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Manuscript 14676 1 10 20170102

This document summarizes the development of an Equipment Criticality Analysis (ECA) protocol to screen static mechanical equipment on offshore platforms prior to detailed risk-based inspection analysis. The ECA protocol categorizes equipment into high (C1), medium (C2), or low (C3) criticality based on probability of failure and consequences of failure scores. C3 equipment requires minimal monitoring while C2 and C1 equipment require more detailed risk analysis. The ECA protocol developed probability of failure and consequences of failure models based on factors like corrosion and consequences to personnel, environment, and business. It aims to efficiently screen hundreds of equipment items before detailed risk-based inspection analysis.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
74 views9 pages

Manuscript 14676 1 10 20170102

This document summarizes the development of an Equipment Criticality Analysis (ECA) protocol to screen static mechanical equipment on offshore platforms prior to detailed risk-based inspection analysis. The ECA protocol categorizes equipment into high (C1), medium (C2), or low (C3) criticality based on probability of failure and consequences of failure scores. C3 equipment requires minimal monitoring while C2 and C1 equipment require more detailed risk analysis. The ECA protocol developed probability of failure and consequences of failure models based on factors like corrosion and consequences to personnel, environment, and business. It aims to efficiently screen hundreds of equipment items before detailed risk-based inspection analysis.
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Asian Journal of Applied Sciences (ISSN: 2321 – 0893)

Volume 04 – Issue 06, December 2016

The Development of Equipment Criticality Analysis (ECA)


Protocols of Offshore Carbon Steel Static Mechanical
Equipment
Dwi Priyanta1
1
Department of Marine Engineering, Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember (ITS)
Surabaya, Indonesia
Email: priyanta [AT] its.ac.id

_________________________________________________________________________________
ABSTRACT— Best practice in developing Inspection Plan for static mechanical equipment on offshore topside
platform is by performing Risk-based inspection (RBI) analysis. However, there are hundreds or even thousands static
mechanical equipment on offshore topside platform. Since detailed RBI analysis requires a lot of data and tedious
calculation then it is necessary to do equipment criticality screening prior to perform detail RBI analysis as it is
suggested in DNV-RP-G101. Equipment Criticality Analysis (ECA) protocols for carbon steel static mechanical
equipment have been developed as criticality screening tools. The protocols were developed based upon DNV-RP-
G101. ECA categorizes the static mechanical equipment into C1, C2, or C3 which refer to high, medium or low
criticality equipment respectively. The C3 equipment will receive minimum surveillance with planned corrective
maintenance while C2 and C1 equipment will require detail RBI analysis.

Keywords— Equipment Criticality Analysis (ECA), Risk-Based Inspection (RBI), DNV-RP-G101, Risk
_________________________________________________________________________________

1. INTRODUCTION
There are hundreds even thousands static mechanical equipment installed on topside of offshore platforms. The
equipment might suffer more than one degradation mechanism that leads to loss of its integrity. Inspection program will
ensure the integrity of the equipment. It will check the wall thickness of the static mechanical equipment, predict the
degradation rate and conclude whether the existing equipment is still fit to operate. A comprehensive and effective
inspection program will describe clearly of what, when, where and how to inspect [1, 2]. These can be achieved by
performing Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) Analysis. RBI is a decision making technique for inspection planning based on
risk.
Risk is a measure of possible loss or injury, and is expressed as the combination of the incident probability and its
consequences. RBI defines risk as loss of containment of pressurized equipment. Mathematically, risk can be expressed
in equation (1).
(1)
To carry out the RBI analysis for each equipment, the consequences of failure (CoF) and probability of failure (PoF)
are assessed separately. Both of them are then combined to obtain risk of equipment failure. This evaluation is carried out
separately for safety (addressing personnel death and injury), environmental (addressing damage to the environment) and
economic (addressing financial loss).
Equipment criticality analysis (ECA) will be a crucial screening tool prior to performing RBI analysis when the
analysis involves hundreds or even thousands of equipment. The premise says that a large percent of the total unit risk
will be concentrated in a relatively small percent of the equipment items [3].
ECA is a risk-based screening process to prioritize which equipment should be analyzed further using RBI or not. The
basic equipment criticality analysis risk matrix uses a 2 x 2 risk matrix as screening tool as it is shown in Figure 1. DNV
[2] recommends that the boundary between low and high probability of failure has been set to approximately 10 -5 per
year, i.e. no significant degradation is expected with PoF of 10 -5 per year or less. The matrix classifies risk into three
levels; they are low risk, medium risk and high risk. ECA denotes low risk, medium risk and high risk as C3, C2 and C1
respectively. Generally, low criticality equipment (C3) requires minimal inspection supported by maintenance. Medium

