POLITICAL LAW

Pre-week Notes (Part I)

Atty. Alexis F. Medina

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 CITIZENSHIP

Repatriation: Recovery of Natural-Born Citizenship

Those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire
natural-born citizenship. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality

Compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 (who take the Oath of Allegiance to reacquire
Philippine citizenship) does not show that the person is a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225
reacquire natural-born citizenship. Repatriation involves the restoration of former
status or the recovery of one's original nationality. Repatriation results in the recovery
of the original nationality. This means that if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.

(David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016)

Requirements for Former Natural-Born Filipinos to Run in Philippine Elections

Under RA 9225, the former natural born Filipino citizen must execute the a) oath of
allegiance, and b) personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for naturalborn
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to
certain conditions. R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who reacquire
their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. It is an
additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire
their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their
right to run for public office. A Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship that is
not sworn before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy. It will not be sufficient regain the political right to seek elective
office. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)

The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are
separate requirements. (Chua v. Comelec, G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016)

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 The mere act of running for public offices does not suffice to serve as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship.

The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective
renunciation of her Australian citizenship. The filing by a person with dual citizenship
of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship,
such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on
August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 198742, August 10, 2012)

Foundlings: Presumed Natural-Born Citizens

The Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born
to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there
is substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such
countervailing proof must show that both—not just one—of a foundling's biological parents
are not Filipino citizens. (David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016)

The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born, unless there is substantial
evidence to the contrary. The Constitution mandates the State to defend the well-being of
children, guarantee equal protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public
service, and respect human rights. (David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538,
September 20, 2016)

RA. 11767 – Foundling Recognition and Protection Act (May 06, 2022)

A foundling shall be a deserted or abandoned child or infant with unknown facts of birth and
parentage. This shall also include those who have been duly registered as a foundling during
her or his infant childhood, but have reached the age of majority without benefitting from
adoption procedures upon the passage of this law. (Section 3)

A foundling found in the Philippines and/or in Philippine embassies, consulates and

territories abroad is presumed a natural-born Filipino citizen regardless of the status or
circumstances of birth. As a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a foundling is accorded
with rights and protections at the moment of birth equivalent to those belonging to such class
of citizens whose citizenship does not need perfection or any further act. The presumption
of natural-born status of a foundling may not be impugned in any proceeding unless
substantial proof of foreign parentage is shown. (Section 5)

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 STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

When the doctrine is applicable:

If the suit seeks to impose a financial charge or liability
against the government

If Complaint seeks to "impose a charge or financial liability against the state," the defense of
non-suability may be properly invoked. Undoubtedly, in the event that PPI succeeds in its
suit, the government or the state through the DOH would become vulnerable to an imposition
or financial charge in the form of damages. This would require an appropriation from the
national treasury which is precisely the situation which the doctrine of state immunity aims
to protect the state from. (Department of Health v. Phil Pharmawealth, G.R. No. 182358, February
20, 2013)

An unincorporated agency enjoys immunity from suit

when it enters into proprietary contracts

An unincorporated agency enjoys immunity from suit and waives its non-suability only when
it enters into proprietary contracts. There is no waiver of immunity when the DPWH enters
into public road construction contracts, which involve exercise of government functions.
(Mendoza v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014)

If the government agency performs proprietary, private or non-governmental functions, it is

not immune from suit. If an unincorporated government agency performs proprietary,
private or non-governmental functions, it is not immune from suit. The ATO was involved in
the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, which are primarily private or non-
governmental functions. Hence, the ATO has no claim to immunity from suit. (Air
Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011)

The doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as

an instrument for perpetrating an injustice

The doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to
a citizen. Even an unincorporated agency such as the DOTC may be sued, even when
performing sovereign functions, for taking of private property without filing an
expropriation case. The Department’s entry into and taking of possession of the respondents’
property amounted to an implied waiver of its governmental immunity from suit.
(Department of Transportation v. Spouses Abecina, G.R. No. 206484, June 29, 2016)

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 THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Privilege of Speech and Debate

Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution states:

xxx No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

Purpose of Speech or Debate Clause: To enable Members of Congress to perform the functions
without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside

Congress. (Trillanes IV v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018)

Meaning of “Speech or Debate”: Performance of official functions; Participation in media

interviews is not an official function of a Senator
Acts in the performance of their official functions. Acts in official discharge of their
duties as members of Congress. Examples -- Speeches delivered, statements made, or
votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress. To participate in media interviews is not an official function
of any lawmaker. It is not covered by the Speech or Debate Clause. Thus, the court
validly denied the motion of Trillanes to dismiss the libel case against him based on
his claim of Privilege of Speech or Debate. (Trillanes IV v. CastilloMarigomen, G.R. No.
223451, March 14, 2018)

Legislative Process
Enrolled Bill Doctrine: The signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed is conclusive not only as to its provisions but also as to its due enactment. -- Under
the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed
is conclusive not only as to its provisions but also as to its due enactment. The rationale rests
on the consideration the respect due to coequal and independent departments. (Council of
Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No.
216930, October 09, 2018)

Urgent bills: The President's certification of the bill as urgent to meet a public calamity or
emergency justifies non-compliance with the general procedure for enacting laws. The
Courts must refrain from intruding into the President's certification, unless there is grave
abuse of discretion: Petitioners maintain that the House of Representatives transgressed the
requirements under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution in enacting the

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 ATA, specifically that the bill did not undergo three readings on separate days, and that no
printed copies of the House Bill in its final form were distributed to the members of the House
three days before its passage. They also argue that the certification for the immediate
enactment of the law did not meet the "public calamity or emergency" exception.

The President's certification of the bill as urgent justifies non-compliance with the general
procedure for enacting laws. The general procedure under the Constitution requiring that the
readings be made on three separate days and that the bill be printed in its final form and
distributed three days before the third reading may, however, be dispensed with when the
President certifies a bill as urgent to meet a public calamity or emergency.

The President's certification should be accorded with due deference. The Court must refrain
from intruding into such matter through the exercise of its judicial power in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion.

In this case, President Rodrigo R. Duterte, through a letter dated June 1, 2020, certified the
necessity for the immediate enactment of HB No. 6875 "to address the urgent need to
strengthen the law on anti-terrorism and effectively contain the menace of terrorist acts for
the preservation of national security and the promotion of general welfare." As the Court sees
it, there is no grave abuse in deeming that the passage of a law to sufficiently address
terrorism in the country falls within the public emergency exception. (Calleja v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021)

Power to Choose its Own Officers and Sole Authority to Determine the Rules of its Proceedings

The House has the prerogative on the method and manner of choosing officers other than
the Speaker, and sole authority to determine the rules of its proceedings. The Supreme
Court has no authority to interfere and intrude into this exclusive realm: The method of
choosing who will be the other officers (other than the Speaker) must be prescribed by the
House of Representatives itself, not by the Court.

Moreover, the House has the sole authority to "determine the rules of its proceedings." The
Supreme Court has no authority to interfere and intrude into this exclusive realm. As a
general rule, the Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm, without running afoul of Constitutional principles that it is bound to protect
and uphold. (Baguilat v. Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017)

Under the Constitution, Congress has the discretion to determine the rules of its
proceedings, including the voting on and approving bills through virtual platforms.
Absent any grave abuse of discretion, it is beyond the scope of the Court's jurisdiction to
scrutinize the internal procedures of Congress: The petitioners question the lack of quorum
during the session and voting on HB No. 6875 because some members attended through
virtual platforms, in contravention of the physical attendance requirement. Under the
Constitution, Congress has the discretion to determine the rules of its proceedings. Thus, the
House has the authority to promulgate rules on the conduct of virtual session through

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 electronic platforms like video conference, telecommunications and other computer online
technologies. While voting on and approving bills through virtual platforms may be
unconventional, this is not prohibited by the internal rules of the House of Representatives.
Absent any palpable grave abuse of discretion, it is beyond the scope of the Court's
jurisdiction to scrutinize the internal procedures of Congress. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021)

Power to Grant Legislative Franchise

Congress has the sole authority to grant and renew legislative franchises for broadcasting
entities, such as ABS-CBN, to legally broadcast their programs through allocated frequencies
for the purpose. The legislative branch of our government has yet to grant or renew ABS-
CBN's legislative franchise, which decision - whether fortunate or unfortunate - this Court
must impartially respect, else it violates the fundamental principle of separation of powers.
(ABS-CBN Corp. vs. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 252119, August 25, 2020)

Power to Create Public Offices

The power of Congress to create public offices includes the power to abolish them and to
modify their nature, qualifications, and terms.

