0% found this document useful (0 votes)
76 views21 pages

03.24.steenbergen Jones

Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
76 views21 pages

03.24.steenbergen Jones

Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 21

Modeling Multilevel Data Structures

Author(s): Marco R. Steenbergen and Bradford S. Jones


Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 218-237
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3088424
Accessed: 09/12/2008 08:31

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mpsa.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Midwest Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
American Journal of Political Science.

http://www.jstor.org
Modeling Multilevel Data Structures

MarcoR. Steenbergen Universityof NorthCarolina,ChapelHill


BradfordS. Jones Universityof Arizona

Multileveldata are structuresthat olitical scientists frequently work with data measured at multiple
consist of multipleunitsof analysis, levels, for example, individual-level survey data, and aggregatecon-
one nested withinthe other.Such textual or demographic data. As such, the use of multilevel data
data are becoming quite common in structures is common in political science research. Moreover, many theo-
politicalscience and providenumer- ries and hypotheses in political science hinge on the presumption that
ous opportunitiesfor theorytesting "something"observed at one level is related to "something"observed at an-
and development. Unfortunately, this other level. Yet despite the prevalence of cross-level or multilevel data and
type of data typicallygenerates a theories of political behavior, statisticalmethods to exploit the information
numberof statisticalproblems,of found in multilevel data structures have not been widely used.
which clusteringis particularlyimpor- In this article, we discuss the statistical modeling issues associated with
tant.Toexploitthe opportunitiesof- the analysis of multilevel data. Our intention is to provide both an intro-
fered by multileveldata, and to solve duction to multilevel modeling and to review the relevant statistical litera-
the statisticalproblemsinherentin ture on multilevel models. The article is structured as follows. First,we con-
them, special statisticaltechniques sider the substantive motivation leading to models for multilevel data.
are required.Inthis article,we focus Next, we discuss the statistical consequences of ignoring the multilevel
on a technique that has become structure of data. In the next section, we explain the problems of conven-
popularin educationalstatistics and tional approachesto analyzingthese kinds of data. This is followed by a dis-
sociology-multilevel analysis. In cussion of the multilevel model, its different variants and model estima-
multilevelanalysis, researchers build tion. We then provide an application of a multilevel model, examining the
models that capturethe layered issue of public support for the European Union. We conclude by discussing
structureof multileveldata, and deter- some general considerations in multilevel modeling.
mine how layers interactand impact
a dependent variableof interest.Our
objective in this articleis to introduce
the logic and statisticaltheorybehind
multilevelmodels, to illustratehow
such models can be applied fruitfully
Marco R. Steenbergenis Associate Professorof Political Science, Universityof North
in politicalscience, and to call atten- Carolina at Chapel Hill, 308 Hamilton Hall, CB# 3265, Chapel Hill, North Carolina
tion to some of the pitfallsin multilevel 27599-3265 (Marco_Steenbergen@unc.edu). BradfordS. Jonesis AssociateProfessorof
analysis. Political Science, University of Arizona, 315 Social Sciences, Tucson, Arizona 85721
(bsjones@email.arizona.edu).
An earlierversionof this paperwas presentedat the 14thAnnual Meetingof the Politi-
cal MethodologySociety,Columbus,OH. The authorswould like to thank the partici-
pants in this meeting, in particular,Gary King and Jeff Lewis, for their helpful com-
ments. We also thank Bill Dixon, Bob Erikson,David Lowery,StuartMacdonald,Bill
Mishler,GeorgeRabinowitz,MichaelSobel,and Jim Stimson for comments on various
versionsof this paper.Finally,we thankthe anonymousreviewersfor theirvery insight-
ful comments.
AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience,Vol.46, No. 1, January2002, Pp. 218-237
?2002 by the MidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation

