SOCIOLOGY
SOCIOLOGY
Table of contents
1. Introduction to sociology………………………………...……………..4-74
2. The individual and the society………………………….…………….75-79
3. Social interaction………………………………………………………80-82
4. Social structure and organization…………………………………….83-86
5. Social change and development8………………………………………7-92
6. Social problem in Kenya……………………………………………...93-96
INTRODUCTION
Sociology is a social science whose study helps us to understand the relationship
between people as individual and as group and the influence of social conditions on
these relationships.
The purpose of teaching sociology to social work trainees is to introduce them to
sociology issues which are considered relevant to understanding social problems and
social change in the society.
Learning sociology will help the trainee to conceptualize the social position and roles
of individuals, groups and communities within social institution and in the social
process.
GENERAL OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, the trainees should be able to;
a) Identify the various sociological concepts that explain the behavior of
individual, group and communities.
b) Understand and explain the concept of social organization.
c) Understand and explain the various social structures in the society.
d) Identify social process in that an individual is subjected to in society.
e) Acquire general knowledge of sociological traits that explain human behavior.
f) Identify major social problems in Kenya.
g) Identify the various elements of culture and explain how they are passed on in
the society.
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
Specific objectives
By the end of this topic, the trainee should be able to;
a) Define the meaning of sociology
b) Trace the origin and development of sociology as a discipline.
c) Explain the scope of sociology
d) Distinguish sociology from other social science.
e) Acquire general knowledge of sociological theories.
INTRODUCTION
Sociology; is the scientific study of human behavior. As the study of humans in their
collective aspect, sociology is concerned with all group activities, economic, social,
political and religious. sociology study such areas as bureaucracy , community deviant
behavior , family , public opinion , social change , social mobility , social
stratification and such specific problems as crime , divorce child abuse and substance
addiction . Sociology tries to determine the law governing human behavior in social
contexts.
Sociology as a science
Sociology can be considered a science as it involves systematic methods of empirical
research analysis of data and assessment of theories. In addition it ask questions
which can be quantified. Sociology uses scientific methods such as experimental
method, historical methods, comparative, structural functional methods.
With the help of methods, sociology studies abstracts as well as concrete facts. It is
viewed as science for the following reason.
a) Facts
On of the main objective of science is the seeking of facts and keeping of high level of
objects so that those facts that are sought for all scientist are independent of their
subjects that is inclination. In this case therefore sociology is a science which bases
its studies on objectivity as opposed to subjectivity in its search for facts for example
in administration of questionnaires. Sociology keeps high level of objectivity in
seeking facts from the respondent.
The society
It is a group of people related to each other through persistent relations such as social
status, roles and social networks. It can be also a large social grouping that shares the
same geographical territory and is subject to the same political authority and
dominant cultural expectation.
The family
Is a group of people affiliated by consanguinity, affinity or co- residence. In most
societies, it is the principal institution for socialization of children. Extended from
human ‗family unit ‗by affinity, economy, culture, tradition, honour and friendship
and the concept of the family that are metaphorical or that grow increasingly
inclusive extending to natural hood and humanism.
The world sociology was coined by French thinker Augustine Comte in 1938 from Latin
word socins (companion or associate) and Greek (logos) meaning believe.
Early interview approach into sociology led by Comte was to treat it as much manner
as natural science applying the same method and methodology used in natural science
to the study of phenomena.
In the early 20th Century sociology expanded in USA including both the development
macro sociology interested in the evaluation of societies and micro sociology i.e.
study of every day human interaction on a small scale basis.
Branches of Sociology
a) Social psychology
This is a discipline that incorporates sociology and psychology in the study of human
interaction and behavior. It tries to identify the mental process that take place in the
course of interaction and how they influence human behaviuor.
b) Rural sociology
It tries to understand the social interaction of people from the rural areas. It is a
result of unique social problem that people face e.g. unemployment, gender, poverty
mobiliosation.
c) Medical sociology
Studies social and mental cause of disease It is a discipline that shows that disease is
caused by germs e.g. bacteria, some are caused by social problem e.g. stresses,
isolation. It studies lifestyle disease e.g. cancer cause by smoking. It is a discipline
that stresses prevention rather than treatment.
d) Industrial sociology
It is a discipline that studies the interaction between the factors of production.
e) Criminology
It studies criminal possession and nature of crime from social point of view.
f) Political
Is a branch that studies how power is shared and distributed in a society? It attempts
to understand the various form of leadership that existed through history.
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
In sociology, sociological perspectives, theories, or paradigms are complex
theoretical and methodological frameworks used to analyze and explain objects of
social study. They facilitate organizing sociological knowledge. Sociological theory is
constantly evolving, and can never be presumed to be complete.
Sociological theory, on the other hand, is centered on the attempt to understand the
society.[2] Whereas sociological theory relies heavily on the scientific method, is
objective, and does not presume to judge the society, social theory is closer to
philosophy, more subjective, and is much more likely to use the language of values
and judgment, referring to concepts as "good" or "bad". prominent sociological
theorists include Talcott Parsons, Robert K. Merton, Randall Collins, James Samuel
Coleman, Peter Blau, Immanuel Wallerstein, George Homans, Harrison White, Theda
Skocpol, Gerhard Lenski, Pierre van den Berghe and Jonathan H. Turner.
Blurry boundaries affect social science, and there are prominent scholars who could
be seen as being in between social and sociological theories, such as Harold Garfinkel,
Herbert Blumer, and Claude Lévi-Strauss.
Whereas the field of sociology itself and sociological theory by extension is relatively
knew, dating to 18th and 19th centuries (see history of sociology), it is closely tied to
a much older field of social sciences (and social theory) in general. Sociology has
separated itself from the other social sciences with its focus on society, a concept
that goes beyond nation, and includes communities, organizations and relationships.
Some of the key developments that influenced sociological theory were: the rise of
individualism, the appearance of the modern state, industrialization and capitalism,
colonization and globalization, and the world wars. Those and similar developments
challenged contemporary thinkers, inspiring them to question whether existing
theories can explain the observed reality, and to built on them, creating alternate
theories, in search for the explanation of the observed society.
EVALUATION THEORY
Evaluation is part and parcel of educating – yet it can be experienced as a burden and
an unnecessary intrusion. We explore the theory and practice of evaluation and some
of the key issues for informal and community educators, social pedagogues youth
workers and others. In particular, we examine educators as connoisseurs and critics,
A lot is written about evaluation in education - a great deal of which is misleading and
confused. Many informal educators such as youth workers and social pedagogues are
suspicious of evaluation because they see it as something that is imposed from
outside. It is a thing that we are asked to do; or that people impose on us. As Gitlin
and Smyth (1989) comment, from its Latin origin meaning 'to strengthen' or to
empower, the term evaluation has taken a numerical turn - it is now largely about the
measurement of things - and in the process can easily slip into becoming an end
rather than a means. In this discussion of evaluation we will be focusing on how we
can bring questions of value (rather than numerical worth) back into the centre of the
process. Evaluation is part and parcel of educating. To be informal educators we are
constantly called upon to make judgements, to make theory, and to discern whether
what is happening is for the good. We have, in Elliot W. Eisner‘s words, to be
connoisseurs and critics. In this piece we explore some important dimensions of this
process; the theories involved; the significance of viewing ourselves as action
researchers; and some issues and possibilities around evaluation in informal and
community education, youth work and social pedagogy. However, first we need to
spend a little bit of time on the notion of evaluation itself.
On evaluation
Much of the current interest in evaluation theory and practice can be directly linked
to the expansion of government programmes (often described as the 'New Deal')
during the 1930s in the United States and the implementation of various initiatives
during the 1960s (such as Kennedy's 'War on Poverty') (see Shadish, Cork and Leviton
1991). From the 1960s-on 'evaluation' grew as an activity, a specialist field of
employment with its own professional bodies, and as a body of theory. With large
sums of state money flowing into new agencies (with projects and programmes often
controlled or influenced by people previously excluded from such political power)
officials and politicians looked to increased monitoring and review both to curb what
they saw as 'abuses', and to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their
programmes. A less charitable reading would be that they were both increasingly
concerned with micro-managing initiatives and in controlling the activities of new
agencies and groups. Their efforts were aided in this by developments in social
scientific research. Of special note here are the activities of Kurt Lewin and the
interest in action research after the Second World War.
Last, evaluation if it is to have any meaning must look at the people involved, the
processes and any outcomes we can identify. Appreciating and getting of flavour of
these involves dialogue. This makes the focus enquiry rather than measurement -
although some measurement might be involved (Rowlands 1991). The result has to be
an emphasis upon negotiation and consensus concerning the process of evaluation,
and the conclusions reached.
To help make sense of the development of evaluation I want to explore three key
dimensions or distinctions and some of the theory associated.
These two forms of evaluation will tend to pull in different directions. Both are
necessary – but just how they are experienced will depend on the next two
dimensions.
To enable people and agencies make judgments about the work undertaken; to
identify their knowledge, attitudes and skills, and to understand the changes
that have occurred in these; and to increase their ability to assess their
learning and performance (formative evaluation).
To enable people and agencies to demonstrate that they have fulfilled the
objectives of the programme or project, or to demonstrate they have achieved
the standard required (summative evaluation).
We can see in these contrasting models important questions about power and control, the
way in which those directly involved in programmes and projects are viewed. Dialogical
evaluation places the responsibility for evaluation squarely on the educators and the other
participants in the setting (Jeffs and Smith 2005: 85-92).
The key part of evaluation, some may argue, is framing the questions we want to ask,
and the information we want to collect such that the answers provide us with the
indicators of change. Unfortunately, as we have seen, much of the talk and practice
around indicators in evaluation has been linked to rather crude measures of
performance and the need to justify funding (Rogers and Smith 2006). We want to
explore the sort of indicators that might be more fitting to the work we do.
Luckily, in trying to make sense of our work and the sorts of indicators that might be
useful in evaluation, we can draw upon wisdom about practice, broader research
findings, and our values.
We want to suggest four possible areas that we might want indicators for:
The number of people we are in contact with and working with. In general, as
informal educators we should expect to make and maintain a lot of contacts. This is
so people know about us, and the opportunities and support we can offer. We can also
expect to involve smaller numbers of participants in groups and projects, and an even
smaller number as ‗clients‘ in intensive work. The numbers we might expect - and the
balance between them - will differ from project to project (Jeffs and Smith 2005:
116-121). However, through dialogue it does seem possible to come some agreement
about these - and in the process we gain a useful tool for evaluation.
The quality of relationships available. Many of us talk about our work in terms of
‗building relationships‘. By this we often mean that we work both through
relationship, and for relationship (see Smith and Smith forthcoming). This has come
under attack from those advocating targeted and more outcome-oriented work.
However, the little sustained research that has been done confirms that it is the
relationships that informal educators and social pedagogues form with people, and
encourage them to develop with others, that really matters (see Hirsch 2005).
Unfortunately identifying sensible indicators of progress is not easy - and the job of
evaluation becomes difficult as a result.
How well people work together and for others. Within many of the arenas where
informal education flourishes there is a valuing of working so that people may
For some of these areas it is fairly easy to work out indicators. However, when it
comes to things like relationships, as Lesley Sewell noted many years ago, ‗Much of it
is intangible and can be felt in atmosphere and spirit. Appraisal of this inevitably
depends to some extent on the beholders themselves‘ (1966: 6). There are some
outward signs – like the way people talk to each other. In the end though, informal
education is fundamentally an act of faith. However, our faith can be sustained and
strengthened by reflection and exploration.
Describing informal education as an art does sound a bit pretentious. It may also
appear twee. But there is a serious point here. When we listen to other educators, for
example in team meetings, or have the chance to observe them in action, we
inevitably form judgments about their ability. At one level, for example, we might be
impressed by someone's knowledge of the income support system or of the effects of
different drugs. However, such knowledge is useless if it cannot be used in the best
way. We may be informed and be able to draw on a range of techniques, yet the thing
that makes us special is the way in which we are able to combine these and improvise
regarding the particular situation. It is this quality that we are describing as artistry.
For Donald Schön (1987: 13) artistry is an exercise of intelligence, a kind of knowing.
Through engaging with our experiences we are able to develop maxims about, for
example, group work or working with an individual. In other words, we learn to
appreciate - to be aware and to understand - what we have experienced. We become
what Eisner (1985; 1998) describes as 'connoisseurs'. This involves very different
qualities to those required by dominant models of evaluation.
