SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141993. March 17, 2006.]

NARCISA AVILA, assisted by her husband Bernardo Avila,
Spouses JANUARIO N. ADLAWAN and NANETTE A.
ADLAWAN, NATIVIDAD MACAPAZ, assisted by her husband
EMILIO MACAPAZ, FRANCISCA N. ADLAWAN and LEON
NEMEÑO, petitioners, vs. Spouses BENJAMIN BARABAT and
JOVITA BARABAT, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J :p

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court assails the July 30, 1999 decision 1 and January 19, 2000
resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50899.
The subject of this controversy is a portion of a 433-square meter
parcel of land located in Poblacion, Toledo City, Cebu. The entire
property is
designated as cadastral lot no. 348 registered in the name of
Anunciacion
Bahena vda. de Nemeño. Upon her death, ownership of the lot was
transferred by operation of law to her five children, petitioners
Narcisa Avila,
Natividad Macapaz, Francisca Adlawan, Leon Nemeño and Jose
Bahena.
These heirs built their respective houses on the lot.
In 1964, respondent Benjamin Barabat leased a portion of the house
owned by Avila. His co-respondent, Jovita Barabat, moved in with
him in
1969 when they got married.
Avila subsequently relocated to Cagayan de Oro City. She came
back
to Toledo City in July 1979 to sell her house and share in the lot to
her
siblings but no one showed interest in it. She then offered it to
respondents
who agreed to buy it. Their agreement was evidenced by a private
document
dated July 17, 1979 which read:
ALANG SA KASAYURAN SA TANAN:
Nga ako, NARCISA AVILA, nagpuyo sa siyudad sa Cagayan de
Oro, 52 años ang panu-igon, minyo ug may mga anak magatimaan
ning maong kasulatan nga akong guibaligya sa kantidad nga walo ka
libo ka pesos (P8,000.00) ang bahin nga balay ug yuta nga sinunod ko
sa akong mga ginikanan ngadto sa magtiayon nga Benjamin ug Jovita
Barabat, mga lumulupyo sa siyudad sa Toledo. TCaEIc

Nga ang maong lote ug balay ana-a mahimutang sa Poblacion,

Toledo City kansang mga utlanan mao kining musunod:
Atubangan N. Rafols Street
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Dapit sa Tuo yuta ug mga panimalay sa Magsuong

Natividad Macapaz, Francisca Adlawan,
Jose Bahena ug Leoning Nemeno
Dapit sa wala kanal sa tubig
Dapit sa luyo lote nga kumon sa magsuong Nemeno
Tiniman-an: (Sgd.)
Narcisa Avila 2
Respondents stopped paying rentals to Avila and took possession of
the property as owners. They also assumed the payment of realty
taxes on
it.
Sometime in early 1982, respondents were confronted by petitioner
Januario Adlawan who informed them that they had until March 1982
only to
stay in Avila's place because he was buying the property.
Respondents
replied that the property had already been sold to them by Avila.
They
showed Adlawan the July 17, 1979 document executed by Avila.
On January 6, 1983, respondents received a letter from Atty. Joselito
Alo informing them that Avila had sold her house and share in lot no.
348 to
his clients, the spouses Januario and Nanette Adlawan. Considering
the sale
to the spouses Adlawan as prejudicial to their title and peaceful
possession
of the property, they demanded that Avila execute a public
document
evidencing the sale of the property to them but Avila refused.
Respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo City, Branch 29. 3 Docketed as Civil Case
No. T-
53, the complaint was subsequently amended to include annulment
of the
deed of sale to the spouses Adlawan, specific performance, partition
and
damages as additional causes of action. Respondents anchored their
claim
over the property to the July 17, 1979 private document which they
presented as Exhibit "A."
Avila denied having offered to sell her property to respondents. She
claimed that respondents gave her an P8,000 loan conditioned on
her
signing a document constituting her house and share in lot no. 348
as
security for its payment. She alleged that she innocently affixed her
signature on Exhibit "A" which was prepared by respondents and
which they
now claim as a private deed of sale transferring ownership to them.
The trial court rendered its May 9, 1995 decision in favor of
respondents. It declared Exhibit "A" as a valid and lawful deed of
sale. It
nullified the subsequent deed of sale between Avila and the spouses
Adlawan. Avila was ordered to execute a formal and notarized deed
of sale
in favor of respondents. It also held petitioners liable for moral
damages and
attorney's fees. EHSADa

