Manuscript 14676 1 10 20170102
Manuscript 14676 1 10 20170102
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ABSTRACT— Best practice in developing Inspection Plan for static mechanical equipment on offshore topside
platform is by performing Risk-based inspection (RBI) analysis. However, there are hundreds or even thousands static
mechanical equipment on offshore topside platform. Since detailed RBI analysis requires a lot of data and tedious
calculation then it is necessary to do equipment criticality screening prior to perform detail RBI analysis as it is
suggested in DNV-RP-G101. Equipment Criticality Analysis (ECA) protocols for carbon steel static mechanical
equipment have been developed as criticality screening tools. The protocols were developed based upon DNV-RP-
G101. ECA categorizes the static mechanical equipment into C1, C2, or C3 which refer to high, medium or low
criticality equipment respectively. The C3 equipment will receive minimum surveillance with planned corrective
maintenance while C2 and C1 equipment will require detail RBI analysis.
Keywords— Equipment Criticality Analysis (ECA), Risk-Based Inspection (RBI), DNV-RP-G101, Risk
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1. INTRODUCTION
There are hundreds even thousands static mechanical equipment installed on topside of offshore platforms. The
equipment might suffer more than one degradation mechanism that leads to loss of its integrity. Inspection program will
ensure the integrity of the equipment. It will check the wall thickness of the static mechanical equipment, predict the
degradation rate and conclude whether the existing equipment is still fit to operate. A comprehensive and effective
inspection program will describe clearly of what, when, where and how to inspect [1, 2]. These can be achieved by
performing Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) Analysis. RBI is a decision making technique for inspection planning based on
risk.
Risk is a measure of possible loss or injury, and is expressed as the combination of the incident probability and its
consequences. RBI defines risk as loss of containment of pressurized equipment. Mathematically, risk can be expressed
in equation (1).
(1)
To carry out the RBI analysis for each equipment, the consequences of failure (CoF) and probability of failure (PoF)
are assessed separately. Both of them are then combined to obtain risk of equipment failure. This evaluation is carried out
separately for safety (addressing personnel death and injury), environmental (addressing damage to the environment) and
economic (addressing financial loss).
Equipment criticality analysis (ECA) will be a crucial screening tool prior to performing RBI analysis when the
analysis involves hundreds or even thousands of equipment. The premise says that a large percent of the total unit risk
will be concentrated in a relatively small percent of the equipment items [3].
ECA is a risk-based screening process to prioritize which equipment should be analyzed further using RBI or not. The
basic equipment criticality analysis risk matrix uses a 2 x 2 risk matrix as screening tool as it is shown in Figure 1. DNV
[2] recommends that the boundary between low and high probability of failure has been set to approximately 10 -5 per
year, i.e. no significant degradation is expected with PoF of 10 -5 per year or less. The matrix classifies risk into three
levels; they are low risk, medium risk and high risk. ECA denotes low risk, medium risk and high risk as C3, C2 and C1
respectively. Generally, low criticality equipment (C3) requires minimal inspection supported by maintenance. Medium
(C2) and high (C1) criticality equipment require detail evaluation. In the case of piping and pressure vessels, risk-based
inspection (RBI) will be utilized to perform analysis in detail.
MEDIUM HIGH
Significant RISK RISK
PoF (C2) (C1)
Acceptable Unacceptable
CoF CoF
AT, CO and T represent atmospheric type, coating age and corrosion rate as a function of temperature respectively. The
scoring protocol for each parameter is listed in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 respectively.
Table 1: Atmospheric type scoring protocol
Atmospheric Type (AT) Score
Low humidity and low temperature 1
Chemical and low humidity 2
High humidity and high temperature 3
Marine, swamp, coastal 4
Chemical and high humidity 5
Chemical and marine 5
severity level as a function of pH of water and H 2S content in water as it is shown in Table 8 [3]. Table 9 shows the
scoring protocol of H2S corrosion that is generated based upon values listed in Table 8 .
