Major Cases of Criminal Law

LIST OF CASES.

Asia Bibi Case

Qandeel Balouch Case
Cannibalism Case
Lahore motorway Case
Shahbaz murder Case
PIA Plane Crash.
High Treason- Parvez Musharraf Case.
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner 1969
2017 PLD 370
2013 PLD 117
2011 SCMR 1966
1958 PLD 188

CAUSATION

Qurban v Atta Muhammad 

2020 SCMR 939
PLD 1995 SC 464
R v Cheshire 1991
1992 CLC 2540
Cato 1976
Blaue 1975
R vs William and Davis 1992

RECKLESSNESS

2020 SCMR Copland 

2018 PLD 903
2015 SCMR 1192
2010 PLD 134
2001 PLD 113
1976 PCRLJ 356

Cases - 2 April 2021 (online class)

Canadian case 2020 SCMR 541
2020 PLD 358
2020 PLD 358
2020 SCMR 1442
2013 PLD 117
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner 1969

09 April 2021 (Online class)

1997 PRCLJ 1971
2005 ECRLJ 182
2005 SCMR 599
PLD 1991 SC 202
PLD 2007 SC 111
2000 PCRLJ 1688
PLD 2017 SC 165
AIR 1966 CRILJ 171 SC
AIR 1964 SC 1263
PLD 1996 SC 274
1977 PCRLJ 1411
1999 PCRLJ 9
2012 YLR 442
PLD 2007 SC 93
2001 PCRLJ 1548
2006 PCRLJ 662
2002 SCMR 1493
PLD 2004 SC 874
2007 SCMR 1896
PLD 2005 SC 530

R v Cheshire (David William) [1991] 1 WLR 844 (UK CASE)

Chain of causation – Death in hospital following shooting

Facts

Cheshire shot a man during the course of an argument. The victim was taken to hospital
to have surgery and shortly after developed respiratory issues. The doctors inserted a
tracheotomy tube, which remained in place for four weeks and initially improved the
victim’s condition. Several days later the victim complained of respiratory issues, his
condition soon worsened and he died shortly afterwards. The post-mortem found that
the victim’s windpipe had narrowed near the location where the tracheotomy pipe had
been inserted. Cheshire was subsequently charged with murder and convicted. The
decision was appealed.

Issue

A key issue in this case was whether the accused’s acts of shooting the victim had
caused the death or whether the chain of causation was broken by the negligent
medical treatment that the victim had received following being injured by the shooting.
The judge in this case directed the jury to decide whether Cheshire’s acts could have
made a ‘significant contribution’ to the victim’s death. Importantly, the judge directed
the jury that the acts need not be the sole or even main cause of death.

Held
Appeal dismissed. The jury was not required to evaluate the competing causes of death
and therefore the judge was right to direct them as he did in the first instance. It was
clear that the negligent medical treatment in this case was the immediate cause of the
victim’s death but that did not absolve the accused unless the treatment was so
independent the accused’s act to regard the contribution as insignificant.

R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110

Causation and whether consent of victim to injections is relevant; requirements of

unlawful and malicious administration of “noxious thing” under s. 23 of the Offences
against the Person Act 1861

Facts

Mr Cato and the victim prepared their own syringes and then injected each other with
heroin. The victim died. Mr Cato was convicted of manslaughter and administering a
noxious thing contrary to s. 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. He
appealed against his conviction.

Issue

The jury was asked to decide whether the injection caused, contributed to or accelerated
the victim’s death. The judge did not provide the direction that cause or contribution
should be substantial, and advised the jury that the victim’s consent to the heroin
injection was irrelevant to the consideration of whether Mr Cato was reckless or grossly
negligent (i.e. whether he committed manslaughter). Mr Cato argued that the trial judge
had thus misdirected the jury. He also claimed that heroin was not a “noxious” thing and
that “malicious”  administration under s. 23 OAPA 1861 had not occurred – i.e. the act
of injection was not unlawful.

Held

The injection of heroin had to be the  cause of death in order to find that manslaughter
had taken place. Even though no express directions were given about the necessity of
“substantial” cause of death, it must have been clear to the jury that more than a de
minimis contribution was required. Secondly, the victim’s consent might be relevant to
the finding of recklessness or gross negligence but consent in itself is not a defence to
manslaughter. The jury was thus not misdirected. Thirdly, as Mr Cato had unlawfully
taken heroin into his possession in order to inject the victim with it, the act of injection
was itself unlawful in relation to the charge of manslaughter. Finally, heroin is a
potentially harmful substance and thus a “noxious” thing for the purposes of s. 23
OAPA 1861; since the act of administration was deliberate and direct, there is no need
to find “maliciousness”.

Fagan v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1969] 1 Q.B. 439

Actus reus – assault of policeman – car driven on to policeman’s foot

Facts

Fagan was sat in his car when he was approached by a police officer who told him to
move the vehicle. Fagan did so, reversed his car and rolled it on to the foot of the police
officer. The officer forcefully told him to move the car off his foot at which point Fagan
swore at him and refused to move vehicle and turned the engine off. Fagan was
convicted of assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty. Fagan subsequently
appealed the decision.

