred
from reversing a prior determination of probable cause upon the reassessment of
evidence presented to it. There is no grave abuse of discretion when an earlier
finding of probable cause is overturned, if it can be shown that the judge arrived
at the later conclusion upon an independent study of the available facts and
evidence on record.

The order granting the withdrawal of an information must state the judge's
assessment of the evidence and reasons in resolving the motion. It must clearly
show why the court's earlier assessment of probable cause was erroneous. The
court should not merely accept the prosecution's findings and conclusions. Its
independent judicial discretion in allowing the information to be withdrawn must
not only be implied but must be palpable in its order. Should the court fail to
faithfully exercise its judicial discretion, the order granting the withdrawal of the
information is void.

A reading of the Order shows that the trial court made its own assessment
of the prosecution's evidence as embodied in its January 29, 2010 Resolution, It
sufficiently explained how the elements of estafa were not met based on the
additional evidence presented by the accused at the reinvestigation before the
Office of the City Prosecutor. The trial court also considered the opposition filed
by Personal Collection to the Motion to Withdraw Information, giving even the
private offended party the opportunity to be heard.

775
Section 2 - Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations

Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December 7, 2016

FACTS:

The consolidated complaints trace their roots to the contents of the sealed
second envelope, Estrada’s impeachment trial, and his plunder trial before
the Sandiganbayan in People v. Estrada (Criminal Case No. 26558).

Dichaves was identified as one of the John Does in People v. Estrada. While
the preliminary investigation proceedings in these complaints were being
conducted, Dichaves was nowhere to be found in the Philippines. Later on, finding
probable cause, the Ombudsman also indicted Dichaves for plunder under Sec. 2
of R.A. 7080. A warrant of arrest was issued against Dichaves, but he could not be
located as he had already slipped out of the country. No subpoena was served on
him.

After Estrada's conviction and pardon, Dichaves resurfaced. He filed a

Motion to Quash and/or Motion for Reinvestigation, seeking for a preliminary
investigation of his case as none was conducted. The Sandiganbayan granted the
motion for reinvestigation and directed the Ombudsman to conduct/complete the
preliminary investigation of Dichaves' case. The Sandiganbayan held in abeyance
further proceedings until after the preliminary investigation was completed.

Meanwhile, the anti-graft court denied Dichaves' motion to quash, ruling

that "the material facts in the Amended Information sufficiently establish the
elements of the crime of Plunder."

After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman found probable cause to

charge Dichaves with plunder. Thus, Dichaves was indicted for conspiring with
the former President in amassing ill-gotten wealth through profits and
commissions from the purchase of Belle Corporation shares by the GSIS and the
SSS.

ISSUE:

Did the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abuse its discretion in finding
probable cause against petitioner?

RULING:

No.

776
 As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the
Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and
The Ombudsman Act of 1989 give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on
criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. The rule
on non-interference is based on the "respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman.”

The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is,
therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence
on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of
facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.

Invoking an exception to the rule on non-interference, petitioner alleges

that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion. According to him: (a)
he was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, (b) the
Ombudsman considered pieces of evidence not presented during the preliminary
investigation, and (c) there is no probable cause to charge him with plunder.

Petitioner's assertions are erroneous.

First, there is nothing capricious or whimsical about petitioner's lack of

opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. A person's rights in a preliminary
investigation are subject to the limitations of procedural law. These rights are
statutory, not constitutional. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely
to present such evidence "as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and that [the respondent in a criminal complaint] is probably
guilty thereof." It does not 'call for a "full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence.”

Thus, petitioner has no right to cross-examine the witnesses during a

preliminary investigation. At this early stage, the Ombudsman has yet to file an
information that would trigger into operation the rights of the accused. It is the
filing of a complaint or information in court that initiates a criminal action, and
carries with it all the accompanying rights of an accused.

Petitioner's failure to cross-examine the witnesses during the trial in People

v. Estrada was, thus, his own fault. When he slipped out of the Philippines
following Estrada's impeachment in 2000, petitioner was able to avert the
implementation of the initial warrant of arrest against him. His decisions have
consequences.

777
 His disappearance during such a crucial period in our history necessarily
meant that he could not cross-examine the witnesses at the time of Estrada's
plunder trial. Petitioner cannot conveniently impute this fault on the Ombudsman
now, more than a decade later. It is injustice, not to mention a grave error, to
attribute to the Ombudsman the dire consequences of petitioner's own actions.

Second, the public prosecutor is not bound by the technical rules on

evidence. The executive finding of probable cause requires only substantial
evidence, not absolute certainty of guilt. The Ombudsman merely depends on
evidence of such facts and circumstances amounting to a "more likely-than-not"
belief that a crime has been committed. As the Office of the Ombudsman's
conclusion is based on a belief or an opinion, the technical rules on evidence cannot
be made to apply to it. Thus, at the stage of preliminary investigation, the question
on the admissibility of evidence is premature for petitioner to raise.

Petitioner erroneously claims that the Ombudsman considered pieces of

evidence not presented during the preliminary investigation. No part of the ruling
of the Office of the Ombudsman was based on the proceedings in Estrada's
impeachment and plunder trials or their records. All references to the
impeachment and plunder trials were made only by way of summarizing the
initial allegations and reply of complainants.

In any event, the Ombudsman may rely on the facts as stated in People v.
Estrada. In the determination of probable cause, nothing bars the Ombudsman
from considering evidence already established in a related and decided case.
Notably, the present case is an offshoot of the proceedings in Estrada's
impeachment and plunder trials. Petitioner was identified as one of the John Does
in Estrada's plunder case. Both People v. Estrada and this case are docketed as
Criminal Case No. 26558.

778
Section 3 – Procedure

Reyes v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 208243, June 5, 2017

FACTS:

On November 21, 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bansalan, Davao del Sur
passed Municipal Ordinance No. 357, prohibiting the "storing, displaying, selling,
and blowing up ('pagpabuto') of those pyrotechnics products allowed by law,
commonly called 'firecrackers' or 'pabuto' within the premises of buildings 1 and
2 of the Bansalan Public Market." On December 14, 2009, then Bansalan Mayor
Reyes approved a permit allowing vendors to sell firecrackers at the Bansalan
Public Market from December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010.

On December 27, 2009, a fire befell the Bansalan Public Market. It caused
extensive damage and destroyed fire hydrants of the Bansalan Water District.
Subsequently, private respondent Paul Jocson Arches (Arches) filed a complaint
dated December 20, 2010 against Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao (Ombudsman-Mindanao). Arches questioned the approval and
issuance of a mayor's permit agreeing to sell firecrackers, in violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 357. He claimed that this permit caused the fire the previous year.

The Ombudsman found that probable cause existed to charge Reyes and
his co-respondents a quo with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
While the mayor's permit was not the proximate cause of the fire, it nonetheless,
gave unwarranted benefit and advantage to the fire cracker vendors to sell
firecrackers in the public market despite existing prohibition.

Petitioner avers that his right to due process was violated. Petitioner points
out that the initial complaint against him and his co-respondents a quo did not
mention giving unwarranted benefit to the firecracker vendors. Yet, he was
charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for giving
unwarranted benefit to the firecracker vendors. Petitioner states that this charge
was based on co-respondent a quo Andres' affidavit, which he was not given.
Because he had no opportunity to respond to Andres' affidavit, he asserts that he
was deprived of due process.

ISSUE:

Is petitioner’s right to due process violated?

RULING:

779
 No.

A person's rights during preliminary investigation are limited to those

provided by procedural law. Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Procedure. - The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in

the following manner:

(b)… The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy
them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be
required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and
these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his
expense.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint
and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his
counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied
upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and
certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished
by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to
dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.

Under procedural law, a respondent under preliminary investigation has

the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant, but he does not
have a similar right over the evidence submitted by his or her co-respondents.

This issue is not novel. This Court has held that during preliminary
investigation, the Ombudsman is not required to furnish a respondent with the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

Here, petitioner was able to file a counter-affidavit to explain his side and
to respond to the complaint filed against him. He was not denied due process.

780
 Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division
G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018

FACTS:

The Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint on February 10, 2003,

alleging that Constantino, Gadian, and Tangan of the Vice Governor's Office,
Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption by diverting public funds
given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as "dummies." The
Commission on Audit submitted its audit report on December 312003, finding that
the officials and employees of the Provincial Government of Sarangani appear to
have embezzled millions in public funds. The Ombudsman then issued a Joint
Order on September 30 2003, which recommended that a criminal case for
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents and
Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 be filed against Cagang, among others.

In a Joint Order dated October 29, 2003, the accused were directed to file
their counter-affidavits and submit controverting evidence. The complainants
were also given time to file their replies to the counter-affidavits. There was delay
in the release of the order since the reproduction of the voluminous case record to
be furnished to the parties "was subjected to bidding and request of funds from
the Central Office." Only five (5) sets of reproductions were released on November
20, 2003 while the rest were released only on January 15, 2004.

In a 293-page Resolution dated August 11, 2004 the Ombudsman found

probable cause to charge Governor Escobar, Vice Governor Constantino, Board
Members, and several employees of the Office of the Vice Governor of Sarangani
and the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with Malversation through
Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
In the Supplemental Order dated October 18, 2004, Tanodbayan Marcelo ordered
the conduct of further fact-finding investigations on some of the other accused in
the case. It stated that a preliminary investigation should be conducted against
Mangalen and Macagcalat.

In the meantime, the Ombudsman filed informations for Malversation of

Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents against the foregoing,
including Cagang. In June 17, 2010, Escobar, Maglinte, and Cagang were acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence.

In a Memorandum dated August 8, 2011, the prosecutor prayed for the

approval of the informations to be filed wherein Cagang is one of the accused. The
recommendation was approved by Ombudsman Morales on October 20, 2011.
Thus, on November 17, 2011, Informations for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic

781
Act No. 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents were filed against Cagang, among others. accused Cagang filed his
“Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest”
arguing that there was an inordinate delay of 7 years in the filing of the
Informations (reckoned from the issuance of the supplemental order). The Office
of the Ombudsman, on the other hand, filed a Comment/Opposition arguing that
the accused have not yet submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
that there was no showing that delay in the filing was intentional, capricious,
whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons.

The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motions to

Quash/Dismiss filed by Cagang.

ISSUE:

Is there a violation of the accused’s right to speedy disposition of cases in

relation to Section 3 (f), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court?

HELD:

No.

There is no violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition of cases

considering that there was a waiver of the delay of a complex case. Definitely,
granting the present Petitions and finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan will only prejudice the due process rights of the State.

Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary

investigation violates the accused's right to due process and the speedy disposition
of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. The
determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere
mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period
from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public
officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. If there has been
delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such
delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely
invocation of the accused's constitutional rights must also be examined on a case-
to-case basis.

In this case, the criminal complaint against petitioner was filed on February
10, 2003. On August 11, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution
finding probable cause against petitioner. This Resolution, however, was modified
by the Resolution dated October 18, 2004, which ordered the conduct of further

782
fact-finding investigation against some of the other respondents in the case. This
further fact-finding was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman on April 12,
2005. On August 8, 2011, or six (6) years after the recommendation to file
informations against petitioner was approved by Tanodbayan Marcelo, Assistant
Special Prosecutor II Pilarita T. Lapitan submitted the informations for
Ombudsman Carpio Morales' review. Informations against petitioner were filed
on November 17, 2011. Six (6) years is beyond the reasonable period of fact-
finding of ninety (90) days. The burden of proving the justification of the delay,
therefore, is on the prosecution, or in this case, respondent.

However, although there was delay, Cagang failed to invoke his right to
speedy disposition of cases despite knowledge that the preliminary investigation
of his case is still pending. Moreover, the complexity of the case justifies the period
spent for the preliminary investigation since the records of the case show that the
transactions investigated are complex and numerous. Therefore, there was a
waiver of the right. Despite the pendency of the case since 2003, Cagang only
invoked his right to speedy disposition of cases when the informations were filed
on November 17 2011.

783
 Mendoza v. People
G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014

FACTS:

Juno Cars, Inc. filed a complaint-affidavit for qualified theft and estafa
against Alfredo Mendoza (Mendoza). In the said complaint-affidavit, it alleged
that: (1) Mendoza was hired as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor; (2) after a partial
audit of used cars, it was discovered that 5 cars had been sold and released by
Mendoza without the finance manager’s permission; (3) Mendoza failed to remit
the payments made for the said 5 cars; (4) there are 20 cars under Mendoza’s
custody, but only 18 were accounted for; and (5) Mendoza pilfered a total amount
of P1,046,000 to its prejudice and damage.

Provincial Prosecutor Delgado issued a resolution finding probable cause

and recommending the filing of an information against Mendoza. Mendoza was
then charged before the RTC. Thereafter, Mendoza filed a motion for
determination of probable cause before the trial court. The RTC issued an order
dismissing the complaint.

ISSUE:

May the trial court dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the
basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause?

RULING:

Yes.

Since qualified theft is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a preliminary

investigation must be first conducted “to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial,” in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

At this stage, the conduct of preliminary investigation and the subsequent

determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of
the public prosecutor. If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds
sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she shall cause the filing of the
information with the court. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall
then “personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence” to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest. The difference is clear: the executive determination of probable cause

784
concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an Information
being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand,
determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.

In this case, while the Information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid,
the judge (Judge Capco-Umali) still had discretion to make her own finding of
whether probable cause exist to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with
trial. Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on
record and concluded that “the evidence adduced does not support a finding of
probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa.” Accordingly, with
the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly
dismissed the case against Mendoza.

785
 Marantan v. Department of Justice
G.R. 206354, March 13, 2019

FACTS:

News outlets reported that on January 6, 2013, a shootout occurred in

Atimonan, Quezon between the combined forces of the Philippine National Police
(police personnel) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines' First Special Forces
Battalion (armed forces personnel) on one (1) side, and 13 fully armed men riding
a convoy of vehicles on the other. While the investigation was ongoing, and before
all the involved police and armed forces personnel filed their affidavits recounting
the incident, then Department of Justice Secretary Leila De Lima (Department of
Justice Secretary De Lima) made public pronouncements on the Atimonan
Encounter, reportedly mentioning Marantan's name.

The Department of Justice convened a Panel of Prosecutors (the Panel) to

conduct the preliminary investigation. In its Omnibus Resolution, the Panel found
probable cause to charge petitioner, along with his co-respondent police officers,
with the crime of multiple murder. It found evidence that they had killed the
victims in conspiracy, enumerating the reasons and factual basis for such
conclusion. It found that the checkpoint itself was highly suspicious and irregular.
Moreover, the physical evidence did not support the claim that there was a
Shootout—it belied the possibility that the victims fired at the officers from within
their vehicles, or that there was a legitimate firefight. Petitioner prays that this
Court issue an injunctive relief to restrain the continuation of proceedings.
However, the act sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished with the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation, the issuance of the August 30, 2013
Omnibus Resolution, and the filing of the Information against petitioner. Thus,
petitioner prayed in his Memorandum that this Court annul an aside the
preliminary investigation and Omnibus Resolution, along with Department of
Justice Office Order No. 208, Subpoena, and Letter-Denial.

ISSUE:

Is the conduct of preliminary investigation over a case rendered moot

when an information was filed before the trial court against petitioner?

RULING:

Yes.

A case is rendered moot when, because of supervening events, this Court is

left with no justiciable controversy to resolve, and a declaration on it would be of

786
no practical use or value. In Secretary De Lima v. Reyes, this Court reiterated its
ruling in Crespo v. Mogul that once an information is filed before a court, that court
acquires jurisdiction over the case. Notably, a petition questioning the preliminary
investigation of an accused becomes moot once an information based on the
preliminary investigation is filed before a trial court, which, in turn, would
complete its own determination of probable cause. After this judicial
determination, the question of an accused's guilt or innocence would rest with the
trial court's own sound discretion.

Here, an information against petitioner has already been filed before the
Regional Trial Court. Consequently, whether the case should be dismissed, or
whether petitioner should be acquitted or convicted, is for the trial court to
determine. Resolving whether public respondent Department of Justice should
have inhibited from conducting the preliminary investigation and forwarded the
case records to the Office of the Ombudsman would be of no practical use and
value here.

787
 Tupaz v. Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas
G.R. 212491-92, March 6, 2019

FACTS:

In her Complaint, Tupaz stated that her mother, Sol Espiña Hubahib
(Hubahib), was the registered owner of a property. Since its issuance in 1971, she
added, a duplicate has always been in the possession of their family—initially by
Hubahib and, upon her demise, by her heirs. On April 17, 2011, Atty. Abella
canceled Original Certificate of Title and, in its stead, issued Transfer Certificate
of Title in favor of Genaro Espiña (Genaro), represented by his attorney-in-fact,
Macrina. Hence, she filed her Complaint, asserting that Atty. Abella, along with
Macrina, were liable for falsification, graft and corrupt practices, misconduct,
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In its
assailed April 23, 2013 Consolidated Evaluation Report, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas dismissed Tupaz's Complaint for being
"premature"and declined to file criminal informations—both for falsification and
graft and corrupt practices—against Atty. Abella and Macrina. It reasoned: Upon
scrutiny of the present complaint, it is found that the issue on the possible criminal
liability of the respondents and the administrative liability of respondent ABELLA
is closely intertwined with the issue on ownership of the subject property. It hinges
on which party has the better right over the lot in question. If the transfer of the
title of the property in favor of respondent ESPIÑA is upheld as valid, the present
charges for falsification and dishonesty, etc. against the respondents would have
no leg to stand on. Hence, the issue presented before this Office cannot be resolved
without first touching on the overarching issue on ownership which is not within
our jurisdiction to determine. This matter should be brought before the proper
forum wherein questions regarding the transfer of title can be adjudicated. Thus,
Tupaz filed this Petition for Certiorari specifically assailing the ruling of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas on the criminal aspect of her
Complaint.

ISSUE:

Did the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas act with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding
probable cause to charge private respondents?

RULING:

Yes.

788
 As a general rule, a public prosecutor's determination of probable cause —
that is, one made for the purpose of filing an Information in court — is essentially
an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial
scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. While defying precise definition, grave abuse of
discretion generally refers to a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Corollarily, the abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law. To note, the underlying principle behind the courts' power to review a public
prosecutor's determination of probable cause is to ensure that the latter acts within
the permissible bounds of his authority or does not gravely abuse the same. When,
however, "there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the prosecutor" in declining to prosecute specific persons for specific
offenses, a writ of certiorari may be issued to set aside the prosecutor's initial
determination. Determining probable cause must be made in reference to the
elements of the crime charged. Appraising probable cause for a violation of Section
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act must begin with the text of Section
3(e): SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.— In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful: (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. From the evidence
adduced by petitioner, there is basis to maintain a reasonable belief that private
respondent Abella enabled the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title and
issuance of new transfer certificates of title. This was despite manifest and
unequivocal deficiencies, most notably in the owner's duplicate copy, the
Certificate Authorizing Registration, and the Deed of Conveyance that had been
presented to him. Even granting that he did not act with a deliberately malevolent
design, he still appears to have acted with grossly inexcusable negligence that he
practically evaded his duties as a registrar of deeds. The palpable defects of the
documents presented to him should have prompted him to desist with the
cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title. Instead, he went so far as to issue
new transfer certificates of title. In so doing, he caused undue injury to Hubahib's
heirs and extended unwarranted benefits to Genaro. He, with Macrina, must
rightly stand trial for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

789
Section 4 - Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review

De Lima v. Reyes
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016

FACTS:

Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry," was a
veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in Palawan. On 24 January 2011,
at around 10:30 am, he was shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in
San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. After a brief chase with police officers,
Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession
admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Edrad, Aranas, Noel, Jr. On
February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-
Terrorism Division of the NBI where he alleged that it was former Palawan
Governor Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. On February 7, 2011,
Secretary Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 091 creating a special panel
of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. The First Panel
concluded its preliminary investigation and issued the Resolution dismissing the
Affidavit-Complaint. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega's wife, filed a
Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the
mastermind of her husband's murder. The Secretary of Justice issued DO No. 710
creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case and to address the offer of additional evidence denied by the First
Panel. The Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of informations on all accused, including former
Governor Reyes.

ISSUES:

Whether the Secretary of Justice may, even without a pending petition

for review, motu proprio order the conduct of a reinvestigation of the resolutions
of prosecutors.

HELD:

Yes. Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary
of Justice may motu proprio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city
prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition for
review.

790
 The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors
and it is within her authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions
of her prosecutors.

Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary

of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of
direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm,
nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.

791
Section 5 - When warrant of arrest may issue

Maza, et al. v. Hon. Evelyn Turla

G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order ,and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casiño,
and Rafael V. Mariano are former members of the House of Representatives. Liza
represented Gabriela Women's Party (Gabriela), Saturnino and Teodoro
represented Bayan Muna Party-List (Bayan Muna), while Rafael represented
Anakpawis Party-List (Anakpawis). Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo,
Deputy Provincial Chief of the Nueva Ecija Criminal Investigation and Detection
Team, referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, three
(3) cases of murder against petitioners and 15 other persons, who were allegedly
responsible for the death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe.
His findings show that the named individuals conspired, planned, and
implemented the killing of the supporters of AKBAYAN Party List (AKBAYAN),
a rival of Bayan Muna and Gabriela.

Inspector Palomo recommended that a preliminary investigation be

conducted and that an Information for each count of murder be filed against the
19 individuals. On July 18, 2008, Presiding Judge Evelyn A. Atienza-Turla iissued
an Order on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla held that "the proper procedure in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed in the Palayan cases"
and ordered remanding the cases back to the provincial prosecutors.

Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order of remanding the case back to the
prosecutors had no basis in law, jurisprudence, or the rules. Since she had already
evaluated the evidence submitted by the prosecutors along with the Informations,
she should have determined the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants or the dismissal of the Palayan cases. Petitioners assert that under
the Rules of Court, in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, Judge Turla
could "order the prosecutor to present additional evidence [or] set the case for
hearing so she could make clarifications on the factual issues of the case. Moreover,
petitioners argue that the setting aside of the Joint Resolution establishes the non-
existence of probable cause against them. Thus, the cases against them should have
been dismissed. Petitioners also aver that the documents submitted by the
prosecution are neither relevant nor admissible evidence. The documents "do not
establish the complicity of the petitioner party-list representatives to the death of
the supposed victims."

792
 On May 29, 2009, respondents filed their Comment through the Office of
the Solicitor General, raising the following arguments: 1) Petition before this Court
violates the principle of hierarchy of courts; 2) Petitioners should have filed their
petition before the Court of Appeals since it also exercises original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and 3) Petitioners failed to justify a direct
resort to this Court. On the allegation that Judge Turla reneged on her
constitutional duty to determine probable cause, respondents countered that she
did not abandon her mandate. Her act of remanding the cases to the public
prosecutors "is a confirmation of her observance of the well-settled principle that
such determination of probable cause is an exclusive executive function of the
prosecutorial arm of our government."

ISSUE:

1. Did respondent Judge Turla gravely abuse her discretion when she
remanded the Palayan cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct
of preliminary investigation?
2. Can the admissibility of evidence can be ruled upon m preliminary
investigation?

RULING:

1. Yes.

The remand of the criminal cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the
conduct of another preliminary investigation is improper.

Rule 112, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within
ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or
information.
A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information,
the trial court judge has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the

793
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant
of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable cause; or (3) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt on the existence
of probable cause.

In De Lima v. Reyes, this Court further held: The courts do not interfere with
the prosecutor’s conduct of a preliminary investigation. The prosecutor’s
determination of probable cause is solely within his or her discretion.
Prosecutors are given a wide latitude of discretion to determine whether an
information should be filed in court or whether the complaint should be
dismissed. Thus, when Judge Turla held that the prosecutors' conduct of
preliminary investigation was "incomplete" and that their determination of
probable cause "has not measured up to the standard," she encroached upon
the exclusive function of the prosecutors. Instead of determining probable
cause, she ruled on the propriety of the preliminary investigation.

In Leviste v. Hon. Alameda, et al.: The task of the presiding judge when the
Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof,
he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard
the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.

In this case, the documents submitted along with the Informations are
sufficient for Judge Turla to rule on the existence of probable cause. If she finds
the evidence inadequate, she may order the prosecutors to present additional
evidence. Regardless of Judge Turla's assessment on the conduct of the
preliminary investigation, it was incumbent upon her to determine the
existence of probable cause against the accused after a personal evaluation of
the prosecutors' report and the supporting documents. She could even
disregard the report if she found it unsatisfactory, and/or require the
prosecutors to submit additional evidence. There was no option for her to

794
remand the case back to the panel of prosecutors for another preliminary
investigation. Thus, in doing so, she acted without any legal basis.

2. No.

The admissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary

investigation. In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutors do not
decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
person charged; they merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

To emphasize, "a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial,

it is not a trial on the merits." Since "it cannot be expected that upon the filing
of the information in court the prosecutor would have already presented all the
evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused, the admissibility or
inadmissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary
investigation.

795
 Napoles v. De Lima
G.R. No. 213529 July 13, 2016
FACTS:

Arturo Luy, Gertrudes Luy, Arthur Luy, and Annabelle Luy alleged that a
family member, Benhur Luy, had been detained against his will, transferred from
place to place in a bid to cover up the JLN Group of Companies' anomalous
transactions involving Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Secretary
of Justice De Lima directed the NBI Special Task Force to investigate the matter.
This led to a “rescue operation” to release Benhur Luy.

Finding no probable cause against Lim and Napoles, Prosecutor Navera

recommended the dismissal of the complaint for serious illegal detention.
Prosecutor Navera’s recommendation was initially approved by Prosecutor
General Arellano. However, in the Review Resolution Senior Deputy State
Prosecutor and Chair of the Task Force on Anti-Kidnapping Theodore M.
Villanueva (Prosecutor Villanueva) reversed the Resolution. An Information for
serious illegal detention was thereafter filed against Napoles and Lim.
Recommending no bail for Napoles and Lim, Judge Alameda issued a warrant for
their arrest.

ISSUE:

Is there a difference as to the determination of probable cause for filing

an information in court and that for issuance of an arrest warrant?

RULING:

Yes.

The determination of probable cause for filing an information in court and

that for issuance of an arrest warrant are different. During preliminary
investigation, the prosecutor determines the existence of probable cause for filing
an information in court or dismissing the criminal complaint. As worded in the
Rules of Court, the prosecutor determines during preliminary investigation
whether "there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial." At this stage, the determination of probable cause is an executive
function. Absent grave abuse of discretion, this determination cannot be interfered
with by the courts. This is consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.

On the other hand, if done to issue an arrest warrant, the determination of

probable cause is a judicial function. No less than the Constitution commands that

796
"no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce." This requirement of personal
evaluation by the judge is reaffirmed in Rule 112, Section 5(a) of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the determination of probable cause for filing an
information in court and that for issuance of an arrest warrant are different. Once
the information is filed in court, the trial court acquires jurisdiction and "any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court."

797
Section 6. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.

Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular

G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018

FACTS:

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
February 26, 2009 Order and Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Ramon D.
Pamular (Judge Pamular) of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija
in Civil Case No. 2618-G. The assailed Order granted the prosecution's Motion to
Amend the Original Information for murder filed against Carlito Samonte
(Samonte) to include Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpus (Corpus) as his co-accused in
the crime charged. Furthermore, it directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against Corpus.

Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte at Corpuz Street,

Cuyapo, Nueva Ecjia on June 4, 2008, causing his death. Samonte was caught in
flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an
Information for murder. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but
pleaded self-defense. Trial on the merits ensued.

The wife of the deceased, Mrs. Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa (Priscilla), filed

a complaint-affidavit captioned as Reply-Affidavit dated September 8, 2008 after
the prosecution presented its second witness. She also filed an unsworn but signed
Reply to the Affidavit of Witnesses before First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
and Officer-in-Charge Floro F. Florendo (Florendo). Other affidavits of witnesses
were also filed before the prosecutor's office. Based on one of the affidavits
executed by Alexander Lozano (Lozano) on June 30, 2008, Corpuz was the one
who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. In its October 7, 2008 Resolution, the
Regional Trial Court dismissed Priscilla's complaint and the attached affidavits of
witnesses.

Priscilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was opposed by

Corpus. Florendo reconsidered and set aside the October 7, 2008 Resolution. He
also instructed Assistant Public Prosecutor Edwin S. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) to
conduct the review. Bonifacio was not able to comply with the directive to
personally submit his resolution by January 22, 2009, prompting Florendo to order
him to surrender the records of the case as the latter was taking over the resolution
of the case based on the evidence presented by the parties. This order was released
on January 23, 2009 and was received by Bonifacio on the same date.

798
 In his January 26, 2009 Resolution, Florendo found probable cause to indict
Corpus for Angelita's murder. He directed the filing of an amended information
before the Regional Trial Court.

Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review
Resolution dated January 26, 2009, where he reinstated the Regional Trial Court
October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder complaint
against Corpus.

Meanwhile, Florendo filed an undated Motion to Amend Information,

praying for the admission of the amended information. Corpus and Samonte
opposed this Motion by filing a Joint Urgent Manifestation/Opposition dated
February 2, 2009.

The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Samonte and Corpus

opposed this through a Vehement Opposition and Omnibus Motion dated
February 4, 2009. They averred that Judge Pamular's action was premature
considering that the Motion to Amend Information has yet to be scheduled for
hearing. Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned. Samonte and Corpus also
claimed that the issuance of a warrant of arrest should be suspended because the
latter intended to appeal through a Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice.

Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review dated February 9,
2009 before the Department of Justice. They also filed a Manifestation and Motion
dated February 9, 2009 with the Regional Trial Court, asking it to desist from
acting further on the Amended Information in view of the Petition for Review filed
with the Department of Justice.

However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular of Branch 33, Regional

Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija issued the assailed February 26, 2009 Order,
which granted the motion to amend the information and to admit the attached
amended information. The assailed Order also directed, among others, the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.
Hence, a direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 with a prayer for an immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order,
was filed by Corpus and Samonte on March 3, 2009. This Petition seeks to enjoin
Judge Pamular from enforcing the February 26, 2009 Order and the warrant of
arrest issued pursuant to the Order, and from conducting further proceedings in
the murder case.

799
 Through its March 9, 2009 Resolution, this Court required respondents to
comment on the Petition. It also granted petitioners' prayer for a temporary
restraining order. Judge Pamular, Florendo, Priscilla, and all other persons acting
on the assailed Regional Trial Court February 26, 2009 Order were enjoined from
implementing it and the warrant of arrest issued pursuant to it.

Priscilla filed her comment on April 3, 2009. She insists that the Regional
Trial Court is correct in granting the motion to admit the amended information
because it has no effect on Samonte's case. She claims that the alleged lack of
determination of probable cause before the issuance of a warrant has no basis since
petitioners failed to present evidence or facts that would prove their claim.

Judge Pamular filed his Comment on April 8, 2009. He asserts that he made
a careful perusal of the case records in issuing the assailed order. His independent
judgment on the existence of probable cause was derived from his reading and
evaluation of pertinent documents and evidence. He states that he had set the case
for hearing on February 13, 2009, when both parties were heard and given the
opportunity to argue.

On July 22, 2009, Priscilla filed a Manifestation before this Court. She asserts
that this "present petition questioning the alleged impropriety of the admission of
the amended information as well as the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Mayor Amado Corpus, Jr. has no more legal legs to stand on." She claims that
Florendo's January 26, 2009 Resolution was upheld by the Department of Justice

Priscilla asserts further that the issue regarding the suspension of

proceedings pending resolution by the Department of Justice can now be
considered moot and academic.

Petitioners filed their reply on August 7, 2009.They claim that respondent

judge should have suspended action on the issuance of a warrant considering the
pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.

Petitioners also cite the dispositive portion of Tolentino v. Bonifacio, which

directed the respondent judge in that case to desist from proceeding with the trial
until after the Department of Justice would have finally resolved a pending
petition for review.

Petitioners claim that due to the theory of conspiracy in the amended

information, Samonte will have an additional burden of setting up a new defense
particularly on any acts of his co-accused since "the act of one is the act of all.
"Petitioners also claim that respondent judge failed to comply with the mandate

800
of making a prior determination of probable cause before issuing the warrant.
They insist that this mandate "is never excused nor dispensed with by the
respondent judge's self-serving narration of the law (not the required facts) stated
in his assailed order."

On the issue of whether the arraignment of Corpus may proceed despite

the lapse of the 60-day maximum period of suspension under Rule 116, Section
11(c), petitioners aver that "what jurisprudence underscores is not the lapse of the
60-day period, but the issue of finality of the decision on appeal. "The matter
should not only cover the suspension of arraignment but for respondent judge to
defer from further proceedings on the amended information pending the final
resolution of the Department of Justice.

ISSUE:

Was the issuance of the warrant of arrest proper?

HELD:

Yes.

Petitioners claim that the assailed warrant of arrest was made in utter
disregard of the constitutional mandate which directs judges to personally
conduct an independent examination, under oath or affirmation, of the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce.

In the 1987 Constitution, the judge is required to "personally" determine

the existence of probable cause. This requirement, however, does not appear in the
corresponding provisions found in our previous Constitutions. This gives
prominence to the framers' intent of placing "greater degree of responsibility upon
trial judges than that imposed under previous Constitutions."

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal

Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate
when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal
determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have
known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a
certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for
the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and

801
recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient
for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can
perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the
evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting
the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.

The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes
depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how
cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise
sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by
the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case
require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and
investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and
witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the
circumstances of the case so require.

We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is

not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible
officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and
is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that
discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.

Soliven provided that as dictated by sound policy, an issuing judge is not

required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses as long as he or
she has satisfied himself or herself of the existence of probable cause. To rule
otherwise would unduly burden judges with preliminary examination of criminal
complaints instead of attending to more important matters. However, due to
recent developments in the legal system which include the judicial affidavit rule,
the evil sought to be prevented in Soliven does not exist anymore. To minimize the
time required for completing testimonies of witnesses in litigated cases, this Court
approved the use of judicial affidavits in lieu of witnesses' direct testimonies. Thus,
this is more in tune with the Constitutional mandate by lessening the burden
imposed upon judges by expediting litigation of cases for them to attend to their
exclusive and personal responsibility of satisfying themselves with the existence
of probable cause when issuing a warrant.

Rule 112, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

802
 Section 6. When Warrant of Arrest May Issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial
Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant
of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant
to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In
case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information.

Pursuant to the provision, the issuing judge has the following options upon
the filing of an Information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a
warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause,
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice,
the issue to be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the
information.

It is required for the judge to "personally evaluate the resolution of the

prosecutor and its supporting evidence." In case the evidence on record fails to
substantiate probable cause, the trial judge may instantly dismiss the case.

The records of this case reveal that the February 26, 2009 Order presented a
discussion showing both the factual and legal circumstances of the case from the
filing of the original information until the filing of the Motion to Amend
Information. Respondent Judge Pamular, therefore, is familiar with the incidents
of this case, which were his basis for issuing the warrant. Thus, before he issued
the assailed Order and warrant, a hearing was conducted on February 13, 2009
regarding the motions and manifestations filed in the case: On February 13, 2009,
a hearing was held wherein the parties presented their arguments. On the issue
regarding the undated motion to amend information without notice of hearing
and the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution, the court ruled that
the same is moot and academic due to the conduct of the said hearing.

Furthermore, respondent Judge Pamular has a working knowledge of the

circumstances regarding the amended information that constrained him to find
probable cause in issuing the warrant.

803
 In respondent Judge Pamular's Comment, he claimed that: Be that as it may,
still, the undersigned respondent judge made a careful perusal of the records of
the case. Sufficient copies of supporting documents and/or evidence were read
and evaluated upon which, independent judgment as to the existence of probable
cause was based. But, then again, still not satisfied, the undersigned even went
beyond the face of the resolution and evidences (sic) presented before this Court.
On 13 February 2009, Criminal Case No. 2618-G was set for hearing. The
prosecution and the defense were given the chance to argue on the matter and
ample opportunity to be heard.

Apart from respondent judge's personal examination of the amended

information and supporting documents, the hearing conducted on February 13,
2009 enabled him to find probable cause prompting him to issue the warrant of
arrest.

804
 RULE 113
Arrest

Section 5 - Arrest without Warrant; when lawful

People of the Philippines v. Casio

G.R. No. 211465, December 3, 2014
FACTS:
This case involves R.A. No. 9208 or “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2003.” The accused, Shirley Casio, was charged for violation of R.A. No. 9208,
Section 4 (a) qualified by Section 6 (a).
On May 2, 2008, an entrapment operation was conducted in Queensland
Motel in Cebu City. The team rented two rooms. One was designated for the
transaction and the other was for the rest of the police team. PO1 Luardo and PO1
Veloso proceeded in Cebu City’s red light district. Accused noticed them and
called their attention by saying “Chicks mo dong?” (Do you like girls, guys?). After
few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB (Private Complainants). The
police officers convinced accused to come with them to Queensland Motel and
handed the marked money to her. After giving the pre-arranged signal, the team
proceeded to the first room and arrested the accused. During the trial, AAA
testified that she was a minor at the time, being 17 years of age. The prosecution
also presented the police operatives during the trial.
RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to
suffer 20 years of imprisonment. CA affirmed the decision of RTC but imposed the
penalty of life imprisonment. A notice of appeal was filed and the records were
transferred to SC. Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she
was instigated into committing the crime. The police did not conduct prior
surveillance and did not even know the identity of the accused nor the victims.
ISSUE:
Was the entrapment operation valid even without the conduct of prior
surveillance and that the police did not know the subject of the operation?
RULING:
Yes.
The entrapment operation was valid. The court affirmed accused’s
conviction.
In Chang v. People, the court explained that: “There is entrapment when the
law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal

805
while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused
is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the
origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind
of the criminal. The idea and resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In
instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to
the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.”
In this case, the accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she
initiated the transaction. As testified by PO1 Veloso and Luardo, accused called
out their attention by saying “Chicks mo dong?” If accused had no predisposition
to commit the offense, then she most likely would not have asked PO1 Veloso and
Luardo if they wanted girls. There was no illicit inducement on the part of the
police for the accused to commit the crime.
With regard to lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a
condition for an entrapment operation’s validity. In People v. Padua the court
underscored the value of flexibility in police operations: “A prior surveillance is
not a pre-requisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust operation, the
conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method… The police officers may
decide that the time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior
surveillance.” This flexibility is even more important in cases involving trafficking
of persons. The urgency of rescuing the victims may at times require immediate
but deliberate action on the part of the law enforcers.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused committed the offense of trafficking in persons, qualified by the fact that
one of the victim was a child. The act of “sexual intercourse” need not have been
consummated for the mere “transaction” i.e. solicitation for sex and handling over
of the bust money already consummated the said act. Therefore, the conviction of
the accused was affirmed.

806
 Villasana v. People
G.R. No. 209078, September 4, 2019
FACTS:

Jojo Villasana was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. PO3
Martinez received a confidential information that Jojo Villasana and Nida
Villasana were rampantly selling drugs. A team was formed to conduct
surveillance operations. At 11:30 p.m. that day, the team proceeded to the target
area on board three vehicles. Around 10 to 15 minutes later, they saw, through the
van's tinted front windshield, Villasana coming out of an alley around 5 to 6 meters
away. He was holding a plastic sachet while talking to a woman. The Police
officers approached him discreetly. After verifying that Villasana was indeed
holding shabu, PO3 Martinez arrested him and confiscated the sachet. The
woman, however, was able to escape. Villasana testified that he was having a
conversation with Sabel and Diane inside a jeepney, which was then parked in
front of his house. Not far from them, a group of Police officers arrived. PO2
Sanchez called Villasana to come out. He did as asked, but as he alighted from the
jeepney, PO2 Magno grabbed him by the waist and forced him to board a car
parked behind the jeepney. He tried to resist, but the arresting officers
overpowered him. RTC convicted Villasana. CA held that there was a valid
warrantless arrest because Villasana "was caught in flagrante delicto of having in
his possession an illegal drug." It also found that the police officers had probable
cause to apprehend Villasana, as he matched the description given by the
informant, and was also found at the place specified by the informant.

ISSUE:

Was there a valid warrantless arrest of Villasana?

RULING:

No.

As a rule, a search and seizure must be carried out with a search warrant
validly issued by a judge upon personal determination of probable cause;
otherwise, the search becomes unreasonable. Jurisprudence, however, has
recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. The instances of
lawful arrest without warrant are provided in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 5 (a) refers to an in flagrante delicto arrest,
and requires compliance with the "overt act test," as explained in People v. Cogaed:
For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;

807
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer." Section 5 (b), on the other hand, requires that at the time of the arrest, an
offense had just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the accused had committed it. In both instances, the
police officer must have personal knowledge of the commission of an offense.
Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself or herself witnesses the crime; in Section 5
(b), the officer knows that a crime has just been committed and had witnessed
some facts that led him or her to believe that the person about to be arrested
committed the offense.

In this case, PO3 Martinez was about 6 to 10 meters away when he saw
Villasana emerge from an alley, talking to a woman while holding a plastic sachet.
His testimony fails to state that he had personal knowledge that the sachet
contained shabu, or that he saw the sachet containing white crystalline substance,
to create a reasonable suspicion that the sachet did indeed contain shabu. From all
indications — the time of the arrest being 11:30 p.m., PO3 Martinez's location, and
the tinted front windshield of the van through which he was looking — it was
highly doubtful that PO3 Martinez saw, let alone deciphered, the contents of the
sachet. It is settled that "reliable information" provided by Police assets alone is
not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. There must be independent
circumstances perceivable by the arresting officers suggesting that a criminal
offense is being committed. An accused must perform some overt act within plain
view of the Police officers indicating that she or "he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime." None was present in this case.

808
 Veridiano y Sapi v. People
G.R. No. 200370, June 07, 2017
FACTS:

Acting on a tip that a certain Veridiano was on the way to obtain illegal
drugs, the Nagcarlan Police Station set up a checkpoint to intercept the former.
Chancing upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney, the police officers instructed
the passengers to disembark, raise their t-shirts, and empty the contents of their
pockets. A tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana was allegedly found
in Veridiano’s possession and he was thereafter arrested. The contents of the tea
bag later turned out to be positive for marijuana. In his defense, Veridiano alleges
that while on his way home, armed men in civilian attire boarded the jeepney he
was riding where he was frisked but nothing was found in his person. However,
while in the police station, he was informed that illegal drugs were found in his
possession.

Veridiano was charged with violation of R.A. 9165. The RTC and CA both
found him guilty and ruled that the search and the subsequent arrest conducted
was valid pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

ISSUE:

Is the arrest an in flagrante delicto arrest and/or hot pursuit arrest under
Rule 113 Section 5 thereby making the subsequent warrantless search valid?

RULING:

No.

The arrest does not comply with the requirements of either an in flagrante
delicto or hot pursuit arrest under Section 5 of Rule 113. As a consequence, the
warrantless search is also invalid as a search incidental to a lawful arrest requires
that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a
lawful arrest must precede the search.

As a general rule, for there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be

armed with a valid warrant. Nonetheless, there are ground which will justify a
warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Section. The first kind of warrantless arrest
under Section 5(a) is known as in flagrante delicto arrest which must comply with
the overt act test. The overt act test requires the presence of two (2) elements: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he/she has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)

809
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
The second kind of warrantless arrest under Section 5(b) is known as the hot
pursuit arrest. The rule requires that an offense has just been committed. It
connotes immediacy in point of time. While law enforcers need not personally
witness the commission of a crime, they must have personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested committed it.

In this case, petitioner was not committing a crime at the checkpoint and
the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone
is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person
to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed. The law enforcers also had no personal
knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had just
committed an offense. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest.
Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation,
that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives
rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search.

810
 Aparente y Volcan v. People
G.R. No. 205695, September 27, 2017
FACTS:

Prosecution witnesses PO1 Dela Cruz and PO1 Pastor testified that when
they were patrolling, they saw two men, one of whom was later identified as
Aparente. They watched as the other man handed Aparente a small plastic sachet.
When the police officers approached, the two men fled. Only Aparente was
caught. PO1 Dela Cruz told Aparente to open his hands and found a small sachet
with a white crystalline substance, which the police officers confiscated. They
brought Aparente to the Police Station where a police investigator marked the
confiscated sachet with Aparente's initials. PO1 Dela Cruz then submitted the
sachet, together with its contents, to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Prosecution
witness Forensic Chemical Officer Abillonar issued a Laboratory Report which
stated that the contents of the sachet tested positive for shabu.

Aparente on the other hand testified that at the time of the alleged incident,
he was watching television with his mother, brother, and niece when five persons
forcibly entered the house. They handcuffed him and searched the house.
Afterwards, the intruders told him they found shabu, which he was coerced to
admit possessing.

The RTC found Aparente guilty of violating Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
Aparente appealed, arguing that the evidence against him was obtained from an
illegal warrantless arrest. The CA affirmed the RTC. It found that the warrantless
arrest was lawfully conducted upon probable cause.

ISSUE:

Was there a valid warrantless arrest?

RULING:

Yes.

The warrantless arrest was valid. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
provides that the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures is
inviolable. However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when
warrantless. In the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed
even without a separate warrant. This court has taken into account the "uniqueness
of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured."

811
 Where a warrantless search preceded a warrantless arrest but was
substantially contemporaneous with it, what must be resolved is whether or not
the police had probable cause for the arrest when the search was made. Probable
cause may be in the form of overt acts which show that a crime had been, was
being, or was about to be committed.

In this case, the arrest and the search were substantially contemporaneous.
the arresting officers saw a man hand petitioner a small plastic sachet, which
petitioner then inspected by flicking it against the light of a lamp post in an alley.
Upon the officers' approach, these two men fled. These overt acts and
circumstances were observed personally by the arresting officers and, taken
together, constitute reasonable suspicion that these two men were violating R.A.
No. 9165.

Thus, that the search preceded the arrest does not render invalid the search
and arrest of petitioner.

812
 Manibog v. People
G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019

FACTS:

Larry Manibog was charged with violation of Section 1 of Commission on

Elections Resolution No. 8714, in relation to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166,
and Sections 261(q) and 264 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election
Code (Gun Ban). In the morning of March 17, 2010, Police Chief Inspector
Randolph Beniat (Chief Inspector Beniat) received information from a police asset
that Manibog was standing outside the Municipal Tourism Office of Dingras,
Ilocos Norte with a gun tucked in his waistband. To verify this information, Chief
Inspector Beniat immediately organized a team. Together, they proceeded to the
Municipal Tourism Office located around 20 meters from the police station. About
five (5) to eight (8) meters away from the Municipal Tourism Office, Chief
Inspector Beniat saw Manibog standing outside the building. The team slowly
approached him for fear that he might fight back. As he moved closer, Chief
Inspector Beniat saw a bulge on Manibog's waist, which the police officer deduced
to be a gun due to its distinct contour. Chief Inspector Beniat went up to Manibog,
patted the bulging object on his waist, and confirmed that there was a gun tucked
in Manibog's waistband. He disarmed Manibog of the .45 caliber handgun inside
a holster, after which he arrested him for violating the election gun ban and
brought him to the police station for an inquest proceeding.

In its August 25, 2011 Judgment, the Regional Trial Court found Manibog
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the election offense with which he was charged.
It ruled that the warrantless search on Manibog was incidental to a lawful arrest
because there was probable cause for the police officers to frisk and arrest him.
Manibog appealed the Judgment, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's finding that the warrantless search made
on Manibog was incidental to a lawful arrest.

ISSUE:

Is the warrantless search on the petitioner valid?

Ruling:

Yes.

Two (2) exceptions to a search warrant—a warrantless search incidental to

a lawful arrest and "stop and frisk"—are often confused with each other. Malacat
v. Court of Appeals explained that they "differ in terms of the requisite quantum of

813
proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope." For an
arrest to be lawful, a warrant of arrest must have been judicially issued or there
was a lawful warrantless arrest as provided for in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court: SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the arresting officer
must have personal knowledge of the offense. The difference is that under Section
5(a), the arresting officer must have personally witnessed the crime; meanwhile,
under Section 5(b), the arresting officer must have had probable cause to believe
that the person to be arrested committed an offense. Nonetheless, whether under
Section 5(a) or (b), the lawful arrest generally precedes, or is substantially
contemporaneous, with the search.

In direct contrast with warrantless searches incidental to a lawful arrest,

stop and frisk searches are conducted to deter crime. In People v. Cogaed , the Court
held,"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are
necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced
with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness"
present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in.
Malacat instructed that for a stop and frisk search to be valid, mere suspicion is not
enough. Accordingly, to sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting
officer should have personally observed two (2) or more suspicious circumstances,
the totality of which would then create a reasonable inference of criminal activity
to compel the arresting officer to investigate further.

Here, while the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a reasonable search
was conducted on petitioner, the facts on record do not point to a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest. Rather, what transpired was a stop and frisk
search.

The tip on petitioner, coupled with the police officers' visual confirmation
that petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in his waistband, led to a
reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun ban.

814
However, a reasonable suspicion is not synonymous with the personal knowledge
required under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a valid warrantless
arrest. Nonetheless, the combination of the police asset's tip and the arresting
officers' observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner's shirt already
suffices as a genuine reason for the arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk
search on petitioner. Hence, the trial court correctly upheld the reasonableness of
the warrantless search on petitioner.

815
 Lapi y Mahipus v. People
G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019
FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals which upheld the Regional Trial Court
Decision. The trial court found Simeon M. Lapi (Lapi) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of having violated Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentenced him to six (6) months of rehabilitation at a government-approved
facility.

Operatives of the Bacolod City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task

Group conducted a stakeout operation in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City.
During the operation, Police Officer 2 Ronald Villeran (PO2 Villeran) heard noises
from one of the houses. He "peeped through its window" and saw Lapi, Sacare,
and Lim "having a pot session."

PO2 Villeran tried to enter the house through the main door, but the door
was locked. He then tried to enter through the kitchen door. Upon entry, he met
someone trying to flee, but PO2 Villeran restrained the person. Then, PO2 Villeran
"peeked into the adjacent room" and saw that the pot session was ongoing. He
entered the room and introduced himself as a police officer. Lapi, and two others
tried to escape, but were caught by PO2 Villeran's team members, who were
waiting by the main door.

The men were then brought to the City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation
Task Group Office, where a police blotter was filed. They were later brought to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory to undergo drug tests. The initial
laboratory report found that Lapi and his companions tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Another test conducted yielded the
same results.

The Regional Trial Court found Lapi guilty. It ruled that the warrantless
arrest against him was legal since he was caught in flagrante delicto. Upon appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision. Lapi filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied. Hence, Lapi filed this
Petition.

Petitioner asserts that while he failed to question the validity of his arrest
before entering his plea, his warrantless arrest was illegal from the start. Hence,
any evidence obtained cannot be used against him. He argues that PO2 Villeran
committed "a malevolent intrusion of privacy" when he peeped through the
window; had he not done so, he would not see what the people in the house

816
did. He contends that this intrusion into his privacy "cannot be equated in plain
view; therefore, petitioner cannot be considered caught in flagrante delicto."
.
ISSUE:

Whether petitioner may question the validity of his arrest for the first
time in his Petition before the Supreme Court

RULING:

No.

Petitioner admits that he failed to question the validity of his arrest before
arraignment. He did not move to quash the Information against him before
entering his plea. He was assisted by counsel when he entered his plea. Likewise,
he was able to present his evidence.

In People v. Alunday: The Court has consistently ruled that any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. We have also ruled that an accused
may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the
quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And since the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. We have also held in a
number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial
free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the
accused. Herein, accused-appellant is, therefore, deemed to have waived such
alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-
assisted plea during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and
by not raising the objection before his arraignment. As with certain constitutional
rights, the right to question the validity of a warrantless arrest can be waived. This
waiver, however, does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of the
evidence seized during the illegal arrest.Petitioner, however, has already waived
the right to question the validity of his arrest. No items were seized from him
during his arrest as he was not charged with possession or sale of illegal drugs.
Thus the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in violation of Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No.
9165.

817
 Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
FACTS:

Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently

traveled, "coming back and forth taking a vessel." At around 12:00 noon of May
11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to
Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. It
took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. Dela Cruz then proceeded to the
entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for
inspection. The operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag.

Flores, the x-ray machine operator-on-duty, saw the impression of what

appeared to be three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag. Upon seeing the
suspected firearms, she called the attention of port personnel Igot who was the
baggage inspector then. Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the
bag. Dela Cruz answered Igot in the affirmative and consented to Igot's manual
inspection of the bag.

Port Police Officer Abregana was called by Igot and was told that there
were firearms in a bag owned by Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz admitted that he was
owner of the bag. The bag was then inspected and the following items were found
inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman's book; other personal items; and
four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. When asked whether he had
the proper documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative. Dela
Cruz was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law.
He was also informed of his constitutional rights.

In the Information, Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act
No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms. Subsequently, another Information was
filed charging him with the violation of Commission on Elections Resolution No.
7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment.

After trial, RTC Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the
Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to
Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. The trial court also finds the search
conducted by the port authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the
accused's constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the accused
revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught
in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions

818
obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against
the accused.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Judgment.

Petitioner argues that he did not validly consent to the search conducted by
the port authorities. He further argues that he did not have an actual intention to
relinquish his right against a warrantless search

ISSUE:

Was the search and seizure of firearms valid?

RULING:

Yes.

The trial court's findings show that petitioner presented his bag for
scanning in the x-ray machine. When his bag went through the x-ray machine and
the firearms were detected, he voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection to the
port authorities. It was after the port personnel's inspection that Officer
Abregana's attention was called and the bag was inspected anew with petitioner's
consent. Thus, Petitioner is precluded from claiming an invalid warrantless search
when he voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In addition, petitioner's
consent to the search at the domestic port was not given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances. Petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to port security
measures and, as he claimed during trial, he was familiar with the security
measures since he had been traveling back and forth through the sea port.

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done

without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional
provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny
reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.

819
 RULE 114
Bail

Section 5 - Bail, when discretionary

Reyes v. People
G.R. No. 237172, September 18, 2019
FACTS:

On August 29, 2017, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision finding Reyes
guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six
years and one month, as minimum, to eight years, as maximum, when he renewed
the small scale mining permit of a mining company despite it violating the terms
and conditions of its previous permit. The court initially granted petitioner’s
application for bail. The prosecution, however, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion
to cancel the bail. On January 17, 2018 the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
granting the motion and cancelling petitioner’s bail.

Reyes filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari and an Urgent Motion to

Review the Revocation of Bail assailing the Sandiganbayan’s January 17, 2018
Resolution which had revoked his bail. The Sandiganbayan cited that Reyes had
previously violated the conditions of his bail posted on September 1, 2011 in a
murder case after he failed to appear before the Sandiganbayan despite a directive
for him to do so, and there was a probability of flight as shown by the fact that he
flew to Thailand during the trial of his murder case.

Reyes counters that the bail previously granted by the Sandiganbayan in its
January 17, 2018 Resolution is distinct from the bail he posted on September 1,
2011 to stay the warrant of his arrest. He states that any violation of the conditions
of his bail was prior to his conviction. Thus, the bail he posted on September 11,
2001 was considered cancelled. He adds that since he was acquitted of the charge
of murder, the Sandiganbayan had no reason to revoke his bail in this case.

ISSUE:

Was the bail correctly revoked on the ground of violation of the

conditions of his bail and for possibility of flight?

RULING:

Yes.

820
 Bail after conviction is not a matter of right. Its grant or cancellation is
within the sound discretion of the court. After conviction of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the grant of bail
becomes discretionary upon the court, which may either deny or grant it. In
circumstances where the penalty imposed exceeds six years, the court is not
precluded from cancelling the bail previously granted upon a showing by the
prosecution of the circumstances enumerated in Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court. The presence of even one of the enumerated circumstances is sufficient to
deny or cancel the bail.

Indeed, the factual findings show the presence of 2 circumstances stated in

Rule 114, Section 5: (1) petitioner had previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the condition of his bail without a valid justification;
and (2) he poses a flight risk if admitted to bail. Petitioner had the propensity to
evade the lawful orders of the court even before he could be convicted of murder.
Since petitioner had already been convicted, the Sandiganbayan had to be more
circumspect in examining the condition for petitioner’s bail in this case.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates

and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of
bail is subject to judicial discretion. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper
courts are to be guided by the fundamental principal that the allowance of bail
pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and
only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by
the trial court.

821
Section 17 - Bail, where filed

Tejano v. Marigomen
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492, September 26, 2017
FACTS:

During the pendency of a civil case for declaration of absolute nullity of

deed of absolute sale in Br. 61, Bogo City, Tejano filed a criminal complaint for
VAWC against Andrino. The case was raffled to Br. 20, Cebu City presided by
Judge Saniel. With no standing warrant of arrest against him, Andrino posted bail
before Br. 61, Bogo City and not before Br. 20 in Cebu City where the criminal case
was pending. In posting bail, Andrino was assisted by respondent Camay, who
was assigned to Br. 61. On the same day that Andrino posted bail, Judge
Marigomen ordered Andrino's release.

Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint against Judge Marigomen for gross

ignorance of the law, alleging that Judge Marigomen issued the Order of Release
with no standing warrant of arrest against Andrino, in violation of Rule 114,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

According to Judge Marigomen, he approved the bail bond in the exercise

of his sound discretion. He argued that in applications for bail, the stringent
application of the Rules of Court may be relaxed in favor of the accused. For his
part, Camay admitted that he assisted Andrino in posting bail but only because he
was a public employee obliged to do so, denying that he was a fixer.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Judge Marigomen

guilty of gross ignorance of the law. According to the OCA, Judge Marigomen was
found guilty of improperly applying the rules on bail bond applications. Under
Rule 114, Section 17(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, bail may be
posted in another court only if the judge where the case is pending is absent or
unavailable. The OCA found that Judge Marigomen failed to prove that Judge
Saniel, the judge of the court where the criminal case against Andrino was
pending, was absent or unavailable. In addition, there was no standing warrant of
arrest against Andrino at the time he posted bail on May 9, 2013. The Warrant of
Arrest was issued only on May 30, 2013.

ISSUE:

Was Judge Marigomen correct in granting the bail bond and ordering the
release of Andrino when the criminal case was pending in another court and no
warrant of arrest was still issued?

822
RULING:

No.

Bail, as defined in Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, is "the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him [or her]
or a bondsman, to guarantee his [or her] appearance before any court as required
under the conditions hereinafter specified." Based on this definition, the accused
must be in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his or her liberty to be able
to post bail.

Generally, bail is filed before the court where the case is pending. However,
under Rule 114, Section 17(a) of the Rules of Court, if bail cannot be filed before
the court where the case is pending, in the absence or unavailability of the judge
thereof, the bail may be filed with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or
municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other
than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court
of said place, or if no judge thereof is available. with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

The text of Rule 114, Section 17(a) of the Rules of Court shows that there is
an order of preference with respect to where bail may be filed. In the absence or
unavailability of the judge where the case is pending, the accused must first go to
a judge in the province, city, or municipality where the case is pending.
Furthermore, a judge of another province, city, or municipality may grant bail only
if the accused has been arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than
where the case is pending.

A judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the case
is pending but approves an application for bail filed by an accused not arrested is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law. It is gross ignorance of the law if a judge grants
an application for bail in a criminal case outside of his or her jurisdiction without
ascertaining the absence or unavailability of the judge of the court where the
criminal case is pending.

Judge Marigomen was not a judge in the province, city, or municipality

where the case was pending. Neither was Andrino arrested in a province, city, or
municipality other than where the case was pending precisely because no warrant
of arrest had yet been issued when he posted bail on May 9, 2013. Judge
Marigomen violated Rule 114, Section 17(a) and is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law.

823
 Moreover, Judge Marigomen did not ascertain the absence or unavailability
of Judge Saniel. This duty to ascertain is a consequence of Judge Marigomen not
being the judge of the place where the criminal case was pending and could have
been satisfied by inquiring and coordinating with the court personnel belonging
to Br. 20, where the criminal case was pending.

Hence, Judge Marigomen’s act amounts to gross ignorance of the law for
violation of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court

824
Section 22. Cancellation of bail

Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang

G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017
FACTS:

Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. (“Personal Collection”) filed against

Teresita L. Carandang (“Carandang”) a criminal complaint for Estafa with
unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code. An Information was issued against Carandang. However,
upon Carandang’s filing of her Motion for Reinvestigation, the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) recommended that the complaint be dismissed. It also filed a
Motion to Withdraw Information with the Regional Trial Court, stating that the
Office of the City Prosecutor found that there was lack of probable cause to hold
Carandang liable for estafa.

The RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information.

The trial court also noted the general policy of the courts to not interfere in the
conduct of preliminary investigations and to give the investigating officers
sufficient discretion to determine probable cause. It found that no exception
existed in the case that would require the court to intervene in the findings of the
preliminary investigation.

Personal Collection filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the trial court failed to make its own evaluation of the merits of the
case and only relied on Prosecutor Aquiatan-Morales' recommendation that there
was no probable cause to charge Carandang with estafa. Personal Collection also
alleged that it was deprived of due process when the RTC granted Carandang's
Motion to Release Cash Bond, even though Personal Collection did not receive a
copy of this motion.

CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, finding that: (a) the Regional Trial
Court conducted an independent asessment of the facts of the case; (b) Personal
Collection was not deprived of the opportunity to oppose Carandang's Motion to
Release Cash Bond, since under Rule 110, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, the
accused's bail bond shall be automatically cancelled when the accused was
acquitted; and (c) only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
can ask for the reinstatement of the criminal case against Carandang, since a
private offended party's interest in a criminal case was limited to its civil aspect.

825
ISSUE:

Was the Personal Collection deprived of due process when it was

allegedly not given notice or opportunity to be heard on respondent
Carandang's Motion to Release Cash Bond?

RULING:

No.

Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for the
cancellation of bail:

Section 22. Cancellation of bail. — Upon application of the bondsmen, with

due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the
accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the

accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. In all
instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

Among the instances when bail is deemed automatically cancelled is when

the case is dismissed. Since cancellation of bail is automatic upon the dismissal of
the case, no notice or hearing is even necessary, as the cancellation takes place
when any of the three (3) enumerated instances takes place.

The release of the amount posted as bail is a separate matter. When the cash
bond is made to answer for any fines or costs, the automatic cancellation is not
succeeded by the immediate release of the cash bond.

In this case, the dismissal of the case due to the withdrawal of the
information resulted in the automatic cancellation of respondent's bail. Further,
the trial court November 16, 2011 Order does not state that there is any need for
the deposit to be applied to any fines or costs

The trial court correctly granted the release of respondent's cash bond.
Petitioner's right to due process was not violated when it was not given notice or
an opportunity to be heard on the Motion to Release Cash Bond. No notice or
hearing was necessary, since the bail was automatically cancelled upon the
dismissal of the case. Petitioner's hypothetical objections to the Motion to Release
Cash Bond would have been superfluous and unnecessary since the release of the
cash bond to respondent was already warranted under the Rules of Court.

826
 RULE 115
Rights of Accused

Section 1 - Rights of accused at the trial

Kim Liong v. People

G.R. No. 200630, June 4, 2018

FACTS:

Liong was charged with estafa for allegedly failing to return to Equitable
PCI Bank, despite demand, of a total of US $ 50,955.70, which was erroneously
deposited in his dollar account. The initial presentation of the prosecution’s
evidence was set on December 19, 2005. However, several postponements were
had for various reasons. The first prosecution witness, Antonio Dela Rama was
eventually presented on June 8, 2006. His direct examination was terminated on
January 25, 2007, and the initial date for his cross-examination was set on March
15, 2007. There had also been several postponements for the cross-examination of
the witness due to the absence of the lawyer for the defense. These postponements
dragged on until August 27, 2009 where the prosecution moved that Liong be
declared to have waived his right to cross-examine Dela Rama. This was granted
by the trial court.

Liong, through a new counsel, filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion

for Reconsideration. Liang argued that his former counsel was negligent in
handling his case as he repeatedly failed to attend hearings. Liong prayed that the
trial court reconsider and grant him another chance to cross-examine Dela Rama.
This was denied by the trial court. A Petition for Certiorari was then filed before
the Court of Appeals, against the Judge of the trial court alleging grave abuse of
discretion in declaring him to have waived his right to cross-examine Dela Rama.
The Petition for Certiorari was denied by the CA. Liong filed his Petition for
Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in declaring
as waived Liong’s right to cross-examine prosecution witness Antonio Dela
Rama.

HELD:

No.

827
 The right to cross-examine may be waived. It is a personal one which may
be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the
right of cross-examination. When an accused is given the opportunity to cross-
examine a witness but fails to avail of it, the accused shall be deemed to have
waived this right. The witness' testimony given during direct examination will
remain on record. If this testimony is used against the accused, there will be no
violation of the right of confrontation.

Rule 115 of the Rules of Court with its lone section is devoted entirely to the rights
of the accused during trial. Rule 115, Section 1(f) on the right to cross-examine
provides:

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall be entitled to the following rights: …

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either
party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines,
unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine
him.

828
 RULE 116
Arraignment and Plea

Section 1 - Arraignment and Plea; how made

People v. Palema y Vargas

G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019

FACTS:

Palema, Palmea, Saldua, Grengia, along with Lester Ladra y Palema (Ladra),
Edwin Manzanero y Bautista (Manzanero), and Marvin Marqueses (Marqueses),
robbed Enicasio Depante y Rosales of his Nokia N70 cellular phone and mauled,
assaulted and stabbed the latter resulting to his demise. They were charged with
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
On arraignment, Ladra, Saldua, Palema, Palmea, Manzanero, and Grengia
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Marqueses, meanwhile, remained at
large.

The Regional Trial Court rendered another Decision, convicting Palema,

Palmea, Saldua, Ladra, and Grengia of the crime of robbery with homicide. The
Regional Trial Court acquitted Marqueses for the prosecution's failure to present
evidence that he participated in committing the crime.

On appeal, Saldua, Palema, Palmea, and Grengia argued that the Regional
Trial Court erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. the
Court of Appeals dismissed the group's appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial
Court Decision. Aggrieved, the group filed a Notice of Appeal, which the Court of
Appeals gave due course.

ISSUE:

Is the acquittal of Marqueses proper considering the fact that he

remained at large and was never arraigned?

RULING:

No.

It is a basic principle in criminal law that a notice of appeal throws the entire
case open for review. Once an appeal is accepted by this Court, it will have "the
authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as errors by the

829
parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the
case."

Aperusal of the records shows that Marqueses was never arraigned. While
the Regional Trial Court noted that all the accused were present on arraignment
and that they all pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, only the names of
accused- appellants Palema, Palmea, Saldua, and Grengia, as with Ladra and
Manzanero, were shown in the Certificate of Arraignment. Marqueses' name is
nowhere to be found.

Arraignment is defined as "the formal mode and manner of implementing

the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him." Its purpose is to notify the accused of "the reason for his
indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty
that could be possibly meted against him." It is not an idle ceremony that can be
brushed aside peremptorily, but an indispensable requirement of due process, the
absence of which renders the proceedings against the accused void.

In Borja v. Mendoza, this Court stressed that an arraignment not only

satisfies the due process clause of the Constitution, but also affords an accused an
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him or her. Through
arraignment, the accused is placed in a position to enter his or her plea with full
knowledge of the consequences. It is a vital aspect of any criminal prosecution,
demanded by no less than the Constitution itself.

In People v. Verra, this Court held that "just as an accused is accorded this
constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal
prosecutions. It must similarly be given the chance to present its evidence in
support of a charge."

Without evidence of Marqueses' arraignment, the Regional Trial Court had

no authority to order his acquittal. All proceedings against him before the Regional
Trial Court are deemed void.

830
Section 11 - Suspension of Arraignment

ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon

G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015
FACTS:

Angelo dela Cruz was an OFW who was kidnapped by Iraqi militants. ABS-
CBN conducted live audio-video coverage of and broadcasted the arrival of
Angelo dela Cruz at the NAIA and the subsequent press conference. ABS-CBN
allowed Reuters Television Service to air the footages it had taken under a special
embargo agreement, which provided that no other Philippine subscriber of
Reuters would be allowed to use ABS-CBN footage without the latter’s consent.

GMA-7, subscriber of Reuters, received a live video feed of the coverage of

Angelo dela Cruz’s arrival from Reuters which it immediately carried in its
program “Flash Report,” together with its live broadcast. GMA-7 alleged that it
did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing footages of
ABS-CBN.

ABS-CBN filed a Complaint for copyright infringement against GMA-7. Dela

Peña-Reyes and Manalastas were indicted in the charge, and the Information was
filed against them. Hence, they filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ on
January 4, 2005, and a Motion to Suspend Proceedings before the RTC.

DOJ Secretary Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents. Meanwhile, on January

19, 2005, the trial court granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings since a petition
for review had been filed with the Department of Justice. Under Section 11 (c),
Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, once a petition for review is filed with
the Department of Justice, a suspension of the criminal proceedings may be
allowed by the court. The arraignment was scheduled on March 8, 2005, but they
were not arraigned.

The DOJ’s resolution was subsequently reversed by DOJ Secretary Agra.

Respondents assailed the Resolution via a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, with
prayer for the issuance of a TRO. On September 13, 2010, the CA granted the TRO.

ISSUE:

Is the trial court correct in not proceeding with the arraignment during the
interim period?

RULING:

No.

831
 The trial court is not correct in not proceeding with the arraignment during
the interim period. The trial court should have proceeded with the said
arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for Review
before the DOJ.

Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the
suspension of the accused’s arraignment in certain circumstances only in certain
cases, one of which is when a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor
is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President;
provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that
after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused
or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case

as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court.

It was only on September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was
issued by the Court of Appeals. Failure to proceed with the arraignment
disregards the requirements of due process and erodes the Court’s independence
and integrity. Hence, the trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case
during the interim period.

832
 Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular
G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018
FACTS:

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
February 26, 2009 Order and Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Ramon D.
Pamular (Judge Pamular) of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija
in Civil Case No. 2618-G. The assailed Order granted the prosecution's Motion to
Amend the Original Information for murder filed against Carlito Samonte
(Samonte) to include Mayor Amado "Jong" Corpus (Corpus) as his co-accused in
the crime charged. Furthermore, it directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against Corpus.

Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte at Corpuz Street,

Cuyapo, Nueva Ecjia on June 4, 2008, causing his death. Samonte was caught in
flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an
Information for murder. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but
pleaded self-defense. Trial on the merits ensued.

The wife of the deceased, Mrs. Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa (Priscilla), filed

a complaint-affidavit captioned as Reply-Affidavit dated September 8, 2008 after
the prosecution presented its second witness. She also filed an unsworn but signed
Reply to the Affidavit of Witnesses before First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
and Officer-in-Charge Floro F. Florendo (Florendo). Other affidavits of witnesses
were also filed before the prosecutor's office. Based on one of the affidavits
executed by Alexander Lozano (Lozano) on June 30, 2008, Corpuz was the one
who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. In its October 7, 2008 Resolution, the
Regional Trial Court dismissed Priscilla's complaint and the attached affidavits of
witnesses.

Priscilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was opposed by

Corpus. Florendo reconsidered and set aside the October 7, 2008 Resolution. He
also instructed Assistant Public Prosecutor Edwin S. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) to
conduct the review. Bonifacio was not able to comply with the directive to
personally submit his resolution by January 22, 2009, prompting Florendo to order
him to surrender the records of the case as the latter was taking over the resolution
of the case based on the evidence presented by the parties. This order was released
on January 23, 2009 and was received by Bonifacio on the same date.

In his January 26, 2009 Resolution, Florendo found probable cause to indict
Corpus for Angelita's murder. He directed the filing of an amended information
before the Regional Trial Court.

833
 Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review
Resolution dated January 26, 2009, where he reinstated the Regional Trial Court
October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder complaint
against Corpus.

Meanwhile, Florendo filed an undated Motion to Amend Information,

praying for the admission of the amended information. Corpus and Samonte
opposed this Motion by filing a Joint Urgent Manifestation/Opposition dated
February 2, 2009.

The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Samonte and Corpus

opposed this through a Vehement Opposition and Omnibus Motion dated
February 4, 2009. They averred that Judge Pamular's action was premature
considering that the Motion to Amend Information has yet to be scheduled for
hearing. Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned. Samonte and Corpus also
claimed that the issuance of a warrant of arrest should be suspended because the
latter intended to appeal through a Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice.

Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review dated February 9,
2009 before the Department of Justice. They also filed a Manifestation and Motion
dated February 9, 2009 with the Regional Trial Court, asking it to desist from
acting further on the Amended Information in view of the Petition for Review filed
with the Department of Justice.

However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular of Branch 33, Regional

Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija issued the assailed February 26, 2009 Order,
which granted the motion to amend the information and to admit the attached
amended information. The assailed Order also directed, among others, the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.

Hence, a direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 with a prayer for an immediate issuance of a temporary restraining
order, was filed by Corpus and Samonte on March 3, 2009. This Petition seeks to
enjoin Judge Pamular from enforcing the February 26, 2009 Order and the warrant
of arrest issued pursuant to the Order, and from conducting further proceedings
in the murder case.

Through its March 9, 2009 Resolution, this Court required respondents to

comment on the Petition. It also granted petitioners' prayer for a temporary
restraining order. Judge Pamular, Florendo, Priscilla, and all other persons acting
on the assailed Regional Trial Court February 26, 2009 Order were enjoined from
implementing it and the warrant of arrest issued pursuant to it.

834
 Priscilla filed her comment on April 3, 2009. She insists that the Regional
Trial Court is correct in granting the motion to admit the amended information
because it has no effect on Samonte's case. She claims that the alleged lack of
determination of probable cause before the issuance of a warrant has no basis since
petitioners failed to present evidence or facts that would prove their claim.

Judge Pamular filed his Comment on April 8, 2009. He asserts that he made
a careful perusal of the case records in issuing the assailed order. His independent
judgment on the existence of probable cause was derived from his reading and
evaluation of pertinent documents and evidence. He states that he had set the case
for hearing on February 13, 2009, when both parties were heard and given the
opportunity to argue.

On July 22, 2009, Priscilla filed a Manifestation before this Court. She asserts
that this "present petition questioning the alleged impropriety of the admission of
the amended information as well as the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Mayor Amado Corpus, Jr. has no more legal legs to stand on." She claims that
Florendo's January 26, 2009 Resolution was upheld by the Department of Justice

Priscilla asserts further that the issue regarding the suspension of

proceedings pending resolution by the Department of Justice can now be
considered moot and academic.

Petitioners filed their reply on August 7, 2009.They claim that respondent

judge should have suspended action on the issuance of a warrant considering the
pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.

Petitioners also cite the dispositive portion of Tolentino v. Bonifacio, which

directed the respondent judge in that case to desist from proceeding with the trial
until after the Department of Justice would have finally resolved a pending
petition for review.

Petitioners claim that due to the theory of conspiracy in the amended

information, Samonte will have an additional burden of setting up a new defense
particularly on any acts of his co-accused since "the act of one is the act of all.
"Petitioners also claim that respondent judge failed to comply with the mandate
of making a prior determination of probable cause before issuing the warrant.
They insist that this mandate "is never excused nor dispensed with by the
respondent judge's self-serving narration of the law (not the required facts) stated
in his assailed order."

On the issue of whether the arraignment of Corpus may proceed despite

the lapse of the 60-day maximum period of suspension under Rule 116, Section
11(c), petitioners aver that "what jurisprudence underscores is not the lapse of the

835
60-day period, but the issue of finality of the decision on appeal. "The matter
should not only cover the suspension of arraignment but for respondent judge to
defer from further proceedings on the amended information pending the final
resolution of the Department of Justice.

ISSUE:

Can the case still proceed even if the petition for review before the DOJ
was filed?

HELD:

Yes.

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and

judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is afimction that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official
has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must
be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not
and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one

made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot
be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

The public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining

whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that courts must respect the
exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged
is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be
imputed to the public prosecutor.

Thus, courts do not meddle with the prosecutor's conduct of a preliminary

investigation because it is exclusively within the prosecutor's discretion. However,
once the information is already filed in court, the court has acquired jurisdiction
of the case. Any motion to dismiss or determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused is within its discretion.

836
 The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the
accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In
turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal
action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereqfter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused
or the right of the People to due process of law.

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to
a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a
motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits
proceed for the proper determination of the case.

Hence, when a Regional Trial Court has already determined that probable
cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, like in this case, jurisdiction is
already with the Regional Trial Court. Therefore, it can proceed in conducting
further proceedings on the amended information and on the issuance of a warrant
despite the pendency of a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.

Petitioners insist that respondent judge should have deferred from

conducting further proceedings on the amended information and on the issuance
of a warrant considering the pendency of their Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice. They cite Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides:

Section 11. Suspension of arraignment — Upon motion by the proper

party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
....
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office.

Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertains to

a suspension of an arraignment in case of a pending petition for review before the

837
Department of Justice. It does not suspend the execution of a warrant of arrest for
the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of an accused.

In the assailed February 26, 2009 Order, Judge Pamular denied Corpus'
motion to defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings. Petitioners claim
that he should have suspended action on the issuance of a warrant considering the
pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice, Furthermore, they also assert that the assailed Order defies Rule 116,
Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides

for the grounds for suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party,
the arraignment shall be suspended in case of a pending petition for review of the
prosecutor's resolution filed before the Department of Justice.

Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion dated February 9, 2009 before

the Regional Trial Court, informing it about their pending Petition for Review of
the Prosecutor's January 26, 2009 Resolution before the Department of Justice. 1

Thus, respondent judge committed an error when he denied petitioners' motion to

suspend the arraignment of Corpus because of the pendency of their Petition for
Review before the Department of Justice.

However, this Court's rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of

suspension counted from the filing of a petition with the reviewing office. 1

Consequently, therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period, "the trial court
is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice on February 9, 2009. Thus, the 60-day period has already lapsed since April
10, 2009. Hence, respondent judge can now continue with the arraignment and
further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.

838
 RULE 117
Motion to Quash

Section 3 – Grounds

Osorio v. Navera
G.R. No. 223272 (Resolution); February 26, 2018

FACTS:

SSgt. Osorio was charged in two informations for allegedly kidnapping

University of the Philippines Students Karen Empeño and Sherlyn Cadapan.
Warrants of arrest were issued against SSgt. Osorio on December 19, 2011. The
next day, Ssgt. Osorio was arrested and was turned over to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Unit Group in Camp Crame and was detained in
Bulacan Provincial Jail. He was later transferred to the Philippine Army Custodial
Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City where he is currently detained. Contending
that he was illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus before the Court of Appeals on July 21, 2015 contending that court-martial
and not civil courts had jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that he
was a soldier on active duty and that the offense charged was allegedly service-
connected. He also argued that the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation and the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case
because among his co-accused was Major General Palparan, a public officer with
salary grade higher than 28. The Court of Appeals held that SSgt. Osorio’s
confinement was by virtue of a valid judgment or a judicial process. Ssgt. Osorio’s
Motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA. He then filed his Petition
for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

HELD:

No. If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order of the court,

the proper remedy is to pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the
warrant of arrest based on one or more of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

839
 Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over
the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no

authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed

form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a

single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by
law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been

extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would

constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or

acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.

With a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal

complaint or information ... for insufficiency on its face in [a] point of law, or for
defects which are apparent in the face of the information." An accused filing a
motion to quash "hypothetically admits the facts alleged in the information" and
cannot present evidence aliunde or those extrinsic from the Information. The effect
of the grant of the motion to quash depends on the grounds availed of. When the
defect in the complaint or information can be cured by amendment, the grant of
the motion to quash will result in an order directing the amendment. If the ground
is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the
prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment." If, despite
amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect, the
complaint or information shall be quashed.

840
Section 4 - Amendment of complaint or information

Dio v. People
G.R. No. 208146 June 8, 2016
FACTS:

Private respondent Timothy Desmond (Desmond) is the Chair and Chief

Executive Officer of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, of which Dio is Treasurer
and Member of the Board of Directors. Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for
libel. Two (2) separate Informations, were filed and docketed.

The said accused with malicious intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and
reputation of Timothy Desmond, Chairman and Chief Executive Office of Subic
Bay Marine Exploratorium, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously sent electronic messages to the offended party and to other persons
namely: Atty. Winston Ginez, John Corcoran, and Terry Nichoson.

Dio filed a Petition to suspend the criminal proceedings but it was denied.
Dio moved for reconsideration she also moved to quash the Informations, arguing
that the "facts charged do not constitute an offense however the trial court denied
both Motions. Dio filed a Motion for leave of court to file a second motion for
reconsideration she also filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the Informations for
failure to allege publication and lack of jurisdiction, and for second
reconsideration with leave of court to which the trial court granted.
Desmond thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE:

Does failure of an information to establish venue a defect that can be

cured by amendment before arraignment?

RULING:

Yes.

Failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend is an

arbitrary exercise of power. In People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that when a
motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information,
and the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash
and order the prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect
pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts constituting an offense
is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such instances, courts are
mandated not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant the

841
prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment. This rule
allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured
by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which
only result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.

In this case, petitioner Virginia Dio has not yet been arraigned; thus, Rule
117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies. If the information is defective, the
prosecution must be given the opportunity to amend it before it may be quashed.

The trial court erred in quashing the Informations without giving the
prosecution a chance to amend them pursuant to Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules
of Court. Although the Court agree with the trial court that the facts alleged in the
Informations do not substantially constitute the offense charged, the most prudent
thing to do for the trial court is to give the prosecution the opportunity to amend
it and make the necessary corrections. Indeed, an Information may be defective
because the facts charged do not constitute an offense, however, the dismissal of
the case will not necessarily follow. The Rules specifically require that the
prosecution should be given a chance to correct the defect; the court can order the
dismissal only upon the prosecution's failure to do so. The trial court's failure to
provide the prosecution with this opportunity constitutes an arbitrary exercise of
power.

842
 RULE 119
Trial

Section 23 - Demurrer to Evidence

BDO Unibank, Inc. v. Choa

G.R. No. 237553, July 10, 2019

FACTS:

Antonio Choa, the accused, being then the President and General Manager
of Camden Industries, Inc., executed several Trust Receipt Agreements in favor of
Equitable PCI Bank (now Banco De Oro- EPCI, Inc. or BDO for Brevity), in
consideration of the receipt by the said accused of the sum of Php7,875,904.96
under the terms of which the accused agreed to sell the same with express
obligation to remit to the complainant bank proceeds of the sale and/or turn over
the same if not sold or disposed of in accordance with the said Trust Receipt
Agreements on demand, but the accused once in possession of the said good,
misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit the said goods
and/or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, failed and
refused to account for and/or remit the proceeds of the sale thereof.

On August 20, 2014, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence, which the trial court admitted in its September 12, 2014 Order. In the
same Order, the trial court gave Choa 10 days to comment on the prosecution's
evidence.

On September 25, 2014, Choa filed his Comment. Later, on October 13, 2014,
Choa filed a Motion for Leave to file Demurrer to Evidence, attached to which was
his Demurrer to Evidence with the contention that BDO and CAMDED are
mutually creditors and debtors of each other, stemming from Civil Case No. 70098
where BDO supposedly owed Camden the judgment award of P90 million.
Thereafter, in its October 20, 2014 Order, the trial court directed the prosecution to
comment on Choa's pleading, and Choa's counsel to reply on the comment if
needed.

The prosecution filed its Opposition, arguing that the Motion for Leave
should be expunged from the records, it claimed that the pleading was pro-forma
for being filed beyond the five (5)-day reglementary period under Rule 119,
Section 23 of the Rules of Court. Even if the Motion was timely filed, the
prosecution asserted that it should still be denied for lack of basis, maintaining
that Choa's civil liabilities could not have been offset by the judgment award
granted to Camden in Civil Case No. 70098 because Choa's civil liabilities

843
stemmed from his criminal violations of the Trust Receipts Law, thus,
compensation is improper. The prosecution added that the decision of the trial
court, which had awarded Camden P90 million, was reversed and set aside by the
Court of Appeals.

On November 26, 2014, the trial court issued an Order granting Choa's
Demurrer to Evidence. Based on the records and the witnesses' testimonies, it
found that the prosecution failed to establish Choa's guilt. The prosecution filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Thus, BDO filed before
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, assailing the trial court's orders.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the
trial court. It found that Choa filed his Motion for Leave within the prescriptive
period since the prosecution could not "yet be deemed to have rested its case." It
explained that the trial court only "physically admitted” in its September 12, 2014
Order the prosecution's Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, but had yet to
rule on its admissibility. This was shown, the Court of Appeals explained, when
Choa was also directed to submit his Comment. Furthermore, it added that BDO
was not denied due process. The Court of Appeals noted that when the
opportunity to be heard is accorded, "there is no denial of procedural due process."

Finally, the Court of Appeals held that BDO failed to show how the trial court
had committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the September 12, 2014
Order. Even if the trial court erred in granting Choa's Demurrer to Evidence, the
Court of Appeals stated that this error was not "capricious and whimsical as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion."

BDO moved for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion. Hence, BDO filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Is there error on the part of the trial court in not dismissing outrightly
respondent's Motion for Leave and Demurrer to Evidence for being filed out
of time?

RULING:

Yes.

A review of the case records reveals that when the prosecution filed its
Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence on August 20, 2014, it included a
reservation in its Prayer. The prayer itself indicates that the prosecution would rest

844
its case depending on whether the trial court admitted its evidence. If the trial
court did not admit its evidence, the prosecution would present additional
evidence; otherwise, it would rest its case. Due to this reservation, the five (5) -day
period for the filing of a Motion for Leave had not yet started when petitioner filed
its Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence.

The prosecution is deemed to have rested its case on September 12, 2014,
when the trial court admitted its documentary evidence. In Cabador v. People, this
Court held that "only after [the court ruled on the prosecution's formal offer of
documentary evidence] could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case."

However, the counting of the five (5) -day period did not commence on
August 20, 2014, when the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence; or on September 12, 2014, when the trial court admitted the evidence.
Instead, it started upon respondent's receipt of the September 12, 2014 Order, for
only then was he notified that the prosecution had rested its case.

Nonetheless, respondent filed his Motion for Leave and Demurrer to

Evidence on October 13, 2014. To recall, the September 12, 2014 Order had also
directed respondent to submit his comment/opposition, which he then submitted
on September 25, 2014. Even if there is no record of when respondent received a
copy of the Order, it can be surmised that he received it before September 25, 2014.
It follows that the Motion for Leave and the Demurrer to Evidence were filed
beyond the five (5) -day period under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court, then, should have denied these pleadings outright.

845
 RULE 120
Judgment

Section 4 - Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.

Osorio v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 207711, July 2, 2018
FACTS:

Maria Osorio, an agent of Philam Life, offered a Philam Life's Tri-Life Plan
and Excelife Gold Package to Josefina Gabriel. The latter availed of the packaged.
Afterwards, Osorio offered Gabriel an investment opportunity with Philam Life
Fund Management. The proposed investment would be placed under a time
deposit scheme and would earn 20% annually. Osorio informed Gabriel that the
proceeds of her investment may be channeled to pay for her insurance premiums.
Enticed by the offer, Gabriel tendered P200,000.00 to Osorio, who in turn issued
Philam Life receipts. A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her insurance
policies had lapsed due to non-payment of premiums. Gabriel then discovered
that the funds given to Osorio were invested to Philippine Money Investment
Asset Management (PMIAM).

Because of this, Osorio was charged with estafa, punished under Article
315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. Osorio pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. The Regional Trial Court
rendered judgment finding Osorio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa.
When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the latter rendered judgment
affirming Osorio's conviction. Hence, a petition was filed before the Supreme
Court.

In praying for her acquittal, Osorio asserts that not all the elements of estafa
under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code were established by the
prosecution. Only damage on the part of the Gabriel was proven. She further
argues that she did not employ any deceit in soliciting Gabriel's investment as
nothing in the records shows that she used a fictitious name or that she pretended
to possess power, agency, or certain qualifications.
Furthermore, she claims that she acted in good faith when she decided to place the
investment in PMIAM.

ISSUE:

May the Rule on Variance under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
be applied to justify the conviction of a person of estafa for diverting a money
investment to another without the investor’s consent?

846
HELD:

Yes.

In this case, Osorio was charged with Article 315, 2 (a) of the RPC. However,
the Supreme Court held that she cannot be convicted based on that provision
because the elements are not present. There is no evidence to prove that Osorio
committed any of these acts when she obtained private complainant's money. She
neither used a fictitious name nor misrepresented herself as an agent of Philam
Life. There is also no proof that petitioner pretended to possess the authority to
solicit investments for Philam Life Fund Management. In estafa by means of deceit
under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, the element of deceit consisting
of the false pretense or representation must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise, criminal liability will not attach. However, despite the fact that the
elements are not present, Osorio should nevertheless be held criminally liable for
misrepresenting to Gabriel that the latter's money would be invested in Philam
Life Fund Management and that its proceeds may be utilized to pay for private
complainant's insurance premiums under Article 318 of the RPC in connection
with Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.

As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which he or

she is charged. This rule proceeds from the Constitutional guarantee that an
accused shall always be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him or her. An exception to this is the rule on variance under Rule 120,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The provision simply
means that if there is a variance between the offense charged and the offense
proved, an accused may be convicted of the offense proved if it is included in the
offense charged. An accused may also be convicted of the offense charged if it is
necessarily included in the offense proved.

In the present case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code is necessarily included in the crime of estafa by means of
deceit under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, petitioner
may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

847
 RULE 121
New Trial or Reconsideration

Section 1 - New Trial or Reconsideration

Abubakar v. People
G.R. Nos. 202408, 202409 & 202412, June 27, 2018
FACTS:

Based on the report submitted by the Commission on Audit, the Office of

the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause
to indict Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, Masandag and other regional officials of
DPWH-ARMM for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Separate Informations were then filed against
them. Upon arraignment, Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and some of their co-
accused entered a plea of not guilty. Seven (7) of their co-accused remained at large
while one (1) died prior to the scheduled arraignment.

Accused Guiani, Mamogkat, Abubakar, Baraguir, and Suasin were found

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 for causing the disbursement of 30% of the mobilization fees or advance
payment to Arce Engineering Services. Abubakar and Baraguir filed their
respective motions for new trial and reconsideration on separate dates. They
anchored their prayer for new trial on the alleged incompetence of their former
counsel. This was however denied by the Sandiganbayan. Therefore, consolidated
Petitions for Review on Certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court.

Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir maintain that they are entitled to a new
trial due to their former counsel's incompetence and negligence. They claim that
aside from simply adopting the evidence submitted by their co-accused, their
former counsel also failed to present and to formally offer relevant evidence that
would exonerate them from liability. Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir believe
that they were deprived of the opportunity to fully present their case and to claim
that the following documents should have been presented before the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Are Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir entitled to a new trial for the
alleged incompetence of their former counsel?

HELD:

848
 No.

It has been held in the case of Umali vs. Court of Appeals that mistakes of
attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy, materiality,
or immateriality of certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof are
not proper grounds for a new trial; and in general the client is bound by the action
of his counsel in the conduct of his case, and can not be heard to complain that the
result of the litigation might have been different had counsel proceeded
differently. Liberality has been applied in criminal cases but under exceptional
circumstances. Given that a person's liberty is at stake in a criminal case, Umali
concedes that the strict application of the general rule may lead to a manifest
miscarriage of justice. Thus, appropriate relief may be accorded to a defendant
who has shown a meritorious defense and who has satisfied the court that
acquittal would follow after the introduction of omitted evidence.

In this case, they are not entitled to a new trial because they failed to
convince that they have a meritorious defense and that the evidence they seek to
introduce would probably lead to their acquittal. It is incumbent upon them to
present a meritorious defense and to convince this Court that the evidence omitted
by their former counsel would probably alter the results of the case. They cannot
simply allege that they were deprived of due process or that their defense was not
fully threshed out during trial.

Also, petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir's former counsel was not grossly
negligent. Their former counsel may have failed to present other pieces of evidence
in addition to what their co-accused had presented. He may have also failed to
incorporate other arguments in the record of the case. However, these cannot be
considered as grossly negligent acts. Assessments regarding the materiality or
relevancy of evidence, competency of witnesses, and procedural technique
generally fall within the expertise and control of counsel. This Court has held that
for a claim of gross negligence to prosper, "nothing short of clear abandonment of
the client's cause must be shown."

849
 RULE 122
Appeal

Section 1 - Who may appeal

Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang

G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017
FACTS:

Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. (“Personal Collection”) filed against

Teresita L. Carandang (“Carandang”) a criminal complaint for Estafa with
unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code. An Information was issued against Carandang. However,
upon Carandang’s filing of her Motion for Reinvestigation, the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) recommended that the complaint be dismissed. It also filed a
Motion to Withdraw Information with the Regional Trial Court, stating that the
Office of the City Prosecutor found that there was lack of probable cause to hold
Carandang liable for estafa.

The RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information.

The trial court also noted the general policy of the courts to not interfere in the
conduct of preliminary investigations and to give the investigating officers
sufficient discretion to determine probable cause. It found that no exception
existed in the case that would require the court to intervene in the findings of the
preliminary investigation.

Personal Collection filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the trial court failed to make its own evaluation of the merits of the
case and only relied on Prosecutor Aquiatan-Morales' recommendation that there
was no probable cause to charge Carandang with estafa. Personal Collection also
alleged that it was deprived of due process when the RTC granted Carandang's
Motion to Release Cash Bond, even though Personal Collection did not receive a
copy of this motion.

CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, finding that: (a) the Regional Trial
Court conducted an independent asessment of the facts of the case; (b) Personal
Collection was not deprived of the opportunity to oppose Carandang's Motion to
Release Cash Bond, since under Rule 110, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, the
accused's bail bond shall be automatically cancelled when the accused was
acquitted; and (c) only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
can ask for the reinstatement of the criminal case against Carandang, since a
private offended party's interest in a criminal case was limited to its civil aspect.

850
ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals correctly rule that the Petition was improper, as
it is only the State which may pray for the reinstatement of the criminal case?

RULING:

Yes.

Appeal was available and was the proper remedy.

Rule 122, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 1. Who may appeal. — Any party may appeal from a judgment or final
order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. An order granting a
motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is final, and the
remedy to question this final order is an appeal.

The petition for certiorari filed by respondent under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is inappropriate. It bears stressing that the Order of the RTC, granting the
motion of the prosecution to withdraw the Informations and ordering the case
dismissed, is final because it disposed of the case and terminated the proceedings
therein, leaving nothing to be done by the court. Thus, the proper remedy is
appeal.

The Court has nonetheless recognized that if the criminal case is dismissed
by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the
case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability
of the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only
to the civil aspect of the case. This rule is reiterated in the Metrobank case cited by
respondent. However, it should be remembered that the order which herein
petitioner seeks to assail is not one dismissing the case or acquitting respondents.
Hence, there is no limitation to the capacity of the private complainant to seek
judicial review of the assailed order.

Despite petitioner's claim that its petition before the Court of Appeals was
not an appeal of an order dismissing the criminal case against respondent, it is
evident that the grant of the Motion to Withdraw Information dismissed the
criminal case. Further, in its Petition for Certiorari, petitioner assails the Regional
Trial Court's findings of lack of probable cause due to the alleged insufficiency of
evidence presented by respondent and because all the elements of estafa were
present. Thus, petitioner questions the trial court's allegedly erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, which are errors of judgment that cannot be corrected
by an extraordinary writ of certiorari.

851
 Moreover, a Petition for Certiorari was inappropriate, since appeal, under
Rule 122, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, was an available remedy for Personal
Collection. Despite the use of an improper remedy, the Supreme Court proceeded
to decide the issues to pursue judicial economy.

Section 3 - How appeal taken

Lapi y Mahipus v. People

G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019
FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals which upheld the Regional Trial Court
Decision. The trial court found Simeon M. Lapi (Lapi) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of having violated Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentenced him to six (6) months of rehabilitation at a government-approved
facility.

Operatives of the Bacolod City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task

Group conducted a stakeout operation in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City.
During the operation, Police Officer 2 Ronald Villeran (PO2 Villeran) heard noises
from one of the houses. He "peeped through its window" and saw Lapi, Sacare,
and Lim "having a pot session."

PO2 Villeran tried to enter the house through the main door, but the door
was locked. He then tried to enter through the kitchen door. Upon entry, he met
someone trying to flee, but PO2 Villeran restrained the person. Then, PO2 Villeran
"peeked into the adjacent room" and saw that the pot session was ongoing. He
entered the room and introduced himself as a police officer. Lapi, and two others
tried to escape, but were caught by PO2 Villeran's team members, who were
waiting by the main door.

The men were then brought to the City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation
Task Group Office, where a police blotter was filed. They were later brought to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory to undergo drug tests. The initial
laboratory report found that Lapi and his companions tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Another test conducted yielded the
same results.

The Regional Trial Court found Lapi guilty. It ruled that the warrantless
arrest against him was legal since he was caught in flagrante delicto. Upon appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision. Lapi filed a

852
Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied. Hence, Lapi filed this
Petition.

Petitioner argues that while he raises factual questions, his case falls under
the exceptions under the Rules of Court. He claims that the Court of Appeals'
factual findings "are totally bereft of support in the records and so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for review on certiorari filed by the

petitioner may raise factual issues

RULING:

No.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must,
as a general rule, only raise questions of law. This Court generally gives weight to
the factual findings of the lower courts because of the opportunity enjoyed by the
lower court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and assess their
testimony.

In criminal cases, however, the accused has the constitutional right to be

presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. To prove guilt, courts must
evaluate the evidence presented in relation to the elements of the crime charged.
Thus, the finding of guilt is essentially a question of fact. For this reason, the entire
records of a criminal case are thrown open for this Court's review.

This Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual findings of the lower
courts, or even arriving at a different conclusion, if it is not convinced that the
findings are conformable to the evidence of record and to its own impressions of
the credibility of the witnesses. The lower court actual findings will not bind this
Court if facts that could affect the result of the case were overlooked and
disregarded.

An examination of the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals shows no error that requires this Court's review. On this ground, the
Petition can be outright dismissed.

853
 Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Judge Tirso Velasco and
Dolores Molina
G.R. No. 109645, January 21, 2015
FACTS:

Respondent Epimaco V. Oreta (Oreta) filed a Complaint against Molina for

falsification of public document before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon
City. In his Affidavit-Complaint, he stated that he is "the Head of the Security
Force hired to secure certain properties of The Manila Banking Corporation
(TMBC)" and that he is the "duly-appointed statutory receiver of TMBC." Oreta
alleged that TMBC owns several parcels of land in Greenmeadows, Quezon City
purchased at public auctions due to the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages
over the lands. The one-year redemption period expired, and none of the
mortgagors exercised their right to redeem. Thus, "TMBC executed various
Affidavits of Consolidation of Ownership" and consolidated the titles to the
properties. Several of the properties owned by TMBC overlapped with the
properties being claimed by Molina. In 1990, Molina filed "a case for Damages with
Prayer for Reconveyance and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction before Branch 88
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City." Molina claimed that she was unable
to attend to the titling of the property because "she was so preoccupied as the sole
breadwinner of the family with children to support."

Oreta presented documentary evidence to support his and further alleged

that because of the issuance of TCT No. RT-58287 and the subsequent issuance of
TCT Nos. 83163, 83165, and 83167, an Information for coercion and other forms of
trespass was filed against him. However, the basis of the charge against him was
a false document. Thus, he prays that Molina be prosecuted for the crime of
falsification of public document under Article 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Molina filed a Counter-affidavit, stating that she and her husband, Pio
Molina, had been in possession of the land covered by TCT No. 124088 since 1939.
In September 1991, TCT No. 124088 was lost "and unfortunately, the original
thereof on file with the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City was also lost or
destroyed due to fire that gutted the said office." Molina claimed that she went to
the Land Registration Authority to inquire where she could find a copy of TCT
No. 124088. She found a microfilm negative of TCT No. 124088, which the Land
Registration Authority found to be correct.

Assistant City Prosecutor Eduardo D. Resurreccion recommended the

dismissal of the case. Oreta filed a MR but was denied. Oreta filed a Petition for
Review before the Department of Justice. Chief State Prosecutor Zenon L. De Guia
reversed the Resolution of the City Prosecutor and directed the filing of an
information for falsification of public document. Molina filed a Motion for

854
Reconsideration with Manifestation to File Documents. This was denied by then
Secretary of Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. Molina filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed Molina’s
Petition on technical grounds. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether Molina availed of the proper remedy, which is a review of the

City Prosecutor’s finding of probable cause.

HELD:

No.

Prior to the filing of the Information, Molina had filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Chief State Prosecutor’s Resolution, which Resolution
directed the City Prosecutor to file an Information against her. The records show
that the Information against Molina was filed on May 27, 1996. Her Petition for
Review before the Court of Appeals was filed on January 16, 1997.

In other words, while the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case,
Molina pursued another remedy, specifically, a review of the City Prosecutor’s
finding of probable cause. In Crespo v. Judge Mogul, the rule in this jurisdiction is
that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case
as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should
be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the

Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by
the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be
left entirely for the determination of the Court.

855
 The ruling in Crespo was clarified in Chan v. Formaran III, et al.: In
subsequent cases, the Court clarified that Crespo does not bar the Justice Secretary
from reviewing the findings of the investigating prosecutor in the exercise of his
power of control over his subordinates. The Justice Secretary is merely advised, as
far as practicable, to refrain from entertaining a petition for review of the
prosecutor’s finding when the Information is already filed in court. In other words,
the power or authority of the Justice Secretary to review the prosecutor’s findings
subsists even after the Information is filed in court. The court, however, is not
bound by the Resolution of the Justice Secretary, but must evaluate it before
proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it
is not binding on courts.

The proper remedy to review the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice was
the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. It was further discussed that
albeit the findings of the Justice Secretary are not absolute and are subject to
judicial review, this Court generally adheres to the policy of non-interference in
the conduct of preliminary investigations, particularly when the said findings are
well-supported by the facts as established by the evidence on record. Absent any
showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said
officer’s finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of
the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. Simply stated,
findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review, unless made with
grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing
Molina’s Petition. In any case, a review of the records shows that no grave abuse
of discretion can be attributed to Secretary Guingona, Jr. when he affirmed the
findings of Chief State Prosecutor Zenon L. De Guia

856
Section 11 - Effect of appeal by any of several accused

People v. Yanson
G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019
FACTS:

An Information was filed against Sison, Yanson, and Bautista before the
Regional Trial Court for violation of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
for illegally possessing and transporting six (6) kilos of marijuana. On
arraignment, all accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

According to the prosecution, at 8:30 a.m. on May 31, 1996, the Municipal
Police Station of M'lang, North Cotabato received a radio message about a silver
gray Isuzu pickup was transporting marijuana from Pikit. The Chief of Police
instructed the alert team to set up a checkpoint on the riverside police outpost
along the road from Matalam to M'lang. At around 9:30 a.m., the tipped vehicle
reached the checkpoint and was stopped by the team of police officers on standby
for checking, thereafter discovering the marijuana beside the engine.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Yanson, Sison, and Bautista of the crime
charged.

Only Yanson appealed before the Court of Appeals. Yanson contended that
the marijuana supposedly seized from him, Bautista, and Sison are inadmissible
evidence since the police officers did not have probable cause to conduct a search
on their vehicle. Furthermore, citing People v. Vinecario, Yanson asserted that
searches at checkpoints, in the absence of probable cause, should be limited only
to a visual search.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's judgment. Hence,
Yanson filed his Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE:

Should Yanson’s co-accused, Sison and Bautista, also be acquitted?

RULING:

Yes.

Rule 122, Section 11 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concerns
situations where there are several accused but not all of them appeal their
conviction:

857
 SECTION 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. —
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who
did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
and applicable to the latter.

As a rule, the effects of an appeal can only bind the accused who appealed
his or her conviction. However, when an appellate court renders a favorable
judgment, the effects of such favorable judgment extends even to those who did
not appeal, to the extent that such effects apply to their specific contexts.

Here, accused-appellant's acquittal arising from a lack of proof of corpus

delicti favors the other accused, Sison and Bautista, even if they did not appeal
before this Court. This Decision applies to them as much as it does to accused-
appellant.

858
 RULE 124
Procedure in the Court of Appeals

Section 18 - Application of certain rules in Civil Procedure to Criminal Cases

People v Escobar
G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017
FACTS:
Respondent Manuel Escobar (Escobar) filed a petition for bail (First Bail
Petition), which was denied by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in the
Order dated October 6, 2008 and by the Court of Appeals(CA) in the
Decision dated March 8, 2011. A subsequent development in the accused's
case compelled him to file a second petition for bail (Second Bail Petition). The
RTC denied this on the ground of res judicata. The CA overturned the RTC Order
and granted the Second Bail Petition.
Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary
Grace Cheng-Rosagas (Mary Grace), daughter of Filipino-Chinese businessman
Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two (2) other victims. Robert was the owner of
Uratex Foam, Philippines.
On June 18, 2001 at 7:40 a.m., Mary Grace, her bodyguard Valentin B.
Torres (Torres), and her driver Dionisio F. Burca (Burca) were passing by the
front of Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City when
a vehicle blocked their way. Clad in police uniform, four (4) armed men forced
Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres inside the vehicle. Alleged group leader Rolando
Villaver (Villaver) and some of the suspects then travelled and detained Mary
Grace, Burca, and Torres in an undisclosed location in Batangas. Afterwards, the
group headed to Club Solvento, a resort in Calamba, Laguna owned by Escobar,
who personally served them food. Some of the accused stayed in Club Solvento
to rest or sleep while the others, namely, Villaver, Cesar Olimpiada, a certain
Cholo, and Biboy Lugnasin, left to negotiate the price for the victims' release.
Cheng paid the ransom of P15,000,000.00.
At 7:00 p.m. on the same day, Villaver's group returned to Club Solvento,
followed by co-accused brothers Rolando and Harold Fajardo (the Fajardo
brothers), who were alleged advisers of Villaver. The group then locked
themselves in a room where Villaver partitioned the ransom money. Cancio
Cubillas (Cubillas), the group's driver, confessed to have received a total of
P1,250,000.00 for the kidnapping operation. Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres were
finally released. They were freed somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna, more than 12
hours since they were abducted.

859
 Cubillas became a state witness. On June 3, 2002, he executed an
extrajudicial confession and implicated respondent Escobar as an adviser for
Villaver. Cubillas believed that Escobar was involved after he saw Escobar talk
to Villaver while they were in Club Solvento. In his extrajudicial confession,
Cubillas also claimed that Escobar received a portion of the ransom money from
Villaver.
On February 17, 2004, an Amended Information was filed before the RTC
charging Escobar as a co-conspirator in the kidnapping for ransom. Escobar was
arrested on February 14, 2008.
On June 3, 2008, Escobar filed the First Bail Petition before the
RTC. During the hearing on Escobar's bail application, Cubillas testified
that Escobar and the Fajardo brothers were Villaver's advisers. The RTC denied
Escobar's First Bail Petition. Escobar appealed before the CA. The CA
affirmed the denial of the First Bail Petition. Escobar moved to reconsider the CA
March 8, 2011 Decision. This was denied and he no longer appealed before the
Court.
Pending the proceedings on Escobar's case, the police arrested one (1) of
the co-accused Fajardo brothers, Rolando Fajardo (Rolando), who applied for
bail before the Regional Trial Court. In an Order dated September 13, 2011, the
RTC denied Rolando's petition for bail. However, in an Order dated October 14,
2011, the Regional Trial Court reversed its previous order and granted Rolando's
bail application. The reversal came about after the trial court considered that,
according to Cubillas, "[Rolando] was not present before, during and after the
kidnapping." There was paucity of evidence on Rolando's alleged participation.
By January 2012, only Escobar was left in detention pending the final
judgment on the merits of the case as all the other accused who had active
participation in the kidnapping had been granted bail. Escobar saw Rolando's
release on bail as a new "development which warranted a different view" on his
own bail application.
Thus, on January 27, 2012, Escobar filed another petition for bail (Second
Bail Petition) before the RTC. He noted that Cubillas could not explain how
either Rolando or Escobar advised Villaver and that both Rolando
and Escobar were absent before, during, and after the kidnapping. Hence, if
Rolando's petition for bail was granted based on the unreliability of Cubillas'
testimony, Escobar reasoned that the trial court should likewise grant him
provisional release.
The RTC denied Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground of res
judicata, reasoning thus: "in deference to the Decision of the Court of Appeals
which has already attained finality, accused's Petition for Bail which is actually
a second petition for bail must be necessarily denied."

860
 On January 14, 2013, he appealed before the CA via Rule 65, arguing that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Second Bail
Petition. The CA granted the petition for certiorari and ordered the RTC to
determine the appropriate bail for Escobar's provisional liberty.
Issue:
Is Manuel Escobar's second petition for bail barred by res judicata?
Ruling:
No.
Manuel Escobar’s second petition for bail is not barred by res judicata.
In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged." This
doctrine bars the re-litigation of the same claim between the parties, also known
as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment. It likewise bars the re-litigation
of the same issue on a different claim between the same parties, also known as
issue preclusion or conclusiveness of judgement. It "exists as an obvious rule of
reason, justice, fairness, expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquillity."
Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the
dispute between the parties or their successors-in-interest. Trinidad v.Marcelo
declares that res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a
principle in civil law and "has no bearing on criminal proceedings." Rule 124,
Section 18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. —
The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the
Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases
shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be
applied in criminal cases, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded
from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Here, Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this
doctrine is not recognized in criminal proceedings.
The CA correctly ruled that his Second Bail Petition was not barred by res
judicata.

861
 RULE 126
Search and Seizure

Section 13 - Search incident to lawful arrest

People v. Yanson
G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019

FACTS:

An Information was filed against Sison, Yanson, and Bautista before the
Regional Trial Court for violation of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
for illegally possessing and transporting six (6) kilos of marijuana. On
arraignment, all accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

According to the prosecution, at 8:30 a.m. on May 31, 1996, the Municipal
Police Station of M'lang, North Cotabato received a radio message about a silver
gray Isuzu pickup was transporting marijuana from Pikit. The Chief of Police
instructed the alert team to set up a checkpoint on the riverside police outpost
along the road from Matalam to M'lang. At around 9:30 a.m., the tipped vehicle
reached the checkpoint and was stopped by the team of police officers on standby
for checking. The team leader asked the driver about inspecting the vehicle. The
driver alighted and, at an officer's prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Thereafter,
the marijuana was found.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Yanson, Sison, and Bautista of the crime
charged. Therafter, only Yanson appealed before the Court of Appeals. Yanson
contended that the marijuana supposedly seized from him, Bautista, and Sison are
inadmissible evidence since the police officers did not have probable cause to
conduct a search on their vehicle. Furthermore, citing People v. Vinecario, Yanson
asserted that searches at checkpoints, in the absence of probable cause, should be
limited only to a visual search.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's judgment. Hence,
Yanson filed his Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE:

Is there a valid warrantless search and seizure in the present problem?

RULING:

No.

862
 A search of a moving vehicle is one of the few permissible exceptions where
warrantless searches can be made. There have been a number of cases where this
Court considered warrantless searches made in moving vehicles to be valid. In
these cases, probable cause was founded on more than just a solitary suspicious
circumstance. In all these instances, the finding of probable cause was premised
on more than just the initial information relayed by assets. It was the confluence
of initial tips and a myriad of other occurrences that ultimately sustained probable
cause.

People v. Cogaed, citing Chief Justice Lucas Bersamin's dissent in Esquillo v.

People, emphasized that in warrantless searches, law enforcers "must not rely on
a single suspicious circumstance." What is required is the "presence of more than
one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable
inference of criminal activity."

Exclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the very

nature of probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to "the existence of such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched." To maintain otherwise
would be to sanction frivolity, opening the floodgates to unfounded searches,
seizures, and arrests that may be initiated by sly informants. In drugs cases where
the allegedly confiscated drug is excluded from admissible evidence — as when it
was acquired through an invalid warrantless search — the prosecution is left
without proof of corpus delicti. Any discussion on whether a crime has been
committed becomes an exercise in futility. Acquittal is then inexorable.

Lastly, it cannot be said that Sison, the driver, consented to the search made
by the arresting officers. Jurisprudence has settled that "[m]ere passive conformity
or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which
amounts to no consent at all." The validity of a supposedly consented warrantless
search is contingent on the totality of the attendant circumstances. This may entail
an inquiry into the environment in which the consent was ostensibly given, such
as "the presence of coercive police procedures" just like in the case at bar.

863
 People v. Cogaed
G.R No. 200334, July 30, 2014
FACTS:

The accused in this case was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana.

It was alleged that Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the
San Gabriel Station in La Union received a text message from an unidentified
civilian informer that one Marvin Buya “would be transporting marijuana” from
Barangay Lun-Oy in San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of the same town. PSI
Bayan organized checkpoints in an attempt to intercept the suspect. He instructed
SPO1 Jaime Taractac (SPO1 Taractac), a member of the police, to set up a
checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San
Fernando City.

A passenger jeep from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at the said checkpoint. The
jeepney driver signaled to SPO1 Taractac indicating that the two male passengers
are carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taractac approached the passengers who were
identified as Cogaed and Santiago Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a
sack, while Dayao was holding a yellow bag. When asked about its contents, they
said that they did not know of its contents as the same was being asked as a favor
for their barriomate, Marvin Buya. Cogaed opened the bag, revealing three bricks
of what looked like marijuana.

While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley
Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.18 Inside
Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,"
and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana. PO3 Campit
prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing. PSI Bayan personally
delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Forensic
Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests
and found that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana. Subsequently, the
accused herein were charged with illegal possession of marijuana.

The case was filed with the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union. Cogaed and
Dayao pleaded not guilty. The case was dismissed against Dayao as he was only
14 years old at the time and was exempt from criminal liability under RA 9344.
Trial against Cogaed ensued, ending in his conviction. The trial court ruled that
the arrest of Cogaed was illegal as at the time, thus, the warrantless search was
also illegal. However, Cogaed waived his right to object to such irregularity when
he did not protest when SPO1 Taractac, after identifying himself, asked him to
open his bag.

864
 On appeal, the CA affirmed Cogaed’s conviction. The CA found that Cogaed
waived his right against warrantless searches when without prompting SPO1
Taractac, he voluntarily opened his bag.

ISSUE:

Was there a valid search and seizure of marijuana against the appellant?

RULING:

No.

There are instances when searches are reasonable even when

warrantless. The Rules of Court recognizes warrantless searches incidental to a
valid arrest. Moreover, one of the jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is
"stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches are often confused with searches
incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a
lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to
ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.

On the other hand, "stop and frisk" searches are conducted to prevent the
occurrence of a crime. A ‘stop and frisk’ situation is one whose object is either to
determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." "Stop and
frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches) are necessary for law
enforcement. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with the Constitution.

In cases previously decided by the Supreme Court, the police officers used
their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish
eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of
a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear
is probably hiding something as well. The search involved in this case was initially
a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of
reasonability required by the Constitution.

In the case of Cogaed, he was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling
aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious about riding a jeepney or carrying
a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the
jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was

865
"suspicious." Even SPO1 Taractac said in his testimony that if the jeepney driver
did not signal him that the passengers carried marijuana, he did not have a reason
to suspect Cogaed.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a
reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the
suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person
suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be
an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effect.

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The
person searched was note even the person mentioned by the informant. The
informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor
Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was
transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance.
This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings
without a valid search warrant.None of the other exceptions to warrantless
searches exist to allow the evidence to be admissible. The facts of this case do not
qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a
lawful arrest. These are: 1) in flagrante delicto arrest; b) hot pursuit arrest; and c)
in case of an escapee from a penal institution or a place where the prisoner is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined. The apprehension of Cogaed
was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in the
Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the time of his
apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to
commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers
that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed
was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the
last allowable warrantless arrest.There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s
constitutional rights even if it’s assumed that he did not object when the police
asked him to open his bags. Silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such
search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of
showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing,
intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be
presumed.

866
 REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE

RULE 128
General Provisions

Section 3 - Admissibility of Evidence

Villasana v. People
G.R. No. 209078, September 4, 2019

FACTS:

Jojo Villasana was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. PO3
Martinez received a confidential information that Jojo Villasana and Nida
Villasana were rampantly selling drugs. A team was at once formed to conduct
surveillance operations. At about 11:30 p.m. that day, the team proceeded to the
target area on board three vehicles. Around 10 to 15 minutes later, they saw,
through the van's tinted front windshield, Villasana coming out of an alley around
5 to 6 meters away. He was holding a plastic sachet while talking to a woman. The
Police officers approached him discreetly. After verifying that Villasana was
indeed holding shabu, PO3 Martinez arrested him and confiscated the sachet. The
woman, however, was able to escape. Villasana and the seized drug were brought
to the Marulas Barangay Hall, where an inventory was made. The inventory was
signed by Kagawad Mendez and a certain Artemus Latoc, a former official. PO3
Martinez marked the confiscated item with Villasana's initials, "JCV," in the
"office." RTC convicted Villasana. CA held that there was a valid warrantless arrest
because Villasana "was caught in flagrante delicto of having in his possession an
illegal drug." In any case, CA held that Villasana was already estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest since he failed to move for the quashing of the
Information before his arraignment. Neither did he raise the issue of his
warrantless arrest prior to or during the proceedings before the trial court. CA
gave no merit to Villasana's claim on noncompliance with the guidelines on
custody and disposition of the seized items. CA further held that procedural
infirmities in the custody of dangerous drugs are insufficient to render the seized
items inadmissible in court as evidence, so long as their integrity was shown to be
preserved, as in this case.

ISSUE:

Is the drug allegedly seized from Villasana admissible in evidence?

RULING:

867
 No.

From all indications — the time of the arrest being 11:30 p.m., PO3
Martinez's location, and the tinted front windshield of the van through which he
was looking — it was highly doubtful that PO3 Martinez saw, let alone
deciphered, the contents of the sachet. It is settled that "reliable information"
provided by Police assets alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The
prosecution failed to establish probable cause to justify the in flagrante delicto
arrest of petitioner. Thus, the ensuing seizure of the shabu purportedly in his
possession is unlawful, and the seized drug is, therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, Villasana’s imputation of irregularities in the custody and the police
officers' handling of the seized shabu is well taken. From the facts on record, the
police officers had compromised the integrity of the shabu purportedly seized
from him.

