Republic Act No.

9225 (August 29, 2003)

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic:

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity
of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must Meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
"The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
 (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to
their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the
country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in

the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or
invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

 Bengzon III v. HRET, 357 SCRA 545, G.R. No. 142840 (May 7, 2001)

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz, who was born in the Philippines to
Filipino parents. He later enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and took an oath of
allegiance to the United States, causing him to lose his Philippine citizenship. However,
he reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.
Petitioner filed a case questioning Cruz's qualification as a natural-born citizen since the
 Constitution requires that members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born
citizens.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of respondent Cruz, stating that repatriation
results in the recovery of the original nationality. Therefore, Cruz, being a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, regained his status as a natural-born
Filipino upon repatriation. The Court also emphasized that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the sole judge of qualifications. Unless there is a grave abuse
of discretion, the Court will not interfere with its decisions. Thus, the petition was
dismissed.

 Tabasa v. CA, 500 SCRA 9, G.R. No. 125793

Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, a Filipino citizen who acquired U.S. citizenship through
derivative naturalization. He returned to the Philippines but was detained by immigration
authorities. Tabasa claimed he had repatriated to Filipino citizenship under RA 8171 and
couldn't be deported. However, the Court ruled against him, stating he did not qualify for
repatriation under RA 8171. Even if he did, he failed to follow the proper procedure and
lacked evidence of political or economic necessity for his parents' renunciation of
Philippine citizenship. The Court clarified repatriation is not an automatic right but a
privilege. Consequently, Tabasa's claim of reacquiring Philippine citizenship was invalid,
and he was considered an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation. The
petition was dismissed.

 AASJS v. Datumanong, 523 SCRA 108, G.R. No. 160869 (May 11, 2007)
The petition seeks to stop the implementation of Republic Act No. 9225, alleging that
it allows dual allegiance, which is unconstitutional. However, the Court finds that the law
permits dual citizenship, not dual allegiance, as individuals taking the oath of allegiance
are implicitly renouncing their foreign citizenship. The Court rejects the petitioner's
reliance on Mercado v. Manzano to define dual allegiance and emphasizes that a law on
dual allegiance must be enacted by Congress before the courts can rule on related
issues. The Court rules that Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a policy
declaration, not self-executing. Thus, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

 Jacot v. DAL, 572 SCRA 295, G.R. No. 179848 (November 27, 2008)
 Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot was disqualified from running for the position of Vice-
Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 2007 National and Local Elections. He sought to
reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act) but failed to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US
citizenship, as required by Section 5(2) of the law. Jacot argued that his oath of allegiance
and Certificate of Candidacy were sufficient as renunciations, but the Court held that these
were distinct from the renunciation of foreign citizenship required under the law.
Jacot later presented an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States and any Foreign Citizenship," claiming that it was executed before he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy. However, the Court ruled that the late submission of evidence is
not allowed, and the petitioner should have presented it during the proceedings before the
COMELEC. The Court emphasized that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of
their counsel and that the candidate's high number of votes cannot cure his ineligibility
due to failure to comply with citizenship requirements. Consequently, Jacot's appeal was
dismissed, affirming his disqualification from running for Vice-Mayor.

 De Guzman v. COMELEC, 590 SCRA 149, G.R. No. 180048 (June 18, 2009)

The petition by Roseller De Guzman challenges his disqualification from running

as vice-mayor due to his failure to renounce his American citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225). The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that he
needed to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship before running
for public office. The Court upheld the COMELEC's decision, stating that filing a certificate
of candidacy and oath of allegiance did not meet the renunciation requirement, making De
Guzman ineligible for the position, and consequently, he was disqualified from the election.

 In Re: Petition to Re-acquire the Privilege to Practice Law, Bar Matter No.
2112 (July 24, 2012)

Epifanio B. Muneses filed a petition to resume practicing law in the Philippines. He

had become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in 1966 but lost his
privilege to practice when he became a U.S. citizen in 1981. However, he re-acquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 in 2006. The Court granted his petition,
allowing him to resume the practice of law, subject to retaking the Lawyer's Oath and
 paying appropriate fees. The Court also directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to draft
guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume law practice.

 Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, 678 SCRA 267, G.R. No. 198742 (August 10,
2012)
The petitioner, a natural-born Filipino who acquired Australian citizenship through
marriage, re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. However, she failed to
comply with the requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of her
Australian citizenship before a public officer, as mandated by Section 5(2) of the same
law. The Supreme Court ruled that this requirement is mandatory and failure to fulfill it
disqualifies a candidate from running for elective public office in the Philippines. Therefore,
the petitioner is disqualified from holding the position of Vice-Mayor due to her dual
citizenship and non-compliance with the renunciation requirement.

 Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649 (April 16, 2013) and G.R. No.
195649 (July 2, 2013)
The mayor in question reacquired Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 and executed
a sworn renunciation of all foreign citizenship, including his American citizenship, to qualify
for running for an elective position. However, he traveled to the US using his American
passport and made public representations as an American citizen before his Philippine
passport was issued. The issue is whether he is disqualified under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, which pertains to those with dual citizenship. The Supreme
Court ruled that using a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship is a voluntary
act that recants the Oath of Renunciation required for eligibility to run for public office.
Although it does not divest him of his Filipino citizenship, it reverts him back to his status
as a dual citizen. As a result, his act of using a foreign passport after renunciation
disqualified him from holding an elective local position.

Note: Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
Section 40(d), provides that a person with dual citizenship is disqualified from running for
any elective local position.

 David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 119113 (March 18, 2015)

The petitioner, a former Filipino citizen who became a Canadian citizen, re-acquired
his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. 9225). He filed a
 Miscellaneous Lease Application for public land in the Philippines, stating that he is a
Filipino citizen. The private respondent opposed the application and filed a criminal
complaint against the petitioner for falsification of public documents. The petitioner argued
that he re-acquired Philippine citizenship. Still, the courts ruled that the falsification was
already a consummated action, and that R.A. 9225 has no retroactive effect in this case.
The court affirmed the orders of the lower courts and held that the petitioner could still
raise his defense during the trial. The court also clarified that seeking affirmative relief
waives the jurisdictional issue, and the MTC erred in citing lack of jurisdiction over the
petitioner's person as a ground for denying his motion.

 Arnado v. COMELEC, 767 SCRA 168, G.R. No. 210164 (August 18, 2015)

In the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, the court

emphasized the variable nature of citizenship, requiring its determination on a case-by-
case basis when relevant. In election contests, citizenship is a continuing requirement for
elective officials. The court ruled that Rommel C. Arnado's use of a US passport after
renouncing his US citizenship nullified his renunciation and made him a dual citizen,
disqualifying him from running for local office. The dissenting opinion argued for individual
treatment of each case, but the majority upheld the finding of Arnado's US passport usage,
leading to his disqualification from public office.

DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:

Amado became a Philippine citizen on April 3, 2009, after taking an oath of

allegiance and executing an affidavit of renunciation. Although he was later deemed to
have recanted his renunciation, there was a brief period when he was considered a "pure"
Filipino, as recognized in the Maquiling ruling. He reaffirmed his status by executing
another Affidavit of Renunciation on May 9, 2013, which cured any defects in his
qualification to run in the May 2013 Elections.

LEONEN, J.:

Petitioner Rommel C. Amado renounced his foreign citizenship three times in

accordance with Republic Act No. 9225. Despite winning the 2013 elections, the majority
opinion now requires him to renounce his foreign citizenship again, which I disagree with.
 The petitioner was already a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his candidacy, making him
qualified to run in the 2013 elections. The petition should be granted.

