Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v.

Shivkant Shukla
(1976 AIR 1207)

Constitutional Law- I

D. Mithravinda
Mr. N Srikanth 121933101051
Assistant Professor BA LLB
GITAM School of Law Semester 5
GITAM (Deemed to be GITAM School of Law,
University)
GITAM (Deemed to be
University)
Introduction:
The ruling in the notorious case of "ADM, Jabalpur v Shivkant Shukla" was delivered on
April 28th, 1976, and is considered the darkest day in the Indian judicial system. The
"Habeas Corpus case" is another name for this case. The emergency was imposed by Indira
Gandhi's ruling administration, which issued a Presidential Order after the Supreme Court
deemed her Prime Ministerial election to be unlawful. The issue originated from the question
as to whether a person has the right to go to the High Court if their Fundamental Rights are
being violated, particularly Article 21 of the Constitution, which deals with the right to life
and liberty, and Article 14 of the Constitution, which deals with the right to equality. The
overall effect of the decision was harsh, as it was determined that a person's right to petition
the High Court under Article 226 for a writ of Habeas Corpus or any other writ challenging
the legitimacy of an order of detention made during the proclamation of an emergency will be
suspended. Furthermore, the person cannot go to the High Court to seek redress or justice.
This was the fundamental reason why ADM Jabalpur was labelled "the darkest moment in
Supreme Court history."     

Factual Background:

On the 25th of June, 1975, the President, exercising powers conferred by Article 352(1) of
the Indian Constitution, proclaimed a grave emergency in which India's security was
threatened by internal disturbances. On the 27th of June, 1975, using the powers granted
under Article 359 of the Constitution, it was declared that the right of any person, including
foreigners, to go to any court to enforce their rights granted to them under Articles 14, 21,
and 22 of the Constitution, as well as all court proceedings pending for the above mentioned
rights, would be suspended during the period of the proclamation of emergency. The
President issued a notification on January 8, 1976, using the powers granted under Article
352 of the Constitution, declaring that any person may go to any court to enforce the rights
granted to them under Article 19 of the Constitution, and that all proceedings pending in the
court for the above-mentioned right will be suspended during the period of proclamation of
emergency. Several illegal detentions followed, including those of some of the country's most
powerful politicians, including Jayaprakash Narayan, Morarji Desai, Atal Bihari Vajpayee,
and L.K. Advani, who were held without accusation or trial. As a result, numerous writ
petitions were filed around the country. Nine High Courts ruled in favour of the detainees,
stating that even though Article 21 could not be enforced, the detention order may still be
challenged since it was not in accordance with the Act or was made in bad faith. Furthermore,
many appeals were filed at the Supreme Court against these orders. 1

Issues:

 Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be filed before the
High Court to enforce Fundamental Rights during the state of emergency?
 If yes, what is the extent of judicial scrutiny that can be exercised?2

Petitioner’s Arguments:

The state's main argument was that the sole purpose of including emergency provisions in the
Indian Constitution is so that, in the event of an emergency, the Executive can exercise
complete discretion over the implementation of the country's laws by exercising special
powers granted to them by the Indian Constitution, but that the state should take precedence
when exercising these powers.

They also expressed dissatisfaction with the state's refusal to release the detainees, despite the
advisory board's conclusion that there is no valid reason for their arrest. As a result, holding
individuals without cause is a breach of their fundamental right guaranteed by Article 22 of
the Indian Constitution. Furthermore, the detainees are unable to seek judicial enforcement of
their right under Article 19 of the Constitution, which was suspended by the President via an
order made under Article 359(1) of the Indian Constitution during the proclamation of
emergency.

The suspension of these rights is carried out in accordance with the Constitution; thus, it
cannot be stated that the resulting situation is devoid of the rule of law.

Respondent’s Arguments:

The respondents argued that the aim of Article 359(1) is to eliminate constraints on
legislatures' authority so that, in times of emergency, they are free to violate citizens' basic
1
https://lawcirca.com/adm-jabalpur-v-shivkant-shukla-case-analysis-suspension-of-fundamental-rights-during-
emergency-the-habeas-corpus-case/#Conclusion
2
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1735815/
rights as guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. They went on to say that there is a law in
place called the Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1971 that governs pre-trial detentions.
As a result, Article 21 cannot be regarded as the sole guarantor of the right to life and liberty.