It must be emphasized that Villasana’s failure to question his arrest before

he made his plea only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his person and does
not bar him from raising the inadmissibility of the illegally seized shabu. A waiver
of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility
of the evidence obtained during the illegal arrest. Because the dangerous drug was
unlawfully seized, it cannot be used as evidence against petitioner.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 3 of Rule 128
remains the same, only with an addition of the word “Constitution”.

868
 People v. Dimaano y Tipdas
G.R. No. 174481, February 10, 2016

FACTS:

Non-Uniformed Personnel Florence S. Bilugot was detailed as frisker at the

Manila Domestic Airport Terminal. A woman who went in the airport was then
frisked by Bilugot. Bilugot felt a hard object bulging near the woman’s buttocks.
Asked what the object was, the woman replied that it was a sanitary napkin,
explaining that she was having her monthly period. Suspicious, Bilugot requested
the woman to accompany her to the ladies’ room. Bilugot then asked the woman
to remove her panties. On the panties’ crotch was a panty shield on top of a
sanitary napkin, but under all of these was a plastic sachet. Bilugot then seized the
plastic sachet and, together with the woman, went out of the ladies’ room. NUP
Bilugot turned over the plastic sachet to SPO2 Ragadio. SPO2 Ragadio recalled
receiving from NUP Bilugot two (2) transparent plastic sachets, which NUP
Bilugot placed inside a plastic bag. Thirty minutes later, three investigators from
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency arrived to collect the specimen and
placed their initials on the two plastic sachets. A criminal action was filed against
Dimaano for attempting to transport the dangerous drugs.

Dimaano contends that there was a break in the chain of custody of the
methamphetamine hydrochloride allegedly seized from her person. Because the
testimonies of NUP Bilugot and SPO2 Ragadio differed as to the number of sachets
allegedly obtained from her, "the identity of the illegal drugs recovered from her
was not established."

ISSUES:

Whether or not inconsistencies in the prosecution witness in cases

involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act is fatal to the
prosecution of the witness.

HELD:

No.

Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 under justifiable

grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

869
 To show that "the drugs examined and presented in court were the very
ones seized from the accused," testimony as to the "chain of custody" of the seized
drugs must be presented. The purpose of Section 21 is "to protect the accused from
malicious imputations of guilt by abusive police officers."

Nevertheless, Section 21 cannot be used to "thwart the legitimate efforts of

law enforcement agents." "Slight infractions or nominal deviations by the police
from the prescribed method of handling the corpus delicti as provided in Section
21 should not exculpate an otherwise guilty defendant."

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

870
 Lescano v. People
G.R. No. 214490, January 13, 2016

FACTS:

An informant sought the assistance of the City Anti-Illegal Drug Special

Operation Team (CAIDSOT) of Olongapo City. The informant alleged that drug-
pushing activities were taking place at the corner of Tulio and Tabacuhan Streets.
Acting on this tip, the CAIDSOT monitored the area and allegedly found the
informant’s claims to be true. A buy-bust operation took place. While walking
towards Tulio Street, the informant pointed to Lescano who was standing alone,
about three (3) meters away, allegedly waiting for a prospective customer. The
informant introduced PO3 Javier to Lescano. Lescano asked PO3 Javier how much
marijuana he was willing to buy. PO3 Javier responded by handing the marked
P100 bill to Lescano.11 Lescano then gave PO3 Javier a medium-sized plastic
sachet supposedly containing marijuana. At this, PO3 Javier gave the pre-arranged
signal to the buy-bust team. PO1 Mataverde approached them and introduced
himself as a police officer. He then frisked Lescano and recovered the buy-bust
money. Lescano was then charged for violating Section 5 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

ISSUES:

Whether proof beyond reasonable doubt may be established in drug

cases when the corpus delicti of the crime for which the accused was charged is
cast in doubt due to failure to comply with the chain of custody requirements.

HELD:

No.

Compliance with Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of

2002 is critical. Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of
corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these offenses,
non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused.

As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) requires
the performance of two (2) actions: physical inventory and photographing. Section
21(1) is specific as to when and where these actions must be done. As to when, it
must be "immediately after seizure and confiscation." As to where, it depends on

871
whether the seizure was supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was
served, the physical inventory and photographing must be done at the exact same
place that the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless seizures, these
actions must be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable."

Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present

during the physical inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the
accused or the person/s from whom the items were seized; second, an elected
public official; and third, a representative of the National Prosecution Service.
There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the
accused or the person/s from whom items were seized), there are two (2)
alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to
the representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the
media may be present in his or her place.

Section 21 spells out matters that are imperative. "Even the doing of acts
which ostensibly approximate compliance but do not actually comply with the
requirements of Section 21 does not suffice." This is especially so when the
prosecution claims that the seizure of drugs and drug paraphernalia is the result
of carefully planned operations, as is the case here.

Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended,

leaves room for deviating from its own requirements. It includes a proviso stating
that "noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/tea m, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
and custody over said items." However, the prosecution failed to establish the
existence of any such justifiable grounds.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

872
 Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. National Power Corporation
G.R. Nos. 181683 & 184568, October 7, 2015

FACTS:

Lorenzo Shipping (LORENZO) is the owner and operator of the

commercial vessel MV Lorcon Luzon which hit and rammed a power barge owned
by National Power Corporation (NPC). Due to this incident, NPC filed before the
Quezon City RTC a Complaint for Damages against LORENZO. The RTC
absolved LORENZO of liability. NPC appealed before the CA which later on
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and entered another judgment
ordering LORENZO to pay the amount of P876,286.00 as actual damages and
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. LORENZO filed a Motion
for Reconsideration to which the CA issued the Amended Decision. Noting that
the amount of actual damages was not proven by NPC, it awarded NPC the
amount of P300,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. NPC then
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied. Thereafter, NPC filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari. It bewails the CA’s observation that the basis of
its claims was not properly receipted. It counters that it was able to show by
competent testimonial and documentary evidence that it must be compensated for
actual damages in the amount of P876,826.00. One of the evidence relied on by
NPC was the "Total Incidental Cost for Drydock and Repair" (Exhibit “F”)
prepared by PHILSECO which enumerated and itemized the actual damages
sustained by Power Barge 104 and the repairs made by PHILSECO. However,
LORENZO pointed out fatal flaws in that evidence. These flaws led the CA to
reconsider its earlier award of actual damages to NPC.

ISSUE:

Did the NPC satisfactorily prove its pecuniary loss which shall be the
basis for the award of actual damages?

RULING:

No.

NPC failed to establish the precise amount of the pecuniary loss it suffered.

A bill of expenses, such as NPC's Exhibit "F", is considered a private

document as it does not fall under what the Revised Rules on Evidence defines to
be public documents. Accordingly, for it to have been admitted by the RTC as
authentic, Rule 132, Section 20 of the Revised Rules on Evidence must have been

873
complied with. NPC failed in this respect. Thus, the RTC denied the admission of
Exhibit "F" for not having been identified nor authenticated. It emphasized that no
witness came forward to attest to its authenticity and due execution, let alone
allowed himself or herself to be cross-examined on these points.

It is of no consequence that the substance or contents of Exhibit "F" are such

that they specify an amount. It is of no consequence that it is purportedly of such
evidentiary weight that it could definitely establish NPC's claims. Admissibility of
evidence and weight accorded to evidence are two distinct affairs. Rule 128,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Evidence governs admissibility and provides
that "evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by
the law of these rules." When evidence has "such a relation to the fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or non-existence," it is said to be relevant. When
evidence is not excluded by law or by the Rules, it is said to be competent.

The weight accorded to evidence is properly considered only after evidence

has been admitted. To this end, courts evaluate evidence in accordance with the
rules stipulated by Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, consistent with
basic precepts of rationality and guided by judicially established standards. It is
improper to even speak of evidentiary weight when the piece of evidence in
question has not even been admitted.

Exhibit "F" was ruled to have been inadmissible for failing to comply with
Rule 132, Section 20 thus, it failed the standard of competency. Consistent with
this, reliance on NPC’s Exhibit "F" and its contents, so as to establish the extent of
NPC's pecuniary loss, is misplaced. Not having been admitted, Exhibit "F" does
not form part of the body of evidence worthy of judicial consideration.

NPC suffered pecuniary loss, albeit its precise extent or amount had not
been established. Accordingly, we sustain the CA's conclusion that NPC is entitled
to temperate damages.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The particular provision involved in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v.

National Power Corporation (G.R. Nos. 181683 & 184568, October 7, 2015) is
affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 3, Rule 128 of the new rules now provides
that “Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by
the Constitution, the law or these Rules.” The new rules included the word
“Constitution.” However, even before the amendment, the term “law” was
understood to encompass the Constitution.

874
 People v. Opiniano y Verano
||| G.R. No. 181474, July 26, 201

FACTS:

On November 30, 1997, at around 2:30 a.m., spouses Eladio Santos

(Eladio), 72, and Leonor Santos (Leonor), 71, were found dead in the garage of
their house.

The Spouses Santos were dealers of soft drinks and beer. They maintained
a store, adjacent to their two-storey house which sold other commodities. Dela
Cruz was their stay-in helper. He had been working for them for only three (3)
to five (5) days before the couple were killed. Around 2:30 a.m. of November 30,
1997, Estrella received a call from her sister that their parents were stabbed. She
and her husband hurriedly went to the store. They noticed policemen and
reporters waiting outside the store. When she entered the garage, Estrella saw
the bloodied and dead bodies of her parents, while the police took pictures of
the victims. She saw the store and the house in disarray. She noticed that
cigarettes, lighters, coins, and bills were missing. Estrella remembered wrapping
some coins and signing her initials on them for eventual bank deposit.

When she went up to the second floor, she found the master bedroom in
shambles, and noticed that some money and her mother's pieces of jewelry were
missing. A pair of pearl earrings were among those missing.Estrella estimated
that the total cash missing amounted to P100,000.00. She also noticed that the
kitchen knife was missing. It had a "black rubber band wrapped around the
handle. She later found the knife full of blood inside a case of beer. The knife was
turned over to the La Loma police.

Around 9:00 p.m. of the previous day, November 29, 1997, PO2 Paule and
SPO1 Eduardo Roderno (SPO1 Roderno) of the Caloocan police were traversing
C-3 Road aboard a police-marked vehicle when they noticed a man carrying a
heavy-looking bag. When they approached him, the man ran away. After a brief
chase, the man was cornered. PO2 Paule noticed that he was nervous and
sweating. His right leg was stained with blood and his right waistline was
bulging with an object, which turned out to be a double bladed 9-inch mini
kris. He did not answer when asked about the bloodstain on his leg. They
brought him to the police station where he identified himself as Jerry Dela Cruz.
The bag yielded three (3) reams of Marlboro cigarettes, a lighter, some coins, and
a blue denim wallet with cash in different denominations amounting to
P1,470.00. PO2 Paule also noticed that the P500.00 bill in the wallet was stained
with fresh blood.

875
 Upon interrogation, Dela Cruz verbally confessed that he and his
companions, whom he later revealed as "Ango" or Lumayag, and Opiniano, "had
just killed and robbed an old couple." He was supposed to bring the contents of
the bag to his cohorts in the illegal settlers' area in Malabon. During cross-
examination, PO2 Paule affirmed that Dela Cruz was not aided by a lawyer, nor
was his confession reduced into writing. PO2 Paule further testified that when
they informed Dela Cruz of his right to a lawyer, the latter remained silent.
Dela Cruz then accompanied the police officers to the scene of the crime.
When they peeped through the gate, using a search light, they saw a "female
lying on the floor," covered with blood. They called the La Loma Police Station,
which had jurisdiction over the case. PO2 Paule and the other Caloocan police
operatives, together with Dela Cruz, then proceeded to Letre, Malabon where
they were able to apprehend Opiniano.

SPO2 Ko was assigned to investigate the case. When he arrived at the

crime scene at around 3:00 a.m., members of the Scene of the Crime Operative
(SOCO) led by a certain Lt. Pelotin, and members of media and barangay tanods
were already in the area. Estrella also arrived. Upon the arrival of a barangay
official, the gate was opened. SPO2 Ko saw Leonor sprawled on the ground
leaning on the wall of the garage and Eladio was placed on top of a bicycle. Both
were dead. He also saw that the store was forcibly opened and some of the store
articles were disarranged. Inside the house, he found one (1) of the rooms in the
second floor ransacked and in total disarray. He proceeded to the Caloocan
police precinct where he saw Dela Cruz and Opiniano.

The Caloocan police turned over to SPO2 Ko the multi-colored bag with
its contents and the mini-kris that were recovered from Dela Cruz. SPO2 Ko
brought the bloodstained bills, the mini-kris, and the knife found by Estrella to
the NBI for testing of human blood. SPO2 Ko brought Dela Cruz and Opiniano to
the La Loma Police Station for further investigation. PO3 Gomez conducted the
body search on the suspects. As Opiniano was undressing, a pair of earrings
dropped to the floor. When asked whose they were, Opiniano replied that they
belonged to a distant relative.

On November 30, 1997, PO2 Flores and other La Loma police officers,
together with Dela Cruz, were dispatched to Kaysikat, Antipolo, Rizal where
they arrested Lumayag. When Lumayag was frisked, two (2) coin wrappers
bearing initials were found inside his pocket. Estrella later identified the initials
in the coin wrappers as hers.

876
 Dr. Arizala, the medico-legal officer of the NBI who conducted the
autopsies of the victims, testified that Eladio suffered 14 incised wounds, two (2)
contusions, one (1) abrasion, and five (5) stab wounds. On the other hand, Leonor
sustained 28 incised wounds, a contusion, five (5) abrasions, two (2) lacerations,
and three (3) stab wounds. Dr. Arizala said that the incised wounds could have
been caused by a knife while the numerous wounds could be attributed to more
than one (1) assailant. He also found that the stab wounds sustained by the
victims were mostly fatal. Forensic Biologist Buan testified that he had examined
the blood on the knives and peso bills recovered by the police; he testified that
he had also examined the fresh blood sample of Leonor and Eladio. His
examination showed that Leonor's blood belonged to group type "O," while that
of Eladio belonged to group type "B.”

On the other hand, the defense presented their version of the facts as
follows:

Dela Cruz, who at the time of the commission of the crime was only 16
years old, testified that he was employed on November 25, 1997 by the victims,
whom he called Lolo and Lola. On November 26, 1997, Lumayag, his first cousin,
visited him at his employer's house. Lumayag borrowed from him P50.00 to buy
food. The following day, November 27, 1997, Lumayag visited him again to ask
for cigarettes. Before leaving, however, Lumayag disclosed that he would come
back on November 29, 1997 to rob his employer's house. When Dela Cruz
dissuaded Lumayag from his plans, the latter merely replied, "Bahala ka, pupunta
rin ako dyan."

Around 8:00 p.m. of November 29, 1997, Dela Cruz was eating in the
kitchen when he heard Leonor shouting for help. When he went out of the
kitchen, he saw Lumayag holding Leonor by the neck. When he asked Lumayag,
"Bakit ganon?" the latter responded, "Wala kang pakialam. Lakad namin ito."

While Leonor was being held by Lumayag, Eladio came out of the room
in the lower portion of the house, he went inside the store and took a knife. When
Eladio came out of the store, Lumayag threw Leonor to Opiniano, grabbed the
knife from Eladio, and stabbed Eladio several times. Dela Cruz just stood by in
fear. He attempted to stop Lumayag, but the latter threatened him. As Eladio
fell, Dela Cruz turned around and saw Leonor already dead. Opiniano stabbed
her with a knife.

Lumayag then went upstairs and came down carrying money in paper
bills. He counted the money, which amounted to P25,000.00, and pocketed them.
He then went to the store, took the paper-wrapped coins from the drawer, and

877
placed them inside Dela Cruz's bag. He also searched Leonor and got money
from her. Likewise, he took Eladio's wallet and placed the money in the wallet.
Lumayag then directed Dela Cruz to go with them. Dela Cruz told them,
"Patayin n'yo na lang ako; wala ng iba; madadamay din ako." Lumayag answered him,
"Hindi kita papatayin pero sumama ka na lang sa akin." Dela Cruz told him that he
would think it over. Lumayag then instructed Dela Cruz to bring the money to
Letre, Malabon or else he would kill him. After the two (2) had left, Dela Cruz
also left for Letre, but was caught by the Caloocan police officers upon reaching
Monumento.

For his part, Opiniano put up the defense of denial and alibi. He testified
that when he was arrested on the night of November 29, 1997, he was babysitting
his cousin Manang Ligaya Verano's child at her house in Letre, Malabon. He did
not know the victims or why Dela Cruz, who was his townmate from Samar,
implicated him in the crime.

The RTC found Opiniano and Lumayag guilty as principals of the crime of
robbery with homicide and imposed upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. According to the CA, the direct
testimony of Dela Cruz admitting their participation in the crime and Opiniano's
possession of the stolen items were clear proofs of his involvement in the crime.

Appellant Opiniano contends, among others, that the extra-judicial

confession of Dela Cruz, implicating him in the crime, is inadmissible in evidence,
as it was obtained without the assistance of counsel.

ISSUE:

Is the extra-judicial confession of Dela Cruz, implicating Opiniano in the

crime admissible in evidence?

RULING:

No.

The extra-judicial confession of Dela Cruz is not admissible in evidence.

In People v. Jara, the Supreme Court held that where a confession was
illegally obtained from two (2) of the accused, and consequently were not
admissible against them, with much more reason should the same be
inadmissible against a third accused who had no participation in its execution.

878
 In this case, Dela Cruz's extrajudicial confession without counsel at the
police station without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing
and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that
Dela Cruz was neither assisted by a lawyer nor was his confession reduced into
writing. Further, when the police officers informed Dela Cruz of his right to a
lawyer, the latter did not say anything. Even so, such silence did not constitute a
valid waiver of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel. Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution states that "these
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." Dela
Cruz was merely told of his Constitutional rights, but he was never asked
whether he understood what he was told or whether he wanted to exercise or
avail himself of such rights. This kind of perfunctory giving of the so-called
Miranda rights is what the SC has previously frowned upon as ineffective and
inadequate compliance with the mandates of the Constitution. Any confession
obtained under these circumstances is flawed and cannot be used as evidence
not only against the declarant but also against his co-accused.

Hence, Dela Cruz's extrajudicial confession is likewise inadmissible

against appellant Opiniano

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The amendment
now expressly includes the exclusionary rule under the Constitution. However,
even before the amendment, the term “law” was understood to encompass the
constitution.

879
 People of the Philippines v. Victor Cogaed
G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

FACTS:

The accused in this case was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana.

It was alleged that Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the
San Gabriel Station in La Union received a text message from an unidentified
civilian informer that one Marvin Buya “would be transporting marijuana” from
Barangay Lun-Oy in San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of the same town. PSI
Bayan organized checkpoints in an attempt to intercept the suspect. He instructed
SPO1 Jaime Taractac (SPO1 Taractac), a member of the police, to set up a
checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San
Fernando City.

A passenger jeep from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at the said checkpoint. The
jeepney driver signaled to SPO1 Taractac indicating that the two male passengers
are carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taractac approached the passengers who were
identified as Cogaed and Santiago Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a
sack, while Dayao was holding a yellow bag. When asked about its contents, they
said that they did not know of its contents as the same was being asked as a favor
for their barriomate, Marvin Buya. Cogaed opened the bag, revealing three bricks
of what looked like marijuana.

While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley
Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags. Inside 18

Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,"
and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana. PO3 Campit
prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing. PSI Bayan personally
delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Forensic
Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests
and found that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana. Subsequently, the
accused herein were charged with illegal possession of marijuana.

The case was filed with the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union. Cogaed and
Dayao pleaded not guilty. The case was dismissed against Dayao as he was only
14 years old at the time and was exempt from criminal liability under RA 9344.
Trial against Cogaed ensued, ending in his conviction. The trial court ruled that
the arrest of Cogaed was illegal as at the time, thus, the warrantless search was
also illegal. However, Cogaed waived his right to object to such irregularity when

880
he did not protest when SPO1 Taractac, after identifying himself, asked him to
open his bag.

On appeal, the CA affirmed Cogaed’s conviction. The CA found that Cogaed

waived his right against warrantless searches when without prompting SPO1
Taractac, he voluntarily opened his bag.

ISSUE:

Is the seized marijuana, admissible in evidence?

RULING:

No.

None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the

evidence to be admissible. The facts of this case do not qualify as a search
incidental to a lawful arrest.

The Constitution provides the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous
doctrine. It states that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as
evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures."

In this case, the apprehension of Cogaed was not effected under a valid
warrantless arrest. None of the instances enumerated in the Rules of Court were
present when the arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has
not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. There were
no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed
was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner
that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless
arrest. It follows that the search done incidental to his arrest was illegal. Hence,
the marijuana seized from him should be rendered inadmissible following the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine.

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if it’s

assumed that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. Silence
should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to
the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive

881
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any
coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on

the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that
there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Rule 128, Sec.4
of the Rules of Court provides that evidence shall be admissible when it is relevant
and not excluded by law and by rules. The Revised Rules on Evidence made the
provision more specific by adding the phrase “the Constitution” to emphasize the
Constitutional doctrine of the fruit of the poisionous tree.

882
 RULE 130
Rules of Admissibility

A
Object (Real) Evidence

Section 1 - Object as evidence

People v. Ramos
G.R. No. 225325, August 28, 2019

FACTS:

Two separate information were filed against Isidro Ramos for using and
selling drugs. PO2 Navarro and PO3 Yco, Bernardino Talao and Francisco Palo
testified for the prosecution. PO2 Navarro and PO3 Yco conducted a buy-bust
operation. The items were not immediately marked after seizure, PO2 Navarro
explained, as none of the required witnesses under the law were then present. PO3
Yco, meanwhile, testified that the markings were not placed at the time of arrest
because he and PO2 Navarro did not bring pens. With the 18 sachets in his
custody, PO2 Navarro went to the police station while PO3 Yco brought Ramos.
In the presence of Barangay Kagawad Palo, media representative Talao, and DOJ
representative Manuel Villanueva, PO2 Navarro removed the sachets from their
respective plastic containers and the sachets were marked. Later, PO2 Navarro,
PO3 Yco, Ramos and the three witnesses signed a Confiscation Receipt. Talao
testified that he was not sure when the writings on the seized items were made,
and if there were indeed markings on them. Palo, meanwhile, testified that the
inventory and photographing occurred at the municipal hall, and that what was
presented to them was marijuana but he clarified that he had confused the details
of this case with another buy-bust operation he had also been asked to witness.

ISSUE:

Was the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs properly
preserved and was there justifiable ground for the non-compliance in the chain
of custody rule?

RULING:

No.

883
 Before a court may convict someone for the crimes of illegal possession and
sale of drugs, it must be certain that dangerous drugs were seized, and that the
"drugs examined and presented in court were the very ones seized." To convince
the court of this, the prosecution must show that the apprehending team followed
the stringent requirements on the custody of the seized drugs, as provided under
Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The first step in the
mandatory procedure for chain of custody is the immediate marking, physical
inventory, and photographing of the seized items, which must be done in the
presence of certain witnesses. Here, the apprehending officers admitted that they
did not mark, photograph, or inventory the seized items immediately after
confiscation. Indeed, strict compliance with the requirements under Section 21 of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act may not always be possible under
varied field conditions. The prosecution must satisfactorily prove that: (1) there is
justifiable ground for noncompliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved. The witnesses' absence at the time of
seizure is not a justifiable ground for not immediately marking the items, since
they should have, at the onset, been present or near the place of seizure.

Assuming that the apprehending team in this case really could not have
immediately marked the seized drugs because they had no marker or because the
required witnesses were absent, both circumstances were entirely of their own
making. If anything, the lack of foresight that led to these circumstances shows
that the team did not exert genuine effort to comply with the chain of custody rule.
All these circumstances cast doubt on the source, identity, and integrity of the
drugs allegedly seized from accused-appellant. Accused-appellant's acquittal,
therefore, is only proper.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

884
 People v. Banding
G.R. No. 233470, August 14, 2019

FACTS:

A confidential informant apprised PO2 Inway about the illegal drug

activities of a certain "Al." Acting on the tip, police officers formed a buy-bust team
designating PO2 Inway as the poseur-buyer, SPO4 Fernandez as the arresting
officer, and PO3 Blanco, PO2 Valdez, and PO3 Palimar as backup. The team
headed to a Mercury Drug Store branch in Barangay Lagro, where the informant
was supposed to meet "Al." A man whom they later identified as Banding arrived.
After handing the money and upon receipt of the sachet, PO2 Inway executed the
pre-arranged signal, prompting SPO4 Fernandez to arrest Banding. In the same
place, PO2 Inway then marked the seized item. The team proceeded to their station
in Camp Karingal, Quezon City for the physical inventory. At the police station,
PO2 Inway and SPO4 Fernandez immediately turned over the seized item and the
buy-bust money to PO3 Corona. PO3 Corona prepared the inventory receipt for
"one small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing undetermined
quantity of alleged marijuana fruiting tops. PO2 Inway then submitted the seized
item, along with requests for laboratory examination and drug tests. The
Chemistry report yielded positive results for shabu, which was confirmed by the
forensic chemist.

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to establish that a valid
buy-bust operation took place and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized item were properly preserved. Among others, it held that a clerical error—
particularly, writing marijuana instead of shabu—in the inventory receipt does not
tarnish the police officers' credibility. It also found that though the police officers
inventoried and photographed the evidence without an elected official and a
Department of Justice representative, such lapse was justified since the "illegal
drug was never altered or tampered." CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Did the discrepancy in the inventory receipt and chemistry reports impair
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item?

RULING:

Yes.

885
 Section 21 of RA 9165 is couched in a specific, mandatory language that
commands strict compliance. The accuracy it requires goes into the covertness of
buy-bust operations and the very nature of narcotic substances. Section 21 (a) of
the IRR of RA 9165 sanctions noncompliance when: (1) there are justifiable
grounds; (2) that despite non-compliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized drugs and/or drug paraphernalia were properly preserved. Here, the
prosecution itself admitted that accused-appellant did not sign the inventory
receipt. This casts doubt that the dangerous drug allegedly seized from accused-
appellant was the same drug delivered to PO3 Corona for documentation. Further
destroying the prosecution's case is the lack of proof as to how the prosecution
handled the seized item for seven (7) months after confiscation. It is not for this
Court to speculate on how the law enforcers dealt with the seized item during this
appreciable amount of time until Chief Inspector Rodis reexamined it. We cannot
dismiss as mere "clerical error" the discrepancies between the inventory receipt
and chemistry reports. The inventory receipt labeled the seized item as marijuana,
while the chemistry reports indicate it was shabu. The discrepancies are blatant
irregularities that cast serious doubts on the seized items' identity. They
completely defeat the police officers' self-serving assertions that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drug were preserved.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

886
 People v. Ternida y Munar
G.R. No. 212626, June 3, 2019

FACTS:

On November 12, 2009, a confidential informant told the San Fernando City
Police that an illegal drug transaction involving Ternida would take place in 5 days
at Quezon Avenue, San Fernando City, La Union. Acting on the tip, the San
Fernando City Police formed a buy-bust team composed of PO2 Ricardo Annague,
who was designated as the poseur-buyer, Police Inspector Quesada, PO3 Raul
Dapula, and PO3 Paul Batnag, who was designated as back-up.

On November 17, 2009, the team carried out the operation. At around 10:40
p.m., the officers spotted Ternida along Quezon Avenue. PO2 Annague
approached him, while PO3 Batnag stayed at a distance where he could observe
the transaction.

Ternida asked how much PO2 Annague would buy, to which PO2 Annague
said P1,000.00 worth. Ternida then gave PO2 Annague 1 heat-sealed plastic sachet
of crystalline substance in exchange for PO2 Annague's P1,000.00 bill, which had
been designated as the buy-bust money. After securing the sachet, PO2 Annague
gave the pre-arranged signal to PO3 Batnag, who immediately approached and
arrested Ternida. A Certificate of Inventory was subsequently prepared. The
seized plastic sachet was then sent to the crime laboratory for forensic
examination, where it tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.

The Regional Trial Court found Ternida guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Is accused-appellant Rolando Ternida y Munar guilty beyond

reasonable doubt despite the prosecution’s failure to offer justification for
noncompliance with the chain of custody in drugs cases?

RULING:

No.

887
 To convict an accused of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution
must not only prove that the sale took place, but also present the corpus delicti in
evidence. In doing this, the prosecution must establish the chain of custody of the
seized items to prove with moral certainty the identity of the dangerous drug
seized.

Article II, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act provides

the procedures that the apprehending team must observe to comply with the chain
of custody requirements in handling seized drugs. The first step upon seizure
mandates:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.

That the photographing and physical inventory of the seized drugs must be
done immediately where seizure had taken place minimizes the possibility that
evidence may be planted. Noncompliance with this legally mandated procedure,
upon seizure, raises doubt that what was submitted for laboratory examination
and as evidence in court was seized from an accused.

Here, the prosecution failed to provide any evidence that the allegedly
seized drugs were photographed upon seizure, in the presence of the accused.
That no photograph of the seized drugs was offered in evidence raises questions
as to whether the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was seized from
accused-appellant in the buy-bust operation.

Worse, the prosecution did not even address the apprehending team's
failure to photograph the seized items.

Thus, before courts may consider the seized drugs as evidence despite
noncompliance with the legal requirements, justifiable grounds must be identified
and proved. The prosecution must establish the steps taken to ensure that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. It has
the positive duty to establish its reasons for the procedural lapses.

In this case, the prosecution has failed to perform such duty.

888
 Assuming that the other requirements of the law had been complied with,
the prosecution could have strengthened its case by taking positive action and by
providing evidence on why the seized drugs were not photographed. It could have
also presented evidence to establish that what was submitted for laboratory
examination was, indeed, seized from accused-appellant.

Instead, the prosecution claimed that noncompliance with the law is

irrelevant. This is not only insufficient to convince this Court of the evidentiary
value of the allegedly seized drugs; it also raises serious doubts as to their identity,
especially given the minuscule amount involved.

Nonetheless, the arresting officers' failure to photograph the seized drugs,

to explain this failure, and to establish that the integrity of the seized drugs was
preserved despite the failure, are sufficient to reverse accused appellant's
conviction based on reasonable doubt.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

889
 Veriño y Pingol v. People
G.R. No. 225710, June 19, 2019
FACTS:

On April 4, 2014 at around 5:00 p.m., PO1 Verde of the Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs of the Valenzuela Police Station received a phone call tagging Veriño as a
dangerous drugs seller in Marulas Public Market, Valenzuela City. The informant
also described Veriño's hair and mustache.

PO1 Verde informed Police Chief Inspector Ruba of the tip. In turn, Chief
Inspector Ruba created a group composed of PO1 Verde, SPO3 Ronald Sanchez
(SPO3 Sanchez), PO3 Fabreag, and PO3 Hernandez to conduct the buy-bust
operation.

At around 9:00 p.m., the team went to Marulas Public Market, parked about
5 meters away from Veriño's reported store, and from their service vehicle,
surveyed the area. Around an hour later, the police officers saw Veriño come out
a store and meet a man, with whom he showed a plastic sachet. The officers slowly
walked toward them, but the unidentified man saw them and shouted, "Mga
pulis!" before running away.

PO1 Verde managed to grab Veriño, while PO1 Verde seized 2 plastic
sachets from his hand and another sachet from his pocket. PO1 Verde also
retrieved four P50.00 bills, two P100.00 bills, and a cellphone from Veriño's
pocket.

PO1 Verde then placed the 3 seized sachets "in 2 small brown envelope
bags, marked with his initials 'HTV-1,' 'HTV-2,' and 'HTV-3,'" before sealing and
signing the envelopes in the other officers' presence. The whole team then went to
Barangay Marulas and inventoried the seized items in the presence of Barangay
Kagawad Viray.

PO1 Verde turned the seized items over to SPO3 Sanchez, who then
prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination and Request for Drug Test. PO3
Macaraeg received the requests, and forwarded them to Chief Inspector Cejes for
laboratory examination.

In the Initial Laboratory Report, Chief Inspector Cejes found that the urine
sample taken from Veriño tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.

890
 In his defense, Veriño stated that he was closing his store at the market
when he was suddenly arrested by police officers, who then planted sachets of
shabu in his pocket. Veriño also claimed that the police officers had originally
intended to arrest a different person, but arrested him instead after that person
escaped.

The Regional Trial Court found Veriño guilty of the crime charged against
him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’S decision. Veriño moved for
reconsideration but such motion was denied. Hence, Veriño filed this Petition for
Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Is petitioner Ricardo Veriño y Pingol guilty beyond reasonable doubt

despite the prosecution’s failure to show strict compliance with the chain of
custody?

RULING:

No.

As to the corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs

Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640, imposes the following requirements
for the manner of custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or
surrendered drugs, and/or drug paraphernalia prior to the filing of a criminal
case.

When it comes to Section 21, this Court has repeatedly stated that the
handling officers must observe strict compliance to guarantee the integrity and
identity of seized drug. Thus, acts that "approximate compliance but do not strictly
comply with Section 21 have been considered insufficient."

Nonetheless, while strict compliance is the expected standard, the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act recognized that it may not always be
possible in every situation. Hence, the law's Implementing Rules and Regulations
introduced a saving clause, which was eventually incorporated in Section 21 when
the law was amended by Republic Act No. 10640.

The saving clause may be appreciated in the prosecution's favor if

noncompliance with Section 21 was justified and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized dangerous drug were preserved. Thus, the prosecution has the

891
burden of explaining why Section 21 was not strictly complied with and proving
its proffered justifiable ground during trial.

Here, an inventory of the items seized from petitioner was prepared by

SPO3 Sanchez, the investigating officer. However, despite the clear requirements
under Section 21, the inventory was only witnessed by an elected public official.
The prosecution failed to explain why the inventory was not signed by petitioner
or his representative and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or
the media, as mandated by law.

When the Regional Trial Court asked why only the elected public official
signed the inventory, PO1 Verde explained that he did not prepare the inventory
and was in no position to know the protocol behind the inventory of items seized
from operations. He added that SPO3 Sanchez should know the protocol for
inventory-taking since he prepared the inventory. However, the prosecution
never presented SPO3 Sanchez as its witness.

Another lapse was the prosecution's failure to present a photograph of the

inventory, despite PO1 Verde's testimony that at least 2 people took photos during
the inventory. Again, the prosecution failed to explain this blatant noncompliance
with Section 21.

Nonetheless, despite the glaring lapses committed by the police officers, the
Court of Appeals, as well as the Regional Trial Court, did not deem them fatal to
the prosecution's case, reasoning that the prosecution has established all the links
in the chain of custody, and that the police officers enjoyed the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties.

The Court of Appeals is mistaken.

Here, the prosecution claimed that the police officers recovered 3 sachets of
shabu from petitioner, with one sachet containing 0.02 gram and the other two
sachets containing 0.05 gram each. These minuscule amounts should have
prompted the lower courts to demand from the police officers strict compliance
with the legal safeguards under Section 21, instead of allowing the prosecution to
misguidedly seek refuge under the saving clause and the presumption of
regularity accorded to State agents.

It has not escaped this Court's attention that the prosecution did not even
bother to proffer a justifiable cause for the lapses. Nonetheless, its indifference to
the legal safeguards was rewarded by the lower courts, which ruled that despite
noncompliance, the prosecution proved the integrity and identity of the seized

892
sachets.

The lower courts are mistaken. The unjustified noncompliance with Section
21 creates a substantial gap in the chain of custody and casts doubt on the identity
of the corpus delicti. The gaps in the chain of custody created by the unexplained
lapses cannot be remedied by a presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties, as the lapses themselves are clear proof of irregularity.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty "stands

only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the
performance of official duty. And even in that instance the presumption of
regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused."

Notably, there were noticeable discrepancies between the prosecution

witnesses' testimonies and the prosecution's documentary evidence. PO1 Verde
testified that at around 5:00 p.m. of April 4, 2014, he received a tip from a
concerned citizen about petitioner's illegal activities in Marulas Public Market. Yet,
the Coordination Form filled out by PO3 Fabreag for the surveillance on petitioner
was prepared at 3:20 p.m. that same day, a good two (2) hours before PO1 Verde
supposedly received the information on petitioner. PO3 Fabreag was not
presented to explain this discrepancy.

However, despite PO1 Verde's statement that only Chief Inspector Ruba
could explain why petitioner's name was not indicated as a target in the Pre-
Operation Report, the prosecution did not present him as its witness.

These discrepancies, coupled with the flagrant noncompliance with Section

21, create reasonable doubt as to whether PO1 Verde received a tip regarding
petitioner, whether a surveillance was conducted on him, and ultimately, whether
he was caught possessing dangerous drugs.

A conviction in criminal proceedings requires proof beyond reasonable

doubt, as defined under Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The
prosecution is tasked with establishing an accused's guilt purely on the strength
of its own evidence, not on the weakness of the accused's defense. The prosecution
failed in its task. Petitioner, then, must be acquitted.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 2, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court was amended only to address gender sensitivity.

893
 Aparente y Vocalan v. People
G.R. No. 205695, September 27, 2017

FACTS:

Prosecution witnesses PO1 Dela Cruz and PO1 Pastor testified that when
they were patrolling, they saw two men, one of whom was later identified as
Aparente. They watched as the other man handed Aparente a small plastic sachet.
When the police officers approached, the two men fled. Only Aparente was
caught. PO1 Dela Cruz told Aparente to open his hands and found a small sachet
with a white crystalline substance, which the police officers confiscated. They
brought Aparente to the Police Station where a police investigator marked the
confiscated sachet with Aparente's initials. PO1 Dela Cruz then submitted the
sachet, together with its contents, to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Prosecution
witness Forensic Chemical Officer Abillonar issued a Laboratory Report which
stated that the contents of the sachet tested positive for shabu.

Aparente on the other hand testified that at the time of the alleged incident,
he was watching television with his mother, brother, and niece when five persons
forcibly entered the house. They handcuffed him and searched the house.
Afterwards, the intruders told him they found shabu, which he was coerced to
admit possessing.

The RTC found Aparente guilty of violating Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
Aparente appealed, contending that the prosecution failed to establish that the
rules on chain of custody were followed and that his guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the RTC. It found that the warrantless arrest
was lawfully conducted upon probable cause. It also held that the evidentiary
value of the confiscated drugs was preserved, considering that the police officers
went to the police station and immediately turned over the seized evidence, which
was then marked and submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory; thus, the witnesses
established an unbroken chain of custody from the arresting officer, to the
investigating officer, and to the forensic chemist. Further, the Court of Appeals
found that Aparente failed to submit convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption of regularity of the police officers' performance of official duties.

ISSUE:

Does the fact that the seized drugs were not marked by the apprehending
team but by an investigating officer at the police station cast a shadow of doubt
on the integrity of the operation?

894
RULING:

Yes.

Section 21 of RA No. 9165 provides for the handling of dangerous drugs

after its seizure and confiscation. It states that:

The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well
as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated arid/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.

Trial courts must carefully consider the intricacies of cases involving RA

No. 9165 and employ heightened scrutiny. Non-compliance with Section 21 of RA
No. 9165 produces doubt as to the origins of any seized narcotics. Although non-
compliance with RA No. 9165 upon justifiable grounds does not render void and
invalid the seizure of the narcotics.

Here, respondent failed to squarely address this matter of its compliance

with RA No. 9165. As duly supported by the testimonies of its witnesses, an
unbroken chain of custody of the seized drags had been established by the
prosecution from the arresting officer, to the investigating officer, and finally to
the forensic chemist. There is no doubt that the items seized from the appellant at
the scene of the crime were also the same items marked by the investigating officer,
sent to the Crime Laboratory, and later on tested positive for rnethamphetamine
hydrochloride.

However, it appears from the record that the seized drugs were not marked
by the apprehending team but by an investigating officer at the police station, an
act which is not in accordance with Republic Act No. 9165. Further, no justifiable
reason for this was presented by the prosecution.

895
 Where miniscule amounts of drugs are involved, trial courts should require
more exacting compliance with the requirements under Section 21 of RA No. 9165.
The RTC and the CA should have considered the failure of the apprehending team
to mark the seized drugs immediately after seizure and confiscation. They should
also have considered that it was the investigating officer at the police station who
marked the same and not the arresting officers. The failure of the prosecution to
address this issue and to provide a justifiable reason for this are enough to cast a
shadow of doubt on the integrity of the operation.

Hence, accused Aparente was acquitted of violating R.A. No. 9165.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

896
 People v. Cabellon y Cabañero
G.R. No. 207229, September 20, 2017

FACTS:

A buy bust operation was planned to capture Cabellon in the act of selling
drugs. The asset poseur-buyer transacted with Cabellon in an alley, where police
officers descended upon Cabellon, who then ran away. Cabellon ran and hid
inside a nearby house and the police officers followed him. The police officers
stumbled upon three men sniffing shabu inside the house, one of whom they
apprehended while the other two managed to escape. The police officers caught
up with Cabellon inside the house, whom they thereafter frisked. They recovered
the marked P100.00 and P50.00 bills from him.

After Cabellon's arrest, the poseur-buyer handed over the sachet of shabu
he purchased from Cabellon to PO3 Bucao. On the same day, a sachet marked with
"SCC 04/13/06" was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

Cabellon was charged with violation of Section 5 of RA No. 9165. P/S Insp.
Salinas, a forensic chemist, confirmed executing a Chemistry Report. She testified
that she had examined a heat-sealed plastic sachet of white crystalline substance
labelled with "SCC 04/13/06." The chemistry report bore the signatures of P/S
Insp. Salinas and P/Supt. Areola. The specimen weighed 0.03 grams and tested
positive for shabu. Cabellon was the only defense witness and he denied selling
shabu to the poseur-buyer.

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements for
the illegal sale of shabu. Furthermore, PO3 Bucao and PO2 Barangan identified the
sachet sold by Cabellon to the poseur-buyer. The seized sachet's chain of custody
from the time Cabellon was arrested until it was presented as evidence to the court
was accounted for.

On appeal, the CA held that the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were
duly proven. It downplayed the supposed necessity of presenting the poseur-
buyer as a witness in court since the testimonies of the members of the
apprehending team had already sufficiently established the illegal sale. It likewise
waived the stringent application of Section 21 of RA No. 9165, emphasizing that
the defense never questioned the integrity of the evidence during trial and only
did so upon appeal.

ISSUE:

897
 Was Cabellon's guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the non-
observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of R.A No. 9165?

RULING:

No.

While the prosecution may have proven that a transaction took place, it was
not as convincing in its presentation of the alleged corpus delicti as evidence. In
all prosecutions for violations of RA No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous
drug itself. Its existence is essential to a judgment of conviction. Hence, the identity
of the dangerous drug must be clearly established.

Section 21 of RA No. 9165 provides the manner by which law enforcement

officers should handle seized dangerous drugs. It states that:

The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well
as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition.

While it may be true that strict compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165
may be excused under justifiable grounds, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items must still be preserved by the apprehending officer.

In this case, Court was not convinced that the prosecution was able to prove
the identity of the shabu supposedly seized from the accused.

The four (4) links that should be established by the prosecution to

constitute an unbroken chain of custody are: (a) the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; (b) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; (c) the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (d) the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.

Undeniably, a noticeable gap exists in the chain of custody with the

prosecution's failure to present evidence that the seized sachet was actually
marked by any of the three apprehending officers. The prosecution likewise did
not present evidence that the seized sachet was inventoried and photographed
in the presence of the accused or his representative, a representative from the

898
media or the Department of Justice, and an elected public official. Neither did it
provide an explanation as to why the police officers did not follow the
requirements provided under the law. The prosecution utterly failed to proffer
evidence on who placed the markings on the sachet. It also failed to account for
the seized sachet's transfer from PO3 Bucao to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
laboratory examination, creating another gap in the chain of custody.

Hence, Cabellon was acquitted for the violation of R.A. 9165 due to the
prosecution’s failure to prove that it has observed procedure under Section 21 of
RA No. 9165 on chain of custody.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

899
 People v. Abundio M. Saragena
GR No. 210677, Aug 23, 2017

FACTS:

On September 23, 2005, SPO1 Paller received information that a certain

"Tatay" was selling illegal drugs. "Tatay's" exact address was unknown. A buy-
bust team was formed, composed of SPO3 Magdadaro as team leader, PO1 Misa
as poseur-buyer, and SPO1 Paller as back-up. A buy-bust money of P100.00 was
handed to PO1 Misa. On June 23, 2005, at about 7:00 p.m., the buy-bust team
headed to Sitio Sindulan in their service vehicle. An informant helped them locate
the house of accused-appellant, Saragena, alias "Tatay." The police officers parked
three (3) comers away from accused-appellant's house. As the designated poseur-
buyer, PO1 Misa walked towards accused-appellant's house. SPO1 Paller and
SPO3 Magdadaro trailed behind him. Accused-appellant's house was located at
the back of a stage. As PO1 Misa drew closer to the target site, SPO1 Paller and
SPO3 Magdadaro hid themselves at the side of the stages beside the basketball
court. The distance between the designated poseur-buyer and the two (2) back-up
officers were about five (5) to eight (8) meters. Outside accused-appellant's
house, PO1 Misa convinced the suspect to sell him shabu. PO1 Misa handed the
P100.00 bill as payment, for which he received a "pack of white crystalline
substance." SPO1 Paller and SPO3 Magdadaro then rushed to the scene and
introduced themselves as police officers. SPO1 Paller conducted a body search on
accused-appellant and recovered the buy-bust money. Accused-appellant was
brought to the police station. PO1 Misa retained custody of the plastic pack, while
SPO1 Paller took the buy-bust money from accused-appellant.

At the police station, PO1 Misa turned over the plastic pack to their team
leader, SPO3 Magdadaro, who then marked it with the letters "AS." The incident
was logged in the police blotter. SPO3 Magdadaro wrote a letter-request for
laboratory examination of the seized and marked plastic pack, signed by Chief
Police Superintendent Armando Macolbacol Radoc. PO1 Misa, accompanied by
SPO1 Paller, delivered SPO3 Magdadaro's letter-request and the seized plastic
pack to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Cebu City. A certain
PO2 Roma received the letter-request and the specimen from PO1 Misa and then
delivered these items to P/S Insp. Pinky Sayson-Acog, a forensic chemist. On June
23, 2005, P/S Insp. Acog found the plastic pack marked as "AS" to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. She entered her findings in her Chemistry
Report marked the specimen as "D-890-05," and put her initials, "PSA."

On the other hand, according to the defense, accused-appellant was at

home when three armed police officers kicked the door of his house. He

900
recognized PO1 Misa, SPO1 Palter, and SPO3 Magdadaro as they frequented
illegal cockfights and would take turns asking for the defeated fighting cock. The
police officers held accused-appellant. One (1) of them searched his pockets but
found nothing. They also searched his house. Despite the lack of contraband
found, accused-appellant was sent to the Mabolo Police Station. He inquired why
he was being arrested. The buy-bust team told him that they were able to buy
shabu from him. Denying this accusation, accused-appellant asserted that they
planted the evidence.

RTC convicted the accused-appellant of crime charged. The CA found that

the police officers failed to comply with the compulsory procedure on the seizure
and custody of dangerous drugs under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
chain of custody rule. Nevertheless, it justified the noncompliance by applying the
exception in the same provision.

ISSUES:

1. Is Saragena guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

2. Did the law enforcement officers substantially complied with the chain
of custody rule that would establish the corpus delicti, a crucial element
of the crime charged?

RULING:

1. NO. Accused-appellant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved

beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution had the burden of overcoming such
presumption, which it miserably failed to do so.

Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved[.]" To overcome this constitutional presumption, prosecution must
establish accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require absolute certainty; it only
requires moral certainty or the "degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind," Thus: Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let the
mind rest ea[sy] upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not
demanded by the law to convict a criminal charge, but moral certainty is required
as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. The legal

901
presumption of innocence prevails if the judge's mind cannot rest easy on the
certainty that the accused committed the crime.

2. NO. This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the prosecution
failed to follow the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165.

Paragraph 1 of Section 21 of the original Republic Act No. 9165 (2002)

provides the requirements for ensuring the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized item:
1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of [a] the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, [b] a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and [c] any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof.

The Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations require the

apprehending team to mark, inventory, and photograph the evidence in the
following manner:

First, the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer must place his or her
initials and signature on the seized item. Here, PO1 Misa did not place his initials
"RM" on the confiscated pack; rather, it was SPO3 Magdadaro who wrote "AS" on
it, presumably standing for accused-appellant's initials for Abundio Saragena,
instead of the police officer's initials. It was also not shown whether PO1 Misa or
SPO3 Magdadaro signed the plastic pack.

Second, in a warrantless search as in this case, the marking of the drug must
be done in the presence of the accused-appellant and at the earliest possible
opportunity. The earliest possible opportunity to mark the evidence is
immediately at the place where it was seized, if practicable, to avoid the risk that
the seized item might be altered while in transit. In People v. Sabdula:

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or

other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. "Marking"
means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her
initials and signature on the items seized. This Court has consistently held that
failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs casts reasonable
doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.

902
 Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is
vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until
they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus preventing
switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.

Here, the records do not show why the officers had to wait to arrive at the
police station before marking the seized plastic pack. The earliest available
opportunity to mark it was in accused-appellant's house. Likewise, there is no
showing that the seized item was marked in the presence of accused-appellant. All
that the prosecution established was that, while at the police station, PO1 Misa
turned over the plastic pack to SPO3 Magdadaro, who marked it with the letters
"AS." Other details are left out for this Court to guess.

Third, the physical inventory and photograph of the seized item must be
done in the presence of (a) the accused, the accused's representative, or the
accused's counsel; (b) any elected public official; and (c) a representative of the
Department of Justice's National Prosecution Service or a media practitioner.
These three (3) persons required by law should sign the copies of the inventory of
the seized item and be given a copy of the certificate of inventory. This insulates
the buy-bust operation "from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity."

Finally, the apprehending team shall "document the chain of custody each
time a specimen is handled, transferred or presented in court until its disposal,
and every individual in the chain of custody shall be identified following the
laboratory control and chain of custody form."

The Court of Appeals disregarded the operative phrase—that the

prosecution must provide "justifiable grounds" for noncompliance, in addition to
showing that the prosecution maintained the integrity of the seized item. In People
v. Jafaar, this Court held that the exception under then Section 21 (a) of Republic
Act No. 9165 Implementing Rules and Regulations "will only be triggered by the
existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule." The Chain of
Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations require that the apprehending
officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this
ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took
to preserve the integrity of the seized item.

903
 Here, the prosecution has not given a justifiable ground for applying the
exception. All it has done is to assert a self-serving claim that the integrity of the
seized pack has been preserved despite the numerous procedural lapses it has
committed. The fatal errors of the apprehending team can only lead this Court to
seriously doubt the integrity of the corpus delicti. The prosecution's procedural
shortcut finds no basis in fact or law. Its failure to comply with the chain of custody
rule is equivalent to its failure to establish the corpus delicti, and therefore, its
failure to prove that the crime was indeed committed.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

904
 People v. Comoso y Turemutsa
G.R. No. 227497, April 10, 2019

FACTS:

On March 26, 2005, the Anti-Drug Special Operation Task Force and Drug
Enforcement Action Division planned a buy-bust operation after receiving
information from their civilian asset that a certain "Coro" was selling illegal drugs
in Quimson, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa City. The team prepared four
P100.00 bills.

At around 2:30 p.m., PO2 Ferdinand Aquino (PO2 Aquino) and PO3 Jose
Fernandez (PO3 Fernandez) proceeded to the area of the operation. They parked
their motorcycle and walked about 50 meters to the target area, where the asset
told them to wait since their target, later identified as Comoso, was still
playing tong-its. The police officers waited by a store, while their asset waited in
front of Comoso's house.

Soon after, Comoso arrived. There, he handed a plastic sachet supposedly

containing marijuana in exchange for the asset's buy-bust money. The asset, in
turn, removed his hat—the pre-arranged signal that the transaction had been
consummated.

Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Aquino and PO3 Fernandez
rushed to the scene and arrested Comoso and the asset. PO2 Aquino recovered
the plastic sachet from the asset, while PO3 Fernandez frisked Comoso and
recovered the buy-bust money, one used marijuana stick, and a lighter. PO2
Aquino then marked both the plastic sachet and the buy-bust money with his
initials "FJA."

As they reached the police station, PO2 Aquino also marked the used
marijuana stick and lighter. He then prepared an Inventory of Confiscated Items.

On April 8, 2005, about two weeks after the buy-bust operation,

Superintendent De Villa, a forensic chemist at the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory Office, MIMAROPA, received the samples of seized items and a
letter-request for laboratory examination. She found that the specimens tested
positive for marijuana.

Comoso, a fisher residing on Liberty Road, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto

Princesa City, solely testified in his defense. He alleged that in the afternoon of
March 26, 2005, on his way home from delivering his catch, he was grabbed and

905
frisked by two armed men, whom he figured were police officers. They first
brought Comoso to the airport, then to the police station, where he would be
detained. The police officers recovered from Comoso P420.00, the money he had
earned from selling fish. He denied having sold illegal drugs.

The Regional Trial Court found Comoso guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. On
appeal before the Court of Appeals, the appellate court dismissed Comoso’s
appeal and affirmed his conviction. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Is accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemusta's guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act despite failure of the prosecution to prove strict
compliance with the Chain of Custody in drugs cases?

RULING:

No.

Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. To secure

conviction, the prosecution must overcome this presumption by presenting
evidence of the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

A guilty verdict relies on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on

the weakness of the defense:

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is ultimately a matter of conscience.

Though it does not demand absolutely impervious certainty, it still charges
the prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral
certainty. Much as it ensues from benevolence, it is not merely engendered
by abstruse ethics or esoteric values; it arises from a constitutional
imperative.

The burden of proof lies with the prosecution. Failure to discharge this
burden warrants an accused's acquittal.

Chain of Custody in Drug Cases

906
 The sale of illegal drugs is punished under Article II, Section 5 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. To secure conviction, the prosecution must
prove the following elements: "(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and
(2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence."

In proving the second element of the offense, the prosecution must establish
compliance with the chain of custody requirements outlined in Section 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640.

Moreover, every link in the chain of custody, as summarized in People v.

Nandi, must be established:

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.43

Here, PO2 Aquino, the apprehending officer, testified that he had seized
the plastic sachet from accused-appellant and marked it with his own initials,
"FJA." He added that he had also prepared the Inventory of Confiscated Items and
brought the seized items to the crime laboratory.

However, it remained unclear from PO2 Aquino's testimony if: (1) he

conducted the inventory before accused-appellant; (2) the inventory was signed
by accused-appellant; and (3) PO2 Aquino turned the items over to an
investigating officer.

The prosecution further presented evidence that Superintendent De Villa,

the forensic chemist, only received the seized items on April 8, 2005, or 10 working
days after the buy-bust operation on March 26, 2005. This is obviously beyond the
24-hour period required by law, a delay for which the prosecution has not been
able to explain. This creates reasonable doubt on whether the illegal drug turned
over to the forensic chemist was the same illegal drug seized from accused-
appellant:

This break in the chain of custody opens up the possibility of substitution,

alteration, or tampering of the seized drugs during the turn over to the chemist,
especially since the amount was as little as 0.02 grams. Thus, the illegal drugs
tested by the chemist may not be the same items allegedly seized by the buy-bust

907
team from accused-appellant. The doubt that the break created should have been
enough to acquit accused-appellant.

Worse, nothing in the records shows that the witnesses required to be

present and sign the inventory—an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media—were present, even though this
was a pre-planned entrapment operation.

Moreover, the prosecution did not justify the law enforcement officers'
noncompliance with the chain of custody. It merely stated that "the integrity of the
evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or
proof that the evidence has been tampered with."

Generally, noncompliance with these requirements would not have

rendered the search and seizure invalid "under justifiable grounds." However, the
absence of any justification only serves to magnify the irregularity of the police
officer's performance of their official duties.

The prosecution cannot merely sweep the police officers' lapses under the
mantle of the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties.
This presumption only applies when nothing in the evidence shows that the police
officers deviated from the standard procedures required by law.

The law's stringent requirements are not designed to hamper police

operations with needless procedural minutiae. They merely ensure that courts can,
with reasonable moral certainty, guarantee that the illegal drug presented by the
prosecution is the same illegal drug that was seized from the accused.

Because the prosecution was unable to establish accused-appellant's guilt

beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence must prevail. Accused-
appellant must, thus, be acquitted.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 2, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court was amended only to address gender sensitivity.

908
 People v. Sultan
G.R. No. 225210; August 7, 2019

FACTS:

Superintendent Rapiz was informed that a certain Larry Sultan was

engaging in the illegal trade of shabu. He assembled a buy-bust team, designating
PO2 Hechanova as the poseur-buyer. PO2 Hechanova received a marked
P1,000.00 bill for the transaction. Upon arrival at the Sea Breeze Hotel, PO2
Hechanova and the confidential asset approached Sultan. The confidential asset
inquired if Sultan has P1,000 worth of shabu. Confirming that he had it, Sultan
handed PO2 Hechanova an elongated sachet containing white crystalline
substance in exchange for the marked money. As soon as the transaction occurred,
the asset placed a missed call to the team, which then rushed to the scene. Upon
frisking Sultan, PO2 Hechanova recovered three plastic sachets of suspected shabu
in his left pocket. Sultan was then brought to the barangay hall where PO2
Hechanova marked the plastic sachets. The inventory and photographing of the
seized items were made in the presence of Punong Barangay Demapanag and
Kagawad Gomez. Subsequently, PO2 Hechanova requested a laboratory
examination of the seized sachets' contents at the PNP Crime Laboratory. PO2
Albarico received the specimen, after which he gave it to Chief Inspector
Puentespina who examined the seized items, which tested positive for shabu.

RTC found Sultan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. CA affirmed. Maintaining that what is important
is the preservation of the seized items' integrity, CA held that "the testimony about
a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain." Sultan assails the police officer's unjustified marking
of the seized items at the barangay hall instead of at the place of confiscation. He
argues that the non-presentation of PO2 Albarico, the police officer who allegedly
received the specimen for examination, casts doubt on the identity and integrity
of the seized items.

ISSUE:

Was the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs properly
preserved

RULING:

No.

909
 In both illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs cases, the
corpus delicti is the illicit drug seized from the accused. Its identity and integrity
must be proven to have been safeguarded. The chain of custody rule removes
unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs presented in court.
Officers who come into possession of seized drugs must show how they handled
and preserved the integrity of the seized drugs while in their custody. People v.
Nandi identified four (4) links which should be established in the chain of custody
of the confiscated item: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover
of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. Here, the
prosecution established that from the place of seizure to the barangay hall, PO2
Hechanova had sole custody of the supposedly confiscated items. But this alone
cannot be taken as a guarantee of the items' integrity. On the contrary, an officer's
act of personally and bodily keeping allegedly seized items, without any clear
indication of safeguards other than his or her mere possession, has been viewed
as prejudicial to the integrity of the items.

