Cases

POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 221697
& 221698-700

THE PETITION:

The petition is composed of two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex
parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the following:

1.     DECEMBER 1, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS SECOND DIVISION (Cancelled petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy);

2.     DECEMBER 23, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

(Denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration); and

3.     DECEMBER 11, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC FIRST

DIVISION
(Declared that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete
the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed material
misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a
resident of the Philippines for a period of ten 10 years and 11 months as of the day
of the elections on 9 May 2016)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

September 3, Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-

1968 Llamanzares (petitioner) was found
abandoned as a newborn infant in the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar. Custody
over petitioner was passed on by
Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano
Militar and his wife.

September 6, Emiliano Militar reported and

1968  registered petitioner as a foundling
with the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo).

1973 When petitioner was five (5) years

old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan
 Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.)
and Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her
adoption with the Municipal Trial
Court
(MTC) of San Juan City.

May 13, 1974   The Poe spouses’ petition for

adoption was granted by the trial
court and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed from "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar" to
"Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."

December 13, Having reached the age of 18,

1986 petitioner registered as a voter with
the local COMELEC Office in San
Juan City.

April 4, 1988 Petitioner applied for and was issued

Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by
the Department of Foreign Affairs

1988-1991 Initially, the petitioner enrolled and

pursued a degree in Development
Studies at the University of the
Philippines but opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the U.S. in
1988.

Petitioner graduated in 1991 from

Boston College in Chestnuts Hill

July 27, 1991 Petitioner married Teodoro Misael

Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of
both the Philippines and the U.S., at
Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San
Juan City.

July 29, 1991 Desirous of being with her husband

who was then based in the U.S., the
couple flew back to the U.S.

April16, 1992 Petitioner gave birth to her eldest

child Brian Daniel

April 5, 1993 Renewed her Philippines passport.

May 19, 1998 Renewed her Philippines passport.

July 10, 1998 Petitioner gave birth to daughter
Hanna MacKenzie.

October 18, Petitioner became a naturalized

2001 American citizen

April 8, 2004 – Petitioner came back to the

July 8, 2004 Philippines together with Hanna to
support her father's candidacy for
President in the May 2004 elections.
It was during this time that she gave
birth to her youngest daughter Anika.

December 13, Petitioner rushed back to the

2004 – Philippines upon learning of her
February 3, father's deteriorating medical
2005 condition who died shortly.

2005 Petitioner and husband began

preparing for their resettlement
including notification of their
children's schools that they will be
transferring to Philippine schools

May 24, 2005 Petitioner came home to the

Philippines and without delay,
secured a Tax Identification Number
from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

March 2006 The petitioner's husband officially

informed the U.S. Postal Service of
the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the
U.S. petitioner and her husband
acquired a 509-square meter lot in
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where
they built their family home.

July 7, 2006 Petitioner took her Oath of

Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003.

July 18, 2006 The Bureau of Immigration acted

favorably on petitioner's petitions
and declared that she is deemed to
 have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship.

August 31, Again, petitioner registered as a voter

2006 of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan
City. She also secured from the DFA
a new Philippine Passport bearing
the No. XX4731999.

October 6, President Benigno S. Aquino III

2010 appointed petitioner as Chairperson
of the Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB).

October 20, Before assuming her post, petitioner

2010 executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and
Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in
Pasig City.

October 21, Petitioner submitted the said affidavit

2010 to the Bureau of Immigration and
took her oath of office as
Chairperson of the MTRCB. From
then on, petitioner stopped using her
American passport.

July 12, 2011 The petitioner executed before the

Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States" and stated that she in
the Philippines, from 3 September
1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May
2005 to present.

December 9, The U.S. Vice Consul issued to

2011 petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States"
effective 21 October 2010.

October 2, The petitioner filed with the

2012 COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the
2013 Elections wherein she answered
"6 years and 6 months" to the
question "Period of residence in the
 Philippines before May 13, 2013."

October 15, Petitioner filed her COC for the

2015 Presidency for the May 2016
Elections.

In her COC, the petitioner declared

that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines
up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months counted from 24 May
2005.

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the
filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these
consolidated cases.

ISSUES:

1.     With regard to: a) being a foundling, and b) her repatriation, is the petitioner a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines? YES TO BOTH.
2.     Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency requirement for running as
president? YES.
3. Did the petitioner commit material misrepresentation in her Certificate of
Candidacy? NO.

HELD:

1.    Is petitioner a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?

ON BEING A FOUNDLING:

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.

The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. 
That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents
and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are
unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:

Sec. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on
collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that
petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that
both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did
not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that
her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high
probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA) that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was
10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that
decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee.
Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact
that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.
She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair,
almond-shaped eyes and an oval face.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by

this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 15:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
right to change his nationality.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to
acquire a nationality:"

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just
because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these
foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright
discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the
statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a
natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a
denial of their birthright. There is no reason to sacrifice the fundamental political
rights of an entire class of human beings.
 While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.

ON PETITIONER’S REPATRIATION

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born
citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act,
what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine
citizenship."

According to the Supreme Court, the COMELEC's ruling disregarded consistent

jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, repatriation was explained as follows:

…Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-bom Filipino.

Also, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was

already rejected in Bengson vs. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified
to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof."

2.    Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency requirement for running as
president?

ON RESIDENCE

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have 10 years residence in the

Philippines before the day of the elections.

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May
2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail
correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company
to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds
to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring
how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing
enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax
identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and
parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations
issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in
the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-
mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final
statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their
U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the
U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident
since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of
petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the
condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming
that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in
2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to
sell the family home).

The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and coupled with her eventual

application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous
stay taken together, lead to no other conclusion that when she came here on May
24 2005, her intention was to permanently abandon the United States. Petitioner
also actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005.

ON MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six
( 6) years and six (6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her
2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a
Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC
automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC
as false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date

required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted
that COC in 2012.

Her explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence
before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the
COC, is strengthened by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the
2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day
before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did
not acknowledge that the first version was vague.

Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as
a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner.

CONCLUSION:
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions
emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9
May 2016 National Elections.

[ G.R. No. 213346, February 11, 2019 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MILLER

OMANDAM

UNABIA, RESPONDENT.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

1. On February 11,2009, respondent Miller Omandam Unabia filed before the

RTC Special Proceeding No. 2009-018, which is a "Petition for Correction
of Entries on the Birth Certificate of Mellie Umandam Unabia," claiming
that his Birth Certificate contained errors in that the name entered therein
was "Mellie Umandam Unabia", when it should be Miller Omandam
Unabia"; that the gender was erroneously entered as "female" instead of
"male"; and that his father's middle initial was erroneously indicated as "U"
when it should have been "O"

2. RTC ruled in his favor

3. On June 27, 2014, the CA issued the assailed Decision, which contains the
following pronouncement: Under Republic Act 10172, which amended R.A.
9048, the city or municipal registrar or the consul general, as the case may
be, is now authorized to correct clerical or typographical errors in the day
and month, in the date of birth or sex of a person appearing in the civil
register without need of a judicial order.

ISSUES:
 1. Can RA10172 be applied retroactively?

2. Does the petition to change spelling, sex and middle initial qualify as
clerical or typographical errors?

HELD:

1. When Special Proceeding No. 2009-018 was filed in 2009, the governing
law then was the original, unamended RA 9048. There was no provision
then for the administrative correction or change of clerical or typographical
errors or mistakes in the civil registry entries of the day and month in the
date of birth or sex of individuals, but only clerical or typographical
errors and change of first names or nicknames.

