Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No.

L-2068, October 20, 1948

FACTS: The petitioner in the case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of Peace of Masantol,
Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty,
upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so
that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The
fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, andun the objection was sustained. "In
view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the
justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the CFI praying that the record of the case be remanded to
the justice of peace of Masantol, on order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses
in connection with their testimony. The motion was denied and for that reason the present special civil action of
mandamus was instituted. Petitioner squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11 or Rule 108, on the
ground that it deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution,
contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is an infringement to the provision of section
13, Article VIII, of the Constitution hence the decision of the majority is judicial legislation that diminishes the right
of the accused.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a
substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may
be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights are a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the
legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of
the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that
which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the
procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished
Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence — which is the "the mode and manner of
proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial
proceedings" — is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and
redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading,
evidence and practice. The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We cannot tear
down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied
in these Rules. We do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to
cross-examine the witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the
constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due
process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly
enjoyed thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.

While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary
investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the
charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the
only stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be
confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary
investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently waived. It is inevitable that
the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to
tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him
of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is
not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's approval.
This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power
to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard
to their source.

Primicias v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953

FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory offenses, namely, (1)
with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to an
alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation to
section 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code in that he failed to submit to the Collector of Customs the
manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance
from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.
On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be
appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said cases as authorized by section 49 of
Republic Act No. 409 which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the
Municipal Court, or the Court of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code
of Civil Procedure." This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal.
On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that with the promulgation of the
Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines previously existing were not only superseded but expressly
repealed. The Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly omitted the portions of the
Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of Court. Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner
now comes to this court imputing abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.

ISSUES: Whether or not the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right,
and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.

HELD: Yes, a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right. The trial with the aid of assessors as
granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of
substantive law and as such are not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. The aid may be
invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, and this right has been declared absolute and
substantial by this Court in several cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked. The intervention of the
assessors is not an empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or the spirit of the
law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of which they cannot
be deprived without vitiating all the proceedings.
The contention of respondents we reckon is predicated on the assumption that the provisions on assessors of the
Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed. Such is not the case. We have already pointed out that the
basic provisions on the matter partake of the nature of substantive law and as such they were left intact by the
Supreme Court.
It is therefore the opinion that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion in denying petitioner his right to
the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal cases now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005

FACTS: The petitioners filed an action for reconveyance and annulment of title which was dismissed (February 12,
1998) by the trial court on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Twelve days (March 18, 1998) after
receiving the dismissal order (March 3, 1998), the petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration which was also
dismissed ( ordered July 1, 1998 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998). Five days later, (July 27, 1998) they
filed a notice of appeal but was also denied (August 4, 1998). Another motion for reconsideration was filed and
denied again which prompted them to petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals. They
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appear started on the day they received the final order of the trial
court denying their motion for reconsideration. However, the CA ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have
been on the day they received the order of dismissal of their complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 15-day reglementary period to appeal starts upon receipt of order dismissing the Motion
for Reconsideration.

HELD: Yes, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal starts on the denial of the motion for reconsideration. An
appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or
order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the
rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
In the cases of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc and Apuyan v. Haldeman, the Supreme Court held that it was the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it
was what ended the issues raised or which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
In this case, the petitioners’ view that the order denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order was
correct and was sustained by the Supreme Court.

Alvero v. de la Rosa, G.R. No. L-286, March 29, 1946

FACTS:Respondent Jose R. Victoriano filed a complaint against petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero and Margarita
Villarica in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila on June 25, 1945. The complaint alleged two causes of
action: To declare the contract of sale between Jose R. Victoriano and Margarita Villarica, involving two parcels of
land, valid and enforceable. To declare the subsequent sale of the same land from Villarica to Alvero null and void.
Margarita Villarica admitted selling the land to Alvero in December 1944 due to financial necessity and offered to
repurchase it. Alvero denied the allegations and claimed exclusive ownership of the land. He also filed a
counterclaim and crossclaim against Victoriano, demanding rent and damages. After a trial, the respondent judge
declared the property was originally sold to Victoriano, who made improvements and occupied it. Villarica
subsequently sold it to Alvero. The judge ruled in favor of Victoriano, adjudging him the title and dismissing
Alvero's counterclaim.

ISSUES:Whether the appeal filed by Fredesvindo S. Alvero was properly dismissed due to late filing of the appeal
bond.

HELD:Yes.The appeal was properly dismissed due to the late filing of the appeal bond. Although Alvero's notice of
appeal and record on appeal were filed within the original period, the P60-appeal bond was filed beyond the
prescribed time. The court emphasized the mandatory nature of complying with the rules of court and the
importance of timely filing to prevent delays. Alvero's excuse of his lawyer's wife's illness leading to her death was
acknowledged, but the court held that strict compliance with rules is imperative, and personal considerations should
not impede legal duties. The court dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding no showing of excusable negligence
or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.

Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012

FACTS: On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of ₱160,000.00 to
respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto,
Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would pay ₱80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of
₱80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System; and that should Margarita become
incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M.
Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.

After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita,the vendor’s undertaking fell on the shoulders
of Priscilla, being Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause
the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by
dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial
subdivision. Faced with Priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for
specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan.
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the
complaint did not state a cause of action.
The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss on February 4, 1998. However, upon her motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself on June 24, 1999 and granted the motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana
had no cause of action against her due to her not being bound to comply with the terms of the deed of conditional
sale for not being a party thereto.

On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb the order of June
24, 1999.

On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, reversing and setting
aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, and remanding the records to the RTC "for further proceedings in
accordance with law."

ISSUES: Whether or not that the June 21, 2000 RTC order was not appealable.

HELD: No, the June 21, 2000 RTC order was appealable because under Sec. 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court provides,
an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case,...In this case, RTC
decision on June 21, 1999 was a final order, therefore, wa s subject of appeal. it confirmed the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one.The Court has distinguished between final
and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise:

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the
subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except
to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but
leaves something else to be decided upon.The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory
or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A
final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court to the effect that "appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or
of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from an interlocutory
one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or
judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the
prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order.

Samahan v. Hon. Magsalin, G.R. No. 172303, June 6, 2011

FACTS:

ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground that the same
is an improper mode of appeal; and

2. Whether the CA erred in deleting the award of financial assistance in the amount of P100,000.00 to Caragdag.

HELD:
 1. No. Decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for review under Rule
43 ( Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that the proper mode of
appeal from judgments, final orders or resolution of voluntary arbitrators is through a Petition for Review
which should be filed within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of notice of judgment, order or resolution of
the voluntary arbitrator.) Hence, upon receipt of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Resolution denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, petitioner should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)

-The reglementary period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no cogent reason in this case to deviate from the
general rule. Verily, rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal
construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They
may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of
substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper
litigants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard
following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a
conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules.

2. No. In Piedad v. Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc.,we ruled that a series of irregularities when put
together may constitute serious misconduct, which under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, is a
just cause for dismissal.

Caragdag's dismissal being due to serious misconduct, it follows that he should not be entitled to financial
assistance. To rule otherwise would be to reward him for the grave misconduct he committed. We must emphasize
that social justice is extended only to those who deserve its compassion. The Court succinctly discussed the
propriety of the grant of separation pay in this wise:

We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where
the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character.Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving
moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give
the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of
social justice.

Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Supra.)

FACTS: Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of ₱160,000.00 to respondent by deed of
conditional sale two parcels of land. They agreed that Javellana would pay ₱80,000.00 upon the execution of the
deed and the balance of ₱80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the
registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita be
incapacitated, her son and her daughter Priscilla would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the
application for registration.

After Margarita died, Priscilla, being Margarita’s sole surviving heir did not comply with the undertaking to cause
the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by
dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial
subdivision. Due to priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana commenced an action for specific performance,
injunction, and damages against her in the RTC.

Javellana averred that upon the execution of the deed of conditional sale, he paid the initial amount, had taken
possession of the parcels of land and that he paid the balance of the purchase price to Juvenal because it was needed
to for the expenses of registration and payment of real estate tax.

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the
complaint did not state a cause of action.
The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss. However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC
reversed itself and granted the motion to dismiss.

Javellana moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason to
disturb the order.

Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).

The CA promulgated its decision in reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil Case and remanding the
records to the RTC “for further proceedings in accordance with law.”
CA explained that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action and that Priscilla is bound to comply with the
obligations of Margarita with respect to the parcels of land.

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that it decided to give due course to the appeal even if filed
out of time because Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek an extension
of time to file his appellant’s brief; that current jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to present
their cases free from the constraints of technicalities, such that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate
court was given the discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.

ISSUES: WON the notice of appeal was made on time.

HELD: Yes. Notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.

Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She points out that he received a copy of the
June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of
12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he
received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to
perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should have been dismissed
for being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.

Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which
to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration interrupting the running of the period
of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as
Priscilla insists.

The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering that the Court meanwhile
adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an
adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or
even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the
rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions
may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

According to De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be
able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be
made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on
retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present
case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since
the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the
notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that
parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh
period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.

Consequently, we rule that Javellana’s notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.

Light Railway Transit Authority v. Salvaña, G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014
G.R. No. 192074 (lawphil.net)

FACTS:
The former head of the Light Rail Transit Authority, Melquiades Robles, issued Office Order No. 119 in 2006,
which revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña's position as Officer-in-Charge of the LRTA Administrative Department.
Instead, she was instructed to handle special projects and other assigned tasks under Robles' direction. However,
Salvaña contested this order by appealing to the Office of the President. During this period, she also requested sick
leave from May 15 to May 31, 2006, supported by a medical certificate from Dr. Grace Marie Blanco. The
certificate was later deemed falsified as Dr. Blanco denied issuing it.

Following these events, Administrator Robles initiated a preliminary investigation on June 23, 2006, requiring
Salvaña to explain within 72 hours why disciplinary action shouldn't be taken against her for non-compliance with
Office Order No. 119 and for presenting a fraudulent medical certificate. Salvaña responded on June 30, 2006,
claiming that her refusal to support a specific bidder as a Bids and Awards Committee member led to Robles'
vengeful issuance of Office Order No. 119.

A Fact-finding Committee established by LRTA reviewed Salvaña's explanation and, finding it insufficient,
formally charged her with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Insubordination, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service on July 26, 2006. On October 31, 2006,
the Committee concluded that Salvaña was guilty of these charges and imposed the penalty of dismissal from her
position, which was approved by the LRTA Board of Directors.

On July 18, 2007, the Civil Service Commission rendered a verdict of simple dishonesty against Salvaña. The
LRTA contested this decision but was denied upon reconsideration. The LRTA then appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which also rejected the petition. The Court of Appeals additionally ruled that Administrator Robles lacked
the authority to file a motion for reconsideration with the Civil Service Commission, as this right belonged
exclusively to the respondent in an administrative case.

ISSUES:
Whether the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator, has the standing to appeal the
modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision.

HELD:
While this decision was being considered, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RACCS)
were introduced on November 18, 2011. The Civil Service Commission made changes to the definition of "party
adversely affected" for appeal purposes. Section 4. Definition of Terms. – . . . . k. PARTY ADVERSELY
AFFECTED pertains to the respondent against whom a decision has been issued in an administrative case or to the
disciplining authority in an appeal following a decision that alters or adjusts the original decision.

Procedural laws can sometimes be applied retroactively to ongoing cases even without explicit instructions. Hence,
procedural rules can be relevant to cases that are unresolved at the time the rules are enacted. Statutes governing
court procedures can indeed be implemented for cases that are still undecided when the statutes come into effect.
Procedural laws have this retrospective nature and scope. Remedial rights encompass those rights granted by
remedial or procedural laws. They are rights that exclusively serve to uphold procedural rules or validate vested
rights. Consequently, the retroactive utilization of remedial rights won't harm the vested rights of any individual.
Because the right to appeal is a remedial right by nature, we find that Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the RACCS
applies in this scenario. Consequently, the petitioner had the privilege to appeal the decision of the Civil Service
Commission that modified its initial dismissal ruling. Recent rulings implied the retroactive application of this
principle. Although the right of government parties to appeal was not a point of contention, this court authorized the
appeals submitted by government agencies prior to the introduction of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service.

In the case of Civil Service Commission v. Clave, the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) found
Aurora M. Clave, one of its employees, guilty of simple neglect of duty. The Civil Service Commission validated
the GSIS's findings. However, the Court of Appeals, while confirming the Civil Service Commission's decision,
reduced the penalty. Both the GSIS and the Civil Service Commission were permitted to appeal the Court of
Appeals' verdict. In GSIS v. Chua, the GSIS terminated Heidi R. Chua for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
conduct detrimental to the service's best interests. The Civil Service Commission upheld the GSIS's decision, but the
Court of Appeals, while agreeing with the Commission's findings, altered the penalty to simple misconduct. The
GSIS was then authorized to challenge the altered penalty before this court. Consequently, we now confirm that
parties who are adversely affected by a decision in an administrative case and who have the right to appeal include
the disciplining authority whose decision to dismiss the employee was either reversed or modified by the Civil
Service Commission.

Panay Railways, Inc. v. Heva Management, G.R. No. 154061, January 25, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Panay Railways Inc. (PRI) executed real estate mortgages (REM) to secure a loan from Traders Royal
Bank (TRB) to purchase several parcels of lands, including Lot6315 which has subdivided portions that were
excluded in the REM. PRI failed to meet its loan obligations causing the foreclosure of the REM in favor of the
bank. Writ of Possession was filed by TRB against PRI.
During the proceeding, PRI waived its rights over the parcels of land including Lot 6315.Unbeknownst to PRI, the
excluded portions of Lot 6315 were included in their waiver and in the Contract to sell and deed of absolute sale
from the foreclosure. PRI eventually filed a motion for the partial annulment of said contracts upon finding out;
RTC dismissed this petition.
PRI filed an appeal without paying docket fees, respondent filed for dismissal due to non payment of docket fees.
PRI reasoned its counsel was not yet familiar with the 1997 Rules of Court which recently effected back then and
that the docket fees were not mandatory. RTC dismissed the notice of appeal and the Motion for reconsideration
subsequently filed by PRI.
PRI escalated the case to the CA, alleging RTC erred as it failed to relax procedural rules for the sake of substantial
justice. During the pendency of this case, AM 00-2-10SC took effect which enabled trial courts to dismiss appeal
motu prporio for being filed out of time or nonpayment of docket fees within the reglementary period. CA dismissed
PRI’ s case, PRI escalates the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
Whether the dismissal of PRI’s appeals were erroneous as procedural rules should be relaxed in the case to
administer substantial justice?

HELD:
No, the dismissal of PRI’s appeals were valid. The Supreme Court held that, procedural rules are not to be belittled
or dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. The right
to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process - It is merely a statutory privilege, which may be
exercised only in accordance with the law. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may
not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. As a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise
from procedural laws and rules. In this case, PRI cannot assert that the negligence of its counsel in not familiarizing
itself with the rules of procedure is a valid reason to relax the procedural rules for PRI to attain substantial justice.
The court reiterated the rule that any act performed by lawyers within their scope of general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of the client. The mistake or negligence of the counsel may result in the rendition of an
unfavorable judgement against it. Therefore the dismissal of PRI’s appeals were valid as procedural rules as a
general rule should be followed.

Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002

FACTS:
The case involves a 34,829 sqm of land in Bunawan, Davao City registered in the name of Jaime Tan. Tan executed
a deed of absolute sale in favor of spouses Magdangal for P59,200. With an agreement giving Tan 1 year to redeem
or repurchase the property. Tan’s heirs filed a suit against Magdangals for reformation of instrument because the
real intention of parties was to conclude an equitable mortgage not deed of sale. RTC Davao rendered in favor of
plaintiff Tan, Jr. Sps. Magdangal appealed to CA, which affirmed RTC decision. Sps. Magdangal filed a motion for
consolidation and writ of possession claiming that 120 days redemption period commenced on 20 Oct and has
already expired. Tan, Jr. filed a writ of execution and thereafter filed a manifestation and motion of its intention to
redeem the property along with a deposit of repurchase price. RTC denied Sps. Magdangal’s motion for
consolidation and writ of possession, and considered P116k deposit by plaintiff as full payment of redemption price.
Cueto v Collantes. 120 days period to pay amount plus interest should be reckoned from date of Entry of Judgment,
which was 13 March 1996. Plaintiff made a deposit on 17 April 1996, within the 120-day period.

ISSUES:
WON the revised rules on finality of judgment shall be retroactively applied
HELD:
Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it
would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner
followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the
period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot.
It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot
be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of
redemption when he made the redemption.
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the date of reckoning
of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the change
applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the RTC’s order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day
thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another
order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July
27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. The court again dismissed
the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
Petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final
order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.

ISSUES:
Did the petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time?

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal
or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In
the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43, and 45 the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions
may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial
Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is
filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in
Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their
motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of
15 days, as already discussed.

Yu v. Hon. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011

FACTS:
Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa against the petitioner
Judith Yu was filed with the RTC.

In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9,
2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material
evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted.

In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for new trial for lack of merit.

On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a fresh period of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of
her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fresh period rule as enunciated in Neypes applies to criminal cass.

RULING:
The petition is with merits. The raison dtre for the fresh period rule is to standardize the appeal period provided in
the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day
period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration;
litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-
day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
or any final order or resolution.

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to appeal
should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

1. BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the
periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that [t]he period for
appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15)
days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.

2. The provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial
difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon the
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said
motion for new trial or reconsideration.

3. While the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals
in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16,
2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her
motion for new trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED.

San Lorenzo Builders v. Bayang, G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015

DOCTRINE/PROVISIONS:

The "fresh period rule"—which allows a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration—applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals.

FACTS:

April 15, 2000: Petitioner SLR Builders as seller, and respondent Cristina, as buyer, entered into a "contract to sell"
of a sixty (60)-square meter lot in Violago Homes Parkwoods Subdivision, located in Barangay Payatas, Quezon
City. Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the purchased lot, Cristina demanded from SLR Builders
the execution of the deed of absolute sale and the lot’s certificate of title but the latter failed to deliver. Cristina filed
a complaint for specific performance and damages against the petitioners before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). February 16, 2004: The Housing and Land Use Arbiter ruled in Cristina’s favor. The
petitioners appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The Board dismissed and denied the petitioners’
appeal and their subsequent motion for reconsideration. April 27, 2006: The petitioners filed an appeal to the Office
of the President (OP). November 17, 2006: The OP dismissed the petitioners’ appeal for having been filed out of
time. The HLURB Decision affirming the Arbiter’s decision was received by them on July 27, 2005. On that date,
the 15-day prescriptive period within which to file an appeal began to run. Instead of preparing an appeal, SLR
Builders opted to file a Motion for Reconsideration on August 10, 2005. Their filing of the said motion interrupted
the period of appeal by that time, however, 14 days had already elapsed. April 18, 2006 was their last day left to
appeal. When they filed on April 27, 2006, they were already 9 days late. The petitioners moved to reconsider and
argued that the "fresh period rule" in Domingo Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. should be applied to their
case. July 26, 2007: The OP denied the petitioners’ motion with finality, stating that the "fresh period rule" applies
only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals.
The CA denied the petitioners’ petition for review and denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration; hence, the
filing of the present petition.

ISSUES:

Whether the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to administrative appeals, such as an appeal filed from a decision
of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the President.

HELD:

The "fresh period rule" applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals. The "fresh period rule" in
Neypes declares:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40…, Rule 42…, Rule 43…, Rule 45…The new rule
aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, the appeal
from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP is administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period
rule" in Neypesdoes not apply.
As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765-2004 [1] in relation to Paragraph 2,
Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18-1987.[2]
RULING: DENY the present petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the decision dated July 23, 2010 and
resolution dated December 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100332.

[1]
Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765-2004, Section 2. Appeal. - Any party may, upon notice to the Board and
the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987. The
pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period of appeal to the Office of the
President.

[2]
Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18-1987 provides that in case the aggrieved party files a
motion for reconsideration from an adverse decision of any agency/office, the said party has the only remaining
balance of the prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice of the decision denying
his/her motion for reconsideration.

Fortune Life v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015
FACTS: Respondent Antique LGU and the petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the life
insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasures, and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for
the premium payment and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA Antique for
pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under RA 7160 (Local Gov’t Code).
Respondent Antique LGU appeal but its appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. COA denied the petition, holding that
under Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local Goverment Code, only municipal or city governments are expressly
vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and nothing the LGU’s failure to
comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of RA 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act).

The petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari was dismissed on
August 19, 2014 for:
a. The late filing of the petition;
b. The non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and
c. The failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. Hence, this MR.

ISSUES: WON the Fresh Period Rule applies on Rule 64.

HELD: NO. Jurisprudence dictates that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief
that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same
fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed
only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the prescribed procedure. Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.

The petitioner filed its MR on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA
on December 14, 2012. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only 5 days from receipt of the denial of its MR to
file the petition. COnsidering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014
to file the petition. However, it file the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.

Jocson v. San Miguel, G.R. No. 206941, March 9, 2016

FACTS: Jocson alleged that she is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 60,241 square
meters in Magalang, Pampanga covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 473856-R. 56,000 sq. m. of the subject
land became the subject of an agricultural leasehold contract between Jocson and San Miguel with the latter as the
tenant-lessee. As part of the contract, they agreed that the subject landholding shall be devoted to sugar and rice
production.

According to Jocson, San Miguel occupied the entire landholding and refused to vacate the portion that was not
covered by their Contract despite repeated demands. San Miguel further violated their Contract by planting corn of
the subject landholding.

San Miguel maintained that he had religiously complied with all the terms and conditions of their Contract and that
Jocson has no valid ground to eject him from the disputed landholding.

DARAB-PARAB Ruling:
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD)

The PARAB terminated the existing leasehold contract as well as their tenancy relationship and ordered San Miguel
and all persons claiming rights under him to peacefully vacate and surrender the land to Jocson.

A Motion for Reconsideration (MR) was filed by San Miguel but it was denied on May 31, 2011. San Miguel filed
his Notice of Appeal on June 15, 2011.

Jocson filed an Omnibus Motion to expunge the Notice of Appeal, dismissing the said Appeal, and issuing a Writ of
Execution. She alleged that the Notice of Appeal filed by San Miguel was filed not in accordance with the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure, specifically the non-payment of appeal fee and the failure to attach therein a
Certification against Non-Forum Shopping pursuant to Section 2, Rule IV of the Rules.
San Miguel’s Notice of Appeal was denied and the PARAB declared that the case was final and executory. The
PARAB held that San Miguel failed to pay the required appeal fee and that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of
time

Section 12, Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, "[t]he filing of the Motion for Reconsideration shall
interrupt the period to perfect an appeal. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party shall have the remaining period
within which to perfect his appeal. Said period shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from the
receipt of the notice of denial."

The PARAD found that San Miguel, through his counsel, received his copy of Decision dated January 26, 2011 on
February 3, 2011 and thereafter filed his MR on February 15, 2011, thus, he could have only three (3) days within
which to file his Notice of Appeal upon its denial. The MR was denied on May 31, 2011 and San Miguel, through
his counsel, received his copy of the Order on June 2, 2011 and he filed his Notice of Appeal on June 15, 2011 or
after twelve (12) days, which, following the rules abovementioned, is already beyond the period allowed.

San Miguel argued that the “fresh-period rule” enunciated in the case of Neypes v. CA was adopted by the 2009
DARAB Rules of Procedure which allowed the litigants a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of
appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration as
provided for under Section 1, Rule IV of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

CA Ruling:
The CA granted San Miguel’s petition and remanded the case to the DARAB-PARAD for further proceedings.

ISSUES:1. WON the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure shall apply. (NO)
2. WON the “fresh period rule” applies in DARAB Rules of Procedures. (NO).

HELD:1. Section 1, Rule XXIV of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure explicitly states that:

Sec. 1. Transitory Provisions. — These Rules shall govern all cases filed on or after its effectivity. All cases pending
with the Board and the Adjudicators, prior to the date of effectivity of these Rules, shall be governed by the DARAB
Rules prevailing at the time of their filing. (Emphasis ours)

In the present case, the Complaint was filed on September 10, 2008 prior to the date of effectivity of the 2009
DARAB Rules of Procedure on September 1, 2009. Thus, pursuant to the above-cited rule, the applicable rule in the
counting of the period for filing a Notice of Appeal with the Board is governed by Section 12, Rule X of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure

2. The “Fresh Period Rule” only applies to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the [CA] or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts to the [CA]); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the [CA]); and Rule 45 (appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The petitioner's present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the decision or order of the DENR
regional office to the DENR Secretary.
In the present case, the appeal from a decision of the Provincial Adjudicator to the DARAB as provided for under
Section 1, Rule XIV of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, is not judicial but administrative in nature. As such,
the "fresh period rule" in Neypes finds no application therein.
As correctly observed by PA Sicat, San Miguel should perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period of
appeal, but not less than five (5) days, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial of his MR or until June 7,
2011.
As a final note, it is worthy to emphasize that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but is
merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. The right is unavoidably
fonrfeited by the litigant who does not comply with the manner thus prescribed. In addition, the liberal application
of rules of procedure for perfecting appeals is still the exception and not the rule; and it is only allowed in
exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice. This exceptional situation, however, does not obtain
in this case.

Phil. Carpet Manufacturing v. Tagyamon, G.R. No. 191475, December 11, 2013
See: U.S. v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321 (1915)

FACTS: Respondents are employees of petitioner who were affected by petitioner's retrenchment and voluntary
retirement programs. The employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal invoking the SC ruling in Philippine
Carpet Employees Association (PHILCEA) v. Hon. Sto. Tomas (Philcea case), as to the validity of the company's
retrenchment program. The LA upheld the dismissal and so did the NLRC on appeal holding that the employees
voluntarily retired and the complaint is a mere afterthought and that the principle of laches applies. The CA however
reversed the LA and NLRC and refused to apply the principle of laches, because the case was instituted prior to the
expiration of the prescriptive period set by law which is four years. It stressed that said principle cannot be invoked
earlier than the expiration of the prescriptive period. The CA ordered reinstatement with full backwages. Hence the
instant case. Petitioner contends that the Philcea case decided by this Court and relied upon by the CA in the assailed
decision was based on erroneous factual findings, inapplicable financial statement, as well as erroneous analysis of
such financial statements. They, thus, implore the Court to revisit the cited case in order to dispense with substantial
justice.

ISSUES:
1.WON the principle of laches apply;
2.WON there is stare decisis

HELD: No.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.30 It has been repeatedly held by the Court
that:

x x x Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of law not
courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. x x x Courts
exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. In Zabat
Jr. v. Court of Appeals x x x, this Court was more emphatic in upholding the rules of procedure. We said therein:

As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," this is applied only in the absence of,
and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis.
The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based
only on equity.

Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be barred by
laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the
commencement of actions at law."

An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury to the complainants' rights which
should be brought within four years from the time of their dismissal pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
Respondents' complaint filed almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal was still well within the prescriptive
period. Laches cannot, therefore, be invoked yet. To be sure, laches may be applied only upon the most convincing
evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights of laborers are protected under the social justice provisions of the
Constitution and under the Civil Code.

Stare Decisis
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different.36 Where the facts are essentially different, however, stare decisis does not
apply, for a perfectly sound principle as applied to one set of facts might be entirely inappropriate when a factual
variant is introduced.

The question, therefore, is whether the factual circumstances of this present case are substantially the same as the
Philcea case.

We answer in the affirmative.

This case and the Philcea case involve the same period which is March to April 2004, the issuance of Memorandum
to employees informing them of the implementation of the cost reduction program; the implementation of the
voluntary retirement program and retrenchment program, except that this case involves different employees; the
execution of deeds of release, waiver, and quitclaim, and the acceptance of separation pay by the affected
employees.

We find no reason to depart from the above conclusions which are based on the Court's examination of the evidence
presented by the parties therein. As the respondents here were similarly situated as the union members in the Philcea
case, and considering that the questioned dismissal from the service was based on the same grounds, under the same
circumstances, there is no need to relitigate the issues presented herein. In short, we adopt the court's earlier findings
that there was no valid ground to terminate the employees.

A closer look at petitioners arguments would show that they want the Court to re-examine our decision in the
Philcea case allegedly on the ground that the conclusions therein were based on erroneous interpretation of the
evidence presented.

Indeed, in Abaria v. National Labor Relations Commission 39 although the Court was confronted with the same
issue of the legality of a strike that has already been determined in a previous case, the Court refused to apply the
doctrine of stare decisis insofar as the award of backwages was concerned because of the clear erroneous application
of the law. We held therein that the Court abandons or overrules precedents whenever it realizes that it erred in the
prior decision.40 The Court's pronouncement in that case is instructive:

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override
the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it
aside. For the Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the
Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines
after re-examination to call for a rectification

Waivers, Releases and Quitclaims

"As a rule, deeds of release and quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally
entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of those benefits would not amount to
estoppel."To excuse respondents from complying with the terms of their waivers, they must locate their case within
any of three narrow grounds: (1) the employer used fraud or deceit in obtaining the waivers; (2) the consideration
the employer paid is incredible and unreasonable, or (3) the terms of the waiver are contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. The instant
case falls under the first situation.

As the ground for termination of employment was illegal, the quitclaims are deemed illegal as the employees'
consent had been vitiated by mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by
employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal responsibilities. The
circumstances show that petitioner's misrepresentation led its employees; specifically respondents herein, to believe
that the company was suffering losses which necessitated the implementation of the voluntary retirement and
retrenchment programs, and eventually the execution of the deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim.
U.S. v. Tamparong (31 Phil 321 [1915])

FACTS: The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of Baguio for having played the game of chance
called "monte" in violation of Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to the Court of First Instance, where they were
again tried and convicted upon the same charge. An appeal was allowed to this court because the validity of
Ordinance No, 35 was drawn in question during the trial of the cause in the court below.

ISSUE:
1.Whether or not Ordinance No. 35 is valid.
2.Whether or not the Supreme Court is required under the law to examine the evidence for the purpose of
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants.

HELD:

1. Yes, Ordinance No. 35 is valid. For the issue at hand, the SC merely wrote, “The first question is answered in the
affirmative by this court in the case of the United States vs. Joson (26 Phil. 01). The cases are on all fours, and a
further discussion of this branch of the case is unnecessary.” Nothing more.

2. No. Although the SC wrote that Act No. 1627 does not explicitly limit their powers from examining issues of
facts, it likewise does not expressly authorize them to do so. The SC, nevertheless, interpreted that the law was NOT
framed to confer them the said power.

The SC has revisited prior laws to ascertain the intention of the framers of the amended section of Act No. 1627; the
latter being ambiguous in the sense that it did not explicitly allow nor prohibit SC to examine issues of facts on
appeals. The SC found, in light of former practices and from further understanding the circumstances in which the
framers of the amended law were subject to, that the amendment was not meant to confer in them the jurisdiction of
reviewing questions of fact.

The SC further distinguished their holding from Loeb vs. Columbia Township Trustees, and Boise Artesian Hot and
Cold Water Co., Ltd. vs. Boise City . These two latter cases were taken to the US SC directly from the circuit courts
as writs of error, (not as appeals) where the US SC does not only have jurisdiction to review constitutional questions
but also every other question properly arising.

In at least fourteen other cases, the SC has showed that the ruling for this issue in the last 10 years has remained
uniform. And that the court, since its organization, never held that it had the power to review facts touching guilt of
an accused person, ONLY as to when the appeal involved the validity or constitutionality of a statute or the
constitutionality of a municipal or township ordinance.

PRINCIPLE: It is urged that as the civil-law term "appeal" is used in section 43 (supra), we must apply the same
rule of construction that the courts in England and the United States have ,almost uniformly applied to the same term
and thus derive an unqualified review of both the law and the facts. This doubtless would be a correct position in
some jurisdictions in the American Union, as there the technical civil-law meaning of the term "appeal" is followed.
The reason for doing so is set forth in the case of Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Bunn (168 Fed. Rep., 862), wherein
the court said:

"The distinction between a ’writ of error,’ which brings up the record in an action of law for a review of questions of
law only, and an ’appeal,’ which involves a rehearing upon both the facts and the law, is vital. These remedies have
their origin and functions in the inherent difference between courts of law and courts of equity, differences which
are recognized in the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress. The ’writ of error’ is a common
law writ, and searches the record for errors of law in the final judgment of a common-law court. If error is found, the
judgment awards a venire facias de novo. The ’appeal’ is a procedure which comes to us from the civil law along
with the fundamentals which go to make up the jurisprudence of a court of equity. Its office is to remove the entire
cause, and it subjects the transcript to a scrutiny of fact and law and is in substance a new trial."
Under the system of procedure which obtains in the Philippine Islands, both legal and equitable relief is dispensed in
the same tribunal. We have no courts of law and courts of equity as they are known and distinguished in England
and the United States. All cases (law and equity) are presented and tried in the same manner, including their final
disposition in the Supreme Court. Therefore, the word "appeal," as used in section 43 (supra), does not necessarily
imply the removal of the cause from one tribunal to another in its entirety, subjecting the facts, as well as the law, to
a review or a retrial, but it is to be interpreted by the ordinary rules of construction.

The intention of the framers of General Orders No. 58 is the law. In order to ascertain that intention the provisions of
the order must be construed in the light of existing law and the circumstances at the time of its promulgation.

Rayos v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 196063, December 14, 2011

FACTS:
The case is a petition for review of certiorari and declaratory relief against the decision of the RTC which denied the
motion to dismiss filed by petitioner in an expropriation case. The motion to dismiss invoked the grounds that (1)
Ordinance No. 7949 passed by the City of Manila authorizing the mayor to expropriate said properties is
unconstitutional and (2) the cases of Lagcao v. Labra and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v.
Municipality (now city) of Pasig, Metro Manila apply squarely to the present case. The trial court denied the motion
to dismiss unconvinced that the doctrine of stare decisis is applicable.
ISSUES: WON Stare Decisis applies
HELD: No.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable. An order denying a motion to dismiss
does not finally dispose of the case, and in effect, allows the case to proceed until the final adjudication thereof by
the court. As such, it is merely interlocutory in nature and thus, not appealable.

Clearly, no appeal, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, may be taken from an interlocutory order. In case of denial
of an interlocutory order, the immediate remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Even if the Court treats the present petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which is the proper remedy to
challenge the order denying the motion to dismiss, the same must be dismissed for violation of the principle of
hierarchy of courts. This well-settled principle dictates that petitioners should file the petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, and not directly with this Court.

Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction. However, such concurrence in
jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v.
Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, the Court held:

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional
Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.

In short, to warrant a direct recourse to this Court, petitioners must show exceptional and compelling reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This petitioners failed to do.
Petitioners merely rehashed the arguments in their motion to dismiss, which consist mainly of unsubstantiated
allegations. Petitioners invoke the cases of Lagcao v. Labra and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v.
Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila in challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7949 without,
however, showing clearly the applicability and similarity of those cases to the present controversy. Neither did
petitioners explain why Ordinance No. 7949 is repugnant to the Constitution. Nor did petitioners specifically and
sufficiently set forth any extraordinary and important reason to justify direct recourse to this Court.

Likewise, assuming the present petition is one for declaratory relief, as can be gleaned from the caption of the
petition, this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction over such a petition. While this Court may treat a
petition for declaratory relief as one for prohibition or mandamus, over which this Court exercises original
jurisdiction, it must be stressed that this special treatment is undertaken only in cases with far reaching implications
and transcendental issues that need to be resolved.

United Claimants Assoc. v. NEA, G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012

FACTS:
This is a case on action for injunction to restraint or prevents the resolution on the termination Pay Plan issued by
NEA (National Electrification Administration) Board. The respondent, NEA, being a government owned and/or
controlled corporation was empowered to organize or reorganize the NEA staffing structure which stipulated in PD
269, Sec. 5 (a)(5). Later on, another law, RA 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2011) imposed another
restructuring of the organization in order to be competitive and provide proper services.

Due to such implementations, this led to the termination of several employees and be given separation pay. The
petitioners filed a case but got dismissed in the lower court which led them to file directly to the Supreme Court
upon appeal. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
The Court held that it should not be in its jurisdiction but due to special and important reasons, it can take it. The
respondents essentially argue that petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the
instant petition should have been filed with the regional Trial Court first.

The Court explained the principle of hierarchy of courts in Mendoza v. Villas, stating:
In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian reform, a petition for
certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court, violating the principle of
hierarchy of courts to wit:

“Primary, although thus Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicar, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the following pronouncements:
This Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional
Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefore will be directed. There is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions of the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reason therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket.

Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with RTC. However, as an exception to this general rule, the
principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant
case involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were
effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This to mind of the Court entails its attention.

Ernesto Dy v. Hon. Palamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders, G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011

Sure, here is the case digest of Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders, G.R. No. 192649, March
9, 2011:

Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011.

Facts:

 Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) is a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines.
 R-11 Builders, Inc. (R-11 Builders) is also a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines.
 On March 8, 2005, HGC and R-11 Builders entered into a loan agreement. Under the
loan agreement, HGC loaned PHP 10 million to R-11 Builders.
 R-11 Builders defaulted on its loan payments.
 HGC filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against R-11 Builders before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

Issue:

 Whether the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:
  The Supreme Court held that the RTC of Makati City does not have jurisdiction over the
case.
 The Supreme Court held that the venue of an action upon a contract is the place where
the contract is executed. In this case, the loan agreement was executed in Manila.
Therefore, the RTC of Makati City does not have jurisdiction over the case.
 The Supreme Court also held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply in
this case. The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court to dismiss a case if it is
more convenient for the parties and the witnesses to litigate the case in another forum.
However, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not
apply in this case because the RTC of Makati City is also a convenient forum for the
parties and the witnesses.

Rationale:

 Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action upon a
contract is the place where the contract is executed.
 In this case, the loan agreement was executed in Manila. Therefore, the RTC of Makati
City does not have jurisdiction over the case.
 The doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply in this case because the RTC of
Makati City is also a convenient forum for the parties and the witnesses.

Significance:

 The Supreme Court decision in Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders is an important
case on the issue of venue in civil cases involving contracts. The decision clarifies that
the place where the contract is executed is the place where the action upon the contract
must be filed. This means that the parties to a contract cannot simply choose a convenient
forum to file their case.

Davao Light v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111685, August 20, 2001

Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Hon. Rodolfo M. Bellaflor, Presiding
Judge of Branch 11, RTC-Cebu and Francisco Tesorero, G.R. No. 111685, August 20, 2001.

Facts:

 Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. (Davao Light) is a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines with its principal office in Davao City.
 Francisco Tesorero is a resident of Cebu City.
 On April 10, 1992, Davao Light filed a complaint for damages against Tesorero before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 11. The complaint alleged that
Tesorero caused the damage to Davao Light's property when he negligently operated a
crane that hit one of Davao Light's electric posts.
  Tesorero moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. He argued
that Davao Light should have filed the complaint in the RTC of Davao City, where
Davao Light's principal office is located.
 The RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
 Tesorero appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

 Whether the RTC of Cebu City has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court
held that the RTC of Cebu City does not have jurisdiction over the case because Davao
Light's principal office is located in Davao City.
 The Supreme Court also held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply in
this case. The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court to dismiss a case if it is
more convenient for the parties and the witnesses to litigate the case in another forum.
However, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not
apply in this case because Davao Light is a corporation and it has no residence in the
sense that a natural person has.

Rationale:

 Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action against a
corporation is the place where the corporation has its principal office.
 In this case, Davao Light's principal office is located in Davao City. Therefore, the RTC
of Cebu City does not have jurisdiction over the case.
 The doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply in this case because Davao Light is
a corporation and it has no residence in the sense that a natural person has.

Significance:

 The Supreme Court decision in Davao Light v. Court of Appeals is an important case on
the issue of venue in civil cases involving corporations. The decision clarifies that the
principal office of a corporation is the place where the corporation is considered to be
"residing" for purposes of venue. This means that a corporation must file a civil case in
the RTC of the province or city where its principal office is located.

Nocum v. Lucio Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioners Armand Nocum and The Philippine Daily Inquirer. The first complaint failed to state the residence of the
complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed
and first published. The RTC dismissed the complaint but later admitted the second amended complaint which
alleged that the article was first printed and published in the City of Makati and set aside the previous dismissal. The
CA upheld the RTC’s decision, hence the
instant case. Nocum and PDI contends that the CA erred in ruling (1) that the lower court had jurisdiction over the
case (on the basis of the original complaint) notwithstanding the fact that the lower court had earlier dismissed the
original complaint for its failure to confer jurisdiction upon the court; and (2) that the amended complaint was
properly allowed or admitted because the lower court was “never divested” of jurisdiction over the case and that the
original complaint of respondent was amended purposely to confer upon the lower court jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUES:
Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for damages?
HELD: YES
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises
a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.[11] In the case at bar, after
examining the original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed
before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent’s cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the
jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is a Court of
First Instance[12] that is specifically designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former colleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado,[14]
differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue
is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural
law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between
plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by
the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature were
printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These
additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s failure to include the
same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s failure to allege
these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that venue was not properly laid.
In Laquian v. Baltazar,[15] this Court construed the term “jurisdiction” in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as
referring to the place where actions for libel shall be filed or “venue.”
In Escribano v. Avila,[16] pursuant to Republic Act No. 4363,[17] we laid down the following rules on the venue of
the criminal and civil actions in written defamations.
1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense.
2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the time the offense was committed, the venue is
Manila or the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published.
3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of Manila, the venue is the province or the city
where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place of residence at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published.
The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the offended party is a public officer or a private person,
he has always the option to file the action in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed or first published.
We further restated[18] the rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
We so hold that dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on
its face, failed to allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where the libelous article was printed
and first published. Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended as in fact the
amended complaint was admitted, in view of the court a quo’s jurisdiction, of which it was never divested. In so
doing, the court acted properly and without any grave abuse of discretion.[19]
It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not
involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to
jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to
trial and not to jurisdiction.[20] It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or
geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court.[21]
It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place
of trial.[22] In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element
of jurisdiction.[23]
Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege the
place where the libelous articles were printed and first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a
criminal case. The failure of the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because this fact
involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be because the case
before us is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.
The cases[24] cited by petitioners are not applicable here. These cases involve amendments on complaints that
confer jurisdiction on courts over which they originally had none. This is not true in the case at bar. As discussed
above, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter upon the filing of the original complaint. It did not lose
jurisdiction over the same when it dismissed it on the ground of improper venue. The amendment merely laid down
the proper venue of the case.

Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013

FACTS: Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a parcel of land. Elenita’s mother, Lilia Baluyot, had a
conversation with one Maura Passion regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura Passion was a
real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owner’s copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Maura Passion
subdivided the property into several lots under the name of Elenita and Felicisimo. Maura, through a falsified deed
bearing the forged signature of Elenita and Felicisimo, sold the lots. One of these was sold to a certain Lorna Ong.
Lorna, after acquiring the property, then sold it to a certain Editha Padlan (petitioner). After learning what happened,
respondent Dinglasan demanded the petitioner to surrender possession of the lot. However, the petitioner refused to
do so. Respondents then filed a case before the RTC of Balanga, Bataan for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate
of Title. Summons was, thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan.
Petitioner filed an opposition to Declare Defendant in default with motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. Petitioner maintained that she had been residing in Japan and only comes to the
Philippines for a brief vacation once every two years.
RTC then rendered a decision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith, and consequently, dismissed the
complaint.
Respondent appealed and sought recourse before the CA. The CA then rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the TCT issued
in the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of respondents' own title. Petitioner then filed an MR.
However, the CA denied the motion. Petitioner alleged that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the person of the petitioner.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Honorable Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

HELD:
No. The Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint
which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an
action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.
Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, which was already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP
Blg. 129.
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law BP Blg. 129 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. x x x
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by
the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot
was sold by Lorna to the petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that would
show the valuation of the subject property.
Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not
the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.
Thus, the honourable court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Gonzales v. Quirico Pe, G.R. No. 167398, August 9, 2011

FACTS:
Respondent Quirico Pe was engaged in the business of construction materials, and had been transacting business
with petitioner Spouses Nestor Victor Rodriguez and Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez. The Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) awarded two contracts in favor of petitioner Nestor Rodriguez for the following projects,
namely, construction of "Lanot-Banga Road and concreting of "Laua-an Pandan Road, Province of Antique.

In 1998, respondent agreed to supply cement for the construction projects of petitioner Spouses Rodriguez.
Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez gave Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 6563066 to respondent, but
leaving the amount and date in blank. The blank LBP check was delivered to respondent to guarantee the payment
of 15,698 bags of Portland cement valued at ₱1,507,008.00, covered by Official Receipt No. 1175,5 issued by
respondent (as owner of Antique Commercial), in favor of petitioner Nestor Rodriguez (as owner of Greenland
Builders). However, a year later, respondent filled up blank LBP Check No. 6563066, by placing ₱2,062,000.00 and
June 30, 1999, corresponding to the amount and date.
On December 9, 1999, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint for Declaration of Payment, Cancellation of
Documents and Damages against respondent with the RTC, Branch 31, Iloilo City, docketed as Civil Case No.
25945. Consequently, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against the respondent.
After receipt of a copy of the said RTC Decision on July 26, 2002, respondent PE filed a Notice of Appeal on
July 30, 2002. On August 26, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for
Issuance of Writ of Execution, stating that respondent's appeal should be dismissed as the same was not
perfected due to non-payment of docket and other lawful fees as required under Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court. Claiming that since the respondent's appeal was not perfected and, as a consequence, the RTC Decision
dated June 28, 2002 became final and executory, petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of execution for the
implementation of the said RTC Decision. To buttress their motion, petitioners also appended a
Certification dated August 19, 2002, issued by the Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the
RTC, Iloilo City, certifying that no appeal fees in the case had been paid and received by the OCC.
The CA Decision reversed and set aside the Order dated September 23, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo City, Branch 31, which dismissed respondent's appeal for non-payment of docket and other lawful fees, and
directing the issuance of the writ of execution for the implementation of its Decision 4 dated June 28, 2002 in favor
of the petitioners and against the respondent. The CA Decision also directed the RTC to assess the appellate docket
fees to be paid by the respondent, if it has not done so, and allow him to pay such fees and give due course to his
appeal.
Hence, petitioner filed this present petition raising the sole issue that:
ISSUE: DID THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT AND ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO BELATEDLY PAY THE REQUIRED APPELLATE
DOCKET AND OTHER LEGAL FEES and DID THEY ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER?
HELD: The petition is meritorious. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision and they did not acquire
jurisdiction, the “court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.”
In cases of ordinary appeal, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal to the CA in cases
decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
RTC (the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from) and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. Section 3 thereof states that the appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Concomitant with the filing of a notice of appeal is the payment of the
required appeal fees within the 15-day reglementary period set forth in Section 4 of the said Rule. Thus,
“SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall
pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court
together with the original record or the record on appeal.”
In reversing the ruling of the trial court, the CA cited Yambao v. Court of Appeals 23 as justification for giving due
course to respondent’s petition and ordering the belated payment of docket and other legal fees. In Yambao, the CA
dismissed therein petitioners’ appeal from the RTC decision for failure to pay the full amount of the required docket
fee. Upon elevation of the case, the Court, however, ordered the CA to give due course to their appeal, and ruled that
their subsequent payment of the ₱20.00 deficiency, even before the CA had passed upon their motion for
reconsideration, was indicative of their good faith and willingness to comply with the Rules.
The ruling in Yambao is not applicable to the present case as herein respondent never made any payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, not even an attempt to do so, simultaneous with his filing of the Notice of Appeal.
Although respondent was able to file a timely Notice of Appeal, however, he failed to pay the docket and other legal
fees, claiming that the Branch Clerk of Court did not issue any assessment. This procedural lapse on the part of the
respondent rendered his appeal with the CA to be dismissible and, therefore, the RTC Decision, dated June 28, 2002,
to be final and executory.
In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with other subsequent cases of the same ruling, the Court explained that the
procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other
legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a
right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be
made within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. The
requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the
perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and
executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on
that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable
step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.
Since respondent’s appeal was not perfected within the 15-day reglementary period, it was as if no appeal was
actually taken. Therefore, the RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on pending incidents lodged before it, such as the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for Issuance of Writ of Execution, filed on August
26, 2002, which sought to set aside its Order dated August 5, 2002 that gave due course to respondent’s Notice of
Appeal, and directed the issuance of a writ of execution. Having no jurisdiction over the case, the prudent thing that
the CA should have done was to dismiss the respondent’s appeal for failure to pay the appeal fees, and declare that
the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 has now become final and executory.

RULING:
While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere
technicality. It raises jurisdictional problems, as it deprives the appellate court of its jurisdiction over the appeal.
After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing
party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the decision on the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 23, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23,
2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, issued by the Court of Appeals on August 20, 2003, is LIFTED.

Bagunu v. Spouses Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011

FACTS:
Spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit filed a protest against Rosito Bagunu’s free patent application over
a parcel of unregistered land, asserting their ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Sale executed in their favor. The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an ocular
inspection and formal investigation and ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent
application since the lot belongs to the respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties respective
deeds of sale, the Subdivision Plan of the lot is erroneous for what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot
322. The petitioner appealed to the CA, which affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since questions on the identity of a land require a technical determination by
the appropriate administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR
Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if not finality.

ISSUE: Whether or not DENR had jurisdiction over the case involving the identity of the land
HELD:
Yes, DENR had to resolve the issue of identity of the lot. This issue of identity of the land requires a technical
determination. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter,
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

It is the DENR which determines the respective rights of rival claimants to alienable and disposable public lands;
courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the DENR Secretary and the
Director of Lands, unless grave abuse of discretion exists. In the present case, neither party has asserted private
ownership over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged the public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the
administrative findings of the DENR in their complaint-in- intervention and the petitioner’s act of applying for a free
patent with the Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment that the land covered by his application is a public land
whose management and disposition belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands.

Omictin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, holding the position of Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., lodged a
complaint for estafa against private respondent George I. Lagos. Omictin claimed that Lagos, who was formerly the
president of Saag Phils., Inc., refused to return two company vehicles entrusted to him despite repeated demands.
Lagos filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceedings, citing a prejudicial question stemming from a pending
petition he had lodged with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC case involved the nullity of
appointments, declarations of dividends, recovery of share in profits, involuntary dissolution, receiver appointment,
damage recovery, and injunction against various parties, including Omictin.
The trial court denied Lagos' motion to suspend proceedings and motion to recuse, prompting him to file a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA found that a prejudicial question existed and ruled in favor of
Lagos, suspending the criminal proceedings. The SEC case was subsequently transferred to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaluyong.
In the meantime, the CA, addressing petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision, issued
its assailed resolution, that the petition for review on certiorari of the 30 June 2000 decision of this Court, filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General before the Supreme Court has already terminated on November 20, 2000 and a
corresponding entry of judgment has already been issued by the High Court, that the same is final and executory, the
private respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the decision 30 June 2000 before this Court is noted for being
moot and academic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable.
HELD:
YES. By analogy, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applied in this case. The issues raised by petitioner
particularly the status of Saag Phils., Inc. vis-à-vis Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., as well as the question regarding the supposed
authority of the latter to make a demand on behalf of the company, are proper subjects for the determination of the
tribunal hearing the intra-corporate case which in this case is the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. These issues
would have been referred to the expertise of the SEC in accordance with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction had the
case not been transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong.
Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. The court cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to resolving the
same, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge,
experience and services in determining technical and intricate matters of fact.
While the doctrine refers specifically to an administrative tribunal, the Court believes that the circumstances in the
instant case do not proscribe the application of the doctrine, as the role of an administrative tribunal such as the SEC
in determining technical and intricate matters of special competence has been taken on by specially designated
RTCs by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799. Hence, the RTC of Mandaluyong where the intra-corporate case is
pending has the primary jurisdiction to determine the issues under contention relating to the status of the domestic
corporation, Saag Phils., Inc., vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.; and the authority of petitioner to act on behalf of the domestic
corporation, the determination of which will have a direct bearing on the criminal case. The law recognizes that, in
place of the SEC, the regular courts now have the legal competence to decide intra-corporate disputes.

Euro-Med Laboratories v. Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. filed a complaint against Province of Batangas for unpaid balance still
due to the petitioner. Respondent alleged that some payments it had already made were not reflected in the
computation set forth in the complaint and that it was continuously exerting genuine and earnest efforts "to find out
the true and actual amount owed."

At the conclusion of petitioner's presentation of evidence, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the primary jurisdiction over petitioner's money claim was lodged with the Commission on Audit
(COA). Respondent pointed out that petitioner's claim, arising as it did from a series of procurement transactions
with the province, was governed by the Local Government Code provisions and COA rules and regulations on
supply and property management in local governments. Respondent argued that the case called for a determination
of whether these provisions and rules were complied with, and that was within the exclusive domain of COA to
make.

ISSUES:
WON it is the COA or the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioner’s money claim against the
Province of Batangas.

HELD:

It was ruled that it is the COA who has the primary jurisdiction of the case. Therefore the petition is denied.

TOPIC: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Agra, et al v. COA, G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011

Facts:

Republic Act No. 6758 took effect. Existing additional compensation of any national government official or
employee paid from local funds of a local governmnent unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or
employee and shall be paid by the National government. Pursuant to its authority to implement RA No. 6758, a
group of NEA employees filed civil action for mandamus against NEA alleging violation of their right to the equal
protection clause under the Constitution. RTC rendered decision in their favor and issued a Notice of Garnishment
against the funds of NEA. NEA questioned before the CA the orders of lower court and the CA rendered a decision
declaring the RTC decision null and void.

Thus NEA filed a petition for review for certiorari. Meanwhile the RTC held abeyance the execution of its decision
pending resolution of the court of the review of certiorari in NEA vs. Morales. The Commission of Audit advised
NEA against making further payments is settlement of the claims of Morales. Apparently, COA had already passed
upon claims similar to those of Morales that "the adverse action of this Commission sustaining the disallowance
made by the Auditor, NEA, on the payment of fringe benefits granted to NEA employees hired from July 1, 1989 to
October 31, 1989 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, subject disallowance is lifted." Thus, employees hired after
the extended date of October 31, 1989, pursuant to the above COA decision cannot defy that decision by filing a
petition for mandamus in the lower court.

Thus, petitioners came to this Court questioning the COA’s decision and resolution on the disallowance of their rice
subsidy.

Issue: WON COA has the primary jurisdiction arising from the implementation of RA 6758.

Ruling:

Yes.
Undoubtedly, the petition in the guise of a case for mandamus is a money claim falling within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of this Commission. Noting the propensity of the lower courts in taking cognizance of cases
filed by claimants in violation of such primary jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court issued Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 23, 2000 enjoining judges of lower
courts to exercise caution in order to prevent "possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the Commission
on Audit" and reiterating the basic rule that: "All money claims against the Government must be filed with the
Commission on Audit which shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect sue the State thereby."

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is clothed with original and exclusive
jurisdiction, courts are utterly without power and authority to exercise concurrently such jurisdiction. Accordingly,
all the proceedings of the court in violation of that doctrine and all orders and decisions reached thereby are null and
void. It will be noted in the cited Supreme Court Circular that money claims are cognizable by the COA and its
decision is appealable only to the Supreme Court. The lower courts have nothing to do with such genus of
transactions.

Spouses Fajardo v. Flores, G.R. No. 167891, January 15, 2010

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction, G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013
FACTS:
The Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (respondent) entered into a
contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) and Passenger Terminal
Building (Phase II) in Malay, Alan. In the course of construction, petitioner issued variation/change orders for
additional works. Jody King demanded for the payment of Aklan's balance, but to no avail. Jody King filed a case in
the RTC of Marikina City to collect the said balance. The Province of Aklan denied any unpaid balance and interest.
The RTC favored Jody King, and issued a writ of execution against petitioner. Sheriff Gamboa served notices of
garnishment on Land Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines at
their branches in Kalibo, Alan for the satisfaction of the judgment debt from the funds deposited under the account
of petitioner.
Said banks, however, refused to give due course to the court order, citing the relevant provisions of statutes,
circulars and jurisprudence on the determination of government monetary liabilities, their enforcement and
satisfaction.
Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order (TO) and
preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution. It was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111754, which was
dismissed as it found no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's issuance of the writ of execution.
The trial court denied petitioner's notice of appeal and motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner filed another
petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the aforesaid orders denying due course to its notice of appeal, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 114073, which was also dismissed because petitioner failed to provide valid justification for its
failure to file a timely motion for reconsideration

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner is stopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction
2. Whether or not the issuance of the Writ of Execution is void

HELD:
 1. No. The petitioner is not stopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction. COA has the primary jurisdiction
over the respondent's money claims. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the
courts even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. In such a case, the court in which the
claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case
without prejudice
Respondent's collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money claim should have been first
brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and referred the filing of the claim
before the COA. Moreover, the petitioner is not stopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of
its notice of appeal and before the CA.
2. Yes. The writ of execution issued in violation of COA's primary jurisdiction is VOID. All the proceedings
of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and
void.Since a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case is no judgment at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect and the void judgment can never be
final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void. Clearly, the CA erred in ruling that the RTC
committed no grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the execution of its judgment against petitioner and
garnishment of the latter's funds.

Aruego v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112193, March 13, 1996

FACTS:
In 1959, Jose M. Aruego Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian until his death on
March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonio Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego. On March 7, 1983, a
complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights was filed by the minors, Antonia and
Evelyn. However, Jose Aruego Jr., and the petitioners also filed a complaint to declare the private respondents as
illegitimate children of their defunct father. The lower court decided that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate daughter
or Jose Aruego Sr., and Luz M. Fabian and that she is entitled to a share of equal to one-half portion of share of the
legitimate.

So the petitioners filed a motion for partial reconsideration alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court
over the complaint by virtue of the passage of E.O. 209 or the Family Code of the Philippines.

It was denied, hence this petition for review.

ISSUES: Whether or not trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent by virtue of the
passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227), otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988.

HELD:

NO.

In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,6 a case which involves a similar complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance"
but treated by this court as one to compel recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the "open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child," we had occasion to rule that:

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has been
vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code.

We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. 7 where we
held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same
proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the
Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will
prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The
right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this,
the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when
the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an
exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.

Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction
over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.

Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases,
once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would
have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally
disposes of the case.

Barrameda v. Rural Bank of Canaman, G.R. No. 176260, November 24, 2010
FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Tan v. Cinco et al, G.R. No. 213054, June 15, 2016

FACTS:
Dante Tan, husband of the petitioner obtained loan from the respondents in the amount of P50,000,000.00. The loan
was facilitated by Penta Capital Investment Corporation and was secured by Dante;s shares in Best World Resoruces
Corporation. When Dante failed to pay the loan upon maturity and despite demands, he proposed to settle the same
by selling his shares in BWRC and assigning the proceeds to SLHI, the individual lenders, and PentaCapital.
However, Dante disappeared before executing the corresponding deeds of assignment.
Hence, respondents filed an action for sum of money against him before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 146 (Makati RTC), and after due proceedings, rendered judgment] on May 21, 2002 ordering Dante to pay
respondents the sum of P100,100,000.00 with legal interest from June 26, 2000 until the principal amount is fully
paid, plus attorney's fees and costs. Dante's attempts to reverse the decision on appeal proved futile, thus, a Writ of
Execution (writ) was issued on February 16, 2005.

In order to enforce the writ, Deputy Sheriff Rommel Ignacio (Sheriff Ignacio) levied on a property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 126981 registered in Dante's name (subject property). An auction sale was
then conducted on March 29, 2005. Consequently, Dante sought the quashal of the writ by presenting an affidavit
executed by his wife, herein petitioner Teresita Tan (Teresita) attesting to the conjugal nature of the subject
property. Meanwhile, the period to redeem the subject property lapsed without redemption having been made;
hence, a Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of respondents.
On May 2, 2007, Teresita - Dante's wife - filed before the Parañaque RTC a nullification case. After due
proceedings, the Parañaque RTC initially dismissed the nullification case on the ground of res judicata, ruling that
the issues raised therein had already been passed upon by the Makati RTC with Teresita's active and voluntary
participation.[28] However, upon Teresita's motion for reconsideration, the Parañaque RTC, in an Order dated
January 6, 2011, reversed its initial disposition and instead, nullified the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the
Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents
ISSUES:

Whether or not Paranaque RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:

No.Teresita's nullification case filed before the Parañaque RTC was improper and in glaring violation of the doctrine
of judicial stability. The judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in the collection case, as well as the execution
thereof, and all other incidents arising therefrom, may not be interfered with by the Parañaque RTC, a court of
concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to open, modify, or vacate the said judgment or order is
not only possessed but is restricted to the court in which the judgment or order is rendered or issued. [53]
Consequently, the Parañaque RTC lacked jurisdiction over the same, rendering all the proceedings therein, as well
as the Decision and other orders issued thereon, void for lack of jurisdiction.

Del Rosario v. Ocampo-Ferrer, G.R. No. 215348, June 20, 2016

FACTS:
● The levy on and sale of the real property owned by respondent Cristina Ocampo-Ferrer was procedurally
defective, thereby nullifying the Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner Eldefonso G. Del Rosario, the
annotation thereof on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 30480, and the Officer's Deed of Final Sale.
● Sometime in February 2001, Ocampo-Ferrer obtained a loan in the amount of P850, 000.00 from Del
Rosario, secured by a parcel of land situated in Calauan, Laguna and covered by TCT No. T-165897. After
Ocampo-Ferrer defaulted on said loan, Del Rosario filed a complaint for sum of money against her before
the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, Branch 275.
● Ocampo-Ferrer and Del Rosario entered into a Compromise Agreement. Despite the foregoing, Ocampo-
Ferrer still failed to comply with her obligation, thus compelling Del Rosario to move for execution, which
was granted by the RTC-Las Pinas Br. 275 in an Order dated December 16, 2005.
● After the issuance of the Writ of Execution, petitioner Sheriff Josefino Ortiz of RTC-Las Pinas Br. 275
issued a Demand/Notice to Pay to Ocampo-Ferrer, which the latter failed to act upon. This prompted
Sheriff Ortiz to levy Ocampo-Ferrer's parcel of land located in Las Pinas, covered by TCT No. 30480, and
to schedule the public auction of said land.
● At the auction sale, Del Rosario came out as the sole and highest bidder, and consequently, a Certificate of
Sale dated February 20, 2006 was issued in his favor. In view of the foregoing, Ocampo-Ferrer filed a
complaint before the RTC-Las Pinas, Branch 198 seeking the annulment of the sheriff’s sale, as well as
payment of damages.
● In her complaint, Ocampo-Ferrer claimed that Del Rosario and Sheriff Ortiz committed unlawful acts in
enforcing the writ of execution in the Civil Case.
ISSUES:
● The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held that the levy and consequent
sale of the property covered by TCT No. 30480 is null and void?
HELD:
Yes. At the outset, the Court emphasizes that under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, the various trial courts of a province or city, having the same
equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much: less with
their orders or judgments. Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is
considered as still pending, so that all proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which
issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial
officers and to control its own processes.
To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate1 forum in the resolution of incidents arising
in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.