Moreover, the prosecution failed to present as witness PO2 Albarico, the

police officer who personally received the specimen and the request for laboratory
examination. Chief Inspector Puentespina recalled that PO2 Hechanova turned the
seized items over to PO2 Albarico, who placed them in his personal drawer for
safekeeping. However, his testimony is mere hearsay and inadmissible in
evidence. The testimony on matters of which only PO2 Albarico has personal
knowledge cannot be admitted or given probative value. Without PO2 Albarico's
testimony, this Court finds a fatal gap in the juncture involving PO2 Hechanova,
the designated poseur-buyer, and Chief Inspector Puentespina, the forensic
chemical officer. This—together with the absence of the required third-party
witnesses, the police officers' lack of a sense of immediacy to mark, inventory, and
photograph the items at the place of the arrest, and the unsound manner of
transporting whatever items were supposedly seized from accused-appellant—
reveals a seriously compromised chain of custody. These put in serious suspicion
the identity of the objects of the offenses attributed to accused-appellant, leaving
reasonable doubt on his guilt. This Court is, thus, constrained to acquit accused.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

910
 People v. Jaafar y Tambuyong
G.R. No. 219829, January 18, 2017

FACTS:

When an informant reported to Chief of Police Superintendent Larubis that

a certain "Mana", later on identified as Jaafar, was selling shabu, Chief Larubis
moved for the formation of a buy-bust team. The team was composed of, among
others, PO1 Look, the designated poseur-buyer, and PO2 Bucoy and PDEA Agent
Mark Dela Cruz, the designated arresting officers. The buy-bust team left the
police station at 1:45 am and went to Jaafar's house.

The sale took place. PO1 Look paid with the marked P 500.00 bill and
received the packet of shabu from Jaafar, as handed by Gani. After the pre-
arranged signal was made, the police officers rushed to arrest Jaafar, but he
managed to escape. Jaafar threw away the marked money as he ran. Eventually,
the arresting officers caught up with him 30 meters away from his house.

Immediately after the arrest, PO1 Look marked the confiscated sachet of
shabu with his initials. He then turned over the sachet and the marked P500.00 bill
to their team leader, SPO4 Morales. The buy-bust team brought Jaafar and Gani to
the police station for investigation.

Chief Larubis prepared a letter-request addressed to forensic chemist

Melvin Manuel for the examination of the contents of the sachet. Upon
examination, the contents tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Jaafar and Gani were charged with violation of R.A. 9165. Upon
arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

RTC found that the prosecution clearly established all the elements of the
crime of illegal sale of drugs. Applying the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties by police officers, the RTC ruled that although the chain of
custody rule was not strictly complied with, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the confiscated shabu sachet had been duly preserved. Thus, the RTC convicted
Jaafar. However, it acquitted Gani for insufficiency of evidence.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC in toto. Aggrieved, Jaafar filed a Notice
of Appeal which was noted and given due course.

ISSUE:

911
 Is Jaafar’s guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the non-
observance of the required procedure under Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165?

RULING:

No.

In all prosecutions for violations of R.A. 9165, the corpus delicti is the
dangerous drug itself. Its existence is essential to a judgment of conviction. Hence,
the identity of the dangerous drug must be clearly established.

Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To determine their

composition and nature, they must undergo scientific testing and analysis.
Narcotic substances are also highly susceptible to alteration, tampering, or
contamination. It is imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized from the
accused are the very same objects tested in the laboratory and offered in court as
evidence. The chain of custody, as a method of authentication, ensures that
unnecessary doubts involving the identity of seized drugs are removed.

Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 provides for the manner by which law enforcement
officers should handle seized dangerous drugs:

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

The IRR of R.A. 9165 further provides:

Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under

justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

While it may be true that non-compliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 is not
fatal to the prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this
exception will only be triggered by the existence of a ground that justifies
departure from the general rule.

912
 This Court finds that the prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason
that would warrant non-compliance with the mandatory requirements in Sec. 21
of R.A. 9165.

Although the buy-bust team marked and conducted a physical inventory

of the seized sachet of shabu, the records do not show that the seized sachet had
been photographed. Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the
physical inventory was done in the presence of the accused-appellant or his
representative, representatives from the media and the Department of Justice, and
an elected public official.

The prosecution established during trial and on appeal that the buy-bust
operation had been carefully planned by narrating the events with intricate detail.
However, at the same time, the prosecution relied heavily on the exception to the
chain of custody rule. Worse, the prosecution did not even offer any explanation
on why they failed to comply with what was mandated under the law. Indeed, if
the police authorities had carefully planned the buy-bust operation, then there was
no reason for them to neglect such important requirements. They cannot feign
ignorance of the exacting standards under Section 21 of R.A. 9165. Police officers
are presumed and are required to know the laws they are charged with executing.

This Court cannot merely gloss over the glaring procedural lapses
committed by the police officers, especially when what had been allegedly seized
from the accused-appellant was only 0.0604 grams of shabu. Recent cases have
highlighted the need to ensure the integrity of seized drugs in the chain of custody
when only a miniscule amount of drugs had been allegedly seized from the
accused.

Non-observance of the mandatory requirements under Section 21 of R.A.

9165 casts doubt on the integrity of the shabu supposedly seized from accused-
appellant. This creates reasonable doubt in the conviction of accused-appellant for
violation of Article II, Section 5 of R.A. 9165.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

913
 People v. Caiz y Talvo
G.R. No. 215340, July 13, 2016

FACTS:

Two Informations were filed against accused-appellant Gloria Caiz y Talvo

(Caiz) for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165. That on or about
11:00 o’clock in the morning of February 20, 2008 at Zone 1, Brgy. Pinmaludpod,
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, the accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (SHABU) weighing 0.05 gram, a dangerous
drug. More so, she has in her possession, control and custody two (2) heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (SHABU)
weighing 0.05 gram and 0.04 gram, with a total weight of 0.09 gram.

During the trial, Police Officer I Nesely Valle (PO1 Valle), Senior Police
Officer I Ronald Patricio (SPO1 Patricio), and Police Officer III Michael Datuin
(PO3 Datuin) were presented as witnesses. They testified on the events "before,
during, and after the buy-bust operation." Police Officer II Jeffrey Tajon (PO2
Tajon) of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory testified that he
"received the request for laboratory examination at around 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of February 20, 2008."

Accused-appellant alleges that the marking of the sachets of shabu was not
done at the place of arrest, but at the police station. She claims that there was a
nearer police station where the marking could have been done, the marking of the
alleged three (3) sachets of shabu with PI Patricio’s initials was not made at the
place of arrest but only at the police station. This took place only after they have
passed by the barangay hall of Pinmaludpod, then the police’s safehouse located
at Zone 5, Brgy. Pinmaludpod, then to the office of Special Operations Group in
Lingayen, Pangasinan and have brought the accused-appellant to the hospital for
medical examination. On the other hand, the testimonies of the police officers
reveal that they were confused as to the place where the seized sachets were
marked, PO1 Valle’s testimony seems to imply that the seized sachets were
marked at the place where the buy-bust operation was conducted. On the other
hand, SPO1 Patricio testified that the seized sachets were marked at the police
station.

ISSUE:

Was the rule on the chain of custody of the corpus delicti observed?

914
RULING:

No.

Rules on the chain of custody was not observed. In the case of People v.
Kamad, the Court held and summarized the links in the chain of custody that must
be established by the prosecution. First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of
the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second,
the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.

In this case, the lapses of the police officers in the procedure for handling
seized sachets containing dangerous drugs are numerous and unjustified such that
there is reasonable doubt whether the integrity of the corpus delicti was preserved.
First, the place where the seized sachets were marked was not established with
certainty, the testimonies of the police officers reveal that they were confused as to
the place where the seized sachets were marked. Second, the police officers failed
to have the confiscation receipts signed by accused-appellant, by her
representative or counsel, by a representative from the media, the Department of
Justice, or by an elected public official. The police officers likewise failed to give a
copy of the confiscation receipts to accused-appellant. Third, none of the witnesses
testified that the seized sachets were photographed. Fourth, accused-appellant’s
arrest was not immediately entered in the booking sheet. Thus, the totality of the
procedural lapses committed by the police officers leads this Court to doubt the
integrity of the corpus delicti.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

915
 People v. Merando y Aves
G.R No. 232620, August 5, 2019

FACTS:

Merando was charged with violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

According to the prosecution, at around 7:00 p.m. on April 8, 2013, a

confidential informant went to the office of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operation Task Group at the Pasig City Police Station. The informant reported that
a certain "Begote," later identified as Merando, was rampantly selling illegal drugs
along Magsaysay Street, Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City.

A buy-bust team was organized with PO1 Reyes as the poseur-buyer and
PO2 Anggati as the immediate backup. At around 2:00 p.m. the following day, the
buy-bust team met with the informant. The informant arrived told them that
Begote was at a market on Magsaysay Street. The buy-bust operation was
executed. At the place of arrest and in Begote's presence, PO1 Reyes signed the
plastic sachet containing suspected marijuana, marking it "1 ERB/BEGOTE
04/09/2013." In the same place, PO1 Reyes photographed and inventoried the
seized item. PO1 Reyes and his team then proceeded to Manggahan Barangay
Hall. There, the team asked two (2) barangay officials to sign the inventory.

The accused claimed that PO1 Reyes brought out a sachet of marijuana and
a document from his shoulder bag and ordered him to sign the document.

The Regional Trial Court found Merando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Furthermore, it found that the identity and
evidentiary value of the seized item were preserved even though none of the
required third-party witnesses were present in inventorying and photographing
the seized items.

Accused Merando appealed before the Court of Appeals. It affirmed

Merando's conviction. It decreed that the absence of representatives from the
media and the Department of Justice did not render the confiscated items
inadmissible. Thus, Merando filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course
by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

916
 Is there a violation of the Doctrine of Chain of Custody?

RULING:

Yes.

Since prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act

(CDDA) primarily revolve around the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti,
compliance with its guidelines on the custody and disposition of the dangerous
drugs seized is vital. Section 21 of CDDA requires the presence of the accused,
representatives from the Department of Justice and the media, and an elected
public official during the actual seizure of the evidence and their subsequent
inventory and photographing. It demands strict compliance. Compliance cannot
give way to a facsimile; otherwise, the purpose of guarding against tampering,
substitution, and planting of evidence is defeated.

In People v. Que, this Court stressed the importance of the presence of third-
party representatives during the actual seizure and subsequent inventory and
photo-taking of the evidence: The presence of third-party witnesses is imperative,
not only during the physical inventory and taking of pictures, but also during the
actual seizure of items. The requirement of conducting the inventory and taking
of photographs "immediately after seizure and confiscation" necessarily means
that the required witnesses must also be present during the seizure or confiscation

The Regional Trial Court found that none of the required third-party
witnesses were present. There, PO1 Reyes presented accused-appellant, the buy-
bust money, the sachet of suspected marijuana, and the inventory of seized
evidence to barangay officials, who then signed the inventory.

Nevertheless, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.

9165 states that noncompliance with the law's requirements may be allowed as
long as the arresting officers offer a justifiable ground and prove that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items, despite noncompliance, have been
properly preserved. This clause, however, will not work to help the prosecution's
case. A perusal of the records reveals that the prosecution offered no justifiable
reason for their failure to strictly comply with the mandate of Section 21.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING: The ruling in this case is not
affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 1, Rule 130 of the new rules provides the
same provision as that of the old rules. Hence, in connection with Section 21 of
R.A. 9165, the Doctrine of Chain of Custody must be followed with regard to the
object evidence in drug-related cases so as to preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of such seized objects.

917
 People v. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 229053, July 17, 2019

FACTS:

On July 23, 2012, two (2) Informations were filed before the Regional Trial
Court, charging Dela Cruz for the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, respectively. According to the prosecution, at around 2:25 p.m. on July 10,
2012, PO1 Vidal phoned the PDEA Regional Office in San Fernando City, La Union
and thereafter discussed a buy-bust operation to entrap Dela Cruz, who is
suspected of selling marijuana. That same day, a team led by Police Senior
Inspector Cruz, with PO1 Vidal, PO1 Valerio, and PO1 Santillan - poseur-buyer
conducted the buy-bust operation.

Later, at around 3:05 p.m., the team proceeded to the Memorial Colleges
along Artacho Street in Lingayen. PO1 Santillan waited for Dela Cruz on the
western side of Alviar Street, while his companions positioned themselves on the
eastern side. At around 3:20 p.m., PO1 Santillan saw Dela Cruz and recognized
him from the week-long surveillance he had earlier conducted. The buy-bust
operation soon followed and was executed.

PO1 Santillan wrote "DYS4" and "DYS4-A" on each of the two (2) plastic
sachets that Dela Cruz had sold him, and "DYS5" and "DYS5-A" on each of the two
(2) other plastic sachets recovered from the body search. The police officers then
brought Dela Cruz to the police station. PO3 Vinluan prepared the Request for
Forensic Laboratory Examination, Request for Drug Test, and the Confiscation
Receipt of the seized items. PO1 Santillan testified that he possessed the
confiscated items from the time he took them from Dela Cruz until he eventually
turned them over to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for testing.

The Regional Trial Court found Dela Cruz guilty of illegal possession and
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the trial
court Decision with modification of penalty. Hence, Dela Cruz filed a Notice of
Appeal which the Court of Appeals gave due course to. He argues that the
Regional Trial Court gravely erred in finding him guilty despite the police officers'
failure to comply with Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

ISSUE:

Is there a violation of the Doctrine of the Chain of Custody to warrant

the acquittal of the accused?

918
RULING:

Yes.

None of the three (3) people required by Section 21 (1), as originally worded,
was present during the physical inventory of the seized items. Compliance with
the chain of custody requirements is critical to ensure that the seized items were
the same ones brought to court. The prosecution cannot invoke the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty to conveniently disregard such
lapse whenever there is an unjustified noncompliance with the chain of custody
requirements.Noncompliance with these requirements tarnishes the credibility of
the corpus delicti, along with the claim that an offense violating the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed. In cases involving the
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, noncompliance with the
chain of custody requirements equates to a failure to establish critical elements of
these offenses, justifying an accused's acquittal: In both illegal sale and illegal
possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug
must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements
of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and
sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise
be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty
verdict.

People v. Garcia emphasized that the mere marking of seized items,

unsupported by a proper physical inventory and taking of photographs, and in
the absence of the persons whose presence is required by Section 21 will not justify
a conviction. The presence of third-party witnesses is imperative, not only during
the physical inventory and taking of pictures, but also during the actual seizure of
items. The requirement of conducting the inventory and taking of photographs
"immediately after seizure and confiscation" necessarily means that the required
witnesses must also be present during the seizure or confiscation. This is
confirmed in People v. Mendoza, where the presence of these witnesses was
characterized as an “insulating presence [against] the evils of switching, 'planting'
or contamination.”

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 1 of

Rule 130 of the new rules provides the same contents as that of the old rules.
Hence, nothing is changed.

919
 People V. Pangan
G.R. No. 206965, 29 November 2017

FACTS:

At around 8:00 a.m. of April 10, 2003, PO1 Carillo, an Intelligence

Operative, conducted a test-buy operation on Pangan at B&T Merchandising on
Asis Street, Roxas City. After PO1 Carillo bought a sachet of shabu worth P1,000.00
from Pangan, he expressed his interest to buy more drugs. Pangan instructed him
to return in the afternoon of that day as more shabu would allegedly be delivered
to her via Fastpak. Upon returning, Pangan went out to get a delivery package
from Culili. She then returned to the store and placed the delivered Fastpak pouch
on top of a table. PO1 Carillo made the pre-arranged signal, prompting other
members of the buy-bust team. P/S Insp. Batiles read the contents of the search
warrant to Pangan. Barangay Captain Andrada, Barangay Kagawad Beluso,
Barangay Kagawad Cesar Lara (Lara), Rey Casumpang of Radio Mindanao
Network (RMN), Nimbe dela Cruz and Ricardo Bulana (Bulana) of RMN-DYVR
also arrived.

The police officers inspected the Fastpak package on top of the table.
Pangan suddenly became unruly, trying to grab the package from PO1 Carillo.
The police officers brought Pangan out of the store to continue the search and to
prevent Pangan from harming herself. SPO4 Revisa opened the sealed package
with a knife. He found a Noli Me Tangere book, the pages of which were
intentionally cut to serve as "compartments" for the three (3) big sachets of
suspected shabu. PO1 Carillo searched the table's drawer where he found another
small pack of suspected illicit drugs, magazines of a 0.45 caliber pistol,
ammunition, a magazine pouch, and a holster. Members of the media and
barangay officials were present during the entire course of the search and seizure.
The confiscated items were turned over for marking. He also prepared the
inventory, which was signed by the third-party witnesses, who were present
during the search. PO1 Carillo took pictures of the premises and the seized items.
Further, Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Camp Delgado, Iloilo City.
56 P/C Insp. Baldevieso issued Chemistry Report No. D-145, which verified that
the seized items tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Pangan. It found that Pangan had animus
possidendi as she appeared to know the contents of the Fastpak package she had
received.

ISSUE:

920
 Did the prosecution prove the guilt of Pangan beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING:

Yes.

In crimes involving dangerous drugs, the State has the burden of proving
not only the elements of the offense but also the corpus delicti of the charge. To
establish that the illicit drugs scrutinized and presented in court were the very
same ones confiscated from the accused, the prosecution should offer testimonies
relating to its chain of custody.

While the chain of custody has been a crucial issue which led to acquittals
in drugs cases, this Court has still ruled that non-conformity with the mandated
procedure in handling the seized drugs does not automatically mean that the
seized items' identity was compromised, which necessarily leads to an acquittal.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 provide
some flexibility 1with the addition of a proviso which reads:

Section 21: Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment . . .

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The saving mechanism included in the implementing rules guarantees that

not every case of non-observance will irreversibly prejudice the prosecution's

921
cause. However, to merit the application of the saving clause, the prosecution
should acknowledge and explain the deviations they committed. Moreover, the
prosecution should also prove that the integrity and evidentiary worth of the
confiscated evidence was maintained. In other words, the arresting officers' non-
compliance with Section 21 is not fatal, provided that that there is a justifiable
reason for their deviation and that the evidentiary worth of the seized drugs or
articles was preserved. Non-conformity with the mandated procedures will not
make the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized inadmissible as evidence.
What matters most is that the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized articles
were maintained since these will be used in resolving the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The police officers acknowledged their breach, offering a justifiable
reason why they had to dispense with Pangan's presence during the search,
inventory, and photographing. The police narrated how Pangan became
"uncontrollable." This is a fact corroborated by the accused herself when she
testified that she "struggled to free herself [and] she accidentally swiped a bottle
in front of her store that fell and broke into pieces." Therefore, Pangan's aggressive
actuations urged the police officers to lock her up in the vehicle for the search to
smoothly proceed. The attendance of third-party witnesses during buy-bust
operations and during time of seizures is to prevent the planting of evidence or
frame-up. Even though neither Pangan nor any of her representatives was present
during the marking, inventory, and photographing, the police officers
substantially complied with the rules as media representatives and barangay
officials were present during the search. Furthermore, even assuming that the
police officers failed to strictly conform to the procedures provided for under
Section 21, the accused may still be adjudged guilty of the charge provided that
the chain of custody remains uninterrupted. In this case, the prosecution was able
to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody from the time the sachets of
illicit drugs were confiscated until they were forwarded to the laboratory for
examination and presented as evidence in court. Apart from Pangan's
unsupported claims, no cogent proof was shown to attest that the seized items
were tampered in any way. Based on the totality of the prosecution's evidence, the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were never compromised. The
rationale behind Section 21 is to shield the accused from malicious assertions of
guilt from abusive police officers. However, this provision cannot be utilized to
frustrate legitimate efforts of law enforcers. Minor deviations from the mandated
procedure in handling the corpus delicti must not absolve a guilty defendant.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

922
 People v. Holgado y Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 207992, August 11, 2014

FACTS:

An information for the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act

were filed against the accused, Holgado and Misarez, for illegal sale of shabu. It
was alleged that the Pasig City Police received reports of illegal drug activities of
Holgado, with which surveillance was sought. A search warrant was then issued
against Holgado. The Pasig City Chief of Police, however, instructed his officers
to first conduct a buy-bust operation before actually enforcing the search warrant.

The police operatives went to Raymundo street, the alleged place of

Holgado’s activities, for the buy-bust operation. PO1 Philip Aure, acting as
poseur-buyer and accompanied by the police informant, approached Holgado
who was then part of a drinking session. Holgado asked the informant if he was
buying drugs. The informant then introduced PO1 Aure as a drug user. The latter
handed Holgado two marked one hundred peso bills. Holgado called Misarez,
who handed PO1 Aure a plastic sachet containing shabu. Aure then signaled his
companions that the sale of drugs had been consummated.

The search warrant was enforced in coordination with a barangay official

and in the presence of some media people. The search allegedly discovered several
drugs and drug paraphernalia. The seized items were the subject of three other
cases, which were eventually dismissed.

P03 Abuyme prepared an inventory of the seized items. With respect to the
plastic sachet which was the basis of the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
P01 Aure supposedly marked the plastic sachet handed to him by Misarez at the
site of the buy-bust operation.

The RTC of Pasig found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
sale of dangerous drugs. However, they were acquitted of possession of drugs in
another case for lack of evidence. The sentence was affirmed by the CA. Holgado
and Misarez assailed the supposed lack of compliance with the requirements set
by the chain of custody of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia as provided by
Sec. 21 of RA 9165.

ISSUE:

Did authorities herein properly follow the chain of custody rule in

drugs cases?

923
RULING:

No.

There was a violation of the chain of custody rule in drugs cases in this case.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640,
provides for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or
surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. Specifically with respect to
custody before the filing of a criminal case, Section 21, as amended, provides that
“The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well
as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
dangerous drugs, shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous

drugs, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall

be done by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the
receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial
laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory:

924
Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon
completion of the said examination and certification

In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution

must account for the custody of the incriminating evidence from the moment of
seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in evidence. This is the
reason why authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of
evidence are important. By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-
compliance with Section 21 indicates a failure to establish an element of the offense
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-compliance suffices as a
ground for acquittal.

The prosecution’s sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of

seized drugs and drug paraphernalia will not secure a conviction. Not even the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties will
suffice. Republic Act No. 9165 requires compliance with Section 21. Even the doing
of acts which ostensibly approximate compliance but do not actually comply with
the requirements of Section 21 does not suffice.

There is no evidence either on how the item was stored, preserved, labeled,
and recorded. The apprehending officers cannot even provide the name of the
investigator. He admitted that he was not present when it was delivered to the
crime laboratory. It was Forensic Chemist Bernardino M. Banac, Jr. who identified
the person who delivered the specimen to the crime laboratory. He disclosed that
he received the specimen from one PO1 Cuadra, who was not even a member of
the buybust team. Per their record, PO1 Cuadra delivered the letter-request with
the attached seized item to the CPD Crime Laboratory Office where a certain PO2
Semacio recorded it and turned it over to the Chemistry Section.

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the
seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made in this
case. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law
enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law;
where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise.

While the buy-bust operation team allegedly conducted an inventory of the

seized items, it is unclear if this inventory was limited to those seized pursuant to
the enforcement of the search warrant (i.e., after the conduct of the buy-bust
operation) or was inclusive of whatever items seized during the buy-bust
operation. In any case, this inventory was discredited as Holgado was acquitted

925
by the Regional Trial Court of the charge of illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia because the inventory was found to be unreliable.

There have been claims to the effect that the search warrant was enforced "in
coordination with a barangay official and in the presence of some media people."
However, this "barangay official" and these "media people" have neither been
identified nor presented as witnesses. In any case, even if it were to be granted that
these individuals took part in the events that transpired in the evening of January
17, 2007, their participation was alleged to have been only with respect to the
enforcement of the search warrant. It did not extend to the physical inventory and
taking of photographs of the seized items arising from the buy-bust operation, as
required by Section 21. For that matter, it was not even shown that photographs
of the sachet marked were taken. Per his own testimony, PO1 Aure himself
doubted if any photograph was taken.

It is true that Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a proviso to the effect
that in case there is non-compliance with the requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer would not render the search and
seizure void. However, the prosecution has not shown that when the buy-bust
operation was allegedly conducted and the sachet was supposedly seized and
marked, there were "justifiable grounds" for dispensing with compliance with
Section 21. Rather, it merely insisted on its self-serving assertion that the integrity
of the seized sachet has nevertheless been, supposedly, preserved.

This is further underscored by the fact that Holgado and Misarez were
acquitted by the Regional Trial Court of all other charges (i.e., for possession of
dangerous drugs and for possession of drug paraphernalia). The Regional Trial
Court’s observations which led to accused-appellants’ acquittal for violations of
Sections of Republic Act No. 9165 should have warned the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals that something was amiss.

EFFECT OF A.M. 19-8-15-SC (NEW RULES) ON THE RULING

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. R.A 9165, also
known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, still governs the
handling of drugs and drug paraphernalia seized or surrendered in legitimate
drugs operations. It complements the requirements set in the Rules of Court for
object evidence, that is, it must be preserved to maintain its evidentiary value.

926
 B
Documentary Evidence

1
Best Evidence Rule

Section 2 – Documentary Evidence

Gotesco Properties v. Solidbank Corporation

G.R. No. 209452, July 26, 2017

FACTS:

In 1995, Gotesco obtained from Solidbank a term loan of P300 million

through its President, Mr. Jose Go (Mr. Go). To secure the loan, Gotesco was
required to execute a Mortgage Trust Indenture (Indenture) naming Solidbank-
Trust Division as Trustee.

The Indenture obliged Gotesco to mortgage several parcels of land in

favor of Solidbank. One (1) of the lots mortgaged and used as a collateral was a
property located in San Fernando, Pampanga. A stipulation in the Indenture also
irrevocably appointed Solidbank-Trust Division as Gotesco's attorney-in-
fact. Under the Indenture, Gotesco also agreed to "at all times maintain the
Sound Value of the Collateral."

When the loan was about to mature, Gotesco found it difficult to meet its
obligation and Gotesco sent a letter to Solidbank proposing to restructure the
loan obligation. The loan restructuring agreement proposed to extend the
payment period to seven (7) years. The suggested period included a two (2)-year
grace period.

In its February 9, 2000 letter, Solidbank informed Gotesco of a substantial

reduction in the appraised value of its mortgaged properties. Based on an
appraisal report submitted to Solidbank, the sound value of the
mortgaged properties at that time was at P381,245,840.00. Since the necessary
collateral to loan ratio was 200%, Solidbank held that there was a deficiency in
the collateral, which Gotesco had to address. Solidbank required Gotesco to
replace or add to the mortgaged properties. Gotesco construed the February 9,
2000 letter as Solidbank's implied agreement to the loan restructuring proposal.
However, Gotesco found it unnecessary to address the alleged deficiency in the

927
collateral. It insisted that the aggregate sound value of the
mortgaged properties had not changed and was still at P1,076,905,000.00.

Solidbank sent a demand letter dated June 7, 2000 to Gotesco as the loan
became due. Despite having received this demand letter, Gotesco failed to pay
the outstanding obligation. Solidbank then filed a Petition for the Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of the lot through Atty. Wilfrido Mangiliman (Atty. Mangiliman), a
notary public. The public auction was held on August 31, 2000
and Solidbank was declared the winning bidder.

On February 5, 2001, Gotesco filed a complaint for Annulment of

Foreclosure Proceedings, Specific Performance, and Damages against Solidbank,
Atty. Mangiliman, and the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later
on, Solidbank also filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession. The two (2) cases were consolidated before Branch 42, Regional Trial
Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.

Gotesco assailed the validity of the foreclosure proceeding claiming that

it was premature and without legal basis. According to Gotesco, the
jurisdictional requirements prescribed under Act No. 3135 were not complied
with. First, Solidbank did not furnish Gotesco copies of the petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure, notice of sale, and certificate of sale. Even assuming the
original period for loan payment was not extended, the prerequisites for the
foreclosure proceeding provided in the Indenture were not met.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, Solidbank alleged, among others,

that it never entered into a restructuring agreement with Gotesco and that
Solidbank complied with the publication and posting requirements laid down
by Act No. 3135.

The RTC dismissed Gotesco's complaint for the annulment of the

foreclosure proceeding and granted the Writ of Possession in Solidbank's favor.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA also declared Gotesco in default.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner claims, among others, that it was not notified that it was in
default. Under the Indenture, the foreclosure proceeding can only be initiated
upon petitioner's failure to pay within 10 days after receipt of the notice of
default. Allegedly, respondent did not send any notice. Respondent's failure to
prove that it sent a demand letter means the obligation is not yet due and
demandable.

928
 Respondent argues that petitioner cannot claim that it was not notified of
the default. Respondent submitted a return card which indicated that the
demand letter dated June 7, 2000 informing Gotesco of its default was received
by petitioner.

ISSUE:

Was there proper notice to petitioner as to its default?

RULING:

Yes.

Petitioner argues that the foreclosure should not have been initiated
because it was not notified that an event of default occurred. It claims that under
the Indenture, it should have been notified that it was in default and that the
obligation was due and demandable. After such notice, it should have been
given 10 days to settle the debt. Petitioner avers that the foreclosure proceeding
could only be initiated upon failure to pay after the lapse of the 10-day period.

Petitioner claims it did not receive any demand letter. Gotesco's first
witness, Arturo M. Garcia, testified that Gotesco did not receive any written
demand. On the other hand, respondent avers that it sent a demand letter dated
June 7, 2000 to petitioner. As proof, respondent submitted a return card which
indicated that the letter was accepted by the addressee.

Documentary evidence will generally prevail over testimonial evidence.

As the Court of Appeals noted, the return card submitted by respondent proves
that the demand letter was received by petitioner. This Court is inclined to give
more evidentiary weight to documentary evidence as opposed to a testimony,
which can be easily fabricated.

929
 3
Parol Evidence Rule

Section 9 - Evidence of Written Agreements

Eagleridge Development Corporation v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset

Management, Inc.,
G.R. No. 204700 November 24, 2014
FACTS:

This case stemmed from a collection case between petitioner Eagleridge

Development Corporation and respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset
Management Corporation. The collection case was originally between petitioner
and Export and Industries Bank (EIB). During its pendency, EIB was substituted
by respondent pursuant to a deed of assignment issued by the former whereby it
transferred all petitioner’s loan obligation in favor of the latter. Petitioner
questioned the validity of the deed of assignment alleging that it failed to comply
with the mandatory requirements of the Special Purpose Vehicle Act and it
referred to Cameron Granville Asset Management (SPV-AMC), Inc., as the
assignee, and not respondent. By reason thereof, it filed a motion for production
against respondent to inspect the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) of
respondent and EIB. The lower courts dismissed the motion, on appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

In this motion for consideration, respondent raised the following grounds:

1) the motion for production of the LSPA has been filed out of time, even beyond
the protracted pre-trial period from September 2005 to 2011; 2) the LSPA is
immaterial or irrelevant to the case since the lower court’s order of substitution
settled the issue of respondent’s standing before the court and its right to fill in the
shoes of EIB 3) the production of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence rule
under Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court; 4) the LSPA is a
privileged/confidential bank documents; and 5) respondent points out that the
deed of assignment is a contested document. It would be unfair if the LSPA be
produced since petitioner also questions the integrity of the Deed of Assignment.
In producing the LSPA, the petitioner is claiming both the validity and invalidity
of the instrument at the same time.

ISSUE:

Will the production of the LSPA violate the Parol Evidence Rule?

RULING:

930
 No.

Parol Evidence Rule is not applicable. According to Rule 130, Section 9 of

the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing,
it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than
the contents of the written agreement.

In the case, petitioners are not parties to the deed of assignment and do not
base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to
determine the complete terms of the deed of assignment. Even assuming that Rule
130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under the second paragraph is
when the party puts in issue the validity of the written agreement, as in the case a
quo. Besides, what is forbidden under the parol evidence rule is the presentation
of oral or extrinsic evidence, not those expressly referred to in the written
agreement. Documents can be read together when one refers to the other. By the
express terms of the deed of assignment, it is clear that the deed of assignment was
meant to be read in conjunction with the LSPA.

In addition, Rule 132, Section 17 of the Rules of Court allows a party to

inquire into the whole of the writing or record when a part of it is given in evidence
by the other party. Since the deed of assignment was produced in court by
respondent and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was
made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its
understanding may also be inquired into by petitioners.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 10, Rule
130 of the new rules provides that xxx However, a party may present evidence
to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he or she puts
in issue in a verified pleading:xxx, Hence, in order to qualify under the
exceptions of Parole Evidence Rule, the party must raise the issues in a verified
pleading.

931
 Spouses Paras v. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation
G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015

FACTS:

Lucia Paras and Kimwa entered into a contract where 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates were “allotted” by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. When Kimwa stopped
hauling after 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates, Lucia and her husband filed a
complaint for breach of contract with damages, claiming that sometime in
December 1994, Lucia was approached by Kimwa and asked that it be assured of
40,000 cubic meters worth of aggregates. Lucia countered that her concession area
was due to be rechanneled on May 15, 1995, when her Special Permit expires, so
she would be willing to enter into a contract provided the 40,000 cubic meters were
withdrawn before the said date. Kimwa then assured Lucia that it would take only
two to three months for it to completely haul the 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates.

Kimwa asserted that the Agreement articulated the parties’ true intent that
40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as
a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were
barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed
differently.

The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses, reasoning that it was contrary to human
experience for Kimwa to have entered into an Agreement with Lucia without
verifying the latter’s authority as a concessionaire. Considering that the Special
Permit granted to Lucia clearly indicated the duration of her authority, the trial
court noted that Kimwa must have been aware that the aggregates must
necessarily be hauled by May 15, 1995. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s
decision.

ISSUE:

Is there a violation of the Parol Evidence Rule?

RULING:

No.

There is no violation of the Parol Evidence Rule. Rule 130, Section 9 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on
admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement have been

932
reduced into writing. Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the
formalities observed, ”forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a
written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written
contract.”

Two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that
the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s
pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the
parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion
proposed by the presenting party.

Although the complaint does not specifically state words and phrases such as
“mistake,” “imperfection,” or “failure to express the true intent of the parties”, it
is evident that the crux of the Complaint is the assertion that the Agreement was
founded on the parties’ supposed understanding that the quantity of aggregates
allotted in favor of respondent Kimwa must be hauled by May 15, 1995, lest such
hauling be rendered impossible by the rechanneling of petitioner Lucia Paras’
permitted area. Considering how such was successfully put in issue in the
Complaint and even responded to by respondent Kimwa in its Answer, this case
falls under the exceptions provided by Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not substantially affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

Although the New Rules contain amendments, these amendments only pertain
to the following: 1) a grammatical change in the first paragraph and gender
sensitivity in the second paragraph; 2) the old Section 9, Rule 130 is now Section
10; 3) issues warranting exception to the Parol Evidence Rule should now be
raised in a verified pleading. Prior to the amendment, the issues could be raised
in a pleading that is not necessarily verified. Further, the amended Section 6 of
Rule 7 now requires several attestations to be alleged in the verification.
However, the grounds under the Parol Evidence Rule remain the same.

933
 C
Testimonial Evidence

1
Qualification of Witnesses

Section 20 - Witnesses; their qualifications

Ricalde v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015
FACTS:

An information for rape through sexual assault was filed against accused-
appellant, Richard Ricalde. It was alleged that on January 30, 2020, Ricalde, then
31 years old, was allowed to sleep in the house of the victim XXX, a 10-year old
boy. Ricalde and XXX were distant relatives and textmates. Ricalde slept on the
sofa while XXX slept on the floor. At around 2:00 am, XXX awoke as he felt pain
in his anus and stomach as something was inserted in his anus. He also saw that
Ricalde fondled his penis. XXX told his mother what happened. His mother
confronted Ricalde and later asked him to leave. XXX and his mother went to the
barangay hall and reported the incident. XXX underwent medical examination
where no signs of trauma in his anal orifice nor spermatozoa were found.
Thereafter, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements leading to the
filing of the criminal complaint.

RTC found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment. The CA affirmed the conviction but modified the amount of
damages. Hence, this Petition for Review. Ricalde argues the existence of
reasonable doubt in his favor for the following reasons: (1) The medico-legal
findings yielded negative results. As a physical evidence, it ranks high in the
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence; (2) XXX did not categorically say that a penis
was inserted in his anal orifice; (3) XXX’s inconsistent testimony raises reasonable
doubt on his guilt.
ISSUE:
Is XXX, a 10-year old victim, qualified to be a witness?
RULING:
Yes.

934
 Jurisprudence holds that “the findings of the trial court, its calibration of
the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect
if not conclusive effect. The trial court found that XXX’s “straightforward,
unequivocal, and convincing testimony” sufficiently proved that petitioner
committed an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into XXX’s anal orifice.
There was no showing of ill motive on the part of XXX to falsely accuse petitioner.
Thus, no cogent reason exists for this court to overturn lower court’s findings.
In a long line of cases, the court has given full weight and credit to the
testimonies of child victims. Their youth and immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity. XXX, then 10 years old, had no reason to concoct lies against
petitioner. This court also held that “leeway should be given to witnesses who are
minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse.”
Also, the petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s findings lacks merit.
The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility
of an erection and penetration. The results do not contradict the positive testimony
of XXX that the lower courts found as credible, natural, and consistent with human
nature.
Therefore, the petitioner’s conviction is affirmed with modification as to the
penalty imposed.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Under the Revised
Rules, the SC now repeals Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The deleted
provision refers to persons who cannot be witnesses: (1) those whose mental
condition makes them incapable of intelligently making known their perception
to others; and (2) children whose mental maturity renders them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully. The deletion of the two exceptions, particularly of second
enumeration in the original Section 21, was in keeping with Section 6 of the Rule
on Examination of Child Witness, which provides that every child is presumed
qualified to become a witness.

935
 People v. Corpuz y Flores
G.R. No. 208013, July 03, 2017

FACTS:

Edgar Allan Corpuz y Flores (Allan) was charged with four (4) counts of
rape. The prosecution presented AAA, the victim, as a witness during the trial.
Prior to taking the witness stand, AAA underwent a neuropsychiatric examination
where she was found to have a mild degree of mental retardation and low
Intelligence Quotient. Nonetheless, the doctor found her fit to testify as a witness.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Allan finding that AAA’s testimony
was categorical, straight forward, credible, and that since the victim is
intellectually disabled, it would be unlikely for her to fabricate her accusation
against Allan. The Court of Appeals affirmed Allan’s conviction ruling that AAA’s
testimony was credible and her positive identification of the accused and the
narration of the sordid acts committed against her sufficed. Hence, the appeal
before the Court.

ISSUE:

Is intellectual disability alone sufficient to disqualify a person from

testifying as a witness?

RULING:

No.

The credibility as a witness of an intellectually disabled person is upheld

provided that he/he is capable and consistent in narrating his/her experience.

Section 20 of Rule 130 provides that all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses, subject
however to Section 21 (a) whereby those whose mental condition, at the time of
their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently
making known their perception to others are disqualified by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity.

Therefore, an intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason,

ineligible from testifying in court. He or she can be a witness, depending on his or
her ability to relate what he or she knows. If an intellectually disabled victim's
testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court. In this case, notwithstanding AAA's

936
intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness stand. A person with low
Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of making known his or her
perception to others.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 20, Rule 130 of
the old rules was renumbered to Section 21 of the new rules and the phrase
“except as provided in the next succeeding section” deleted. Despite the deletion,
it can still be inferred from Section 21 of the new rules that if the witness cannot
make known their perception to others then they are disqualified as witnesses.
Section 21 of the old rules is deleted.

937
 People v. Dimapilit
GR No. 210802, Aug 09, 2017

FACTS:

Diego informed his live-in partner Magdalena that he would go to Pastor’s

house as Pastor wanted to rent his tricycle Diego informed Magdalena that he
would be back immediately because he would be sending off his brother, Simeon
who was visiting from Mindoro at that time. When twenty minutes passed and
Diego was still not home, Magdalena worried, since Pastor and his sons were
reputed troublemakers in their place. Thus, Magdalena and Simeon decided to go
to Pastor's house. As they approached Pastor's house, Magdalena saw one (1) of
Pastor's sons, Junnel, box Diego's face. Diego tried to escape but Junnel caught
him. Pastor hit Diego's head with a piece of wood, rendering Diego unconscious.
Accused Rene Boy, another son of Pastor, hit Diego's face with a crowbar (bareta).
Pastor and his sons Junnel and Joel kept on boxing Diego, prompting Simeon to
shout, "Tigilan na po ninyo ang pagbugbog at pagbareta sa mukha ng aking kapatid."
Rene Boy then responded, "Putang-ina mo, ikaw na ang susunod na mapapatay." For
fear that the assailants might pursue her, Magdalena hid behind a mango tree.
Simeon ran for help. When Pastor and his sons left, Magdalena went to Diego's
aid, whose face was unrecognizable. Barangay officials came and volunteered to
report the incident to the police, By the time Simeon, and his two (2) sons, arrived,
the assailants had already left.

Meanwhile, a report on the killing incident reached Tuy Municipal Police

Station. PO3 Ruelito Fronda, PO3 Pedro Oronico, SPO1 Augusto Sanchez, PO2 Joy
Jimenez, and PO2 Michael Canlubo responded pursuant to the orders of their
Chief of Police, PO3 Gary Bulaclac. They arrived at the crime scene at around 2:10
p.m., where they saw Diego lying on the ground, drenched in blood, with his
tricycle 20 meters away and his sandals scattered about. Magdalena told the police
that Pastor, Junnel, Rene Boy, and Joel killed Diego. With the information
gathered, the police made a follow up operation.

At around 3:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m., they arrested Pastor in Barangay
Lumbangan, Tuy, Batangas and Junnel in Lian, Batangas, both of whom they
delivered to the police station. Only Rene Boy was arraigned as Pastor and Junnel
escaped from detention. Rene Boy pleaded not guilty to the charge. The
prosecution presented the following witnesses: Magdalena; Diego's son, Rommy
Garcia (Rommy); PO3 Bulaclac; and Dr. Valientes. The RTC found that Diego was
killed by the four (4) accused. In his appeal, Rene Boy underscores the material
inconsistencies in Magdalena's testimony and insists that they cannot serve as a
basis for finding him guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court

938
ruling. In issues involving the credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial
court are given great respect since it has the opportunity to "observe the demeanor
of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the
truth." In the absence of any showing that it has overlooked or misapplied some
facts, its findings of facts will not be disturbed on appeal.

ISSUE:

Do the minor inconsistencies in Magdalena’s testimony affect her

credibility as a witness?

RULING:

No.

It is already established that “assignment of values to the testimony of a

witness is virtually left, almost entirely, to the trial court which has the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness on the stand.” Except for
significant matters “that might have been overlooked or discarded, the findings of
credibility by the trial court will not generally be disturbed on appeal.” The trial
court explicitly stated that Magdalena’s testimony was categorical and consistent.
Based on the evidence presented before it, the trial court sustained the
prosecution’s stand. Given that the trial court ruling on the credibility of
Magdalena’s testimony was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals, this Court does
not see any reason to deviate from the general rule. Hence, this Court is persuaded
that Rene Boy participated in the killing since Magdalena has given a detailed
account of the incident and has positively identified him as one (1) of the
assailants.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. However, the
provision referring to the original Section 20 is now the amended Section 21.

939
Section 21 - Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity

People v. Corpuz y Flores

G.R. No. 208013, July 03, 2017

FACTS:

Edgar Allan Corpuz y Flores (Allan) was charged with four (4) counts of
rape. The prosecution presented AAA, the victim, as a witness during the trial.
Prior to taking the witness stand, AAA underwent a neuropsychiatric examination
where she was found to have a mild degree of mental retardation and low
Intelligence Quotient. Nonetheless, the doctor found her fit to testify as a witness.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Allan finding that AAA’s testimony
was categorical, straight forward, credible, and that since the victim is
intellectually disabled, it would be unlikely for her to fabricate her accusation
against Allan. The Court of Appeals affirmed Allan’s conviction ruling that AAA’s
testimony was credible and her positive identification of the accused and the
narration of the sordid acts committed against her sufficed. Hence, the appeal
before the Court.

ISSUE:

Is intellectual disability alone sufficient to disqualify a person from

testifying as a witness?

RULING:

No.

The credibility as a witness of an intellectually disabled person is upheld

provided that he/he is capable and consistent in narrating his/her experience.

Section 20 of Rule 130 provides that all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses, subject
however to Section 21 (a) whereby those whose mental condition, at the time of
their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently
making known their perception to others are disqualified by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity.

Therefore, an intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason,

ineligible from testifying in court. He or she can be a witness, depending on his or

940
her ability to relate what he or she knows. If an intellectually disabled victim's
testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court. In this case, notwithstanding AAA's
intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness stand. A person with low
Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of making known his or her
perception to others.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 20, Rule 130 of
the old rules was renumbered to Section 21 of the new rules and the phrase
“except as provided in the next succeeding section” deleted. Despite the deletion,
it can still be inferred from Section 21 of the new rules that if the witness cannot
make known their perception to others then they are disqualified as witnesses.
Section 21 of the old rules is deleted.

941
 3
Admissions and Confessions

Section 32 - Admission by Silence

Carlos L. Reynes v. Office Of The Ombudsman (Visayas), Lucresia M. Amores,

And Maribel Hontiveros
G.R. No. 223405, February 20, 2019

FACTS:

This resolves a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure praying that the Resolution and Order of public respondent Office
of the Ombudsman (Visayas), through Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer
I Michael M. Mernado, Jr. (Atty. Mernado), be set aside for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Reynes alleged that Barangay Captain Amores collected increased monthly

garbage collection fees amounting to P2,000.00, even without any ordinance or
statute, or any other regulation authorizing its collection, and despite the City of
Lapu-Lapu already collecting its own garbage fees. When Reynes questioned the
increase in the collection fee, Barangay Captain Amores never gave an explanation
in response; instead, she ordered the cessation of the collection of the resort's
garbage.

Aggrieved, Reynes wrote a letter dated 8 August 2011 to Amores

questioning her authority to levy garbage collection fees, considering that the same
fees were already being paid to the City of Lapu-Lapu alongside business taxes
and fees for licenses, and considering that no public hearing was ever conducted.
Copies of this letter were furnished to the offices of the City Mayor, Vice Mayor,
City Attorney, and City Secretary.

Amores still offered no explanation and, in a meeting, merely told Reynes'

wife, Dr. Sonia Beth Reynes (Dr. Reynes), that the collection of P2,000.00 was "final
and unalterable.” Left with no alternative, lest the resort's garbage be left
uncollected, Reynes relented to paying P2,000.00 monthly.

Reynes filed a complaint for illegal exactions under Article 213 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code against Amores with the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman
dismissed the complaint. Reynes filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court questioning the Ombudsman’s resolution dismissing the complaint.

942
ISSUE:

Whether Amores’ failure to explain, despite receipt of the letter dated 8

August 2011, be considered as evidence against her during the preliminary
investigation.

RULING:

Yes.

The situation engendered by the 8 August 2011 letter calls to mind the
Revised Rules of Evidence's provision on admission by silence. To be clear, the
Revised Rules on Evidence did not govern the proceedings before public
respondent, “except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.” Moreover, the provision on admission by silence
refers to any “act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing of
another,” not to a declaration made in written correspondences. Nonetheless, the
basic wisdom underlying the provision on admission by silence is obvious and
commonsensical. The application of that underlying wisdom, if not of the actual
rule, is readily appreciable here.

The grave imputations that were communicated not only to private

respondent Amores, but even to the highest officials of the Lapu-Lapu City
Government, demanded a denial, a refutation, or some manner of response from
private respondent Amores. Yet, the record is bereft of proof of any such response.
That she appears to have never bothered to address a damning situation raises
grave questions that can only militate against her cause.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

943
 5
Testimonial Knowledge

Section 36 - Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay

excluded

DST Movers Corp. V. People’s General Insurance Corp.

G.R. No. 198627, 13 January 2016

FACTS:

An accident occurred involving a Honda civic driven by Adeline Dela Cruz,

a truck allegedly belonging to DST Movers, and a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by
Harrison Valdez . It was alleged that the truck hit the Honda Civic and pushed it
forward, thereby hitting the Mitsubishi Lancer. The driver of the truck then
allegedly escaped. An investigation report was prepared by PO2 Tomas describing
the involved Honda civic and Mitsubishi Lancer, their drivers, and damaged
sustained but on the trucks description the driver was stated as unidentified and
the damaged was undetermined. The Honda Civic was covered by PGIC’s
insurance and paid its owner the entire amount of the insurance.

PGIC then filed a complaint for sum of money against DST movers. In its
answer DST Movers acknowledged that it was the owner of the truck, however it
claimed that the truck did not make any trips on the day of the alleged accident.
They supported their claims with copies of invoices and receipts and vouchers
relating to repairs and maintenance procedures that were undertaken on the truck
on specific dates which included the date when the accident occurred. The MTC
ruled in favor of PGIC.

DST Movers insisted that its liability was not established by a

preponderance of evidence. Specifically, it faults the MTC for ruling in favor of
PGIC despite how its version of events was supported by nothing more the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report. It asserts that reliance on this Report was misplaced
as it was supposedly “improperly identified [and] uncorroborated.”

ISSUES:

Whether it was an error for the MTC to admit and give evidentiary weight
to the Traffic Accident Investigation Report when the one who prepared the
same was not presented in court to testify.

944
HELD:

Yes.

Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the
Hearsay Rule. It renders inadmissible as evidence out-of-court statements made
by persons who are not presented as witnesses but are offered as proof of the
matters stated. This rule proceeds from the basic rationale of fairness, as the party
against whom it is presented is unable to cross-examine the person making the
statement.

While the Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as evidence,

the investigating officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to
testify that he had sufficient knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he
acquired them personally or through official information. Neither was there any
explanation as to why such officer was not presented. The Traffic Accident
Investigation Report should not have been admitted and accorded weight as it was
improperly identified and uncorroborated.

Non-presentation in court of PO2 Tomas, the officer who prepared the

report, was fatal to respondent’s cause. The Report should not have been admitted
as evidence for violating the Hearsay Rule.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

945
 People of the Philippines vs. Feliciano, et. al.
G.R. No. 196735, August 3, 2016

FACTS:

Feliciano, Medalla, Soliva, Zingapan, and Alvir were accused for the
murder of Venturina and attempted murder of Lachica, Fortes, Natalicio, Gaston,
and Mangrobang, all caused by fraternity hazing. Natalicio, a victim turned
witness, during his first attack, he tried to stand up and was able to positively
identify 2 of his attackers, one of whom is Soliva. The RTC convicted the accused
and was affirmed by both the CA and SC. Soliva sought for reconsideration of his
conviction arguing that his conviction was merely based on Natalicio’s sole
testimony, which he alleges was doubtful and inconsistent.

ISSUE:

Can Soliva be convicted on the basis of the testimony of Natalicio alone?

RULING:

Yes.

Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that a witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
And the testimony of a single witness, as long as it is credible and positive, is
enough to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, Natalicio explained that during his first attack, he tried to stand
up and was able to identify 2 of his attackers, one of whom is Soliva. His testimony
is undoubtedly based on personal knowledge, being also a victim in the crime.
Since Natalicio positively identified Soliva and his testimony was clear and
categorical, there is no cogent reason to reverse Soliva’s conviction.

Thus, Soliva can be convicted on the basis of the testimony of Natalicio

alone.

946
 EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. It is now designated as

Sec. 22, Rule 130, but deleted the phrase “except as otherwise provided in these
rules”. The new designation appears to be proper. It immediately follows the
new Sec. 21 which defines who may be witnesses and, logically must be followed
by the new Sec. 22 which defines what testimonies may a witness provide.
Meanwhile, the deletion of the “except” clause in the new Sec. 22 is
inconsequential because the exceptions to the hearsay rule is still retained in the
latter sections under Rule 130 of the New Rules.

947
 Lopez v. People
G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner Ariel Lopez (Lopez) was charged with violation of Presidential

Decree No. 533 that with intent to gain and with grave abuse of confidence and
without the knowledge and consent of the complainant, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously took, stole and carried away one (1) female carabao valued at Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, more or less, belonging to Teresita D. Perez, to the
latter's damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount. Lopez pleaded not guilty
during his arraignment.

During trial, Mario Perez (Perez) testified that he purchased the female
carabao from a certain Enrique Villanueva. The purchase was evidenced by a
Certificate of Transfer of Large Cattle. Teresita Perez (Teresita) testified that
Barangay Police Moralde informed her and Perez, her husband, that Lopez stole
their carabao. Subsequently, a confrontation took place at the barangay police
station. During the confrontation, Lopez admitted to taking the carabao and
promised to pay indemnification. Police Officer III Leo Lozarito (PO3 Lozarito)
corroborated Teresita's testimony and stated that a request for Lopez's appearance
was issued, but no custodial investigation was conducted. He claimed that he
simply allowed Lopez and Teresita to "confront each other." He also stated that
Lopez wanted to settle by paying for the carabao, but the parties were unable to
agree on the price.

ISSUE:

Is the statement of Police Officer III Leo Lozarito (PO3 Lozarito) on what
transpired between petitioner and Mario and Teresita Perez inadmissible for
being hearsay?

RULING:

Yes.

PO3 Lozarito's statement on what transpired between petitioner and Mario

and Teresita Perez are inadmissible for being hearsay. As held in the case of Miro
v. Vda. de Erederos, hearsay evidence is defined as a basic rule in evidence that a
witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own personal
knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception. A witness may
not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is

948
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned,
read or heard. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself
but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or
statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits.

In this case, PO3 Lozarito testified that he "let Teresita and Lopez confront
each other." He most likely overheard the conversation between Teresita and
petitioner. Thus, he had no personal knowledge of what the parties had discussed.

Thus, he had no personal knowledge of what the parties had discussed, and
statements made on what transpired between petitioner and Mario and Teresita
Perez are inadmissible for being hearsay.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. However, the
original Section 36 was moved to the amended Section 22 and the sequence
seems proper since it provides for what a witness should testify on – those facts
of his or her personal knowledge. Previously, this provision was placed right
before the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Since there was a change in order, the
last phrase laying the basis for the exceptions to the hearsay rule that would refer
to the provisions following the same was deleted, since the exceptions to the
hearsay rule no longer follow the new Section 22. The deletion does not mean
that there is no more admissible hearsay evidence or exceptions to the hearsay
evidence. There is still admissible hearsay evidence and the title on Exceptions to
the Hearsay Rule found in the later part of the rules was maintained. Other than
the foregoing and the amendment to address gender sensitivity, the comparable
provisions are the same.

949
 Concha and Managuelod vs. People of the Philippines
GR 208114, October 3, 2018

FACTS:
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela filed two (2) criminal
Informations against Marlon Caliguiran (Caliguiran), Alvin Tamang, Concha, and
Managuelod, charging them with two (2) counts of carnapping under Republic
Act No. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. On January 21, 2009, Concha
and Managuelod were arraigned and both pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial
ensued. The prosecution presented Michael Macutay (Macutay), Eugenio Cacho
(Cacho), and SPO4 Juan C. Anapi (SPO4 Anapi) as its witnesses, whose
testimonies corroborated as follows:

A Honda Wave motorcycle with plate number BI-8085 owned by Cacho

was forcibly taken by the four (4) accused from his nephew, Macutay, who was
then driving it. The prosecution narrated that on February 15, 2006, Macutay
parked the passenger van owned by one Aileen Cacho at Cacho's house in Centro,
Tumauini. Cacho thereafter lent the motorcycle with sidecar to Macutay to go
home to Liwanag, Tumauini. Macutay drove the motorcycle, while his uncle,
Junior, and his cousins, Jayson and Jake, were aboard the sidecar.

On February 21, 2006, the Tumauini police proceeded to Macutay's house

in Liwanag and asked him to accompany them to Cabagan Police Station to
identify the persons suspected to be responsible for the crime. At the police station,
the police presented to Macutay five (5) persons that they had apprehended.
Macutay pointed to Managuelod, Concha, and Caliguiran as the persons who
robbed him. He claimed that Managuelod was the one who declared "holdup" and
drove the motorcycle, while Concha wore the t-shirt they got from him. On the
other hand, the defense presented Concha and Managuelod as its witnesses.

Regional Trial Court found Concha and Managuelod guilty of carnapping

based on Macutay's testimony. It held that Macutay "was able to identify the
culprits who committed the robbery in the lineup at the Philippine National Police
Station at Cabagan, Isabela."

Upon the testimony of the witness Michael Macutay, it is sufficiently

proven that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening of February 15, 2006, the accused
Romeo Managuelod and Melky Concha, together with their companions Alvin
Tamang and Romeo Caliguiran, held at gun point Michael Macutay and took
away from the latter the Honda Wave Motorcycle.The Court had carefully studied

950
the testimony of Michael Macutay who himself witnessed the incident complained
of and it is of the firm belief that the evidence [proffered] therein is credible
evidence by reason of the natural, straightforward, spontaneous, consistent and
frank manner in which the witness testified before the Court. In the view of [the]
Court, Michael Macutay is a credible witness whose testimony is worthy of
credence.

On June 30, 2011, Concha and Managuelod filed an appeal before the Court
of Appeals and prayed for the reversal of the Regional Trial Court November 10,
2010 Joint Decision. They argued that the out-of-court identification was not valid
as it was conducted through a police show-up, not a lineup, since only the four (4)
suspects were presented to Macutay for identification.

Since the prosecution was able to establish the existence of all the elements
of carnapping through the testimonies of its witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the appeal before it should be dismissed. On March 5, 2013, Concha and
Managuelod moved for reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals
in its July 5, 2013 Resolution. On July 30, 2013, Concha and Managuelod filed a
Petition for Review. Petitioners justify their filing of a Rule 45 Petition by stating
that the Court of Appeals based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts and
that it failed to consider relevant facts, which if taken into account, could sustain
a different conclusion.

Petitioners emphasize that SPO4 Anapi's testimony revealed that only the
four (4) accused were presented to Macutay for identification. Byy doing so, the
police "grossly suggested to the witness that the persons shown to him were the
perpetrators of the crime charged in effect, no police lineup was conducted.

Moreover, Macutay supposedly failed the totality of circumstances test,

which is used to determine if an out-of-court identification is admissible. The
prosecution allegedly "failed to establish that [Macutay] had the opportunity to
view the faces of the perpetrators." He was not even sure if the object used to
intimidate him during the carnapping incident was a gun. Also, his disposition
during the ordeal—scared and confused—could have diminished his degree of
attention.Petitioners add that there was no proof that Macutay described the
perpetrators to the police when he reported the incident on February 16, 2006. He
was only able to identify them during the out-of-court identification on February
21, 2006. The significant lapse of time from the day of the incident to the day of
identification makes the authenticity and accuracy of the carnappers' description
open to question. Since Macutay's out-of-court identification was tainted with
impermissible suggestion, it follows then that his in-court identification was

951
tainted as well. For failing to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
petitioners should be acquitted.

ISSUE:

Is the out of court identification of Melky Concha and Romeo

Managuelod admissible?

HELD:

No.