Congress has the power to create public offices, including the power to abolish them
and to modify their nature, qualifications, and terms. Flowing from the legislative
power to create public offices is the power to abolish and modify them to meet the
demands of society. Congress can change the qualifications for and shorten the term
of existing statutory offices. When done in good faith, these acts would not violate a
public officer's security of tenure, even if they result in his removal from office or the
shortening of his term.

Since the creation of public offices involves an inherently legislative power, the
particular characteristics of the public office, including eligibility requirements and the
nature and length of the term in office, are also for legislative determination. (Lagman
v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 197422, November 03, 2020)

The legislature may, in good faith, change the qualifications for and shorten the term
of existing statutory offices, even if these changes would remove, or shorten the term
of, an incumbent. (Lagman v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 197422, November 03,
2020)

Petitioner Lagman assails Republic Act No. 10149 as unconstitutional for violating the
security of tenure of officials, trustees, and directors of GOCCs with original charters.
The law shortens the directors' terms to one year, and pre-terminates the terms of
incumbent chief executive officers (CEOs) and appointive board members shall only
be up to June 30, 2011. The law allegedly infringes on the security of tenure of those
with fixed terms under the GOCCs' special charters, and is "an outright removal" of
the affected incumbents "without cause and without due process.

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 These changes are constitutional. The law is consistent with the objective of the
legislative and executive departments to restructure the GOCCs to address these
reported abuses in the remuneration scheme and inefficiencies in the operations of the
GOCCs. This is consistent with Congress's legislative prerogative to modify, through
laws, the terms of public office. (Lagman v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 197422,
November 03, 2020)

Reorganization is valid when pursued in good faith, such as if the purpose is to make
the bureaucracy more efficient. (Lagman v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No.

197422, November 03, 2020)

Power to Impeach
Issues in impeachment proceedings that are political questions

• Whether a narration of facts constitutes an impeachable offense.

• Sufficiency of the substance of the impeachment complaint.
• Decision of the Committee on Justice to impeach. (Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011)

One-year ban on impeachment

The one-year bar starts from “initiation” of impeachment complaint:

Meaning of “initiation” of impeachment complaint:

• Filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House

Committee on Justice or
• Filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with
the Secretary General of the House. (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011)

Effect of Impeachment: No further than to removal from office and disqualification from
holding any public office

The effects of a judgment on an impeachment complaint extends no further than to

removal from office and disqualification from holding any public office. Impeachment
is, thus, designed to remove the impeachable officer from office, not punish him. It is
purely political, and it is neither civil, criminal, nor administrative in nature

An impeached public officer whose civil, criminal, or administrative liability was not
judicially established may be considered involuntarily retired from service.

An impeached public officer whose civil, criminal, or administrative liability was not
judicially established is entitled to the retirement benefits provided under RAs 9946
and 8291. (Re: Letter of Mrs. Corona, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021)

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Power of Oversight
The power of oversight embraces all activities or post-enactment measures undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation
it has enacted. Congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget
hearings, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by
either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and

(2) investigation of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power to conduct

inquiries in aid of legislation. (Abakada Guro Party-List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715,
August 14, 2008)

Legislative Veto

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative

agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or
"power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take
effect. (Abakada Guro Party-List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008)

Invalidity of legislative veto: Encroachment into executive and judicial powers in violation
of separation of powers:

Legislative veto entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or

implementing its own laws. Moreover, it also allows Congress to arrogate judicial
power unto itself. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on
a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of the law,
Congress in effect exercises a judicial function. (Abakada Guro Party-List v. Purisima,
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008)

Power of Inquiry
Constitutional basis - Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”

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Constitutional Limitations

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not
absolute. Under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, the investigation must be -

a) in aid of legislation;
b) in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure; and
c) the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected."

(see Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991)

Duration of the legislative inquiry:

Terminated upon 1) Approval/disapproval of Committee Report; and 2) Expiration of

one Congress. At that point, the power of contempt simultaneously ceases and the
detained witness should be released

The legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances: First, upon the
approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. At that point, the power of
contempt simultaneously ceases and the detained witness should be released. Second,
upon the expiration of one Congress. As the legislative inquiry ends upon that
expiration of one Congress, the imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends.
(Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)

Termination of legislative inquiry upon expiration of Congress

The Senate as an institution is "continuing", but in the conduct of its day-to-day

business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate
of the Congress before it. All pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and
even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular

Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress. (Balag v.
Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)

All pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that

Congress. (Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)

Indefinite period of detention for contempt violates the right to liberty of persons appearing
in legislative inquiries.

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 The Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of legislation,
must respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein. An indefinite and
unspecified period of detention for being cited for contempt will amount to excessive
restriction and will certainly violate any person's right to liberty. (Balag v. Senate of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)

Imprisonment for contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the
termination of the legislative inquiry, which is 1) Upon approval/disapproval of
Committee Report; and 2) upon expiration of one Congress. (Balag v. Senate of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Presidential Immunity from Suit

The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil
or criminal case. Reasons --

• A suit will degrade the dignity of the office of the President, the Head of State.
• The President must be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction in the
performance of his official functions. (Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino, G.R. No. 210500, April
2, 2019)

A non-sitting President has no immunity from suit.

(Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 193160, November 15, 2011)

The President is immune from suit during his tenure, even for acts that do not pertain to his
official acts as President, and regardless of the nature of the suit. (De Lima v. Duterte, G.R.
No. 227635, October 15, 2019)

The President is immune from suit during his tenure, even if the suit (habeas data) does not
involve the determination of administrative, civil, or criminal liabilities. (De Lima v. Duterte,
G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019)

Diplomatic Power
The President is the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations and is accorded a wider
degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa,
G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)

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The President is also the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. As
the sole organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally assigned chief architect of our
foreign policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the
country's interface with other states and governments.

The decision of how best to address our disputes with China (be it militarily,
diplomatically, legally) rests on the political branches of government. The Constitution
vests executive power, which includes to duty to execute the law, protect the Philippines, and
conduct foreign affairs, in the President- not this Court. Barring violations of the limits
provided by law and the Constitution, we should take care not to substitute our exercise of
discretion for his. (Esmero v. Duterte, G.R. No. 256288, June 29, 2021)

A treaty is required for initial entry of foreign military bases, troops and facilities

The constitutional restriction on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the

Philippines refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to
the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to
the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary
Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)

When the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops
and facilities

The President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law
or treaty. The EDCA can be in the form of an executive agreement, since it merely
involves "adjustments in detail" in the implementation of the Mutual Defense Treaty
and the Visiting Forces Agreement.

(Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)

Rules on withdrawal from treaties by the President

When withdrawal from a treaty need not be with Senate/Congressional

consent/concurrence

The president can withdraw from a treaty as a matter of policy, if a treaty is

unconstitutional or contrary to provisions of an existing prior statute.
(Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021)

The Constitution mandates the president to "ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed." Thus, the president can withdraw from a treaty, if a treaty is
unconstitutional or contrary to provisions of an existing prior statute.
(Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021)

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 When withdrawal from a treaty must be with legislative concurrence The president

may not unilaterally withdraw from a treaty:

(a) when the Senate conditionally concurs, such that it requires concurrence
also to withdraw; or

(b) when the withdrawal itself will be contrary to a statute, or to a legislative

authority to negotiate and enter into a treaty, or an existing law which
implements a treaty. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021)

The President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements

where the Senate concurred and expressly declared that any withdrawal must
also be made with its concurrence.

As effecting treaties is a shared function between the executive and the

legislative branches, the Senate's power to concur with treaties necessarily
includes the power to impose conditions for its concurrence. (Pangilinan v.
Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021)

Power of Appointment
The ban on midnight appointments

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. (Article VII, Section, 1987
Constitution; Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

Requirements for a valid Presidential appointment before the appointment ban

The concurrence of all procedural steps in the Presidential appointment process is

required for valid appointments outside the midnight appointment ban: 1)
Presidential signing of the appointment; 2) transmittal of the appointment paper; 3)
receipt by the appointee; 4) and acceptance by the appointee by taking oath or
assumption of office.