218
MODELING MULTILEVEL DATA STRUCTURES 219

SubstantiveMotivation analysis? Causal heterogeneity is a concern in much of


the political science literature. A good example of this
Multilevel data structures involve data that are ordered concern is found in contextual analysis of political be-
havior. The major supposition of contextual analysis is
hierarchically. For example, a study of voting behavior
that the "contextual effect [...] arises due to social inter-
may focus on voters in different places (Jones, Johnston,
and Pattie 1992). In this case, there are two levels of analy- action within an environment" (Huckfeldt and Sprague
sis, voters and places, with the first level embedded, or 1993, 289). This environment-the context-may be
nested within the second level. In general, multilevel data spatially defined (e.g., local neighborhoods; see
structures exist whenever some units of analysis can be Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987) in terms of"social net-
considered a subset of other units, and one has data for works" (e.g., Mackuen and Brown 1987) or in terms of
both subsets. Thus, time may be nested in states (Western political and social groupings (e.g., Lau 1989). Regard-
1998) or in individuals (e.g., Steenbergen, Kilburn and less of the specifics about the environment, however, a
Wolak 2001); individuals may be nested in geographic di- common assumption is that environmental factors in-
visions (Charnock 1997;Jones,Johnston, and Pattie 1992; teract with individual factors to shape political behavior.
Quillian 1995), institutions, or groups; groups may be Finally, multilevel analysis can provide a test of the
nested in organizations, and so forth. A multilevel data generalizabilityof findings. That is, do findings obtained
structure may comprise two, three, or more levels of data, in one particular context (or time period) also apply to
as long as a hierarchyamong the levels can be established.1 other contexts (or periods)? Generalizability is an issue
The goal of multilevel analysis is to account for vari- that arises particularly often in comparative research.
ance in a dependent variable that is measured at the low- Since much of this work involves case studies of single
est level of analysis by considering information from all nations or regions, some have argued that the case study
levels of analysis.There areboth substantive and method- approach should be augmented by a comparative
ological reasons for using information from multiple lev- method with the goal of testing generalizability (Lijphart
els of analysis. Here we discuss three of these reasons.2 1971; Przeworskiand Teune 1970; Rokkan 1966). Multi-
First, multilevel data make it possible for researchers to level analysis can contribute to these generalizabilitytests
combine multiple levels of analysis in a single comprehen- because it allows researchersto explore causal heteroge-
sive model by specifying predictors at different levels. Be- neity. If the contextual units are randomly sampled, as
cause the model spans multiple levels of analysis, it is less multilevel methods typically assume, multilevel analysis
likely to suffer from model misspecification than when may have the added benefit that it helps overcome the
compared to models comprised of a single level. The need case selection problems that often plague comparative
for theoretical explanations spanning multiple levels of research (Geddes 1990; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).
analysisarises frequentlyin political science. For example,
Caldeira and Gibson(1995) used both individual-level
and institutional factors to account for public support to-
ward the judicial institutions of a particularcountry. Statistical
Motivation
Second, multilevel analysis allows researchersto ex-
plore causal heterogeneity(Western 1998). By specifying In addition to substantive motivations, there also is an
cross-level interactions, it is possible to determine important statistical motivation for explicitly accounting
whether the causal effect of lower-level predictors is for multilevel data structures. Specifically, ignoring the
conditioned or moderated by higher-level predictors. In multilevel character of data carries significant statistical
other words, is there a single, uniform causal dynamic costs in the form of possibly incorrect standard errors
or does the causal dynamic vary across higher levels of and inflated Type I error rates.To understand these prob-
lems, consider a situation in which a researcher has
'Within the multilevelmodeling approach,methods exist for deal- sampled N individuals from J contexts. If the researcher
ing with non-hierarchicaldata structures(so-called cross-classifi- ignores the contextual layer in the data-a practice that is
cations). These methods are beyond the scope of this paper,but a sometimes called "naive pooling" (Burton, Gurrin, and
good discussion can be found in Fienberg (1980)and Goldstein
(1995). Sly 1998)-then it appears as if there are N independent
observations in the design. But this impression will gen-
2Wehold off on a discussion of a fourth reason for multilevel
analysis, namely borrowing strength in the estimation of the
erally be misleading. If individual-level factors, for ex-
effects of predictors. We return to this matter in the section on ample attitudes, are influenced by contextual factors,
model estimation. then individuals sampled from the same context, j, share
220 MARCO R. STEENBERGEN AND BRADFORD S. JONES