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In

its
July 30, 1999 decision, the appellate court affirmed the decision of
the RTC in
toto. Petitioners sought a reconsideration but it was denied. Hence,
this
petition.
Petitioners claim that the appellate court erred in ruling that the
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transaction between respondents and Avila was an absolute sale,

not an
equitable mortgage. They assert that the facts of the case fell within
the
ambit of Article 1602 in relation to Article 1604 of the Civil Code on
equitable
mortgage because they religiously paid the realty tax on the
property and
there was gross inadequacy of consideration. In this connection,
Articles
1602 and 1604 provide:
Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, in any of the following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is
unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or
otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to
repurchase another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the
purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes of the
thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the
real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall
secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any
other obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit
to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered
as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.ECSaAc

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a
contract purporting to be an absolute sale.
They also claim that the court erred in denying them the right to
redeem the property and in ruling that there was implied partition
by the
acts of the parties.
We rule in favor of respondents.
For Articles 1602 and 1604 to apply, two requisites must concur: (1)
the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of
sale and (2)
their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. 4
Here,
both the trial and appellate courts found that Exhibit "A" evidenced
a
contract of sale. They also agreed that the circumstances of the
case show
that Avila intended her agreement with respondents to be a sale.
Both courts
were unanimous in finding that the subsequent acts of Avila
revealed her
intention to absolutely convey the disputed property. It was only
after the
perfection of the contract, when her siblings began protesting the
sale, that
she wanted to change the agreement.
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Furthermore, contrary to petitioners' claim, the trial court found that

it
was respondents who took over the payment of real property taxes
after the
execution of Exhibit "A." There is no reason to depart from these
factual
findings because, as a rule, factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted
and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive
on the
Court and generally will not be reviewed on appeal to us. 5 There is
no
reason for us to deviate from this rule.
Petitioners' claim of gross inadequacy of selling price has no basis.
They failed to introduce evidence of the correct price at the time the
land
was sold to respondents in 1979. How can we therefore conclude
that the
price was grossly inadequate? In the absence of evidence as to the
fair
market value of a parcel of land at the time of its sale, we cannot
reasonably
conclude that the price at which it was sold was inadequate. 6
Petitioners' rely on Article 1623 in relation to Article 1620 of the Civil
Code to justify their right of redemption. This is incorrect. DcaCSE

These provisions state:

Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of
redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or any of
them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of
redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may
respectively have in the thing owned in common.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall
not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by
the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The
deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining
owners.
Petitioners' right to redeem would have existed only had there been
coownership
among petitioners-siblings. But there was none. For this right to
be exercised, co-ownership must exist at the time the conveyance is
made
by a co-owner and the redemption is demanded by the other co-
owner or coowner(
s). 7 However, by their own admission, petitioners were no longer
coowners
when the property was sold to respondents in 1979. The
coownership
had already been extinguished by partition.
The regime of co-ownership exists when the ownership of an
undivided
thing or right belongs to different persons. 8 By the nature of co-
ownership, a
co-owner cannot point to any specific portion of the property owned
in
common as his own because his share in it remains intangible and
ideal. 9
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is
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deemed to be a partition. 10 Here, the particular portions pertaining

to
petitioners had been ascertained and they in fact already took
possession of
their respective parts. The following statement of petitioners in their
amended answer 11 as one of their special and affirmative defenses
was
revealing:
F-8. That all defendants [i.e., petitioners] in this case who are
co-owners of lot 348 have their own respective buildings constructed
on the said lot in which case it can be safely assumed that that their
respective shares in the lot have been physically segregated
although there is no formal partition of the land among themselves. 12
(emphasis supplied) SHCaEA