The word connoisseurship comes from the Latin cognoscere, to know (Eisner 1998: 6).
It involves the ability to see, not merely to look. To do this we have to develop the
ability to name and appreciate the different dimensions of situations and
experiences, and the way they relate one to another. We have to be able to draw
upon, and make use of, a wide array of information. We also have to be able to place
our experiences and understandings in a wider context, and connect them with our
values and commitments. Connoisseurship is something that needs to be worked at –
but it is not a technical exercise. The bringing together of the different elements into
a whole involves artistry.
Criticism can be approached as the process of enabling others to see the qualities of
something. As Eisner (1998: 6) puts it, ‗effective criticism functions as the midwife to
perception. It helps it come into being, then later refines it and helps it to become
more acute‘. The significance of this for those who want to be educators is, thus,
clear. Educators also need to develop the ability to work with others so that they may
discover the truth in situations, experiences and phenomenon.
Schön (1987) talks about professionals being ‗researchers in the practice context‘. As
Bogdan and Biklen (1992: 223) put it, ‗research is a frame of mind – a perspective
people take towards objects and activities‘. For them, and for us here, it is something
that we can all undertake. It isn‘t confined to people with long and specialist
training. It involves (Stringer 1999: 5):
• A problem to be investigated.
• A process of enquiry
The second tradition, perhaps more widely approached within the social welfare field
- and most certainly the broader understanding in the USA - is of action research as
'the systematic collection of information that is designed to bring about social change'
(Bogdan and Biklen 1992: 223). Bogdan and Biklen continue by saying that its
practitioners marshal evidence or data to expose unjust practices or environmental
dangers and recommend actions for change. It has been linked into traditions of
citizen‘s action and community organizing, but in more recent years has been
adopted by workers in very different fields.
In many respects, this distinction mirrors one we have already been using – between
programme evaluation and practice evaluation. In the latter, we may well set out to
explore a particular piece of work. We may think of it as a case study – a detailed
examination of one setting, or a single subject, a single depository of documents, or
one particular event (Merriam 1988). We can explore what we did as educators: what
were our aims and concerns; how did we act; what were we thinking and feeling and
so on? We can look at what may have been going on for other participants; the
conversations and interactions that took place; and what people may have learnt and
how this may have affected their behaviour. Through doing this we can develop our
abilities as connoisseurs and critics. We can enhance what we are able to take into
future encounters.
When evaluating a programme or project we may ask other participants to join with
us to explore and judge the processes they have been involved in (especially if we are
concerned with a more dialogical approach to evaluation). Our concern is to collect
information, to reflect upon it, and to make some judgements as to the worth of the
project or programme, and how it may be improved. This takes us into the realm of
what a number of writers have called community-based action research. We have set
out one example of this below.
Look - building a picture and gathering information. When evaluating we define and
describe the problem to be investigated and the context in which it is set. We also
describe what all the participants (educators, group members, managers etc.) have
been doing.
Think – interpreting and explaining. When evaluating we analyse and interpret the
situation. We reflect on what participants have been doing. We look at areas of
success and any deficiencies, issues or problems.
Act – resolving issues and problems. In evaluation we judge the worth, effectiveness,
appropriateness, and outcomes of those activities. We act to formulate solutions to
any problems.
In recent years informal educators have been put under great pressure to provide
‗output indicators‘, ‗qualitative criteria‘, ‗objective success measures‘ and ‗adequate
assessment criteria‘. Those working with young people have been encouraged to show
how young people have developed ‗personally and socially through participation‘. We
face a number of problems when asked to approach our work in such ways. As we
have already seen, our way of working as informal educators places us within a more
dialogical framework. Evaluating our work in a more bureaucratic and less inclusive
fashion may well compromise or cut across our work.
There are also some basic practical problems. Here we explore four particular issues
identified by Jeffs and Smith (2005) with respect to programme or project
evaluations.
Those who may have been affected by the work of informal educators are often not
easily identified. It may be possible to list those who have been worked with directly
over a period of time. However, much contact is sporadic and may even take the form
of a single encounter. The indirect impact is just about impossible to quantify. Our
efforts may result in significant changes in the lives of people we do not work with.
This can happen as those we work with directly develop. Consider, for example, how
we reflect on conversations that others recount to us, or ideas that we acquire
second- or third-hand. Good informal education aims to achieve a ripple effect. We
hope to encourage learning through conversation and example and can only have a
limited idea of what the true impact might be.
Change can rarely be monitored even on an individual basis. For example, informal
educators who focus on alcohol abuse within a particular group can face an
insurmountable problem if challenged to provide evidence of success. They will not
be able to measure use levels prior to intervention, during contact or subsequent to
the completion of their work. In the end all the educator will be able to offer, at
best, is vague evidence relating to contact or anecdotal material.
Change of the sort with which informal educators are concerned does not happen
overnight. Changes in values, and the ways that people come to appreciate
themselves and others, are notoriously hard to identify - especially as they are
happening. What may seem ordinary at the time can, with hindsight, be recognized as
special.
Workarounds
There are two classic routes around such practical problems. We can use both as
informal educators.
The second route is to make linkages between our own activities as informal
educators and the general research literature. An example here is group or club
membership. We may find it very hard to identify the concrete benefits for individuals
from being member of a particular group such as a football team or social club. What
we can do, however, is to look to the general research on such matters. We know, for
example, that involvement in such groups builds social capital. We have evidence
that:
In those countries where the state invested most in cultural and sporting facilities
young people responded by investing more of their own time in such activities
(Gauthier and Furstenberg 2001).
The more involved people are in structured leisure activities, good social contacts
with friends, and participation in the arts, cultural activities and sport, the more
likely they are to do well educationally, and the less likely they are to be involved
even in low-level delinquency (Larson and Verma 1999).
There appears to be a strong relationship between the possession of social capital and
better health. ‗As a rough rule of thumb, if you belong to no groups but decide to join
one, you cut your risk of dying over the next year in half. If you smoke and belong to
no groups, it‘s a toss-up statistically whether you should stop smoking or start joining‘
(ibid.: 331). Regular club attendance, volunteering, entertaining, or church
attendance is the happiness equivalent of getting a college degree or more than
doubling your income. Civic connections rival marriage and affluence as predictors of
life happiness (Putnam 2000: 333).
This approach can work where there is some freedom in the way that you can respond to
funders and others with regard to evaluation. Where you are forced to fill in forms that
require the answers to certain set questions we can still use the evaluations that we have
undertaken in a participatory manner – and there may even be room to bring in some
references to the broader literature. The key here is to remember that we are educators –
and that we have a responsibility foster learning, not only among those we work with in a
project or programme, but also among funders, managers and policymakers. We need to
view their requests for information as opportunities to work at deepening their appreciation
and understanding of informal education and the issues and questions with which we work.
Missing from the instrumental and technicist ways of evaluating teaching are the kinds of
educative relationships that permit the asking of moral, ethical and political questions
about the ‗rightness‘ of actions. When based upon educative (as distinct from managerial)
relations, evaluative practices become concerned with breaking down structured silences
and narrow prejudices. (Gitlin and Smyth 1989: 161)
Evaluation is not primarily about the counting and measuring of things. It entails valuing –
and to do this we have to develop as connoisseurs and critics. We have also to ensure that
this process of ‗looking, thinking and acting‘ is participative.
Social exchange theory features many of the main assumptions found in rational
choice theory and structuralism.
Basic Concepts
The basic concepts addressed in social exchange theory are: Cost, Benefit, Outcome,
Comparison Level, Satisfaction, and Dependence. Benefits include things such as
material or financial gains, social status, and emotional comforts. Costs generally
consist of sacrifices of time, money, or lost opportunities. Outcome is defined to be
the difference between the benefits and the costs:
Note that the set of potential alternatives can be governed both by extrinsic and
intrinsic factors. An example of an extrinsic factor would be that the person is from a
sparsely populated town, and an example of an intrinsic factor would be that a person
is very shy about meeting new people. Both intrinsic and extrinsic factors affect the
set of people available to an individual for forming an alternate relationship, and thus
affect the level of dependence of the individual on his or her current relationship.
Critiques
Katherine Miller outlines several major objections to or problems with the social
exchange theory as developed from early seminal works (Miller 2005):
The theory reduces human interaction to a purely rational process that arises
from economic theory.
The theory favors openness as it was developed in the 1970s when ideas of
freedom and openness were preferred, but there may be times when openness
isn‘t the best option in a relationship.
The theory assumes that the ultimate goal of a relationship is intimacy when
this might not always be the case.
The theory places relationships in a linear structure, when some relationships
might skip steps or go backwards in terms of intimacy.
It also is strongly seated in an individualist mindset, which may limit its application in
and description of collectivist cultures.
Exchange theory has become one of the most ambitious social, especially socio-
psychological, theories. Social exchange theory‘s fundamental premise is that
human behavior is an exchange of rewards between actors. This is the rationale
for the claim that social exchange can serve as a general paradigm for
sociology and anthropology as well as social psychology. The present critique is
aimed at rational choice and behaviorist variants of social exchange theory
rather than at the theory as such. First, the main assumptions of (these
variants of) social exchange theory are presented. This is followed by a critique
of these assumptions at two levels. The first level pertains to the treatment of
social interaction as an exchange, and the second to the status of social
exchange as an economic or psychological phenomenon. Other criticisms of
exchange theory are also presented.
The exchange approach in sociology [is] the economic analysis of
noneconomic social situations (Emerson, 1976, p. 336).
The question can arise as to the reasons readers need to know about social exchange
theory. An important reason is exchange theory‘s ambition to be a sort of integrative
theoretical paradigm for social science, social psychology in particular, which derives
from the corresponding claim of the rational choice model and behaviorism, as its key
bases and sources. Another reason is exchange theory‘s self-description as an
interdisciplinary theoretical endeavor putatively spanning social-science disciplinary
boundaries, especially those between sociology, economics, psychology and political
science. So is the moment that exchange theory, especially its economic variant, is
intimately linked with ―public choice‖ or ―rational choice‖ approaches, which are
more familiar to social and political theorists. A corollary reason is then that
exchange theory involves or revolves around the issue of how standard economic
frameworks, notably market metaphors and analogies, are applied to social analysis in
recent times.
This paper scrutinizes these approaches and claims of exchange theory. The
examination is organized in three parts. The first part contains the key concepts and
assumptions of social exchange theory as presented by its representatives. The second
part involves a critique of social exchange theory at two levels, viz. the treatment of
social interaction as exchange, and then of social exchange as an extension of
economic and/or behavioral (psychological) phenomena. Adduced in the third part are
some other criticisms of exchange theory. A key criticism is that modern exchange
theory is neither a completely original nor satisfactory paradigm for social science in
virtue of being a mixture of elements from psychological behaviorism and orthodox
economics as more or less discredited theoretical traditions, as well as (unwittingly)
restating and misinterpreting some classical sociological and anthropological ideas
(e.g. Simmel, Mauss). On the account of that mixture, the theory appears as an
attempt to resurrect the double ‗ghost‘ of behaviorism and utilitarianism, in respect
of this restatement, a sort of déjà vu expedition to ‗rediscover America.‘
Still, economic models of social exchange (and rational choice) are not immune to
internal contradictions, which can admittedly (Markovsky et al. 1997, p. 833) be self-
defeating. Thus, while recognizing the differences between market and social
exchange (Cook, 2000, Stole et al., 2001), making the latter a distinct phenomenon
vis-à-vis the former, exchange theorists do not see them as an impediment to
applying standard economic models of rational choice. Further, some regard models
of economic exchange as universal and so applicable to ―extra-economic exchange‖
(Macy and Flache, 1995) or ―social situations‖ (Emerson, 1977). Admittedly, modern
social exchange theory uses ―concepts and principles borrowed from microeconomics‖
(Cook, 2000, p. 687). For example, the principle of diminishing marginal utility
originally pertaining to market transactions is extended to extra-economic relations
on the ground that the present realization of expectations has a dampening effect on
future attainment, though such effects are counteracted by rising aspirations (Blau,
1964, pp. 148-9; Coleman, 1990, pp. 37-42).
Adopting the rule of diminishing marginal utility, social exchange theory sees the
underlying assumption of utility maximization (i.e. optimum or equilibrium) in its
domain as little different from that in economics, though admittedly no exact price
can be attached to ‗invaluable goods‘ (Arrow 1997) and their utility is not
independent or separable. Since for social exchange theorists the principle of
marginal utility is applicable to exchanges of non-economic character (Blau, 1994, pp.
