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Republic v. Santos

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and ruled that the respondents did not acquire ownership over a consolidated parcel of land (Lot 3). While Lot 3 was classified as alienable public land in 1982, the respondents only filed for registration in 2002, which did not meet the statutory period for extraordinary prescription against the State. As an unregistered land, Lot 3 is presumed to belong to the State unless a party can prove valid title, which the respondents failed to do as they did not establish the required open, continuous, and notorious possession since 1945.

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Maria Michelle Moraca
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165 views4 pages

Republic v. Santos

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and ruled that the respondents did not acquire ownership over a consolidated parcel of land (Lot 3). While Lot 3 was classified as alienable public land in 1982, the respondents only filed for registration in 2002, which did not meet the statutory period for extraordinary prescription against the State. As an unregistered land, Lot 3 is presumed to belong to the State unless a party can prove valid title, which the respondents failed to do as they did not establish the required open, continuous, and notorious possession since 1945.

Uploaded by

Maria Michelle Moraca
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Republic v. Santos, GR No.

160453 (2012)

DOCTRINE:

By law, accretion — the gradual and imperceptible deposit made


through the effects of the current of the water — belongs to the owner of
the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of
the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the
State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a
law vests the ownership in some other person.

FACTS:

 Alleging con􀆟nuous and adverse possession of more than ten


years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied
on March 7, 1997 for the registra􀆟on of Lot 4998-B (the property)
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property,
which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was
located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was
bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent
Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the
Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in
the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.
 On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his applica􀆟on for land
registra􀆟on to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of
the later’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the
property had been formed through accre􀆟on and had been in their
joint open, notorious, public, con􀆟nuous and adverse possession
for more than 30 years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired
through the process of accre􀆟on.

RULING:

 No.
 Accre􀆟on is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the
banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accre􀆟on,
must be: (a) gradual and impercep􀆟ble; (b) made through the
effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land
adjacent to the banks of rivers.
 The RTC and the CA grossly erred in trea􀆟ng the dried-up river
bed as an accre􀆟on that became respondents property pursuant
to Ar􀆟cle 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an
accre􀆟on. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land
involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and
the dried-up land did not equate to accre􀆟on, which was the
gradual and impercep􀆟ble deposi􀆟on of soil on the river banks
through the effects of the current. In accre􀆟on, the water level did
not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents
as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot
4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of
Ar􀆟cle 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to
accre􀆟on, we should apply the provision as its clear and
categorical language tells us to. Axioma􀆟c it is, indeed, that where
the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room
for interpreta􀆟on; there is only room for applica􀆟on. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.
 The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested
of its right of ownership. Ar􀆟cle 502 of the Civil Code expressly
declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of
the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B,
con􀆟nue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion,
unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river
beds should belong to some other person.
 The court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the
applica􀆟on for registra􀆟on of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio
Ivan S. Santos III respec􀆟ng
 Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less,
situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila;
and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State
for being part of the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANTOS G.R. No. 180027, July


18, 2012

Facts: The respondents purchased three (3) parcels of unregistered


land which were previously owned by one Generosa Asuncion
(Generosa), one Teresita Sernal (Teresita) and by the spouses Jimmy
and Imelda Antona, respectively. The 3 parcels of land were then
consolidated into a single lot "Lot 3". The respondents filed with the RTC
an Application for Original Registration of Lot 3 under Presidential
Decree No. 1529. Due to an Order by the RTC, the DENR Calabarzon
Office submitted a Report indicating that the area covered by Lot 3 "falls
within the Alienable and Disposable Land. The respondents then
submitted a Certification from the DENR- Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) attesting that, indeed, Lot 3 was
classified as an "Alienable or Disposable Land" as of 15 March 1982.
The respondents allege that their predecessors-in-interest have been in
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the
said parcels since time immemorial. The RTC granted the respondents'
Application for Original Registration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. The government argues that the
respondents have failed to offer evidence sufficient to establish its title
over Lot 3 and, therefore, were unable to rebut the Regalian
presumption in favor of the State. It also posits that since Lot 3 was only
classified as alienable and disposable on 15 March 1982, the period of
prescription against the State should also commence to run only from
such date. Thus, the respondents' 12 March 2002 application, filed
nearly twenty (20) years after the said classification is still premature, as
it does not meet the statutory period required in order for extraordinary
prescription to set in. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the RTC ruling? Ruling: Yes. Being an unregistered land, Lot 3
is therefore presumed as land belonging to the State. Those who seek
the entry of such land into the Torrens system of registration must first
establish that it has acquired valid title thereto as against the State, in
accordance with law. Original registration of title to land is allowed by
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. The said section provides: Section 14.
Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those
who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable an disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions
of existing laws. (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the
existing laws. (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any
other manner provided for by law. Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 refers to the original registration of "imperfect" titles to public
land acquired under Section 11(4) in relation to Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended.
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 specify identical requirements for the
judicial confirmation of "imperfect" titles, to wit

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