In the case at bar, the Court notes that in performing a levy on and subsequent auction sale of the property covered
by TCT No. 30480, Sheriff Ortiz was merely enforcing the writ of execution issued by the RTC-Las Pinas Br. 275
pursuant to its ruling in Civil Case No. LP-03-0088. Since said writ of execution emanated from the RTC-Las Pinas
Br. 275, its enforcement cannot be assailed in a co-equal court such as the RTC-Las Pinas Br. 198, as it would
violate the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court.

Cabili v. Hon. Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-10-22252, September 6, 2011

FACTS:
Civil Case No. 06-29542 is an action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC against the Mindanao State
University (MSU), et al., arising from a vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and physical
injuries to several others.

On November 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision, holding the MSU liable for damages amounting to
₱2,726,189.90. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Iligan City RTC decision and the CA decision subsequently
lapsed to finality.

On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution. The MSU, however, failed to comply with the
writ; thus, on March 24, 2009, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on the MSU’s depository
bank, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City Branch.

The MSU responded to the denial by filing on April 1, 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition
and mandamus with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary
injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje. The petition of MSU was raffled to the RTC, Marawi City, and Branch
8, presided by respondent Judge.

The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a TRO on April 8, 2009. After this
hearing, the respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing ₱2,726,189.90 from MSU’s
LBP-Marawi City Branch account.

Subsequently, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 06- 2954,
filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority,
Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service for interfering with
the order of a co-equal court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the elementary rule of non-
interference with the proceedings of a court of co-equal jurisdiction?

RULING:
YES, as we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as still pending,
so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.

A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of
its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the
appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is
obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.

Jurisprudence shows that a violation of this rule warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.
In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by issuing a TRO to
temporarily restrain Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the
Iligan City RTC.

Villamor v. Salas, G.R. No. 101041, November 13, 1991

FACTS: The petitioner, Judge Adriano Villamor, was the presiding judge on the civil case filed by Gloria Naval for
recovery of ownership of a parcel of coconut land against the respondent, George Carlos. While the civil case was
pending there, respondent Carlos filed Criminal Cases for qualified theft against Gloria Naval and her helpers. The
criminal cases were also assigned to the sala of Judge Villamor.

A decision was then rendered by the Judge Villamor in favor of Naval who was declared the lawful owner and
possessor of the disputed land. Carlos was ordered to vacate the land. Thereafter, the criminal cases were then
dismissed. Judge Villamor then granted the execution pending appeal, which was unsuccessfully challenged by
Carlos in Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.

Afterwards, Carlos filed an administrative case against Judge Villamor, charging him with having issued illegal
orders and an unjust decision in the civil case. On November 21, 1988, the Supreme Court En Banc summarily
dismissed the administrative case.

Dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative case, respondent Carlos filed a civil action for damages against
Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment when he dismissed the five (5) criminal cases against
Naval, et al. Judge Villamor, instead of responding to the civil case, issued an order of direct contempt against
Carlos and his lawyer, Atty Antonio Guerrero, and sentenced each of them the penalty of imprisonment for five (5)
days and to pay a fine of P500. The Supreme Court, subsequently, annulled the contempt order.

On the civil case, Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court
granted the motion and affirmed by Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.
Unfazed by these setbacks, Carlos and his counsel, Attorney Antonio Guerrero, filed separate complaints for
damages against Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an unjust order of contempt. Attorney Guerrero's
complaint for damages was raffled to Branch 21, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, presided over by Judge Peary G.
Aleonar. Carlos' complaint for damages was raffled to Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City presided over by
Judge Bernardo LL. Salas.

On March 30, 1990, Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss in those civil cases but was denied by both presiding
judges. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order.

ISSUES: Whether or not Judges Aleonar and Salas may take cognizance of the actions for damages against Judge
Villamor for allegedly having rendered an unjust order of direct contempt against Carlos and Attorney Guerrero
which this Court subsequently annulled.

HELD: The answer is no.

To allow respondent Judges Aleonar and Salas to proceed with the trial of the actions for damages against the
petitioner, a co-equal judge of a co-equal court, would in effect permit a court to review and interfere with the
judgment of a co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review. The various branches of
a Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) being co-equal, may not interfere with each other's cases,
judgments and orders (Parco vs. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 262).

The Supreme Court has already ruled that only after the Appellate Court, in a final judgment, has found that a trial
judge's errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision
be levelled against the latter (Garcia vs. Alconcel, 111 SCRA 178; Sta. Maria vs. Ubay, 87 SCRA 179; Gahol vs.
Riodique, 64 SCRA 494).

Nowhere in the Supreme Court's decision annulling Judge Villamor's order of direct contempt (G.R. Nos. 82238-42,
November 13, 1989) can there be found a declaration that the erroneous order was rendered maliciously or with
conscious and deliberate intent to commit an injustice. In fact, a previous order of direct contempt issued by Judge
Villamor against Carlos' former counsel was sustained by the Supreme Court (Jaynes C. Abarrientos, et al. vs. Judge
Villamor, G.R. No. 82237, June 1, 1988).

At most, the order of direct contempt which the court nullified may only be considered an error of judgment for
which Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents. A judge is not liable for an
erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in rendering it (Barroso vs. Arche, 67 SCRA 161).

Heirs of Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 156078, March 14, 2008

FACTS:
● Private respondents Marasigan filed a Motion to Appoint Commissioners following the procedure outlined
in Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court (rule governing the partition of real estate) due to
the fact that the parties involved in this case could not agree on how they can physically partition the estate
of Alicia Marasigan.
● The RTC granted the motion and appointed Myrna Badiong and Sandie Dacara as commissioners. Cesar
Marasigan Jr. failed to nominate a third commissioner despite notice.
● The two Commissioners conducted an ocular inspection. However, Cesar Jr. contended that he did not
receive any notice from the Commissioners to attend the ocular inspection and he was, thus, not present on
said occasion.
● The commissioned findings and recommendations state that 47.24 hectares represents the 2/12 pero-
indiviso share of Alicia Marasigan and the 1/7 shares of each heir is equivalent to 6.47 hectares.
Considering that the pro-indiviso share is situated in different locations, the Commissioners recommended
that the heirs may assign their 1/7 share to one of the parties willing to buy the same at P700,000.00 per
hectare.
● Cesar Jr. opposed the findings and asked for disapproval of the report. The RTC ruled approving the
recommendations of the Commissioners. Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Petitioners elevated the
case to CA, which the appellate court dismissed as well. Subsequent MR was denied.
● Petitioner, then filed for certiorari at the Supreme Court and raised the following assignment of errors:
○ THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT THEREFORE
DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN FINDING THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR
DUE NOTICE TO THE PARTIES TO ATTEND THE VIEWING AND EXAMINATION OF
THE REAL ESTATE SUBJECT OF PARTITION WHEN THE COMMISSIONERS HAVE
DECIDED NOT TO PARTITION THE PROPERTY AND SUCH NOTICE UNDER SECTION 4
OF RULE 69 IS INDISPENSABLE ONLY WHEN THEIR DECISION IS TO PARTITION.
○ THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
PARTICULARLY WITH ARTICLES 494 AND 495 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND
SECTIONS 5 RULE 69 OF THE RULES.
○ THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY
AND IMPRACTICALITY IF EMBRACED IN ‘PREJUDICE’ REFERRED IN SECTION 5,
RULE 69 OF THE RULES SHALL MAKE SAID RULE VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE RULE MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME
COURT THAT ITS RULES SHALL NOT INCREASE, DECREASE OR MODIFY
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS.
● In their memorandum, however, petitioners raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and cause of action for
the first time.

ISSUES:
WON lack of jurisdiction can be raised as an additional issue in a memorandum before the Supreme Court.

HELD:
NO. The parties were duly informed by SC in its September 17, 2003 resolution that no new issues may be raised by
a party in its Memorandum and the issues raised in its pleadings but not included in the Memorandum shall be
deemed waived or abandoned. The raising of additional issues in a memorandum before the SC is irregular,
because said memorandum is supposed to be in support merely of the position taken by the party concerned
in his petition, and the raising of new issues amounts to the filing of a petition beyond the reglementary
period. The purpose of this rule is to provide all parties to a case a fair opportunity to be heard. No new
points of law, theories, issues or arguments may be raised by a party in the Memorandum for the reason that
to permit these would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.

Petitioners failed to heed the Court's prohibition on the raising of new issues in the Memorandum. Moreover,
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that:

SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that the court has not jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the
court shall dismiss the claim.

First, it bears to point out that Cesar, petitioners’ predecessor, did not file any motion to dismiss, and his answer
before the RTC did not bear the defenses/objections of lack of jurisdiction or cause of action on these grounds;
consequently, these must be considered waived. The exception that the court may still dismiss a case for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, although the same is not pleaded, but is apparent in the pleadings or evidence on
record, does not find application to the present Petition. Second, petitioners’ arguments on the lack of jurisdiction of
the RTC over the case more appropriately pertain to venue, rather than jurisdiction over the subject matter, and are,
moreover, not apparent from the pleadings and evidence on record. Third, the property subject of partition is only
the 47.2 hectare pro-indiviso area representing the estate of Alicia. It does not include the entire 496 hectares of land
comprising Hacienda Sta. Rita.

Even petitioners’ argument that non-payment of appropriate docket fees by private respondents deprived the RTC of
jurisdiction to partition the entire Hacienda Sta. Rita deserves scant consideration. In National Steel Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, the Court ruled:

x x x while the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the party raising
such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and he only
objects to the court’s jurisdiction because the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.

Irrefragably, petitioners raised the issues of jurisdiction for lack of payment of appropriate docket fees and
lack of cause of action belatedly in their Memorandum before this Court. Cesar and petitioners were
noticeably mum about these in the proceedings before. In fact, Cesar actively participated in the proceedings
conducted before the RTC by seeking affirmative reliefs therefrom, such as the inclusion of more properties
in the partition. Hence, petitioners are already estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC on this
ground.

It is conceded that this Court adheres to the policy that "where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may de done at any time." While it is the
general rule that neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, the Court may rule
otherwise under meritorious and exceptional circumstances. One such exception is Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, which
finds application in this case. This Court held in Tijam that "after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power
of the court."

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968

Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog - plaintiffs-appellees

Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio – defendants

Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (Cebu branch) – bonding company and defendant-appellant

FACTS: On July 19, 1948, spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them
the sum of P1,908.00 plus legal interest.

As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the
same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. (the Surety).

CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a writ of execution against the defendants but was unsatisfied; thus
was moved against the Surety. Manila Surety objected to the lack of demand and sought affirmative relief by
requesting that its liability be lifted.

Manila Surety then moved to quash the writ of execution due to lack of required summary hearing but such was
denied.

In 1962, Manila Surety appealed in the CA. CA affirmed CFI decision. A year after, five days after the Surety
received notice of decision, the Surety filed an extension to file for a Motion for reconsideration. However, they
filed a Motion to Dismiss the case instead on the ground that the CFI Cebu did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
as RA 296 placed actions where the demand does not exceed P2000 (without interest) in the inferior courts, not the
CFI.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in this case, lack of Jurisdiction should be raised at earliest possible opportunity

HELD: Yes. Generally, the rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively
by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, Laches is an exception to the rule.

Laches is a failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.

In this case, the Court accorded jurisdiction by estoppel, emphasizing the principle of laches. Thus, the Surety is
barred by laches from invoking the plea for the first time on appeal after an adverse decision was reached in the CA
for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with its active participation.

Villagracia v. Fifth Shari-a District Court, G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014
FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Republic v. Bantigue Point Development, G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012
SUBJECT MATTER/TOPIC: Lack of jurisdiction over subject matter may be raised at any stage
OVERVIEW: The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be
acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
Lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage in the proceeding.

FACTS:

● On July 17, 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with an
assessed value of ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property,
more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less
10,732 square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas.

● On July 18, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on October 22, 1997. On
August 7, 1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on November 4, 1997.

● Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on January 8, 1998 while the
records were still with the RTC.

● On March 31, 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC
of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than ₱100,000.

● MTC Ruling: MTC entered an Order of General Default and commenced with the reception of evidence.
Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax Declarations, a Deed
of Absolute Sale in its favour, and a Certification from the DENR Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and disposable
zone. Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent Corporation.

● The Republic appealed to the CA.

● CA Ruling: The CA affirmed MTC since petitioner had actively participated in the proceedings before the
lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein. Thus, petitioner is thereby estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal. The CA further found that respondent Corporation
had sufficiently established the latter’s registrable title over the subject property after having proven open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself and its
predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II.3. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Republic is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
over the application for original registration of land title even for the first time on appeal.

HELD: The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction.

The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.

In this case, petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still
with the RTC. At that point, petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply
because the case was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed
pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional
question in its Brief. As to the issue of laches based on the ruling of the CA, the Court reiterate the definition of the
same as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it."In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us
to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
Possible Questions:

1. Difference between the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy case? - In the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy case, the party was
estopped for objecting the court's jurisdiction by reason of laches. In the said case, only 15 years thereafter,
and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant
question the lower court's jurisdiction. Whereas for the Republic v. Bantigue case, petitioner Republic has
not been estopped from objecting the jurisdiction since petitioner did not displayed such unreasonable
failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to
question the lower court's jurisdiction.

2. Is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case a ground for a motion to dismiss?- Yes, lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter is a ground for motion to dismiss an action as provided under Sec. 12,
Rule 15 of the new rules.

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968

FACTS:
● Tijam filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against Sibonghanoy. A writ of attachment was
issued but the respondent filed a surety bond. The court rendered judgement in favor of the plaintiffs and,
after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of
execution against the defendants.
● The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
against the Surety’s bond. The court ruled in favor of the surety but after demand by Tijam, the surety still
did not pay, hence a second motion for execution was filed which the Court granted.
● The surety filed a motion for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration which the
CA granted.
● However, the surety filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the CFI had no jurisdiction over the case
because RA No. 296, otherwise knows as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, and
Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions
where the value of the subject matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of
interest and costs.
Issue: Whether CFI was conferred jurisdiction over the subject matter
Held: Yes.
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect
about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However,
considering the facts and circumstances of the present case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the
opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling
everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost
fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time.

De Herrera v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 170251, June 1, 2011

Why is this case assigned?
This case is in relation to the topic of lack of jurisdiction over subject matter may be raised at any stage because in
this case, petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP when she appealed the case to the CA and at that time,
no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach as compared to the Sibonghanoy case. Petitioner is not
estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction
of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such
jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.

FACTS:

● Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo, represented by Emelita Bernardo, filed a complaint before the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against Alfredo Herrera (Alfredo) for
interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land.
● On December 6, 1999, the COSLAP ruled that respondents have a rightful claim over the subject property.
Consequently, a motion for reconsideration and/or reopening of the proceedings was filed by Alfredo. The
COSLAP denied the motion.
● Petitioner Celia S. Vda. de Herrera, as the surviving spouse of Alfredo, filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of the COSLAP. The CA ruled that the
COSLAP has exclusive jurisdiction over the present case and, even assuming that the COSLAP has no
jurisdiction over the land dispute of the parties herein, petitioner is already estopped from raising the issue
of jurisdiction because Alfredo failed to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction before the COSLAP and he
actively participated in the proceedings before the said body.
● Respondents alleged that the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the present case. Further, respondents argued
that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of laches due to
Alfredo's active participation in the actual proceedings before the COSLAP. Respondents said that
Alfredo's filing of the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reopening of the proceedings before the
COSLAP is indicative of his conformity with the questioned resolution of the COSLAP.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not COSLAP had jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership

2. WON Petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP

HELD:

1. No.

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers
which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. 8 Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two
options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated
in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large
number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action.

In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' complaint. The
present case does not fall under any of the cases enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561.
The dispute between the parties is not critical and explosive in nature, nor does it involve a large number of parties,
nor is there a presence or emergence of social tension or unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as involving a
critical situation that requires immediate action.

2. No.

Respondents’ allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by
reason of laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. The fact that a
person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its
jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.

The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on
the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar
the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In
such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so
belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the
Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the
court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar that would justify the application of
estoppel by laches against the petitioner. Here, petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP when she
appealed the case to the CA and at that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. Therefore,
petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Additionally, no laches will even attach
because the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction

Megan Sugar Corp. v. RTC of Iloilo, G.R. No. 170352, June 1, 2011
FACTS:

● Respondent New Frontier Sugar Corporation (NFSC) obtained a loan from Equitable PCI Bank (EPCIB),
secured by a real estate mortgage and a chattel mortgage.
● NFSC entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Central Iloilo Milling Corporation
(CIMICO) due to financial problems. CIMICO would take over NFSC's operations.
● NFSC sued CIMICO for non-payment under the MOA.
● CIMICO counter-sued NFSC for breach of contract. CIMICO later included Philippine Industrial Security
Agency (PISA) and EPCIB in the case.
● EPCIB foreclosed on NFSC's property and won at auction.
● CIMICO, along with petitioner Megan Sugar Corporation (MEGAN), entered into a MOA where MEGAN
took over CIMICO's rights and obligations.
● Passi Iloilo Sugar Central, Inc. (Passi Sugar) filed a motion to intervene, claiming to have purchased the
property from EPCIB.
● Atty. Reuben Mikhail Sabig (Atty. Sabig) appeared as MEGAN's counsel in a hearing related to Passi
Sugar's intervention.
● Several parties raised objections to Atty. Sabig's appearance, but he asserted he had authority due to the
MOA.
● The RTC issued orders related to escrowing sugar quedans and other matters.
● MEGAN filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (CA) to question the jurisdiction of the RTC and Atty.
Sabig's authority.
● The CA dismissed MEGAN's petition, finding MEGAN estopped from challenging the jurisdiction.
● MEGAN appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER (MEGAN) IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE ASSAILED
ORDERS BECAUSE OF THE ACTS OF ATTY. REUBEN MIKHAIL SABIG

HELD:
Yes.

The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its
purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom
they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable principles and
the equities in the case. It is designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where without its aid injustice
might result. It has been applied by this Court wherever and whenever special circumstances of a case so demand.

Based on the events and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the assailed orders, this Court rules that
MEGAN is estopped from assailing both the authority of Atty. Sabig and the jurisdiction of the RTC. While it is
true, as claimed by MEGAN, that Atty. Sabig said in court that he was only appearing for the hearing of Passi
Sugar’s motion for intervention and not for the case itself, his subsequent acts, coupled with MEGAN’s inaction and
negligence to repudiate his authority, effectively bars MEGAN from assailing the validity of the RTC proceedings
under the principle of estoppel.

MEGAN can no longer deny the authority of Atty. Sabig as they have already clothed him with apparent authority to
act in their behalf. It must be remembered that when Atty. Sabig entered his appearance, he was accompanied by
Concha, MEGAN’s director and general manager. Concha himself attended several court hearings, and on
December 17, 2002, even sent a letter 28 to the RTC asking for the status of the case. A corporation may be held in
estoppel from denying as against innocent third persons the authority of its officers or agents who have been clothed
by it with ostensible or apparent authority. 29Atty. Sabig may not have been armed with a board resolution, but the
appearance of Concha made the parties assume that MEGAN had knowledge of Atty. Sabig’s actions and, thus,
clothed Atty. Sabig with apparent authority such that the parties were made to believe that the proper person and
entity to address was Atty. Sabig. Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory,
or doctrine of ostensible agency, imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but
rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the
relationship or the authority exists.

One of the instances of estoppel is when the principal has clothed the agent with indicia of authority as to lead a
reasonably prudent person to believe that the agent actually has such authority. 32 With the case of MEGAN, it had
all the opportunity to repudiate the authority of Atty. Sabig since all motions, pleadings and court orders were sent to
MEGAN’s office. However, MEGAN never questioned the acts of Atty. Sabig and even took time and effort to
forward all the court documents to him.

MEGAN had all the opportunity to assail the jurisdiction of the RTC and yet far from doing so, it even complied
with the RTC Order. With the amount of money involved, it is beyond belief for MEGAN to claim that it had no
knowledge of the events that transpired. Moreover, it bears to stress that Atty. Sabig even filed subsequent motions
asking for affirmative relief. Noteworthy is the fact that Atty. Sabig’s motion was favorably acted upon by the RTC.
Like the CA, this Court finds that estoppel has already set in. It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked
the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.38 The party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid but because such a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of public policy.

The rule is that the active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to
object to the jurisdiction of the court or administrative body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an
invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from
later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction. Based on the preceding discussion, this Court holds that
MEGAN’s challenge to Atty. Sabig’s authority and the RTC’s jurisdiction was a mere afterthought after having
received an unfavorable decision from the RTC. Certainly, it would be unjust and inequitable to the other parties if
this Court were to grant such a belated jurisdictional challenge.

Phil. Women’s Christian Temperance Union v. Yangco, G.R. No. 199595, April 2, 2014
FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Manchester Development v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987

FACTS:

The case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 but
the docket fee paid upon filing of complaint was only P410.00 because the lower court considered the action to be
merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation. After an
investigation due to reports of under-assessment of filing fees, the Supreme Court issued an order on October 15,
1985 ordering the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated, on
November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which
they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in
the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended
complaint was admitted by the trial court but on appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the filing fees should be
based on the original complaint.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Magaspi vs. Ramolete wherein the amended complaint was made the basis of the
computation of the filing fee.

ISSUES:

WON the amended complaint should be the basis of the filing fees.

HELD:

As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court . Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the
complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint that
was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages. In the
Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of the
defendant to the property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks
for the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in the amounts specified
therein. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in
the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and possession of
a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as merely to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only
P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. The trial court later ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of
P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not consider the damages to
be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and possession of real property. An amended
complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the government of the Republic as defendant and
reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also
admitted. In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also for
damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment.
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the complaint, the
designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee
should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed
the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the
amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint.
This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not was
compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner
through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for
in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial
court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the
damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer
thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of
the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.

Nestle Phils. v. FY Sons, G.R. No. 150780, May 5, 2006

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989

FACTS:Petitioner Sun Insurance files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the consignation of fire
insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent files a complaint for the refund of premiums and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages,
attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought although from
the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP
210.00 in docket fees.The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-
assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

ISSUES: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct or
sufficient docket fees
HELD: YES.
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where
the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment
of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Same
rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the docket fee due not
only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, a more
liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Phil. First Insurance v. Paramount Gen. Insurance, G.R. No. 165147, July 9, 2008

What does this case tell you about?

This case tells us that the requirement for the commencement of a civil action is- “civil action is commenced
by the filling of the original complaint with the court (Sec, 5 Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court Civil Procedure)
plus the payment of a corresponding docket and other legal fees.”

Hence, payment of the prescribed docket fees is not simply filing of the complaint or appropriate pleadings but it
would vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of action.

In this case, respondents were assessed the docket fee on the basis of the amount specified in the prayer but later
deliberately omitted to specify the amount of damages to clearly evade the payment of the correct filing fee.
According to Circular no. 7 of the Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of
the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of filing fees in any
case."

The court concluded that the respondent showed dishonesty and lack of regard of the rules. Following this line
of reasoning, respondent would do everything if only for it to spend less for the filing fee, even to the extent of
circumventing and defying the rule on the payment of the filing fee.

Indeed, Pyramid captioned its complaint as one for “specific performance and damages'' and failed to specify in its
prayer in the complaints the amount of its claims/damages and it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to
specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination and for the proper
assessment of the docket fees.

What’s the original complaint filed? Where is it filed? Pyramid Logistics and Trucking Corporation (Pyramid),
which filed on November 7, 2001 a complaint, Specific performance and damages, against petitioners Philippine
First Insurance Company, Inc. (Philippine First) and Paramount General Insurance Corporation (Paramount) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1609.

FACTS:

Pyramid sought to recover the proceeds of two insurance policies issued to it, Policy No. IN-002904 issued by
petitioner Paramount, and Policy No. MN-MCL-HO-00-0000007-00 issued by petitioner Philippine First. Despite
demands, petitioners allegedly failed to settle them, hence, it filed the complaint subject of the present petition.

Pyramid was assessed ₱610 docket fee, apparently on the basis of the amount of ₱50,000 specified in the prayer
representing attorney’s fees, which it duly paid.

Pyramid later filed a 1st Amended Complaint containing minor changes in its body but bearing the same prayer to
Branch 148 of the Makati RTC to which the complaint was raffled admitted the Amended Complaint.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction, Pyramid not having paid the
docket fees in full, arguing thus:

“In the body of the Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleged that the goods belonged to California Manufacturing Co.,
Inc. (CMC) is [sic] "valued at Php907,149.07" and consequently, "plaintiff incurred expenses, suffered damages and
was constrained to engage the services of counsel to enforce and protect its right to recover compensation under the
said policies and for which services, it obligated itself to pay the sum equivalent to twenty-five (25%) of any
recovery in the instant action, as and for attorney’s fees and legal expenses".”

On the other hand, in the prayer in the Complaint, plaintiff deliberately omitted to specify what these damages are.

xxxx

Verily, this deliberate omission by the plaintiff is clearly intended for no other purposes than to evade the payment
of the correct filing fee if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee. In fact, the docket clerk
in the instant case charged the plaintiff a total of Php610.00 only as a filing fee, which she must have based on the
amount of Php50,000.00 [attorney’s fees] only.

Petitioners cited Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals which held: "[A]ll complaints, petitions,
answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of
the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted or admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record."

Pyramid filed its Opposition, alleging that if there was a mistake in the assessment of the docket fees, the trial court
was not precluded from acquiring jurisdiction over the complaint as "it has the authority to direct the mistaken party
to complete the docket fees in the course of the proceedings . . ."

Petitioners eventually file before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari (With Preliminary Injunction and
Urgent Prayer for Restraining Order) posing the following two of three queries, viz:

First, Does [Pyramid’s] deliberate omission to pay the required correct docket and filing fee vest the trial court
[with] jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of the instant case?

Second, [Is] the instant case an action for specific performance or simply one for damages or recovery of a sum of
money?

ISSUES:

Does [Pyramid’s] deliberate omission to pay the required correct docket and filing fee commenced their civil
action in the instant case? And does it vest the trial court [with] jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of
the case?

HELD: NO.

The Court of Appeals partially granted petitioners’ petition for certiorari by setting aside the trial judge’s assailed
orders and ordering Pyramid to file the correct docket fees within a reasonable time, it holding that while the
complaint was denominated as one for specific performance, it sought to recover from petitioners Pyramid’s "claims
arising from the subject losses." The appellate court ratiocinated:

xxxx

Indeed, it has been held that "it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action." To determine the docket fees, it is necessary to determine the true nature of the action by
examining the allegations of the complaint.

As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 [of this Court which was issued based on the Manchester ruling]
that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is the rule
that subsequent "amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading," the trial court now
being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive period or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing the awards of claims
not specified in the pleading – i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading – as to which
the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment. (this part is where it closed the liberal
interpretation of Sun Insurance 3rd Guideline)

Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the
aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading
should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of filing fees in
any case."

The court also concluded that the respondent showed dishonesty and lack of regard of the rules. Following this line
of reasoning, respondent would do everything if only for it to spend less for the filing fee, even to the extent of
circumventing and defying the rule on the payment of the filing fee.

While it is true that the determination of certain damages x x x is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the
duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may
make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception
contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court
is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it
will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.

Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders, G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011 (Supra)
FACTS:
On 19 March 1993, a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was entered into between respondents National Housing
Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders) for the implementation of the Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP). On 26 September 1994, NHA and R-II Builders, alongside
petitioner Housing Guaranty Corporation (HG) as guarantor and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as trustee,
entered into an Asset Pool Formation Trust Agreement which provided the mechanics for the implementation of the
project. To back the project, an Asset Pool was created. On the same date, the parties likewise executed a Contract
of Guaranty whereby HG, upon the call made by PNB and conditions therein specified, undertook to redeem the
regular Smokey Mountain Project Participation Certificate (SMPPCs) upon maturity and to pay the simple interest
thereon to the extent of 8.5% per annum. Subsequent to R-Il Builders' infusion of P300 Million into the project, the
issuance of the SMPPCs and the termination of PB's services on 29 January 2001, NHA, R-II Builders and HGC
agreed on the institution of Planters Development Bank (PDB) as trustee on 29 January 2001. By 24 October 2002,
however, all the Regular SMPPCs issued had reached maturity and, unredeemed, already amounted to an aggregate
face value of P2.513 Billion. The lack of liquid assets with which to effect redemption of the regular SMPPCs
prompted PB to make a call on HGC's guaranty and to execute in the latter's favor a Deed of Assignment and
Conveyance (DAC) of the entire Asset Pool,. On 1 September 2005, R-II Builders filed the complaint against HGC
and NHA before Branch 24 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, a Special Commercial Court (SCC). Contending
that HGC's failure to redeem the outstanding regular SMPPCs despite obtaining possession of the Asset Pool
ballooned the stipulated interests and materially prejudiced its stake on the residual values of the Asset Pool, R-II
Builders alleged, among other matters, that the DAC should be rescinded since PDB exceeded its authority in
executing the same prior to HGC's redemption and payment of the guaranteed SMPPCs; Having filed its answer to
the complaint, in the meantime, HGC went on to move for the conduct of a preliminary hearing on its affirmative
defenses which included such grounds as lack of jurisdiction. On 2 August 2007, R-ll Builders, in turn, filed a
motion to admit its Amended and Supplemental Complaint which deleted the prayer for resolution of the DAC
initially prayed for in its original complaint. In lieu thereof, said pleading introduced causes of action for
conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, for NHA to pay the Asset Pool the sum of
P1,803,729,757.88 representing the cost of the changes and additional works on the project and for an increased
indemnity for attorney's fees in the sum of P2,000,000.00.1 Consistent with its joint order dated 2 January 2008
which held that R-II Builders' complaint was an ordinary civil action and not an intra-corporate controversy, Branch
24 of the Manila RTC issued a clarificatory order dated 1 February 2008 to the effect, among other matters, that it
did not have the authority to hear the case. As a consequence, the case was re-raffled to respondent Branch 22 of the
Manila RTC. R-ll Builders filed a motion to admit it Second Amended Complaint, on the ground that its pravious
Amended and Supplemental Complaint had not yet been admitted in view of the non- payment of the correct docket
fees therefore. Said Second Amended Complaint notably resurrected R-II Builders' cause of action for resolution of
the DAC, deleted its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset
Pool, reduced
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred in not ruling that respondent RTC was curtailed by R-II Builders non-payment of the
correct docket fees?

HELD:
Yes. Prescinding from the foregoing considerations, and to show that the proceedings below was error upon error,
we find that the CA also gravely erred in not ruling that respondent RTC’s (Branch 22, the regular court) jurisdiction
over the case was curtailed by R-II Builders’ failure to pay the correct docket fees. In other words, the
jurisdictionally flawed transfer of the case from Branch 24, the SCC to Branch 22, the regular court, is topped by
another jurisdictional defect which is the non-payment of the correct docket fees. In its order dated 19 May 2008
which admitted R-II Builders’ Amended and Supplemental Complaint, respondent RTC distinctly ruled that the case
was a real action and ordered the re-computation and payment of the correct docket fees. 53 In patent circumvention
of said order, however, R-II Builders filed its 14 August 2008 motion to admit its Second Amended Complaint
which effectively deleted its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the
entire Asset Pool and, in addition to reducing the claim for attorney’s fees and seeking its appointment as a receiver,
reinstated its cause of action for resolution of the DAC.54
For failure of R-II Builders to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint or, for that matter, its Amended
and Supplemental Complaint as directed in respondent RTC's 19 May 2008 order, it stands to reason that
jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach. Applying the rule that "a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court" in the landmark case of Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 76 this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional. To temper said ruling, the
Court subsequently issued the guidelines in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion.
The importance of filing fees cannot be over-emphasized for they are intended to take care of court expenses in the
handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and
others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of each case. The payment of said fees, therefore, cannot be
made dependent on the result of the action taken without entailing tremendous losses to the government and to the
judiciary in particular. 80 For non-payment of the correct docket fees which, for real actions, should be computed on
the basis of the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof as alleged by the
claimant,81 respondent RTC should have denied admission of R-II Builders’ Second Amended Complaint and
ordered the dismissal of the case. Although a catena of decisions rendered by this Court eschewed the application of
the doctrine laid down in the Manchester case, 82 said decisions had been consistently premised on the willingness of
the party to pay the correct docket fees and/or absence of intention to evade payment of the correct docket fees. This
cannot be said of R-II Builders which not only failed to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint and
Amended and Supplemental Complaint but also clearly evaded payment of the same by filing its Second Amended
Complaint.

Unicapital v. Consing, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013
FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Ramones v. Spouses Guimoc, G.R. 226645, August 13, 2018

Overview: The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the Amended Decision dated March 21, 2016 and the
Resolution dated August 23, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131201, deleting the portion of the
judgement dated April 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 4 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. ML-
4095 which ordered Teodorico Guimoc, Jr. and Elenita Guimoc to collectively pay Isabel Ramones the amounts of
P60,000.00 and P507,000.00 as civil liabilities.

After judgement has been rendered by the MTC, an appeal by the respondents has been filed before the RTC on
January 10, 2012 citing that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to award damages in favor of petitioner for
failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees.

FACTS: An information was filed on June 30, 2006 before the MTC of Mariveles, Bataan, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 06-8539, charging the respondents with the crime of Other Forms of Swindling under Article 316 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code.

“That on or about June 09, 2005, in Mariveles, Bataan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, obtained money from Isabel Ramones in the amount of P663,000.00 with the
promise to sell their house and lot to the latter. The accused executed a Deed of Sale of Residential Bldg. and
Transfer of Rights over the aforementioned house and lot which they acknowledged before a Notary Public, despite
that the property was already mortgaged to a third person.”

The case proceeded to trial and upon Judgement on September 21, 2011, the MTC acquitted Teodorico but found
Elenita guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 1
month and 1 day to 4 months of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium period, and ordered her to pay a fine of
P567,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, as the case may be. In addition, Elenita was ordered to pay the amount
of P507,000.00 and despite his acquittal, Teodorico was also directed to pay the amount of P60,000.00 which
amounts reflect their respective civil liabilities, both with legal interest from December 13, 2006 until fully paid.

An appeal by the respondents filed before the RTC on January 10, 2012 citing that the MTC did not acquire
jurisdiction to award damages in favor of petitioner for failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees pursuant to
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 (SC Circular No. 35-2004), which provides that the filing fees
must be paid for money claims in estafa cases. They claimed that the petitioner’s payment of filing fees of P500.00
was deficient due to her failure to make an express reservation to separately institute a civil action. The damages
sought was worth P663,000.00; thus, the correct filing fees should have been around P9,960.00.

ISSUES: WON the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to award damages in favor of the petitioner for failure to pay
the correct amount of docket fees pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 35-2004.

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. It is a well-established principle in the Rules of Court that the Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading.

However, in Sun Insurance Office Ltd v Asuncion, the Court found that “a more liberal interpretation of the rules
was called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the
rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.”

Accordingly, subsequent decisions now uniformly hold that “when insufficient filing fees are initially paid by the
plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.”

In line with this legal paradigm, prevailing case law demonstrates that “non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at
the time of the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial
court. Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the Clerk of Court, and the amount paid
turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff
of the deficiency assessment.” “The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not
fair if the party has acted in good faith.”

In the present case, it is undisputed that the amount of P500.00 paid by the petitioner was insufficient to cover the
required filing fees for her estafa case under the premises of Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. Nonetheless, it is equally undisputed that she paid the full amount of docket fees as
assessed by the Clerk of Court of the MTC. In her petition, she consistently manifested her willingness to pay
additional docket fees when required. Indeed, the foregoing actuations negate any bad faith on petitioner’s part,
much more belie any intent to defraud the government. As such, the Court holds that the court a qou properly
acquired jurisdiction over the case. However, petitioner should pay the deficiency that shall be considered as a lien
on the monetary awards in her favor pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

Heirs of Renato Dragon, et al. v. Manila Banking Corp., G.R. No. 205068. March 06, 2019

Facts:

Dragon obtained several loans from Manila Banking and failed to pay his outstanding obligation. The RTC issued a
decision in favor of Manila Banking in order to pay the amount of P6,945,642 and not P48,028,268.98 per the
Statement of Account that Manila Banking failed to submit documents to justify or support the computation of SOA.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration. Dragon raised for the first time the issue of the trial courts lack of
jurisdiction over the complaint and alleged that Manila Banking willfully and deliberately evaded payment of the
correct docket fees for the amounts it claimed. RTC denied both parties' motions. As to the issue of docket fees,
applying the ruling in Sun Insurance Office that there was no need to resolve it.

Upon appeal by both parties, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.

The Heirs of Dragon filed before this Court a Notice of Death with Motion for Substitution of Petitioner and a
Motion for extension of Time to File petition for Review and the court granted the said motions.

The heirs of Dragon filed their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The petitioner argue that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to award Manila Banking’s claim due to insufficient payment of docket fees. The respondents point out
that the issues raised in the Petition were never raised during pre-trial in the RTC. For being belatedly raised, these
defenses should be waived and petitioner were estopped from questioning the non-payment of correct docket fees
since they only raised this issue after the RTC rendered decision against Dragon.

Issue:

WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the complaint of respondent in view of the insufficient payment of docket
fees.

Ruling:

No. In accordance with Manchester Development Corporation, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
complaint due to respondent’s insufficient payment of filing fees.

The filing party must show that there was no intention to defraud the government of the appropriate filing fees due
it. In Manchester Development Corporation, this Court found that the filing party, in repeatedly omitting the amount
of damages it was asking for, aimed to evade payment of docket fees. Should there be a finding that the filing party
intended to conceal the amount of its claims to pay a smaller amount of docket fees, demonstrating an intent to
defraud the court what it is owed, then the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation, not Sun Insurance
Office, shall apply.

Clearly, respondent is perfectly capable of estimating the accrued interests, penalties, and charges it demanded as of
the date it filed its Complaint. But despite respondent's demand letters containing computations of accrued interests,
penalties, and attorney's fees, none of these computations were mentioned in the Complaint, either in its body or
prayer. Further, nowhere in any of the respondent's pleadings filed before any court did respondent manifest its
willingness, to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals or to this Court, that it will be paying additional
docket fees when required.
Therefore, under the circumstances, a liberal application of the rules on payment of filing fees is unwarranted. In
accordance with Manchester Development Corporation, the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the Complaint due to respondent's insufficient payment of filing fees.

Durisol Phil. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121106, February 20, 2002

FACTS:

On January 17, 1962 and December 5, 1969, petitioner Durisol obtained industrial loans from respondent
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) amounting to P1,213,000.00 and P2,698,800.00, respectively. As
security therefor, petitioner executed a mortgage on two parcels of registered land located in Polo (now Valenzuela),
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 29906 and 29909.

After petitioner defaulted in the payment of the loans, DBP instituted on August 21, 1970 a petition for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.In the meantime, the foreclosure sale was held, wherein DBP emerged as the
highest bidder. On October 9, 1973, the corresponding certificates of sale were issued to DBP.

Petitioner, however, filed a complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Valenzuela, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 605-V. The CFI rendered judgment upholding
the validity of the foreclosure. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the CFI.
The decision of the Court of Appeals became final on April 30, 1975.

Respondent DBP, thus, filed a motion for execution, which was granted. The writ, however, was returned unserved
because petitioner was not found in the address stated in the record. An alias writ of execution was issued against
petitioner’s president, Rene Knecht, but the latter refused to comply with the order to surrender the titles. Hence, on
motion of DBP, an Order was issued on April 4, 1990 directing the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the seven
titles and to issue new ones in lieu thereof. Accordingly, new certificates of title were issued to DBP.

Thereafter, DBP sold the lots covered.

More than four years later, or on September 2, 1994, petitioner instituted before the Court of Appeals a petition to
annul the trial court’s decision dated January 10, 1989 and Resolution dated April 4, 1990, alleging for the first time
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner prayed that the certificates of title issued in the names
of all private respondents, except DBP, be annulled and that TCT Nos. T-167751 and T-167752 and T-187023-
187027 be reinstated.

On January 20, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered the now assailed decision dismissing the petition for
annulment of judgment. Petitioner Durisol’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of
merit.

Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of new duplicate owner’s
certificate of title; and
2. Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from challenging the court’s lack of jurisdiction?

RULING:
1. Yes. Petitioner argues that the then CFI had no jurisdiction when the case was remanded to it by the then IAC
because as a cadastral court, the CFI had limited jurisdiction.

It should be noted, however, that when the CFI took cognizance of the remanded case, the distinction between the
CFI acting as a land registration court with limited jurisdiction, on the one hand, and a CFI acting as an ordinary
court exercising general jurisdiction, on the other hand, has already been removed with the effectivity of the
Property Registration Decree (PD 1529). The amendment was aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits. The change
has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the designated trial courts the authority to act not only on
applications for “original registration” but also “over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power
to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or petition.”

2. Yes. Rule 47, Section 3 expressly provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction
must be filed before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Hence, it has been held that while jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case may be raised at any time of the proceedings, this rule presupposes that laches or estoppel
has not supervened. Thus:

This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. Here, the
principle of estoppel lies. Hence, a party may be estopped or barred from raising the question of jurisdiction for the
first time in a petition before the Supreme Court when it failed to do so in the early stages of the proceedings.

Note: The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court of general jurisdiction. All cases, the
jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other court, fall
under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.

But the regional trial court is also a court of limited jurisdiction over, among others, cadastral and land registration
cases. All proceedings involving title to real property, or specifically land registration cases, including its incidents
such as the issuance of owner’s duplicate certificate of title, are matters cognizable by the regional trial courts. It has
been ruled that the regional trial courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land, except
forcible entry and illegal detainer.

Montaner v. Shari’ah District Court, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009
FACTS:
● This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to set aside the Orders of the Shari’a District Court,
4th Shari’a District, Marawi City on August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006
● August 27, 1956, Luisa Kho Montaner (petitioner), a Roman Catholic married Alejandro Montaner, Sr.
Petitioners Alejandro Montaner, jrLilibeth Montaner-Barrios, adn Rhodora Eleanor Montaner-Dalupan are
their children.
● May 26, 1995 - Alejandro Montaner Sr. died.
● August 19, 2005 - Private Respondents Liling Disancopan and daughter Almahleen Liling S. Montaner,
both Muslims, filed a “Complaint” for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court.
They prayed for the (1) partition of the estate of the decedent among others
● Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of (1) SDC has no jurisdiction over
the estate of Montaner Sr. because he was a Roman Catholic among others
● November 22, 2005 - the SDC dismissed the private respondent’s complaint and held that Montaner Sr.
was not a Muslim and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of
deceased Muslims.
ISSUES:
● WON the SDC has jurisdiction over the estate of Montaner Sr.
HELD:
Article 143 (b) of PD No. 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the SDC
have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims.

In the case at bar, the SDC is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as defense the allegation
that the deceased is not a Muslim. The SDC has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it
has jurisdiction, which requires a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after the hearing, the SDC
determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the SDC should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Vera v. Hon. Arca, G.R. No. L-25721, May 26, 1969

FACTS:
● February 4, 1966 - other respondents started a special civil action for prohibition and injunction in the the
sala of respondent judge (Arca) to declare the Tax Census Act as unconstitutional, illegal, and invalid. The
respondents in that suit were the CIR, Sec. of Finance, and EA, now petitioners
● The present Petitioners, as respondent in such special civil action in their Answer, on February 18, 1966
that the Act was intended to implement the government function “for a just, equal and efficient system of
collecting taxes”
● February 21, 1966 - Arca ordered the writ of preliminary injunction
● Petitioners seek the setting aside of the preliminary injunction by Arca and would restrain him perpetually
from further hearing the suit for prohibition and injunction pending before him, they further alleged that
Arca gravely abused his discretion in issuing the writ as the Tax Census Act is valid and constitutional, and
that there is grave abuse of discretion on the issuance of the writ due to his failure to consider the serious
injury it would cause the paramount public interest.
ISSUES:
● WON respondent Judge Arca outh to have issued the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
enforcement of the Tax Census Act.
● WON Petitioners are entitled to the writ of certiorari
HELD:
Although the issuance of an injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, its exercise is not controlled
by the Rules of Court but by the accepted doctrines, one of which states that an injunction should not be granted if
the rights of the parties are undetermined except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be
done. It is only appropriate when there can be no compensation in damages for the injury and where no adequate
remedy in law exists as pronounced in the case of Devesa v. Arbes.

Further, Palanan Lumber & plywood Co. v. Arranz emphasized that the court has repeatedly deplored the
readiness of some judges to grant injunctions ex parte against acts of public functionaries, ignoring the
presumption of regularity and validity of official actuations, disregarding the the deference and courtesy due
to a coordinate branch of the government, and with no other guide that the far from impartial assertions in
pleadings of interested parties which results too often in the prejudice of the public interest due to
unnecessary delays. Preliminary injunctions, therefore, remain extraordinary remedies that should be dispensed
with circumspection.

Thus, a party seeking injunction must show that his right to it must be clear and unmistakable. This is not shown in
the instant case as the respondent Judge only took into consideration purely legal arguments, no evidence being
introduced, both for and against the validity of the challenge statute. He was also deaf to the cogent and persuasive
constitutional law doctrines of presumption of validity that every legislative act has in its favor as well as the
doctrine that the task of suspending the operation of the law is a matter of extreme delicacy because that is an
interference with the official acts of Congress and the Supreme Court.

It is manifest that respondent Judge did overstep the bounds of discretion that set limits to the authority he is entitled
to exercise in the issuance of preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of a statute and although such
issuance does not have the impress of finality, it should be exercised with due caution and circumspection.
Moreover, the petitioner is entitled to the writ of certiorari. Although the respondent Judge did possess the discretion
to whether or not issue a preliminary injunction, it should not be abused as in the instant case. As such even on a
matter of less significance, the Court has not hesitated to exercise its supervisory authority by correcting such
failure to abide by controlling legal principles with a petition for certiorari as the appropriate remedy.
Therefore, the respondent Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and abused his discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction the nullity of which is sought, and the writ of certiorari applied for should be issued.

Mendoza v. Mayor Villas, G.R. No. 187256, February 23, 2011

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

CREBA v. DAR Secretary, G.R. 183409, June 18, 2010

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Also- Hierarchy of Court doctrine (Supra.)

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Allied Domecq Phil. v. Hon. Villon, G.R. No. 156264, September 30, 2004

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed
the special civil action for certiorari filed by Allied Domecq, Philippines Inc. (ADPI), herein petitioner, for lack of
jurisdiction.

The petitioner, Allied Domecq Phil., is the exclusive importer and distributor of Pedro Domecq products, Fundador
brandy, in the Philippines, filed a Temporary Restraining Order from importing, distributing and selling agains
Kimberly Clark, owner of a shipment of Fundador products held by Customs for lack for customs documents.
RTC-Manila denied the petition as petitioner failed to prove that respondent engaged in unfair competition.

Upon appeal, Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The establishment, registration, and operation of respondent Clark Liberty and the other enterprises within the Clark
Special Economic Zone are projects (involving the private sector) which convert Clark Air Base, a military
reservation, "into productive uses." In this connection, Section 21 of R.A. No. 7227 provides:
"SEC. 21. Injunction and Restraining Order. – The implementation of the projects for the conversion into alternative
productive uses of the military reservations are urgent and necessary and shall not be restrained or enjoined except
by an order issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines."

Hence this petition for review.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that it has no jurisdiction over CA-
G.R. SP No. 63802 pursuant to Section 21 of Republic Act 7227.
Held: The petition was denied. The Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion.

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear
and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.9 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the
court that it exists.10 Basic is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the cause or causes
of action as alleged in the complaint. But where the actual issues are evident from the records of the case, then
jurisdiction over the subject matter need not depend upon the literal averments in the complaint, but on the law as
applied to established facts.

Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision Court of Appeals (CA) denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration and cancelling the TCT in the name of petitioner and reviving the TCT in the name of
plaintiffs-appellants.

The petitioner, Editha Padlan, was a buyer of a lot from Lorna Ong / Maura Passion, who fraudulently acquired and
sold the lot originally owned by plaintiff-respondents spouses Elinita and Felicisimo Dinglasan, for the amount of
P4,000.00. The RTC - Balanga Bataan favored the petitioner Padlan and denied the petition of respondent
Dinglasan for cancellation of TCT under the name of the petitioner Padlan.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals favored the Dinglasans and resolved that the petitioner Padlan was a buyer in bad
faith thereby this petition assailing the decision of CA and RTC for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the honorable court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Held: The court granted the petition. RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint is essential.
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint,
jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein.

Section 1 of RA 7691, Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
xx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x
Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts, thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law BP Blg. 129 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by
the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Since the
amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only ₱4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC
has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

Guy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165849, December 10, 2007

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Barayuga v. Adventist University, G.R. No. 168008, August 17, 2011

FACTS:

City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011

Topic: Manner of Acquiring Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter - Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss; for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

The parties are the City of Dumaguete represented by City Mayor Agustin Perdices as the petitioner. Philippine
Ports Authority as respondent.

FACTS: Mayor Remollo filed an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land before the RTC.
It’s a land where the Engineer’s compound is situated and has been in continuous occupation and possession of the
same for more than 30 years. The Director of Lands and the Philippine Ports Authority opposed that petitioner may
not register the subject property in its name since petitioner had never been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the said property for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application and
the subject property remains to be a portion of the public domain. After the first hearing when Engineer Dorado
stood as witness, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction arguing that Section 14 (1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, refers only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership. The subject property is not alienable
and disposable, since it is foreshore land, which is not registerable,as explicitly testified to by petitioner's own
witness. Petitioner claimed that the subject property was a swamp reclaimed about 40 years ago, which it occupied
openly, continuously, exclusively, and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership. Petitioner invoked
Republic Act No. 1899, which authorizes chartered cities and municipalities to undertake and carry out, at their own
expense, the reclamation of foreshore lands bordering them; and grants said chartered cities and municipalities
ownership over the reclaimed lands. The RTC initially granted the motion to dismiss by the respondents, dismissing
the petitioner’s application for registration.
In its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner contended that the
dismissal of its application was premature and tantamount to a denial of its right to due process. Respondent
opposed the Motion for Reconsideration based on technical grounds, that petitioner violated Sections 4 (Hearing of
motion), 5 (Notice of hearing), and 6 (Proof of service necessary), Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, Section 11, Rule
13 of the Rules of Court when it did not attach to the Motion for Reconsideration a written explanation why it did
not resort to personal service of the said Motion. Thus, respondent averred that the Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner should be treated as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect. The RTC agreed with respondent on the
violations of the petitioner on their Motion for Reconsideration but considered its Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration in the interest of justice and resolving to have a full-blown proceeding to determine factual issues.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied prompting them to file a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals, in which the CA set aside the RTC orders. Thus the
petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE1: Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction over the case
RULING1: Yes, the dismissal by the RTC for lack of jurisdiction was erroneous. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement
of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or
body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss; for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
almost entirely depend upon the defendant.
In this case, the Application for Original Registration of Title filed by petitioner before the RTC of the City of
Dumaguete conformed to Section 15 of the Property Registration Decree, which prescribes the form and contents of
such applications. In its Application, petitioner prayed that its title to the subject property, which it repeatedly
alleged to have acquired through continuous and adverse possession and occupation of the said property for more
than 30 years or since 1960, be placed under the land registration laws. The allegations and prayer in the Application
of petitioner were sufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC over the said Application upon the filing thereof.

ISSUE2: Whether or not liberal application of the Rules of Court be applied in the attainment of justice
RULING2: Yes, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the
rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter.
In this case, motions filed by petitioner did not comply with Sections 4,5,6 of Rule 15. Ordinarily, such non-
compliance would have rendered said motions as mere scraps of paper, considered as not having been filed at all,
and unable to toll the reglementary period for an appeal. However, the Court found that the exceptional
circumstances extant in the present case warrant the liberal application of the rules. In the case of PNB vs Paneda,
the court said even if the Motion may be defective for failure to address the notice of hearing of said motion to the
parties concerned, the defect was cured by the court's taking cognizance thereof and the fact that the adverse party
was otherwise notified of the existence of said pleading. In this case, it was not refuted that petitioner furnished
respondent and respondent actually received copies of the Motion for Reconsideration, as well as the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, in which, respondent was able to file its Oppositions to the said Motions.
As to violation of Section 11, Rule 13 , Counsel for petitioner holds office in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, in
the Visayas; while counsel for respondent holds office in Quezon City, Metro Manila, in Luzon. Given the
considerable distance between the offices of these two counsels, personal service of pleadings and motions by one
upon the other was clearly not practicable and a written explanation as to why personal service was not done would
only be superfluous.

Republic v. Bantigue Point Development, G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012
FACTS:
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land.

On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land Petitioner Republic filed its
Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the records were still with the RTC.

On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San
Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than ₱100,000.

The CA ruled that since the former had actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to
raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower
court on appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction of the lower court over the case.

HELD:
No, the petitioner is not estopped from questioning jurisdiction of the lower court. The rule is settled that lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the
omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be
cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has
actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in the
event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him" is based on the doctrine of estoppel by
laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In Tijam, the party-
litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years
thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant
question the lower court’s jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had
already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal.

People of the Philippines v. Hon. Garfin, G.R. No. 153176, March 29, 2004
FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Lazo v. Republic Surety, G.R. No. L-27365, January 30, 1970

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:
Buce v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136913, May 12, 2000

What does the case tell us?

The issue is being tried and decided by the court within the issue raised in the
pleading.

This jurisdiction means that the court must only pass upon issues raised by the
pleadings of the parties. Hence if the issue raised by the parties is possession, the
court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of ownership because it is not an issue
in the case.
FACTS:

What’s the original complaint filed?

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for specific
performance with prayer for consignation, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-
67135. She prayed that private respondents be ordered to accept the rentals in accordance
with the lease contract and to respect the lease of fifteen years, which was renewable for
another ten years, at the rate of P200 a month.

Where is it filed?
Regional Trial Court of Manila

What happened?
● On 29 August 1995, the RTC declared the lease contract automatically
renewed for ten years and considered as evidence thereof (a) the
stipulations in the contract giving the lessee the right to construct
buildings and improvements and (b) the filing by petitioner of the
complaint almost one year before the expiration of the initial term of
fifteen years. It then fixed the monthly rent at P400 from 1 June 1990 to
1 June 1994; P1,000 from 1 June 1994 until 1 June 1999; and P1,500
for the rest of the period or from 1 June 2000 to 1 June 2004, reasoning
that the continuous increase of rent from P200 to P250 then P300, P400
and finally P1,000 caused "an inevitable novation of their contract."
● However, On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC, and ordered petitioner to immediately vacate the leased premises
on the ground that the contract expired on 1 June 1994 without being
renewed and to pay the rental arrearages at the rate of P1,000 monthly.
●

ISSUE: WON Court of Appeals has Jurisdiction over the issue raised
by the petitioner

RULING: NO.

The issue of possession of the leased premises was not among the
issues agreed upon by the parties or threshed out before the court a quo.
Neither was it raised by private respondents on appeal.
Thus, as correctly contended by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals
went beyond the bounds of its authority when after interpreting the
questioned provision of the lease contract in favor of the private
respondents it proceeded to order petitioner to vacate the subject
premises.
 Thus, it is not correct for the court to order the lessee to vacate the
premises where the lessor did not include in his pleadings a claim for
restoration of possession.

Mercader v. DBP, G.R. No. 130699, May 12, 2000

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Cesar v. Hon. Ricafort-Bautista, G.R. No. 136415, October 31, 2006

FACTS:
Private respondent Specified Materials Corporation filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money against
petitioner arising from the latter's failure to pay the construction materials it purportedly purchased under a credit
line extended by private respondent.

Where is it filed? RTC Paranaque

What happened? After the filing of the complaint, summons was issued to petitioner and this was served by Sheriff
Juan C. Marquez. As petitioner failed to file his answer to the complaint, private respondent moved that he be
declared in default.This motion was favorably acted upon by public respondent.

private respondent filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint alleging that it erroneously computed petitioner's
obligation to be P1,860,000.00, when it should have amounted to P2,005,000.00. A copy of the motion and the
Amended Complaint were personally received by petitioner as evidenced by his signatures thereon. The
amended complaint was admitted, public respondent issued its now assailed decision.

Petitioner, by way of special appearance, filed a Motion to Set Aside Decision arguing that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over his person.This motion was denied through public respondent's order. petitioner filed
before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order, This petition was dismissed.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Following this set-back, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The same was denied
and the resolution became final and executory. Hence , the present petition.

Petitioner argues that since the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. He claims that the person who
allegedly received the summons on his behalf, and who was identified in the sheriff's return as Arsenio Robles, was
not his employee.

ISSUES: WON the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the substituted
service of summons.
HELD: Yes.

It is fundamental that courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff once the complaint is filed. On the other hand,
there are two ways through which jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is acquired – either through the
service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court.

The Rules of Court requires that, whenever practicable, summons must be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant in person. In case the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering the summons to him
or her.However, in the event that summons cannot be served within a reasonable time, the Rules permit that
substituted service may be resorted to, thus:

Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.

In this case, the sheriff employed the substituted service of summons. The defect, however, in the manner in which
he implemented this mode of service of summons is readily apparent on the face of the return. It must be
emphasized that laws providing for modes other than the personal service of summons must be strictly
followed in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent or defendant. Compliance
therewith should appear affirmatively on the return. The essence of this requirement was enunciated in the case of
Keister v. Navarro33 to be –
The summons must be served to the defendant in person. It is only when the defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made. Impossibility of prompt
service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that
such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.

As the sheriff's return in the present case does not contain any statement with regard to the impossibility of personal
service the same is patently defective and so the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
will not lie.

Nevertheless, we still hold that jurisdiction was validly acquired by the trial court. Although the substituted service
upon him of summons was defective, said defect was cured by his voluntary appearance.

As the records of this case disclose, after private respondent moved for the execution of the trial court's decision,
petitioner filed a motion for a re-setting of the court's hearing thereon.
In Flores v. Zurbito, we held that an appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or
respondent, thus:
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in whatever
form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person. While the formal method of entering an appearance in a cause
pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance of
the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or
answer. This formal method of appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such formal
appearance and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He may appear by presenting a motion,
for example, and unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he
thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.

Hence, in this case, petitioner's filing of a Motion for Re-setting of the Hearing effectively cured the defect of the
substituted service of summons. Petitioner's insistence of

Rodriguez vs. Alikpala, G.R. No. L-38314, June 25, 1974

FACTS:
Petitioners Rodriguez and Santos, filed an action against the spouses Manuel and Fe Rebollado for recovery of the
sum of P5,320 plus interest, attorney's fees and costs.

Where is it filed? City court of Manila

What happened? A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and served on the Rebollados at their store in
Divisoria market.Fe Rebollado immediately communicated with the petitioner Santos, and Rodriguez, to plead for
time before the attachment was to be effectively enforced. Rodriguez agreed to cause the suspension of the
attachment writ on condition that the now respondents Federico and Felisa Tolentino, would bind themselves, jointly
and severally with the Rebollado's, to pay the entire obligation subject of the suit.

They drew up a motion for judgment on a compromise embodying the terms of the agreement of the parties. The
Rebollado's subsequently failed to comply with the terms of the compromise, thus prompting the petitioner
Rodriguez to ask the city court for a writ of execution not only against the Rebollados but as well against the
Tolentino's which was granted by the court.

Tolentino opposed the decision and brought an action for certiorari in the respondent Court of First Instance of
Manila to enjoin the city court from enforcing any writ of execution against them.After hearing, the respondent court
rendered judgment excluding the Tolentinos from the effects of the writ of execution granted by the city court.
Hence, the appeal.

In excluding the Tolentino's from the effects of the judgment on a compromise rendered by the city court, the
respondent court invokes that the city court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the Tolentino's and,
therefore, the latter cannot be bound by the judgment rendered in civil cue 204601.

ISSUES: WON the Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person by voluntary appearance.

HELD: Yes.

The principle of equity that jurisdiction over a person not formally or originally a party to a litigation may
nevertheless be acquired, under proper conditions, thru the voluntary appearance of that person before the court.
Thus, judgment may be directed against one who, although not a formal party in the case, has assumed or
participated in the defense

There is no question in the mind of the respondent court that the Rebollado's and the Tolentinos freely and
voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement which became the basis of the judgment of the city court. The
involvement of the Tolentino's in the compromise agreement arose out of their natural filial concern for their
daughter Fe whose inventories at Divisoria market were under imminent threat of levy and seizure.

By assuming the roles of co-movants in the motion for a judgment on a compromise, the Tolentino's actively
instigated the city court into giving its judicial imprimatur to the said agreement as well as their participation
therein. Under the circumstances, the Tolentino's are estopped from denying the very authority they have invoked.

Moreover, because they signed and executed the compromise agreement willingly and voluntarily, and, in a manner
of speaking, with their eyes wide open, they should be bound by its terms. A person cannot repudiate the effects of
his voluntary acts simply because they do not suit him. In the very words of Justice Labrador, "in a regime of law
and order, repudiation of an agreement validly entered into can not be made without any ground or reason in
law or in fact for such repudiation.”

By coming forward with the original litigants in moving for a judgment on a compromise and, furthermore, by
assuming such interest in the final adjudication of the case as would place them in unequivocal liability, together
with the Rebollado's, to the plaintiff therein, the Tolentino's effectively submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the city court. They were and are thus subject to its judgment.

Midgely v. Hon. Fernando, G.R. No. L-34314, May 13, 1975

Subject Matter: Over the Res

FACTS:

Alvaro Pastor, Sr., a Spanish citizen, was the owner of properties and rights in mining claims located in Cebu, upon
his death he was survived by his wife, Sofia, who later died too, and by his two legitimate children, Alvaro Pastor,
Jr. and his wife Maria Elena Achaval (“Mrs. Midgely”), herein petitioners. Respondent Quemada claims to be his
illegitimate child of the late Alvaro and the latter devised in his holographic will to Quemada 35% of his 42%
percent share in those mining claims and real properties. As such administrator and as heir of Alvaro Sr., Quemada
filed in the CFI of Cebu a complaint against the spouses Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Mrs. Midgely to settle the question of
ownership.

Since both were living abroad at that time, Quemada caused extraterritorial service of summons to be made in that
case through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Embassy in Madrid, Spain, which effected the
service of the summons by registered mail upon Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses at their respective address
in Alicante and Barcelona, Spain. The spouses acknowledged the service of summons but reserved the right to
contest the courts jurisdiction over their persons.

