6

Afghanistan–Pakistan
Relations
From Uncertainty and
Confrontation to Optimism
Muhammad Azam

Although Afghanistan and Pakistan often claim to have friendly relations, an

undercurrent of irreconcilable differences has persisted and resulted in periods of
conflicts and cooperation. The historical origin of this friction lies in the Durand
Line – that is the 2,611-kilometre long boundary that separates the two countries.
It was demarcated in 1893 between the then Afghan ruler Amir Abd al-Rahman
Khan and the British India.1 After the British left the Indian subcontinent in 1947,
Afghanistan refused to accept it as an international border with Pakistan. This
study endeavours to analyse the various aspects of the Pakistan–Afghanistan rela-
tionship, including differences; sources of conflict and cooperation; the cultural,
historic and ethnic bonds, the impact of the role of regional and global political
factors and the security challenges.
A common religion and a large number of Pashtuns living on the both sides of
the Durand Line are the basic factors that create a sense of brotherhood among the
people of the two countries. However, as Pakistan applied for the UN member-
ship as a new member, Hosayn Aziz, the then Afghan representative to the United
Nations, on 30 September 1947 cast the only vote against Pakistan’s application.
Nevertheless, barely 1 month later, on 20 October, the vote was rescinded, and it
was hoped that bilateral discussions would lead to an understanding between the
two countries.2 Officials of both sides held talks in Karachi and exchanged ambas-
sadors in February 1948.3
Finding no favourable reception to its territorial claims, Afghanistan brought
forth the idea of ‘Pashtunistan,’ comprising the Pakistani territories: the frontier
states of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Baluchistan and the Baluchistan states of Kalat,
Kharan, Makran and Las Bela.4 Some analysts also ascribe Afghanistan’s espousal
of Pashtunistan to its domestic or national considerations.5
Another reason of conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan was their join-
ing the opposite security blocks during the 1950s in the backdrop of the Cold
War. Pakistan joined the US-led capitalist block and signed defence pacts with
the United States. Afghanistan, on the other hand, sided with the USSR and India.
Both Moscow and New Delhi backed Kabul on its dispute with Pakistan via-a-vis
the Durand Line issue.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-8
100  Muhammad Azam
The Idea of Pak–Afghan Confederation
It is interesting to note that parallel with differences, there were discussions
for the confederation of Pakistan and Afghanistan. There were different views
about the origin and the development of the idea. It was first raised by the leader
of the Ismaili sect, Agha Khan (1877–1957), the first president of All India Mus-
lim League.6 The idea gained some momentum in the mid-1950s. Afghanistan
showed even an interest in a defence pact with Pakistan. The idea of confederation
gained momentum when at times the adverse propaganda of the Afghan media
against Pakistan on the subject of Pashtunistan was lessened.7 Later, emphasis for
the confederation came from Afghanistan. It had a rationale. At that time Pakistan
was a close ally of the United States, so perhaps this might have been a proposal
aired in Afghanistan based on the rationale that a close union with Pakistan was a
way to acquire US aid to counteract Soviet influence in Afghanistan.8 On the other
hand, according to some analysts, the idea of confederation was pushed forward
by Colonel A.S.B. Shah, Pakistani ambassador to Kabul. He was a staunch sup-
porter of closer relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan.9
Among the promoters of the idea of a confederation of Afghanistan and Pakistan
were Agha Khan, Afghan Foreign Minister Naim Khan (1953–1955), and Paki-
stan’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Aslam Khattak. Reportedly, Afghan ambassa-
dor to the United States, Naim Khan, solicited American support to advance the
idea. Aslam Khattak, a leading Pakistani diplomat and politician, had discussed
the proposal with Afghan leader and Prime Minister Sardar Daoud Khan. Regard-
ing Pakistan’s reaction, Khattak stated that he followed up the idea with the Prime
Minister Husseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy and his successor Firoz Khan Noon. As
stated by Khattak, Noon responded, ‘We should have no difficulty accepting King
Zahir Shah as the constitutional Head of State’ and President Iskandar Mirza ‘con-
curred with this.’10
The idea of confederation was expanded to include Iran. Delivering a speech
in Quetta in August  1962, Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, for the first time
publicly spoke about a confederation of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.11 He
showed his willingness of binding three Muslim countries into a larger political
system.12 He stated, ‘I will welcome a possible confederation of Afghanistan, Iran
and Pakistan.’13 However, in the same speech he made a few caustic references
about Afghanistan’s refusal to accept the Durand Line as international frontier.
This was probably to forestall any prompt and consequential deliberations on the
proposal.14 Thus, the plan lingered with an outward show of goodwill. As subse-
quent events showed, there was no confirmation that it was seriously taken up by
any of the governments involved.15
To understand what led to the idea of confederation, three key factors prompted
were geographic proximity; religion; and history of linguistic, ethnic, cultural and
political links. Generally, there was a tendency of compliance to political author-
ity in these three nations. This increased the prospects of its acceptance. A similar
tendency in the three countries’ world view towards the developed nations made
them want to project a positive, cooperative image of themselves to potential
 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 101
donor nations. Likewise, common religion and historically long ethnic linkages
further increased the prospects of unity.
Parallel to this, there were several centrifugal forces which ultimately domi-
nated and prevented any sort of confederation. Acting against the federation were
tribal, regional, cultural, political, geographic and international factors. Intense
particularistic attitudes are connected to regionalism, tribalism or ethnocentrism.
‘Pashtunistan’ was a manifestation of the pre-eminent ethnocentric trait.16 Fur-
thermore, the contrasting ruling structures of a monarchy in Afghanistan and a
quasi-presidential system in Pakistan presented political obstacles. There were at
least two geographic factors that also stood in the way of any such confederation:
the ‘empty triangle,’ that is the area lying between Karachi, Meshed and Khor-
ramshahr, was ‘a zone of inaccessibility’ due to it being backwards with a lack of
infrastructure; different levels of political, social and economic development in
Pakistan and Iran vis-à-vis Afghanistan created an imbalance, and the remoteness
of East Pakistan (which declared independence in 1971 and became Bangladesh)
perturbed some Bengalis on the thought of a confederation in the west wing.17
Furthermore, global considerations, like Soviet interests in Afghanistan and
Indian opposition, were other obstacles to any scheme that would ensure a stable
relationship between the neighbouring countries.18 The fact that Afghanistan was
receiving political, economic and military assistance from the USSR and Pakistan
was getting the same from the United States put both countries in opposing camps.
Moreover, Kabul’s hostility towards Pakistan was a serious impediment19 that
had to be overcome for a confederation to eventuate. On the basis of these facts,
some top leaders such as Chaudhry Mohammed Ali and Ayub Khan expressed
their reservations about the idea of confederation. Country’s leading daily, Dawn,
published editorials criticizing the plan.20 Pakistani leaders were suspicious why
Afghanistan, which did not accept Pakistan’s boundary with it, readily accepted
the idea of a confederation. The idea disappeared in the following decades.

Daoud
Daoud Presidency
Presidency and
and Détente
Detente with
with Pakistan
Pakistan
During Zahir
During Zahir Shah’s
Shah’s rule
rule in
in Afghanistan
Afghanistan in in the
the 1960s, two contracting
1960s, two trends were
contracting trends were
noticed in its relations with Pakistan. Officially, Afghanistan government
noticed in its relations with Pakistan. Officially, Afghanistan government missed missed
no
no opportunity
opportunity of of avowing
avowing support
support forfor Pashtunistan
Pashtunistan and and officially
officially rejecting
rejecting the
the
Durand
Durand Line. In practice, however, relations remained normal. It was obvious
Line. In practice, however, relations remained normal. It was obvious
from
from thethe fact
fact that there were
that there were no visa restrictions
no visa between the
restrictions between the two
two countries
countries and
and
that there was free movement of people across
that there was free movement of people across the border. the border.
A
A shift
shift in
in relationship took place
relationship took place as
as in
in July 1973, Daoud overthrew
July 1973, Daoud overthrew the the mon-
mon­
archy and took power in his hands. This perturbed Pakistan
archy and took power in his hands. This perturbed Pakistan because Daoud was because Daoud was
an
an avowed
avowed ‘Pakistan-baiter’
‘Pakistan-baiter’21 21
and
and ‘champion
‘champion of of the
the Pashtunistan
Pashtunistan cause.’
cause.’22 22
Given
Given
his
his anti-Pakistan
anti-Pakistan tone,tone, Daoud
Daoud did did not
not even
even attend the Islamic
attend the Islamic summit
summit in in Lahore
Lahore in
in
November 1974. The mantra of Pashtunistan was amplified
November 1974. The mantra of Pashtunistan was amplified during this tenure.23 during this tenure.23
However, the
However, the confrontational
confrontational policy
policy with Pakistan was
with Pakistan was economically
economically damaging
damaging
for the land-locked Afghanistan whose trade depended on
for the land-locked Afghanistan whose trade depended Pakistan to
on Pakistan to aa great
great
extent.
extent.
102  Muhammad Azam
In the later years of Daoud’s presidency, Pakistan–Afghan relations began to
improve. This change resulted due to changes in Daoud’s policy towards Paki-
stan. In fact, Afghan economy was rapidly deteriorating. Country’s reliance on the
Soviet Union multiplied latter’s influence in the country. Daoud decided to reori-
ent his foreign policy away from the USSR and mend fences with Pakistan. On
the other hand, Soviets were also not happy with many of Daoud’s policies, espe-
cially his consolidation of power and independent foreign policy. In 1976, Daoud
invited Zulfikar Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan for a 5-day visit (7–11
June). The tour was reciprocated by Daoud in August the same year. In June 1977,
when returning from a visit to Iran, Bhutto made a stopover in Kabul. In spite of
drastic changes in Pakistan in the form of General Zia-ul-Haq’s military coup on
5 July 1977, the détente between Islamabad and Kabul remained intact. General
Zia paid a visit to Kabul in October the same year. Daoud reciprocated it. Both
sides scheduled a second meeting in 1978 in Kabul to finalize matters pertaining
to their bilateral relations. In the course of his interactions with Pakistani leaders,
Daoud had indicated that he had altered his stand on the issue of Pashtunistan and
was willing to negotiate adjustments in it.24 However, this second meeting never
transpired. The communist Parcham Party led by Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah
Amin, who was the Head of the Khalq faction that had infiltrated the Afghan
army, staged a coup on 27 April 1978 (Karmal had earlier escaped to Russia, and
Amin was under house arrest at the time). In what was called the Saur Revolution,
Daoud and his family were arrested and assassinated on 28 April.
However, in-fighting among the communist leaders of Afghanistan and the
instability of the regime necessitated the USSR to send troops to occupy the coun-
try, oust Hafizullah Amin and install Babrak Karmal as president. On 26 Decem-
ber 1979, Russian tanks entered Kabul.