 Caballero v. COMELEC, 771 SCRA 213, G.R. No. 209835 (September 22,
2015

Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for the mayoralty position
in the Municipality of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 2013 elections. Private respondent filed
a petition to cancel petitioner's certificate of candidacy, alleging that petitioner made false
representations regarding his eligibility as a Canadian citizen and non-resident. The
COMELEC First Division granted the petition and canceled petitioner's certificate of
candidacy based on a finding of material misrepresentation in his COC regarding his
residency.
After the May 2013 elections, petitioner was proclaimed as the Mayor of Uyugan,
Batanes. However, private respondent filed motions and petitions to challenge the
proclamation due to the COMELEC First Division's resolution canceling petitioner's
certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed this resolution on November 6,
2013. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, challenging the
COMELEC's decision. In the meantime, private respondent sought the execution of the
resolution to cancel petitioner's COC, and he was eventually proclaimed as the duly-
elected Mayor of Uyugan on December 20, 2013.
In Japzon v. COMELEC, it was clarified that reacquiring Philippine citizenship
under RA No. 9225 does not automatically reestablish one's residence or domicile in a
specific place. The individual must still prove that he has chosen that place as his new
domicile, and this is determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In the
case of the petitioner, he failed to present competent evidence to prove that he
reestablished his residence in Uyugan, Batanes within one year preceding the May 13,
2013 elections. The COMELEC's findings on this matter are considered final unless there
is a showing of grave abuse of discretion, which was not present in this case. Therefore,
the petitioner's claim of residency in Uyugan, Batanes was not substantiated, and he did
not meet the residency requirement to run for Mayor.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated May
3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division and the Resolution dated November 6, 2013 of
the COMELEC En Banc are hereby AFFIRMED.
 Cardino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216637 (March 7, 2017)
The case involves a dispute over the validity of Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation,
which she submitted to qualify for running as a candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte. Cardino, who ran against her, claimed that the affidavit was falsified
and thus Jalosjos remained a dual citizen and ineligible to run for elective office. The
COMELEC Second Division and En Banc both ruled in favor of Jalosjos, finding that the
date on the affidavit (July 16, 2012) was a clerical error and that the actual execution date
was July 19, 2012. The Court upheld the COMELEC's decision, emphasizing that its role
is not to reevaluate factual findings unless there is a grave abuse of discretion. The Court
also noted that a similar administrative case against Judge De Guzman-Laput, who
notarized the affidavit, was resolved in favor of the judge, further supporting the validity of
the affidavit. As a result, Jalosjos was considered eligible to run for the mayoral position,
and Cardino's petition was denied.

 Tan v. Crisologo, G.R. No. 193993 (November 11, 2017)

The case involves Vivienne K. Tan, a natural-born Filipino citizen who became a
naturalized U.S. citizen. She registered as a voter in the Philippines, but later reacquired
Philippine citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225. The Court of Appeals ruled that R.A.
No. 9225 does not have a retroactive effect, and Tan was not a Filipino citizen when she
registered as a voter, making her inclusion in the voter's list irregular. The Supreme Court
affirmed this decision, stating that a renunciation of Philippine citizenship through
naturalization as a foreigner results in the loss of Philippine citizenship until allegiance is
reaffirmed. Therefore, Tan was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter.
 Dual Citizenship v. Dual Allegiance – Section 5, Article IV, 1987
Constitution

I. Causes

Constitution does not prevent or prohibit dual citizenship. What is referred to in the
Constitution is dual allegiance, which is inimical to national interest and shall be dealt
with in accordance with law.

Each country or state is to determine who its citizens are. If a person‘s citizenship
is at issue, what will be used to determine the question is the law of the country where his
citizenship is at issue.

A person can have dual citizenship, and most of these situations are involuntary,
not until RA 9225 was passed. But before RA 9225, dual citizenship could arise because
of involuntary acts on the part of a person, viz:

a. Because of the application of the laws of two states, a person may have dual
citizenship;

b. A person who is married to a foreigner may be considered a dual citizen

c. Children born of that marriage will also become dual citizens;

d. If the person is born of Filipino parents in a country that follows jus soli as a
mode of acquiring citizenship from birth, then that child may become a dual citizen.