common influences. Hence, the observations in context j Conventional


Approaches
are not truly independent; they are clusteredand dupli- forMultilevel
Data
cate one another to some extent. As Kreft and De Leeuw
put it, "the more individuals share common experiences Clustering in multilevel data structures poses a challenge
due to closeness in space and/or time, the more they are to statistical analysis. In the past, political scientists have
similar,or to a certain extent, duplications of each other" sometimes tried to meet this challenge by using two dif-
(1998; 9). ferent approaches, both of which are implemented in an
In terms of statistical models, the duplication of ob- OLS regression analysis. Unfortunately,neither approach
servations violates the assumption that the errors are in- is satisfactory.The first approach is to absorb contextual
dependent. This assumption underlies the standard or subgroup differences through a series of dummy vari-
models for data analysis used in political science (e.g., ables. In models that do not contain a constant, one
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and ordinary least squares should include as many dummy variables as there are
(OLS) regression analysis). In the context of multilevel
subgroups.When a constant is present in the model, then
data structures, the correlation between the errors (ob- one of the subgroups is designated the baseline category
servations) is referredto as intra-class or cluster correla- and does not receive a dummy variable. In the context of
tion. In most cases this correlation is positive, and this
experimental data, this model is often referred to as the
will cause the estimated standard errors to be too low
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) model (Kreft and De
and the test-statistics too high (just as in the case of posi- Leeuw 1998). In the context of pooled cross-sectional
tive auto-correlation in time series analysis).3As a result, data it is sometimes referred to as the least squares
Type I errors are more frequent, i.e., predictors appear to dummy variable (LSDV) model (e.g., Dielman 1989;
have a significant effect when in fact they do not.
Sayrs 1989; Stimson 1985). Hereafter,we refer to this ap-
Barcikowski's(1981) simulation study of the conse-
proach as the dummy variable model.6
quences of positive intra-class correlation for Type I er- Dummy variable models are popular in political sci-
rors in ANOVA illustrates this point. The nominal Type I ence for two reasons. First, these models perfectly cap-
error rate in this study was .05. But Barcikowski found ture any clustering by subgroups that may exist in the
that even a slight intra-class correlation can dramatically
data, since the dummy variables "absorb" the unique
increase the real Type I error rate compared to the nomi- variation among the subgroups. Second, these models
nal rate, especially when the number of cases per contex- can be implemented easily within a standard OLS regres-
tual unit is large. For example, with 100 cases per contex- sion framework. Despite these strengths, the dummy
tual unit, an intra-class correlation of .01, which is variable approach has limitations for the analysis of mul-
generally considered very small, produced a Type I error tilevel data. Dummy variables are only indicators of sub-
rate of .17. With an intra-class correlation of .20, a
group differences;they do not explain why the regression
sample size of 10 per contextual unit is sufficient to in- regimes for the subgroups are different.As discussed ear-
flate the Type I error rate to .28.4 Positive intra-class cor-
lier, an important goal of multilevel statistical analysis is
relations thus have the potential of biasing statistical in- to substantivelyaccount for causal heterogeneity.On this
ference. This may happen even when one explicitly
objective, dummy variable models provide little leverage.
incorporates contextual covariates in the model because The second approach to modeling multilevel data
these covariates may fail to account for all of the depen- structures is the inclusion of subgroup level predictors in
dence between the observations.5 the analysis. By including such predictors as main effects
in a regression model, it is possible to account for sub-
3Negativeintra-classcorrelationsoccur less frequently.They imply group differences in the constant. By interacting sub-
that observations in the same contextual unit are less similar to group characteristicswith predictors measured at a lower
each other than they are to observationsin other contextualunits. level of analysis,it becomes possible to account for differ-
One cause of this phenomenon is when there is competition be-
tween individualswithin the same contextualunit. ences in the partial slopes of these predictors across sub-
4SeeGoldstein (1995) for similarresultsin the context of a simple groups. Because of these interaction terms, this approach
is sometimes referredto as interactive modeling.7
regression model in which data clustering is due to contextual
variationin the model intercepts.
6The dummy variablemodel can be extendedby including inter-
5Further,it is sometimes useful to contemplatethe existenceof in- action terms between the dummy variablesand one or more pre-
tra-class correlationseven when there are no obvious contextual dictors in the model. This makes it possible to model contextual
units that are of substantiveinterest.Often the samplingdesign of
heterogeneityin the partialslopes of the predictors.
a study brings about intra-class correlations that may not (or
should not) be ignored. This is true, for example, in cluster 7 This type ofmodeling strategyhas a long history in political sci-
samples(see, e.g., Barnett1991),which arewidely used in political ence, in largepart due to the work of Boyd and Iversenon contex-
science (e.g., NationalElectionStudiesand GeneralSocialSurvey). tual analysis(1979; see also Friedrich1982 and Iversen1991).
MODELING MULTILEVEL DATA STRUCTURES 221

