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Scope Statement

The Space Shuttle Challenger was destroyed shortly after liftoff in 1986, killing all crew aboard. An investigation found that O-ring seals in the solid rocket boosters had failed due to design flaws that were known years prior but not adequately addressed. The commission report concluded that the accident was caused by a lack of communication between NASA engineers and managers, and poor risk management practices. Our case study will evaluate NASA's risk management plan for the Challenger launch based on risk identification, evaluation, handling, and control to determine weaknesses that contributed to the disaster.

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60 views1 page

Scope Statement

The Space Shuttle Challenger was destroyed shortly after liftoff in 1986, killing all crew aboard. An investigation found that O-ring seals in the solid rocket boosters had failed due to design flaws that were known years prior but not adequately addressed. The commission report concluded that the accident was caused by a lack of communication between NASA engineers and managers, and poor risk management practices. Our case study will evaluate NASA's risk management plan for the Challenger launch based on risk identification, evaluation, handling, and control to determine weaknesses that contributed to the disaster.

Uploaded by

Sri
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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On January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger was destroyed in a disastrous fire shortly after liftoff.

All passengers aboard the vehicle were killed. A presidential commission was formed to investigate the
cause of the accident and found that the O-ring seals had failed, and, furthermore, that the seals had
been recognized as a potential hazard for several years prior to the disaster. The commission’s report,
stated that because managers and engineers had known in advance of the O-ring danger, the accident
was principally caused by a lack of communication between engineers and management and by poor
management practices.
Our case study would be looking at the incident from the perspective of Risk Management Plan followed
by NASA. We intend to evaluate the RMP on the basis of 4 parameters: Risk Identification, Risk
Evaluation (Qualitative and Quantitative), Risk handling and Risk Control and discuss the drawbacks in
their strategy.

Risk Management Plan


1. Does it appear, from the data provided in the case, that a risk management plan was in existence?
2. If such a plan did exist, then why wasn’t it followed—or was it followed?

Risk Identification

3. Is there a difference between a risk management plan, a quality assurance plan, and a safety plan, or are they the
same?
4. Does there appear to have been a structured process in place for risk identification at either NASA or Thiokol?
5. How should one identify or classify trade-off risks such as trading off safety for political acceptability?

Risk Quantification
6. Given the complexity of the Space Shuttle Program, is it feasible and/or practical to develop a methodology for
quantifying risks, or should each situation be addressed individually? Can we have both a quantitative and
qualitative risk evaluation system in place at the same time?
7. How were the identified risks quantified at NASA? Is the quantification system truly quantitative or is it a
qualitative system?

Risk Response (Risk Handling)

8. Did it appear that the risk response method selected was dependent on the risk or on other factors?
9. What should be the determining factors in deciding which risks are brought upstairs to the executive levels for
review before selecting the appropriate risk response mechanism?
10. What risk response mechanism were managers at Thiokol and NASA using when they ignored the
recommendations of their engineers?
11. Did the engineers at Thiokol and NASA do all they could to convince their own management that the wrong risk
response mechanism was about to be taken?

Risk Control:

12. How much documentation should be necessary for the tracking of a risk management plan? Can this
documentation become over excessive and create decision-making problems?
13. How could the chains of communication and responsibility for the Space Shuttle Program have been made to
function better?
14. What level of risk should have been acceptable for launch?
15. If you were on a jury attempting to place liability, whom would you say was responsible for the Challenger
disaster?

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