2. Administrative corrections or changes relating to the date of birth or sex of

individuals was authorized only with the passage in 2012 of RA10172. Even
then, the amendments under RA 10172 should still apply, the law being
remedial in nature. Moreover, under Section 11 of RA 9048, retroactive
application is allowed "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws."

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and

Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and
month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that
there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can
be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.

(a) A scrutiny of the foregoing evidence reveals that appellee was actually
using the name Miller Omandam Unabia and not Millie Umandam Unabia,
as that reflected in his birth certificate.

(b) The similarity between "Miller" and "Millie" and "Omandam" and
"Umandam" undoubtedly caused confusion in its entry in the birth certificate
of the appellee.

(c) Moreover, a reading of the medical certificate shows that appellee is

phenotypically male.

There were clerical errors in the aforesaid entries necessitating its rectification.
Section 2(3) of R.A. 10172 defines 'clerical of typographical error' as:

'Clerical or typographical error' refers to a mistake committed in the

performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in
the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the date of birth
or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: provided, however, that no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, or status of the petitioner.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY

(CHANGE OF FAMILY NAME IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF
FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA AS APPEARING IN THE RECORDS OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE), FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA, Petitioner
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

FACTS OF THE CASE:

For almost sixty (60) years, petitioner has been using the surname "Almojuela."
However, when he requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the National
Statistics Office (NSO), he was surprised to discover that he was registered as
"Felipe Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela."

Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 and is the acknowledged
natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela (Jorge), former governor of the said province,
and Francisca B. Condeno (Francisca), both deceased. He averred that while his
parents did not marry each other, he has been known to his family and friends as
"Felipe Almojuela" and has been using the said surname in all of his official and
legal documents. In support of his petition, he also presented a copy of his birth
certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pandan,
Catanduanes showing that "Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered full name.

In a Decision, CA held that Petitioner’s failure to implead and notify the Local
Civil Registrar and his half-siblings as mandated by the rules precluded the RTC
from acquiring jurisdiction over the case, thereby, reversing the RTC’s Decision

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in nullifying the correction of entry on petitioner's

birth certificate on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,

HELD:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of
substantial changes in the civil registry through an appropriate adversary
proceeding.

A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices
to potential oppositors: one given to persons named in the petition, and another
given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a
substantial correction of an entry in the civil registry should implead as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to
have any interest that would be affected thereby.

In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, the Court emphasized that in a petition for a

substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry under Rule 108, it is
mandatory that the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to
have any interest that would be affected thereby be made respondents for the
reason that they are indispensable parties.
Similarly, in Republic v. Uy, the Court nullified the trial court's order to correct
respondent's entry for the latter's failure to implead and notify not only the Local
Civil Registrar, but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest
and are affected by the changes or corrections sought.

In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to implead both the Local
Civil Registrar and his half-siblings.  Although he claims that his half-siblings have
acknowledged and accepted him, the procedural rules nonetheless mandate
compliance with the requirements in the interest of fair play and due process and to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.

Moreover, although it is true that in certain instances, the Court has allowed the
subsequent publication of a notice of hearing to cure the petition's lack/failure to
implead and notify the affected or interested parties, such as when: (a) earnest
efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties;
(b) the parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; (c) there is no
actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or, (d)
when a party is inadvertently left out, these exceptions are, unfortunately,
unavailing in this case.

In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed requirements of

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar
involving substantial and controversial alterations renders the entire proceedings
therein null and void.

In Republic v. CA, the Court held that the proceedings of the trial court were null
and void for lack of jurisdiction as the petitioners therein failed to implead the civil
registrar, an indispensable party, in the petition for correction of entry, viz.: 

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is
an indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. As he was not imp leaded in this case much less given notice of the
proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the
correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders
ineffectual all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the
judgment.

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an

indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction
of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the corrction of
entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as
to the subject matter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF
CERTIFICATES OF LIVE BIRTH OF YUHARES JAN BARCELOTE
TINITIGAN AND AVEE KYNNA NOELLE BARCELITE TINITIGAN

 (G.R. No. 222095 August 7, 2017)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In 2008, Jonna Barcelote bore a child out of wedlock with a married man named
Ricky Tinitigan (Tinitigan). She was not able to register the birth of their child,
whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a
hospital. In 2011, she bore another child with Tinitigan, whom she named as
Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did not register his birth to avoid humiliation,
ridicule, and possible criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan.

When the children’s certificate of live birth are needed for school admission,
Barcelote finally decided to register the births of both children. She went to the
Local Civil Registrar to register their birth. LCR approved the late registration of
the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote.
However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the
NSO, Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live birth with the
same name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in their office. It
appears that Tinitigan had earlier registered their two children with “Tinitigan” as
the children’s surname.

Thus, Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject
birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation.

ISSUES:

a) Whether the children is under compulsion to use the surname of Tinitigan, since
Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, amending Article 176 of the Family Code, allows
illegitimate children to use the surname of their father if the latter had expressly
recognized them through the record of birth appearing in the civil register.

b) Whether the registrations of the children’s births, caused by Tinitigan under Act
No. 3753 require the consent of Barcelote.

c) Whether the certificates registered by Tinitigan are valid.

HELD:

a) NO.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides:

“Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during
his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child.” (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word ‘may’ in Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA
9255, readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word ‘may’ is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.”

The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother. The use of the word “shall” underscores its
mandatory character. The discretion on the part of the illegitimate child to use the
surname of the father is conditional upon proof of compliance with RA 9255.

b) The registration caused by Tinitigan is not valid.

Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, states:

 “Section 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. –xxx

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses.

In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the
name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified.

Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth

certificate of her child, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his
or not. The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of
illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the blood of the
mother. Thus, this provision ensures that individuals are not falsely named as
parents.

The mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth
certificate because she has the parental authority and custody of the
illegitimate child.

Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother
did not sign the documents, the local civil registrar had no authority to
register the subject birth certificates. Under the IRR of Act No. 3753, the civil
registrar shall see to it that the Certificate of Live Birth presented for registration is
properly and completely filled up, and the entries are correct. In case the entries are
found incomplete or incorrect, the civil registrar shall require the person concerned
to fill up the document completely or to correct the entries, as the case may be.

Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the
provisions of the law respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children.
Aside from the fact that the entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname
of the children is incorrect since it should have been that of the mother, the subject
birth certificates are also incomplete as they lacked the signature of the mother.

c) The birth certificates registered by Tinitigan are void.

Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall
be void. Accordingly, the Court declare the subject birth certificates void and order
their cancellation for being registered against the mandatory provisions of the
Family Code requiring the use of the mother’s surname for her illegitimate
children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature of the mother in her children’s
birth certificates.

THINGS DECIDED:

a) Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. However, illegitimate children may use the surname
of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father.

b) It is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate

of her child, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not.
Without the signature of the mother, the registration by the father shall be void.  
c) Under Act No. 3753, the local civil registry has no authority to register birth
certificates if the mother of the child did not sign the same.

MARLYN MONTON NULLADA V. THE HON. CIVIL REGISTRAR

G.R. NO. 224548 JANUARY 23, 2019

FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Nullada and Respondent Akira Ito (Akira) got married in
Katsushika-Ku, Japan on July 29, 1997 and begot a child, Shin Ito. Their union
eventually turned sour so they later decided to obtain a divorce decree in Japan.
The Divorce Certificate that was issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines
was issued under the name of petitioner.