They further claimed that the Presidential order has no effect on the non-Fundamental rights
derived from Articles 256, 265 and 361 (3), nor on natural or contractual rights, nor on legal
rights to personal liberty. Only the legislature, not the Executive Department, has the
authority to take away these rights. It was further argued that state and its officers have right to
arrest only if the detention fall under Section 3 of the MISA Act and also the conditions provided
under the said section were fulfilled. However, if any condition is unfulfilled then the detention
will be considered “beyond the powers of the Act”. 3

Judgement:

So, the judgement in this case was delivered in the ratio of 4:1 where the majority were Chief
Justice A. N. Ray, M.H. Beg. J, Y.V Chandrachud. J and P.N. Bhagwati. J and the dissenting
judgement were delivered by Justice H.R. Khanna. Except for Justice Khanna, the four judges
were of the opinion that during a state of emergency, the government's actions, whether arbitrary
or illegal, cannot be questioned. This is because, in such circumstances, the government protects
the nation's existence by exercising extraordinary powers, which are granted to them as a matter
of emergency. As a result, because liberty is a gift from the law, it can also be taken away by the
law.

Article 359 (1)'s purpose and goal was to prevent the enforcement of any Fundamental Right
stated in the Presidential order from being suspended during the emergency. Even a Habeas
Corpus application under Article 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be filed in the
High Court at the same time. Article 359(1) also had the goal of limiting the actions of the
legislative branch as well as the executive branch.

Dissenting judgement by H R Khanna:

(Review)

Justice Khanna was the sole dissenting voice and disagreed on the point that article 21 is the
sole repository of right to life & personal liberty as we can observe in para number 163 of the
judgement delivered and observed that “Sanctity of life and liberty was not something new
when the Constitution was drafted…the principle that no one shall be deprived of his life and

3
https://lexforti.com/legal-news/adm-jabalpur-case-analysis/
liberty without the authority of law was not the gift of the Constitution. It was a necessary
corollary of the concept relating to the sanctity of life and liberty; it existed and was in force
before the coming into force of the Constitution. The idea about the sanctity of life and liberty as
well as the principle that no one shall be deprived of his life and liberty without the authority of
law are essentially two facets of the same concept. 4He argued that because Article 226 is a
component of the Constitution, the right to examine and issue a writ of Habeas Corpus cannot
be refused. He went on to say that it's a means to ensure judicial review of executive orders
and keep the checks and balances in place, referencing Ambedkar's thoughts on the subject
from the Constituent Assembly debates.

Khanna J. was clearly drafting a dissent for the ages when he did so. He believed that life and
liberty are fundamental rights that are contained throughout the Constitution, not just in the
text of individual articles. In his opinion, Article 21 was just a representation of that right,
and even if its operation was halted, it was erroneous to believe that an individual's life or
liberty could be taken away by the authority of law. According to Khanna J., the right to not
be arbitrarily deprived of one's life or personal liberty did not arise because it was expressly
recognized in the Constitution.

The right stretches back well before the Constitution was written in 1950. The fact that the
writers of the Constitution included a portion of such a right in the list of essential rights did
not obliterate the right's autonomous character or make Article 21 the exclusive repository of
that right. The sanctity of life was recognised by Khanna J., who held that its foundation,
worth, and existence predate and extend beyond the wording of the Constitution.

The fundamental idea of using the Constitution to defend the worth of human life and liberty
requires that every single member of the Court reach the same conclusion as J. Khanna.
Nonetheless, Khanna J.'s actions were revolutionary in the circumstances of the time. It was
truly radical and revolutionary to decide against the majority opinion, to sit on a Supreme
Court established by the Constitution, and to locate essential rights in moral principles
outside of the Constitution.

4
https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/indian-young-scholars/2019/7/26/a-cloud-without-a-silver-lining-indias-justice-
khanna-his-resignation-and-a-constitution-in-crisis
Aftermath:

This decision changed India's political and judicial future. It demonstrated how the system's
flaws might be exploited by the Executive, allowing it to make choices at will. Justice H. R.
Khanna, the most senior judge on the bench after the Chief Justice, resigned later, while the
rest of the judges went on to become Chief Justices of India. The opinions expressed in this
judgement were reversed in cases determined by the Supreme Court after the Emergency was
lifted. Article 21's scope has since been enlarged to include several areas such as the right to a
livelihood and the right to a clean environment, and it can no longer be suspended under any
circumstances. Justices Chandrachud and Bhagwati both expressed regret over their decisions
in the case. This has influenced Justice D Y Chandrachud's position in the relatively recent
Right to Privacy case, when he modified his stance after acknowledging his father's apologies
in the Habeas Corpus case.

Conclusion:

This case shows how judges have differing perspectives on a given issue. This decision
exemplifies how intricate a problem may be. At the same time, the Court's failure to
acknowledge the Right to Life as an inalienable human right should be highlighted and
challenged. Justice H R Khanna's tenacity is admirable, and his decisions have served as a
model for future judges and policymakers. This case cleared the door for a more expansive
reading of Article 21 in the future. Finally, it should be understood how, in such instances,
the Rule of Law must take precedence in order to secure proper power allocation and
separation.