158-9), they extend the assumption of utility optimization (and satisficing) beyond the
market. Thus, some (Coleman, 1994, p. 159) argue that maximization of utility is a
universal engine of action for both economic and non-economic actors (individual or
corporate) that leads to the attainment of equilibrium in which the divergence
between utility and control of events/goods is minimized. Because actors are assumed
to aim at gaining utility by relinquishing control, power is attained not for its own
sake but is instrumental in obtaining wealth, thus seeking the first is the means to
2
gaining the second (Coleman, 1973).
While assuming that social bonds result from reciprocated benefactions, they see
unilateral services are the ultimate source of differentiation in power (and status).
This simultaneous generation of social bonds and power differentiation is called the
paradox of social exchange. The ultimate form of the first is pure expression of love,
and the extreme case of the latter is potlatch in its primitive and modern variations
(Blau, 1994, pp. 158-9; Nisbet, pp. 1970:65-6). This process of power differentiation
has social structural effects like asymmetries in relations between members of
different groups, as superiority in group resources is transmitted into the superior
prestige of individuals accruing to them by membership independently of personal
factors (Blau, 1994, pp. 146-7). In conventional economics, market exchange is a
primary determining phenomenon in relation to power as secondary and derivative. In
a similar vein, economic-behavioral models of social exchange treat exchange as more
fundamental than power, explicitly (Emerson, 1969, pp. 385-6) or implicitly (Cook,
1990, pp. 115-6) on the market-style assumption that the latter largely emerges and
evolves in a complex structure of exchanges of resources.
As regards its second key insight, specifically for exchange theory the inverse
association between power and dependence characterizes their relations, so
(non)reciprocity in the latter generates the problem of (in)equality or (a)symmetry in
power (Emerson, 1962, pp. 31-41). In recent exchange theory, this perspective has
become known as the ―power-dependence theory of Emerson‖ (Molm and Peterson,
1999). In this view, reciprocal or balanced exchange relations do not always imply the
absence of power, however. Power (though not domination) may still be operative
rather than neutralized in such relations because actors can continue to exercise
control over each other‘s actions. Two or more power-dependence relations
constitute a power network that tends to closure. A major process in such networks is
the legitimation or transformation of power into authority as balanced and directed
power exerted only in ways specified by group norms (Emerson, 1969, pp. 395-397)
and thus a social structural rather than personal phenomenon residing in dyads.
Arguably, the nature of network connections--positive, negative and mixed--and
resource scarcity by virtue of being factors altering dependency relations determine
the locus of power in exchange networks, a view that seeks to go beyond dyadic social
exchange to more ‗macro‘ levels (Yamaguchi, Gillmore and Cook, 1988). This shift of
attention from isolated dyads to exchange networks (attributed to Emerson 1972) is a
key feature of modern social exchange theory for its recent advocates (Molm, 1991,
p. 475). However, some modify or replace such network models by a process view
that advances an identity model of power associated with a participation level in
exchange networks, as set by actors‘ standards of identities (Burke, 1997, pp. 135-7).
In rational choice versions of exchange theory, the distribution of power among actors
is determined by the ‗availability of resources from alternative exchange relations‘ in
networks consisting only of negative connections like competition and conflict
(Yamaguchi et al., 1988, p. 851). In turn, the ‗local scarcity of resources‘ determines
power distribution in exchange networks with solely positive connections such as
cooperation. And, in networks of mixed connections, the distribution of power is
conditional on a conjunction of network positions--e.g., the distance from the
sources--and the control of resources. Overall, rational choice models of exchange
typically equate power with the total value of economic resources (Yamaguchi, 1997,
p. 840) or wealth. Specifically, the power ratio between actors is the reciprocal
magnitude of the exchange rates between them--the less resources actor A exchanges
with B, the higher A‘s power over B--with these rates (or marginal utilities of
exchanges with alternative partners) being equal in market-like equilibrium (so
optimum). Attaining the latter implies establishing uniform power ratios or
approximately symmetrical power-dependence relations between actors in networks.
In this view, the frequency and distribution of exchange is the indicator of satisfaction
from exchange relations, which is determined by the amount and balance of power.
The greater average power or balance, the more symmetrical distribution of exchange
and so the greater satisfaction, and vice versa. Hence, this satisfaction derives from
relative power positions via the expectation entailed in each position, with higher
(lower) ‗nodes‘ producing high (low) expectations (Molm, 1991, p. 493). As to the
effect of the degree of reciprocity vs. negotiation in social exchange on power
distribution within networks, presumably reciprocal exchanges exhibit lower strategic
power uses (Molm and Peterson, 1999), just as greater perceptions of fairness (Molm,
Peterson, and Takahashi, 2003).
Some exchange theorists relax the rational choice argument for the determination of
power by exchanges of resources within network structures (Willer et al., 1989).
Describing it as a relational and unobservable phenomenon, they view power as
determined by multiple rather than single structural conditions, including resource
exchanges. They suggest that a substantial departure from some baseline value of
expected outcomes is indicative of power use in exchange relations, thus of grounding
power in a resource flow linking any pair of positions in a network. In such networks,
power transitivity exists if a resource flow between at least three positions is
operative. Overall, power is structurally generated in exchange networks via exclusion
and inclusion, or hierarchy and mobility, and is proportional to the ability to avoid
being excluded. In this rendition of exchange theory, excludability becomes the major
factor determining individual and network realms or power positions, though critics
(Cook and Yamaguchi, 1990, pp. 297-300) object that the connection between power-
dependence and exclusion is not articulated. It defines exclusion in the sense that
some actors are effectively prevented from obtaining valuable resources like wealth
(and so power and status) by social-structural conditions that affect (and stem from)
resource availability, valuation and transfers between individual and collective actors
(Markovsky et al., 1988).
Thus, the power of micro-units within exchange networks to access these resources is
to some degree the function of macro-social structures. Technically, this version of
exchange theory assumes that to every network position and its holder accrues
relative power analytically predicted by a graph-theoretic power index (GPI) that
indicates the number of points earned and distributed in resource exchanges and is
based on the equation of power to the availability of alternative exchange relations.
GPI calculations in multi-exchange networks are simplified by using the concept of
network domains as independent (sub) networks in the sense that power use and
change in one domain do not have impact on that in the others. In sum, both
exchanges of resources and configurations of network positions determine power and
its use, as manifested in resource distributions. Yet, some exchange theorists object
that this procedure of power estimation via the accumulation and distribution of
resource points may perpetuate the rational-choice myth that social actors wish solely
to accumulate wealth (Burke, 1997, p. 149).
Instead, they redefine social (and economic) exchange as a type of choice behavior.
Presumably, actors in social exchange make choices freely in regard to other
interactants or alternative courses of action while guided by cost-benefit
considerations, though no formal bargaining and explicit contracts on reciprocation
are involved (Molm, 1990, pp. 427-9). The satisfaction of actors‘ preferences becomes
the prime mover of exchanges: exchange processes are outcomes of their attempts to
satisfy their needs (Cook, 1990, pp. 115-116) rather than live up to social
expectations, values, and rules. Admittedly, alternatives for exchange transactions as
well as their outcomes are influenced by a group‘s network that prevents or mitigates
by various social sanctions, including moral disapproval, failures of reciprocation.
Yet, exchange theory typically treats these sanctions and the underlying social norms
as secondary explanatory factors in relation to expected returns in the belief that
they do not generate (though may sustain) such transactions (Blau, 1994, p. 158).
Generally, it, especially its rational-choice rendition, conceives exchange behavior as
mostly, to use Weber‘s terms, instrumental-rational rather than (also) value-rational
well as traditional and affective (or emotional) action, despite some recent attempts
in the second direction, e.g. affect theories (Lawler, 2001; Molm, 1991). In Paretian
terms, it conceptualizes social exchange as driven largely by logico-rational elements
such as material interests in resources, while downplaying non-rational variables like
sentiments and their rationalizations (residues and derivations). This feature of
exchange theory helps explain why its advocates avoid reference to, or criticize and
dubiously reinterpret, Weber, Pareto and other classical sociologists and
anthropologists (as implicitly admitted by Cook, 2000).
However, some of them see the rational choice approach as but a special case of
behavioral psychology (Homans, 1990, pp. 85-6), a view that the exponents of this
approach (e.g. Coleman 1990, p. 11) reject. In this view, among social laws only
economic ones approach level of generality in virtue of being grounded on universal
behaviorist psychological principles (Homans, 1990, pp. 77-81), though they
admittedly emerge and function solely within definite institutional conditions like
markets, property rights, legal guarantees, or cultural rules (Elster, 1989; Willer et
al., 1989). Thus, early exchange theorists (like Homans) describe such market laws as
the law of supply and demand as derivations from psychological propositions or
behavioral propensities, though under certain institutional parameters. They
explicitly pursue and justify psychological reductionism on the ground that
sociological laws are not very general or pertinent. Notably, they treat the rational
choice propositions about social exchange, by virtue of referring to individual actions
and treating institutions as their aggregate outcomes, as psychological and thus
universal, and not sociological.
If so, then these propositions assume on the heroic function of explaining and
predicting virtually all social phenomena, economic and non-economic alike. For
example, some exchange theorists propose that social status--denoted as a special
capital (Blau, 1994, pp. 160-1) whose function is to obtain material gains--is subject
to the operation of the law of supply and demand, just as are economic variables. The
role of wealth or money in economics is in social exchange theory matched by status
(Blau, 1994, pp.146-7), approval (Homans, 1990, pp. 77-9), reputation and related
non-economic variables assumed in turn to be rationally used for obtaining efficiency
gains within exchange systems (Raub and Weesie, 1990, pp. 653-4).
Overall, for leading exchange theorists (Homans, 1971), the key propositions of their
theory are much like those of economics, viz. rational pursuit of self-interest, by
assuming that actors are more likely to engage in an action, the more valuable its
reward, and conversely. In turn, by virtue of making no reference to the conditions
and positions of a social system‘s integration or equilibrium, they are not functional
or macro-sociological propositions. Relatedly, like general sociological theory, that of
The initial behavioral approach--as pioneered by Homans, as perhaps the first modern
exchange and even rational choice theorist (Coleman and Lindenberg, 1989; Fararo,
2001—is elaborated in the model of operant psychology treated as the theoretical
foundation. The model uses concepts such as operant stimulus, discriminatory
stimulus and reinforcing stimulus, and views not the actor but the relationship as the
unit of analysis (Emerson, 1969, pp. 379/95). It distinguishes exchange networks from
groups in that they are structures created by exchange processes among different
individual and collective actors--i.e., as sets of two or more connected exchanges—
thus extending these processes from direct dyadic to indirect multi-agent forms. In an
extension of this model, exchange networks meet individual needs and cause or
constrain the emergence of social structures--rather than vice versa--by producing
differentiation among individuals and groups on the basis of asymmetrical access to
valuable resources like wealth, power, prestige, or privilege (Cook, 1990, pp. 115-6).
A further related claim is that the assumption that institutional structures are
―generated‖ via the concatenation of individual exchanges makes exchange theory a
―theory of social structure [sic!]‖ (Cook, 2000, p. 687).
This implies the expectation that the psycho-social unrest due to distributive injustice
will arise only if the distribution standard is (perceived as being) violated (Cook,
1975). In addition, some exchange theorists reintroduce procedural distributive
justice stating that ‗judgments of fairness are a function not only of outcomes in
relation to some standard but of the processes or procedures through which outcomes
are obtained‘ (Molm et al. 2003:129). Thus, they examine how the processes of
negotiation and reciprocation—i.e. negotiated and reciprocal exchange with their
different ‗procedural dimensions‘--affect perceptions or judgments of fairness. Their
finding is that negotiations as putatively ‗fair procedures‘ produce the ‘untended
consequence of reducing the perception that exchange is fair and just‘, and
reciprocal exchange is a ‗process for building relationships in which other actors are
perceived as fair and cooperative‘ (Molm et al. 2003:129). In general, social exchange
theory predicts that definite behavioral consequences will ensue from (in)justice
perception and experience (Markovsky et al., 1984).
In this regard, some exchange theorists propose social comparison functions
(Markovsky et al., 1984) on the ground that judgments of distributive justice are
based on comparisons across individuals, groups, societies, or distributional standards.