Table 8: Environmental severity as function of water pH and H 2S content
pH of H2S Content (ppm)
Water < 50 50 to 1,000 1,000 to 10,000 > 10,000
< 5.5 Low Moderate High High
5.5 to 7.5 Low Low Low Moderate
7.6 to 8.3 Low Moderate Moderate Moderate
8.4 to 8.9 Low Moderate Moderate High
> 9.0 Low Moderate High High
4.2 Pressure
Pressure hazard is proportional to the internal pressure inside the equipment. Maximum operating pressure (MOP)
will be used as parameter to consider the contribution of pressure inside the equipment when it leaked. Table 11 shows
the pressure distribution and its scoring protocol which will be used during ECA process.
Table 11: Scoring protocol of MOP (Cp)
Pressure Score
≤ 50 psig 1
> 50 psig to ≤ 200 psig 2
> 200 psig to ≤ 400 psig 3
> 400 psig to ≤ 600 psig 4
> 600 psig to ≤ 700 psig 5
> 700 psig 6
4.3 Consequence Modeling of Health and Safety of Personnel (FC1)
The consequences of equipment failure are modeled based on the properties of the product service that is transported
within the equipment. The hazard category levels caused by product service may refer to NFPA 704 [7]. Chemical
compositions of the product service consist of several materials. The most dominant chemical composition will be
selected to represent the consequence model.
The primary factor in determining the nature of the hazard is the product service itself. Most products will have some
acute hazard characteristics and some chronic hazard characteristics. Acute means sudden onset, or demanding urgent
attention, or of short duration. Hazards such as fire, explosion, or contact toxicity are considered to be acute hazards.
They are immediate threats caused by a leak. Acute hazard scoring will consider following hazard characteristics,
flammability (Nf), reactivity (Nr) and toxicity (Nh). These hazard characteristics will be adopted as part of FC1 scoring
protocol as it is also found in [8]. Flammability scoring protocol is shown in Table 12, reactivity scoring protocol is
shown in Table 13 and toxicity scoring protocol is shown in Table 14.
Scoring Personnel Health and Safety Consequence (FC1) can be obtained by summing up all Nf, Nr, and Nh scores
and then multiply them by the size of the leakage hole score (Ch) and pressure score (Cp) as it is shown in the equation
(3). Based on the values listed in Table 10 to Table 14, the possible score of FC1 will vary from 0 to 288.
(3)
Table 12: Scoring protocol of flammability
Flammability Criteria Nf
Noncombustible 0
FP > 200°F 1
100°F < FP < 200°F 2
FP < 100°F and BP < 100°F 3
FP < 73°F and BP < 100°F 4
Table 13: Scoring protocol of reactivity
Reactivity Criteria Nr
Substance is completely stable 0
Mild reactivity on heating with pressure 1
Significant reactivity 2
Detonation possible with confinement 3
Detonation possible without confinement 4
Table 14: Scoring protocol of toxicity
Toxicity Criteria Nh
No hazard beyond that of ordinary combustibles 0
Only minor residual injury is likely 1
Prompt medical attention required to avoid temporary incapacitation 2
Materials causing serious temporary or residual injury 3
Short exposure causes death or major injury 4
The location of the equipment also contribute to the damage of other components around the equipment that is being
analyzed. Equipment located on the corner will have a lower contribution of damage to other equipment compared to that
is located in the center of the plant. Table 16 tabulates the scoring protocol regarding to the equipment location in a plant
(FC3.2).
Table 16: Equipment location scoring protocol (FC3.2)
Equipment Layout Score
In a plant corner 1
In a vicinity of plant side 2
Recovery time of plant outage depends on how severe is the damaged plant. Outage of the plant as a consequence of
damaged equipment may last from a few hours to months. Table 17 lists the scoring protocol regarding to the plant
outage evaluation (FC3.3).
Secondary damage to other equipment may only occur if the damage to the equipment being analyzed severe enough
to affect other equipment. Table 18 shows the secondary damage scoring protocol regarding to the secondary damage
equipment caused by other damaged equipment (FC3.4).