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Volume 04 – Issue 06, December 2016

(C2) and high (C1) criticality equipment require detail evaluation. In the case of piping and pressure vessels, risk-based
inspection (RBI) will be utilized to perform analysis in detail.

MEDIUM HIGH
Significant RISK RISK
PoF (C2) (C1)

Negligible LOW MEDIUM


PoF RISK RISK
(C3) (C2)

Acceptable Unacceptable
CoF CoF

Figure 1: Basic Equipment Criticality Analysis Matrix


2. EQUIPMENT CRITICALITY ANALYSIS (ECA) PROTOCOL
Concept of risk is adopted in developing the equipment criticality analysis protocol of offshore carbon steel static
mechanical equipment. In this case, risk is defined as the loss of containment of pressurized mechanical equipment. The
categories of equipment belong to the ECA are mostly carbon steel pressure vessels and piping. The criticality of
equipment is determined by scoring probability of event that leads to the loss of containment of pressurized equipment
and the consequences of it that leads to health and safety of personnel, environmental pollution as well as business
interruption. The combination of probability and consequence scoring will represent the risk or the criticality level of the
equipment being analyzed.
The ECA protocols will adopt scoring system as it is suggested by Muhlbauer [4]. The ECA scoring system for
offshore carbon steel mechanical equipment will be developed based on the model shown in Figure 2. The left and right
side of Figure 2 shows the probability of failure and consequence of failure model respectively.
External Damage Factor (EDF)
Personnel Health and Safety
Sand Erosion (IDF1) Consequence (FC1)

Water System (IDF2)


RISK
Environmental / Chronic
(LOSS of
Hazard Consequence (FC2)
CONTAINMENT)
MIC (IDF3)

CO2 Corrosion (IDF4) Business Interruption


Consequence (FC3)
H2S Corrosion (IDF5)
Consequence of Failure Model
Probability of Failure Model

Figure 2: ECA Model for Offshore Carbon Steel Mechanical Equipment


The probability is modeled based upon external damage factor (EDF) and internal damage factor (IDF) as it is
suggested in [2]. The sub category of internal damage factor consists of sand erosion (IDF1), water systems (IDF2),
microbiologically induced corrosion (IDF3), CO 2 corrosion (IDF4) as well as H2S corrosion (IDF5). Each damage factor
is assessed separately since each damage factor occurs independently.
The consequence of failure is evaluated based on three types of consequences. The consequences relate to the safety
of personnel (FC1), to the environment (FC2) and to the economy / business interruption (FC3).
The developed ECA protocols will be implemented in an oil gas company which has established a 5 x 6 risk matrix.
The risk matrix consists of 5 probability ratings and 6 consequence ratings. For those reasons, the ECA scoring protocols
will also be developed based upon a 5 x 6 risk matrix.
3. PROBABILITY OF FAILURE MODEL
Probability of failure (PoF) model of carbon steel material will be represented by external damage factor (EDF) and
internal damage factor (IDF). The IDF covers sand erosion (IDF1), water system (IDF2), microbiologically induced
corrosion or MIC (IDF3), CO2 Corrosion (IDF4) and H2S Corrosion (IDF5) as it is recommended by DNV [2].
EDF will be scored ranging from 1 to 10 while IDF1 to IDF5 will be scored ranging from 1 to 5. The minimum score
1 means that the probability model will have low probability of occurrence. The maximum score 5 or 10 means that that
the probability model will have high probability of occurrence.