As some of its adherents admit, most of social exchange theory ―combines roots in
behaviorism [...] with concepts and principled borrowed from microeconomics‖
(Cook, 2000, p. 687), a combination that virtually excludes relevant sociological and
anthropological ideas as incongruent. For example, economic and psychological
versions of exchange theory hardly contain relevant references to classical
sociological (and anthropological) works, including even those of Simmel and Weber
as putative early ‗rational choice‘ sociologists (Kiser and Hechter 1998). Contrast this
negligence with their numerous references to (neo)classical economics (e.g. Smith,
Bentnam, Marshall, Edgeworth, etc.) and behavioral psychology (e.g. Skinner). In one
respect, social exchange theory tends to ground itself in standard and partly
discredited economic concepts and models like homo economicus, self-interest,
Modern exchange theory cum a mix of behaviorism and microeconomics justifies its
disregard of sociological ideas on meta-theoretical or doctrinaire grounds that their
holist or cultural crust is incompatible with its individualist, utilitarian and behaviorist
core. It neglects or dismisses the classical sociological-anthropological conception of
generalized, ‗rule-governed‘ (Weber‘s expression) and symbolic social exchange (e.g.
Durkheim, Mauss, Malinowski) in favor of that of restricted, normatively independent,
and pseudo-market exchanges. The issue is not whether which conception is more
adequate but the disjuncture of an ostensibly sociological theory with the tradition of
sociology and its curious continuity with (and borrowing from) orthodox economics
and behaviorism. Still, this path makes the modern exchange paradigm appear less
adequate as a sociological (or socio-psychological) theory than perhaps would have
been the case if the other route were followed. In particular, admittedly ―one
limitation of [social exchange theory] is the relative inattention to issues of cultural
context and cross-cultural variations in the norms and rules that regulate social
exchange. Ironically, this is the strength of early studies of social exchange within
anthropology‖ (Cook, 2000, 688).
Despite its claim to be a sociological paradigm, exchange theory in its rational choice
and behavioral varieties fails to recognize the distinctive social character of
exchanges that are not fully reducible to their particular economic and/or
psychological dimensions. It overlooks that social exchange represents, as Simmel
puts it, a sociological phenomenon sui generis by virtue of being originally determined
by society as well as subsequently socially regulated by inter-personal and inter-group
commitments eventually conducive to impersonal rules and institutions. As critics
object, based on its central proposition that the rational operation of economic and
psychological processes defines social behavior as an exchange of rewards, and that
institutional structures arise and exist as just more complex forms or outcomes of
such processes, exchange theory misconceives the societal framework of exchanges
by offering a mechanistic portrayal of human action (Mitchell, 1978, p. 168). In this
view, its depiction of actors as motivated by reward vs. punishment and profit vs.
cost reflects social exchange theory‘s parasitic reliance on reductive psychology and
economics. Alternatively, it overlooks or dismisses the self-emergent or pre-existing
properties of macro-phenomena relative to individual units and their actions in favor
of ‗ad hoc quality of utilitarian rationalities‘ (Mitchell, 1978, p. 168) as the presumed
prime mover of social structures regarded as collections or results of these unit acts.
Admittedly, exchange theory treats social structures as ―generated through the
formation of [individual] exchange relations‖ (Cook, 2000, p. 687).
For critics, what is at issue, however, is not only this rational choice micro-
aggregation to generate macro-outcomes—even for some economists (Arrow 1994) a
dubious procedure--but also, to paraphrase Weber, co-determination of individual
actions by (what Blau calls) the large social structure, including institutions, thus
beyond interpersonal networks as ‗substructures‘. If these processes are intertwined
with, or co-determined by, each other, a key problem exchange theory overlooks, yet
needs to solve, pertains to the ways thereby macro-social structure affect actors in
Thus, even some exchange theorists (Willer, et al., 1989) consider the macro-to-micro
approach from social structure (not local networks) to individual exchange (agency)
more in accordance with the sociological tradition, particularly Marx and Weber, than
the micro-to-macro model characteristic of rational choice theory. Such an approach
treats outcomes from exchanges like exchange rates as generated by connecting
individual actions with macro-social structures as different from network sub- or
micro-structures. This admits that just as it is implausible to reduce human
interaction to an exchange of rewards, so is it to treat ‗large social structure‘ as an
aggregate outcome or composition effect of individual exchanges propelled by
utilitarian or behavioral considerations. If so, then this casts doubt on the claim that
exchange theory ―offers significant insights about the nature and operation of social
structure‖ (Stolte et al., 2001, p. 410), even that it is ―a theory of social structure‖
(Cook, 2000, p. 687). (In fact, what modern exchange theorists, following Emerson,
call ‗structure‘ is what Blau denotes as sub- or micro-structures, like exchange
networks, distinguished from large or macro-social structure.) Also, it doubts the
general argument of ‗sociological miniaturism‘ (or social psychology) that the
phenomena usually ‗taken as characteristic of the microbehavioral level of analysis
transcend that level of analysis and apply on macrolevels of analysis as well‖ (Stolte
et al., 2001, p. 409).
The second level of critique of exchange theory involves the relationship between
economic and social exchange. Economic and behaviorist models tend to reduce social
exchange to a set of market-like exchanges of material objects driven by extrinsic
motivations like gain, even when it declaratively distinguishes between the two. For
instance, this reduction is implicit in the claim that exchange theory is ‗well-suited
for grasping material/extrinsic exchange‖ (Stolte et al., 2001, p. 411) insofar as this
means that social exchanges are subsumed under the latter. A related claim is that
exchange theory brings to sociology a ―clear conception of the material and resource
basis of social action‖ (Cook, 2000, p. 688).
These claims assume or imply that not just economic but social exchange is induced
by pursuit of material resources (wealth) and/or hedonistic motives (pleasure). As
some exchange theorists (Homans, Emerson) suggest, the economic postulate of
utility maximization is a special case of the general hedonistic ‗law‘ of pleasure
optimization, as is loss minimization relative to pain avoidance. This highlights their
project for, even most of modern, social exchange theory as an extension and
Thus, even the exchange of material goods in the market is, as Simmel stresses, not a
purely economic fact as treated in orthodox microeconomics. For, as he puts it, ―such
a fact--i.e. one whose content would be exhausted in the image of economics--does
not exist [but is one of] the purest and most primitive forms of socialization‖.
Further, Simmel observes that even when considered an economic phenomenon,
market exchange far from exhausting analysis becomes the subject of sociological
(and psychological) analyses examining its ―preconditions in non-economic concepts
and facts and its consequences for non-economic values and relationships‖. In some
views, economic and social exchange differ in that in the former the focus is on
material goods and the associated gains and sacrifices in contrast to the latter where
relationships are central mostly regardless of such benefits (Burns, 1990). In Simmel‘s
words, if the exchange of economic values entails the notion of sacrifice of a useful
good and cost-benefit calculation, most social exchanges involve no such sacrifices
and calculations. For instance, when, as he puts it, ―we exchange love for love, we do
not sacrifice any [material] good‖.
In this view, social exchange theory confines itself to individual-level relations and so
fails to establish the micro-macro transition—seen as a key virtue of neoclassical
economics--from dyadic to generalized exchanges (yet see Bearman 1997), in addition
to introducing dubious ad hoc hypotheses. Admittedly, ‗[there are] two deficiencies in
work that introduced ‗exchange theory‘ into sociology. One was the limitation to
microsocial relations, which abandons the principal virtue of economic theory, its
ability to make the micro-macro transition from pair relations to system. The other
was the attempt to introduce principles in and ad hoc fashion [e.g. ‗distributive
justice‘ and ‗norm of reciprocity]‖ (Coleman, 1988:96).
Socio-Psychological Assumptions
Even if all the propositions of social exchange theory are valid, it seems handicapped
by its behavioral assumptions derived from reductive psychology. Just as rational
choice versions of exchange theory stand or fall with neoclassical economics and
utilitarianism, so is the destiny of its psychological variants tied with behaviorism. A
critique of behaviorist as well as rational choice models may even seem redundant in
light of the partly discredited place of utilitarianism and behaviorism, as ostensibly
universal theoretical paradigms, in social science and philosophy, thus casting doubt
on a social exchange theory based on them. This particularly holds true insofar as
social exchange, like rational choice, theory seeks to become ―an inclusive and
universally applicable [utilitarian-behaviorist] construct that simultaneously explains
everything and therefore nothing‖ (Smelser, 1992, p. 403), i.e. a ‗theory of
everything [under the sun]‘ (Hodgson, 1998:178).
Like rational choice, exchange theory can hardly be deemed more satisfactory than
its initial target, structuralism-functionalism or macro-sociology overall (Mulkay,
1971, p. 225), as even by some of its exponents admit recently (Blau, 1994). One
reason is that behavioral models of exchange (Homans, Emerson et al.) lack
explanatory value vis-à-vis macro-social phenomena, especially institutions, because
it neglects or downplays the impact of structural variables, viz. institutional (as
distinguished from personal) power, authority relations, coercion, stratification, and
political centralization, on individual exchanges (Mitchell, 1978, pp. 46-48). Since
these models perform conceptual insulation of (pairs of) actors from this macro-social
reality, they can deal only with the simplest forms of exchange like dyadic direct
exchanges.
As noted, for many exchange theorists since Homans, their behavioral assumptions
make for a universal model of human nature in the image of (as utilitarian economists
like Edgeworth put it) a ‗pleasure machine‘, rational egoist, or optimizing agent, so a
sort of homo economicus.
A problem with such a model is that over-rational actors can degenerate into
irrational subjects (‗rational fools‘), since admittedly ‗hyper-rationality [is]
Even when dealing with exchange networks, rational choice and behavioral models
fail to reach a concept of structural impersonal power, as they construe these clusters
of micro-interaction as ‗structures‘. Dubiously treating exchange networks as
‗structure‘, these models overlook those genuine, macro-structures and processes,
viz. institutions, beyond micro-interaction settings. To see how dubious this approach
is, imagine an economics that is only microscopic dealing with processes within
exchange networks or ‗structures‘ like markets and firms while neglecting or
excluding macro-economic structure or economy as a whole. By doing so rational
choice and behavioral models make it appear as if nothing (relevant) exists outside
networks of exchanges or explicit and implicit ‗markets‘ and the power deriving from
them. In particular, rational-choice exchange theory, by extending the economic
theory of markets to non-economic phenomena, views market-like exchanges of
‗resources‘ and their distribution as the generator of power differentiation as well as
institutions and other social structures. Like the neoclassical (Edgeworth) ―pure
catallactics‖ of markets, social exchange theory via a sort of market-style alchemy
converts power and institutions into derivations of resource exchanges between
individuals within networks. And, even some of its early advocates (e.g. Blau) try to
go beyond current exchange theory (and market catallaxy) by proposing that
impersonal power as rooted in macro-social structures crucially affects exchanges of
resources and their distribution. This implies that exchange/distribution is, to use
Weber‘s terms, a set of ‗power constellations‘ or what J. S. Mill calls a ‗matter of
human institution‘ rather than the other way round.
CONCLUSION
The principal objective of this paper has been to reexamine social exchange theory,
as one of the more ambitious contemporary sociological or socio-psychological
theories by presenting and reassessing the arguments of its adherents and those of its
critics. The key conclusion is that exchange theory has become a variant or mutant of
the rational choice model and behaviorism given the predominance of its economic
and behavioral versions often combined (Cook 2000). In essence, it embraces the
―basic behavioral assumptions of operant psychology and utility theory in economics
regarding utility maximization, rationality, learning and deprivation-satiation‖ (Baron
and Hannan, 1994, p. 1133). In particular, social exchange (like rational choice)
theory in its ―efforts to extend microeconomic models to extraeconomic exchange‖
(Macy and Flache, 1995, p. 73), claims, for example, that group pressure and member
conformity ―better be viewed as two sides of a transaction involving the exchange of
utility or reward‖ (Emerson, 1976, p. 336). Admittedly, the perceived ―rigor,
parsimony, and analytic power of rational choice has prompted sociologists to extend
the theory beyond market transactions to exchanges of symbolic and nonfungible
resources such as social approval, security, and even love‖ (Macy and Flache, 1995, p.
73). The outcome of such efforts has been social exchange theory, notably its rational
choice version. Prima facie, this makes exchange (and rational choice) theory
‗parasitic‘ on utilitarian economics and psychological behaviorism as partly
compromised paradigms in social science rather than an autonomous theoretical
endeavor.