The main strengthof interactivemodelsis that they and variancecomponents analysis(see Searle,Casella,
allowthe analysisof substantivelyinterestingpredictors andMcCullogh1992).
in orderto accountfor causalheterogeneity.Thus,inter- To fix ideas,we firstconsidera multilevelmodel for
activemodels exploit the theoreticalopportunitiesthat the caseinvolvingtwo levelsof analysis.Wereferto these
multileveldatastructuresoffer.This is a majorimprove- levels as "level-1"and "level-2"and assumethe level-i
ment over dummyvariablemodels.On anotherdimen- observationsare nestedwithin level-2 units. In applied
sion, however,interactivemodelsareinferiorto dummy research,level-1 observationsmay referto individuals
variablemodels. Implicitly,interactivemodels assume and level-2 units may referto contextualunits, for ex-
that the subgrouplevel predictorsfullyaccountfor sub- ample,countries.We startby consideringa model with
group differences.This is so becauseinteractivemodels one level-1and one level-2predictor,which are observ-
incorporate random error only at the lowest level of able and have a linearrelationshipwith the level-i de-
analysis;at the higherlevelsof analysis(i.e., subgroups) pendentvariable(also observable).Laterwe generalize
the errorcomponentsare assumedto be zero.This is a this presentationto encompass more complex model
verystrongassumptionthatwill usuallyproveto be false. specifications,althoughthe focus in this paperremains
Unfortunately, whenfalse,the interactivemodeldoes not exclusivelyon linearmodels.9
avoid the statisticalissues associatedwith clusteringof
the data. ASimpleLinear
Multilevel
Model
It appears,then, that existing models make trade-
offs betweenthe opportunitiesand challengesof multi- Westartby positingthe followinglevel-1model:10
level data structures.Dummyvariablemodels meet the
statisticalchallenges,but they failto exploitthe theoreti- Yij= Poj+ Pljxij -+ ij (1)
calopportunitiesmultileveldataoffer.Interactivemodels
take advantageof these theoreticalopportunities,but Here yij is the level-i dependentvariablefor a level-1
they usuallyfallshorton solvingthe statisticalproblems. unit i (=1, . . ., Nj) nested in level-2 unit j (=1,. .., J).
Clearly,both of theseconventionalapproacheshavelimi- Further,xijis the level-1predictorand ?ijis a level-i dis-
tations. Unfortunately,combiningthese approachesto turbanceterm.This model is identicalto the simplere-
offset theirweaknessesis not possiblebecausethereare gressionmodelwith the importantdifferencethatthe re-
insufficientdegreesof freedomto estimateboth contex- gression parametersare not fixed but, instead, vary
tualeffectsand dummyvariables.Fortunately, thereis an acrosslevel-2 units (as indicatedby the j-subscriptson
alternativemodelingapproach,whichwe now consider. the regression parameters P). The introduction of these
variablecoefficientssets multilevelmodels apartfrom
most otherstatisticalmodelsusedin politicalscience.
To see thesedifferencesmore clearly,we can directly
TheMultilevelModel model the variationof the level-1regressionparameters
in (1) as a functionof level-2predictors,suchthat
Recentdevelopmentsin educationalresearch(e.g., Bryk
and Raudenbush 1992; De Leeuw and Kreft 1986; (2)
Po3j= Yoo+ Yolzj + 60j,
Goldstein 1995; Kreft and De Leeuw 1998; Longford
1993;Snijdersand Bosker1999),sociology(e.g.,Mason,
Wong,and Entwisle1983)haveresultedin the formula- 9Therehas been tremendousprogressin the developmentof non-
tion of multilevelor hierarchicalmodels.In the political linear and latent variablemultilevel models. An adequatediscus-
sion of these models would requireanotherpaper,however,so we
methodologyliterature,the pioneeringworkof Jackson leave the reader with some references to the relevant literature.
(1992) led to the consideration,development,and pre- Goldstein (1991, 1995), Hedeker and Gibbons (1994), and Gib-
sentation of a random coefficients model, which pro- bons and Hedeker(1997) develop multilevelmodels for categori-
vides the foundation for the models consideredhere.8 cal data.A discussion of multilevel event count and event history
models can be found in Goldstein (1995). The idea of multilevel
Thesemodelsarecloselyrelatedto severaloldermethod- latent variable models was first probed in papers by Joreskog
ological traditions such as random coefficient models (1971) and Sorbom (1974). Recently,Muthen (1989, 1991, 1994),
(see Rubin1950;Swamy1970;Swamyand Tavlas1995) McDonald (1994), and Chou, Bentler,and Pentz (2000) have ex-
pandedthe statisticaltheory for such models, makingit possibleto
conduct multilevel factor analyses (see Li et al. 1998, Muthen
8Other political methodologists who have contributed to multi- 1991) and multilevelsimultaneousequation analyses.
level analysis include Jones, Johnston, and Pattie (1992), Achen 10Our developmentand notation of the multilevelmodel drawlib-
and Shively (1995), Beck and Katz (1995), and Western (1998). erally from the excellent discussion by Bryk and Raudenbush
Zorn's(2001) work also follows in this tradition. (1992).
222 MARCO R. STEENBERGEN AND BRADFORD S. JONES