Petitioner sought recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines by

filing with the RTC a petition, which said court found to be in due form and
substance.

During the trial, petitioner presented the following pieces of evidence:

1. Report of Marriage that was issued by the Embassy of the Republic of the
Philippines in Japan on the registration with the embassy of Akira and
Marlyn’s marriage on July 29, 1997 in Japan;
2. Authentication Certificate of the Report of Marriage;
3. Divorce Certificate issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines on the
basis of the Official Family Register issued by the Head of kKatsushika-ku,
Tokyo, Japan;
4. Authentication Certificate of the Divorce Certificate;
5. Acceptance Certificate; and,
6. Excerpts of the Japanese Civil Code

Akira did not file and Answer to the petition, notwithstanding summons by
publication. The Republic also did not offer any evidence to rebut the case of
Marlyn.

The Regional Trial Court denied the petition ratiocinating that “the fact that
Marlyn also agreed to the divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira barred the
application of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which would
have otherwise allowed a Filipino spouse to remarry after the alien spouse had
validly obtained a divorce… the Filipino spouse cannot invoke the intention of
equity behind the law when he or she is an initiator or active participant in
procuring the divorce.” Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, which
prompted her to file a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code has a restrictive
application so as to apply only in cases where it is the alien spouse who sought the
divorce, and not when the divorce was mutually agreed upon by the spouses.
HELD:

The facts in Manalo are similar to the circumstances in this case. In the said
case, the recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines was rejected by the
RTC where the petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment was
filed, as the trial court cited Article 15 of the New Civil Code and reasoned that as
a rule, “the Philippine law ‘does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or
to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the RTC decision was overturned. The
appellate court held that Article 26 of the Family Code should apply even if it was
Manalo who filed the divorce. The decree made the Japanese spouse no longer
married to Manalo; he then had the capacity to remarry. It would be unjust to still
deem Manalo married to the Japanese who, in turn, was no longer married to her.
The fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce was inconsequential. This ruling
of the CA was then affirmed by the Court in Manalo upon a petition for review on
certiorari that was filed by the Republic of the Philippines.

Applying the same legal considerations and considering the similar factual
milieu that attended in Manalo, the present case warrants a reversal of the RTC’s
decision that refused to recognize the divorce decree that was mutually obtained by
Marlyn and her foreigner spouse in japan solely on the ground that the divorce was
jointly initiated by the spouses.

The court reasoned in Manalo:

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings.

When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues
of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise
acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation
to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and
ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former
spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

xxxx

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad

by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear
and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce
validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

xxxx

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd

situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a
corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied
to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of
his or her country.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
 proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino
who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in "like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction.
In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of
the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.

While opposition to the foregoing interpretation is commonly raised on the

basis of the nationality principle, such principle is not an absolute and unbending
rule. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code should be deemed an
exception to the general rule. The dismissal of petitioner’s petition based on the
trial court’s interpretation of Article 26 of the Family Code is erroneous in light of
the Court’s disposition in Manalo. The fact that the divorce was by the mutual
agreement of Marlyn and Akira was not sufficient ground to reject the decree in
this jurisdiction.

However, petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements to prove a foreign law.

The records only include a photocopy of excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan. This
does not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of Japan’s law on
divorce. In any case, similar to the remedy that was allowed by the Court in
Manalo to resolve such failure, a remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings and reception of evidence on the laws of Japan on divorce is allowed.

The petition for review on certiorari was granted, but the case was remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the
relevant Japanese law on divorce.
REPUBLIC v. LORENA OMAPAS SALI

G.R. No. 206023, April 03, 2017, Second Division, (Peralta, J.)

Section 1 of RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the
power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged
with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is
to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied

TOPIC/S:
Special Proceeding; Correction of Entry under Rule 108

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court before the RTC. In her petition, she averred that in recording
the facts of her birth, the personnel of the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte,
erroneously entered in the records the following: Firstly, the first name of the
petitioner as "DOROTHY" instead of "LORENA" and Secondly, the date of birth
of the petitioner as "June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968. The petitioner has
been using the name "Lorena A. Omapas” and her date of birth as "April 24, 1968"
for as long as she could remember and is known to the community in general as
such.

The trial court ruled in favor of Lorena Sali thereby granting the petition to
correct the erroneous entries in her birth certificate. However, The Republic,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC Decision for
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo because the title of the petition
and the order setting the petition for hearing did not contain Sali's aliases.

The CA denied the appeal, ruling that: (1) the records are bereft of any indication
that Sali is known by a name other than "Lorena," hence, it would be absurd to
compel her to indicate any other alias that she does not have; (2) Sali not only
complied with the mandatory requirements for an appropriate adversarial
proceeding under Rule 108 of the Rules but also gave the Republic an opportunity
to timely contest the purported defective petition; and (3) the change in the first
name of Sali will certainly avoid further confusion as to her identity and there is no
showing that it was sought for a fraudulent purpose or that it would prejudice
public interest.

Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it
applied Rule 108 instead of Rule 103, thereby dispensing with the
requirement of stating the respondent’s aliases in the title of the petition

2. Whether or not respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

HELD:

Anent the first issue:

NO. Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule
103 of the Rules but for correction of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the
correction of clerical errors which were committed in the recording of her name
and birth date. This Court has held that not all alterations allowed in one's name are
confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors may be set right
under Rule 108. The evidence presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has
been using the name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention
to change her name. What she seeks is simply the removal of the clerical fault or
error in her first name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name she grew
up with.

Anent the second issue:

YES on the part of Sali’s first name but NO on the part of her birth
date. At the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in
effect. Section 1 of RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the
power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,
form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of
first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

In Republic v. Cagandahan, we said that under R.A. No. 9048, the

correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. The law
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical
or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for
the correction of his and his mother's first name.

In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first
name, was not within the RTC's primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the
remedy should have been administrative, i.e., filing of the petition with the local
civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC
should have dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name.

On the other hand, anent Sali's petition to correct her birth date from "June
24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968," R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on
August 15, 2012 that R.A. No. 10172 was signed into law amending R.A. No.
9048. As modified, Section 1 now includes the day and month in the date of birth
and sex of a person.

Considering that Sali filed her petition in 2008, Rule 108 is the appropriate
remedy in seeking to correct her date of birth in the civil registry. The Republic did
not question the petition to correct Sali's birth date from "June 24, 1968" to "April
24, 1968." In fact, it did not contest the CA ruling that the requirements for an
appropriate adversarial proceeding were satisfactorily complied with.

The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Petition for Correction of Entry in

the Certificate of Live Birth of Dorothy A. Omapas with respect to her first name
is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to its filing with the local civil
registrar concerned.

MARRIAGES DISSOLVED BY FOREIGN JUDGMENT

REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND

CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE
G.R. No. 199515
June 25, 2018

Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001. They lived
together for nine (9) years in Saitama Prefecture, Japan and did not have any
children. Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and
the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate issued by Consul
Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the Japanese Consulate in the
Philippines and had it authenticated. She filed the Divorce Certificate with the
Philippine Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan, where she was informed that by
reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to return to the
Philippines to report the documents for registration and to file the appropriate case
for judicial recognition of divorce. She tried to have the Divorce Certificate
registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but was refused by the City Registrar
since there was no court order recognizing it. She filed a Petition for Judicial
Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry.

The RTC rendered a Decision, finding that Racho failed to prove that Tanaka
legally obtained a divorce. It stated that while she was able to prove Tanaka's
national law.

Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement
becomes effective upon notification, whether oral or written, by both parties and
by two (2) or more witnesses. She contends that the Divorce Certificate stating
"Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of
Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan" is sufficient to prove that she and her husband
have divorced by agreement and have already effected notification of the divorce.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that a divorce by agreement is not
the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code. Considering that
Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse," OSG posits that only the foreign spouse may initiate divorce proceedings.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is

sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce between petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho
and respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by the latter according to his
national law.

2.Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties was valid

HELD:

1. YES.

Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official
records that are kept in a foreign country requires that it must be accompanied by a
certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in that foreign country.

The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by an

Authentication issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of the
Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan. The
Authentication further certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine.
Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between petitioner and
respondent.

The Regional Trial Court established that according to the national law of Japan, a
divorce by agreement "becomes effective by notification." Considering that the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was duly authenticated, the
divorce between petitioner and respondent was validly obtained according to
respondent's national law.

2. YES.

Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse," the Office of the Solicitor General posits that only the foreign
spouse may initiate divorce proceedings.

The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from initiating or
participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a
Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from something that a
foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from
participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.

The Solicitor General's narrow interpretation of Article 26 disregards any agency

on the part of the Filipino spouse. It presumes that the Filipino spouse is incapable
of agreeing to the dissolution of the marital bond. It perpetuates the notion that all
divorce proceedings are protracted litigations fraught with bitterness and drama.
Some marriages can end amicably, without the parties harboring any ill will
against each other. The parties could forgo costly court proceedings and opt for, if
the national law of the foreign spouse allows it, a more convenient out-of-court
divorce process. This ensures amity between the former spouses, a friendly
atmosphere for the children and extended families, and less financial burden for the
family.

It is unfortunate that legislation from the past appears to be more progressive than
current enactments. Our laws should never be intended to put Filipinos at a
disadvantage. Considering that the Constitution guarantees fundamental equality,
this Court should not tolerate an unfeeling and callous interpretation of laws. To
rule that the foreign spouse may remarry, while the Filipino may not, only
contributes to the patriarchy. This interpretation encourages unequal partnerships
and perpetuates abuse m intimate relationships.

To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under our laws, petitioner
is still married to respondent despite the latter's newfound companionship with
another cannot be just. Justice is better served if she is not discriminated against in
her own country.86 As much as petitioner is free to seek fulfillment in the love and
devotion of another, so should she be free to pledge her commitment within the
institution of marriage.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court June 2, 2011
Decision and October 3, 2011 Order in SP. Proc. No. 10-0032 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. By virtue of Article 26, second paragraph of the Family Code and the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce dated December 16, 2009,
petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho is declared capacitated to remarry.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO

GR No. 207074, Jan 17, 2018

LEONEN, J.:

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Gallo has never been known as "Michael Soriano Gallo." She has always been
female. Her parents, married on May 23, 1981, have never changed their names.
For her, in her petition before the Regional Trial Court, her Certificate of Live
Birth contained errors, which should be corrected. For her, she was not changing
the name that was given to her; she was merely correcting its entry.
To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the
Regional Trial Court of Ilagan City, Isabela in for the correction of her name from
"Michael" to "Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under
Rule 108of the Rules of Court.
In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"; her
mother's middle name, "Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her
parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these
were not recorded.
As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification,
official transcript of records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and
parents' marriage certificate.
The RTC having found Gallo's petition sufficient in form and substance and
ordered the publication of the Notice of Hearing once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Isabela.
The RTC granted her petition however the OSG appealed alleging that Gallo did
not comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because the title of
her Petition and the published Order did not state her official name, "Michael
Gallo."Furthermore, the published Order was also defective for not stating the
cause of the change of name.
The Court of Appeals denied the OSG’s appeal and found that Gallo availed of the
proper remedy under Rule 108 as the corrections sought were clerical, harmless,
and innocuous.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in

alleging that the change sought by Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and
not a mere correction of error; and
2. Whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo failed to exhaust administrative
remedies and observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

HELD:
1. NO.
In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of
evidence as determining whether or not the change sought is a typographical error
or a substantive change requires looking into the party's records, supporting
documents, testimonies, and other evidence.
Republic Act No. 10172/9048 defines a clerical or typographical error as a
recorded mistake, "which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding."
Thus:
"Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in
the date of birth or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only
by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no
correction must involve the change of nationality, age, or status of the
petitioner.

By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible

to the eyes or obvious to the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a
factual determination made after reference to and evaluation of existing documents
presented.
Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is
"obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or
circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used.
The Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court's determination, concurred in by
the Court of Appeals, that this case involves the correction of a mere error.
2.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first
avail of all administrative processes available before seeking the courts'
intervention. The administrative officer concerned must be given every opportunity
to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust
administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as these remedies refer
to a precedent condition which must be complied with prior to filing a case in
court.
Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence
of a court to take cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be waived.
However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court
has ruled that failure to raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of
primary administrative jurisdiction at an opportune time may bar a subsequent
filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way of laches.

G.R. No. 209527, February 14, 2018

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. VIRGIE (VIRGEL)
L. TIPAY, Respondent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the October 9, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) that denied the appeal of petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lupon, Davao
Oriental. The trial court, in turn, granted respondent Virgie (Virgel) L. Tipay's
(Virgel) petition for the correction of certain entries in his birth certificate.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In a petition dated February 13, 2009, Virgel sought the correction of several
entries in his birth certificate. Attached to the petition are two (2) copies of his
birth certificate, respectively issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Governor
Generoso, Davao Oriental and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Both copies
reflect his gender as "FEMALE" and his first name as "Virgie." It further appears
that the month and day of birth in the local civil registrar's copy was blank, while
the NSO-issued birth certificate indicates that he was born on May 12,
1976. Virgel alleged that these entries are erroneous, and sought the correction of
his birth certificate as follows: (a) his gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE;" (b) his
first name, from "VIRGIE" to "VIRGEL;" and (c) his month and date of birth to
"FEBRUARY 25, 1976."

The petition was found sufficient in form and substance, and the case proceeded to
trial. Aside from his own personal testimony, Virgel's mother, Susan L. Tipay,
testified that she gave birth to a son on February 25, 1976, who was baptized as
"Virgel." The Certificate of Baptism, including other documentary evidence such
as a medical certificate stating that Virgel is phenotypically male, were also
presented to the trial court.

Ruling of the RTC

There was no opposition to the petition. Soon after, the RTC rendered its
Decision dated July 27, 2010 granting Virgel's petition:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, an Order is hereby issued: 1. Directing the

Local Civil Registrar of Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental to cause the
appropriate change in the Certificate of Live Birth of VIRGIE L. TIPAY upon
payment of the required legal fees, particularly:

First Name : From:   VIRGIE

To: VIRGEL
 
Sex : From:   Female
To: MALE
 
 Date of Birth of Child : From:   no entry
To: FEBRUARY 25, 1976

From this decision, the Republic filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due
course by the trial court. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) argued that the change of Virgel's name from Virgie should have been made
through a proceeding under Rule 103, and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. This
argument was premised on the assumption that the summary procedure under Rule
108 is confined to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors, which excludes
one's name or date of birth. Since the petition lodged with the RTC was not filed
pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the Republic asserted that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Virgel refuted these arguments, alleging that changes of name are within the
purview of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He further disagreed with the position
of the Republic and asserted that substantial errors may be corrected provided that
the proceedings before the trial court were adversarial. He also argued that the
proceedings before the RTC were in rem, which substantially complies with the
requirements of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling of the CA

The CA denied the Republic's appeal in its Decision dated October 9, 2013, the
dispositive of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The July 27, 2010 Decision of the
[RTC], 11th Judicial Region, Branch No. 32, Lupon, Davao Oriental, in Special
Proceedings Case No. 243-09 is AFFIRMED in toto.