A possible alternative to these formulations of social exchange theory can be a more
sociological perspective drawing upon the insights of classical sociology and
anthropology--in conjunction with, rather than subordinated to, those of utilitarian
economics and behaviorism—and more empirically-historically grounded. For
illustration, a key assumption of this perspective is that, as Weber states, non-
economic exchange and other ‗forms of social action follow "laws of their own", and
even apart from this fact, they may always be co-determined by other than economic
causes.‘ Moreover, market-economic exchange itself is often ‗influenced by the
autonomous structure of social action within which it exists‘. However, a further
elaboration of these issues is outside the scope of this paper.
Stolte et al. (2001, p. 388) argue that since (sociological) social psychology‘s
distinctive contribution is sociological miniaturism, it is ―not fundamentally social
psychological, but, in contrast, is a form of microsociology‖, seemingly a far cry from
Homan and in part Emerson. Further, it is argued that sociological social psychology
thus understood ―will be linked inexorably to concerns of macrosociology‖ (Stolte et
al., 2001, p. 388).
Blau (1964, pp. 155-6) asserts that the relationship between the fair rate and the
going rate in social exchange parallels that between just, normal or equilibrium price
and market or average price in economic transactions.
One might describe exchange theory as ‗rational choice crossed with classical
sociology‘. Still, as a matter of proportion, exchange theory is admittedly (Cook 2000)
more rational choice (and behaviorism) than classical sociology.
Podolny and Baron (1997, p. 691) examine the bearing of social networks on intra-
organizational mobility (in a corporation) and report that individuals can experience
―negative reputational consequences in an organization by dropping person-to-person
ties no longer valuable. The individual may need to preserve ties no longer
instrumentally valuable because of norms against the breaking of ties. The presence
of such constraints calls into question the value of conceptualizing workplace
networks in highly strategic and voluntary terms.‖
Social learning theory is derived from the work of Albert Bandura which proposed that
social learning occurred through four main stages of imitation:
close contact,
imitation of superiors,
understanding of concepts,
role model behavior
For the article on social learning theory in psychology and education see social
cognitive theory. It consists of three parts: observing, imitating, and reinforcements
Julian Rotter moved away from theories based on psychosis and behaviorism, and
developed a learning theory. In Social Learning and Clinical Psychology (1945), Rotter
suggests that the effect of behavior has an impact on the motivation of people to
engage in that specific behavior. People wish to avoid negative consequences, while
desiring positive results or effects. If one expects a positive outcome from a behavior,
or thinks there is a high probability of a positive outcome, then they will be more
likely to engage in that behavior. The behavior is reinforced, with positive outcomes,
leading a person to repeat the behavior. This social learning theory suggests that
Albert Bandura (1977) expanded on Rotter's idea, as well as earlier work by Miller &
Dollard (1941), and is related to social learning theories of Vygotsky and Lave. This
theory incorporates aspects of behavioral and cognitive learning. Behavioral learning
assumes that people's environment (surroundings) cause people to behave in certain
ways. Cognitive learning presumes that psychological factors are important for
influencing how one behaves. Social learning suggests a combination of environmental
(social) and psychological factors influence behavior. Social learning theory outlines
three requirements for people to learn and model behavior include attention:
retention (remembering what one observed), reproduction (ability to reproduce the
behavior), and motivation (good reason) to want to adopt the behavior.
Criminology
In criminology, Ronald Akers and Robert Burgess (1966) developed social learning
theory to explain deviancy by combining variables which encouraged delinquency
(e.g. the social pressure from delinquent peers) with variables that discouraged
delinquency (e.g. the parental response to discovering delinquency in their children).
The first two stages were used by Edwin Sutherland in his Differential Association
Theory. Sutherland‘s model for learning in a social environment depends on the
cultural conflict between different factions in a society over who has the power to
determine what is deviant. But his ideas were difficult to put into operation and
measure quantitatively. Burgess, a behavioral sociologist, and Akers revised
Sutherland‘s theory and included the idea of reinforcement, which increases or
decreases the strength of a behavior, and applied the principles of Operant
Psychology, which holds that behavior is a function of its consequences and can be
really bad in some cases.(Pfohl, 1994).
Functionalism had been the dominant paradigm but, in the 1960s, there was a shift
towards Social Control Theories, Conflict Criminology, and Labeling Theories that
tried to explain the emerging and more radical social environment. Moreover, people
believed that they could observe behavior and see the process of social learning, e.g.,
parents watched their own children and saw the influence of other children on their
own; they could also see what kind of effect they had on their own children, i.e. the
processes of differential association and reinforcement. The conservative political
parties were advocating an increase in punishment to deter crime. Unlike Labeling
Theory, Social Learning Theory actually supports the use of punishment which
translates into longer sentences for those convicted, and helps to explain the increase
in the prison population that began in the early 1970s (Livingston, 1996).
Unlike situational crime prevention, the theory ignores the opportunistic nature of
crime (Jeffery, 1990: 261-2). To learn one must first observe criminal behavior, but
where was this behavior learned? The theory does explain how criminal behavior is
There is also a definite problem. What may be reinforcement for one person may not
be for another. Also, reinforcements can be both social involving attention and
behavior between more than one person, and non-social reinforcement would not
involve this interaction (Burgess & Akers: 1966) Social Learning Theory has been used
in mentoring programs that should, in theory, prevent some future criminal behavior.
The idea behind mentoring programs is that an adult is paired with a child, who
supposedly learns from the behavior of the adult and is positively reinforced for good
behavior (Jones-Brown, 1997). In the classroom, a teacher may use the theory by
changing the seating arrangements to pair a behaving child and a misbehaving child,
but the outcome may be that the behaving child begins not satisfying
Hale (1993) applied the social learning theory to serial murder using Amsel's
frustration theory. In frustration theory, humiliation is the result of a no reward
situation, which is a reward that is not given when a reward had been given in the
past. When an individual is conditioned to be rewarded they anticipate it to happen in
the future, but when they are presented with a no reward situation this creates an
unconditioned frustration response, otherwise called humiliation. Signs associated
with the humiliating experience form a conditioned anticipatory frustration response,
which triggers specific internal stimuli. These stimuli prevent an individual from
future humiliation. During childhood, serial killers experience many humiliating
situations and with unbalanced nonreward situations and no reward situations, they
perceive all situations as nonreward and develop the inability to distinguish between
the two. They anticipate humiliation in every encounter that they come across. When
it comes to choosing their victims serial killers do not go back to the person who
caused the humiliation. According to Dollard and Miller's (1939, 1950) theory of
learning, the individual is ―instigated‖ toward a behavior, which is some antecedent
condition of which the predicted response is the consequences. For a serial killer,
frustration gets in the way of an instigated goal and their built up aggression must be
released. Their behavior is seen as a delayed and indirect release of aggression. They
are unable to release their aggression on their source of frustration and are forced to
choose more vulnerable individuals to act on (Singer and Hensley, 2004). The child
learns to expect humiliation or a negative situation from the past, which then causes
frustration or aggression. Jerome Henry Brudos felt he was never accepted by his
mother. Brudos transferred his hatred for his mother to other women through his
mutilation of their bodies. For Brudos, the murder of strange women served as a
catharsis for the humiliation he endured through his mother's rejection (Hale, 1993).
In all of these instances the serial killer was presented with some form of humiliation
as a child, and learned to vent their anger through aggression.
The applications of social learning theory have been important in the history of
education policies in the United States. The zone of proximal development is used as
a basis for early intervention programs such as Head Start. Social learning theory can
also be seen in the TV and movie rating system that is used in the United States. The
rating system is designed to let all parents know what the programs that their
children are watching contain. The ratings are based on age appropriate material to
help parents decide if certain content is appropriate for their child to watch. Some
content may be harmful to children who do not have the cognitive ability to process
certain content; however the child may model the behaviors seen on TV.
Guided participation is seen in schools across the United States and all around the
world in language classes when the teacher says a phrase and asks the class to repeat
the phrase. The other part to guided participation is when the student goes home and
practices on their own. Guided participation is also seen with parents who are trying
to teach their own children how to speak.
Portraitising is another technique that is used widely across the United States. Most
academic subjects take advantage of portraitising , however mathematics is one of
the best examples. As students move through their education they learn skills in
mathematics that they will build on throughout their scholastic careers. A student
who has never taken a basic math class and does not understand the principles of
addition and subtraction will not be able to understand algebra. The process of
learning math is a portraitising technique because the knowledge builds on itself over
time.
Bandura‘s Social Learning Theory posits that people learn from one another, via
observation, imitation, and modeling. The theory has often been called a bridge
between behaviorist and cognitive learning theories because it encompasses
attention, memory, and motivation.
Bandura believed in ―reciprocal determinism‖, that is, the world and a person‘s
behavior cause each other, while behaviorism essentially states that one‘s
environment causes one‘s behavior, Bandura, who was studying adolescent
aggression, found this too simplistic, and so in addition he suggested that behavior
causes environment as well. Later, Bandura soon considered personality as an
interaction between three components: the environment, behavior, and one‘s
psychological processes (one‘s ability to entertain images in minds and language).
Social learning theory has sometimes been called a bridge between behaviorist and
cognitive learning theories because it encompasses attention, memory, and
motivation. The theory is related to Vygotsky‘s Social Development Theory and Lave‘s
Situated Learning, which also emphasize the importance of social learning.
Social learning theory focuses on the learning that occurs within a social context. It
considers that people learn from one another, including such concepts as
observational learning, imitation, and modeling. Among others Albert Bandura is
considered the leading proponent of this theory.
2. Learning can occur without a change in behavior. Behaviorists say that learning has
to be represented by a permanent change in behavior, in contrast social learning
theorists say that because people can learn through observation alone, their learning
may not necessarily be shown in their performance. Learning may or may not result in
a behavior change.
3. Cognition plays a role in learning. Over the last 30 years social learning theory has
become increasingly cognitive in its interpretation of human learning. Awareness and
expectations of future reinforcements or punishments can have a major effect on the
behaviors that people exhibit.
People are often reinforced for modeling the behavior of others. Bandura suggested
that the environment also reinforces modeling. This is in several possible ways:
1, The observer is reinforced by the model. For example a student who changes dress
to fit in with a certain group of students has a strong likelihood of being accepted and
thus reinforced by that group.
2. The observer is reinforced by a third person. The observer might be modeling the
actions of someone else, for example, an outstanding class leader or student. The
teacher notices this and compliments and praises the observer for modeling such
behavior thus reinforcing that behavior.
3. The imitated behavior itself leads to reinforcing consequences. Many behaviors that
we learn from others produce satisfying or reinforcing results. For example, a student
in my multimedia class could observe how the extra work a classmate does is fun. This
student in turn would do the same extra work and also receive enjoyment.
Social learning theory has cognitive factors as well as behaviorist factors (actually
operant factors).
4. Reciprocal causation: Bandura proposed that behavior can influence both the
environment and the person. In fact each of these three variables, the person, the
behavior, and the environment can have an influence on each other.
5. Modeling: There are different types of models. There is the live model, and actual
person demonstrating the behavior. There can also be a symbolic model, which can be
a person or action portrayed in some other medium, , such as television, videotape,
computer programs.
Many behaviors can be learned, at least partly, through modeling. Examples that can
be cited are, students can watch parents read, students can watch the
demonstrations of mathematics problems, or seen someone acting bravely and a
fearful situation. Aggression can be learned through models. Much research indicate
Bandura mentions four conditions that are necessary before an individual can
successfully model the behavior of someone else:
2. Retention: the observer must be able to remember the behavior that has been
observed. One way of increasing this is using the technique of rehearsal.
3. Motor reproduction: the third condition is the ability to replicate the behavior that
the model has just demonstrated. This means that the observer has to be able to
replicate the action, which could be a problem with a learner who is not ready
developmentally to replicate the action. For example, little children have difficulty
doing complex physical motion.
Self efficacy:
People are more likely to engage in certain behaviors when they believe they are
capable of executing those behaviors successfully. This means that they will have high
self-efficacy. In layman's terms self-efficacy could be looked as self confidence
towards learning.
Joy of activities: individuals typically choose activities they feel they will be
successful in doing.
Learning and achievement: students with high self-efficacy tend to be better students
and achieve more.
In general students typically have a good sense of what they can and cannot do,
therefore they have fairly accurate opinions about their own self-efficacy. In my
multimedia program, the challenge is to increase student self-efficacy. There are
many factors which affect self efficacy. Some of these factors can be; previous
successes and failures, messages received from others, and successes and failures of
others. Note example of ACS and Cliff & Vanessa.