Soviet Invasion, Civil War and the Taliban

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1988), Pakistan played an indis-
pensable role in helping the Mujahideen (the Afghan resistance) to oust the Soviet
troops. Pakistan’s response to the Soviet invasion was instinctive, expressing the
‘gravest concerns.’25 Its reaction to the invasion was two-fold. First, it enhanced
pressure on the USSR on the diplomatic front. Second, it aided the Mujahideen
on the battlefield. On the diplomatic front, Pakistan, with the support of several
other countries, engaged the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the
United Nations. A special session of the foreign ministers of the OIC member
states in Islamabad was held on 29 January 1980 that suspended Afghanistan’s
membership of the organization. Under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ banner, the UN
General Assembly passed a resolution on 14 January 1980 seeking instant depar-
ture of the Soviet forces. Pakistan’s role in the conduct of Geneva talks – 12
sessions in total – and the conclusion of the Geneva Accords in April 1988 were
crucial. Pakistan’s resolve to buttress the Afghan resistance ‘was not only morally
right but based on enlightened self-interest.’26 The Geneva Accords led to a (a)
departure of Soviet troops, (b) ended US involvement without however any final
 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 103
settle and (c) the metamorphosis of the international war into a civil war which
lasted for another decade. An unending civil war ensued. The Mujahideen fought
against Najibullah’s communist regime which took over after Soviet departure
and fell in April 1992. Thereafter, a struggle for power among the various armed
factions that had fought the Soviets started. Pashtun, Tajik and Uzbek factions of
the Mujahideen, along with the groups of veterans like Hekmatyar and Rabbani,
began fighting with each other to gain power.
Due to the American disengagement, Pakistan had to deal with the refugee
crisis on one hand and with the unfolding developments of the civil war in war-
ravaged country on the other. Pakistan kept on backing the Afghan Mujahideen,
particularly when they refused to join the communist regime in Kabul. In this sce-
nario, regional powers including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and India assumed
a greater role in Afghanistan. Regional politics, particularly the hostile relations
between India–Pakistan, further complicated the Afghan imbroglio.
In collaboration with Saudi Arabia and Iran, Pakistan attempted to bring peace
to the embattled country. They facilitated two accords among the Afghan Muja-
hideen leaders in 1992 and 1994 which came to nothing due to fierce rivalry
between them. A US-initiated peace process equally failed in 1998 despite having
started with ‘spectacular momentum.’27 The process brought five Taliban and nine
Northern Alliance members across the negotiation table in Pakistan. But, then,
suddenly, the Taliban attacked Takhar Province aborting the peace process.28
The civil war among the various factions can be said to have lasted from 1992
to 2001. From 1996 to 2001, there was a period of comparatively less uncertainty
when the Taliban took over and ruled Kabul and other Pashtun areas. The North-
ern Alliance comprising mainly Tajiks and Uzbeks held the Panjshir Valley. This
was not anywhere near an ideal situation for Pak–Afghan ties, but at least some
form of governance began to function again.
Pakistan is widely believed to have supported the Taliban in their speedy
advances against the rival Mujahideen groups. The Rabbani regime (that the
mediators managed to install for a short while), America and other critics held
Pakistan responsible for Taliban’s victories, and they did not give due considera-
tion to the other Mujahideen, as is asserted by former foreign minister of Pakistan,
Abdul Sattar.29
After the Taliban captured Kabul in May 1997, Pakistan immediately recog-
nized their government. Pakistan considered it necessary on the following reasons:
(a) In order to manage the everyday affairs in the war-torn country; (b) to process
visas for travelers and (c) to open transit trade for land-locked Afghanistan.30
Unlike other governments in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime did not provoke
Pakistan. No special benefit, however, accrued to Pakistan during the Taliban
rule – even on the issue of the Durand Line. The policy of de-recognition of the
Durand Line as the international boundary was never reviewed by them therefore
tacitly the Taliban did not renounce Afghan claims on Pakistani territories. The
extent of Pakistan’s influence over the Afghan Taliban may be gauged by the fact
that they forthrightly turned down Pakistan’s request not to harm the Bamiyan
Buddha statues and refused to sever their ties with al-Qaeda – that is they ‘paid
104  Muhammad Azam
little heed to Pakistan’s suggestions.’31 Pakistan restricted formal relations with
the Taliban regime and closed the Afghan banks when they were penalized by
the UN Security Council in December 2000 for destroying historical monuments.
Former foreign minister, Abdul Sattar, once stated that developments since the
1990s have demonstrated that a Pakistani Minister’s inference that the Taliban
were ‘our boys’ was a misconception and the notion of the Americans that the Tal-
iban were Pakistan’s surrogates was a glaring gaffe.32 In Pakistan, many believe
the Afghan Taliban were not any strategic asset.
After their recapture of Kabul and other main cities in August 2021, Pakistan
has lucidly and publicly affirmed that it is not going to recognize the Taliban
government unilaterally.33 After fleeing from Kabul, Ghani averred that approxi-
mately 15,000 fighters joined the Afghan Taliban from Pakistan, but both Pakistan
and the United States repudiated it.34

9/11, Peace Efforts and Interference

The 9/11 and the US War on Terror transformed Pakistan–Afghan ties in a dra-
matic way. The US invasion caused a repetition of several of the same issues that
Pakistan as a neighbouring and frontline state faced at the time of the Soviet inva-
sion during the 1980s such as a fresh influx of Afghan refugees; a security threat
to its western boundary and a resultant huge pressure on its military to maintain
law and order situation and pressure on its economy. At the time of the invasion,
Pakistan had to make a ‘pivotal and courageous turn toward the United States.’35
It had to abandon the Taliban regime when the United States decided to bring
them down for sheltering and shielding al-Qaeda leaders. As Pakistan’s military
ruler accepted WoT (partially to gain Western legitimacy to his military regime),
the country allowed the US forces to use its ports and air bases for logistics and
supplies for the US-led coalition forces of NATO fighting in Afghanistan. As the
United Nations initiated the process of setting up another government in Decem-
ber 2001, Pakistan recommended ‘a fair representation’ for Pushtuns, Tajiks,
Hazaras and Uzbeks.36 In 2000s, several mechanisms for cooperation involving
Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) were instituted. These included meetings of foreign ministers, a
Joint Economic Commission, the jirga peace process, a tripartite commission on
refugees together with the UNHCR to oversee border security and cross-border
violations.37
Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan during the early years of Karzai regime
(2001 to 2014) were relatively less unpleasant. In 2004, for example, ‘a positive
thrust’ was apparent at the time of Musharraf’s visit to extend felicitations on Kar-
zai’s electoral success. Similarly, the start of the next year ‘marked a high point’
of the mutual relations on the occasion of Pakistan’s invitation to Karzai to be the
guest of honour at the Pakistan Day parade on 23rd of March.38 Hamid Karzai
referred to Pakistan as a ‘twin brother,’ ‘conjoined twins,’ ‘brother country,’ and
‘great friend.’39 However, in foreign relations, traditional attitudes have a habit
of lingering and re-emerging when stakeholders perceive the need to reassert
 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 105
them. It did not take long for the ties to start becoming sour again. Karzai govern-
ment banned Pakistani newspapers and websites alleging that they indulged in
anti-Afghan propaganda. In reaction, Pakistan disallowed Afghan TV channels.
In September 2006, Karzai and Musharraf had a rancorous summit in President
Bush’s presence. The extent of resentment ‘reached such alarming proportions’
that the Group of Eight (G-8) extended invitations to both of these countries to
attend the foreign ministers’ meeting in Potsdam on 30 May 2007 in order to
bring them together.40 Taliban attacks in Afghanistan allegedly from safe havens
in Pakistan and the hideouts of the Haqqani network hindered efforts for ‘trust
building’ between the two states. Ashraf Ghani made positive gestures during his
visit to Islamabad after securing his first term as the president, but these obstacles
continued to mar relations.41 Operations carried out by Pakistan’s armed forces
to clean out terrorists together with a rising number of American drone attacks in
2005 could not stop Taliban activities.42
Kabul and Islamabad had to continue efforts for years and years to bring
the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. Before the formation of the High
Peace Council, views on its composition were exchanged with Islamabad. In
March 2010, Karzai promised Pakistan a role in the proposal for ‘reconciliation
and reintegration’ of the Afghan Taliban and pledged to take Pakistan into confi-
dence in connection with any political arrangement with the Taliban. Radio Free
Europe revealed that a Pakistani delegation had participated in the negotiations
between the Afghan government and Taliban delegates in Kabul in 2010.43
In 2010, Karzai felt it was important to have peace negotiations with the Tal-
iban. The Taliban had two conditions: an immediate evacuation of all foreign
troops and release of all Taliban prisoners. In 2012, Pakistan and Afghanistan con-
curred to set up a combined peace commission to make contact with the Afghan
Taliban leaders in North Waziristan.44 Pakistan hosted the High Peace Council
Chairman Salahuddin Rabbani in November 2012 in Islamabad and thereafter set
free several senior Taliban leaders held in Pakistan, because the Karzai govern-
ment had been striving to obtain their release. According to media reports, on 30
December 2012, four more Afghan Taliban prisoners were released, including for-
mer justice minister Mullah Nooruddin Turabi and former governor of Helmand
Province, Abdul Bari. Twenty-six detainees were freed in two batches in 2012.
However, relations between the Karzai government and Pakistan were filled
with suspicion, and the United States kept asking the latter to ‘do more’ and get
rid of safe havens in its territory. In fact, both the United States and Afghanistan
had initially burned their boats as far as relations with the Taliban were concerned
and now depended on Pakistan to bring them to the negotiating table. Karzai was
not able to make any headway in talks with the Taliban, as the latter refused to
recognize the government. As Ashraf Ghani became the president, Karzai was
made Chairman of the High Peace Conference.
In June 2015, Pakistan brought the Afghan Taliban to Murree (a hill resort in
Pakistan) to hold negotiations with the representatives of the Ghani regime. How-
ever, Kabul’s revelation that Taliban chief Mullah Omar had breathed his last
in 2013 turned out to be a stumbling block for these negotiations, and the next
106  Muhammad Azam
meeting that was to be held on 31 July 2015 was cancelled. Pakistan warned
that they would banish the Quetta Shura (the council of elders of the Taliban in
Quetta, Pakistan) if they did not consent to restore the peace talks.45 Friends of
Afghanistan backed up endeavours for ceasefire and settlement. A gathering of 22
countries on the platform of the Heart of Asia (HoA) met on 8 December 2015 in
Islamabad and laid stress on the vital importance of termination of hostilities in
Afghanistan. The Afghan ambassador in Islamabad acknowledged Pakistan’s role
in the ceasefire on the occasion of the religious holiday of Eid al-Fitr in 2018.46
Russia also stepped into the picture. On 9 November 2018, a peace confer-
ence was arranged in Moscow that was attended by the Taliban, all the regional
countries and the Central Asian Republics. This was the first time the Taliban sent
a delegation to an international conference. The delegation was led by Stanikzai,
and the Taliban conceded that there should be peace but insisted on the precondi-
tion of complete withdrawal of foreign troops.
The Taliban did not recognize the US-backed Kabul regime, and their main
demand was the US withdrawal. In 2019, the US opened direct negotiations with
the Taliban in Doha. Pakistan was very much instrumental in arranging these
talks. At the end, on 29 February 2020, the United States concluded a watershed
agreement with the Afghan Taliban. However, these were to be followed up with
intra-Afghan peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government
to arrive at a permanent settlement.
During Karzai and Ghani regimes, Kabul and Islamabad continued to com-
plain of interference by the other in their internal affairs despite their policy of
non-interference. Afghanistan accused Pakistan of abetting the Afghan Taliban,
and the latter held the former responsible for allowing India to fan insurgency
in Balochistan, for planning other terrorist and sabotage activities and support-
ing Pakistani Taliban. Pakistan is vulnerable to attacks by militant organizations,
including the Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, having sanctuaries in Afghanistan.47 Moreover,
four suspected agents of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Afghan-
istan’s secret agency, were captured from Pishin (near Quetta, Balochistan) in
February 2018.48
Troubles continued to hamper cooperation. Alleging ‘undue interference’ by
the governor of Nangarhar Province, Pakistan closed its Jalalabad consulate in
September 2018. Afghan officials made allegations in August 2018 that the Tali-
ban’s attack on Ghazni was supported by Pakistani citizens. Two months later,
Ghani contended that the latest assault in Kandahar was planned in Pakistan.
Pakistan rejected the allegations.49 Such accusations and rejections were a routine
matter. In March 2019, Khan angered Ghani by proposing ‘an impartial interim
government’ to hold free and fair elections, as he asserted that peace cannot return
to the country otherwise.50
Violent activities along the border also continued. For example Pakistan
claimed that it eliminated 50 Afghan soldiers on 7 May 2017 in a cross-border
exchange of fire, accusing Afghan border police for starting the skirmish. Eleven
people lost their lives in border clashes on 15 July 2018. Four Pakistani soldiers
were slain in militant fire from Afghanistan on 14 September 2019. A Pakistani
 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 107
soldier was killed by Afghan gunfire on 22 September 2020. Afghanistan accused
the Pakistan armed forces of firing a rocket into their territory that caused civilian
casualties on 16 July 2020.
Border violence did not end in 2021, too, and several Pakistani troops were
martyred in firing from across the border. Islamabad accused that over 5,000
anti-Pakistan militants was present in Afghanistan.51 There was danger even after
Taliban’s taking control of Kabul, hence Islamabad was contemplating to close
down the Chaman border in the early days of September 2021.52 The Pak–Afghan
boundary is regarded among the most dangerous ones in the world.53
In the run-up to Taliban’s recapture of Kabul on 15 August 2021, a number of
Afghan soldiers took refuge in Pakistan to escape the onslaught of Taliban.54 In
the wake of the fall of Kabul, Pakistan rolled out historic evacuation operations in
which hundreds of flights (400 till 28 August) took part bringing around 12,000
evacuees to Pakistan, including ISAF and NATO troops and Afghan and foreign
civilians from 38 countries.55

Conclusion
Cooperative relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are vitally important for
both sides. Pakistan depends upon Afghanistan for access to Central Asia and
Russia, while the latter is landlocked and critically depends upon the former for
its trade. Several factors contribute towards friendly relations between the two
countries. Both sides have historic, cultural, religious and ethnic bonds. The two
nations had mutual struggle against imperialism first against the British Empire
and later against the Soviet imperialism. The idea of Pakistan–Afghan confedera-
tion in fact reflected the desire of unity, although it could not be materialized. Both
countries have mutual economic and trade interests vital to progress and devel-
opment of their people. Pakistan believes that its support of the Afghans against
Soviet occupation, its efforts for a peaceful transition at the time of the overthrow
of the communist regime, its endeavours and cooperation with Karzai and Ghani
administrations for bringing peace and stability and, above all, its opening up
of the border for millions of Afghan refugees have been in line with the inter-
ests of the international community as well as for the goodwill of the Afghan
people. While UNHCR facilitated voluntary repatriation of 4.4 million Afghan
refugees from 2002 to 2021, Pakistan still hosts well over 1.4 million registered
and many more unregistered Afghan refugees, residing in more than 0.2 million
households.56 A spectre of refugees looms large once again after the withdrawal
of US armed forces as the UN has warned of around 0.5 million more Afghan
refugees by the end of 2021.57
It is in the core interests of Pakistan and Afghanistan not to allow their territo-
ries to be used by militants or to serve the interests of imperialist states. It will also
benefit the two nations to keep the border peaceful and favourable for interna-
tional trade, conducted mainly through the Khyber and Chaman passes. Contrary
to this, adverse and hostile relations between the two neighbours will negatively
impact trade and the Afghan peace process. A number of factors are responsible
108  Muhammad Azam
for this unwanted situation, including a huge trust deficit. Restoring the trust is
not an easy task. The cardinal reason, however, behind these unfriendly relations
between Afghanistan and Pakistan is the former’s perpetual refusal to accept the
Durand Line as the Pakistan–Afghan border and claim on some Pakistani terri-
tories. The settlement of these issues is important for trouble-free relations. With
dramatic changes with the advent of Taliban, it remains to be seen if the Taliban
regime musters up enough strength to put a full stop to sparring over the Durand
Line that has marred Pakistan–Afghan relations since the outset and driven the
region into war and violence for decades. If done with, the two neighbours will
benefit tremendously in the shape of materialization of multinational projects like
Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) Pipeline and Central Asia
South Asia Electricity Transmission Project (CASA-1000) and enhancement of
international trade with Central Asian states and beyond.