Issues

Fagan appealed on the basis that there cannot be an offence in assault in omitting to
act and that driving on to the officer’s foot was accidental, meaning that he was lacking
mens rea when the act causing damage had occurred. The legal issue here was whether
the prosecution had proven facts which had amounted to an assault. For an assault to
be committed both actus reus and mens rea must be established at the same time.

Held

It was agreed that an omission cannot establish an assault. The court held that:

‘Although assault is an independent crime and is to be treated as such, for practical

purposes today, assault is generally synonymous with battery.’ (at page 433)

On this basis, it was held that Fagan’s crime was not the refusal to move the car but that
having driven on to the foot of the officer and decided not to cease the act, he had
established a continual act of battery. This meant that actus reus and mens rea were
present and as such, an assault was committed. Fagan’s conviction was upheld.

R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411

Chain of Causation – Manslaughter – Novus Actus Interveniens – Victim’s Own Act – Egg
shell Skull Rule

Facts
After the victim refused the defendant’s sexual advances the defendant stabbed the
victim four times.  Whist the victim was admitted to hospital she required medical
treatment which involved a blood transfusion.  The victim was a Jehovah’s Witness
whose religious views precluded  accepting a blood transfusion.  She was informed that
without a blood transfusion she would die but still refused to countenance treatment as
a result of her religious conviction.  The victim subsequently died and the defendant was
charged with manslaughter by way of diminished responsibility.  The defendant
appealed.

Issue

Did the victim’s refusal to accept medical treatment ritute a novus actus interveniens  and
so break the chain of causation between the defendant’s act and her death?  Whether
the test laid down in R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 was to be applied because of
an omission on behalf of the victim.

Held

The appeal was dismissed.  The stab wound and not the girl’s refusal to accept medical
treatment was the operating cause of death.  The victim’s rejection of a blood
transfusion did not break the chain of causation.  The defendant must take their victim
as they find them and this includes the characteristics and beliefs of the victim and not
just their physical condition.  Unlike in R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 the victim’s
decision was an omission and not a positive act and so the test was not of whether the
omission was reasonably foreseeable.  In the case of omissions by the victim ‘egg-shell
skull’ rule was to be applied.  Even if R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 is applied the
victim’s response was foreseeable taking into account their particular characteristics.

R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95

Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm – Causation – Foreseeability – Novus Actus

Interveniens

Facts

After a party the male defendant R, gave the female victim a lift in his automobile.  The
victim and the defendant had not met before.  The defendant began making sexual
advances towards the victim which were rejected before attempting to pull off her coat. 
The victim then opened the door and jumped out of the moving vehicle sustaining
injuries as a result.  The defendant was charged with sexual assault and assault
occasioning actual bodily harm and was convicted at trial of assault occasioning actual
bodily harm but acquitted of sexual assault.  The defendant appealed.

Issue

Was the defendant guilty of assault occasioning actual bodily harm?  Was the defendant
responsible both in fact and in law for the injuries caused by her leaving the moving
car?  Was the trial judge correct to direct the jury that they could convict the defendant
if they considered that the victims actions caused the victim’s injuries as a result of the
victim’s behaviour being a natural consequence of the defendant’s acts?

Held

The defendant’s appeal was dismissed.  The trial judge was right to direct the jury that
they could convict if they thought the victim’s act had been a natural consequence of
the defendant’s actions.  The test for whether a victim’s own acts were not to be
considered capable of breaking the chain of causation was whether the act was a natural
consequence or result of what the assailant did or said?  If the victim’s act was so
unexpected that it could not be foreseen by a reasonable man then the act would be a
remote and unreal consequence of the assault and as such would then break the chain
of causation.

R v Williams; R v Davis [1992] 2 All ER 183

Directions on evidence and causation in manslaughter by an unlawful act (joint
enterprise)

Facts

The victim was a hitchhiker picked up by Mr Williams; Mr Davis and Mr Bobat were
passengers in the car. After a few miles, the victim jumped out of the moving car and
suffered fatal injuries. Mr Williams and Mr Davis were convicted of manslaughter and
robbery after the jury accepted that they robbed the victim (as pre-planned) and
threatened him with physical violence as a result of which he jumped out of the car; Mr
Bobat was acquitted. Messrs Williams and Davis appealed.

Issue

The judge directed the jury that statements to the police could only be used against the
maker of the statement, but Mr Williams argued that the evidence was too tenuous to
go before the jury, and that his conviction was inconsistent with Mr Bobat’s acquittal. Mr
Davis claimed that the judge should have accepted a submission of no case to answer;
that his conviction was based on Mr Bobat’s statement to the police and that evidence
of the mere presence of a knife and stick in the car should not have been admitted.

Held

Firstly, the evidence shown in order to prove the presence of a joint enterprise to rob
the victim applied equally against all defendants and thus the conviction of Messrs
Williams and Davis was indeed inconsistent with Mr Bobat’s acquittal. It follows that that
the jury must have used the defendants’ statements to the police against other
defendants, despite the judge’s direction to the contrary. Further, the jury should have
been directed that the victim’s actions must be proportional to the gravity of the threat.
Based on these failures, joint enterprise could not be proven and, consequently, the case
for robbery failed. In the absence of an unlawful act, the elements of manslaughter were
also not present.