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G.R. No. 193846.  April 12, 2011.*

MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. THE

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DANTE O. TINGA,
respondents.

Election Law; Commission on Elections; The Supreme Court

has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or
interlocutory, even a final resolution of a division of the
COMELEC—the Court can only review via certiorari a decision,
order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc in accordance with
Section 7, Article IX-A  of the Constitution, a rule which admits of
exceptions as when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order
is a patent nullity because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue the
same.—Plainly, from the foregoing, the Court has no jurisdiction
to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final
resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the
Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of
the COMELEC en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A
  of the Constitution. Petitioner’s assertion that circumstances
prevailing herein are different from the factual milieu attendant
in Repol has no merit. As stated in Soriano, “the general rule is
that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be
elevated directly to this Court through a special civil action for
certiorari.” In short, the final order of the COMELEC (Second
Division) denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot be
questioned before this Court even via a petition for certiorari.
True, the aforestated rule admits of exceptions as when the
issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity
because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue the same.
Unfortunately for petitioner, none of the circumstances
permitting an exception to the rule occurs in this instance.
Same; Same; Certiorari; The issuance of a special writ of
certiorari has two prerequisites: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, (2) there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.—The

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* EN BANC.

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Cayetano vs. Commission on Elections

issuance of a special writ of certiorari has two prerequisites: (1) a

tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Same; Same; Appeals; Although it is not the duty of the Court
to point to litigants to the appropriate remedy which they should
take from orders of COMELEC Divisions, the aggrieved party can
still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the
proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC
En Banc.—Although it is not the duty of the Court to point
petitioner, or all litigants for that matter, to the appropriate
remedy which she should have taken, we refer her to the cue
found in Soriano, i.e., “[t]he aggrieved party can still assign
as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the
proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the
COMELEC En Banc.” In addition, the protest filed by private
respondent and the counter-protest filed by petitioner remain
pending before the COMELEC, which should afford petitioner
ample opportunity to ventilate her grievances. Thereafter, the
COMELEC should decide these cases with dispatch.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
   The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
  Romulo B. Macalintal and Edgardo L. Vistan, II for
petitioner.
  Brillantes, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin,
Martinez & Vivero Law Offices for private respondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA,  J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Orders issued by public respondent Commission on
Elections
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VOL. 648, APRIL 12, 2011 563

Cayetano vs. Commission on Elections

(COMELEC), through its Second Division, dated August

23, 20101 and September 7, 2010,2 respectively. The two
Orders were issued in relation to the election protest,
docketed as EPC No. 2010-44, filed by private respondent
Dante O. Tinga against petitioner Maria Laarni Cayetano.
In the automated national and local elections held on
May 10, 2010, petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for the position of Mayor of Taguig City.
Petitioner was proclaimed the winner thereof on May 12,
2010, receiving a total of Ninety-Five Thousand Eight
Hundred Sixty-Five (95,865) votes as against the Ninety-
Three Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Five (93,445) votes
received by private respondent.
On May 24, 2010, private respondent filed an Election
Protest against petitioner before the COMELEC. Private
respondent’s protest listed election frauds and
irregularities allegedly committed by petitioner, which
translated to the latter’s ostensible win as Mayor of Taguig
City. On the whole, private respondent claims that he is
the actual winner of the mayoralty elections in Taguig City.
Posthaste, petitioner filed her Answer with Counter-
Protest and Counterclaim on June 7, 2010. Petitioner
raised, among others, the affirmative defense of
insufficiency in form and content of the Election Protest
and prayed for the immediate dismissal thereof.
On July 1, 2010, the COMELEC held a preliminary
conference and issued an Order granting private
respondent a period within which to file the appropriate
responsive pleading to the Answer of petitioner. The
COMELEC likewise stated that it will rule on the
affirmative defenses raised by petitioner.
As previously adverted to, the COMELEC issued the
assailed Preliminary Conference Order dated August 23,
2010,

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1 Rollo, pp. 32-43.

2 Id., at p. 44.

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Cayetano vs. Commission on Elections

finding the protest filed by private respondent and counter-

protest filed by petitioner to be sufficient in form and
substance. Effectively, the COMELEC denied petitioner’s
affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and substance
of the protest filed by private respondent. The Order reads:

“WHEREFORE, finding the instant protest and the counter-

protest to be sufficient in form and substance, the Commission
(Second Division) hereby:
1.  DIRECTS [private respondent] to make a cash deposit [of]
ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED NINE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P1,609,500.00) to defray the expenses for
the recount of the ballots as well as for other incidental expenses
relative thereto pertaining to the 217 clustered protested
precincts composed of 1,073 established precinct[s] at the
rate of P1,500.00 for each precinct as required in Section 2 Rule II
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 payable in three (3) equal
installments every twenty (20) days starting within five (5) days
from receipt hereof.
2.  DIRECTS [petitioner] to make a cash deposit of TWO
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,811,000.00) to defray the expenses for the recount of the
ballots as well as for other incidental expenses relative thereto
pertaining to the 380 protested clustered precinct[s]
composed of 1,874 established precincts at the rate of
P1,500.00 for each precinct as required in Section 2[,] Rule II of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 payable in three (3) equal
installments every twenty (20) days starting within five (5) days
from receipt hereof.
3.  DIRECTS the City Election Officer (EO) of Taguig City, to
gather and collect the subject contested ballot boxes containing
the ballots, and their keys from the City Treasurer of Taguig City
and to deliver the same to ECAD, COMELEC, Intramuros,
Manila, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the ballot boxes
from said Treasurer with prior notice to herein parties who may
wish to send their respective duly authorized representatives to
accompany the same, observing strict measures to protect the
safety and integrity of the ballot boxes;
4.  DIRECTS [private respondent] and [petitioner] to provide
for the needed vehicle/s to the EO for the gathering and
transportation of the subject contested ballot boxes. All expenses
for the re-