Notes
Notes
1 Pakistan: Map
1 Pakistan: Map Showing
Showing Length
Length of Borders with
of Borders with Neighbouring
Neighbouring Countries &
Countries & Coastal
Coastal
Line (Survey
Line (Survey ofof Pakistan, n.d.), www.surveyofpakistan.gov.pk/SiteImage/Downloads/
Pakistan, n.d.), www.surveyofpakistan.gov.pk/SiteImage/Downloads/
pakistan_showing_border_length.pdf.
pakistan_showing_border_length.pdf.
2
2 “General Assembly Official
“General Assembly Records, 92nd
Official Records, 92nd Plenary Meeting,” September 
Plenary Meeting,” September 30,30, 1947.
1947.
Cited in S.
Cited in S. M.
M. Burke, Pakistan’ss Foreign
Burke, Pakistan’ Foreign Policy:
Policy: An
An Historical Analysis (London:
Historical Analysis (London: ElyEly
House, 1973),
House, 1973), 73.
73.
3 Arwin Rahi, “Afghanistan
3 Arwin Rahi, “Afghanistan and and Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s Oft-Ignored History (1947–1978),”
Oft-Ignored History (1947-1978),” The The
Tribune, September 10,
Express Tribune,
Express September 10, 2020,
2020, http://tribune.com.pk/article/97165/afghanistan-
http://tribune.com.pk/article/97165/afghanistan-
and-pakistans-oft-ignored-history-1947–1978.
and-pakistans-oft-ignored-history-1947-1978.
4 Burke, Pakistan’ss Foreign
4 Burke, Pakistan’ Policy, 68–69.
Foreign Policy, 68-69.
5 Khurshid Hasan,
5 Khurshid Hasan, “Pakistan–Afghanistan
“Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,” Asian Survey
Relations,” Asian Survey 2, 2, no.
no. 77 (1962):
(1962):
14–15,
14-15, https://doi.org/10.2307/3023688.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3023688.
6 Department of
6 Department of State,
State, “Outlook
“Outlook for Afghanistan,” in
for Afghanistan,” Foreign Relations
in Foreign Relations ofof the
the United
United
States: Diplomatic
States: Papers, vol.
Diplomatic Papers, vol. 11, NIE –- 53–54
11, NIE 53-54 (Washington,
(Washington, DC, DC, 1954).
1954).
7
7 “Report
“Report of Afghan–Pakistani Confederation
ofAfghan-Pakistani Confederation Plans,”
Plans,” NSC Briefing (Central
NSC Briefing (Central Intelligence
Intelligence
Agency, April
Agency, April 13,
13, 1954),
1954), www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R0089
www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R0089
0A000300010019-3.pdf.
0A000300010019-3.pdf.
8
8 “Foreign
“Foreign Relations
Relations ofof the
the United
United States,”
States,” 1493.
1493.
9
9 “Report
“Report of Afghan-Pakistani Confederation
of Afghan-Pakistani Confederation Plans.”
Plans.”
10 Muhammad Aslam
10 Muhammad Aslam Khan
Khan Khattak,
Khattak, A A Pathan Odyssey (Karachi:
Pathan Odyssey (Karachi: Oxford University
Oxford University
Press, 2004),
Press, 2004), 100–03
100-03 cited in Khurshid
cited in Mahmud Kasuri,
Khurshid Mahmud Neither aa Hawk
Kasuri, Neither Hawk Nor
Nor a a Dove:
Dove:
An Insider’
An Insider’ss Account
Account of ofPakistan’s
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1st
Foreign Policy, 1st ed.
ed. (Karachi:
(Karachi: Oxford
Oxford University
University
Press, 2015),
Press, 2015), 502.
502.
11 Louis
11 Louis Dupree,
Dupree, “A Suggested
“A Suggested Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran Federation,” Middle
Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran Federation,” Middle East
East
Journal 17,
Journal no. 44 (Autumn
17, no. (Autumn 1963):
1963): 394–95.
394-95.
12 Associated Press
12 Associated Press of Pakistan cited
of Pakistan cited in Dupree, 395.
in Dupree, 395.
13 Dupree, “A Suggested
13 Dupree, “A Suggested Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran Federation,” 395.
Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran Federation,” 395.
14 Ibid., 394–95.
14 Ibid., 394-95.
15
15 “Foreign
“Foreign Relations
Relations ofof the
the United
United States,”
States,” 1493.
1493.
16 Dupree, “A Suggested
16 Dupree, “A Suggested Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran
Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran Federation,”
Federation,” 385–98.
385-98.
17 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18
18 “Afghanistan–Pakistan
“Afghanistan-Pakistan Merger,” Briefing (Central
NSC Briefing
Merger,” NSC (Central Intelligence Agency, Octo-
Intelligence Agency, Octo­
ber 14,
ber 14, 1954), www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01443R0003000
1954), www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01443R0003000
80015-6.pdf.
80015-6.pdf.
 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 109
19 “Report of Afghan–Pakistani Confederation Plans.”
20 Dupree, “A Suggested Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran Federation,” 395.
21 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016): A Concise History, 4th ed.
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2017), 180.
22 Nirode Mohanty, America, Pakistan, and the India Factor (New York: Palgrave,
2013), 104.
23 Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 498.
24 Rahi, “Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Oft-Ignored History.”
25 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 182.
26 Ibid., 214.
27 Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave,
2002), 203.
28 Ibid.
29 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 209.
30 Ibid., 251.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 208.
33 Anwar Iqbal, “No Unilateral Recognition, Pakistan Assures US, Others,” Dawn,
August 19, 2021.
34 Anwar Iqbal, “US Refuses to Endorse Ghani’s Claim of Pakistan’s Role,” Dawn, Sep-
tember 3, 2021.
35 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation
Enduring Freedom (Arlington: RAND and National Defence Research Institute,
2005), 161.
36 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 297.
37 Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 540–41.
38 Ibid.
39 “India ‘Close Friend’ but Pak ‘Conjoined Twin’ Says Afghanistan,” The Times of India,
March 11, 2010, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/india-close-
friend-but-pak-conjoined-twin-says-afghanistan/articleshow/5672129.cms.
40 Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 535.
41 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 301.
42 Harrison Akins, “Mashar Versus Kashar in Pakistan’s FATA: Intra-Tribal Conflict and
the Obstacles to Reform,” Asian Survey 58, no. 6 (2018): 1136–59.
43 Dawn, October 16, 2010.
44 “Dialogue with Taliban: Joint Commission for Afghan Peace,” The Express Tribune,
July 31, 2012, https://tribune.com.pk/story/415279/dialogue-with-taliban-joint-com
mission-for-afghan-peace.
45 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 303.
46 “Afghan Envoy Acknowledges Pakistan’s Role in Eid Ceasefire,” Dawn, July 6, 2018,
www.dawn.com/news/1418300.
47 Michael Kugelman, “Pakistan in 2016: Tensions with Neighbors, Turmoil at Home,”
Asian Survey 57, no. 1 (February 2017): 33–42.
48 “Security Forces Arrest Four Suspected NDS Operatives in Pishin,” Pakistan Today,
February 5, 2018, www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/02/05/security-forces-arrest-sus
pected-nds-operatives-in-pishin/.
49 “Kandahar Attack: Pakistan Rejects Baseless Allegations of Afghanistan,” The
News, October 25, 2018, www.thenews.com.pk/print/385111-kandahar-attack-pakis
tan-rejects-baseless-allegations-of-afghanistan.
50 Hasib Danish, “Afghanistan Recalls Envoy Over Khan Remark,” Voice of America,
March 27, 2019, www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/afghanistan-recalls-envoy-
over-khan-remark.
51 “5,000 Terrorists Posing Threat to Pakistan’s Security from Afghanistan: FO,” Dawn,
June 29, 2021.
110  Muhammad Azam
52 Munawer Azeem, “Chaman Border Being Closed Due to Threats: Minister,” Dawn,
September 3, 2021.
53 Philip Walker, “The World’s Most Dangerous Borders,” Foreign Policy, June 24, 2011,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/24/the-worlds-most-dangerous-borders/.
54 Iftikhar A. Khan, “Pakistan Grants Refuge to 46 More Afghan Soldiers,” Dawn,
July 27, 2021.
55 Mohammad Asghar, “400 Flights Take Part in Evacuation from Afghanistan,” Dawn,
August 28, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1643039.
56 “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan” (United Nations High Commission for Refugees),
accessed September 4, 2021, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/pak.
57 AFP, “UN Warns of up to 500,000 More Afghan Refugees by Year-End,” Dawn,
August 28, 2021.
7 Indian Factor in Pakistan’s
Policy Towards Afghanistan
Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali

Introduction
Since its independence in August 1947, the dominant agenda of Pakistan’s foreign
policy was overshadowed by its quest for security from its archrival India, com-
paratively a superior economic and military power. There is a strong perception
among the Pakistani ruling elites that India has never truly reconciled with the
idea of the creation of Pakistan. This perception was further reinforced when India
played a significant role in the separation of the Eastern part of Pakistan in 1971
that is now Bangladesh. Pakistan’s fixation on India has largely shaped Pakistan’s
foreign relations, particularly towards its neighbour Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s
irredentist claims on Pakistan’s north-western part and its close relations with
India intensified Pakistan’s security apprehensions. Therefore, Islamabad has
always sought a friendly regime in Kabul in order to avoid a situation of being
sandwiched between the eastern and western neighbours.
Pakistan has largely viewed Afghanistan from the Indian prism. This is per-
haps due to Indian attempts to exploit Afghanistan’s long-held hostility towards
Pakistan to its benefits. From 1947 to 1992, India provided unstinted support to
every Afghan government that demonstrated hostility towards Pakistan. However,
the situation changed in Pakistan’s favour when the Taliban assumed power in
Afghanistan and ruled it from 1996 to 2001. Islamabad’s support to the Taliban in
turn helped alleviate its security concerns to a certain degree.
The 9/11 terrorist events followed by American decision to invade Afghanistan
dramatically changed the regional situation. Pakistan had to join the American-
sponsored alliance formed to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and
to eliminate Al-Qaeda. Pakistan supported the US efforts in routing out the Tali-
ban from Afghanistan but remained reluctant to provide wholehearted support in
completely defeating the Taliban forces due to heavy Indian involvement in the
post-9//11 settings in Afghanistan which Islamabad regarded as detrimental to
its security. However, Pakistan’s cooperation was forthcoming when the United
States started dialogues with the Afghan Taliban starting in the late 2010s. The
Taliban inclusion in any governmental setup would significantly assuage Islama-
bad’s security concerns. Therefore, Pakistan has played a crucial role in facilitat-
ing the recent direct peace dialogue between the Afghan Taliban and the United

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-9
112  Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
States. Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace process has gained much international
appreciation.

