Case Digest for fifth week

Case #1

Dy Yieng Seangio Et Al vs Reyes

GR No. 140371-72

Facts:

On Sept. 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of
the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of
Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of
petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.

In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the

event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the
will. On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of
Segundo was filed by petitioners before the RTC and reiterated that the probate
proceedings should take precedence over the intestate proceedings because testate
proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

The holographic will entitled “Kasulatan sa Pag-aalis ng Mana” only

removed his eldest son Alfredo Seangio as his heir.

Issue:
WON the document executed by Segundo be considered as a holographic
will.

Held:

Yes. Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere

disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in
itself.
 In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of
the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of
Alfredo. Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not
learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more
liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.

In this regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng

Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed
by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect. The petition for probate of the
was granted.

Case #2

Acain vs IAC
GR No. 72706

Facts:

Nemesio Acain executed a will whereby he gave all his shares in the
conjugal property to his brother Segundo. In case Segundo predeceases Nemesio,
all his shares were to be given to Segundo’s children. Segundo predeceased
Nemesio.

Thus, Constantino and his brothers and sisters, the children of Segundo, fi
led a petition for probate claiming the property as Nemesio’s heirs. During the
petition for probate, Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of Nemesio
and the latter’s widow, Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain, moved to dismiss on the
grounds: (1) Constantino has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he
is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and adopted daughter have been
preterited.

The trial judge denied the motion. The Intermediate Appellate Court granted
Virginia A. Fernandez’s petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition
for probate of Nemesio’s will.

Issue:

WON the will was abrogated.

Held:

Yes. The Court held that the universal institution of Constantino together
with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally
abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs
— without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written.

Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no
leeway for inferential interpretation. No legacies or devises having been provided
in the will, the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to
said heirs and his brothers. The effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be,
necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy except that proper legacies and devises
must be respected.

Case #3

Gabriel vs Bilon
GR No. 146989

Facts:

Petitioner was the owner-operator of a public transport business, Gabriel

Jeepney Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, and
separation pay against petitioner with the NLRC Amended to implead Bacoor
Transport Service Cooperative, Inc. (BTSCI) since both parties are members.

Respondents alleged that they were regular drivers of Gabriel Jeepney under
a boundary system of P400/day. They were required to pay an additional P55 per
day. Petitioner told them not to drive anymore, and were not given a unit to drive
upon reporting to work. Boundary drivers of passenger jeepneys are considered
regular employees entitled to security of tenure.

Labor Arbiter ruled that there was Illegal dismissal. Petitioner passed away.
Two weeks later, the decision was delivered personally to the petitioner’s house.
After reading the decision, petitioner’s wife Flordeliza and their daughter refused
to receive the same. Bailiff nonetheless left a copy of the decision but was not
signed and acknowledged. Subsequently served by registered mail and received.
 The NLRC did not resolve the matter definitively; merely suggested
petitioners pursue their claim against the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Melencio Gabriel.

Issue:

WON the respondents’ money claims must be filed against the estate of the
petitioner.

Held:

Yes. As provided for in Rule 3, Sec. 20, When the action is for recovery of
money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before
entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of
such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until
entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein
shall be enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims
against the estate of a deceased person.

Rule 86, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court further provides that all claims for
money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, and judgment for money against the decedent,
must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred
forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants.

In accordance with the above mentioned rules, the Court ruled that the
money claims of respondents must be filed against the estate of the Petitioner.

Case #4

Heirs of Late Spouses Maglasang vs Manila Banking Corporation

GR No. 171206

Facts:

The spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps.Maglasang) obtained a

credit line from respondent in the amount of ₱350,000.00 which was secured by a
real estate mortgage executed over seven of their properties. They availed of their
credit line by securing loans in the amounts of ₱209,790.50 and ₱139,805.83 on
October 24, 1975 and March 15, 1976, respectively, both of which becoming due
and demandable within a period of one year.
After Flaviano Maglasang died intestate, his widow Salud Maglasang and
their surviving children, herein petitioners appointed their brother petitioner Edgar
Maglasang as their attorney-in-fact. Edgar filed a verified petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Flaviano before the then Court of First
Instance.
The probate court, issued a Notice to Creditors for the filing of money
claims against Flaviano’s estate. Accordingly, as one of the creditors of Flaviano,
respondent notified the probate court of its claim in the amount of ₱382,753.19.

During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and Oscar were able
to obtain several loans from respondent, secured by promissory notes which they
signed.

In an order, the probate court terminated the proceedings with the surviving
heirs executing an extra-judicial partition of the properties of Flaviano’s estate. The
loan obligations owed by the estate to respondent, however, remained unsatisfied
due to respondent’s certification that Flaviano’s account was undergoing a
restructuring. Nonetheless, the probate court expressly recognized the rights of
respondent under the mortgage and promissory notes executed by the Sps.
Maglasang, specifically, its "right to foreclose the same within the statutory period."

In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage

covering the Sps. Maglasang’s properties and emerged as the highest bidder at the
public auction. There, however, remained a deficiency on Sps. Maglasang’s
obligation to respondent. Thus respondent filed a suit to recover the deficiency
amount of ₱250,601.05 as of May 31, 1981 against the estate of Flaviano.

The RTC decided in favor of the respondent.

The petitioners elevated the case to the CA on appeal, contending, inter alia,
that the remedies available to respondent under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) are alternative and exclusive, such that the election of one operates as
a waiver or abandonment of the others. Thus, when respondent filed its claim
against the estate of Flaviano in the proceedings before the probate court, it
effectively abandoned its right to foreclose on the mortgage.

The CA denied the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

Issue:

WON after the respondent foreclosed the mortgage, the respondent may still
file a claim against the estate.