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Volume 04 – Issue 06, December 2016

3.1 External Damage Factor (EDF)


Atmospheric corrosion is basically a chemical change that occurs in the material of component as a result of material
interactions with the atmosphere. Generally, these interactions cause oxidation on metal. Corrosion rate of external
corrosion will increase if the coating of the component is damaged or the temperature is increased.
The external damage factor is modeled based upon the atmospheric type where the equipment is operated, coating age
and corrosion rate as a function of temperature. The scoring protocol of external damage factor (EDF) is given by
equation (2).
(2)

AT, CO and T represent atmospheric type, coating age and corrosion rate as a function of temperature respectively. The
scoring protocol for each parameter is listed in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 respectively.
Table 1: Atmospheric type scoring protocol
Atmospheric Type (AT) Score
Low humidity and low temperature 1
Chemical and low humidity 2
High humidity and high temperature 3
Marine, swamp, coastal 4
Chemical and high humidity 5
Chemical and marine 5

Table 2: Coating age scoring protocol


Coating Age (CO) Score
< 5 years 1
≥5 to < 7.5 years 2
≥7.5 to < 10 years 3
≥10 to < 12.5 years 4
≥12.5 years 5

Table 3: Temperature scoring protocol


Temperature Range (T) Score
T< 20 C 1
20 < T < 50 C 2
50 < T < 80 C 3
80 < T < 100 C 4
T > 100 C 5

3.2 Internal Damage Factor 1 (IDF1) – Sand Erosion


Degradation due to sand erosion gives general wall thinning where the product flow impinges on the pipe or vessel
wall. The rate of wall loss by erosion increases with the quantity of sand in the product and the product flow rate.
The sand erosion is modeled based upon the solid quantity and velocity of the fluid [5]. The combination of these two
parameters will form an evaluation matrix to predict the occurrence of sand erosion as it is shown in Figure 3. The matrix
will show whether the probability of occurrence of sand erosion will be very high, high, medium, low or very low. These
classifications are then used as a basis of sand erosion scoring protocol as it is shown in Table 4.
High Medium High Very High
Velocity

Medium Low Medium High


Low Very Low Low Medium
Low Medium High
Solids
Figure 3: Evaluation Matrix to Predict the Occurrence of Sand Erosion
Table 4: IDF1 scoring protocol – sand erosion
Possibility Erosion IDF1
Occurrence Score
Very High 5
High 4
Medium 3
Low 2

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Volume 04 – Issue 06, December 2016

Possibility Erosion IDF1


Occurrence Score
Very Low 1

3.3 Internal Damage Factor 2 (IDF2) – Water Systems


Water systems use “water” of various corrosiveness, ranging from untreated seawater to potable water. Corrosion rate
increases with the increase in flow rate, oxygen concentration and temperature. DNV has shown that the rate of internal
corrosion of carbon steel piping depends on the flow rate of sea water and it can be described by normal distribution [2].
The flow rate of sea water varies from 0 m/s to about 5.5 m/s while the mean corrosion rate varies from 0.1 mm/year to
about 0.9 mm/year. In this case, the higher the flow rate, the higher mean corrosion rate will be. The combination of sea
water flow rate and estimated corrosion rate will be adopted in scoring protocol of water systems (IDF2) as it is shown in
Table 5.
Table 5: IDF2 scoring protocol – water systems
Water Flow Estimated Corrosion IDF2
Rate Rate Score
< 1 m/s 0.1 - 0.2 mm/year 1
1 to 1.5 m/s 0.2-0.4 mm/year 2
1.5 to 2 m/s 0.4 - 0.6 mm/year 3
2 to 3.5 m/s 0.6 - 0.8 mm/year 4
3.5 to 6 m/s 0.8 - 1 mm/year 5