Pakistan’s Perennial Security Threat from India

There is a common saying in international relations that you can choose your
friends but not your neighbours. Pakistan and India share a long common border
along with common history and cultural practices. However, most of their rela-
tions have been fraught with mistrust and hostility. A number of factors high-
light the enduring rivalry between Islamabad and New Delhi. The ideological
rivalry is vividly manifested in the poles-apart philosophical structure of Islam
and Hinduism. As pointed out by S. M. Burke, “Centuries of dedication to such
diametrically opposed systems as Islam and Hinduism could not but nurture an
utterly different outlook on the outside world among their respective followers.”1
Therefore, the Pakistan security establishment has framed its rivalry with India as
a civilizational one.2
Another cause of tension between the two countries is related with Pakistan’s
fear of being inferior to India’s strategic and economic strength. As noted by
Howard Wriggins, “However unjustified Indian leaders may have thought it,
Pakistan’s overriding concern vis-à-vis India” is the “fear of India’s size, the size
of its army . . . and fear compounded out of not infrequent public statements by
prominent Indians regarding the tragedy of partition and reiterating the inherent
unity of the subcontinent.”3
The partition process created a legacy of misperceptions and culture of dis-
trust that added further complications to the relation between the two countries.
Leo Rose and Richard Sisson pointed out, “Most of the political and social con-
cepts that dominated the ideology and psychology of the narrow élites that con-
trolled these two movements survived into the independence period and have not
disappeared.”4
The persistence of the Kashmir dispute led to three major wars, a limited Kar-
gil war in 1999, and three crises (Brass Tacks (1987), Kashmir uprising (1990)
and a military standoff (2001–2) between India and Pakistan.5 The 1990 Kashmir
uprising increased the tension between the two countries, which made Kashmir
a nuclear flashpoint creating potential serious security threats for the region and
internationally as well, as both were de-facto nuclear power states.6 Because of the
long-standing hostility between the two countries, both pursued security policies
with zero-sum attitude. The Kashmir conflict remains the stumbling block in the
normalization of relations between the two countries.7 The Kashmir dispute owes
its origin in the partition process, and the first war between both countries started
over Kashmir in 1948. India’s occupation of Kashmir and its consistent refusals to
honour United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to resolve the issue
of Kashmir further augmented mistrust and hostility.8 Later in 1998, the Kashmir
issue once again gained world-wide attention after two countries went nuclear as
Kashmir emerged as the nuclear flash point creating real prospects of Pakistan–
India tensions to rise with the possibility of nuclear use. To an expert on Kashmir
 Pakistan’ss Policy
Pakistan’ Policy Towards Afghanistan 113
Towards Afghanistan 113
conflict,
conflict, “there
“there is is no
no guarantee
guarantee thatthat it
it will
will notnot lead to war
lead to war or or military
military adventures
adventures
involving
involving nuclear
nuclear deployment
deployment and and possibly
possibly the the use
use of
of aa nuclear
nuclear weapon.”
weapon.”99
Pakistan’s threat perception
Pakistan’s threat perception fromfrom India
India intensified
intensified rivalry between Pakistan
rivalry between Pakistan
and
and India in the post-September 11 period when India blamed the Pakistan-based
India in the post-September 11 period when India blamed the Pakistan-based
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba Jaish-e-Mohammad for
and Jaish-e-Mohammad for carrying
carrying outout aa terrorist
terrorist attack
attack onon
its parliament on December 13, 2001. 10
Subsequently, India
its parliament on December 13, 2001.10 Subsequently, India called back its High called back its High
Commissioner
Commissioner from from Pakistan, broke air
Pakistan, broke air and
and ground transport links
ground transport with Pakistan
links with Pakistan
and
and put
put its
its military
military onon high
high alert
alert while
while deploying
deploying 750,000
750,000 troops
troops along
along the border
the border
with Pakistan.11 Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee said, “We cannot tolerate such
with Pakistan. 11
Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee said, “We cannot tolerate such
attacks
attacks any
any more.
more. We We have
have reached
reached the the limits
limits of of our tolerance.”12 In
our tolerance.”12 In response,
response,
Pakistan
Pakistan also
also deployed
deployed its its ground
ground and
and air forces along
air forces along its
its eastern border and
eastern border and alerted
alerted
its
its naval forces in the Arabian Sea.13 General Musharraf in an interview stated,
naval forces in the Arabian Sea. 13
General Musharraf in an interview stated,
“I would
“I would like to warn
like to (New Delhi)
warn (New Delhi) against
against any any precipitous
precipitous action by the
action by the Indian
Indian
government against Pakistan. This would lead to very serious
government against Pakistan. This would lead to very serious repercussions.”14 repercussions.” 14
In
In
addition, Pakistan denied any involvement in the terrorist attacks
addition, Pakistan denied any involvement in the terrorist attacks and pledged not and pledged not
to
to allow
allow any terrorism originating
any terrorism from its
originating from territory.15 While
its territory.15 While addressing the nation
addressing the nation
on
on 12 January 2002,
12 January Musharraf condemned
2002, Musharraf condemned attacks attacks on on the
the Indian parliament and
Indian parliament and
vowed to take action against the violent groups such as
vowed to take action against the violent groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba
and
and the Jaish-e-Mohammad. Musharaf
the Jaish-e-Mohammad. Musharaf said said that:
that:

Pakistan
Pakistan rejects
rejects and
and condemns
condemns terrorism
terrorism in
in all
all its forms and
its forms and manifestations.
manifestations.
Pakistan
Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for terrorist activity
will not allow its territory to be used for terrorist activity anywhere
anywhere
in the world.
in the world. No
No organisation will be
organisation will be allowed
allowed toto indulge
indulge in terrorism in
in terrorism the
in the
name
name ofof Kashmir. 16
Kashmir.16

Amid
Amid thethe ongoing
ongoing hostility,
hostility, another
another attack took place
attack took place on
on the
the residential
residential quarters
quarters
of
of an
an Indian
Indian army
army camp
camp at Kaluchuk in
at Kaluchuk in Jammu
Jammu on on 14 May 2002,
14 May 2002, only
only intensifying
intensifying
the
the already
already estranged
estranged relations. 17
relations.17 Indian Prime Minister
Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee
Vajpayee warned,
warned, “We
“We
will teach the perpetrators of the proxy war a lesson. Our forces are standing
will teach the perpetrators of the proxy war a lesson. Our forces are standing like
like
rocks
rocks onon the borders.”18 In
the borders.”18 In response, Pakistan not
response, Pakistan not only
only removed
removed more than 50,000
more than 50,000
troops from its
troops from border with
its border with Afghanistan
Afghanistan to to deploy
deploy along
along its
its Eastern border with
Eastern border with
India but also threatened the United States to vacate some of the air
India but also threatened the United States to vacate some of the air fields given to fields given to
the United States for launching military operations in Afghanistan.
the United States for launching military operations in Afghanistan.19 The standoff 19
The standoff
between India
between India and Pakistan could
and Pakistan potentially affect
could potentially affect Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s role
role in the War
in the War
on
on Terror in Afghanistan. The United States dispatched US Deputy Secretary of
Terror in Afghanistan. The United States dispatched US Deputy Secretary of
State,
State, Richard
Richard Armitage,
Armitage, toto India
India and
and Pakistan
Pakistan in in June 2002
June 2002 to urge both
to urge both countries
countries
to
to put
put aa restraint to the
restraint to the deteriorating
deteriorating situation.
situation.20 20
Armitage’s visit helped
Armitage’s visit helped normalize
normalize
the relations between the two countries.
the relations between the two countries.
President
President Musharraf’s
Musharraf’s actions
actions toto stop
stop support
support forfor militancy
militancy in Kashmir were
in Kashmir were
welcomed by New Delhi. For example after the May 
welcomed by New Delhi. For example after the May 2002 standoff, the 2002 standoff, the Paki-
Paki­
stani
stani government,
government, as part of
as part of restraining
restraining thethe Jihadi
Jihadi forces
forces operating from Pakistan,
operating from Pakistan,
put restrictions on the United Jihad Council, an umbrella group of Kashmiri and
put restrictions on the United Jihad Council, an umbrella group of Kashmiri and
non-Kashmiri
non-Kashmiri Mujahideen
Mujahideen factions,
factions, including
including two two leading
leading Jihadi
Jihadi organizations,
organizations,
Hezb-ul-Mujahideen and
Hezb-ul-Mujahideen Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.21 Responding
and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.21 Responding to to Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s
moves,
moves, Prime Minister Vajpayee took the Indian parliament into confidence on
Prime Minister Vajpayee took the Indian parliament into confidence on
114  Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
2 May  2003 to launch his “third and final” peace offering to Pakistan to hold
“decisive talks” to resolve outstanding disputes between the two countries.22 On 6
January 2004, President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee met during the
SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation) summit in Islama-
bad and pledged to resume the talks aimed at normalizing relations between the
two countries. Both leaders demonstrated optimism about “the resumption of the
‘Composite Dialogue’ that will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues,
including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”23 A number of
important Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) took place since both countries
engaged in a peace process since January 2004, but it was void of any progress on
Kashmir dispute because Indian policies largely used the pretexts of the War on
Terror to stifle and discredit the Kashmir’s movement for self-determination in the
eyes of the international community.24 Both India and Pakistan pursued conflict-
ing interests over the issue of War on Terror in the region as well as the future of
Afghanistan. With no significant progress on resolving the Kashmir conflict, there
has always been estranged relations between both countries.

Indo-Afghan Close Ties and Pakistan’s Security

Apprehensions
Because of the hostile relations between India and Pakistan, both countries
have had a fierce competition to enhance their respective influence in Afghani-
stan. Excluding the Taliban rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, Afghani-
stan has largely displayed hostility towards Pakistan. The only state that had
opposed Pakistan’s membership of the United Nations in 1947 was none other
than Afghanistan. Hostility between the two countries further flared up when
Afghanistan put forward its irredentist claims on Pakistan’s territory, in particu-
lar some parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa (KPK) and Baluchistan. Because of its
enmity and particularly dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, India extended its
wholehearted support to Afghanistan over Pashtunistan issue.25 It is important to
mention that Pakistani Pashtun nationalists supported the Indian National Con-
gress against the British Imperial rule. In addition, Pakistan’s Pashtun national-
ists have invariably supported Afghan rulers. Pashtun’s historical cordiality with
Afghanistan and the Indian National Congress made Pakistan suspicious of their
intentions.
India has always sought friendly relations with Afghanistan which is demon-
strated with the signing of the “Friendship Treaty” in 1950. In addition, India had
signed various agreements and protocols with pro-Soviet regimes in Afghanistan
to promote mutual co-operation in an attempt to enhance its influence. Indian
Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, once said:

Ever since India’s independence, we have grown closer to each other, for a
variety of reasons. The long memory of our past was there, and the moment it
was possible to renew them, we renewed them. And then came mutual inter-
est, (our common hostility towards Pakistan) which is a powerful factor.26
 Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan 115
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had provided Pakistan a unique oppor-
tunity to increase its influence in Afghanistan. With the Soviet intervention, Paki-
stan became a frontline state and served as a conduit for international arms and aid
heading to the Mujahideen engaged in fighting the Soviets. India continued their
unstinted support to the Soviet Union throughout its intervention in Afghanistan.
With the support of Pakistan, the Mujahideen offered severe resistance ultimately
forcing the Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1988. In opposition to
Pakistan’s support for the Mujahideen fighters, India supported the Communist
government, until its demise in 1992. Even after the removal of Najibullah from
power, India supported the first Mujahideen government, predominantly non-
Pashtun, and extended humanitarian and technical assistance.
Pakistan, on the other hand, backed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami
whose inability to capture Kabul led Pakistan to shift its support to the newly
emerged force known as the Taliban who proclaimed to end the ongoing civil
strife in the country. In 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul and established Islamic
Emirates of Afghanistan in most parts of the country. India opposed the Taliban
regime because of its association with Pakistan and closed its embassy in Sep-
tember 1996. In the meanwhile, the non-Pashtun groups opposed to the Taliban
regime united to form the Northern Alliance and exercised their control over areas
in the north of Afghanistan, adjacent to the Central Asian States of Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. The Taliban and the Northern Alliance remained engaged in fighting
even after the fall of Kabul to the former.
Afghanistan became a theatre of a proxy war between Pakistan and India. In
opposition to Pakistan’s support to the Taliban regime, India extended its sup-
port to the Northern Alliance by providing high-altitude warfare equipment worth
$10 million through its Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and technical advice
to the Northern Alliance.27 During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (1996–2001),
India encouraged and supported the groups engaged in fighting against the Tali-
ban. Moreover, India also developed close ties with the anti-Taliban countries
such as Russia and Iran and also developed links with Central Asian States.