Held:

No. Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement
proceedings of their estate. Such proceedings are primarily governed by special
rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules governing ordinary
actions may, as far as practicable, apply suppletorily. Among these special rules,
Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7, Rule86) provides the rule in dealing with
secured claims against the estate:

SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding a claim against
the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the
security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the
general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or
realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a
party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the
mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding
to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner
provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other
security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of
limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive
no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein
contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property
mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the
direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for the best interest of the
estate that such redemption shall be made.

As the foregoing generally speaks of "a creditor holding a claim against the
deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security" as above-highlighted,
it may be reasonably concluded that the aforementioned section covers all secured
claims, whether by mortgage or any other form of collateral, which a creditor may
enforce against the estate of the deceased debtor.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are

deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy
operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen
upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an
action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is
deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any
court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is
to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
No.4118.

Case #5

Sui Man Hui Chan and Gonzalo vs CA

GR No. 147999

Facts:

On November 14, 1988, Napoleon C. Medalla as lessor and Ramon Chan as

lessee entered into a Lease Contract over a hotel building. On August 5, 1989,
Ramon Chan died. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Sui Man Hui Chan.
Napoleon Medalla also died and his heir, private respondent Oscar Medalla,
succeeded him as owner and lessor of the leased premises.

Petitioners failed to pay the monthly rentals due on the leased premises.
Medalla then sent demand letters to petitioners, but the latter still failed to pay the
unpaid rentals. Medalla then asked petitioners to settle the unpaid rentals, pay the
unpaid real estate taxes, and vacate the leased premises. Petitioners vacated the
premises but without paying their unpaid rentals and realty taxes. Aggrieved by
petitioners’ refusal to pay the amounts owing, Private respondent Medalla
instituted this collection suit.
 Petitioners contend that any claim should be filed against the estate of
Ramon Chan in an estate proceeding pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86, of the Revised
Rules of Court since Ramon Chans estate is the real party-in-interest. The court
declared that Section 5, Rule 86 is inapplicable in the case. It pointed out that the
unpaid rentals being claimed were those for the period April 1993 to December
1998. These were incurred by petitioners and not by the late Ramon Chan, who
died on August 5, 1989.
Issue:

WON the claim for the unpaid rentals must be made against the estate of
Ramon Chan pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Held:

No. A lease contract is not essentially personal in character. Thus, the rights
and obligations therein are transmissible to the heirs. However, only obligations
incurred before the decedent’s death is chargeable as a Claim Against the estate
under Rule 86.

In the case at bar, the unpaid rentals sought to be claimed were for the period
April 1993 to December 1998, which is after the death of Ramon Chan, the
original lessee, on August 5, 1989. In other words, as the unpaid rentals did not
accrue during the lifetime of Ramon Chan, but well after his death, his estate might
not be held liable for them. Hence, there is no indubitable basis to apply Section 5,
Rule 86, of the Revised Rules of Court as petitioners urge respondents to do.

Case #6

In Re: Administration of the Estate of Villanueva vs PNB

GR No. L-18403

Facts:

The widow Mauricia Villanueva petitioned the CFI of Agusan for letters of
administration for the administration of her deceased husband, Pascual Vilanueva.
On the hearing, it was agreed to place the estate under administration, but not
under the widow but to a certain Atty. Teodulo R. Ricaforte. After taking oath, he
entered upon the performance of his duties.
 On November 9, 1950 the Clerk of the Agusan CFI, issued the following
Notice to Creditors to all persons having claims for money against the decedent
requiring them to file their claims with the clerk of court within six but not beyond
twelve months after date of the first publication of this notice.

The above notice contained the usual order for publication thereof (once a
week for three consecutive weeks) which was effected, thru the Morning Times of
City, a newspaper of general circulation, on Nov. 16, 23 and 30, 1950, which
expired on November 16, 1951.

On July 20, 1953, PNB filed in the administration proceedings, Creditor's

Claim for the total amount of P1,347.45 due as of June 5, 1953 which was due and
demandable since Dec. 20, 1940. The administrator, on November 5, 1954,
opposed the alleging that he had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegations therein. He also argued that the same
indebtedness has already been paid, that the caused action for the recovery of the
aforesaid amount of P1,847.45 is barred by the statute of limitations, for more than
ten (10) Years have elapsed since the cause of action accrued up to present time;
That the said claim is barred forever on the ground that notice to creditors having
been published in the MORNING TIMES of Cebu City, a newspaper of general
circulation in on November 16, 23 and 30, 1950.

The appellant PNB, more than four (4) Years after the opposition of the
claim presented by the administrator, filed a Petition for an Extension alleging,
among others, that Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules, allows the filing of claims even if
the period stated in the notice to creditors elapsed, upon cause shown and on such
terms as equitable; that its failure to present the claiming with the period stated in
the notice, was its lack of knowledge of administration proceeding. The CFI ruled
against PNB and denied its subsequent reconsideration. The said order was
appealed to the CA which certified it saying that the issue if purely of law.

Issue:

WON PNB is barred to claim the amount of P1, 347.45.

Held:

Yes. Publication of notice to creditors is a constructive notice to the world.

Hence, creditor cannot be permitted to file his claim beyond the period fixed in the
notice on the ground that he had no knowledge of the administration proceedings.
 The period fixed in the notice lapsed on November 16, 1951 and the claim
was filed on July 20, 1953 or about 1 year and 8 months late. This notwithstanding,
appellant contends that it did not know of such administration proceedings, not
even its employees in the Branch Office in Butuan City, Agusan. It is to be noted
that the petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to Creditors were duly
published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning Times, respectively,
which was a full compliance with the requirements of the Rules. It is quite true that
the Courts can extend the period within which to present claims against the estate,
even after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension should be granted
under
special circumstances. The lower did not find any justifiable reason to give the
extension and for one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had elapsed.