3.4 Internal Damage Factor 3 (IDF3) – Microbiologically Induced Corrosion (MIC)


The microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC) is generally not expected in other materials than carbon steels in
anaerobic hydrocarbon systems. DNV presented the graph that shows the relation of probability of failure (per mm of
wall thickness) of carbon steel static mechanical equipment due to microbiologically induced corrosion as a function of
water temperature [2]. By knowing the water temperature that flows in the equipment we may estimate the probability of
the failure of the equipment due to microbiologically induced corrosion. The scoring protocol of MIC is developed based
upon the probability of failure value read from the graph. Table 6 shows the scoring protocol of microbiologically
induced corrosion (IDF3).
Table 6: IDF3 scoring protocol – microbiologically induced corrosion
Probability of Failure (failure IDF3
per year) Score
<10-6 1
10-6 to 10-4 2
10-4 to 10-2 3
10-2 to 1 4
>1 5

3.5 Internal Damage Factor 4 (IDF4) – CO2 Corrosion


Carbon Dioxide is a weakly acidic gas which is corrosive when dissolved in water becoming carbonic acid (H 2CO3).
The partial pressure of CO2 is used as a guideline to determine the corrosiveness of CO 2 as recommended by NACE [6].
In the presence of water, NACE divided the CO 2 corrosion into three categories. A partial pressure of CO 2 above 207 kPa
(30 psi) is usually corrosive, between 21 kPa (3 psi) and 207 kPa (30 psi) may be corrosive and below 21 kPa (3 psi) is
generally considered noncorrosive. These criteria are adopted to develop the scoring protocol of CO 2 corrosion as it is
shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Scoring protocol of IDF4 – CO2 corrosion
CO2 Partial IDF4 Score
Pressure
> 30 psi 5
3 psi to 30 psi 3
< 3 psi 1

3.6 Internal Damage Factor 5 (IDF5) – H2S Corrosion


If equipment material made of carbon or low alloy steel and the process contains water and H2S in any concentration,
the equipment should be evaluated for susceptibility to H2S corrosion. The H2S scoring protocol is developed based upon
the environmental severity since this will contribute to H 2S corrosion growth. API provides the H2S environmental

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severity level as a function of pH of water and H 2S content in water as it is shown in Table 8 [3]. Table 9 shows the
scoring protocol of H2S corrosion that is generated based upon values listed in Table 8 .
Table 8: Environmental severity as function of water pH and H 2S content
pH of H2S Content (ppm)
Water < 50 50 to 1,000 1,000 to 10,000 > 10,000
< 5.5 Low Moderate High High
5.5 to 7.5 Low Low Low Moderate
7.6 to 8.3 Low Moderate Moderate Moderate
8.4 to 8.9 Low Moderate Moderate High
> 9.0 Low Moderate High High

Table 9: Scoring protocol of IDF5 – H2S corrosion


Environmental Severity IDF5 Score
High 5
Moderate 3
Low 1

4. CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE MODEL


Consequence of failure (CoF) is evaluated based on three types of consequences. They are: the consequences related
to the safety of personnel (FC1), to the environment (FC2) and to the economy / business interruption (FC3). Size of the
leakage hole (Ch) and pressure (Cp) will contribute significantly to the severity of the consequences of failure.
4.1 Size of the Leakage Hole
Size of the leakage hole together with pressure of product service will determine the amount of product service
released to the atmosphere when a static mechanical equipment is leaking. The scoring protocol of the size of the leakage
hole is based on standard size of the leakage hole category model. Table 10 shows the scoring protocol of size of the
leakage hole.
Table 10: Scoring protocol of size of the hole (Ch)
Leakage Hole Hole Size Diameter Score
Category (D)
Small Holes D ≤ 5 mm 1
Medium Holes 5mm < D ≤ 25 mm 2
Large Holes 25 mm ≤ D 3
Ruptures Equipment Diameter < D 4