and (3) Cov[60j, bj] = t01. This means that the level-2
disturbanceson the interceptsand slopesmaybe corre-
= YIo + Y71Zj+ blj ' (3) lated. It is common to find that level-2 units with large
lj
slopesalsohavelargeinterceptsor,conversely, havesmall
Takentogether,(2) and (3) comprisethe level-2model.
intercepts.ThecovariancetermT1 capturesthis relation-
Here the y-parametersdenote the fixed level-2 param-
ship betweenthe interceptsand slopes and, in general,
etersand zjdenotesa level-2predictor.The 8-parameters one should
always estimate this term (Snijders and
in this model are disturbances.Thus,in (2) and (3), no Bosker1999).
assumptionis made that the level-2 predictoraccounts (4) 80jand 61jare normallydistributed,as is ij.12
perfectlyfor the variationin the level-1parameters. Takentogether,assumptions(1)-(4) implythatthe level-
The multilevel model is fully characterizedby the 2 disturbancesaredrawnfroma bivariatenormaldistri-
level-1 model, (1), and the level-2 model shown in (2) butionwith mean0 and a variance-covariance matrix
and (3). A single-equationexpressionof the modelis de-
rivedby substituting(2) and (3) into (1):
-'COO1QO = (5)
+
Yij = (Yoo+ Yolzj + o0j) + (Yio + Y -lzj + lj )xij ?ij
Yoo+ Yol0 + YloXij+ YllZjXi+ 80j + 6jij + ij, (4) Thelevel-1disturbancesaredrawnfroma normaldistri-
butionwith mean0 andvariance(2.
where oodenotesthe interceptor constant,yo, is the ef- (5) Cov[60j,?ij]= Cov[b1j,eij]= 0. This impliesthat
fect of the level-2predictor,yll is the effectof the level-1 the errorsin the location of slopes and interceptsare
uncorrelatedwith errorsthat affectwherelevel-1 units
predictor,and Yll is the effectof the cross-levelinterac-
tion betweenthe level-1and level-2predictors.The dis- arelocatedon the dependentvariable.This assumption
turbanceterm consistsof 8oj,5lj, and ?ij, which are the is usuallynecessaryto obtainan identifiedmodel.It im-
randomparametersof the model. Specifically,50jgives plies that the effectsof omittedlevel-1 predictorsis as-
the residuallevel-2variationin the level-1interceptthat sumedto be fixed,which,in the absenceof clearcontra-
remains after controlling for zji, 81jgives the residual dictoryinformation,is a reasonableassumption.
level-2variationin the level-1slope for xijaftercontrol- Withthe majorassumptionsspecified,we now con-
sider the statisticalfeaturesof the multilevelmodel. To
ling for zji,and eij is the level-i disturbancecapturing
omittedlevel-1predictors,measurementerrorin yij,and begin, we denote the multilevel disturbance term as
= bj + ijxij+ ?i. This expression has several impor-
any idiosyncraticsourcesof variationin yij attributable Uij
to level-1units.We can thus thinkof 80jand 6bjas com- tant characteristics.First,it can be shown that ui does
not haveconstantvariance:13
prisingparameternoise and of ij as level- noise.There-
fore,predictionerrorin the generalmultilevelmodelhas
two sources:imperfectlevel-1modelingof the response Var[uiy]= E[(80j + ljxij + ?j)2]
variable(?ij);andimperfectlevel-2modelingof the level- = +
E[82j] + 2xijE[oj,6 lj] xjE[l2] + E[?t]. (6)
1 parameters(6o0andblj). = 'o + 2xiyTo1+ xtl1 + 2
Thespecificationof the multilevelmodelin (4) is in-
completewithoutspecifyingthe assumptionsconcerning In (6), it is clearthat Var[uij](andthereforeVar[yj]) is
the disturbances.The following assumptionsare com- in part a functionof the level-1 predictor;hence uijhas
mon in multilevelanalysis. nonconstantvariance(even though 8j and ?ijhavecon-
(1) E[oj] = E[81j]= E[?ij]= . This implies that stant variancesby assumption (2)). Constantvariance
thereis no systematicparameternoise or level-1noise. will only be achievedwhen 61j is 0, whichmeansthat zj
= T11,Var[?ij]
(2) Var[80j]= T00,Var[81j] = (2. This
stipulatesthatthe level-1andlevel-2disturbanceshavea
constantvariance.11 An importantobjectiveof multilevel '2This last assumption is appropriate for the linear multilevel
analysisis to estimatethesevariancecomponentsand to models on which this paper focuses. Of course, models for cat-
makeinferencesaboutthem. egorical,count, or durationdatarequirea differentspecificationof
the distributionof the level-1 disturbances.
'3For this proof, we make an additional assumption that
IThis Cov[ ij, kl] = 0 for i ? j,k ? 1.This assumptionis includedmerely
assumptionmay be relaxedfor the level-1 disturbances(see
Browneet al. 2000;Snijdersand Bosker1999).We arealso awareof for convenience.It can and should be relaxedin applicationsof the
an applicationin which the level-2 units were characterizedby dif- multilevelmodelto timeseriesof pooledcross-sections
(Goldstein
ferent (co)variance structures (Thum 1997). 1995).
MODELING MULTILEVEL DATA STRUCTURES 223

perfectly accounts for the differences in the slope of xij AGeneral


Two-Level
Linear
Multilevel
across level-2 units. ModelandSubmodels
Second, it can be shown that the multilevel distur-
We can generalize the models in (1), (2) and (3) by in-
bances are also correlated for level-1 units nested in the
same level-2 unit. Let uijand Ukj denote two such distur- cluding multiple level-1 and level-2 predictors. To set no-
bances. Then tation, let there be P level-i predictors, Xpij(p = 1,... P).
Then the general level-1 model is given by:
Cov[uij,Ukj]= E[(6oj + bjxij + ?i)(6oj + 6jxkj + ?j)] P
=
= E[68o]+ xjE[80j, 8l] + xkjE[86, blJ] I_ pjxpi +
Yij Poj+ ijp, (9)
(7) p=l
+ XijXkE[6lj]