In its assailed decision, the CA ruled in favor of Virgel, stating that while the
correction of the entry on his gender is considered a substantial change, it is
nonetheless within the jurisdiction of the trial court under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The CA also held that the petition filed with the trial court fully complied
with the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 108 because notices were sent to the
concerned local civil registrar and the OSG. Since Virgel was able to establish that
he is indeed male, a fact which remains undisputed, the CA upheld the trial court's
decision.

As to the change of Virgel's name from "Virgie" to "Virgel," the CA did not find
any reason to depart from the decision of the RTC because it was more expeditious
to change the entry in the same proceeding. The CA found that the correction of
Virgel's name was necessary to avoid confusion, especially since his correct gender
is male. In the same vein, the CA ruled that even if the petition with the RTC was
considered a Rule 103 proceeding, the requirements under Rule 108 are
substantially the same as that under Rule 103. Thus, the CA already deemed these
requirements complied with. Finally, regarding the month and date of Virgel's
birth, the CA found the documentary evidence credible enough to establish that he
was indeed born on February 25, 1976.
Unsatisfied with the ruling of the CA, the Republic appealed to this Court insisting
that the entries sought to be corrected are substantial changes outside the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The Republic also reiterated its earlier arguments,
adding that the CA should not have equated the procedural requirements under
Rule 103 with that of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

The Court denies the petition. However, this Court finds that the evidence is
insufficient to establish that Virgel was born on February 25, 1976.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for the correction of
substantial changes in the civil registry.

It is true that initially, the changes that may be corrected under the summary
procedure of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are clerical or harmless errors. Errors
that affect the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a person, are considered
substantial errors that were beyond the purview of the rule.20

Jurisprudence on this matter later developed, giving room for the correction of
substantial errors. The Court ultimately recognized that substantial or controversial
alterations in the civil registry are allowable in an action filed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, as long as the issues are properly threshed out in appropriate
adversarial proceedings— effectively limiting the application of the summary
procedure to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors. 21 The Court's ruling
in Republic v. Valencia,22 explained the adversarial procedure to be followed in
correcting substantial errors in this wise:

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction
of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality
or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative
relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also
true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as
the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the
Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412
of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that
"the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate
proceeding."

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are-(l) the civil registrar,
and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue
an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the
order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise
entitled to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction
and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as
"summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed
either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the
entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.

Evidently, the Republic incorrectly argued that the petition for correction
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is limited to changes in entries
containing harmless and innocuous errors.24 The cited cases in the petition were
already superseded by much later jurisprudence.25 Most importantly, with the
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 904826 in 2001, the local civil registrars, or
the Consul General as the case may be, are now authorized to correct clerical or
typographical errors in the civil registry, or make changes in the first name or
nickname, without need of a judicial order.27 This law provided an administrative
recourse for the correction of clerical or typographical errors, essentially leaving
the substantial corrections in the civil registry to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.28

The RTC was correct in taking cognizance of the petition for correction of entries
in Virgel’s birth certificate.

R.A. No. 9048 defined a clerical or typographical error as a mistake committed in.
the performance of clerical work, which is harmless and immediately obvious to
the understanding.29 It was further amended in 2011, when R.A. No. 10172 30 was
passed to expand the authority of local civil registrars and the Consul General to
make changes in the day and month in the date of birth, as well as in the recorded
sex of a person when it is patently clear that there was a typographical error or
mistake in the entry.

Unfortunately, however, when Virgel filed the petition for correction with the RTC
in 2009, R.A. No. 10172 was not yet in effect. As such, to correct the erroneous
gender and date of birth in Virgel's birth certificate, the proper remedy was
to commence the appropriate adversarial proceedings with the RTC,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 32 The changes in the entries
pertaining to the gender and date of birth are indisputably substantial corrections,
outside the contemplation of a clerical or typographical error that may be corrected
administratively.

The records of this case show that Virgel complied with the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He impleaded the local civil
registrar of Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental, the Solicitor General, and the
Provincial Prosecutor of Davao Oriental as parties to his petition for correction of
entries.33 The RTC then issued an order, which set the case for hearing on July 10,
2009. In compliance with Rule 108, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, the order was
published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province of Davao Oriental. Additionally, the local civil registrar and the OSG
were notified of the petition through registered mail.34

The OSG entered its appearance and deputized the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Mati, Davao City for purposes of the proceedings before the RTC.
Accordingly, the prosecutor assigned to the case was present during the hearing but
opted not to cross-examine Virgel or his mother after their respective testimonies.
There was also no opposition filed against the petition of Virgel before the RTC.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties who have a claim or whose interests
may be affected were notified and granted an opportunity to oppose the petition.
Two sets of notices were sent to potential oppositors—through registered mail for
the persons named in the petition, and through publication, for all other persons
who are not named but may be considered interested or affected parties. 36 A
hearing was scheduled for the presentation of Virgel's testimonial and documentary
evidence, during which time, the deputized prosecutor of the OSG was present, and
allowed to participate in the proceedings. While none of the parties questioned the
veracity of Virgel's allegations, much less present any controverting evidence
before the trial court,37 the RTC proceedings were clearly adversarial in nature.
It dutifully complied with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Notably, the Republic does not assail whether the proceedings before the trial court
were adversarial, but merely insists on the erroneous premise that a Rule 108
proceeding is limited to the correction of harmless, clerical or typographical errors
in the civil registry.38 Having established that the proper recourse for the correction
of substantial changes in the civil registry is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, the
Court cannot sustain the Republic's assertion on this matter. The Court has long
settled in Republic v. Olaybar39 that as long as the procedural requirements in Rule
108 were observed, substantial corrections and changes in the civil registry, such
as those involving the entries on sex and date of birth, may already be
effected, viz.:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary
or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since
the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled
that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition
filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by
the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish
the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or
motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure
laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication
of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim
interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires
the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it
states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is
after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108
are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.40 (Emphases Ours)

Since the Republic was unable to substantiate its arguments, or even cite a specific
rule of procedure that Virgel failed to follow, the Court has no reason to depart
from the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, in the
absence of evidence refuting Virgel's assertion that he is indeed phenotypically
male, the correction of the entry on Virgel's sex in his birth certificate, from
"FEMALE" to "MALE," was correctly granted.

With respect to the change of his name to "Virgel" the Court does not agree with
the CA that the requirements under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court may be
substituted with that of Rule 108. These remedies are distinct and separate from
one another, and compliance with one rule cannot serve as a fulfillment of the
requisites prescribed by the other.41 Nonetheless, the Court has settled in Republic
v. Mercadera42 that changes in one's name are not necessarily confined to a petition
filed under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Rule 108, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court include "changes of name" in the enumeration of entries in the civil register
that may be cancelled or corrected. Thus, the name "Virgie" may be corrected to
"Virgel" as a necessary consequence of the substantial correction on Virgel's
gender, and to allow the record to conform to the truth.