It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper; there should be
evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. Release of
the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the

President's intent of its issuance. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
203372, June 16, 2015)

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 The constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential
appointments. It does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives.
(Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015)

Power of Appointment and JBC Clustering of Nominees

Why the President can disregard the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council
in case of simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts

▪ The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the
President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose is still paramount. As
long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the
appointment is valid. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016)
▪ Clustering of nominees to the judiciary by JBC restricts the President’s power
to choose. The President's option for every vacancy was limited to the five to seven
nominees in each cluster. Once the President had appointed a nominee from one
cluster, then he was proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same
cluster for the other vacancies.
▪ Clustering of nominees by the JBC restricts the President’s power to determine
the seniority of members of a collegiate court.
▪ Clustering of nominees by the JBC can be used as a device to favor or prejudice
a qualified nominee.
▪ Clustering of nominees by the JBC is arbitrary, with no objective criteria or
guidelines for clustering. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017)

Power to Discipline Presidential Appointees

As presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President
pursuant to the well-settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to
remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority in whom the power to appoint is
vested. Having the power to remove or to discipline presidential appointees, therefore, the
President has the corollary authority to investigate them and look into their conduct in office.
Thus, Baculi, as a presidential appointee, came under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
President in line with the principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint." As such, the DAR Secretary held no disciplinary jurisdiction over him. (Baculi v.
Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017)

Power to Transfer Appropriations

Constitutional requisites for a valid transfer of appropriated funds:

• Law authorizing the transfer;

• Savings; and

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 • Transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

Why the transfer of funds under DAP is invalid

▪ Funds transferred were not necessarily savings.

▪ Transfers were made to non-existing items or non-existing provisions in the GAA.
▪ Cross-border transfers are prohibited.
▪ Invalid authority. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

THE JUDICIARY

Judicial Review
The power of judicial review is the power to review the constitutionality of the actions of the
other branches of the government. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642,
September 10, 2019)

Judicial Review: Basic Requirements

ACTUAL CASE - there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power.

LOCUS STANDI - the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance (locus standi).

EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY - the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity; and

LIS MOTA - the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

(In the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015;
Belgica v. Honorable Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013; Biraogo v. Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No.
192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 148; Funa v. Executive Secretary, 11 February 2010, G.R.
No. 184740; Planters Products v. Fertiphil, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008)

14
Requirement No. 1: Actual Case or Controversy

DEFINITION -- An actual case or controversy is

▪ a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.

▪ a conflict ripe for adjudication or judicial determination.

(Remman Enterprises v. Professional Regulation Board, G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014; Belgica
v. Honorable Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013; Corrales v. Republic, G.R.
No. 186613, August 27, 2013;
Garcillano v. House of Representatives, 23 December 2008; La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association v.
Ramos, January 27, 2004, G.R. No. 127882; Didipio Earth Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association v.
Gozun, G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006)

NO ACTUAL CASE -- when the issue is

• Speculative
• Hypothetical
• Anticipatory
• Theoretical
• Fictional
• Abstract
• Conjectural
• Academic
• Moot

(Garcillano v. House of Representatives, 23 December 2008; La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association v.

Ramos, January 27, 2004, G.R. No. 127882; Lozano v. Nograles, 16 June 2009, G.R. No. 187883;
Remman v. Professional Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014; Information
Technology Foundation v. Comelec, G.R. No. 159139, June 15, 2005; Anak Mindanao Party List v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007; Anak Mindanao Party List v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007)

Examples of no actual case leading to dismissal of petition

• A petition to declare an SEC circular void based on a hypothetical case of a fictional

corporation is not ripe for decision because any pronouncement from the Court is a purely
advisory opinion and not a decision binding on identified and definite parties and on a
known set of facts. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)

15
• A petition challenging the constitutionality of a law on the ground that the law’s
implementation may be abused belongs to the realm of the merely imagined. Allegations of
abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
(Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)

• A petition to declare as unconstitutional peace agreements that can only be

implemented through the passage of a law and/or amendment of the Constitution is
premature and not ripe for adjudication. Congress has full discretion to enact the kind of
Bangsamoro Basic Law that Congress, in its wisdom, deems necessary and proper. The
Executive branch cannot compel Congress to adopt the peace agreements. Until a
Bangsamoro Basic Law is passed by Congress, there is no actual case or controversy that

requires the Court to exercise its power of judicial review. (Philconsa v. Philippine Government,
G.R. No. 218406, November 29, 2016)

• A petition to invalidate the DOLE administrative issuances requiring payment of

minimum wages to bus drivers on the ground that such issuances “may” result in the
diminution of the income of bus drivers is based on speculation, and thus, there is no actual
controversy: According to petitioners, implementing Department Order No. 118-12 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 "may [result] in [the] diminution of the income of . . .
bus drivers and conductors." The allegation is obviously based on speculation with the use of
the word "may." There was even no showing of how granting bus drivers' and conductors'
minimum wage and social welfare benefits would result in lower income for them. There
being no actual facts from which this Court could conclude that Department
Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are unconstitutional, this case
presents no actual controversy. (Provincial Bus Operators Association v. Department of Labor, GR
No. 202275, Jul 17, 2018)

Moot and Academic Principle

As a general rule, the courts will not adjudicate a case that has become moot.

A case becomes moot when

• it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so

that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.

(Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015; Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287,
July 1, 2014; Penafrancia Sugar Mill v. Sugar Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 208660, March 5,
2014; Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013; Vilando v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 192147
& 192149, August 23, 2011)

16
 • a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, cannot be enforced.

(Penafrancia Sugar Mill v. Sugar Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 208660, March 5, 2014;
Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008; Chavez v.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008; Sales v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174668, September
12, 2007)

The Rule Against Advisory Opinions

Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions.

(Guingona v. Court of Appeals, July 10, 1998, G.R. No. 125532)

Reasons: Separation of powers. Unnecessarily tax judicial resources. It is

inconsistent with Court’s role as final arbiter and adjudicator. (In the Matter of: Save the
Supreme Court Judicial Independence, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015)

EXCEPTIONS to the Actual Case Requirement

The courts will still decide the case even if there is no “actual controversy.”

1. The instances/exceptions to the Moot and Academic Principle

Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;

third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling

principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

(Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015; Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February
19, 2013; Funa v.
Chairman, COA, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012; David v. Arroyo, 03 May 2006; Mattel v.
Francisco, 30 July 2008, G.R. No. 166886; Gunsi v. Commissioners, 23 February 2009)

2. Facial challenges on the ground of vagueness and overbreadth

17
 Facial Challenges: Departure the Actual Case Requirement

A facial challenge is a departure from the case or controversy requirement.

(Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552,
October 5, 2010; Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001)

"On its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. It permits decisions to be made without concrete factual
settings and in sterile abstract contexts.

A facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.

(Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552,

October 5, 2010; Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001)

Requirement No. 2: Legal Standing or Locus Standi

Definition of Legal Standing: Direct Injury Test -- A personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
government act challenged. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December
7, 2010; Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014;
Villafuerte v. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390, December 10, 2014)

The prohibition against third-party standing

Challenging the constitutionality of a statute on the ground of violation of rights of

third persons not before the court -- is not allowed. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819,
April 8, 2014)

Legal Standing of Different Parties as Petitioners

(Direct injury need not be shown)

18
1. TAX PAYER - there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional.

2. VOTER - there must be a showing of interest in the validity of the election law in
question.

3. LEGISLATOR - there must be a claim of infringement upon their prerogatives as

legislators.

4. CITIZEN CONCERNED with an issue of Transcendental Importance or Paramount

Public Interest.

Doctrine of Transcendental Importance: Standing requirement is

waived/relaxed

If the case is of transcendental importance or paramount interest to the public, the

requirement of locus standi may be waived or relaxed, and the suit may be allowed to
prosper, even where there is no showing of direct injury to the petitioner.

The Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct
injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental
importance.

Even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed
to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance." (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
204819, April 8, 2014; Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December
7, 2010; David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

5. CITIZEN ASSERTING A PUBLIC RIGHT (Right to Information)

A citizen has personal interest and standing to sue for the enforcement of a public
right. When the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as the right
to information, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
the petitioner is a citizen.

Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained
against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that
he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right.
(Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment [IDEAL] v. Power Sector Liabilities and
Management Corporation [PSALM], G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)

19
6. CITIZEN AS A STEWARD OF NATURE

The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a "citizen suit," and permit
any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to file an action before our courts for
violations of our environmental laws; this collapses the traditional rule on personal
and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. (Resident
Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No.
180771, April 21, 2015)

7. MINORS AND UNBORN GENERATIONS (Intergenerational Responsibility) (Oposa

v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

8. CITIZEN MOUNTING A FACIAL CHALLENGE

Facial Challenge – No need to show direct injury

A petitioner may mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute

even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it
involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.

Reason: To counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes
violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a
crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in
order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him
into silence. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

9. CITIZEN QUESTIONING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE

DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW

Section 18 of Article VII which provides that any citizen may file the appropriate
proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The only requisite
for standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the challenger be a
citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer." (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658/G.R.
No. 231771/G.R. No. 231774, July 4, 2017)

Being lawyers/ IBP Members is not sufficient to establish legal standing

Mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing. (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006;
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000)

20
Political Question Doctrine

General Rule:

Political questions are beyond judicial review.

Political questions are non-justiciable.

Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary.

(Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947; Vera v. Avelino, G.R. No. L-543, August
31, 1946; Tanada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957, 103 Phil. 1051; Llamas v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991; Belgica v. Honorable Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

Political questions defined

Who should decide the issue: People, Legislative or Executive Branch

Political questions are those which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch.

(Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013; Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010; Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584,
April 2, 2009)

As to the nature of the issue: Questions of Policy or Wisdom

Political questions refer to questions of policy or wisdom.

Policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the
exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.

(Tanada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957; Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 208566, November 19, 2013; Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 28 April
2010; Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003; Estrada v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001)

21
 Basis of political question doctrine: The principle of separation of powers

Within its own sphere, each department is supreme and independent of the others.
Each is devoid of authority, not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action
assigned to any of the other departments, but, also, to inquire into or pass upon the
advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, or decisions made by the other
departments —if such acts or decisions are within its Constitutional power.

Political question doctrine does not preclude judicial review

Courts now have the power to rule upon the wisdom of the decisions of the executive
and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers
of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution, which
includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of
the government.

(Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993; Osmena v. Comelec, G.R. No. 100318, July 30,
199; Mamba v. Lara, G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009; Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, March
2, 2001; Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

Political Questions - Examples

The foreign relations decision of how best to address our disputes with China (be it
militarily, diplomatically, legally) is a political question

The President is also the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country.
Petitioner has failed to point to any law that specifically requires the President to go to
the UN or the ICJ to sue China for its incursions into our exclusive economic zone
(EEZ).

If President Duterte sees fit to take a different approach with China despite said
[Arbitral] ruling, this does not by itself mean that he has, as petitioner suggests,
unlawfully abdicated his duty to protect and defend our national territory, correctible
with the issuance by this Court of the extraordinary writ of mandamus. Ultimately,
the decision of how best to address our disputes with China (be it militarily,
diplomatically, legally) rests on the political branches of government. The
Constitution vests executive power, which includes to duty to execute the law, protect
the Philippines, and conduct foreign affairs, in the

President- not this Court. (Esmero v. Duterte, G.R. No. 256288, June 29, 2021)

22
Whether or not the House observed its own internal rules of procedure, such as in the
election of its Minority Leader, is a political question

Under the Constitution, the House has sole control over method and manner of
choosing its officers other than the Speaker. Moreover, the House has sole authority to
determine the rules of its proceedings. Mere matters of procedure of the House are of
no concern to the courts. The Supreme Court has no authority to interfere and intrude
into that exclusive realm. Thus, the Supreme Court cannot pry into the internal
workings of the House. Thus, the petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat
should be recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing
tradition" in the House; and (b) the irregularities attending Rep. Suarez's election to
said Minority Leader position -- must be

dismissed. (Baguilat v. Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017)

The determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint

and what constitutes an impeachable offense as a political questions
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint
is part of the rule-making powers of the House of Representatives. In the discharge of
that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable
standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential
considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty
to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the
minimum constitutional guidelines.

The determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense is a purely political

question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature.

(Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011)

The conduct of foreign relations, such as whether or not to espouse the claims of Philippine
nationals against Japan, is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative—
’the political’—departments of the government

The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the

Constitution to the executive and legislative—’the political’—departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. The question whether the
Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.

(Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010)

The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign
relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against the
Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the

23
 Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the
conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. (Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014)

Legal, Not Political Question

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within the
ambit of judicial review. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658 July 4, 2017)

Power of Supervision over Judges of Lower Courts

Why Congress’ power to cite in contempt and arrest and detain in the course of a legislative
inquiry cannot be exercised over members of the Judiciary

Power of supervision over judges of lower courts and power to discipline judges of
lower courts -- The Supreme Court has the Constitutional duty to supervise judges of
lower courts in the performance of their official duties. It is only the Supreme Court
that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take
the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof.
No other branch of government may intrude into this power. (Agcaoili v. Farinas, G.R.
No. 232395, July 3, 2018)

Judicial Privilege v. Power of Inquiry

Separation of powers - Because of the principle of separation of powers, Justices, officials and
employees of the Judiciary are exempt and the Judiciary's privileged and confidential
documents and information are excluded from any compulsory processes, including the
Congress' power of inquiry in aid of legislation. Such exemption has been jurisprudentially
referred to as judicial privilege as implied from the exercise of judicial power expressly
vested in one Supreme
Court and lower courts created by law. (Agcaoili v. Farinas, July 3, 2018, G.R. No. 232395)

When judicial privilege is applicable: The invocation of the Court's judicial privilege is
understood to be limited to matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions of
the Court in the exercise of the Members' adjudicatory functions and duties: Judicial privilege
is unavailing on matters external to the Judiciary's deliberative adjudicatory functions and
duties. (Agcaoili v. Farinas, July 3, 2018, G.R. No. 232395)

24
Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. xx

Regulation of Legal Education:

Why the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over legal education
Legal education had been historically and consistently exercised by the political departments

The Supreme Court’s rule-making power does not confer on it primary and direct
jurisdiction over legal education. Regulation and supervision of legal education had
been historically and consistently exercised by the political

departments. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)

The Supreme Court’s rule making power covers the practice of law, not study of law

(Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)

The Supreme Court cannot perform or assume duties not pertaining to administering of
judicial functions
Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he Members
of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions." The Supreme Court
and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administering of judicial functions. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954,
September 10, 2019)

The Supreme Court does not regulate legal education

The Court has not promulgated any rule that directly and actually regulates legal
education. The Rules of Court provide for the requisites and qualifications for
admission to the practice of law and not for admission to the study of law. (Pimentel v.
Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)

The Court does not impose upon law schools what courses to teach, or the degree to
grant, but prescribes only the core academic courses for an applicant to be admitted to
the bar. Law schools enjoy the autonomy to teach or not to teach these courses.
(Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)

25
 The Revised Law Student Practice Rule does not regulate legal education but the practice of
law of law students. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)

Legal Education Board (LEB) and

Violations of the Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court

LEB adoption of a system of mandatory continuing legal education and to require the
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as
it may deem necessary -- is an encroachment on the Supreme Court's power to
promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar, which includes the education of
"lawyer-professors" as teaching of law is practice of law. (Pimentel v. Legal Education
Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)

LEB imposition of law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar unduly
interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto. The jurisdiction to determine
whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the
Court. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)

Congress v. The Supreme Court: Why Congress cannot limit court injunctions against
Ombudsman investigations

The prohibition under Section 14, RA 6770 against courts other than the Supreme Court
from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman encroaches upon the Supreme Court’s rule-making
authority and only undermines the constitutional allocation of powers; it also
practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. It should be considered
ineffective, pending deliberation on whether or not the Supreme Court should adopt
such prohibition. Injunctions are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs
created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which
belong exclusively within the province of this Court. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Prohibition on Holding of Dual Positions by

Constitutional Commissioners
Under the Constitution, no Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his
tenure, hold any other office or employment. However, a Member of the Constitutional
Commission can hold any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure
if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. (Funa v.
Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)

26
 Prohibition on Holding of Dual Positions by Constitutional Commissioners

General Rule: Under the Constitution, no Member of a Constitutional Commission

shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment.

Exception: However, a Member of the Constitutional Commission can hold any other
office or employment in the Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed
1) by law or 2) by the primary functions of his position.

Example: CSC Chairman cannot be designated ex-officio Director of GSIS because 1)

this will allow him to exercise powers not related to his functions as CSC Chairman;
and 2) he will under the control of the President and impair the independence of the
CSC.