ISSUE:

Did the Philippine courts have acquired jurisdiction over the res of the non-resident defendant or the subject in
action?

RULING: Yes. The Philippine courts do have jurisdiction over the res.

A non-resident alien, by filing his complaint in a Philippine court, submits thereby to its jurisdiction and the court
acquires jurisdiction over him, such action in an implied waiver of his special appearance assailing the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, and voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court, even if as a matter of fact he
had never been able to enter the Philippines.

Under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, with respect to the extraterritorial service of summons to a non-
resident defendant like Mrs. Midgely:

“When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects…Property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent… service may, by leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service… in which case a copy of the summons and order of the
court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant”

In any of such four cases where extraterritorial service of summons is proper, the service of summons may, with
leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in three ways, one of which is the service of summons which
substantially complied with in this case.

In this civil case, the subject matter of the action for reconveyance consists of properties of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. which
are located in Cebu. Mrs. Midgely claims an actual interest in those properties. She has been receiving a share of the
income therefrom. Therefore, the extraterritorial service of summons upon her was proper.

In a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. Consequently, the
lower court had jurisdiction to try the case even if it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person.

Perkins v. Dizon, G.R. No. 46631, November 16, 1939

OVERVIEW:

The case was assigned because the case tells us when court acquires jurisdiction over the person. It is fundamental
that courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff once the complaint is filed. On the other hand, there are two ways
through which jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is acquired – either through the service of summons
upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court.

IMPORTANT LEGAL DOCTRINES:

In order that the court may validly try a case, it must have jurisdiction over the subject-matter and over the persons
of the parties. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is acquired by concession of the sovereign authority which
organizes a court and determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its jurisdiction with
reference to actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant. Jurisdiction over the persons of the parties is
acquired by their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of
legal process exerted over their persons.

When the defendant is a non-resident and refuses to appear voluntary, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his
person even if the summons be served by publication, for he is beyond the reach of judicial process.

The general rule, therefore, is that a suit against a non-resident cannot be entertained by a Philippine court. Where,
however, the action is in rem or quasi in rem in connection with property located in the Philippines, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res, and its jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident is non-essential.

FACTS:

● On July 6, 1938, respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, instituted an action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for dividends registered in his
name, payment of which was being withheld by the company; and, for the recognition of his right to the
control and disposal of said shares, to the exclusion of all others.
●
The company filed its answer alleging that the withholding of such dividends and the non- recognition of
plaintiff's right to the disposal and control of the shares were due to certain demands made with respect to
said shares by the petitioner herein, Idonah Slade Perkins, and by one George H. Engelhard. Including
defendant petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, and George H. Engelhard in his amended complaint, respondent
Perkins prayed that they be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from
any claim they assert thereon. Thereafter, summons by publication were served upon these two non-
resident defendants pursuant to the order of the trial court.

● Engelhard filed his answer to the amended complaint while petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins, through
counsel, challenged the jurisdiction of the lower court over her person.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the present petitioner as a non-resident defendant, or, notwithstanding the want of such jurisdiction,
whether or not said court may validly try the case.

HELD:

Yes. Section 398 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a non-resident
defendant is sued in the Philippine courts and it appears, by the complaint or by affidavits, that the action
relates to real or personal property within the Philippines in which said defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding such
person from any interest therein, service of summons maybe made by publication.

The action being in quasi in rem, The Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction
over the person of the non-resident. In order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process, summons has
been served upon her by publication. There is no question as to the adequacy of publication made nor as to the
mailing of the order of publication to the petitioner's last known place of residence in the United States. But, of
course, the action being quasi in rem and notice having be made by publication, the relief that may be granted by the
Philippine court must be confined to the res, it having no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against the non-
resident.

Macahilig v. Heis of Magalit, G.R. No. 141423, November 15, 2000

FACTS:
The case revolves around a dispute over fishpond land between the heirs of Pepito Magalit (respondents) and Melina
Macahilig (petitioner). The conflict started when both Magalit and Macahilig filed fishpond applications for the
same land in Batan, Aklan. Macahilig protested Magalit's application, claiming he had been in possession of a
portion of the land for 20 years.

After a series of administrative and legal proceedings, including a Petition for Review and a Decision by the Court
of Appeals (CA) upholding Magalit's right to the land, Magalit initiated Civil Case No. 3517 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, seeking the issuance of a Writ of Execution to enforce the CA decision.

Original filed complaint: The original filed complaint centered around a dispute over fishpond land between the
heirs of Pepito Magalit and Melina Macahilig.
RTC’s decision: The Regional Trial Court's decision ordered the surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit as part of the
execution of a Court of Appeals decision.
Appellate Court’s decision: The Appellate Court ruled in favor of the Regional Trial Court's jurisdiction and
upheld the validity of the execution order.

ISSUE:
WON the RTC had jurisdiction to order the execution of the CA decision and direct the surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr.
Magalit.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over the matter and that the execution of the CA decision, including
the surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit, was proper. The jurisdiction was acquired through the institution of the
petition for execution, and the RTC had the authority to order the surrender of the property.
The Court also noted that the petitioner's participation in the proceedings effectively barred her from challenging the
RTC's jurisdiction later on. The petitioner could not reject or repudiate the court's jurisdiction after having
voluntarily submitted to it in the earlier stages of the case.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that the earlier order issued by the RTC stating it had no jurisdiction over Lot 4417
did not serve as a bar to the execution order. The earlier order was interlocutory in nature, and the RTC's subsequent
jurisdiction over the property was established through the execution proceedings.

NOTE:
The case discussed above highlights the importance of the manner of acquiring jurisdiction over the res, which
refers to the property or subject matter in a legal dispute. In this case, a dispute arose over fishpond land between the
heirs of Pepito Magalit and Melina Macahilig. Despite an initial claim by the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction
over a specific portion of the land (Lot 4417), the court ultimately exercised jurisdiction through the institution of
legal proceedings, including the petition for execution. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's jurisdiction,
emphasizing that jurisdiction over the res was effectively acquired through the execution process. This case
underscores how jurisdiction over the res can be established not only by physical control but also by the legal
process itself, allowing courts to assert authority over the disputed property and render decisions that impact its
possession and ownership.

See: Joya v. Judge Marquez, G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006
FACTS:
The case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify and set aside a warrant of arrest issued
by a respondent judge against the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952. The petitioner is being charged with
violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. The
petitioner asserts that the respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance
of the warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.

The relevant procedural rule in question is Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
outlines the conditions for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the Regional Trial Court. The rule requires the judge
to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence, and if probable cause is found, a
warrant of arrest shall be issued.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent judge properly exercised jurisdiction in issuing the warrant of arrest against the petitioner and
his co-accused based on the existence of probable cause.

HELD:
The court held that the respondent judge properly exercised jurisdiction in issuing the warrant of arrest against the
petitioner and his co-accused based on the existence of probable cause. The court emphasized that the standard for
issuing a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as the
evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the accused, the judge has sufficient grounds to issue a warrant
of arrest. The court also noted that the judge's role is to determine the probability, not the certainty, of the accused's
guilt.

The court found that the documents presented by the prosecution, including the report of the National Bureau of
Investigation, affidavits of the complainant, copies of checks, demand letters, and resolutions from the State
Prosecutor, sufficiently established the existence of probable cause. The documents indicated that the complainant
was induced to invest a large sum of money in a corporation, checks were issued and dishonored, and the accused,
including the petitioner, were incorporators and directors of the corporation. These facts were enough to establish
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

The court further explained that the petitioner's refusal to submit to the court's jurisdiction did not exempt him from
the legal process, and his continued evasion of the court's jurisdiction provided further reason to uphold the warrant
of arrest. The purpose of the warrant of arrest is to ensure the accused's presence for trial, and evading the
jurisdiction of the court is not a valid reason to avoid this process.

Title of the Rules of Court

Alvero v. de la Rosa, G.R. No. L-286, March 29, 1946 (Supra.)

Facts: This case involves a dispute over the ownership of two parcels of land in the Manotoc subdivision,
Balintawak, in the barrio of Calaanan, Caloocan, Philippines. Respondent Jose R. Victoriano filed a complaint
against petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero and Margarita Villarica. The complaint had two causes of action: (1) to
enforce a contract of sale between Victoriano and Villarica made on October 1, 1940, regarding the two parcels of
land, which Villarica later sold to Alvero; and (2) to declare Alvero's subsequent purchase null and void.

Villarica admitted the sale to Alvero but claimed that she did not remember the previous sale to Victoriano. Alvero
denied Victoriano's claims and asserted his exclusive ownership. The trial court, presided over by Judge Mariano L.
de la Rosa, ruled in favor of Victoriano. The court declared that Victoriano had purchased the land from Villarica
since October 1, 1940, and had continued making payments until December 1941. Due to wartime conditions, the
payments were suspended with Villarica's verbal agreement. Victoriano occupied and improved the land until he
abandoned it in December 1944 due to the war, returning in February 1945.
Villarica sold the land to Alvero in December 1944 for P100,000 in Japanese military notes. She later offered to
repurchase the land from Alvero for P8,000 in Philippine currency after liberation. Alvero presented the deed of sale
to the Register of Deeds but failed to secure the transfer of title. Victoriano also failed to transfer the title despite
presenting the deed of sale to the Register of Deeds.

The trial court ruled in favor of Victoriano based on the older date of his document and his possession since 1940.
Alvero was ordered to surrender the land to Victoriano, including improvements. Alvero was notified of the decision
on November 28, 1945, and filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946.

Alvero filed an appeal without submitting the required P60 appeal bond. Victoriano moved to dismiss the appeal and
sought execution of the judgment. Alvero opposed, stating that the bond was filed on the same day. The trial court
dismissed the appeal on the grounds of the late bond filing. Alvero's request for reconsideration was denied. This
petition for certiorari followed.

Issue: Whether the petitioner has perfected his appeal.

Held:

No. Alvero failed to perfect his appeal because of filing the docket fee beyond the period as prescribed by the rules
of court.

Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court, will cause the judgment to become
final, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter, cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been lost.
(Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil., 623; Estate of Cordoba and Zarate vs.
Alabado, 34 Phil., 920; and Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil., 774.)

The period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond should be perfected and filed may, however, be
extended by order of the court, upon application made, prior to the expiration of the original period. (Layda vs.
Legaspi, 39 Phil., 83.)

Discussion in relation to the topic:

Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law; and rules of court prescribing the
time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable
to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. (Shioji vs. Harvey,
43 Phil., 333.)

Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory and imperative, so that failure to pay the docket
fee in the Supreme Court, within the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the dismissal of the appeal. (Salaveria
vs. Albindo, 39Phil., 922.) In the same manner, on failure of the appellant in a civil case to serve his brief, within the
time prescribed by said rules, on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its own motion, the court
may dismiss the appeal. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)

Human laws are inflexible and no personal consideration should stand in the way of performing a legal duty.

Additional Information:

Unfortunately, counsel for petitioner has created a difficult situation. In his motion for reconsideration and new trial,
dated December 27, 1945, he did not point out specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment, are not
supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal
provisions, as expressly required by Rule 37, section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court. Motions of that kind
have been considered as motions pro forma intended merely to delay the proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and
will not interrupt or suspend the period of time for the perfection of the appeal. (Valdez vs. Jugo, 74 Phil., 49, and
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Bautista, 74 Phil., 235.) Hence, the period for perfecting herein petitioner's appeal
commenced from November 28, 1945, when he was notified of the judgment rendered in the case, and expired on
December 28, 1945; and, therefore, his notice of appeal and record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were filed
out of time, and much more so his appeal bond, which was only filed on January 15, 1946.

Primicias v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953

FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory offenses, namely,
(1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to
an alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation to
section 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code in that he failed to submit to the Collector of Customs the
manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance
from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.

On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be
appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said cases as authorized by section 49 of
Republic Act No. 409 which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the
Municipal Court, or the Court of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code
of Civil Procedure." This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal.

On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that with the promulgation of the
Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines previously existing were not only superseded but expressly
repealed. The Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly omitted the portions of the
Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of Court. Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner
now comes to this court imputing abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.

ISSUES: Whether or not the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right,
and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.

HELD: Yes, a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right. The trial with the aid of assessors as
granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of
substantive law and as such are not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. The aid may be
invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, and this right has been declared absolute and
substantial by this Court in several cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked. The intervention of the
assessors is not an empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or the spirit of the
law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of which they cannot
be deprived without vitiating all the proceedings.

The contention of respondents we reckon is predicated on the assumption that the provisions on assessors of the
Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed. Such is not the case. We have already pointed out that the
basic provisions on the matter partake of the nature of substantive law and as such they were left intact by the
Supreme Court.

It is therefore the opinion that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion in denying petitioner his right to
the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal cases now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Discussion in relation to the topic:

· Rules of procedure should be distinguished from substantive law. A substantive law creates, defines or
regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the
administration of public affairs, whereas rules of procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which
substantive rights may be enforced in courts of justice.
 · Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rights in a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to
the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J. 980.)

· Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the
right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtain redress for their invasions (36 C.J. 27; 52 C.J.S. 1026).

· It is likewise true that because said remedial provisions are inextricably interwoven with the substantive
part, it must have been deemed wise and proper to leave them as they were for reasons of coordination and
expediency, it being a truism that the one cannot be detached from the other. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Remedial measures are but implementary in character and they must be appended to the portion of the law
to which they belong. Mention should be made here that not all of the provisions appearing in the Code of
Civil Procedure are remedial in nature, such as those pertaining to prescription, the requisites for making a
will, and the succession of the estate of an adopted child, which are admittedly substantive in character and
for that reason were not incorporated in the Rules of Court.

GSIS v. Villaviza, G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010

This case highlighted the meaning of suppletory character in the application of the Rules of Court. It means that the
provision in the Rules of Court will apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule.

OVERVIEW

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
August 31, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 98952, dismissing the petition for
certiorari of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assailing the Civil Service Commission's Resolution No.
062177.

FACTS

Petitioner Garcia as President and General Manager of the GSIS filed separate charges against respondents Villaviza
et.al, for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Petitioner allege that
respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of the Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass
Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some employees and disrupted the work at the
Investigation Unit during office hours.

The Manager of the GSIS Investigation Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the
seven (7) respondents requiring them to explain in writing and under oath within three (3) days why they should not
be administratively dealt with.

Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two others, submitted a letter-
explanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005. Denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents
explained that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their
former union president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support, they were interested in
that hearing as it might also affect them. For her part, respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining
that she had a scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate supervisor
about it, attaching a copy of the order of pre-hearing. These letters were not under oath.

PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all 7 respondents guilty of the charges and
meting out the penalty of 1 year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
On appeal, the CSC found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and
Regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand.

PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the CA via a Petition for Review
under Rule 43. The CA upheld the CSC.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not an administrative tribunal may apply suppletorily the provisions of the rules of court on the effect of
failure to deny the allegations in the complaint and failure to file answer, where the respondents in the administrative
proceedings did not file any responsive pleading to the formal charges against them.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in NEGATIVE.

A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an answer merely translates to a
waiver of his right to file an answer. There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It
has not done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence.

It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a suppletory character.
Suppletory is defined as supplying deficiencies. It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to
apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules
of the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.

Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this case, petitioners must remember
that there remain averments that are not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are
immaterial allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint. Thus, even if
respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered
as true and correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We
must not forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who
have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges.

Reyes v. Barrios, G.R. No. 172841, December 15, 2010

OVERVIEW

This petition for review assails the 8 February 2006 Decision 2 and the 29 May 2006 Resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90212. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 29 June 1998 Decision and the 7 December
2004 Resolution of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 5504,
declaring Leopoldo Barrios as bona fide tenant of the subject landholding. The DARAB reversed the 31 October
1996 Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Board (PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga.

FACTS
Petitioner Renato Reyes filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform, Region III, PARAD of San Fernando,
Pampanga, a complaint for ejectment against respondent Leopoldo Barrios. The case involves a parcel of land which
forms part of the property. The property was co-owned by petitioner and his four sisters. Petitioner claimed that the
property became subject of the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 except the 3.6‒hectare
landholding which was allegedly retained. Petitioner averred that he hired respondent as the overseer of the farm and
piggery on the landholding. However, petitioner contended that respondent never remitted the proceeds from the
piggery business and the fruits from the landholding. On the other hand, respondent alleged that he was a tenant of
the landholding since 1972 and he even built his house on the subject landholding. Respondent also acted as the
caretaker of the piggery business on the landholding.

Contrary to petitioners allegations, respondent stated that petitioners wife took all the proceeds from the piggery
business, which later ceased operation due to an epidemic. PARAD rendered a decision declaring Renato Reyes is
entitled to recover the possession of the property. Respondent appealed to the DARAB. Meanwhile, respondent
passed away and was substituted by his spouse Lucia Manalus-Barrios. The DARAB reversed the PARAD decision
and held that respondent is a bona fide tenant of the landholding and that he cannot be ejected from the landholding
absent any justifiable cause. It further directed the DAR Regional Director to issue Emancipation Patent in favor of
respondent or his heirs. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which denied the petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has right to eject respondent.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in NEGATIVE. Under Section 3, Rule I of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure
(now Section 3, Rule I of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the Board and its Regional and Provincial
Adjudicators are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, thus:

SECTION 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. The Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators shall not be
bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and
decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.

xxx

c) The provisions of the Rules of Court shall not apply even in suppletory character unless adopted herein or by
resolution of the Board. However, due process of law shall be observed and followed in all instances.

Section 1, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (now Section 1, Rule X of the 2009 DARAB
Rules of Procedure) reiterates the non-applicability of technical rules regarding the admission and sufficiency of
evidence, thus:

SECTION 1. Nature of Proceedings. The proceedings before the Board or its Adjudicators shall be non-litigious in
nature. Subject to the essential requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedures and the rules
governing the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence obtained in the courts of law shall not apply. x x x

Besides, the DARAB Rules should be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of agrarian reform and to
promote just, expeditious, and inexpensive adjudication and settlement of agrarian cases, disputes or controversies.

Although we affirm the ruling of the DARAB that respondent is a bona fide tenant, we disagree with its order for the
issuance of an Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent’s heir, as provided in its Resolution dated 7 December
2004. The records show that when the property was placed under the Operation Land Transfer, respondent was not
included in the list of tenant beneficiaries who were issued Emancipation Patents, as noted on the title of the
property, TCT No. 14488, which was partially canceled in view of the issuance of the new TCTs in favor of the
tenant beneficiaries.
On the issue of petitioner’s claim that the subject landholding forms part of the retained area awarded to him and his
sisters, the Court notes that there was no sufficient evidence to substantiate petitioner’s claim. Furthermore, as held
by the Court of Appeals, only the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has the
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to a retention area. Indeed, under Section 3
(3.5), Rule II of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure, the exercise of the right of retention by the landowner is
under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR. Besides, even if the
subject landholding forms part of petitioner’s retained area, petitioner landowner may still not eject respondent
tenant absent any of the causes provided under the law. The landowner cannot just terminate the leasehold
relationship without valid cause.

DBM v. Manila’s Finest Retirees, G.R. No. 169466, May 9, 2007

OVERVIEW:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78203, to wit:

1. Decision1 dated July 7, 2005 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 32, in Civil Case No. 02-103702, a suit for declaratory relief, declaring the herein respondents
entitled to the same retirement benefits accorded upon retirees of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551, and ordering the herein petitioners to
implement the proper adjustments on respondents’ retirement benefits; and
2. Resolution2 dated August 24, 2005 which denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

· 1975- PD 765 was issued constituting the Integrated National Police (INP) to be composed of the
Philippines Constabulary (PC) as the nucleus and the Integrated police forces as components thereof

· 1977- PD 1184 complemented PD 765, which was Issued to professionalize the INP and promote
career development therein
· 1990- RA 6975 (An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department
of the Interior And Local Government, and For Other Purposes or PNP Law) was enacted
o Under Sec. 23, the PNP would initially consist of the members of the INP, created under PD
675, as well as the officers and enlisted personnel of the PC

· 1998- RA 6975 was amended by RA 8551 (Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization
Act of 1998)

o Amendatory law that reengineered the retirement scheme in the police organization It enabled
the PNP to have higher retirement benefits that the INP and PC
o It enabled the PNP to have higher retirement benefits that the INP and PC

· 2002. Manila's Finest Retirees Association, Inc. (consisted of INP retirees) filed a petition for
declaratory relief against DBM, PNP, NAPOLCOM, CSC, and GSIS

o MFRAI’s petition stated that they are absorbed and equally considered as PNP-retirees and
thus, entitled to enjoy the same or identical retirement benefits bestowed to PNP-

o retirees by virtue of the PNP Law (RA 6975), as amended by RA 8551

GSIS moved to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and cause of action
 o CSC, DBM, NAPOLCOM, and PNP replied that the petitioners are not entitled to have equal
retirement benefits as PNP-retirees because the former have already retired prior to the
enactment of RA 6975

· 2003- RTC ruled that RA 6975 did not abolish the INP but merely provided for its absorption of its
police functions by the PNP

· April 2003- RTC granted GSIS’s motion to dismiss

· 2005- CA affirmed RTC’s decision that the INP should have equal or identical retirement benefits as
the PNP under RA 6975

· Petitioners filed a petition w/ the SC assailing that the CA committed a serious error in law in
affirming the decision of the RTC notwithstanding that it is contrary to law and established
jurisprudence

ISSUE:

W/N the INP should have equal or identical retirement benefits as the PNP under RA 6975, as amended by RA
8551

RULING:

Yes.

The court stated that during Martial Law, the PC-INP had a military character, being then a major service of the
AFP, but was subsequently moved by a fresh constitutional mandate, after the Marcos regime, for the establishment
of one police force which should be national in scope and, most importantly, purely civilian in character.

The court mentioned Sec. 2 of RA 6975 which stated:

o Section 2. Declaration of policy - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to promote peace and
order, ensure public safety and further strengthen local government capability aimed towards the
effective delivery of the basic services to the citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient
and competent police force that is national in scope and civilian in character.

o The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police
functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall be paramount. No element of the police
force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the
[AFP].

Sec. 23 of RA 6975 also states that the PNP is initially consisted of the members of the police forces who were
integrated into the INP by virtue of PD 765

Sec. 86 of RA 6975 likewise states:

o "Phase L .... At the end of this phase, all personnel from the INP, PC, AFP

Technical Services, NACAH, and NAPOLCOM Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch shall
have been covered by official orders assigning them to the PNP, Fire and Jall Forces by their respective
units."
 o Phase II .... Any PC-INP officer or enlisted personnel may, within the twelvemonth perlod from the
effectivity of this Act, retire and be paid retirement benefits corresponding to a position two (2) ranks
higher than his present grade, subject to the conditions that at the time he applies for retirement, he has
rendered at least twenty (20) years of service and still has, at most, twenty-four (24) months of service
remaining before the compulsory retirement age as provided by existing law for his office.

o Phase III ..... Upon the effectivity of this Act, the [DILG] Secretary shall exercise administrative
supervision as well as operational control over the transferred, merged and/or absorbed AFP
and INP units. The Incumbent Director General of the PC-INP shall continue to act as Director
General of the PNP until replaced .

Based from the provisions above, It is dear that RA 6975 does not abolish the PC-INP. but absorbs, transfers, and
merges It with the PNP

The court also stated that the legislative intent in the passing of RA 6975 was to remove the police force under the
control and supervision of military officers and it likewise seeks to restore and underscore the civilian character of
police work – an otherwise universal concept that was muddled by the martial law years
Regarding those that were already retired by the time of the passing of RA 6975, based on the statement made by the
CA, they are still entitled to claim such benefits because their membership in the INP was an antecedent fact that
nonetheless allowed them to avail themselves of the benefits of the subsequent laws and RA 6795 considered them
as PNP members
It was also explicitly stated in RA 8551 (amended RA 6795) that the rationalized retirement benefits schedule and
program shall have retroactive effect in favor of PNP members and officers retired or separated from the time
specified in law.
POSIBLE QUESTIONS:
1. What was the original filed complaint?
- Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court:
1. Decision1 dated July 7, 2005 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 32, in Civil Case No. 02-103702, a suit for declaratory relief, declaring the herein respondents
entitled to the same retirement benefits accorded upon retirees of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551, and ordering the herein petitioners to
implement the proper adjustments on respondents’ retirement benefits; and
2. Resolution2 dated August 24, 2005 which denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
2. What are the legal provisions invoke?
- Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Section 1, filing of petition with Supreme Court.
The court mentioned Sec. 2 of RA 6975 which stated:

o Section 2. Declaration of policy - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to promote peace and
order, ensure public safety and further strengthen local government capability aimed towards the
effective delivery of the basic services to the citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient
and competent police force that is national in scope and civilian in character.

o The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police
functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall be paramount. No element of the police
force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the
[AFP].

Sec. 23 of RA 6975 also states that the PNP is initially consisted of the members of the police forces who were
integrated into the INP by virtue of PD 765

Sec. 86 of RA 6975 likewise states:

o "Phase L .... At the end of this phase, all personnel from the INP, PC, AFP
 Technical Services, NACAH, and NAPOLCOM Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch shall
have been covered by official orders assigning them to the PNP, Fire and Jall Forces by their respective
units."

o Phase II .... Any PC-INP officer or enlisted personnel may, within the twelvemonth perlod from the
effectivity of this Act, retire and be paid retirement benefits corresponding to a position two (2) ranks
higher than his present grade, subject to the conditions that at the time he applies for retirement, he has
rendered at least twenty (20) years of service and still has, at most, twenty-four (24) months of service
remaining before the compulsory retirement age as provided by existing law for his office.

o Phase III ..... Upon the effectivity of this Act, the [DILG] Secretary shall exercise administrative
supervision as well as operational control over the transferred, merged and/or absorbed AFP
and INP units. The Incumbent Director General of the PC-INP shall continue to act as Director
General of the PNP until replaced .
3. How is the issue relevant to the topic?
- The issue of the is related to the topic because a Civil Action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong which in this case which in this case is
the retirement benefits of the PNP under RA 6975, as amended by RA 8551. While ordinary civil actions when
filed are denominated as “complaints”, some special civil actions are not denominated as such but “petitions”.
However, such action, although governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, is subject to the specific rules
prescribed for a civil action. Like in this particular case a declaratory relief was made.

KINDS OF SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS:

(a) Special civil actions initiated by filing of a Petition:

Declaratory relief other than similar remedies;
Review of adjudication of the COMELEC and COA;
Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus;
Quo warranto; and
Contempt

(b) Special civil actions initiated by filing of a Complaint:

Interpleader;
Expropriation;
Foreclosure of real estate mortgage;
Partition; and
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

Retirement laws should be liberally construed in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his
sustenance and hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. The
liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well-
being of government employees may be enhanced.

Amberti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79981, 2 April 1991

OVERVIEW:

For review is the decision dated September 16, 1987 of the Court of Appeals which dismissed Engracia Bacate
Amberti's petition for annulment of the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 155 (Pasig) dated January 10,
1986 and November 4, 1986, respectively in CA-G.R. SP No. 10991.
The case at bar is another lamentable instance of a mother and her only daughter clashing with each other in a bitter
controversy over inheritance.

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Appellate Court to protest her
removal and replacement.[2] In its decision dated April 10, 1980, the Appellate Court noted the various anomalies
and irregularities committed by petitioner in her administration of her husband's estate particularly her failure to
render an accounting thereof for eight (8) years. Finding thus the probate court to have acted properly, it dismissed
the petition for lack of merit.

FACTS:

· Pietro (Piero) Amberti, an Italian citizen, married petitioner Engracia V. Bacate on September 16,
1965. They have one child, herein private respondent Maria Teresa Amberti, now married to Wilfredo
M. Talag.

· In June, 1970, Pietro, then a resident of Antipolo, Rizal, died in Torino, Italy, leaving behind
considerable properties in the Philippines and a holographic will designating Maria Teresa as his
universal heir in accordance with the laws of Italy. The will was subsequently admitted to probate in
the Philippines on August 2, 1971 and the widow Engracia was named the executrix, only to be
removed after eight (8) years by the same probate court for maladministration of the Amberti estate,
failure to submit an inventory or render an accounting for more than eight (8) years and to account for
the money received by the estate totalling more than P7,000,000.00. She was ordered replaced by her
daughter, Maria Teresa, upon the latter's motion.[1]

· After payment of the estate and inheritance taxes due, private respondent Maria Teresa, as the new
administratrix, filed a motion with the probate court to terminate the administration proceedings and to
declare her as the universal heir of the deceased Pietro Amberti and the absolute owner of all the real
and personal properties of his estate. In compliance with the court's order of November 29, 1985, she
submitted an inventory listing of all the real and personal properties of the subject estate which
disclosed, among others, that petitioner had already sold one-half (1/2) of the 975-square meter West
Avenue (Quezon City) property and had disposed of the various mining equipment used in the once
thriving marble business of the deceased in the reported total amount of P687,500.00. [3]

· On January 10, 1986, the lower court rendered judgment in Special Proceedings No. 5958 awarding
ownership of the residue of the entire Amberti estate consisting of real and personal properties to the
decedent's universal heir, private respondent Maria Teresa. [4]

· On April 14, 1986, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the January 10, 1986 decision,
questioning for the first time the provisions of the holographic will and asserting her alleged right of
usufruct over one-half (1/2) of the estate. The trial court denied said motion on November 4, 1986 for
having been filed long after the judgment of January 10, 1986 had acquired finality. [5]

· Petitioner again sought recourse in the Court of Appeals, [6] this time to seek the annulment of the
orders of January 10, 1986 and November 4, 1986 on the ground that the notice of the January 10,
1986 order sent by registered mail was not "actually" received by her counsel of record resulting in
"deprivation of due process." [7] But before private respondent could comment on the petition, petitioner
filed a motion to withdraw CA-G.R. SP No. 10786 stating that she was no longer interested in pursuing
her action. Consequently, the Appellate Court dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 10786 in its resolution of
January 9, 1987.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 10786 by respondent Appellate Court amounts to a dismissal with
prejudice such that petitioner is now precluded from bringing a second action (CA-GR SP No. 10991) based on the
same subject matter.

RULING:

The petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner. This decision is

Immediately executory.

A careful scrutiny of the records shows that CA-G.R. SP No. 10786 is a special civil action for certiorari with prayer
for preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which petitioner filed on December 8, 1986
to annul the judgment of the trial court of January 10, 1986 and the order of denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of November 4, 1986 on the grounds of lack of due process and grave abuse of discretion. [12] As
above related, before respondents could submit their comment, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw the petition
stating that she was no longer interested in pursuing the case. The motion was granted by the Appellate Court in its
resolution of January 9, 1987. On March 24, 1987, said resolution having become final, entry of judgment was
issued and the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment.

Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court under the heading SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS provides as follows:

"SECTION 1. Preceding rules applicable in special civil actions.— The provisions of the preceding rules shall
apply in special actions for interpleader, declaratory relief and similar remedies, certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, eminent domain, foreclosure of mortgage, partition, forcible entry and detainer, and contempt, which
are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the provisions of the rules relating to such special civil
actions."

From the foregoing, it is clearly stated that in special civil actions the preceding rules are applicable in a supplemen -
tary manner. More specifically, under Sections 2 and 4, Rule 50 of Rules of Court, relating to DISMISSAL OF
APPEAL in the Court of Appeals, the following are provided:

POSIBLE QUESTIONS:

1. What was the original filed complaint?

-Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Appellate Court to protest her
removal and replacement.[2] In its decision dated April 10, 1980, the Appellate Court noted the various anomalies
and irregularities committed by petitioner in her administration of her husband's estate particularly her failure to
render an accounting thereof for eight (8) years.

2. What is the legal provision invoke?

-Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court under the heading SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS.
"SECTION 1. Preceding rules applicable in special civil actions. The provisions of the preceding rules shall apply
in special actions for interpleader, declaratory relief and similar remedies, certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, eminent domain, foreclosure of mortgage, partition, forcible entry and detainer, and contempt, which are
not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the provisions of the rules relating to such special civil actions."

3. How is the Issue relevant to the topic?

- Because case clearly stated that in special civil actions the preceding rules are applicable in a supplementary
manner. More specifically, under Sections 2 and 4, Rule 50 of Rules of Court, relating to DISMISSAL OF
APPEAL in the Court of Appeals, the following are provided:

"SECTION 2. Effect of dismissal. Fifteen (15) days after the dismissal of an appeal, the clerk shall return to the
court below the record on appeal with a certificate under the seal of the court showing that the appeal has been
dismissed. Upon the receipt of such certificate in the lower court the case shall stand there as though no appeal had
ever been taken, and the judgment of the said court may be enforced with the additional costs allowed by the
appellate court upon dismissing the appeal."

"SECTION 4. Withdrawal of appeal. An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of
appellee's brief. After the brief is filed the withdrawal maybe allowed by the court in its discretion. The withdrawal
of an appeal shall have the same effect as that of a dismissal in accordance with

Section 2 of this rule."

Applying the foregoing rules in a supplementary manner, upon the withdrawal of a petition in a special civil action
before the answer or comment thereto has been filed, the case shall stand as though no appeal has been taken, so that
the judgment or order of the lower court being questioned becomes immediately final and executory. Thus, a
resolution granting the withdrawal of such a petition is with prejudice and petitioner is precluded from bringing a
second action based on the same subject matter.

4. How did the court resolve the issue?

-The subsequent petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 10991 is an original action for annulment of judgment filed by
petitioner in the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.
Blg. 129) which vests upon the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) the original exclusive
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial Courts. No doubt that second petition is
barred by res judicata, as the dismissal of the earlier petition for certiorari in C.A. G.R. SP No. 10786 was with
prejudice and on the merits. It has not escaped this Court's attention that these two petitions are based on the same
ground of the alleged deprivation of due process and sought the same reliefs, i.e., the annulment or setting aside of
the January 10, 1986 judgment and November 4, 1986 order of the trial court. A party cannot evade the effects of
res judicata by varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case as petitioner
attempted to do in instituting an original action far annulment of judgment to obtain the same relief sought in the
petition for certiorari earlier withdrawnfrom the Court of Appeals. [13]

This should now put an end to the travails of a daughter whose mother, after having dissipated so much of the estate
of her late husband, still proposes to share in what little is left of the inheritance of their daughter.

Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76431, October 16, 1989
TOPIC: Kinds of Civil Action as to Cause: Real Actions

OVERVIEW:
This is a case concerning petitioner’s complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of its mortgaged
property wherein petitioner filed the complaint in Manila RTC which should have rightfully been filed at the Makati
RTC as dictated in Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court since the property in question is in Makati and since it is an
immovable property (as enumerated in Art. 415, NCC) thereby making it into a real action, not a personal one.

FACTS:
● On March 29,1982 up to January 6,1984, private respondent Metropolitan Bank extended various loans to
petitioner Fortune Motors for a total sum of P32,500,000.00, which loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage on the Fortune building and lot in Makati but due to financial difficulties, petitioner was not able
to pay the loan which became due.
● For failure of petitioner to pay the loans, respondent Bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
and the mortgaged property was sold at public auction to mortgagee Bank as the highest bidder.
● The sheriff's certificate of sale was registered on October 24, 1984 with the one-year redemption period to
expire a year later.
● Three days before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale alleging that:
○ the foreclosure was premature because its obligation to the Bank was not yet due,
○ the publication of the notice of sale was incomplete, there was no public auction, and
○ the price for which the property was sold was "shockingly low".
● Before summons could be served, private respondent Bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the venue of the action was improperly laid in Manila for the realty covered by the
real estate mortgage is situated in Makati, therefore the action to annul the foreclosure sale should be
filed in the RTC of Makati.
● Petitioner argued that its action "is a personal action" and that "the issue is the validity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings" so that it may have a new one year period to redeem.

RTC RULING: On January 8, 1986, the RTC reserved the resolution of the Bank's motion to dismiss
until after the trial on the merits. The Bank subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied.

CA RULING: On petition for certiorari and prohibition, CA reversed RTC’s decision, granted the
petitions and dismissed the case without prejudice to the filing of the case before the proper courts. A MR
was filed by petitioner. Denied, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner's action for annulment of the real estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure sale of Fortune
Building is a personal action or a real action for venue purposes.

RULING:
REAL ACTION. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property.

Real actions must be instituted in the Regional Trial Court of the province where the property or any part thereof lies
while personal actions, on the other hand, may be instituted in the RTC where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real action. Its prime objective is to
recover said real property.

An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real
property.

While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question,
his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the
building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary
objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property
does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover
said real property. It is a real action.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS:
1. Why was this case assigned?
This case was assigned because petitioner originally filed an action for annulment of real estate mortgage
extrajudicial foreclosure at the RTC Manila when it should have been filed at the RTC Makati since the
property was located at Makati. The legal basis for this can be found in Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court. (see Post Scriptum)

2. What was the original action filed? And why was it filed?
The original action filed was an action for annulment of real estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure.
Petitioner alleged that:
○ the foreclosure was premature because its obligation to the Bank was not yet due,
○ the publication of the notice of sale was incomplete, there was no public auction, and
○ the price for which the property was sold was "shockingly low".

3. What was filed in the Supreme Court?

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the Civil Case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IV for improper venue and
for denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

4. What is a real action?

Real actions are actions involving title to, ownership, possession, or any interest in real property.

POST SCRIPTUM:
Sec. 1, Rule 4, ROC. Venue of real actions - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court, which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or
city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013 (?)

TOPIC: Kinds of Civil Action as to Cause: Personal Actions

OVERVIEW:
This is a case concerning personal action wherein petitioners – defendants in a suit for libel brought by respondent –
appeal the decision whereby the Court of Appeals respectively dismissed their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus and denied their motion for reconsideration. Thereby, the CA upheld the order the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 51, in Manila denying their motion to dismiss because the substituted service of the summons had
been valid and effective due to the fact that they had actually received the summonses served through their
substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including an answer with compulsory
counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam. They had also availed themselves of the modes of
discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action.

FACTS:
● On July 3, 2000, respondent sued Abante Tonite and its editorial board, claiming damages because of an
allegedly libelous article petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite.
● The suit was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC Manila, which in due course issued summons to be served on
each defendant, including Abante Tonite.
● On September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to serve the summons on the defendants but
since the defendants were out of the office the whole day, he decided to resort to substituted service of the
summons.
● On October 3, 2000, petitioners (defendants) moved for the dismissal of the complaint, alleging lack of
jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons.
 They contended that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on each of
them. They further moved to drop Abante Tonite as a defendant by virtue of its being neither a natural nor a
juridical person that could be impleaded as a party in a civil action.

RTC Ruling: On March 12, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration but was then denied.

Regarding the impleading of Abante Tonite as defendant, the RTC held that Abante Tonite is deemed a
corporation by estoppels considering that it possesses attributes of a juridical person.

Petitioners then brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus in the CA.

CA Ruling: On March 8, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition, upholding RTC’s decision. Petitioners
subsequently filed for MR but was also denied hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:
1. WON CA committed an error of law in holding that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the herein
petitioners.
2. WON CA committed reversible error by sustaining the inclusion of Abante Tonite as party in the instant
case.

RULING:
1. NO. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the power of the court to render a
personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings
rendered in the action – is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as
criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Furthermore, a proceeding in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific
property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court.

The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some
responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to
compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An
action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished
from a judgment against the property to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam
is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person.
As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in
personam.

In the latter instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant, and such
extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the
purpose of complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that the defendant will be
informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines
belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and
he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand, when the defendant in
an action in personam does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, our courts cannot try the case
against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily
appears in court.
As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary
appearance in the action.

The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an action in personam cannot be
overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely:
a. to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and
 b. to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him.

As to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through the proper service
of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void. If
the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal
jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the latter, the essence of due process lies in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of his defense. With
the proper service of the summons being intended to afford to him the opportunity to be heard on the claim
against him, he may also waive the process. In other words, compliance with the rules regarding the service
of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.

In reality, petitioners’ insistence on personal service by the serving officer was demonstrably superfluous.
They had actually received the summonses served through their substitutes, as borne out by their
filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad
cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam. They had also availed themselves of the modes of
discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the
action.

2. NO. The Court affirmed that Abante Tonite is a corporation by estoppel as the result of its having
represented itself to the reading public as a corporation despite it not being incorporated. Thereby,
the CA concluded that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding that the non-incorporation of
Abante Tonite with the Securities and Exchange Commission was of no consequence, for, otherwise,
whoever of the public who would suffer any damage from the publication of articles in the pages of its
tabloids would be left without recourse.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS:
1. Why was this case assigned?
This case was assigned because petitioners Abante Online, Macasaet et al invoked lack of jurisdiction
alleging that the substituted service of summons by Sheriff Medina was invalid and ineffectual when in
fact, the court impliedly gained jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners by filing several pleadings
before the RTC and voluntarily appearing in the action.

2. What was originally filed?

Libel.

3. What was filed in the Supreme Court?

Petition for review in Re: CA’s decision upholding RTC’s decision in affirming that the court had
jurisdiction over their persons through the valid service of summons.
4. What is a personal action?
It is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person.

5. What are the rules on venue in personal actions?

(See Post Scriptum)

POST SCRIPTUM:
Sec. 2, Rule 4, ROC. Venue of personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried:
1. Where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides; or
2. Where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides; or
3. In the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Chua v. Total Office Products, G.R. No. 152808, September 30, 2005
Topic: Kinds of Civil Action as to Cause Personal Rights
OVERVIEW:
The petitioner files a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue against the plaintiff who filed annulment of
contract of loan and real estate mortgage where the said plaintiff filed the case in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the place of his residence and not the RTC exercising territorial jurisdiction over the location of
property. The Supreme Court ruled that the proper venue for a petition for annulment of loan and cancellation of real
estate mortgage is lodged with the RTC exercising jurisdiction over residence of the plaintiff or defendant, not in
RTC where the property is located.

Facts:
Respondent Total Office Products and Services, Inc., (TOPROS) lodged a complaint for annulment of contracts of
loan and real estate mortgage against herein petitioner Antonio T. Chua before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City.

The said suit sought to annul a loan contract allegedly extended by petitioner to respondent TOPROS in the amount
of ten million four hundred thousand pesos(P10,400,000) and the accessory real estate mortgage contract covering
two parcels of land situated in Quezon City as collateral, alleging that there was no authority granted to Chua (its
president) by the corporation to enter into a contract of loan. It was alleged that the contracts were fictitious.

Petitioner Chua filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue. He contended that the action filed by
TOPROS affects title to or possession of the parcels of land subject to the real estate mortgage. Thus should have
been filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where the encumbered real properties are located, instead of
Pasig City where the parties reside.

RTC Judge denies motion to dismiss. She reasoned that the action to annul the loan and mortgage contracts is a
personal action and thus, the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Pasig City where the parties reside.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the said order, which the Judge denied. Hence, the petitioner filed with the
CA however CA dismissed said petition.

CA applied Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. and ruled that an action for the cancellation of a real estate
mortgage is a personal action if the mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage and the mortgagor is in possession of
the premises, as neither the mortgagor’s title to nor possession of the property is disputed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an action to annul a loan and mortgage contract duly alleged as fictitious with absolutely no
consideration is a personal action or real action.

HELD:
In affirming the CA, the SC ruled, It is a personal Action.

Well – settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory real estate mortgage is a personal
action. In personal action the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the
recovery of damages. In contrast, in a real
action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the then Rules of
Court, areal action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property.

In this case, ownership of the parcels of land subject to the questioned real estate mortgage was never transferred to
the petitioner, but remained with TOPROS. Thus, no real action for the recovery of real property is involved. This
being the case, TOPROS’ action for annulment of the contracts of loan and real estate mortgage remains a personal
action.

And thus falls under the catch-all provision on personal actions under paragraph (b) of the above-cited section, to
wit:
 SEC. 2(b) Personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.

In the same vein, the action for annulment of a real estate mortgage in the present case must fall under Section 2 of
Rule 4, to wit:

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action to nullify the subject loan and real estate
mortgage contracts. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in upholding the orders of the Regional
Trial Court denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.

Paderanga v. Hon. Buissan, G.R. No. L-49475, September 28, 1993

OVERVIEW:
- This case called upon the court to determine the proper venue of an action to fix the period of a contract of lease is
also a personal action.
- For, a personal action may not necessarily be an action in personam and a real action may not at the same time be
an action in rem. In Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., we held thus - In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks
the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In a real action, the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in Section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action
affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
a mortgage on, real property. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal
liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person. Hence, a real action
may at the same time be an action in personam and not necessarily an action in rem.

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent entered into an oral contract of lease for the use of a commercial space within a
building owned by petitioner in Ozamiz City;

Petitioner subdivided the leased premises into 2 by constructing a party wall in between; petitioner alleged that it is
with the acquiescence of respondent but the same is refuted by the respondent;

Private respondent instituted an action for damages and at the same time prayed for the fixing of the period of lease
at 5 years in the CFI of Zamboanga, Dipolog City;

Petitioner, resident of Ozamiz City, moved for its dismissal contending that the action was a real action which
should have been filed with the CFI of Ozamiz City where the property questioned is located;

Lower court decisions:

CFI of Dipolog City: denied the motion to dismiss as the case merely involved the enforcement of the contract of
lease, and while affecting a portion of real property, there was no question of ownership raised. Hence, the venue
was properly laid.

*When case reached the SC:

Petitioner – in as much as it is a recovery of possession of a portion of real property, the case should have been filed
in the CFI of Ozamiz City, where the said real property lies;

Respondent – the action is chiefly for damages arising from an alleged breach of lease of contract; hence, the issue
of recovery of possession is merely incidental. The action is one in personam and not in rem. Therefore the venue
must be laid in the place where plaintiff or defendant resides at the option of plaintiff.
Issue: WON venue was properly laid in the CFI of Dipolog City

Ruling: No, the venue was improperly laid.

Private respondent appears to be confused over the difference between real action and personal action vis-à-vis
actions in personam and in rem.

The former determines venue; and the latter the binding effect of a decision the court may render over the party,
whether impleaded or not;

(Reiterated the usual definitions of Real Actions and Personal Action vis-à-vis action in personam and action in rem)

While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery of possession, such is the necessary
consequence thereof.

The instant petition does not efface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the case which is to recover
the one-half portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner.

See Rule 4, Sec. 2

De la Cruz v. El Seminario, G.R. No. L-5402, January 28, 1911

TOPIC: Kinds of Civil Actions as to Cause: Mixed Actions
OVERVIEW: This case involves a dispute between Cayetano de la Cruz, the plaintiff and president of a Methodist
Episcopal religious association, and El Seminario de la Archidiócesis de Manila, among others, the defendants. The
dispute arose from a lease agreement for a building site where a chapel was constructed by the religious association
but was subsequently destroyed due to a legal action and execution. Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First
Instance in Manila. Respondents argued that the court has no jurisdiction to try and determine the action based from
the provisions of section 377 of the Code of Civil procedure but later on it was held that the demurrer was properly
overruled and that the action is not an action to recover damages to real estate but is an action for breach of covenant
in a lease which is personal and transitory. Hence the topic, kinds of Civil actions as to Cause specifically, mixed
actions.

FACTS:
● Petitioner Cayetano De la Cruz, a member and the president of a Methodist Episcopal religious association
at Dinalupijan, Province of Bataan, Philippine Islands, leased from one J. C. Miller, the agent of the
appellant, His Grace Jeremiah J. Harty, Archbishop of Manila and administrator of the hacienda of
Dinalupijan, for a period of two years, a certain lot or parcel of land, agreeing to pay as rental P2 per year,
the first year’s rent to be paid in advance for the construction of the Methodist Episcopal chapel.

● When the chapel was near completion, one Raymundo SInsuangco filed a complaint of forcible entry and
detainer against De la Cruz and Miller. Judgment was rendered against them and no appeal was taken so
the judgment became final and executory resulting in the destruction of the chapel.

● De la Cruz filed an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the appellants to
recover the sum of P2,000 as damages for a breach of the rental contract.

● To this complaint, the appellants, through their attorneys, presented a demurrer, based upon the following
grounds: (1) That the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila was without jurisdiction to try and
determine this action for the reason that damages for injuries caused to real property situated in the
Province of Bataan is sought to be recovered; and (2) the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. This demurrer was overruled, the appellants duly noting their exception.
 ● The court below on the 29th of March, 1909, rendered judgment in favor of the appellees and against the
appellants for the sum of P402, P2 being the rent for the first year paid in advance, and the P400 being the
agreed value of the chapel which was destroyed by the sheriff in executing the judgment rendered by the
justice of the peace.

ISSUE: That as this action is one for damages to real estate situated in the Province of Bataan, under the provisions
of section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila had no jurisdiction.

HELD:
The demurrer was properly overruled. This is not an action to recover damages to real estate; it is an action for
breach of covenant in a lease. The fact that the damages to real estate are involved, as an incident to the breach of
the contract, does not change the character of the action. Such an action is personal and transitory. The rule is well
stated in the case of Neil vs. Owen (3 Tex., 145), wherein the court said (p. 146):

If the action is founded on privity of contract between the parties, then the action whether debt or covenant,
is transitory. But if there is no privity of contract and the action is founded on privity of estate only, such a
covenant that runs with the land in the hands of the remote grantees, then the action is local and must be
brought in the country wherein the land lies.

In an action on a covenant contained in a lease, whether begun by the lessor against the lessee, or by the
lessee against the lessor, the action is transitory because it is founded on a mere privity of contract.
(Thursby vs. Plant, cited in vol. 5, Ency. Plead. & Prac., p. 362.)

In general, also, actions which are founded upon contracts are transitory. In an action upon a lease for
nonpayment of rent or other breach of covenants, when the action is founded on the privity of contract it is
transitory and the venue may laid in any county. (22 Ency. Plead. & Prac., pp. 782-783.)
Therefore, section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides, among other things, that actions to recover
damages for injuries to real estate shall be brought in the province where the land, or a part thereof, is situated, is not
applicable. (Molina vs. De la Riva, 6 Phil. Rep., 12.) The amended complaint clearly states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. (Sec. 90, Code of Civil Procedure.)

Emergency Loan Pawnshop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129184, February 28, 2001
TOPIC: Kinds of Civil Actions as to Cause: Mixed Actions
OVERVIEW: This case involves a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emergency Loan Pawnshop
Incorporated (ELPI) and Danilo R. Napala against the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA granted the
respondent's petition for certiorari, which resulted in the dismissal of the complaint filed by ELPI against Traders
Royal Bank (TRB) on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner ELPI seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals alleging that the CA erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court erred in not dismissing the complaint for
improper venue.The Supreme Court agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred grievously amounting
to ousting itself of jurisdiction. The motion of respondent TRB was well founded because venue was clearly
improperly laid. An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real
property, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area where the real property
or any part thereof lies.

FACTS:

● On January 18, 1996, Traders Royal Bank (TRB) sold in favor of petitioner Emergency Loan Pawnshop
Incorporated (ELPI) a parcel of land located at Km. 3 Asin, Baguio City for Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).

● At the time of the sale, Traders Royal Bank misrepresented to Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated
that the subject property was a vacant residential lot valued at P600.00 to P800.00 per square meter, with a
usable land area of 1,143.75 square meters (approximately 75% of the land area of 1,525 sq. m.) without
any illegal occupants or squatters, when it truth the subject property was dominantly a public road with
only 140 square meters usable area.
 ● Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated demanded from Traders Royal Bank the rescission and
cancellation of the sale of the property. Traders Royal Bank refused, hence, on April 16, 1996, Emergency
Loan Pawnshop Incorporated filed with the Regional Trial Court, Davao, Branch 17, a complaint for
annulment of sale and damages against Traders Royal Bank.

● On August 27, 1996, Traders Royal Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of
improper venue. On September 18, 1996 the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

● On January 15, 1997, Traders Royal Bank elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, contending that the
trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of improper venue.

● After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, "WHEREFORE, finding merit in
the petition, the Orders dated September 18,1996 and November 14, 1996 are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 24, 317-96 is hereby DISMISSED on ground of improper venue.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC erred in not dismissing the complaint for
improper venue

HELD: No. In the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred grievously amounting to
ousting itself of jurisdiction. The motion of respondent Traders Royal Baml was well founded because venue was
clearly improperly laid. The action in the Regional Trial Court was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of land
located at Km. 3 Asin Road, Baguio City. The venue of such action is unquestionably within the territorial
jurisdiction of the proper court where the real property or part thereof lies. An action affecting title to real property,
or for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court
having jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies.

Hence, the case at bar clearly falls within the exceptions to the rule. The Regional Trial Court has committed a
palpable and grievous error amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of improper venue.

Spouses Yu v. Pacleb, G.R. No. 172172, February 24, 2009

Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59731, January 11, 1990

Licaros v. Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, April 29, 2003
OVERVIEW: This is a petition for review on certiorar to annul the Decision dated 9 August 2001 of the CA as
well as the Resolution dated 23 October 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration. The CA dismissed the petition
to annul the following decision rendered in Branch 143 of RTC Makati: (1) The Decision dated 27 Dcember 1990
granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses Abelardo B. Licaros and Margarita
Romualdez-Licaros; and (2) The Decision dated 8 November 1991 declaring the marriage between the same spouses
null and void.

Action in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific
persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person
and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world

FACTS:
 ● Abelardo Licaros and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros were lawfully married in 1968. Sometime in 1979,
they agreed to separate due to marital differences. Margarita together with her two children left for the
United States.
● In 1991, Abelardo commenced a civil case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Margarita,
based on psychological incapacity. As Margarita was then residing in the US, the court rendered that
summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and at the same time furnishing
Margarita a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at her
address in the US through the DFA, all at the expense of Abelardo.
● Margarita was given sixty (60) days after publication to file a responsive pleading. On November 8, 1991,
the marriage of Abelardo to Margarita was declared null and void.
● Almost nin (9) years later, Margarita received a letter dated November 18, 1991 from a certain Atty.
Angelo Q. Valencia informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family name “Licaros”
inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo has already been judicially dissolved by the RTC.
● Margarita filed a petition for review on certiorari, insisting that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over her person in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since she was never validly served with
summons. Neither did she appear in court to submit voluntarily to its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether Margarita was validity served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Abelardo

RULING:
Petitioner is bereft of merit. Summons is a wit by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Service is of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.

As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippines courts cannot try any
case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears
in court. But when the case is one of action in rem or quasi in rem in Section 15, Rule 14 of the RoC, Philippine
courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the
person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.

Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with
summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of
the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal
service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of
the court by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other
means the judge may consider sufficient.

Applying the foregoing rule, the trial court required extraterritorial service of summons to be effected on Margarita
in the following manner:
x x x, service of Summons by way of publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, at the same time, furnishing respondent copy of this Order as well as the corresponding
Summons and copy of the petition at her given address at No. 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., thru
the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of petitioner.

The trial court’s prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under the first or second mode specified in
Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to "any other means that the judge may consider
sufficient."

Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004

OVERVIEW: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the decision of the CA dated September 30, 1996, nullifying the decision and orders of the RTC of Cebu City
(Branch 10) in Civil Case No. CEB-11103 for want of jurisdiction.

Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is an action in personam because it is an action against persons, namely, herein
respondents, on the basis of their personal liability. As such, personal service of summons upon the defendants is
essential in order for the court to acquire of jurisdiction over their persons

When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court, personal service of summons within the State is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over
his person.

FACTS:
● Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is an action for specific performance and/or rescission filed by herein
petitioners, spouses Fortunato and Aurora Gomez, against the heirs of Jesus J. trocino, Sr., which include
herein respondents and their mother Caridad Trocino.
● Spouses Jesus and Carisas Trocino mortgage two parcels of land to Dr. Clarence Yujuico. The mortgage
was subsequently foreclosed and the properties sold at public auction on July 11, 1988, and before the
expiry of the redemption period, the spouses Trocino sold the property to petitioners who in turn, redeemed
the same from Dr. Yujuico.
● The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey ownership of the properties to Petitioners, hence, the
complaint.
● The trial court’s Process Server served summons on respondents. The defendant, filed their Answer,
through their counsel Atty. Expedito P. Bugarin. Defendant Caridad A. Trocino, respondent’s mother,
verified said pleading.
● After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
and was ordered to jointly and severally execute a Deed of Sale in favpr of the plaintiffs and to deliver the
owner’s duplicate copies.
● Respondents Adolfo and Mariano Trocino filed with the CA, a petition for the annulment of the judgment
rendered by the RTC-Cebu, alleging that the trial court’s decision is null and void on the ground that it did
not acquire jurisdiction over their persons as they were not validly served with a copy of the summons and
the complaint.
● According to them, at the time summons was served on them, Adolfo Trocino was already in Ohio, USA,
and has been residing there for 25 years, while Mariano Trocino was in Talibon, Bohol. They also refuted
the receipt of the summons by Caridad A. Trocino, and the representation made by Aty. Bugarin in their
behalf.

ISSUE: Whether or not summons was effectively served on respondent

RULING:
No. When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court, personal service of summons within the State is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over
his person. This cannot be done if the defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.

The action instituted by petitioners affect the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action in personam,
i.e., any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. The complaint they filed for specific
performance and/or rescission is not an action in rem. While it is a real action because it affects title to or possession
of the two parcels of land, it does not automatically follows that the action is already one in rem.

The objective sought in petitioners complaints was to establish a claim against respondents for their alleged refusal
to convey to them the title to the two parcels of land that they inherited from their father, Jesus Trocino, who was
one of the sellers of the properties to petitioners.

On the other hand, Mariano Trocino has been in Talibon, Bohol since 1986. To validly acquire jurisdiction over his
person, summons must be served on him personally, or through substituted service, upon showing of impossibility
of personal service. Such impossibility, and why the efforts exerted towards personal service failed, should be
explained in the proof of service. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be
stated in the proof of service or Officers Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on
jurisdictional grounds.

The process server served summons and copies of the complaint on respondents Jacob, Jesus, Jr., Adolfo, Mariano,
Consolation, Alice and Racheal, through their mother, Cardidad Trocino. The return did not contain any particulars
as to the impossibility of personal service on Mariano Trocino within a reasonable time. Such improper service
rendered the same ineffective.

Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011

SUBJECT MATTER: Action in Rem

OVERVIEW: Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition for
review on certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with a relatively new
evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated September 25, 2009 and
Resolution dated December 17, 2009.

This case is assigned because the answer to this question, raised on the issue on this case depends on the nature of
petitioner’s action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem

FACTS:
● Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing before the RTC. Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s
certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that
he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of
Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines,
College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.
● Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the
case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the
basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
● The RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case,
affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and
the child.
● Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the
RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place.
● Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to
show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA
testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the service of summons jurisdictional

RULING:
The answer to this question depends on the nature of petitioner’s action, that is, whether it is an action in personam,
in rem, or quasi in rem.

An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the
thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to
subject that person’s interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the
“thing” itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or
correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over
the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective.

The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to
establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through publication, all
interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.

If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. This is but proper in order to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive
the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it
is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that
the due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the
proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.

Spouses Yu v. Pacleb, G.R. No. 172172, February 24, 2009 (Supra.)

TOPIC: ACTION IN PERSONAM ON WHETHER THOSE NOT PARTY TO DEED OF SALE (IN THIS
CASE) IS BOUND BY IT.

Overview: This case discusses whether a complaint with allegations of specific performance and damages furtherly
discussed by the court as under action personam is binding upon those not party of the deed of sale. The court said
that in such action, the deed is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard. Therefore, it cannot bind respondent since he was not a party therein. Neither can
respondent be considered as privy thereto since his signature and that of his late first wife, Angelita Chan, were
forged in the deed of sale.

FACTS:

● Before the Court is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing: (i) the Decision dated
August 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78629 setting aside the Decision dated
December 27, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1325-96; and (ii) the Resolution dated
April 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals denying reconsideration of the said decision.
● Respondent Baltazar N. Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are the registered owners of an
18,000-square meter parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-118375 (Langcaan Property).
● In 1992, the Langcaan Property became the subject of three (3) documents purporting to transfer its
ownership.
● On February 27, 1992, a Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into between Spouses Baltazar N. Pacleb and
Angelita Chan and Rebecca Del Rosario.
● On May 7, 1992, a Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into between Rebecca Del Rosario and Ruperto L.
Javier (Javier).
● On November 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell was entered into between Javier and petitioner spouses Ernesto
V. Yu and Elsie Ong Yu. In their contract, petitioner spouses Yu agreed to pay Javier a total consideration
of ₱900,000. Six hundred thousand pesos (₱600,000) (consisting of ₱200,000 as previous payment and
₱400,000 to be paid upon execution of the contract) was acknowledged as received by Javier and ₱300,000
 remained as balance. Javier undertook to deliver possession of the Langcaan Property and to sign a deed of
absolute sale within thirty (30) days from execution of the contract.
● All the aforementioned sales were not registered.
● On April 23, 1993, petitioner spouses Yu filed with the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, a Complaint
for specific performance and damages against Javier, docketed as Civil Case No. 741-93, to compel the
latter to deliver to them ownership and possession, as well as title to the Langcaan Property.
● In their Complaint, they alleged that Javier represented to them that the Langcaan Property was not
tenanted. However, after they already paid ₱200,000 as initial payment and entered into an Agreement
dated September 11,
● 1992 for the sale of the Langcaan Property, they discovered it was tenanted by Ramon C. Pacleb (Ramon).
Petitioner spouses demanded the cancellation of their agreement and the return of their initial payment.
Thereafter, petitioner spouses and Javier verified from Ramon if he was willing to vacate the property and
the latter was agreeable. Javier then promised to make arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and
to pay the latter his disturbance compensation. Hence, they proceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell
canceling the Agreement mentioned. However, Javier failed to comply with his obligations.
● RTC: Judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendant based on the sale of subject
parcel of land to the former who is entitled thereby to the ownership and possession thereof from the said
defendant who is further directed to pay damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) including
attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by the plaintiff in this case as a consequence.
● On March 10, 1995, petitioner spouses and Ramon and the latter’s wife, Corazon Bodino, executed a
"Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan." Under the
said agreement, petitioner spouses paid Ramon the amount of ₱500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his
tenancy rights over the Langcaan Property.
● On October 12, 1995, respondent filed a Complaint for annulment of deed of sale and other documents
arising from it, docketed as Civil Case No. 1199-95. He alleged that the deed of sale purportedly executed
between him and his late first wife and Rebecca Del Rosario was spurious as their signatures thereon were
forgeries. Respondent moved to have summons served upon Rebecca Del Rosario by publication since the
latter’s address could not be found.
● Trial court denied the motion. Respondent moved to dismiss the case affirmed by the trial court.
● MTC: Meanwhile, on November 23, 1995, petitioner spouses filed an action for forcible entry against
respondent with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). They alleged that they had prior physical possession of
the Langcaan Property through their trustee, Ramon, until the latter was ousted by respondent in September
1995. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner spouses, which decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial
Court.
● CA: The Court of Appeals set aside the decisions of the lower courts and found that it was respondent who
had prior physical possession of the property as shown by his payment of real estate taxes thereon. On
appeal by respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. The Court
of Appeals ruled that petitioner spouses are not purchasers in good faith and that the Decision in Civil Case
No. 741-93 did not transfer ownership of the Langcaan Property to them. Accordingly, the appellate court
ordered the cancellation of the annotation of the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 on the title of the
Langcaan Property. The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration of said decision.