With respect to the date of Virgel's birth, the Court again disagrees with the CA
that the alleged date (i.e., February 25, 1976) is undisputed. The NSO copy of
Virgel's birth certificate indicates that he was born on May 12, 1976, a date
obviously different from that alleged in the petition for correction. 43 As a public
document, the date of birth appearing in the NSO copy is presumed valid
and prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it. Virgel bore the burden of proving
its supposed falsity.44

Virgel failed to discharge this burden. The police clearance presented to the trial
court corroborates the entry in the NSO copy, indicating Virgel's date of birth as
May 12, 1976.45 The Court is also unconvinced by the other documentary evidence
supposedly showing that Virgel was born on February 25, 1976 because the
information indicated in the identification card from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and the Member Data Record from the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation, were all supplied by Virgel.46 These are self-serving information,
which do not suffice to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the date
of birth reflected in the NSO copy of Virgel's birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 9, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02286 is AFFIRMED, only insofar as the corrections
of the following entries in the birth certificate are concerned: (a) first name, from
"Virgie" to "Virgel;" and (b) gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE.

G.R. No. 233520, March 06, 2019

ROICE ANNE F. FOX, PETITIONER, v. THE PHILIPPINE STATISTICS

AUTHORITY AND THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,
RESPONDENTS.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

filed by Roice Anne F. Fox (petitioner), assailing the Orders dated March 24,
2017 and July 24, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54 of Davao
City, which dismissed outright her petition for correction of entry on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On October 29, 2012, petitioner married Thomas Kenneth K. Fox (Thomas), a

Canadian citizen, in a ceremony held at the Grand Regal Hotel in Lanang, Davao
City. Right after their union, they flew to Thomas's hometown in Weyburn,
Saskatchewan, Canada where they have decided to settle and raise a family. Not
long thereafter, the petitioner conceived and gave birth to a baby girl, whom they
named Zion Pearl Fox (Zion), on June 27, 2015. The fact of birth of the petitioner's
daughter was duly registered at the Registrar's Office in Regina Saskatchewan,
Canada, which issued the corresponding birth certificate. In the said certificate, the
petitioner's minor daughter's birthdate was correctly stated as June 27, 2015.
Thereafter, in October 2015, her daughter was issued a Canadian passport which
also properly reflected the exact date of birth of the child.
On June 7, 2016, considering that the petitioner's daughter was born outside of the
Philippines, the Philippine Consulate Office (PCO) in Calgary, Alberta submitted a
Report of Birth4 of the child to the national office of the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA) in Manila. Unfortunately, through oversight or mistake, the PCO
erroneously indicated the child's birthdate as June 27, 2016, instead of June 27,
2015, in the said Report of Birth. The petitioner brought the said discrepancy to the
attention of the concerned officials of the PCO which, instead of taking immediate
action, advised her to file a petition before the proper court in the Philippines for
the correction of entry in the Report of Birth of her daughter.

Ruling of the RTC

On January 17, 2017, the petitioner filed before the RTC of Davao City, where she
was a resident, a Petition entitled "In the Matter of the Petition of Roice Anne F.
Fox to Correct in the Report of Birth under Registration Number 2016-124030 the
Year of Birth of Her Minor Daughter Zion Pearl F. Fox From June 27, 2016 to
June 27, 2015," which was docketed as SP Case No. R-DV0-17-00181-SP. In an
Order7 dated March 24, 2017, however, the RTC motu proprio dismissed the
petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the order
read, thus:

Acting on the petition, this court cites Section 1 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides for the Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry, as follows:

Section 1, Rule 108

"Any person interested in any act, event, order, or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
[Regional Trial Court] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located."

Evidently, the Regional Trial Court in Davao City has no jurisdiction over the
instant petition which seeks to direct the Philippine Statistics Authority in Manila
to make the correction of entry in the report of birth of Zion Pearl F. Fox made by
the Philippine Consulate Office of Calgary, Alberta, Canada to the said office in
Manila.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

On April 10, 2017, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same
was denied in the Order dated July 24, 2017, which pertinently states:

In the instant petition, the fact of birth of petitioner’s daughter Zion Pearl F. Fox
was reported by petitioner to the Philippine Consulate in Calgary, Alberta, Canada,
which in turn caused to be recorded directly said fact of birth before the Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA) in Manila and not to any local civil registrar.
Consequently, the Petition for Correction of Entry in the Report of Birth of Zion
Pearl F. Fox recorded directly before the Philippine Statistics Office in Manila
should have been filed before the Regional Trial Court in Manila pursuant to
Section 1 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. There is no evidence that said fact of
birth was recorded in the Civil Registry of Davao City. Consequently, the Regional
Trial Court in Davao City is NOT the proper venue of the instant petition for
correction of entry in the report of birth of the minor daughter of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby

DENIED.

The petitioner turns to this Court for relief in a petition for review
on certiorari raising a pure question of law, particularly whether the RTC was
correct in motu proprio dismissing her petition for correction of entry on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:

The petition lacks merit.

In the assailed Order dated March 24, 2017, the RTC motu proprio dismissed the
petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the proper court is the
RTC of Manila, where the PSA Office, in which the Report of Birth of the
petitioner's daughter was registered, is situated.

To be clear, the petition filed before the RTC was a petition for correction of entry
which, under Section 1 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, must be filed in the RTC
where the corresponding civil registry is located. The Rule provides:

Section 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the [Regional Trial Court] of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.

Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid

grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births; (b) marriage; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; U) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.

Based on the above-mentioned rule, a petition for the cancellation or correction of

any entry concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register may be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.
It bears stressing that Rule 108 is a special proceeding for which specific rules
apply. In Fujiki v. Marinay,12 the Court noted, thus:

Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person's life which are recorded by
the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of
public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest
in recording.

Given that Rule 108 pertains to a special proceeding, the specific provisions stated
thereunder, particularly on venue, must be observed in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction.

Apart from the foregoing, the petition likewise failed to comply with other
jurisdictional requirements such as impleading the civil registrar and all persons
who may have a claim or interest in the correction sought. The local civil registrar
is an indispensable party for which no final determination of the case can be
reached. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the importance of
impleading the civil registrar on petitions filed under Rule 108, viz.:

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is
an indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the
proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the
correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders
ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including
the judgment.

The inescapable consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar is that the
RTC will not acquire jurisdiction over the case or, if proceedings were conducted,
to render the same a nullity. In Republic, the Court emphasized, thus:

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an

indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction
of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and
as to the subject matter.

In view of the defects in the filing of the petition, the RTC of Davao City cannot be
faulted in dismissing the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
the dismissal is without prejudice to the refilling of the petition in the proper court,
with full compliance to the specific requirements of Rule 108.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Orders dated March 24, 2017 and
July 24, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54 of Davao City
are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 239584, June 17, 2019

MATRON M. OHOMA (MATIORICO M. OHOMNA), PETITIONER, v.

OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
AGUINALDO, IFUGAO AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated February 1,

2018 and the Resolution dated May 16, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 105591, which annulled and set aside the Resolution dated June 9,
2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao, Branch 15 (RTC) in
Special Proceedings Case No. 142-14.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This case stemmed from a petition filed by petitioner Matron M. Ohoma

(Matiorico M. Ohomna; petitioner) before the RTC on March 26, 2014, seeking the
cancellation of his Certificate of Live Birth with Registry Number 45-86 (first birth
certificate). He averred that: (a) he was born on May 13, 1986 in Aguinaldo,
Ifugao; (b) his birth was belatedly recorded with the Local Civil Registrar of
Aguinaldo, Ifugao (LCR-Aguinaldo) on February 8, 2000 under Certificate of Live
Birth with Registry Number 2000-24 (second birth certificate); (c) unknown to
him, his birth had been previously registered with the LCR-Aguinaldo on June 13,
1986 under the first  birth certificate;  (d) the first  birth certificate contained 
erroneous entries, i.e., (i) his first name was erroneously recorded as Matron
instead of Matiorico and (ii) his last name was erroneously recorded as Ohoma
instead of Ohomna; (e) he has been using the first name Matiorico and the last
name Ohomna, and has been known by such first and last names both in his public
and private transactions; and (f) the second birth certificate reflects the true and
correct data of petitioner; hence, must be the one retained.  The petition, which was
docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 142-14, likewise included a prayer
for"[o]ther reliefs just and equitable x x x."