= T0o + xijTol + Xkj'Ol + XijXkjl ll


where Eij- N(0,(2) (cf. assumption (4)). Further,assume
that there are Q level-2 predictors, zqj(q = 1 ... Q). Then
This covariance will go to 0 only if 80j = 8?j = 0, which the general level-2 model for the intercepts is given by:
means that zj perfectly accounts for the variation across
Q
level-2 units in the level-1 model intercepts and slopes.
The covariance in (7) produces the so-called intra-class oj= Yoo+ ,YoqZ + oj (10)
q=l
or cluster correlation that we discussed earlier. Specifi-
cally, the intra-class correlation is equal to and the general level-2 model for the level-i slopes is
given by:
Cov[uij,Ukj]
(8) Q
JVar[uij]Var[ukj] + 8pj
Ppj= Ypo+ Y pqZqj (11)
q=l
This correlation is an indicator of the amount of duplica-
tion among level-1 units that are nested in the same Here we assume (cf. assumption (4)) that the 8-param-
level-2 unit (Kreft and De Leeuw 1998). Alternatively,it eters follow a multivariatenormal distribution with mean
can be interpreted as an indicator of group homogeneity: 0 and a covariance matrix consisting of elements Tpr (for
the more homogeneous level-2 units are, the higher the p, r= 0,..., P). Note that the parametersY0qandypqcan be
intra-class correlation is. restricted, so that not every equation for level-1 param-
These results imply that multilevel models are tai- eters needs to contain the same level-2 predictors. Substi-
lored to situations in which the data are clustered and tution of (10) and (11) into (9) gives the single-equation
the variance is not constant. In contrast, standard re- general multilevel model:
gression analysis of such data will generally be inappro-
priate because OLS assumes there is constant variance Q P
and no clustering. As we have discussed, clustering alone = +
Yij Yoo I YoqZqj+ YpoXpij
can lead to false inferences about the impact of predic- q=l p=l
Q P P
(12)
tors. Further, it is useful to note that clustering and
+ y + + +
nonconstant variance are often more than statistical , YpqzqXp 8oj I apXp
q=l p=l p=l
nuisances. In many applications, these data features are
of substantive interest. For example, what does depen- The meaning of the various components in this equation
dence among the observations imply substantively is similar to that shown in (4). Specifically,the first term
about the problem under study? Moreover, what factors
gives the constant, the second term gives the effects of the
help account for this dependence and for nonconstant level-2 predictors, the third term gives the effects of the
variance? These may be important questions that level-i predictors, the fourth term gives the cross-level
prompt the researcherto explore the nature of variation interactions, and the remaining terms constitute the dis-
and co-variation in the data. This in turn can help in the turbance term.
development of theoretical explanations that span mul- The model shown in (12) is very general and con-
tiple levels of analysis. It is when we look at clustering tains a wide variety of submodels that are well known in
and nonconstant variance as substantively interesting political science. Table 1 lists these models with the re-
phenomena that multilevel models have substantial strictions that are needed to derive them from (12) (see
value-added. We now elaborate on the multilevel model Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). We consider these models
presented above. in turn.
224 MARCO R. STEENBERGEN AND BRADFORD S. JONES

I Submodelsof the GeneralMultilevelModel


TABLE

Parameter Level-1 Level-2


Model Noise Predictors Predictors
GeneralMultilevel
Model Yes Yes Yes
RandomCoefficientModel Yes Yes No
Means-as-OutcomesModel Yes No Yes
RandomEffectsANOVA Yes No No
Model
Interactive No Yes Yes

Q
The randomcoefficients model. In the random coeffi- Yij= Yoo+ YoqZq+ + +ij * (19)
cientsmodel (see Swamy1970;Swamyand Tavlas1995), q=l
which is widely used in pooled cross-sections and time-
Since E[yij]= lj = Yoo+ Xq YoqZqj, the model treats the
series analysis (see Dielman 1989; Sayrs 1989; Stimson
level-2 means of the dependent variable, gLj,as a func-
1985) and also in other areas of political analysis (e.g., tion of the level-2 predictors (whence the name means-
Jackson 1992), the level-2 predictors are dropped from as-outcomes model). The disturbances of this model,
(10) and (11). Thus, the level-2 model for the random
coefficients model is Uij= 60j + ij, possess compound symmetry (i.e., have
an exchangeable covariance structure); their variances
are given by Var[uij]= oo0+ (2 and their covariances by
Pj =YO +60j (13)
Cov[uij,ukj]= 00,oresulting in an intra-class correlation
and of To0/ (X00+ (2).