Case #7

Chua vs Absolute Management Corporation

GR No. 144881

Facts:

Betty T. Chua was appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of the

deceased Jose L. Chua. Thereafter, she submitted to the trial court an inventory of
all the real and personal properties of the deceased.

One of the creditors of the deceased, Absolute Management Corporation,

filed a claim on the estate in the amount of P63,699,437.74. In the interim,
Absolute Management Corporation noticed that the deceased’s shares of stocks
with Ayala Sales Corporation and Ayala Construction Supply, Inc. were not
included in the inventory of assets.

As a consequence, it filed a motion to require Betty T. Chua to explain why

she did not report these shares of stocks in the inventory. Absolute Management
Corporation, suspecting that the documents attached to Betty T. Chua’s reply were
spurious and simulated, filed a motion for the examination of the supposed
transferees.

It premised its motion on Section 6, Rule 87, Revised Rules of Court, infra,
which states that when a person is suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or
conveyed away any of the properties of the deceased, a creditor may file a
complaint with the trial court and the trial court may cite the suspected person to
appear before it and be examined under oath on the matter of such complaint.

Issue:

WON the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the Trial Court to give due
course to Absolute’s Motion for Examination.

Held:

Section 6 of Rule 87 seeks to secure evidence from persons suspected of

having possession or knowledge of the properties left by a deceased person, or of
having concealed, embezzled or conveyed any of the properties of the deceased.

The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased

person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings has supervision and
control over these properties. The trial court has the inherent duty to see to it that
the inventory of the administrator lists all the properties, rights and credits which
the law requires the administrator to include in his inventory.

In compliance with this duty, the court also has the inherent power to
determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased the administrator
should include or exclude in the inventory. An heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased may call the court’s attention that certain properties, rights
or credits are left out from the inventory. In such a case, it is likewise the court’s
duty to hear the observations of such party. The court has the power to determine
if such observations deserve attention and if such properties belong prima facie to
the estate.

However, in such proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide

whether the properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or to the persons
examined.

If after such examination there is good reason to believe that the person
examined is keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the administrator
should file an ordinary action in court to recover the same. Inclusion of certain
shares of stock by the administrator in the inventory does not automatically deprive
the assignees of their shares. They have a right to be heard on the question of
ownership, when that property is properly presented to the court.
Case #8

PNB vs CA
GR No. 121597

Facts:

Spouses Antonio and Asuncion Chua were the owners of a parcel of land
registered in their name. Upon Antonio’s death, the probate court appointed his
son, respondent Allan Chua, as special administrator of Antonio’s intestate estate.
Allan obtained a loan of P450,000 from PNB evidenced by a promissory note and
secured by a real estate mortgage.

For failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real
estate mortgage and PNB was the highest bidder. To claim the deficiency of P372,
825. 63, PNB instituted an action with RTC Batangas against Asuncion and Allan.

The RTC dismissed PNB’s complaint, affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

WON PNB may no longer pursue by civil action the recovery of the balance
of indebtedness after foreclosure.

Held:

Yes. Case law holds that Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court grants the
mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be
alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in
case the mortgagor dies, among them: (1) to waive the mortgage and claim the
entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) to foreclose
the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to
rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is
barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency.

The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor
waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate.

In this case, PNB has chosen the mortgage-creditor’s option of

extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now
bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased. Petitioner
may no longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of
indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the property securing
the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no further liability remains on
the part of respondents and the late Antonio M. Chua’s estate.

Case #9

Saligumba vs Palanog
GR No. 143365

Facts:

Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino, filed a complaint for

Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants, spouses Saligumbas before
RTC Kalibo, Aklan involving a parcel of land, praying that they be declared the
true and rightful owners of the land.

A sheriff was appointed commissioner for the delimitation of the parcel of

land. Present during the delimitation were spouses Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas,
and Ernesto Saligumba, son of spouses Saligumbas.

The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of spouses Palanogs. A motion for

the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed but the trial court
ruled that since more than five years had elapsed after the date of its finality, the
decision could no longer be executed by mere motion. Thus, Monica Palanog
(respondent), now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the
Decision and impleaded petitioners Generoso Saligumba and Ernesto Saligumba,
the heirs and children of the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants.

Petitioners on the other hand argue that the judgment of the trial court is
void and cannot be enforced because before the decision was rendered, their
parents, Eliseo and Valeria Saligumba died and there was no proper substitution of
the deceased spouses and were no longer represented by counsel.

Issue:

WON the execution may be enforced against the heirs of Spouses Saligumba

Held:

Yes. The civil case is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an
action involving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party.

Further, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, in case of death

of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order the legal
representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the deceased.

However, it is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the
death of his client. The failure of counsel to comply with his duty to inform the
court of the death of his client and the non-substitution of such party will not
invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the
death of such party. The decision rendered shall bind the party’s successor-in-
interest.

In this case, the counsel of Spouses Saligumba, Atty. Miralles did not inform
the court of the court of the death of the spouses. Petitioners should have
questioned immediately the validity of the proceedings absent any formal
substitution. Yet, despite the court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over the persons of
petitioners, petitioners never bothered to challenge the same, and in fact allowed
the proceedings to go on until the trial court rendered its decision.

Case #10

Sarsaba vs Vda. De Te
GR No. 175910
Facts:

In an NLRC Case entitled, Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro Gasing/Truck

Operator, Sereno was declared to have been illegally dismissed, and Gasing was
ordered to pay him his monetary claims. After the writ of execution was returned
and unsatisfied, an alias writ was issued. Sheriff Lavarez, accompanied by Sereno
and his counsel, petitioner Atty. Rogelio Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck, which at
that time was in the possession of Gasing. The truck was sold at public auction,
with Sereno appearing as the highest bidder.