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trieval and transportation of the said ballot boxes shall be borne

by both [private respondent] and [petitioner];
5.  AUTHORIZES the City Election Officer to secure a
sufficient number of security personnel either from the PNP or
the AFP in connection with the afore-directed gathering and
transportation of the subject ballot boxes;
6.  DIRECTS [private respondent] to shoulder the travel
expenses, per diems and necessary allowance of the COMELEC
personnel, which include the PES and at most two (2) support
staff, and the PNP/AFP personnel acting as security; and
7.  DIRECTS the herein parties to shoulder the travelling
expenses of their respective counsels and watchers.
8.  DIRECTS [private respondent] in the protest proper and
[petitioner] in the counter protest to bear the expenses for the
rental of the Precinct Count Optical System (PCOS) machine that
will be used for the authentication of the ballots as well as the
payment for the information Technology Expert (IT Expert) who
will assist in the authentication of the ballots, unless they are
both willing to stipulate on the authenticity of the said ballots
cast in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. DIRECTS further that in case [private respondent]
agree[s] to stipulate on the authenticity of the ballots and
[petitioner] raises the issue of authenticity, [petitioner] shall be
the one to bear the fee for the rent of the PCOS machine as well
as the service of the IT Expert.
9.  DIRECTS the parties to file a manifestation whether they
intend to secure photocopies of the contested ballots within a non-
extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of this Order. No
belated request for the photocopying of ballots shall be
entertained by this Commission (Second Division). The
photocopying shall be done simultaneous with the recount of the
ballots considering that the ballot box storage area is no longer
near the recount room.
The pertinent Order for the constitution of Recount
Committees and the schedule of recount shall be issued after the
arrival of the subject ballot boxes and after the required cash
deposits shall have been paid by [private respondent].
The Preliminary Conference is hereby ordered terminated. The
parties are given three (3) days from receipt hereof to file their
comment, suggestions or corrections, if any, to this Preliminary
Conference Order. After the lapse of said period, no more
comment, sugges-

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tion or correction shall be entertained, and this Preliminary

Conference Order shall thereafter be valid and binding upon the
parties.”3

Thereafter, on August 31, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion

for Reconsideration of the Preliminary Conference Order
relative to the denial of her affirmative defenses. Private
respondent filed a Comment and Opposition thereto.
Consequently, the COMELEC issued the second assailed
Order dated September 7, 2010, denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari positing the singular
issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
refusing to dismiss the protest of private respondent for
insufficiency in form and content.
Not unexpectedly, private respondent refutes the
allegations of petitioner and raises the procedural infirmity
in the instant petition, i.e., the power of this Court to
review decisions of the COMELEC under Section 3,4 Article
IX-C of the Constitution, pursuant to the leading case of
Repol v. COMELEC.5 Private respondent likewise counters
that the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of
discretion.
Adamantly, petitioner insists that the case at bar differs
from Repol since the herein assailed Orders constituted a
final order of the COMELEC (Second Division) on that
particular issue. Moreover, petitioner maintains that the
COMELEC patently committed grave abuse of discretion.

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3 Supra note 1, at 41-43.

4  Section  3.  The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
5 G.R. No. 161418, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 321.

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We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s proposition. The

landmark case of Repol, as affirmed in the subsequent
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cases of Soriano, Jr.   v. COMELEC6 and Blanco v.

COMELEC,7 leaves no room for equivocation.
Reviewing well-settled jurisprudence on the power of
this Court to review an order, whether final or
interlocutory, or final resolution of a division of the
COMELEC, Soriano definitively ruled, thus:

“In the 2004 case of Repol v. Commission on Elections, the

Court cited Ambil and held that this Court has no power to review
via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a
division of the COMELEC. However, the Court held that an
exception to this rule applies where the commission of grave
abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. In Repol, what was
assailed was a status quo ante Order without any time limit, and
more than 20 days had lapsed since its issuance without the
COMELEC First Division issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction. The Court held that the status quo ante Order of the
COMELEC First Division was actually a temporary restraining
order because it ordered Repol to cease and desist from assuming
the position of municipal mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and
directed Ceracas to assume the post in the meantime. Since the
status quo ante Order, which was qualified by the phrase “until
further orders from this Commission,” had a lifespan of more than
20 days, this Order clearly violates the rule that a temporary
restraining order has an effective period of only 20 days and
automatically expires upon the COMELEC’s denial of preliminary
injunction. The Court held:
“Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised
before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of
final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc, thus:
SEC.  3.  The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in
two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order
to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard
and decided in

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6 G.R. Nos. 164496-505, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 88.