The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) cannot be designated as an ex

officio Director or Trustee of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, as this will allow
him to exercise powers and functions that are not anymore derived from his position
as CSC Chairman. The term ex officio means “from office; by virtue of office. (Funa v.
Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)

Under the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in
the Executive Branch. The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are offices under the
Executive Department, and their respective governing Boards are under the control of
the President. Thus, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission cannot sit as Director
or Trustee of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, as this will impair the
independence of the CSC. (Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672,
November 25, 2014)

COMELEC Jurisdiction

When exercising quasi-judicial powers

Comelec must decide the case first in division, and en banc only upon motion for
reconsideration. (Eriguel v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010)

Filing of MR with the Comelec en banc is mandatory before elevating the case to the
Supreme Court.

The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated
to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The rule requires that there be no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for
reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by
this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. In like
manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed
by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc
decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of

27
 a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. (Cagas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 194139, January
24, 2012)

The Supreme Court has no power to review an interlocutory order or even a final resolution
issued by a Division

The Supreme Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or

even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC exercising adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers.

Under Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has no power
to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a
Division of the COMELEC in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasijudicial powers.
This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a
division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. (Cagas v. Comelec, G.R. No.
194139, January 24, 2012)

Jurisdiction: Electoral Tribunals v. Comelec

The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member
of the House of Representatives. To be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member
of the House of Representatives, as stated in the Constitution: The Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. From the foregoing, it is then clear that
to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and
(3) assumption of office. (Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 20726, June 25, 2013)

Party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives; once the
party or organization has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. (Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010)

Why COMELEC also has no jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the expulsion of an
incumbent House Member from the winning party-list organization

The COMELEC has no jurisdiction over a petition for the expulsion from a partylist
organization of an incumbent party-list Member of the House of Representatives.

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 Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-
list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning partylist group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of
office as member of the House of Representatives. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.
R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015)

The COMELEC also has no jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the expulsion of an
incumbent Member of the House of Representatives from the winning partylist
organization that he represents. His expulsion from the party-list organization is not
a mere intra-corporate matter because it necessarily affects his title as member of
Congress. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge
of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015)

COA Jurisdiction
COA has the power to prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant,
or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. (Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015)

Liquidated money claims against the government must be filed with COA

COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities, including local governments. The COA and not the RTC has primary
jurisdiction to pass upon a money claim against a local government unit.

COA’s authority over money claims is limited to liquidated claims, or those

determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers
within reach of accounting officers. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and
Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)

Types of Money Claims before the COA: 1) Money claims against the Government
originally filed with COA; and 2) money claims arising from a final and executory
judgment of a court or arbitral body. -- The types of money claims brought before the COA
must be distinguished.

The first type covers money claims originally filed with the COA. Jurisprudence
specifies the nature of the money claims which may be brought to the COA at first
instance as limited to liquidated claims or those determined or readily determinable
from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers.

This pertains to the "examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any
sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and

29
 instrumentalities". The process of government audit is adjudicative in nature. The
decisions of COA presuppose an adjudicatory process involving the determination
and resolution of opposing claims. Its work as adjudicator of money claims for or
against the government means the exercise of judicial discretion. It includes the
investigation, weighing of evidence, and resolving whether items should or should not
be included, or as applied to claim, whether it should be allowed or disallowed in
whole or in part. Its conclusions are not mere opinions but are decisions which may be
elevated to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party.

The second type of money claims refers to those which arise from a final and executory
judgment of a court or arbitral body. (Taisei Shimizu Joint Venture v. Department of
Transportation, G.R. No. 238671, June 02, 2020)

COA cannot review on appeal or modify final and

executory judgment of a court or adjudicative body

COA's original jurisdiction is limited to liquidated claims and quantum meruit cases. It
cannot interfere with the findings of a court or an adjudicative body that decided an
unliquidated money claim involving issues requiring the exercise of judicial functions or
specialized knowledge and expertise which the COA does not have in the first place. (Taisei
Shimizu Joint Venture v. Department of Transportation, G.R. No. 238671, June 02, 2020)

The COA has no appellate review power over the decisions of any other court or tribunal.
COA does not have the power to modify the final and executory judgment of another
adjudicative body. -- The COA has no appellate review power over the decisions of any other
court or tribunal. Once judgment is rendered by a court or tribunal over a money claim
involving the State, it may only be set aside or modified through the proper mode of appeal.
It is elementary that the right to appeal is statutory. There is no constitutional nor statutory
provision giving the COA review powers akin to an appellate body such as the power to
modify or set aside a judgment of a court or other tribunal on errors of fact or law.

The COA is devoid of power to disregard the principle of immutability of final judgments.
When a court or tribunal having jurisdiction over an action renders judgment and the same
becomes final and executory, res judicata sets in. COA did not have the power to modify the
final and executory judgment of another adjudicative body. (Taisei Shimizu Joint Venture v.
Department of Transportation, G.R. No. 238671, June 02, 2020)

The COA's exercise of discretion in approving or disapproving money claims that have been
determined by final judgment is akin to the power of an execution court. COA's jurisdiction
over final money judgments rendered by the courts pertains only to the execution stage.
(Taisei Shimizu Joint Venture v. Department of Transportation, G.R. No. 238671, June 02, 2020)

30
The COA's audit jurisdiction generally covers public entities and
non-governmental entities that receives financial aid from the
government

It is beyond the mandates of the COA to open and examine the books of accounts of the Big
3 [Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation; Caltex Philippines, Inc., and Petron Corporation].

The COA's audit jurisdiction extends to the following entities:

1. The government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities;

2. GOCCs with original charters;
3. GOCCs without original charters;
4. Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under the Constitution; and
5. Non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or
through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to
the COA for audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.

The COA's audit jurisdiction generally covers public entities. However, its authority to audit
extends even to non-governmental entities insofar as the latter receives financial aid from the
government. Thus, it is clear that the determination of COA's jurisdiction over a specific entity
does not merely require an examination of the nature of the entity. Should the entity be found
to be non-governmental, further determination must be had as to the source of its funds or
the nature of the account sought to be audited by the COA.

Without a doubt, the case of the Big 3 [Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation; Caltex
Philippines, Inc., and Petron Corporation], would not fall under the audit jurisdiction of
COA. They are not public entities nor are they non-governmental entities receiving financial
aid from the government. (Commission on Audit v. Pampilo, G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020)

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Local Autonomy

Autonomy of local governments was not intended to create an imperium in imperio. Local
ordinances must not be inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. Local governments
cannot regulate conduct already covered by a statute involving the same subject matter. Thus,
an ordinance that seeks to control and regulate the use of ground water within a city, a power
that pertains solely to the NWRB under the Water Code – is ultra vires and void. (City of
Batangas v. Pilipinas Shell, G.R. No. 195003, June 7, 2017)

31
LGU Share in National Taxes

Under the Constitution, (1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes; (2) the just
share shall be determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be automatically released to the
LGUs

Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution embodies three mandates, namely: (1) the LGUs
shall have a just share in the national taxes; (2) the just share shall be determined by law; and
(3) the just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
199802, July 03, 2018)

The national taxes to be included in the base for computing the just share the LGUs should
not be limited to the national internal revenue taxes (NIRTs) but should include other
national taxes, such as tariff and customs duties, excise taxes, documentary stamp taxes, and
franchise taxes. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 03, 2018)

LGUs' share in national wealth

The 1987 Constitution conferred on LGUs the right to share not only in the national taxes, but
also in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth in their respective areas. Thus,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenues and to levy 'taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as
the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees,
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.

Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.

Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in
the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of
direct benefits. (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December
4, 2018)

For purposes of sharing in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth in their respective
areas, the territorial jurisdiction of an LGU refers to territorial boundaries as defined in the
LGU's charter. An LGU's territorial jurisdiction pertains to its physical location or area, as
identified by its boundaries.

The question principally raised here is whether the national wealth, in this case the
Camago-Malampaya reservoir, is within the Province of Palawan's "area" for it to be

32
 entitled to 40% of the government's share under Service Contract No. 38. The intention
of the Local Government Code is to consider an LGU's territorial jurisdiction as
pertaining to a physical location or area as identified by its boundaries. By definition,
"area" refers to a particular extent of space or surface or a geographic region. (Republic
v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018)

Rights of LGUs to enable it to have resources to discharge its responsibilities: 1) the right to
create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in
national taxes; and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.
(Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018)

Area as delimited by law, and not exercise of jurisdiction, is basis of the LGU's equitable
share. Territorial jurisdiction is defined by the law that creates it; it is delimited, not by the
extent of the LGU's exercise of authority, but by physical boundaries as fixed in its charter.