Meanwhile, respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact,

Faustino Castañeda, filed with the RTC of Digos, a Complaint for recovery of
motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente lite
against petitioner, Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC of Davao City. Petitioner and
NLRC filed Motions to Dismiss which were denied by the RTC.

Because of the death of Vda. De Te, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to

Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants
and to discharge the attorney-in-fact for lack of legal personality to sue.

Respondent, through her lawyer, Atty. Carpentero, filed an Opposition,

contending, among others, that respondent's death did not render functus officio
her right to sue since her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, had long testified on
the complaint on March 13, 1998 for and on her behalf and, accordingly, submitted
documentary exhibits in support of the complaint.

Issue:

WON the case survives the death of the respondent

Held:

Yes. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not
extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. Section 1,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the actions that survived and may be
filed against the decedent's representatives as follows: (1) actions to recover real or
personal property or an interest thereon, (2) actions to enforce liens thereon, and
(3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a property. In such
cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the
name and address of the latter's legal representative.
 The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

While it may be true that with the death of Fe Vda. de Te, the Special Power
of Attorney she executed empowering the Attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda to
sue in her behalf has been rendered functus officio, however, the Court believes
that the Attorney-in-fact had not lost his personality to prosecute this case. Records
reveal that the Attorney-in-fact has testified long before in behalf of the said
respondent and more particularly during the state when the respondent was
vehemently opposing the dismissal of the complainant. Subsequently thereto, he
even offered documentary evidence in support of the complaint, and the court
admitted the same. Thus, the proper remedy here is the Substitution of Heirs and
not the dismissal of this case which would work injustice to the respondent.

Case #11

Bayot vs Zuribito
GR No. 13124

Facts:

Plaintiff Patrocinio Bayot is the administratrix of the estate of her deceased

father, Francisco Ma. Bayot, formerly a merchant in Masbate, who died intestate
many years ago. The defendant, Lucas Zurbito, is the administrator of the estate of
his father, Gaspar Zurbito. The claim sued on this case consists of a debt for
P9,694.52, with interest, which is the balance resulting from mercantile operations
sustained between the Francisco and Gaspar. The claim in question in this suit was
presented by the plaintiff to the committee in the estate of Gaspar Zurbito and was
allowed by the committee as a just debt, but upon appeal to the Court of First
Instance it was held that the action could not be maintained inasmuch as the
plaintiff had previously exhibited this debt by way of set-off against another claim
presentee by Zurbito against the estate of the plaintiff's intestate.

In a prior case, Gaspar Zurbito presented a claim for P53,602.76 to the

committee acting in the estate of Francisco Bayot. According to Zurbito, Bayot had
become indebted to Zurbito's father while the former was acting as manager or
administrator of a cattle ranch belonging to the latter. Said claim was disallowed
by the committee on claims of the Bayot estate as being wholly without any merit
whatever. An appeal was promptly taken by Zurbito to the Court of First Instance,
which court also disallowed the claim, and upon appeal to the Supreme Court the
judgment of the Court of First Instance was affirmed. Meanwhile Gaspar Zurbito,
the original proponent of the claim, had died and had been succeeded by the
defendant, Lucas Zurbito, in the character of his administrator.

When the claim of Gaspar Zurbito was presented to the committee in the
estate of Francisco Bayot, the present plaintiff, Patrocinio Bayot, as administratrix
of Bayot, denied liability and asked that judgment be given in favor of the estate of
Francisco Bayot upon the indebtedness which is the subject of the present action.
The committee, however, considered that, inasmuch as the Zurbito claim was
disallowed, it had no jurisdiction to allow the claim in favor of the Bayot estate.

Issues:
(1) WON the committee on claims had authority to allow the claim which
was exhibited by the administratrix by way of set-of;
(2)WON the administrator, Patrocinio Bayot, has the right to pursue the
action in behalf of the estate.

Held:

1. Yes. The provision upon which the committee based its action is found in
the last clause of section 696 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which declares that
"the committee shall have no jurisdiction over claims in favor of the estate, except
as offsets to claims presented against the estate." From this provision the
committee evidently inferred that if the principal claim is not allowed the authority
to allow the set-off falls to the ground. This cannot be accepted as a correct
interpretation of that provision. A creditor who presents a claim against an estate
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the committee, and the circumstance that his
claim is found to be without merit in no wise defeats the authority of the committee
to allow the set-off against him.

2. Yes. Under Section 701 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an executor or

administrator shall not be prevented from commencing and prosecuting an action
commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, for the recovery of a debt or claim, to
final judgment.

The meaning of the entire provision is clear; and it evidently recognize the right of
an executor or administrator, not only to continue the prosecution of an action
already begun, but also to institute an action upon a cause which accrued in the
lifetime of the deceased but which had not been made the subject of action by him.
This of course supposes that the cause of action is such as to have survived to the
estate.

The conclusion is that the claim on which this action is based is not barred by the
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute it with effect as an offset in the former
proceeding; and inasmuch as the judgment entered in that proceeding cannot, for
reasons already stated, be considered binding as res judicata, the result is that the
plaintiff is entitled to be heard on the merits in this action.

Case #12

Magbanua vs Akol
GR No. L-47971

Facts:

When Julio Magbanua died intestate in Iloilo in 1917, no intestate

proceedings had been instituted until 1935, when a petition was filed in CFI Iloilo
by one Reynalda Magbanua, who alleged to be an acknowledged natural daughter
of the deceased. She prayed that letters of administration be issued and that
Zacarias Doromal be appointed administrator of the estate left by the deceased
Julio Magbanua.

To this petition Priscila Magbanua and Paz Magbanua, who alleged to be

legitimate sisters of the deceased, filed an opposition in which they prayed that the
petition be dismissed and that, if the court deemed it proper to appoint an
administrator, Attorney Manuel Akol be so appointed. The court appointed Manuel
Akol as administrator and Zacarias Doromal as co-administrator.