Once again we stress that the correct identification of the author of a crime
should be the primal concern of criminal prosecution in any civilized legal system.
Corollary to this is the actuality of the commission of the offense with the
participation of the accused. All these must be proved by the State beyond
reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the
weakness of the defense. Thus, even if the defense of the accused may be weak,
the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the prosecution failed to discharge
the onus on his identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates
that it is for the people to demonstrate guilt and not for the accused to establish
innocence.

The out-of-court identification of petitioners could have been disregarded

altogether since it was not shown that they were assisted by counsel. However,
this Court recognizes that the "probative weight of an in-court identification is
largely dependent upon an out-of-court identification."

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is

done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the
witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown
to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure
its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time

952
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.

At the outset, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
that the out-of-court identification conducted by the police was a police lineup.
What was conducted was a police show-up, since only four (4) persons were
shown to the prosecution's witness for the purpose of identifying his four (4)
assailants. This was stated by SPO4 Anapi in his testimony and admitted by
81

respondent in its Comment.

When Macutay, the sole witness, was invited by the police to identify his
assailants, his mind was already conditioned that he would come face-to face with
the persons who robbed him. He knew that the group that attacked him consisted
of four (4) persons. Consequently, when he was shown four (4) persons in the
police show-up, it registered to him that they were the perpetrators. With no prior
description of his assailants, it was highly likely that Macutay's identification was
tainted with apparent suggestiveness. Therefore, there was no positive and
credible identification made by the prosecution's witness.

To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a

positive identification by a witness during trial due to the frailty of human
memory. It must also show that the identified person matches the original
description made by that witness when initially reporting the crime. The unbiased
character of the process of identification by witnesses must likewise be shown.

Human memory does not record events like a video recorder. In the first
place, human memory is more selective than a video camera. The sensory
environment contains a vast amount of information, but the memory process
perceives and accurately records only a very small percentage of that information.
Second, because the act of remembering is reconstructive, akin to putting puzzle
pieces together, human memory can change in dramatic and unexpected ways
because of the passage of time or subsequent events, such as exposure to
"postevent" information like conversations with other witnesses or media reports.
Third, memory can also be altered through the reconstruction process.
Questioning a witness about what he or she perceived and requiring the witness
to reconstruct the experience can cause the witness' memory to change by
unconsciously blending the actual fragments of memory of the event with
information provided during the memory retrieval process.

This seemingly staggering rate of involvement of eyewitness errors in

wrongful convictions is, unfortunately, no surprise. Previous studies have
likewise found eyewitness errors to be implicated in the majority of cases of

953
wrongful conviction. But Garrett's analysis went farther than these previous
studies. He not only documented that eyewitness errors occurred in his cases. He
also tried to determine why they occurred — an issue eyewitness science has
investigated for over 100 years.

The problem of eyewitness reliability could not be more clearly

documented. The painstaking work of the Innocence Project, Brandon Garrett, and
others who have documented wrongful convictions, participated in the
exonerations of the victims, and documented the role of flawed evidence of all
sorts has clearly and repeatedly revealed the two-pronged problem of unreliability
for eyewitness evidence: (1) eyewitness identifications are subject to substantial
error, and (2) observer judgments of witness accuracy are likewise subject to
substantial error.

The bifurcated difficulty of misplaced reliance on eyewitness identification

is borne not only by the intrinsic limitations of human memory as the basic
apparatus on which the entire exercise of identification operates. It is as much the
result of and is exacerbated by extrinsic factors such as environmental factors,
flawed procedures, or the mere passage of time:

Given the peculiar circumstances of this case, this Court holds that the gross
corruption of Macutay's out-of-court identification through the improper
suggestion of police officers affected the admissibility of his in-court identification.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. However, it

must be noted that the original Section 36 was moved to the amended Section 22
and the sequence seems proper since it provides for what a witness should testify
on – those facts of his or her personal knowledge.

954
 6
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

Section 42 - Part of the Res Gestae

People v. Feliciano, Jr.

G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014

FACTS:

On December 8, 1994, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity were
having lunch at the Beach House Canteen near the Main Library of the University
of the Philippines when they were attacked by several masked men carrying
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of the sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.

An information for murder was filed against the accused-appellants who

are members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, based on the identification made by
the victims that they were the alleged perpetrators of the crime. Upon evaluation
of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered its decision finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision. The accused-appellants argue that the testimony of their witness, U.P.
Police Officer Salvador, that he interviewed bystanders when he arrived at the
scene and they all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they
were all masked must be given as part of the res gestae.

ISSUE:

Should the testimony of defense’s witness be admitted on the ground

that it is part of the res gestae?

RULING:

Yes.

As a general rule, a witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception. All other
kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of
Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which
is when the evidence is part of res gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130. A
declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible

955
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c)
the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch

on a school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of
the bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in
fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae. However, the statements made by
the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the
bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and
at different points in time. When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against
those of the victims who witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to
end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that an
attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given
considerably less weight than that of the victims.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 42, Rule 130 of
the old rules has merely been renumbered to Section 44, Rule 130 under the new
rules. Moreover, the new rules make clear that the statements made must be
under the stress of excitement caused by the occurrence, although even without
such revision, this qualification was recognized under the old rule.

956
Section 44 - Entries in official records.

DST Movers Corp. V. People’s General Insurance Corp.

G.R. No. 198627, 13 January 2016

FACTS:

An accident occurred involving a Honda civic driven by Adeline Dela Cruz,

a truck allegedly belonging to DST Movers, and a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by
Harrison Valdez . It was alleged that the truck hit the Honda Civic and pushed it
forward, thereby hitting the Mitsubishi Lancer. The driver of the truck then
allegedly escaped. An investigation report was prepared by PO2 Tomas describing
the involved Honda civic and Mitsubishi Lancer, their drivers, and damaged
sustained but on the trucks description the driver was stated as unidentified and
the damaged was undetermined. The Honda Civic was covered by PGIC’s
insurance and paid its owner the entire amount of the insurance.

PGIC then filed a complaint for sum of money against DST movers. In its
answer DST Movers acknowledged that it was the owner of the truck, however it
claimed that the truck did not make any trips on the day of the alleged accident.
They supported their claims with copies of invoices and receipts and vouchers
relating to repairs and maintenance procedures that were undertaken on the truck
on specific dates which included the date when the accident occurred. The MTC
ruled in favor of PGIC.

DST Movers insisted that its liability was not established by a

preponderance of evidence. Specifically, it faults the MTC for ruling in favor of
PGIC despite how its version of events was supported by nothing more the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report. It asserts that reliance on this Report was misplaced
as it was supposedly “improperly identified [and] uncorroborated.”

ISSUES:

Whether the Traffic Report by PO2 Tomas falls under S44R130 “Entries
in Official Records” as an exception to the hearsay rule despite the fact that
neither PO2 Tomas, nor the person who supposedly reported the subject events
to him gave testimony in support of the Traffic Report.

HELD:

No.

957
 Precisely as an exception to the Hearsay Rule, Rule 130, Section 44 does
away with the need for presenting as witness the public officer or person
performing a duty specially enjoined by law who made the entry. This, however,
is only true, for as long the following requisites have been satisfied: (a) that the
entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law
to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties,
or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.

It is plain to see that the matters indicated in the Report are not matters that
were personally known to PO2 Tomas. The Report is candid in admitting that the
matters it states were merely reported to PO2 Tomas by "G. Simbahon of
PNCC/SLEX."47 It was this "G. Simbahon," not PO2 Tomas, who had personal
knowledge of the facts stated in the Report. Thus, even as the Report embodies
entries made by a public officer in the performance of his duties, it fails to satisfy
the third requisite for admissibility for entries in official records as an exception to
the Hearsay Rule.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

958
 7
Opinion Rule

Section 49 - Opinion of Expert Witness

Tortona v. Gregorio
G.R. No. 202612, 17 January 2018

FACTS:

During their lifetime, Rufina and Rafaela co-owned with their other siblings
two (2) parcels of land. Sometime in 1997, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery
of real property with damages. They alleged that their cousin Emilio Casimiro
(Emilio) offered them a balato of P50,000.00 for the sale of the first parcel to the
Department of Public Works and Highways. Surprised, they asked why they were
not instead given their 1/10 share in the proceeds of the sale. To this, Emilio
allegedly replied that according to respondents, the two (2) properties had already
been sold by Rufina to Rafaela during their lifetime.

Petitioners proceeded to the Office of the Registry of Deeds to verify the

supposed sale. They learned that OCT No. O-923, covering the first parcel, had
already been cancelled on account of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed
by Rufina and Rafaela.

Petitioners underscored that their mother was illiterate, not even knowing
how to write her own name. They alleged that she only affixed her thumbmark on
documents, and whenever she did so, she was always assisted by at least one (1)
of her children. Thus, they asserted that if the sales to Rafaela were genuine, they
should have known about them.

During trial, petitioners Teodoro, et al., presented an NBI Agent who

testified that the thumb mark in the Deed of Sale does not match the standard
thumb marks of Rufina appearing in other public documents. The RTC ruled in
favor of petitioners Teodoro, et al., and held that the Deed of Sale was forged.
However, the CA reversed trial court’s decision and ruled that the Deed of
Absolute Sale was a notarized document and had in its favor the presumption of
regularity.

ISSUE:

Should the expert testimony on the NBI Agent be considered by the court
in determining the authenticity of the thumbmark in the Deed of Sale?

959
RULING:

Yes.

Rule 130, Section 49 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies that courts
may admit the testimonies of expert witnesses or of individuals possessing
"special knowledge, skill, experience or training": Section 49. Opinion of expert
witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
Contrary to respondents' dismissiveness towards Gomez, his performance of such
tasks as taking fingerprints, even if, for a time it was his main duty, does not, per
se, discount competence. A history of performing this function does not negate
any "special knowledge, skill, experience or training" that Gomez possesses.
Despite respondents' protestations, it remains that Gomez personally scrutinized
and compared Rufina's disputed thumbmarks in the contested Deed of Absolute
Sale with her authentic thumbmarks in the standard documents and detailed his
findings in his reports.

Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may
place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the
facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability
and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and
process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias
in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the
relative opportunities for study or observation of the matters about which he
testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The
opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the
court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common
knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am.
Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. However, the new
rule adds “education”, not present under the old rule. There is also amendment
to address gender sensitivity.

960
 RULE 131
Burden of Proof and Presumptions

Section 1 - Burden of Proof

David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016

FACTS:

Private respondent Grace Poe was a certified as a foundling by the Civil

Registrar after she was found abandoned in a church in Iloilo in 1968. She was later
adopted by spouses Fernando Poe and Susan Roces, a fact which was noted by the
Civil Registrar in Poe’s certificate. When she matured as a woman, her physical
attributes are described as having brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge,
straight black hair and an oval-shaped face. She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall.
She married Llamanzares and lived in the US. She was naturalized and granted
American citizenship on October 2001 and was subsequently issued a US passport.
She decided to return to the Philippines in 2005 and took the Oath of Allegiance to
Republic of the Philippines on July 2006. She then filed a petition for retention
and/or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship through RA 9225 with the Bureau
of Immigration (BI), which was granted on July 2006. She was later appointed as
MTRCB Chairman by former Pres. Aquino III in October 2010. Prior to assumption
in said office, Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the US
and Renunciation of American Citizenship and filed it with the BI. She also
executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality in the presence of
Vice Consul Briers on July 2011 and was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality
by Vice Consul Galian on December 2011. She later ran for Senate in the 2013
Elections, where she won and was proclaimed by the COMELEC.

Petitioner Rizalito David, a losing a senatorial candidate, then filed a

Petition for Quo Warranto before the SET, contesting Poe’s qualification alleging
that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen contrary to the requirement under
Art. VI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. The BI and NSO were subpoenaed to
present the documents relevant to Poe’s application for re-acquisition of
citizenship, travel records, and birth certificate. On the other hand, Poe manifested
that her DNA tests failed to provide results which would shed light to the real
identity of her biological parents.

Based on the documents presented by the BI and NSO, the SET ruled to
dismiss the petition and found that Poe is a natural-born Filipino, thus is qualified
to hold office as Senator. Aggrieved by the SET decision, David filed a petition for

961
certiorari before the SC arguing that SET erred in ruling that Poe is a natural-born
citizen despite having no proof of her biological Filipino parentage. Accordingly,
Sec. 1(2), Art. IV of the 1987 Constitution identifies as citizens those whose fathers
or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. Since it is settled that Poe is a foundling,
the burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon her and failure to discharge this
burden necessarily leads to the conclusion that she is not a natural-born Filipino.

ISSUE:

Does Poe have the burden to prove her Filipino parentage?

RULING:

No.

Sec. 1, Rule 131 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof
is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Burden of proof
lies on the party making the allegations; that is, the party who “alleges the
affirmative of the issue.” Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another.
What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a
prima facie case in his or her favor. The other party then bears the “burden of going
forward” with the evidence considering that which has ostensibly been
established against him or her.

In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the
party who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for
the office involved in the controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies
such as the SET, the requisite quantum of proof is substantial evidence. This
burden was petitioner’s to discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case,
the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent. However, private respondent’s
admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie case in favor of
petitioner. While it does establish that the identities of private respondent’s
biological parents are not known, it does not automatically mean that neither her
father nor her mother is a Filipino. The most that petitioner had in his favor was
doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no means substantial evidence establishing
a prima facie case and shifting the burden of evidence to private respondent.

Thus, Poe does not have the burden to prove her Filipino parentage.

962
 EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. First, the title of Rule 131
is added with the phrase “Burden of Evidence”. Second, Sec. 1 thereof retains the
definition of burden of proof and, in addition, it incorporated the long-settled
principle, as in the above case, that burden of proof never shifts. Lastly, a second
paragraph is added to Sec. 1 defining burden of evidence, which is likewise a
product of jurisprudence as exemplified in the above case, to wit: “Burden of
evidence is the duty of a party to present evidence sufficient to establish or rebut
a fact in issue to establish a prima facie case. Burden of evidence may shift from
one party to the other in the course of the proceedings, depending on the
exigencies of the case.”

963
 Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines
GR. 204594, November 7, 2018

FACTS:

This case involves a 2,791-square-meter parcel of land (Tramo property)

located on Aurora Boulevard (Tramo), Pasay City, currently in Sindophil's
possession. Sindophil anchors its right to the Tramo property on Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 132440, which was purportedly issued by the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Complaint
for revocation, annulment, and cancellation of certificates of title before the Pasay
City Regional Trial Court, and impleaded Sindophil as one of the defendants.

In its Complaint, the Republic alleged that per TCT No. 10354, issued by the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City, the Tramo property was initially registered under
the name of Teodoro on November 12, 1964. Teodoro then sold it to a certain
Reynaldo Puma (Puma), causing the cancellation of TCT No. 10354 and the
issuance of TCT No. 128358. Subsequently, Puma sold it to a certain Lourdes Ty
(Ty). Puma's TCT No. 128358 was cancelled and TCT No. 129957 was issued to Ty.
Finally, on May 3, 1991 Ty sold the property to Sindophil, causing the cancellation
of TCT No. 129957 and the issuance of TCT No. 132440 to Sindophil on March 24,
1993.

Despite the issuance of certificates of title over the Tramo property, the
Republic claimed that TCT No. 10354 in the name of Teodoro was spurious or of
doubtful authenticity.

In their Answer Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil countered that the
Republic was estopped from questioning the transfers considering that it had
allowed the series of transfers and even accepted the "tremendous amount[s] paid"
as capital gains tax. They added that the Complaint was filed because of the
Register of Deeds' "personal grudge" against them because they had questioned a
consulta issued by the Register of Deeds before the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority. They also contended that they were innocent purchasers
for value and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, reconveyance should not
lie.

During trial, only the Republic was able to present its evidence. Defendants
Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil were all deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence when they failed to present any evidence or witness despite
several settings. The parties were then ordered to file their respective memoranda;
but instead of filing a memorandum, Sindophil filed a Motion to Re-Open Case,

964
praying that it be allowed to present evidence. As to why it failed to present
evidence during trial, Sindophil explained that its witness, Sindophil President
Victoria Y. Chalid (Chalid), suffered a stroke which prevented her from testifying
during trial

During trial, only the Republic was able to present its evidence. In its
November 13, 2009 Decision, It ruled in favor of the Republic and voided the
certificates of title issued to defendants Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil. It
found that the Tramo property claimed by Teodoro under TCT No. 10354 was
derived from TCT No. 6735 registered in the name of the Republic. However, no
annotation of the supposed transfer to Teodoro was annotated on TCT No. 6735.
On the claim of defendants that they were innocent purchasers for value, the
Regional Trial Court said that this defense was "just a mere [assertion] and was
never supported by any documents." It stated that defendants failed to discharge
the burden of proving that they were purchasers in good faith and for value, thus,
rejecting their argument.

Sindophil, together with Teodoro, appealed before the Court of Appeals.

However, for failure to file their appellants' brief within the required period, the
Court of Appeals deemed the appeal abandoned and consequently dismissed it.

ISSUE:

Did Sindophil properly prove that it was a buyer in good faith?

HELD:

No.

Sindophil insists that it bought the Tramo property from Ty in good faith
and that it was an innocent purchaser for value. However, the presumption of
good faith and that a holder of a title is an innocent purchaser for value may be
overcome by contrary evidence.

Here, the Republic presented evidence that TCT No. 10354, from which
Sindophil's TCT No. 132440 was derived, was void. As found by the Regional Trial
Court:

Record shows that Certificate of Title No. 6735, wherein the lot claimed by
defendant, Marcelo R. Teodoro, lot 3270-B, is derived therefrom, is under the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, dated October 17, 1913. Nothing in the

965
subsequent annotations was under the name of any of the defendants and neither
the subject TCT No. 10354.

With the Republic having put forward evidence that the Tramo property
claimed by Sindophil belongs to the Republic, the burden of evidence shifted to
Sindophil to prove that its title to it was valid. Concomitantly, it had the burden
of proving that it was indeed a buyer in good faith and for value. As this Court
said "the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value
lies upon him who asserts that status" and "[i]n discharging that burden, it is not
enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith, i.e., that everyone is
presumed to act in good faith. The good faith that is [essential here] is integral with
the very status which must be proved."

Unfortunately for Sindophil, it utterly failed to discharge the burden of

evidence because its counsel failed to attend the scheduled initial presentation of
evidence. Further, looking at the records, the defects in Sindophil's title could be
inferred from the annotations in TCT No. 129957, the certificate of title held by
Sindophil's immediate predecessor, Ty. A certain Antonio C. Mercado had filed
an adverse claim against Ty because the Tramo property had been previously sold
to him by Puma, Ty's predecessor. The alleged double sale should have prompted
Sindophil to look into Puma's title, TCT No. 128358, where it can be gleaned that
Teodoro likewise filed an adverse claim. These annotations show that the Tramo
property is controversial and has been the subject of several adverse claims,
belying Sindophil's contention that it acquired the property in good faith.

With Sindophil failing to prove that it was a buyer in good faith, it cannot
recover damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund under Section 95 of the
Property Registration Decree.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. However, Section 1 of
Rule 131 was amended. The old and new provisions for defining burden of proof
are the same, except for amendment to address gender sensitivity and the new
rule adds that the burden of proof never shifts. However, even without the
amendment, the rule that Burden of proof never shifts has long been settled. The
new rule adds burden of evidence under Section 1 and provides for its definition.

966
Section 3 - Disputable presumptions

Tortona v. Gregorio
G.R. No. 202612, 17 January 2018

FACTS:

During their lifetime, Rufina and Rafaela co-owned with their other siblings
two (2) parcels of land. Sometime in 1997, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery
of real property with damages. They alleged that their cousin Emilio Casimiro
(Emilio) offered them a balato of P50,000.00 for the sale of the first parcel to the
Department of Public Works and Highways. Surprised, they asked why they were
not instead given their 1/10 share in the proceeds of the sale. To this, Emilio
allegedly replied that according to respondents, the two (2) properties had already
been sold by Rufina to Rafaela during their lifetime.

Petitioners proceeded to the Office of the Registry of Deeds to verify the

supposed sale. They learned that OCT No. O-923, covering the first parcel, had
already been cancelled on account of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed
by Rufina and Rafaela.

Petitioners underscored that their mother was illiterate, not even knowing how to
write her own name. They alleged that she only affixed her thumbmark on
documents, and whenever she did so, she was always assisted by at least one (1)
of her children. Thus, they asserted that if the sales to Rafaela were genuine, they
should have known about them.

During trial, petitioners Teodoro, et al., presented an NBI Agent who

testified that the thumb mark in the Deed of Sale does not match the standard
thumb marks of Rufina appearing in other public documents. The RTC ruled in
favor of petitioners Teodoro, et al., and held that the Deed of Sale was forged.
However, the CA reversed trial court’s decision and ruled that the Deed of
Absolute Sale was a notarized document and had in its favor the presumption of
regularity.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals correctly apply the presumption of regularity

on the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale?

RULING:

967
 No.

The presumption of regularity in the execution of the Deed of Sale was

contradicted by clear and convincing evidence. Documents acknowledged before
a notary public are presumed to have been duly executed. This presumption may
be contradicted by clear and convincing evidence.

It is then incumbent upon petitioners to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the seller's thumbmarks, as appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale,
are forged. Petitioners successfully discharged this burden. Petitioners themselves
recounted in a straightforward manner that their mother, being illiterate, never
dealt with her properties without the assistance of any of her children. To attest to
this, they presented documents bearing the thumbmarks of their mother, where it
appeared that at least one (1) of them was present to assist her. These same
documents, when compared with the contentious Deed of Absolute Sale,
demonstrated the falsity of the thumbmarks appearing on the latter. Respondents'
cause may have been supported by the general presumption that notarized
documents were duly executed; however, this presumption must crumble in light
of the significantly more compelling evidence presented by petitioners. As against
petitioners' evidence, all that respondents presented was the testimony of the
notarizing lawyer, whose own acts are clouded with suspicion. With the aid of an
expert witness, they contrasted Rufina's apparent thumbmarks on the Deed of
Absolute Sale with specimen thumbmarks on authentic documents.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The old and new
provisions are the same except that there are amendments to address gender
sensitivity under paragraph (ii) and Section 4, and the addition of the word
“and” under paragraph (jj) (4), which addition does not change the meaning of
the rule.

968
 Ong Lay Hin vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 191972, January 26, 2015

FACTS:

A decision by the Regional Trial Court was rendered convicting petitioner

and Obsioma, Jr. of estafa punished under Aricle 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code. The trial court found that Ong and Obsioma, Jr. failed to pay
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company a total of 344,752.20, in violation of their
trust receipt agreement with the bank. Ong filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the court denied it. Ong then filed a notice of appeal, which the trial court gave
due course. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The Court of
Appeals likewise denied Ong’s Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals then issued an Entry of Judgment, declaring that the
case became final and executory on May 15, 2003. The Court of Appeals based the
date of finality on the date of receipt indicated in the registry return card
corresponding to the mail sent to Ong’s former counsel, Zosa & Quijano Law
Offices. Based on the registry return card, Zosa & Quijano Law Offices received
on April 29, 2003 a copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution denying Ong’s Motion
for Reconsideration. Thereafter on March 22, 2004, the trial court received the entry
of judgment issued by the CA. In view thereof, the trial court ordered the arrest of
Ong.

Almost six (6) years after, Ong was arrested. Ong then filed before the
Supreme Court petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
application for issuance of preliminary and/or mandatory injunction. Ong alleges
that his counsel never received a copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution denying
his Motion for Reconsideration. Consequently, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals never became final and executory, and the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment. Assuming that his former
counsel received a copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution, Ong argues that his
counsel was grossly negligent in failing to appeal the Court of Appeals’
Resolution. This gross negligence allegedly deprived him of due process and,
therefore, should not bind him. In its Comment, the People of the Philippines
argues that the registry return card "carries the presumption that ‘it was prepared
in the course of official duties that have been regularly performed and must be
presumed to be accurate unless proven otherwise.’"

ISSUE:

969
 Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
entry of judgment.

HELD:

No.

Grave abuse of discretion is the "arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due

to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or a
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law." The registry
return card is the "official . . . record evidencing service by mail." It "carries the
presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties that have been
regularly performed and, therefore, it is presumed to be accurate, unless proven
otherwise."

The affidavits of petitioner’s wife and mother-in-law, Mary Ann Ong and
Nila Mapilit, stating that petitioner’s former counsel told them that the law office
never received a copy of the Resolution, are inadmissible in evidence for being
hearsay. Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s false claim, his former counsel had
notice that the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration as early as
April 21, 2004 when his counsel received a copy of the trial court’s Order directing
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner.

With petitioner failing to rebut this presumption, it must be presumed that

his former counsel received a copy of the Resolution on April 29, 2003 as indicated
in the registry return card. The 15-day period to appeal commenced from this date.
Since petitioner did not file an Appeal within 15 days from April 29, 2003, the
Decision became final and executory on May 15, 2003.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion in
issuing the Entry of Judgment, which declared petitioner’s conviction final and
executory as of May 15, 2003. Under Rule 51, Section 10 of the Rules of Court on
"Judgment," "if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within
the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith
be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the
judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its
entry."

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

970
 Arreza v. Toyo
G.R. No. 213198. July 1, 2019

FACTS:

Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese

citizen, were married in Quezon City. After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a
Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of Konohana-ku, Osaka
City, Japan received on February 4, 2011. It was later recorded in Tetsushi's family
register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu.

Genevieve filed before the RTC a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry.In support of her Petition,
Genevieve submitted a copy of their Divorce Certificate, Tetsushi's Family
Register, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce, and an
English translation of the Civil Code of Japan, among others.

After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial
Court set the case for hearing on October 16, 2012. On the day of the hearing, no
one appeared to oppose the Petition. After the jurisdictional requirements were
established and marked, trial on the merits ensued.

The RTC denied the Genevieve’s petition. It decreed that while the pieces of
evidence presented by Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement was
accepted by the local government of Japan, she nevertheless failed to prove the
copy of Japan's law. The RTC noted that the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and
its English translation submitted by Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of
Foreign Affairs. Genevieve filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was later on
denied. Thus, Genevieve filed before this Court the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari.

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in not treating the English
translation of the Civil Code of Japan as an official publication in accordance with
Rule 131, Section 3 (gg) of the Rules of Court since it was printed "under
authorization of the Ministry of Justice. That it is an official publication, she points
out, makes it a self-authenticating evidence of Japan's law under Rule 132, Section
25 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in not
considering the English translation of the Japan Civil Code as a learned treatise
and in refusing to take judicial notice of its authors' credentials.

ISSUE:

971
 Is the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation an
official publication under Rule 131, Section 3 (gg) of the Rules of Court and,
therefore, is a self-authenticating document||

RULING:

No.

The English translation submitted by petitioner was published by Eibun-

Horei-Sha, Inc., a private company in Japan engaged in publishing English
translation of Japanese laws, which came to be known as the EHS Law Bulletin
Series. However, these translations are "not advertised as a source of official
translations of Japanese laws;" rather, it is in the KANPŌ or the Official Gazette
where all official laws and regulations are published, albeit in
Japanese. Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is not an
official publication exempted from the requirement of authentication.

In Patula v. People, this Court explained the nature of a self-authenticating

document:

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the

documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue
of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a
notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the
formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing
authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in
order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any
other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign
character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private
document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of
Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of
authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically:
(a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable
document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c)
when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or
(d) when the document is not being offered as genuine. (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)

972
 EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 3 of Rule 131
of the new rules is substantially the same as in the old rules. Amendments were
done only to address gender sensitivity. Hence, nothing is to be changed as to
the ruling.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. AVON PRODUCTS

G.R. Nos. 201398-99 & 201418-19, October 3, 2018

FACTS:
Avon filed its Value Added Tax (VAT) Returns and Monthly Remittance
Returns of Income Tax Withheld for the taxable year 1999. On July 14, 2004, Avon
was served a Collection Letter dated July 9, 2004. It was required to pay
P80,246,459. On February 14, 2003, Avon filed a letter dated February 13, 2003
protesting against the Preliminary Assessment Notice. Without ruling on Avon's
protest, the Commissioner prepared the Formal Letter of Demand and Final
Assessment Notices, all dated February 28, 2003, received by Avon on April 11,
2003. Except for the amount of interest, the Final Assessment Notices were the
same as the Preliminary Assessment Notice. In a letter dated and filed on May 9,
2003, Avon protested the Final Assessment Notices. Avon resubmitted its protest
to the Preliminary Assessment Notice and adopted the same as its protest to the
Final Assessment Notices.

On August 13, 2004, Avon filed a Petition for Review before the Court of
Tax Appeals which was dismissed. Hence, the present Petitions via Rule 45 were
filed before this Court. In her Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 201398-99, the
Commissioner asserts that Avon is estopped from assailing the validity of the
Waivers of the Defense of Prescription as it has paid the other assessments that
these waivers covered. It also avers that Avon's right to appeal its protest before
the Court of Tax Appeals has prescribed and that the assessments have attained
finality. Finally, it states that Avon is liable for the deficiency assessments.

Avon, in its separate Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 201418-19, argues that
the assessments are void ab initio due to the failure of the Commissioner to
observe due process. It maintains that from the start up to the end of the
administrative process, the Commissioner ignored all of its protests and
submissions. The Petitions were consolidated on July 4, 2012.The Commissioner
and Avon subsequently submitted their respective Memoranda in compliance
with this Court's June 5, 2013 Resolution.

973
ISSUE:

Does the presumption of regularity apply?

HELD:

No.

The facts demonstrate that Avon was deprived of due process. It was not
fully apprised of the legal and factual bases of the assessments issued against it.
The Details of Discrepancy attached to the Preliminary Assessment Notice, as well
as the Formal Letter of Demand with the Final Assessment Notices, did not even
comment or address the defenses and documents submitted by Avon. Thus, Avon
was left unaware on how the Commissioner or her authorized representatives
appreciated the explanations or defenses raised in connection with the
assessments. There was clear inaction of the Commissioner at every stage of the
proceedings.

It is true that the Commissioner is not obliged to accept the taxpayer's

explanations, as explained by the Court of Tax Appeals. However, when he or she
rejects these explanations, he or she must give some reason for doing so. He or she
must give the particular facts upon which his or her conclusions are based, and
those facts must appear in the record.

Indeed, the Commissioner's inaction and omission to give due

consideration to the arguments and evidence submitted before her by Avon are
deplorable transgressions of Avon's right to due process. The right to be heard,
which includes the right to present evidence, is meaningless if the Commissioner
can simply ignore the evidence without reason.

Similarly, in this case, despite Avon's submission of its explanations and

pieces of evidence to the assessments, the Commissioner failed to acknowledge
these submissions and instead issued identical Preliminary Assessment Notice,
Final Letter of Demand with the Final Assessment Notices, and Collection Letter,
the latter being premised on Avon's alleged failure to submit supporting
documents to its protest. Had the Commissioner performed her functions properly
and considered the explanations and pieces of evidence submitted by Avon, this
case could have been settled at the earliest possible time. For instance, all the
evidence needed to settle the issue on under-declared sales, which constituted the
bulk of the deficiency tax assessments, have been submitted to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Indeed, from these same submissions, the Court of Tax Appeals
concluded that there was no under-declaration of sales. As aptly pointed out by

974
Avon, "The Commissioner could not feign simple mistake or misappreciation of
the evidence . . . because the issue was plain and simple."

Moreover, the Court of Tax Appeals erroneously applied the "presumption

of regularity" in sustaining the Commissioner's assessments.

The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is a

disputable presumption under Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Rules of Court. As a
disputable presumption — [I]t may be accepted and acted on where there is no
other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be
overcome by other evidence.

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by

affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.

In Sevilla v. Cardenas, this Court refused to apply the "presumption of

regularity" when it noted that there was documentary and testimonial evidence
that the civil registrar did not exert utmost efforts before certifying that no
marriage license was issued in favor of one of the parties.

This Court also refused to apply the presumption of regularity in Bank of

the Philippine Islands v. Evangelista, where the process server failed to show that
he followed the required procedures:

We cannot sustain petitioner's argument, which is anchored on the

presumption of regularity in the process server's performance of duty. The Court
already had occasion to rule that "[c]ertainly, it was never intended that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty will be applied even
in cases where there is no showing of substantial compliance with the
requirements of the rules of procedure." Such presumption does not apply where
it is patent that the sheriff's or server's return is defective. Under this circumstance,
respondents are not duty-bound to adduce further evidence to overcome the
presumption, which no longer holds.

Here, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the presumption of

regularity in the performance of the Commissioner's official duties cannot stand
in the face of positive evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

975
 People v. Chavez y Bitancor
G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014

FACTS:

An information against Mark Chavez (Chavez) for robbery with homicide

was filed on November 8, 2006. It was alleged that Angelo Penamante, the
prosecution witness, arrived home from his job in Quezon City. When he was
about to enter his house in Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a man holding something
while leaving the parlor of Elmer Duque (deceased-victim) which he recognized
to be Chavez. The following morning, the SOCO team arrived in the
aforementioned place, finding Duque’s dead body with the whole place in
disarray. An autopsy of the cadaver revealed that the deceased received 21 stab
wounds, 4 of which were considered fatal. It was also alleged that two (2) units of
mobile phones were taken with some pieces of jewelry.

Penamante was invited to the Manila Police Station to give a statement. He

attested that he saw Chavez coming out of the parlor. Eventually, Chavez
voluntarily surrendered to the police. Chavez explained that he was at home on
the said night, exchanging messages with Duque on whether they could talk
regarding their misunderstanding. When Duque did not reply to his text message,
Chavez decided to go to his house, where he was allowed to enter. After which,
he went home. Chavez’ mother gave a statement and surrendered two cellular
phones owned by the deceased. She also said that the jewelries of Duque were
pawned by Chavez.

The RTC convicted Chavez with the CA affirming the decision. Chavez filed
a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure,
elevating the case to the SC. Chavez argues that he cannot be convicted of the said
crime as the prosecution merely relied on circumstantial evidence.

According to him, even if Penamante saw him leaving the crime scene, he
did not specify whether Chavez was acting suspiciously at that time. Moreover,
the findings of the autopsy revealed that the wounds were caused by two sharp
bladed instruments, thus, it is possible that there were two assailants. It was also
possible that the crime was committed after he left the house of the deceased.
Given that there are many explanations which fit the fact that Chavez is innocent,
he should be acquitted.

On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argued that direct evidence is not

indispensable when the prosecution is establishing the guilt of Chavez. The

976
circumstantial evidence presented before the trial court laid down an unbroken
chain of events leading to no other conclusion than Chavez’s acts of killing and
robbing Duque.

ISSUE:

Can Chavez be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with

homicide on the basis of the circumstantial evidence presented in the trial court?

RULING:

No.

The court held that Chavez can only be convicted of the crime of homicide
on the basis of circumstantial evidence, but not of robbery.

The court has held that "what is imperative for a conviction for the crime of
robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offender’s intent to
take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide
is actually carried out." In cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove
that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused
can be convicted of robbery with homicide. The possession of Chavez of the
missing Nokia units and consequently, the surrender of the same by Chavez’
mother, gives rise to the presumption that Chavez is the author of the theft.

There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a

thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him." Thus, when a person has possession of a
stolen property, he can be disputably presumed as the author of the theft.

Barbie’s missing cellular phones were turned over to the police by Chavez’s
mother, and this was never denied by the defense. Chavez failed to explain his
possession of these cellular phones. However, with Chavez and Barbie’s close
7

relationship having been established, there is still a possibility that these

cellphones were lent to Chavez by Barbie.

The integrity of these cellphones was also compromised when SPO3

Casimiro testified during cross-examination that the police made no markings on
the cellphones, and their SIM cards were removed. The other missing items were
no longer found, and no evidence was presented to conclude that these were taken
by Chavez. The statement of Chavez’s mother mentioned that her son pawned one

977
of Barbie’s necklaces. However, since she was not presented to testify, the
statement is considered a hearsay.

At most, prosecution witness Raymund Senofa, a town mate of Barbie,

testified that he could not remember the model of the Motorola fliptype cellphone
he saw used by Barbie but that he knew it was worth 19,000.00 more or less. This
amounts to hearsay as he has no personal knowledge on how Barbie acquired the
cellphone or for how much. These circumstances create reasonable doubt on the
allegation that Chavez stole the missing personal properties of Barbie.

This court, thus, finds that the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves
beyond reasonable doubt that Chavez is guilty of the crime of homicide, and not
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Rule 131, Sec. 3 (j)
which states that "a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that
thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned
by him" remains to be a disputable presumption which can be rebutted by
evidence. Hence nothing is to be changed as to the ruling.

978
 People v. Chavez y Bitancor
G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014

FACTS:

An information against Mark Chavez (Chavez) for robbery with homicide

was filed on November 8, 2006. It was alleged that Angelo Penamante, the
prosecution witness, arrived home from his job in Quezon City. When he was
about to enter his house in Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a man holding something
while leaving the parlor of Elmer Duque (deceased-victim) which he recognized
to be Chavez. The following morning, the SOCO team arrived in the
aforementioned place, finding Duque’s dead body with the whole place in
disarray. An autopsy of the cadaver revealed that the deceased received 21 stab
wounds, 4 of which were considered fatal. It was also alleged that two (2) units of
mobile phones were taken with some pieces of jewelry.

Penamante was invited to the Manila Police Station to give a statement. He

attested that he saw Chavez coming out of the parlor. Eventually, Chavez
voluntarily surrendered to the police. Chavez explained that he was at home on
the said night, exchanging messages with Duque on whether they could talk
regarding their misunderstanding. When Duque did not reply to his text message,
Chavez decided to go to his house, where he was allowed to enter. After which,
he went home. Chavez’ mother gave a statement and surrendered two cellular
phones owned by the deceased. She also said that the jewelries of Duque were
pawned by Chavez.

The RTC convicted Chavez with the CA affirming the decision. Chavez filed
a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure,
elevating the case to the SC. Chavez argues that he cannot be convicted of the said
crime as the prosecution merely relied on circumstantial evidence.

According to him, even if Penamante saw him leaving the crime scene, he
did not specify whether Chavez was acting suspiciously at that time. Moreover,
the findings of the autopsy revealed that the wounds were caused by two sharp
bladed instruments, thus, it is possible that there were two assailants. It was also
possible that the crime was committed after he left the house of the deceased.
Given that there are many explanations which fit the fact that Chavez is innocent,
he should be acquitted.

On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argued that direct evidence is not

indispensable when the prosecution is establishing the guilt of Chavez. The
circumstantial evidence presented before the trial court laid down an unbroken

979
chain of events leading to no other conclusion than Chavez’s acts of killing and
robbing Duque.

ISSUE:

Can Chavez be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with

homicide on the basis of the circumstantial evidence presented in the trial court?

RULING:

No.

The court held that Chavez can only be convicted of the crime of homicide
on the basis of circumstantial evidence, but not of robbery.

The court has held that "what is imperative for a conviction for the crime of
robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offender’s intent to
take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide
is actually carried out." In cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove
that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused
can be convicted of robbery with homicide. The possession of Chavez of the
missing Nokia units and consequently, the surrender of the same by Chavez’
mother, gives rise to the presumption that Chavez is the author of the theft.

There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a

thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him." Thus, when a person has possession of a
stolen property, he can be disputably presumed as the author of the theft.

Barbie’s missing cellular phones were turned over to the police by Chavez’s
mother, and this was never denied by the defense. Chavez failed to explain his
possession of these cellular phones. However, with Chavez and Barbie’s close
7

relationship having been established, there is still a possibility that these

cellphones were lent to Chavez by Barbie
.
The integrity of these cellphones was also compromised when SPO3
Casimiro testified during cross-examination that the police made no markings on
the cellphones, and their SIM cards were removed. The other missing items were
no longer found, and no evidence was presented to conclude that these were taken
by Chavez. The statement of Chavez’s mother mentioned that her son pawned one

980
of Barbie’s necklaces. However, since she was not presented to testify, the
statement is considered a hearsay.

At most, prosecution witness Raymund Senofa, a town mate of Barbie,

testified that he could not remember the model of the Motorola fliptype cellphone
he saw used by Barbie but that he knew it was worth 19,000.00 more or less. This
amounts to hearsay as he has no personal knowledge on how Barbie acquired the
cellphone or for how much. These circumstances create reasonable doubt on the
allegation that Chavez stole the missing personal properties of Barbie.

This court, thus, finds that the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves
beyond reasonable doubt that Chavez is guilty of the crime of homicide, and not
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Rule 131, Sec. 3 (j)
which states that "a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that
thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned
by him" remains to be a disputable presumption which can be rebutted by
evidence. Hence nothing is to be changed as to the ruling.

981
 RULE 132
Presentation of Evidence

A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC

Judicial Affidavit Rule

Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 214163, July 1, 2019

FACTS:

Ronald Geralino M. Lim (Ronald) filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor a Complaint for grave threats against his brother Edwin M. Lim
(Edwin).

On August 12, 2013, the case was set for pre-trial. However, because of
Ronald's and his counsel's absence, pre-trial was reset to September 5, 2013. After
Edwin's counsel had fled a Motion for time to submit a counter-affidavit, pre-trial
was again reset to October 17, 2013.

On October 17, 2013, the defense counsel moved that the hearing be set at
10:00 a.m. However, because the private prosecutor was unavailable and the
prosecution needed time to submit their judicial affidavits, pre-trial was reset to
November 21, 2013 at 8:30 a.m.

At the pre-trial on November 21, 2013, the prosecution, among others, moved
that they be allowed to submit the Judicial Affidavits of Ronald and their witnesses
later that day. It explained that it had completed the Judicial Affidavits earlier, but
"for whatever reason," was not able to submit them. Despite the defense counsel's
insistent opposition, the MTC in Cities granted the Motion and gave the
prosecution until 5:00 p.m. that day to submit the judicial affidavits.

Aggrieved, Edwin moved for reconsideration. He argued that the

prosecution was deemed to have waived its right to submit its Judicial Affidavits
when it failed to submit them at least five (5) days before pre-trial. The MTC in
Cities denied Edwin's Motion.

Edwin filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. He contended that the MTC in Cities committed grave
abuse of discretion when it allowed the belated filing of the Judicial Affidavits.

982
 In its Comment, the prosecution contended, among others, that they
contended that a resort to a petition for certiorari was improper since the remedy
of appeal was still available to them.

The RTC ruled that the MTC in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion
when it allowed the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits. Hence,
petitioners filed before the Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, contending,
among others, that that the filing of a Petition for Certiorari was improper since
the remedy of appeal was available to respondent.

ISSUE:

Are the Judicial Affidavits justifiably filed?

RULING:

No.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion in

blatantly disregarding the clear wording of A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, or the Judicial
Affidavit Rule. The Rule is explicit: the prosecution is mandated to submit the
judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five (5) days before pre-trial.
Should they fail to submit them within the time prescribed, they shall be deemed
to have waived their submission. Nevertheless, if the belated submission of
judicial affidavits has a valid reason, the court may allow the delay once as long
as it "would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party
pays a fine of not less than P1,000.00 nor more than P5,000.00, at the discretion of
the court."

Here, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities allowed the prosecution's belated
submission of their Judicial Affidavits despite the repeated postponements of the
scheduled pre-trial. To recall, the pre-trial was reset thrice: from August 12, 2013
to September 5, 2013, then to October 17, 2013, and finally, to November 21, 2013.
In spite of that, the prosecution failed to submit their Judicial Affidavits within the
time prescribed by the Rule. Its excuse —"for whatever reason" — cannot be
considered sufficient to allow the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits.

983
 EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 6 of Rule 7
requires that judicial affidavits must be attached together with pleading and
form an integral part thereof. This is to secure that a person filing a case or a
pleading would, at the time of filing, already have evidentiary basis to back up
such case or pleading, and to prevent any delay caused by the parties in still
trying to search for evidence as basis for the claims during the pendency of the
case. Hence, the five (5) - day period for the filing of judicial affidavits of
witnesses before pre-trial seemed to be no longer applicable.

984
 B
Authentication and Proof of Documents

Section 19 - Classes of documents

Constantino v. People
G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019

FACTS:

An Information was filed against Atty. Constantino and Teresita C.

Saliganan (Saliganan), charging them with falsification of a public document. The
Information stated that Constantino made it appear that testator Severino
participated in the execution of the Last Will and Testament, when in fact he did
not so participate, and making it appear that the testator Severino and the attesting
witnesses, Dr. Eliezer Asuncion, Mary Balintona and Dr. Justino Balintona
acknowledge the Last Will and Testament before Atty. Constantino while in truth
they never appeared to acknowledge the same.

Atty. Constantino narrated that in the morning of September 9, 2001, he

brought 3 typed copies of the Last Will and Testament to Severino's house for
signing. Together in the room were Severino, Atty. Constantino, his wife Editha
and son Bernard Christian, the Balintona Spouses, Cu, Saliganan, and one other
person.

The 3 instrumental witnesses present—the Balintona Spouses and Cu—

then signed the document, after which Atty. Constantino affixed his signature.
Addressing the absence of Dr. Asuncion, whose name was indicated as an
instrumental witness, Atty. Constantino assured Severino that only 3 witnesses
were needed for the document. He then allegedly instructed Severino to leave the
document as it was and "not make any erasures or crossing-out on it in order not
to make it dirty." Atty. Constantino took a copy of the document and gave the
other two to Severino.

On his way out, Atty. Constantino alleged that Saliganan took his copy of
the document, telling him that Dr. Asuncion had already arrived. Sometime later,
Saliganan returned the copy, but Atty. Constantino stated that he did not check if
Dr. Asuncion had signed it.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Atty. Constantino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of falsification of a public document under Article 171(2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Atty. Constantino appealed before the Court of Appeals but

985
said court affirmed the RTC’s decision. Atty. Constantino moved for
reconsideration, but his Motion was denied. Hence, he filed this Petition.

ISSUE:

Is the last will and testament a public document under the provisions of
the Rules of Court?

RULING:

No.

Before one can be held criminally liable for falsification of public

documents, it is essential that the document allegedly falsified is a public
document.

Public documents are defined in Cacnio v. Baens as "those instruments

authorized by a notary public or by a competent public official with all the
solemnities required by law. By this definition, any notarized document is
considered a public document.

Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court, however, provides:

SECTION 19. Classes of documents. — For the purpose of their

presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are: xxx (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary

public except last wills and testaments; xxx

Notarization confers a public character upon private documents so that, for

the purposes of admissibility in court, no further evidence is required to prove the
document's authenticity. The notary public swears to the truth of the document's
contents and its due execution. In Antillon v. Barcelon:

The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents.

When a notary public certifies the due execution and delivery of a document under
his hand and seal he thereby gives such a document the force of evidence.

Indeed, one of the very purposes of requiring documents to be

acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should
surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such

986
documents to be given in evidence without further proof of their execution and
delivery.

Thus, notaries public are cautioned to take due care in notarizing

documents to ensure the public's confidence in notarized documents.

Under the Rules on Evidence, notarized documents are clothed with the
presumption of regularity; that is, that the notary public had the authority to
certify the documents as duly executed. A last will and testament, however, is
specifically excluded from the application of Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court. This implies that when the document being presented as evidence is a last
will and testament, further evidence is necessary to prove its due execution,
whether notarized or not.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The old and new
provisions are the same except that under the amended rule, an additional
provision was added under public document. The following provision is added:
“Documents that are considered public documents under treaties and
conventions which are in force between the Philippines and the country of
source.”

987
Section 20 – Proof of Private Document

Imperial VS Bayaban
G.R. No. 197626, October 3, 2018

FACTS:

On December 14, 2003, at about 3:00 p.m., two (2) vehicles, a van and a
tricycle, figured in an accident along Sumulong Highway, Antipolo City. The
Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number USX 931 was owned and registered under
Imperial’s name, and was driven by Laraga. The tricycle with plate number DU
8833 was driven by Gerardo Mercado (Mercado). On board the tricycle were the
Bayaban Spouses, who sustained injuries. They were brought to Unciano Hospital.
For the injuries they sustained, the Bayaban Spouses had to undergo therapy and
post-medical treatment.

The Bayaban Spouses demanded compensation from Imperial, Laraga, and

Mercado for the hospital bills and loss of income that they sustained while
undergoing therapy and post-medical treatment. When neither Imperial, Laraga,
nor Mercado heeded their demand, the Bayaban Spouses filed a Complaint for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City

In his Answer, Imperial denied liability, contending that the van was under
the custody of one Rosalia Habon Pascua (Pascua). According to Imperial, he lent
the van to Pascua who needed it in fixing the greenhouse and water line pipes in
Imperial’s garden somewhere in Antipolo. Imperial admitted that he had
employed Laraga as family driver but contended that he had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of Laraga.He even allegedly sponsored
Laraga’s formal driving lessons. Furthermore, Laraga was allegedly acting outside
the scope of his duties when the accident happened considering that it was a
Sunday, his rest day.

RTC ruled in favor of the Bayaban Spouses. It found Laraga negligent and
the proximate cause of the accident.

The Regional Trial Court held that the official receipts presented in
evidence substantiated the Bayaban Spouses’ claim for reimbursement of medical
and hospital expenses. However, it found the certificates of employment
inadequate to prove the amount of their unearned income to settle the amount of
damages.

988
 The Court of Appeals likewise found that Imperial failed to prove that he
had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Laraga. Apart from
his bare allegation that he had financed the formal driving lessons of Laraga, he
failed to present documentary evidence that he did so. He could not even
remember the name of the driving school where Laraga had allegedly enrolled.
However, the Court of Appeals deleted the award of temperate damages because
the claim was allegedly not substantiated. It added that temperate and actual
damages were mutually exclusive and could not be awarded at the same time.

Thus this present case. Petitioner maintains that he is not liable because
respondents failed to discharge their burden of proving that Laraga was acting
within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the accident. Furthermore, the
official receipts of the medical and hospital bills, though original, were allegedly
not authenticated as required under Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court.
Therefore, these receipts are not competent evidence of the actual damages
sustained by Neil and respondent Mary Lou.

ISSUE:

Are the original receipts of the medical and hospital bills presented by
respondents Neil Bayaban and Mary Lou Bayaban competent evidence of the
actual damages that they have sustained considering that the receipts were not
authenticated?

HELD:

Yes.

The pieces of evidence are admissible.

Petitioner nevertheless claims that the official receipts of the medical and
hospital bills are not competent evidence of the actual damages allegedly
sustained by the Bayaban Spouses for not having been authenticated. He,
therefore, cannot be held liable for unsubstantiated claims for actual damages.

Under the rules of evidence, documents are either public or private. Public
documents are those exclusively enumerated in Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules
of Court. These include written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of
the Philippines, or of a foreign country; documents acknowledged before a notary
public except last wills and testaments; and public records, kept in the Philippines,
of private documents required by law to be entered there. When public documents

989
are presented in evidence, they are prima facie evidence of the facts stated there,
and thus, need not be authenticated.

As for private documents, i.e., those not enumerated in Rule 132, Section
19, they must be authenticated, or their due execution and authenticity proven,
per Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, thus:

Section 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any
other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

Official receipts of hospital and medical expenses are not among those
enumerated in Rule 132, Section 19. These official receipts, therefore, are private
documents which may be authenticated either by presenting as witness anyone
who saw the document executed or written, or by presenting an evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

In insisting that respondents should have presented as witnesses the

persons who signed the official receipts, petitioner ignores the first manner of
authenticating private documents. Respondent Mary Lou testified as to the
circumstances of the accident and the expenses she and Neil had incurred as a
result of it.The official receipts were issued to her and Neil upon payment of the
expenses. Since the official receipts were issued to respondent Mary Lou, her
testimony, therefore, is a competent evidence of the execution of the official
receipts.

With respondent Mary Lou testifying as to the execution and issuance of

the official receipts, they were duly authenticated, contrary to petitioner's claim.
There being no question that the official receipts were all in the original, they were
the best evidence of their contents, specifically, of the actual damages incurred by
the Bayaban Spouses. The Regional Trial Court correctly admitted the receipts in
evidence.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 20, Rule 132 of the
new rules now provides that the due execution and authenticity of private
documents may be proved ‘by other evidence showing its due execution and
authenticity.’ The new rules are now broader in scope.

990
Section 23 - Public documents as evidence

William G. Kwong Management, Inc. v. Diamond Homeowners & Residents

Association
G.R. No. 211353, June 10, 2019

FACTS:

Diamond Subdivision is a residential subdivision with several commercial

establishments operating within it such as beer houses, karaoke bars, night clubs,
and other drinking joints. Because of these, patrons, customers, and many other
people freely come in and out of Diamond Subdivision. Such unrestricted access
to the subdivision, however, also exposed its residents to incidents of
robbery, akyat-bahay, prostitution, rape, loud music, and noise that would last until
the wee hours of the morning. Diamond Homeowners & Resident Association
(Diamond Homeowners) raised these peace and security issues with the Angeles
City Council.

Subsequently, the Angeles City Council issued Ordinance No. 132, series of
2003, reclassifying Diamond Subdivision as exclusively residential and prohibited
the further establishment and operation of any business except for those already
existing. However, this Ordinance was not complied with as more beer gardens
and nightclubs were still put up.

Among those affected was William G. Kwong (Kwong). A resident of

Diamond Subdivision for more than 38 years, he runs 3 motels in the subdivision
under his company, William G. Kwong Management, Inc.

Seeking to address his security concerns, Kwong proposed to his

neighbors that guard posts with telephone lines be set up at the entry and exit
points on the street where he resides to screen all incoming and outgoing
visitors. However, the other residents of Diamond Subdivision also wanted their
security concerns addressed. Thus, to safeguard the whole subdivision, Diamond
Homeowners proposed the "No Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy (the Policy).

Kwong, however, contested the Policy. When Diamond Homeowners did

not heed his objection, Kwong filed before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board Regional Office a Complaint for the issuance of a cease and
desist order with application for a temporary restraining order.

991
 The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional Office ruled in
favor of Kwong and issued a Cease and Desist Order and a Temporary Restraining
Order. The records were later forwarded to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board Arbiter for final disposition. It lifted the Cease and Desist Order and
dismissed Kwong's Complaint. On appeal before the Board of Commissioners of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the Arbiter's ruling was reversed.
The Office of the President affirmed the Board of Commissioners' Decision in toto.
It noted that the factual findings of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board,
as the administrative agency with the technical expertise on the matter, were
entitled to great respect. Diamond Homeowners elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals granted Diamond
Homeowners' Petition and set aside the Office of the President's Decision. Hence,
this petition.

Petitioners deny that there are security concerns within the subdivision.
They claim that the Policy was enacted based on a speculative, conjectural, and
negative exaggeration of the actual situation, as there is no single evidence of an
actual crime committed. Likewise, they submit that Ordinance No. 132 cannot be
considered as competent evidence of the alleged criminality in the subdivision.

ISSUE:

Is Ordinance No. 132 a prima facie evidence of the security concerns in

Diamond Subdivision?

RULING:

Yes.

The case records reveal that Diamond Subdivision was experiencing

security concerns.

In Ordinance No. 132, the Angeles City Council acknowledged that

Diamond Subdivision had been having security problems that seriously affected
the homeowners and residents.

Ordinance No. 132 explicitly states that "with the present classification of
Diamond Subdivision[,] constant problems of peace and order have confronted
the homeowners and residents affecting their lives, property[,] and security.”

992
 Ordinance No. 132 is a public document. Under Rule 132, Section 19(a) of
the Rules of Court, written official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines are public documents.

Public documents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated m them. Rule
132, Section 23 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 23. Public documents as evidence. - Documents consisting of

entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents
are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter.

Thus, there is prima facie evidence of the security and safety issues within
Diamond Subdivision.

Besides, these security concerns were affirmed by petitioner Kwong

himself. In his August 3, 2006 Letter, he acknowledged that there was a "sharp
increase in criminal activities" in Diamond Subdivision, "a number of which
remain[ed] unreported." He also proposed to shoulder the costs of putting up
security gates on both entry and exit points of the street where he resides, and
the hiring of security guards to screen incoming and outgoing visitors. These
constitute admissions, or declarations "as to a relevant fact that may be given in
evidence against him."

Petitioner Kwong presented no evidence to counter these documents. Thus,

this Court affirms that Diamond Subdivision was experiencing security concerns.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

993
 Iris Rodriguez v. Your Own Home Development Corporation (YOHDC)
G.R. No. 199451, August 15, 2018

FACTS:
This case originated from a low-cost housing project in Occidental
Mindoro, which YOHDC entered into with its partner, Archangel Corporation.
Iris' husband, Tarcisius Rodriguez (Tarcisius), was hired as the project
coordinator/manager.

Tasked to find land suited for the project, Tarcisius found a property
owned by Rosa Rosillas (Rosillas) and proceeded to negotiate with her.
According to YOHDC, Rosillas agreed to sell the land for P1,200,000.00.
However, Tarcisius misrepresented to the partner corporations that Rosillas had
asked for P4,000,000.00 instead. Rosillas was paid P1,200,000.00 in two (2)
installments. Despite this, Tarcisius still requested for two (2) more checks in
Rosillas' name, each for P500,000.00, insisting that the land was acquired for
P4,000,000.00. Thus, YOHDC issued Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank) Check Nos. 1181043810 and 1181043843 (Rosillas' Checks). Aside
from this, Tarcisius also requested for two (2) more checks to pay the surveyor
of Rosillas' property, Engineer Senen Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), in the amount
of P254,400.00 each.

Tarcisius received all four (4) checks. However, instead of delivering them
to Rosillas and Delos Reyes, Tarcisius and his wife, Iris, (collectively, the
Rodriguez Spouses), deposited two (2) checks — one of Rosillas' Checks and one
of Delos Reyes' Checks — totaling P754,400.00 in their personal Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) Account No. 3293-0730-06. The other two (2) checks
were deposited in the Rodriguez Spouses' other personal bank account, BPI
Account No. 0065-0506-25.

YOHDC eventually discovered the irregularities on Rosillas' and Delos

Reyes' checks after it received reports of project anomalies, such as padding of
expenses and overpricing.

YOHDC demanded from Tarcisius the amount of the checks which he

failed to return. Tarcisius then requested to settle YOHDC's claim by way of
transferring properties. However, no settlement was reached with Tarcisius, so
YOHDC pursued its claim against the banks.

YOHDC first sought reimbursement from Metrobank, which advised it to

direct its claim against BPI. BPI suggested that YOHDC course its documents

994
through Metrobank. Pursuant to Metrobank's instructions, YOHDC submitted
Rosillas' and Delos Reyes' Checks and affidavits to Metrobank, which, in turn,
forwarded them to BPI. BPI then advised the Rodriguez Spouses to deposit the
amount of P1,508,800.00 in their BPI bank account so that it could respond to
YOHDC's complaint.

The Rodriguez Spouses complied and deposited the amount of

P1,508,800.00 in their BPI Account No. 3293-0994-39. However, they requested
BPI to suspend its action on YOHDC's claim and instructed it not to deduct the
amount until they have clarified the matter. BPI denied this request and sent
Metrobank Special Clearing Receipt No. 065273 to reimburse the amounts of the
four (4) checks totaling P1,508,000.00. Thereafter, Metrobank credited the
amount to YOHDC.