The Provincial Government of Palawan argues that its local police maintains peace and
order in the area; and the provincial government enforces environmental laws over the
same area. An LGU cannot claim territorial jurisdiction over an area simply because
its government has exercised a certain degree of authority over it. Territorial
jurisdiction is defined by the law that creates it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the
LGU's exercise of authority, but by physical boundaries as fixed in its charter. (Republic
v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4,

2018)

Unless clearly expanded by Congress, the LGU's territorial jurisdiction refers only to its land
area. "Territory" refers to the land area comprising the LGU. Utilization of natural resources
found within the land area as delimited by law is subject to the 40% LGU share. (Republic v.
Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018)

The UNCLOS did not confer on LGUs territorial jurisdiction over different maritime zones
and the continental shelf. (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867,
December 4, 2018)

LGU Participation in National Projects

National government agencies must conduct prior public consultation and secure the
approval of local government units for national government projects affecting the
ecological balance of local communities. The lack of prior public consultation and approval
is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement.

Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local

33
 communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent
either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal. Prior
consultations and prior approval are required by law to have been conducted and
secured by the respondent Province. Accordingly, the information dissemination
conducted months after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to comply
with this requirement under the Local Government Code. The lack of prior public
consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the
reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan
of the

Municipality of Malay. (Boracay Foundation v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June
26, 2012)

Conversion of LGUs

Why conversion of a component city into a Highly Urbanized City (HUC) requires approval
by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite for the entire province:

The Constitution requires the approval of the people “in the political units directly affected.”
Conversion will lead to material change in the political and economic rights of not only of
the component city but of the entire province. (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
203974, April 22, 2014)

The conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.

“Substantial alteration of boundaries” involves a change in the geographical

configuration of a local government unit or units. However, “boundaries” should not
be limited to the mere physical one, but also to its political boundaries. With the city’s
newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which,
in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the Province. What once formed part of
Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. Nueva Ecija
stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s
severance from its mother province. Thus, the conversion to an HUC is substantial
alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X.
(Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)

LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are
entitled to participate in the plebiscite to approve the conversion. Umali v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)

Economic impact of conversion: The conversion of a component city into a HUC will result
in reduction of the province’s Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), reduction in tax collections
due to reduction of taxing jurisdiction, and loss of shares in taxes imposed in the city to be

34
 converted. With the reduction in income upon separation, there would be less funding to
finance infrastructure projects and to defray overhead costs, and the quality of services being
offered by the province may suffer. (Umali v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)

Political impact of conversion: Administrative supervision of the province over the city will
effectively be revoked upon conversion. Thus, the provincial government will lose the power
to ensure that the local government officials of Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its
prescribed powers and functions, to review executive orders issued by the city mayor, and to
approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council. The province will also be
divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the elected city officials of the
new HUC. Moreover, provincial government will no longer be responsible for delivering
basic services for the city residents’ benefit. Ordinances and resolutions passed by the
provincial council will no longer cover the city. (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
203974, April 22, 2014)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Rule-Making Power

When notice and opportunity to be heard are required in the issuance of administrative
rules: When the rule substantially increases the burden of those governed

When the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to
those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before
that new issuance is given the force and effect of law." (Republic v. Drugmakers
Laboratories, G.R. No. 190837, March 5, 2014)

Prior opportunity to be heard is required before an administrative agency enforces

rules and regulations that substantially adds to or increases the burden of those
governed. Thus, the Comelec should have conducted prior hearings before
promulgating the resolution on aggregate-based air time limits for political
advertising, as this administrative rule introduces a radical change, and adversely
affects, or imposes a heavy and substantial burden on, the citizenry. Consequently,
the new Comelec resolution is ineffectual. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)

35
Quasi-Judicial Power

The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to
the exercise of administrative powers. Adjudication signifies the exercise of the power to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties. If the only purpose of an
investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and
judgment. (Encinas v. PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013)

A fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an

administrative offense should be filed is an exercise of administrative powers, not judicial
or quasi-judicial powers. Fact-finding investigations are not judgments on the merits for
purposes of res judicata. (Encinas v. PO1 Agustin and PO1
Caubang, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013)

PUBLIC OFFICERS

Dual Positions and Double Compensation

Prohibition on Appointive Officials in General vs. Prohibition on Cabinet Members, their

Deputies and Assistant: Appointive officials may hold other office if allowed by law or the
primary functions of their positions. Cabinet Members, their deputies and assistants can hold
other office only when allowed by the Constitution.

While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. (Funa v. Executive
Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010)

DOTC Undersecretary cannot be designated OIC of MARINA.

A DOTC undersecretary cannot be designated concurrently as OIC of MARINA because 1)

Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants cannot, unless otherwise provided
in the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure, and 2) she was
not designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception
recognized. (Funa v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010)

36
 Prohibition on Dual Positions: Not applicable to positions in ex-officio capacity because these
posts do not comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of the prohibition.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office.
The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said
officials. (Funa v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010)

The term ex officio means “from office; by virtue of office. (Funa v. Chairman,
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)

An ex officio position, being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, is not “another office” for purposes of the Constitutional prohibition on dual
positions, and does not entitle an official to additional compensation. (Funa v. Executive
Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010)

De Facto Officer

One who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority,
meaning an authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, is a de
facto officer. Because Duque as CSC Chairman did not validly hold office as Director or
Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he was a de facto officer. He is entitled
to emoluments for actual services rendered. (Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R.
No. 191672, November 25, 2014)

The actions of a de facto officer are valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far
as the public or third persons are concerned. Thus, as a de facto officer, the CSC Chairman’s
official actions as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF, were
presumed valid, binding and effective. (Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
191672, November 25, 2014)

Next-in-Rank Rule

The next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to consider for promotion. It does not
give employees next in rank a vested right to the position next higher to theirs should that
position become vacant. Appointment is a discretionary power of the appointing authority.
(Abad v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015)

37
Nepotism The prohibition against nepotism applies to appointments made by a group of

individuals acting as a body. A relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity

of a member of the body that is the appointing authority

(such as the Civil Service Commission) cannot be appointed by such body. (Civil Service
Commission v. Cortes, G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014)

The Ombudsman

Ombudsman independence: The independence of the Ombudsman has the following aspects:
1) It is created by the Constitution and cannot be abolished by Congress; 2) it has fiscal
autonomy; and 3) it is insulated from executive supervision and control. The Office of the
Ombudsman is not under the control of the President, even if it discharges functions that
are executive in nature. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

The law vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman
violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It directly collides not only with
the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but
inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman
office seeks to revitalize. (Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014)

The Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. It has disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies
(with the exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary).
(Ombudsman v. Quimbo, G.R. No. 173277,
February 25, 2015)

The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies. In administrative cases
involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body
where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
(Alejandrino v. Office of the Ombudsman Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 173121,
April 3, 2013)

38
Suspension and Back Salaries

Period of preventive suspension pending investigation: 90 days, except for Presidential

appointees, whose preventive suspension pending investigation shall be for a reasonable
time as the circumstances may warrant.

A public official should be automatically reinstated at the end of the 90-day period of
his preventive suspension during an administrative investigation, if his case was not
finally decided within the said period. Preventive suspension is of two kinds. The first
is the preventive suspension pending investigation, and the second is the preventive
suspension pending appeal where the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority
is either suspension or dismissal but after review the respondent official or employee
is exonerated. If the proper disciplinary authority does not finally decide the
administrative case within a period of 90 days from the start of preventive suspension
pending investigation, and the respondent is not a presidential appointee, the preventive
suspension is lifted and the respondent is "automatically reinstated in the service."

In the case of presidential appointees, the preventive suspension pending

investigation shall be "for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may
warrant."(Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017)

Prohibition on indefinite suspension pending investigation

There shall be no indefinite suspension pending investigation, whether the respondent

officials are presidential or nonpresidential appointees. In the guise of a preventive
suspension, the official’s term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be
removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation
of the Constitution. (Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017)

A presidential appointee comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President in line
with the principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the
power to appoint." (Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017)

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Public Trust Doctrine

The Public Trust Doctrine speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative of
continuing supervision over the taking and use of appropriated water. Thus, parties who

39
 acquired rights in trust property only hold these rights subject to the trust and, therefore,
could assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust.