Subsequently, Mariano Magbanua and his wife, Priscila Magbanua, filed

with the committee a claim against the deceased Julio Magbanua in the total
amount of P2,251.86. After hearing, the committee disallowed this claim, on the
ground that it had prescribed. Due exception was made to this adverse resolution
by the claimants, Mariano Magbanua and Priscila Magbanua, and by way of
appeal, they filed the corresponding complaint against the administrators.

The CFI affirmed the decision of the committee on claims.

Issue:
 WON the claim of spouses Mariano and Priscila Magbanua against the
estate of Julio Magbanua has prescribed

Held:

Yes. There is more justification for ruling that the herein appellants cannot
recover upon their claim, it appearing that more than eighteen years had elapse
after the death of their debtor, Julio Magbanua, and before the institution of the
latter's intestate proceedings.

As is conspicuous in Sikat vs. Viuda de Villanueva, "according to law the

persons entitled to the administration or to propose another person for
administrator have thirty days from the death within which to claim that right, after
which time the court may appoint any creditor of the intestate debtor," and to "hold
otherwise would be to permit a creditor having knowledge of his debtor's death to
keep the latter's estate in suspense indefinitely, by not instituting either testate or
intestate proceedings in order to present his claim, to the prejudice of the heirs and
delegatees."

In the instant case there can be no dispute that the appellants were aware of
the death of Julio Magbanua, because the latter was a brother of the appellant
Priscila Magbanua who alleges to have taken care of him during his last days and
to have paid his funeral expenses, the latter being one item of her claim. The
speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and
those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.

Case #13

Heirs of Doronio vs Heirs of Doronio

GR No. 169454

Facts:

Deceased spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante were the registered
owners of a parcel of land located in Pangasinan. Among their children are
Marcelino and Fortunato Doronio.

A private deed of donation propter nuptias regarding a piece of residential

land was executed by the spouses in favor of Marcelino and his wife. However,
there is a significant discrepancy with respect to the adjacent property on the east:
based on the title, the owners were the Najordas, while in the DOD, it was
Fortunato. Both the parties in this case are occupying the said property.
Petitioners, the heirs of Marcelino, claim that by virtue of the DOD, they are the
owners. Respondents, heirs of Fortunato, claim that only half of the property was
incorporated in the DOD.

The heirs of Marcelino filed for the registration of the private deed of
donation which was granted by the RTC. A new certificate of title was issued to
the heirs. The heirs of Fortunato then filed for reconsideration, and filed an action
for reconveyance and damages.

The RTC held that the title in favor of the petitioners cannot be defeated
and the donation was valid, which was reversed by the CA.

Issue:

WON the issue on impairment of legitime of Fortunato may be resolved in

the settlement of the estate of the spouses

Held:

Yes. Under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court and citing

jurisprudence, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by
the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall
be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word “may,” it is nevertheless
clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the
“court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings.”

In this case, petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the
impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the
settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not
be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in
the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge
the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the
settlement of estate.
 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable
obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at
the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it.
With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or
heirs can be established; and only then can it be ascertained whether or not a
donation had prejudiced the legitimes.

As to the donation, it was held by the court as null and void. It cancelled the
title in the name of spouses Marcelino and ordered it reinstated in the name of the
deceased spouses. The question on ownership was yet to be resolved.

Case #14

Guilas vs Judge of CFI Pampanga

GR No. L-26695

Facts:

Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir
and executor. Petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and now married to Federico
Guilas, was declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the spouses
Jacinta and Alejandro. Despite the legal adoption, the testatrix Doña Jacinta did
not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her
heirs. The will was then admitted to probate and the surviving husband, Alejandro
Lopez was appointed executor.

Nevertheless, in a project of partition executed by both Alejandro Lopez

and Juanita Lopez Guilas, the right of Juanita Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was
recognized and properties in Bacolor Pampanga were adjudicated to Juanita.

Petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate ordinary action to set aside

and annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud.

Meanwhile, in the testate proceeding, Juanita filed a petition praying that

Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of the lots as
well as the 1,216 caverns of palay that he collected from the ten (10) tenants or
lessees of the said two lots. Alejandro opposed, stating that the testate proceedings
had already been closed and terminated.
 In reply, Juanita contends that the actual delivery and distribution of the
hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the order of the court declaring as closed
and terminated the proceedings, determines the termination of the probate
proceedings.

Issue:

WON the order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the
proceedings determines the termination of the probate proceedings.

Held:

No. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration

only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. As long as the
order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated because a judicial partition
is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action
to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed.

In the instant case, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of her
share was filed just more than 3 years from when the amended project of partition
was approved and within 5 years from when the original project of partition was
approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two lots allocated to her under the project
of partition had not yet expired. And in the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the
Revised Rules of Court of 1964 and jurisprudence the order of the probate court
closing and terminating the probate case did not legally terminate the testate
proceedings, for her share under the project of partition has not been delivered to
her.

Case #15

Reyes vs RTC
GR No. 165744

Facts:
 Zenith Insurance Corporation and Rodrigo Reyes filed a complaint with the
SEC against Oscar Reyes. The complaint stated that it is a derivative suit to obtain
an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith Corporation which are now in the
control, custody, and/or possession of Oscar, and to determine the shares of stock
of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were fraudulently
appropriated by Oscar for himself and which were not collated and taken into
account in the partition, distribution, and settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouses.

Oscar denied illegally acquiring the shares of Anastacia Reyes. He asserted

that he purchased the subject shares with his own funds from the unissued stocks
of Zenith, and that the suit is not a bona fide derivative suit because the requisites
have not been complied with. He further questioned the SEC’s jurisdiction to
entertain the complaint because it pertains to the settlement of the estate of
Anastacia Reyes.

Thenafter, Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or

Harassment Suit, which was however, denied by the RTC. Upon appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of RTC.