These events prompted the Rodriguez Spouses to file a Complaint for

Damages against YOHDC, BPI, Metrobank, Rosillas, and Delos Reyes, among
others. The Rodriguez Spouses claimed that Rosillas' Checks were received by
Rosillas' agent, Godofredo Syquioco (Syquioco). As for Delos Reyes' Checks, the
Rodriguez Spouses asserted that Delos Reyes received P424,000.00 from the
proceeds of Metrobank Check Nos. 181043813 and 181043841. They claimed that
all four (4) checks were encashed through BPI with the assistance of Iris.
On August 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case against Rosillas,
Delos Reyes, Metrobank, and BPI. However, it noted that in Delos Reyes'
Answer dated July 9, 1995, he admitted receiving portions of the proceeds of his
Checks in the amount of P424,000.00.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified in its July 18, 2011 Decision the
Regional Trial Court August 13, 2007 Decision. It found that the principle
against unjust enrichment did not apply. It did not lend credence to Delos Reyes'
admission in his Answer regarding an Acknowledgement dated June 9, 1995,
which he allegedly signed (Delos Reyes' Acknowledgement). It found that the
document is a private document, the execution and authenticity of which were
not proven as required by the rules of evidence.

Instead, the Court of Appeals lent credence to the evidence presented by

YOHDC, consisting of payment receipts to Delos Reyes, and Delos Reyes' duly
notarized Affidavit dated March 14, 1995 (Delos Reyes' Affidavit), which stated
that he never received, encashed, or deposited the checks.

She argues that in Delos Reyes' Answer filed with the Regional Trial
Court, he admitted the existence of his Acknowledgment and receipt of the
amount of P424,000.00. She also points out that there is no substantial disparity

995
between the numbers of Delos Reyes' Checks and the numbers of the checks
stated in Delos Reyes' Acknowledgment.

She claims that the subsequent execution of his July 9, 1995 Answer and
of his June 9, 1995 Acknowledgment constitutes an abandonment of his March
14, 1995 Affidavit, where he denied the receipt or encashment of his Checks.

ISSUE:
Is the court is bound by Delos Reyes’ admission in the answer?

HELD:
No.

This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals and gives more
credence to Delos Reyes' Affidavit, which is a public document.

A notarized document is presumed valid, regular, and genuine. It carries

evidentiary weight with respect to its due execution. As such, it need not be
proven authentic before it is admitted into evidence. On its face, it is entitled to
full faith and credit, and is deemed to be in full force and effect.

To nullify a notarized document on account of flaws and defects, there

must be a strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity. The required
quantum of proof is a clear, strong, and convincing evidence.

The rationale for this rule is to maintain public confidence in the integrity
of notarized documents.

In contrast, private documents must first be authenticated before they

could be admitted in evidence. To establish their authenticity, the best proof
available must be presented.

However, authentication may not be necessary where the document's

genuineness and due execution were admitted by the adverse party.
However, this rule presents a caveat in that the admission of the document's
authenticity must be categorical:

In the case at bar, Delos Reyes' Acknowledgement is a private document.

Thus, for Iris to rely on it, she must have first proven its genuineness and
authenticity by presenting the best proof available. As such, she should have

996
presented Delos Reyes to testify on its genuineness and due execution. However,
Iris merely relied on Delos Reyes' Answer and Acknowledgement on their faces.
Delos Reyes neither appeared in court to attest to the allegations of his
Acknowledgement or to explain his Answer, nor presented as Iris' witness.

Assuming that the statements in Delos Reyes' Answer are binding

admissions, these admissions only pertain to the existence of his
Acknowledgment. He neither categorically stated its genuineness and
authenticity, nor admitted its allegations. Moreover, while he admitted the
receipt of P424,000.00, he excluded from his admission that it was from the
Metrobank checks stated in the Rodriguez Spouses' Complaint. Thus, the
amount he received cannot be assumed to have been from the proceeds of his
Checks or that it was payment made to him on behalf of YOHDC as these claims
must still be proven.

Moreover, this Court notes that Delos Reyes never denied his notarized
Affidavit's allegations even though his Acknowledgement's allegations are
inconsistent with them.

Hence, this Court assumes that the Acknowledgement is in the nature of

a retraction. This Court has consistently held that retractions are looked upon
with disfavor because of its unreliable nature and the likely probability that it
may again be repudiated.

In retractions it is important to consider a witness' surrounding

circumstances and motives for changing his or her stance.

There must be a comparison of the two (2) testimonies and the general
rules of evidence must still be applied.In the case at bar, considering the evidence
presented by the parties, this Court hesitates to accord Delos Reyes' retraction
any weight or credibility.

This Court is not bound by Delos Reyes' alleged admission in his Answer.
In the case at bar, assuming Delos Reyes' Acknowledgement is genuine, he
provided no satisfactory explanation for his contradictory statements in his
Affidavit. He did not appear in court to clarify the matter or elucidate any
circumstance that could explain what happened between the executions of these
two (2) documents.

The only logical explanation that could reconcile the two (2) documents is
if this Court assumes that the Rodriguez Spouses paid Delos Reyes the amount
of P424,000.00 sometime after he executed his Affidavit. However, if this is the

997
case, that payment on behalf of YOHDC is not authorized since the Rodriguez
Spouses did not represent YOHDC in any manner. Moreover, it can be assumed
that Tarcisius' authority to represent YOHDC had been impliedly revoked
considering the incidents on Delos Reyes' and Rosillas' Checks.

Thus, if Delos Reyes was paid by the Rodriguez Spouses on behalf of

YOHDC, this payment is unauthorized. Iris' cause of action is with Delos Reyes,
and not with YOHDC.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

998
Section 24 - Proof of Official Record

Racho v. Seiichi Tanaka

G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018

FACTS:

Racho and Tanaka were married on April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City. They
lived in Japan for 9 years and had no children. According to Racho, Tanaka filed
for divorce on December 16, 2009 which was granted. This was evidenced by the
Divorce Certificate issued the Japanese Consulate in the Philippines, and
authenticated by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Racho filed the Divorce
Certificate with the Philippine Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan, where she was
informed that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to
return to the Philippines to report the documents for registration and to file the
appropriate case for judicial recognition of divorce. Upon return, she tried to have
the Divorce Certificate registered in the Philippines in Civil Registry of Manila,
National Statistics Office and the DFA for her passport renewal, however, her
request were denied because there was no court order recognizing the divorce
decree.

Racho then filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of

Capacity to Marry with the RTC. The RTC denied the Petition and ruled that Racho
failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. It stated that while she was
able to prove Tanaka's national law, the Divorce Certificate was not competent
evidence since it was not the divorce decree itself. When the case reached the Court
of Appeals, Racho argued that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by
agreement becomes effective upon notification, whether oral or written, by both
parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. Therefore, the Divorce Certificate stating
"Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce that was issued is sufficient to
prove the divorce by agreement and have already effected notification of the
divorce.

ISSUE:

Is the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce sufficient to

prove the fact that a divorce between petitioner Racho and respondent Tanaka
was validly obtained by the latter according to his national law?

HELD:

Yes.

999
 Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is insufficient.
In the case of Garcia v. Recio, the Supreme Court established the principle that
before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this jurisdiction, a separate action
must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that the divorce decree and the
national law of the foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like any other fact
before trial courts.

In this case, Tanaka’s national law was duly admitted by the RTC when
Racho presented "a copy of the English Version of the Civil Code of Japan
translated under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice and the Code of
Translation Committee. To prove the fact of divorce, Racho presented the Divorce
Certificate issued by Consul Takayama of Japan on January 18, 2010. However,
this Certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or the Acceptance
Certification of Notification of Divorce, exists. It is not the divorce decree itself. In
a divorce by agreement, the same becomes effective by notification, orally or in a
document signed by both parties and two or more witnesses of full age, in
accordance with the provisions of Family Registration Law of Japan. Thus, while
Tanaka’s national law was duly admitted, Racho failed to present sufficient
evidence before the RTC that a divorce was validly obtained according to the
national law of her foreign spouse. The Regional Trial Court would not have erred
in dismissing her Petition. However, upon appeal to the Supreme Court, Racho
submitted a Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce, certifying that
the divorce issued by Susumu Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama
Prefecture, has been accepted on December 16, 2009. The seal on the document
was authenticated by Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Japan.

Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official
records that are kept in a foreign country requires that it must be accompanied by
a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in that foreign country.

The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by

an Authentication issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of the
Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan. The
Authentication further certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine.
Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of

1000
Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between petitioner and
respondent.

The Regional Trial Court established that according to the national law of
Japan, a divorce by agreement "becomes effective by notification." Considering
that the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was duly authenticated,
the divorce between petitioner and respondent was validly obtained according to
respondent's national law.

Therefore, By virtue of Article 26, second paragraph of the Family Code and
the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce dated December 16, 2009,
petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho is declared capacitated to remarry.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1001
 Arreza v. Toyo
G.R. No. 213198. July 1, 2019

FACTS:

Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese

citizen, were married in Quezon City. After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a
Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of Konohana-ku, Osaka
City, Japan received on February 4, 2011. It was later recorded in Tetsushi's family
register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu.

Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry.In support of
her Petition, Genevieve submitted a copy of their Divorce Certificate, Tetsushi's
Family Register, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce, and
an English translation of the Civil Code of Japan, among others.

After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial
Court set the case for hearing on October 16, 2012. On the day of the hearing, no
one appeared to oppose the Petition. After the jurisdictional requirements were
established and marked, trial on the merits ensued.

The RTC denied the Genevieve’s petition. It decreed that while the pieces of
evidence presented by Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement was
accepted by the local government of Japan, she nevertheless failed to prove the
copy of Japan's law. The Regional Trial Court noted that the copy of the Civil Code
of Japan and its English translation submitted by Genevieve were not duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila,
or the Department of Foreign Affairs. Genevieve filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was later on denied. Thus, Genevieve filed before this
Court the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in not treating the English
translation of the Civil Code of Japan as an official publication in accordance with
Rule 131, Section 3 (gg) of the Rules of Court since it was printed "under
authorization of the Ministry of Justice. That it is an official publication, she points
out, makes it a self-authenticating evidence of Japan's law under Rule 132, Section
25 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in not
considering the English translation of the Japan Civil Code as a learned treatise
and in refusing to take judicial notice of its authors' credentials.

ISSUE:

1002
 Is the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation sufficient
to prove Japan's law on divorce?

RULING:

No.

Settled is the rule that in actions involving the recognition of a foreign

divorce judgment, it is indispensable that the petitioner prove not only the
foreign judgment granting the divorce, but also the alien spouse's national law.
This rule is rooted in the fundamental theory that Philippine courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.
As explained in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas: The starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his [or her] claim
or defense.
Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse's national law,
purported to be official acts of a sovereign authority, can be established by
complying with the mandate of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of
Court:
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Here, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the documents petitioner
submitted to prove the divorce decree have complied with the demands of Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25. However, it found the copy of the Japan Civil Code and
its English translation insufficient to prove Japan's law on divorce. It noted that

1003
these documents were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan,
the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 24 of Rule 132 of
the new rules included new amendments. The new rule provides an additional
paragraph “If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, which
is a contracting party to a treaty or convention to which the Philippines is also a
party, or considered a public document under such treaty or convention
pursuant to paragraph (c) of Section 19 hereof, the certificate or its equivalent
shall be in the form prescribed by such treaty or convention subject to reciprocity
granted to public documents originating from the Philippines. “and also
removed “If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country” and
changed it to “For documents originating from a foreign country which is not a
contracting party to a treaty or convention referred to in the next preceding
sentence,…” Hence, the new rules provide that the treaty, to which the
Philippines is a contracting party, shall govern the form of the certificate of its
equivalent, subject to reciprocity granted to public documents originating from
the Philippines. The aforementioned change also now affords a distinction as to
whether or not the public document originated from a country with which the
Philippines has a treaty. As regards Section 25 of Rule 132 of the new rules, there
is an amendment only to address gender sensitivity.

1004
Section 25 - What attestation of copy must state

Arreza v. Toyo
G.R. No. 213198. July 1, 2019

FACTS:

Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese

citizen, were married in Quezon City. After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a
Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of Konohana-ku, Osaka
City, Japan received on February 4, 2011. It was later recorded in Tetsushi's family
register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu.

Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. In support
of her Petition, Genevieve submitted a copy of their Divorce Certificate, Tetsushi's
Family Register, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce, and
an English translation of the Civil Code of Japan, among others.

After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial
Court set the case for hearing on October 16, 2012. On the day of the hearing, no
one appeared to oppose the Petition. After the jurisdictional requirements were
established and marked, trial on the merits ensued.

The RTC denied the Genevieve’s petition. It decreed that while the pieces of
evidence presented by Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement was
accepted by the local government of Japan, she nevertheless failed to prove the
copy of Japan's law. The Regional Trial Court noted that the copy of the Civil Code
of Japan and its English translation submitted by Genevieve were not duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila,
or the Department of Foreign Affairs. Genevieve filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was later on denied. Thus, Genevieve filed before this
Court the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in not treating the English
translation of the Civil Code of Japan as an official publication in accordance with
Rule 131, Section 3 (gg) of the Rules of Court since it was printed "under
authorization of the Ministry of Justice. That it is an official publication, she points
out, makes it a self-authenticating evidence of Japan's law under Rule 132, Section
25 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in not
considering the English translation of the Japan Civil Code as a learned treatise
and in refusing to take judicial notice of its authors' credentials.

1005
ISSUE:

Is the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation sufficient
to prove Japan's law on divorce?

RULING:

No.
Settled is the rule that in actions involving the recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment, it is indispensable that the petitioner prove not only the
foreign judgment granting the divorce, but also the alien spouse's national law.
This rule is rooted in the fundamental theory that Philippine courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.
As explained in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas: The starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his [or her] claim
or defense.
Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse's national law,
purported to be official acts of a sovereign authority, can be established by
complying with the mandate of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of
Court:
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Here, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the documents petitioner
submitted to prove the divorce decree have complied with the demands of Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25. However, it found the copy of the Japan Civil Code and
its English translation insufficient to prove Japan's law on divorce. It noted that

1006
these documents were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan,
the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. Section 24 of Rule 132 of
the new rules included new amendments. The new rule provides an additional
paragraph “If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, which
is a contracting party to a treaty or convention to which the Philippines is also a
party, or considered a public document under such treaty or convention
pursuant to paragraph (c) of Section 19 hereof, the certificate or its equivalent
shall be in the form prescribed by such treaty or convention subject to reciprocity
granted to public documents originating from the Philippines. “and also
removed “If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country” and
changed it to “For documents originating from a foreign country which is not a
contracting party to a treaty or convention referred to in the next preceding
sentence,…” Hence, the new rules provide that the treaty, to which the
Philippines is a contracting party, shall govern the form of the certificate of its
equivalent, subject to reciprocity granted to public documents originating from
the Philippines. The aforementioned change also now affords a distinction as to
whether or not the public document originated from a country with which the
Philippines has a treaty. As regards Section 25 of Rule 132 of the new rules, there
is an amendment only to address gender sensitivity.

1007
Section 31 - Alterations in document, how to explain

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF GABRIEL Q. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015

FACTS:

The Republic, on behalf of the DPWH, filed a Verified Complaint for

Expropriation against the heirs of Fernandez, who owned a lot in Barangay Tuyo,
Balanga, Bataan. There was a dispute as to the valuation of the lot. The parties
presented as evidence two different sets of the Bureau of Internal Revenue’s zonal
valuations covering the barangay, and while petitioner’s copy contained
typewritten annotations, respondent’s did not. No explanation was made by
petitioner as to the annotations in the document it presented.

ISSUE:

Is a document admissible as evidence if it contains typewritten annotations

that were not explained?

RULING:

No.

A document containing typewritten annotations is not admissible if the party

presenting it does not account for the alterations.

Rule 132(B), Section 31 of the Rules of Evidence provides that it there is an

alteration in the document, the party producing a document as genuine which has
been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material
to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the
alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the
consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made,
or that the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If
he fails to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence.

Since there was a discrepancy as to the two certifications presented by the

parties, reference must be made to the zonal values posted by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue on their website. The zonal values therein is the same document
presented by respondents Heirs of Fernandez. It is clear, therefore, that alterations
were made to the Republic’s photocopy of the zonal values, alterations which were
not properly authenticated in court. No witness was presented to testify on the

1008
typewritten annotations. There was no evidence presented that the Bureau of
Internal Revenue or any of its officers consented to the typewritten annotations.
There was also no explanation given by the Republic as to why there were
typewritten annotations to what otherwise appeared to be a genuine document.
Hence, it is not admissible as evidence.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The amendments
introduced by the New Rules, Section 31, Rule 132, is only to address gender
sensitivity.

1009
 C
Offer and Objection

Section 34 - Offer of evidence

Republic vs. Gimenez and Gimenez

G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016

FACTS:

The Republic, through the PCGG, instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance,

Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses
before the Sandiganbayan. The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth
acquired by them as dummies, agents, or nominees of former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos.

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the

positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the
Gimenez Spouses. The Republic presented the testimonies of witnesses testified
on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez
Spouses.

The Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further
evidence." Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until
March 29, 2006 "to file its formal offer of evidence."

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days
or until April 28, 2006, within which to file its formal offer of evidence. The Motion
was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same date.

On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until
May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. This Motion was
granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8, 2006.

Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the

Republic.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that
the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated
extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated its presentation of
evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer
of Evidence.

1010
 Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated
May 30, 2006. He argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was
no evidence to support its cause of action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to
Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to prosecute. Through her
own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.

Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June
15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed
Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the

Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the
Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss.

The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Does the failure of the Republic to formally offer its evidence fatal?

RULING:

No. Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that
evidence must be formally offered to be considered by the court. Evidence not
offered is excluded in the determination of the case. Failure to make a formal offer
within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it.
However, the Supreme Court has long acknowledged the policy of the
government to recover the assets and properties illegally acquired or
misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his wife Mrs. Imelda
R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,
agents or nominees. Hence, the Supreme Court has adopted a liberal approach
regarding technical rules of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten
wealth. To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit,
belatedly. Petitioner hurdled 19 years of trial before the Sandiganbayan to present
its evidence as shown in its extensive Formal Offer of Evidence.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1011
 Gotesco Properties v. Solidbank Corporation
G.R. No. 209452, July 26, 2017

FACTS:

In 1995, Gotesco obtained from Solidbank a term loan of P300 million

through its President, Mr. Jose Go (Mr. Go). To secure the loan, Gotesco was
required to execute a Mortgage Trust Indenture (Indenture) naming Solidbank-
Trust Division as Trustee.

The Indenture obliged Gotesco to mortgage several parcels of land in

favor of Solidbank. One (1) of the lots mortgaged and used as a collateral was a
property located in San Fernando, Pampanga. A stipulation in the Indenture also
irrevocably appointed Solidbank-Trust Division as Gotesco's attorney-in-
fact. Under the Indenture, Gotesco also agreed to "at all times maintain the
Sound Value of the Collateral."

When the loan was about to mature, Gotesco found it difficult to meet its
obligation and Gotesco sent a letter to Solidbank proposing to restructure the
loan obligation. The loan restructuring agreement proposed to extend the
payment period to seven (7) years. The suggested period included a two (2)-year
grace period.

In its February 9, 2000 letter, Solidbank informed Gotesco of a substantial

reduction in the appraised value of its mortgaged properties. Based on an
appraisal report submitted to Solidbank, the sound value of the
mortgaged properties at that time was at P381,245,840.00. Since the necessary
collateral to loan ratio was 200%, Solidbank held that there was a deficiency in
the collateral, which Gotesco had to address. Solidbank required Gotesco to
replace or add to the mortgaged properties. Gotesco construed the February 9,
2000 letter as Solidbank's implied agreement to the loan restructuring proposal.
However, Gotesco found it unnecessary to address the alleged deficiency in the
collateral. It insisted that the aggregate sound value of the
mortgaged properties had not changed and was still at P1,076,905,000.00.

Solidbank sent a demand letter dated June 7, 2000 to Gotesco as the loan
became due. Despite having received this demand letter, Gotesco failed to pay
the outstanding obligation. Solidbank then filed a Petition for the Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of the lot through Atty. Wilfrido Mangiliman (Atty. Mangiliman), a
notary public. The public auction was held on August 31, 2000
and Solidbank was declared the winning bidder.

1012
 On February 5, 2001, Gotesco filed a complaint for Annulment of
Foreclosure Proceedings, Specific Performance, and Damages against Solidbank,
Atty. Mangiliman, and the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later
on, Solidbank also filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession. The two (2) cases were consolidated before Branch 42, Regional Trial
Court, San Fernando, Pampanga. Gotesco assailed the validity of the foreclosure
proceeding claiming that it was premature and without legal basis. According
to Gotesco, the jurisdictional requirements prescribed under Act No. 3135 were
not complied with. First, Solidbank did not furnish Gotesco copies of the
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, notice of sale, and certificate of sale. Even
assuming the original period for loan payment was not extended, the
prerequisites for the foreclosure proceeding provided in the Indenture were not
met.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, Solidbank alleged, among others,

that it never entered into a restructuring agreement with Gotesco and that
Solidbank complied with the publication and posting requirements laid down
by Act No. 3135.

The RTC dismissed Gotesco's complaint for the annulment of the

foreclosure proceeding and granted the Writ of Possession in Solidbank's favor.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA also declared Gotesco in default.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner Gotesco insists, among others, that

respondent Solidbank agreed to restructure its loan. It continues to argue that
respondent impliedly accepted petitioner's proposal when it asked for an
increase in the collateral. Respondent reneged on the restructuring agreement
when it caused the foreclosure of the property prematurely.

Respondent denies that it agreed to restructure petitioner's loan. It

emphasized that petitioner has not shown any concrete proof that respondent
accepted the proposal. Moreover, the alleged restructuring agreement was not
offered in evidence and cannot be considered by this Court.

ISSUE:

Was there a valid restructuring agreement entered into and accepted by

the respondent?

RULING:

1013
 No.

There was no valid restructuring agreement entered into and accepted by

the respondent.

The Civil Code requires absolute acceptance of the offer before it can be
considered a binding contract. For a proposal to bind a party, there must be proof
that it consented to all the terms on offer. To prove that the original period of
payment was extended, petitioner must show that respondent unequivocally
accepted the offer.

In this case, petitioner points to respondent's February 9, 2000 letter

claiming that if respondent had not agreed to the proposal, it would not have
asked for additional collateral. However, respondent's February 9, 2000 letter
showed no indication that it extended the loan's payment period. It did not even
mention any restructuring proposal. The demand to address the deficiency in
the loan's security cannot be interpreted as an implied agreement to restructure
the loan. Futher, petitioner did not present any shred of evidence which would
prove that respondent agreed to restructure the loan. At best, petitioner only
alleged that it sent a letter to respondent to ask for a debt restructuring. However,
sending a proposal is not enough. There must be proof that respondent expressly
accepted the offer. Without an absolute acceptance, there is no concurrence of
minds. Since the loan restructuring which Gotesco proposed was not accepted,
there is no question that petitioner defaulted on the payment of its loan.

Thus, this Court cannot bind respondent to stipulations it never

consented to.

Furthermore, under the rules, the courts cannot consider any evidence not
formally offered. In Spouses Ong v. Court of Appeals, the SC explained that “a
formal offer is necessary, since judges are required to base their findings of fact
and their judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties
at the trial. To allow parties to attach any document to their pleadings and then
expect the court to consider it as evidence, even without formal offer and
admission, may draw unwarranted consequences. Opposing parties will be
deprived of their chance to examine the document and to object to its
admissibility.”

Here, petitioner did not offer the alleged restructuring agreement in

evidence. As respondent points out, the theory that the loan was restructured is
hinged on the January 24, 2000 letter from petitioner. However, this letter which

1014
allegedly proposed the restructuring of petitioner's obligation was not offered in
evidence.

Thus, as the CA correctly held, that there was no perfected restructuring

agreement between the parties.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1015
Section 36 – Objection

Amoguis, v. Ballado
G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018

FACTS:

On November 24, 196, the Ballado Spouse entered into Contracts with
owner and developer St. Joseph Realty, Ltd. (St. Joseph Realty) to buy on
installment parcels of land, which were designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2, and were
located in Block No. 1, Dadiangas Heights Subdivision, General Santos City. The
Ballado Spouses initially paid a total of P500.00 for the lots, and had to pay
P107.13 and P97.15 per month for Lot Nos. 1 and 2, respectively, both for 180
months starting on December 30, 1969. St. Joseph Realty characterized the
contracts as contracts to sell and provided for automatic rescission and
cancellation. The Ballado Spouses amortized until 1979 when Crisanto Pinili
(Pinili), St. Joseph Realty's collector, refused to receive their payments. They
erected a small house made of light materials for their caretaker. Pinili informed
them that it was an eyesore and was against the rules of the subdivision. He
advised to suspend the payment for the lots, and directed the Ballado Spouses to
remove the small house before payments could continue. He also promised to
return and collect after he had put their records in order, but he never did.
Francisco informed St. Joseph Realty that the small house had already been taken
down, but Pinili still did not come to collect. On February 17, 1987, the Ballado
Spouses discovered that St. Joseph Realty rescinded their contracts. They found
out that St. Joseph Realty had sent written demands to pay to the address of Lot
Nos. 1 and 2, and not to their residence as declared in the contracts.

Meanwhile, on February 9, 1987, St. Joseph Realty sold Lot Nos. 1 and 2 to
Epifanio Amoguis (Epifanio), father of Gregorio Amoguis (Gregorio) and Tito
Amoguis (Tito) (collectively, the Amoguis Brothers). On August 18, 1987, titles
were issued in the Amoguis Brothers' names. Ballado confronted the Amoguis
Brothers when he saw that the barbed fences, which he had installed around the
lots, were taken down. Epifanio told him that he bought the lots from St. Joseph
Realty. Thereafter, the Amoguis Brothers took down Francisco's mango and chico
trees.

Compelled by these events, the Ballado Spouses filed a Complaint for

damages, injunction with writ of preliminary injunction, mandatory injunction,
cancellation and annulment of titles, and attorney's fees.

1016
 They also prayed for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Amoguis
Brothers from erecting walls around the lots. St. Joseph Realty filed its Answer. It
was its affirmative defense that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear
the case, and that jurisdiction was properly vested in the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the Ballado
Spouses, and against St. Joseph Realty and the Amoguis Brothers.

Only the Amoguis Brothers timely filed their appeal brief. The Amoguis
Brothers argued that the Regional Trial Court should have considered valid the
rescission or cancellation of the contract to sell, and that they should not have been
declared as buyers in bad faith. They contended that the evidence presented by
the Ballado Spouses should not have been considered as it was not formally
offered. They averred that in case there was no valid rescission or cancellation of
contract, St. Joseph Realty should have been ordered to pay them the cost of their
improvements, attorney's fees, litigation expense, and moral and exemplary
damages. They did not raise the Regional Trial Court's lack of jurisdiction.

On September 26, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision,

affirming the Regional Trial Court Decision. Though not raised, the Court of
Appeals discussed at the outset the issue of jurisdiction. Since the Ballado Spouses
wanted St. Joseph Realty to comply with the provisions of the contracts to sell, the
Complaint was for specific performance. The subject matter of the case involved
subdivision lots. Therefore, jurisdiction was lodged with the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board. The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that since neither St.
Joseph Realty nor the Amoguis Brothers raised the issue of jurisdiction before the
Regional Trial Court, they must be considered estopped from raising it on appeal.

ISSUE:

Were the Amoguis brothers at fault for not objecting when the opposing
counsel started his direct examination without offering the purpose of the
witnesses' testimonies?

HELD:

Yes.

On the issue of the admissibility of the Ballado Spouses' testimonial and

documentary evidence, the Amoguis Brothers argue that it was unfair to fault
them for not objecting when the former's counsel started his direct examination
without offering the purpose of the witnesses' testimonies. Had they done so, it
would alert the Ballado Spouses' counsel of the defect. Rule 132, Sections 34 and

1017
35 of the Rules of Court are mandatory, regardless if an opposing party timely
objected.

Rule 132, Sections 34 to 36 of the Rules of Court govern the manner of

offering and objecting to evidence.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination

of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days

after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court. In any
case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.

Following these provisions, a witness' testimony must be offered at the

start, when he or she takes the stand for the first time and before questions are
propounded to him or her. Documentary or object evidence, on the other hand,
must be orally offered after the presentation of a party's witnesses unless the court
orders or allows that a written formal offer is filed.

All evidence must be formally offered. Otherwise, the court cannot consider
them. This rule ensures that judges will carry out their constitutional mandate to
render decisions that clearly state the facts of cases and the applicable laws.
Judgments must be based "only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties to the suit." This rule also affords parties their right to due process by
examining the evidence presented by their opponent, and to object to its
presentation when warranted.

However, testimonial evidence not formally offered but not timely objected
to by an opposing party may be still be considered by the court. The purpose of
offering a witness' testimony is for the court to expertly assess whether questions
propounded are relevant and material, and if the witness is competent to answer.

Under the rules, a timely objection is a remedy available to petitioners.

They waived their right to this remedy when they waited until the case was
submitted for resolution to do so.

The rules on examination of witnesses and objecting to them are not

separate for civil and criminal cases. A witness, whether in a criminal or civil case,
is presented to support and prove the allegations made by the party presenting
him or her. The witness must be competent, and his or her testimony must be
relevant and material. Whether the case is civil or criminal, objection or failure to

1018
offer the testimony of a witness must be made immediately.

As to the Ballado Spouses' documentary evidence, the Court of Appeals

was correct to consider only the contracts to sell. These were the only documents
attached to the written formal offer of evidence that they filed. Hence, these
documents should be considered as the only documentary evidence formally
offered. When a party fails to formally offer his or her documentary or object
evidence within a considerable period after the presentation of witnesses, he or
she is deemed to have waived the opportunity to do so. The party, therefore, as in
this case, runs the risk of weakening his or her claim or defense.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The old rule was revised
so that there is no more distinction between an oral and written offer of evidence.
Thus, the first sentence now states objection to offer of evidence, without
distinction as to whether the evidence was offered orally or not, unlike under the
old rule. The revised rule also provides that in case a witness begins to testify
without the offer of testimony being made prior to said testimony, the objection
to such lack of formal offer must be made as soon as the witness begins to testify.
The provision on when an objection to written offer of evidence was deleted. It
appears that unlike the old rule, the court no longer has discretion to allow the
formal offer of evidence in writing.

1019
 RULE 133
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

Section 2 - Proof beyond reasonable doubt

People v. Castillo
G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019

FACTS:

Two separate Information were filed against Castillo charging him with
illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The buy-bust team, together
with a civilian asset, arrived near a covered basketball court in Barangay 7, Lipa
City. After the exchange between Castillo and the asset, the latter touched his
head, signaling that the transaction had been consummated. After a body search
on Castillo, SPO2 Yema recovered four (4) plastic sachets containing crystalline
substances suspected to be shabu, which were all placed inside a plastic case of
playing cards. The officers brought the items inside their vehicle, which was still
parked near the place of arrest. There, SPO2 Yema marked the seized items. These
were photographed along with the marked money and Castillo. The seized items
were also inventoried, as witnessed by Limbo, DOJ representative, Barangay Chair
Latayan, SPO2 Yema, and Castillo, who all signed the Certificate of Inventory.
Upon examination, the forensic chemist reported that the confiscated substances
yielded positive results for shabu. RTC found Castillo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offenses charged.

On appeal, Castillo argued that the buy-bust operation did not actually
happen. Assuming that it did take place, he claimed that the prosecution failed to
establish the police officers' compliance with the chain of custody requirements.
He pointed out supposed gaps in the chain of custody, including, among others,
irregularities in the seized items' marking and the belated presence of the DOJ
representative, only arriving at the police station when the inventory had already
been prepared. CA affirmed. It held that SPO2 Yema substantially complied with
the requisites in marking the seized items, and that there was no break in the chain
of custody of the items seized. While the police officers did not strictly comply
with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, CA ruled that this did not affect
the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from Castillo.

ISSUE:

1020
 Did the prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt Castillo’s guilt
for violation of Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act?

RULING:

No.

To secure a conviction in a criminal case, the prosecution must prove the

guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
requires that every fact necessary to constitute a crime . . . be established. While
not requiring absolute certainty, this standard requires that the prosecution
establish moral certainty, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. In both illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused comprise the corpus delicti of the
charges. Thus, their identity and integrity must be established beyond reasonable
doubt. It is the prosecution's duty to ensure that the illegal drugs offered in court
are the very same items seized from the accused by complying with the chain of
custody requirement.

The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized
from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings,
thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence. Such
significance impels the presence of third-party witnesses during the actual seizure
and marking, which must immediately follow seizure. Here, the absence of
witnesses during seizure and marking casts reasonable doubt on the actual origin
and identity of the drugs introduced in evidence as those allegedly seized from
accused-appellant. Ultimately, this same absence casts reasonable doubt on
accused-appellant's guilt for the offenses with which he is charged. It was also only
at the police station that Limbo, the DOJ representative, and Barangay Chair
Latayan were called in to witness the inventory and photographing. It is clear that
the required witnesses themselves had no personal knowledge of the supposed
sale and subsequent apprehension, search, seizure, and marking.

To successfully invoke the saving clause in the chain of custody rule, the
prosecution bears the burden of first acknowledging procedural lapses and
specifically plead justifiable grounds for these lapses. It must also plead specific
safety measures taken in view of the deviations made from the chain of custody
requirements. Specifically, on the absence of the required witnesses, it must be
alleged and demonstrated that earnest efforts were undertaken to secure their
attendance. Here, the prosecution has never bothered to prove, let alone plead,

1021
any justifiable ground accounting for the buy-bust team's deviation from the
prescribed procedure.

Noncompliance with the chain of custody requirements raises doubts on

the credibility of the corpus delicti, and consequently, on the very claim that an
offense penalized by the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed.
The prosecution's failure to establish beyond reasonable doubt the critical
elements of the offenses charged against accused-appellant can only serve to
warrant his acquittal.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The amendment in
Section 2 of Rule 133 s only to address gender sensitivity.

1022
 People v. Balao y Lopez
G.R. No. 207805, November 22, 2017

FACTS:

Balao was charged of murder. During arraignment, Balao pleaded not

guilty. RTC convicted Balao. However, in his Appelant’s brief, he asserted that the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court
heavily relied on the testimony of a single eyewitness to determine whether or not
he was guilty of the crime charged. Although he was identified as Wilfredo's
assailant, the sole eyewitness, Francisco, had ill motives against him. Therefore,
Francisco's testimony should be re-examined and more weight should be given to
accused-appellant's alibi, which was corroborated by the testimonies of the other
defense witnesses. OSG asserted that a conviction may rest on the sole testimony
of an eyewitness provided that the testimony is clear and straightforward.
Francisco had no ill motive against Balao or any history of quarrels with him. CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Was the guilt of Balao proven beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING:

Yes.

The conviction of accused-appellant rests on the testimony of Francisco, the

sole eyewitness presented by the prosecution during trial. The Court of Appeals
found no reason to re-evaluate the trial court's assessment of Francisco's credibility
holding that his testimony was "clear and positive in its vital points."

Francisco, the sole eyewitness, was familiar with accused-appellant and

knew accused-appellant's identity and reputation even before the stabbing
incident took place. First, although Francisco did not know accused-appellant's
name, Francisco knew accused-appellant's identity. Second, when he testified in
court, Francisco affirmed without hesitation that it was accused-appellant who
stabbed Wilfredo in the chest. During his direct examination, Francisco narrated
the events that transpired on the day of the alleged incident and identified the
person responsible for Wilfredo's death. Francisco's testimony on how Wilfredo
was killed does not appear to be tainted with any irregularity. The circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime gave him a fair opportunity to observe
the events that transpired. First, the killing happened around noon, in broad

1023
daylight when he could see clearly. Second, Francisco was at a distance not far
from where the victim and the accused-appellant were standing when the stabbing
occurred. Moreover, Francisco's testimony is bolstered by the autopsy report,

The trial courts' assessment of a witness' credibility is generally given great

weight and respect by the appellate courts. Trial courts are in the best position to
gauge whether or not a witness has testified truthfully since they had "the direct
opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand."

However, if there is a clear showing that the assessment was made

arbitrarily or that "the trial court . . . plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
or value that if considered might affect the result of the case," then appellate courts
would not hesitate to review the trial court's findings, especially when a person's
fundamental right to liberty is at stake.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The amendment is
only to address gender sensitivity.

1024
 Capistrano Daayata, et al. v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 205745, March 08, 2017

FACTS:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, praying that the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside,
and that petitioners be acquitted of the offense of which they are charged. The
Court of Appeals' assailed Decision affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, which found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals' assailed Resolution denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

In an Information, petitioners Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and

Bregido Malacat, Jr. were charged with frustrated murder: That on December 17,
1995, at about 6:00 [o]'clock in the morning at Zone 3, San Simon, Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their
superior strength, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent
to kill, attack, assault[,] box and struck one Rolando O. Bahian with a stone and
hitting the latter's head and several parts of his body, thereby inflicting injuries[,]
to wit: "Depressed Fracture, Open frontal bone, left, and advised for surgery,["]
thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Murder, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause independent
of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance
rendered to the said offended party which prevented his death.

Upon arraignment, all three accused, now petitioners, pleaded not guilty.
Trial then ensued.

According to the prosecution, Bahian and Kagawad Abalde made their way
to Barangay Captain Yañez' house. While on their way, they were blocked by
petitioners. Daayata hit Bahian on the left part of his chest. Bahian staggered and
fell onto a parked jeep. Salisi then hit Bahian with a stone on the left side of his
forehead, causing Bahian to fall to the ground. While Bahian was lying prostrate
on the ground, petitioners boxed and kicked Bahian. Kagawad Abalde tried his
best to get Bahian away but to no avail. All he could do was to shout for help.
Daayata then poked a gun at Bahian, Malacat unsheathed a bolo, and Salisi
wielded an iron bar.

1025
 The defense offered a different version of events. Petitioners Salisi and
Malacat claimed that they were having coffee at the house of Vicente Daayata,
brother of petitioner Daayata, in the morning of December 17, 1995. Bahian
arrived, together with Kagawad Abalde, and called for Salisi to come out. When
Salisi acceded, Bahian challenged him to a fight and threw the first punch that
started a scuffle. In the course of the melee, Bahian took a swing for Salisi, who
ducked, causing Bahian to lose his balance. Bahian then fell on the pavement and
hit his head. Kagawad Abalde then drew a gun, poked it at Salisi, and threatened
to kill him. For his part, petitioner Daayata claimed that he was in his house, some
50 meters away from Vicente's house when the incident recalled by petitioners
Salisi and Malacat transpired.

While the prosecution painted a picture of a relentless assault that lasted

for as much as 30 minutes - with petitioners supposedly not content with Bahian
falling onto a parked jeep, but even attacking him until he lay on the pavement,
and thereafter still continuing to punch and kick him - Bahian's "medical certificate
showed no injury other than that on his forehead."

ISSUE:

Are the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated

murder?

RULING:

No.

Conviction in criminal actions demands proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is

entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

While not impelling such a degree of proof as to establish absolutely

impervious certainty, the quantum of proof required in criminal cases nevertheless
charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral
certainty, a certainty that ultimately appeals to a person's very conscience. While

1026
indeed imbued with a sense of altruism, this imperative is borne, not by a mere
abstraction, but by constitutional necessity:

This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an
accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the
weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt
finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in
the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved."
"Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such
burden upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden,
it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted. As explained
in Basilio v. People of the Philippines, citing the ruling in People v. Ganguso:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of
Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be
acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause
of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it
discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and
he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of
course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied
that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the

accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the
prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.

In the present case, the details pointed out by the defense reveal how the
prosecution failed to establish the moral certainty and conscientious satisfaction
that attends proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While not per se
demonstrating the veracity and blamelessness of the defense's entire version of
events, they nevertheless disclose how the prosecution's case is unable to stand on
its own merits.

They cast doubt on whether the complainant and his companion were
actually stopped in their tracks to be assaulted, and support the possibility that
they may have instead deliberately intended to bring themselves to Vicente's
house to provoke or challenge one (1) of the petitioners. They also cast doubt on

1027
whether the complainant was relentlessly assaulted, with the specific purpose of
ending his life; whether the ostensible fatal blow was dealt to complainant by one
(1) of the petitioners or was dealt upon him by his own violent imprudence; and
whether petitioners had actually brandished implements for maiming and killing.
Not only do these doubts persist, details disclosed by the prosecution itself taken
together with how the defense accounted for the events of December 16 and 17,
1995 - demonstrate the dubiety of the prosecution's claims.

The confluence of Bahian's admissions of a prior altercation, his self-issued

threat, how he was constrained to desist, and his own account to Dr. Mata of how
he sustained his injury, as well as the glaring dissonance noted by the defense and
backed by physical evidence, demonstrate how the prosecution has fallen far too
short of discharging its burden of proving petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1028
 Constantino v. People
G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019

FACTS:

An Information was filed against Atty. Constantino and Saliganan,

charging them with falsification of a public document. The Information stated that
Constantino made it appear that testator Severino participated in the execution of
the Last Will and Testament, when in fact he did not so participate, and making it
appear that the testator Severino and the attesting witnesses, Dr. Eliezer Asuncion,
Mary Balintona and Dr. Justino Balintona acknowledge the Last Will and
Testament before Atty. Constantino while in truth they never appeared to
acknowledge the same.

A Petition for Probate of Severino's alleged Last Will and Testament was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City.

Upon learning of the probate proceedings, Fernando, a son of Severino,

secured a copy of the purported Last Will and Testament. He claimed that the
signature in the document was not Severino's. The document was notarized by
Atty. Constantino. The witnesses who signed it were Rosalinda Cu, Dr. Justino
Balintona and his wife Mary Balintona (the Balintona Spouses), and Dr. Eliezer
John Asuncion.

Fernando immediately spoke to Dr. Asuncion, who told him that Rene
Ferrer, Jr. (Ferrer), Saliganan's son-in-law, had gone to his clinic and asked him to
sign the document. Dr. Asuncion did as asked, having known Ferrer as a member
of his motorcycle club. He also told Fernando that only he, Ferrer, and some
patients were present when he signed the document.

In his defense, Atty. Constantino narrated that in the morning of September

9, 2001, he brought 3 typed copies of the Last Will and Testament to Severino's
house for signing. Together in the room were Severino, Atty. Constantino, his wife
Editha and son Bernard Christian, the Balintona Spouses, Cu, Saliganan, and one
other person.

The 3 instrumental witnesses present—the Balintona Spouses and Cu—

then signed the document, after which Atty. Constantino affixed his signature.
Addressing the absence of Dr. Asuncion, whose name was indicated as an
instrumental witness, Atty. Constantino assured Severino that only 3 witnesses
were needed for the document. He then allegedly instructed Severino to leave the
document as it was and "not make any erasures or crossing-out on it in order not

1029
to make it dirty." Atty. Constantino took a copy of the document and gave the
other two to Severino.

On his way out, Atty. Constantino alleged that Saliganan took his copy of
the document, telling him that Dr. Asuncion had already arrived. Sometime later,
Saliganan returned the copy, but Atty. Constantino stated that he did not check if
Dr. Asuncion had signed it.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Atty. Constantino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of falsification of a public document under Article 171(2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Atty. Constantino appealed before the Court of Appeals but
said court affirmed the RTC’s decision. Atty. Constantino moved for
reconsideration, but his Motion was denied. Hence, he filed this Petition.

ISSUE:

Is petitioner Atty. Constantino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

falsifying a public document under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code?

RULING:

No.

The Constitution guarantees that an accused is presumed innocent until the

contrary is proven. Thus, every conviction requires no less than proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

The burden of proof rests with the prosecution. Guilt must be founded on
the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the
defense. Reasonable doubt on the evidence presented will result in an acquittal. In
People v. Capili:

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed to overcome the presumption of

innocence. Accused-appellant's guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt[;]
otherwise, the Court would be left without any other recourse but to rule for
acquittal. Courts should be guided by the principle that it would be better to set
free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict
one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.

Here, petitioner was found to have falsely certified in the Joint

Acknowledgment that Dr. Asuncion was an instrumental witness to the execution

1030
of Severino's Last Will and Testament since he did not sign it in petitioner's
presence.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals, however, disregarded one crucial
detail from its finding of facts: Dr. Asuncion signed the Joint
Acknowledgment after it was notarized by petitioner.

Based on the findings of the trial court, at the time petitioner notarized the
Last Will and Testament, only 3 witnesses had signed it. The trial court, however,
did not make any finding that petitioner had falsified the participation of the 3
witnesses who attested and subscribed to its due execution. It likewise found that
Dr. Asuncion signed the document at the urging of Saliganan's son-in-law, Ferrer,
and that petitioner seemed unaware that Dr. Asuncion later signed the document.
Dr. Asuncion also admitted that his signature was genuine and that he was aware
of what he was signing.

Since Dr. Asuncion did not sign the Joint Acknowledgment before it was
notarized, he cannot be considered as having attested and subscribed to its due execution
at the time of its notarization. Thus, when petitioner certified that the persons who
attested and subscribed to the document were present before him, there could
have been no falsity. It was not petitioner who made it appear that Dr. Asuncion
participated in the execution of the Joint Acknowledgment, but Ferrer and Dr.
Asuncion himself. Petitioner, therefore, must be acquitted.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. An amendment was
made to address gender sensitivity.

1031
 People v. San Jose y Gregorio
G.R. No. 206916, July 3, 2017

FACTS:

Joseph San Jose y Gregorio and Jonathan San Jose y Gregorio (the San Jose
brothers) were charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution presented Jilito Espino as sole witness who positively identified
the brothers as the perpetrators of the crime. During the trial, Jilito repeatedly
testified that the victim was stabbed twice but the autopsy report shows that the
latter was only stabbed once.

The Regional Trial Court found the brothers guilty, which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. The CA relied heavily on the positive identification made
by the witness. Furthermore, despite the inconsistencies and variances in the
testimony of the sole witness, the CA ruled that they referred only to minor details
and proved that his testimony was not rehearsed.

ISSUE:

Was the prosecution able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt despite inconsistencies in the witness’ testimony?

RULING:

No. The fact that the prosecution’s lone eyewitness could not make a clear
and categorical narrative of the events and the inconsistencies in his testimony
casts doubt as the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section
2 of the Rules of Court provides that In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The burden
of proving the accused's guilt rests with the prosecution. A guilty verdict relies on
the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. If
the prosecution's evidence produces even an iota of reasonable doubt, courts
would have no choice but to rule for the accused's acquittal.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1032
 People v. Nuñez
G.R. No. 209342, October 4, 2017

FACTS:

In an Information, Marciales, Nabia, Pobre, and a certain alias "Jun'' were

charged with robbery with homicide, under Article 294(1) of the RPC. In its
decision, the RTC found the offense of robbery with homicide as alleged in the
Information to have been established, along with Marciales and Nabia's
conspiracy with Pobre and Jun to commit this offense. It pronounced Marciales
and Nabia guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them to death. The case
against Pobre and Jun was archived subject to revival upon their apprehension.

In 2006, accused-appellant Nuñez was apprehended on the premise that he

was the same ''Paul Pobre" identified in the Information. Upon arraignment,
Nuñez moved that the case against him be dismissed as he was not the "Paul
Pobre" charged in the Information. However, prosecution witnesses identified him
as one of the alleged robbers and his motion to dismiss was denied. The
information was then amended to state Nuñez' name in lieu of "Paul Pobre."

During trial, the prosecution manifested that it would be adopting the

evidence already presented in the course of Marciales and Nabia's trial. Apart from
this, it also recalled prosecution witnesses Cruz and Perez. In their testimonies,
they both positively identified Nuñez as among the perpetrators of the crime.
Nuñez testified in his own defense and recalled the circumstances of his
apprehension. He further claimed that when the crime happened, he was in
Taytay, Rizal with his aunt and not in Binangonan, Rizal where the crime
happened.

The RTC found Nuñez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE:

(1) Is accused-appellant Nuñez the same person, earlier identified as Paul

Pobre, who acted in conspiracy with Marciales and Nabia?

(2) Do inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses

jeopardize the prosecution's case?

(3) Was Nuñez’s guilt proven to be beyond reasonable doubt?

1033
RULING:

(1) No.

It has not been established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant

Nuñez is the same person identified as Paul Pobre.

Eyewitness identification, or what our jurisprudence commendably refers

to as "positive identification," is the bedrock of many pronouncements of guilt.
However, eyewitness identification is but a product of flawed human memory.

People v. Teehankee, Jr. introduced in this jurisdiction the “totality of

circumstances test”, which relies on factors already identified by the United States
Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.

Applying these standards, the Court found the identification made by

prosecution witnesses Cruz and Perez unreliable. Nunez's identification fails to
withstand the rigors of the totality of circumstances test. First, the witnesses failed
to even give any prior description of him. Second, a prosecution witness failed to
exhibit even the slightest degree of certainty when originally given the chance to
identify him as the supposed fourth robber. Third, a significantly long amount of
time had lapsed since the criminal incident; the original witness' statement that
none of his features were seen as to enable his identification; and the positive
identification made of him when the case was re-opened. And finally, his
presentation for identification before and during trial was peculiarly, even
worrisomely, suggestive as to practically induce in prosecution witnesses the
belief that he, to the exclusion of any other person, must have been the supposed
fourth robber.

(2) No.

Jurisprudence holds that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution

witnesses do not necessarily jeopardize the prosecution's case. However, this is
only true of minor inconsistencies that are ultimately inconsequential or merely
incidental to the overarching narrative of what crime was committed; how, when,
and where it was committed; and who committed it. "It is well-settled that

1034
inconsistencies on minor details do not affect credibility as they only refer to
collateral matters which do not touch upon the commission of the crime itself."

The inconsistencies here between Cruz and Perez are far from trivial. At
issue is precisely the participation of an alleged conspirator whose name the
prosecution did not even know for proper indictment. Yet, where the prosecution
witnesses cannot agree is also precisely how the person who now stands accused
actually participated in the commission of the offense. Their divergences are so
glaring that they demonstrate the prosecution's failure to establish Nunez's
complicity.

(3) No.

Conviction in criminal cases demands proof beyond reasonable doubt.

While this does not require absolute certainty, it calls for moral certainty. An
accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be
acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause
of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it
discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and
he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such degree of proof as excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the
accused is responsible for the offense charged.

In this case, due to the inconsistencies in the testimonies of Cruz and Perez,
and the doubts in the identification of Nuñez as one of the robbers, the Court was
unable to come to a conscientious satisfaction as to Nuñez's guilt. Hence, he was
acquitted.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1035
 People of the Philippines vs. Asaytuno, Jr.
G.R. No. 245972, December 2, 2019

FACTS:

Following the report made on drug activities of Martin and Renato

Asaytuno, PO1 Pagulayan coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) to conduct a buy-bust operation. The poseur-buyer, PO2
Limbauan, proceeded to purchase shabu at 24 Avenue, Barangay East Rembo
th

from Martin who stood with Renato. After Martin handed a plastic sachet which
appeared to contain shabu and Renato received the payment, PO2 Limbauan
pocketed the sachet. At that moment, PO2 Limbauan introduced himself as a
police officer and grabbed both Martin and Renato and frisked them where he
recovered 2 other sachets of suspected shabu.

PO2 Limbauan called for an elected Barangay official for the conduct of
inventory, but no one immediately came. After waiting for one minute and when
people began to gather around the area, the operatives decided to bring both men,
as well as the seized evidence, to East Rembo Barangay Hall. At the Barangay hall,
an inventory was conducted in the presence of Kagawad Awit. The sachets were
marked. Photographs were then taken during the inventory. After receiving the
Inventory Receipt, a chemical analysis was conducted which showed that the
sachets were tested positive for shabu.

Both the RTC and CA convicted Martin for illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs and Renato for illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE:

Was the prosecution able to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt to

warrant a conviction?

RULING:

No.

To warrant a conviction, the offense charged against an accused must be

proven beyond reasonable doubt. An accused enjoys the constitutionally
protected right to be presumed innocent and cannot be convicted without the
moral certainty occasioning proof beyond reasonable doubt.

1036
 In drug-related cases, the corpus delicti is the seized drugs themselves. Its
existence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and this demands that
unwavering exactitude to be observed in establishing the corpus delicti. The chain
of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubt
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. The prosecution must
establish that the drugs presented in court as evidence are the exact same drugs
seized from the accused and examined by the crime laboratory. The failure of the
prosecution to establish the identity and integrity of the drugs presented as
evidence naturally raises grave doubt about any search being actually conducted
and warrants the suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted evidence.

In this case, the prosecution claims that after the initial sale, PO2 Limbauan
pocketed the sachet handed to him. Following this, the buy-bust team and the
accused transferred to the East Rembo Barangay Hall. Only then was marking
done. These actions are replete with fatal violations of chain of custody
requirements. For one, this Court has emphasized that marking must be done
immediately upon confiscation. Even granting that there was a valid need to
transfer, their failure to mark before departure, along with unclear precautionary
measures taken while en route to the Barangay hall, means that there was an
intervening period during which the sachets remained unaccounted. Other than
the standalone assurances of police officers who laid them out for inventory, there
is no guarantee that the items pursued at the Barangay hall were actually obtained
from the accused.

Another fatal defect is the absence of required presence of the accused, his
counsel, or or representative, a representative of the DOJ, the media, and an
elected public official during the physical inventory of the seized items and the
photographing, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory as
provided by section 21 of R.A. 9165.

When a court cannot be assured that the drugs presented as evidence are
exactly what the prosecution purports them to be, it cannot be assured that any
activity or transaction pertaining to them truly proceeded, as the prosecution
claims that they did. Thus, no conviction can ensue.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1037
 Benito vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 204644, February 11, 2015

FACTS:

Rebecca Agbulos and Angelita Cruz Benito were charged with estafa
punished under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code in an
information filed by one Abadilla. According to the prosecution, Abadilla and
Agbulos entered into several transactions for the sale of jewelry, with Agbulos
going to Abadilla's residence. In all these transactions, Benito accompanied
Agbulos. In two out the three transactions between Abadilla and Agbulos,
Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from Abadilla. They agreed that Agbulos
would return the pieces of jewelry in the afternoon should Agbulos fail to sell
them. Agbulos then issued Abadilla a check for the value of the jewelry received.
On the third transaction, Agbulos received the last batch of jewelry from Abadilla,
issuing a check in the amount of P453,000.00. However, Abadilla called Agbulos
on the phone, asking for security for the pieces of jewelry she gave Agbulos.
Agbulos then gave as security the owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of Title.

However, upon verification with the Land Registration Authority, the

certificate of title turned out to be spurious. Abadilla deposited the checks Agbulos
issued to her, and all were dishonored by reason of "closed account." Abadilla then
tried to locate Agbulos, but Agbulos could no longer be found. Thereafter,
Abadilla learned from Agbulos' sister-in-law that the latter received pawn tickets
from a friend. Abadilla, through her friend Pamintuan, obtained from Agbulos'
sister-in-law pawn tickets issued by E. Ochoa Pawnshop. Appearing on the pawn
tickets was the name "Linda Chua." Abadilla went to E. Ochoa Pawnshop to verify
the items described in the pawn tickets. She learned that the items pawned were
among the pieces of jewelry she turned over to Agbulos, specifically, a men's
diamond ring and a set of diamond ring and earrings. She also learned from
Diloria, the pawnshop appraiser, that the "Linda Chua" who pawned her jewelry
was Benito. As for the defense, Benito denied that she was the "Linda Chua" who
pawned Abadilla's jewelry. Agbulos supported the testimony of her co-accused
Benito, stating that the latter had no participation in her transactions with
Abadilla. The Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Agbulos and Benito conspired to commit estafa. In Benito’s
appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.

1038
ISSUE:

Whether Angelita Cruz Benito conspired with Rebecca Agbulos in

committing estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised
Penal Code.

HELD:

No.

Proof of conspiracy may be direct or circumstantial. So long as the evidence

presented show a "common design or purpose" to commit the crime, all of the
accused shall be held equally liable as co-principals even if one or more of them
did not participate in all the details of the execution of the crime. For this reason,
the fact of conspiracy "must be proven on the same quantum of evidence as the
felony subject of the agreement of the parties," that is, proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

Assuming that Benito accompanied Agbulos in going to Abadilla's

residence, this does not prove that Benito received any jewelry from Abadilla. As
the helper of Agbulos' brother, Benito may have accompanied Agbulos on her
employer's order. "Mere presence at the scene of the crime is not by itself indicative
of conspiracy between the accused." Adding to this, Agbulos testified that the
transaction was only between her and Abadilla. She alone issued security for the
jewelry, namely, the dishonored checks and the spurious certificate of title.
Agbulos even declared in open court that Benito had no participation in the case
at bench. Agbulos' statement was an admission against her interest. The statement
negated the alleged "common design or purpose" between her and Benito and
would lead to her being solely liable for the crime. It also means that she admitted
that her companion's acts can never be attributed to her. The Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals should have considered this statement in assessing the
guilt of Benito.

Generally, demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust is necessary
before an accused is convicted of estafa. However, if there is an agreed period for
the accused to return the thing received in trust and the accused fails to return it
within the agreed period, demand is unnecessary. Failure to return the thing
within the agreed period consummates the crime of estafa, i.e, the
misappropriation of the thing received in trust. When Agbulos failed to return in
the afternoon the jewelry she received on June 9, 14, and 16, 1994, she was already
presumed to have misappropriated the jewelry. There would be no more need to
present any act to prove the misappropriation.

1039
 Consequently, the estafa had already been consummated when "Linda
Chua" allegedly pawned the jewelry on June 17, 1994. Benito, who was allegedly
"Linda Chua," cannot be held criminally liable with Agbulos. "There can be no ex
post facto conspiracy to do that which has already been done and consummated."

All told, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Benito conspired with Agbulos in misappropriating the jewelry belonging to
Abadilla. Benito, therefore, cannot be convicted of estafa.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1040
 Macayan, Jr. y Malana v. People
G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015

FACTS:

Nilo Macayan, Jr. worked as a sample cutter in a garment business owned by

Annie Uy Jao. According to Jao, Macayan often took his work for granted so Jao
confronted him a lot. Once, he allegedly responded “Kung gusto mo, bayaran mo
na lang ako at aalis ako.”and subsequently stopped reporting for work. Macayan
then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Jao and after a postponed
conference for the case, threatened her that her family would be harmed and/or
kidnapped if she did not give him P200,000. This threat was reiterated via phone
call. Jao claimed that she was sure it was Macayan speaking to her, as the person
on the phone addressed her as “Madam” which was how he customarily called
her. Her secretary, Angel, was with her when the threat was made. Although she
never informed her family of the treat, she sought the help of the NBI for an
entrapment operation. Macayan was then arrested in the operation and charged
with robbery.

Macayan, in his testimony, alleged that he discovered that Jao had not been
remitting required premiums to the SSS. When he inquired with Jao regarding his
Medicare benefits, she prevented him from performing his tasks at work. He
construed this as harassment, stopped reporting for work, and filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal against her. As evidenced by the minutes, Jao never personally
attended the conferences in the illegal dismissal case but Macayan recalled that he
expressed to Angel his willingness to settle the case for P40,000.00. He was then
informed that Jao agreed to settle. On the day of his meeting with Jao, he was then
arrested.