Dual Allegiance- on the other hand, is viewed from the perspective of the person.
It does not follow that a person of dual citizenship has dual allegiance as well because the
application of the laws of two states may make him a dual citizen. If he owes allegiance
only to one of these states, he is not guilty of having dual allegiance.

II. Section 40(d), Local Government Code of 1991

- Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code of 1991, Section
40( d) provides that a person with dual citizenship is disqualified from running for any
elective local position.
 Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, G.R. No. 135083 (May 26, 1999)
In the case of Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630 (1999), stated that Section
40(d) should be understood to mean dual allegiance and not dual citizenship.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition
is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states." (Emphasis
supplied) This bill aims to correct the oversight in the drafting of Section 40( d) of RA. No.
7160, in order to make Section 40 (d) conform to the Constitution and the ruling of the
Supreme Court in the case mentioned above.

 Cordora v. COMELEC and Tambunting, G.R. No. 176947 (February 19, 2009)
The court affirmed that Tambunting possessed dual citizenship due to his birth to a
Filipino mother and an American father. However, the court clarified that dual citizenship
is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship arises involuntarily when a person is
considered a national by two or more states due to their laws, such as in cases of jus soli
and jus sanguinis principles. On the other hand, dual allegiance results from an individual's
active voluntary participation in the naturalization process of another country while
maintaining allegiance to their country of origin.

The court emphasized that having dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify a
candidate from running for public office. As long as a candidate with dual citizenship files
a certificate of candidacy and swears allegiance to the Philippines, they can be considered
eligible for public office. The case established that possessing dual citizenship does not
equate to holding dual allegiance, and thus, it does not hinder a person from fulfilling the
qualifications to run for elective local positions.
 Agustin v. COMELEC, 774 SCRA 353, G.R. No. 207105 (November 10, 2015)

The issue was related to a candidate's dual citizenship and eligibility for public
office. The candidate had both Filipino and American citizenship but renounced his
American citizenship to run for a mayoral position. However, he continued using his USA
passport after renunciation, which led to his disqualification from running for office due to
dual citizenship under the Local Government Code. The court clarified that possessing
dual citizenship is distinct from dual allegiance, and while dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual's active loyalty to two or more states. In both
cases, the court emphasized the importance of accurate representation in the Certificate
of Candidacy and the consequences of making false representations.

 Chua v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216607 (April 5, 2016)

In this case, petitioner Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua, a dual citizen of the Philippines
and the United States, filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Councilor in Manila.
However, she failed to execute a sworn and personal renunciation of her American
citizenship, which was required for those seeking elective public office under Section 5(2)
of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Thus, at the time of filing her
certificate of candidacy, she was a dual citizen, rendering her ineligible to run for the said
position according to Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Private respondent
Imelda E. Fragata filed a timely petition for disqualification against petitioner, asserting
that she was disqualified due to her permanent residency in the United States. The
Commission on Elections properly considered the petition as one for disqualification, not
a petition to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy.

 Cardino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216637 (March 7, 2017)

The case involves a dispute over the validity of Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation,
which she submitted to qualify for running as a candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte. Cardino, who ran against her, claimed that the affidavit was
falsified, and thus Jalosjos remained a dual citizen and ineligible to run for elective office.
The COMELEC Second Division and En Banc both ruled in favor of Jalosjos, finding that
the date on the affidavit (July 16, 2012) was a clerical error and that the actual execution
date was July 19, 2012. The Court upheld the COMELEC's decision, emphasizing that its
role is not to reevaluate factual findings unless there is grave abuse of discretion. The
 Court also noted that a similar administrative case against Judge De Guzman-Laput, who
notarized the affidavit, was resolved in favor of the judge, further supporting the validity of
the affidavit. As a result, Jalosjos was considered eligible to run for the mayoral position,
and Cardino's petition was denied.

Foundlings

I. Republic Act No. 11767 – Foundling Recognition and Protection Act