Self regulation:
Self instructions:
Cognitive modeling
Overt external guidance
Overt self guidance
Faded, overt self guidance
covert self instruction
These are two ways that people can control their own behavior. First they monitor
and observe their own behavior, sometimes even scoring behavior. Secondly, people
are also able to change their behavior by reinforcing themselves, by giving are
withholding reinforcement.
4. Teachers and parents must model appropriate behaviors and take care that they do
not model inappropriate behaviors.
6. Students must believe that they are capable of accomplishing school tasks. Thus it
is very important to develop a sense of self-efficacy for students. Teachers can
promote such self-efficacy by having students receive confidence-building messages,
watch others be successful, and experience success on their own. .
7. Teachers should help students set realistic expectations for their academic
accomplishments. In general in my class that means making sure that expectations are
not set too low. I want to realistically challenge my students. However, sometimes
the task is beyond a student's ability, example would be the cancer group.
Theory
Functionalist thought, from Comte onwards, has looked particularly towards biology
as the science providing the closest and most compatible model for social science.
Biology has been taken to provide a guide to conceptualizing the structure and the
function of social systems and to analyzing processes of evolution via mechanisms of
adaptation ... functionalism strongly emphasizes the pre-eminence of the social world
over its individual parts (i.e. its constituent actors, human subjects).
Whilst one may regard functionalism as a logical extension of the organic analogies for
society presented by political philosophers such as Rousseau, sociology draws firmer
attention to those institutions unique to industrialized capitalist society (or
modernity). Functionalism also has an anthropological basis in the work of theorists
such as Marcel Mauss, Bronisław Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. It is in Radcliffe-
Brown's specific usage that the prefix 'structural' emerged.[5]
These views were upheld by Radcliffe-Brown, who, following Comte, believed that
society constitutes a separate "level" of reality, distinct from both biological and
inorganic matter. Explanations of social phenomena had therefore to be constructed
within this level, individuals being merely transient occupants of comparatively stable
social roles. The central concern of structural functionalism is a continuation of the
Durkheimian task of explaining the apparent stability and internal cohesion needed by
societies to endure over time. Societies are seen as coherent, bounded and
fundamentally relational constructs that function like organisms, with their various
parts (or social institutions) working together in an unconscious, quasi-automatic
fashion toward achieving an overall social equilibrium. All social and cultural
phenomena are therefore seen as functional in the sense of working together, and are
effectively deemed to have "lives" of their own. They are primarily analyzed in terms
of this function. The individual is significant not in and of himself but rather in terms
of his status, his position in patterns of social relations, and the behaviours associated
with his status. The social structure, then, is the network of statuses connected by
associated roles.
Prominent Theorists
Herbert Spencer, a British philosopher famous for applying the theory of natural
selection to society, was in many ways the first true sociological functionalist;[7] in
fact, while Durkheim is widely considered the most important functionalist among
positivist theorists, it is well known that much of his analysis was culled from reading
Spencer's work, especially his Principles of Sociology (1874-96).
While most avoid the tedious tasks of reading Spencer's massive volumes (filled as
they are with long passages explicating the organic analogy, with reference to cells,
simple organisms, animals, humans and society), there are some important insights
that have quietly influenced many contemporary theorists, including Talcott Parsons,
in his early work "The Structure of Social Action" (1937), Cultural anthropology, too,
uses functionalism consistently.
This evolutionary model, unlike most 19th century evolutionary theories, is cyclical,
beginning with the differentiation and increasing complication of an organic or "super-
organic" (Spencer's term for a social system) body, followed by a fluctuating state of
equilibrium and disequilibrium] (or a state of adjustment and adaptation), and,
finally, a stage of disintegration or dissolution. Following Thomas Malthus' population
Every solution, however, causes a new set of selection pressures that threaten
society's viability. It should be noted that Spencer was not a determinist in the sense
that he never said that
In fact, he was in many ways a political sociologist, and recognised that the degree of
centralised and consolidated authority in a given polity could make or break its ability
to adapt. In other words, he saw a general trend towards the centralisation of power
as leading to stagnation and, ultimately, pressure to decentralise.
Initially, in tribal societies, these three needs are inseparable, and the kinship system
is the dominant structure that satisfies them. As many scholars have noted, all
institutions are subsumed under kinship organisation, but, with increasing population
(both in terms of sheer numbers and density), problems emerge with regards to
feeding individuals, creating new forms of organisation — consider the emergent
division of labour —, coordinating and controlling various differentiated social units,
and developing systems of resource distribution.
Talcott Parsons was heavily influenced by Durkheim and Max Weber, synthesising
much of their work into his action theory, which he based on the system-theoretical
concept and the methodological principle of voluntary action. He held that "the social
system is made up of the actions of individuals. His starting point, accordingly, is the
interaction between two individuals faced with a variety of choices about how they
might act, choices that are influenced and constrained by a number of physical and
social factors.
Parsons determined that each individual has expectations of the other's action and
reaction to his own behavior, and that these expectations would (if successful) be
"derived" from the accepted norms and values of the society they inhabit. As Parsons
himself emphasised, however, in a general context there would never exist any
perfect "fit" between behaviours and norms, so such a relation is never complete or
"perfect."
Social norms were always problematic for Parsons, who never claimed (as has often
been alleged) that social norms were generally accepted and agreed upon, should this
prevent some kind of universal law. Whether social norms were accepted or not was
for Parsons simply a historical question.
Furthermore, one person can and does fulfill many different roles at the same time.
In one sense, an individual can be seen to be a "composition" of the roles he inhabits.
Certainly, today, when asked to describe themselves, most people would answer with
reference to their societal roles.
Parsons later developed the idea of roles into collectivities of roles that complement
each other in fulfilling functions for society. Some roles are bound up in institutions
and social structures (economic, educational, legal and even gender-based). These
are functional in the sense that they assist society in operating and fulfill its
functional needs so that society runs smoothly.
A society where there is no conflict, where everyone knows what is expected of him,
and where these expectations are consistently met, is in a perfect state of
equilibrium. The key processes for Parsons in attaining this equilibrium are
socialisation and social control. Socialisation is important because it is the mechanism
for transferring the accepted norms and values of society to the individuals within the
Parson states that "this point [...] is independent of the sense in which [the]
individual is concretely autonomous or creative rather than 'passive' or 'conforming',
for individuality and reativity, are to a considerable extent, phenomena of the
institutionalization of expectations"; they are culturally constructed.
Parsons recognises this, stating that he treats "the structure of the system as
problematic and subject to change," and that his concept of the tendency towards
equilibrium "does not imply the empirical dominance of stability over change." He
does, however, believe that these changes occur in a relatively smooth way.
Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore (1945) gave an argument for social stratification
based on the idea of "functional necessity" (also known as the Davis-Moore
hypothesis). They argue that the most difficult jobs in any society have the highest
incomes in order to motivate individuals to fill the roles needed by the division of
labour. Thus inequality serves social stability.
This argument has been criticized as fallacious from a number of different angles: the
argument is both that the individuals who are the most deserving are the highest
rewarded, and that a system of unequal rewards is necessary, otherwise no
individuals would perform as needed for the society to function. The problem is that
these rewards are supposed to be based upon objective merit, rather than subjective
"motivations." The argument also does not clearly establish why some positions are
worth more than others, which they may benefit more people in society, e.g.,
teachers compared to athletes and movie stars. Critics have suggested that structural
inequality (inherited wealth, family power, etc.) is itself a cause of individual success
or failure, not a consequence of it.
Merton criticised functional unity, saying that not all parts of a modern, complex
society work for the functional unity of society. Some institutions and structures may
have other functions, and some may even be generally dysfunctional, or be functional
for some while being dysfunctional for others. This is because not all structures are
functional for society as a whole. Some practices are only functional for a dominant
individual or a group [Holmwood, 2005:91]. Here Merton introduces the concepts of
power and coercion into functionalism and identifies the sites of tension which may
lead to struggle or conflict. Merton states that by recognizing and examining the
dysfunctional aspects of society we can explain the development and persistence of
alternatives. Thus, as Holmwood states, ―Merton explicitly made power and conflict
central issues for research within a functionalist paradigm‖ [2005:91].
Merton also noted that there may be functional alternatives to the institutions and
structures currently fulfilling the functions of society. This means that the institutions
that currently exist are not indispensable to society. Merton states that ―just as the
same item may have multiple functions, so may the same function be diversely
fulfilled by alternative items‖ [cited in Holmwood, 2005:91]. This notion of functional
alternatives is important because it reduces the tendency of functionalism to imply
approval of the status quo.
Conformity occurs when an individual has the means and desire to achieve the
cultural goals socialised into him.
Innovation occurs when an individual strives to attain the accepted cultural
goals but chooses to do so in novel or unaccepted method.
Ritualism occurs when an individual continues to do things as proscribed by
society but forfeits the achievement of the goals.
Retreatism is the rejection of both the means and the goals of society.
Thus it can be seen that change can occur internally in society through either
innovation or rebellion. It is true that society will attempt to control these individuals
and negate the changes, but as the innovation or rebellion builds momentum, society
will eventually adapt or face dissolution.
In the 1970s, political scientists Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell introduced a
structural-functionalist approach to comparing political systems. They argued that, in
order to understand a political system, it is necessary to understand not only its
institutions (or structures) but also their respective functions. They also insisted that
these institutions, to be properly understood, must be placed in a meaningful and
dynamic historical context.
In addition to structures, Almond and Powell showed that a political system consists
of various functions, chief among them political socialisation, recruitment and
communication: socialisation refers to the way in which societies pass along their
values and beliefs to succeeding generations, and in political terms describes the
process by which a society inculcates civic virtues, or the habits of effective
citizenship; recruitment denotes the process by which a political system generates
interest, engagement and participation from citizens; and communication refers to
the way that a system promulgates its values and information.
In their attempt to explain the social stability of African "primitive" stateless societies
where they undertook their fieldwork, Evans-Pritchard (1940) and Meyer Fortes (1945)
argued that the Tallensi and the Nuer were primarily organised around unilineal
descent groups. Such groups are characterised by common purposes, such as
administering property or defending against attacks; they form a permanent social
structure that persists well beyond the lifespan of their members. In the case of the
Tallensi and the Nuer, these corporate groups were based on kinship which in turn
fitted into the larger structures of unilineal descent; consequently Evans-Pritchard's
and Fortes' model is called "descent theory". Moreover, in this African context
territorial divisions were aligned with lineages; descent theory therefore synthesised
both blood and soil as two sides of one coin (cf. Kuper, 1988:195). Affinal ties with
the parent through whom descent is not reckoned, however, are considered to be
merely complementary or secondary (Fortes created the concept of "complementary
filiation"), with the reckoning of kinship through descent being considered the primary
organising force of social systems. Because of its strong emphasis on unilineal
descent, this new kinship theory came to be called "descent theory".
Before long, descent theory had found its critics. Many African tribal societies seemed
to fit this neat model rather well, although Africanists, such as Richards, also argued
that Fortes and Evans-Pritchard had deliberately downplayed internal contradictions
and overemphasised the stability of the local lineage systems and their significance
for the organisation of society. However, in many Asian settings the problems were
even more obvious. In Papua New Guinea, the local patrilineal descent groups were
fragmented and contained large amounts of non-agnates. Status distinctions did not
depend on descent, and genealogies were too short to account for social solidarity
through identification with a common ancestor. In particular, the phenomenon of
cognatic (or bilateral) kinship posed a serious problem to the proposition that descent
groups are the primary element behind the social structures of "primitive" societies.
Leach's (1966) critique came in the form of the classical Malinowskian argument,
pointing out that "in Evans-Pritchard's studies of the Nuer and also in Fortes's studies
of the Tallensi unilineal descent turns out to be largely an ideal concept to which the
empirical facts are only adapted by means of fictions." (1966:8). People's self-
interest, manoeuvring, manipulation and competition had been ignored. Moreover,
descent theory neglected the significance of marriage and affinal ties, which were
emphasised by Levi-Strauss' structural anthropology, at the expense of
overemphasising the role of descent. To quote Leach: "The evident importance
attached to matrilateral and affinal kinship connections is not so much explained as
explained away."
Decline of functionalism
Structural functionalism reached the peak of its influence in the 1940s and 1950s, and
by the 1960s was in rapid decline. By the 1980s, its place was taken in Europe by
As the influence of both functionalism and Marxism in the 1960s began to wane, the
linguistic and cultural turns led to myriad new movements in the social sciences:
"According to Giddens, the orthodox consensus terminated in the late 1960s and 1970s
as the middle ground shared by otherwise competing perspectives gave way and was
replaced by a baffling variety of competing perspectives. This third 'generation' of
social theory includes phenomenologically inspired approaches, critical theory,
ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism, structuralism, post-structuralism, and
theories written in the tradition of hermeneutics and ordinary language philosophy."