The illegal dismissal case was decided in Macayan’s favor by the LA. On
appeal, the NLRC held that the dismissal was legal but Macayan was still entitled
to unpaid benefits. The CA affirmed this. Meanwhile, the RTC convicted Macayan
of robbery, which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Is there proof beyond reasonable doubt that Macayan committed robbery?

RULING:

No.

1041
 There is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that Macayan committed robbery.
Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the requisite
quantum of evidence in criminal cases which is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. This
rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused,
relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of
the defense of an accused.

For evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve under the circumstances. The test to
determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity
with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind. Conviction
resting on a singular testimony is warranted if it is trustworthy and reliable.

In this case, Jao’s testimony is not credible. There was no proof of her presence
at the time and place of the supposed intimidation. There is also no basis for
ascertaining the identity of Macayan as the caller other than the caller’s use of
“Madam” in addressing Jao. Further, Jao never saw it proper to warn her family
of the threats. Hence, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of establishing
Macayan’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The amendment
introduced by the New Rules under the same rule and section is only to address
gender sensitivity.

1042
 People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Sagana y De Guzman
G.R. No. 208471, August 2, 2017

FACTS:

The prosecution’s version of events are as follows:

Police officers coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency

to act on a tip by a confidential informant. PO3 Lucas Salonga, with four other
police officers, carried out a buy-bust operation in Sagana's residence at Muslim
Tondaligan, Dagupan City. PO3 Salonga posted as the poseur-buyer. Five (5)
P100.00 bills served as buy-bust money, marked with PO3 Salonga's initials, "LCS."
Allegedly before the operation, PO3 Salonga had arranged the transaction through
a phone call with Sagana, who set the meeting at his house. The operation ensued.
Upon arrival at Sagana's house, Sagana invited PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carvajal
inside. Once inside, PO3 Salonga informed Sagana that he would purchase P500
worth of shabu. When Sagana asked for the payment, PO3 Salonga gave him the
marked money. After counting the money, Sagana handed him one (1) plastic
sachet of shabu. Thereafter, PO3 Salonga confronted Sagana and introduced
himself as a police officer. PO3 Carvajal apprehended Sagana's wife and another
lady who also peddled him shabu. After a body search on Sagana, PO3 Salonga
recovered the marked money and retrieved five (5) more plastic sachets of shabu.
PO3 Salonga marked the articles with his initials, "LCS." Accordingly, he made the
confiscation receipt before delivering Sagana to the police station. At the police
station, the incident was entered in the police blotter. They took photos
of Sagana and the confiscated items in the presence of a representative from the
Department of Justice, media representatives, and an elected barangay
official. Based on the chemistry reports of P/Sr. Insp. Myrna Malojo, the heat-
sealed plastic sachets were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

The defense posed frame-up and extortion against the police officers in
their version of the events as follows:

Sagana was allegedly washing the dishes by the deep well next to his
house when he heard a commotion in the yard. He was then prompted to check
out what it was. There, he purportedly saw an armed man attempting to destroy
their fence. This man hurriedly approached him, held his neck, and instructed
him not to stand and to keep quiet because they were searching for
someone. Allegedly, two (2) men barged inside his house. When the men went
out, they commanded him to direct them to "the money." When Sagana asked
about the money, one (1) of them supposedly hit his left side with a gun and was
told that he would be brought to the police station. His family saw what the men

1043
did, which made his eldest child hysterical. Sagana and his wife were taken to
the police station where he was asked if the items on top of the office table were
his. Sagana answered in the negative, which prompted the police officers to
bring his wife to the investigating room. A police officer allegedly demanded
P50,000.00 in exchange for not filing a case against Sagana, an amount open for
bargain. However, when Sagana told them that they did not have that amount,
he was detained and was taken to the prosecutor's office for inquest the
following week.

The RTC found Sagana guilty of the charges. It ruled that Sagana "was
caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to a poseur buyer and possessing another
five (5) plastic sachets of shabu." The CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Hence,
this appeal before this Court.

ISSUE:

Was Ernesto Sagana's guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING:

No.

“Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to

produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those
who act in judgment," is necessary to surmount the presumption of innocence.

In a criminal case, the SC commences with the law's own standpoint on the
standing of the accused that "in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent
of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt." The
burden of proof lies with the prosecution, which must depend "on the strength of
its case rather than on the weakness of the case for the defense."

In cases involving illegal sale and illegal possession, the illicit drugs
confiscated from the accused comprise the corpus delicti of the charges. "It is of
paramount importance that the existence of the drug, the corpus delicti of the
crime, be established beyond doubt." Its identity and integrity must be proven
to have been safeguarded. Aside from proving the elements of the charges, "the
fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold was the same substance
offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of
certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict." The chain of custody carries

1044
out this purpose "as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity
of the evidence are removed."

It is essential that the chain of custody is established in buy-bust

operations. Section 21 of RA No 9165, the then prevailing law, provides the
manner in dealing with confiscated articles in drug cases. This mandated
procedure emphasizes "the value of preserving the chain of custody in relation
to the dangerous drugs." Hence, the prosecution must prove compliance to
establish the elements of the charges.

In this case, the prosecution offered testimonies corroborating the

narration of the alleged sale of illicit drugs that paved the way for Sagana's
arrest. However, there were apparent lapses in the chain of custody that cast
doubt on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. Hence, the prosecution
failed to establish that the miniscule amounts of 0.12 grams and 0.59 grams of
dangerous drugs presented as evidence in court were the very same ones
allegedly seized and retrieved from Sagana. The prosecution's narration of
events reveals that the police officers did not conform with the chain of custody,
which is in contravention to Section 21 of RA No 9165 which is mandatory in
nature, as reflected in the presence of the word "shall" in the provision.

Similarly, none of the required third-party representatives was present

during the seizure and inventory of the dangerous articles. Their presence in buy-
bust operations and seizure of illicit articles in the place of operation would
supposedly guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame up." In other
words, they are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination
proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity."

To underscore, the prosecution "has the positive duty to establish that

earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated
under Section 21 . . . or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so." In
this case, the records were bereft of any explanation why the third-party
representatives were present only during the belated photographing of the
confiscated articles. Hence, the very purpose of their mandated presence is
defeated.

Furthermore, pursuant to "the rule that penal laws shall be construed

strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the accused," the failure
of the police officers to observe the procedure in handling the seized items
provided for under RA No 9165 and its implementing rules essentially
prejudices the prosecution's claim. A perusal of PO3 Salonga's testimony shows
that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody.

1045
 "Every person who takes possession of seized drugs must show how it
was handled and preserved while in his or her custody to prevent any switching
or replacement." In a number of drug cases, this Court ruled that the failure of
the prosecution to offer the testimonies of the persons who had direct contact
with the confiscated items without ample explanation casts doubt on whether the
allegedly seized shabu were the very same ones presented in court.

The prosecution has the "burden of establishing the identity of the seized
items." Considering the sequence of the people who have dealt with the
confiscated articles, the prosecution failed to justify why three (3) other
significant persons were not presented as witnesses. These persons were the
desk officer who supposedly recorded the incident in the police blotter, the
investigator who prepared the request for examination, and the police officer
who received the articles in the laboratory. "In effect, there is no reasonable
guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the
possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own
detriment." While non-conformity with the strict directive of Section 21 is not
essentially prejudicial to its claim, the lapses committed by the police officers
"must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and
the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to
have been preserved."

In this case, however, the prosecution failed to offer any justifiable reason
why the police officers failed to strictly comply with Section 21. It also failed to
prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were
maintained despite the failure to conform to the directives of the law. "The
prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of the seized
drugs . . . will not secure a conviction."

To establish "whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper

procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent
upon the courts to make sure that the details of the operation are clearly and
adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence." More
so, as in this case where the seized quantities of shabu are merely 0.12 grams and
0.59 grams, it is important that all details are clear. Hence, the miniscule
quantities of dangerous drugs allegedly confiscated magnify the uncertainties
with regard their integrity.

Trial courts should thoroughly take into consideration "the factual

intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 9165." Thus, "[c]ourts
must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof

1046
beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of
drugs for these can be readily planted and tampered."

The miniscule quantity of confiscated illicit drugs heightens the

importance of a more stringent conformity with Section 21, which the police
officers in this case miserably failed to do so. The significant lapses committed,
as well as their failure to explain their non-compliance with the directives of the
law, cast doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti. With these circumstances,
this Court acquits accused-appellant Sagana as his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1047
 People of the Philippines v. PO3 Julieto Borja
G.R. No. 199710, August 2, 2017

FACTS:

On May 26, 2004, Ronalyn Manatad and her friend, Vicky Lusterio, were
walking along Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City. Suddenly, a man who was
later identified as PO3 Borja, grabbed Ronalyn by her right forearm and forcibly
took her inside a gray van where three (3) other men were waiting. Both Ronalyn
and Lusterio shouted for help, but no one came to their rescue.
Lusterio managed to escape. She immediately reported the incident to
Ronalyn's mother, Adelina Manatad. Meanwhile, PO3 Borja and his companions
drove the van around Quezon City. One (1) of Ronalyn's abductors, a certain
Major Clarito, asked for her relatives' contact numbers. Ronalyn gave the
number of her brother, Edwin G. Silvio.

Adelina received a phone call from one (1) of the kidnappers, who
demanded P200,000.00 in exchange for Ronalyn's liberty. The kidnappers later
lowered their demand to P100,000.00. Edwin sought assistance from Sergeant
Abet Cordova of the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force. At around 12:00
noon, Edwin received a call from Ronalyn's abductors. They instructed him to
place the money in an SM plastic bag and to proceed to the Wildlife Park along
Quezon Avenue at 3:00 p.m. Edwin informed Sgt. Cordova about the payoff.

The police operatives proceeded to the Wildlife Park and positioned

themselves within the area. Edwin went to the Wildlife Park at 3:00 p.m. as
planned. Shortly after, PO3 Borja approached Edwin and took the SM plastic bag
containing the ransom money. Upon seeing the exchange, the police operatives
arrested PO3 Borja.

Despite the successful entrapment operation, the authorities failed to

rescue Ronalyn. She was taken by her captors to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency where she was charged with illegal sale of shabu.

For his defense, PO3 Borja testified that on the day of the alleged incident,
he was with PO2 Ding Tan at Branch 79, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City to
testify as a witness in a criminal case. However, the hearing was
postponed. After securing a certificate of appearance, PO3 Borja decided to go
home at 12:00 noon. At around 2:00 p.m., PO3 Borja received a phone call from
an unknown person. The caller sought assistance to recover his sister who had
been arrested. He instructed the caller to call back. On the second call, the caller
told him to go to the Wildlife Park and meet a certain Edwin, who would be

1048
wearing a white T-shirt and a bull cap. PO3 Borja proceeded to the Wildlife Park
and met Edwin, who told him that Ronalyn and Lusterio had been arrested
earlier in a buy-bust operation. PO3 Borja advised Edwin to go with him to the
police station and report the incident. However, Edwin said that he had to wait
for his cousin to arrive. Half an hour later, Captain Frederick Obar, SPO3 Eric
Orellaneda, and three (3) unidentified persons approached PO3 Borja. SPO3
Orellaneda shouted, "Meron lang ditong nag-eextortion" to which
PO3 Borja replied, "Wala naman akong alam." SPO3 Orellaneda confiscated
PO3 Borja's wallet, cellphone, and firearm. Afterwards, Sgt. Cordova
shouted, "O, meron ditong P100,000.00 galing kay Borja."

PO3 Borja was arrested and was charged of kidnapping for ransom. The
RTC found PO3 Borja guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for
ransom.

On appeal, Borja anchors his arguments on the arrest and subsequent

conviction of Ronalyn for the sale of shabu. He argues that it is absurd to convict
him of kidnapping considering that the alleged victim was caught in flagrante
delicto during a buy-bust operation on the day of the alleged incident.
Furthermore, Ronalyn was found guilty of violation of Republic Act No. 9165 by
both the Court of Appeals and this Court.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that
the categorical and spontaneous testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses are
sufficient to convict accused-appellant of kidnapping. The OSG argues that
accused-appellant's defense of alibi does not deserve weight. It was not
physically impossible for him to be at the place where the crime was committed
since Quezon City Hall of Justice was just a few blocks away from where the
victim was taken.

ISSUE:

Is PO3 Julieto Borja guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping?

RULING:

Yes.

PO3 Julieto Borja is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping.

The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. This does not entail absolute certainty on the accused's guilt. It only
requires moral certainty or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in

1049
an unprejudiced mind." The mind and consciousness of a magistrate must be
able to rest at ease upon a guilty verdict. For the defense of alibi to prosper, there
must be a showing that it was physically impossible for the accused "to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission."

In this case, all the elements of kidnapping were sufficiently proven by

the prosecution, which cannot be overturned by accused-appellant's bare denial
and alibi. These two (2) defenses are inherently weak considering that they can
be easily contrived. Ronalyn's apprehension for violation of Republic Act No.
9165 does not automatically negate the criminal liability of accused-appellant.
The buy-bust operation carried out against Ronalyn and her kidnapping are
events that can reasonably co-exist. A violation of Republic Act No. 9165 bears
no direct or indirect relation to the crime of kidnapping. In other words,
Ronalyn's innocence or guilt would neither affirm nor negate the commission of
the crime of kidnapping against her. Accused-appellant failed to overcome this
standard. Even if he attended the hearing in Quezon City Hall of Justice, there is
no showing that it was physically impossible for him to be at Agham Road when
the victim was forcibly taken. The SC takes judicial notice that Agham Road and
the Quezon City Hall of Justice are just a few blocks away from each other.
Accused-appellant could have easily slipped out of the city hall at any time.

Hence, accused-appellant PO3 Julieto Borja is found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1050
 People of the Philippines v. Julito Divinagracia, Sr.
G.R. No. 207765, July 26, 2017

FACTS:

Divinagracia and CCC were husband and wife with seven (7) children. The
family lived in a one (1)-room house at Jagobiao, Mandaue City. Sometime in
November 1996, Divinagracia and CCC quarreled, prompting CCC to leave and
spend the night at her sibling's house. Their daughters AAA and BBB were then
left by themselves since their other siblings were either at their grandmother's
house or with their friends. Later that evening, while AAA and BBB were sleeping
side by side inside their house, BBB suddenly woke up to her father's tight embrace
from behind and felt him roughly running his hand over her leg and breasts. BBB
then felt her father poking his hard penis against her buttocks. BBB begged her
father to stop, saying that she still had to go to school the following
day. Divinagracia moved away from BBB and went out of the house. BBB was nine
(9) years old at that time.

A few minutes later, Divinagracia went back inside the house and lay
down beside AAA. AAA woke up and asked her father where her mother
was. Divinagracia pinched her ear and ordered her to keep quiet. AAA noticed
that BBB, who was then lying beside her, slowly moved away. AAA tried to
follow BBB, but Divinagracia pulled AAA towards him and made her face
him. Divinagracia pulled down AAA's shorts and put his finger inside her
vagina. Afterwards, Divinagracia got on top of AAA and inserted his penis
inside her vagina. AAA's father then continued to molest her. AAA cried to her
sister for help but BBB could do nothing but weep and cover her ears. AAA was
eight (8) years old at that time.

When CCC arrived later that day, AAA told her that she was molested
by Divinagracia. AAA did not say that she was raped because she was afraid
that her parents would only quarrel again. However, CCC did not believe her
daughter. AAA claimed that CCC told Elvira Aburido (Aburido), Divinagracia's
sister, about the molestation.

A little over two (2) years after the incident, Sister Mary Ann Abuna
(Sister Mary Ann), CCC's sister and a nun, visited her family in Cebu. That same
day, AAA told Sister Mary Ann that she wanted to stop her schooling and
begged to go with her back to Manila because she did not want to see her father
anymore. Sister Mary Ann asked AAA's sisters if their father had changed his
ways. BBB and their other sister responded that he had not reformed and even
almost raped them. Sister Mary Ann asked the sisters to leave Cebu and go back

1051
with her to Manila to prevent their father from further molesting them. She
brought AAA, BBB, their other sister, and CCC back with her to Manila. A few
days later they all went to Pampanga where Sister Mary Ann was a missionary.
While in Pampanga, AAA saw CCC crying because she wanted to go back to
Cebu. AAA then went to Sister Mary Ann and declared that if CCC would return
to Cebu, she would not go back with her. It was at this point that AAA opened
up to Sister Mary Ann about the sexual abuse she suffered from her father.

Sister Mary Ann brought AAA to the Hospital Ning in Angeles City to be
examined by a doctor. After examining AAA, Dr. Lauro C. Biag (Dr. Biag) issued
a medical certificate, a portion of which read: Genitalia: labia majora/minora —
well coaptated.Hymen: orifice 0.7 cm old healed complete laceration on 11, 8, 2
o'clock.old healed incomplete laceration 5 & 10 o'clock. (-) abrasion, (-)
hematoma, (-) discharge. Sister Mary Ann helped the girls file their respective
complaints against their father. At first, BBB was hesitant to file a complaint but
she finally agreed because AAA would not stop crying and was always afraid.
On November 13, 2000, Divinagracia was charged with rape and acts of
lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610. The complaints for rape and acts of
lasciviousness against Divinagracia were eventually consolidated for trial.

The prosecution presented AAA, BBB, Sister Mary Ann, and Dr. Naomi
Poca (Dr. Poca) as witnesses. Dr. Poca, a pediatrician who was also a child
protection specialist, interpreted the medical findings of Dr. Biag, who failed to
attend the hearings due to the distance of Angeles City, Pampanga from
Mandaue City, Cebu. Dr. Poca testified that the healed lacerations at 11:00, 2:00,
and 10:00 positions are "more likely congenital rather than acquired." However,
the lacerations at 8:00 and 5:00 positions could have only been caused by
penetration into the vagina. Moreover, given AAA's disclosure, Dr. Poca opined
that the healed laceration at 8:00 position suggested sexual abuse.

The defense presented the following as its witnesses: Divinagracia, his

neighbors Pamela Sison (Sison), Alvin Ho (Ho), Darwin Isok (Isok), and his sister
Aburido. Divinagracia denied abusing his daughters and claimed that they had
a happy family life. He further claimed that he only found out about the
complaints for molestation against him when he was arrested in
2001. Divinagracia then accused his wife's family of plotting against him.
In its Joint Judgment, the RTC found Divinagracia guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the charges of rape and acts of lasciviousness against him.

The RTC ruled that AAA's testimony was direct, candid, and convincing,
clearly proving that Divinagracia had carnal knowledge of AAA when she was
only eight (8) years old. It also held that Dr. Poca's testimony corroborated AAA's

1052
version of the abuse she experienced. The RTC also found BBB's testimony to be
clear and convincing on the acts of lasciviousness committed by her father. The
RTC held that BBB was direct and remained consistent and steadfast during her
testimony. The RTC further held that Sister Mary Ann's testimony corroborated
both the testimonies of AAA and BBB.

Divinagracia filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. In his

Appellant's Brief, Divinagracia points to several inconsistencies in the
testimonies of AAA and BBB that purportedly lessen their credibility as
witnesses. He claims, among others, that it was not clear when AAA told Sister
Mary Ann about her rape. AAA claimed that she confided to her aunt Sister
Mary Ann when she visited them in Cebu in 1996. However, Sister Mary Ann
testified that AAA only told her about the rape when they were in Pampanga in
1999.

Divinagracia emphasizes that BBB never actually saw him having sexual
intercourse with AAA since BBB only testified to seeing him on top of
AAA. Divinagracia also insists that BBB's accusation of acts of lasciviousness
against him was uncorroborated, even by AAA who was in the same room when
it supposedly happened. Finally, Divinagracia asserts that the charges of rape
and acts of lasciviousness against him were unfounded and that his guilt was
never established beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution, in turn, avers that it was able to prove Divinagracia's

guilt on both charges beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution posits that the
straightforward and candid testimonies of AAA and BBB, with the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Biag corroborating AAA's testimony, sufficiently proved
the elements of the charges against their father. The prosecution contends that
the supposed inconsistencies on when AAA told Sister Mary Ann of the abuse
or when CCC and Aburido learned of the ordeal she underwent are trivial
matters, which have no bearing on the crimes committed.

ISSUE:

Was the prosecution able to prove beyond reasonable

doubt Divinagracia's guilt for the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness
against his minor daughters?

RULING:

Yes.

1053
 The rule cited in People v. Pacala that inconsistencies on minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the veracity, substance, or weight of the witness'
testimony finds application in the case at bar.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA, BBB, and Sister

Mary Ann are immaterial as these are not elements of the crime and do not
detract from the credibility of the witnesses. In fact, minor inconsistencies may
even be expected from AAA and BBB who are not accustomed to public trial and
were only eight (8) and nine (9) years old, respectively, at the time of their father's
sexual abuse.

The records show that AAA admitted that she could no longer recall
when she told her aunt of the rape, but AAA was consistent in her testimony that
she eventually told her aunt about the rape when they left Cebu. This
corroborates Sister Mary Ann's testimony that she only learned of AAA's rape in
1999, when they were no longer in Cebu. These supposed discrepancies, not
being elements of the crime, do not diminish the credibility of AAA's
declarations.

People v. Noveras emphasized that when a rape victim's allegation is

corroborated by a physician's finding of penetration, "there is sufficient
foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge."

The medical findings of Dr. Biag, as interpreted and testified to by Dr.

Poca, also corroborate AAA's allegations of her father's abuse. Dr. Poca testified
that while some of the healed lacerations could still be considered as normal
variant finding rather than acquired, the lacerations at 8:00 and 5:00 positions
could have only been caused by the insertion of a penis, object, or finger into the
vagina. Dr. Poca likewise testified that given AAA's revelation of her ordeal
caused by her father, "the complete healed laceration at 8:00 o'clock" is indicative
of sexual abuse.

It is well-established that “physical evidence is evidence of the highest

order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses." The physical
evidence of the healed lacerations in AAA's vagina strongly corroborates AAA
and BBB's testimonies that AAA was raped by their father.

Imbo v. People emphasized that the self-serving defense of denial falters

against the "positive identification by, and straightforward narration of the
victim." The SC has repeatedly held that the lone yet credible testimony of the
offended party is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.

1054
 Aside from the supposed inconsistencies in AAA's and Sister Mary Ann's
testimonies, Divinagracia only managed to present a defense of denial, which
must fail in light of AAA's categorical and competent testimony as well as the
undisputed findings of healed lacerations in her vagina. This Court is not
swayed by Divinagracia's argument that his daughters were manipulated by his
in-laws into filing these charges against him. Even the well-meaning testimonies
of the other defense witnesses did not disprove AAA's account of the rape since
they only managed to prove that Divinagracia and his wife constantly
quarrelled. What their testimonies inadvertently revealed, though,
was Divinagracia's proclivity towards violence, particularly when dealing with
his wife.

The RTC and CA likewise found that there was clear and convincing
evidence to hold Divinagracia guilty of committing sexual violence against his
daughter BBB. The lower courts also found BBB's testimony to be candid,
credible, and competent. Compared to his daughter's candid and categorical
testimony, Divinagracia's defense of denial must fail.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1055
 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Segundo y Iglesias
G.R. No. 205614, July 26, 2017

FACTS:

The testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses corroborated the following

account of events:

At around 3:00 p.m. of July 6, 2003, a tip was received by the Mandaluyong
Police Station from a "confidential informant" about Segundo's sale of illegal drugs
in Talumpong Street, Barangay Malamig, Mandaluyong City. A buy-bust team
was created upon the order of Officer in Charge PO3 Victor Santos (PO3 Santos)
to PO2 Oliver Yumul (PO2 Yumul), who was stationed as team leader of the
operatives at the Drug Enforcement Unit. PO1 Cesar Claveron (PO1 Claveron) was
assigned as the poseur-buyer while PO2 Yumul, PO1 Angel Von Occeña (PO1
Occeña), PO2 Pascual, PO1 Garro, PO1 Buted, PO1 Boyles, PO2 Pucan, and POS
Bernardino Adriano (POS Adriano) operated as backups. Two (2) P100.00 bills
served as marked buy-bust money. PO1 Occeña prepared a pre-coordination
form, which was faxed to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency before the
operation.

When the police officers reached their destination, PO1 Claveron and the
confidential informant came near Segundo, who was then positioned along an
alley. Meanwhile, PO2 Yumul was about 10 to 15 meters away where he could
supervise the operation without being easily noticed. PO1 Claveron was
introduced as a buyer of shabu. Segundo was initially hesitant but the
confidential informant persuaded him to finally sell illegal drugs.

PO1 Claveron gave the buy-bust money to Segundo. In

return, Segundo handed him "one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet"
with shabu. PO2 Yumul allegedly saw this exchange although he could not tell
what Segundo gave PO1 Claveron, considering his distance. PO1 Claveron
made the pre-arranged signal, which prompted the other members of the team
to make the arrest. Segundo ran to his house and was pursued by PO2 Yumul,
PO1 Occeña, and POS Adriano.Inside Segundo's house, the police officers
coincidentally saw Gubato "repacking prohibited drugs scattered on the
floor." POS Adriano pursued Segundo while PO2 Yumul apprehended
Gubato and PO1 Occeña collected the evidence. Later, POS Adriano
arrested Segundo.

PO1 Occeña made a body search on Segundo and Gubato. He retrieved

"one (1) heat- sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) suspected

1056
shabu and one (1) heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet containing marijuana"
from Gubato's right pocket. PO2 Yumul marked these items in the presence of
the two (2) accused as "JSI 1" to "JSI 10," where "JSI" stood for
"Jaime Segundo y Iglesias."

Segundo and Gubato were subsequently brought to the Mandaluyong

Medical Center and to the Criminal Investigation Unit while the drug
paraphernalia and shabu were submitted to the investigator.
PO2 Yumul prepared a request for the examination of the seized items, which
was submitted to Karen Palacios, and the Spot Report, which PO1 Occeña
forwarded to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. The drug paraphernalia
and the plastic sachet yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

During cross examination, PO1 Claveron testified that he only knew the
names of the accused during the investigation. He identified Segundo as the
person who gave him the alleged shabu after taking the P200.00 buy-bust money.
Additionally, he mentioned that he did not state in his affidavit that the
confidential informant told Segundo, "[P]are, may kasama ako dito. Iiskor siya.
Kung pwede pagbigyan mo."

Further, PO1 Claveron admitted that PO3 Santos did not give him a
receipt for the bills used as marked money but he photocopied them in their
office. He clarified that he had no personal knowledge on what happened
inside Segundo's house when Segundo was pursued by the police officers. He
averred that Segundo and Gubato did not have a counsel when they were
brought in for investigation.

PO2 Yumul attested that he made the inventory and took the photographs
of the pieces of evidence collected. However, he admitted that the photos were
lost and could not be submitted to the prosecutor for inquest. He claimed that he
did not know the two (2) accused before their arrest on the day of the operation.

PO1 Occeña averred that he did not know Segundo prior to their
operation and confirmed that "there was no representative of the media and the
Barangay when the markings were placed on the recovered evidence."

PO3 Romarico D. Sta. Maria, the police investigator on duty when this
case was brought to the Mandaluyong Criminal Investigation Unit for proper
action, identified the marked bills as the buy-bust money used in the operation.
He verified that the items and the operational coordination form were submitted
to him.

1057
 SPO1 Ruperto Balsamo (SPO1 Balsamo), the assigned investigator to the
case, affirmed that the two (2) accused and the physical evidence were turned
over to him. He confirmed that the prohibited drugs retrieved from the accused
were recorded in their book at the Drug Enforcement Unit. He admitted that "no
picture [was] taken on the alleged recovered object evidence."

On the other hand, the defense presented Segundo, who denied all the
accusations against him and accused the police officers of
extortion. Segundo insisted that on the date of the incident, he was in his sari-
sari store when he saw several police officers barging in his neighbor's house.
Suddenly, two (2) men in civilian clothes stood in front of his store and several
others entered his store. They hurriedly handcuffed Segundo and "poked a gun
at him." Segundo was dragged outside and was boarded into a van.

He was allegedly brought for a medical examination at the Mandaluyong

Medical Center. Thereafter, they proceeded to the office of the Drug Enforcement
Unit where he was bodily searched in a small room. When they got nothing from
him, one (1) of the police officers demanded P100,000.00. Since he could not give
the demanded amount, he was subsequently detained. Gubato was reportedly
at large. For this reason, the defense had no other witness to present and the case
was submitted for decision.

The RTC found Segundo guilty of selling dangerous drugs. It ruled that
in prosecution of illegal possession or sale of prohibited drugs, great weight is
given to prosecution witnesses, particularly when they are police officers. In the
absence of any ill-motive on their part, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duty stands except when there is proof to the contrary.
Hence, this presumption prevails over the accused's unsubstantiated defense of
denial and claim of frame-up.

In his appeal, Segundo assailed the broken chain of custody in handling

the alleged confiscated shabu.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. It held that the
prosecution's failure to prove that the police handled the seized items based on
the guidelines provided for under Section 21 of RA 9165 and its implementing
rules did not immediately make Segundo's arrest illegal and the confiscated
items inadmissible as evidence. The CA held that non-compliance with the rules
was permissible provided that the reasons were justifiable "and as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, [were] properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team." Nevertheless, records of this case
revealed that the confiscated items "were marked at the scene of the incident in

1058
the presence of appellant." Hence, an appeal before this Court has been
submitted.

ISSUE:

Was Jaime Segundo's guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING:

No.

Every criminal prosecution begins with the "constitutionally-protected

presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that can only be defeated by
proof beyond reasonable doubt." "Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince
and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment" is crucial in defeating
the presumption of innocence.

During proceedings, the prosecution initially presents proof

substantiating the elements of the charge. The prosecution must rest "on the
strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the case for the defense." In
sustaining a conviction for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the prosecution must
establish the following elements:(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.

Accordingly, these entail proof "that the sale transaction transpired,

coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti."

Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires "that unwavering exactitude be

observed in establishing the corpus delicti — the body of the crime whose core is
the confiscated illicit drug." Moreover, "every fact necessary to constitute the
crime must be established." The rule on chain of custody plays this role in buy-
bust operations, warranting that there are no doubts on the identity of evidence.

"Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation requires evidence, not

only that the transacted drugs actually exist, but evidence as well that the drugs
seized and examined are the same drugs presented in court. This is a pre-
condition "for conviction as the drugs are the main subject of the illegal sale
constituting the crime and their existence and identification must be proven for
the crime to exist."

1059
 Chain of custody is composed of testimonies on each link of the sequence.
The account starts from the time the item was taken until it was presented as
evidence such that each person who had contact with "the exhibit would describe
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in [his or her] possession, the condition in which it was received and . . . in
which it was delivered to the next." Every person in the chain must attest to the
precautions observed while in his or her possession to guarantee that the item's
condition has not been altered and that there is no opportunity for anyone not in
the chain to take hold of it. Compliance with the chain of custody is necessary
due to the unique nature of narcotics.

Here, the prosecution offered testimonies to establish the identity of the

buyer and seller, as well as the consideration that sustained the alleged deal and
how the sale had transpired. It failed, however, to comply with the chain of
custody that would supposedly ensure that the miniscule amount of 0.03 grams
of shabu offered as evidence in court was the one retrieved from Segundo at the
time of the operation.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1060
 People v. ZZZ
G.R. No. 228828. July 24, 2019

FACTS:

AAA was raped and clubbed by ZZZ, inflicting upon her the following:
cracked temporal skull with brains coming out; and lacerated wound (1/2) inch
long below (L) labia which directly caused her death, to the damage and prejudice
of her heirs.

BBB testified that at around 7:00 p.m. on May 16, 1996, he was on his way to
the store to buy cigarettes when he saw ZZZ dragging AAA by the wrist toward
the school. Still, he said he presumed nothing was off, thinking they were relatives.
He had merely reprimanded them before he went on to buy his cigarette and
returned home.

AAA was then missing. With his cousin Josefino Camilet, BBB went on a
search for his niece and informed barangay officials who then helped to look for
her. A couple of days later, the barangay officials found a lifeless AAA in a bamboo
grove near the school. On the same day, he said he found ZZZ in his house — the
last time he had ever seen him.

ZZZ averred that on the night of May 16, 1996, he said that he went to his
grandmother's house, where he watched television with his brother and around
20 other people — including AAA. After watching, he and his brother, YYY,
returned to their sister's house to sleep. He said that he did not notice if AAA left
their grandmother's house. Furthermore, he contended that on May 22, 1996, his
stepfather brought him to Tarlac to work as a helper in a grocery store, where he
used the alias Peter Viray to be employed. It is where he later found out that he
was charged with rape with homicide of AAA.

The trial court found that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution proved ZZZ's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Upon appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, ZZZ filed his Notice of
Appeal which the Court of Appeals gave due course to.

ISSUE:

Is ZZZ’s alibi and denial enough to cast doubt on his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt?

1061
RULING:

No.

Accused-appellant's denial cannot prevail over the prosecution's evidence.

Although the testimony of his brother YYY corroborated his denial, it does not
escape this Court's attention that his brother admitted in his initial testimony that
he did not go home with accused-appellant on the night of the incident. This Court
has held that retractions are generally disfavored as they are unreliable.

Nevertheless, even if we consider YYY's more recent testimony, accused-

appellant's alibi must still fail. For his defense of alibi to be credible, he must show
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene when the crime
was committed. Yet, accused-appellant, who stayed in the same barangay as AAA
and the school, failed to do so

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1062
 People of the Philippines v. Joshua Que y Utuanis
G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018

FACTS:

In two separate Informations, Que was charged with violating Sections 5

and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Que filed a Motion to Quash
Information and Warrant of Arrest and Admission to Bail. He pleaded not guilty
to both charges when he was arraigned. During the hearings for the bail petition,
the prosecution presented three witnesses. PO3 Lim recounted that an informant
reported that Que was allegedly selling shabu. A buybust operation was
conducted and Que was arrested after handing PO3 Lim shabu inside a plastic
cellophane. After the arrest, the marked bill and another sachet of shabu were
recovered from Que. Que was then brought to the police station where the sachets
of shabu and the bills were turned over to the investigator, SPO4 Tubo, who
marked the items with his initials. P/C Insp. Diestro recounted their office receipt
of a request for laboratory examination of the contents of two plastic sachets. The
RTC denied Que’s plea for bail and latter found Que guilty as charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Que’s guilt for violating Sec. 5 and 11 of the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

Yes.

Conviction in criminal actions requires proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence spells out this requisite
quantum of proof:

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is

entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is ultimately a matter of conscience. Though it

does not demand absolutely impervious certainty, it still charges the prosecution
with the immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty. Much as it ensues

1063
from benevolence, it is not merely engendered by abstruse ethics or esoteric
values; it arises from a constitutional imperative:

This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an
accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the
weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt
finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in
the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved."
"Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such
burden upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden,
it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted.

In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the

Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating evidence from the
moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in evidence. That
account goes to the weight of evidence. It is not enough that the evidence offered
has probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently
connected to and tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely
because it is available but that it has an actual connection with the transaction
involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and
laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are important.

The following links should be established in the chain of custody of the

confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of
the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.

Fidelity to the chain of custody requirements is necessary because, by

nature, narcotics may easily be mistaken for everyday objects. Chemical analysis
and detection through methods that exceed human sensory perception, such as
specially trained canine units and screening devices, are often needed to ascertain
the presence of dangerous drugs. The physical similarity of narcotics with
everyday objects facilitates their adulteration and substitution. It also makes
planting of evidence conducive.

Compliance with the chain of custody requirement ... ensures the integrity
of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in
four (4) respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the

1064
quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the
substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and
fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to
have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement
forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in
any manner.

The identity of corpus delicti is jeopardized by non-compliance with Section

21, critical elements of the offense of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs remain wanting. It follows then, that this non-compliance
justifies an accused's acquittal.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1065
Section 4 - Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient

Bacerra y Tabones v. People

G.R. No. 204544, July 03, 2017

FACTS:

Bacerra was charged with the crime of Simple Arson. According to the
prosecution witnesses, prior to the incident, Bacerra was seen throwing stones at
the house of Alfredo Melegrito (Alfredo), shouting invectives, and threatening to
burn the house of Alfredo. A few hours later, Bacerra was then seen pacing in front
of the nipa hut and moments later, Alfredo saw the hut burning. Based on these
testimonies, both the RTC and CA found Bacerra guilty of the crime. Petitioner
assails his conviction arguing that it was based on circumstantial evidence, which,
being merely based on conjecture, falls short of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that no direct evidence was presented to prove that he
actually set fire to Alfredo’s nipa hut.

ISSUE:

Is the conviction of Bacerra based on circumstantial evidence proper

despite absence of direct evidence establishing his criminal liability?

RULING:

Yes.

The conviction is proper if the circumstantial evidence, taken as a whole,

create an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that the accused authored the
crime. The commission of the crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding
of guilt may all be established by circumstantial evidence.

Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules on Evidence provides that circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
support a finding of guilt is a qualitative test not a quantitative one. The proven
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

1066
 In the case at bar, evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that: (a)
petitioner stoned private complainant's house and threatened to burn it, (b)
petitioner returned a few hours later and made his way to private complainant's
nipa hut, and (c) petitioner was in close proximity to the nipa hut before it caught
fire.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1067
 Cirera y Ustelo v. People
G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014

FACTS:

In a criminal case filed against accused Miguel Cirera y Ustelo for frustrated
murder, victim Romeo Austria testified that he was playing a lucky nine game at
a wake on Araneta Avenue in Quezon City when the accused arrived. Said
accused asked money from Austria so he could buy liquor but the latter told him
to “keep quiet.” Austria was then asked by the other victim, Gerardo Naval, to go
home but this allegedly irked the accused causing a heated exchange between him
and Naval. Both victims testified that they felt they were stabbed but admitted that
they did not see who did so. Austria attested that he saw the accused armed with
a knife chasing Naval which the latter confirmed. The trial court found petitioner-
accused guilty of two counts of frustrated murder. On appeal, the decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In this petition for review on certiorari, accused
assails the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the victims identifying him
as the perpetrator of the crime. He points out that other players in the lucky nine
game might have gotten mad at the victims when Naval allegedly asked Austria
to go home.

ISSUE:

Does the evidence sufficiently identify the petitioner-accused Miguel

Cirera y Ustelo as the perpetrator of the crime?

RULING:

Yes.

The Court ruled that circumstantial evidence was used to identify the
perpetrator in this case. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that a
person may be convicted based on circumstantial evidence if the requisites
enumerated therein are present. It held that the settled rule is that a judgment of
conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In
this case, the combination of the circumstances constitutes an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the petitioner, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

1068
 EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The revised rules
merely added the phrase “Inferences cannot be based on other inferences.” to
Section 4 of Rule 133. Even without this amendment, such rule is settled as in
fact, paragraph (b) provides that the inferences are derived from proven facts.

1069
 People vs. Baron
G.R. No. 213215, January 11, 2016

FACTS:

Ruben Baron was charged with the rape and killing of a seven-year old girl
identified as AAA. Eight (8) witnesses testified for the prosecution: AAA’s mother,
Alcid Flores, Arsenio Valguna, Barangay Captain Segundina Morales, Ma.
Concepcion Tacorda, Gennivive Belarma, Dr. Tito D. Doromal, and rebuttal
witness Romeo Inocencio.

Based on their testimonies, the Prosecution was able to prove that:

(1) Seven-year-old Gennivive Belarma was playing with AAA when Baron
picked up AAA and brought her to the river/seawall.
(2) Alcid Flores saw accused-appellant clad in a white sleeveless shirt and
short pants with AAA walking towards the seawall at about 4:15 p.m.
on May 4, 1999.
(3) Twelve-year-old Ma. Concepcion Tacorda saw a man clad in a white
sleeveless shirt and short pants right behind AAA as she was going
towards the seawall. Her description of what the man was wearing
matched Flores’ and Valguna’s description of what Baron was wearing.
(4) Arsenio Valguna saw accused-appellant, clad in a white sleeveless shirt
and short pants, nervously and hurriedly leaving the seawall and,
thereafter, boarding his trisikad.
(5) Accused-appellant’s conduct when he was asked by AAA’s mother to
join the search, in which he expressed much reluctance despite his
having been the last known companion of AAA.
(6) AAA’s body, which bore injuries at the vaginal area, was discovered at
the seawall. The seawall is the same place several witnesses identified
as where AAA and accused-appellant went in the afternoon of May 4,
1999. This is also the same from where accused-appellant nervously and
hurriedly left in the same afternoon.
(7) The lacerations sustained by AAA on her vagina, which, per Dr.
Doromal, could very well have been caused by the insertion of an erect
penis.
(8) The medico-legal findings pointing to asphyxiation by drowning as the
cause of AAA’s death, along with other injuries on her thorax, abdomen,
and extremities.

The RTC of Iloilo found Baron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide and sentenced him to death. Baron filed his Appeal arguing that that the

1070
prosecution has not established his involvement with certainty and bewails the
prosecution’s reliance on supposedly tenuous circumstantial evidence.

ISSUE:

Is the trial court correct in sustaining conviction based on circumstantial

evidence?

RULING:

Yes.

The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are

settled. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

A multiplicity of circumstances, which were attested to by credible

witnesses and duly established from the evidence, points to no other conclusion
than that accused-appellant was responsible for the rape and killing of the seven-
year-old child, AAA.

Testimonies regarding the details were given by disinterested witnesses

whom Baron himself had not managed to discredit for having any ill-motive
against him. Two (2) of the prosecution witnesses are even children of tender age.

As against these details and testimonies, all that accused-appellant had

offered in defense were denial and alibi— defenses that jurisprudence has long
considered weak and unreliable.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The New Rules only
added into the Section 4, Rule 133 the phrase “Inferences cannot be based on
other inferences”, which does not affect the ruling in this case.

1071
 David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016

FACTS:

Private respondent Grace Poe was a certified as a foundling by the Civil

Registrar after she was found abandoned in a church in Iloilo in 1968. She was later
adopted by spouses Fernando Poe and Susan Roces, a fact which was noted by the
Civil Registrar in Poe’s certificate. When she matured as a woman, her physical
attributes are described as having brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge,
straight black hair and an oval-shaped face. She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall.
She married Llamanzares and lived in the US. She was naturalized and granted
American citizenship on October 2001 and was subsequently issued a US passport.
She decided to return to the Philippines in 2005 and took the Oath of Allegiance to
Republic of the Philippines on July 2006. She then filed a petition for retention
and/or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship through RA 9225 with the Bureau
of Immigration (BI), which was granted on July 2006. She was later appointed as
MTRCB Chairman by former Pres. Aquino III in October 2010. Prior to assumption
in said office, Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the US
and Renunciation of American Citizenship and filed it with the BI. She also
executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality in the presence of
Vice Consul Briers on July 2011 and was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality
by Vice Consul Galian on December 2011. She later ran for Senate in the 2013
Elections, where she won and was proclaimed by the COMELEC.

Petitioner Rizalito David, a losing a senatorial candidate, then filed a

Petition for Quo Warranto before the SET, contesting Poe’s qualification alleging
that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen contrary to the requirement under
Art. VI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. The BI and NSO were subpoenaed to
present the documents relevant to Poe’s application for re-acquisition of
citizenship, travel records, and birth certificate. On the other hand, Poe manifested
that her DNA tests failed to provide results which would shed light to the real
identity of her biological parents.

Based on the documents presented by the BI and NSO, the SET ruled to
dismiss the petition and found that Poe is a natural-born Filipino, thus is qualified
to hold office as Senator. Aggrieved by the SET decision, David filed a petition for
certiorari before the SC arguing that SET erred in ruling that Poe is a natural-born
citizen despite having no proof of her biological Filipino parentage. Accordingly,
Sec. 1(2), Art. IV of the 1987 Constitution identifies as citizens those whose fathers
or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. Since it is settled that Poe is a foundling,

1072
the burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon her and failure to discharge this
burden necessarily leads to the conclusion that she is not a natural-born Filipino.

ISSUE:

Is reliance on circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish Poe’s status

as a natural-born Filipino?

RULING:

Yes.

Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstances; (b)
the facts which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial evidence
is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the
use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings. There is no rational basis for
making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and
for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or
administrative proceedings. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high
standard of proof of reasonable doubt in criminal cases, so too may it suffice to
satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings such as those before the SET, i.e., substantial evidence.

In this case, proving private respondent’s biological parentage is now

practically impossible. She was abandoned almost half a century ago. Even the
identification of individuals against whom DNA evidence may be tested is
improbable, and by sheer economic cost, prohibitive. However, our evidentiary
rules admit of alternative means for private respondent to establish her parentage.
In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence.

Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the church in

Iloilo in 1968. At that time, Iloilo, as did most — if not all — Philippine provinces,
had a predominantly Filipino population. Private respondent is described as
having “brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and
an oval-shaped face.” She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall. Further, in 1968, there
was no international airport in Iloilo. These circumstances are substantial evidence
justifying an inference that her biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment
at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968,
lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would have

1073
behaved. The absence of an international airport in Iloilo precludes the possibility
of a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously
coming in and out of Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though
proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it.
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her parents
after half a century, a range of substantive proof is available to sustain a reasonable
conclusion as to private respondent’s parentage.

Thus, reliance on circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish Poe’s

status as a natural-born Filipino.
EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The requisites for
circumstantial evidence remain the same. A second paragraph is added therein
stating “inferences cannot be based on other inferences.” However, even without
this addition, such rule is settled as in fact, paragraph (b) provides that the
inferences are derived from proven facts.

1074
 People of the Philippines v. Romaldo Lumayag y Dela Cruz, et al.
||| G.R. No. 181474, July 26, 2017

FACTS:

On November 30, 1997, at around 2:30 a.m., spouses Eladio Santos

(Eladio), 72, and Leonor Santos (Leonor), 71, were found dead in the garage of
their house. The Spouses Santos were dealers of soft drinks and beer. They
maintaned a store, adjacent to their two-storey house, which sold other
commodities such as cigarettes. Dela Cruz was their stay-in helper. He had been
working for them for only three (3) to five (5) days before the couple were killed.

Around 2:30 a.m. of November 30, 1997, Estrella received a call from her
sister that their parents were stabbed. She and her husband hurriedly went to
the store. They noticed policemen and reporters waiting outside the store. When
she entered the garage, Estrella saw the bloodied and dead bodies of her parents,
while the police took pictures of the victims. She saw the store and the house in
disarray. She noticed that cigarettes, lighters, coins, and bills were missing.
Estrella remembered wrapping some coins and signing her initials on them for
eventual bank deposit.

When she went up to the second floor, she found the master bedroom in
shambles, and noticed that some money and her mother's pieces of jewelry were
missing. Among the missing pieces of jewelry was a pair of pearl earrings.
Estrella estimated that the total cash missing amounted to P100,000.00. She also
noticed that the kitchen knife was missing. It had a "black rubber band wrapped
around the handle. She later found the knife full of blood inside a case of beer.
The knife was turned over to the La Loma police.

Around 9:00 p.m. of the previous day, November 29, 1997, PO2 Paule and
SPO1 Eduardo Roderno (SPO1 Roderno) of the Caloocan police were traversing
C-3 Road aboard a police-marked vehicle when they noticed a man carrying a
heavy-looking bag. When they approached him, the man ran away. After a brief
chase, the man was cornered. PO2 Paule noticed that he was nervous and
sweating. His right leg was stained with blood and his right waistline was
bulging with an object, which turned out to be a double bladed 9-inch mini
kris. He did not answer when asked about the bloodstain on his leg. They
brought him to the police station where he identified himself as Jerry Dela Cruz.
The bag yielded three (3) reams of Marlboro cigarettes, a lighter, some coins, and
a blue denim wallet with cash in different denominations amounting to
P1,470.00. PO2 Paule also noticed that the P500.00 bill in the wallet was stained
with fresh blood.

1075
 Upon further interrogation, Dela Cruz verbally confessed that he and his
companions, whom he later revealed as "Ango" or Lumayag, and Opiniano, "had
just killed and robbed an old couple." He was supposed to bring the contents of
the bag to his cohorts in the illegal settlers' area in Malabon. During cross-
examination, PO2 Paule affirmed that Dela Cruz was not aided by a lawyer, nor
was his confession reduced into writing. PO2 Paule further testified that when
they informed Dela Cruz of his right to a lawyer, the latter remained silent.

Dela Cruz then accompanied the police officers to the scene of the crime.
They called the La Loma Police Station, which had jurisdiction over the case. PO2
Paule and the other Caloocan police operatives, together with Dela Cruz, then
proceeded to Letre, Malabon where they were able to apprehend Opiniano.
SPO2 Ko was assigned to investigate the case. Upon the arrival of a barangay
official, the gate was opened. SPO2 Ko saw Leonor "sprawled on the ground
leaning on the wall of the garage and . . . Eladio was placed on top of a bicycle.
"Both were dead. He also saw that the store was forcibly opened and some of the
store articles were disarranged." Inside the house, he found one (1) of the rooms
in the second floor ransacked and in total disarray. He proceeded to the Caloocan
police precinct where he saw Dela Cruz and Opiniano.

The Caloocan police turned over to SPO2 Ko the multi-colored bag with
its contents and the mini-kris that were recovered from Dela Cruz. SPO2 Ko
brought the bloodstained bills, the mini-kris, and the knife found by Estrella to
the NBI for testing of human blood. SPO2 Ko brought Dela Cruz and Opiniano to
the La Loma Police Station for further investigation. PO3 Gomez conducted the
body search on the suspects. As Opiniano was undressing, a pair of earrings
dropped to the floor. When asked whose they were, Opiniano replied that they
belonged to a distant relative.

About 1:00 p.m. on November 30, 1997, PO2 Flores and other La Loma
police officers, together with Dela Cruz, were dispatched to Kaysikat, Antipolo,
Rizal where they arrested Lumayag. When Lumayag was frisked, two (2) coin
wrappers bearing initials were found inside his pocket. Estrella later identified
the initials in the coin wrappers as hers.

Dr. Arizala, the medico-legal officer of the NBI who conducted the
autopsies of the victims, testified that Eladio suffered 14 incised wounds, two (2)
contusions, one (1) abrasion, and five (5) stab wounds. On the other hand, Leonor
sustained 28 incised wounds, a contusion, five (5) abrasions, two (2) lacerations,
and three (3) stab wounds. Dr. Arizala said that the incised wounds could have
been caused by a knife while the numerous wounds could be attributed to more

1076
than one (1) assailant. He also found that the stab wounds sustained by the
victims were mostly fatal.

Forensic Biologist Buan testified that he had examined the blood on the
knives and peso bills recovered by the police. Forensic Biologist Buan further
testified that he had also examined the fresh blood sample of Leonor and Eladio.
His examination showed that Leonor's blood belonged to group type "O," while
that of Eladio belonged to group type "B.”

On the other hand, the defense presented their version of the facts as
follows:

Dela Cruz, who at the time of the commission of the crime was only 16
years old, testified that he was employed on November 25, 1997 by the victims,
whom he called Lolo and Lola. On November 26, 1997, Lumayag, his first cousin,
visited him at his employer's house. The following day, November 27, 1997,
Lumayag visited him again to ask for cigarettes. Before leaving, Lumayag
disclosed that he would come back on November 29, 1997 to rob his employer's
house. When Dela Cruz dissuaded Lumayag from his plans, the latter merely
replied, "Bahala ka, pupunta rin ako dyan."

Around 8:00 p.m. of November 29, 1997, Dela Cruz was eating in the
kitchen when he heard Leonor shouting for help. When he went out of the
kitchen, he saw Lumayag holding Leonor by the neck. When he asked Lumayag,
"Bakit ganon?" the latter responded, "Wala kang pakialam. Lakad namin ito." While
Leonor was being held by Lumayag, Eladio "came out of the room in the lower
portion of the house, he went inside the store and took a knife." When Eladio
came out of the store, Lumayag threw Leonor to Opiniano, grabbed the knife
from Eladio, and stabbed Eladio several times. Dela Cruz just stood by in fear.
He attempted to stop Lumayag, but the latter threatened him. As Eladio fell, Dela
Cruz turned around and saw Leonor already dead. Opiniano stabbed her with a
knife. Lumayag then went upstairs and came down carrying money in paper
bills. He counted the money, which amounted to P25,000.00, and pocketed them.
He then went to the store, took the paper-wrapped coins from the drawer, and
placed them inside Dela Cruz's bag. He also searched Leonor and got money
from her. Likewise, he took Eladio's wallet and placed the money in the wallet.

Lumayag then directed Dela Cruz to go with them. Dela Cruz told them,
"Patayin n'yo na lang ako; wala ng iba; madadamay din ako." Lumayag answered him,
"Hindi kita papatayin pero sumama ka na lang sa akin." Dela Cruz told him that he
would think it over. Lumayag then instructed Dela Cruz to bring the money to
Letre, Malabon or else he would kill him. After the two (2) had left, Dela Cruz

1077
also left for Letre, but was caught by the Caloocan police officers upon reaching
Monumento.

For his part, Opiniano put up the defense of denial and alibi. He testified
that when he was arrested on the night of November 29, 1997, he was babysitting
his cousin Manang Ligaya Verano's child at her house in Letre, Malabon. He did
not know the victims or why Dela Cruz, who was his townmate from Samar,
implicated him in the crime.

The RTC found Opiniano and Lumayag guilty as principals of the crime of
robbery with homicide and imposed upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.

Appellant Opiniano contends, among others, that the totality of the

circumstantial evidence is "insufficient to support his conviction beyond
reasonable doubt."

ISSUE:

Is the totality of circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a

conviction beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING:

Yes.
When several accused are tried together, the confession made by one (1) of
them during the trial implicating the others is evidence against the latter. In People
v. De la Cruz, the SC has held that, an accused is always a competent witness for
or against his co-accused, and the fact that he had been discharged from the
information does not affect the quality of his testimony, for the admissibility, the
relevancy, as well as the weight that should be accorded his declarations are to be
determined by the Rules on Evidence. And in this connection, it has been held that
the uncorroborated testimony of an accused, when satisfactory and convincing,
may be the basis for a judgment of conviction of his co-accused. To add, the
“testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to produce a
conviction."

Here, the eyewitness account of Dela Cruz, corroborated by the testimony

and findings of Dr. Arizala and Forensic Biologist Buan, suffices to convict
accused-appellant Opiniano of the crime charged. The RTC aptly gave credence to
Dela Cruz's "graphic account of what transpired . . . that fateful night of November

1078
29, 1997." The RTC determined Lumayag as the lead man, "who hatched the plan
to rob the couple,” along with appellant as his co-conspirator. There is no showing
that the RTC overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded facts and circumstances of
significance to the case. Dela Cruz's straightforward narration showed how
Lumayag and appellant Opiniano acted in concert to commit the robbery with
homicide. Dela Cruz was categorical and coherent in stating appellant Opiniano's
participation in the robbing and killing of the Spouses Santos. His testimony
remained unshaken even on a lengthy and intense cross-examination from
appellant Opiniano's counsel and the prosecutor. His answers were candid and
spontaneous, which, according to the RTC, "could not have been glamorized or
embellished by someone ignorant and unknowing as Jerry Dela Cruz." He
positively identified Lumayag and Opiniano as the assailants who stabbed the
victim spouses with a knife. Dr. Arizala testified that Eladio and Leonor died as a
result of several stab wounds, inflicted by sharp-edged and single-bladed instruments,
on different areas of their bodies. The Regional Trial Court's conclusions were
founded principally on the direct, positive, and categorical assertions made by
Dela Cruz as regards material events in the crime.

In contrast, appellant Opiniano could only offer a lame denial and alibi,
which were replete with inconsistencies. There is no corroborative evidence
that appellant Opiniano was in another place at the time the crime was
committed; neither was it clearly shown that it was physically impossible for
him to be present at the scene of the crime.

All told, the prosecution proved appellant Opiniano's guilt beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. The SC affirms the
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals. Opiniano's
conviction still stands.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The amendments add
that inferences shall not be based on other inferences, but such is already settled
as in fact, even without this amendment, paragraph (b) provides that the
inferences are derived from proven facts.

1079
 People v. ZZZ
G.R. No. 228828. July 24, 2019

FACTS:

AAA was raped and clubbed by ZZZ, inflicting upon her the following:
cracked temporal skull with brains coming out; and lacerated wound (1/2) inch
long below (L) labia which directly caused her death, to the damage and prejudice
of her heirs.

BBB testified that at around 7:00 p.m. on May 16, 1996, he was on his way to
the store to buy cigarettes when he saw ZZZ dragging AAA by the wrist toward
the school. He was able to see them using a flashlight he was carrying. Still, he said
he presumed nothing was off, thinking they were relatives. He had merely
reprimanded them before he went on to buy his cigarette and returned home

The following day, news spread that AAA was missing. With his cousin
Josefino Camilet, BBB went on a search for his niece and informed barangay
officials who then helped to look for her. A couple of days later, the barangay
officials found a lifeless AAA in a bamboo grove near the school. BBB said that her
niece's naked body had already blackened due to decomposition. On the same
day, he said he found ZZZ in his house — the last time he had ever seen him.

ZZZ contended that on May 22, 1996, his stepfather brought him to Tarlac to
work as a helper in a grocery store, where he used the alias Peter Viray to be
employed. ZZZ later found out that he was charged with rape with homicide of
AAA.

The trial court found that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution proved ZZZ's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Upon appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, ZZZ filed his Notice of
Appeal which the Court of Appeals gave due course to.

ISSUE:

Is circumstantial evidence enough as basis for the Court to render the

verdict of guilty beyond reasonable doubt to the accused for the crime of rape
with homicide?

RULING:

Yes.

1080
 The commission of the crime of rape may be proven not only by direct
evidence, but also by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence are "proof
of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may
be inferred according to reason and common experience."

In the absence of direct evidence, a resort to circumstantial evidence is

usually necessary in proving the commission of rape. This is because rape "is
generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for [him or]
herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with
homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify."

Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the

requirements for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to sustain a conviction:
SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the following
circumstantial evidence in convicting accused-appellant: (1) BBB testified seeing
him dragging AAA to the school on the night of the incident; (2) accused-
appellant's brother, YYY, testified going home with him and AAA, but accused-
appellant asked him to leave them behind; (3) after AAA's body had been found,
accused-appellant fled town and hid his identity using an alias; and (4) the post-
mortem examination conducted by Dr. Mejia and Dr. Bandonill confirmed that the
cause of AAA's death was a traumatic cerebral contusion, while the dried blood
from her vagina was caused by a tear inside the genital area.

A careful review of the records shows nothing that warrants the reversal of
the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' rulings.

EFFECT OF A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC (NEW RULES) ON THE RULING:

The ruling in People v. ZZZ (G.R. No. 228828. July 24, 2019) is not affected by
A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC. Section 4 of Rule 133 of the new rules provides the same
requisites as that provided in the old rules. The new rule only adds that
“Inferences cannot be based on other inferences” which is not necessary because
such rule is already settled, pursuant to paragraph (b) of such rule which requires
that the facts from which the inferences are derived must be proven.

