Summary of facts: we are aware of the fact that the prosecution can charge A for the offence of

Theft Act. 1968, However, to prove theft, the prosecution needs to first prove the Actus Reus and
Mensrea for the theft which is defined under Section 1 of the Act as appropriation of property
belonging to someone else with dishonesty and an intention to permanently deprive
Property:
2) To prove the AR for theft, the first issue is to prove that the subject matter in the question,
which in our case is ______ falls within the definition of property under the Act. Section 4 of the
Act gives a very wide definition of property which includes all tangible and intangible property
except for land and building. (Body parts par Qs nah hou tou ospar kuch nahi likhna) in our case,
Body parts: However, according to the case of Sharpe, body parts are not considered as property
but, in the case of Kelly, the courts eld that if some sort of skill is applied on body parts, then it
becomes property and the person stealing those will be held liable under Theft Act. Hence in our
case, ..
3) The second issue is to prove that the property ie _____, belongs to someone else which means
ownership should vest with someone else or the property should be in someone else’s legal
possession as seen in the case of Turner NO II where D took own can from mechanic without
paying him, who fixed it, and since an individual can be liable for theft of his own property
assuming that such property was under control and possession of another person hence D was
held liable for theft.
* If property is purchased: The defense can raise a strong argument that B legally purchased the
stamp from A there purchased the ‘name of property’ from A before, it belongs to B and one
cannot be liable for theft at property which belongs to him. Whilst the argument of the defense
may be valid but relying on the case of Shadrokh Cigari where bank had to transfer £286 but
mistakenly transferred £286,000 and the person used all the money because of which he was held
liable for theft. Similarly, in the case of Moynes, if property is procured or received by a person
and the person giving it was mistaken in any manner then the property should be returned as it
belongs to the first person. In addition, relying on the case of Davidge and Wain the Defendant
was given money for a certain purpose however, the D used for something else, and they stated
that in such case, the property belongs to someone else. Accordingly, in our case, .. Therefore, in
view of the above law and arguments, the courts would consider the ‘name of property’ to
belong to A notwithstanding that B purchased it.
Appropriation:
The third aspect is to prove that the 'name of property which belongs to A has to be appropriated
by B. Appropriation is widely defined sec 3 (1) of the theft Act as assuming any right of an
owner. In our case,.. . However, 3's defense counsel can raise the argument that A gave the
property name’ with consent. The law in respect of consent and appropriation has had many
changes starting from thead case of Lawrence where the courts held that consent is irrelevant as
it's not stated whether consent can negate appropriation or not under section 3 (1) of the act.
However, it was held in Morris that consent negates a appropriation but consent can be
invalidated if the invalidated if the owner's rights have been challenged. This was further
changed in Gomes where it was held that consent will be vitiated if there are elements of fraud.
But again in the case of thinks. courts changed this where they stated that consent would negate
appropriation provided that there are no elements of dishonesty. Dishonesty is a matter for the
jury to decide based on objectively defined reasonably standards of honest people (lvey) In
respect to the mentioned laws, in our case since appropriation is proven, all the elements of
Actus Reus are proven.
The next issue is to prove the Mensrea for theft. Here, the prosecution will have to prove that B
was dishonest which is not defined under Section 2 (1) of the theft Act but there are certain
situations where a person is not dishonest. since none of the situations mentioned under section 2
C are applicable in our case; reliance can be placed on the common law definition of dishonesty
which was initially introduced in the case of Feely but later was modified in the case of Ghosh
and then again modified in the case of Ivey where an objective test is carried out to determine
whether there are any elements of dishonesty or not and the jury decides according to the
objective standards of reasonable people, hence according to this law B was dishonest.
The final issue is to prove that B had a subjective intent to permanently deprive A of the
property and reliance for this can be placed on Velumyl Case person took money from cash
register and left a note that he will return it after the weekend however, the courts held him liable
as there was intention to permanently deprive since the taken and the coins returned were not
same. In our case, .. Likewise, as indicated by Section 6 (1) of the Theft Act an individual can be
held liable for theft on the off chance that the individual treats the thing as his own discard no
matter what the others right is and a borrowing or lending of it might likewise add up to so
regarding it as his own assuming that the acquiring or loaning is for a period and situation which
is equivalent to an outright aking or disposal I.e worth of item is diminished because of
borrowing as seen in the case of Marshall where person sold, used but unexpired train ticket and
was held liable as deprived railway. However, in the case of Lloyds, person took a movie reel,
copied it and kept it back. He was not held liable for theft. Hence, in accordance with the case
facts and laws, we can say that in our case,..
As per Section 6(2) of the Theft Act, if a person puts a condition on the return of property which
he knows is difficult or cannot be met, he will be held liable for theft.
By way of conclusion, since all elements of Actus reus and Mensrea are proven, ok theft B will
be held liable for the offences under the Act.