4.2 Pressure
Pressure hazard is proportional to the internal pressure inside the equipment. Maximum operating pressure (MOP)
will be used as parameter to consider the contribution of pressure inside the equipment when it leaked. Table 11 shows
the pressure distribution and its scoring protocol which will be used during ECA process.
Table 11: Scoring protocol of MOP (Cp)
Pressure Score
≤ 50 psig 1
> 50 psig to ≤ 200 psig 2
> 200 psig to ≤ 400 psig 3
> 400 psig to ≤ 600 psig 4
> 600 psig to ≤ 700 psig 5
> 700 psig 6
4.3 Consequence Modeling of Health and Safety of Personnel (FC1)
The consequences of equipment failure are modeled based on the properties of the product service that is transported
within the equipment. The hazard category levels caused by product service may refer to NFPA 704 [7]. Chemical
compositions of the product service consist of several materials. The most dominant chemical composition will be
selected to represent the consequence model.
The primary factor in determining the nature of the hazard is the product service itself. Most products will have some
acute hazard characteristics and some chronic hazard characteristics. Acute means sudden onset, or demanding urgent
attention, or of short duration. Hazards such as fire, explosion, or contact toxicity are considered to be acute hazards.

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They are immediate threats caused by a leak. Acute hazard scoring will consider following hazard characteristics,
flammability (Nf), reactivity (Nr) and toxicity (Nh). These hazard characteristics will be adopted as part of FC1 scoring
protocol as it is also found in [8]. Flammability scoring protocol is shown in Table 12, reactivity scoring protocol is
shown in Table 13 and toxicity scoring protocol is shown in Table 14.
Scoring Personnel Health and Safety Consequence (FC1) can be obtained by summing up all Nf, Nr, and Nh scores
and then multiply them by the size of the leakage hole score (Ch) and pressure score (Cp) as it is shown in the equation
(3). Based on the values listed in Table 10 to Table 14, the possible score of FC1 will vary from 0 to 288.
(3)
Table 12: Scoring protocol of flammability
Flammability Criteria Nf
Noncombustible 0
FP > 200°F 1
100°F < FP < 200°F 2
FP < 100°F and BP < 100°F 3
FP < 73°F and BP < 100°F 4
Table 13: Scoring protocol of reactivity
Reactivity Criteria Nr
Substance is completely stable 0
Mild reactivity on heating with pressure 1
Significant reactivity 2
Detonation possible with confinement 3
Detonation possible without confinement 4
Table 14: Scoring protocol of toxicity
Toxicity Criteria Nh
No hazard beyond that of ordinary combustibles 0
Only minor residual injury is likely 1
Prompt medical attention required to avoid temporary incapacitation 2
Materials causing serious temporary or residual injury 3
Short exposure causes death or major injury 4

4.4 Consequence Modeling of Environmental Pollution (FC2)


The environmental pollution consequence (FC2) is modeled based on the combination of leakage hole size, pressure
and the amount of reportable spill quantity (RQ) of product service that spilled when a component is leaking [8]. The
score of RQ varies from 0 to a maximum 10. Score 0 can be interpreted that the spill corresponds to least spill while
score 10 corresponds to large spill. Environmental pollution consequence score (FC2) can be obtained by multiplying
leakage hole size score (Ch), pressure score (Cp) and spill quantity score (RQ) as it is shown in equation (4). The
possible score of FC2 will vary from 0 to 240.
(4)
Auto ignition likelihood of released product will contribute to the possibility of fire or explosion if the product service
released into the air due to equipment leakage. Released product that has AIT (auto ignition temperature) lower than the
operating temperature or the temperature around when the product is released to the air will be more flammable. Table 15
shows the scoring protocol regarding the possibility of auto ignition occurrence when the product service leaked (FC3.1).
Table 15: Scoring protocol of released product auto ignition (FC3.1)
Likelihood of Released Product to be Score
Auto Ignited
Likely 2
Unlikely 1