Pp =Ypo +pj (14) The random effects ANOVAmodel. Random effects


ANOVAs play an important role in the analysis of
The single-equation multilevel model is then given by:
within-subjects experimental designs and repeated mea-
P P sures (e.g., Winer 1971). This model can be derived by
Yij= Yoo+ YpoXpij
+ + + ,pjxpij +i
X (15)
specifying the level-1 model as (18). Here lj are the
p=l p=1
treatment means and eij is within-group variance. It is
This model is simpler than (12) in that there are no fixed assumed that the level-2 units are the products of sam-
effects from the level-2 predictors and no cross-level in- pling, so that
teractions. The disturbance term of this model is given
by uij = Joj+ Sp 8pjxpij + ij and has a variance of 10 .ti = Yoo+ o0j (20)

Var[uij]
= o= 2 +
TopXpij +
T'prXpijXri a2, (16) Substitution into (18) gives
P p r

Yij = oo + 0oj + Eij. (21)


(where xpijand xri denote two level-1 predictors), and a
covariance of
The disturbances, uij = 6oj + eij possess compound sym-
= + + *
metry. The random effects ANOVA is often a good place
Cov[uij, Ukj] T00 = E OpXpij E OpXpkj E E tprpijXrkj to start in analyzing multilevel data structures. Because
P P p r (17)
this model decomposes the variance in the dependent
model.Anothersubmodelof in-
Themeans-as-outcomes variable across different levels of analysis, the researcher
terest from (12) is the so-called "means-as-outcomes" is in a good position to assess the importance of each
model. In this model, no level-1 predictors are included, level and how much would be lost by ignoring a particu-
so that the level-1 model is given by lar level.

+ ?ij Interactivemodel.Finally,it is instructiveto note that if


Yij = Po (18)
the disturbances are removed from (10) and (11) (or
The level-2 model for this case is equivalent to (10). equivalently,if the estimates of their variances and cova-
Thus, substitution of (10) into (18) gives rise to the fol- riances are 0), the interactive model is obtained. It is ob-
lowing combined multilevel model: vious that in the absence of (residual) level-2 heterogene-
MODELING MULTILEVEL DATA STRUCTURES 225

ity, the disturbance term is simply uij = ?ij. Given our as- densityin the contextof linearmultilevelmodels is the
sumptions, this implies that there is no clustering and normaldensity(see assumption(4)). This distributional
that the variance is constant. Thus, the interactive model assumption informs the likelihood function, which is
is, in fact, a special case of the general multilevel model in maximizedto obtain estimatorsof the fixed effectsand
(12), which arises under stringent and usually unrealistic the variancecomponents (for detailed discussions see
assumptions about the level-2 disturbances. Brykand Raudenbush1992;Goldstein 1995;Longford
1993;Raudenbush1988;Searle,Casella,and McCullogh
ModelswithMoreThanTwoLevels 1992).
There are several algorithms for implementing
The multilevel model can be extended to data structures MLE.In a pioneeringpaperon maximum-likelihoodes-
that have more than two levels. From a conceptual per- timation of variance components models, Dempster,
spective such an extension is straightforward: effects at Rubin, and Tsutakawa(1981) proposed the EM algo-
the highest level are considered fixed, while effects at rithm (see also Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Mason,
lower levels may vary over units at higher levels in the hi- Wong,and Entwisle1983).Goldstein(1986) developed
erarchicaldata structure (although they do not have to). an iterativegeneralizedleast squares(IGLS)algorithm,
However, in terms of interpretation, these models can be while Longford(1987) proposeda Fisherscoringalgo-
very complex because of the rapid increase in possible rithm. Under the assumption of normality IGLSand
interaction terms, including higher-level interactions. Fisherscoringare equivalent(see Goldstein1995). The
For instance, a three-level model may contain three sets advantage of EM is guaranteed convergence, while
of two-way cross-level interactions (between level-1 and Fisherscoring (IGLS)has the advantageof being fast
level-2, level-1 and level-3, and level-2 and level-3), in (see Kreftand De Leeuw1998;Kreft,De Leeuw,andVan
addition to a set of three-way interactions (between Der Leeden1994).
level-1, level-2, and level-3) and three sets of main effects MLE has certain desirable statistical properties.
(one for each level). Not only can the interpretation of all When the normalityassumptionholds, MLEis consis-
of these terms be complicated, but the demands on the tent and asymptoticallyefficient(Brykand Raudenbush
data may be quite steep if one is to achieve sufficient sta- 1992;Goldstein1995;Longford1993;Raudenbush1988;
tistical power to unravel all of the interactions. Of course, Searle,Casella,andMcCullogh1992).MLEremainscon-
not every model will contain all possible interactions be- sistent in the estimationof the fixed effectseven when
cause there may not be theoretical reasons to do this. An the normalityassumptionis violated(Goldstein1995).15
example of a relatively simple three-level model is pre- Whilethe ideal circumstancesfor estimatingmultilevel
sented in our application. modelsarebalanceddesigns(i.e.,equalnumbersof level-
1 units per level-2unit), Raudenbush(1988) comments
Statistical
Inference
fortheMultilevel
Model that MLEperformswell even with unbalanceddesigns,
whicharecommonin politicalanalysis.In termsof finite
Our discussion so far has focused on the conceptual de- sample properties,a series of Monte Carlosimulation
velopment of multilevel models and the purposes they studieshas demonstratedthat MLEfixedeffectsestima-
serve. An unanswered question is how these models are torsareconsistent(Kreft1996).
estimated. We now turn to this question, drawing a dis- If thereis a weaknessto MLEit maybe in the estima-
tinction between estimation of the fixed effects and vari- tion of the variancecomponentsin smallsamples.MLE
ance components, on the one hand, and of the level- co- variancecomponentstend to be biaseddownwardlyin
efficients, on the other.