1081
 PEOPLE v. CHAVEZ y BITANCOR
G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014

FACTS:

An information against Mark Chavez (Chavez) for robbery with homicide

was filed on November 8, 2006. It was alleged that Angelo Penamante, the
prosecution witness, arrived home from his job in Quezon City. When he was
about to enter his house in Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a man holding something
while leaving the parlor of Elmer Duque (deceased-victim) which he recognized
to be Chavez. The following morning, the SOCO team arrived in the
aforementioned place, finding Duque’s dead body with the whole place in
disarray. An autopsy of the cadaver revealed that the deceased received 21 stab
wounds, 4 of which were considered fatal. It was also alleged that two (2) units of
mobile phones were taken with some pieces of jewelry.

Penamante was invited to the Manila Police Station to give a statement. He

attested that he saw Chavez coming out of the parlor. Eventually, Chavez
voluntarily surrendered to the police. Chavez explained that he was at home on
the said night, exchanging messages with Duque on whether they could talk
regarding their misunderstanding. When Duque did not reply to his text message,
Chavez decided to go to his house, where he was allowed to enter. Afterwhich, he
went home. Chavez’ mother gave a statement and surrendered two cellular
phones owned by the deceased. She also said that the jewelries of Duque was
pawned by Chavez.

The RTC convicted Chavez with the CA affirming the decision. Chavez
filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
procedure, elevating the case to the SC. Chavez argues that he cannot be convicted
of the said crime as the prosecution merely relied on circumstantial evidence.

According to him, even if Penamante saw him leaving the crime scene, he
did not specify whether Chavez was acting suspiciously at that time. Moreover,
the findings of the autopsy revealed that the wounds were caused by two sharp
bladed instruments, thus, it is possible that there were two assailants. It was also
possible that the crime was committed after he left the house of the deceased.
Given that there are many explanations which fit the fact that Chavez is innocent,
he should be acquitted.

On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argued that direct evidence is not

indispensible when the prosecution is establishing the guilt of Chavez. The
circumstantial evidence presented before the trial court laid down an unbroken

1082
chain of events leading to no other conclusion than Chavez’s acts of killing and
robbing Duque.

ISSUE:

Can Chavez be convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of

the circumstantial evidence presented in the trial court?

RULING:

Yes.

However, the court found Chavez guilty of homicide only and not of
robbery.

The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may be

sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of an
accused:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence

is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a

conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In the instant case, while there is no direct evidence showing that the
accused robbed and fatally stabbed the victim to death, nonetheless, the Court
believes that the following circumstances form a solid and unbroken chain of
events that leads to the conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt, that accused
committed the crime charged, vi[z]: first, it has been duly established, as the
accused himself admits, that he went to the parlor of the victim at around 1:00
o’clock in the morning of 28 October 2006 and the accused was allowed by the
victim to get inside his parlor as it serves as his residence too; second, the victim’s
two (2) units of cellular phones (one red Nokia with model 3310 and the other one
is a black Motorola) without sim cards and batteries, which were declared as part
of the missing personal belongings of the victim, were surrendered by the mother
of the accused when the accused voluntarily surrendered, accompanied by his
mother, at the police station: third, on 28 October 2006 at about 2:45 o’clock in the

1083
morning, witness Angelo Peñamante, who arrived from his work, saw a person
holding and/or carrying something and about to get out of the door of the house
of the victim located at 1325 G. Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and trying to
close the door but the said person was not able to successfully do so. He later
positively identified the said person at the police station as Chavez, the accused
herein; and finally, the time when the accused decided on 27 October 2006 to patch
up things with the victim and the circumstances (the autopsy report had shown
that the body of the victim was dead for more or less twelve (12) hours) when the
latter was discovered fatally killed on 28 October 2006 is not a co-incidence.

The prosecution has equally established, based on the same circumstantial

evidence, that the accused had indeed killed the victim.

Nevertheless, the court has held that "what is imperative for a conviction
for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the
offender’s intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time
when the homicide is actually carried out." In cases when the prosecution failed to
conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the
victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide.

The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts, as quoted

previously, do not satisfactorily establish an original criminal design by Chavez to
commit robbery. While the mother of the accused gave a statement before the
police that his son confessed to her in killing Duque and in appropriating the
stolen belongings thereafter, the said statement is not admissible. This statement
is considered as hearsay, with no evidentiary value, since Chavez’s mother was
never presented as a witness during trial to testify on her statement.

The court resolved to modify the conviction finding Chavez guilty of the
crime of homicide.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC. The requisites for
circumstantial evidence to support a conviction remain the same. Furthermore,
the phrase “inferences cannot be based on other inferences” was added in the
amended rules. This is a mere reiteration that inferences should be drawn from
proven facts. Hence, nothing is to be changed.

1084
Section 5 - Substantial evidence

Office of the Ombudsman v. Fetalvero, Jr.,

G.R. No. 211450, July 23, 2018

FACTS:

Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) (security

services contractor for Philippine Ports Authority's Port District Office-Luzon)
applied for accreditation to bid for the security services contract. Upon the review
of the officers from the Port Police Department, Lockheed was given a “fair” rating
which disqualified it from being accredited to bid. Cecilio (Philippine Ports
Authority Assistant General Manager for Operations) referred Lockheed’s rating to
the Port District Office-Luzon. A recommendation for the recomputation of
Lockheed's rating and the issuance of a Certificate of Accreditation in Lockheed’s
favor was given by Gorospe (Port District Office-Luzon Security Staff Officer) and
Miole (Port District Office-Luzon Port District Manager) after the submission of
comment by Lockheed regarding the rating given.

Cecilio directed Fetalvero Jr. (Port District Office-Luzon Superintendent) to

review the recommendations against the guidelines and to draft a reply. Peregrino
(Port Management Office-Puerto Princesa, Palawan Station Commander) submitted
Lockheed's re-evaluation performance to Miole. Cecilio then adapted Grospe's
and Miole's recommendations and issued Lockheed a Certificate of Final Rating,
with a readjusted rating of 83.97, or satisfactory, from the original rating of 78.30,
or fair, making Lockheed eligible for the accreditation to bid.

Aguirre (Port Police Department Division Manager) filed a complaint-affidavit

against Cecilio, Fetalvero, Miole, Grospe, and Peregrino for Grave Misconduct and
Dishonesty. According to him, there was deceit, misrepresentation, and deception
because the reassessment was without basis and was done to favor Lockheed.

Initially, the complaint was dismissed by Generoso (Graft Investigation and

Prosecution Officer). However, it was reversed upon approval of a review
resolution by the Deputy Ombudsman. Accordingly, they were made liable for
grave misconduct and dishonesty.

Fetalvero Jr. appealed the review resolution and order of the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Court of Appeals (CA) contending that his acts of collating
and computing Lockheed's reevaluated ratings from Grospe and Miole were
"ministerial and was done in the regular performance of his duty. The CA upheld
the dismissal previously ordered by Generoso.

1085
 Because of this, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a petition for review
before the Supreme Court contending that Fetalvero, Jr. connived with Cecilio,
Miole, and Grospe to give Lockheed an unfair preference by readjusting its rating
so that it could participate in the bidding for a security services contract with the
Philippine Ports Authority.

ISSUE:

Is there substantial evidence to hold Fetalvero Jr. administratively liable

for the charges of dishonesty and misconduct against him?

HELD:

No.

In administrative proceedings, complainants carry the burden of proving

their allegations with substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion." On the other
hand, dishonesty is defined as the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity." It involves intentionally making a false
statement to deceive or commit a fraud. Moreover, misconduct is more than just
mere error of judgment as it involves a wrongful intention from the public officer
involved. It is also defined as "a transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer. In this case, the Office of the Ombudsman has the burden of proving that
Fetalvero Jr. deliberately committed falsehood or transgressed established rules to
give Lockheed undue preference during the bidding process of the contract for
services. The Office of the Ombudsman fails to discharge its burden.

In its Statement of Facts, the Office of the Ombudsman puts forth that it was
Grospe and Miole who recommended to Cecilio the reconsideration and
readjustment of Lockheed's rating, while respondent, upon Cecilio's instructions,
reviewed their recommendations vis-à-vis the guidelines. Nowhere was it alleged
that Fetalvero, Jr. likewise recommended the reconsideration or readjustment of
Lockheed's original rating. This supports Fetalvero, Jr.’s assertion that he
performed the ministerial task of creating a report by collating and computing the
ratings transmitted to him by Miole. Moreover, Generoso found that Fetalvero, Jr.
was not guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct since his participation was
limited to the mechanical act of computing the raw data provided to him. The
Office of the Ombudsman attempts to pin liability on Fetalvero, Jr. by insisting
that the Certificate of Final Rating issued by Cecilio was "loosely based" on the

1086
reply that petitioner drafted. However, as Fetalvero, Jr.’s reply is a compilation of
Lockheed's ratings, it is inevitable that it will be referred to for the issuance of
Certificate of Final Rating in Lockheed's favor. This cannot be interpreted as
Fetalvero, Jr.’s positive act to recompute or adjust Lockheed's rating to give it
undue preference.

What the Office of the Ombudsman only managed to prove was that
Fetalvero, Jr., upon orders of his superior, collated the ratings and
recommendations submitted by the other officers and then summarized them into
a report. By no stretch of mind can Fetalvero, Jr.’s submission of a report, an act
which was done within the confines of his function as the Superintendent of the
Port District Office-Luzon, be seen as an unlawful act.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1087
 RULE 137
Disqualification of Judicial Officers

Section 1 – Disqualification of Judicial Officers

Chavez v. Marcos
G.R. No. 185484, June 27, 2018

FACTS:

33 consolidated criminal cases were filed against Imelda R. Marcos

(Imelda), among others, for violations of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No.
960, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, or the Central Bank Act. One
of the witnesses of the prosecution is Chavez (who was presented as an expert
witness in the field of law). However, his presentation as a witness was hampered
by a series of scheduling issues, which resulted in several postponements and
absences.

When Chavez was scheduled to continue his direct testimony on April 24,
2007, the prosecution filed a Motion to inhibit seeking Presiding Judge Silvino T.
Pampilo, Jr.’s (Judge Pampilo) inhibition. Because of this, Chavez decided not to
appear in court on the scheduled date because the issue of inhibition is a “question
of first priority”.

The April 24, 2007 proceeded without Chavez. After the April 24, 2007
hearing, Chavez filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with
the Court of Appeals, docketed, praying that the order denying the motion to
inhibit of Judge Pampilo be declared null and void. Chavez claims that there was
bias and was based largely on his perception of how RTC Presiding Judge
Pampilo, scheduled his testimony, combined with what transpired when he failed
to testify on April 24, 2007. The CA decided against Chavez because the alleged
bias was not sufficiently substantiated. In the meantime, the RTC rendered
acquitted accused Imelda and Hector T. Rivera on the ground of reasonable doubt.
It found the prosecution evidence wanting and did not mince words in describing
the various failures of the prosecution. It noted that only two (2) witnesses were
presented and that the prosecution's evidence was based on hearsay.

Chavez filed an MR but it was denied. Hence, he filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

1088
 Is the allegation that Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. acted with bias in favor
of respondent Imelda R. Marcos present for him to inhibit in the case?

RULING:

No.

Whether or not to voluntarily inhibit from hearing a case is a matter within

the judge's discretion. Absent clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that the judge will dispense justice in accordance with law and
evidence, this Court will not interfere.

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 provides that “a judge may, in
the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.” When a judge does not
inhibit himself, and he is not legally disqualified by the first paragraph of Section
1, Rule 137, the rule remains as it has been — he has to continue with the case.

Thus, since the second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1 was introduced,
this Court has periodically repeated that it shall always presume that a judge will
decide on the merits of the case without bias. Allowing a judge to inhibit without
concrete proof of personal interest or any showing that his bias stems from an
extrajudicial source will open the floodgates to abuse.

No concrete proof of Judge Pampilo's personal interest in the case was

presented. There was no showing that his bias stems from an extrajudicial source.
Not only that, but none of his acts, as shown on the record, was characterized by
any error.

Petitioner finds fault in the scheduling of his testimony but fails to show
how it was irregular. He characterizes the scheduling as "noose-tightening," for
being scheduled on "unreasonably proximate" dates. Far from the scheduling
being evidence of partiality, it was aligned with this Court's rules on expeditious
disposition of cases and the mandatory continuous trial system. Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 3-90 requires all trial courts to adopt the mandatory
continuous trial system pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4 and Circular
No. 1-89. Thus, the dates provided for petitioner's testimony were in accordance
with the rules and guidelines issued by this Court.

Petitioner also claims that Judge Pampilo could have accommodated the
prosecution's requests for postponement, but he did not. However, Judge
Pampilo's reluctance in sanctioning further delays and in denying motions to

1089
postpone hearings was also in accordance with the rules on the expeditious
resolution of cases. This Court cannot assume bias or arbitrariness based on the
denial of requests of postponement.

There was nothing remarkable about the denial of the Motion to Inhibit. It
was not hasty, and whether to deny it orally in court is the prerogative of the judge,
who could have decided it as soon as its factual basis had been clearly laid. 103
Further, counsel for the prosecution expressly agreed that the motion be submitted
for resolution.

Petitioner Chavez believes that respondent Imelda would not have been
acquitted had he been allowed to testify. However, Judge Pampilo did not even
have to decide on whether to allow petitioner Chavez to continue his testimony
because both parties agreed that his testimony would be terminated during the
April 24, 2007 hearing. However, this claim is not only wildly speculative, but it is
also devoid of basis.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-08-15-SC.

1090
 REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

Chinatrust (Phils.) Commercial Bank v. Turner

G.R. No. 191458, July 3, 2017

FACTS:

Philip Turner, pursuant to a telegraphic transfer agreement with Chinatrust

Phils (Chinatrust), seeks the refund of an amount Chinatrust debited from the
account of Turner and transferred to Citibank. Due to Chinatrust’s refusal to grant
the refund, Turner filed a complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. After the preliminary
conference, the court issued an order where the sole issue to be resolved was
whether Chinatrust failed to comply with its obligations under the telegraphic
transfer agreement.

The MeTC ruled in favor of Turner but was reversed by the RTC and the
CA with further ruling on issues that were not raised in the affidavits and position
papers of the parties, such as the presence of negligence on the part of Chinatrust,
and granting reliefs not prayed for.

ISSUE:

Is the ruling of the Court of Appeals on issues that were not raised in the
lower court and in the preliminary conference order proper?

RULING:

No.

The determination of issues at the preliminary conference bars the

consideration of other questions on appeal. Ruling on an issue that was not raised
by a party in the lower court is violation of a party’s right to due process. Courts
cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being
sought by the party. Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
provides that within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next
preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and
other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their
position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.

Under Section 9 above, parties are required to submit their affidavits and
other evidence on the factual issues as defined in the preliminary conference

1091
order. In Summary Procedure, there is no trial conducted because after the
preliminary conference the parties are only made to submit position papers based
only on the issues stated in the preliminary conference order. Thus, either of the
parties cannot raise a new factual issue on appeal, otherwise it would be unfair to
the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present evidence against it.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC.

1092
 Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation vs. Lidua, Sr.
G.R. No. 169588; October 7, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell) is a private

parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in
Baguio City pursuant to a city ordinance. It is also authorized under the said
ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp
if the vehicle is illegally parked.

In I.S. No. 2003-1997, Jadewell alleged in its Affidavit-Complaint that the

respondents dismantled, took and carried the clamp attached to their cars which
was illegally parked. It was also alleged that the fines for illegal parking and the
declamping fee were not paid by respondents. The said offense was committed
on May 7, 2003.

The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor on
May 23, 2003. A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003. On October
2, 2003, two Criminal Informations were filed with the MTC-Baguio. Thereafter,
respondents filed a Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation stating as ground
extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription, among others.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, arguing that the filing
of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the
running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have
not prescribed.

ISSUE:

Did the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on
May 23, 2003 toll the prescriptive period of the commission of the offense
charged?

RULING:

No.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the
attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced
the running of the prescriptive period. The procedural rules that govern this case
are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Under the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, violations of municipal and city ordinances are within the

1093
coverage of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Section 11 of the same law
further provides cases under its scope shall be commenced only by information,
except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.

Thus, it is clear that only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged involved is an ordinance.

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has
the effect of tolling the prescription period of the crime charged. The case of People
v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as
special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this
principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of
special laws but not to ordinances.

When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the
Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued
to run until the filing of the Information. The conduct of the preliminary
investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the
violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the
Information.

EFFECT OF THE NEW RULES ON THE RULING:

The ruling in this case is not affected by A.M. 19-10-20-SC.

1094
 RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

Abogado, et.al. v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, et.al.

G.R. No. 246209, September 3, 2019

FACTS:

A Petition was filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, all the
members of the Kalayaan Palawan Farmers and Fisherfolk Association, inlcuding
some residents of Sitio Kinabuksan, Cawag, Zambales. They sought the issuance
of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, or the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, over Panatag Shoal, Panganiban
Reef, and Ayungin Shoal, located within the Philippines' EEZ. Respondents in this
case include the DENR, DA, BFAR, Philippine Navy, Philippine Coast Guard,
PNP, PNP Maritime Group, DOJ. On May 3, 2019, this Court issued a Writ of
Kalikasan and ordered respondents to file a verified return within a non-
extendible period of 10 days from receipt of notice. On May 24, 2019, respondents,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Verified Return with
Comment. They argued that the Petition suffered from fatal procedural infirmities,
which should have warranted its dismissal. They alleged that the Petition failed to
state a cause of action since petitioners merely relied on the 2016 Arbitral Award
as evidence and failed to attach the required judicial affidavits of witnesses.

When the oral arguments resumed, Solicitor General Calida before

presenting his opening statement, orally manifested that he be allowed to submit
as additional compliance a Manifestation and Motion, along with its attached
documents, to be admitted as part of the case records. They were affidavits
executed by 19 of the 40 fisherfolk-petitioners before BFAR, requesting that their
signatures be withdrawn from the Petition, which they claimed they did not read
and was not explained to them before signing. Thinking that the respondents
would be the foreign nationals who caused the environmental damage, they said
that they were surprised to hear that the case was instead filed against BFAR and
Philippine Navy, whom they considered allies. Petitioners' counsels objected,
arguing that it was unethical for BFAR to have conferred with petitioners without
their counsels' knowledge. On July 19, 2019, petitioners' counsels filed an Omnibus
Motion with Manifestation. They informed this Court that they met with 6 of the
fisherfolk-petitioners, who signified that they no longer wished to pursue the case.
Petitioners' counsels also informed this Court that the IBP Board of Governors
adopted resolutions requesting the Petition's withdrawal. Petitioners' counsels in
their Compliance explained the circumstances that proved that the other
fisherfolk-petitioners gave their conformity to the Petition's withdrawal.

1095
RULING:

This Court resolves to grant the Motion to Withdraw the Petition. The
Petition is dismissed, without passing upon any of the substantive issues raised.
However, we take this occasion to discuss the following points.

The nature of a writ of kalikasan is stated in Rule 7, Section 1 of the Rules

of Procedure for Environmental Cases. Expectedly, the Rules do not define the
exact nature or degree of environmental damage but only that it must be
sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for
the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental damage
sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case basis.

A writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy that "covers environmental

damages the magnitude of which transcends both political and territorial
boundaries." The damage must be caused by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official, public employee, or private individual or entity. Parties that seek
the issuance of the writ of kalikasan, whether on their own or on others' behalf,
carry the burden of substantiating the writ's elements. Before private parties or
public interest groups may proceed with the case, they must be ready with the
evidence necessary for the determination of the writ's issuance. A writ of kalikasan
cannot and should not substitute other remedies that may be available to the
parties, whether legal, administrative, or political. Mere concern for the
environment is not an excuse to invoke this Court's jurisdiction in cases where
other remedies are available.

A writ of continuing mandamus, on the other hand, "is a special civil action
that may be availed of 'to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined
by law.'" The writ is essentially a continuing order of the court, as it permits the
court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful
implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court's decision and, in order to
do this, the court may compel the submission of compliance reports from the
respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor
compliance with its decision. However, requiring the periodic submission of
compliance reports does not mean that the court acquires supervisory powers over
administrative agencies. For this reason, every petition for the issuance of a writ
of continuing mandamus must be clear on the guidelines sought for its
implementation and its termination point. Petitioners cannot merely request the
writ's issuance without specifically outlining the reliefs sought to be implemented
and the period when the submission of compliance reports may cease.

1096
 A.O. NO. 07
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Lee v. Sales
G.R. No. 205294, July 4, 2018

FACTS:

The Field Investigation Office (Office of the Ombudsman) charged Elmer

and Mary Lee (Spouses Lee) (both employed in the BIR as Revenue Officer I) with
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. The Ombudsman found the Spouses Lee guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct because they had the willful intent to violate Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 3019,
in relation to Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 1379, when they failed to declare their true,
detailed, and sworn statements of their business and financial interests. They did
not initiate to correct their earlier non-declaration of their interests in their
subsequent SALNs, which confirmed their persistent disregard of the existing
laws. The Ombudsman found that these acts amounted to gross misconduct, and
ordered them to be "dismissed from service effective immediately with forfeiture
of all of their benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to their
reemployment in the government." Elmer Lee (Lee) then filed his Motion for
Reconsideration before the Ombudsman.

During the pendency of his Motion for Reconsideration, Lee received a

letter from the BIR which directed him to turn over all government assets and
documents to the head office and also prohibited him from reporting to,
representing the office, among other. Lee informed them of his pending Motion
for Reconsideration and that the decision of the Ombudsman is not yet final and
executory. However, BIR insisted on his dismissal. Because of this, Lee’s filed a
petition for injunction with the RTC seeking to enjoin the BIR from executing his
dismissal during the pendency of Motion for Reconsideration with the
Ombudsman. The RTC denied Elmer Lee’s Petition stating that the Ombudsman’s
Decision is immediately executory. Therefore, Lee was not entitled to a writ of
preliminary injunction. Thus, Lee filed a Petition for Review assailing the order of
the RTC.

ISSUES:

Will the pendency of a motion for reconsideration stay the execution of a

decision of the Ombudsman dismissing a public officer from service?

1097
HELD:

No.

A pending motion for reconsideration of a decision issued by the Office of

the Ombudsman does not stay its immediate execution. This is clear under the
rules of the Office of the Ombudsman and our jurisprudence.

The Office of the Ombudsman issued Administrative Order No. 7, as

amended by Administrative Order No. 17, Rule III, Section 7, which states:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. — Where the respondent is

absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions
set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the
penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall
be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the
salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall

be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that
the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or
failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of
the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground
for disciplinary action against said officer.

Moreover, Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006,

provides:

Section 7 Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, otherwise known as, the
"Ombudsman Rules of Procedure" provides that: "A decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course."

1098
 In order that the foregoing rule may be strictly observed, all concerned are
hereby enjoined to implement all Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions in
administrative disciplinary cases, immediately upon receipt thereof by their
respective offices.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before

the Office of the Ombudsman does not operate to stay the immediate
implementation of the foregoing Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions.

Only a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction, duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, stays the immediate
implementation of the said Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions.

The immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman is a protective

measure with a purpose similar to that of preventive suspension, which is to
prevent public officers from using their powers and prerogatives to influence
witnesses or tamper with records. Moreover, there is no vested right to a public
office or an absolute right to remain in office that would be violated should the
decision of the Ombudsman be immediately executed. In case the suspended or
removed public official is exonerated on appeal, Administrative Order No. 17,
Rule III, Section 7 itself provides for the remedial measure of payment of salary
and such other emoluments not received during the period of suspension or
removal. No substantial prejudice is caused to the public official.

In the case of Gamallo v. Escandor, Escandor was ordered dismissed from the
service. Undoubtedly, such decision against him is appealable via Rule 43 to the
CA. Nonetheless, the same is immediately executory even pending appeal or in
his case even pending his motion for reconsideration before the OMB as that is the
clear mandate of Section 7, Rule III of the OMB Rules of Procedure, as amended,
as well as the OMB's MC No. 01, Series of 2006. As such, Escandor's filing of a
motion for reconsideration does not stay the immediate implementation of the
OMB's order of dismissal since "a decision of the [OMB] in administrative cases
shall be executed as a matter of course" under the afore-quoted Section 7.

Since decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even

pending appeal, it follows that they may not be stayed by the issuance of an
injunctive writ. It bears noting that for an injunction to issue, the right of the person
seeking its issuance must be clear and unmistakable. However, no such right of
petitioner exists to stay the execution of the penalty of dismissal. There is no vested
interest in an office, or an absolute right to hold office. Petitioner is deemed
preventively suspended and should his motion for reconsideration be granted or
his eventual appeal won, he will be entitled to the salary and emoluments he did

1099
not receive in the meantime. Further, it is the legally mandated duty of
respondents to implement the Office of the Ombudsman's decision.

As correctly ruled by the Regional Court, Lee’s proper recourse should have
been to file a petition for mandamus to compel the Ombudsman to resolve his
motion for reconsideration within the five (5)-day period prescribed in the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, he should have awaited
the Ombudsman's ruling on his motion for reconsideration, then, in the event of a
denial, file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court
of Appeals.

1100
 Canlas v. Bongolan
G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018
FACTS:

Canlas filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman

against Home Guaranty's officers. He claimed that the Home Guaranty Officers
were guilty of grave misconduct and of entering into a contract grossly
disadvantageous to the government under Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019.
39 He alleged that the lots were sold below their actual or appraised fair market
value, and that the government suffered

The Office of the Ombudsman then dismissed the complaint for lack of
proof that the questioned transaction was disadvantageous to the government. It
found that the Home Guaranty Officers were not directly responsible for the sale,
as it was the Board of Directors that was liable. It noted that there was no evidence
showing that any other offer was made for the purchase of the properties. Thus,
the fair market value of the adjacent properties alleged by Canlas was merely
speculative.

This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
found that it was Home Guaranty's Board of Directors, which approved the sale.
Thus, the Home Guaranty Officers were duty bound to implement and execute
this action. It also ruled that Home Guaranty was a juridical entity with a legal
personality separate and distinct from those acting on its behalf. It also found that
Canlas was a stranger to the contract and had no right to dictate the parameters
under which the contracting parties may determine price.

Thus, Canles filed a Petition before the Supreme Court. The respondents
question the standing of Canlas to file the Petition. They emphasize that the
decision of the Ombudsman is unappealable as exoneration is included under
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Rule III, Section 7 of Administrative Order
No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17-03.

ISSUE:

May Canlas appeal a decision of the Ombudsman dismissing the

administrative complaint against respondents?

HELD:

No.

1101
 The Ombudsman was given the power to evaluate an administrative
complaint even though the complainant does not have a personal interest in the
case. Under Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has
the power to act on any complaint against those in public service. Thus, no matter
the identity of the complainant, the Ombudsman may act on the matter. Moreover,
it may, on its own, inquire into illegal acts of public officials, which may be
discovered from any source.

Under Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770, if the "the complainant has no
sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance," the Ombudsman
may choose not to investigate the administrative act complained of. The use of the
word "may" which signifies that it is permissive and not imperative. The power of
the Ombudsman to act on an administrative complaint by a person without any
personal interest in the case is, thus, discretionary. Thus, the law allows the filing
of cases to the Ombudsman against public officers by any complainant. However,
not all may appeal to question a decision of the Ombudsman.

According to Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended, the

Ombudsman's decision may not be appealed if it dismisses the complaint or
imposes the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one (1)-month salary. Otherwise, it may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals under the requirements and conditions set forth
in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman, this Court
further elucidated that when the Ombudsman has exonerated the defendant, its
decision is unappealable. Reyes, Jr. v. Belisario explained that a complainant loses
his or her right to appeal once respondent becomes absolved. Accordingly, the
clear import of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules is to deny the
complainant in an administrative complaint the right to appeal where the
Ombudsman has exonerated the respondent of the administrative charge, as in
this case. The complainant, therefore, is not entitled to any corrective recourse,
whether by motion for reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman, or by
appeal to the courts, to effect a reversal of the exoneration. Only the respondent is
granted the right to appeal but only in case he is found liable and the penalty
imposed is higher than public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension or a fine
equivalent to one[-]month salary.

In the case at bar, the Office of the Ombudsman's October 12, 2010 Decision
exonerated respondents. Thus, Canlas has no right to appeal this Decision. He has
no other recourse. "The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions
of law. There must then be a law expressly granting such right." Considering there
is no law allowing Canlas to appeal, he has no right to appeal. This absence of a

1102
right to appeal affects Canlas' legal standing in this case. He is not a party entitled
to the relief prayed for, or one who will benefit or be injured by the results of the
suit. Standing depends on a party's right to the relief prayed for. This party must
be entitled to the relief before he or she may file a suit. The party affected by the
judgment in the suit or entitled to the relief prayed for must pursue the action. In
Baltazar v. Mariano, this Court ruled that a party who files a criminal case before
the Ombudsman but has no interest in it has no standing to pursue a petition
before this Court.

There is no showing that Canlas filed the instant case as an authorized

representative of R-II or Harbour Centre, or that he was authorized by these two
(2) entities to file the instant case. He only admitted that he was connected to these
two (2) entities in his Consolidated Reply dated September 28, 2012 and in his
Memorandum dated May 30, 2013, after respondents had pointed out this
circumstance. In his personal capacity, there is no showing that he stands to be
benefited or injured by the finding of guilt of respondents. He is not a party to the
Trust Agreement or the Contract of Guaranty. Neither did he allege that he
invested in the Project nor was he a holder of any Participation Certificate. He did
not claim to own any of the properties in the asset pool, or to have any claim in the
properties covered by the contract of sale between Home Guaranty and Wong.
Thus, Canlas has no standing to file the instant appeal.

Assuming Canlas has the legal standing to question the ruling of the
Ombudsman, he may only do so if the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Generally, a decision by the
Ombudsman absolving respondents is unappealable. However, if it is shown that
the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion, then the complainant may
file a Rule 65 Petition with the proper court. In this case, Canlas did not argue that
the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in the case at bar. What
Canlas contends is that the Office of the Ombudsman's October 12, 2010 Decision
is still appealable because respondents are being accused of an offense penalized
with dismissal from service.

1103
 R.A. 9285
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM

Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. v. Sulpicio Lines Inc.

G.R. No. 196072. September 20, 2017

FACTS:

Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. (Steamship) was a

Bermuda-based Protection and Indemnity Club, managed outside London,
England. It insures its members-shipowners against "third party risks and
liabilities" for claims arising from (a) death or injury to passengers; (b) loss or
damage to cargoes; and (c) loss or damage from collisions. Sulpicio insured its fleet
of inter-island vessels with Steamship including M/V Princess of the World,
evidenced by a Certificate of Entry and Acceptance issued by Steamship. M/V
Princess of the World was gutted by fire while on voyage from Iloilo to
Zamboanga City, resulting in total loss of its cargoes. DILG declared the same to
be “accidental” in nature. Sulpicio claimed indemnity from Steamship under the
insurance policy. The same was denied by Steamship on the ground that Sulpicio
was grossly negligent in conducting its business regarding safety, maintaining the
seaworthiness of its vessel, and proper training of its crew. Sulpicio filed a
complaint with the RTC for specific performance. Steamship filed a motion to
dismiss and/or to refer case to arbitration pursuant to R.A. No. 9285, or ADR Law,
and to Rule 47 of the 2005/2006 Club Rules, which provided for arbitration in
London of disputes between Steamship and its members. Before RTC ruled on the
motion, Steamship already commenced the arbitration proceedings against
Sulpicio. Thereafter, RTC denied the motion and was affirmed by the CA. Hence,
Steamship filed a petition for review via Rule 45.

Steamship argues that a referral of the case to arbitration is imperative

pursuant to the mandates of the ADR Law. Section 25 of the ADR Law specifically
provides that the court shall refer to arbitration those parties who are bound by
the arbitration agreement although the civil action may continue as to those who
are not bound by such arbitration agreement and that Sulpicio should participate
in the London Arbitration as it is already progressing instead of wasting its time
on prosecuting its claim before a Philippine court that is devoid of jurisdiction.
Sulpicio counters that the arbitration clause in the 2005/2006 Club Rules is not
valid and binding for failure to comply with Section 4 of the ADR Law, which
requires that an arbitration agreement be in writing and subscribed by the parties
or their lawful agent and that the Certificate of Entry and Acceptance did not
provide for arbitration as a mode of dispute resolution, that the rules referred to

1104
was not particularly identified or described, and that it never received a copy of
the Club Rules.

ISSUES:

1. Is the arbitration agreement valid and binding between Steamship and

Sulpicio?
2. Is the arbitration agreement valid even if it was not signed upon by
Sulpicio?

RULING:

1. Yes.

It is the State's policy to promote party autonomy in the mode of

resolving disputes. Under the freedom of contract principle, parties to a
contract may stipulate on a particular method of settling any conflict
between them. Arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution
methods like mediation, negotiation, and conciliation are favored over
court action.

The contract of insurance between Steamship and Sulpicio is more

than of insurance where Sulpicio not only obtains insurance coverage for
its vessels but also becomes a member of Steamship. A contract of insurance
is perfected between the parties upon Steamship’s issuance of the
Certificate of Entry and Acceptance. Sulpicio's acceptance of the Certificate
of Entry and Acceptance manifests its acquiescence to all its provisions.
There is no showing in the records or in Sulpicio's contentions that it
objected to any of the terms in this Certificate. Its acceptance, likewise,
operated as an acceptance of the entire provisions of the Club Rules which
includes the arbitration clause.

Rule 47 of the Club Rules provides that any dispute concerning the
insurance afforded by Steamship must first be brought by a claiming
member to the Directors for adjudication. If this member disagrees with the
decision of the Director, the dispute must be referred to arbitration in
London. Despite the member's disagreement, the Managers of Steamship
may refer the dispute to arbitration without adjudication of the Directors.
This procedure must be complied with before the member can pursue legal
proceedings against Steamship. There is no ambiguity in the terms and
clauses of the Certificate of Entry Acceptance. Contrary to the ruling of the

1105
 CA, the Certificate clearly incorporates the entire Club Rules — not only
those provisions relating to cancellation and alteration of the policy.

2. Yes.

In domestic arbitration, the formal requirements of an arbitration

agreement are that it must "be in writing and subscribed by the party
sought to be charged, or by his lawful agent." In international commercial
arbitration, it is likewise required that the arbitration agreement must be in
writing.

An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained (1) in a

document signed by the parties, (2) in an exchange of letters, telex,
telegrams or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of
the agreement, or (3) in an exchange of statements of claim and defense in
which the existence of an agreement is alleged by a party and not denied
by another. The reference in a contract to a document containing an
arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement provided that the
contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that clause part
of the contract.

In BF Corp. v. CA, one (1) of the parties denied the existence of the
arbitration clause on the ground that it did not sign the Conditions of
Contract that contained the clause. This Court held that the arbitration
clause was nonetheless binding because the Conditions of Contract were
expressly made an integral part of the principal contract between the
parties. The formal requirements of the law were deemed complied with
because "the subscription of the principal agreement effectively covered the
other documents incorporated by reference [to them]." A contract may be
encompassed in several instruments even though every instrument is not
signed by the parties, since it is sufficient if the unsigned instruments are
clearly identified or referred to and made part of the signed instrument or
instruments. The arbitration agreement contained in the Club Rules, which
in turn was referred to in the Certificate of Entry and Acceptance, is binding
upon Sulpicio even though there was no specific stipulation on dispute
resolution in this Certificate.

1106
 Lanuza, Jr. v. BF Corporation
G.R. No. 174938 October 1, 2014

FACTS:

In 1993, BF Corporation filed a collection complaint with the RTC against

Shangri-La and members of its board of directors: Alfredo Ramos, Rufo Colayco,
Antonio Olbes, Gerardo Lanuza, Maximo Licauco and Benjamin Ramos.
(petitioners) BF Corporation alleged that it entered into agreements with Shangri-
La wherein it undertook to construct for Shangri-La, a mall and multi-level
parking along EDSA. At the onset of their agreement, Shangri-La was consistent
in paying BF Corporation in accordance with the agreement. However, by October
1991, Shangri-La started defaulting in payment.

BF Corporation continued to construct the structure on its own funds and

credit on the alleged misrepresentation of Shangri-La that it has funds to pay for
its obligations, and that the delay in payment was simply a matter of delayed
processing of billing statements. After the completion of the project, Shangri-La
took possession of the building while still owing BF Corporation an outstanding
balance. Despite repeated demands, Shangri-La failed to pay. BF Corporation
alleged bad faith on the part of the board of directors of Shangri-La, thus they
should be held jointly and severally liable for its obligations and damages.

Shangri-La and its board of directors filed a motion to suspend proceedings

in view of BF Corporation’s failure to submit its dispute to arbitration in
accordance with the arbitration dispute clause provided in its contract. On
November 18, 1993, the RTC denied the motion, to which the petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration. Petitioners filed an answer with compulsory
counterclaim against BF Corporation and crossclaim against Shangri-La, alleging
that they had resigned as board of directors as of July 1991.

The motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 1993 order was denied
by the trial court. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which
the latter granted and ordered the submission of the dispute to arbitration.
Aggrieved, BF Corporation filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC,
who affirmed the decision.

BF Corporation initiated the arbitration proceedings. Shangri-La filed an

omnibus motion and BF Corporation, an urgent motion for clarification, both
seeking to clarify whether Shangri-La’s directors should be included in the
arbitration proceedings and served with separate demands for arbitration.
Petitioners prayed that they be excluded from the arbitration proceedings for

1107
being non-parties to Shangri-La’s and BF Corporation’s agreement. The trial court
directed the service of demands for arbitration upon all defendants in BF
Corporation’s complaint, ruling that the directors were interested parties who
must also be included to give them opportunity to safeguard their interest.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave abuse of
discretion, which was dismissed, ruling that they were necessary parties to the
arbitration proceedings and to avoid multiplicity of suits. A petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 was filed with the SC. Petitioners argue that they cannot
be held personally liable for corporate acts and obligations, and that they did not
bind themselves personally. They are also regarded as third persons to the contract
between BF Corporation and Shangri-La, thus, arbitration stipulations should only
bind the parties thereto. In its memorandum, Shangi-La contended that the non-
inclusion of petitioners will result in multiplicity of suits.

The Arbitral Tribunal promulgated its decision denying BF Corporation’s

claims against petitioners. The latter reiterated that throughout the proceedings,
they manifested their objections and unwilling participation in the arbitration.
However, petitioners reiterated in the trial court that the resolution of the arbitral
tribunal is without prejudice to the resolution of this case.

ISSUE:

Should the petitioners (board of directors) of Shangri-La be made parties

to the arbitration proceedings, pursuant to the arbitration clause provided in the
contract between BF Corporation and Shangri-La?

RULING:

Yes.

Petitioners may be compelled to submit to the arbitration proceedings in

accordance with Shangri-La and BF Corporation’s agreement, in order to
determine if the distinction between Shangri-La’s personality and their
personalities should be disregarded pursuant to the doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction.

This jurisdiction adopts a policy in favor of arbitration. Arbitration allows

the parties to avoid litigation and settle disputes amicably and more expeditiously
by themselves and through their choice of arbitrators. Consistent with the above-
mentioned policy, courts should liberally construe arbitration clauses. Indeed, as
petitioners point out, their personalities as directors of Shangri-La are separate and
distinct from Shangri-La. Because a corporation’s existence is only by fiction of

1108
law, it can only exercise its rights and powers through its directors, officers, or
agents, who are all natural persons. A corporation cannot sue or enter into
contracts without them.

A submission to arbitration is a contract. As such, the Agreement, containing

the stipulation on arbitration, binds the parties thereto, as well as their assigns and
heirs. As a general rule, therefore, a corporation’s representative who did not
personally bind himself or herself to an arbitration agreement cannot be forced to
participate in arbitration proceedings made pursuant to an agreement entered into
by the corporation. He or she is generally not considered a party to that agreement.

However, there are instances when the distinction between personalities of

directors, officers, and representatives, and of the corporation, are disregarded.
We call this piercing the veil of corporate fiction. When corporate veil is pierced,
the corporation and persons who are normally treated as distinct from the
corporation are treated as one person, such that when the corporation is adjudged
liable, these persons, too, become liable as if they were the corporation. Among the
persons who may be treated as the corporation itself under certain circumstances
are its directors and officers.

When there are allegations of bad faith or malice against corporate directors
or representatives, it becomes the duty of courts or tribunals to determine if these
persons and the corporation should be treated as one. Without a trial, courts and
tribunals have no basis for determining whether the veil of corporate fiction
should be pierced. The determination of these circumstances must be made by one
tribunal or court in a proceeding participated in by all parties involved, including
current representatives of the corporation, and those persons whose personalities
are impliedly the same as the corporation.

In that case, complainants have no choice but to institute only one proceeding
against the parties. Under the Rules of Court, filing of multiple suits for a single
cause of action is prohibited. Institution of more than one suit for the same cause
of action constitutes splitting the cause of action, which is a ground for the
dismissal of the others. This is explicit in Rule 2, Sec. 3 and 4, which mandates the
institution of only one suit for a single cause of action and the effect of splitting a
single cause of action.

Hence, the issue of whether the corporation’s acts in violation of

complainant’s rights, and the incidental issue of whether piercing of the corporate
veil is warranted, should be determined in a single proceeding. Such finding
would determine if the corporation is merely an aggregation of persons whose
liabilities must be treated as one with the corporation. Thus, in cases alleging

1109
solidary liability with the corporation or praying for the piercing of the corporate
veil, parties who are normally treated as distinct individuals should be made to
participate in the arbitration proceedings in order to determine if such distinction
should indeed be disregarded and, if so, to determine the extent of their liabilities.

In this case, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered a decision, finding that BF

Corporation failed to prove the existence of circumstances that render petitioners
and the other directors solidarily liable. It ruled that petitioners and Shangri-La’s
other directors were not liable for the contractual obligations of Shangri-La to BF
Corporation. The Arbitral Tribunal’s decision was made with the participation of
petitioners, albeit with their continuing objection. In view of our discussion above,
we rule that petitioners are bound by such decision.

1110
 Camp John Hay Development Corp. v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp.
G.R. No. 198849, August 7, 2019

FACTS:

In January 2001, Camp John Hay Development (CJHD) entered into a

Contractor's Agreement with Charter Chemical, the company awarded to
complete the interior and exterior painting works of unit 2E of the Camp John Hay
Manor. Although the Contractor's Agreement contained no date of the units'
turnover, it allowed Charter Chemical to choose the units for offsetting under an
offsetting scheme. After completing the painting works in 2003, Charter Chemical
demanded the execution of the deed of sale and delivery of the titles of 2 units in
September 2004. In June 2005 CJHD and Charter Chemical executed contracts to
sell. The units were not delivered because the construction of Camp John Hay
Suites was not yet complete. Due to the subsisting construction delay, Charter
Chemical wrote CJHD, demanding that it transfer the units or pay the value of
these units. When it felt that further demands would be futile, Charter Chemical,
on June 12, 2008, filed before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission a
Request for Arbitration under the arbitration clause in the Contractor's
Agreement. The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission ordered CJHD to
pay the monetary value of the 2 units in Camp John Hay Suites, and attorney's
fees.

CJHD filed before the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. It argued that the arbitral tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the
dispute because the arbitration clause had been superseded by a subsequent
dispute resolution clause contained in the contracts to sell. CA affirmed the arbitral
tribunal's award. It held that the arbitration clause in the Contractor's Agreement
was neither modified nor superseded by the contracts to sell, which were merely
devices by which to transfer possession and title over the units to Charter
Chemical. The Contractor's Agreement, it noted, remained the principal covenant.
CJHD filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. It claims that the arbitral tribunal
had no jurisdiction over the Complaint. It asserts that the contracts to sell executed
following the Contractor's Agreement contain a different mode of dispute
resolution. From the dispute resolution clause, CJHD points out that disputes must
be adjudicated by the proper courts of Pasig City, to the exclusion of all other
courts. The contracts to sell also effectively removed the parties' dispute outside
the ambit of a construction dispute since they are not the construction contracts
contemplated by the Construction Industry Arbitration Law. Charter Chemical
claims that the arbitral tribunal correctly acquired jurisdiction over the dispute
because the relationship of the parties was born out of the Contractor's Agreement.
The Contractor's Agreement provided the arbitration clause in case of any dispute.

1111
The contracts to sell "cannot be considered to have superseded the Contractor's
Agreement" because they are merely preparatory contracts required for the
processing of the titles of the units.

ISSUE:

Do the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission have jurisdiction

over the dispute despite the existence of a dispute resolution clause?

RULING:

Yes. The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), created

under EO No. 1008, has jurisdiction over construction disputes between or among
parties to an arbitration agreement, or those who are otherwise bound by the latter,
directly or by reference. For the CIAC to acquire jurisdiction, the law merely
requires that the parties agree to submit to voluntary arbitration any dispute
arising from construction contracts. The mere existence of an arbitration clause in
the construction contract is considered by law as an agreement by the parties to
submit existing or future controversies between them to CIAC jurisdiction,
without any qualification or condition precedent. Arbitration of construction
disputes through the CIAC was incorporated into the general statutory framework
on alternative dispute resolution through R.A. No. 9285, or the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also
hastens the resolution of disputes, especially of the commercial kind. It is thus
regarded as the "wave of the future" in international civil and commercial
disputes. Brushing aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration between
the parties would be a step backward. Consistent with the aforementioned policy
of encouraging alternative dispute resolution methods, courts should liberally
construe arbitration clauses. Provided such clause is susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute, an order to arbitrate should be
granted.

Moreover, the contracts to sell, containing a contrary dispute resolution

clause, did not supersede the arbitration clause. The case records show that the
contracts to sell are not inconsistent with the Contractor's Agreement. They are
merely devices to facilitate the transfer of ownership of the 2 units to respondent-
an offshoot of the offsetting scheme provision in the Contractor's Agreement. This
dispute is better left to the expertise of the CIAC, a quasi-judicial body with the
technical expertise to resolve disputes outside the expertise of regular courts. It
should adjudicate and determine the claims and rights of petitioner and
respondent with respect to the construction contract and all its incidents.

1112
 Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. DMCI Project Developers Inc.
G.R. No. 173137, January 11, 2016

FACTS:

BCDA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Philippine

National Railways (PNR) and other foreign corporations to construct a railroad
system from Manila to Clark with possible extensions to Subic Bay and La Union
and later, possibly to Ilocos Norte and Nueva Ecija. The JVA contains an
arbitration clause.

Also, part of the agreement is for BCDA to establish North Luzon Railways
Corporation (Northrail) for purposes of constructing, operating, and managing the
railroad system, which was complied by BCDA.

In 1996, the JVA was amended (AJVA) to include DMCI as a party/investor

of Northrail, through DMCI-PDI as nominate party. They also entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) wherein it was agreed that the initial seed
capital of P600 million shall be infused to Northrail, of that amount, P200 million
shall be DMCI's share, which shall be converted to equity upon Northrails
privatization. Later, D.M. Consunji, Inc.'s share was increased to P300 million.

Upon BCDA and Northrail’s request, DMCI-PDI deposited P300 million

into Northrails account with Landbank.

Later, Northrail withdrew from the Securities and Exchange Commission

its application for increased authorized capital stock. Moreover, according to
DMCI-PDI, BCDA applied for Official Development Assistance from Obuchi Fund
of Japan.This required Northrail to be a 100% government-owned and controlled
corporation.

DMCI-PDI started demanding from BCDA and Northrail the return of its
P300 million deposit. DMCI-PDI cited Northrail's failure to increase its authorized
capital stock as reason for the demand. BCDA and Northrail refused to return the
deposit.

DMCI-PDI served a demand for arbitration to BCDA and Northrail, citing

the arbitration clause in the JVA. BCDA and Northrail failed to respond.

DMCI-PDI filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati a Petition to

Compel Arbitration against BCDA and Northrail, pursuant to the alleged
arbitration clause in the JVA.

1113
 BCDA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that there was no arbitration
clause that DMCI-PDI could enforce since DMCI-PDI was not a party to the JVA
containing the arbitration clause. Northrail filed a separate Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over it and that DMCI-PDI had
no cause for arbitration against it.

The RTC of Makati denied BCDA's and Northrail's Motions to Dismiss and
granted DMCI-PDI's Petition to Compel Arbitration.

BCDA filed a Rule 45 Petition before the Supreme Court, assailing the RTC
Order granting DMCI-PDI's Petition to Compel Arbitration.

ISSUE:

Can DMCI-PDI compel BCDA and Northrail to submit to arbitration

pursuant to the Arbitration Clause found in the Joint Venture Agreement?

RULING:

Yes.

The state adopts a policy in favor of arbitration. Arbitration agreements are

liberally construed in favor of proceeding to arbitration.

There is no rule that a contract should be contained in a single document.

A whole contract may be contained in several documents that are consistent with
one other.

Moreover, at any time during the lifetime of an agreement, circumstances

may arise that may cause the parties to change or add to the terms they previously
agreed upon. Thus, amendments or supplements to the agreement may be
executed by contracting parties to address the circumstances or issues that arise
while a contract subsists.

A reading of all the documents of agreement (JVA, AJVA, and MOA) shows
that they were executed by the same parties. Initially, the JVA was executed only
by BCDA, PNR, and the foreign corporations. When the JVA was amended to
include D.M. Consunji, Inc. and/or its nominee, D.M. Consunji, Inc. and/or its
nominee were deemed to have been also a party to the original JVA executed by
BCDA, PNR, and the foreign corporations. D.M. Consunji, Inc. and/or its nominee

1114
became bound to the terms of both JVA and the AJVA. The JVA, AJVA, and the
MOA should be treated as one contract because they all form part of a whole
agreement. Hence, the arbitration clause in JVA should not be interpreted as
applicable only to the JVA’s original parties. The succeeding agreements are
deemed part of or a continuation of the JVA. The arbitration clause should extend
to all the agreements and its parties since it is still consistent with all the terms and
conditions of the amendments and supplements.

1115
 INTRA-CORPORATE DISPUTE

Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Jose Santos and Victoria Belo

G.R. No. 185894. August 30, 2017

FACTS:

Santos, a stockholder of record for 25 shares in Belo Medical Group,

requested for an inspection of the corporate books. Belo, another stockholder of
record of Belo Medical Group, opposed to granting Santos’ request alleging that:
(1) Santos is not the true owner of the 25 shares and is merely a trustee for said
shares in favor of Belo; and, (2) Santos’ request for inspection is done in bad faith
as he allegedly requests it to work in favor of a competitor company which Santos
is also a stockholder. Being caught in the disputing claims of Belo and Santos, Belo
Medical Group filed a Complaint for Interpleader with RTC, alleging that while
Santos appeared to be a registered stockholder, there was nothing on the record to
show that he had paid for the shares under his name. Subsequently, Belo Medical
Group filed a Supplemental Complaint for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. In its Supplemental Complaint, Belo Medical Group relied on
Section 74 of the Corporation Code to deny Santos' request for inspection.

The Complaint and Supplemental Complaint were raffled to the RTC of

Makati, a special commercial court, thus classifying them as intra-corporate.
However, Belo argued that the proceedings should not have been classified as
intra-corporate because while their right of inspection as shareholders may be
considered intra-corporate, "it ceases to be that and becomes a full-blown civil law
question if competing rights of ownership are asserted as the basis for the right of
inspection."

The trial court characterized the dispute as "intrinsically connected with the
regulation of the corporation as it involves the right of inspection of corporate
records." Included in Santos and Belo's conflict was a shareholder's exclusive right
to inspect corporate records. In addition, the issue on the ownership of shares
requires the application of laws and principles regarding corporations.

However, RTC dismissed the Complaint for Interpleader as Belo Medical

Group failed to sufficiently allege conflicting claims of ownership over the subject
shares. Finally, the Complaint for Declaratory Relief was struck down as improper
because it sought an initial determination on whether Santos was in bad faith and
if he should be barred from inspecting the books of the corporation. Only after
resolving these issues can the trial court determine his rights under Sections 74
and 75 of the Corporation Code. The act of resolving these issues is not within the

1116
province of the special civil action as declaratory relief is limited to the
construction and declaration of actual rights and does not include the
determination of issues.

Belo Medical Group directly filed a petition before the SC under Rule 45 on
the basis that the appeal is based purely on questions of facts. However, Santos
contends that Belo Medical Group that the petition must be dismissed as it is the
wrong mode of appeal, where the proper appeal should be under Rule 43 as it
involves an intra-corporate controversy.

ISSUE:

Do the complaints filed by Belo Medical Group involve an intra-

corporate controversy?

RULING:

Yes.

A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC or the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-

Corporate Controversies, enumerates the cases where the rules will apply. Section
1 (5) Inspection of corporate books. To determine whether an intra-corporate
dispute exists and whether this case requires the application of these rules of
procedure, this Court evaluated the relationship of the parties. The types of intra-
corporate relationships were reviewed in Union Glass & Container Corporation v.
Securities and Exchange Commission: [a] between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; [b] between the corporation, partnership or association
and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; [c] between the corporation,
partnership or association and the state in so far as its franchise, permit or license
to operate is concerned; and [d] among the stockholders, partners or associates
themselves. For as long as any of these intra-corporate relationships exist between
the parties, the controversy would be characterized as intra-corporate. This is
known as the "relationship test."

DMRC Enterprises v. Este del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc. employed what
would later be called as the "nature of controversy test." It became another means
to determine if the dispute should be considered as intra-corporate. In DMRC
Enterprises, the Supreme Court held that it was not just the relationship of the
parties that mattered but also the conflict between them. This Court now uses both
the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test to determine if an intra-
corporate controversy is present.

1117
 Applying the relationship test, this Court notes that both Belo and Santos
are named shareholders in Belo Medical Group's Articles of Incorporation and
General Information Sheet for 2007. The conflict is clearly intra-corporate as it
involves 2 shareholders although the ownership of stocks of one stockholder is
questioned. Unless Santos is adjudged as a stranger to the corporation because he
holds his shares only in trust for Belo, then both he and Belo, based on official
records, are stockholders of the corporation. Belo Medical Group argues that the
case should not have been characterized as intra-corporate because it is not
between two shareholders as only Santos or Belo can be the rightful stockholder
of the 25 shares of stock. This may be true. But this finding can only be made after
trial where ownership of the shares of stock is decided.

Applying the nature of the controversy test, this is still an intra-corporate

dispute. The Complaint for interpleader seeks a determination of the true owner
of the shares of stock registered in Santos' name. Ultimately, however, the goal is
to stop Santos from inspecting corporate books. This goal is so apparent that, even
if Santos is declared the true owner of the shares of stock upon completion of the
interpleader case, Belo Medical Group still seeks his disqualification from
inspecting the corporate books based on bad faith. Therefore, the controversy
shifts from a mere question of ownership over movable property to the exercise of
a registered stockholder's proprietary right to inspect corporate books. The
circumstances of the case and the aims of the parties must not be taken in isolation
from one another. The totality of the controversy must be taken into account to
improve upon the existing tests.

The trial court cannot classify the case based on potentialities. The two
defendants in that case are both stockholders on record. They continue to be
stockholders until a decision is rendered on the true ownership of the 25 shares of
stock in Santos’ name. If Santos’ subscription is declared fictitious and he still
insists on inspecting corporate books and exercising rights incidental to being a
stockholder, then, and only then, shall the case cease to be intra-corporate, and a
complaint of interpleader will prosper.

1118
 VILLAMOR, Jr. v. UMALE
G.R. No. 172843, September 24, 2014

FACTS:

MC Home Depot occupied a prime property (Rockland area) Pasig. The

property was part of the area owned by Mid-Pasig Development Corporation
(Mid-Pasig) On March 1, 2004, Pasig Printing Corporation (PPC) obtained an
option to lease portions of Mid-Pasig’s property, including the Rockland area.
Subsequently, PPC’s board of directors issued a resolution waiving all its rights,
interests and participation in the option to lease contract in favor of the law firm
of Atty. Alfredo Villamor (Villamor) PPC received no consideration for the waiver
in favor of Villamor’s law firm.

On November 22, 2004, PPC, represented by Villamor, entered into a

memorandum of agreement with MC Home Depot, where the latter would
continue to occupy the area as PPC’s sublessee for four years, renewable for four
years. In compliance with the MOA, MC Home Depot issued 20 post-dated checks
representing the rental payments for one year. The checks were given to Villamor
who did not turn the amount over to PPC upon encashment.

Hernando Balmores, a stockholder of PPC, wrote a letter to PPC’s directors

(petitioners) informing them that Villamor should be made to deliver to PPC and
account for MC Home Depot’s checks. Due to the alleged inaction of the directors,
Balmores filed with the RTC an intra-corporate controversy complaint under the
Interim Rules for Intra-Corporate Controversies (Interim Rules) against
petitioners for the alleged fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the interest of
the corporation and its stockholders. He alleged that because of the inaction of the
petitioners, PPC’s assets were dissipated, lost, wasted and destroyed. Respondent
Balmores prayed that a receiver be appointed, and that the petitioners be
prohibited from encumbering transferring or disposing PPC’s properties,
including MC Home Depot’s checks. He also prayed for the annulment of the
board’s resolution waiving PPC’s rights in favor of Villamor’s law firm.

The RTC denied the Balmores’ prayer for appointment of a receiver or the
creation of a management committee. According to the trial court, there was no
clear and positive showing of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of PPC’s
assets that was prejudicial to the interests of the minority stockholders, amongst
others. The failure of the board to recover said amount does not indicate of
mismanagement resulting in dissipation of the assets.

Balmores filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, assailing
the denial of his prayer for appointment of a receivership or management

1119
committee. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court. It issued an order
placing PPC under receivership and creating an interim management committee.
The CA classified the assailed trial court order as interlocutory and hence, non-
appealable. In justifying its decision to place PPC under receivership and to create
a management committee, the Court of Appeals stated that the board’s waiver of
PPC’s rights in favor of Villamor’s law firm without any consideration and its
inaction on Villamor’s failure to turn over the proceeds of rental payments to PPC
warrant the creation of a management committee. The circumstances resulted in
the imminent danger of loss, waste, or dissipation of PPC’s assets.

A petition for Review on certiorari was filed with the SC. According to the
directors, assuming that a receiver or management committee may be appointed
in the case, it is the Regional Trial Court only and not the Court of Appeals that
must appoint them.

ISSUE:

Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to appoint a receiver or

management committee in cases of intra-corporate disputes?

RULING:

No.

The Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to appoint the receiver or

management committee.

The Court of Appeals has no power to appoint a receiver or management

committee. The Regional Trial Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide intra-corporate controversies, including incidents of such
controversies. These incidents include applications for the appointment of
receivers or management committees.

Under the law, "The receiver and members of the management committee ...
are considered officers of the court and shall be under its control and supervision."
They are required to report to the court on the status of the corporation within
sixty (60) days from their appointment and every three (3) months after.

When respondent Balmores filed his petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, there was still a pending action in the trial court, that is, the intra-
corporate controversy complaint. No less than the Court of Appeals stated that it

1120
allowed respondent Balmores’ petition under Rule 65 because the order or
resolution in question was an interlocutory one. This means that jurisdiction over
the main case was still lodged with the trial court.

The court making the appointment controls and supervises the appointed
receiver or management committee. Thus, the Court of Appeals’ appointment of a
management committee would result in an absurd scenario wherein while the
main case is still pending before the trial court, the receiver or management
committee reports to the Court of Appeals.

“That in all things,

God may be glorified!”

1121