Issue:

WON the RTC as special commercial court has jurisdiction

Held:

No. A probate court has the power to enforce an accounting as a necessary

means to its authority to determine the properties included in the inventory of the
estate to be administered, divided up, and distributed.  Beyond this, the
determination of title or ownership over the subject shares (whether belonging to
Anastacia or Oscar) may be conclusively settled by the probate court as a question
of collation or advancement.

In summary, the RTC – sitting as special commercial court – has no

jurisdiction to hear Rodrigo’s complaint since what is involved is the
determination and distribution of successional rights to the shareholdings of
Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigo’s proper remedy, under the circumstances, is to
institute a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Anastacia Reyes, a move that is not foreclosed by the dismissal of his present
complaint.
Case #16

Vda De Lopez vs Lopez

GR No. L-23915

Facts:

Saturnina Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of Emilio

Lopez, filed with CFI Negros Occidental a project of partition adjudicating the
whole estate to herself and her legitimate children. The court approved the project
of partition and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all
legal purposes."

Seventeen days thereafter, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed
Lopez, represented by their mother, Lolita Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the
proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they were illegitimate children
of the deceased, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares
in the estate given to them. The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix
on the ground that the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and that
the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which
should be an independent action against the individual distributees.

Issues:

(1) WON the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late.
(2) WON such motion was the proper remedy

Held:

(1) No. The Supreme Court, citing jurisprudence, stated that: "A judicial partition
in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto…A
judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, and not being
of such definitive character to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been
deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may still, within the prescriptive period,
bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of the real property of
the deceased may be situated."

The motion to reopen was not too late. The court’s order declaring the intestate
proceeding closed did not become final immediately upon its issuance. And
judgments or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from
notice to the party concerned. In this case appellants’ motion to reopen was filed
only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure. The remedy was
therefore invoked on time.

(2) Yes. The court, relying on jurisprudence, held that: “… all demands and
claims filed by any heir, legatee or party in interest to a testate or intestate
succession, shall be acted upon and decided in the same special proceedings, and
not in a separate action, and the judge who has jurisdiction over the administration
of the inheritance, and who, when the time comes, will be called upon to divide
and adjudicate it to the interested parties, shall take cognizance of all such
questions.”

In another case: "The only instance that we can think of in which a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when
he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure
relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary
period, instead of an independent action…"

Case #17

Divina Gracia vs Rovira

GR No. L-42615

Facts:

Feliciano Divinagracia was survived by his wife, Salud Bretaña, and their
four daughters. The notice of his death was published in two local periodicals and
in the Manila Times. The order setting the petition for hearing regarding the
settlement of the deceased’s estate was published on for 3 days in the Yuhum, an
English and Ilongo weekly circulating in Iloilo City and Western Visayas.

Emilia Divinagracia, one of his daughters, administered the estate for seven
years.The judge approved the final accounting and project of partition submitted
by the administratrix and declared the proceeding “closed and terminated, subject
to the condition that the heirs shall assume all the outstanding obligations of the
estate”. The partition was duly registered.
 After the order closing the intestate proceedings had become final, Camilo
Divinagracia filed a motion to reopen, alleging that he was an illegitimate child of
the decedent and that he came to know of the proceeding only when he was
transferred to Iloilo.

The court set aside its order of closure and directed Emilia to submit a
complete liquidation and inventory of the estate.

Issue:

WON the instestate proceeding must be reopened.

Held:

No. The court held that the probate court erred in reopening the intestate
proceeding, a proceeding in rem of which Camilo Divinagracia is deemed to have
had constructive notice. The order closing it was already final and executory. The
motion to reopen it was not filed within the thirty-day reglementary period counted
from the date the order of closure was served on the administratrix. The closure
order could not be disturbed anymore.

Moroever, there was already a liquidation of the conjugal partnership and a

statement as to who were the heirs and their respective shares. The probate court
also erred in entertaining the motion to reopen the proceeding because the question
involving the determination of Camilo’s status as a spurious child falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Iloilo.

There is a rule that the remedy of a natural child, who has not been
voluntarily acknowledged but who can justifiably compel recognition, is either (a)
a separate action against his parent to compel recognition, or, if the parent is dead,
against all the potential heirs who would be prejudiced by his recognition together
with an action for the enforcement of his rights against his parent or the latter’s
heirs; or (b) he may intervene in the administration proceeding for the settlement of
his deceased parent’s estate and there ask for recognition and at the same time
enforce his hereditary rights.

In the instant case, Camilo Divinagracia did not disclose whether he has any
evidence of voluntary recognition of his filiation. There is no allegation in his
motion that would sustain his claim for compulsory acknowledgment of his
filiation.

Case #18

Heirs of Jesus Fran vs Salas

GR No. 53546

Facts:

Remedios Vda. de Tiosejo, a widow, died with neither descendants nor

ascendants. She executed a last will and testament wherein she bequeathed to her
collateral relatives and designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter’s death, Jesus
Fran, as executor to serve without bond.

Because Tan is not physically well and signed a waiver in favor of Fran, the
court appointed him to be the special administrator. Private respondents filed
Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate of the Will wherein they
expressly manifested, with their full knowledge and consent that they have no
objection. The court rendered a decision admitting the will and appointed Fran as
executor. The project partition was then approved with no objections from the
respondent and the proceeding was declared closed.

Surprisingly, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of

the probate judgment and on the Order of partition. They alleged: (a) they were not
furnished with a copy of the will; (b) the will is a forgery; (c) they were not
notified of any resolution or order on their manifestation requesting time within
which to file their opposition, or of the order authorizing the clerk of court to
receive the evidence for the petitioner, or of the order closing the proceedings; (d)
the reception of evidence by the clerk of court was void per the ruling in Lim
Tanhu v. Ramolete; (e) the project of partition contains no notice of hearing and
they were not notified thereof; (f) the petitioner signed the project of partition as
administrator and not as executor, thereby proving that the decedent died intestate;
(g) the petitioner did not submit any accounting as required by law; and (h) the
petitioner never distributed the estate to the devisees and legatees. Further, the
probate court never acquired jurisdiction over the case since petitioner Jesus Fran
failed to submit to the court the original of the will.
 The respondent judge ruled in favor of respondents and declared the probate
judgment null and void.