ISSUE/S: .

Whether ownership over the Langcaan Property was properly vested in petitioner spouses by virtue of the
Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93.

RULING:

No. Civil Case No. 741-93 is an action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioner spouses against
Javier to compel performance of the latter’s undertakings under their Contract to Sell. As correctly held by the Court
of Appeals, its object is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase price, and to execute a deed of
absolute sale over the Langcaan Property in their favor. The obligations of Javier under the contract to sell attach to
him alone, and do not burden the Langcaan Property.
We have held in an unbroken string of cases that an action for specific performance is an action in personam. In
Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction and Development Corporation, we ruled that an action for specific
performance praying for the execution of a deed of sale in connection with an undertaking in a contract, such as the
contract to sell, in this instance, is an action in personam.

Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein
and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard, Therefore, it cannot bind respondent since he was not a party
therein. Neither can respondent be considered as privy thereto since his signature and that of his late first wife,
Angelita Chan, were forged in the deed of sale.

All told, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals finding that, as between respondent and petitioner spouses,
respondent has a better right over the Langcaan Property as the true owner thereof.

Principle:

In Domagas v. Jensen, we distinguished between actions in personam and actions quasi in rem.

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in
personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding
in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or
seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a
proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon
the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or
actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a
judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety (sic) to determine its state. It
has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is
brought against the person.

xxx

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such
persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and
the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property.
Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to
operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the
rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in
the action.

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, September 25, 1998

Asiavest LTD - Petitioner

CA and Antonio Heras - Respondents

Topic: Kinds of Civil Actions as to Object (Action Quasi in Rem)

Overview: The case is assigned because determining whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem will
be helpful to apply the rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines. In the
case assigned, the action filed in Hong Kong against Heras was in personam thus, Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court providing for extraterritorial service will not apply.

Facts: Plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras praying that the defendant
be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgement.
Fortunata dela Vega, personal secretary of Mr. Heras who was presented as a witness alleged that there is no service
of the writ of summons served on the defendant at his residence in New Manila, Quezon City.

The Trial court ruled that the issues in this case relate to procedural matters, thus Hong Kong Laws, the law of the
forum, should govern.

Heras appealed the decision to CA. CA agreed with Heras that notice sent outside the state to a non-resident is
unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for money recovery. Summons should have been
personally served on Heras in Hong Kong.

Issue: Whether or not the Hong Kong Court acquired jurisdiction over Heras

Ruling: No. Heras should have been served with summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong
Kong as he was an absentee.

In view of the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law in respect of service of summons either in actions in rem or in
personam, and where the defendant is either a resident or nonresident of Hong Kong, the presumption of identity or
similarity or the so-called processual presumption shall come into play since testimony of Mr. Lousich didn't
mention the specific law of Hong Kong regarding them. It will thus be presumed that the Hong Kong law on the
matter is similar to the Philippine law.

It was held in the case of Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals that it will be helpful to determine first whether the action
is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
of the Philippines apply according to the nature of the action.

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an
action against the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien
burdening the property.

In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over
her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not
found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the
case against him. On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.

In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against Heras was in personam, since it was based on his personal
guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor. Therefore, Heras, who was an absentee, should have been served
with summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court providing for extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against him was in personam. Neither can
we apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who is temporarily absent from
the country, because even if HERAS be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he
left Hong Kong not only "temporarily" but "for good."

Sections 17 and 18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Section 17. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the
relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of
the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under Section 6; or as provided for in international conventions to which the
Philippines is a party; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the
court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the
last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such
leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) calendar days after notice, within which
the defendant must answer.

Section 18. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When any action is commenced against a
defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of
court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding Section.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

BA Finance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102998, July 5, 1996

BA FINANCE CORPORATION - Petitioner

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROBERTO M. REYES - Respondents

Topic: Kinds of Civil Actions as to Object (Mixed Action)

Overview: In this case, Petitioner BA Finance filed a complaint for replevin with damages against the respondents
Manahan spouses after demand letters for failure to pay due installments sent by BA Finance to Manahans remained
unheeded. The trial court dismissed the case because summons could not be served on the Manahans. BA finance
asserted that a suit for replevin is an action quasi in rem. However, it was held that replevin is described as a mixed
action, being partly in rem and partly in personam – in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned,
and in personam as regards to damages involved.

Facts: Spouses Reynaldo and Florencia Manahan executed a promissory note, binding themselves to pay
Carmasters, Inc. the amount of PHP 83,080.00 in 36 monthly installments. A deed of chattel mortgage over a motor
vehicle, a Ford Cortina, was executed by the Manahan spouses to secure payment. Carmasters later assigned the
promissory note and the chattel mortgage to petitioner BA Finance Corporation with the conformity of the
Manahans. The petitioner sent demand letters to the spouses Manahan when they failed to pay the installments.
Petitioner filed a complaint for replevin (a process whereby seized goods may be restored to their owner. In a
replevin case, the Plaintiff claims a right to personal property (as opposed to real property/real estate) which has
been wrongfully taken or detained by the defendant and seeks to recover that personal property.) with damages
against the spouses, as well as against a John Doe in the person of Roberto M. Reyes, praying for the recovery of the
vehicle with an alternative prayer for the payment of a sum of money should the vehicle not be returned. The lower
court issued a writ of replevin.

Few months later, the court dismissed the replevin case on the ground that the Manahan spouses were never served
with summons and ordered that the Ford Cortina be returned to John Doe.

BA Finance filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted, the court allowing them to cause service of
summons on the Manahan spouses within 5 days from receipt.

The order was recalled, but summons still could not be served on the Manahans. So, the trial court dismissed the
case and ordered that the vehicle be returned to Reyes. The CA affirmed.

On appeal, BA finance asserted that a suit for replevin aimed at the foreclosure of the chattel is an action quasi in
rem which does not necessitate the presence of the principal obligors as long as the court does not render any
personal judgment against them. CA denied the appeal as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not a suit for replevin an action quasi in rem

Ruling: No. Replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the action
itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to
the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it
pendente lite (during litigation). The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more
than the right of possession. Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in
personam – in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages
involved. As an “action in rem,” the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of
specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein. Consequently,
the person in possession of the property sought to be replevied is ordinarily the proper and only necessary party
defendant, and the plaintiff is not required to so join as defendants other persons claiming a right on the property but
not in possession thereof. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows an application for the immediate possession of the
property but the plaintiff must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for seeking such interim
possession.

Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specific property is so conceded or evident, the action need
only be maintained against him who so possesses the property. The court, in the case of Northern Motors, Inc. vs.
Herrera held that persons having a special right of property in the goods the recovery of which is sought, such as a
chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action for replevin therefor. Where the mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to
take possession of the property on default, he may maintain an action to recover possession of the mortgaged
chattels from the mortgagor or from any person in whose hands he may find them.

Board of Liquidators v. Zulueta, G.R. No. L-30738, July 30, 1982

See: Sotelo vs. Dizon, 67 Phil. 537; Cabrera vs. Tianco, 8 SCRA 582
Manchester Development v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987 (Supra.)
Nestle Phils. v. FY Sons, G.R. No. 150780, May 5, 2006 (Supra.)
Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989 (Supra.)

Phil. First Insurance v. Paramount Gen. Insurance, G.R. No. 165147, July 9, 2008 (Supra.)
Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders, G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011 (Supra.)

Unicapital v. Consing, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013 (Supra.)

Subject Matter: Section 5. Commencement of action

Overview: This is a consolidated petition for review on certiorari assailing separate issuances of the Court of
Appeals (CA) as follows:

(a) The petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285 filed by Unicapital et. al assail the CA’s Joint Decision
which affirmed the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68 (in SCA No. 1759,
upholding the denial of their motion to dismiss; and (b) The petition in G.R. No. 192073 filed by Rafael Jose
Consing, Jr. assails the CA’s Decision which affirmed the Orders of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 60 (RTC-
Makati City) upholding the denial of his motion for consolidation.

FACTS:

In 1997, Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), obtained an
₱18,000,000.00 loan from Unicapital. The said loan was secured by Promissory Notes and a Real Estate Mortgage
registered in the name of Dela Cruz as per Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).

Prior to these transactions, Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a real estate company, initially wanted to develop a
property into a residential subdivision. They formed a joint venture with Unicapital, specifically its real estate
branch called URI. The property's loan and mortgage were changed to an Option to Buy Real Property. After
negotiations, the owner of the property, Dela Cruz, chose to sell it to both Unicapital and PBI. To facilitate this, Dela
Cruz designated Consing as her attorney-in-fact. Eventually, Unicapital, through URI, purchased one-half of the
subject property for a consideration of ₱21,221,500.00 (against which Dela Cruz’s outstanding loan obligations were
first offset), while PBI bought the remaining half for the price of ₱21,047,000.00.
 However, Juanito Tan Teng (Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu) informed Unicapital that they are the lawful
owners of the subject property and that Dela Cruz’s title was a mere forgery.

PBI discovered that Dela Cruz's property title had questionable legitimacy after conducting further
investigations. In response, both PBI and Unicapital sent separate demand letters to Dela Cruz and Consing asking
for a refund of the purchase price they had paid for the property.

On May 3, 1999, Consing filed a complaint, denominated as a Complex Action for Declaratory Relief and
later amended to Complex Action for Injunctive Relief before the RTC-Pasig City against Unicapital, URI, PBI, etc.
Consing claimed that the incessant demands/recovery efforts made upon him by Unicapital and PBI to return to
them the purchase price they had paid for the subject property constituted harassment and oppression which severely
affected his personal and professional life. Accordingly, Consing prayed that: (a) he be declared as a mere agent of
Dela Cruz, and as such, devoid of any obligation to Unicapital, URI, and PBI for the transactions entered into
concerning the subject property; (b) Unicapital, URI, and PBI be enjoined from harassing or coercing him, and from
speaking about him in a derogatory fashion; and (c) Unicapital, URI, and PBI pay him actual and con sequential,
moral, and exemplary damages.

Unicapital, URI, and Martirez (Unicapital, et al.) filed separate Motions to Dismiss Consing’s complaint
(Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss) on the ground of failure to state a cause of action and posited that the RTC-
PasigCity did not acquire jurisdiction over the case given that Consing failed to pay the proper amount of docket
fees.

RTC-Pasig City issued a Resolution denying the Unicapital’s motions to dismiss, holding that Consing’s
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for tort and damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code. It ruled
that where there is abusive behavior, a complainant, like Consing has the right to seek refuge from the courts.

Unicapitals motion for reconsideration was denied. Tus, it elevated the case before the CA via petition for
certiorari and prohibition, which rendered a Joint Decision holding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed
by the RTC-Pasig City in refusing to dismiss Consing’s complaint Thus, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Consing’s complaint should have been dismissed because of failure to convey a case of
action.

HELD: No. The Court finds that Consing’s complaint in SCA No.1759 properly states a cause of action since the
allegations there insufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil Code. Consing’s
complaint contains allegations which aim to demonstrate the abusive manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al.
enforced their demands against him.

Among others, the complaint states that Consing, Jr. "has constantly been harassed and bothered by
Unicapital and PBI, et al.; x x x besieged by phone calls from them; x x x has had constant meetings with them
variously, and on a continuing basis, such that he is unable to attend to his work as an investment banker." In the
same pleading, he also alleged that Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s act of "demanding a postdated check knowing fully
well that he does not have the necessary funds to cover the same, nor is he expecting to have them is equivalent to
asking him to commit a crime under unlawful coercive force." Accordingly, these specific allegations, if
hypothetically admitted, may result into the recovery of damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code which
states that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Likewise, Consing, Jr.’s complaint states a cause of action
for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code.

It is a standing rule that issues that require the contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as
the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should not be within the province of a mere motion to
dismiss,78 as in this case. Hence, as what is only required is that the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the Court – in view of the above[1]stated reasons – finds that the RTC-Pasig City’s
denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action was not tainted with
grave abuse of discretion which would necessitate the reversal of the CA’s ruling.
 Further, so as to obviate any confusion on the matter, the Court equally finds that the causes of action in
SCA No. 1759 were not – as Unicapital, et al. claim – misjoined even if Consing averred that Unicapital and PBI, et
al. violated certain provisions of the Corporation Law and the Revised Securities Act.

Neither should Consing’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his complaint. It
has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the complaint does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are paid within a reasonable period.

Provisions Applied:

1. Article 19 of the Civil Code: "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

2. Article 26 of the Civil Code: Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.

Ramones v. Spouses Guimoc, G.R. 226645, August 13, 2018

Overview: The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the Amended Decision dated March 21, 2016 and the
Resolution dated August 23, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131201, deleting the portion of the
judgement dated April 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 4 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. ML-
4095 which ordered Teodorico Guimoc, Jr. and Elenita Guimoc to collectively pay Isabel Ramones the amounts of
P60,000.00 and P507,000.00 as civil liabilities.

After judgement has been rendered by the MTC, an appeal by the respondents has been filed before the RTC on
January 10, 2012 citing that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to award damages in favor of petitioner for
failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees.

FACTS: An information was filed on June 30, 2006 before the MTC of Mariveles, Bataan, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 06-8539, charging the respondents with the crime of Other Forms of Swindling under Article 316 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code.

“That on or about June 09, 2005, in Mariveles, Bataan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, obtained money from Isabel Ramones in the amount of P663,000.00 with the
promise to sell their house and lot to the latter. The accused executed a Deed of Sale of Residential Bldg. and
Transfer of Rights over the aforementioned house and lot which they acknowledged before a Notary Public, despite
that the property was already mortgaged to a third person.”

The case proceeded to trial and upon Judgement on September 21, 2011, the MTC acquitted Teodorico but found
Elenita guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 1
month and 1 day to 4 months of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium period, and ordered her to pay a fine of
P567,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, as the case may be. In addition, Elenita was ordered to pay the amount
of P507,000.00 and despite his acquittal, Teodorico was also directed to pay the amount of P60,000.00 which
amounts reflect their respective civil liabilities, both with legal interest from December 13, 2006 until fully paid.

An appeal by the respondents filed before the RTC on January 10, 2012 citing that the MTC did not acquire
jurisdiction to award damages in favor of petitioner for failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees pursuant to
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 (SC Circular No. 35-2004), which provides that the filing fees
must be paid for money claims in estafa cases. They claimed that the petitioner’s payment of filing fees of P500.00
was deficient due to her failure to make an express reservation to separately institute a civil action. The damages
sought was worth P663,000.00; thus, the correct filing fees should have been around P9,960.00.

ISSUES: WON the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to award damages in favor of the petitioner for failure to pay
the correct amount of docket fees pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 35-2004.

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. It is a well-established principle in the Rules of Court that the Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading.

However, in Sun Insurance Office Ltd v Asuncion, the Court found that “a more liberal interpretation of the rules
was called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide
by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.”

Accordingly, subsequent decisions now uniformly hold that “when insufficient filing fees are initially paid by the
plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.”

In line with this legal paradigm, prevailing case law demonstrates that “non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at
the time of the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial
court. Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the Clerk of Court, and the amount paid
turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff
of the deficiency assessment.” “The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not
fair if the party has acted in good faith.”

In the present case, it is undisputed that the amount of P500.00 paid by the petitioner was insufficient to cover the
required filing fees for her estafa case under the premises of Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. Nonetheless, it is equally undisputed that she paid the full amount of docket fees as
assessed by the Clerk of Court of the MTC. In her petition, she consistently manifested her willingness to pay
additional docket fees when required. Indeed, the foregoing actuations negate any bad faith on petitioner’s part,
much more belie any intent to defraud the government. As such, the Court holds that the court a qou properly
acquired jurisdiction over the case. However, petitioner should pay the deficiency that shall be considered as a lien
on the monetary awards in her favor pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

Heirs of Renato Dragon, et al. v. Manila Banking Corp., G.R. No. 205068. March 06, 2019

Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998

FACTS:
● Petitioner Annie Tan, doing business under the name and style "AJ & T Trading," leased a portion of the
ground floor of her building, more specifically described as Stall No. 623, Carvajal Street, Binondo,
Manila, in favor of Bloomberry Export Manufacturing, Inc. The lease was for a period of five years starting
on February 17, 1995 and ending on February 17, 2000, at a monthly rental of P20,000 for the first three
years. For several alleged violations of the lease contract, petitioner filed against the private respondent a
complaint for ejectment. As its rental payment was refused by petitioner, private respondent instituted a
case for consignation.
● The two cases were consolidated and MTC of Manila, Branch I, ordered the dismissal of the complaint of
the petitioner. The counterclaim and damages sought by private respondent are likewise ordered dismissed.
The case for consignation has become moot and academic for failure of petitioner to appeal the decision of
the Metropolitan [Trial] court, Branch 15, Manila, allowing the private respondent to consign rental
 payments to the Court of Manila. Besides, the complaint for consignation being in conformity with law,
private respondent is allowed to continue consigning with this Court all rentals that [may be] due.
● On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, affirmed the aforementioned MTC.
● In the assailed Decision, Respondent Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's setting for hearing
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and held that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
setting for hearing petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, notwithstanding the fact that said Motion
contained no notice of hearing. Citing a litany of cases, it ruled that petitioner's failure to comply with the
mandatory provisions of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, reduced her motion to a mere
scrap of paper which did not merit the attention of the court. For failing to attach a notice of hearing to the
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner proffers the following excuses: (1) her former counsel's messenger,
due to an honest mistake, inadvertently omitted the fourth page of the motion containing the crucial Notice
of Hearing; and (2) because of the pressure of work, her former counsel was unable to follow up such
motion until the day said counsel requested the setting of a hearing.
ISSUE:
● Whether the omission through inadvertence of a notice of hearing of a motion for reconsideration filed with
the trial court is a fatal defect which did not stop the running of the period to appeal, thus rendering the
assailed decision final and executory.
RULING:
● Yes. Petitioner pleads for liberal construction of the rule on notice of hearing, citing Tamargo, Galvez and
Que. In rebuttal, we adopt by reference the CA's excellent disquisition, cited earlier, on why these cases are
inapplicable. Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in the following cases: (1)
where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on
its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
(3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court;
and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the case at bar
falls under any of these exceptions.
● Indeed, there is no miscarriage of justice to speak of. Having failed to observe very elementary rules of
procedure which are mandatory, petitioner caused her own predicament. To exculpate her from the
compulsory coverage of such rules is to undermine the stability of the judicial process, as the bench and bar
will be confounded by such irritating uncertainties as when to obey and when to ignore the Rules. We have
to draw the line somewhere.
● For failing to attach a notice of hearing to the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner proffers the following
excuses: (1) her former counsel's messenger, due to an honest mistake, inadvertently omitted the fourth
page of the motion containing the crucial Notice of Hearing; and (2) because of the pressure of work, her
former counsel was unable to follow up such motion until the day said counsel requested the setting of a
hearing.
○ We are not in the least convinced. First, it is unfair to place the blame for such omission on the
messenger. The burden of preparing a complete pleading falls on counsel's shoulders, not on the
messenger's. The counsel is ultimately responsible for the acts or omissions of his agents. Hence,
the messenger's conduct can neither justify the counsel's mistake nor warrant a departure from the
mandate of the aforesaid procedural rules.
○ Second, it is incredible that the fourth page containing the Notice of Hearing was left behind due
to honest mistake. In fact, there was no such page. The normal practice is to note, at the end of the
pleading, that a copy was furnished to the adverse party. Thus, petitioner's motion ended exactly at
the bottom of the third page as evidenced by the "copy-furnished" notation. It is safe to conclude
that there was no accidental or excusable neglect in not including a fourth page in this case. In
other words, petitioner's counsel simply failed to include a notice of hearing.
○ Finally, the fact that petitioner's former counsel calendared the motion for hearing for August 23,
1996 belies the excuse that an alleged fourth page had been left behind. In the first place, if a
notice of hearing had been included in the Motion for Reconsideration, there would have been no
need for petitioner to file the Motion to set the time and date of hearing. What is clear is that said
counsel filed the latter Motion, only after private respondent had submitted its Motion for Entry of
Judgment — with copy furnished petitioner's counsel — on the ground that petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper that did not stop the period for appeal.
Baylon v. Fact-finding Intelligence, G.R. No. 150870, December 11, 2002

Republic v. Kenrick Development, G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006

FACTS:
● Respondent Kenrick Development Corporation constructed a concrete perimeter fence on several parcels of
land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Centre of the Air Transportation Office (ATO), resulting to
the latter's dispossession of almost 30,228 square meters of prime property. Kenrick justified its action
with a claim of ownership over the property, and presented its Transfer Certificate of Title registered in
the name of Alfonso Concepcion.
● However, when ATO verified Kenrick's title with the Land Registration Authority, the LRA reported that
there was no record of the said TCT and that the land which was allegedly covered by Kenricks title was
found within the Villager Air Base.
● September 3, 1996 - Using the report as basis, the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for
revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines (represented by LRA) against Kenrick and Alfonso Corporation with the RTC of Pasay.
● December 5, 1996 - Kenrick filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as
its counsel.
● Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the trial court ordered the
issuance of an alias summons by publication against him. The case was thereafter punctuated by various
incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or continuances, motions to dismiss,
motions to declare defendants in default and other procedural matters.
● While the case was on-going, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human
Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. Both
Committees looked into this case, summoned Kenricks former counsel, Atty Garlitos to testify. According
to Atty Garlitos, he was the one who prepared Kenricks answer and transmitted its unsigned draft to
Kenricks President, Mr. Victor Ong, however, was not the one who signed it, nor authorized another
person to sign. on his behalf. With this revelation, the Republic filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick
in default.
● PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Republic contends that Kenrick failed to file a valid answer,
effectively rendering an unsigned pleading, citing Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, it was a mere
scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.
● TRIAL COURT RULING: In favor of petitioner. Ordered the respondent's answer stricken from the
records, declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.
Respondents MR was likewise denied. Aggrieved, Kenrick elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
● RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The trial court erred when it declared the respondent in default for
not failing to file a valid and timely answer. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never
disowned its contents and he resumed acting as counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These
circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified the signing of the answer by another.
● CA RULING: In favor of the respondent. Reversed the RTC’s decision since it found Atty. Garlitos’
statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination .
The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the answer and concluded that he
assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the
answer may have had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondent’s petition for certiorari. It directed the
lifting of the order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch.
The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
● Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:
- Whether Kenrick failed to file a valid and timely answer, thus rendering an unsigned pleading?
RULING:
 YES, A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another’s statement. Where it
appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those
statements is admissible against him. This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable
to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. By adoptive
admission, a third person’s statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive
admission may occur when a party:
a. expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;
b. hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;
c. utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;
d. replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he or
she has heard the other make or
e. reads and signs a written statement made by another.
Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance
did it ever deny or contradict its former counsel’s statements. Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos
in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in
the Court of Appeals as well as in the comment and memorandum it submitted to this Court. Evidently, respondent
completely adopted Atty. Garlitos’ statements as its own. Respondent’s adoptive admission constituted a judicial
admission which was conclusive on it.

Contrary to respondent’s position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his
counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him. Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert
a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed. Counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person. The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him
that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his
signature, who can certify to these matters. The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work
involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not as stated in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 9.01.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any
act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by
Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts. No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just
anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect
as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to
present evidence ex parte. Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were
true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid
raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and
injustice.

Building Care Corp. v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357, December 10, 2012

FACTS:

On September 9, 2008, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
salaries, non-payment of separation pay and refund of cash bond. Conciliation and mediation proceedings failed, so
the parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers.

Respondent claimed that petitioners failed to give her an assignment for more than nine months, amounting to
constructive dismissal, and this compelled her to file the complaint for illegal dismissal.
On the other hand, petitioners alleged in their position paper that respondent was relieved from her post as requested
by the client because of her habitual tardiness, persistent borrowing of money from employees and tenants of the
client, and sleeping on the job. Petitioners allegedly directed respondent to explain why she committed such
infractions, but respondent failed to heed such order.
Respondent then filed an administrative complaint for illegal dismissal with the PNP-Security Agencies and Guard
Supervision Division on June 18, 2008, but she did not attend the conference hearings for said case.

Petitioners then sent respondent a letter ordering her to report to headquarters for work assignment, but respondent
did not comply with said order. Instead, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter.

On May 13, 2009, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners.

Respondent then filed a Notice of Appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), but in a Decision
dated October 23, 2009, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time, thereby declaring that the
Labor Arbiter's Decision had become final and executory on June 16, 2009.

Respondent elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari, and on March 24, 2011, the CA promulgated its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 23, 2009 and
Resolution dated March 2, 2010 rendered by public respondent in NLRC LAC No. 07-001892-09 (NLRC
Case No. NCR-09-12628-08) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof, a new judgment is
ENTERED declaring petitioner to have been illegally dismissed and DIRECTING private respondents to
reinstate petitioner without loss of seniority rights, benefits and privileges; and to pay her backwages and
other monetary benefits during the period of her illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement.

Public respondent NLRC is DIRECTED to conduct further proceedings, for the sole purpose of
determining the amount of private respondent's monetary liabilities in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision was denied per Resolution dated August 19,
2011. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in liberally applying the rules of procedure?

HELD: YES.

It should be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application of procedural rules,
must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be complied with for the orderly
administration of justice.

In Marohomsalic v. Cole,10 the Court stated:

While procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well-settled that these are tools designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases. The relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice was never intended to
be a license for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the interpretation and application
of the rules can be invoked only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While
litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

The later case of Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc. v. Raza,12 further explained that:

To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without any valid reasons proffered for or
underpinning it. To merit liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its non-compliance with the
rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of
substantial justice. x x x The desired leniency cannot be accorded absent valid and compelling reasons for such a
procedural lapse. x x x

We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" line is not some magic wand that will
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled, let alone
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantial rights. Utter
disregard of the rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.

In this case, the justifications given by the CA for its liberality by choosing to overlook the belated filing of the
appeal are, the importance of the issue raised, i.e., whether respondent was illegally dismissed; and the belief that
respondent should be "afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
the constraints of technicalities," considering that the belated filing of respondent's appeal before the NLRC was the
fault of respondent's former counsel. Note, however, that neither respondent nor her former counsel gave any
explanation or reason citing extraordinary circumstances for her lawyer's failure to abide by the rules for filing an
appeal. Respondent merely insisted that she had not been remiss in following up her case with said lawyer.

It is, however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the client. A departure
from this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to
support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law. The only exception
would be, where the lawyer's gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the
due process of law. In this case, there was no such deprivation of due process. Respondent was able to fully present
and argue her case before the Labor Arbiter. She was accorded the opportunity to be heard. Her failure to appeal the
Labor Arbiter's Decision cannot, therefore, be deemed as a deprivation of her right to due process.

In sum, the Court cannot countenance relaxation of the rules absent the showing of extraordinary
circumstances to justify the same. In this case, no compelling reasons can be found to convince this Court that
the CA acted correctly by according respondent such liberality.

tan

Uy v. Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009\

Topic: Construction
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, which granted the demurrer to evidence of respondent Jose
Ngo Chua, resulting in the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate filiation against respondent.
RTC Branch 24:
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene
Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent
attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed that petitioner’s birth
certificate be filled out with the following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as father and "IRENE DUCAY" as
mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s
mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner and Allan. Respondent had consistently and regularly given
petitioner allowances before she got married. He also provided her with employment. When petitioner was still in
high school, respondent required her to work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family. She was later
on able to work at the Gaisano- Borromeo Branch through respondent’s efforts. Petitioner and Allan were
introduced to each other and became known in the Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children. During
petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative, and it was the latter
who acted as father of the bride. Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of petitioner’s daughter.
In his Answer to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with
Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.Hearings then ensued during which petitioner testified that respondent
was the only father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until she finished her college education; and that he
came to visit her on special family occasions. She also presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of
illegitimate filiation.
Subsequently, on 27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the Decision of RTC-
Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been barred by res judicata in Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24.
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding ,petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-
CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, which was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision dated 21 February 2000.
RTC Decision:
Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the Court hereby approves the same. Judgment is rendered in
accordance with the provisions of the compromise agreement. The parties are enjoined to comply with their
respective undertakings embodied in the agreement.

With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21 February 2000 Decision of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding
8830-CEB was declared final and executory.
Opposition to demurrer:
Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition to respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence in Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB. Thereafter, RTC-Branch 24 issued its now assailed Resolution dated 25 June 2008 in Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, granting respondent’s Demurrer.
The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:
1. That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is established by the open, and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child.
2. The Demurrer to the evidence cannot set up the affirmative grounds for a Motion to Dismiss.
3. The question on the civil status, future support and future legitime can not be subject to compromise.
4. The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief against the same
defendant.

RTC 24 decision on MR and demurrer:

Demurrer to the Evidence DISMISSED.
MR- Denied

SC:

At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution granting respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner
went directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that petitioner is raising pure questions of law in her
instant Petition.a1f
Issue:
The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent,
duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.
Ruling:
No. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an
end to one already commenced. In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court pronounced that a
judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on
the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the
requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the
subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the
terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy
and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no
rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at all.
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which states: ART.
2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.

The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by
RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to
settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In
exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent
would pay petitioner and Allan ₱2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said
Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an
illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner
and respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.

It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must prevail. When there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage
of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the
interest of substantial justice. The Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves
to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have
always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities
take backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.
_________________________________________________
Llamas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149588, August 16, 2010

Facts:
● August 14, 1984 - Petitioner-spouse Francisco Llamas and Carmelita Llamas were charged with “other
forms of swindling” under Art. 316, p.2, of the RPC. The information provided that on or about Nov. 20,
1978, in Paranaque, Manila, well knowing that their land, Lot No.11 Block 6 was mortgaged to the Rural
Bank of Imus, unlawfully sold it to Conrado P. Avila, falsely representing it to be free from liens and
encumbrances and Avila bought it for P12,895 to the damage and prejudice of Avila.
● June 30, 1994 - RTC Makati found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime and charged for
2 mos. imprisonment and fine of P18,085 each.
● CA - affirmed the trial court’s decision on February 19, 1999; CA denied petitioner’s MR on December 22,
1999
● SC - petitioners filed for a petition for review and was denied on March 13, 2000 for failure to state
material dates , and denied their MR on June 28, 2000 making the judgment final and executory, and by
virtue of a warrant of arrest, Carmelita Llamas was arrested while Francisco Llamas was not since he was
nowhere to be found.
● July 16, 2001 - Francisco moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time that the
court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and since there was no action taken by the trial court,
petitioners instituted on Sept. 13, 2001, the annulment of the trial and the appellate courts’ decisions.
● September 29, 2009 - the petitioners prayed for the annulment of their conviction by the trial court and
prayed for a referral of the case to the Court En Banc for oral argument and be allowed to submit written
supplementary pleading to state the compelling reasons why their MR should be allowed.
Issue:
● WON the petitioners MR should be granted
Ruling:
In the interest of justice and for humanitarian reasons, the Court deems it necessary to re-examine this case.
Considering the petitioners’ advanced age, length of time their case is pending, and imminent loss of personal liberty
as a result of their conviction, the court resolves to grant pro hac vice the MR.
The court, on occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of procedure where matters of life, liberty,
honor, or property, are at stake. It has allowed some cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses
on the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The
strict and rigid application of rules that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be
avoided. It is more prudent for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case
to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties.

In the instant case, one of the elements of swindling under Art. 316, p.2 which is the act of disposing the
encumbered real property to the damage of another is not present. Neither the RTC nor the CA made any finding of
damage to the offended party. In fact, the complainant had possession and control on the land as the case was heard
and his dominion was not disturbed.

Therefore, petitioners should be acquitted of the crime and the MR granted. The assailed decision on Spet. 29,
2009 is set aside and the petitioners acquitted on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
_________________________________________________
Heirs of Pacańa, et al. v. Spouses Masalihit, G.R. No. 215761, September 13, 2021
FACTS:
• The Pacaña heirs filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of ownership and possession, annulment
of documents, and damages against the Masalihit heirs.
• The RTC issued a decision dismissing the Pacaña heirs' complaint for lack of merit. And ordered the
Pacaña heirs to pay the Masalihit heirs moral damages and attorney's fees, as well as the costs of the case.
• The CA dismissed the appeal on December 19, 2012, based on records verification that showed no payment
had been made.
• The Pacaña heirs filed a motion for reconsideration, emphasizing the attachment of PMOs and their
submission to the RTC.
• The CA, in a resolution dated October 27, 2014, acknowledged the attachment of the PMOs to the Notice
of Appeal. However, the PMOs were payable to the CA Clerk of Court, not the RTC Clerk of Court.
• As the payment was not made to the proper court, the appeal was not perfected, and the appealed decision
became final and executory.
• The Pacaña heirs filed a petition, seeking the liberal construction of the rules to consider the actual delivery
of the PMOs to the RTC Clerk of Court as valid payment of appellate docket fees.

ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in strictly applying the rules valid payment of appellate docket fees.

RULING:
Yes. The established rule is that the payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory.
However, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of such requirement, the Court had also recognized that its strict
application is qualified by the following: first, the failure to pay appellate court docket fees within the reglementary
period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; and second, such power should be used by the court in
conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as
with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the subject PMOs representing payment of the appellate docket and filing
fees were attached to the Notice of Appeal filed with the RTC within the reglementary period, leading to the
transmittal of the case records to the CA in January 2006. In their Manifestation dated March 22, 2006 in
compliance with the CA's March 15, 2006 Resolution requiring them to submit proof of complete payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, the Pacaña heirs had already disclosed that when they filed their Notice of Appeal,
they attached the subject PMOs, all in the name of the payee, "The Clerk of Court, Court of Appeals," with address
in Cebu City, appending therewith photocopies of the subject PMOs. It even subsequently submitted the
corresponding stubs to prove such remittance. Despite the same, it took the CA over eight (8) years, however, to
notice such error in the payee of the PMOs, and dismiss the appeal on the ground of non-perfection.

In the present case, there was good faith attempt to comply with the requirements of the Rules regarding the manner
of appeal from the RTC's decision. The subject PMOs which were intended for the payment of the appellate docket
fees were actually sent to the RTC within the reglementary period to appeal, and duly received by the RTC which
thereafter transmitted the case records to the CA. Thus, it cannot be disputed that petitioners clearly intended to file
an appeal.

Admittedly, this Court has allowed the filing of an appeal in some cases where a narrow and stringent application of
the rules would have denied it. Indeed, the allowance thereof would fully serve the demands of substantial justice in
the exercise of the Court's equity jurisdiction. The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every
party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.

After all, court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both
parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth.Hence, it would be
more in accord with justice and equity to allow the appeal by the Pacaña heirs to enable the CA to review the RTC's
decision.

Turner v. Lorenzo Shipping, G.R. No. 157479, November 24, 2010

TOPIC:
● RULE 2- Cause of Action
○ Sec. 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of. — Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of
action. (n)

Facts: This case concerns the right of dissenting stockholders to demand payment of the value of their
shareholdings. The petitioners held 1,010,000 shares of stock of the respondent, a domestic corporation engaged
primarily in cargo shipping activities. In June 1999, the respondent decided to amend its articles of incorporation to
remove the stockholders’ pre-emptive rights to newly issued shares of stock. Feeling that the corporate move would
be prejudicial to their interest as stockholders, the petitioners voted against the amendment and demanded payment
of their shares at the rate of ₱2.276/share based on the book value of the shares, or a total of ₱2,298,760.00. On
October 27, 2000, the appraisal committee reported its valuation of ₱2.54/share, for an aggregate value of
₱2,565,400.00 for the petitioners.

In respondent’s letter to the petitioners dated January 2, 2001, the respondent refused the petitioners’ demand,
explaining that pursuant to the Corporation Code, the dissenting stockholders exercising their appraisal rights could
be paid only when the corporation had unrestricted retained earnings to cover the fair value of the shares, but that it
had no retained earnings at the time of the petitioners’ demand, as borne out by its Financial Statements for Fiscal
Year 1999 showing a deficit of ₱72,973,114.00 as of December 31, 1999.
Upon the respondent’s refusal to pay, the petitioners sued the respondent for collection and damages in the RTC in
Makati City on January 22, 2001. RTC granted the petition that “the defendant has an accumulated unrestricted
retained earnings of ELEVEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
NINETY (P11,975,490.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, evidenced by its Financial Statement as of the Quarter
Ending March 31, 2002.
Upon the appeal, the CA reversed RTC decision, thereby this petition.

Issue: Did CA erred in holding that the petitioners had no cause of action, and in ruling that the RTC did not
validly render the partial summary judgment.

Held: No, the CA correctly concluded that the RTC had exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the petitioners’
complaint in Civil Case No. 01-086 for lack of cause of action and in rendering the summary judgment and issuing
writ of execution.

That the respondent had indisputably no unrestricted retained earnings in its books at the time the petitioners
commenced Civil Case No. 01-086 on January 22, 2001 proved that the respondent’s legal obligation to pay the
value of the petitioners’ shares did not yet arise, and thereby the petitioner had no cause of action against the
petitioner at the inception of the case.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.27 The essential elements of a
cause of action are: (a) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff; (b) a correlative legal duty of the
defendant to respect such right; and (c) an act or omission by such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff
with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of
relief from the defendant. Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the
occurrence of the last element, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or
other appropriate relief.

Section 1, Rule 2, of the Rules of Court requires that every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action.
Accordingly, Civil Case No. 01-086 was dismissible from the beginning for being without any cause of action.

Verily, a premature invocation of the court’s intervention renders the complaint without a cause of action and
dismissible on such ground. Neither did the subsequent existence of unrestricted retained earnings after the filing of
the complaint cure the lack of cause of action in Civil Case No. 01-086. The petitioners’ right of action could only
spring from an existing cause of action. Thus, a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be
cured by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action during the
pendency of the action. For, only when there is an invasion of primary rights, not before, does the adjective or
remedial law become operative.

Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte, G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013

FACTS
● On July 29, 2010, petitioners filed a complaint against Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte for Cancellation of
Title and Reconveyance with Damages.
● They alleged that Magdaleno died intestate in 1968, leaving two lots.
● Gaudioso claimed to be Magdaleno's sole heir and obtained the titles through an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication.
● In response, Gaudioso presented evidence, including his birth certificate, school letters, and passport, to
prove he was Magdaleno's lawful son.
● Gaudioso also argued that the complaint had no cause of action and wasn't filed by the real parties-in-
interest.
● On July 27, 2011, the RTC ruled that the complaint lacked a cause of action against Gaudioso.
● The RTC noted that the plaintiffs had established their relationship with Magdaleno but weren't considered
compulsory heirs.
● Gaudioso successfully established that he was Magdaleno's son and, therefore, his compulsory heir.
● Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in August 2011 due to a missing certificate
date.
● Petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs, then sought direct recourse to the Court through a new petition.
● They were aggrieved by the RTC's decision.
● The case involved a dispute over property rights.
● The RTC's decision rested on the claimants' status as compulsory heirs of Magdaleno.
● Gaudioso's evidence played a crucial role in the RTC's decision.

ISSUE:
WON the RT's dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of
action was proper.

RULING:
Dismissal proper. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is
well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation,
a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the
plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which
the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred
by the defendants.
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the
lawful heirs of Magdalen and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by
Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter's favor be cancelled.
While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said
complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent's lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the
same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent's lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such
purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and or possession

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be reopened.

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need
to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heir ": involved, ultimately resulting to the
dismissal of the case.

Swagman Hotels v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161135, April 8, 2005

TOPIC: Cause of Action
This case tells us that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured by an amended
or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. Such
an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be dismissed by the court
upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant.

FACTS: Swagman Hotels and Travel obtained a loan from Neal Christian evidenced by 3 promissory notes. Private
respondent filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation, that they were in
violation of the terms of the three promissory notes. Petitioner corporation was experiencing huge losses due to the
Asian financial crisis thus there was a renegotiation on the interest from 15% per annum to 6%. They answered that
they continued payments in the renegotiated terms, that there was lack of cause of action because the three
promissory notes were not yet due and demandable.
The trial court said that none of the promissory notes was due and demandable when the case was filed but the first
and second matured pending the case, hence, payment was already due. The CA affirmed the decision saying that
the complaint which stated no cause of action can be cured either by evidence presented without objection or, in the
event of an objection sustained by the court, by an amendment of the complaint with leave of court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual of a
cause of action during the pendency of the case.

RULING: No, the defect of lack of cause of action at the commencement of the suit cannot be cured by the accrual
of a cause of action during the pendency of this case arising from the alleged maturity of two of the promissory
notes. It was obvious that when the complaint for a sum of money and damages was filed with the trial court, no
cause of action has as yet existed because the petitioner had not committed any act in violation of the terms of the
three promissory notes as modified by the renegotiation. Without a cause of action, the private respondent had no
right to maintain an action in court, and the trial court should have therefore dismissed the complaint.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. — When issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and
shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.|
The trial court and the CA erred in their interpretation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 5 applies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is
presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on
motion of a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence presented
during the trial. However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the
time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. A complaint whose
cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging
the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. Such an action is prematurely brought and is,
therefore, a groundless suit, which should be dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the
defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________

Joseph v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-41423, February 23, 1989

TOPIC: RULE 2- CAUSE OF ACTION, Sec. 3

FACTS:

● Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying cargoes and passengers for a
consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant
Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan. Petitioner, with a cargo of
livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to
Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway proceeding towards
Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At
about the same time, a pick-up truck, supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto
Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then
in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the
road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.
● Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck,
based on a breach of contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva,
as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
● Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner of the pick-up truck and
neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future.
● On September 24, 1973, petitioner, filed his amended complaint impleading respondents Jacinto Pagarigan
and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently could not ascertain
who the real owner of said cargo truck was, whether respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario Vargas, and
who was the real owner of said pick-up truck, whether respondents Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.
● Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her co-defendants for indemnity and
subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay petitioner's claim, and therein impleaded cross-defendant
Alberto Cardeno as additional alternative defendant.
● Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and Counter
Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was premised on the fact that the release of
claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured to the benefit of respondent Perez,
considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
● On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing the case, and a motion for the
reconsideration thereof was denied.

ISSUE:
 ● Whether or not there is only single cause of action taken in the petitioner’s complaint

HELD:

Yes. A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of
various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct
legal obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of
the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person.

The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or wrong violating the rights of one
person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. In the
case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single
cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate
remedies allowed by law.

Phil. Bank of Comm. v. Lim, G.R. No. 158138, April 12, 2005

PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Joinder of two causes of action filed in RTC Manila instead of RTC Makati.

WHAT DOES THIS CASE TELL YOU ABOUT?

The surety agreement is merely an accessory to the principal loan agreement embodied in the promissory note.
Hence, the enforcement of the former depends upon the latter.

A cause of action is a party’s act or omission that violates the rights of the other. Only one suit may be commenced
for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, only one case
should remain and the others must be dismissed.

FACTS:

What’s the original complaint filed? Philippine Bank of Communications (petitioner) filed a complaint against
[Respondents Elena Lim, Ramon Calderon and Tri-Oro International Trading & Manufacturing Corporation (‘Tri-
Oro’ for brevity)] with the for the collection of a deficiency amounting to ₱4,014,297.23 exclusive of interest.

Where is it filed? Regional Trial Court of Manila

What happened?

Petitioner alleged that respondents obtained a loan from it and executed a continuing surety agreement for all loans,
credits, etc., that were extended or may be extended in the future to [respondents]. Petitioner granted a renewal of
said loan upon request as evidenced by Promissory Note Renewal in the amount of ₱3,000,000.00. It was expressly
stipulated therein that the venue for any legal action that may arise out of said promissory note shall be Makati City,
‘to the exclusion of all other courts’ x x x.

In its Complaint, petitioner bank averred that respondents had entered into the Surety Agreement (SA) to guarantee
existing and future credit facilities, and that they had executed the Promissory Note (PN) to document their loan.
Now, the bank is claiming that Tri-Oro issued the PN on which the other respondents should be made liable as
sureties.
 "[Respondents] moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue- denied
A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied. On appeal, the CA ruled that respondents’ alleged
debt was based on the Promissory Note, which had provided an exclusionary stipulation on venue "to the exclusion
of all other courts." The parties’ Surety Agreement, though silent as to venue, was an accessory contract that should
have been interpreted in consonance with the Promissory Note.

the cause of action to recover on the basis of the SA is inseparable from that which is based on the PN.
A stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of the action in other places, unless qualifying or restrictive
words are used in the agreement.15

ISSUE:
1. WON there are two causes of action in this case.
2. WON joinder of causes of action in RTC Manila is correct.

RULING:
1. YES.

Petitioner correctly argues that there are two causes of action contained in its Complaint. A cause
of action is a party’s act or omission that violates the rights of the other.Only one suit may be commenced
for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, only
one case should remain and the others must be dismissed.
TWO CAUSES OF ACTION:
1. against Tri-Oro International Trading & Manufacturing Corporation, petitioner’s cause of action is the
alleged failure to pay the debt in violation of the PN;
2. against Elena Lim and Ramon Calderon, in violation of the SA.

Because of the variance between the causes of action, petitioner could have filed separate actions against
respondents to recover the debt, on condition that it could not recover twice from the same cause. It could
have proceeded against only one or all of them, as full payment by any one of them would have
extinguished the obligation. By the same token, respondents could have been joined as defendants in one
suit, because petitioner’s alleged right of relief arose from the same transaction or series of transactions
that had common questions of fact. To avoid a multiplicity of suits, joinder of parties is encouraged by the
law.

2. NO.

Under Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court,

"Section 5. Joinder of Causes of Action. –A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
xxxxxxxxx
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venue or jurisdictions,
the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the
jurisdiction of the said court and venue lies therein."

In this case, although there are two causes of action contained in its Complaint, In enforcing a surety
contract, the "complementary-contracts-construed-together" doctrine finds application.
According to this principle, an accessory contract must be read in its entirety and together with the
principal agreement. This principle is used in construing contractual stipulations in order to arrive at their
true meaning; certain stipulations cannot be segregated and then made to control. This no-segregation
principle is based on Article 1374 of the Civil Code, which we quote:
 "Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful
ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly."
The aforementioned doctrine is applicable to the present case. Incapable of standing by itself, the SA can be
enforced only in conjunction with the PN. The latter documents the debt that is sought to be collected in the
action against the sureties.

By inserting the provision that Makati City would be "the venue for any legal action [that] may arise out of
[the] Promissory Note," petitioner also restricted the venue of actions against the sureties. The legal action
against the sureties arose not only from the SA, but also from the PN.

Since the cases pertaining to both causes of action are restricted to Makati City as the proper venue,
petitioner cannot rely on Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.

______________________________________________________________________________

Chua v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 182311, August 19, 2009

PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHAT DOES THIS CASE TELL YOU ABOUT?

The case highlights the 3 ways in committing forum shopping. To wit 1) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground
for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).

FACTS:

After obtaining a P4 million loan secured by REM on parcels of land, petitioners Chua, et. al. were given an open
credit line by respondent Metrobank. Petitioners thus obtained other loans from Metrobank. Petitioners failed to pay
their obligation. The lawyers of Metrobank demanded that petitioners settle their liabilities; however, the latter still
failed. Respondent Metrobank sought to extrajudicially foreclose the REM constituted on the lands.

1st CIVIL CASE:

Petitioner Chua filed before RTC Parañaque Branch 257 a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Preliminary Injunction and Damages against respondents Atty. Celestra,
docketed as Civil Case No. CV-01-0207. RTC Branch 257 issued a TRO enjoining respondents Metrobank and
Atty. Celestra from conducting the auction sale. After the expiration of the TRO, respondent Atty. Celestra reset the
auction sale. The auction sale proceeded on Nov. 8, 2001, and a Certificate of Sale was accordingly issued.
Petitioners filed with RTC-Branch 257 a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207,
impleading as additional defendant the incumbent Register of Deeds of Parañaque City. They alleged that the
Certificate of Sale was falsified since no actual sale took place. They also sought the issuance of TRO/WPI to enjoin
Atty. Celestra from proceeding with the foreclosure sale. RTC Branch 257 denied the application for injunction, the
same being moot and academic. Petitioners filed an MR which was denied. They filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA which was also denied. The SC dismissed the appeal of respondents with finality.

2nd CIVIL CASE:

Petitioners filed with Branch 195 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque (RTC-Branch 195) a Verified Complaint
for Damages against respondents Metrobank, Atty. Celestra, and three Metrobank lawyers, namely, Atty. Antonio
Viray, Atty. Ramon Miranda and Atty. Pompeyo Maynigo. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. CV-05-
0402. They sought award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages against respondents for making it appear that an
auction sale of the took place, as a result of which, petitioner Chua was prevented from realizing a profit of P70
million from the intended sale. Motion to Consolidate Petitioners filed with RTC-Branch 195 a Motion to
Consolidate, seeking the consolidation of Civil Case No. CV-05-0402, the action for damages pending before said
court, with Civil Case No. CV-01-0207, the injunction case. Respondents filed an Opposition to Motion to
Consolidate with Prayer for Sanctions on the ground of forum shopping.

What’s the original complaint filed? 1st Civil Case: Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Preliminary Injunction and Damages
2nd Civil case: A Verified Complaint for Damages and Motion to Consolidate
Where is it filed? RTC Paranaque Branch 257 and RTC Paranaque Branch 195

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SUCCESSIVE FILING OF THE TWO CIVIL CASES AMOUNTED TO FORUM
SHOPPING.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative.

The proscription against forum shopping is found in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court. Forum shopping
can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved
(where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but
with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or
res judicata).

IN THIS CASE, petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action,
although with different prayers. They also failed to state in the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, attached to their
Verified Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 before RTC-Branch 195, the existence of Civil Case No. CV-01-
0207 before RTC-Branch 258. Splitting of a Single Cause of Action Sections 3 and 4, Rule 2 proscribe the splitting
of a single cause of action. Forum shopping occurs although the actions seem to be different, when it can be seen
that there is a splitting of a cause of action. It is true that a single act or omission can violate various rights at the
same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. o
However, where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of
rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. Petitioner would like to make it appear that the first
civil case was solely concerned with the nullification of the auction sale while the second civil case was a totally
separate claim for damages.
HOWEVER, the Court observed that the damages being claimed by petitioners were also occasioned by the
supposed fictitious foreclosure sale. Both cases are premised on the same cause of action, i.e. the purportedly
wrongful conduct of respondents in connection with the foreclosure sale of the subject properties. The rule against
splitting a cause of action is intended to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same
subject of controversy, to protect the defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses
incident to numerous suits. It comes from the old maxim nemo debet bis vexari, pro una et eadem causa (no man
shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause).

OTHER ISSUES: The damages purportedly arose from the bad faith of respondents in offering the subject
properties at the auction sale at a price much lower than the assessed fair market value of the said properties, said to
be P176,117,000.00. o On the other hand, the damages in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402, allegedly resulted from the
backing out of prospective buyers, who had initially offered to buy the subject properties for "not less than
P175,000,000.00," because respondents made it appear that the said properties were already sold at the auction sale.
o Yet, it is worthy to note that petitioners quoted closely similar values for the subject properties in both cases due to
the fact that petitioners actually based the said values on the single appraisal report of the Philippine Appraisal
Company on the subject properties. If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent
case shall be dismissed without prejudice, on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata. However, if the
forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with
prejudice.
IN THIS CASE, petitioners did not deliberately file Civil Case No. CV05-0402 for the purpose of seeking a
favorable decision in another forum. Otherwise, they would not have moved for the consolidation of both cases.
Thus, only Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 is dismissed and the hearing of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 before RTC-
Branch 258 will be continued.
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 DENIED.

Chu v. Spouses Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011

SUBJECT MATTER. 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

FACTS:
● Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu (Chus) executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving
their five parcels of land in Saguin, San Fernando City, Pampanga, in favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan
(Cunanan) for a consideration of P5,161,090.00.
● There was a side agreement clarifying the payment terms, and it was stipulated that ownership of the lots
would transfer to Cunanan upon complete payment of the total consideration.
● Cunanan transferred the titles to her name without the Chus' knowledge and borrowed money using the lots
as security, without paying the balance of the purchase price to the Chus.
● The Chus initiated Civil Case No. G-1936 to recover the unpaid balance from the Cunanans. They later
amended the complaint to seek the annulment of the deed of sale and related titles and to recover damages.
Cool Town Realty and Development Corporation and the Office of the Registry of Deeds were also
impleaded as defendants.
● Benelda Estate Development Corporation was impleaded as an additional defendant after it purchased two
of the lots from the Carloses, who had acquired them from Cunanan.
● The Chus later entered into a compromise agreement with the Cunanans, transferring to the Chus their
share in all the parcels of land registered in the name of Cool Town Realty.
● Subsequently, the Chus filed another suit, Civil Case No. 12251, against the Carloses and Benelda Estate,
seeking the cancellation of titles and damages. They amended the complaint to include the Cunanans as
additional defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action

RULING:
Apparently, the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or rescind the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage. Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of
action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them. A single cause of action or entire
claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions.
Thus, Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits splitting of a single cause of action, viz.:
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground
for the dismissal of the others. (4a)

The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief was sought
under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and then to leave the rest to be presented in another suit;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose
primary objective was to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. Their contravention of the policy merited
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251 on the ground of bar by res judicata.

Pantranco v. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005

TOPIC: Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

DOCTRINE

Totality Rule [exemplified by Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129]

Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.

“Embodied in the same complaint” = joinder of parties & joinder of causes of action

See: Section 6, Rule 3 of the ROC [Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties.]

Permissive joinder of parties requires: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of
transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is
not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.

See also: Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the ROC [Section 5. Joinder of causes of action.]

IMPORTANT PROVISIONS

Section 6, Rule 3 ROC

Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the
action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. (6n)

Section 5(d) Rule 2 ROC

Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount claimed
shall be the test of jurisdiction

Section 33(1) B.P. Blg. 129

“xxx where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.”

FACTS

1. 28 October 1984 (rainy): Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeep owned by his mother Martina
along the National Highway in Talavera, Nueva Ecija.
2. While negotiating a curve, a Pantranco bus driven by Alexander Buncan (trailing behind the jeep)
overtook the latter and hit the left rear side of the jeep and sped away thereafter.
3. Crispin reported the incident to the police and their insurance company, Standard Insurance Company
Inc.
4. The repairs of the jeep amounted to PHP 21,415.00. Standard shouldered PHP 8,000.00 while Martina
shouldered the balance of PHP 13,415.00.
5. Petitioners demanded reimbursement from Pantranco, however, the latter refused.
 6. Martina and Standard (herein respondents) filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money.
7. The RTC ruled in favor of herein respondents and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

· RTC
o Standard Insurance and Martina
§ Complaint for sum of money
o Pantranco and Buncan
§ Denied allegations
§ Averred that it is the MTC that has jurisdiction, not the RTC
o RTC Decision
§ In favor of Standard and Martina

· CA
o Pantranco and Buncan appealed
§ Argued that Martina’s claim of PHP 13,415.00 and Standard’s claim of PHP 8,000.00
fell under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC.
§ Contended that there was a misjoinder of parties
§ Claimed that they were denied due process because the case was deemed submitted for
decision “without even declaring defendants in default or to have waived
presentation of evidence”

o CA Decision
§ Pantranco’s argument regarding jurisdiction is incorrect per the Totality Rule provided
for in Section 19, BP 129 (not yet amended) which states that it is the sum of the
two claims that determines the jurisdictional amount
§ In the case at bench, total is above PHP 20,000 and is therefore under the RTC
jurisdiction.
§ On misjoinder: assuming that there was, Sec. 11 Rule 7 of the ROC and under the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the misjoinder does not affect the jurisdiction of the court
nor is it a ground to dismiss complaint.
§ On due process denial: This is incorrect. Pantranco failed to present during the
scheduled hearing for the reception of their evidence despite notice and without any
motion or explanation, nor did they file any motion for reconsideration.

8. Aggrieved, Pantranco filed for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case. – YES.

2. Whether Pantranco is liable to the respondents. – YES.

3. Whether Pantranco was denied due process. – NO.

4. Whether or not there was a misjoinder of parties – NO

RULING:

1. - YES
· Pantranco insists that the RTC has no jurisdiction because the cause of action of each respondent did
not arise from the same transaction and there are no common questions of law and fact.
· SC
o In this case, there is a single transaction common to all: Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side of
the jeep. There is also a common question of fact: whether Pantranco was negligent.
 o To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence
which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient for the
first cause to recover
o Here, if both parties filed suit, the same evidence would have been presented to sustain their
causes of action, thus filing by both respondents with the court is in order (speedy and orderly
administration of justice)

2. - YES.
· The finding of the RTC as confirmed by the CA is a factual finding which is binding upon the
Supreme Court.
· It has been repeatedly held that a trial court’s factual findings, when affirmed by the Appelalate Court,
are conclusive and binding upon the SC.
· There is not sufficient ground in the present case to deviate from this rule.

3. - NO.
· Records show that during the hearing, Pantranco’s counsel filed two motions to reset the trial and
were granted by the trial court. Then they filed a notice to withdraw.
· After Standard and Martina presented their evidence, the trial court (based on the motion of
Pantranco) reset the hearing to another date. Pantranco failed to appear on the said date.
· The trial court warned Pantranco that if they fail to appear in the next hearing date, the case will be
submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence presented.
· After two more postponements, Pantranco still failed to appear. Thus the trial court submitted it for
decision.
· The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard which clearly was given.

4. - NO.
Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since the cause of action of each respondent did
not arrive at the same transactions and there are no common questions of law and fact common to both parties.

Section 6, Rule 3 ROC provides that:

Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the
action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.

Permissive joinder of parties requires: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of
transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is
not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 23, 1999 and Resolution dated
November 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38453 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Umale v. Canoga Park, G.R. No. 167246, July 20, 2011

Umale v. Canoga Park, G.R. No. 167246, July 20, 2011

TOPIC: Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

Doctrine/Rule: litis pendentia

OVERVIEW:

On January 24, 2000, petitioner Umale agreed to lease from respondent Canoga Park Development Corporation a lot
in Ortigas Center for 2 years, subject to the conditions on the property’s use and membership in the Ortigas Center
Association, Inc. However, on Oct. 2000, prior to the contract’s expiry, Canoga filed an unlawful detainer case
against Umale before the MTC branch-68, Pasig City. Canoga alleged that under their contract, the lot shall be used
as a parking space for light vehicles and as a site for small drivers’ canteen but Umale constructed restaurant
buildings and other commercial establishments and even subleased the property to various merchants, without
Canoga’s consent and necessary permits from the association.

Two civil cases were filed but, generally a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more
suits is instituted on the bases of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgement on the merits in any one
is ground for the dismissal of the others.

FACTS:

· The parties entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the petitioner agreed to lease, for a period of two
(2) years, a lot located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City owned by the respondent.

· Before the lease contract expired, the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner
before the MTC (Civil Case No. 8084) on the ground of petitioner's violation of stipulations in the
lease contract regarding the use of the property. The MTC ruled in favor of respondent. On appeal,
RTC reversed and set aside MTC’s decision. Thus, respondent filed a petition for review with the CA.

· During the pendency of the petition for review with the CA, the respondent filed another case for
unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the MTC (Civil Case No. 9210) on the ground of the
expiration of the parties' lease contract. The MTC ruled in favor of respondent. On appeal, the RTC
dismissed the case on the ground of litis pendentia. Aggrieved, respondent filed again, a petition for
review with the CA. The CA ruled that there was no litis pendentia because the two civil cases have
different causes of action. Hence, this petition before the SC.

· The petitioner insists that litis pendentia exists between the two ejectment cases filed against him
because of their identity with one another and that any judgment on the first case will amount to res
judicata on the other. The petitioner argues that the respondent reiterated the ground of violations of
the lease contract, with the additional ground of the expiration of the lease contract in the second
ejectment case. Also, the petitioner alleges that all of the elements of litis pendentia are present in this
case.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not litis pendentia exist in this case.

2. Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing Civil Case no. 9210, the second
civil case.

RULING:
1. NO. The Supreme Court held that the 2 civil cases involved different causes of action. As a ground for the
dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious.

Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two actions; substantial
identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and the identity between the two actions
should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other.

In the present case, the parties' bone of contention is whether Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve the same cause
of action. The petitioner argues that the causes of action are similar, while the respondent argues otherwise. If an
identity, or substantial identity, of the causes of action in both cases exist, then the second complaint for unlawful
detainer may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia.

The Court ruled that Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action. Generally, a suit may only be
instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the
filing of one or a judgment on the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others.

Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such as whether the
same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action (also known as the "same
evidence" test), or whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also
fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing
of the first complaint.

Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of action in
the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint - and to which we answer in the negative. The
facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioner's violation of stipulations
in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time
the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000, the lease contract between the parties was
still in effect. The lease was fixed for a period of two (2) years, from January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a
renewal agreed upon by the parties, the lease remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the expiration
of the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the
respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in
existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case.

2. NO. The Court do not find the respondent guilty of forum shopping in filing Civil Case No. 9210, the
second civil case. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another.

Considering our pronouncement that not all the requisites of litis pendentia are present in this case, the CA did not
err in declaring that the respondent committed no forum shopping. Also, a close reading of the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping(attached to the second ejectment complaint) shows that the respondent did
disclose that it had filed a former complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner. Thus, the respondent cannot
be said to have committed a willful and deliberate forum shopping.

POSIBLE QUESTIONS:

1. What is Litis Pendentia?

Is a ground for the dismissal of an action when there is another action pending between the same parties involving
the same cause of action, thus, rendering the second action unnecessary and vexatious

2. What is the procedural issue?

whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint - and to which
we answer in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the
petitioner's violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the
expiration of the lease contract.

3. Why was this case assign what is it importance?

This case was assigned for us to know that two civil cases can have different cause of action To determine whether a
party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present
or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Considering our pronouncement that
not all the requisites of litis pendentia are present in this case, the CA did not err in declaring that the respondent
committed no forum shopping. The Court ruled that Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of
action.

Spouses Plaza v. Lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, March 5, 2014

The case highlights the 3 ways in committing forum shopping. To wit 1) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground
for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). It also provides the requisites of litis pendentia to wit: (a)
the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such
that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.”