Criticisms
In the 1960s, functionalism was criticized for being unable to account for social
change, or for structural contradictions and conflict (and thus was often called
"consensus theory"). The refutation of the second criticism of functionalism, that it is
static and has no concept of change, has already been articulated above, concluding
that while Parsons‘ theory allows for change, it is an orderly process of change
[Parsons, 1961:38], a moving equilibrium. Therefore referring to Parsons‘ theory of
society as static is inaccurate. It is true that it does place emphasis on equilibrium
and the maintenance or quick return to social order, but this is a product of the time
in which Parsons was writing (post-World War II, and the start of the cold war).
Society was in upheaval and fear abounded. At the time social order was crucial, and
this is reflected in Parsons' tendency to promote equilibrium and social order rather
than social change.
Another criticism describes the ontological argument that society can not have
"needs" as a human being does, and even if society does have needs they need not be
met. Anthony Giddens argues that functionalist explanations may all be rewritten as
historical accounts of individual human actions and consequences (see Structuration
theory).
Marxism which was revived soon after the emergence of conflict theory, criticised
professional sociology (functionalism and conflict theory alike) for being partisan to
advanced welfare capitalism [Holmwood, 2005:103]. Gouldner [in Holmwood,
2005:103] thought that Parsons‘ theory specifically was an expression of the dominant
interests of welfare capitalism, that it justified institutions with reference to the
function they fulfill for society. It may be that Parsons‘ work implied or articulated
that certain institutions were necessary to fulfill the functional prerequisites of
society, but whether or not this is the case, Merton explicitly states that institutions
are not indispensable and that there are functional alternatives. That he does not
identify any alternatives to the current institutions does reflect a conservative bias,
which as has been stated before is a product of the specific time that he was writing
in.
Jeffrey Alexander (1985) sees functionalism as a broad school rather than a specific
method or system, such as Parson's, which is capable of taking equilibrium (stability)
as a reference-point rather than assumption and treats structural differentiation as a
major form of social change. "The name 'functionalism' implies a difference of method
CONFLICT THEORY
Conflict theories are perspectives in social science which emphasize the social,
political or material inequality of a social group, which critique the broad socio-
political system, or which otherwise detract from structural functionalism and
ideological conservativism. Conflict theories draw attention to power differentials,
such as class conflict, and generally contrast historically dominant ideologies.
Certain conflict theories set out to highlight the ideological aspects inherent in
traditional thought. Whilst many of these perspectives hold parallels, conflict theory
does not refer to a unified school of thought, and should not be confused with, for
instance, peace and conflict studies, or any other specific theory of social conflict.
In classical sociology
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman
and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a
word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried
on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended,
either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of
the contending classes.
Two early conflict theorists were the Polish-Austrian sociologist and political theorist
Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838-1909) and the American sociologist and paleontologist
Lester F. Ward (1841-1913). Although Ward and Gumplowicz developed their theories
independently they had much in common and approached conflict from a
comprehensive anthropological and evolutionary point-of-view as opposed to Marx's
rather exclusive focus on economic factors.
What happened in India, Babylon, Egypt, Greece and Rome may sometime happen in
modern Europe. European civilization may perish, over flooded by barbaric tribes. But
if any one believes that we are safe from such catastrophes he is perhaps yielding to
an all too optimistic delusion. There are no barbaric tribes in our neighborhood to be
sure — but let no one be deceived, their instincts lie latent in the populace of
European states.
Ward directly attacked and attempted to systematically refute the elite business
class's lassiez faire philosophy as espoused by the hugely popular social philosopher
Herbert Spencer. Ward's "Dynamic Sociology" (1883) was an extended thesis on how to
reduce conflict and competition in society and thus optimize human progress. At the
most basic level Ward saw human nature itself to be deeply conflicted between self-
aggrandizement and altruism, between emotion and intellect, and between male and
female. These conflicts would be then reflected in society and Ward assumed there
had been a "perpetual and vigorous struggle" among various "social forces" that shaped
civilization. Ward was more optimistic than Marx and Gumplowicz and believed that it
was possible to build on and reform present social structures with the help
sociological analysis.
Weber's (1864-1920) approach to conflict is contrasted with that of Marx. While Marx
focused on the way individual behavior is conditioned by social structure, Weber
emphasized the importance of "social action," i.e., the ability of individuals to affect
their social relationships.
Modern approaches
C. Wright Mills has been called the founder of modern conflict theory. In Mills's view,
social structures are created through conflict between people with differing interests
and resources. Individuals and resources, in turn, are influenced by these structures
and by the "unequal distribution of power and resources in the society." The power
elite of American society, (i.e., the military-industrial complex) had "emerged from
the fusion of the corporate elite, the Pentagon, and the executive branch of
government." Mills argued that the interests of this elite were opposed to those of the
people. He theorized that the policies of the power elite would result in "increased
Gene Sharp (born 21 January 1928) is a Professor Emeritus of political science at the
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth and Nobel Peace Prize nominee. He is known
for his extensive writings on nonviolent struggle, which have influenced numerous
anti-government resistance movements around the world. In 1983 he founded the
Albert Einstein Institution, a non-profit organization devoted to studies and promotion
of the use of nonviolent action in conflicts worldwide. Sharp's key theme is that power
is not monolithic; that is, it does not derive from some intrinsic quality of those who
are in power. For Sharp, political power, the power of any state - regardless of its
particular structural organization - ultimately derives from the subjects of the state.
His fundamental belief is that any power structure relies upon the subjects' obedience
to the orders of the ruler(s). If subjects do not obey, leaders have no power. Sharp
has been called both the "Machiavelli of nonviolence" and the "Clausewitz of
nonviolent warfare." Sharp's scholarship has influenced resistance organizations
around the world. Most recently the protest movement that toppled President
Mubarak of Egypt drew extensively on his ideas, as well as the youth movement in
Tunisia and the earlier ones in the Eastern European color revolutions that had
previously been inspired by Sharp's work. The Albert Einstein Institution's web site
offers many of Gene Sharp works for download, in English and in over sixty
translations.
Societies are defined by inequality that produces conflict, rather than which
produces order and consensus. This conflict based on inequality can only be
overcome through a fundamental transformation of the existing relations in the
society, and is productive of new social relations.
The disadvantaged have structural interests that run counter to the status quo,
which, once they are assumed, will lead to social change. Thus, they are
viewed as agents of change rather than objects one should feel sympathy for.
The State serves the particular interests of the most powerful while claiming to
represent the interests of all. Representation of disadvantaged groups in State
processes may cultivate the notion of full participation, but this is an
illusion/ideology.
Although Sears associates the conflict theory approach with Marxism, he argues that it
is the foundation for much "feminist, post-modernist, anti-racist, and lesbian-gay
liberationist theories.
Sociologists working in this tradition have researched a wide range of topics using a
variety of research methods. However, the majority of interactionist research uses
qualitative research methods, like participant observation, to study aspects of (1)
social interaction and/or (2) individuals' selves. Participant observation allows
researchers to access symbols and meanings, as in Howard S. Becker's Art Worlds
(1982) and Arlie Hochschild's The Managed Heart (1983). Sociological areas that have
been particularly influenced by symbolic interactionism include the sociology of
emotions, deviance/criminology, collective behavior/social movements, and the
sociology of sex. Interactionist concepts that have gained widespread usage include
definition of the situation, emotion work, impression management, looking glass self,
and total institution. Semiology is connected to this discipline, but unlike those
The symbolic interaction perspective is based on how humans develop a complex set
of symbols to give meaning to the world (LaRossa & Reitzes, 1993). Meaning evolves
from their interactions in their environment and with people. These interactions are
subjectively interpreted through existing symbols. Understanding these symbols is
important in understanding human behavior. Interactions with larger societal
processes influence the individual, and vice-versa. It is through interaction that
humans develop a concept of larger social structures and also of self concept. Society
affects behavior through constraints by societal norms and values. Self concept also
affects behavior. Symbolic interactionism‘s unique contributions to family studies are
Symbolic interactionism is the way we learn to interpret and give meaning to the
world though our interactions with others.
Individuals are not born with a sense of self but develop self concepts through social
interaction. Self concept is developed through the process of interaction and
communication with others. Self concept is shaped by the reactions of significant
others and by our perceptions of their reactions. Self concept, once developed,
provides an important motive for behavior. Self fulfilling prophecy is the tendency for
our expectations, and/or other‘s expectations of us to evoke expected responses.
Humans interact and develop roles in the family according to symbols used to describe
the family. These roles are based on the symbolic meaning attached to each role.
How family members react to a situation is determined by how they interpret the
situation. So, it is important to understand the symbols the family uses to understand
their interactions and behaviors.
2. The meaning attributed to those things arises out of social interaction with
others
We are not born knowing the meanings of things
“I”
o An individual‘s self-conception
o The subjective self
“Me” - The “Generalized Other”
o the generalized, perceived view that others have of the individual
Self-concept
The image we have of who and what we are (formed in childhood by how significant
others treat/respond to us). The self-concept is not fixed and unchanging – if in
childhood your teachers tell you you‘re stupid, but later in life your teachers and
friends begin to treat you as if you‘re very bright, your self-concept is likely to
change.
Self-fulfilling prophecy
The tendency for our expectations to evoke responses in others that confirm what we
originally anticipated. Each one of us affects how others view themselves. Our
expectations evoke responses that confirm what we originally anticipated.
Phenomenon: The way I choose to see the world creates the world I see.
Significant symbol
1. A word or gesture that has a common meaning to an individual and others;
Social Act
Behavior that in some way takes into account the ―other‖ person, group or social
organization, and is guided by what they do. It emerges through the process of
communication and interaction.
Symbol manipulation
The means through which we motivate others to action through the use of symbols
b) Economics.
Seeks to analyze and describe the production and distribution of goods and services. It
deals with how man distributes the scarce resource in the society. They are related in
that it shows how man allocates scarce resource interns of distribution affects human
behaviuor in the society.
REVISION QUESTION
1. Define the meaning of sociology
2. Trace the origin and development of sociology as a discipline.
3. Explain the scope of sociology
4. Distinguish sociology from other social science.
5. Acquire general knowledge of sociological theories.
Society
Society refers to a totally of human grouping i.e. independent , large and having
its own culture and line between physical bound group which give them
identification for example in the society.
Culture
Culture is the totally of land, socially transmitted. It includes the ideas, values and
customs of groups of people. It simplifies much today interaction.
Components of culture
They are also known as elements of culture of a society and they include;
i) social norms
iii) values
Are collective conceptions of what is considered good, desirable and proper. They
indicate what people in a given culture prepare as well as what the final important
and morally right or wrong.
Value influence people behaviour and measure of evaluating the action of others. It is
a from value attached to something in culture that laws are derived for example
value of private property given meaning for every society.
iv) symbols
It refers to anything that cause a particular meaning recognized by people who share
culture. Every symbol has a given meaning for every society.
v) customs
Are socially transmitted norms regarded by a given group of people who share a given
belief. It is regarded as a social life in that no body would want to face the sanctions
with its violation.
vii) moves
Are taboos governing group behaviour and action. They serve to restrain individuals
from act and behaviour considered to be improper by those members for fear of
meeting social sanctions by group members i.e. cursor of member from society.
Concept of Cultural
Cultural assimilation
Cultural assimilation
Is the exchange of cultural features that result when a group comes into continuous
first hand. The origin cultural patterns of either both groups remain distinct.
Cultural shock
It refers to the anxiety feeling (surprise, uncertainty and confusion) feel people have
when they enter into a different culture or social environment such as foreign
country.
Cultural relativism
It‘s the principle that an individual human belief and activities should be understood
in terms of his or her own culture.
Cultural continuity
Can be defined as the absence of social change i.e. things remain the same because
social change is a continuous process in all society, however when society, their
structure which are inherently resistance to change and in this sense we talk about
them being social continuity.
SOCIALIZATION
Is a complex, lifelong process. The socialization is a process of social interaction by
which people acquire the knowledge, attitude values and behavior essential for
effective participation in society. It‘s a process of becoming a social being, a process
that is continuous throughout ones life. The cases of children reared under condition
of extreme isolation illustrate importance of socialization.