Issue:

WON a motion for reconsideration is the proper remedy

Held:

No. As to the issue of forgery, it cannot be entertained because the probate

judgment long final and undistributed by any attempt to unsettle it, had inevitably
passed beyond the reach of the court to annul or set the same aside, by mere
motion, on the ground that the will is a forgery. Settled in the rule that the decree
of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will and it cannot
be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
separate or independent action or proceeding.

As to the issue of non-distribution of the estate, the same is not a ground for
the reopening of the testate proceedings.

In this case, their omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed exactly six
(6) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days after the rendition of the
decision, and six (6) years, one (1) month and thirteen (13) days after the court
issued the order approving the Project of Partition, to which they voluntarily
expressed their conformity through their respective certifications, and closing the
testate proceedings.

Case #19

Gregorio vs Madarang
GR No. 185226

Facts:

Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. died intestate, leaving real and personal

properties.

In the intestate proceedings filed by Jose in RTC Cebu City, Dolores was
appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of Casimiro, Sr. Dolores
submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the decedent’s estate. Jose
filed his Comment on the Report, alleging that it omitted six lots including Lot
829-B-4-B located in Cebu City.

After a hearing was conducted, the RTC instructed Dolores to revise her
Inventory Report to include the six lots. Dolores and her children, except Jose who
suggested that the former be referred to as "oppositors," questioned the RTC order
of inclusion of the six lots via motion for reconsideration during the pendency of
which motion the court appointed petitioner Corazon as co-administratrix of her
mother Dolores.

As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been
transferred during the lifetime of the decedent, they were ordered to submit their
affidavits, in lieu of oral testimony, to support the allegation. Only respondent
Vicente complied. In his Affidavit, Vicente declared that one of the six lots, Lot
829-B-4-B, was conveyed to him by a Deed of Donation executed by his parents
Dolores and Casimiro, Sr. They later manifested that they no longer oppose the
provisional inclusion of the six lots, except Lot 829-B-4-B.

The RTC ordered that Lot 829-B-4-B should be excluded from the
inventory. Jose moved to reconsider, arguing that since the title to Lot 829-B-4-B
remained registered in the name of his parents, it should not be excluded from the
Inventory. The CA affirmed the exclusion.

Issues:

(1) WON the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction in passing upon the
merits of Jose’s appeal from the RTC order excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the
inventory.
(2) WON Lot 829-B-4-B should be excluded from the inventory.

Held:

1. No. While a probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act
on questions of title and ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or exclusion in
the inventory of properties of a decedent, make a provisional determination of
ownership, without prejudice to a final determination through a separate action in a
court of general jurisdiction.

2. No. Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides that every compulsory
heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during
the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the
account of partition.

In relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. – Questions as
to advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir.

The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate court
to make a provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-B-4-B. It bears stress
that the question is one of collation or advancement by the decedent to an heir over
which the question of title and ownership can be passed upon by a probate court.

By express provision of law then, Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have been
donated by the decedent and his wife to their son-respondent Vicente, should not
be excluded from the inventory of the properties of the decedent.

Case #20

Sps. Salitico vs Heirs of Felix

GR No. 240199

Facts:

Amanda Burgos is the registered owner of a parcel of land registered in her

name located in Bambang, Bulacan. By virtue of a document entitled Huling
Habilin ni Amanda H. Burgos dated May 7, 1986 (Huling Habilin), the subject
property was inherited by the niece of Amanda, Resurreccion, as a devisee.

Resurreccion, as the new owner of the subject property, executed a

document entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa, which transferred ownership over
the parcel of land in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico, who took physical
possession of the same.

Thenafter, a proceeding for the probate of the Huling Habilin was

undertaken before the RTC. Respondent Recaredo was appointed as the executor
of the Huling Habilin. He then filed and presented the Huling Habilin before the
Probate Court, which approved it. The Probate Court likewise issued a Certificate
of Allowance of the Will.

Petitioners Sps. Salitico received a demand letter requiring them to vacate

the subject property and surrender possession over it to the respondents heirs. To
protect their interest over the subject property, the petitioners Sps. Salitico
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, which was however denied registration
by the respondent Registry of Deeds.

In their Complaint before the RTC, the petitioners Sps. Salitico sought the
delivery and return in their favor of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 and
the execution of the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale by way of confirming
the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. They likewise prayed that OCT P-1908 be
cancelled and a new one be issued in their names.

The RTC dismissed the Complaint for the sole reason that the petitioners
Sps. Salitico's cause of action had supposedly not yet accrued, as the Estate of
Amanda has not yet been fully settled by the Probate Court. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.

Issue:

WON the Register of Deeds can be compelled to issue a new certificate of

title in favor of petitioners.

Held:

No. Rule 90, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states that the actual
distribution of property subject to testate or intestate proceedings, i.e., the issuance
of a new title in the name of the distributee, shall occur only when the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate, have been paid.

Only then can the testate or intestate court assign the residue of the estate to
the persons entitled to the same. Under Rule 90, Section 1, the testate or intestate
court may also order the distribution of the property pending the final order of
distribution if the distributees give a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned
upon the payment of the aforesaid said obligations within such time as the court
directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.

Hence, reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent
provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, while an heir may dispose and
transfer his/her hereditary share to another person, before the transferee may
compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering specific property in
his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation
of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must first be had.