FACTS

On August 28, 1997, the CA ruled that among the Plaza siblings, namely: Aureliano, Emiliana, Vidal, Marciano,
and Barbara, Barbara was the owner of the subject agricultural land. The decision became final and executory and
Barbara’s successors, respondents Guillermo Lustiva, Eleodora Vda. de Martinez and Vicky Sayson Goloseno, have
continued occupying the property. On September 14, 1999, Vidal’s son and daughter-in-law, the petitioners, filed a
Complaint for Injunction, Damages, Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the respondents and the City Government of Butuan. They
prayed that the respondents be enjoined from unlawfully and illegally threatening to take possession of the subject
property. According to the petitioners, they acquired the land from Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole
bidder and winner in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of Butuan on December 27, 1996. In their answer,
the respondents pointed out that they were never delinquent in paying the land taxes and were in fact not aware that
their property had been offered for public auction. Moreover, Tuazon, being a government employee, was
disqualified to bid in the public auction, as stated in Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991.5 As
Tuazon’s participation in the sale was void, she could have not transferred ownership to the petitioners. Equally
important, the petitioners merely falsified the property tax declaration by inserting the name of the petitioners’
father, making him appear as a co-owner of the auctioned land. Armed with the falsified tax declaration, the
petitioners, as heirs of their father, fraudulently redeemed the land from Tuazon. Nonetheless, there was nothing to
redeem as the land was not sold. For these irregularities, the petitioners had no right to the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order prayed for against them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouses Plaza is guilty of forum shopping.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. The SC agreed with the CA that the petitioners committed forum shopping
when they filed the specific performance case despite the pendency of the present case before the CA. In the recent
case of Heirs of Marcelo Sotto, etc., et al. v. Matilde S. Palicte,[26] the Court laid down the three ways forum
shopping may be committed: 1) through litis pendentia — filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet; 2) through res judicata — filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved; and 3)
splitting of causes of action — filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers —
the ground to dismiss being either litis pendentia or res judicata. “The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the
identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such
that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.”Noticeable
among these three types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different cases filed. Cause of
action is “the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.”

The cause of action in the present case (and the main case) is the petitioners’ claim of ownership of the land when
they bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or from Tuazon. This ownership is the petitioners’ basis
in enjoining the respondents from dispossessing them of the property. On the other hand, the specific performance
case prayed that the City Government of Butuan be ordered to issue the petitioners the certificate of sale grounded
on the petitioners’ ownership of the land when they had bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or
from Tuazon. While it may appear that the main relief prayed for in the present injunction case is different from
what was prayed for in the specific performance case, the cause of action which serves as the basis for the reliefs
remains the same — the petitioners’ alleged ownership of the property after its purchase in a public auction. Thus,
the petitioners’ subsequent filing of the specific performance action is forum shopping of the third kind-splitting
causes of action or filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers. As the Court
has held in the past, “there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different, so long
as both cases raise substantially the same issues.” Similarly, the CA correctly found that the petitioners and their
counsel were guilty of forum shopping based on litis pendentia. Not only were the parties in both cases the same
insofar as the City Government of Butuan is concerned, there was also identity of rights asserted and identity of
facts alleged. The cause of action in the specific performance case had already been ruled upon in the present case,
although it was still pending appeal before the CA. Likewise, the prayer sought in the specific performance case —
for the City Government of Butuan to execute a deed of sale in favor of the petitioners — had been indirectly ruled
upon in the present case when the RTC declared that no certificate of sale could be issued because there had been no
valid sale.

Bayang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-53564, February 27, 1987

FACTS:

· Petitioner Juan Bayang filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages against Benigno Biong in
the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte, Branch 1, docketed as Civil Case No. 1892. While the
case was pending, Biong succeeded in dispossessing the plaintiff of the land in question and remained
there until January 25, 1978. On February 21, 1972, the case was decided in favor of Biong, but the
Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court. This decision became final.

· On February 6, 1978, Bayang filed a second case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2589, with the CFI of
Surigao del Norte, Branch II, seeking to recover from Biong the incomes earned from the same land
from 1970 up to the quarterly incomes from 1978 until the said land was delivered to the plaintiff.
 · On August 16, 1978, Biong filed a motion for summary judgment, reiterating the affirmative defense
of res judicata raised in his answer insofar as it related to the incidents concerning the case prior to
January 25, 1978. An opposition to this motion was duly filed by Bayang.

· The trial court, after considering the arguments of the parties, granted the motion and rendered a
summary judgment on October 30, 1978. The said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment on the 1st case (civil case no. 1892) constitutes res judicata as to bar civil case 2589.

RULING:

Yes.

A long line of decisions has consistently held that for res judicata to apply: a) the former judgment must be final; b)
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and d) there must be between the first case and the second case identity of parties, identity
of subject matter and Identity of cause of action.

The decision in Civil Case No. 1892 became final and executory on February 2, 1978. There is no dispute that the
trial court which rendered that decision had jurisdiction over the subjectmatter and the parties to the proceeding. The
case was tried on the merits. The parties to Civil Case No. 1892 and the subsequent Civil Case No. 2589 are the
same petitioner and private respondent now before us.

The petitioner would draw a distinction between the land in dispute in Civil Case No. 1892 and the income
from that land being claimed in Civil Case No. 2589. But that is in our view splitting hairs to split a cause of
action. The subjectmatter is essentially the same in both cases as the income is only a consequence or
accessory of the disputed property. We cannot agree that there are involved here two causes of action calling
for two separate cases. The claim for the income from the land was incidental to, and should have been raised
by Bayang in his earlier claim for, ownership of the land.

We are not unmindful of the argument that affirmance of the challenged decision of the respondent court will result
in the unjust enrichment of Biong at the expense of Bayang. This assumes, of course, that the petitioner could have
proved his right to the income he now claims belatedly. The point is that he did not make the proper claim at the
proper time and in the proper proceedings, and he cannot do it now. Whatever right he might have had is
now deemed waived because of his neglect.

De Larena v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-29155, November 5, 1928

TOPIC: Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

OVERVIEW:

The case at bar is a sequel to case G. R. No. 21706, Josefina Rubio de Larena vs. Hermenegildo Villanueva, decided
on March 26, 1924. 1 In that case we affirmed a decision of the Court of First Instance ordering the rescission of a
lease of the Tacgajan Sugar Plantation and the payment by the defendant-lessee of the unpaid balance of the rent for
the agricultural year 1920-1922 in the sum of P5,949.28 with interest from August 26, 1922, an for P8,000 in rent
for the agricultural year 1921-1923. The decision also provided that the possession of the leased land be delivered to
the plaintiff.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed in regard to the second cause of action. It is reversed as to the first an
third causes of action, an it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff have and recover from the defendant the sum of
P11,226.50 with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from April 13, 1925, the date of the filing of the
complaint. No costs will be allowed." So ordered.
FACTS:

● Shortly after the record was returned to the court below, a writ of execution was issued, but before levy was
made the parties came to an agreement, under which the money judgment was to be satisfied by the
payment of P10,500 in cash and the transfer to the plaintiff of a dwelling house situated in the municipality
of Bais. The agreement was carried out in accordance with its terms, and on September 30, 1924, the
following document was executed by the plaintiff:

● Habiendo llegado a un convenio entre la que subscribe, ejecutante, en la causa civil No. 67 decidida por la
Corte Suprema, y el ejecutado, Don Hermenegildo Villanueva, por la presente declaro haber recibido del
Sheriff Provincial de Negros Oriental, y mi entera satisfaccion la suma de diez mil quinientos pesos
(P10,500), mas una casa residencial con su solar, situada en la plaza del Municipio de Bais, Provincia de
Negros Oriental, cuyas descripciones aparecen an un ocumento aparte, por el importnte de la ejecusacion
expidida por el Jusgado de Negros Oriental al 14 de mayo de 1924, en vitud de una decision de la Corte
Suprema. Con este queda definitivamente cumplimentada esta ejecucion.

● Y para que asi conste, firmo la presente en el Municipio de Bais, Provincia de Negros Oriental, I. F., ante el
Sheriff Provincial de esta Provincia de Negros Oriental y el Notario Publico Don Francisco Romero, que
ratifica este compromiso.

● The present action was brought on April 13, 1925, but the last amended complaint, setting forth three
causes of action, was not filed until June 17, 1927. As her first cause of action the plaintiff, after a
preliminary statement of the origin of the controversy, alleges that while case G. R. No. 21706 was on
appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant knew positively that the aforesaid lease was declared rescinded
by the Court of First Instance on September 8, 1923, and that he, the defendant, also knew that he thereafter
was not entitled to the possession of the aforesaid hacienda; that he, nevertheless, in bad faith continued in
such possession during the agricultural year 1922-1924 and appropriated to himself the cane harvest for
that year, which after deducting the share of the sugar central, produced 1,679.02 piculs for his own benefit,
which sugar was sold by him for the sum of P13 a picul; that the plaintiff has demanded payment to her of
the total value of said 1,679.02 piculs, amounting to P21,827.26, but that the defendant refuses to pay. The
plaintiff, therefore, asks judgment for the sum of P21,827.26 upon the first cause of action.

● For the second cause of action the plaintiff alleges that under the contract of lease of the Tacgajan
Hacienda, one of the obligations assumed by the defendant was that he would use the care of a good father
of the family in conserving the tools, agricultural implements, draft animals, and other effects enumerated
in an inventory made at the time the defendant entered in possession under the lease; that he was further
obligated to return said property to the plaintiff, but that he return said property to the plaintiff, but that he
returned only a part that he returned only a part thereof and failed to returned only a part thereof and failed
to return 4 carabaos, 4 vacunos, 1 corn mill, 4 wagons, 106 steel rails, 14 plows, 1 table, 1 scale, an 1
telephone, the total value of the property enumerated being P3,596 for which amount, plus P500 in
damages, the plaintiff asks judgment under her second cause of action.

● As a third cause of action the plaintiff alleges that the harvest of sugar cane illegally made by the
defendant in 1924 left ratoon sugar cane in the fields of the hacienda, which sugar can was the property of
the plaintiff, and that during the year 1925, the defendant illegally harvested said ratoon cane together with
some recently planted cane, which harvested after deducting the share of the sugar central, produced
1,613.25 piculs of sugar, which the defendant sold for his own benefit at the price of P13 per picul, the total
amount received by him being P20,962.25 for which the plaintiff demands judgment. lawphi1.net

● In his answer to the first and third causes of action, the defendants alleges that according to the pleadings in
case G. R. No. 21706, the two causes of action were included in that case and, therefore, must be
considered res adjudicata. In regard to the second cause of action the defendant pleads the general issue and
sets up as a special defense that assuming that the property referred to in said cause of action was missing,
it loss was due to its total extinction by ordinary use, for which the defendant could not be held responsible.
 For all three causes of action, the defendant sets up as a special defense the document executed by the
plaintiff on September 30, 1924, acknowledging the satisfaction of the judgment in case G. R. No. 21706.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff have recovered for the defendant the sum of money being claimed.

RULING:

The judgment of the court below is affirmed in regard to the second cause of action. It is reversed as to the first and
third causes of action, and it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff have and recover from the defendant the sum of
P18,486.13 with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from April 13, 1925, the date of the filing of the
complaint. No costs will be allowed. So ordered.

"For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court below is affirmed in regard to the second cause of action. It
is reversed as to the first and third causes of action, and it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff have and
recover from the defendant the sum of P11,226.50 with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from
April 13, 1925, the date of the filing of the complaint. No costs will be allowed." So ordered.

In the motion filed by the defendant on November 14, 1928 our attention is called to a mathematical error in that we,
in discussing the plaintiff's third cause of action, failed to take into consideration the fact that one-half of the gross
ratoon crop produced on the land in question in the agricultural year 1924-1925 was ceded to the sugar central as
compensation for the milling of the cane and that the defendant paid the expenses of the production of the total or
gross crop. Page 8 of the aforesaid decision is therefore amended so as to read as follows:

Very little need be said in regard to the third cause of action. It relates to a period subsequent to complete
termination of the lease by final judicial order. The defendant had then no right whatever to the possession of the
land or to the fruits thereof, and in removing the fruits, he acted in bad faith. This being the case, he must pay for the
fruits received by him, less the necessary expenses of production (Arts. 455 and 453 of the Civil Code.) As his bad
faith commenced long before the fruits in question were produced, he is not entitled to any part of the net proceeds
of the crop. The evidence shows that the gross ratoon crop for the year 1924-1925 was 3,226.50 piculs of sugar, and
according to the defendant's own statement, the market value of the sugar was in the neighborhood of P11 per picul
and the cost of production about P4.50. The defendant received only one-half of the gross crop, the other half going
to the sugar central as compensation for the milling of the cane, but the defendant paid the cost of production both of
his share of the sugar and that of the sugar central. The net result is that under the third cause of action, the
defendant must pay to the plaintiff the sum of P3,226.50 with interest.

Blossom & Company v. Manila Gas Corp., G.R. No. L-32958, November 8, 1930

FACTS: In that case, Blossom & Company, Inc. entered into a contract with Manila Gas Corporation for the sale
and delivery of water gas and coal gas tar at stipulated prices for a period of four years. In the second year of the
contract, Manila Gas willfully and deliberately refused to deliver any coal and water gas tar to Blossom and
Company, Inc. because it was asking for a higher price than what had been previously stipulated by them. The price
of its tar products had gone up.

ISSUE: WON there was splitting a single cause of action from the rendition of the former judgment to the right of
the plaintiff to recover damages. – NO.

RULING: The court said no. The plaintiff's original cause of action, in which it recovered judgment for damages,
was founded on the ten-year contract, and that the damages which it then recovered were recovered for a breach of
that contract. Under the plaintiff's own theory, the defendant was to make deliveries from month to month of the tars
during the period of ten years, and it is alleged in both complaints that the defendant broke its contract, and in bad
faith refused to make any more deliveries.

As a general rule a contract to do several things at several times in its nature, so as to authorize successive actions;
and a judgment recovered for a single breach of a continuing contract or covenant is no bar to a suit for a subsequent
breach thereof. But where the covenant or contract is entire, and the breach total, there can be only one action, and
the plaintiff must therefore recover all his damages.

Both actions are founded on one and the same contract. By the terms of the original contract of September 10, 1018,
the defendant was to sell and the plaintiff was to purchase three tons of water gas tar per month from September to
January 1, 1919, and twenty tons of water gas tar per month after January 1, 1919, one-half ton of coal gas tar per
month from September to January 1, 1919, and six tons of coal gas tar per month after January 1, 1919. That from
and after January 1, 1919, plaintiff would take at least the quantities specified in the contract of September 10, 1918,
and that at its option, it would have the right to take the total output of water gas tar of defendant's plant and 50 per
cent of the gross output of its coal gas tar, and upon giving ninety days' notice, it would have the right to the entire
output of coal gas tar, except such as the defendant might need for its own use. That is to say, the contract provided
for the delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of the specified amounts of the different tars as ordered and
requested by the plaintiff. In other words, under the plaintiff's own theory, the defendant was to make deliveries
from month to month of the tars during the period of ten years, and it is alleged in both complaints that the defendant
broke its contract, and in bad faith refused to make any more deliveries.

In the final analysis, there is no real dispute about any material fact, and the important and decisive question is the
legal construction of the pleadings in the former case and in this case, and of the contract between the plaintiff and
the defendant of January 1, 1920.

The complaint on the former case specifically alleges that the defendant "has refused and still refuses to deliver to
the plaintiff any coal and water gas tar whatsoever under the said contract Exhibit A, since the said month of July,
1920." " That owing to the bad faith of the said Manila Gas Corporation, defendant herein, in not living up to its said
contract Exhibit A, made with this plaintiff, and refusing now to carry out the terms of the same." That is a specific
allegation not only of a breach of the contract since the month of July, 1920, but of the faith of the defendant in its
continuous refusal to make deliveries of any coal and water gas tar. That amended complaint was filed on July 11,
1924, or four years after the alleged bad faith in breaking the contract.

DANFOSS V. CONTINENTAL CEMENT, G.R. No. 143788, September 9, 2005

TOPIC: Sec. 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

OVERVIEW: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure of the
February 11, 2000 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-55645, and its resolution dated June 7,
2000 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The antecedents show that on November 5, 1998, respondent Continental Cement Corporation (CCC) filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner DANFOSS and Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI)
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80.

FACTS: On November 5, 1998, respondent Continental Cement Corporation (CCC) filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner DANFOSS and Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 80. Continental Cement ordered from MINCI and Danfoss 2 units of Frequency
Converter/Inverter on 1 September 1997. The delivery was set within eight (8) to ten (10) weeks from the opening
of the letter of credit. But MINCI and Danfoss was not able to delivery right away after repeated demands until,
Continental informed defendant MINCI in a letter dated 13 November 1997, of its intention to cancel the said order
and it has suffered an actual substantial production losses in the amount of Eight Million Sixty-four Thousand Pesos
(P8,064,000.00) due to the time lost and delay in the delivery of the said two (2) unit Frequency Converter/Inverter.
Likewise, plaintiff CCC was compelled to look for another supplier.
On February 17, 1999, petitioner DANFOSS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not
state a cause of action. The argument is that the plaintiff’s cause of action against Danfoss or plaintiff’s right to
demand delivery cannot arise earlier than November 19, 1997, which is the last day for the defendant Danfoss’s
principal (Danfoss Denmark) to deliver the two (2) units Frequency Converter. As admitted by the plaintiff, it
cancelled its order on November 13, 1997, or six (6) days before the expiry of the defendant’s obligation to deliver.
Indeed, defendant Danfoss’s obligation to deliver is not yet demandable. The period of 8 to 10 weeks for the
delivery of plaintiff’s purchase order of two (2) units Frequency Converter was established for the benefit of both
the plaintiff and the defendant Danfoss. MINCI’s defense is that it cannot be held liable with Danfoss because it was
merely an agent. The court a quo denied the twomotions to dismiss in its order Dated May 28, 1999. Danfoss filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order but it was denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter also denied
Danfoss’ petition for lack of merit. The CA likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the denial by the court a quo of petitioner’s motion to dismiss the
complaint for damages on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action.

HELD: Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides that:

Section 1. Grounds – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting
a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

A cause of action is defined under Section 2, Rule 2 of the same Rules as:

Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined. – A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right
of another.

It is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of the
plaintiff.

In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of
the complaint. And the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment thereon in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint.

After a careful perusal of the allegations in respondent’s complaint for damages against petitioner, we rule that the
same failed to state a cause of action. When respondent sued petitioner for damages, petitioner had not violated any
right of respondent from which a cause of action had arisen. Respondent only surmised that petitioner would not be
able to deliver the two units frequency converter/inverter on the date agreed upon by them. Based on this
apprehension, it cancelled its order six days prior to the agreed date of delivery. How could respondent hold
petitioner liable for damages (1) when petitioner had not yet breached its obligation to deliver the goods and (2) after
respondent made it impossible for petitioner to deliver them by cancelling its order even before the agreed delivery
date.

The trial court erred in ruling that the issue of whether or not the defendants incurred delay in the delivery of the
equipment within the period stipulated was a debatable question. It said that trial on the merits was necessary and
the parties had to adduce evidence in support of their respective positions.[8] But what was there to argue about
when, based on the allegations of the complaint, petitioner was not yet due to deliver the two units frequency
converter/inverter when respondent cancelled its order? It still had six days within which to comply with its
obligation. The court a quo should not have denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint (for its failure to
state a cause of action) when, on its face, it was clear that petitioner had not yet reneged on its obligation to deliver
the frequency converter/inverter on the date mutually agreed upon by the parties. Moreover, the obligation itself was
negated by no less than respondent’s own act of cancelling its order even before the prestation became due and
demandable. Where therefore was the breach? Where was the damage caused by petitioner? There was none.

Consequently, it was wrong for the CA to affirm the order of the trial court denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss
the complaint for its failure to state a cause of action.

The principle of anticipatory breach enunciated in Blossom & Company, Inc. v. Manila Gas Corporation does not
apply here. In that case, Blossom & Company, Inc. entered into a contract with Manila Gas Corporation for the sale
and delivery of water gas and coal gas tar at stipulated prices for a period of four years. On the second year of the
contract, Manila Gas willfully and deliberately refused to deliver any coal and water gas tar to Blossom and
Company, Inc. because it was asking for a higher price than what had been previously stipulated by them. The price
of its tar products had gone up. We held that:

… even if the contract is divisible in its performance and the future periodic deliveries are not yet due, if
the obligor has already manifested his refusal to comply with his future periodic obligations, “the contract is entire
and the breach total,” hence, there can only be one action for damages.

Thus, the principle contemplates future periodic deliveries and a willful refusal to comply therewith. Here, the
obligation was single and indivisible – to deliver two units of frequency converter/inverter by November 19, 1997.
The records do not show that petitioner refused to deliver the goods on the date agreed upon. On the contrary,
petitioner exerted efforts to make good its obligation by looking for other suppliers who could provide it the parts
needed to make timely delivery of the frequency converter/inverter ordered by respondent.

Furthermore, respondent’s complaint suffered from another fatal infirmity. It was premature. The obligation of
petitioner to respondent was not yet due and demandable at the time the latter filed the complaint. The alleged
violation of respondent’s right being no more than mere speculation, there was no need to call for judicial
intervention.
The premature invocation of the court’s intervention was fatal to respondent’s cause of action.Hence, the dismissal
of respondent’s complaint was in order.

In sum, since respondent’s fear that petitioner might not be able to deliver the frequency converter/inverter on time
was not the cause of action referred to by the Rules and jurisprudence, the motion to dismiss the respondent’s
complaint for damages for lack of cause of action should have been granted by the trial court. In addition, the
dismissal of the complaint was warranted on the ground of prematurity.

Bank of America v. American Realty, G.R. No. 133876, December 29, 1999
TOPIC:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

Allandale Sportsline v. Good Development Corp, G.R. No. 164521, December 18, 2008
TOPIC: Sec. 4 Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

Rule 2, Sec. 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available
as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

OVERVIEW: This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
May 15, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59475 which dismissed the petition of
Allandale Sportsline, Inc. and Melbarose R. Sasot from the January 13, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158 in Civil Case No. 61053; and the June 12, 2004 CA Resolution which denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:
● Allandale Sportsline, Inc. (ASI) obtained a loan of P204,000.00 from The Good Development Corp. (GDC)
under a Promissory Note signed by Melbarose R. Sasot (Melbarose) and Allandale R. Sasot (Allandale).
The loan was secured by chattel mortgage.

● On June 24, 1991, GDC demanded that Melbarose pay the unpaid account of P179,000.00 or surrender the
mortgaged chattels within five days from notice. When no payment was made, GDC filed with the RTC a
Complaint for Replevin and/or Sum of Money with Damages against ASI, Melbarose, Manipon, Florante
Edrino and John Doe at the Pasig City, Branch 158. Plaintiff GDC prayed for alternative reliefs of replevin
for the purpose of foreclosure and if the chattels cannot be obtained, for collection of sum of money.

● The RTC issued the writ of replevin and several chattels were seized.

● Meanwhile, ASI and Melbarose filed their Answer with Counterclaim alleging that their unpaid obligation
was only P171,000.00; that they repeatedly tendered payment of this amount, but GDC rejected their
efforts for no valid reason.

● During the pendency of the case, GDC disclosed that after it obtained possession of the properties subject
of the writs of replevin, it caused the auction sale of some of them and realized proceeds amounting to
P78,750.00. RTC Ruling The RTC ruled in favor of GDC and ordered Allandale to pay the plaintiff jointly
and severally the amount of P269,611.82 plus legal interest thereon effective to date until the full amount is
fully paid, and 25% of the total amount due as liquidated damages.

● RTC RULING: The RTC ruled in favor of GDC and ordered Allandale to pay the plaintiff jointly and
severally the amount of P269,611.82 plus legal interest thereon effective to date until the full amount is
fully paid, and 25% of the total amount due as liquidated damages.

● ASI, Sasot and Manipon appealed to the CA, which rendered the Decision denying the appeal. Their
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not petitioners' check payment of Php171,000.00, PCIB Check No. 851688, to cover the total
balance of their loan to respondent, became a valid tender of payment by virtue of the respondent’s
acceptance thereof;
(2) Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the return of their properties pursuant to Section 9, Rule 60 of the
Rules of Court.
(3) Whether or not there is legal basis in the award of liquidated damages.

RULING:
(1) No. Tender of payment, without more, produces no effect; rather, tender of payment must be followed by a
valid consignation in order to produce the effect of payment and extinguish an obligation.[40] Tender of
payment is but a preparatory act to consignation. It is the manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply
with or pay an obligation. If refused without just cause, the tender of payment will discharge the debtor of
the obligation to pay but only after a valid consignation of the sum due shall have been made with the
proper court.

Consignation is the deposit of the proper amount with a judicial authority, before whom the debtor must
establish compliance with the following mandatory requirements: (1) there was a debt due; (2) the
consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom tender of payment was made
 refused to accept it, or because he was absent or incapacitated, or because several persons claim to be
entitled to receive the amount due, or because the title to the obligation has been lost; (3) previous notice of
the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation; (4) the
amount due was placed at the disposal of the court; and (5) after the consignation had been made, the
person interested was notified thereof. Failure to prove any of these requirements is enough ground to
render a consignation ineffective.

(2-3) The remaining issues are interrelated because their resolution depends on the nature of the remedy which
respondent actually adopted.

As emphasized at the outset, the reliefs respondent prayed for in its Complaint and Amended Complaint are
in the alternative: delivery of the mortgaged properties preparatory to foreclosure or payment of the unpaid
loan.Moreover, after respondent acquired possession of the mortgaged properties through the writs of
replevin, it caused the auction sale of assorted sports outfits, one unit Sansio Karaoke, one unit Sony T.V.
Set and one unit Toyota Corona, and earned proceeds amounting to P78,750.00. While it appears that
respondent failed to obtain the other personal properties covered by the Deed of Mortgage and the writs of
replevin, there is no doubt that it had effectively elected the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage security over the remedy of collection of the unpaid loan.

The RTC was aware that respondent had elected one remedy. In its Decision, it cited the fact that some of
the mortgaged properties which were delivered to respondent by means of the Writs of Replevin had been
sold on auction, and acknowledged that the proceeds from said auction sale should be deducted from the
loan account of petitioners. The RTC noted:

The seized pieces of personal properties by virtue of the writ of replevin and alias writ of replevin
were sold in an auction sale where [respondent] realized P78,750.00 from the sale.

Yet, it is curious that in the dispositive portion of its Decision, the RTC granted respondent the remedy of
collection of sum of money. Not only is there no more reference to the conduct of the auction sale of the
mortgaged properties, there is also no longer any acknowledgment that the proceeds earned from the
auction sale should be deducted from the total unpaid loan.

This is a glaring error.

In Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal, the Court held that the remedies available to any mortgage
creditor are alternative, not cumulative or successive,viz.:
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the
debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In
other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure
of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and for that
reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate
agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation.
Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by
applying the rules above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment
of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the
first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints
simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in
effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and
with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.

By causing the auction sale of the mortgaged properties, respondent effectively adopted and pursued the
remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure, using the writ of replevin as a tool to get hold of the mortgaged
properties. As emphasized in Bachrach, one effect of respondent’s election of the remedy of extra-judicial
foreclosure is its waiver of the remedy of collection of the unpaid loan.
 Therefore, there was no more legal basis for the RTC to grant respondent the relief of collecting from
petitioners “the amount of Php269,611.82 [sic] plus legal interest thereon effective to date until the full
amount is fully paid,” nor for the CA to affirm it.

However, another effect of its election of the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure is that whatever
deficiency remains after applying the proceeds of the auction sale to the total loan obligation may still be
recovered by respondent. But to recover any deficiency after foreclosure, the rule is that a mortgage
creditor must institute an independent civil action.

An examination of the Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals that respondent did not allege any
deficiency account. Nor did it raise the matter in its Pre-Trial Brief. This is only to be expected because the
auction sale of the properties was apparently conducted on June 19, 1992, long after it filed its
Complaint/Amended Complaint and Pre-trial Brief.

However, the Court notes that evidence on the deficiency amount was duly presented by respondent and
examined by petitioners. Documentary evidence of the deficiency amount was also presented in the form of
the August 24, 1992 Statement of Account marked Exhibits “F-1” and “F-2.”Thus, an independent action
to recover the deficiency will merely entail the presentation of the same evidence of the same claim, in the
process taxing the time and resources of the parties and the courts.Therefore, in the higher interest of justice
and equity, the Court takes it upon itself to grant the claim of respondent to the deficiency amount of
P191,111.82, as stated in its August 24, 1992 Statement of Account.

Yet another effect of the election by respondent of the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure is the
inapplicability of Section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 9. Judgment. – After trial of the issues, the court shall determine who has the right of possession to
and the value of the property and shall render judgment in the alternative for the delivery thereof to the
party entitled to the same, or for its value in case delivery can not be made and also for such damages as
either party may prove, with costs.

The properties of petitioners which were seized by virtue of the Writs of Replevin were extra-judicially
foreclosed and sold at public auction by respondent in the exercise of its absolute right under the contract
entered into by the parties, without need of prior notice or demand to forthwith judicially or extra-judicially
foreclose this mortgage and proceed against all or any of the mortgaged rights, interests and properties for
the full satisfaction of the mortgagors' entire obligation to the mortgagee. Finally, under the same Deed of
Mortgage, it is provided that in case of default, petitioners shall be liable for liquidated penalty/collection
charge in the amount equivalent to “twenty-five (25%) percent of said outstanding obligation.” It being
settled that petitioners defaulted on their loan obligation to respondent, the former are liable for liquidated
damages

Enriquez v. Ramos, G.R. No. L-16797, February 27, 1963

TOPIC: Sec. 4 Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

Rule 2, Sec. 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available
as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

OVERVIEW: This is a direct appeal made by Socorro upon the decision of the Court of First Instance against her
averment that the Enriquez and the spouses Dizon are guilty of splitting a single cause of action.

FACTS:

● On November 24,1958, Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses Urbano Dizon and Aurea Soriano de Dizon sold
to Socorro A. Ramos, by a notarial deed of even date, eleven (11) parcels of land situated in Bago Bantay,
 Quezon City, and covered by their corresponding certificates of title, for the stipulated price of
P101,000.00. The vendee paid P5,000.00 down, P2,500.00 in cash, and P2,500.00 by a check drawn against
the Philippine National Bank, and agreed to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within ninety (90) days.

● To secure the said balance, the vendee Socorro A. Ramos, in the same deed of sale, mortgaged the eleven
parcels in favor of the vendors. By way of additional security, Socorro A. Ramos, as attorney-in-fact of her
children, Enrique, Antonio, Milagros, and Lourdes, and as judicial guardian of her minor child Angelita
Ramos, executed another mortgage on Lot No. 409 of the Malinta Estate.

● Because of the vendee-mortgagor's failure to comply with some conditions of the mortgage, this action for
foreclosure of the mortgage was filed by the vendors-mortgagees in the court below, on 29 April 1959 at
the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

● Defendant Socorro Ramos moved to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously had filed action against
her in the Court of First Instance of Manila on February 24, 1959 for the recovery of P2,500.00 paid by
check as part of the down payment on the price of the mortgaged lands; that at the time this first suit was
filed, the mortgage debt was already accrued and demandable; that plaintiffs were, therefore, guilty of
splitting a single cause of action, and under section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, the filing of the first
action for P2,500.00 was a defense that could be pleaded in abatement of the second suit.

● MTC RULING: Upon opposition by the plaintiffs, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the
motion to dismiss; but defendant Ramos repleaded the averments as a special defense in her answer. After
trial, on 16 December 1959, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City rendered judgment against
defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay P96,000.00, with 12% interest from 24 February 1959 until payment,
10% of the amount due as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit; and further decreed the foreclosure sale
of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment within ninety (90) days.

● Socorro Ramos appealed directly to this Court, and here insists that the action should be dismissed on
account of the alleged splitting of appellee's cause of action, and that the obligation not having fixed a
period, although one was intended, the court below should have set first a date of maturity before ordering
payment or foreclosure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case filed by Enriquez, et. al. should be dismissed on the ground of splitting their
cause of action.

RULING: No, the Court finds no merit on this appeal.

An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court of First Instance of Manila shows that
it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the check for P2,500.00 she had issued in
favor of appellees; while the complaint in the present action was for non-payment of the balance of P96,000.00
guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security;
and since the mortgage was constituted on lands situated in Quezon City, the appellees could not ask for its
foreclosure in the Manila courts. The two causes of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.

On the second assignment of error: the stipulation in the mortgage contract that the obligation for P96,000.00
was to be — without interest, payable within ninety (90) days from this date, provided that in case of default it
shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum, clearly fixes a date of maturity, the stipulated twelve per cent in
case of default being nothing more than a penalty, designed to induce the debtor to pay on or before the
expiration of the ninety (90) days. Hence, there was no call upon the court to set another due date.

Finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Possible Questions:
 1. What is splitting a single cause of action?- Splitting a single cause of action is the act of instituting two or
more suits for the same cause of action.

2. Why is splitting a single cause of action not allowed? - The practice of splitting a single cause of action is
discouraged because it breeds multiplicity of suits, clogs the court dockets, leads to vexatious litigation,
operates as an instrument of harassment, and generates unnecessary expenses to the parties.

____________

Tarnate v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-26266, December 29, 1972

TOPIC: Rule 2 - Cause of Action Sec. 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

OVERVIEW: Petitioner Tarnate received 2 complaints, filed on different dates, for forcible entry from respondent
Garcia. Tarnate moved to dismiss the second complaint on the ground of pendency of another action between the
same parties for the same cause. The motion was denied. In this case, the 1st complaint had not been tried yet when
the 2nd complaint was filed therefore, the 2 cases could be tried together as one or the 2nd complaint could be
treated as an amendment of the first.

RAMON A. TARNATE, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
LUCILO U. GARCIA and The Hon. VICTORIANO H. ENDAYA as presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of
Batangas, respondents-appellees.

Facts: On 17 August 1964, Respondent Lucilo U. Garcia filed a complaint for forcible entry against herein
petitioner Ramon A. Tarnate which complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1083. On 10 September 1964,
respondent Garcia filed another complaint for forcible entry against the same defendant in the same court. Tarnate
moved to dismiss the second case, Civil Case No. 1091 on the ground of pendency of another action between the
same parties for the same cause. Garcia opposed the motion. Municipal court denied the motion to dismiss.

CC no. 1083:
2. — On August 2, 1964 plaintiff was and, for some time prior thereto, had been in possession of a strip of land
situated in the Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas and known as the old or abandoned bed of the
Calumpang River, said strip of land

3. — On August 2, 1964 the defendant, without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, unlawfully,
surreptitiously and forcibly, and with the use of armed men, entered upon and took possession of aforementioned
land and placed barbed wire fence along the western side thereby illegally depriving plaintiff of possession of said
land and preventing him from hauling therefrom truckloads of sand, so that, unless restrained by the Court, the
defendant will continue to commit further acts of dispossession and unwarranted intrusion into the land in question,
to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff;

CC no. 1091:
2. That on August 2, 1964 plaintiff was and, for some time prior thereto, had been in lawful and peaceful possession
of strips of land in the Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas and known as the old or abandoned bed of
the Calumpang River situated east of lots 57, 59 and 60 of the Batangas cadastre. Copy of the sketch is hereto
attached and made integral part hereof as Annex "A";

3. That plaintiff's possession over a portion of said strips of land more specifically that portion situated east of Lot
57 is in consequence of his ownership thereof and as regards those portions east of Lots 59 and 60, supra, as
LESSEE thereof;

4. That on August 2, 1964 the defendant, by means of force, strategy and stealth and with the use of armed men,
unlawfully, surreptitiously and forcibly, entered upon and took possession of the aforementioned strips of land,
placed thereon a barbed wire fence, thereby unlawfully and illegally deprived plaintiff of the possession of said
strips of land and prevented him from hauling therefrom truckloads of sand and since the date defendant has
remained in illegal possession of the premises and, up to the present, still retain such unlawful possession thereof, to
the damage and prejudice of plaintiff.

Tarnate filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the municipal court of Batangas and Lucilo U. Garcia
in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying that the order of denial by the municipal court be annulled and that
the said court be commanded not to give due course to, but to order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1091. The Court
of First Instance of Batangas denied the writ prayed for.

Issue: Whether or not the municipal court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the second
complaint because the ground therefor, namely, pendency of another action between the same parties for the same
cause, was not indubitable

Ruling: No. there was no abuse of discretion and that if the municipal court committed an error it was an error of
judgment, which was not correctible by certiorari or prohibition.

In the court of first instance, the parties stipulated in the course of the trial that Civil Case No. 1083 referred to "that
portion of the old bed of the Calumpang River east of Lot 58" and that Civil Case No. 1091 referred to the bed of the
"old course of the Calumpang River east of Lot 57, 59 and 60."

While from the strictly technical viewpoint there was a splitting of the cause of action in pursuing the same remedy
in two separate complaints notwithstanding the fact that the alleged forcible entry constituted one and the same act,
still a realistic and practical approach dictated the action taken by the municipal court. It should be remembered that
the first complaint commenced on 17 August 1964 and had not yet been tried when the second was filed about three
weeks later. The two cases could be tried together as one, or the second complaint could be treated as an amendment
of the first. Either way the entire controversy between the parties could be judicially settled, disregarding unessential
procedural niceties, especially in the light of the reasonable explanation offered by the plaintiff below

Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012

TOPIC: Sec. 6, RULE 3

Rule 3, Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in whom or against whom any right
to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all
such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may
be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with
any proceedings in which he may have no interest.

OVERVIEW: This case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
and set aside the Decision 1 dated October 26, 2007 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
01746. The assailed decision partially reversed and set aside the Decision 2 dated October 20, 2005 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tan jay City, Negros Oriental, Branch 43 in Civil Case No. 11657.
FACTS:
● On July 3, 1996, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for partition, accounting and damages
against Florante, Rita and Panfila. The parties are either the heirs or successors-in-interest of the Baylon
siblings who are the heirs of the estate of spouses Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon.

● The petition alleged therein that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime, owned 43 parcels of land5 all
situated in Negros Oriental. After the death of Spouses Baylon, they claimed that Rita took possession of
the said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income from the same. Using the income produced
by the said parcels of land, Rita allegedly purchased two parcels of land, Lot No. 47096 and half of Lot No.
 4706,7 situated in Canda-uay, Dumaguete City. The petitioners averred that Rita refused to effect a
partition of the said parcels of land.

● In their Answer, Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted that they and the petitioners co-owned 22 out of the 43
parcels of land mentioned in the latter’s complaint, whereas Rita actually owned 10 parcels of land out of
the 43 parcels which the petitioners sought to partition, while the remaining 11 parcels of land are
separately owned by other siblings and relatives.

● During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997, conveyed Lot No.
4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 to Florante. On July 16, 2000, Rita died intestate and without any issue.
Thereafter, learning of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, the petitioners filed a
Supplemental Pleading17 dated February 6, 2002, praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent
be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. They further alleged that Rita was
already sick and very weak when the said Deed of Donation was supposedly executed and, thus, could not
have validly given her consent thereto.

● Florante and Panfila opposed the rescission of the said donation, asserting that Article 1381(4) of the Civil
Code applies only when there is already a prior judicial decree on who between the contending parties
actually owned the properties under litigation.

● RTC DECISION: The RTC rendered a Decision ordering partition over the co-owned lots and that
declared that the death of Rita during the pendency of the case without any issue had rendered the issue of
ownership insofar as parcels of land which she claims as her own moot since the parties below are the heirs
to her estate. Thus, the RTC regarded Rita as the owner of the said 10 parcels of land and, accordingly,
directed that the same be partitioned among her heirs. Nevertheless, the RTC rescinded the donation inter
vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in favor of Florante.

● Florante sought reconsideration of the Decision dated October 20, 2005 of the RTC insofar as it rescinded
the donation of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in his favor. He asserted that, at the time of Rita’s
death on July 16, 2000, Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 were no longer part of her estate as the same
had already been conveyed to him through a donation inter vivos three years earlier. On July 28, 2006, the
RTC issued an Order which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Florante.

● CA DECISION: On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision dated October 26, 2007 reversing the rescission
and remanding the case to determine ownership of the donated lots holding that the rescission was
premature in the absence of a judicial decree that the contested lots were owned by the Spouses Baylon.
The CA held that an action for rescission should be filed by the parties concerned independent of the
proceedings below.

● The petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision dated October 26, 2007 but it was denied by the CA
in its Resolution dated March 6, 2008.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in
favor of Florante may only be rescinded if there is already a judicial determination that the same actually belonged
to the estate of Spouses Baylon.

RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious. The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves two separate,
distinct and independent actions – partition and rescission.

By a joinder of causes of action is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the
basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. The objectives of the rule or provision are to
avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action
a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject
matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. parties to an action may assert in one pleading
as many causes of action as they may have against an opposing party subject to the condition, inter alia, that the
joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules. Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of
action.

The action for partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said
donation inter vivos an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while
an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. Nevertheless,
misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. the courts have the power, order the severance of the
misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately. However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder
or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all
the erroneously joined causes of action. Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC direct the
severance of the petitioners’ action for rescission from their action for partition. While this may be a patent omission
on the part of the RTC, this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of its decision. The
RTC validly adjudicated the issues.

Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads “Upon motion of a party the court may, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of
the pleading sought to be supplemented.” As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster
or add something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original. Here, the issue as to
the validity of the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante is
a new cause of action that occurred after the filing of the original complaint. However, the petitioners’ prayer for the
rescission of the said donation inter vivos in their supplemental pleading is germane to, and is in fact, intertwined
with the cause of action in the partition case.

After having threshed out the procedural matters, we now proceed to adjudicate the substantial issue presented by
the instant petition.

Rescission is a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties and even to third persons, to secure the reparation of
damages caused to them by a contract, even if it should be valid, by means of the restoration of things to their
condition at the moment prior to the celebration of said contract. Contracts are rescissible due to fraud or bad faith
include those which involve things under litigation, if they have been entered into by the defendant without the
knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code.

The reason for this is simple. Article 1381(4) seeks to remedy the presence of bad faith among the parties to a case
and/or any fraudulent act which they may commit with respect to the thing subject of litigation. any disposition of
the thing subject of litigation or any act which tends to render inutile the court’s impending disposition in such case,
sans the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of the court, is unmistakably and irrefutably indicative of bad
faith. , Rita’s failure to inform and seek the approval of the petitioners or the RTC regarding the conveyance gave
the petitioners the right to have the said donation rescinded pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. It bears
stressing that the right to ask for the rescission not contingent upon the final determination of the ownership of the
thing subject of litigation.

It should be stressed that the partition proceedings before the RTC only covers the properties co-owned by the
parties therein in their respective capacity as the surviving heirs of Spouses Baylon. Hence, the authority of the RTC
to issue an order of partition in the proceedings before it only affects those properties which actually belonged to the
estate of Spouses Baylon. In this regard, if Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706, as unwaveringly claimed by
Florante, are indeed exclusively owned by Rita, then the said parcels of land may not be partitioned simultaneously
with the other properties subject of the partition case before the RTC.

Pantranco v. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005 (Supra.)
Union Glass Corp. v. SEC, G.R. No. 64013, November 28, 1983
WHAT DOES THIS CASE TELL YOU ABOUT?

This case talks about joinder of causes of action (Rule 2, Sec 5). While the Rules of Court, which applies
suppletorily to proceedings before the SEC, allows the joinder of causes of action in one complaint, such procedure
however is subject to the rules regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Since petitioner has no
intra-corporate relationship with the complainant, it cannot be joined as party-defendant in said case as to do
so would violate the rule or jurisdiction. Hofileña’s complaint against petitioner for cancellation of the sale of the
glass plant should therefore be brought separately before the regular court.

Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the
joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction
of said court and the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed
shall be the test of jurisdiction.

JURISDICTION OVER A CASE; WHEN COGNIZABLE. — In order that the SEC can take cognizance of a
case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following relationships: (a) between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; (b)between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members, or officers; (c) between the corporation, partnership or association and the state in so far as its franchise,
permit or license to operate is concerned; and (d) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.

JURISDICTION OVER A CASE; WHERE ISSUES INVOLVED LACKED INTRA-CORPORATE

RELATIONSHIP, COGNIZABLE BY R.T.C. — The fact that the controversy at bar involves the rights of
petitioner Union Glass who has no intra-corporate relation either with complainant or the DBP, places the suit
beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent SEC. The case should be tried and decided by the court of general
jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court. This view is in accord with the rudimentary principle that administrative
agencies, like the SEC, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such powers as are
specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes.

What’s the original complaint filed? Nullity of the dacion en pago transaction
Where is it filed? SEC

FACTS:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul and set aside the Order of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, dated September 25, 1981, upholding its jurisdiction in SEC Case No. 2035, entitled "Carolina
Hofileña, Complainant, versus Development Bank of the Philippines, Et Al., Respondents."

Private respondent Carolina Hofileña, complainant in SEC Case No. 2035, is a stockholder of Pioneer Glass
Manufacturing Corporation, Pioneer, a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of silica mines and the
manufacture of glass and glassware. Since 1967, Pioneer Glass had obtained various loan accommodations from the
Development Bank of the Philippines [DBP], and also from other local and foreign sources which DBP guaranteed.

As security for said loan accommodations, Pioneer Glass mortgaged and/or assigned its assets, real and personal, to
the DBP, in addition to the mortgages executed by some of its corporate officers over their personal assets. The
proceeds of said financial exposure of the DBP were used in the construction of a glass plant in Rosario, Cavite, and
the operation of seven silica mining claims owned by the corporation. It appears that through the conversion into
equity of the accumulated unpaid interests on the various loans amounting to P5.4 million as of January 1975, and
subsequently increased by another P2.2 million in 1976, the DBP was able to gain control of the outstanding shares
of common stocks of Pioneer Glass, and to get two, later three, regular seats in the corporation’s board of directors.

Sometime in March, 1978, when Pioneer Glass suffered serious liquidity problems, it entered into a dacion en pago
agreement with DBP, whereby all its assets mortgaged to DBP were ceded to the latter in full satisfaction of the
corporation’s obligations in the total amount of P59,000,000.00. Part of the assets transferred to the DBP was the
glass plant in Rosario, Cavite, which DBP leased and subsequently sold to herein petitioner Union Glass and
Container Corporation, hereinafter referred to as Union Glass.

On April 1, 1981, Carolina Hofileña filed a complaint before the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission
against the DBP, Union Glass and Pioneer Glass. Of the five causes of action pleaded therein, only the first cause of
action concerned petitioner Union Glass as transferee and possessor of the glass plant. Said first cause of action was
based on the alleged illegality of the aforesaid dacion en pago resulting from: [1] the supposed unilateral and
unsupported undervaluation of the assets of Pioneer Glass covered by the agreement; [2] the self-dealing indulged in
by DBP, having acted both as stockholder/director and secured creditor of Pioneer Glass; and the wrongful inclusion
by DBP in its statement of account of P26M as due from Pioneer Glass when the same had already been converted
into equity.

Thus, with respect to said first cause of action, respondent Hofileña prayed that the SEC issue an order:

"1. Holding that the so-called dacion en pago conveying all the assets of Pioneer Glass and the Hofileña personal
properties to Union Glass be declared null and void on the ground that the said conveyance was tainted with.

2. Holding that the assets of the Pioneer Glass taken over by DBP and part of which was delivered to Union Glass
particularly the glass plant to be returned accordingly.
On April 21, 1981, Pioneer Glass filed its answer. On May 8, 1981, petitioners moved for dismissal of the case on
the ground that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the suit. Respondent Hofileña filed
her opposition to said motion, to which herein petitioners filed a rejoinder. SEC Hearing Officer Reyes, upholds
SEC’s jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of petitioners. Unable to secure a reconsideration of
the Order as well as to have the same reviewed by the Commission En Banc, petitioners filed the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition to set aside the order of September 25, 1981, and to prevent respondent SEC from taking
cognizance of SEC Case No. 2035.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Union Glass can join as party-defendant in the instant case?
Is it the regular court or the SEC that has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING: NO, Petitioner cannot be joined as party-defendant. SEC no jurisdiction.

In the ordinary course of things, petitioner Union Glass, as transferee and possessor of the glass plant covered by the
dacion en pago agreement, should be joined as party-defendant under the general rule which requires the joinder of
every party who has an interest in or lien on the property subject matter of the dispute. Such joinder of parties avoids
multiplicity of suits as well as ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.

But since petitioner Union Glass has no intra-corporate relation with either the complainant or the DBP, its joinder
as party-defendant in SEC Case No. 2035 brings the cause of action asserted against it outside the jurisdiction of the
respondent SEC. The jurisdiction of the SEC is delineated by Section 5 of PD No. 902-A.

In order that the SEC can take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following
relationships: [a] between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; [b] between the corporation,
partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; [c] between the corporation,
partnership or association and the state in so far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and [d]
among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.

The fact that the controversy at bar involves the rights of petitioner Union Glass who has no intra-corporate relation
either with complainant or the DBP, places the suit beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent SEC. The case should
be tried and decided by the court of general jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court.

"Inasmuch as the private respondents are not shareholders of the petitioner condominium corporation, the instant
cases for collection cannot be a ‘controversy arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between and
among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively,’ which controversies are under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities & Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 5 [b] of PD. No.
902-A. . . ."

As heretofore pointed out, petitioner Union Glass is involved only in the first cause of action of Hofileña’s
complaint in SEC Case No. 2035. While the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to proceedings before the
SEC, allows the joinder of causes of action in one complaint, such procedure however is subject to the rules
regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Since petitioner has no intra-corporate relationship with the
complainant, it cannot be joined as party-defendant in said case as to do so would violate the rule or
jurisdiction. Hofileña’s complaint against petitioner for cancellation of the sale of the glass plant should therefore
be brought separately before the regular court.

Flores v. Hon. Mallare-Philipps, G.R. No. L-66620, September 24, 1986

Subject matter: Rule 2 Sec. 5 Joinder of causes of action

FACTS:

● Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Mallare-Phillipps of the RTC of Baguio City
and Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction
● The order appealed from, states that the first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against
respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing the cost of truck
tires which he purchased on credit from petition on various occasions
● The second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the
amount of P10,212.00 representing the cost of truck tires which he purchased on several occasions.
● The counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since
the amount of the demand against said respondent is less than P20,000.00 which is the jurisdictional
amount in order for RTC to exercise original jurisdiction of the case under section 19(8) of BP 129.
● It was further averred in said motion that although another person, Calion, was allegedly indebted to
petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other
respondent.
● At the hearing, counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
● The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case subject to the rules on joinder.

HELD: No. The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case. The court ruled that the lower court correctly held that the
jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3
of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties
for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of
which falls within its jurisdiction.
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section 33(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section
11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3
which provides as follows:

Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect
to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common
to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such
orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to
expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.

Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes
of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of
action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the
two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.

In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of
Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining
or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each
complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

NOTE: This case is assigned because it involves the issue of jurisdiction in a civil lawsuit regarding the joinder of
causes of action. The case provides that in situations involving permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule
3, the total of all the claims must be considered for jurisdictional purposes. However, for this rule to apply, the
claims against the parties should arise from the same transaction or series of transactions and involve a common
question of law or fact. If the claims are separate and distinct, they should not be joined in one complaint, and each
claim should satisfy the jurisdictional threshold independently.

Genesis Investment v. Heirs of Ebarasabal, G.R. No. 181622, November 20, 2013

OVERVIEW: This case tells about Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court that where the causes of action are
between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC
provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein.

Also, In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by courts of
first instance [now Regional Trial Courts].

FACTS: On November 12, 2003, herein respondents filed against herein petitioners a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees. The Complaint was filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu.

On August 5, 2004, herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss4 contending, among others, that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to try the case on the ground that, as the case involves title to or possession of real property or any
interest therein and since the assessed value of the subject property does not exceed ₱20,000.00 (the same being
only ₱11,990.00), the action falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
In its Order dated September 29, 2004, the RTC granted petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.

Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, arguing that their complaint consists of several causes of
action, including one for annulment of documents, which is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, as such, falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

On March 17, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting respondents' Motion for Partial Reconsideration and
reversing its earlier Order.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the RTC denied it in its Order dated June 23, 2005.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA dismissed the petition via its
assailed Decision dated July 11, 2007, holding that the subject matter of respondents' complaint is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that the main purpose in filing
the action is to declare null and void the documents assailed therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a joinder of causes of action involve in this case.

RULINGS: YES.

It is provided under Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court that where the causes of action are between the same
parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein. Thus, as shown above,
respondents complaint clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

It is true that one of the causes of action of respondents pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of the
contending parties over the contested property, the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the
allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As stated above, it is clear from the records that respondents' complaint was for "Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees." In filing their Complaint with the RTC,
respondents sought to recover ownership and possession of their shares in the disputed parcel of land by questioning
the due execution and validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well as the Memorandum of
Agreement entered into by and between some of their co-heirs and herein petitioners. Aside from praying that the
RTC render judgment declaring as null and void the said Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale and
Memorandum of Agreement, respondents likewise sought the following:

(1) nullification of the Tax Declarations subsequently issued in the name of petitioner Cebu Jaya Realty,
Inc.;
(2) partition of the property in litigation;
(3) reconveyance of their respective shares; and
(4) payment of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, plus appearance fees.

As cited by the CA, this Court, in the case of Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,16 held that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by courts of
first instance [now Regional Trial Courts]
Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of partition of or
recovery of shares or interest over the real property in question but includes an action for declaration of nullity of
contracts and documents which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Uniwide Holdings v. Cruz, G.R. No. 171456, August 9, 2007

Petitioner Uniwide Holdings Inc entered into a Franchise Agreement granting Cruz a five-year franchise to adopt
and use the Uniwide Store System for the establishment and operation of a Uniwide Family Store.

Cruz had outstanding obligations drawing UHI to send him a letter of even date for the settlement and remained
unsettled.

UHI filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before the RTC and the complaint Cruz filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue and granted by the RTC.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

WON on several causes of action is dismissible on the ground of improper venue.

Ruling:

The general rule on venue of personal actions, as in petitioner’s complaint for collection of sum of money, is
embodied in Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The afore-quoted provision is, however, qualified by Section 4 of the same rule which allows parties, before the
filing of the action, to validly agree in writing on an exclusive venue.

The forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue of an action does not, however, preclude parties from
bringing a case to other venues.

Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does not arise out of the contract
where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the complaint, as in the one at bar, may be brought before other
venues provided that such other cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein.

Based on the allegations in petitioner’s complaint, the second and third causes of action are based on the deeds of
assignment executed in its favor by FPC and USWCI. The deeds bear no exclusive venue stipulation with respect to
the causes of action thereunder. Hence, the general rule on venue applies – that the complaint may be filed in the
place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.

It bears emphasis that the causes of action on the assigned accounts are not based on a breach of the agreement
between UHI and Cruz. They are based on separate, distinct and independent contracts-deeds of assignment in
which UHI is the assignee of Cruz’s obligations to the assignors FPC and USWCI. Thus, any action arising from the
deeds of assignment cannot be subjected to the exclusive venue stipulation embodied in the agreement. So San
Miguel Corporation v. Monasterio14 enlightens:
Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the suit relates to
breach of said contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily encompassing, such that even
those not related to the enforcement of the contract should be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation
designating exclusive venues should be strictly confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the
basic principles of freedom to contract might work to the great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who ought to be
allowed free access to courts of justice.

In fine, since the other causes of action in petitioner’s complaint do not relate to a breach of the agreement it forged
with Cruz embodying the exclusive venue stipulation, they should not be subjected thereto. As San Miguel further
enlightens:

Restrictive stipulations are in derogation of the general policy of making it more convenient for the parties to
institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements. Thus, the restriction should be strictly construed as
relating solely to the agreement for which the exclusive venue stipulation is embodied. Expanding the scope of such
limitation on a contracting party will create unwarranted restrictions which the parties might find unintended or
worse, arbitrary and oppressive.

Unicapital v. Consing, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013
FACTS:

In 1997, Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), obtained an
₱18,000,000.00 loan from Unicapital. The said loan was secured by Promissory Notes and a Real Estate Mortgage
registered in the name of Dela Cruz as per Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).

Juanito Tan Teng (Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu) informed Unicapital that they are the lawful owners of the subject
property and that Dela Cruz’s title was a mere forgery.

Investigations on the subject property later revealed that Dela Cruz's title was actually of dubious origin. A real
estate company PBI and Unicapital then sent separate demand letters to Dela Cruz and Consing, Jr., seeking the
return of the purchase price they had paid for the subject property.

On May 3, 1999, Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a Complex Action for Declaratory Relief and later
amended to Complex Action for Injunctive Relief (Consing, Jr.’s complaint) before the RTC-Pasig City against
Unicapital, URI, PBI, and others.

In his complaint, Consing, Jr. claimed that the incessant demands/recovery efforts made upon him by Unicapital and
PBI to return to them the purchase price they had paid for the subject property constituted harassment and
oppression which severely affected his personal and professional life .

Unicapital, URI, and Martirez (Unicapital, et al.) filed separate Motions to Dismiss. One of the grounds was on the
docket fees.

Respondent Unicapital posited that the RTC-PasigCity did not acquire jurisdiction over the case given that Consing,
Jr. failed to pay the proper amount of docket fees. In the same vein, they maintained that the RTC-Pasig City had no
jurisdiction over their supposed violations of the Corporation Code and Revised Securities Act, which, discounting
its merits, should have been supposedly lodged with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The RTC-Pasig on its Resolution denied respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code. It
ruled that where there is abusive behavior, a complainant, like Consing, Jr., has the right to seek refuge from the
courts.

Complainants then elevated the case before the CA via petition for certiorari and prohibition. The CA then rendered
a Joint Decision holding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC-Pasig City in refusing to
dismiss Consing, Jr.'s complaint Thus, this case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss.

HELD:

No. A careful perusal of his complaint discloses that Consing, Jr. did not seek to hold Unicapital and PBI, et al.
liable for any specific violation of the Corporation Code or the Revised Securities Act. Rather, he merely sought
damages for Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s alleged acts of making him sign numerous documents and their use of the
same against him. In this respect, Consing, Jr. actually advances an injunction and damages case which properly
falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC-Pasig City.

Additionally, neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his
complaint. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the complaint does not automatically cause
the dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are paid within a reasonable period.

Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s insistence that the stringent rule on non-payment of docket fees enunciated in the
case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA should be applied in this case cannot be sustained in the
absence of proof that Consing, Jr. intended to defraud the government by his failure to pay the correct amount of
filing fees.

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the
time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
rules prescribing such payment.

Iniego v. Hon. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006

TOPIC:
WHAT DOES THIS CASE TELL YOU ABOUT?

FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 Private Respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for
quasi-delict and damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, driver of the truck involved in the traffic accident, and against
Artemio Iniego (Petitioner), owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion. The complaint stemmed from a
vehicular accident in 1999, where a freight truck driven by Pinion hit PR’s jitney which Santos was driving at the
time of the accident. (No details given.) The total amount of damages claimed is P490,000 Santos filed a Motion to
Declare Iniego in default for failure of the latter to file his answer within the final extended period. Iniego filed a
Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
cause of action. Judge Guillermo G. Purganan of the RTC issued the assailed Omnibus Order, which ruled:

The Motion to Declare Iniego in default must be denied, as Iniego’s failure to file his answer was because the Order
was sent to the wrong address, and so Iniego never received it. The main cause of action is not the claim for
damages, but quasi-delict. Damages are claimed only as a result of the
alleged fault or negligence of both defendants under Art. 2176 in the case of Pinion, and Art. 2180 for Iniego. But
since fault or negligence cannot be the subject of pecuniary estimation, this court (RTC) has exclusive jurisdiction.
Iniego moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
What’s the original complaint filed?
Complaint for quasi delict and damagest against the petitioner as the owner of the truck and the driver,
Pinion.
Where is it filed?
RTC
What happened?
Defendant (herein petitioner) to an action based on QD filed a Motion to Dismiss the action against him
pending before the RTC on the ground that such court has no jurisdiction over it. Private respondent asserts
otherwise. Respondent judge ruled in favor of the latter, claiming that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the action. CA affirmed. SC affirmed insofar as jurisdiction remains with the RTC, considering that the total
amount claimed is P490,000

ISSUE:
Whether or not actions for damages based on quasi-delict is capable of pecuniary estimation.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. Petition for Certiorari denied for lack of merit. Fault or negligence
is not actionable by itself, and must be a resulting damage to a third person. The relief available to the offended
party in such cases is for the reparation, restitution, or payment of such damage. The fault or negligence of the
defendant, is inextricably intertwined with the claim for damages, and there can be no action based on quasi-delict
without a claim for damages. The subject matter of actions for damages based on quasi-delict is capable of
pecuniary estimation. In the current case, the total amount of damages claimed by the private respondent still
exceeds the jurisdictional limit of P400,000.00, and thus remains under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Furthermore,
Rule 2, Section 5 allows a party to assert as many causes of action as he may have against the opposing party, while
subsection (d) provides that where the claims in all such joined causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. Whether or not the different claims for
damages are based on a single cause of action or different causes of action, it is the total amount thereof which shall
govern.

Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012 (Supra.)

TOPIC: Sec. 6, RULE 3
● Rule 3, Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief
in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs
or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be
just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no interest.
FACTS:
● On July 3, 1996, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for partition, accounting and damages
against Florante, Rita and Panfila. The parties are either the heirs or successors-in-interest of the Baylon
siblings who are the heirs of the estate of spouses Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon.
● The petition alleged therein that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime, owned 43 parcels of land5 all
situated in Negros Oriental. After the death of Spouses Baylon, they claimed that Rita took possession of
the said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income from the same. Using the income produced
by the said parcels of land, Rita allegedly purchased two parcels of land, Lot No. 47096 and half of Lot No.
4706,7 situated in Canda-uay, Dumaguete City. The petitioners averred that Rita refused to effect a
partition of the said parcels of land.
● In their Answer, Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted that they and the petitioners co-owned 22 out of the 43
parcels of land mentioned in the latter’s complaint, whereas Rita actually owned 10 parcels of land out of
 the 43 parcels which the petitioners sought to partition, while the remaining 11 parcels of land are
separately owned by other siblings and relatives.
● During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997, conveyed Lot No.
4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 to Florante. On July 16, 2000, Rita died intestate and without any issue.
Thereafter, learning of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, the petitioners filed a
Supplemental Pleading17 dated February 6, 2002, praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent
be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. They further alleged that Rita was
already sick and very weak when the said Deed of Donation was supposedly executed and, thus, could not
have validly given her consent thereto.
● Florante and Panfila opposed the rescission of the said donation, asserting that Article 1381(4) of the Civil
Code applies only when there is already a prior judicial decree on who between the contending parties
actually owned the properties under litigation.
● RTC DECISION: The RTC rendered a Decision ordering partition over the co-owned lots and that
declared that the death of Rita during the pendency of the case without any issue had rendered the issue of
ownership insofar as parcels of land which she claims as her own moot since the parties below are the heirs
to her estate. Thus, the RTC regarded Rita as the owner of the said 10 parcels of land and, accordingly,
directed that the same be partitioned among her heirs. Nevertheless, the RTC rescinded the donation inter
vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in favor of Florante.
● Florante sought reconsideration of the Decision dated October 20, 2005 of the RTC insofar as it rescinded
the donation of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in his favor. He asserted that, at the time of Rita’s
death on July 16, 2000, Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 were no longer part of her estate as the same
had already been conveyed to him through a donation inter vivos three years earlier. On July 28, 2006, the
RTC issued an Order which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Florante.
● CA DECISION: On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision dated October 26, 2007 reversing the rescission
and remanding the case to determine ownership of the donated lots holding that the rescission was
premature in the absence of a judicial decree that the contested lots were owned by the Spouses Baylon.
The CA held that an action for rescission should be filed by the parties concerned independent of the
proceedings below.
● The petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision dated October 26, 2007 but it was denied by the CA
in its Resolution dated March 6, 2008.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in
favor of Florante may only be rescinded if there is already a judicial determination that the same actually belonged
to the estate of Spouses Baylon.

RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious. The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves two separate,
distinct and independent actions – partition and rescission.

By a joinder of causes of action is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the
basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. The objectives of the rule or provision are to
avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action
a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject
matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. parties to an action may assert in one pleading
as many causes of action as they may have against an opposing party subject to the condition, inter alia, that the
joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules. Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of
action.

The action for partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said
donation inter vivos an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while
an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. Nevertheless,
misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. the courts have the power, order the severance of the
misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately. However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder
or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all
the erroneously joined causes of action. Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC direct the
severance of the petitioners’ action for rescission from their action for partition. While this may be a patent omission
on the part of the RTC, this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of its decision. The
RTC validly adjudicated the issues.

Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads “Upon motion of a party the court may, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of
the pleading sought to be supplemented.” As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster
or add something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original. Here, the issue as to
the validity of the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante is
a new cause of action that occurred after the filing of the original complaint. However, the petitioners’ prayer for the
rescission of the said donation inter vivos in their supplemental pleading is germane to, and is in fact, intertwined
with the cause of action in the partition case.

After having threshed out the procedural matters, we now proceed to adjudicate the substantial issue presented by
the instant petition.

Rescission is a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties and even to third persons, to secure the reparation of
damages caused to them by a contract, even if it should be valid, by means of the restoration of things to their
condition at the moment prior to the celebration of said contract. Contracts are rescissible due to fraud or bad faith
include those which involve things under litigation, if they have been entered into by the defendant without the
knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code.

The reason for this is simple. Article 1381(4) seeks to remedy the presence of bad faith among the parties to a case
and/or any fraudulent act which they may commit with respect to the thing subject of litigation. any disposition of
the thing subject of litigation or any act which tends to render inutile the court’s impending disposition in such case,
sans the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of the court, is unmistakably and irrefutably indicative of bad
faith. , Rita’s failure to inform and seek the approval of the petitioners or the RTC regarding the conveyance gave
the petitioners the right to have the said donation rescinded pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. It bears
stressing that the right to ask for the rescission not contingent upon the final determination of the ownership of the
thing subject of litigation.

It should be stressed that the partition proceedings before the RTC only covers the properties co-owned by the
parties therein in their respective capacity as the surviving heirs of Spouses Baylon. Hence, the authority of the RTC
to issue an order of partition in the proceedings before it only affects those properties which actually belonged to the
estate of Spouses Baylon. In this regard, if Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706, as unwaveringly claimed by
Florante, are indeed exclusively owned by Rita, then the said parcels of land may not be partitioned simultaneously
with the other properties subject of the partition case before the RTC.

Limjoco v. Instestate Estate, G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948

FACTS:

Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered
its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install,
maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence therein
showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing
the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan;
that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate
estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service".

The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of
section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate
Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator,
appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive
capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant
in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to
the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).

In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the
legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before
the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in
contravention of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a person and have legal personality

RULING:

YES.

Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it
seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term
"person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these
latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law,
or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to
include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar
nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons.

Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered
an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations
of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the
Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final
conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same
reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of
subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to
P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant
proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this Court.

We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on
Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our
law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be
considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as
to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Barlin vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-2832, Nov. 24, 1906

FACTS:

Since 1839, priests of the Roman Catholic Church have administered in pueblo Lagonoy, province of Ambos
Camarines. The church and convent were burnt in 1869. With the direction of cabeza de barangay, the necessary
reconstruction was performed by the people of pueblo and the materials were paid by the funds of the church and
some were donations from certain individuals of the pueblo. After completion, it was always administered by the
Roman Catholic Church. Vicente Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest, took possession of
the church on July 5, 1901 and administered it under the orders of his superior until November 14, 1902. His
successor, having then appointed, made a demand on this defendant for the delivery of him of the church, convent,
and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money and other property of the church which the latter
refused to make. Such refusal is made

through written document expressing the church’s

intention to separate from the obedience and control of the Pope at Rome and join the Filipino National Church.
The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church building, the
convent, cemetery, the books, money and other property belonging thereto, and asking it be restored to the
possession thereof. In return, the defendant answered that the municipality of Lagonoy and its inhabitants are the
lawful owners of the said property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not they said property is owned by the Catholic Church having the capacity as juridical person.

HELD:

The court decided in favor of the plaintiff; hence, the Catholic Church is the owner of the property, having its
capacity, here in the Philippines. The possession of the churches, their care and custody, and maintenance of
religious worship were necessarily entrusted to that body.

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Stronghold Insurance v. Cuenca, G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013
FACTS:

● On January 19, 1998, Marañon filed a complaint in the RTC against the Cuencas for the collection of a sum
of money and damages included an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
● On January 26, 1998, the RTC granted the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment conditioned upon the posting of a bond ₱1,000,000.00 executed in favor of the Cuencas. Less
than a month later, Marañon amended the complaint to implead Tayactac as a defendant.
● Marañon posted SICI Bond (P1M) issued by Stronghold Insurance. Two days later, the RTC issued the writ
of preliminary attachment.
● Enforcing the writ of preliminary attachment on February 16 and 17, 1998, the sheriff levied upon the
equipment, supplies, materials and various other personal property belonging to Arc Cuisine, Inc. The
sheriff submitted a report on his proceedings, and filed an ex parte motion seeking the transfer of the levied
properties to a safe place. The RTC granted the ex parte motion.
● The Cuencas and Tayactac presented in the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Writ of Preliminary
Attachment. RTC denied the Motion but the CA reversed this decision. The CA remanded the hearing and
resolution of the Cuencas and Tayactac’s claim for the damages sustained from the enforcement of the writ
of preliminary attachment.
● Upon checking the levied items were all gone and missing.
● RTC held Marañon and Stronghold Insurance jointly and solidarily liable for damages to the Cuencas and
Tayactac. CA, finding no reversible error, promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the Cuencas and Tayactac could themselves recover damages arising from the wrongful
attachment of the assets of Arc Cuisine, Inc.

RULING: NO.
Sec. 2, Rule 3 of RoC requires that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under the same rule, a real party in interest is one
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or one who is entitled to the avails of the suit.
Accordingly, a person, to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, should appear to be
the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced, that is, his interest must be a present substantial interest,
not mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.

The remedial right or the remedial obligation is the person’s interest in the controversy. The right of the plaintiff or
other claimant is alleged to be violated by the defendant, who has the correlative obligation to respect the right of the
former. Otherwise put, without the right, a person may not become a party plaintiff; without the obligation, a person
may not be sued as a party defendant; without the violation, there may not be a suit. In such a situation, it is legally
impossible for any person or entity to be both plaintiff and defendant in the same action, thereby ensuring that the
controversy is actual and exists between adversary parties. Where there are no adversary parties before it, the court
would be without jurisdiction to render a judgment.

There is no dispute that the properties subject to the levy on attachment belonged to Arc Cuisine, Inc. alone, not to
the Cuencas and Tayactac in their own right. They were only stockholders of Arc Cuisine, Inc., which had a
personality distinct and separate from that of any or all of them. The damages occasioned to the properties by the
levy on attachment, wrongful or not, prejudiced Arc Cuisine, Inc., not them. As such, only Arc Cuisine, Inc. had the
right under the substantive law to claim and recover such damages. This right could not also be asserted by the
Cuencas and Tayactac unless they did so in the name of the corporation itself. But that did not happen herein,
because Arc Cuisine, Inc. was not even joined in the action either as an original party or as an intervenor.

The Cuencas and Tayactac were clearly not vested with any direct interest in the personal properties coming under
the levy on attachment by virtue alone of their being stockholders in Arc Cuisine, Inc. Their stockholdings
represented only their proportionate or aliquot interest in the properties of the corporation, but did not vest in them
any legal right or title to any specific properties of the corporation. Without doubt, Arc Cuisine, Inc. remained the
owner as a distinct legal person.

Given the separate and distinct legal personality of Arc Cuisine, Inc., the Cuencas and Tayactac lacked the legal
personality to claim the damages sustained from the levy of the former’s properties.

Mayor Dagdag v. Tongnawa, G.R. Nos. 161166-67, February 3, 2005

Sec 2. Parties in interest

Facts: Petitioner was formerly the mayor of the municipality of Tanudan, Province of Kalinga. Michael
Tongnawa and Antonio Gammod, respondents, are the municipal engineer and municipal planning and development
coordinator, respectively, of the said municipality.
The respondents were administratively sanctioned for acts of becoming of public servants and failure to perform
their duties. After investigation, the Municipal Grievance Committee found respondents liable for insubordination,
non-performance of duties and absences without official leaves (AWOL).

On November 27, 1995, petitioner issued an order suspending respondents from their respective positions for two
months or from December 1, 1995 to February 28, 1996, and subsequently dropped from the roll of employees
effective May 28, 1996. In both instances, they appealed to Civil Service Commission and denied.

The decisions were reversed by the Court of Appeals upon respondents’ petitions for review, reinstating them to
their respective positions and ordering the payment of corresponding backwages. Petitioner filed a joint motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the instant petition.
Basically, petitioner alleges that his "suspension and dismissal orders against the respondents are supported by
substantial evidence." Moreover, the sworn declarations of William Tumbali and Guilbert Dangpason, the
designated Chairman of the Municipal Grievance Committee, that there was actually no investigation conducted on
petitioner's charges, are "devoid of credibility."

In their joint comment, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal personality to file the instant petition because he
had ceased to be the municipal mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga; and that the CSC, being the aggrieved party, is the
proper party to file this petition.

Issue: Who may appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Held: The former mayor is no longer the “real party in interest” in the case. The petition was denied.

In resolving the issue, the concept of "real party in interest" becomes relevant.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

"SEC. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest."

The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one
entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest," as contemplated by the Rules, means material interest or an
interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a
mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished
from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who
has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.

The Court held that the CSC and the mayor of Tanudan are real parties in interest in this case and, therefore, can
contest the assailed joint Decision of the Court of Appeals.

The CSC is the party adversely affected by the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals because it has been
mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system. Thus, any
transgression by herein respondents of the CSC rules and regulations will adversely affect its integrity. Significantly,
it has not challenged the assailed Decision.

As regards the mayor of Tanudan, there are two (2) reasons why he may interpose such appeal. The first is rooted in
his power to appoint officials and employees of his municipality. His right to appeal flows from the fact that his
power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. Being chief executive of the municipality, he possesses this
disciplinary power over appointive municipal officials and employees. The second reason why the municipal mayor
of Tanudan has legal personality to challenge the Decision of the Court of Appeals is because the salaries of the
respondents, being municipal officials, are drawn from the municipal funds. Obviously, the mayor has real and
substantial interest in the outcome of the administrative cases against respondents.

Admittedly, however, petitioner, at the time he filed with this Court the instant petition assailing the Appellate Court
Decision, was no longer the mayor of Tanudan.
In several cases, the court held that where the petitioner (a public officer) ceases to be mayor, the appeal and/or
action he initiated may be continued and maintained by his successor if there is substantial need to do so. If the
successor failed to pursue the appeal and/or action, the same should be dismissed.

Records show that upon petitioner's cessation from public office, his successor did not file any manifestation to the
effect that he is continuing and maintaining this appeal.

The court agrees with the respondents that petitioner has lost his legal personality to interpose the instant petition.

————————————————
Spouses Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006
Facts:
Sabas Limbaring transferred his lot to his two nieces- Jennifer and Sarah Jane. His daughter, Oco, filed a case of
perjury and falsification against her uncle, Victor, his 2 daughters. They agreed to return the lots with Oco paying
necessary expenses of 25k (30k at first but renegotiated to 25k).
Oco was able to transfer the lot to her name. Respondent, however, filed a case against Sps Oco fo for the rescission
of the sales contracts, with recovery of possession and ownership of the two parcels of land. Oco filed a MTD on the
ground that respondent was not a real party in interest. In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, respondent
contended that he was a trustor, whose property was being held in trust by his daughters.
Oco filed an Answer with Counterclaim, alleging in the mainly: 1) that respondent had tried to secure a DAR
clearance and to have a certificate of title issued in his name, but failed because Republic Act (RA) 6657 prohibited
the acquisition of more than five hectares of agricultural land; 2) that through deceit and manipulation, respondent
was able to convince Sabas Limbaring to execute the two Deeds of Sale, notwithstanding the lack of any
consideration.
RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the Complaint and Counterclaim, on the ground that respondent was not
the real party in interest.
CA held that a trust relationship was created and reversed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Is Respondent a real party-in-interest? NO.
Ruling:
Rule on real parties in interest
GR: only contracting parties, the parties bound by it, are the ones who can violate and benefit from it. Thus, one who
is not a party to a contract, and for whose benefit it was not expressly made, cannot maintain an action on it. One
cannot do so, even if the contract performed by the contracting parties would incidentally inure to one’s benefit.
Except: those who are not principally or subsidiarily obligated in a contract, in which they had no intervention, may
show their detriment that could result from it.
Eg. Contracts pour autrui
Respondent’s Complaint, entitled "Rescission of Contract & Recovery of Possession & Ownership of Two Parcels
of Land," is clearly an action on a contract. The agreements sought to be rescinded clearly show that the parties to
the Deeds of Absolute Sale were Jennifer and Sarah Jane Limbaring as vendors and Percita Oco as vendee. Clearly
then, the action upon the contracts may -- as a rule -- be instituted only by Jennifer and Sarah Jane against Percita.
No trust relationship was created. One who alleges a trust relationship has the burden of proof. Respondent has
presented only bare assertions that a trust was created.

Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120465, September 9, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioners William Uy and Rodel Roxas are agents authorized to sell eight parcels of land by the owners
thereof. They offered to sell the said parcels of land to respondent National Housing Authority to be utilized and
developed as a housing project. The NHA Board approved the acquisition of said lands. However, only five parcels
were paid for by the NHA because of the report it received from the Land Geosciences Bureau of the Department of
Environment and National Resources (DENR) that the remaining area is located at an active landslide area and,
therefore, not suitable for development into a housing project. Subsequently, the NHA cancelled the sale over the
three parcels of land but it offered the amount of P1.225 million to the landowners as daños perjuicios. On the other
hand, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Complaint for Damages against
NHA and its General Manager Robert Balao. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the cancellation of
the contract to be justified. Nevertheless, it awarded damages to plaintiffs in the sum of P1.255 million. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
THE RESPONDENT CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS FAILED TO JOIN AS INDISPENSABLE PARTY PLAINTIFF THE SELLING LOT-OWNERS.
RULING: NO.

Petitioners claim that they lodged the complaint not in behalf of their principals but in their own name as
agents directly damaged by the termination of the contract. The damages prayed for were intended not for the
benefit of their principals but to indemnify petitioners for the losses they themselves allegedly incurred as a result of
such termination.
These damages consist mainly of "unearned income" and advances. Petitioners, thus, attempt to distinguish
the case at bar from those involving agents or apoderedos instituting actions in their own name but in behalf of
their principals. 5 Petitioners in this case purportedly brought the action for damages in their own name and
in their own behalf.

Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be prosecuted and defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest.

The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest, within the meaning of the rule, means material interest, an
interest in the issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. 6 Cases construing the real party-in-interest provision can be more easily
understood if it is borne in mind that the true meaning of real party-in-interest may be summarized as follows: A n
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be
enforced.

As such an indispensable party, their joinder in the action is mandatory and the complaint may be
dismissed if not so impleaded

Tampico v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 76225, March 31, 1992

FACTS:
Petitioner Espiridion Tanpingco is a tenant-lessee of Benedicto Horca (respondent) who owns a riceland
in Jaro, Leyte. In a letter dated April 9, 1985, Horca’s representative informed Tanpingco to desist from working
on the land. Tanpingco is also ordered to vacate the premises because the subject lot was donated to the
Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports Region VIII as a school site for the Buenavista Barangay High School.
Tanpingco filed for payment of disturbance compensation against Horca. Respondent files a motion to dismiss,
stating that the petitioner has no cause of action because he is not the real party-in-interest (after donating the
subject lot).

What’s the original complaint filed?

a complaint for payment of disturbance compensation with damages
Where is it filed?
RTC Palo Leyte
What happened?

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is the real party-in-interest.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in NEGATIVE. Respondent is not the real party-in-interest, and is not
responsible for the payment of disturbance compensation. The Ministry of Education, as the new owner of the
land should pay the disturbance compensation before constructing the school building.
The respondent filed instead a Motion to Dismiss alleging principally that the complaint states no cause of action
because the respondent is not the real party-in-interest having already donated the subject land to the Ministry of
Education, Culture, and Sports, Region VIII, as a school site of the Buenavista Barangay High School; and that the
donation not having in anyway benefited the respondent, no disturbance compensation is due the petitioner since
under Section 36 (1) of the Agrarian Reform Code as amended, disturbance compensation holds true only in cases
wherein the lessor-owner derives financial benefits from the conversion of the agricultural land into non-agricultural
purposes.
⮚ Respondent is not the real party-in-interest, and is not responsible for the payment of disturbance compensation.
The Ministry of Education, as the new owner of the land should pay the disturbance compensation before
constructing the school building.

TOPIC: Sec. 2. Parties in interest

Salonga v. Warner, Barnes, G.R. No. L-2246, January 31, 1951

The Court held that an action must be brought against the real party in interest, or against a party which may be
bound by the judgment to be rendered therein. The real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment, or the "party entitled to the avails of the suit"

And in the case at bar, the defendant issued upon in its capacity as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance Company of
New York in spite of the fact that the insurance contract has not been signed by it.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court: requires that "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest." A corollary proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought against the real party in
interest, or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein. The real party in interest
is the party who would be benefit or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avail of the suit.

Sec. 3. Representatives as parties

But where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real property in
interest.

FACTS:

Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York entered into a contract with Tina J. Gamboa for the
shipment of one case of rayon yardage. Upon arrival, it was discovered that there were a shortage of 1,723.12 pesos
on the shipment from San Francisco, California, on steamer Clovis Victory, to Manila. Consignee, Jovito Salonga,
demanded from American President Lines agents of the ship Clovis Victory, demanding settlement, and when
apparently no action was taken on this claim, plaintiff demanded payment thereof from Warner, Barnes and Co.,
Ltd., as agent of the insurance company in the Philippines to pay him the excess amount. In the meantime, American
President Lines agreed to pay to the plaintiff the amount under its liability in the bill of lading, and when this offer
was rejected, the claim was finally settled. As a result, the amount claimed in the complaint as the ultimate liability
of the defendant under the insurance contract was reduced to P717.82 only. The trial court held that defendant, as
agent of Westchester Fire Insurance is responsible upon the insurance claim subject tot the suit. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the defendant having been denied, the case was appealed to this court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is the real party in interest.

HELD: NO
Counsel next contends that Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd., is not the real party in interest against whom the suit
should be brought. It is claimed that this action should have been filed against its principal, the Westchester Fire
Insurance Company of New York.

This point is also well taken. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that "every action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest."

A corollary proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought against the real party in interest, or against a
party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein (Salmon & Pacific Commercial Co. vs. Tan
Cueco, 36 Phil., 556). The real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
the "party entitled to the avails of the suit" (1 Sutherland, Court Pleading Practice & Fornts, p. 11).

And in the case at bar, the defendant issued upon in its capacity as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance Company of
New York in spite of the fact that the insurance contract has not been signed by it. As we have said, the defendant
did not assume any obligation thereunder either as agent or as a principal. It cannot, therefore, be made liable under
said contract, and hence it can be said that this case was filed against one who is not the real party in interest.

The scope and extent of the functions of an adjustment and settlement agent do not include personal liability. His
functions are merely to settle and adjusts claims in behalf of his principal if those claims are proven and
undisputed, and if the claim is disputed or is disapproved by the principal, like in the instant case, the agent does
not assume any personal liability. The recourse of the insured is to press his claim against the principal.

Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012

Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59731, January 11, 1990 (Supra.)
TOPIC: Rule 3, Sec. 3. Representatives as parties

OVERVIEW:
In this case, the role of representatives in legal proceedings is crucial. The central issue pertains to whether legal
proceedings can be pursued against a deceased individual and their estate. Ching Leng, the deceased party, was
represented in the lawsuit by his estate administrator, Alfredo Ching. Despite the representation, the court raised
questions about its jurisdiction over Ching Leng, who had passed away. It emphasized that a deceased individual
lacks juridical personality, rendering it challenging to serve summons.

FACTS:
• The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land. In May 1960, a decree and title were issued to spouses
Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan for this land. In August 1960, a portion of the property was reconveyed
to certain individuals, and a new title was issued. Later, in September 1961, the property was sold to Ching Leng,
who obtained a new title.

• Ching Leng passed away in 1965, and his legitimate son, Alfredo Ching, filed for the administration of
Ching Leng's estate. During this process, the land in question was included in the estate inventory.

• Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death, Pedro Asedillo filed a suit against him for reconveyance of the
property based on possession. Since Ching Leng was deceased, the suit was filed against his estate. Despite Ching
Leng's last known address being listed, he was not known to be alive or dead at the time.

• Summons by publication was initiated, and a judgment by default was rendered in favor of Pedro Asedillo.
The court declared Pedro Asedillo the owner of the property and ordered the estate to reconvey it.

• Alfredo Ching later learned of this decision and filed a petition to set it aside for lack of jurisdiction. The
court initially granted his petition but later reinstated the decision upon reconsideration.
• Alfredo Ching's subsequent attempts to challenge the decision were unsuccessful, including a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

• During the case's pendency with the Court of Appeals, Pedro Asedillo passed away.

ISSUE:
WON the proceedings for reconveyance and cancellation of title can be held ex-parte.

RULING:
Yes. Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in
question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the
action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475 [1976]) the decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is
void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with summons.
He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost
through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).

The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching Leng's estate as co-
defendant. it is a well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued through an executor or administrator in his
representative capacity (21 Am. Jr. 872). Contrary to private respondent's claims, deceased Ching Leng is a resident
of 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City as shown in his death certificate and T. C. T. No. 91137 and there is an on-going
intestate proceedings in the same court, Branch III commenced in 1965, and notice of hearing thereof duly published
in the same year. Such misleading and misstatement of facts demonstrate lack of candor on the part of private
respondent and his counsel, which is censurable.

The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land registration case,
RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act
(Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P
(Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748 [1982]).

Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the other
world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held (Estanislao
v. Honrado, supra).

The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner Perkins was a non-
resident defendant sued in Philippine courts and sought to be excluded from whatever interest she has in 52,874
shares of stocks with Benguet Consolidated Mining Company. The action being a quasi in rem summons by
publication satisfied the constitutional requirement of due process.

The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should have been granted and the amended complaint
of private respondent based on possession and filed only in 1978 dismissed outrightly. Ching Leng is an innocent
purchaser for value as shown by the evidence adduced in his behalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the roots of his
title since 1960, from the time the decree of registration was issued.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Araneta vs. Court of Appeals

VENUE IN PERSONAM

MARCOS-ARANETA vs CA (GR 154096, AUGUST 22, 2008)

Facts:

· Sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto, now deceased, and his business associates
(Benedicto Group) organized Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity Corporation
(UEC), respectively.
· Petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta alleges that both corporations were organized pursuant to a contract or
arrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name and in the name of his associates, as trustees, the
shares of stocks of FEMII and UEC with the obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for the
benefit of Irene to the extent of 65% of such shares. When petitioner requested for the reconveyance of said
65% stockholdings, the Benedicto Group refused.
· In March 2000, petitioner instituted before the RTC two similar complaints for conveyance of shares of
stock, accounting and receivership against the Benedicto Group with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO). A motion to dismiss was filed for both complaints, alleging among others improper
venue, failure to state a cause of action and that SEC has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes and not the
RTC.
· Upon Benedicto’s motion, both cases were consolidated.
· During the preliminary proceedings on the motion to dismiss, a Joint Affidavit of Gilmia B. Valdez,
Catalino A. Bactat, and Conchita R. Rasco (who all attested being employed as household staff at the Marcos’
Mansion in Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte) was presented to support the claim of improper venue. The Joint
Affidavit states that Irene did not maintain residence in said place as she in fact only visited the mansion twice
in 1999; that she did not vote in Batac in the 1998 national elections; and that she was staying at her husband’s
house in Makati City. Petitioner presented her PhP 5 community tax certificate (CTC) issued on “11/07/99” in
Curimao, Ilocos Norte to support her claimed residency in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
· In the meantime, on May 15, 2000, Benedicto died and was substituted by his wife, Julita C. Benedicto, and
daughter Francisca.
· On June 29, 2000, the RTC dismissed both complaints, stating that these partly constituted “real action,”
and that Irene did not actually reside in Ilocos Norte, and, therefore, venue was improperly laid.
· Petitioner filed an MR. Pending such MR, petitioner filed a motion to admit amended complaint, putting
additional plaintiffs as petitioner’s new trustees, all from Ilocos Norte. Subsequently, the MR was denied but
the amended complaint was admitted by the RTC and defendants were ordered to answer the complaint.
· Julita and Francisca moved to dismiss the amended complaint, but said motion was denied. Thus, they filed
their answer to avoid being declared in default.
· On the same day, they filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was subsequently granted. The
amended complaints were accordingly dismissed.
· Petitioner’s MR was denied by the CA.
· Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: W/N venue was properly laid.

Held: No, venue was improperly laid. Petition dismissed.

· In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or
the recovery of damages. In the instant case, petitioners are basically asking Benedicto and his Group, as
defendants a quo, to acknowledge holding in trust Irene’s purported 65% stockownership of UEC and FEMII,
inclusive of the fruits of the trust, and to execute in Irene’s favor the necessary conveying deed over the said
65% shareholdings. In other words, petitioner seeks to compel recognition of the trust arrangement she has with
the Benedicto Group.
 · It is an action in personam, The venue of personal actions is the court where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. The Court held that as to
petitioner, she is not a resident of Batac, as such she cannot opt for Batac as venue of her reconveyance
complaint. The CTC she presented is of no moment, anyone can easily secure a CTC.
· As to petitioner’s co-plaintiffs, although they are residents of Batac Ilocos Norte, the Court held that venue
was still improperly laid. The additional plaintiffs, as new trustees of petitioner, serve only as mere
representatives of petitioner. As trustees, they may be accorded, by virtue of Sec. 3 of Rule 3, the right to
prosecute a suit, but only on behalf of the beneficiary who must be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party-in-interest. In the final analysis, the residences of Irene’s co-plaintiffs cannot be
made the basis in determining the venue of the subject suit. The real party in interest is still petitioner Irene
Marcos-Araneta. Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal
action case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue. As such,
the subject civil cases ought to be commenced and prosecuted at the place where Irene resides.

· Another Issue: There is substantial compliance with the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping in Julita and Francisca’s petition. Verification is, under the Rules, not a jurisdictional but merely a
formal requirement which the court may motu proprio direct a party to comply with or correct. Regarding the
certificate of non-forum shopping, the general rule is that all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case should sign it.
As has been ruled by the Court, the signature of any of the principal petitioners or principal parties, as Francisca
is in this case, would constitute a substantial compliance with the rule on verification and certification of non-
forum shopping.

· Another Issue: The CA, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Rule 65, is limited to reviewing
and correcting errors of jurisdiction only. It cannot validly delve into the issue of trust which, under the
premises, cannot be judiciously resolved without first establishing certain facts based on evidence.

__________________________________________________________________________________________

MIAA vs Rivera Village Lessee Hometown Assn.

G.R. NO. 143870 September 30,2005

FACTS:

The case revolves around the lease contracts of a four-hectare property in Rivera Village, Pasay City, which was
initially entered into by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) with its employees in 1965 for a 25-year
period. The lease contracts allowed these employees to occupy the land at an annual rental rate of P20.00.

In 1995, the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), which succeeded the CAA, ceased issuing rental bills
and refused rental payments. The homeowners association representing the lessees requested MIAA to sell the
property to its members under certain legal provisions, which MIAA denied in 1996, citing plans for airport-related
activities on the property.

The homeowners association filed a lawsuit against MIAA and the National Housing Authority (NHA) seeking to
stop MIAA's Conceptual Development Plan for the property, and to compel the NHA to facilitate the sale of the land
to the association members. The trial court ruled against the homeowners association, citing a law (PD 1818) barring
injunctions in government infrastructure projects and the association's failure to demonstrate a cause of action.
The trial court held that PD 1818 bars the issuance of a restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving infrastructure projects of the government or any
public utility operated by the government. It also ruled that the petition failed to state a cause of action inasmuch as
petitioner therein (respondent homeowners association) is not the real party-in-interest, the individual members of
the association being the ones who have possessory rights over their respective premises. Moreover, the lease
contracts have already expired.

As regards the contention that the lessees are entitled to possess the subject property by virtue of PD 1517,
Proclamation No. 1967 and PD 2016, which respectively identify parcels of urban land as part of the Urban Land
Reform Zone, specify certain areas in Metro Manila, including Rivera Village, as areas for priority development or
urban land reform zones, and prohibit the eviction of occupant families from such lands, the trial court declared that
the subject property has been reserved by MIAA for airport-related activities and, as such, is exempt from the
coverage of the Comprehensive and Continuing Urban Development and Housing Program under Republic Act No.
(RA) 7279.

Respondent filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, interposing essentially the same arguments raised before the
trial court. The appellate court annulled and set aside the order of the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings.

MIAA now seeks a review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. In the instant petition, MIAA contends that the
appellate court erred in ruling that PD 2016, which prohibits the eviction of occupant families from real property
identified as areas for priority development or urban land reform zones, has modified PD 1818, which bars the
issuance of injunctive writ in cases involving infrastructure projects of the government, including public utilities for
the transport of goods and commodities.

It argues that the petition filed by the homeowners association with the trial court fails to state a cause of action
because the homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest in the suit. Allegedly, the Board Resolution
presented by respondent shows that it was only the board of directors of the association, as distinguished from the
members thereof, which authorized respondent to act as its representative in the suit.

Issue:

Whether the case filed before the Trial Court failed to state a cause of action not having been brought in the name of
the real parties-in-interest.

Held:

It is a settled rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Where
the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
must be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. The name of such
beneficiaries shall, likewise, be included in the complaint.19

Moreover, Sec. 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued,
or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred in the complaint. In order to
maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he or she or it must
be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person. The party bringing suit
has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the representative character that he claims. If a complaint is filed by one
who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed
filed and the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. It must be stressed that an unauthorized
complaint does not produce any legal effect.

In this case, the petition filed with the trial court sufficiently avers that the homeowners association, through its
President, is suing in a representative capacity as authorized under the Board Resolution attached to the petition.
Although the names of the individual members of the homeowners association who are the beneficiaries and real
parties-in-interest in the suit were not indicated in the title of the petition, this defect can be cured by the simple
expedient of requiring the association to disclose the names of the principals and to amend the title and averments of
the petition accordingly.

Essentially, the purpose of the rule that actions should be brought or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest is to protect against undue and unnecessary litigation and to ensure that the court will have the benefit of
having before it the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case. This rule, however, is not to be narrowly and
restrictively construed, and its application should be neither dogmatic nor rigid at all times but viewed in
consonance with extant realities and practicalities. 21 As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, the dismissal of this
case based on the lack of personality to sue of petitioner-association will only result in the filing of multiple suits by
the individual members of the association.

Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006

WHAT DOES THIS CASE TELL YOU ABOUT?

Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. – Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.

Pro-forma parties can either be indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary. The third case
occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover a property which he claims to be part of his exclusive
property. The wife may have no legal interest in such property, but the rules nevertheless require that she be joined
as a party.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution affirming the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision rendering herein petitioners Arcadio and Luisa Carandang [hereinafter
referred to as spouses Carandang] jointly and severally liable for their loan to Quirino A. de Guzman.

What’s the original complaint filed?

On June 5, 1992, [de Guzman] filed his complaint, seeking to recover the ₱336,375 together with damages.
After trial on the merits, the trial court disposed of the case in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [de Guzman]. Accordingly,
[the spouses Carandang] are ordered to jointly and severally pay [de Guzman], to wit:

(1) ₱336,375.00 representing [the spouses Carandang’s] loan to de Guzman;

(2) interest on the preceding amount at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from June 5, 1992 when
this complaint was filed until the principal amount shall have been fully paid;
(3) ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
(4) Costs of suit.

Where is it filed?
What happened?

Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay
Broadcasting System (MBS), with equities at fifty four percent (54%) and forty six percent (46%) respectively.

On November 26, 1983, the capital stock of MBS was increased, fromP500,000 to P1.5 million and
P345,000 of this increase was subscribed by the spouses Carandang .Thereafter, on March 3, 1989, MBS again
increased its capital stock, from ₱1.5 million to ₱3 million, the spouses Carandang yet again subscribed to the
increase. They subscribed to ₱93,750 worth of newly issued capital stock.
 De Guzman claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were paid by him, ₱293,250 for the
November 26, 1983 capital stock increase and ₱43,125 for the March 3, 1989 Capital Stock increase or a total of
₱336,375. o Thus, on March 31, 1992, [de Guzman] sent a demand letter to the spouses Carandang for the payment
of said total amount.

The spouses Carandang refused to pay the amount, contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was
executed between Arcadio Carandang and de Guzman, whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock
subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration for Arcadio Carandang’s technical expertise, his newly
purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore, there is no
indebtedness on their part

On June 5, 1992, de Guzman filed his complaint, seeking to recover the ₱336,375 together with damages.
After trial on the merits, the trial court disposed of the case in favor of de Guzman o Accordingly, the spouses
Carandang are ordered to jointly and severally pay de Guzman ₱336,375.00 representing the spouses Carandang’s
loan to de Guzman; interest on the preceding amount at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from June 5,
1992 when this complaint was filed until the principal amount shall have been fully paid; ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s
fees; and Costs of suit.

Spouses Carandang appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same in the 22
April 2003 assailed Decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action, considering
that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable party, was not included as a party-plaintiff

RULING: NO.
The Supreme Court held that the joint account of the spouses from which the 4 checks were draw is part of
their conjugal property and thus under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the husband alone may file an action to
recover or protect the spouses’ conjugal property. The spouses interchanged real party in interest and indispensable
party, as Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party and simply a real party in interest, and thus her not being
included will not invalidate the proceedings.
In Docena v. Lapesura [355 SCRA 658], the Supreme Court held that "x x x Under the New Civil Code,
the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not
entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit
or action without being joined by the wife. x x x Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property
belongs to the husband and the wife jointly.

The Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioners erroneously interchange the terms "real party in interest" and
"indispensable party." A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.15 On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action,16 in contrast to a necessary party, which is
one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.

Although the spouses Carandang were correct in invoking the aforementioned doctrine, the ground set forth
entails an examination of “whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation,
and not whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded.” The first query seeks to answer
the question of whether Milagros is a real party in interest, while the latter query is asking if she is an indispensable
party. Since the issue of this case calls for the definition of an indispensable party, invoking the above
mentioned doctrine is irrelevant to the case because the doctrine talks about a ‘real party in interest’ and not
an ‘indispensable party’. Although it is important to take note that an indispensable party is also a real party in
interest (since both classes of parties stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit).

All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted
or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Credits
are personal properties, acquired during the time the loan or other credit transaction was executed. Therefore, credits
loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be conjugal property

Assuming that the four checks are credits, they are assumed to be conjugal properties of Quirino and
Milagros. There being no evidence to the contrary, such presumption subsists. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a
co-owner of specific partnership property, is certainly a real party in interest. Being co-owners of the alleged credit,
Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action for the recovery thereof.

“In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to
Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action,
for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the
suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even
without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.”

Definitions:
i. Real party in interest – the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit.
ii. Indispensable party – a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
iii. Necessary party – one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief
is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action
iv. Pro-forma parties – those who are required to be joined as co-parties in suits by or against another party
as may be provided by the applicable substantive law or procedural rule. Pro-forma parties can either be
indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary.

The third case occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover a property which he claims to be
part of his exclusive property. The wife may have no legal interest in such property, but the rules nevertheless
require that she be joined as a party.

Before proceeding with the substantive aspects of the case, however, there is still one more procedural issue to
tackle, the fourth issue presented by the spouses Carandang on the non-inclusion in the complaint of an
indispensable party.

The spouses Carandang claim that, since three of the four checks used to pay their stock subscriptions were issued in
the name of Milagros de Guzman, the latter should be considered an indispensable party. Being such, the spouses
Carandang claim, the failure to join Mrs. de Guzman as a party-plaintiff should cause the dismissal of the action
because "(i)f a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed
on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action.

Flores v. Hon. Mallare-Philipps, G.R. No. L-66620, September 24, 1986 (Supra.)

TOPIC: PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES

DOCTRINE: The following are requisites for a Joinder of Parties, Sec. 6, Rule 3, Rules of Court:

(1) A right to relief in respect or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions; and

(2) A common question of law or fact.

FACTS:
 Flores sued the respondents for the collection of sum of money with the RTC:

(1) alleged in the complaint was against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from Flores on various occasions from August
to October, 1981;

(2) was against resp Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212 representing cost
of truck tires which he purchased on credit from pet on several occasions from March, 1981 to January,
1982.

Binongcal filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said
resp was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
if the amount of the demand is more than P20K.

Although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to pet in the amount of P10,212.00, his
obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other resp. Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the
complaint.

RTC Decision: dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

WoN the RTC correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties.

HELD: YES, RTC had correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties.

The lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the
complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against resps Binongcal and
Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.

The lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(l)
of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.

Section 33(l) of BP129:

That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in
the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. ...

Section 11 of the Interim Rules:

Application of the totality rule. In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount
involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of
interest and costs, irrespective of WON the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any
demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.

Former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 :

Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the
claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties,
each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
 Under the present law, the two cases would be under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Similarly, Brillo vs.
Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez, if the (1) separate claims against the several defendants arose out of the
same transaction or series of transactions and (2) there is a common question of law or fact, they would now be
under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule
3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or
being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each
complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

Boston Equity v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013

Topic: Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties

Sec. 1, Rule 9 – Defenses and Objections not pleaded

Facts:

RTC:

1. On December 24, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against Spouses Manuel and
Lolita Toledo.

2. Respondent filed an answer in which she alleged, among others, that her husband is already dead
since July 13, 1995.

3. Petitioner filed a motion for substitution praying that children of Manuel be substituted as party-
defendanst which the court granted.

4. The trial case then processed where petitioner presented its evidence.

5. The respondent were then given 15 days to file a demurrer of evidence but instead file a motion to
dismiss on the ff grounds:

a. that the complaint failed to implead an indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence, the
case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action;

b. that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of

c. that the trial court erred in ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and

d. that the court must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo.

6. The RTC denied motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time.

7. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was likewise denied on the ground that
"defendants’ attack on the jurisdiction of this Court is now barred by estoppel by laches" since
respondent failed to raise the issue despite several chances to do so.
CA:

On petition, CA granted the petition of the respondent on ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of Manuel and issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stafe of the proceeding, even for the first on appeal,
that there is basis for the court to invoke estoppel and the complaint should have impleaded the estate of Manuel.
Petitioner’s MR likewise was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court

Ruling: YES.

At the outset, it must be here stated that, as the succeeding discussions will demonstrate, jurisdiction over the person
of Manuel should not be an issue in this case. A protracted discourse on jurisdiction is, nevertheless, demanded by
the fact that jurisdiction has been raised as an issue from the lower court, to the Court of Appeals and, finally, before
this Court. For the sake of clarity, and in order to finally settle the controversy and fully dispose of all the issues in
this case, it was deemed imperative to resolve the issue of jurisdiction.

Petitioner calls attention to the fact that respondent’s motion to dismiss questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction was
filed more than six years after her amended answer was filed. According to petitioner, respondent had several
opportunities, at various stages of the proceedings, to assail the trial court’s jurisdiction but never did so for six
straight years. Citing the doctrine laid down in the case of Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al. 30 petitioner claimed
that respondent’s failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars her from later questioning it,
especially since she actively participated in the proceedings conducted by the trial court.

Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects,
namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of
the case; and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the
litigation.31

In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned over
the subject matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly
adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily.

Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction
over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case.
Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein.

The Rules of Court provide:

RULE 9
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss
the claim.
 RULE 15
MOTIONS

Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. – Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be
deemed waived.

Based on the foregoing provisions, the "objection on jurisdictional grounds which is not waived even if not alleged
in a motion to dismiss or the answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. x x x Lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter can always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues cannot be
waived x x x subject, however, to the principle of estoppel by laches."

Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those defenses which are
not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss
is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense. 37 If the objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by
virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it made a sweeping pronouncement in its questioned decision, stating
that "issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first time on appeal" and that,
therefore, respondent timely raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and is, consequently, not estopped from raising
the question of jurisdiction. As the question of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the defendant
Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent
cannot claim the defense since "lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense
which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence."

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Malazarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009

TOPIC: Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

OVERVIEW:
A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs when the suit is deemed
to be instituted for the benefit of all, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the
unimpleaded co-owners. Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

FACTS:
1. Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title to a parcel of coconut land with damages before the
Court of First Instance of Maasin, Southern Leyte against the respondents. The petitioners prayed that
the judgement be rendered confirming their rights and legal title to the subject property and ordering
the defendants to vacate the occupied portion and to pay damages.
2. Respondents denied the allegations of the petitioner and interposed that the subject land was inherited
from their ancestor.
3. During the course of the trial, the testimonies of the petitioners’ witnesses revealed that Nieves was not
the sole and absolute owner of the land. It was passed to her and her 3 other siblings.
4. Respondents, raised in their memorandum the argument that the case should have been terminated at
inception for the petitioners’ failure to implead indispensable parties—the other 3 siblings as co-
owners.

RTC: DISMISSED the case without prejudice. The trial court stated that the case lacks cause of action because the
spouses Plasabas and Malazarte have no complete legal personality to sue by themselves alone without joining the
siblings of Nieves who are also indispensable in the final determination of the case. They are indispensable as a final
decree would necessarily affect their rights, the court cannot proceed without their presence. When an indispensable
party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed.

CA: AFFIRMED the ruling of the trial court. It further declared that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties
would violate the principle of due process. It also declared that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be applied
considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reivindicatory action.

ISSUE:
W/N THE PETITIONERS NEED TO IMPLEAD THEIR CO-OWNERS AS PARTIES

RULING:
NO. Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment,
covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and accion reivindicatoria.
Thus, a co-owner may file a suit without necessarily joining the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. However, if the judgment be adverse, the same cannot prejudice the
rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.

The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff
impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

In this case, the petitioners acknowledged that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings and they have
been authorized by the latter to pursue the case on their behalf. Impleading other co-owners in this case is not
mandatory because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.

The trial and appellate courts committed an error when they summarily dismissed the case after both parties had
rested their cases on the sole ground of failure to implead indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-
joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The proper remedy is to implead the
party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action. When the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order
of the court. It will then be a ground for dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for appropriate
proceedings.

POSSIBLE QUESTION(S):
Why is this case assigned?
It provides to an exception to the general rule. As stated in the case, The only exception to this rule is when the
action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession
thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are
indispensable parties.

Quilatan v. Heirs of Quilatan, G.R. No. 183059, August 28, 2009

Topic:
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

Overview:
This case involves the question of whether the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) and ordered the dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. 67367 on the ground of failure to
implead all the indispensable parties to the case. The dispute centers around the partition of real estate properties
previously owned by Pedro Quilatan.

Facts:
- Petitioners, Ely Quilatan and Rosvida Quilatan-Elias, filed Civil Case No. 67367 seeking the nullification of Tax
Declaration Nos. D-014-00330 and D-014-00204 and the partition of the estate of the late Pedro Quilatan.
- They alleged that Pedro Quilatan owned two parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 1680 and 2301 in
Taguig, Metro Manila.
- Petitioners discovered that these tax declarations were canceled without their knowledge and replaced with Tax
Declaration No. D-014-00204 and D-014-00330, registered under the names of Spouses Lorenzo Quilatan and Anita
Lizertiquez.
- The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, declaring the cancellation of Tax Declaration Nos. 1680 and 2301 as
void and ordering the partition of the properties among the heirs of Francisco, Ciriaco, and Lorenzo Quilatan.

Issues:
1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly reverse the RTC's decision?
2. Was the issue of failure to implead indispensable parties properly raised by the respondents?

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals correctly reversed the RTC's decision. The issue of failure to implead indispensable parties
was properly raised by the respondents. In an action for partition of real estate, it is the responsibility of the plaintiff
to implead all indispensable parties, as the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The dismissal
without prejudice was ordered to ensure that all indispensable parties are joined in the case.

POSSIBLE QUESTION(S):
Why is this case assigned?
It provides what is the action for partition of real estate. As stated in the case, it is the responsibility of the plaintiff
to implead all indispensable parties, as the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Metrobank v. Hon. Alejo, G.R. No. 141970, September 10, 2001

As a general rule, indispensable parties are not a ground for dismissal,except:

- if the mortgage property is encumbrances with new owner

Guy v. Guy, G.R. No. 189486, September 5, 2012

Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.

FACTS:
This case involves 5 consolidated petitions which stemmed from a civil case filed before the RTC of Manila.
Controversies arose from a family dispute. Gilbert Guy is the son of Francisco and Simny Guy. Geraldine, Gladys
and Grace are his sisters. The family feud involves the ownership and control of 20,160 shares of stock of Northern
Islands, between petitioner, and the sisters and their mother (respondents).
Simny further claimed that upon the advice of their lawyers, upon the incorporation of GoodGold, they issued stock
certificates reflecting the shares held by each stockholder duly signed by Francisco as President and Atty. Emmanuel
Paras as Corporate Secretary, with corresponding blank endorsements at the back of each certificate – including
Stock Certificates under Gilbert’s name.

In September 2004, five years after the redistribution of GoodGold's shares of stock, Gilbert filed with the (RTC) of
Manila, a Complaint for the "Declaration of Nullity of Transfers of Shares in GoodGold and of General Information
Sheets and Minutes of Meeting, and for Damages. Simny, and his sisters, Geraldine, Grace, and Gladys. Gilbert
alleged, among others, that no stock certificate ever existed; that his signature at the back of the spurious Stock
Certificate, which purportedly endorsed the same and that of the corporate secretary, Emmanuel Paras, at the
obverse side of the certificates were forged, and, hence, should be nullified.

Three years after the complaint in the RTC of Manila was withdrawn, Gilbert filed a complaint in RTC
Mandaluyong: For Declaration of Transfer Transfers of Shares of Stock Certificates, Fabricated Stock Certificates,
Falsified General Information Sheets, Minutes of Meetings, and Damages with Application for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," against the petitioner.

(RTC) Denied Gilbert’s Motion declaring it a nuisance and harassment suit.

(CA) DENIED (1) his allegation of Judge Sorongon’s partiality and bias; (2)his petition for issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.

The CA, however, found merit on Gilbert's contention that the complaint should be heard on the merits. It
held that:

A reading of the Order, supra, dismissing the [respondent's] complaint for being a harassment suit revealed that the
court a quo relied heavily on the pieces of documentary evidence presented by the [Petitioners] to negate
[Respondent's] allegation of fraudulent transfer of shares of stock, fabrication of stock certificates and falsification
of General Information Sheets (GIS), inter alia. It bears emphasis that the [Respondent] is even questioning the
genuiness and authenticity of the [Petitioner's] documentary evidence. To our mind, only a full-blown trial on
the merits can afford the determination of the genuineness and authenticity of the documentary evidence and
other factual issues which will ultimately resolve whether there was indeed a transfer of shares of stock.

ISSUE:

WON the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders as a ground for dismissal and subsequent actions of the
court null and void. - YES

RULING:

The definition in the Rules of Court, Section 7, Rule 3 thereof, of indispensable parties as "parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action" has been jurisprudentially amplified.

As a general rule, indispensable parties not a ground for dismissal.

It bears emphasis that this controversy started with Gilbert's complaint filed with the RTC of Mandaluyong City in
his capacity as stockholder, director and Vice-President of GoodGold.

Gilbert's complaint essentially prayed for the return of his original 519,997 shares in GoodGold, by praying that the
court declare that "there were no valid transfers [of the contested shares] to defendants and Francisco." It baffles this
Court, however, that Gilbert omitted Francisco as defendant in his complaint. While Gilbert could have opted to
waive his shares in the name of Francisco to justify the latter's non-inclusion in the complaint, Gilbert did not do so,
but instead, wanted everything back and even wanted the whole transfer of shares declared fraudulent. This cannot
be done, without including Francisco as defendant in the original case. The transfer of the shares cannot be, as
Gilbert wanted, declared entirely fraudulent without including those of Francisco who owns almost a third of the
total number.

Francisco, in both the 2004 and 2008 complaints, is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination can be had for the following reasons: (a) the complaint prays that the shares now under the name of
the defendants and Francisco be declared fraudulent; (b) Francisco owns 195,000 shares some of which, Gilbert
prays be returned to him; (c) Francisco signed the certificates of stocks evidencing the alleged fraudulent shares
previously in the name of Gilbert. The inclusion of the shares of Francisco in the complaint makes Francisco an
indispensable party. Moreover, the pronouncement about the shares of Francisco would impact on the
hereditary rights of the contesting parties or on the conjugal properties of the spouses to the effect that
Francisco, being husband of Simny and father of the other contesting parties, must be included for,
otherwise, in his absence, there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which
is effective, complete, or equitable.

Settled is the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is compulsory being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power, and, it is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed"
for such absence renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present.

It bears emphasis that Gilbert, while suing as a stockholder against his co-stockholders, should have also impleaded
GoodGold as defendant. His complaint also prayed for the annulment of the 2004 stockholders' annual meeting, the
annulment of the 2004 election of the board of directors and of its officers, the annulment of 2004 GIS submitted to
the SEC, issuance of an order for the accounting of all monies and rentals of GoodGold, and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary and mandatory injunction. We have made clear that GoodGold is a separate juridical entity distinct from
its stockholders and from its directors and officers. The trial court, acting as a special commercial court, cannot
settle the issues with finality without impleading GoodGold as defendant. Like Francisco, and for the same
reasons, GoodGold is an indispensable party which Gilbert should have impleaded as defendant in his
complaint.

The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

MONIS V. VELASCO, G.R. No. 1692

76, June 16, 2009
TOPIC: Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

OVERVIEW: This case is for review is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated July 13, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 56998 affirming with modification the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision dated April 24, 1997 in Civil Case
No. 466 for Annulment of Documents and Damages.

FACTS:

● Fr. Patricio, Magdalena, Venancio, Macaria ( all surnamed Monis) and Andrea Monis Velasco are siblings.
● Venancio had two children (herein petitioners) : Dionisia Monis Lagunilla and Rafael Monis.
● Fr. Patricio and Magdalena acquired several properties in La Union and one in Quezon City.The Q.C.
property was co-owned by Patricio and Magdalena with Spouses Andrea Monis-Velasco and Pedro
Velasco.
● After death of Patricio and Magdalena, Andrea and Macaria executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement
with Donation and donated it to Andrea’s Son : Pedro Monis Velasco Jr.

PROCEDURE:

● Petitioners, Dionisia and Rafael instituted an action for Annulment of Documents and Damages before
RTC on the ground of the alleged fraudulent act committed by Andrea and Macaria that they
misrepresented themselves as the only surviving heirs of Patricio and Magdalena.
● Petitioners alleged that they have the right to represent their deceased father Venancio (being nephew and
niece of Patricio and Magdalena) and that they have rights as co heirs to the QC Property. They further
sought the cancellation of the title and tax declarations.
 ● Respondents countered that nowhere in the deed did they assert to be the only surviving heirs, they also
added that the petitioners already received advances of their share of the properties and that there still other
properties not yet partitioned from which the petitioners could obtain reparation.
● No amicable settlement was reached during the pre-trial.
● Petitioners moved for the amendment of the complaint to implead Pedro (donee) raising that he is an
indispensable party. RTC denied the motion.
● RTC decided in favor of respondents: Art 887 NCC Petitioners are not compulsory heirs. Declaration of
respondents that they were the only heirs is a valid way of non-recognition of petitioners’ claim.
● CA affirmed RTC: ruled that the petitioners are heirs but they are not compulsory heirs and that they
cannot invoke bad faith.
● Appellate court refused to annul the contractin view of the other properties previously received by the
petitioners. CA also held that prayer for annulment of donation was belatedly raised by the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pedro (donee) is an indispensable party.

RULING:

The general rule with reference to parties to a civil action pursuant to Section 7 Rule 3 of Rules of Court requires the
joinder of all necessary parties and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions.

Jurispridence holds that an indispensable party is a party who has interest in the controversy or subject matter that a
final adjudication cannot be made in his absence without injuring or affecting that interest. An indispensable party is
one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.

A person is not indispensable if his interest in controversy or subject matter is seperable.CA held that the petitioner’s
sole desire was the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement which is separated from the issue of donation.

SC disagrees with CA: Pedro is an indispensable partyAt the time of filing of the complaint the title of the Quezon
City property was already transferred to Pedro.

Even if the court will only resolve the validity of the extrajudicial settlement, there would be no final adjudication of
the case without involving Pedro’s interest. His interest in the controversy and the subject matter is not separable
from the interests of the other parties.

Well settled is the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. It is a condition sine qua non to the
exercise of judicial power. Without the presence of indispensable parties, the judgment of the court cannot attain
finality.

Nevertheless, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage. If the plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party then the court may dismiss the complaint.

FALLO

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56998 is SET
ASIDE.Let the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the inclusion of Pedro Velasco, Jr. as an
indispensable party, and for further proceedings.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORP. V. SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION, INC., G.R.
NO. 216569, JUNE 3, 2019

TOPIC: Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

OVERVIEW: This case involves a dispute between Superlines Transportation Co., Inc. (Superlines) and the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) arising from an incident where a Superlines bus crashed into
a PNCC radio room. The case primarily revolves around the seizure and impounding of the bus by PNCC and the
subsequent legal proceedings.

FACTS:

● Superlines bus crashed into PNCC's radio room, causing damage.The Bus was turned over to the Alabang
Traffic Bureau for investigation and then towed to PNCC's compound at the request of traffic investigator
Patrolman Cesar Lopera.
● Superlines requested the release of the bus, but PNCC's Pedro Balubal demanded P40,000 or collateral for
the estimated cost of radio room reconstruction.
● Superlines filed a complaint for replevin with damages against PNCC and Balubal.
● PNCC and Balubal claimed they towed the bus for safekeeping pursuant to a police order and
counterclaimed for damages.
● RTC initially dismissed Superlines' complaint and ordered Superlines to pay PNCC P40,320 for radio room
damages.
● CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that the case should have been against the police authorities instead
of PNCC.
● Supreme Court ruled in favor of Superlines, ordered the return of the bus, and remanded the case to the
RTC for the inclusion of responsible police officers as parties.
● Superlines filed an amended complaint, including Lopera as a defendant.Superlines moved for the
execution of the Supreme Court's decision, but the whereabouts of the bus were disputed.
● In a subsequent decision, the RTC ordered PNCC and Balubal to pay Superlines for the cost of the bus and
lost/unearned income.
● CA affirmed the RTC decision with a modification to the award of exemplary damages.
● PNCC filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that Lopera should not have been
dropped as a defendant.

ISSUE: Whether the dropping of Lopera as a defendant in the case violates the Supreme Court's ruling in a prior
case (G.R. No. 169596).

RULING:

The Supreme Court clarified that the law of the case doctrine applies when an appellate court has made a ruling on
an issue and subsequently remands the case to a lower court. The ruling becomes the law of the case for the lower
court and any subsequent appeal.

In the previous case (G.R. No. 169596), the Supreme Court had ruled that Lopera and other police officers were
indispensable parties in Superlines' claim for damages due to their involvement in the seizure and impounding of the
bus.

The use of the word "may" in the Supreme Court's decision did not alter the mandatory nature of impleading
indispensable parties; their inclusion was necessary to render any judgment effective.

While the RTC initially included Lopera as a defendant, he was later dropped from the case after due hearings and
evidence showed no liability on his part. The exclusion of Lopera from the case did not violate the Supreme Court's
prior ruling, as it resulted from the trial court's findings based on evidence.
The award of unearned income was based on insufficient data and was therefore deleted from the judgment.The
exemplary damages were reduced from P1,000,000 to P100,000, and attorney's fees were reduced from P300,000 to
P30,000.The modified judgment was then affirmed, and the decision was issued with these modifications.

Chua v. Torres, G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005

Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. 44339, December 2, 1987
Wee v. Castro, G.R. No. 176405, August 20, 2008
Subject Matter: Sec. 8. Necessary party- — A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be
joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action.
Overview: This case involves an ejectment dispute where the plaintiff, Castro, accused the defendant, Wee, of not
paying the agreed-upon increased rent. Despite attempts at reconciliation, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
dismissed the case due to a failure to meet conciliation requirements. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld this
decision, stating that Wee was unlawfully withholding possession. The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled in Wee's favor,
ordering Castro to vacate the property. The Supreme Court (SC) upheld the CA's decision.
FACTS:
● This case involves the ejectment case filed in MTC.
● The original complaint was filed by Castro against Wee for failure to pay the increased rental payment
from 9,000 to 15,000 which was agreed by both parties.
● Wee failed and refused to pay the corresponding increase on rent. The rental dispute was brought to Lupon
Tagapamayapa to attempt for an amicable settlement which failed to reach an agreement, resulting in the
issuance of a Certification to File Action. Castro then filed a complaint for ejectment before the MTC.
And was given a SPA by his siblings to act in their behalf of any lawsuits against the respondent.
● Wee countered that (1) there was no agreement for the increased of month income; (2) respondents failed
jurisdictional requirement of conciliation; and (3) and “unlawful withholding” of possession of the subject
property.
● MTC dismissed the complaint for failure to comply the prior conciliation requirement.
● RTC affirmed the dismissal and likewise agreed that there was “unlawful withholding of possession of
property.
● CA granted the petition of the respondents’ petition and ordered the petitioner to vacate the subject
property and turnover the same to respondents.
● Wee filed a petition for review and was dismissed by the SC and the latter affirmed the Decision of the CA.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the George de Castro can file an action for ejectment without joining all his co-owners
RULING:
Yes. As provided in Art. 487 any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all
kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer, recovery of possession, and
recovery of ownership. As explained by the renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino: A co-owner may
bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he
claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. (Emphasis added.)

In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, this Court declared that a co-owner is not
even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence,
thus: In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest . However, pursuant to
Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of
action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the c o-owner who
filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners
are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit
even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.

Moreover, respondents Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban each executed a Special Power of Attorney,
giving respondent George de Castro the authority to initiate Civil Case No. 1990. A power of attorney is an
instrument in writing by which one person, as principal, appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the
authority to perform certain specified acts or kinds of acts on behalf of the principal.

Mayor of Parañaque v. Ebio, G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010

Subject Matter: Sec. 8. Necessary party- — A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be
joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action.

Overview: Respondents claim ownership of a land parcel in Barangay Vitalez, Paranaque, passed down through
generations. A proposed road project caused disputes, leading to complaints. The city ordered them to vacate, and
they sought an injunction while having a pending land ownership application with the DENR. The RTC denied their
petition for lacking proof of ownership and not involving the government. The CA ruled in favor of Guaranteed
Home as the landowner but didn't consider the Civil Code's Acquisitive Prescription provisions.
FACTS:
● Respondents claim that the are the absolute owners of a parcel of land located in Bargy. Vitalez, Paranaque
covered by Tax Declaration in the name of the respondent Mario Ebio.
● Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondent assert that the original occupant and possesor of
the said parcel was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Which the latter gave the land to his son, Pedro.
From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot.
● Meanwhile, Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter Zenaida which eventually Pedro executed a notarized
transfer of Rights.
● Sagguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a resolution for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut
Creek located in the said Barangay. The proposed road project will run from Urma Drive to the main road
of Vitalez Compound. The city government advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area,
respondents immediately registered their opposition thereto which resulted the road project to be
temporarily suspended.
● Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of
Interior and Local Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor, respondents asserted their opposition to
the proposed project and their claim of ownership over the affected property.
● City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the
next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property.
● Respondents applied for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners and admtted in the course of
proceeding that they have pending application for the issuance of sales patent before the DENR.
● RTC denied the petition for not being able to prove that they have established the right to the property
since they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has not
yet been granted. Additionally, they failed to implead the Republic of the Philippines, which is an
indispensable party.
● The case was elevated in the CA resolving the issue whether who owns the lands adjoining CUt-cut Creek
particularly Road Lot 8. .
● The CA concluded that Guaranteed Home is the owner of the accredited property considering its ownership
of the adjoining Road Lot 8 to which the accretion attached. However, this is without the application of the
provisions of the Civil Code on Acquisitive Prescription.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the state is an indispensable party to the complaint filed by the respondent in the lower
court.

RULING:
An indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree would
necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence. In contrast, a necessary
party is one whose presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy but whose interest
is separable such that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them.

In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of Parañaque from
proceeding with its implementation of the road construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor an
indispensable party to an action where no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be
imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall
be divested nor any of its rights infringed.

Hence, it is undoubtedly that respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property
through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over
the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the
registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means
of acquiring ownership.37 A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.

Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006 (Supra.)
OVERVIEW: This case clarifies the role of co-owners in legal actions involving co-owned property. The case
involves a dispute between de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang over unpaid stock subscriptions in MBS. De
Guzman, with the majority share, claimed partial payment on behalf of the Spouses Carandang. The latter, citing a
pre-incorporation agreement, refused to pay. De Guzman sued for payment, and the trial court ruled in his favor.
The Spouses Carandang appealed, arguing that Milagros de Guzman should be an indispensable party due to some
checks being in her name. The court clarified that only the co-owner who initiates the lawsuit is indispensable, and
Milagros de Guzman's absence did not warrant dismissal.

