CASE STUDY—AMD v.

INTEL
ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION PRACTICE

On November 12, 2009, Advanced Micro Devices Inc. (AMD) and Intel Corporation
Client (Intel) announced the settlement of their epic antitrust dispute. As part of that
AMD
settlement, Intel agreed to pay US$1.25 billion, which is one of the largest private
settlements in the history of Sherman Act Section 2 litigation. Intel also agreed to
Industry refrain from certain business practices that AMD had alleged to be anticompetitive.
MICROPROCESSORS As part of the settlement, the parties also renewed their long-standing patent cross-
license agreement and included language to clarify that AMD can freely operate its
business using multiple foundries.
Areas of expertise
DAMAGES ANALYSIS
Economists Douglas Bernheim, Thomas Lys, and Mark Watson were retained by
ECONOMETRICS
AMD and submitted expert reports in AMD’s antitrust case against Intel Corporation.
SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT ANALYSIS
The reports were credited by Chuck Diamond of O’Melveny and Myers LLP, lead
counsel for AMD, as a significant factor leading to the settlement.

Dr. Bernheim, Bates White Partner and Professor of Economics at Stanford

University, offered a variety of opinions on liability issues related to AMD’s allegations
that certain Intel business practices foreclosed AMD, harmed competition,
and served to maintain Intel’s alleged monopoly, in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Dr. Bernheim’s lengthy report addressed a number of critical antitrust
questions, including the circumstances under which “exclusionary conditions” are
anticompetitive and the appropriate tests to apply in various situations. Exclusionary
conditions are conditions in an agreement between a seller and a buyer that make
discounts, rebates, or other material considerations contingent on the buyer
restricting its business dealings with one of the seller’s rivals.

Dr. Bernheim identified a method to determine whether or not conditions of the

sort allegedly placed by Intel on its dealings with its customers are anticompetitive,
independent of any comparison of prices and costs. He also examined the question
of the appropriate measure of costs in those circumstances in which a price cost
Contact: test is appropriate. Professor Bernheim also examined the extensive discovery
Randal Heeb, PhD record in the case to assess the anticompetitive versus procompetitive balance of
Partner Intel’s conduct.
202.747.5968
randal.heeb@bateswhite.com Dr. Watson, Professor of Economics at Princeton University and a Bates White
Academic Affiliate, conducted an econometric study to determine the extent of
George Rozanski, PhD AMD’s lost revenues attributable to Intel’s alleged conduct and to distinguish the
Partner impacts of the alleged conduct from a large assortment of factors and alternative
202.747.14.23 explanations.
george.rozanski@bateswhite.com
Dr. Lys, Professor of Accounting at Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern
Bates White Economic Consulting University, addressed questions related to the cost of microprocessor production at
1300 Eye St. NW, Suite 600 both AMD and Intel and calculated the lost profits that AMD suffered as a result of
Washington, DC 20005 Intel’s alleged conduct.

BATESWHITE.COM
 Antitrust and Competition Practice—AMD v. Intel case study - Page 2

Bates White’s team of PhD economists, accountants, statisticians, In 2005, AMD brought suit against Intel in the U.S. District Court
programmers, and data analysts supported these experts and for the District of Delaware alleging among other things, violation
O’Melveny attorneys in their investigation of the allegations and of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. AMD asserted that
in preparation of expert reports over the course of more than Intel possessed monopoly power in the worldwide market for
four years of litigation. To determine the extent and impact of the x86 processors and that it maintained that power through “a
alleged anticompetitive behavior, the Bates White team combed relentless, worldwide campaign to coerce customers to refrain
tens of thousands of documents identified from among the millions from dealing with AMD.” Specifically, AMD alleged that Intel
of documents, emails, and depositions collected from scores of employed payments for exclusivity, rebates, and other support
companies, industry participants, and executives. conditional on the recipient restricting its business with AMD, as
well as threats of retaliation against OEMs launching AMD-based
The massive electronic discovery effort, which has been described models in strategically important market segments.
as the largest electronic document discovery collection in history,
was only part of the information examined by the consulting Intel’s response characterized its conduct as aggressive price-
team. In addition, computer transaction records from the litigants based competition of the sort that makes consumers better off.
and from many computer makers were also processed and AMD, it argued, lost business opportunities for reasons it claimed
incorporated into Bates White’s analysis. The consulting team were unrelated to Intel’s conduct, such as disappointing products,
also assisted counsel in responding to requests from antitrust a weak brand image, or execution issues.
regulatory agencies in jurisdictions throughout the world.
More details related to Intel’s alleged conduct can be found on the
The dispute between the two companies has a long history. European Commission website: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
AMD and Intel have competed against each other in the x86 sectors/ICT/intel_provisional_decision.pdf.
microprocessor business since 1981. That was the year that IBM
introduced the IBM personal computer and required that Intel Details of the AMD and Intel settlement can be found on the
give AMD and others a license to produce the x86 processor to United States SEC website as exhibit 10.1 of Intel’s 8-K filing
protect IBM against the risks associated with a single monopoly on November 12, 2009. The link is http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
supplier. AMD eventually became, effectively, the only remaining edgar/data/50863/000005086309000213/exh101.htm.
competitor to Intel in the x86 market.

The turning point that gave rise to the antitrust concerns occurred
in the mid 1990s, when AMD broke from its role as a second
source manufacturer of reverse engineered Intel processor
designs, and began to compete for innovation leadership by
producing its own proprietary, state-of-the-art x86 processors.
Over the next few years, AMD emerged as an innovation rival
and potential challenger to Intel’s dominance of the global x86
processor industry. By 2001, AMD’s Athlon desktop processors
were viewed by many as outperforming Intel’s flagship Pentium-
series processors, and they were offered at lower prices. In 2003,
AMD introduced its award winning “Opteron” server processor,
marking AMD as the technology leader with its significant design
advancements and dramatically improved performance. In spite
of this, AMD experienced many obstacles when it attempted to
break into or expand its toehold among the world’s top computer
makers. In its lawsuit, AMD alleged that this state of affairs was
the result of Intel’s conduct and that this conduct amounted to
illegal exclusionary tactics.