Table 17: Plant outage scoring protocol (FC3.3)
Plant Outage Score
Partial shutdown < 1 day 1
Production loss total shutdown for < 1 day 2
Production loss total shutdown for > 1 day up to 1 week 3
Production loss total shutdown for > 1 week up to 0.5 month 4
Production loss total shutdown for > 0.5 month 5
Table 18: Scoring protocol of secondary damage equipment (FC3.4)
Secondary Damage Score
Equipment it self 1
Some equipment in process unit 3
More than one process units 5
Considering the scoring protocols, the possible business interruption scores will vary from 3 to 720.
5. CONVERTING DAMAGE FACTOR SCORE INTO PROBABILITY RATING
Probability of failure models cover external damage factor and other five internal damage factors. It only needs one of
damage factors to occur to make carbon steel static mechanical equipment leaks. That is the reason why damage factors
which represent probability model in Figure 2 are connected in OR gate. Since there will be six different scores of
damage factors, then it is only the worst score that will be selected to represent the probability of failure of the equipment
being analyzed. Table 19 shows the conversion of damage factor score into probability rating.
Table 19: the Conversion of Damage Factors Scores into Probability Rating
EDF IDF1 IDF2 IDF3 IDF4 IDF5 Probability Probability
Score Score Score Score Score Score Rating Descriptor
1–2 1 1 1 1 1 1 Almost Impossible
3–4 2 2 2 2 Unlikely
5–6 3 3 3 3 3 3 Possible
7–8 4 4 4 4 Likely
9 – 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 Almost Certain
5 M M H H H H
4 L M M H H H
3 L L M M H H
2 L L L M M H
1 L L L L M M
A B C D E F
CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE
Figure 4: A 5 x 6 Corporate Risk Matrix
In order to be able to determine the criticality of the equipment, the integrated risk matrix must be converted into
ECA risk matrix. To convert it, the following boundaries should be set. The boundary between negligible PoF and
significant PoF has been set to approximately 10 -4 per year. The boundary between acceptable CoF and Unacceptable
CoF is set at minor consequence rating (Rating B). By adopting ECA protocols, a new ECA risk matrix based on
corporate risk matrix has been developed as it is shown in Figure 5. C1, C2 and C3 in Figure 5 represent high, medium
and low criticality of the equipment. The protocols and the matrix are ready to be implemented in screening the criticality
of Offshore Carbon Steel Static Mechanical Equipment.
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE
5 C2 C2 C1 C1 C1 C1
4 C2 C2 C2 C1 C1 C1
3 C2 C2 C2 C2 C1 C1
2 C3 C3 C2 C2 C2 C1
1 C3 C3 C2 C2 C2 C2
A B C D E F
CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE
Figure 5: Adjusted Corporate Risk Matrix for ECA
8. CONCLUSION
The equipment criticality analysis (ECA) protocols of offshore carbon steel static mechanical equipment together
with adjusted corporate risk matrix for ECA purpose have been developed. The case study shows that the methodology
can be applied to any dimensions of risk matrix. The key point in implementing this methodology is to find the
boundaries between negligible and significant probability of failure as well as between acceptable and unacceptable
consequence of failure.
The ECA of offshore carbon steel static mechanical equipment will involve hundreds or even thousands piping
segments and pressure vessels. Therefore, the future development will be focused in the database programming.
9. REFERENCES
[1] API RP 580 Risk-Based Inspection, Second Edition, Washington D.C, 2009.
[2] DNV-RP-G101 Risk Based Inspection of Offshore Topsides Static Mechanical Equipment, 2010.
[3] API RP 581 Risk-Based Inspection Technology, Second Edition, September 2008.
[4] Muhlbauer, W. Kent, Pipeline Risk Management Manual: Ideas, Techniques, and Resources, 3rd Edition, Gulf
Professional Publishing, 2004.
[5] Bjarte Rød, Evaluation of Probability of Failure of Static Equipment in Pressurized Mud Systems on an Offshore
Drilling Installation, Master Thesis, The Arctic University of Norway, pp. 47-49, 2015.
[6] NACE SP0106-2006 Item No. 21111 Standard Practice Control of Internal Corrosion in Steel Pipelines and Piping
Systems, 2006.
[7] NFPA 704 Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response, 2012.
[8] Muhlbauer, W. Kent, Pipeline Risk Management Manual: A Systematic Approach to Loss Prevention and Risk