FACTS:
• Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are stockholders and corporate officers of Mabuhay
Broadcasting System (MBS), with de Guzman holding 54% equity and the Spouses Carandang holding 46%.
• MBS increased its capital stock on November 26, 1983, and the Spouses Carandang subscribed to
₱345,000 of the increase. Another capital stock increase occurred on March 3, 1989, with the Spouses Carandang
subscribing to ₱93,750 in newly issued capital stock.
• De Guzman claimed that he made partial payments of ₱336,375 for these subscriptions.
• De Guzman sent a demand letter to the Spouses Carandang on March 31, 1992, requesting payment of the
total amount.
• The Spouses Carandang refused to pay, citing a pre-incorporation agreement with Arcadio Carandang, in
which de Guzman was to cover Arcadio Carandang's stock subscriptions in exchange for technical expertise and
equipment.
• De Guzman filed a complaint on June 5, 1992, seeking to recover ₱336,375 and damages.
• The trial court ruled in favor of de Guzman, ordering the Spouses Carandang to pay the amount, along with
interest, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
• The Spouses Carandang appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals claiming that, since three of the four
checks used to pay their stock subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the latter should be
considered an indispensable party. Thus, seeking for the dismissal of the case. However, CA affirmed the trial
court's decision.
• Their motion for reconsideration at the Court of Appeals was also denied.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Milagros is a necessary non-joinder party to be impleaded in this suit.

RULING:
No. The SC ruled that Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action for the recovery of
the allegedly loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit, and
dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her not being a party thereto.

As stated in Sec. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. – Whenever in any pleading in which
a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why
he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the
omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained. The failure to comply with the order for his
inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party. The non-inclusion of a
necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be
without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
 Non-compliance with the order for the inclusion of a necessary party would not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint. This is an exception to Section 3, Rule 17 which allows the dismissal of the complaint for failure to
comply with an order of the court, as Section 9, Rule 3 specifically provides for the effect of such non-inclusion: it
shall not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. Section 11, Rule 3 likewise provides that the non-joinder of parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of the action.

In cases of pro-forma parties who are neither indispensable nor necessary, the general rule under Section
11, Rule 3 must be followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action
to recover a sum of money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional defect. The
nonjoinder of a spouse does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal requirement which may be cured by
amendment. Thus, dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma party not joined in the complaint is an indispensable
party.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS:

Why is this case assigned?

- This case is assigned in order to determine the exemption option of Sec.9 non-joinder of necessary parties
to be pleaded. In this case, the court finds that Milagros is not an indispensable party which is why the non-
inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment
rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Emata v. IAC, G.R. No. L-72714, June 29, 1989
Subject Matter: Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff -If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can
not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefore shall be stated in the complaint.
Overview: The petitioner bought a car on installment from Viologo Motor Sale Corp., using a promissory note and
chattel mortgage as collateral. These were later transferred to Filinvest Credit Corporation, and the remaining
balance went to Servicewide Specialists, Inc. When the petitioner missed five consecutive payments, Servicewide
Specialists initiated legal action to repossess the car. The petitioner alleged fraud in obtaining the promissory note
and claimed the mortgage was meant for the unpaid car balance. The petitioner initially tried to involve Filinvest
Credit Corporation in the case but didn't file a third-party complaint as directed by the court. After failed
postponement requests, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that Filinvest should have been
directly included in the case as the real party in interest under Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
● Petitioner purchased an installment from Viologo Motor Sale Corp. with a down payment of P 14,982.00.
Petitioner likewise executed in favor of the seller a promissory note and a chattel mortgage over the car as
security for the payment of the note.
● After the execution of said documents, Violago endorsed the promissory note and assigned the chattel
mortgage to Filinvest Credit Corporation (hereafter, Filinvest for short).
● Three years later, Filinvest assigned to private respondent Servicewide Specialists, Inc. the remaining
installment balance.
● Alleging non-payment of five (5) consecutive installments. Servicewide Specialists Inc (respondent)
initiated the case in the trial court for a writ of replevin to effect the seizure of the car.
● Petitioner, in answer alleging that "the promissory note does not express the true intent and agreement of
the parties, the same having been procured through fraud, deceit, trickery and misrepresentation, , that the
chattel mortgage was intended to secure the payment which was the unpaid balance of the purchase price
of the Toyota car; that he was made to sign the note and the mortgage in blank; that he has paid, and even
overpaid. Hence, it violates the Usury Law and Truth in Lending Act.
● Petitioner filed a "Motion to Implead Filinvest Credit Corporation" on the theory that "for all legal purposes
the corporation sought to be impleaded is the real party in interest" because it retained interest over the
balance of the petitioner's account in spite of its assignment to private respondent. . Subsequently, the court
below held in abeyance the pre-trial hearing of the case since, "(u)pon motion of Atty. Melecio Virgilio
Emata," said petitioner was given a "Period of fifteen (15) days to file the third-party complaint against the
third party defendant (Filinvest)."
 ● Petitioner , however, did not file any third-party complaint, hence the trial court set the case for pre-trial on
May 3, 1983, it being understood that petitioner was no longer interested in impleading the herein private
respondent as a third-party defendant therein.
● Petitioner filed several motions for postponement, but on the 2nd motion was denied.
● Petitioner takes exception to respondent court's affirmance of said decision, hence this petition. Petitioner
raises both procedural and substantive issues. Initially, he complains that the trial court erred in requiring
him to file a third party complaint against Filinvest, instead of impleading the latter either as party plaintiff
or defendant. 11 He insists that Filinvest is the real party in interest in the present case and it should be
impleaded under Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides.
● Petitioner appealed to SC.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the contention of the Petitioner that Filinvest is a real party in interest and can be an
unwilling co-plaintiff

RULING:
No. Petitioner cannot rely on the provisions of Section 10, Rule 3 which envisages a party who should be
joined as a plaintiff but who does not assent to such joinder. Obviously and necessarily, such unwilling party must
be a real party in interest. In the case at bar, Filinvest's position and the evidence thereon was that it was not a real
party in interest, as it was no longer entitled to the avails of the suit by reason of the anterior assignment it made in
favor of private respondent. Hence, at the very least, its capacity was in issue and it would be a case of procedural
petitio principii for the trial court to have categorized it as an unwilling co-plaintiff, with the procedural
consequences thereof, although such operative issue was still unresolved. Furthermore, the option lies with the
plaintiff on whether or not to join an additional party in his complaint. The original plaintiff cannot be compelled, on
the mere representations of the defendant, to implead anyone, especially if it does not appear that such joinder is
proper or is necessary for the complete and expeditious adjudication of the case.
The SC rejected petitioner's complaint that the order of the court a quo requiring the filing of a third-party
complaint is improper. A third- party complaint is "a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
against a person not a party to the action, called the third- party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation
or any other relief in respect of his opponent's claim." Obviously, a third-party complaint against Filinvest, had
petitioner filed the same, would be a claim in respect of the plaintiffs claim since the former arises from the same
transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based, that is, the promissory note which was eventually assigned to
private respondent. Although the petitioner did not admit in his answer that any amount is due from the corporation
sought to be impleaded, that is not indicative of nor does it support his thesis of the alleged impropriety of a third-
party complaint. Apparently, petitioner failed to take into consideration that the remedy is also applicable where the
defendant seeks "any other relief in respect of his opponent's claim," a remedial grant of power broad enough to
include the relief he seeks in the case at bar.

Nor can the general rule in Section 11, Rule 3, on the power to order the addition or dropping of a party at
any stage of action, be of solace to the petitioner. This is a power addressed to the sound discretion of the court to be
exercised on such terms as are just, and by this is meant that it must be just to all the other parties. 15 Obviously,
given the facts of this case, the trial court wisely exercised its discretion in refusing to give in to the unjustified
importunings of petitioner.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Boston Equity v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013 (Supra.)

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO, Respondents.

TOPIC: Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties ; Rule 3 - Parties to civil actions

OVERVIEW: Petitioner filed a complaint for some money against spouses Manuel and Lolita. However, Manuel
died before the complaint was filed. Manuel was substituted by his children as party-defendants. Party-defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds including, "that the trial court erred in ordering the substitution of
the deceased Manuel by his heirs." Petitioner claims that the CA erred in not holding that the inclusion of Manuel as
party-defendant is a mere misjoinder of party not warranting the dismissal of the case before the lower court. The
court held that the case against Manuel must be dismissed.

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo years after Manuel died. A motion filed by petitioner
praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-defendants was granted.

The trial of the case then proceeded. Petitioner presented its evidence and its exhibits were thereafter admitted.
However, instead of filing a demurrer to evidence, counsel of respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
citing the following as grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to implead an indispensable party or a real party in
interest; hence, the case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action; (2) that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3) that the trial
court erred in ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that the court must also dismiss
the case against Lolita Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

Trial court denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time citing Sec 1, Rule 16 of 1997 Rules of
Court. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was likewise denied.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court seriously erred and
gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion to dismiss despite discovery, during the trial of the case, of
evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal of the case. CA granted the respondent's petition. On the other
hand, CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case against Manuel must be dismissed

RULING: Yes, the case against Manuel must be dismissed. Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that
"neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such
terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately". However, the
remedy provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not obtain in this case.

Based on the last sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a misjoined party must have the capacity to sue or
be sued in the event that the claim by or against the misjoined party is pursued in a separate case. Therefore, the
inclusion of Manuel in the complaint cannot be considered a misjoinder, as in fact, the action would have proceeded
against him had he been alive at the time the collection case was filed by petitioner. The name of Manuel as party-
defendant cannot simply be dropped from the case.

In addition, the dismissal of the case against Manuel is further warranted by Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, which states that: only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action." Applying this provision of law, the Court, in the case of Ventura v. Militante, held:

Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. x x x. In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff
must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as
either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a person.

Since the proper course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is the dismissal of the
case as against him, thus did the trial court err when it ordered the substitution of Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is
proper only where the party to be substituted died during the pendency of the case, as expressly provided for by
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. x x x
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator x x x.

Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court never acquired jurisdiction
over his person and, in effect, there was no party to be substituted.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Leonis Navigation v. Villamater, G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010

LEONIS NAVIGATION CO., INC. and WORLD MARINE PANAMA, S.A., Petitioners
vs.
CATALINO U. VILLAMATER and/or The Heirs of the Late Catalino U. Villamater, represented herein by
Sonia Mayuyu Villamater; and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents

TOPIC: Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties ; Rule 3 - Parties to civil actions

OVERVIEW: Respondent Villamater was hired by the petitioners and then deployed after passing Pre-
Employment Medical Examination (PEME). Months after his deployment, he was diagnosed with Obstructive
Adenocarcinoma of the Sigmoid and should undergo treatments. Respondent filed a claim with NLRC and NLRC
decided that repondent's illness was compensable but denied his claim for moral and exemplary damages.
Respondent Villamater died on January 4, 2004. In this case, it will be discussed if Villameter’s widow can stand as
an indispensable party.

FACTS: Private respondent Catalino U. Villamater (Villamater) was hired as Chief Engineer for the ship MV Nord
Monaco, owned by petitioner World Marine Panama, S.A., through the services of petitioner Leonis Navigation Co.,
Inc. (Leonis), as the latter’s local manning agent.

Prior to his deployment, Villamater underwent the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). He
passed the PEME and was declared "Fit to Work." Thereafter, Villamater was deployed. Villamater executed an
employment contract.

Around four (4) months after his deployment, Villamater suffered intestinal bleeding and was given a blood
transfusion. Physician in Hamburg, Germany advised hospital confinement. Villamater was diagnosed with
Obstructive Adenocarcinoma of the Sigmoid. He was advised to undergo chemotherapy and continuous supportive
treatment, such as pain-killers and blood transfusion. He was then repatriated. In the course of his chemotherapy,
Villamater filed with the NLRC for payment of permanent and total disability benefits. NLRC decided that his
illness was compensable but denied his claim for moral and exemplary damages.

The petitioner companies then appealed for the decision of the NLRC and with Villamater, still claiming for the
moral damages. Both petitions were denied by NLRC.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. After the filing of the
required memoranda, the CA rendered its assailed May 3, 2007 Decision, dismissing the petition. The appellate
court, likewise, denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its July 23, 2007 Resolution. The grounds on the
petition includes that "the Court of Appeals erred in holding that non-joinder of indispensable parties warrant the
outright dismissal of the Petition for Review on Certiorari."

Respondent Villamater died on January 4, 2004.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that non-joinder of indispensable parties warrant the
outright dismissal of the Petition for Review on Certiorari.

RULING: Yes. The court held that CA erred in dismissing outright their petition for certiorari on the ground of non-
joinder of indispensable parties. It should be noted that petitioners impleaded only the then deceased Villamater as
respondent to the petition, excluding his heirs.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those who are parties in interest without
whom there can be no final determination of an action. They are those parties who possess such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their
presence. A party is indispensable if his interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is
inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ interest.

Unquestionably, Villamater’s widow stands as an indispensable party to this case.

Under Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action, thus:

Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be
severed and proceeded with separately.

The proper remedy is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or
upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff an opportunity to
amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff ordered to include the indispensable
party refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the
action dismissed.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013

Subject Matter: Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties – not a ground for dismissal

Overview: In summary, the ruling in this case emphasizes the distinction between a failure to
state a cause of action and a non-joinder of indispensable parties. It underscores that when the
issue is non-joinder of indispensable parties, the appropriate remedy is to direct the plaintiff to
include all necessary parties in the lawsuit, rather than dismissing the case for failure to state a
cause of action. This ensures that all parties with a vested interest in the matter are involved in
the litigation, allowing for a complete and just resolution of the dispute.

Facts:

● The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina (spouses Mesina), during their lifetime,
bought from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and MariaFian (spouses Fian) two parcels of
land on installment. Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs - whose names do not
appear on the records, claiming ownership of the parcels of land and taking possession of
them- refused to acknowledge the payments for the lots and denied that their late parents
sold the property to the spouses Mesina.
● Meanwhile, the spouses Mesina passed away. Notwithstanding repeated demands, the
Heirs of Fian refused to vacate the lots and to turn possession over to the heirs of the
spouses Mesina. Thus, as attorney-in-fact of his siblings Victor, Maria and Lorna, filed
an action for quieting of title and damages before the RTC of Baybay, Leyte against the
Heirs of Fian.
 ● The "case, entitled Heirs of Sps. Faustino S. Mesina & Genoveva S Mesina, represented
by Norman Mesina v. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr., represented by Theresa Fian Yray. She
claims that the "Heirs of Mesina'' could not be considered as a juridical person or entity
authorized by law to file a civil action. Neither could the "Heirs of Fian" be made as
defendant, not being a juridical person as well. She added that since the names of all the
heirs of the late spouses Mesina and spouses Fian were not individually named, the
complaint is dismissed the complaint.
● The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the RT decision. The respondent Theresa
filed her Vehement Opposition to the motion for reconsideration. The RT issued its
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the
CA. The CA rendered its Decision; ruling that all the heirs of the spouses Fian are
indispensable parties and should have been impleaded in the complaint. Petitioners filed
their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issue state no cause of action for the absence of indispensable parties.

RULING:

The issue states a cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of

the pleading. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential
elements of a cause of action, namely:

(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;

(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and

(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right.

By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state a cause of action, it can be readily seen
that the inclusion of Theresa's co-heirs does not fall under any of the above elements.

The infirmity is, in fact, not a failure to state a cause of action but a non-joinder of an
indispensable party. Non-joinder means the "failure to bring a person who is a necessary party
or in this case an indispensable party into a lawsuit." An indispensable party, on the other hand,
is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of the action, and who
shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant. As such, this is properly a non-joinder of
indispensable party, the indispensable parties who were not included in the complaint being the
other heirs of Fian, and not a failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. of the action on
the ground that the complaint failed to name or implead all the heirs of the late spouses Fian.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which state in part:
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. Only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. XXX

Section 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Xxx

Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is improper. What the trial
court should have done is to direct petitioner Norman Mesina to implead all the heirs of
Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a reasonable time from notice with a warning that his
failure to do so shall mean dismissal of the complaint.

Juana Complex v. Fil-Estate Land, G.R. No. 152272, March 5, 2012

Overview: The court determined that the requirements for a class suit were met in this case. It found that the suit
benefited all commuters and motorists who used La Paz Road, making it a matter of common interest. Moreover, the
sheer number of individuals affected made it impractical to join them all as parties and name them individually in
the complaint. Finally, the court was satisfied that JCHA and the individual residents who brought the class suit
could adequately represent the interests of the entire class.

In conclusion, the court held that the complaint was properly filed as a class suit because it met the necessary
elements for such a suit. It recognized that the subject matter was of common interest, the affected parties were
numerous, and the representatives could effectively protect the interests of the entire class. Therefore, the class suit
was allowed to proceed.

Subject Matter: Sec. 12. Class suit

Facts:

● Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana
Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions, instituted a complaint for damages, in its own behalf and as
a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring
subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc.
● Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and intimidating them in
their use of La Paz Road. Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.
● They claim that the excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a common right or cause
of action for JCHA, etal. against them since each of them has a separate and distinct purpose and each may
be affected differently than the others. With regard to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that
JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and
further claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens registered private road and there was neither a voluntary nor
legal easement constituted over it.

Issue:

Whether the complaint was properly filed as class suit.

Held:
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:1) the subject matter of controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons;2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or
representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. “The individuals
sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as
parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint.”

Newsweek, Inc. v. IAC, G.R. No. L-63559, May 30, 1986

Subject Matter: Sec. 12. Class suit

Facts:
· Private respondents filed a Complaint for damages for 1M. The criminal complaint for libel was filed
separately against Newsweek.
· Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental filed a case in
their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province against Newsweek Inc.
and two of their non-resident correspondents/reporters, Fred Bruning and Barry Came.
· The complaint alleged that petitioner committed libel against them by the publication of the article
“An Island of Fear” in their magazine.
· The article supposedly portrayed the island as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane
planters who exploited the impoverished sugarcane laborers and brutalized and killed them with impunity.
· They claim that the article showed a malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and
misrepresentation of facts, putting them in a bad light
· They are comprised of 8,500 (number is complied with)
· Newsweek, a foreign corporation who publishes weekly magazine, filed a Motion to Dismiss for libel.
· CFI Bacolod denied Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel.
· IAC affirmed CFI’s denial of Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel.

Issue:
Whether the complaint was properly filed as class suit.
Held:
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of class interest affected by the
judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil.
348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They
do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous never singled
out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of
a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it
does to an official act performed by an elective public official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.

Mathay v. Consolidated Bank, G.R. No. L-23136, August 26, 1974

Subject Matter: Class Suit

Facts:
Samuel Mathay, et.al. were former stockholders of Consolidated Mines Inc. (CMI). Petitioners filed a case
for a class suit against CMI containing six causes of action. Petitioners alleged that in violation of the Board
resolution, the defendants unlawfully acquired stockholdings in the defendant Bank in excess of what they were
lawfully entitled, hence depriving the petitioners of their right to subscribe at par value, in proportion to their
equities established under their respective "Pre-Incorporation Agreements to Subscribe" to the capital stock and that
the Articles of Incorporation were fraudulently amended by the defendants. The complaint was dismissed by the
Trial Court on the ground that the class suit could not be maintained because of the absence of a showing in the
complaint that the plaintiffs-appellants were sufficiently numerous and representative, and that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action. The CA affirmed the ruling, hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the instant action is a class suit.
Held:
The action at bar is not a class suit. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are
accordingly: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and
(2) that such persons be so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all to the court. The statute requires
that the complaint should allege the existence of the necessary facts, the existence of a class and the number of
members in the said class so as to enable the court to determine whether the members of the said class are so
numerous as to make it impractical to bring them all to court. The complaint in the instant case failed to state the
number of said CMI subscribing stockholders that the trial court could not infer nor make sure that the parties are
indeed so numerous that they cannot practically appear in court and that the plaintiffs are representative of the other
stockholders. The statute also requires that the subject-matter of the controversy be of common interest to numerous
persons. In the instant case, the interest that appellants, plaintiffs and intervenors, and the CMI stockholders had in
the subject matter of this suit was several, not common or general in the sense required by the statute. Each one of
the appellants and the CMI stockholders had determinable interest; each one had a right, if any, only to his
respective portion of the stocks. No one of them had any right to, or any interest in, the stock to which another was
entitled.
Borlasa v. Polistico, G.R. No. L-22909, January 28, 1925

WHAT DOES THIS CASE TELL YOU ABOUT?

This case tells us that although the general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of
course, the joinder of all necessary parties wherever possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any
and all conditions, the presence of those latter being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power.

However, in a class suit contemplates an exceptional situation where there are numerous persons all in the same
plight and all together constituting a constituency whose presence in the litigation is absolutely indispensable to the
administration of justice.

In the class suit, then, representation of a class interest which will be affected by the judgment is indispensable; but
it is not indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party.

Thus, in this case the addition of some hundreds of persons to the number of the plaintiffs, made in the amendment
to the complaint of December 13, 1922, was unnecessary,

Procedural Issue: The procedural issue in this case is that the amended complaint on the ground that it showed on
its face a lack of necessary parties.

FACTS:

What’s the original complaint filed?

This action was instituted by Victoriano Borlasa and others against Vicente Polistico and others, chiefly for the
purpose of securing the dissolution of a voluntary association named Turuhan Polistico & Co., and to compel the
defendants to account for and surrender the money and property of the association in order that its affairs may be
liquidated and its assets applied according to law.

Where is it filed? Court of First Instance of Laguna on July 25, 1917

What happened? In the month of April, 1911, the plaintiffs and defendants, together with several hundred other
persons, formed an association under the name of Turuhan Polistico & Co. Vicente Polistico, the principal
defendant herein, was elected president and treasurer of the association, and his house in Lilio, Laguna, was made its
principal place of business.

The life of the association was fixed at fifteen years, and under the by-laws each member obligated himself to pay to
Vicente Polistico, as president-treasurer, before 3 o'clock in the afternoon of every Sunday the sum of 50 centavos,
except that on every fifth Sunday the amount was P1, if the president elected to call this amount, as he always did. It
is alleged that from April, 1911, until April, 1917, the sums of money mentioned above were paid weekly by all of
the members of the society with few irregularities.

The inducement to these weekly contributions was found in provisions of the by-laws to the effect that a lottery
should be conducted weekly among the members of the association and that the successful member should be paid
the amount collected each week, from which, however, the president-treasurer of the society was to receive the sum
of P200, to be held by him as funds of the society.

It is further alleged that by virtue of these weekly lotteries Vicente Polistico, as president-treasurer of the
association, received sums of money amounting to P74,000, more or less, in the period stated, which he still retains
in his power or has applied to the purchase of real property largely in his own name and partly in the names of
others. The defendants in the complaint are the members of the board of directors of the association, including
Vicente Polistico, as president-treasurer, Alfonso Noble, secretary, Felix Garcia and Vivencio Zulaybar, as promoter
(propagandistas), and Afroniano de la Peña and Tomas Orencia, as members (vocales) of the board.

In an amended answer the defendants raised the question of lack of parties and set out a list of some hundreds of
persons whom they alleged should be brought in as parties defendant on the ground, among others, that they were in
default in the payment of their dues to the association. On November 28, 1922, the court made an order requiring the
plaintiffs to amend their complaint within a stated period so as to include all of the members of the Turnuhan
Polistico & Co. either as plaintiffs or defendants.

The plaintiffs accepted to this order, but acquiesced to the extent of amending their complaint by adding as
additional parties plaintiff some hundreds of persons, residents of Lilio, said to be members of the association and
desirous of being joined as plaintiffs. Some of these new plaintiffs had not been named in the list submitted by the
defendants with their amended answer; and on the other hand many names in said list were here omitted, it being
claimed by the plaintiffs that the persons omitted were not residents of Lilio but residents of other places and that
their relation to the society, so far as the plaintiffs could discover, was fictitious.

The defendants demurred to the amended complaint on the ground that it showed on its face a lack of necessary
parties and this demurrer was sustained, with the ultimate result of the dismissal of the action. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the addition of some hundreds of persons to the number of the plaintiffs, made in the
amendment to the complaint of December 13, 1922, was unnecessary?

RULING: YES.

The trial judge appears to have supposed that all the members of the Turnuhan Polistico & Co. should be
brought in either plaintiffs or defendants. This notion is entirely mistaken. The situation involved is precisely the
one contemplated in section 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where one or more may sue for the benefit of all. It
is evident from the showing made in the complaint, and from the proceedings in the court below, that it would be
impossible to make all of the persons in interest parties to the cases and to require all of the members of the
association to be joined as parties would be tantamount to a denial of justice.

The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all
necessary parties wherever possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions,
the presence of those latter being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. The class suit contemplates
an exceptional situation where there are numerous persons all in the same plight and all together constituting
a constituency whose presence in the litigation is absolutely indispensable to the administration of justice.
Here the strict application of the rule as to indispensable parties would require that each and every individual in the
class should be present. But at this point the practice is so far relaxed as to permit the suit to proceed, when the class
is sufficient represented to enable the court to deal properly and justly with that interest and with all other interest
involved in the suit. In the class suit, then, representation of a class interest which will be affected by the
judgment is indispensable; but it is not indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party.

The addition of some hundreds of persons to the number of the plaintiffs, made in the amendment to the
complaint of December 13, 1922, was unnecessary, and as the presence of so many parties is bound to prove
embarrassing to the litigation from death or removal, it is suggested that upon the return of this record to the
lower court for further proceedings, the plaintiff shall again amend their complaint by dismissing as to unnecessary
parties plaintiffs, but retaining a sufficient number of responsible persons to secure liability for costs and fairly to
present all the members of the association.

There is another feature of the complaint which makes a slight amendment desirable, which is that the
complaint should be made to show on its face that the action is intended to be litigated as a class suit. We
accordingly recommend that the plaintiffs further amend by adding after the names of the parties plaintiffs
the words, "in their own behalf and in behalf of other members of Turuhan Polistico & Co."

The order appealed from is reversed, the demurrer of the defendants based upon supposed lack of parties is
overruled, and the defendants are required to answer to the amended complaint within the time allowed by law and
the rules of the court. The costs of this appeal will be paid by the defendants. So ordered.

Ibañez v. Roman Catholic Church, 12 Phil. 227

Facts:

The history of the image of the Holy Child of Ternate (Santo Niño de Ternate).

The thirteen plaintiff file complaint against the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church and its representative, the parish
priest of Naic, Valentin Velasco, Defendants, for the proprietor-ship of an image of the Holy Child.

"The plaintiffs as expressed above, as inhabitants of the town of Ternate, for themselves and in the name of all the
other inhabitants of said town, appear before the court and bring complaint against the defendants, alleging as a
cause of action that:"

There are no other allegations in the complaint as to the right of the plaintiffs to represent the inhabitants of Ternate,
nor is there any proof whatever in the case upon this point. The claim of the plaintiffs is that the persons who were at
the time of the presentation of the complaint the inhabitants of Ternate were the owners in common of the image
considered as a piece of personal property. There is no evidence to show that the present plaintiffs, or any one of the
present inhabitants of Ternate, were the heirs or in any way related to any one of the two hundred Mardicas who
came to the Philippines nearly two hundred and fifty years ago. The claim of the plaintiffs is apparently not rested
upon the proposition that they are entitled to relief because they are such heirs, but because they live in the pueblo.
Their view seems to be that the heirs of the Mardicas living in other pueblos have no interest in the image.

Nor is there any evidence in the case to show how many, if any, of the plaintiffs or of the present inhabitants of
Ternate, who are some 2,460 people, belong to the Roman Catholic Church. It will have been observed that, when
the Mardicas came here, there came with them a priest of the Roman Catholic Church; that the image has always
been used in connection with the worship of the religion professed by that church; that the cofradia was an
organization of that church, and by the terms of the decree of November 30, 1803, necessarily had to have as its
rector a priest of that religion; that the disposition of the image has always been at the charge of the church’s
officers, and that recourse has always been had to them to determine any rights relating thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the controversy of the case involves general interest to may person.

RULING: Yes.
The plaintiffs rely upon article 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is as follows:

"When the subject-matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and the parties
are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
benefit of all. But in such case any party in interest shall have a right to intervene in protection of his individual
interests, and the court shall make sure that the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and representative
so that all interests concerned are fully protected."

No case has been called to our attention in which this section or the rule which it enunciates has been applied where
the ownership of personal property is involved and where it is claimed to belong to persons who at a particular time
reside in a particular place, or where the ownership changes as persons move in or out of such locality.

The case of Smith v. Swormstedt (16 How., 288), involved the division of the Methodist Church of the United States
into two bodies, Methodist Church North and Methodist Church South. The matter in controversy was a property
known as The Book Concern. The only persons interested in this property were the preachers belonging to the two
churches, of whom there were about 1,500 in the Church South and about 3,800 in the Church North. These persons
were well known and could be identified, and six of the preachers belonging to the Church South were allowed to
maintain the action for themselves and for all their fellow-preachers in that body. It will be seen that no one of these
three cases is like the present one, wherein no one of the inhabitants of Ternate has a vested interest in the property
in question which would survive his removal from the town and in which another person, by moving into the town,
acquired an interest.

"In all cases where exceptions to the general rule are allowed, and a few are permitted to sue and defend on I behalf
of the many, by representation, care must be taken that persons are brought on the record fairly representing the
interest or right involved, so that it may be fully and honestly tried."

In Macon & Birmingham Railroad v. Gibson, above cited, the court said:

"It is true that as only two of the citizens have become parties, it is rather a small representation of the whole
community; but considering the publicity of the case and of the interest involved in it, and the fact that the suit is
located in Upson County and will be tried (if tried at all) at the county town, which is the town whose citizens are
interested, there can be no cause to apprehend that the two plaintiffs on the face of the petition will be disposed, or if
so disposed, allowed to misrepresent the community in whose behalf they have brought this suit. No doubt it is
somewhat discretionary with a court of equity as to how many representatives of a class will, or ought to be,
regarded as a fair representation of the whole class in the given instance."

It sufficiently appears from the record in this case that it is a controversy between the Roman Catholic Church on
one side and the Independent Filipino Church on the other. That it is the purpose if the plaintiffs, if they secure
possession of the image, to place it in the chapel of the Independent Church is also very clear. What number of the
inhabitants of the town (2,460 according to the census) are members of the Roman Catholic Church and what part
are members of the Independent Filipino Church does not appear. But it is very apparent that many of the
inhabitants are opposed to the transfer of the image from the Roman Catholic Church. Under the circumstances, the
thirteen plaintiffs do not fairly represent all of the inhabitants of the town. Their interest and the interests of some of
the others are diametrically opposed. For this reason this action cannot be maintained.
Liana’s Supermarket v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111014, May 31, 1996

Subject Matter: Class Suit

FACTS:
● This case involves Liana's Supermarket, a self-service retail market, and the National Labor Union, a group
of employees who alleged unfair labor practices during their employment in the 1980s. Soon thereafter,
they aired their grievances but were only met with scolding and threats when they reported the practices to
the supermarket's management.
● In 1983, the supermarket entered a labor supply contract with BAVSPIA International Services. In 1984,
the supermarket required its employees to resign and reapply through BAVSPIA. Employees who refused
to quit their union membership faced suspension, dismissal, or legal action.
● Subsequently, the National Labor Union filed a complaint against Liana's Supermarket and BAVSPIA for
unfair labor practices. The complaint, which was amended in 1984 through its authorized representative,
evolved into a class suit, with varying numbers of complainants involved. Some employees settled with the
supermarket, while others joined the case, resulting in a total of 88 complainants.
● The supermarket disputed the charges, claiming no ongoing union activity at the time of the alleged
dismissals and contending that resignations were voluntary and unrelated to unfair labor practices.
● In 1987, a compromise agreement was attempted between the supermarket and the local union chapter, and
BAVSPIA sought to have its name removed from the case as a co-respondent when it appeared that
evidence was primarily directed against the supermarket.

NLRC-LA Ruling: On 1989, the Labor Arbiter, which the NLRC upheld on 1993, ruled that:
1. petitioner was the employer of complainants with BAVSPIA being engaged in labor-only
contracting;
2. complainants were illegally dismissed;
3. Peter Sy and Rosa Sy were not personally liable; and,
4. the charge of unfair labor practice and all labor standards claims were unsubstantiated by
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the consolidated cases fall under the term “class suit” as defined in Sec. 12, Rule 3 of ROC.

RULING: NO. The Court ruled that this is a “representative suit” as distinguished from “class suit” defined in Sec.
12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all. But in such case
the court shall make sure that the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and
representative so that all interests concerned are fully protected. Any party in interest shall have
a right to intervene in protection of his individual interest.

In the present case, there are multiple rights or causes of action pertaining separately to several, distinct
employees who are members of respondent Union. Therefore, the applicable rule is that provided in Sec. 3,
Rule 3, of the Rules of Court on "representative parties," which states —

SECTION 3. Representative parties. — A trustee of a an express trust, a guardian, executor

or administrator, or a party authorized by statute (Emphasis supplied), may sue or be sued
without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended; but the court
may, at any stage of the proceedings, order such beneficiary to be made a party.

A "representative suit" is akin to a "class suit" in the limited sense that the phrases found in Sec. 12 of Rule 3,
"one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all," and "the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous
and representative," are similar to the phrase " may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the
action is presented or defended " found in Sec. 3 of the same Rule . In other words, both suits are always filed in
behalf of another or others. That is why the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Apparently respondent
Union, the Labor Arbiter and respondent Commission merely denominated the suit, although erroneously, as a
"class suit" when, in reality, it is a "representative suit."

Insurance Company v. US Lines, G.R. No. L-21839 April 30, 1968

Subject Matter: Rule 3, Sec. 13. Alternative Defendants

FACTS:
● On October 10, 1960, 12 cases of cinematograph film were loaded onto the "SS Pioneer Mart" at the port of
New York. The shipment, with an invoice value of $8,685.36, was sent by Eastman Kodak Co. and
consigned to the Prudential Bank & Trust Co. in Manila. It was insured against loss and damage. The "SS
Pioneer Mart" was operated by the United States Lines Co., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in
the Philippines as American Pioneer Lines.
● The shipment arrived in Manila on November 6, 1960, and was discharged on November 7, 1960, into the
care of Manila Port Service, a subsidiary of the Manila Railroad Company, which was the arrastre operator
at the Port of Manila. The consignee's broker requested delivery, but only nine out of the 12 cases were
initially delivered. Later, two cases were found, one of which was missing some contents, and one case was
completely missing and couldn't be delivered to the consignee.
● In 1960, the broker filed a claim for missing and damaged goods within 15 days of discharge from the
shipment. The claim was against the United States Lines Co. and petitioner insurance company, which paid
$1,228.48 to the consignee and became the consignee's rights holder. When both the United States Lines
Co. and Manila Port Service refused to pay, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against them, including the Manila
Railroad Co., seeking the recovery of $1,228.48 plus legal interest and costs due to the connection between
Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad Company.
● The action filed by the plaintiff against the defendants was an alternative one — an action in
admiralty against the United States Lines Co. (on its liability as carrier) and against the Manila
Port Service and/or the Manila Railroad Company (on their liability as the arrastre operator of the
Port of Manila).
CFI (RTC) RULING:
● On June 20, 1963, the lower court determined that the total value of lost merchandise was $1,116.80, plus a
survey cost of $37.65 and an over-insurance of $111.68, resulting in a total liability of $1,266.13. The court
also found that defendant Manila Port Service had received the shipment in good order. However, despite
holding Manila Port Service responsible for the loss, the lower court dismissed the case because it lacked
jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's claim against both Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad Company
being less than P5,000.00, falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred when it ruled that plaintiff's alternative action against defendant
operator of the carrying vessel and the defendant arrastre operator as separable.

RULING: YES. The lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff's action is not in accord with the ruling of this Court in a
line of decisions. In the case of Rizal Surety and Insurance Co. v. Manila Railroad Co., et al., this Court similarly
ruled that:

"The sole issue is one purely of law, whether or not the court below had jurisdiction over the
case.

"The complaint in this case named as alternative defendants under alternative causes of action
(1) C. F. Sharp & Co., Inc., for breach of contract of carriage by sea, and (2) Manila Port
Service and Manila Railroad Company, for violation of arrastre contract. The cause of action
against C. F. Sharp & Co., Inc., being in admiralty, comes within the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance whereas, the cause of action against the Manila Port Service and Manila
Railroad Company comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal court
inasmuch as the amount of the demand is less than P5,000.00.
 "At the time the complaint was filed, plaintiff did not know at what precise stage of the series
of transactions the loss complained of occurred. If the loss took place in transit, C. F. Sharp &
Co., Inc. would be liable therefor, but if the loss occurred after the goods were landed and
discharged from the carrying vessel, the Manila Port Service would bear the loss. Hence, the
joinder of causes of action and parties defendants in the alternative which is permitted by
Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, quoted hereunder:

'SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action. — Subject to rules regarding jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties, a party may in one pleading state, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party (a) if the said causes of action arise
out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or (b) if the causes of
action are for demands for money, or are of the same nature and character.

'In the cases falling under clause (a) of the preceding paragraph, the action shall be filed in the
inferior court unless any of the causes joined falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, in which case it shall be filed in the latter court.

'In the cases falling under clause (b) the jurisdiction shall be determined by the aggregate
amount of the demands, if for money or by their nature and character, if otherwise.'

And, since one of the causes of action is cognizable by the Court of First Instance the suit
should be filed, as was correctly done by the plaintiff, in said court, notwithstanding that the
other cause of action — if standing alone — would fall within the jurisdiction of the
municipal court, by reason of the amount of the demand. In International Harvester Co. of the
Philippines v. Judge Aragon, where a similar action was filed with the municipal court, we
held that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as one of the
alternative causes of action against the shipping firm, was an action in admiralty, cognizable
by the Court of First Instance.

Saligumba v. Palanog, G.R. No. 143365, December 4, 2008

Topic: This case highlights the effect if the original party of the action died during the pendency of the case. The
death of the original party and the non-substitution of such party will not invalidate the proceedings and the
judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The decision rendered shall bind the party’s
successor-in-interest

FACTS:

Spouses Monica and Avelino Palanog filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages against spouses Valeria
Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. with the RTC. The spouses Palanogs alleged that they have been in actual,
open, adverse and continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of land in Aklan. Allegedly, the spouses
Saligumbas prevented them from entering and residing on the said property and had destroyed the barbed wires
enclosing the land. Thus, spouses Palanogs prayed that they be declared the true and rightful owners of the same.
During the proceedings, spouses Saligumbas died and their counsel failed to formally inform the court except for a
note "Deceased" in the return proof of service. On August 7, 1987, the RTC rendered judgment declaring the
spouses Palanogs as the rightful owners of the land and ordering the spouses Saligumbas to vacate the premises. The
trial court also directed that a copy of its decision be furnished to Monica Palanog and Valeria Saligumba. Later, a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed. However, on May 8, 1997, the trial
court ruled that since more than 5 years had elapsed after the date of the decision's finality, the decision could no
longer be executed by mere motion.

So, on May 9, 1997, Monica Palanog, who is now a widow, filed an action to revive and enforce the RTC decision
on 1987 which she claimed has not been barred by the statute of limitations. Eliseo Saligumba Jr. and Eduardo
Saligumba who are heirs and children of spouses Saligumbas were also impleaded in the new action. Apparently,
Eliseo Saligumba Sr. died in 1984, while Valeria died in 1985. Further, no motion for the substitution of the spouses
was filed nor did an order issue for the substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas in the complaint filed by
spouses Palanogs. Accordingly, Atty. Miralles and Eliseo Saligumba Jr. never confirmed the death of the spouses
despite notices sent to them to appear. Moreover, the siblings were declared in default for failure to file any
responsive pleading.

ISSUE: Whether or not the revival of judgment in this case was proper considering that the defendants in the action
for revival were not the original contending party in the original case.

RULING: YES. "An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of
a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon
motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor’s
case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.

An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct from either the recovery of
property case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the
action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of judgment is premised on the
assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by independent action, is already final and
executory."

In the instant case, the 1987 judgment of the RTC had been rendered final and executory by the lapse of time with
no motion for reconsideration nor was an appeal having been filed. Furthermore, there was no formal withdrawal
received and approved by the court from Atty. Miralles as the counsel of the spouses Saligumbas at that time, thus,
since there was no such formal withdrawal, he remained the counsel for the spouses Saligumbas until the RTC
rendered judgment. His acts bind his clients and the latter’s successors-in-interest. Additionally, it was shown on
record that Eliseo Saligumba Jr.was also furnished copies of the trial court’s orders and notices. It is also clear that
in the present case for revival of judgment, the other petitioners have not shown much interest in the case.

It is also important to take note that the complaint filed at that time was an action for quieting of title with damages
which is an action involving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is
not extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides for the procedure, thus: Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased
to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure
the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved
in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court
to order the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the deceased. In the instant case, it is true that
the trial court, after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation in the envelopes, failed to order the
appearance of the legal representative or heir of the deceased. There was no court order for deceased’s legal
representative or heir to appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for the
deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment of such legal representative, nor did the heirs
ever asked to be substituted.

Hon. Sumaljag v. Spouses Literato, G.R. No. 149787, June 18, 2008

Topic: The rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure as amended where the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and if there is no legal representative named by the
counsel for the deceased party or if the one named failed to appear, the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and shall appear for and on
behalf of the deceased. The purpose of this rule is to protect the right to due process of every party to the litigation
who may be affected by the intervening death.

FACTS: On Nov. 16, 1993, Josefa Maglasang filed with the RTC in Baybay Leyte for the nullity of the deed of sale
of real property executed between her and Spouse Diosdidit and Menendez Literato. She alleged that the deed of
sale of Lot 1220-D is spurious. Menendez and Josefa are sisters and 2 out of 6 heirs of their parents Cristito and
Inecita Maglasang. Lot 1220-D was partitioned to Josefa while Lot-1220-E was given to Menendez.

Respondents denied the alleged falsification and impleaded that petitioner (Sumaljag) and Josefa occupied Lot
1220-D and Lot 1220-E without their authority where Lot 1220-E is theirs by inheritance while Lot 1220-D has
been sold to them by Josefa. They further alleged that Sumaljag acted in bad faith in acquiring the two lots because
he prepared and notarized on Sept. 26, 1986 the contract of lease over the whole Lot 1220 between all the
Maglasang heirs excluding Josefa and Vicente Tolo running from 1986-1991, thus petitioner know that Josefa no
longer owned Lot 1220-D.

Civil Case No. 1281 was filed by Menendez on April 4, 1996 with the RTC to declare the inexistence of the lease
contract, recovery of possession of land, and damages against petitioner and Josefa. She further averred that
petitioner and Josefa were in bad faith in their contract of lease since they both know that Josefa did not own the
leased lots. She prayed for the leased contract to be declared null and void.

During the pendency of Civil Cases B-1239 and B-1281, Josefa died on May 3, 1999. Her common counsel with the
petitioner asked RTC in Civil Case 1239 he be given an extended period to file a formal notice of death and
substitution of party which was granted. On August 26, 1999, Atty. Puray prayed to substitute Josefa with the
Petitioner Sumaljag alleging that prior to her death, shee executed a Quitclaim Deed over Lot 1220-D in favor of
Remismundo Maglasang who then sold the property to the petitioner.

Menendez objected to the proposed substitution alleging that Atty. Puray filed the notice of death and substitution
beyond the 30-day period provided under Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 civil Procedure as amended and recommended
that Josefa be substituted by the latter’s full-blooded sister, Michaeles Maglasang Rodrigo.

RTC then denied Atty. Puray’s motion for substitution and ordered Michaeles to appear as Josefa’s representative.
RTC also denied petitioner’s MR.

Petitioner went to the CA on a petition for certiorari to question the interlocutory orders of the court but was
dismissed for lack of merit, the CA also denied petitioner’s MR.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner had effectively been subrogated to the rights of Josefa over the property under litigation
at the time she died.

RULING: NO.

The governing rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, where the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and if there is no legal representative named by
the counsel for the deceased party or if the one named failed to appear, the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and shall appear for and on
behalf of the deceased. The purpose of this rule is to protect the right to due process of every party to the litigation
who may be affected by the intervening death.
To apply this governing rule on substitution we have to determine whether an action survives or not after death of a
plaintiff or petitioner was elucidated in the case of Bonilla v. Barcena where it held that it could be determined
depending on the nature of the action and damages sued for. Since the question involved in this case relates to
property rights, then we are dealing with actions that survive so that Sec 16, Rule 3 must apply.

On the other hand, the duty of counsel on Sec. 16, Rule 3 is to inform the court within 30 days after the fact of death,
give the name and address of the deceased’s legal representative/s. In the present case, counsel did in fact notify the
lower court belatedly of her death and asked the court to substitute Josefa with Petitioner Sumaljag. The court views
that the counsel satisfactorily explained to the lower court the circumstances of the late reporting, the issue lies in
the core of the case whether counsel properly gave the court the name and address of the legal representative of the
deceased Sec. 16, Rule 3 specifices. The court rules, he did not. The legal representatives contemplated by this
provision are those authorized by law - the administrator, executor, or guardian who, under the rule on settlement of
estate of deceased persons, is constituted to take over the estate of the deceased.

Significantly, the person (Sumaljag) that counsel gave as substitute was not one of those mentioned in the rule. He is
a counterclaim co-defendant whose proffered justification for the requested substitution is the transfer to him of
interests of the deceased in the litigation prior to her death.

With this, the lower court and CA were legally correct in not giving effect to counsel’s suggested substitute for the
following reasons:

● Petitioner is not allowed by the rules to be a substitute. Doing so effectively brings to naught the
protection that the rules intend

● Counsel could have validly manifested to the court the transfer of Josefa’s interests in the subject
matter of the litigation pursuant to Sec. 19, Rule 3 but this can only be done while the client-transferor
was alive while manifesting counsel was the effective and authorized counsel, not after the death of the
client when the lawyer-client relationship terminates. The counsel now lost the authority to speak for
and bind his client since Josefa is now deceased. Petitioner then can be said to be a transferee pendente
lite whose status is pending before the lower court.

Therefore , the CA correctly backed the plain terms of Sec. 16, Rule 3 in determining who the appropriate legal
representative/s should be in the absence of an executor or administrator. Since Josefa’s death certificate show that
she was single at the time of her death and no record shows that she left a will, the CA correctly held that her heirs
are her surviving sisters and children of her deceased sister, Lourdes who should be her legal representatives
pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 3. Menendez, is excluded as an adverse party in the case before the RTC.

Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006 (Supra.)
This case tells us:
● the spirit behind the general rule requiring a formal substitution of heirs. The underlying principle
is not really because substitution of heirs is a jurisdictional requirement, but because non-compliance
therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, though not duly
notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. Such violation
of due process can only be asserted by the persons whose rights are claimed to have been violated,
namely the heirs to whom the adverse judgment is sought to be enforced.
● lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be
asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence. Jurisdiction over the person of the parties
to the case may be waived either expressly or impliedly.

FACTS:
What’s the original complaint filed? Recovery of loan with damages
Quirino de Guzman and Arcadio Carandang organized a corporation by pooling together their technical expertise,
equipment, financial resources and franchise they called as Mabuhay Broadcasting Systems, Inc. Carandang
subscribed to the increase of their capital stock, in which de Guzman claimed to have paid for part of the
subscriptions and was asking for payment from Carandang. The spouses Carandang refused to pay the amount,
contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed whereby deGuzman promised to pay for the stock
subscriptions without cost, in consideration for Carandang's technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment, and
his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment. De Guzman filed a complaint with the RTC
seeking for recovery with damage which the RTC granted and the CA confirmed.
Spouses Carandang filed for petition for review on certiorari claiming that the Decision of the RTC, having been
rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, was void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court. The spouses Carandang posited that such failure to comply with the rule rendered void the decision of the
RTC, in adherence to the following pronouncements in Vda. de Haberer v. Court of Appeals and Ferreria v. Vda. de
Gonzales:
Thus, it has been held that when a party dies in an action that survives and no order is
issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased
in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no substitution has ever been effected, the
trial held by the court without such legal representatives or heirs and the judgment rendered
after such trial are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of
the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and judgment would be binding
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC Decision was void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3

RULING: No, the RTC decision was valid.

Jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case may be waived either expressly or impliedly. Implied waiver
comes in the form of either voluntary appearance or a failure to object. In this case, not only did the heirs of de
Guzman interposed no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons; they were actually claiming and
embracing such jurisdiction. In doing so, their waiver was not even merely implied (by their participation in the
appeal of said Decision), but expressed (by their explicit espousal of such view in both the Court of Appeals and in
this Court). The heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of the RTC. Thus, lack of
jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party
who can thereby waive it by silence.
Also, this case had already been submitted for decision before the RTC several months before the passing away of
de Guzman. Hence, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzman's counsel were conducted before
the promulgation of the RTC Decision. Consequently, de Guzman's counsel cannot be said to have no authority to
appear in trial, as trial had already ceased upon the death of de Guzman.
In sum, the RTC Decision was valid despite the failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
because of the express waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because there had been, before
the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzman's counsel.

Commissioner v. Jardin, G.R. No. 141834, July 30, 2007

WHAT DOES THIS CASE TELL YOU ABOUT?

It tells us that failure to make a substitution pursuant to Sec. 17, Rule 3 of the ROC is a ground for dismissal of an
action for the valid substitution of a public officer who has sued or has been sued in his or her official capacity, the
following requisites must be satisfied:
● Satisfactory proof by any party that there is substantial need for continuing or maintaining the action;
● The successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the acts of his or her predecessor;
● The substitution must be effected within 30 days after the successor assumes office or within the time
granted by the court; and,
● Notice of the application of the other party.

FACTS:
On May 8, 1999, Edgardo Cabrrera, Gerardo Gorrospe, and Dorotea Hiyas, intelligence agents of Bureau of
Immingration saw respondent Samuel Jardin, chief of the BI’s Law and Intelligence Division with a Japanese
national at the NAIA. Carrera noticed that the Japanese national’s fifth fingeron the left hand missing, suspicious,
the BI agents watched the respondent and his companions.

They identified that Japanese as Mizutani Ryoichiro, an alien declared undesirable in 1999 and prohibited to enter
the Philippines, they immediately apprehended him and sent back to Japan pursuant to an exclusion order. The BI
agents filed a spot report with the chief of intelligence of the BI in NAIA which Acting Immigration Officer Jude C.
Hinolan confirmed and relayed the service of exclusion to the airline to deport Ryoichiro.

On May 14, 1999, petitioner Rufus Rodriguez ordered associate commissioner Ma. Luisa Ylagan-Cortez to
investigate the incident and she ordered respondent to file his sworn explanation to which he denied the allegations
against him. He aveerred that although aware of Ryoichiro’s blacklist who was born in 1988, his niece’s fiance was
in his fifties and reasoned that acusations against Ryoichiro’s are unfounded because neither a conviction nor a
policerepory linked him to the Yakuza was presented.

On June 4, 1999, Ylagan-Cortez as acting immigration commissioner order the preventive suspension of respondent
Jardin for 90 days and the case was then referred to petitioner Alan Roullo Yap, an associate commissioner at that
time. Respondent moved for suspension of proceedings and Yap denied this and on July 8, 1999, sought the review
of the Secretary of Justice. Despite these motions, he also filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA to
assail the June 4, 1999 order of Ylagan-Cortez which the CA nullified and directed petitioners to reinstate
respondent to his position.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied. On February 21, 2000, the petitioners in the official capacities
filed this appeal contending that the CA erred in granting respondent’s petition for certiorari and annulling the June
4, 1999 order.

On June 15, 2002, respondent moved to declare the petition moot averring that Rodriguez had been replaced by
Andrea Domingo as immigration commissioner while petitioner Yap was appointed to the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel.

What’s the original complaint filed?

This is an administrative case against Samuel Jardin

Where is it filed?
Bureau of Immigration

What happened?
- jardin (respondent) was in a preventive suspension and filed for a suspension of proceedings and
reconsideration but was denied by the BI. He also sought review with the Secretary of Justice on his
preventive suspension
- Jardin filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA to assail the order of the BI which the CA
nullified and reinstate Jardin to his position
- Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied and filed in their official capacities an appeal contending
CA erred in granting respondent’s petition for certiorari
- Respondent moved to declare the petition moot

ISSUE:

WON petitioner Rodriguez’s successor adopt his position in the case of respondent Jardin

RULING:

Petitioner Rodriguez has been replace by Andrea Domingo as immigration commissioner while petitioner Yap had
been appointed to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. Despite the lapse of 30 day, no susbtitution was
effected pursuant to Sec. 17, Rule 3 of the ROC which provides,
 Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. — When a public officer is a party in an
action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action
may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if within thirty (30) days after the successor takes
office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a
substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to continue
or adopt the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer affected, unless expressly
assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be
heard.

In this case, the OSG manifested that Domingo had been appointed as the new immigration commission replacing
petitioner Rodriguez, however, Domingo is not adopting the position of her predecessor.

Well-settled is the rule that failure to make a substitution pursuant to Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a
ground for the dismissal of an action.29 For the valid substitution of a public officer who has sued or has been sued in
his or her official capacity, the following requisites must be satisfied:

1. satisfactory proof by any party that there is substantial need for continuing or maintaining the action;

2. the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the acts of his or her predecessor;

3. the substitution must be effected within 30 days after the successor assumes office or within the time granted by
the court; and,

4. notice of the application to the other party.

Here, petitioner Rodriguez's successor categorically expressed her lack of interest in pursuing this appeal, hence, the
failure to effect a substitution.

Associated Bank v. Spouses Pronstroller, G.R. No. 148444, September 3, 2009

TOPIC: Rule 3, Sec. 19

Overview: The case involves the denial of a Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Associated Bank (now
United Overseas Bank [Phils.]) and a Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Spouses Eduardo and Ma. Pilar Vaca
(spouses Vaca). The key procedural principle here revolves around the rules governing intervention and the concept
of transferee pendente lite.

FACTS:
•The petitioner, Associated Bank, had entered into two letter-agreements concerning a property dispute, with the
second agreement modifying the first.
•The respondents, spouses Vaca, had requested a modification to the original agreement back in 1993 but only
received a response from the bank a year later, which led them to believe that the second letter-agreement, signed by
the bank's attorney, was an action on their request.
•The bank argued that the first agreement was not rescinded by the failure to deposit the full payment in escrow
since the date of full payment had been modified by the second agreement.
•In a prior decision, the Court of Appeals' factual findings were affirmed by the Supreme Court, leading to the
conclusion that the bank's motions were unmeritorious.
•After the Supreme Court's decision, spouses Vaca filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, asserting their ownership
of the subject property and seeking reimbursement from the bank.

ISSUE:
1.Whether the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by spouses Vaca is timely and permissible.
2.Whether the legal interest of spouses Vaca in the litigation qualifies them for intervention.
RULING:
1.The Motion for Leave to Intervene is denied because it was belatedly filed. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court allows intervention before the rendition of judgment by the trial court. In this case, the intervention before the
Supreme Court was untimely.
2.The legal interest of spouses Vaca as transferees pendente lite does not entitle them to intervene. As per Section
19, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they are bound by the proceedings and judgment of the case before they acquired
their interest. The notice of lis pendens on the property had been duly annotated before the sale to spouses Vaca,
making them subject to the outcome of the pending suit.
The claim for reimbursement by spouses Vaca must be pursued in a separate action against the petitioner, as
allowing their intervention would unduly delay and prejudice the rights of other parties who have been deprived of
the property for an extended period.
In light of the above, the Supreme Court denies the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and the Spouses Vaca's
Motion for Intervention.

PRINCIPLE:
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,10 citing Santiago Land Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,11 we have ruled that:

[A] transferee pendente lite of the property in litigation does not have a right to intervene. We held that a transferee
stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor-in-interest, bound by the proceedings and judgment in the case before
the rights were assigned to him. It is not legally tenable for a transferee pendente lite to still intervene. Essentially,
the law already considers the transferee joined or substituted in the pending action, commencing at the exact
moment when the transfer of interest is perfected between the original party-transferor and the transferee pendente
lite.121avvphi1

That the Certificate of Title covering the subject property is in the name of the spouses Vaca is of no moment. It is
noteworthy that a notice of lis pendens was timely annotated on petitioner’s title. This was done prior to the sale of
the property to the spouses Vaca, the cancellation of petitioner’s title, and the issuance of the new Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of the spouses. By virtue of the notice of lis pendens, the spouses Vaca are bound by
the outcome of the litigation subject of the lis pendens. Their interest is subject to the incidents or results of the
pending suit, and their Certificate of Title will afford them no special protection.13

Lastly, the spouses Vaca’s claim for reimbursement, if any, must be ventilated in a separate action against petitioner.
To allow the intervention would unduly delay and prejudice the rights especially of respondents who have been
deprived of the subject property for so long.

Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. v. Chua, G.R No. 191170, September 14, 2016

Topic: Rule 3, Sec. 19

Overview: The key procedural principle in this case is the joinder of parties and the discretion of the trial court in
allowing such joinder, particularly in cases involving a transfer of interest.

In the case at hand, the trial court granted the joinder of a new party, petitioner, to an ongoing lawsuit, allowing it to
be joined as a defendant alongside the original defendant, Metrobank. This joinder was based on the court's
discretion and its determination that petitioner was a necessary party for the final determination of the case.

The Court of Appeals (CA) questioned the trial court's decision and raised concerns about whether the transfer of
interest was adequately disclosed and whether the conditions for joinder were met. However, the Supreme Court, in
its ruling, emphasized that the trial court's discretion in allowing joinder should not be easily overturned unless there
is clear arbitrariness. The Court also clarified that the disclosure of the consideration for the transfer of interest was
not a condition precedent for joinder, as long as the other requirements for joinder were satisfied.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to allow the joinder of the petitioner, highlighting the
flexibility of the rules on joinder of parties and the discretion granted to trial courts in making such determinations.

FACTS:

● In 1988, the respondents obtained an initial loan of P4 million from Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
(Metrobank) secured by a real estate mortgage on three parcels of land in Parañaque City (subject
property). This mortgage was amended multiple times to accommodate additional loans over the years.
● On January 13, 2000, the respondents and Metrobank restructured their obligation through a Debt
Settlement Agreement, consolidating an outstanding debt of P88,101,093.98.
● Due to the respondents' failure to make payments, Metrobank initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage over the subject property. On May 4, 2001, they sent a Notice of Sale, scheduling a
public auction for May 31, 2001.
● Respondents, seeking to halt the auction, filed a Complaint (Civil Case No. 01-0207) on the grounds of
injunction, along with a request for a temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, and
damages.
● The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 257 (RTC Branch 257), issued a TRO. However, after
the TRO expired, Metrobank scheduled another public auction on November 8, 2001. On the morning of
the auction, RTC Branch 257 issued an Order instructing Metrobank to reschedule the sale after resolving
the application for preliminary injunction. Allegedly, Metrobank received this order only on November 12,
2001, and proceeded with the auction on November 8, 2001, issuing a Certificate of Sale in their favor on
November 9, 2001.
● An Order dated March 6, 2002, from RTC Branch 257, denied the application for preliminary injunction,
citing mootness due to the completed auction sale. The respondents' motion for reconsideration was also
denied.
● Subsequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the
RTC Branch 257 Order dated March 6, 2002. The CA remanded Civil Case No. 01-0207 for further
proceedings.
● Upon the motion of respondents, the presiding judge of RTC Branch 257 recused himself from the case,
leading to its reassignment to RTC Branch 258.
● In the meantime, respondents filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, accompanied by an Amended
Verified Complaint. This amended complaint sought the annulment of the mortgage foreclosure,
nullification of the certificate of sale, and injunctive relief.
● On October 17, 2007, petitioner (not specified in the provided text) filed a Motion for Joinder of Party
and/or Substitution. It claimed that, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 17, 2003,
Metrobank had sold its credit against respondents, including all associated rights, interests, claims, and
causes of action, to Asia Recovery Corporation (ARC). ARC, in turn, assigned the credit to petitioner
through a Deed of Assignment dated March 31, 2006. Petitioner requested to be substituted for Metrobank
in the proceedings before RTC Branch 258.
● Metrobank, in addition to consenting to petitioner's motion, filed a Comment stating that it had no
objections to its substitution. Metrobank explained that the respondents' account had been classified as a
nonperforming loan under Republic Act No. 9182 (Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002 or SPV Act) and
had been included in the accounts sold to ARC by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
● Respondents vehemently opposed petitioner's motion, contending that they were entitled to full disclosure
of the details of the sale, as well as the transfer and assignment of their debt, based on their right of
redemption under the SPV Act and Article 1634 of the Civil Code.
● RTC Decision: In an Order dated 28 December 2007,26 RTC Branch 258 granted the motion and ordered
petitioner to be joined as party-defendant, but without dropping Metrobank as defendant. In the Order dated
9 April 2008,27 RTC Branch 258 denied respondents' motion for reconsideration. It ruled that petitioner
was a necessary party to the final determination of the case. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
● CA Decision: In the assailed Decision dated 26 August 2009,28 the CA granted the petition and annulled
the Orders of RTC Branch 258. The CA ruled that if it was true that Metrobank had divested itself of any
interest in respondents' debt, then the trial court should have forthwith ordered the bank's exclusion from
the proceedings.29 According to the CA, the trial court provided for a provisional joinder/substitution of
parties - a practice that cannot be countenanced due to the basic rule that every action must be prosecuted
 or defended in the name of the real party in interest. The appellate court also doubted whether substitution
was proper, because the Deed of Absolute Sale between Metrobank and ARC did not specify whether
respondents' debt was included in the portfolio of nonperforming loans sold. At bottom, the CA ruled that
petitioner could not substitute for Metrobank in the proceedings before the trial court without first
disclosing the consideration paid by petitioner for the transfer of Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the CA denied in the challenged Resolution dated 11 February 2010.
ISSUE:
The issue to be resolved in this case is simple: whether petitioner may be joined as party-defendant in Civil Case No.
01-0207.
RULING:
We grant the petition.

As stated at the outset, the instant petition seeks a Rule 45 review of a Rule 65 decision of the CA. We stated in
Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corp.34 that our task in these cases is not to determine the correctness of the ruling of
the trial court, but to examine whether the CA correctly determined the existence of grave abuse of discretion in the
Orders of RTC Branch 258 allowing the joinder of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0207.

Section 6, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides the rule on the joinder of parties:
Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. � All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the
action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.
The rationale for allowing parties to join in a proceeding that delves on a common question of law or fact
concerning them is trial convenience; i.e., to save the parties unnecessary work, trouble and expense.35 In order to
meet the requirements of justice and convenience, the rule on the joinder of parties is construed with considerable
flexibility.36 Hence, courts are given broad discretion in determining who may properly be joined in a proceeding.

The rules also provide that in case of a transfer of interest, the court, upon motion, may direct the person to whom
the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party.