The location of the equipment also contribute to the damage of other components around the equipment that is being
analyzed. Equipment located on the corner will have a lower contribution of damage to other equipment compared to that
is located in the center of the plant. Table 16 tabulates the scoring protocol regarding to the equipment location in a plant
(FC3.2).
Table 16: Equipment location scoring protocol (FC3.2)
Equipment Layout Score
In a plant corner 1
In a vicinity of plant side 2

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Equipment Layout Score


In a vicinity between plant side / plant corner and plant center 3
In a vicinity close to center of the plant 4
In the center of the plant 5

Recovery time of plant outage depends on how severe is the damaged plant. Outage of the plant as a consequence of
damaged equipment may last from a few hours to months. Table 17 lists the scoring protocol regarding to the plant
outage evaluation (FC3.3).
Secondary damage to other equipment may only occur if the damage to the equipment being analyzed severe enough
to affect other equipment. Table 18 shows the secondary damage scoring protocol regarding to the secondary damage
equipment caused by other damaged equipment (FC3.4).
Table 17: Plant outage scoring protocol (FC3.3)
Plant Outage Score
Partial shutdown < 1 day 1
Production loss total shutdown for < 1 day 2
Production loss total shutdown for > 1 day up to 1 week 3
Production loss total shutdown for > 1 week up to 0.5 month 4
Production loss total shutdown for > 0.5 month 5
Table 18: Scoring protocol of secondary damage equipment (FC3.4)
Secondary Damage Score
Equipment it self 1
Some equipment in process unit 3
More than one process units 5
Considering the scoring protocols, the possible business interruption scores will vary from 3 to 720.
5. CONVERTING DAMAGE FACTOR SCORE INTO PROBABILITY RATING
Probability of failure models cover external damage factor and other five internal damage factors. It only needs one of
damage factors to occur to make carbon steel static mechanical equipment leaks. That is the reason why damage factors
which represent probability model in Figure 2 are connected in OR gate. Since there will be six different scores of
damage factors, then it is only the worst score that will be selected to represent the probability of failure of the equipment
being analyzed. Table 19 shows the conversion of damage factor score into probability rating.
Table 19: the Conversion of Damage Factors Scores into Probability Rating
EDF IDF1 IDF2 IDF3 IDF4 IDF5 Probability Probability
Score Score Score Score Score Score Rating Descriptor
1–2 1 1 1 1 1 1 Almost Impossible
3–4 2 2 2 2 Unlikely
5–6 3 3 3 3 3 3 Possible
7–8 4 4 4 4 Likely
9 – 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 Almost Certain

6. CONVERTING FAILURE CONSEQUENCE SCORE INTO CONSEQUENCE RATING


As it can be seen in Figure 2, there are three models to represent the consequences of failure. Those three models are
the consequences related to the safety of personnel (FC1), to the environment (FC2) and to the economy / business
interruption (FC3). Scoring protocols have been developed for those consequences. The conversion of consequence
scores into consequence ratings is shown in Table 20.
Table 20: the Conversion of Consequence Scores into Consequence Rating
Consequence Consequence
FC1 Score FC2 Score FC3 Score
Rating Descriptor
0 ≤ FC1 ≤ 48 0 ≤ FC2 ≤ 40 0 ≤ FC3 ≤ 120 A Slight
48 < FC1 ≤ 96 40 < FC2 ≤ 80 120 < FC3 ≤ 240 B Minor
96 < FC1 ≤ 144 80 < FC2 ≤ 120 240 < FC3 ≤ 360 C Moderate
144 < FC1 ≤ 192 120 < FC2 ≤ 160 360 < FC3 ≤ 480 D Serious
192 < FC1 ≤ 240 160 < FC2 ≤ 200 480 < FC3 ≤ 600 E Major
240 < FC1 ≤ 288 200 < FC2 ≤ 240 600 < FC3 ≤ 720 F Catastrophic

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Table 21: Corporate probability ratings criteria


Probability Occurrence
Descriptor
Rating per Year
1 Almost Impossible <10-6
2 Unlikely 10 to 10-4
-6