THEORIES OF SOCIALIZATION
While the social scientist acknowledges that are biological organism, biological factors
have not been fully integrated into psychological theory. The theories of socialization
emphasized in sociology today continue to emphasize social structures, learning and
social interaction.
Conditional learning
Observational learning
Through observation, people may learn both a certain mode of behavior and that of
behaviour and that of behavior may elicit certain rewards or punishment. Bandura
(1965) observational learning also referred to as modeling or imitation occurs hen
people reproduce the response they observe in other people either real or fictional.
Agents of socialization
Every social experience, we have affects us in at least a small way, however, several
familiar setting have special importance in the specialization process. These include;
- The family.
- Peer group
- School
i) the family
The family has the greatest impact o socialization, infants totally dependent on
others and the responsibility totally falls on parents and other family member to
socialize the young ones teaching skills and values, beliefs.
REVISION QUESTIONS
1. Describe how the society can be studied scientifically.
2. Define the concept of culture
3. Identify the various element of culture
4. Explain how culture is passed from one generation to another.
5. Explain the concept of socialization
6. State the function of socialization
7. Identify the various agents of socialization
8. Explain how individual behavior is controlled in the society.
CHAPTER THREE
SOCIAL INTERACTION
Specific objectives
At the end of this topic, the trainee should be able to;
a) define social interaction
b) describe the role of the family in social interaction
c) appropriate and relate to various ethnic and kinship groups in the
processes of interaction
d) Identify social institution and their functions.
INTRODUCTION
The family
Functions of a family
ii) socialization
The family is the first and most important setting for child rearing. It continues
throughout the life cycle
iv) social
Legitimate birth into a family gives the individual a stable place in the society
children inherit from their parents not only the maternal goods but also social status .
they belong to the same race , ethnicity religion and social class.
Types of family
Extended family
It is a family unit that includes parents, children as well as other kin.
Nuclear family
This is a family unit composed of one or two parents and their children. It is also
called conjugal family meaning it‘s based on marriage.
Marriage
Is a sanctioned relationship usually involving economic operation as well as sexual
activity and child bearing that people expect to be enduring.
Marital roles
It refers to duties and responsibilities that one undertakes in the marriage that is role
of husband and wife in marriage.
Descent
This is a system by which members of a society traces kinship over generations. Lower
income countries trace kinship through the father and mother side of the family.
Forms of descent
i) Patrilineal descent.
This is a form of descent that traces kinship through the males so that property flows
room father to son.
i) Primary group
Is a small group whose member share personal and enduring relationship? In this
group people spend a great deal of time together engaging in a wide range of
activities and they know one another pretty well. Members of primary group help
one another in many ways, but they generally think of their group as and end in its
self rather than as a means of other ends.
REVISION QUESTIONS
1. define social interaction
2. describe the role of the family in social interaction
3. Discuss the appropriate and relate to various ethnic and kinship groups in
the processes of interaction
4. Identify social institution and their functions.
CHAPTER FOUR
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION
Specific objectives
By the end of this topic, the trainee should be able to;
1. define social structure and organization
2. identify various types of social organization
3. discuss the functions of social organization
4. define social satisfaction
5. explain social stratification
6. explain the functions of social stratification
7. explain the concept mobility
8. Identify various types of social mobility.
INTRODUCTION
Social Organization
Social organization is a state of being or condition in a society in when various
institution function in accordance with implied purpose.
It is characterized by different elements in the society such as family, politics, and
religion economics among others. It is the interdependence of social institution groups
and society that assist to achieve social order and stability in the society.
They are governed by norms, values and beliefs. They have subgroup within large
units for example institution such as political, economic and religion which have
subgroup in the society.
Social structure
It‘s a pattern of social relation that arises from people roles and status when people
interact. The pattern of social relation that emerge reflects to a larger extent their
social status and roles.
Social status
This is the social position that an individual holds in a group or social ranking of a
group when compared to other groups.
An individual status dictates the rights and privileges to which the person is entitled.
It is usually based income, prestige, education.
Ascribed status
It is acquired by an individual at birth through wealth, religion, race, age, social
studying. This form of status is attained by who you are rather than what you have
done. An example is the son of president. He enjoys privileges not because he has
done something that makes him enjoy but because he is from royal family.
Achieved status
This is mainly acquired because of what you have done through your own efforts or
choice. For example the student who works hard and completes the necessary further
studies or experience to attain a desired position is said to be his / her way to achieve
specific status position in the society like being a lawyer, doctor, pilot, teacher or
even an accountant. Another example is a poor man in a village assisting people and
later being rewarded as an area member of parliament. His status will have been
achieved through is hard work.
Social role
Social role is the behavior or appropriate to a given status, that is the part one played
patterns of behavior rights and duties e.g. the person notifying the role of a mother
should show love and commitment to the duties of a house while at the same time
should expect obedience and cooperation from their children and spouse.
Social stratification
AC Ogburn & Nimkoft view social stratification as the process by which individuals and
group are ranked into more as less enduring of status.
Is the diffusion of population into two or more layers of which is relatively
homogenous and between which are different in privileges restriction reward and
obligation. It demonstrates ranking order in a society often demonstrates social
inequality.
Researches generally agree that the population of any society or country can be
divided into upper class, lower, middle class, working class.
Education
Social mobility
Is the ability of persons to move upward or down ward within social classes that exist
in the society.
i) vertical mobility
refers to changes in status of an individual as he/ she moves up or down the social
ladder e.g the manager of the department in a supper market has achieved upward
mobility.
The mobility is accompanied by an increase in income overall responsibility. On the
other hand an headmaster of a certain school who is demoted to ordinary teacher
faces downward vertical mobility.
After college graduation the 5th child enters cooperative of a higher level and after
there years, he is promoted to a top management position while he has attained
upward mobility, his brother and sister have remained at the same social – economic
level.
Positive factors
- Division of labour. People are employed based on their skills and expertise.
- Marriage. One can be married to a rich family hence moved from lower class to
high class.
- Family background. It is seen in terms of inheritance. Those from rich families
will acquire available resource hence upward mobility.
- Different fertility rate. Seen in terms of children people have. People with
more children are seen to be senior and those with no children are seen to be
misfits in the society.
- Economic progress. The performance in the economy in terms of profitability.
If the economy is progressing, more people will be promoted and hence will be
employed hence social mobility.
Negative factors
- Gender discrimination
- Religious belief
- Class discrimination. Rich people discriminate the poor ones.
REVISION QUESTION
1. define social structure and organization
2. identify various types of social organization
3. discuss the functions of social organization
4. explain social stratification and explain the functions of social
stratification
5. Explain the concept mobility and identify various types of social
mobility.
INTRODUCTION
Social change ,
It refers to gradual transformation of individual group and behaviour of those groups
and behavior of that group in the society.
It comprises transformation of social belief norms attitude and values.
It is an inevitable phenomenon or situation in human societies because these human
societies are not static i.e. dynamic (change from time to time.)
THEORIES CHANGE
Conflict theory
- Karl max is usually tough as one of the greatest writer on social conflict.
- He saw conflict in economic terms based on struggle for scarce resources
between the rulings classing (bourecreoisie).
- The rule called (proletarian) is stressed that each group share common ethnic
status basing ground political value which conflict with either group.
- In most cases social change in conflict perspectives is marked by an equal
balance of groups such as ruling class the other one as the ruled class.
- The ruled class will continually seek gained recognition by the ruling class and
the leader of the ruling class will seek to denier that recognition and organize
activity which demonstrates that is delayed.
- The power situation between the ruling and ruled class may change as a result
of change in increase the possibility of society resistance or actual revolution
by the ruled class.
- These factors that can lead to social change are leadership, aspiration,
capacity of organization, their rule in spear heading their interest into the
ruling class.
Modernization Theory
- Is the recent theory which has been used to explain the disparity between
development of country in terms of wealth and political progress.
- It stress that the world is divided into major division i.e. traditional and
modern.
Critics
It neither does nor takes into account correction of social change from outside within
the society (internal) cause of social change.
REVISION QUESTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Problems in Kenya are multi-folded. There are social problems, economic problems,
health problems and education problems as well. These problems are interrelated.
Kenyans have problems in their social fields that are in most cases associated with
health problems as well. In this topic we are going to discus social problems which
include the following among others;
Poverty
Political problems
Unemployment
Drug abuse
POVERTY
Causes of poverty
1. Social causes
There are many social causes of poverty. For example disable people may not be able
to do activities likely to give them income. This will lead to poverty due to the
inability to work. This may result to borrowing as a means of sustaining their
livelihood.
2. Individual problems.
These are caused by individual perception about life in general. This may lead to
individual dropping out of school which may later result to poverty.
In some Kenyan communities, it is not easy for women to obtain formal employment
as men are favoured. This has contributed to a great poverty to women.
Discrimination by ethnicity also prevents people from marginalized communities from
access to the national resources. These leads to poverty among the marginalized
ethnic communities in that they lack infrastructure for economic development
Political problems
Lack of transparency in the management of resources on the country contribution to
political problems. The recent political problems in Kenya are the elections that took
place in 2007-2008.
The caused massive destructions among Kenyans. Many people were killed and
thousands were displaced becoming internally displaced people and the famous IDPs.
This has contributed to a lot of poverty especially among the displaced people and
those who lost the property including individuals whom they were depending for their
livelihood.
Unemployment
If the government does not provide job opportunities for its people, their living
condition or standards may not improve. This will lead to people moving to urban
areas looking for employment. Because of the little or lack of money, they end up
living in urban slums which is mainly characterized by a lot of poverty, people living
bellow a dollar by day. This may also lead to other social problems.
1. Leads to high crime rate. Poor individuals struggle to obtain basic needs such
as food by stealing or through corrupt deeds.
2. Leads to the increase suicide cases in Kenya. This is mainly because of the
hopelessness in the life of people.
UNEMPLOYMENT
Kenya is a country with many obstacles to overcome. Despite being the regional hub
for commerce, it‘s economic and health situations are dire. Unemployment is high
and life expectancy is low. The unemployment rate in Kenya was estimated as 40% as
of 2008. This is the same as of 2001 estimates. Economic process in Kenya has been
slow and plaque with corruption. The economy is also relevant on several goods
whose prices have remained low. Kenyans unemployment rate is 188th in the world.
There is a high rate of crimes in all regions in Kenya, particularly in Nairobi, Mombasa
and Kisumu. Car jacking is among the urban areas. Pickpockets‘ and thieves carry out
―snatch and run‖ crimes on the city. All these are caused by lack of employment and
young people are forced to look for other ways of country a living. It is very common
in urban poor and in rural areas is characterized by cattle rustling. It is a social
problem which needs attention from stalk holders.
DRUG ABUSE
Drug abuse has become a major social issue in Kenya especially in Mombasa is
affected by issue of drugs more than any other part of the country. Young in the early
20s have been affected by the drugs in demographic. Women in Mombasa have held
public protests, asking the government to more quickly to arrest young people using
narcotics.
In Mombasa and Kilindini, there are approximately 40 masking 9meaning places in
Kiswahili) where drug abusers meet to share drugs. Bhang smoking until recently has
been drug of choice, but heroin injection is becoming increasingly popular. 70% of the
drug abusers have been admitted that they are using heroine.
In addition and drug abuse, the trafficking of illegal drugs in the country has become
a major issue as well. An estimated 100 million dollars is trafficked within the
country each year.
Cattle raiding
The northern Kenya and eastern Uganda regions are very insecure. For a number of
years there have been a number of cattle raids going on, terrorizing the civilian
population and killing hundreds of people. This has affected the economy of those
regions and poor living conditions in such areas.
Violence against women and girls is one of the most widespread violations of human
rights. It includes physical, sexual, psychological and economical abuse and it cuts
across all boundaries of age, race, culture, wealth and geography. It takes place at
home, streets, schools, workplace, farm fields, during conflicts and crisis. It has
many manifestations from the most universally prevalent forms of domestic and
Child abuse
This is the physical, sexual, emotional mistreatment or neglect of children. It can also
be defined as the maltreatment or any act or series of commission or commission by
parents or care givers that results to harm potential for harm or threat of harm to a
child abuse in Kenya occurs in child‘s homes. With the smaller amount occurring in
the organization schools, or the community the child interacts with. In Kenya there
are four major categories of child abuse.
Neglect
Physical abuse
Psychological/emotional abuse`
Child sexual abuse.
REVISION QUESTION
1. Differentiate between personal and social problems
2. Identify and analyses the major social problems in Kenya
3. Describe the conformity and deviance