Therefore, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale between

Resurreccion and the petitioners Sps. Salitico, which ordinarily would warrant the
delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 in favor of the latter,
pending the final settlement of the Estate of Amanda, and absent any order of final
distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution from the Probate
Court, the RD cannot be compelled at this time to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a
new certificate of title in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.

Case #23

Estate of Santos vs Santos

GR No. L-34895

Facts:

This is an appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,

disallowing certain items of the account rendered by the executor of the estate of
the deceased Fruto Santos.

One of the contested items in the account of the administrator which invites
but brief comment has to do with a claim of P500 for attorney's fees, which the
trial judge reduced to P250. The action of the presiding judge was predicated on
the failure of the executor to secure authority from the court for the incurring of
expenses for legal services, and on the fact that some of the service performed by
the attorney should have been performed by the executor personally.

The trial judge further refused to permit the executor of the estate to secure
reimbursement from the estate for money paid as premium on the bond filed by his
as special administrator, and for the preparation, filing, and substitution of his bond
as such and as executor of the estate, all totaling P173.95. These are the facts from
which arise the question suggested in the beginning of this decision.

Issue:

WON the expense incurred by an executor or administrator to procure a

bond is a proper charge against the estate.

Held:

No. The position of an executor or administrator is one of trust. In fact, the

Philippine Code of Civil Procedure so mentions it. It is proper for the law to
safeguard the estates of deceased persons by requiring the executor or
administrator to give a suitable bond. The ability to give this bond is in the nature
of a qualification for the office. The execution and approval of the bond constitute
a condition precedent to acceptable of the responsibilities of the trust. If an
individual does not desire to assume the position of executor or administrator, he
may refuse to do so. On the other hand, when the individual profers an adequate
bond and has it approved by the probate court, he thereby admits the adequacy of
the compensation which is permitted his pursuant to law. It would be a very
farfetched construction to deduce that the given of a bond in order to qualify for
the office of executor or administrator is a necessary expense in the care,
management, and settlement of the estate within the meaning of section 680 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, for these are expenses incurred after the executor or
administrator has met the requirements of the law and has entered upon the
performance of his duties.

Case #24

Nunal vs CA
GR No. 94005

Facts:

Sometime in December 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial court) rendered its judgment in favor of private
respondents and ordered the partition of the property of the late Frank C. Lyon and
Mary Ekstrom Lyon. The order of partition was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals in July 1982 then remanded to the lower court and two years later, a writ
of execution was issued by the latter.
 On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon
and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the order
of execution with preliminary injunction. In her motion, she contends that not
being a party to the above-entitled case her rights, interests, ownership and
participation over the land should not be affected by a judgment in the said case;
that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar as her share, right, ownership
and participation is concerned, said share not having been brought within the
Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She further invokes Section 12, Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court.

On January 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing the
inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the
property

The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA assailing the decision of the
lower court whether or not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L.
Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the partition of the property considering
that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in Civil Case No. 872
for partition and accounting of the aforesaid property and that the decision
rendered in said case has long become final and executory.

Issue:

WON the proper remedy to enforce a right of an excluded heir to a final and
executory judgment of partition is a motion to quash said judgment.

Held:

No. The Court said that when a final judgment becomes executory, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether
the modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest
Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors
or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, and, of course, where the judgment is void."
 Furthermore, "any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a
final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the
entire proceedings held for that purpose."

In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has
become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his
jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification that he would make, as
in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority.

The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the
parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject
property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.

Case #25

Vda. De Fernando vs Elchico

GR No. L-18937

Facts:

August 29, 1951. Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. (referred to herein as

Pambusco) lodged its complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against
two (2) defendants Valentin Fernando and Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando.
The suit was to collect P105,000.00 upon a contractual obligation.1

January 23, 1955. Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando died. By this time,
Pambusco in the foregoing civil case had already presented its evidence and
submitted its case.

March 23, 1955. Intestate proceedings were filed.2 Notice to the estate's
creditors was given for them to file their claims within six (6) months from this
date, the first publication of the notice.

April 16, 1955. On Pambusco's motion, the court in the civil case ordered
Jose Nicolas, then administrator, to substitute for the deceased Encarnacion
Elchico Vda. de Fernando as one of the defendants. No objection to this order was
registered.

July 15, 1955. Pambusco amended its complaint in the civil case naming
therein administrator Jose Nicolas and original defendant Valentin Fernando, as
defendants. The court, without objection, admitted this amended complaint on
August 27, 1955.

Jose Nicolas, as such administrator, filed an amended answer with

counterclaim against Pambusco. The date of filing said answer is not of record. In
due course, Nicolas presented his evidence.

Issue:

WON Pambusco’s claims were properly admitted by the probate court.

Held:

Yes. At the time of the death of defendant Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de

Fernando, plaintiff Pambusco had already closed its evidence and submitted its
case. Her administrator substituted. By this substitution, the estate had notice of the
claim. The estate was thus represented.

The administrator did not complain of the substitution. At no time did the
estate of the deceased impugn the authority of the regular courts to determine the
civil case. Much less did it seek abatement of the civil suit. On the contrary, its
administrator took active steps to protect the interests of the estate. He joined issue
with plaintiff. He filed an amended answer. He counterclaimed. He went to trial.
Defeated in the Court of First Instance, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. He
even elevated that civil case to this Court.

Now that the judgment has become final, the estate cannot be heard to say
that said judgment — reached after a full dress trial on the merits — will now go
for naught. The estate has thus waived its right to have Pambusco's claim re-
litigated in the estate proceedings. For, though presentment of probate claims is
imperative, it is generally understood that it may be waived by the estate's
representative. And, waiver is to be determined from the administrator's "acts and
conduct." Certainly, the administrator's failure to plead the statute of nonclaims, his
active participation, and resistance to plaintiff's claim, in the civil suit, amount to
such waiver.