Pakistan’s Afghan Challenge in the Post-9/11 Security

Environment
The removal of the Taliban from power after the US invasion of Afghanistan
offered India an opportunity to develop close ties with Afghanistan as during
the Taliban rule India was completely out of its role in Afghanistan. Mr Jaswant
Singh, the then Indian Foreign Affairs Minister, in his visit to the United States in
October 2001, marked the Taliban regime as illegitimate and conferred legitimacy
on the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. In his television interview in Washington
on 2 October 2001, Mr Singh said,

India has never recognized the Taliban as a legitimate regime. We have con-
tinued to recognize the government of Afghanistan as represented by Presi-
dent Rabbani. They have formed the Northern Alliance . . . it should be the
116  Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
effort of the international community now to strengthen the legitimate gov-
ernment of Afghanistan.28

Indian leaders perceived that the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
has served Indian strategic objectives because the Taliban regime not only denied
India any role in Afghanistan but also facilitated militants fighting against the
Indian forces in India-held Kashmir.29 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
announced, “We are ready to work with the government and people of Afghani-
stan to ensure that Afghanistan will never again be hostage to, or become a haven
for, terrorists.”30 Therefore, India not only wanted a friendly regime in Afghani-
stan to limit Pakistan’s influence but also wanted to retain a diplomatic and intel-
ligence presence in order to monitor Pakistan’s activities within Afghanistan.
India’s desire to build strategic and economic ties with the energy- rich states of
Central Asia motivated cordial relations with Afghanistan, preferably a pro-Indian
regime. In what Stephen Blank characterizes as a “great game” strategy, “India’s
goals reflect the desire to control overland routes to maritime ports for Central
Asian resources by denying both China and Pakistan the ability to threaten Indian
assets in the region.”31
Navtej Sarna, spokesman for the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, “We
have strong bilateral relations with Afghanistan, and we want to help them rebuild
their country. India also sees Afghanistan as a route to Central Asia.”32 Afghani-
stan would provide India access to Central Asian oil and gas resources and also
to marginalize establishing a foothold in Pakistan’s neighbourhood.33 This posed
a serious challenge for Pakistani security elites who invariably aimed at limiting
Indian power in the region. Christine Fair testifies Pakistan’s security concerns,
“Militarily and strategically, Central Asia is an important theatre for India. While
India’s objectives in the region reflect interests that reach far beyond Pakistan, the
fact remains that India is interested in countering Pakistan in this region.”34
India closely watched the removal of the Taliban regime in order to grasp any
opportunity to make inroads in Afghanistan. India extended recognition to the
interim government led by Hamid Karzai that was established as a result of the
Bonn Conference held in December 2001. The Karzai government was dispropor-
tionally represented by the Northern Alliance. Members of the Northern Alliance
enjoyed a close relationship with India as the families of many Northern Alli-
ance elites sought shelter in New Delhi during the Taliban rule. India reopened its
embassy in Kabul and established consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar
and Jalalabad.
To support to the new political administration in Afghanistan, India provided
US$100 million of reconstruction aid and established Indira Gandhi Children’s
Hospital in Kabul.35 Afghanistan responded positively to the Indian moves – for
example Masood Khalili, Afghanistan’s ambassador to India, said, “People in
Afghanistan have long memories. They will not forget who was a friend and oth-
ers, who supported and propped up the Taliban.” He added, “It’s natural that we
will turn to India for assistance.”36 The new Afghan government largely viewed
India as a natural ally. Since then, India has spent billions of dollars in various
 Pakistan’ss Policy
Pakistan Policy Towards Afghanistan 117
Towards Afghanistan 117
infrastructural
infrastructural and
and developmental
developmental projects
projects in
in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan. Therefore,
Therefore, India,
India, in
in its
its
attempt
attempt to create a soft image, launched training programmes and extended sup-
to create a soft image, launched training programmes and extended sup­
port
port in
in health
health and
and developmental
developmental sectors.
sectors. This
This enabled
enabled India to deepen
India to deepen its
its roots
roots in
in
Afghanistan, a development Pakistan was seriously concerned
Afghanistan, a development Pakistan was seriously concerned with. with.

Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s Policy
Policy Responses
Responses Towards Afghanistan
Towards Afghanistan
India
India has
has remained
remained aa significant factor in
significant factor Pakistan’s policy
in Pakistan’s policy towards
towards Afghanistan.
Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s decision to become a part of the war against terrorism had
decision to become a part of the war against terrorism been greatly
had been greatly
influenced
influenced by the Indian factor. For example, the then President General Mush-
by the Indian factor. For example, the then President General Mush­
arraf
arraf cited
cited India
India as as aa major
major reason
reason for Pakistan’s decision
for Pakistan’s decision to to joining
joining US US War War onon
Terror
Terror against
against the the Taliban,
Taliban, itsits former
former allies.
allies.3737

Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s strategy
strategy was was to to counter
counter Indian influence and
Indian influence and maintain
maintain its its own
own in in
Afghanistan. Pakistan’s motives in Afghanistan have
Afghanistan. Pakistan’s motives in Afghanistan have largely been geostrategic - largely been geostrategic –
to
to counter
counter security
security threat
threat from
from India
India and and toto establish
establish aa foothold
foothold in in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan.
Pakistani
Pakistani former President General Zia-ul-Haq once directed to the head
former President General Zia-ul-Haq once directed to the head of of the
the
military
military intelligence organization, ISI, General Akhtar Abdul Rehman, that “the
intelligence organization, ISI, General Akhtar Abdul Rehman, that “the
water
water [in[in Afghanistan]
Afghanistan] must boil at
must boil at the
the right temperature.”38 Traditionally,
right temperature.”38 Traditionally, Paki- Paki­
stan
stan viewed Afghanistan providing “strategic depth” - that it could
viewed Afghanistan providing “strategic depth” – that it could withdraw
withdraw its its
forces
forces into
into Afghan
Afghan territory
territory in in the
the case
case of of an
an Indian
Indian military
military advance.
advance. The The Taliban
Taliban
rule
rule in
in Afghanistan
Afghanistan helped Pakistan to
helped Pakistan to achieve
achieve that that strategic
strategic depth.
depth. According
According to to
former chief of ISI, General Hameed Gul, “Pakistan’s
former chief of ISI, General Hameed Gul, “Pakistan’s military leaders supported military leaders supported
the
the Taliban
Taliban to to attain their goal
attain their goal of of strategic
strategic depth
depth in in Afghanistan
Afghanistan by by squeezing
squeezing out out
the
the interests of other regional rivals including Iran and India and the forces of the
interests of other regional rivals including Iran and India and the forces of the
Northern
Northern Alliance.”
Alliance.”39 39
Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s strategic
strategic circles
circles havehave always
always desired
desired to to avoid
avoid aa
situation
situation of being sandwiched
of being sandwiched between between its two hostile
its two hostile neighbours –
neighbours - Afghanistan
Afghanistan
on
on its
its western
western borderborder andand India
India on on its
its eastern border.
eastern border.
For
For these
these strategic
strategic reasons,
reasons, Pakistan
Pakistan always always wantedwanted aa friendlyfriendly regimeregime in in
Afghanistan that could protect Islamabad interests. In the
Afghanistan that could protect Islamabad interests. In the post-Soviet Afghanistan, post-Soviet Afghanistan,
Pakistan
Pakistan continued
continued to to meddle
meddle in in Afghan
Afghan affairs
affairs in in order
order to to achieve
achieve its its interests
interests in in
the best possible manner. A civil war between different
the best possible manner. A civil war between different Mujahideen factions, fol­ Mujahideen factions, fol-
lowed
lowed by by the
the withdrawal
withdrawal of of Soviet
Soviet forces from Afghanistan,
forces from Afghanistan, seriously threatened
seriously threatened
Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. Emergence of the
Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. Emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan who Taliban in Afghanistan who
proclaimed to end the civil strife provided solace to Pakistan’s
proclaimed to end the civil strife provided solace to Pakistan’s strategic circles. strategic circles.
Islamabad
Islamabad decided
decided to to support
support the the Taliban
Taliban against
against groups
groups who who “established
“established close close
links
links with the Indians” because the Taliban showed a remarkable “success
with the Indians” because the Taliban showed a remarkable “success in in
suppressing
suppressing unruly Mujahideen commanders
unruly Mujahideen commanders and and imposing
imposing peace peace in in and
and around
around
Kandahar.”40
Kandahar.”40
Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s strategic
strategic circles believed that
circles believed the Taliban
that the Taliban wouldwould serve best country’s
serve best country’s
interests.
interests. This led to actions - for example an Afghan cell was established in
This led to actions – for example an Afghan cell was established in
the Interior
the Interior Ministry
Ministry in in 1994
1994 to to provide
provide assistance
assistance to to the
the Taliban
Taliban movement.
movement. The The
interior
interior minister,
minister, General
General Babar,
Babar, oversaw
oversaw the the ISI
ISI toto provide
provide “transportation,
“transportation, fuel, fuel,
communications equipment and advice” to the
communications equipment and advice” to the Taliban movement.41 Pakistan’sTaliban movement. 41
Pakistan’s
support
support to the Taliban
to the Taliban waswas reinforced
reinforced by by several
several considerations.
considerations. First, First, byby helping
helping
the
the Taliban to gain control of Afghanistan, Islamabad expected to get access
Taliban to gain control of Afghanistan, Islamabad expected to get access to to
118  Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
Central
Central Asia
Asia toto establish
establish trade trade links.
links. Second,
Second, Pakistan
Pakistan perceived
perceived the the Taliban
Taliban as as
an
an anti-secular and an anti-Indian force because of their rigid Islamic beliefs, and
anti-secular and an anti-Indian force because of their rigid Islamic beliefs, and
that would help
that would help Pakistan
Pakistan to to diminish
diminish security threats from
security threats from its its western borders.
western borders.
Third,
Third, a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would provide Pakistan the “strategic depth”
a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would provide Pakistan the “strategic depth”42 42

in
in order to protect
order to protect fromfrom Indian
Indian military
military advances
advances from from thethe eastern border. Fourth,
eastern border. Fourth,
aa Taliban-controlled
Taliban-controlled friendly friendly Afghanistan
Afghanistan could could provide
provide aa “base where Kash­
“base where Kash-
miri
miri militants could be trained.”43 Most of Pakistan’s strategic objectives were
militants could be trained.” 43
Most of Pakistan’s strategic objectives were
well-served
well-served under
under the the Taliban
Taliban regime
regime as territorial claims
as territorial claims from from Afghanistan
Afghanistan were were
largely
largely withered,
withered, and and India’s
India’s influence
influence was was significantly
significantly decreased.
decreased. It It is
is important
important
to
to mention that the
mention that the Taliban
Taliban did did not
not recognize
recognize the the Durand Line.44
Durand Line.44
The
The American invasion of Afghanistan followed by the overthrow of
American invasion of Afghanistan followed by the overthrow the Taliban
of the Taliban
government
government deprived Pakistan of a friendly regime in Kabul. After the removal
deprived Pakistan of a friendly regime in Kabul. After the removal
of the Taliban
of the Taliban regime
regime from from power,
power, an an anti-Pakistan
anti-Pakistan group group knownknown as as the Northern
the Northern
Alliance
Alliance got hold of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, with the support of the
got hold of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, with the support of the USUS
military. This was called worst nightmare for Pakistan.
military. This was called worst nightmare for Pakistan. One Pakistani newspa­ One Pakistani newspa-
per
per called
called it
it “Pakistan’s
“Pakistan’s worst worst nightmare
nightmare has has comecome truetrue with Northern Alliance
with Northern Alliance
control
control of Kabul,” whereas other mentioned “a strategic debacle for
of Kabul,” whereas other mentioned “a strategic debacle for the
the army.”
army.”45 45

Pakistan perceived the Northern Alliance control

Pakistan perceived the Northern Alliance control of power in Kabul negatively of power in Kabul negatively
and
and considered
considered it it aa violation
violation of the US
of the US promises
promises to to protect
protect Islamabad’s
Islamabad’s interests
interests
in Afghanistan.
in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, Pakistan’s
Furthermore, Pakistan’s securitysecurity apprehensions
apprehensions intensifiedintensified after increasing
after increasing
Indian
Indian involvement
involvement in in Afghanistan
Afghanistan in the post-9/11
in the post-9/11 time time period. Pakistan felt
period. Pakistan felt
encircled, given cooperation and close ties between
encircled, given cooperation and close ties between India and Afghanistan.46 India and Afghanistan. 46

While talking about Indian presence in Afghanistan,

While talking about Indian presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan President Pervez Pakistan President Pervez
Musharraf
Musharraf said:said: “India’s
“India’s motivation
motivation in in Afghanistan
Afghanistan is very clear;
is very clear; nothing further
nothing further
than upsetting Pakistan. Why should they (India)
than upsetting Pakistan. Why should they (India) have consulates in Jalalabad have consulates in Jalalabad
and Kandahar? What
and Kandahar? What is their interest?
is their interest? There There is is no
no interest
interest other than disturbing
other than disturbing
Pakistan,
Pakistan, doing
doing something
something against against Pakistan.”
Pakistan.”47 47

Pakistan also
Pakistan also alleged
alleged India India for for creating
creating troubles
troubles inside
inside its territory using
its territory using
Afghanistan.
Afghanistan. On On 16 16 October 2003,
October 2003, Pakistan’s Pakistan’s interior
interior minister
minister accused
accused India India for
for
sponsoring
sponsoring terrorism
terrorism in in Pakistan
Pakistan using using their
their intelligence
intelligence presence
presence in in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan.48 48

Pakistani security officials expressed their apprehensions

Pakistani security officials expressed their apprehensions over Indian intelligence over Indian intelligence
presence
presence in in Afghanistan,
Afghanistan, “India’s “India’s activities
activities have have less
less to to dodo with
with humanitarian
humanitarian
aid and more to do with India’s top secret intelligence
aid and more to do with India’s top secret intelligence agency, the agency, the Research
Research and and
Analysis
Analysis Wing
Wing (RAW).”
(RAW).”49 49
Pakistan consistently
Pakistan consistently blamed blamed that that Indian
Indian intelligence
intelligence
officials
officials used
used Afghans
Afghans to to carry
carry out terrorist acts
out terrorist acts in in Pakistan.
Pakistan.
Pakistan also
Pakistan also alleged
alleged India
India for for establishing
establishing aa networknetwork of terrorist training
of terrorist training campscamps
at different parts of Afghanistan, such as at the Afghan
at different parts of Afghanistan, such as at the Afghan military base of Qushila military base of Qushila
Jadid
Jadid located
located north
north of Kabul, at
of Kabul, at Gereshk
Gereshk in in southern
southern Helmand
Helmand province,
province, in in the
the
Panjshir
Panjshir Valley,
Valley, andand atat Khahak
Khahak and and Hassan
Hassan Killies
Killies in in western
western NimrozNimroz Province.
Province.50 50