3 Possible 10-4 to 10-2


4 Likely 10-2 to 1
5 Almost Certain >1

7. CASE STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECA PROTOCOLS


The problem in implementing ECA protocols to the corporate which has developed its own risk matrix is quite
challenging. In this case study, the developed ECA protocols will be adopted by a corporate which has a 5 x 6 risk
matrix. The risk matrix consists of 5 (five) probability ratings and 6 (six) consequence ratings as it is shown in Figure 4.
The risk level is divided into three levels, they are high risk (H), medium risk (M) and low risk (L). Table 21 shows the
probability criteria and Table 22 shows the business interruption consequence criteria which are adopted by the
corporate.
Table 22: Corporate business interruption consequence ratings criteria
Consequence
Descriptor Business Interruption
Rating
A Slight Partial shutdown < 1 day
B Minor Production loss total shutdown for < 1 day
C Moderate Production loss total shutdown for > 1 day up to 1 week
D Serious Production loss total shutdown for > 1 week up to 0.5 month
E Major Production loss total shutdown for > 0.5 up to 1 month
F Catastrophic Production loss total shutdown for > 1 month
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE

5 M M H H H H

4 L M M H H H

3 L L M M H H

2 L L L M M H

1 L L L L M M

A B C D E F
CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE
Figure 4: A 5 x 6 Corporate Risk Matrix
In order to be able to determine the criticality of the equipment, the integrated risk matrix must be converted into
ECA risk matrix. To convert it, the following boundaries should be set. The boundary between negligible PoF and
significant PoF has been set to approximately 10 -4 per year. The boundary between acceptable CoF and Unacceptable
CoF is set at minor consequence rating (Rating B). By adopting ECA protocols, a new ECA risk matrix based on
corporate risk matrix has been developed as it is shown in Figure 5. C1, C2 and C3 in Figure 5 represent high, medium
and low criticality of the equipment. The protocols and the matrix are ready to be implemented in screening the criticality
of Offshore Carbon Steel Static Mechanical Equipment.
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE

5 C2 C2 C1 C1 C1 C1

4 C2 C2 C2 C1 C1 C1

3 C2 C2 C2 C2 C1 C1

2 C3 C3 C2 C2 C2 C1

1 C3 C3 C2 C2 C2 C2

A B C D E F
CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE
Figure 5: Adjusted Corporate Risk Matrix for ECA

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Volume 04 – Issue 06, December 2016

8. CONCLUSION
The equipment criticality analysis (ECA) protocols of offshore carbon steel static mechanical equipment together
with adjusted corporate risk matrix for ECA purpose have been developed. The case study shows that the methodology
can be applied to any dimensions of risk matrix. The key point in implementing this methodology is to find the
boundaries between negligible and significant probability of failure as well as between acceptable and unacceptable
consequence of failure.
The ECA of offshore carbon steel static mechanical equipment will involve hundreds or even thousands piping
segments and pressure vessels. Therefore, the future development will be focused in the database programming.
9. REFERENCES
[1] API RP 580 Risk-Based Inspection, Second Edition, Washington D.C, 2009.
[2] DNV-RP-G101 Risk Based Inspection of Offshore Topsides Static Mechanical Equipment, 2010.
[3] API RP 581 Risk-Based Inspection Technology, Second Edition, September 2008.
[4] Muhlbauer, W. Kent, Pipeline Risk Management Manual: Ideas, Techniques, and Resources, 3rd Edition, Gulf
Professional Publishing, 2004.
[5] Bjarte Rød, Evaluation of Probability of Failure of Static Equipment in Pressurized Mud Systems on an Offshore
Drilling Installation, Master Thesis, The Arctic University of Norway, pp. 47-49, 2015.
[6] NACE SP0106-2006 Item No. 21111 Standard Practice Control of Internal Corrosion in Steel Pipelines and Piping
Systems, 2006.
[7] NFPA 704 Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response, 2012.
[8] Muhlbauer, W. Kent, Pipeline Risk Management Manual: A Systematic Approach to Loss Prevention and Risk

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