Indeed, a transferee pendente lite is a proper party that stands exactly in the shoes of the transferor, the original
party.39 Transferees are bound by the proceedings and judgment in the case, such that there is no need for them to
be included or impleaded by name.40 We have even gone further and said that the transferee is joined or substituted
in the pending action by operation of law from the exact moment when the transfer of interest is perfected between
the original party and the transferee.41chanrobleslaw

Nevertheless, "[w]hether or not the transferee should be substituted for, or should be joined with, the original party
is largely a matter of discretion."42 That discretion is exercised in pursuance of the paramount consideration that
must be afforded for the protection of the parties' interests and right to due process.

Notably, unless the exercise of that discretion is shown to be arbitrary, this Court is not inclined to review acts
committed by the courts a quo.

In this case, part of the reason why the CA ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the trial court was the latter's
statement in the Order dated 28 December 2007 as follows:
Thus, the Court hereby grants that [petitioner] be joined as party defendant in this case without dropping Metrobank
at this stage conditioned, however, that if in the course of the trial, the Court finds that based on the testimonial and
documentary evidence to be presented by Metrobank that it can be dropped, the same shall be effected pursuant to
Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.45
According to the CA, this statement allowed for a "provisional" joinder/substitution of parties. It is difficult to
fathom how the above statement of the trial court could have constituted grave abuse of discretion when the ruling
was in accordance with Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The rule provides that parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of any party or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just. For the CA to say that, as between Metrobank and petitioner, "only one of them is clothed
with the personality to actively participate in the proceedings below"46 is to show a regrettable lack of
understanding of the rules and an unwarranted restriction of the trial court's discretion.

Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006

FACTS:

Quirino de Guzman and Arcadio Carandang organized a corporation by pooling together their technical expertise,
equipment, financial resources and franchise they called as Mabuhay Broadcasting Systems, Inc. Carandang
subscribed to the increase of their capital stock, in which de Guzman claimed to have paid for part of the
subscriptions and was asking for payment from Carandang. The spouses Carandang refused to pay the amount,
contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed whereby deGuzman promised to pay for the stock
subscriptions without cost, in consideration for Carandang's technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment,
and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment. De Guzman filed a complaint with the
RTC seeking for recovery with damage which the RTC granted and the CA confirmed.
Spouses Carandang filed for petition for review on certiorari claiming that the Decision of the RTC, having been
rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, was void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court. The spouses Carandang posited that such failure to comply with the rule rendered void the decision of
the RTC, in adherence to the following pronouncements in Vda. de Haberer v. Court of Appeals and Ferreria v. Vda.
de Gonzales:
Thus, it has been held that when a party dies in an action that survives and no order is
issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the
deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no substitution has ever been
effected, the trial held by the court without such legal representatives or heirs and the
judgment rendered after such trial are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction
over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and judgment
would be binding

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC Decision was void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3

RULING: No, the RTC decision was valid.

Jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case may be waived either expressly or impliedly. Implied waiver
comes in the form of either voluntary appearance or a failure to object. In this case, not only did the heirs of de
Guzman interposed no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons; they were actually claiming and
embracing such jurisdiction. In doing so, their waiver was not even merely implied (by their participation in the
appeal of said Decision), but expressed (by their explicit espousal of such view in both the Court of Appeals and in
this Court). The heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of the RTC. Thus, lack of
jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party
who can thereby waive it by silence.
Also, this case had already been submitted for decision before the RTC several months before the passing away of
de Guzman. Hence, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzman's counsel were conducted
before the promulgation of the RTC Decision. Consequently, de Guzman's counsel cannot be said to have no
authority to appear in trial, as trial had already ceased upon the death of de Guzman.
In sum, the RTC Decision was valid despite the failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
because of the express waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because there had been,
before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzman's
counsel.

Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76431, October 16, 1989 (Supra.)
Topic: Venue of Real Actions

Facts:

In March 1982 to January 1984, private respondent extended various loans to petitioner amounting to P34.15K
secured by a real estate mortgage on petitioner’s building and lot in Makati. Petitioner was not able to pay. Thus,
respondent had the mortgaged property sold at public auction for P47.8K, respondent being the highest bidder.

Certificate of sale was registered on 24 October 1984. On 21 October 1985, or three days before the expiration of
the redemption period, petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale in RTC Manila
alleging inter alia that it was premature because the loan was not yet due.

Respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that the venue of the action was improperly laid in Manila for the
property mortgaged is situated in Makati. Petitioner opposed alleging that its action "is a personal action" and that
"the issue is the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings".

On 28 May 1986, RTC Manila denied its motion to dismissal. On 11 June 1986, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in CA. On 30 July 1986, the CA granted the petition dismissing the complaint without
prejudice to its being filed in the proper venue. When petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on 30
October 1986, it filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the action for annulment of the real estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a
personal action for venue purposes.

Ruling:

No, the action for annulment is a real action.

In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as indicated in Sec. 2 (a) of Rule 4, a real action
is an action affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of,
or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.

Real actions or actions affecting title to, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on real property, must be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the province where the
property or any part thereof lies. (Enriquez v. Macadaeg, 84 Phil. 674,1949; Garchitorena v. Register of Deeds, 101
Phil. 1207, 1957).

Personal actions upon the other hand, may be instituted in the Court of First Instance where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff (Sec. 1, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court).

While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question,
his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the
building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary
objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not
operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property.
It is a real action. Respondent Court, therefore, did not err in dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue
(Sec. 2, Rule 4) which was timely raised (Sec. 1, Rule 16). (Punzalan, Jr. v. Vda. de Lacsamana, 121 SCRA 336,
[1983])

Thus, as aptly decided by the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice now
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, the pertinent portion reads: "Since an
extrajudicial foreclosure of real property results in a conveyance of the title of the property sold to the highest bidder
at the sale, an action to annul the foreclosure sale is necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is
therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies.

Paglaum Management v. Union Bank, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012
Topic: Venue of Real Actions

FACTS:

Paglaum Management and Development Corporation (PAGLAUM) is the registered owner of three parcels of land
located in the Province of Cebu. These lots are co-owned by Benjamin Dy, the president of HealthTech, and his
mother and siblings.

Union Bank extended HealthTech a credit line in the amount of ₱ 10M. To secure this obligation, PAGLAUM
executed three Real Estate Mortgages on behalf of HealthTech and in favor of Union Bank.

Under the Real Estate Mortgage, the venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection with this Mortgage
shall be in Makati, Metro Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located. However, under
the two Real Estate Mortgages dated 11 February 1994 and 22 April 1998, the venue shall be in Cebu City, Metro
Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located.

HealthTech and Union Bank agreed to subsequent renewals and increases in the credit line, with the total amount of
debt reaching ₱ 36.5M. The 1997 Asian financial crisis adversely affected HealthTech’s business and caused it
difficulty in meeting its obligations with Union Bank. Thus, on 11 December 1998, both parties entered into a
Restructuring Agreement, which states that any action or proceeding arising out of or in connection therewith shall
be commenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other venue.

Since HealthTech defaulted on its payment, Union Bank extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties with
the Union Bank as the sole bidder. Thereafter, it filed a Petition for Consolidation of Title.

HealthTech filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Titles with Damages and Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Injunction before the RTC of Makati City. Union Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of improper venue. RTC granted the Motion and dismissed the case. CA affirmed the decision. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Makati City is the proper venue to assail the foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage.

Ruling:

Yes. An action for Annulment of Sale and Titles resulting from the extrajudicial foreclosure by Union Bank of the
mortgaged real properties, is classified as a real action. In the case of Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals – a case
seeking to annul a foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is a real action.
The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to
efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real
action.

Under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not
apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The
mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other
venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place.

According to the Rules, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the court that has jurisdiction over the area
where the property is situated. In this case, all the mortgaged properties are located in the Province of Cebu. Thus,
following the general rule, PAGLAUM and HealthTech should have filed their case in Cebu, and not in Makati.
However, the Rules provide an exception. In the case at bar, the parties claim that such an agreement exists. The
only dispute is whether the venue that should be followed is that contained in the Real Estate Mortgages, as
contended by Union Bank, or that in the Restructuring Agreement, as posited by PAGLAUM and HealthTech. This
Court rules that the venue stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement should be controlling.

The Restructuring Agreement was entered into by HealthTech and Union Bank to modify the entire loan obligation.
Section 20 of the Restructuring Agreement as regards the venue of actions state that “Venue…shall be in Makati
City, HealthTech and Union Bank hereby waiving any other venue.”

Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013 (?)

Chua v. Total Office Products, G.R. No. 152808, September 30, 2005
Paderanga v. Hon. Buissan, G.R. No. L-49475, September 28, 1993
De la Cruz v. El Seminario, G.R. No. L-5402, January 28, 1911
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Emergency Loan Pawnshop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129184, Feruary 28, 2001

An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part
thereof lies.

The motion of respondent TRB was well founded because venue was clearly improperly laid. The action in the
Regional Trial Court was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of land located at Km. 3 Asin Road, Baguio
City. The venue of such action is unquestionably within the territorial jurisdiction of the proper court where the
real property or part thereof lies. An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on real property, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area
where the real property or any part thereof lies.

FACTS:

On January 18, 1996, Traders Royal Bank (TRB for brevity) sold in favor of petitioner Emergency Loan
Pawnshop Incorporated (ELPI for brevity) a parcel of land located at Km. 3 Asin, Baguio City for Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

At the time of the sale, TRB misrepresented to ELPI that the subject property was a vacant residential lot
without any illegal occupants or squatters, when it truth the subject property was dominantly a public road
with only 140 square meters usable area.
ELPI, after having spent to fully ascertain the actual condition of the property, demanded from TRB the
rescission and cancellation of the sale of the property.

TRB refused, hence, on April 16, 1996, ELPI filed with the Regional Trial Court, Davao, for annulment of
sale and damages against TRB.

TRB filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

TRB filed a motion for reconsideration, the trial court denied the motion.7

TRB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order, contending that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in denying its motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE RTC on ground of
improper venue.”9

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not dismissal was valid on the ground of improper venue.

HELD:

In the case at bar, the trial court erred grievously amounting to ousting itself of jurisdiction. The motion of
respondent TRB was well founded because venue was clearly improperly laid. The action in the Regional Trial
Court was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of land located at Km. 3 Asin Road, Baguio City.

The venue of such action is unquestionably within the territorial jurisdiction of the proper court where the real
property or part thereof lies.

IN THE CASE AT BAR THE PROPERTY WAS LOCATED IN BAGUIO BUT THE COMPLAINT WAS
FILED IN RTC DAVA0.

The Regional Trial Court has committed a palpable and grievous error amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue.

An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part
thereof lies (BAGUIO CITY).

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Spouses Yu v. Pacleb, G.R. No. 172172, February 24, 2009
SPS. ERNESTO V. YU AND ELSIE ONG YU, petitioners, vs. BALTAZAR N. PACLEB, (Substituted by
ANTONIETA S. PACLEB, LORNA PACLEB-GUERRERO, FLORENCIO C. PACLEB, and MYRLA C.
PACLEB), respondents.
G.R. No. 172172. February 24, 2009.
Topic: Kinds of Civil Actions as to Object – Action in Personam

I. FACTS:
 ● Baltazar N. Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are the registered owners of an 18,000-quare
meter parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-118375 (Langcaan Property).
● On April 23, 1993, Sps Yu filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Ruperto Javier
(Javier) over the said property. Moreover, Said property was a subject of three (3) documents purporting to
transfer its ownership, which timeline are as follows:
o February 27, 1992 – a Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into between Spouses Baltazar N.
Pacleb and Angelita Chan and Rebecca Del Rosario.
o May 7, 1992 – a Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into between Rebecca Del Rosario and
Ruperto Javier
o November 10, 1992 – Contract to Sell was entered into between Javier and petitioner spouses
Ernesto V. Yu and Elsie Ong Yu.

- In the complaint filed by the Spouses, they alleged that Javier represented to the Yu that the Langcaan
Property was not tenanted but when the 200k was already paid as initial payment, and eventually entered into an
Agreement, they discovered that the said property was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb. Spouses Yu demanded for the
cancellation of their agreement and the return of their initial payment. When verified by both parties the willingness
of Ramon to vacate the property, and the promise of Javier to pay Ramon his disturbance compensation, they
proceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell cancelling the agreement as mentioned. However, Javier failed to deliver
and comply with his obligations.

- The RTC decided in favor of the Spouses Yu and issued a certificate of finality and the same were annotated
in the (TCT) No. T-118375. Javier with his wife executed an agreement for the surrender of the of their rights over
the property.

- In October 1995, respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of the deed of sale and other documents
arising therefrom alleging that the deed of sale purportedly executed between him and his late first wife and Rebecca
Del Rosario was spurious as their signatures thereon were forgeries; which was later dismissed.

- In November 1995, Spouses Yu filed for forcible entry against the respondents before the MTC, alleging that
they had prior physical possession of the property through their trustee, Ramon, until he (Ramon) was ousted by the
respondents in the same year. The MTC Ruled in favor of the Spouses Yu, which was affirmed by the RTC.

- However, the Court of Appeals set aside the decisions of the lower courts, finding that it was the respondent
who had prior physical possession of the property as shown by his payment of real estate taxes.

- In May 1996, the respondent filed for the removal of the cloud with damages, on annotation made in the title
of the property, alleging that the deed executed by him and his wife could not have been possibly executed as he was
living in the US and his wife died 20 years ago, on the time stiopulated in the deed.

- The RTC dismissed the case and held that Spouses are purchasers in good faith, ratiocinated further that the
dismissal of the respondent’s complaint for the annulment of the successive sales at his (respondent’s) instance
“"sealed the regularity of the purchase" by petitioner spouses and that he "in effect admits that the said sale . . .was
valid and in order". Further, the trial court held that the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 on petitioner spouses'
action for specific performance against Javier is already final and can no longer be altered. Accordingly, RTC
ordered the cancellation of the subject property in the name of respondent and the issuance of a new title in the name
of Spouses Yu, and further ordered the heirs of respondent and all persons claiming under them to surrender
possession of the Langcaan Property to the Spouses.

-II. Issues:

A. Whether ownership over the Langcaan Property was properly vested in petitioner spouses by virtue of the
Decision in Civil Case no. 741-93
 III. Ruling:

A. The Court ruled in the negative.

Ø Petitioner spouses argue that the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 741-93 as to
the rightful owner of the Langcaan Property is conclusive and binding upon respondent even if the
latter was not a party thereto since it involved the question of possession and ownership of real
property, and is thus not merely an action in personam but an action quasi in rem.
Ø GR: The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and
purpose, and by these only.
Ø Nature and Purpose of Action in personam vs Action quasi in rem
o Proceeding in personam, defined. A proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations
brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve
his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or
dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court.
§ Purpose: The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a
court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant.
· Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or
actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him.
§ An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the
person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety (sic) to determine its state.
§ It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or
obligations; such action is brought against the person.

o Proceeding quasi in rem, defined. One brought against persons seeking to subject the property
of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed.
§ Purpose: In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of
the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the
property.
· Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular
property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the
particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests
of all possible claimants.
§ The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

Ø How was it applied in the case|?

o Civil Case No. 741-93 is an action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioner
spouses against Javier to compel performance of the latter's undertakings under their Contract to
Sell. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, its object is to compel Javier to accept the full
payment of the purchase price, and to execute a deed of absolute sale over the Langcaan Property
in their favor. The obligations of Javier under the contract to sell attach to him alone, and do not
burden the Langcaan Property.
§ We have held in an unbroken string of cases that an action for specific performance is
an action in personam.
§ In a decided case by the SC ruled that an action for specific performance praying for
the execution of a deed of sale in connection with an undertaking in a contract, such as
the contract to sell, in this instance, is an action in personam.
§ Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard.
Therefore, it cannot bind respondent since he was not a party therein. Neither can
respondent be considered as privy thereto since his signature and that of his late first
wife, Angelita Chan, were forged in the deed of sale.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling made by Court of Appeals finding that the respondent in this case
has better right than the Spouses Yuu over the Lan
Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59731, January 11, 1990
Licaros v. Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, April 29, 2003
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004
Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011
Spouses Yu v. Pacleb, G.R. No. 172172, February 24, 2009 (Supra.)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, September 25, 1998

FACTS:

Plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be
ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment.

The defendant admits the existence of the judgment as well as its amendment, but not necessarily the authenticity or
validity thereof.

One of the defendant’s witness was Mr. Lousich, an expert on the laws of Hong Kong, as a representative of the law
office of the defendant's counsel who made a verification of the record of the case filed by the plaintiff in Hong
Kong against the defendant, as well as the procedure in serving Court processes in Hong Kong.

The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be recognized and given effect in this
jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment.

The Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the decision of the trial court and dismissing ASIAVEST's
complaint without prejudice. It underscored the fact that a foreign judgment does not of itself have any
extraterritorial application.

ISSUE:

Whether the HK Judgment is enforceable here in the Philippines

DECISION:

Yes, the HK Judgment is enforceable in the Philippines but due to invalid service of summons, the
Judgment was invalidated.

Under paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a foreign judgment against a person rendered by a
court having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by the subsequent title. However, the judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Hence, once the authenticity
of the foreign judgment is proved, the burden to repel it on grounds provided for in paragraph (b) of Section 50,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is on the party challenging the foreign judgment.

Here, Heras admitted the existence of the Hong Kong judgment. On the other hand, ASIAVEST presented evidence
to prove rendition, existence, and authentication of the judgment by the proper officials.

The judgment is thus presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is
shown.
FOR RECIT PURPOSES:

DOCTRINE OF PROSESSUAL PRESUMPTION:

The main argument raised against the Hong Kong judgment is that the Hong Kong Supreme Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of HERAS. This involves the issue of whether summons was properly and validly
served on HERAS.

It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon the defendant
are governed by the lex fori or the law of the forum, i.e., the law of Hong Kong in this case. HERAS insisted that
according to his witness Mr. Lousich, who was presented as an expert on Hong Kong laws, there was no valid
service of summons on him.

On cross-examination by counsel for ASIAVEST, Lousich testified that the Hong Kong court authorized service of
summons on HERAS outside of its jurisdiction, particularly in the Philippines. He also admitted the existence of an
affidavit of one Jose R. Fernandez of the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law firm stating that he (Fernandez)
served summons on HERAS at Quezon City, by leaving a copy with HERAS's son-in-law Dionisio Lopez.

On redirect examination, Lousich declared that such service of summons would be valid under Hong Kong laws
provided that it was in accordance with Philippine laws.

We note that there was no objection on the part of ASIAVEST on the qualification of Mr. Lousich as an expert on
Hong Kong law. Under Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the New Rules of Evidence, the record of public documents
of a sovereign authority, tribunal, official body, or public officer may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof
or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof, which must be accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. The certificate may be issued by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent, or any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

Nevertheless, the testimony of an expert witness may be allowed to prove a foreign law.

There is, however, nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on the specific law of Hong Kong in
respect of service of summons either in actions in rem or in personam, and where the defendant is either a resident
or nonresident of Hong Kong. In view of the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law on this particular issue, the
presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption shall come into play. It will thus be
presumed that the Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law.

DISTINCTIONS OF action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem:

As stated in Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals, it will be helpful to determine first whether the action is in personam, in
rem, or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines
apply according to the nature of the action.

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an
action against the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien
burdening the property.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be
acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with
Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted
to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3)
service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself
to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is physically present in the country.
If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and
decide the case against him. An exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a non-resident was
served with summons through his wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and who was his representatives and
attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the first case.

On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless
summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for
satisfying the due process requirements. Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident who is not found in the
Philippines and (1) the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action relates to, or the subject matter
of which is property in the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest; (3) the action seeks the
exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property located in the Philippines; or (4) the property of the
defendant has been attached in the Philippines — service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of
the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court, or (c) any other manner the court may
deem sufficient.

EFFECTIVITY OF SUMMONS IN THIS CASE:

We note that the residence of HERAS insofar as the action for the enforcement of the Hong Kong court judgment is
concerned, was never in issue. He never challenged the service of summons on him through a security guard in his
Quezon City residence and through a lawyer in his office in that city. In his Motion to Dismiss, he did not question
the jurisdiction of the Philippine court over his person on the ground of invalid service of summons. What was in
issue was his residence as far as the Hong Kong suit was concerned. We therefore conclude that the stipulated fact
that HERAS "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction
over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. With that stipulation of fact, ASIAVEST cannot now
claim that HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong at the time.

Accordingly, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, indisputably, one in
personam, summons should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in the
Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows
that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.

Even assuming that HERAS was formerly a resident of Hong Kong, he was no longer so in November 1984 when
the extraterritorial service of summons was attempted to be made on him. As declared by his secretary, which
statement was not disputed by ASIAVEST, HERAS left Hong Kong in October 1984 "for good." His absence in
Hong Kong must have been the reason why summons was not served on him therein; thus, ASIAVEST was
constrained to apply for leave to effect service in the Philippines, and upon obtaining a favorable action on the
matter, it commissioned the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law firm to serve the summons here in the
Philippines.
Similarly, HERAS, who was also an absentee, should have been served with summons in the same manner as a non-
resident not found in Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for extraterritorial service will
not apply because the suit against him was in personam. Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows
extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who is temporarily absent from the country, because even if HERAS
be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he left Hong Kong not only
"temporarily" but "for good."

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition in this case and
AFFIRMING the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
BA Finance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102998, July 5, 1996
Board of Liquidators v. Zulueta, G.R. No. L-30738, July 30, 1982
Sotelo vs. Dizon, 67 Phil. 537; Cabrera vs. Tianco, 8 SCRA 582
Manchester Development v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987 (Supra.)
Nestle Phils. v. FY Sons, G.R. No. 150780, May 5, 2006 (Supra.)
Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989 (Supra.)
Phil. First Insurance v. Paramount Gen. Insurance, G.R. No. 165147, July 9, 2008 (Supra.)
Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders, G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011
(Supra.)
FACTS:
● A Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was entered into between respondents National Housing Authority (NHA)
and R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders) for the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP).
● NHA and R-II Builders, alongside petitioner Housing Guaranty Corporation (HG) as guarantor and the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) as trustee, entered into an Asset Pool Formation Trust Agreement which
provided the mechanics for the implementation of the project. The parties likewise executed a Contract of
Guaranty whereby HG, upon the call made by PNB and conditions therein specified, undertook to redeem the
regular Smokey Mountain Project Participation Certificate (SMPPCs) upon maturity and to pay the simple
interest thereon to the extent of 8.5% per annum.
● Subsequent to R-Il Builders' infusion of P300 Million into the project, the issuance of the SMPPCs and the
termination of PB's services on 29 January 2001, NHA, R-II Builders and HGC agreed on the institution of
Planters Development Bank (PDB) as trustee on the same mentioned date. By 24 October 2002, however, all
the Regular SMPPCs issued had reached maturity and, unredeemed, already amounted to an aggregate face
value of P2.513 Billion. The lack of liquid assets with which to effect redemption of the regular SMPPCs
prompted PB to make a call on HGC's guaranty and to execute in the latter's favor a Deed of Assignment and
Conveyance (DAC) of the entire Asset Pool,.
● On 1 September 2005, R-II Builders filed the complaint against HGC and NHA before Regional Trial Court, a
Special Commercial Court (SCC). Contending that HGC's failure to redeem the outstanding regular SMPPCs
despite obtaining possession of the Asset Pool ballooned the stipulated interests and materially prejudiced its
stake on the residual values of the Asset Pool, R-II Builders alleged, among other matters, that the DAC should
be rescinded since PDB exceeded its authority in executing the same prior to HGC's redemption and payment of
the guaranteed SMPPCs.
● The RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by R-II Builders which, upon the challenge thereto
interposed by HGC, was later affirmed by the CA. Having filed its answer to the complaint, in the meantime,
HGC went on to move for the conduct of a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which included such
grounds as lack of jurisdiction.
● R-II Builders, in turn, filed a motion to admit its Amended and Supplemental Complaint which deleted the
prayer for resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in its original complaint. Consistent with its joint order
which held that R-II Builders' complaint was an ordinary civil action and not an intra-corporate controversy, the
Branch 24 of the Manila RTC issued a clarificatory order to the effect, among other matters, that it did not have
the authority to hear the case. As a consequence, the case was re-raffled to respondent Branch 22 of the Manila
RTC.
● However, R-II Builders filed a motion to admit it Second Amended Complaint, on the ground that its previous
Amended and Supplemental Complaint had not yet been admitted in view of the non-payment of the correct
docket fees therefor. Said Second Amended Complaint notably resurrected R-II Builders’ cause of action for
 resolution of the DAC, deleted its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession
of the entire Asset Pool.
● HGC filed its opposition to the admission of R-II Builders’ Second Amended Complaint on the ground that
respondent RTC had no jurisdiction to act on the case until payment of the correct docket fees and that said
pleading was intended for delay and introduced a new theory inconsistent with the original complaint and the
Amended and Supplemental Complaint.
● Finding that jurisdiction over the case was already acquired upon payment of the docket fees for the original
complaint and that the Second Amended Complaint was neither intended for delay nor inconsistent with R-II
Builders’ previous pleadings, respondent RTC issued its first assailed order which: (a) denied HGC’s motion to
dismiss; (b) granted R-II Builders’ motion to admit its Second Amended Complaint; and, (c) noted R-II
Builders’ Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Annotation of Lis Pendens, to which the attention of the Manila Register
of Deeds was additionally called.
● HGC filed the Rule 65 petition for certiorari and before the CA which, thru its Former Special Fifteenth
Division. HGC’s motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision was denied for lack of merit in the CA’s
resolution. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC (Branch 22) a quo had no jurisdiction to proceed with the case considering that the
original court (RTC Branch 24) was without authority to hear the case.

RULING: Yes. Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case. In
addition to being conferred by the Constitution and the law, the rule is settled that a court’s jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed,
and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted. Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the prescribed fees
shall be paid in full "upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding", the
well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the
prescribed filing and docket fees.

The Court finds that, having squarely raised the matter in its Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition, HGC
correctly faults the CA for not finding that Branch 24 of the Manila RTC had no authority to order the transfer of the
case to respondent RTC. Being outside the jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts, the rule is settled that cases
which are civil in nature, like the one commenced by R-II Builders, should be threshed out in a regular court. With
its acknowledged lack of jurisdiction over the case, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC should have ordered the dismissal
of the complaint, since a court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court. Instead, it
should have simply ordered the dismissal of the complaint, considering that the affirmative defenses for which HGC
sought hearing included its lack of jurisdiction over the case.

Unicapital v. Consing, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013 (Supra.)
Ramones v. Spouses Guimoc, G.R.No. 226645, August 13, 2018

Heirs of Renato Dragon, et al. v. Manila Banking Corp., G.R. No. 205068. March 06, 2019
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Baylon v. Fact-finding Intelligence, G.R. No. 150870, December 11, 2002
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

Republic v. Kenrick Development, G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

Building Care Corp. v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357, December 10, 2012
Uy v. Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009
Llamas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149588, August 16, 2010
Heirs of Pacańa, et al. v. Spouses Masalihit, G.R. No. 215761, September 13, 2021

—-----------------------------------

Manner of acquiring jurisdiction

People of the Philippines v. Hon. Garfin, G.R. No. 153176, March 29, 2004

FACTS: On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in relation
to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Act.

The Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Legazpi City, accuses SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, for Violation
of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security
Act of 1997.

The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City presided by respondent judge
Hon. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin. On September 24, 2001, accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the
charge.

Thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the information was filed without the
prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor.

The People, through State Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an opposition, against which the accused filed a
rejoinder. The People filed a reply to the rejoinder on December 21, 2001. A rejoinder to the reply11 was filed
by the accused on January 21, 2002.

The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it has not been approved by the
City Prosecutor.

ISSUE: Whether the prior written authority and approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor is necessary in filing the information at bar.
HELD: Yes, prior written authority and approval is necessary. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275, the
powers of a Regional State Prosecutor are as follows:

Sec. 8. The Regional State Prosecution Office: Functions of Regional State Prosecutor. - The Regional State
Prosecutor shall, under the control of the Secretary of Justice, have the following functions:

The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of administrative supervision. As
administrative supervisor, he has no power to direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from
handling certain cases. At most, he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the regional
state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the least.

In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by the Secretary of Justice to Regional State
Prosecutor Turingan to investigate and/or prosecute SSS cases filed within his territorial jurisdiction. A bare
reading of the alleged letter of commendation by then Secretary Hernando Perez would show that it does not
amount to a directive or even a recognition of this authority. In fact, while the letter of Secretary Perez
commends the efforts of Regional State Prosecutor Turingan in successfully prosecuting SSS cases, it also
negates his authority to prosecute them. Secretary Perez called the Regional State Prosecutor’s attention to
DOJ Circular No. 27, series of 2001, which states that all important cases of the SSS should be referred to the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. Thus, Regional State Prosecutor Turingan cannot be
considered a special prosecutor within the meaning of the law.

The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on the part of the filing officer prevents
the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.

—------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lazo v. Republic Surety, G.R. No. L-27365, January 30, 1970

FACTS: The original complaint was filed on December 12, 1963, and subsequently amended on November
9, 1964. The plaintiffs are the spouse Felix L. Lazo and Mercedes Castro de Lazo, and Jose Robles; the
defendants are Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. its general manager Antonio M. Koh.

The allegations that the spouses Lazo, acting as guarantors for Jose Robles in connection with a loan
of P12,000.00 obtained by the latter from the Philippine Bank of Commerce, executed on August 18, 1953 a
real estate mortgage in favor of the defendant Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.

Eventually, the mortgage was foreclosed extra-judicially on July 1, 1958 and sold to the mortgagee,
with defendant Antonio M. Koh, pursuant to the power granted to him in the instrument of mortgage a deed
of absolute sale of the foreclosed property of the mortgagee.

XXX

The spouses Lazo contended that the foreclosure of the mortgage was invalid because plaintiff Jose
Robles had paid on the mortgage loan the sum of P13,466.36, he continued to make other payments,
aggregating P17,250.00.

In a motion to dismiss filed by all the defendants with respect to the original complaint, they raised
two issues, namely: that the complaint did not state a cause of action and that the claim or demand set forth
therein had already prescribed. On this second point the defendants pointed out that under the Rules of
Court (Rule 39, Section 34) an accounting such as that prayed for by the plaintiffs could be demanded only in
cases where real property is sold on execution by virtue of a final judgment and not where it is sold on
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; and if the rule is applicable at all in the latter case, it is available only
to a mortgage debtor who exercises his right of redemption within the period provided therefor.
 The trial court did not resolve the motion to dismiss categorically, but in an order dated September
22, 1964, set the case for trial, with the advertence that "evidence on whether or not the action has prescribed
shall first be presented ... (and) then the court will consider the same ... as part of the evidence on the merits."

The trial court, however, went entirely out of the issues submitted to it and chose to decide the case
on a point which was not at all litigated. It said: "The key, as it appears to this Court, lies in the validity or
invalidity of the extrajudicial foreclosure over the real estate mortgage,

In this connection it should be stated that the loan with the Philippine Bank of Commerce was on a
sixty-day note, which was renewed several times, until the said bank refused to grant any further renewal. On
August 14, 1954 the loan was transferred to the Republic Investment Co.

ISSUE: Is the legal right of redemption of said plaintiffs still subsisting, in the light of their indubitable
causes of action in the case at bar.

HELD: No. In Rule 39, Section 34 of the Rules of Court states that, “If the purchaser of real property sold on
execution, or his successor in interest, fails to recover the possession thereof, or is evicted therefrom, in
consequence of irregularities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because the judgment has been
reversed or set aside, or because the property sold was exempt from execution, or because a third person has
vindicated his claim to the property, he may on motion in the same action or in a separate action recover
from the judgment obligee the price paid, with interest, or so much thereof as has not been delivered to the
judgment obligor, or he may, on motion, have the original judgment revived in his name for the whole price
with interest, or so much thereof as has been delivered to the judgment obligor. The judgment so revived
shall have the same force and effect as an original judgment would have as of the date of the revival and no
more.

Implicit in the application of these provisions is the premise that the period for redemption of the
property sold on execution (on extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in the present case) has not yet expired.
For if the right to redeem has been lost it stands to reason that there is no redemption price to speak of, to
which the rents received by the purchasers are to be applied or credited. 3

There are, however, certain circumstances peculiar to this case which take it out of the operation of
the rule concerning registration in this regard. There is, to begin with, the categorical statement in the
certificate of sale that "the period of redemption of the said property sold will expire on the 2nd day of July,
1959." Then there is the fact that no lien or encumbrance, right or claim of any person, other than the
mortgage in question, appeared on the transfer certificate of title of the plaintiff spouses covering the
mortgaged property, such that when the defendant company obtained a new transfer certificate in its name
on March 28, 1963, the same was entirely clean. In other words, no third parties who might have an interest
in the property, either as possible redemptioners or otherwise, had to be protected by due notice of the sale
through its registration.4 As far as the plaintiffs themselves were concerned, not only were they duly notified
of the sale but the same was postponed twice, first upon their request and then upon written agreement of
both parties. These circumstances, in our opinion, have relevance in the consideration of the equities, as
distinguished from the purely legal technicalities, of this case.

The plaintiffs having reneged on all their repeated promises, the defendant company finally consolidated its
title to the property as purchaser at the foreclosure sale on March 28, 1963, and obtained the corresponding
transfer certificate of title. That was almost five years after the said sale.

It is clear, in the light of the facts and circumstances above set forth, that the parties had abandoned entirely
the concept of legal redemption in this case and converted it into one of conventional redemption, in which
the only governing factor was the agreement between them.
Ventanilla Enterprises v. Hon. Lazaro, G.R. No. L-53856, August 21, 1980

The case tells us that although the action was brought against “the Broadway Theater” which is not a
juridical person, but the lessee thereof filed an answer and later entered into a compromise agreement
admitting liability and pursuant to which judgment was rendered, the procedural defect was cured. Writ of
execution cannot be enforced against the theater but against the lessee.

Chiang Kai Shek School v. CA, G.R. No. L-58028, April 18, 1989

Rule 3 - Parties to Civil Actions

Facts:

● Fausta Oh (private respondent) was surprised to find as she reported for work on the first week of July
1968, when she was told that she had no assignment for the next semester at the Chiang Kai Shek School
(petitioner). She had been teaching at the scholl continuously for 33 years since 1932 and for no apparent
reason was given an abrupt dismissal. She sued and demanded separation pay, social security benefits,
salary differentials, maternity benefits, moral, and exemplary damages.
● The original defendanet was theChiang Kai Shek School but when it filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that it could not be sued, the complaint was amended. Certain officials of the school were also
impeded to make them solidarily liable with the school.
● CFI of Sorsogon dismissed the complaint
● CA - CFI’s decision was set aside by the respondent court which held that the school is subale and liable
while absolving the other defendants
● SC - with the MR denied, the school came to this court for review on certiorari

Issue:

WON a school that has not been incorporated may be sued by reason alone of its long continued existence and
recognition by the government

Ruling:

Yes. Rule 3, Section 1, of the Rules of Court clearly provides that “only natural or juridical persons may be parties
in a civil action” It is not denied that the school has not been incorporated but this ommission should not prejudice
the private respondent’s assertion of her claims against the school.

Having been recognized by the government under Act No. 2706 as amended by C.A. No. 180, it was under
obligation to incorporate under the Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. It appears that it had not
done so at the time the complaint was filed notwithstanding its existence even earlier than 1932. The petitioner
cannot now invoke its own non-compliance with the law to immunize it from private respondent’s complaint.

There should be bo no question that having contracted with the private respondent every year for 32 years and thus
represented itself as possessed of juridical personality to do so, the petitioner is now estopped from denying such
personality to defeat her claim against it.

As the school itself may be sued in its own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which the
persones joined in an association without any juridical personality may be sued with such association. Besides, it has
been show that the individual members of the board of trustees are not liable, having been appointed only after the
private respondent’s dismissal.

Hyatt Elevators v. Goldstar, G.R. No. 161026, October 24, 2005-

this case talks about the venue of personal actions, whereby there is a need to clarify the word “ residence” if both
parties are corporations.

FACTS:

Both parties are engaged in the same business of selling installing and maintaining/servicing elevators and
escalators. On February 23, 1999, HYATT filed a complaint for unfair trade practices and damages under Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines against LG industrial Systems Co. Ltd (LGISC) and LG
International Corporation (LGIC), alleging that in 1988, HYATT was appointed by LGISC and LGIC as the
exclusive distributor of LG elevators in the Philippines under a “Distributorship Agreement.” In the latter part of
1996, LGISC made a proposal to change the Distributorship Agreement to that of the joint venture, however
HYATT allege that the representatives of LGISC and LGIC conducted the meeting in bad faith in order to put
pressures upon them and eventually terminated the Exclusive Distributorship Agreement.

LGISC and LGIC filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the persons of
defendants, summons not having been served on its resident agent; (2) improper venue; and (3) failure to state a
cause of action.

HYATT then filed a motion for leave of court to amend the complaint when it learned that LGISC was to be
substituted to LG Otis because of the latter succeeding the former. The motion also averred that Goldstar was being
utilized by LG OTIS and LGIC in perpetrating their unlawful and unjustified acts against HYATT. Goldstar was
additionally impleaded as a party-defendant.

Goldstar filed a Motion to Dismiss the amended complaint, raising the following grounds: (1) the venue was
improperly laid, as neither HYATT nor defendants reside in Mandaluyong City, where the original case was filed,
and (2) failure to state a cause of action against (respondent), since the amended complaint fails to allege with
certainty what specific ultimate acts GOLDSTAR performed in violation of HYATT’s rights.

Trial court dismissed the motion. Goldstar filed a MR but the same was dismissed. CA reversed RTC and declared
that the venue was clearly improper, because none of the litigants “resided” in Mandaluyong City, where the case
was filed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the venue (Mandaluyong) was improper— YES.

HELD:

The Petition was denied. Under Section 2 , Rule 4 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court states that “Venue of personal
actions – all other actions may be commenced and tried whre the plaintiff resided, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendant resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff.” But since both parties to this case are corporation, there is a need to clarify the meaning of residence.
The law recognizes two types of persons: natural and juridical. Corporations fall under juridical. A corporation,
however has no residence in the sense in which this term is applied to a natural person.
In the case of Young Auto Supply Company vs. CA, the court rules that “For practical purposes, a corporation is I a
metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal office is located as stated in the articles of
incorporation.” But even before this ruling, it has been already established that the residence of a corporation is the
place where its principal office is established.

The court held that in the purpose of venue, “residence” is the same with “domicile.” Correspondingly the Civil
Code provides: “Art 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix the domicile
of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal representation is established or
where they exercise their principal functions.” AND Under Section 14(3) of the Corporation Code, the place where
the principal office of the corporation is to be located is one of the required contents of the articles of incorporation,
which shall be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

In the present case, there is no question as to the residence of respondent. What needs to be examined is that of
petitioner. Admittedly, the latter’s principal place of business is Makati, as indicated in its Articles of Incorporation.
Since the principal place of business of a corporation determines its residence or domicile, then the place indicated
in petitioner’s articles of incorporation becomes controlling in determining the venue for this case.

HYATT argues that the Rules of Court did not provide that when the plaintiff is a corporation, the complaint should
be filed in the location of its principal office as indicated in its articles of incorporation. This is however settled by
jurisprudence.

The choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff’s whim or caprice. He may be impelled by some ulterior
motivation in choosing to file a case in a particular court even if not allowed by the rules on venue.

Time, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-28882, May 31, 1971

FACTS:

Respondents Mayor Antonio Villegas (Villegas) and Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) filed a case against
petitioner Time, Inc. for alleged libel for their apparent false and malicious accusations on its “Corruption in
Asia” article in their Time Asia magazine, wherein Villegas, the mayor of Manila, was cited as an example
for corruption and nepotism, and that Enrile is the government official that lent Villegas 30,000 pesos because
he was Villegas’ compadre. Upon motion by the Villegas, et, al., respondent Judge Andres Reyes (Reyes)
granted them leave to take the depositions of the petitioners and ordered the attachment on the real and
personal estate of Time, Inc. Time filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue,
relying upon the provisions of RA 4363, amending Art. 360 of the RPC. However, Judge Reyes deferred the
determination of the MTD as RA 4363 is applicable to non-resident defendants.” Also, the respondents
Villegas and Enrile voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that Time failed to allege its capacity to sue in
Philippine courts, relying on Sec. 69 of the Corporation Code which provides: “No foreign corporation or
corporations formed, organized, or existing under any laws other than those of the Philippines shall be
permitted to…maintain by itself or assignee any suit for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand whatever,
unless it shall have the license prescribed in the section immediately preceding…”

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 4363 is applicable to an action against a foreign or non-resident corporation.

RULING

YES. The assertion that a foreign corporation or a non-resident defendant is not inconvenienced by
an out-of-town suit is irrelevant and untenable, for venue and jurisdiction are not dependent upon
convenience or inconvenience to a party; and moreover, venue was fixed under Republic Act No. 4363,
pursuant to the basic policy of the law that is, as previously stated, to protect the interest of the public service
when the offended party is a public officer, by minimizing as much as possible any interference with the
discharge of his duties. Art. 360, as amended, clearly indicates that if the offended party is a public official
holding office in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the case must be filed in the RTC of
Manila only, in case the libelous publication is originally published or printed outside the Philippines. Thus,
the libel case filed in RTC Rizal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue.

Pilipino Telephone v Tecson, G.R. No. 156966, May 7, 2004

Rule 4. Venue of Actions, Sec. 4. When Rule not Applicable

Facts:

● On various dates in 1996, Delfin Tecson (respondent) applied for 6 cellular phone subscriptions with
PILTEL (petitioner), a business engaged in telecommunication which were approved and covered 6 mobile
service agreements.
● April 5, 2001 - respondent filed with the RTC of Iligan City, Lanao Del Norte against petitioner for “Sum
of Money and Damages”. Petitioner moved for its dismissal on the ground of improper venue citing a
common provision in the mobiline service agreement to the effect that venue of all suits arising from the
Agreement shall be in the proper court of Makati, Metro Manila.
● August 15, 2001 - RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. PILTEL filed an MR and on October 8,
2001, the trials court denied the same
● PILTEL filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and on April 30, 2002, the CA saw no merit in the
petition and affirmed the trial court. Peitioner filed for an MR and on January 21 ,2003, the motion was
denied

Issue:

WON the provision in the mobiline service agreements fixing the venue of all suits arising from the contract is clear
and binding and that the venue of the complaint was improperly laid.

Ruling:

Yes.
Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure allows the parties to agree and stipulate in writing, before the
filing of an action, on the exclusive venue of an litigation between them. Such an agreement would be valid and
binding provided that the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent, that it is expressed in
writing by the parties, and it is entered inte before filing of the suit.

This is embodied in paragraph 22 of the “Mobile Sevice Agreement”made by petitioner PILTEL to its subscribers,
which was accepted and signed by the petitioner. The added stipulation that the subscriber “expressly waives any
other venue” should indicate clearly the intent of the parties to consider the venue stipulations as being, preclsuive in
character.

Union Bank v Maunlad Homes, G.R. No. 190071, August 15, 2012

Rule 4. Venue of Actions, Sec. 4. When Rule not Applicable

Facts:

● Union Bank (patitioner) owns Maunlad Shopping Mall in Malolos Bulacan and on August 2002, Union
Bank and Maunlad Homes (respondent) entered into a contract to sell involving the Mall. Under the
contract, Union Bank authorized Maunlad Homes to take possession over the property and build
improvements. They also agreed if Maunlad Homes violates any provisions of the contract, all payments
med will be applied as rentals for the use and possession of the property, all improvement will accrue in
favor of Union Bank. In the event of recession due to failure to pay or comply with the terms, Maunlad
Homes will be required to immediately vacate the property and voluntarily turn possession over to Union
Bank
● Since Maunlad Home failed to pay the monthly amortization, Union Bank sent a Notice of Recission of
Contract date February 5, 2003 demanding payment, otherwise the contract will automatically be
rescinded. Maunlad failed to comply. Another demand letter was sent of november 19, 2003 demanding
payment and requiring Maunlad to vacate and turn the possession of the property to Union Bank.
● As Maunlad Homes continued to refuse, Union Bank instituted an ejecment suit before MeTC of Makati,
Br. 64 on Febraury 19, 2004. Still, Maulnad resisted claiming ownership of the property since Union Bank
did not reserve ownership of the property under their contract, with this, Maunlad Homes claimed it has the
right to possess the property.
● MeTC - dismissed Union Bank’s ejectment complaint on May 18, 2005. It ruled that the appropriate action
to resolve these conflicting claims was an accion reivindicatoria, over which it had no jurisdiction
● RTC, Makati, Br. 139 - Union Bank’s appeal , the RTC affirmed MeTC’s decision on July 17, 2008. It
declared that the case involves a determination of rights of the parties under the contract. It noted that the
propert is in Malolos, Bulacan, but the ejectment suit was filed by Union bank in Makati City, based on the
contract stipulation that “the venue of all suits and actions arising our or in connection with the Contract to
Sell shall be in Makati City.” The RTC ruled, the proer venue for the ejectment action is in Malolos,
Bulacan, pursuant to the second paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The RTC further ruled
taht the Union Bank cannot rely on the waiver of venue provision in the contract because ejectment is not
an action arising out or connected with the contract
● CA - Union Bank appealed the RTC decision through a petition for review but the CA affirmed RTC’s
decision ruling that UB’s claim of possession is based on its claim of ownership which in turn is based on
its interpretation of the terms and conditions of the contract. The CA further determined that UB’s cause of
action is premised on the interpretation and enforcement of the contract and the determination of the
validity of the recission which are both matters beyond the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Thus, the dismissal of
the the ejectment suit is proper.
● SC - from the CA decision, UB appealed to the Court for a petition on certiorari

Issue:

WON the venue was properly laid

Ruling:
Maunlad Homes questioned the venue of UB’s unlawful detainer action filed in Makati while the subject property is
in Malolos, Bulacan. Citing Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, Maunlad Homes claimed that the unlawful
detainer action should be filed with the municipal trial court of the municiaplity or city where the real property
involved is situated. Union Bank, on the other hand, justified the filing with the MeTC of Makati on the venue
stipulation in the contract stating that “the venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection with this
Contract to Sell shall be at Makati City.”

While Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court states that ejectment actions shall be filed in the “municipal trial court
of the municipality or city wherein the reapl property involved xxx is stiuated,”, Section 4 of the same Rule provides
that the rule shall not apply “where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof.” In this case, the parties provided for a different venue. The same goes in Villanueva v.
Judge Mosqueda etc., et al., where the Court upheld the validity of the contract stipulation in a contact providing for
a venue for ejectment action other than stated in the Ruled of Court. Since the unlawful detainer action is connected
with the contract, UB rightfully filed the complaint with the MeTC of Makati City.

—------

Goco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010

TOPIC: Sec. 2. Parties in interest

FACTS:

This case involves a dispute over a parcel of land located in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The land was originally
owned by Feliciano Alveyra, but the municipality of Calapan acquired a one-half interest in the land as part of a
judgment award. The land was subsequently subdivided into two lots, with one-half belonging to the heirs of
Alveyra and the other half belonging to the municipality of Calapan. The petitioners, who claim to be lawful
occupants of the land, filed a complaint for the annulment of the titles issued to the respondents, who had purchased
the heirs' interest in the land. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the petitioners did not have a
cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, and the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court.

To determine the extent of Alveyra and the Municipality of Calapan's interest over Lot No. 2042, an action to quiet
title was instituted, which case eventually reached the Court of Appeals (CA).

The CA, subdivided Lot No. 2042 into two lots:

one-half or Lot No. 2042-A was declared as the property of the heirs of Alveyra who had since died.

while the other half, Lot No. 2042-B was declared owned by the Municipality of Calapan.
Meanwhile, while they were litigating their conflicting rights over Lot No. 2042, the heirs sold their one-half
interest over the land (Lot No. 2042-A) to respondent spouses Hicoblino and Lourdes Catly ( respondent
Catlys).

Respondent Catlys alleged that a portion of their Lot No. 2042-A was being occupied by the petitioners and
sought to recover possession of the lot, initially, by instituting an ejectment case against the petitioners. When
the ejectment case was dismissed, respondent Catlys then filed a complaint for recovery of possession against
the petitioners; the case is still pending decision before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calapan City, Branch 39.

Allegedly to defend themselves against the cases filed by respondent Catlys and to protect their vested rights as
lawful occupants of the land, the petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the four certificates of
title issued in respondent Caltys' names.

The petitioners claimed they are occupants of the original Lot No. 2042 and alleged that the titles issued in
respondent Catlys' names (covering Lot No. 2042-A which were subdivided into four lots) included portions that
they claimed were part of Lot No. 2042-B which belonged to the Municipality of Calapan.

The petitioners consider the inclusion of these portions of Lot No. 2042-B prejudicial to their interest as its actual
occupants, hence, they questioned respondent Catlys' titles.

Respondent Catlys, in turn, moved for the dismissal of the complaint asserting that it failed to state a cause of action
and that the petitioners (plaintiffs below) were not the real parties in interest.

The trial court discovered that the petitioners were occupying areas outside those covered by their lessor's title
and concluded they had no cause of action against respondent Catlys.

The petitioners' move to have the Order reconsidered and was denied by the RTC They sought the reversal of
the trial court's Orders by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA.

ISSUE: WON An action for annulment of title must be instituted by the real party in interest.

RULING: YES. Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.

This provision has two requirements:

1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party in interest; and

2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.

Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved.
One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action.
When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.

In this case, an action for annulment of certificates of title to property into the issue of ownership
of the land covered by a Torrens title and the relief generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the land's
true owner. The real party in interest in such action therefore is the person claiming title or ownership adverse
to that of the registered owner.

In the case of Tankiko v. Cezar:

It is evident that respondents are not the real parties in interest. Because they admit that they are not the
owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, it is daylight clear that the land is public in
character and that it should revert to the State. This being the case, Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically
declares that only the government may institute an action to recover ownership of a public land.

The petitioners demand the annulment of respondent Catlys' titles because they allege that these included
portions belonging to the Municipality of Calapan. This allegation is a clear recognition of the Municipality's
superior interest over the lot. In instituting the action for annulment of respondent Catlys' titles, what the
petitioners are asserting is a right that is not personal to them, but to that of the local government. That they
are lessees who were granted by the Municipality of Calapan the option to purchase the portion they occupy does
not suffice to constitute as parties with material interest to commence the action.
Metrobank v. Hon. Alejo, G.R. No. 141970, September 10, 2001

Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

WHAT DOES THIS CASE TELL YOU ABOUT?

This case highlights the importance of compulsory joinder of indispensable party, An indispensable party
is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in
his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest[;] a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of
the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his
interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with
equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence
there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go
forward.

For the general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all
necessary parties wherever possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, the
presence of those latter parties being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

FACTS:

Spouses Raul and Cristina Acampado obtained loans from petitioner in the amounts of P5,000,000 and
P2,000,000 which were secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land registered in their names. The land
was covered by TCT No. V-41319. However, on June 3, 1996, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of TCT No.
V-41319 was filed by Respondent Sy Tan Se against Spouses Acampado. In the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Branch 172.

When the Spouses Acampado defaulted their obligation, the said property was foreclosed and sold in the
auction where the highest bidder is the petitioner. Upon presentation to the Register of Deeds of the Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, petitioner was informed of the existence of the August 12, 1998 RTC Decision in Civil
Case No. 4930-V-96, annulling TCT No. V-41319.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision which was
dismissed by the CA for being insufficient in form and substance.

What’s the original complaint filed?

A suit to nullify the existing torrens Certificate of Title

Where is it filed?

RTC Branch 172 Valenzuela, Metro Manila

What happened?

A real estate mortgage has a pending civil action that is unknown to the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. It was undisputed that he property was mortgaged, and the
mortgaged was annotated; the foreclosure of mortgaged was entered in the RD the cancellation of the TCT. The
cancellation of the TCT and the mortgage annotation exposed petitioner to real prejudice, because its rights over the
mortgaged property would no longer be known and respected by third parties o Necessarily, therefore, the
nullification of TCT adversely affected its property rights, considering that a real mortgage is a real right and a real
property by itself Evidently, METROBANK is ENCOMPASSED within the DEFINITION of an
INDISPENSABLE PARTY.

Thus, it should have been impleaded as a defendant in the Case of Dec. of Nullity [second case]
DEFINITION OF INDISPENSABLE PARTY o “a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest” “a person
in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective,
complete, or equitable” “one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward”.

NOT an INDISPENSABLE PARTY if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest
of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete
justice between them JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES [Sec. 7, Rule 3] “SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder
of indispensable parties.—Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.”.

AIM and INENT OF THE RULES on JOINDER is a complete determination of all possible issues, not only
between the parties themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment . A valid
judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties THUS, it is clear that the presence
of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is “the authority to hear and determine
a cause, the right to act in a case. Must be noted: the absence of indispensable parties renders all subsequent
actuations of the court null and void Because of the court’s want of authority to act not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present IN THIS CASE, the disregard of the annotations in the TCT constituted a deprovation
of private property without due process thus, unjust and iniquitous . Clearly, it was the trial court’s duty to order
petitioner’s inclusion as a party to nullity case This was not done. Neither the court nor private respondents
bothered to implead petitioner as a party to the case. In the absence of petitioner, an indispensable party, the trial
court had no authority to act on the case. Its judgment therein was null and void due to lack of jurisdiction over an
indispensable party

Ochoa v. China Bank, G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011

TOPIC: RULE 4- VENUE OF ACTIONS, Sec. 1

WHAT DOES THIS CASE TELL YOU ABOUT?

This case highlights that the rule on venue under the Rules of Court cannot be made to apply to the petition
for extrajudicial foreclosure. The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties and sanctioned by
Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed
by respondent bank because the provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure
is not. Pertinent are the following disquisitions in Supena v. De la Rosa: (334 Phil. 671 (1997). Section 1, Rule 2 [of
the Rules of Court] defines an action in this wise: "Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one
party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."

FACTS:
Spouses Chua mortgaged their properties located in Paranaque City in favor of China Banking
Corporation. The parties agree that necessary action for the foreclosure of the mortgage shall be instituted at
Chinabanking’s option which is in the RTC-Makati City.

The petitioners contend that the CA erred when it said that the stipulated venue applies only for
Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages and not on respondent bank’s Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage.

What’s the original complaint filed?

RTC Paranaque
Where is it filed?
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
What happened?
The parties stipulated a specific venue regarding actions arising from mortgaged properties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is binding on China’s Banking petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in negative. The stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant only to
actions arising from or related to the mortgage, such as petitioners’ complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale,
and Damages and with respect to extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No. 3135, as amended, applies, it being a
special law dealing particularly with extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the general
provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions.

The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended.
Said law provides that “sale (of REM) cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the property
sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be made is the subject of
stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the
property or part thereof is situated”.

Clearly, by express provision of the law, the sale can only be made in Parañaque City. The exclusive
venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties and sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court,7 cannot be made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because
the provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not.

Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012 (Supra.)

TOPIC: Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions

WHAT DOES THIS CASE TELL YOU ABOUT?

A real party in interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced. The choice of
venue should not be left to the plaintiff's whim or caprice. He may be impelled by some ulterior motivation in
choosing to file a case in a particular court even if not allowed by the rules on venue.

What’s the original complaint filed? Action for collection of sum of money.

Where is it filed? RTC - Quezon City

What happened?

FACTS:

Respondents obtained a loan from petitioners. However, despite repeated demands, respondents failed to pay.
Petitioners who were then in California, USA, executed an SPA in favor of Atty. Aceron to file an action against
respondents. Atty. Aceron filed the complaint for collection of sum of money before the Quezon City RTC (his
place of residence).

Respondents moved to dismiss and asserted that the complaint against them may only be filed in the court of the
place where either they or the petitioners reside. They averred that they reside in Bacolod City while the petitioners
reside in Los Angeles, California, USA. Thus, the respondents maintain, the filing of the complaint against them in
the RTC of Quezon City was improper.

Petitioners invoking Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, insist that Atty. Aceron, being their attorney-in-fact, is
deemed a real party in interest in the case below and can prosecute the same before the RTC. Such being the case,
the petitioners assert, the said complaint may be filed in the court of the place where Atty. Aceron resides, which is
the RTC of Quezon City.

ISSUE:

WON it was proper for Atty. Aceron to file the case in Quezon City. - NO
RULING:

It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and
their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a
plaintiff's caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.

The petitioners' complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal action as it primarily
seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint.
He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the action
has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.

However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the court
of the place where the defendant resides. The Supreme Court held that there can be no election as to the venue of the
filing of a complaint when the plaintiff has no residence in the Philippines. In such case, the complaint may only be
filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides.

Here, the petitioners are residents of Los Angeles, California, USA while the respondents reside in Bacolod City.
Applying the foregoing principles, the petitioners' complaint against the respondents may only be filed in the RTC
of Bacolod City — the court of the place where the respondents reside. The petitioners, being residents of Los
Angeles, California, USA, are not given the choice as to the venue of the filing of their complaint.

Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012 (Supra.)

TOPIC: Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions

OVERVIEW:
This case highlights the importance of adhering to venue rules in personal actions. It emphasizes that venue rules are
designed for the convenience of all parties in legal proceedings. When a plaintiff lacks a residence within the
jurisdiction, the complaint is typically required to be filed where the defendant resides. The case also emphasizes
that the attorney-in-fact's residence should not determine venue when the plaintiff lacks a residence in the relevant
jurisdiction. Courts uphold venue rules to protect the rights of resident defendants and ensure fairness in legal
proceedings. Failure to comply with venue rules can lead to case dismissal.

FACTS:
• Spouses Alan and Em Ang borrowed $300,000 from Theodore and Nancy Ang in 1992.
• Agreement included a 10% annual interest and repayment upon demand.
• Despite demands, the respondents did not repay the loan.
• In 2006, petitioners, residing in Los Angeles, USA, appointed an attorney-in-fact to file a collection
lawsuit, who resided in Quezon City.
• Respondents argued that the lawsuit should be filed where they or the petitioners resided.
• Respondents claimed residence in Bacolod City, Philippines, and petitioners in Los Angeles, California.
• RTC of Quezon City initially denied the respondents' motion to dismiss, citing the attorney-in-fact's
residence.
• The Court of Appeals ruled that venue should depend on the real parties' residence, favoring the
respondents.
• CA annulled previous RTC orders and directed the complaint's dismissal.
• Petitioners' request for reconsideration by the CA was denied.
• They filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court to challenge the CA's decision.

ISSUE:
WON CA committed reversible error of law when it ruled that the complaint must be dismissed on the ground that
venue was not properly laid.

HELD:
NO. It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs
and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a
plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.

The petitioners’ complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal action as it primarily
seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint.
He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the action
has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.

However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the court
of the place where the defendant resides.

Here, the petitioners are residents of Los Angeles, California, USA while the respondents reside in Bacolod City.
Applying the foregoing principles, the petitioners’ complaint against the respondents may only be filed in the RTC
of Bacolod City – the court of the place where the respondents reside. The petitioners, being residents of Los
Angeles, California, USA, are not given the choice as to the venue of the filing of their complaint.

Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it annulled and set aside the orders of the RTC of Quezon
City and consequently dismissed the petitioners’ complaint against the respondents on the ground of improper
venue.

Ochoa v. China Bank, G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011 (Supra.)
TOPIC: Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable

FACTS:
Petitioners insist that it was error for the CA to rule that the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is binding
only on petitioners’ complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque City, but not on respondent bank’s Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, which
was filed with the same court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is binding only
upon Petitioner and not on Respondent Bank.

RULING:
NO. The SC ruled that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118. The case at bar involves petitioners’ mortgaged real property located in Parañaque City
over which respondent bank was granted a special power to foreclose extra-judicially. Thus, by express provision of
Section 2 (refer to Possible Questions 2), the sale can only be made in Parañaque City.

The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties and sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because the
provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not.
Unlike an action, an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is initiated by filing a petition not with any
court of justice but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. It is a fact that
extrajudicial foreclosures are not judicial proceedings, actions or suits.

Verily then, with respect to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No. 3135, as amended, applies, it being
a special law dealing particularly with extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the general
provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions.

Consequently, the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant only to actions arising from or related to the
mortgage, such as petitioners’ complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages.

Republic v. Glasgow Credit, G.R. No. 170281, January 18, 2008

TOPIC: Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable

FACTS:
● Republic filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila for civil forfeiture of assets (with
urgent plea for issuance of temporary restraining order [TRO] and/or writ of preliminary injunction) against
the bank deposits maintained by Glasgow in CSBI. The case was filed pursuant to RA 9160 (Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001).
● The RTC (via Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali) issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Meanwhile, summons to Glasgow was returned "unserved" as it could no longer be found at its
last known address.
● Republic filed a verified omnibus motion for (a) issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of court to serve
summons by publication.
● The RTC directed the issuance of alias summons. However, no mention was made of the motion for leave
of court to serve summons by publication. RTC archived the case allegedly for failure of the Republic to
serve the alias summons.
● The Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its pending motion
for leave of court to serve summons by publication. The RTC ordered the reinstatement and directed the
Republic to serve the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days. However, it did not resolve the
Republic’s motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication
● Republic (through the Office of the Solicitor General [OSG]) received a copy of the sheriff’s return stating
that the alias summons was returned "unserved" as Glasgow was no longer holding office at the given
address and left no forwarding address.
● Meanwhile, the Republic’s motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication remained
unresolved. Thus, the Republic filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of
court to serve summons by publication.
● In Glasgow’s Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special Appearance), they alleged, among others, that the
court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had not yet been served on it.
● The Republic opposed Glasgow’s motion to dismiss. It contended that its suit was an action quasi in rem
where jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the
court.
● The RTC issued the assailed order, dismissing the case on the 3 grounds which includes improper venue as
it should have been filed in the RTC of Pasig where CSBI, the depository bank of the account sought to be
forfeited, was located.
● Raising questions of law, the Republic filed this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint for civil forfeiture filed by Petitioner Republic against Respondent Glasglow was
correctly dismissed on the ground of improper venue.

RULING:
NO. The Complaint was filed in the proper venue. On November 15, 2005, the SC issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC,
the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument,
Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense
under RA 9160, as amended (Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture). The order dismissing the Republic’s
complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow’s account in CSBI has not yet attained finality on account of the pendency
of this appeal. Thus, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture applies to the Republic’s complaint.
Moreover, Glasgow itself judicially admitted that the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture is "applicable to
the instant case”.

Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture
cases is any RTC of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving,
or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located. Pasig City, where the account
sought to be forfeited in this case is situated, is within the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly, the
complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of
the RTCs of the NCJR, it was a proper venue of the Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow’s account.