On May 14, 2014, the RTC issued an Order finding the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance, and consequently, gave due course thereon by setting the case
for hearing. It further directed that the concerned government offices be furnished
a copy of the said Order and the same be published in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of petitioner. 

During the scheduled hearing, petitioner established the jurisdictional

requirement of publication, which was admitted by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Ifugao, the office duly deputized to assist the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in the proceedings. An order of general default was issued and
petitioner was then allowed to present his evidence ex-parte before the Clerk of
Court of the RTC. In support of his petition, petitioner presented his two (2) birth
certificates, his Elementary School Permanent Record,  a copy of his Passport
Application Form,   and his Professional Driver's License.

The RTC Ruling

In a Resolution dated June 9, 2015, the RTC granted the petition and ordered the
LCR-Aguinaldo and the National Statistics Office (NSO; now Philippine Statistics
Authority) to cancel petitioner's first birth certificate, finding that the same
contains errors that caused confusion as to the identity of
petitioner.                                                       ·

Dissatisfied, the Republic of the Philippines appealed to the CA, challenging the
validity of petitioner's second birth certificate on the ground that his birth could no
longer be the subject of a second or another registration as the same had already
been validly registered. Assuming that his original or first registration contains
several errors, such do not constitute valid grounds for the cancellation thereof, and
the proper remedy is to file a petition for correction of entries in the first
registration under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Rule 108).

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated February 1, 2018, the CA annulled and set aside the RTC
ruling. It ruled that there can be no valid late registration of petitioner's birth
considering that the same had already been lawfully registered with the LCR-
Aguinaldo within thirty (30) days from the time of his birth, as required under
Office of the Civil Registrar-General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1983. Thus, it held that the RTC should have upheld the validity of
petitioner's first birth certificate instead of his second birth certificate, which
should have been the one nullified and cancelled. It declared that the proper
remedy was to file a petition for correction of entries in petitioner's first birth
certificate pursuant to Rule 108.

Petitioner  moved for  reconsideration  which was denied  in a Resolution dated

May 16, 2018; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error when it annulled and set aside
the RTC ruling ordering the cancellation of petitioner's first birth certificate.

HELD:

Under Office of the Civil Registrar-General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of

1983, as amended, the birth of a child shall be registered within 30 days from the
time of birth in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the city/municipality
where it occurred. In this case, petitioner's birth had already been reported by his
mother, Antonia Maingit (Antonia), and duly recorded in the civil register of the
LCR-Aguinaldo on June 13, 1986. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the CA, there
can be no valid late registration of petitioner's birth as the same had already been
lawfully registered within 30 days from his birth under the first birth certificate.
Consequently, it is the second birth certificate that should be declared void and
correspondingly cancelled even if the entries therein are claimed to be the correct
ones.

However, while the petition specifically prayed for the cancellation of

petitioner's first birth certificate  and the retention  of his second birth certificate, 
the ultimate objective  was to correct the erroneous  entries pertaining to
petitioner's first and last names, i.e., from Matron Ohoma to Matiorico Ohomna, as
he claimed that people in the community know him by the latter name rather than
the former.  Rule 108 implements judicial proceedings for the correction or
cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil
Code. The role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truth about the facts
recorded therein.

The action filed by petitioner before the RTC seeks to correct a supposedly
misspelled name, and thus, properly falls under Rule 108. To correct simply means
"to make or set a right; to remove the faults or error from." Considering that
petitioner complied with the procedural requirements under Rule 108, the RTC had
the jurisdiction to resolve the petition which included a prayer for "[o]ther reliefs
just and equitable x x x." A general prayer for "other reliefs just and equitable"
appearing on a petition enables the court to award reliefs supported by the
complaint or other pleadings, by the facts admitted at the trial, and by the evidence
adduced by the parties, even if these reliefs are not specifically prayed for in the
complaint. Consequently, the CA erred in holding that petitioner has to refile
another petition before the trial court could resolve his claim.

Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that his
father's last name was Ohomna and not Ohoma through competent evidence, i.e.,
the latter's birth certificate, the certificate of his marriage to petitioner's mother,
Antonia, on January 30, 1986, or a government-issued identification card or record.
On this score alone, the correction of petitioner's first and last names should be
denied. While the first name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, the
last name to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.  Although petitioner's
Elementary School Permanent Record and Professional Driver's License identify
him as Matiorico Ohomna, the same are insufficient to grant the petition.  It pears
stressing that the real name of a person is that given him in the Civil Register, not
the name by which he was baptized in his Church or by which he was known in the
community, or which he has adopted.

In addition, the Court notes that Antonia was the informant in both instances and
the one who signed both birth certificates.  However, a perusal of Antonia's
signatures on petitioner's two (2) birth certificates shows that the same are
materially different from each other.  Further, petitioner failed to show any
plausible explanation why she signed as Antonia Ohoma on the first birth
certificate and as Antonia Ohomna on the second birth certificate.

WHEREFORE,  the petition is  DENIED.  The Decision dated February 1, 2018

and the Resolution dated May 16, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 105591 are hereby SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered ORDERING the
Local Civil Registrar of Aguinaldo, Ifugao and the Philippine Statistics Authority
to cancel petitioner Matron M. Ohoma's Certificate of Live Birth with Registry
Number 2000-24.
G.R. No. 200102, September 18, 2019

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, v. ARTHUR TAN

MANDA, RESPONDENT

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the January 4, 2012

Decision of the Court of Appeals-Cebu City (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00026. The
assailed decision dismissed the appeal filed by Republic of the Philippines
(Petitioner) and consequently affirmed the January 15, 2004 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 6 (RTC), in SP. PROC. No. 12146-CEB
granting the Petition for Correction of Entry in the Birth Certificate of Arthur Tan
Manda (Respondent).

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Respondent alleged that he was born to spouses Siok Ting Tan Manda and Chin
Go Chua Tan. His birth certificate reflects his father's and mother's citizenship as
Chinese implying that he is also a Chinese citizen. Respondent averred that the
foregoing entries were erroneous because his father Siok Ting Tan Manda is a
Filipino citizen by birth and his mother Chin Go Chua Tan is also a Filipino citizen
by marriage. He consequently prayed that both erroneous entries of his parents'
citizenship be corrected from Chinese to Filipino. In support of his allegations,
respondent presented Identification Certificates issued by the then Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) to his parents stating that they are Filipino
citizens.