In May 2003, Pakistan accused India for sponsoring the

In May 2003, Pakistan accused India for sponsoring the local militants also known local militants also known
as
as Pakistani
Pakistani Taliban
Taliban and and Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda militantsmilitants in in Waziristan,
Waziristan, an an agency
agency which
which is is part
part
of erstwhile known as Federally Administered Tribal
of erstwhile known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) who staged Areas (FATA) who staged
attacks
attacks against
against thethe Pakistan
Pakistan army. army.51 51
According
According to to Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s media media reports, there
reports, there
was ample evidence of India’s involvement through
was ample evidence of India’s involvement through its consulates in Afghanistan its consulates in Afghanistan
 Pakistan’ss Policy
Pakistan Policy Towards Afghanistan 119
Towards Afghanistan 119
for
for creating
creating troubles
troubles in in Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s South-western
South-western province province of of Baluchistan.
Baluchistan. On On
13 August 2004, Chief Minister of Baluchistan,
13 August 2004, Chief Minister of Baluchistan, Jam Muhammad Yousaf, Jam Muhammad Yousaf, stated
stated
that
that India
India established
established and provided support
and provided support to to 4040 terrorist
terrorist campscamps all all over
over Baluch
Baluch
territory through
territory through its its intelligence
intelligence networknetwork in in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan.52 52
In
In another
another statement,
statement,
Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s MinisterMinister of of State for Information
State for Information Senator, Senator, TariqTariq Azeem,
Azeem, talked talked about
about
the evidence of India providing arms to Akbar
the evidence of India providing arms to Akbar Bugti and Sardar Khair Bakhsh Bugti and Sardar Khair Bakhsh
Marri,
Marri, two two local
local leaders
leaders of Baluchistan, to
of Baluchistan, to engage
engage in in attacks
attacks against
against the Pakistani
the Pakistani
security forces in the
security forces in the province.53 province. 53

Pakistani
Pakistani officials believed that
officials believed that India
India in in collaboration
collaboration with with Afghanistan
Afghanistan
involved
involved in providing substantial support to the ongoing separatist movement
in providing substantial support to the ongoing separatist movement in in
Baluchistan. Adviser
Baluchistan. Adviser to to the
the Prime Minister on
Prime Minister on Interior
Interior Affairs,
Affairs, RehmanRehman Malik, Malik,
briefed the
briefed the Senate
Senate (Upper(Upper House
House of of Pakistan’s Parliament) about
Pakistan’s Parliament) about Indian
Indian support
support
to the
to Baluch Liberation
the Baluch Liberation Army Army (BLA),(BLA), which which has been engaged
has been engaged in fighting since
in fighting since
the
the 1970s for the liberation of Baluchistan. He noted, “India is now funding the
1970s for the liberation of Baluchistan. He noted, “India is now funding the
BLA
BLA and and itsits activities,”
activities,” addingadding further
further that that some
some 4,0004,000 to to 5,000 Baluch terrorists
5,000 Baluch terrorists
received
received their training established
their training established in in camps
camps located
located in various parts
in various parts of of Afghan-
Afghan­
istan.
istan.5454
Rehman Malik
Rehman Malik also also presented
presented the the Senate
Senate with with “documentary
“documentary proof” proof’ of of
India and Afghanistan’s involvement in supporting
India and Afghanistan’s involvement in supporting terrorism in Baluchistan and terrorism in Baluchistan and
the former FATA.55
the former FATA.55
In
In addition, Pakistan
addition, perceived that
Pakistan perceived that the
the US-India
US–India strategic
strategic relationship
relationship enhanced
enhanced
in
in the post-9/11 settings would undermine its regional strategic interests
the post-9/11 settings would undermine its regional strategic interests in in South
South
Asia. In October 2008, India and the United States
Asia. In October 2008, India and the United States signed a civil nuclear strategic signed a civil nuclear strategic
deal
deal that
that shifted
shifted the the power balance entirely
power balance entirely in favour of
in favour of India
India in the South
in the South Asian
Asian
region.
region.56 56
Earlier
Earlier in in 2006,
2006, Pakistan
Pakistan requested
requested for for aa similar
similar strategic
strategic deal with the
deal with the
United States earlier in 2006, but it was declined. Therefore,
United States earlier in 2006, but it was declined. Therefore, the Pakistani security the Pakistani security
establishment
establishment realized realized that that the
the United
United States States hashas shifted
shifted its its regional
regional strategic
strategic con-con­
sideration in favour of India. 57
In addition, Pakistan’s
sideration in favour of India.57 In addition, Pakistan’s view of US abandonment view of US abandonment
of
of Afghanistan
Afghanistan also also significantly
significantly impacted Pakistan’s approach
impacted Pakistan’s approach towards towards the the Tali-
Tali­
ban. The US policymakers publicly expressed their intention to cut the number of
ban. The US policymakers publicly expressed their intention to cut the number of
American
American troops troops in in Afghanistan
Afghanistan and and to to hand
hand over
over authority
authority to to NATO.
NATO. As As General
General
John
John P. P. Abizaid,
Abizaid, Head Head of of the
the United
United States States Central
Central Command,
Command, said said in in late
late 2005,
2005,
“it makes sense that as NATO forces go in,
“it makes sense that as NATO forces go in, and they’re more in numbers, thatand they’re more in numbers, that
we could drop some of the US requirements
we could drop some of the US requirements somewhat.”58 Some analysts arguedsomewhat.” 58
Some analysts argued
that the Pakistani
that the Pakistani (and (and Afghan)
Afghan) government
government officials officials interpreted
interpreted this this statement
statement
as
as an
an expression
expression of of the
the US
US lack
lack of of commitment
commitment to to Afghanistan.
Afghanistan. The The thenthen Afghan
Afghan
regime vehemently viewed India as a strategic
regime vehemently viewed India as a strategic partner which in turn convinced partner which in turn convinced
the
the Pakistani
Pakistani government
government officialsofficials to to support
support the the Taliban
Taliban to to protect
protect Islamabad’s
Islamabad’s
strategic
strategic interests.
interests.59 59

In this context,
In this Pakistan mainly
context, Pakistan mainly relied relied on on the
the Afghan
Afghan Taliban
Taliban to to protect
protect its its geo-
geo­
strategic interest in the region. General Musharraf
strategic interest in the region. General Musharraf acknowledged in an interview acknowledged in an interview
with The
with Guardian:
The Guardian:

The
The ISI
ISI cultivated the Taliban
cultivated the Taliban after
after 2001 because Karzai’s
2001 because Karzai’s government was
government was
dominated by non-Pashtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group, and officials
dominated by non-Pashtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group, and officials
who
who were thought to
were thought favor India.
to favor India. Obviously
Obviously we
we were
were looking for some
looking for some groups
groups
120  Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
to
to counter
counter this
this Indian
Indian action
action against Pakistan. That
against Pakistan. That is
is where the intelligence
where the intelligence
work
work comes in. Intelligence being in contact with Taliban groups. Definitely
comes in. Intelligence being in contact with Taliban groups. Definitely
they
they were
were in
in contact,
contact, and
and they
they should be.60
should be.60

A
A prominent journalist and
prominent journalist and aa close
close observer
observer ofof Afghanistan,
Afghanistan, Ahmed Rashid,
Ahmed Rashid,
argued that Pakistan considered the Taliban to be the best bet against the conver-
argued that Pakistan considered the Taliban to be the best bet against the conver­
gence
gence of
of India
India and
and Afghanistan’s
Afghanistan’s interests
interests during the Northern
during the Northern Alliance
Alliance rule
rule in
in the
the
post 9/11 period. 61
Pakistan’s support to the Taliban primarily aimed at countering
post 9/11 period.61 Pakistan’s support to the Taliban primarily aimed at countering
growing
growing Indian presence and
Indian presence and influence
influence inin Afghanistan.
Afghanistan. General
General McChrystal
McChrystal in in
his September 2009 report revealed Pakistan’s anxiety over Indian
his September 2009 report revealed Pakistan’s anxiety over Indian presence presence inin
Afghanistan
Afghanistan and the possible
and the possible negative
negative impact
impact over
over the
the region. He stated:
region. He stated:

Indian
Indian political
political and
and economic
economic influence is increasing
influence is increasing in
in Afghanistan,
Afghanistan, includ-
includ­
ing
ing significant development efforts and financial investment. In
significant development efforts and financial investment. In addition,
addition,
the
the current
current Afghan
Afghan government
government is perceived by
is perceived by Islamabad
Islamabad to be pro-Indian.
to be pro-Indian.
While
While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian
Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian
influence
influence in
in Afghanistan
Afghanistan isis likely to exacerbate
likely to exacerbate regional tensions and
regional tensions and encour-
encour­
age
age Pakistani
Pakistani countermeasures
countermeasures in in Afghanistan
Afghanistan oror India. 62
India.62

Pakistan in
Pakistan in nono stretch
stretch of of imagination
imagination could think of
could think of an
an Indian presence on
Indian presence both
on both
its
its eastern
eastern andand western borders. Hasan
western borders. Hasan Askari Rizvi, aa Pakistani
Askari Rizvi, Pakistani foreign policy
foreign policy
analyst,
analyst, said,
said, “Pakistan,
“Pakistan, which
which has fought three
has fought three wars
wars with
with India,
India, was
was worried
worried over
over
India’s
India’s growing
growing influence
influence in in Afghanistan,
Afghanistan, which which borders
borders Pakistani territory” and
Pakistani territory” and
aa “growing
“growing influence
influence of of India
India inin Afghanistan
Afghanistan creates
creates problems
problems for for Pakistan.”63
Pakistan.”63
Therefore, Pakistan would
Therefore, Pakistan would nevernever be be able
able to tolerate India
to tolerate India gaining
gaining considerable
considerable
influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan felt being
influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan felt being marginalized by themarginalized by the growing
growing Indo-Indo-
US
US relations
relations in political, military
in political, military andand economic
economic spheres.
spheres.64 64

This
This context
context provides
provides aa clear clear understating
understating of Pakistan’s reluctance
of Pakistan’s reluctance to take
to take
decisive actions against the Taliban, even though Pakistan
decisive actions against the Taliban, even though Pakistan was a US ally against was a US ally against
the war on
the war on terror.
terror. Stephen
Stephen P. P. Cohen
Cohen noted,
noted, “Pakistani
“Pakistani officials freely admit
officials freely admit thatthat
their main concerns in Afghanistan are Indian penetration
their main concerns in Afghanistan are Indian penetration (which would mean (which would mean
encirclement
encirclement for for Islamabad)
Islamabad) and and Afghan President Hamid
Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s
Karzai’s dependence
dependence
on
on New Delhi” adding further, “Given this strategic compulsion, it
New Delhi” adding further, “Given this strategic compulsion, it is
is not
not sur-
sur­
prising
prising that Pakistan tolerates, if it does not directly support, the Taliban; it
that Pakistan tolerates, if it does not directly support, the Taliban; it has
has
no
no other
other instrument
instrument available
available to to it than this
it than this Pashtun
Pashtun tribal
tribal hammer.”
hammer.”65 65
Many
Many
analysts
analysts concurred
concurred that that Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s continued
continued support
support to to the
the Taliban
Taliban waswas mainly
mainly
motivated
motivated by its strategic calculations about India.66 According to an
by its strategic calculations about India. 66
According to an analyst,
analyst,
“Pakistan’s
“Pakistan’s fearsfears areare quite
quite genuine.
genuine. India’s
India’s attempt
attempt to to develop
develop its
its influence
influence in in
Afghanistan
Afghanistan is aimed at isolating Pakistan politically, diplomatically, and
is aimed at isolating Pakistan politically, diplomatically, and mili-
mili-
tarily.” 67
tarily.”67 Kabul increasing
Kabul increasing reliance
reliance andand dependence
dependence on on India
India served
served as as aa stum-
stum­
bling block in the way of cordial relations between Afghanistan
bling block in the way of cordial relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. and Pakistan.
Under
Under these
these strategic
strategic compulsions,
compulsions, Islamabad
Islamabad couldcould not
not go go against
against thethe Taliban
Taliban
forces, who have primarily represented the Pashtuns in
forces, who have primarily represented the Pashtuns in Afghanistan sympathetic Afghanistan sympathetic
to
to Pakistan.
Pakistan.68 68
 Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan 121
Pakistan’s Approach Towards the Current US–Taliban
Peace Process
In the late 2000s, the western interests in Afghanistan faded away, and they were
looking for an exit strategy from Afghanistan. The United States was looking for
a political settlement and reconciliation among Afghan warring groups, includ-
ing the Afghan Taliban. In January 2009, General David Petraeus suggested that
“it’s not possible to solve the challenges internal to Afghanistan without address-
ing the challenges, especially in terms of security, with Afghanistan’s neighbours.
A regional approach is required.” Since then, the rhetoric of a regional approach
has been articulated to find a peaceful solution to the Afghan conflict in the post-
NATO situation.69 In November 2010, the NATO member countries signed a truce
to handover the security of Afghanistan to Afghan national forces by the end of
2014. In June 2011, President Obama also announced the US exit strategy to
gradually withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Moreover,
Obama confirmed the preliminary peace talks with the Afghan Taliban leader-
ship.70 Since then, there was growing interest and competition among regional
stakeholders in the endgame of Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to have a stable and
peaceful Afghanistan with a pro-Islamabad government in Kabul after the US
withdrawal. More specifically, Islamabad does not want an Afghan government
that is closer to India.
In addition to this, the Afghan High Peace Council presented a roadmap for the
peace process in which five goals were planned in November 2012:

(1) the Taliban and other insurgent groups would renounce violence, includ-
ing cutting ties with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups; (2) all insurgent
groups would be converted into legitimate political groups; (3) these groups
would recognize and operate within the boundaries of the Afghan consti-
tution; (4) all disarmed and demobilized groups would be reintegrated into
Afghanistan’s political space and co-exist with one another, where they could
vie for political power in a peaceful manner through elections; and (5) the
Afghan National Security Forces would be the sole legitimate security organ
of the state, responsible for protecting Afghans and providing security for the
country against internal and external threats.71

In this context, Pakistan saw an opportunity to have a greater role in the politi-
cal settlement of Afghanistan by facilitating the reconciliation process with the
Afghan Taliban on which Islamabad has mainly relied to protect its strategic inter-
ests despite international pressure in post-9/11.72 According to General Ashfaq
Parvez Kayani, “Pakistan sees the Taliban not as potential conquerors of Afghani-
stan but more of an anti-Indian asset in a post-NATO world.”73 Admiral Mike
Mullen said that “Pakistan’s long-term goal was to use the Taliban as a ‘hedge’
to redress imbalance in regional power.”74 This meant that reconciliation with the
Afghan Taliban has increased Islamabad’s relevance in the future government
122  Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
in Kabul, whereas the role of India has decreased despite its billions of dollars
investment in developmental projects and cooperation on security. More specifi-
cally, “any power-sharing arrangement accompanying a peace deal with Afghan
Taliban would likely align with Pakistan’s vision of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghani-
stan i.e. a Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan.”75
After the US announcement of its exit strategy in 2011, there has been a shift
in Pakistan’s approach to have a stable Afghanistan after the international forces
left the country. Actually, Pakistan has experienced a severe blowback in the form
of religious militancy and extremism due to its proxy wars in Afghanistan.76 As a
result, a dangerous nexus emerged among Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Cen-
tral Asian militant groups in the former FATA that has largely destabilized the
northern part of Pakistan on the Pak–Afghan border areas.77 Therefore, there has
been a realization in the Pakistani strategic circles that it is in the best interest of
Pakistan to have a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. According to former KP Chief
Minister Amir Haider Khan Hoti, “stability in KP and FATA is closely linked to
stability in Afghanistan.” Since then, Pakistan has showed greater interests in the
peace process in Afghanistan.
During Afghan High Peace Council’s visit to Pakistan in 2012, Pakistan
released nine Afghan Taliban leaders and handed over to Afghanistan, which
was an old demand of the Afghan government. This initiative was appreciated by
both Afghan officials and western diplomats based in Kabul. They believed that it
would help in reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban to find a political settlement
of the decade-long insurgency in the country. It was also seen as a shift in Paki-
stan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan and a step towards a political settlement
of the Afghan conflict. Salahuddin Rabbani, the Head of the Peace Council, called
the Afghan Taliban release as a breakthrough in the reconciliation with the Afghan
Taliban.78
Additionally, Pakistan has been blamed for all the wrongdoings by NATO
forces in Afghanistan and failure of the Afghan government to establish its order
in the country. Many saw Pakistan’s role as a spoiler that has severely affected
Pakistan’s image in Afghanistan. Islamabad believed that its active role in the
peace process and political settlement would improve its image both in Kabul and
at international levels. Furthermore, China has been investing in its Belt and Road
Initiative in which Pakistan is seeing a greater role due to its key geographic posi-
tion which can connect energy-rich Central Asia, Afghanistan and Middle East.
Nonetheless, stability in Afghanistan is a key for the Chinese initiative.
In this scenario, Pakistan has played an active role in the reconciliation pro-
cess to bring the Afghan Taliban into the negotiating table. Pakistan has hosted
the peace talks with the Afghan Taliban and participated in other regional initia-
tives by China, Saudi Arab, Qatar and Russia to find a political settlement in the
war-torn country. In October 2018, Pakistan released Taliban central leader Mul-
lah Abdul Ghani Baradar on the request of the government of Qatar to facilitate
the US–Taliban direct peace talks in Doha where the Taliban political office is
based.79 Mullah Baradar has played a significant part in the recently concluded
peace talks between the United States and Afghan Taliban.
 Pakistan’ss Policy
Pakistan’ Policy Towards Afghanistan 123
Towards Afghanistan 123
In
In February 2020,
February 2020, the the United
United States
States and and Afghan
Afghan Taliban
Taliban signed
signed aa historical
historical
truce
truce in Doha for bringing peace to Afghanistan after 18 years of
in Doha for bringing peace to Afghanistan after 18 years of conflict.
conflict. The The
United
United States
States andand itsits allies
allies have
have agreed
agreed “to “to withdraw
withdraw all all troops within 14
troops within 14 months
months
if
if the
the militants uphold the
militants uphold the deal.” President Trump
deal.” President Trump said,said, “it
“it had been aa long
had been long and and
hard journey in Afghanistan. It’s time after all these years
hard journey in Afghanistan. It’s time after all these years to bring our people back to bring our people back
home.”
home.”80 80
This
This peace truce was
peace truce was thethe result
result of of 14-month
14-month long long negotiating
negotiating process process
brokered and facilitated by Pakistan. It is important
brokered and facilitated by Pakistan. It is important to note that Pakistan’s to note that Pakistan’s effortsefforts
are
are appreciated
appreciated by by the United States
the United States andand Western
Western officials
officials andand diplomats.
diplomats.
Nonetheless,
Nonetheless, the the US–Taliban
US-Taliban truce truce is is aa setback
setback to to India, which has
India, which brought
has brought
the
the Afghan Taliban at the centre of the future government in Afghanistan. It
Afghan Taliban at the centre of the future government in Afghanistan. It is
is aa
win of the Pakistani strategists to have a greater role
win of the Pakistani strategists to have a greater role in the political settlement in the political settlement
of
of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan. As As mentioned
mentioned before,before, IndiaIndia hashas always
always been been sceptical
sceptical about about the the
Afghan
Afghan Taliban due to its close association with Pakistan. Subsequently, New
Taliban due to its close association with Pakistan. Subsequently, New
Delhi
Delhi hashas supported
supported anti-Taliban
anti-Taliban forces forces in in Afghanistan
Afghanistan to to neutralize
neutralize or or isolate
isolate
the
the Taliban’s role in Afghanistan. The United States has also requested India
Taliban’s role in Afghanistan. The United States has also requested India to to
support
support the the US-Taliban
US–Taliban deal deal and
and start
start negotiation
negotiation with with thethe Afghan
Afghan Taliban.
Taliban. To To
neutralize
neutralize the the growing
growing role role of Pakistan in
of Pakistan in Afghanistan,
Afghanistan, Indian Indian leadership
leadership may may
reach out to the Afghan Taliban and establish
reach out to the Afghan Taliban and establish a relationship with the a relationship with the outfit
outfit in in
future.
future.81 81

After
After the the US—Afghan
US—Afghan Taliban Taliban truce,
truce, the the newly
newly US US elected
elected President
President Biden Biden
announced that they will complete their mission in Afghanistan
announced that they will complete their mission in Afghanistan by August 2021.82 by August 2021. 82

This means that Biden continued former President

This means that Biden continued former President Trump’s policy towards Trump’s policy towards
Afghanistan
Afghanistan and withdrew all
and withdrew US forces
all US forces fromfrom Afghanistan
Afghanistan by by August 2021.
August 2021. The The
Afghan
Afghan Taliban termed it their victory against 20 years US occupation that
Taliban termed it their victory against 20 years US occupation that had
had
started
started in the post-9/11.
in the post-9/11.83 83

Nonetheless,
Nonetheless, the the victory
victory of the Afghan
of the Afghan Taliban will have
Taliban will have negative
negative falloutfallout on on
Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s peace and security. Many radical groups in Pakistan will take inspira-
peace and security. Many radical groups in Pakistan will take inspira­
tion
tion from
from the the Afghan
Afghan Taliban which will
Taliban which will lead to extremism
lead to extremism and and radicalization
radicalization in in
the
the country. Also, a new influx of Afghan refugees will arrive to
country. Also, a new influx of Afghan refugees will arrive Pakistan due
to Pakistan due
to
to humanitarian
humanitarian crisis crisis in in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan. More More importantly,
importantly, many many anti-Pakistan
anti-Pakistan ele- ele­
ments such as Pakistani Taliban based in Afghanistan
ments such as Pakistani Taliban based in Afghanistan have increased their have increased their terror
terror
attacks
attacks on Pakistani security
on Pakistani forces in
security forces the former
in the former tribal
tribal areas
areas along
along the the Durand
Durand
Line.
Line.8484

In
In addition,
addition, many regional stakeholders
many regional stakeholders will will try
try toto fill
fill the
the vacuum
vacuum left by the
left by the
United States in Afghanistan. India has reluctantly
United States in Afghanistan. India has reluctantly started to reach out to started to reach out to the
the
Afghan
Afghan Taliban
Taliban in in Doha
Doha in in September 2020
September 2020 despite despite itsits official
official stance
stance to to support
support
the
the Afghan
Afghan government.
government. The primary objective
The primary objective of of India
India is is to protect its
to protect its secu-
secu­
rity interests and investment in Afghanistan. More specifically,
rity interests and investment in Afghanistan. More specifically, India wants that India wants that
Afghanistan
Afghanistan would would not become aa major
not become major security
security concern
concern by by harbouring
harbouring Kashmir- Kashmir-
based militant
based militant groups
groups such such asas Jaish-e-Mohammed
Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.85 In
and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.85 In
addition, India believes that the US dependency
addition, India believes that the US dependency on Pakistan will on Pakistan will bebe reduced
reduced fol- fol­
lowing
lowing its its withdrawal
withdrawal which which will provide her
will provide her an
an opportunity
opportunity to fill the
to fill the vacuum
vacuum
in
in Afghanistan by cooperating with the United States. India could also
Afghanistan by cooperating with the United States. India could also use use itsits
regional
regional diplomacy by engaging Iran with the United States on the question of
diplomacy by engaging Iran with the United States on the question of
Afghanistan.
Afghanistan.86 86
124  Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
To
To sum up, Afghanistan
sum up, Afghanistan willwill remain
remain aa major
major source
source of
of security
security concern for
concern for
Pakistan despite the Afghan Taliban advancement in the country. In fact, the
Pakistan despite the Afghan Taliban advancement in the country. In fact, the Tali­ Tali-
ban takeover
ban takeover ofof Afghanistan would create
Afghanistan would create security
security concerns
concerns as
as extremism
extremism andand
Taliban
Taliban militancy will spill over to the Pakistan’s western border areas in
militancy will spill over to the Pakistan’s western border areas KP and
in KP and
Balochistan
Balochistan provinces. More importantly,
provinces. More importantly, India–US
India-US cooperation
cooperation in
in Afghanistan
Afghanistan
would
would create
create further
further security problems for
security problems Pakistan’s strategic
for Pakistan’s strategic and
and regional
regional inter-
inter­
ests following the US drawdown from Afghanistan.
ests following the US drawdown from Afghanistan.

Conclusion
Conclusion
Pakistan
Pakistan has
has long been accused
long been accused of providing safe
of providing safe havens
havens toto the
the Afghan
Afghan Taliban
Taliban
from the international
from the international community,
community, in particular from
in particular from Washington,
Washington, and playing lit-
and playing lit­
tle or conflicted role in the War on Terror as an ally of the United States.
tle or conflicted role in the War on Terror as an ally of the United States. However, However,
the
the United
United States
States did
did not
not acknowledge
acknowledge for for long
long its
its own
own mistakes
mistakes of of undermining
undermining
Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s mainly India-centric security interests which compromised its
mainly India-centric security interests which compromised its perfor-
perfor­
mance
mance against the War on Terror. However, recently, the US interests in
against the War on Terror. However, recently, the US interests pulling
in pulling
out from Afghanistan
out from Afghanistan and and initiating
initiating dialogues with the
dialogues with the Afghan
Afghan Taliban provided
Taliban provided
an
an opportunity to Pakistan to secure its strategic interests. This opportunity has
opportunity to Pakistan to secure its strategic interests. This opportunity has
not been unattended
not been unattended so so far.
far. This
This is
is evident from the
evident from the fact
fact that Pakistan played
that Pakistan played anan
active
active role
role for
for aa fair
fair share
share of
of the
the Taliban
Taliban in
in new
new political
political setup. However, there
setup. However, there is
is
possible blowback on
possible blowback Pakistan in
on Pakistan the form
in the form ofof extremism
extremism andand radicalization
radicalization inin the
the
case
case of
of the
the Taliban taking over
Taliban taking Kabul.
over Kabul.