The "doctrine further holds that certain natural resources belong to all and cannot be privately
owned or controlled because of their inherent importance to each individual and society as a
whole. A clear declaration of public ownership, the doctrine reaffirms the superiority of
public rights over private rights for critical resources. It impresses upon states the affirmative
duties of a trustee to manage these natural resources for the benefit of present and future
generations and embodies key principles of environmental protection: stewardship,
communal responsibility, and sustainability."

In this framework, a relationship is formed - "the state is the trustee, which manages specific
natural resources the trust principal - for the trust principal for the benefit of the current and
future generations - the beneficiaries." The State has an affirmative duty to take the public trust
into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses
whenever feasible."

The public is regarded as the beneficial owner of trust resources, and courts can enforce
the public trust doctrine even against the government itself.

The right to distribute water was granted by the State via utility franchises to Maynilad and
Manila Water, under express statutory regulation through its delegated representative, the
MWSS. The State conferred the franchise to these concessionaires, working under the firm
belief that they shall serve as protectors of the public interest and the citizenry. In this regard,
water rights must be secured to achieve optimal use of water resources, its conservation, and
its preservation for allocative efficiency. (Maynilad Water

Services v. Secretary of the DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August 06, 2019)

Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy Effectively Controlled by Filipinos

The Constitutional requirement for a national economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos.

The Constitution declares as State policy the development of a national economy

"effectively controlled" by Filipinos. Under the 1987 Constitution, to own and operate a
public utility, a corporation’s capital must at least be 60 percent owned by Philippine
nationals. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012)

The Voting Control Test and the Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied to determine
whether a corporation is a "Philippine national"

Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required
in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital

40
 stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. Both the Voting Control
Test and the Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied to determine whether a
corporation is a "Philippine national." (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012)

For effective control of a public utility, at least 60 percent of the capital of the corporation
must belong to Filipino citizens: “Capital” refers to shares with voting rights and full
beneficial ownership.

The Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to
Philippine nationals, who are defined as Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least 60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos.
The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares
with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No.
176579, October 9, 2012)

The right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of
stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution is to place in the hands of Filipino citizens
the control and management of public utilities. The right to vote in the election of
directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective
control of a corporation. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding
capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally required
for the State’s grant of authority to operate a public utility. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No.
176579, October 9, 2012)

Voting Control Test: The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors

If the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the
term "capital" shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the
control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the
election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
(Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011)

Beneficial Ownership Test: Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital
stock is constitutionally required

Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with
60 percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally required for the State’s grant of
authority to operate a public utility. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012)

Full beneficial ownership: Excluded in the determination of Filipino ownership are shares
with voting rights assigned or transferred to an alien and shares with dividends that do not
accrue to a Filipino citizen.

For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals,
mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial

41
 ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential. If the
voting right of a share held in the name of a Filipino citizen or national is assigned or
transferred to an alien, that share is not to be counted in the determination of the
required Filipino equity. In the same vein, if the dividends and other fruits and
accessions of the share do not accrue to a Filipino citizen or national, then that share is
also to be excluded or not counted. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)

Beneficial ownership: Voting power or investment power must be present for beneficial
ownership to exist

If the Filipino has the "specific stock's" voting power (he can vote the stock or direct
another to vote for him), or the Filipino has the investment power over the "specific
stock" (he can dispose of the stock or direct another to dispose it for him), or he has
both, then such Filipino is the "beneficial owner" of that "specific stock" and that
"specific stock" is considered (or counted) as part of the 60% Filipino ownership of the
corporation. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)

SEC Requirement: The 60 percent Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total
number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors; AND (b)
the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote in the
election of directors. The requirement is fully in accordance with the Gamboa Decision and
Resolution. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)

Regalian Doctrine

The State owns all natural resources.

SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. xxx (Article XII, 1987 Constitution)

LGU share in the proceeds of the development of natural resources cannot be denied based
on the Regalian Doctrine:

The LGU's share in the proceeds of development of natural resources in their areas
under Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution cannot be denied on the basis of the
Regalian Doctrine. While natural resources are owned by the States, the LGUs are entitled to
revenue sharing in the proceeds of the utilization of the national wealth found in their
respective areas. (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4,
2018) Share of LGUs in the national wealth

LGUs' share in national wealth: Equitable share in proceeds of utilization of the national
wealth in their respective areas

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 The 1987 Constitution provides that LGUs shall be entitled to an equitable share in the
proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective
areas, in the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by
way of direct benefits.

Determining the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU: LGU charter, not exercise of authority

Territorial jurisdiction of LGUs for purposes of sharing in the national wealth:

Territorial boundaries as defined in the LGU charter. An LGU's territorial jurisdiction
pertains to its physical location or area, as identified by its boundaries.

Territorial jurisdiction not based on exercise of authority: It is defined, not by the local
government, but by the law that creates it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's
exercise of authority, but by physical boundaries as fixed in its charter. Unless clearly
expanded by Congress, the LGU's territorial jurisdiction refers only to its land area.

The UNCLOS did not confer on LGUs their own continental shelf. (Republic v. Provincial
Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018)

Modes of development of natural resources under the Constitution

• Directly by the State -- The exploration, development, and utilization of natural

resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

• Through co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino

citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60% capital is owned by such citizens.

• Agreement for technical and financial assistance for large-scale exploration,

development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according
to the general terms and conditions provided by law. (Article XII, 1987 Constitution)

The President may enter into service contracts (for technical or financial assistance) with 100%
foreign-owned corporations for the large-scale development of minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils. (Article XII, 1987 Constitution)

Requirements for a service contract with a foreign-owned corporation: 1) in accordance with

a general law; 2) signed by the President; and 3) reported to Congress.

Service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. Agreements involving
Technical or Financial Assistance are service contracts with safeguards. Such service
contracts with foreign corporations may be entered into only with respect to minerals,

43
 petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards,
among which are these requirements:

(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law
that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements;
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because;
(3) Within 30 days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it
to Congress. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v.
Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)

ELECTION LAW

Procedural Requirements for

the Exercise of Suffrage
Biometrics validation is not a qualification to vote but merely regulates the exercise of the
right to vote. It is a procedural, not a substantive requirement. Registration is a mere
procedural requirement which does not fall under the limitation that "no literacy, property,
or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage." (Kabataan Party
List v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015)

Remedies to Question the Qualification of Candidates

Petitions to Question the Qualification of Candidates:

1) Petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy; and

2) Petition for quo warranto after proclamation of the candidate.

Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two
instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to
run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 (Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy the election); and (2) After election, pursuant to Section 253
(Petition for quo warranto.) (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742,
August 10, 2012)

Effect of a void certificate of candidacy (COC): No valid candidate, no valid votes: A void
certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid
votes. (Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012)

If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void
certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such
non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such noncandidate can

44
never be a first-placer in the elections. (Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237,
October 9, 2012)

The rule that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified
or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the
first-placer was valid at the time of filing, but subsequently cancelled for a violation of law
that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the CoC. (Jalosjos v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012)

If a local candidate is disqualified due to his ineligibility (such as based on citizenship), his
certificate is void from the beginning, and he is not a candidate at all in the elections. The
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes should be proclaimed; the
rule on succession will not apply. (Maquiling v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)

Disqualification under Section 68 v. Cancellation of COC

One who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been
a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening
infractions. One whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under
Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all

Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a
candidate's possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or
her commission of certain acts of disqualification, such as (1) giving money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance one's
candidacy; (3) spending in one's election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed
by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and
261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6 of the OEC. Any candidate who, in
an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the
foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public office, or
disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected.

One who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a
candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening
infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility.

A denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of

the OEC is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any of the material
qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. While a disqualified
candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents
and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to
and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The

45
 reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give
rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person
who certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
(Tagolino v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013)

Effect of cancellation of/denial of due course to COC under Section 78

In case a certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, the person legally entitled to the
vacant position would be the candidate who garnered the next highest number of
votes among those eligible. (Chua v. Comelec, G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016)

Effect of cancellation of or denial of due course to a CoC: No valid candidate; No

valid substitution: If a person’s CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled,
he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid
CoC is a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.
(Tagolino v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013)

For cancellation of/denial of due course to, COC, the material misrepresentation must
involve eligibility of qualification for office
For the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to prosper, the
candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility or
qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the requisite residency,
age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for local elective
office. An allegedly false nickname in the CoC is not a “material misrepresentation”
that is a ground to cancel or deny due course to a CoC under Section 78. (Villafuerte v.
Comelec, 25 February 2014)

Due process required for cancellation of/denial of due course to COC

The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course
to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. (Cerafica v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014)

Nuisance candidates: Comelec must give the candidate an opportunity to be heard

before cancellation of/denial of due course of CoC. (Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004,
February 24, 2015)

Nuisance Candidates

Grounds to deny or cancel COC for being a nuisance candidate: a) COC was filed to put
the election process in mockery or disrepute; b) COC was filed to cause confusion among
voters by the similarity of names; and c) candidate has no bona fide intention to run for
public office

46
 Section 69 of BP 881 provides the grounds by which a candidate may be considered a
nuisance candidate, to wit: Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu
proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to
put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and
thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. (Marquez v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 244274, September 03, 2019) Failure to prove financial capacity to
sustain a nationwide campaign is not a ground to declare a candidate a nuisance
candidate; Comelec cannot impose a property requirement on a person’s privilege
to be voted upon

COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Marquez a nuisance

candidate on the ground of failure to prove financial capacity to sustain the financial
rigors of waging a nationwide campaign. The right to vote and to be voted for shall
not be made to depend upon the wealth of the candidate. The State cannot require
candidacy for a public office to be conditioned on the ability to file a surety bond
equivalent to the one-year salary of the position sought. This is a constitutionally
impermissible property qualification. Maquera 's rationale applies with equal cogency
in this case. The COMELEC cannot condition a person's privilege to be voted upon as
senator on his or her financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign. Quite
obviously, the financial capacity requirement is a property requirement.

The COMELEC cannot conflate the bona fide intention to run with a financial capacity
requirement. A candidate's financial capacity to sustain the rigors of waging a
nationwide campaign does not necessarily equate to a bona fide intention to run for
public office. (Marquez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 244274, September 03, 2019)

The supposed inability of a Senate candidate to wage a nationwide election campaign –

because he is virtually known to the entire country, not a member of any political party,
and lacks a network of organization of supporters -- cannot be deemed an indication of
lack of bona fide intent to run for office as to declare him a nuisance candidate

The COMELEC accorded Marquez the status of an alleged nuisance candidate since
he supposedly lacked the ability "to [make] himself known to the entire country and
the electorate." More, the COMELEC faulted Marquez for not being a member of a
political party as this "decreases [his] chances for such a rigorous campaign." The lack
of a "nationwide network or organization of supporters to assist [Marquez] during the
campaign so that he may be known nationally within the short campaign period" was
also taken against him.

For equating the perceived inability of Marquez to mount an election campaign— with
his supposed absence of bona fide intention to run for office, the COMELEC indirectly
violated the proscription against conflating a candidate's financial capacity with bona

47
 fide intention to run as Marquez v. COMELEC had aptly decreed. The attempt of the
COMELEC to pass off the inability of Marquez to wage an election campaign as an
indication of lack of bona fide intent to run for office is unconstitutional. Further,
declaring one a nuisance candidate simply because he or she is not known to the entire
country reduces the electoral process—a sacred instrument of democracy—to a mere
popularity contest. (Marquez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 258435, June 28, 2022)

Residence Requirement

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be

decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency
qualification requirement. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)

Change of residence requirements: 1) bodily presence in the new locality; 2) an intention to

remain there; 3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. (Jalosjos v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012)

Ownership of a house is not required for residence. To insist that the candidate own the house
where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.

A candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence

or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in
a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own
the house where he lives would make property a

qualification for public office. (Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191970,
April 24, 2012)

The fact that Osmeña has no registered property under his name does not belie his
actual residence in Toledo City because property ownership is not among the
qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he should live
in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. (Jalover v. Osmena,
G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014)

The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7)
days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement. (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No.
209286, September 23, 2014)

Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 has no retroactive effect with respect
to residence. He merely has the option to again establish his domicile in old domicile, said
place becoming his new domicile of choice. (Caballero v. Comelec, GR. No. 209835, September
22, 2015)

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Annulment of Elections

Requisites for nullifying elections: (1) The illegality of the ballots must affect more than fifty
percent (50%) of the votes cast on the specific precinct or precincts sought to be annulled, or
in case of the entire municipality, more than fifty percent (50%) of its total precincts and the
votes cast therein; and (2) It is impossible to distinguish with reasonable certainty between
the lawful and unlawful ballots. (Abayon v. House of

Representatives, G.R. No. 222236, May 3, 2016)

Three-Term Limit Rule for Local Officials

Requirements for application

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the three-
term limit rule, the following requisites must concur:

(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
(Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013)

Two conditions must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate
based on violation of the three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. A governor who was
proclaimed winner of the 2007 elections only in March 2010 and served as such only
until June 30 of the same year did not have a complete and full service of his three-year
term. (Albania v. Comelec, G.R. No. 226792, June 6, 2017)

Examples of application of 3-term limit rule

A mayor -- who actually held the office and exercised his functions as mayor only after
he was declared the winner in an election protest, and thus began serving in office
only during the middle of his term -- cannot be considered to have fully served his
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. (Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716,
January 8, 2013)

A mayor who assumed office after winning his electoral protest and with only one a
little over one year left in his term cannot be considered to have fully served his
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. The period when his rival (held office
and assumed the functions of mayor is an involuntary interruption of the continuity
of his service. (Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013)

49
Rules applying the three-term limit rule

1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely
assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his
service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated
as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory
provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit (Borja,
Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of
the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is
considered an involuntary severance or interruption.

2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did
not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall
election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had
become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a
private citizen.

3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality

to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of
service.

4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s

continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during
this period.

5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes

office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from
office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired
portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed. The break or interruption
need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an
interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to
break the continuity of service.

6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes

final after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the
election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the
term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the
application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the
expiration of the term. (Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013)

In case of legislative reapportionment, where the district is practically the same as the
district that previously elected the same candidate, the three-term limit rule
applies. (Naval v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014)

50
 ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Four Essential Freedoms under Academic Freedom

Academic freedom or the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning, covers "four essential freedoms" of a university: To determine for itself on academic
grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who
may be admitted to study. (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R.
No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

Power to discipline students is subsumed in the academic freedom to determine what may be
taught, how it shall be taught and who may be admitted to study

Academic freedom gives institutions of higher learning the right to impose disciplinary
sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel students who violate disciplinary
rules. The power to discipline students is subsumed in the academic freedom to determine
what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who may be admitted to study. (Cudia v. The

Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

LEB Regulations in Violation of Academic Freedom

LEB imposition of law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar
This forces upon law schools the establishment of a legal apprenticeship program or a
legal aid clinic, in violation of the schools' right to determine for themselves their
respective curricula. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, September 10,
2019)

The act and practice of the LEB of excluding, restricting, and qualifying admissions to law
schools, including the requirement of passing the PhiLSAT for admission to any law school
This is a violation of the right of law schools to determine whom to admit to study,
which is part of academic freedom.

The provisions exclude and disqualify those examinees who fail to reach the
prescribed passing score from being admitted to any law school in the Philippines. In
mandating that only applicants who scored at least 55% correct answers shall be
admitted to any law school, the PhiLSAT actually usurps the right and duty of the law
school to determine for itself the criteria for the admission of students and thereafter,
to apply such criteria on a case-by-case basis. The law schools are left with absolutely
no discretion to choose its students at the first instance and in accordance with its own
policies, but are dictated to surrender such discretion in favor of a State-determined
pool of applicants, under pain of administrative sanctions and/or payment of fines.
This transfers complete control over admission policies from the law schools to the
LEB. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, September 10, 2019)

51
LEB additional requirements for admission to law schools such as at least eighteen (18)
units in English, six (6) units in Mathematics, and eighteen (18) units of social science subjects;
Ll.B. or a J.D. degree for the Master of Laws (Ll.M.); and prohibition on any student who has
obtained a general average below 2.5 or 80 in the college course required for admission to
legal studies from being admitted to law school.

Violation of the right of law schools to determine whom to admit to study, which is
part of academic freedom. These provisions similarly encroach upon the law school's
freedom to determine for itself its admission policies. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board,
G.R. No. 230642, September 10, 2019)

-o0o-

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