The RTC Ruling

In its January 15, 2004 Decision, the RTC granted respondent's petition on the
basis of the Identification Certificates and the birth certificate of respondent's
father. It ordered the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City to correct the
entries pertaining to his parents' citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated an appeal before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its January 4, 2012 Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that
respondent complied with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding. The
appellate court opined that the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper
of general circulation and the notices sent to petitioner and the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City were sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. It added
that the Identification Certificates issued by the then CID adequately proved that
respondent's father was a Filipino citizen by birth while his mother was a Filipino
citizen by marriage.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:

I. Whether the petition should be denied for failure to implead indispensable

parties; and

II. Whether respondent sufficiently proved that his parents are Filipino citizens.

Petitioner argues that the changes sought to be effected with respect to the
citizenship of respondent's parents as appearing in his record of birth are
substantial because these may have an effect on the citizenship of his parents and
siblings, thus, an adversarial proceeding should be had where all interested parties
are impleaded, or at least notified, and allowed to be heard before the intended
changes are effected; that only the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City was made a
party defendant in the petition; that there is no showing that respondent's parents
and his siblings were notified of the case or that they participated in the
proceedings before the trial court; and that it is not enough that respondent adduced
in evidence the Identification Certificates issued by the then CID to warrant the
correction or change of entry in his record of birth pertaining to the nationality of
his parents.

On June 1, 2011, however, respondent passed away. Thus, he was substituted by

his wife, Arlinda D. Manda (Arlinda). In her Comment, Arlinda counters that the
publication of the notice of hearing cures the failure to implead indispensable
parties; that the Identification Certificates of respondent's parents which showed
and proved that they are Filipino citizens enjoy the presumption of regularity; and
that petitioner has not adduced any evidence to the contrary to dispute such
presumption.

HELD:

The petition is meritorious. In a long line of cases, starting with Republic v.

Valencia7 the Court has already settled that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. In
that case, the Court declared:

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction
of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality
or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative
relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true
that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as
the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. x x x

What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary

defines "adversary proceeding" as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an [ex parte]

application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an
adoption proceeding.8 x x x (Citation omitted)

Sections 3, 4, and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Rules) state:

SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register

is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming

any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (Emphases supplied)

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature
of the proceedings taken.9 A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rules
mandate two (2) sets of notices to potential oppositors: one given to persons named
in the petition, and another given to other persons who are not named in the
petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties.10 Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction of an entry in the
civil registry should implead as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other
persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby.11 Summons is thus served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with
jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.

In this case, respondent merely impleaded the Office of the Civil Registry of Cebu
City. In filing the petition, however, he seeks the correction of his parents'
citizenship as appearing in his birth certificate from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus,
respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar
but also [his] parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected
by the changes or corrections [he] wanted to make.
Indeed, it is true that in some cases, failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing. In those
cases, however, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all
possible interested parties; the interested parties themselves initiated the
corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the
existence of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out.

Consequently, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules is mandated. "If the
entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary
proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be
affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other
mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and
far reaching."

Finally, respondent merely presented the Identification Certificates issued by the

then CID to his parents to prove that they are Filipino citizens. Surely, their
Chinese citizenship could not be converted to Filipino just because certain
government agencies recognized them as such. "The exercise of the rights and
privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because
a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and
privileges of citizens of this country."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The January 4, 2012 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00026 is SET ASIDE. Consequently,
the January 15, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City, in
Sp. Proc. No. 12146-CEB granting the Petition for Correction of Entry in Birth
Certificate filed by respondent Arthur Tan Manda, is NULLIFIED.
 DR. RUBEN C. BARTOLOME VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 2432288, 28 AUGUST 2019

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Ruben C. Bartolome filed a petition to change his name under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court before the RTC of Parañaque City. The petitioner prays for the
correction of his name from “Feliciano Batholome” as appearing in his birth his
birth certificate to the name that he allegedly use since his childhood, “Ruben
[Cruz] Bartolome”. After the posting and publication, the petitioner presented
different proofs of his identity which all bears the name “Ruben C. Bartolome”.

The RTC denied the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
insufficiency of evidence, and improper venue. It was held that the procedure
sought for the change of petitioner’s first name is incorrect, and RA 9048 is the
proper remedy. As regards with the prayer to correct the last name it was denied
for improper venue. It was further held that the RTC of Manila where the civil
registrar is located is the proper venue, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Lastly, the evidences presented was not sufficient to prove that he
had been habitually called “Ruben C. Bartolome” since childhood.

The CA held that the petitioner should have filled the correction in the
entries of his birth certificate under RA 9048, instead of Rule 103. It was likewise
held that the petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the
surname of his father and his siblings is spelled as “Bartolome”.
 The OSG is argued that the CA correctly denied the petition. A petition
pursuant to RA 9048 before the civil registry should have been filled first in order
to change his first name and to correct the spelling of his surname.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the change/correction sought in the petitioner’s first name,

and middle name, and surname, as appearing in his birth certificate, from Feliciano
Bartolome to Ruben Cruz Bartolome should be filed under RA 9048, Rule 103 or
Rule 108.

HELD:

The court DENIED the petition for lack of merit, and AFFIRMED the
decision of the CA.

The changes sought by the petitioner are all covered by RA 9048. In

connection to this, the change sought in the petitioner’s first name from
“Feliciano” o “Ruben” is covered by the Section 4(2) of RA 9048, as amended, on
the ground that he had habitually and continuously used “Ruben”, and is publicly
known by that first name. Further, the inclusion of the petitioner’s middle name
“Cruz”, and the correction of his last name from “Batholome” to “Bartolome”, a
mere clerical error, and is covered by Section 2of the said law. The latter may be
readily corrected by merely referring to the existing records of the Civil Registrar
such as the last name of the petitioner’s parents and immediate family members.
Therefore, the petition should have been filed in the local civil registry of the city
or municipality where the records sought to be charged or corrected is being kept,
pursuant to Section 3 of RA 9048, as amended.

The petitioner can only avail the appropriate judicial remedies when the
changes/corrections sought through the administration’s proceeding are denied.
Hence, if the prayer to administratively change the first name was denied, the same
may be brought under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. And if the prayers to
administratively correct the middle name and surname were denied, the same way
may be brought under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
 Case Title Citation Promulgated on

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE- G.R. No. March 08, 2016

LLAMANZARES v. COMMISSION ON 221697
ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C.
ELAMPARO

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION G.R. No. August 24, 2016

FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY 211724
(CHANGE OF FAMILY NAME IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF FELIPE C.
ALMOJUELA AS APPEARING IN THE
RECORDS OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE)

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. April 03, 2017

PHILIPPINESv. LORENA OMAPAS 206023
SALI

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR G.R. No. August 07, 2017

CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES 222095
OF LIVE BIRTH OF YUHARES JAN
BARCELOTE TINITIGAN AND AVEE
KYNNA NOELLE BARCELOTE
TINITIGAN

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. G.R. No. January 17, 2018

MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO 207074

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. February 14,

v. VIRGIE (VIRGEL) L. TIPAY 209527 2018

RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO, A.K.A. G.R. No. June 25, 2018

"RHODORA RACHO TANAKA," v. 199515
SEIICHI TANAKA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY,
AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
MARLYN MONTON NULLADA v. G.R. No. January 23, 2019
THE HON. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF 224548
MANILA, AKIRA ITO, SHIN ITO AND
ALL PERSONS WHO HAVE OR
CLAIM ANY INTEREST

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. G.R. No. February 11,

MILLER OMANDAM UNABIA 213346 2019

ROICE ANNE F. FOX v. THE G.R. No. March 06, 2019

PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORIT 233520
Y AND THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL

MATRON M. OHOMA (MATIORICO G.R. No. June 17, 2019

M. OHOMNA) v. OFFICE OF THE 239584
MUNICIPAL
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
AGUINALDO, IFUGAO AND
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

DR. RUBEN C. BARTOLOME v. G.R. No. August 28, 2019

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 243288

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. September 18,

v. ARTHUR TAN MANDA 200102 2019