7 G.R. No. 180164, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 755.

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Division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions

shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis supplied.)
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Under this constitutional provision, the COMELEC en banc

shall decide motions for reconsideration only of "decisions" of a
Division, meaning those acts having a final character. Clearly, the
assailed status quo ante Order, being interlocutory, should first be
resolved by the COMELEC First Division via a motion for
reconsideration.
Furthermore, the present controversy does not fall under any
of the instances over which the COMELEC en banc can take
cognizance of the case. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provides:
SEC.  2.  The Commission En Banc.—The Commission shall
sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-
proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of
the Commission, or in all other cases where a division is not
authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the
Members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to
an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the
Commission en banc.
The present case is not one of the cases specifically provided
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the COMELEC
may sit en banc. Neither is this case one where a division is not
authorized to act nor a case where the members of the First
Division unanimously voted to refer the issue to the COMELEC
en banc. Thus, the COMELEC en banc is not even the proper
forum where Repol may bring the assailed interlocutory Order for
resolution.
We held in Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections that —
Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an
election case within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in division
[cannot] dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of
a decision, resolution or final order of the Division of the
Commission on Elections because the case would not reach the
Comelec en banc without such motion for reconsideration having
been filed x x x.
Repol went directly to the Supreme Court from an
interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division. Section 7,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution prescribes the power of the
Supreme Court to review decisions of the COMELEC, as follows:

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Section  7.  Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of

all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution

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upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum

required by the rules of the commission or by the commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
We have interpreted this constitutional provision to mean final
orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court has no power to
review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Failure to abide
by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for
dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
However, this rule is not ironclad. In ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation v. COMELEC, we stated —
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural
requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be
glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue
involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor,
when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,
or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is
the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
The Court further pointed out in ABS-CBN that an exception
was warranted under the peculiar circumstances of the case since
there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a
reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the 11
May 1998 elections. The same can be said in Repol's case. We rule
that direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for
certiorari is justified under the circumstances obtaining in the
present case. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC
Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a
special

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Cayetano vs. Commission on Elections

civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a

decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division
shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. However, a motion
to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall
be resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order,

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except when all the members of the division decide to refer the
matter to the COMELEC En Banc.
Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC
Division are not appealable, nor can they be proper
subject of a petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise would
not only delay the disposition of cases but would also
unnecessarily clog the Court docket and unduly burden the Court.
This does not mean that the aggrieved party is without
recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the motion for
reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still assign as
error the interlocutory order if in the course of the
proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the
COMELEC En Banc. The exception enunciated in Kho and
Repol is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is
a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the
interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a
temporary restraining order without a time limit, which is the
Repol case, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer
with counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary
period, which is the Kho case.
This Court has already ruled in Reyes v. RTC of Oriental
Mindoro, that “it is the decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC En Banc that, in accordance with Section 7,
Art. IX-A of the Constitution, may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.” The exception provided in Kho
and Repol is unavailing in this case because unlike in Kho and
Repol, the assailed interlocutory orders of the COMELEC First
Division in this case are not a patent nullity. The assailed orders
in this case involve the interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Neither will the Rosal case apply because in that case
the petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of
the COMELEC Second Division and the petition for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on
the main case were already consolidated.”8

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8  Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 6, at 102-107. (Emphasis

supplied, citations omitted.)

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Plainly, from the foregoing, the Court has no jurisdiction

to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a
final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated
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otherwise, the Court can only review via certiorari a

decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc in
accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A  of the Constitution.
Petitioner’s assertion that circumstances prevailing
herein are different from the factual milieu attendant in
Repol has no merit. As stated in Soriano, “the general rule
is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division
cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a special
civil action for certiorari.” In short, the final order of the
COMELEC (Second Division) denying the affirmative
defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before this
Court even via a petition for certiorari.
True, the aforestated rule admits of exceptions as when
the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is a patent
nullity because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue the
same.9 Unfortunately for petitioner, none of the
circumstances permitting an exception to the rule occurs in
this instance.
Finally, certiorari will not lie in this case.
The issuance of a special writ of certiorari has two
prerequisites: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.10
Although it is not the duty of the Court to point
petitioner, or all litigants for that matter, to the
appropriate remedy which she should have taken, we refer
her to the cue found in

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9  Kho v. COMELEC, 344 Phil. 878, 886; 279 SCRA 463, 473 (1997).
10 See Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 1.

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Soriano, i.e., “[t]he aggrieved party can still assign as

error the interlocutory order if in the course of the
proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to
the COMELEC En Banc.” In addition, the protest filed by
private respondent and the counter-protest filed by
petitioner remain pending before the COMELEC, which
should afford petitioner ample opportunity to ventilate her
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grievances. Thereafter, the COMELEC should decide these

cases with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De

Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Corona (C.J.), No part.

Petition dismissed.

Note.—Laws and statutes governing election contests

especially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. (De Guzman, Jr. vs. Sison, 355 SCRA 69
[2001])
——o0o—— 

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