Being an express judicial admission, it was conclusive on petitioners

unless it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was
in fact made. 13 Petitioners proved neither and were therefore bound
by it.
The purpose of partition is to separate, divide and assign a thing
held
in common among those to whom it belongs. 14 By their own
admission,
petitioners already segregated and took possession of their
respective
shares in the lot. Their respective shares were therefore physically
determined, clearly identifiable and no longer ideal. Thus, the co-
ownership
had been legally dissolved. With that, petitioners' right to redeem
any part of
the property from any of their former co-owners was already
extinguished.
As legal redemption is intended to minimize co-ownership, 15 once a
property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the
community
ceases to exist and there is no more reason to sustain any right of
legal
redemption. 16
Under the law, subject to certain conditions, owners of adjoining
urban
land have the pre-emptive right to a lot before it is sold to third
parties, or
the redemptive right if it has already been sold. In particular, Article
1622 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1622. Whenever a piece of urban land is so small and so
situated in that a major portion thereof cannot be used for any
practical purpose within a reasonable time, having been bought merely
for speculation, is about to be re-sold, the owner of any adjoining land
has a right of pre-emption at a reasonable price.
If the re-sale has been perfected, the owner of the adjoining land
shall have a right of redemption, also at a reasonable price.
When two or more owners of adjoining lands wish to exercise the
rights of pre-emption or redemption, the owner whose intended use of
the land in question appears best justified shall be preferred.
However, this provision does not apply here. Aside from the fact that
petitioners never raised it as an issue, the conditions provided for its
application were not met. While the property may be considered as
urban
land, it was not shown or even alleged that its area and location
would
render a major portion of no practical use within a reasonable time.
Neither
was there any allegation to the effect that the disputed property was
bought
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merely for speculation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 30, 1999
decision
and January 19, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No.
50899 are AFFIRMED. ISCHET

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali and concurred in by
Associate
Justices Quirino D. Abad-Santos, Jr. and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now
Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court) of the Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals.
2. CA Decision, rollo , pp. 65-66. The agreement was attached as one
of the
annexes to the complaint and offered as respondents' evidence before
the
court a quo . The trial court admitted the document even if no
translation in
the official languages as required by Rule 132, Section 33 of the Rules
of
Court was presented by respondents. Translated in English, it read:
TO ALL CONCERNED:
That I, NARCISA AVILA, residing at Cagayan de Oro City, 52 years of
age,
married and with children[,] executed this document where I sell for
the
amount of eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) my house and lot
representing
my share in the inheritance from my parents in favor of the spouses
Benjamin and Jovita Barabat, both residing in Toledo City.
That the house and lot are situated at Poblacion, Toledo City with the
following boundaries:
At the front N. Rafols Street
At the right side lot and houses of the siblings Natividad Macapaz,
Francisca Adlawan, Jose Bahena and Leoning
Nemeno
At the left side creek
At the rear common lot of the Nemeno siblings
(Sgd.) Narcisa Avila
3. Presided by Judge Peary G. Aleonar.
4. Heirs of the Late Spouses Aurelio and Esperanza Balite v. Lim ,
G.R. No.
152168, 10 December 2004, 446 SCRA 56.
5. Miranda v. Besa , G.R. No. 146513, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 532.
6. Acabal v. Acabal , G.R. No. 148376, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 555.
7. Vda. de Ape v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 133638, 15 April 2005,
citing Uy v.
Court of Appeals, 316 Phil. 863 (1995).
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8. Id . citing Felices v. Colegado , 146 Phil. 180 (1970).

9. Salatandol v. Retes , G.R. No. L-38120, 27 June 1988, 162 SCRA
568.
10. Article 1082, CIVIL CODE.
11. RTC records, pp. 198-202.
12. Id ., p. 200.
13. Cf. Section 4, Rule 129, RULES OF COURT.
14. Article 1079, CIVIL CODE.
15. Basa v. Aguilar, 208 Phil. 452 (1982).
16. Vda. de Ape v. Court of Appeals, supra .
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