Notes
Notes
1
1 S. M. Burke,
S. M. Mainsprings of
Burke, Mainsprings Indian and
ofIndian Pakistani Foreign
and Pakistani Policies (Karachi:
Foreign Policies (Karachi: Oxford
Oxford
University Press,
University Press, 1975),
1975), 22.
22.
2
2 C.
C. Christine Fair, Fighting
Christine Fair, Fighting toto the End: The
the End: Pakistan Army’
The Pakistan Army’ss Way
Way of War (New
of War (New York:
York:
Oxford
Oxford University
University Press, 2014).
Press, 2014).
3 Howard Wriggins,
3 Howard Wriggins, “The Balancing Process
“The Balancing Process in
in Pakistan’s
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,” in
Foreign Policy,” Pakistan:
in Pakistan:
The View, ed.
Long View,
The Long Lawrence Ziring
ed. Lawrence Ziring (Durham, NC: Duke
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977),
University Press, 1977),
303–4.
303-4.
4 Richard Sisson
4 Richard Sisson and
and Leo Rose, War
Leo Rose, and Secession:
War and Secession: Pakistan,
Pakistan, India
India and
and the
the Creation
Creation of
of
Bangladesh (Karachi:
Bangladesh (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
Oxford University Press, 1992),
1992), 35.
35.
5 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Rifaat Hussain,
6 Rifaat Hussain, “The India-Pakistan Peace
“The India-Pakistan Process,” Defense
Peace Process,” Defense & Analysis 22,
Security Analysis
& Security 22,
no. 44 (2006):
no. 410.
(2006): 410.
7 Rashid Ahmad
7 Rashid Ahmad Khan,
Khan, “Pakistan-India Peace Process:
“Pakistan-India Peace An Assessment,”
Process: An Assessment,” IPRI
IPRI Journal
Journal
IX, no.
IX, no. 11 (Winter 2009): 90.
(Winter 2009): 90.
8 Ibid., 91.
8 Ibid., 91.
9
9 John
John Thomson,
Thomson, “Kashmir:
“Kashmir: The Most Dangerous
The Most Dangerous Place
Place in
in the
the World,”
World,” in Kashmir: New
in Kashmir: New
Voices, Approaches, ed.
New Approaches,
Voices, New W. P.
ed. W. P. S.
S. Sidhu
Sidhu (New Delhi: Viva
(New Delhi: Viva Books
Books Private
Private Ltd.,
Ltd.,
2007), 188.
2007), 188.
10
10 “India Has Reached
“India Has Limit of
Reached Limit of Tolerance-Vajpayee,”Reuters,
Tolerance-Vajpayee,”Reuters, December 16, 2001.
December 16, 2001.
11 Atul Aneja,
11 Atul Aneja, “India
“India Recalls Envoy to
Recalls Envoy to Pak,”
Pak,” The Hindu, December 22,
The Hindu, December 22, 2001.
2001.
12
12 “India Has Reached
“India Has Limit of
Reached Limit of TOLERANCE-VAJPAYEE.”
TOLERANCE-VAJPAYEE.”
13
13 “Pakistani Daily Reports
“Pakistani Daily Reports Troops
Troops on on High Alert Along
High Alert Along Indian
Indian Border,” BBC Monitoring
Border,” BBC Monitoring
Asia, December 15,
South Asia,
South 2001.
December 15, 2001.
 Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan 125
14 Anton La Guardia, “We Do Not Want a War, Says Pakistan,” The Daily Telegraph,
December 29, 2001.
15 “The Pressure Rises in Pakistan,” New York Times, December 20, 2001; John F. Burns,
“Pakistan Is Said to Order an End to Support for Militant Groups,” New York Times,
January 2, 2002.
16 Text of the speech is available at the official web site of the government of Pakistan,
accessed November 3, 2010, www.infopak.gov.pk.
17 Luv Puri, “Be Ready for Decisive Battle, PM Tells Jawans,” The Hindu, May 23, 2002.
18 Ibid.
19 Hussain, “The India-Pakistan Peace Process,” 411.
20 Syed Nadzri, “Musharaf – Threat of Full-Scale India–Pakistan War Has Diminished,”
New Straits Times, June 8, 2002.
21 Ishtaiq Ahmad, “Securing Peace in South Asia,” Pakistan Vision 8, no. 2 (2007): 67.
22 “India to Appoint High Commissioner, Restore Air Links to Pakistan,” The Hindu,
May 3, 2003.
23 Qudssia Akhlaque, “Dialogue to Start Next Month: Joint Statement on Musharaf–
Vajpayee Meeting,” Dawn, January 7, 2004.
24 Ishtiaq Ahmad, “The Futute of India-Pakistan Peace Process Amid the War on Terror
in Afghanistan,” IPRI Journal VII, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 56.
25 Sydney J Freedberg Jr, “The Kabul- New Delhi Axis,” National Journal 39, no. 19
(May 12, 2007): 60.
26 As cited in Qadar Bakhsh Baloch and Abdul Hafeez Khan Niazi, “Indian Encroach-
ment in Afghanistan: A New Imperialism in the Making,” The Dialogue III, no. 1
(2008): 17.
27 Perveen Swami, “The Terror Trajectory,” Frontline 18, no. 21 (October 13–26, 2001).
28 “Jaswant Support to NA,” Times of India, October 3, 2001.
29 Christine C. Fair, “Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S. Relations with Paki-
stan,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (April 2009): 159.
30 Shah Imran Ahmed, “News Analysis: Indian Prime Minister’s Visit Promotes Indo-
Afghan Ties,” Xinhua News Agency, August 30, 2005.
31 Stephen Blank, “India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia,” Comparative Strategy 22,
no. 2 (2003): 142.
32 Scott Baldauf, “India-Pakistan Rivalry Reaches into Afghanistan,” Christian Science
Monitor 95, no. 202 (September 12, 2003): 2.
33 Baloch and Niazi, “Indian Encroachment in Afghanistan,” 17.
34 As cited in R. G. Wirising, “In India’s Lengthening Shadow: The U.S.-Pakistan Strate-
gic Alliance and the War in Afghanistan,” Asian Affairs: An American Review (2007):
164.
35 Sudha Ramachandran, “In Afghanistan, Pakistan's loss is India's gain,” Asia Times,
February 01, 2002.
36 Nirmala George, “Afghanistan Turns to India for Advice,” Associated Press, Janu-
ary 16, 2002.
37 “President Musharaf’s Address to the Nation,” The News, September 20, 2001.
38 Praveen Swami, “Covert Contestation,” Frontline 22, no. 19 (September 10–23,
2005), accessed July 25, 2010, www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2219/stories/2005092
3004503000.htm.
39 Mubashir Zaidi, “The Loss of Strategic Depth Can Be Attributed to the Unholy Shadow
of the Foreign Office-Former ISI Chief, Hameed Gul,” Herald, December 2001.
40 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Balti-
more: John Hopkins, 2000), 335.
41 Ibid.
42 As cited in Hussain, “Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan: Continuity and Change,” 5.
43 Ibid.
126  Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
44 Fair, “Time for Sober Realism,” 159.
45 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghani-
stan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008), 68.
46 “India, Afghanistan and Pakistan in Between,” The Washington Times, September 4,
2005.
47 J. N. Raina, “Is India Benign Role in Afghanistan Anti-Pakistan,” Asian Tribune
19, no. 266 (July 27, 2008), accessed December 19, 2009, http://asiantribune.com/
node/12407.
48 “Afghan Paper Rejects Pakistani Allegations on Terrorist Camps,” BBC Monitoring
South Asia, October 22, 2003.
49 Baldauf, “India-Pakistan Rivalry Reaches into Afghanistan,” 2.
50 Ibid.
51 Shaiq Hussain, “Pakistan to Ask India to Rein in Afghan Consulates,” Nation (Lahore),
March 18, 2006.
52 Jam Muhammad Yousaf, Balochistan CM Statement. See Herald (Karachi, Pakistan),
September, 2004.
53 “Arms Supply to Bugti, Baloch Rebels to Be Taken Up with India, Afghanistan, Says
Tariq Azeem,” Pakistan Press International Information Services, September 05,
2006.
54 Pakistan Openly Accuses India, “Afghanistan of Supporting Secession Movement in
Balochistan,” United News of Bangladesh, April 23, 2009.
55 “Pakistan Interior Adviser Says India, Afghanistan Behind Baluch Unrest,” BBC Mon-
itoring South Asia, April 24, 2009.
56 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Ene-
mies,” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011): 156–57.
57 M. G. Weinbaum and J. B. Harder, “Pakistan’s Afghan Policies and Their Conse-
quence,” Contemporary South Asia 16, no. 1 (2008): 36–37.
58 Eric Schmitt and David S. Cloud, “U.S. May Start Pulling Out of Afghanistan Next
Spring,” New York Times, September 14, 2005.
59 Gregory Treverton and Seth Jones, Measuring National Power (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2005), 18.
60 “Musharraf: Pakistan and India’s Backing for ‘Proxies’ in Afghanistan Must
Stop,” The Guardian, February 13, 2015, accessed October 12, 2017, www.
theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/13/pervez-musharraf-pakistan-india-proxies-afgha
nistan-ghani-taliban.
61 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 86–87.
62 As cited in Syed Farooq Hasnat, “Pakistan’s Strategic Interests, Afghanistan and the
Fluctuating U.S. Strategy,” Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (Fall–Winter
2009): 153.
63 Kamal Zaheer, “Karzai in India to Boost Ties, Pakistan Wary,” Reuters, April 9, 2006.
64 Frederic Grare, “Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations in the Post 9/11 Era,” Carnegie
Papers no. 72, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (October 2006), 12.
65 Wirising, “In India’s Lengthening Shadow,” 166.
66 Fair, “Time for Sober Realism,” 160.
67 Ibid., 159.
68 Wirising, “In India’s Lengthening Shadow,” 166.
69 Nishank Motwani and Srinjoy Bose, “Afghanistan: ‘Spoilers’ in the Regional Security
Context,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 69, no. 3 (2015): 269.
70 CFR report, The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999–2020, www.cfr.org/timeline/us-
war-afghanistan.
71 Motwani and Bose, “Afghanistan,” 268.
72 Arshad Ali, “Endgame in Afghanistan: Pakistan’s New Approach, RSIS Commentar-
ies,” RSIS, Singapore, No. 230/2012, www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/1790-the-
endgame-in-afghanistan-pa/#.XYByYigzY2w.
 Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan 127
73 Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 2014), 189.
74 Ibid., 261.
75 Madiha Afzal, “Will the Afghan Peace Process Be Pakistan’s Road to Redemption?” Blog,
Brookings, June 25, 2020, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/25/
will-the-afghan-peace-process-be-pakistans-road-to-redemption/.
76 Michael Hughes, “Afghanistan’s Troika of Instability: Political Illegitimacy, State-
Building and Pakistani Realolitik,” A Master Degree Thesis Submitted to Johns Hop-
kins University, May 2016, 95.
77 Zahid Hussain, “Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Regional Perspec-
tive,” CIDOB Policy Research Paper (2011): 8.
78 Ali, “Endgame in Afghanistan.”
79 “Afghan Taliban Founder Mullah Baradar ‘Released’ by Pakistan,” Aljazeera, Octo-
ber 25, 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/afghan-taliban-founder-mullah-bara
dar-released-pakistan-181025093128441.html.
80 “Afghan Conflict: US and Taliban Sign Deal to End 18-Year War,” BBC Report, Febru-
ary 29, 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51689443.
81 Umair Jamal, “Understanding Pakistan’s Take on India-Taliban Talks,” The Diplomat,
May 23, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/understanding-pakistans-take-on-
india-taliban-talks/.
82 Zeke Miller and Aamer Madhani, “Biden Says U.S. War in Afghanistan Will End
August 31,” The Diplomat, July 9, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/biden-
says-u-s-war-in-afghanistan-will-end-august-31/.
83 “US completes Afghanistan withdrawal as final flight leaves Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August
30, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/30/us-completes-afghanistan-with
drawal-as-final-flight-leaves-kabul.
84 Zahid Hussain, “The Demons of Conflict,” Dawn, Pakistan, July 7, 2021 www.dawn.
com/news/1633636/the-demons-of-conflict.
85 Abdul Basit, “Why Did India open a Backchannel to the Taliban?” Al-Jazeera, July
7, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/7/7/why-did-india-open-a-backchannel-
to-the-taliban.
86 Raja Mohin, “India Resists the Taliban Bandwagon,” Foreign Affairs, July 25, 2021,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/25/india-afghanistan-taliban-blinken-jaishankar-
modi-meeting-new-delhi-geopolitics-regional-order/.