Fixedeffects and variancecomponents.The dominant 2000; Seltzer,Wong, and Bryk 1996;Zeger and Karim 1991), and
generalizedestimating equations (see Goldstein 1995;Liang and
approach to estimating the fixed effects and variance Zeger 1986; Zorn 2001). Of interest are also the minimum vari-
components is maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).14 ance (MINVAR)and minimum norm quadraticunbiasedestima-
MLE requiresthe specification of a density for the level- tion (MINQUE)estimatorsof the variancecomponents,which are
often used in the context of random effects ANOVA(see Searle,
and level-2 disturbances. The most common choice of Casella,and McCullogh1992).
'5However,the standarderrorsof the fixed effects will tend to be
14However, there is a wide rangeof alternativeapproaches.Among biased.In addition,the estimatesof the variancecomponents may
these alternativesare two-step OLS (see Chou, Bentler,and Pentz also be severelybiased. One solution to these problems is to use a
2000;Kackarand Harville 1981;VanDen Eeden 1988),generalized Monte CarloMarkovChainprocedure(e.g., Gibbssampling)or to
least squares (De Leeuw and Kreft 1986), Bayesian estimation rely on bootstrapping(see Goldstein 1995;Kuk 1995;Meijer,Van
(Lindleyand Smith 1972;Rubin 1981;see also Browneand Draper Der Leeden,and Busing 1995).
226 MARCO R. STEENBERGEN AND BRADFORD S. JONES

such cases because no correction is made for the degrees Neither a separate regression approach nor a pooled
of freedom consumed by estimation of the fixed effects approach, then, is ideal. The question is whether there is
(Swallow and Monahan 1984). An alternative estimator a way in which the approaches can be combined that re-
of the variance components is restricted maximum-like- sults in a "compromise estimator"(Morris 1983,47) with
lihood estimation (REML),which corrects this problem more desirable properties. This question has been ad-
(see Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Goldstein 1995; Kreft dressed in the literature on empirical Bayes (EB) infer-
and De Leeuw 1998; Longford 1993; Searle, Casella, and ence, which shows that combining estimators is indeed
McCullogh 1992).16 Although REML and MLE are as- useful (Carlin and Louis 1996; Effron and Morris 1975;
ymptotically equivalent (Richardson and Welsh 1994), Morris 1983).
the premise is that REMLvariance component estimates The EB estimator of a level-i coefficient 3pj is a
are less biased than MLE variance component estimates weighted combination of the separate regression estima-
in small samples of level-2 units. Evidence from Monte tor of that coefficient and yp0+ XqY'pqzj. The weights
Carlo simulation studies lends support to this premise. correspond inversely to the precision of these two esti-
However,this evidence also points to a potential problem mators. That is, the more precise an estimator is, the
with REML. In the simulations, REML was sometimes more important its contribution is to the EB estimator.
less efficient than MLE.Consequently, the mean squared Thus, there is "shrinkage"in the direction of the most
error (which is the sum of the squared bias and the vari- precise estimator. The resulting EB estimator has the de-
ance of an estimator) did not always favor REML over sirable property that its MSE is typically smaller than the
MLE (Kreft 1996). MSE of the estimators on which it is based (Carlin and
Louis 1996; Effron and Morris 1975; Morris 1983).
Level-1coefficients.In multilevelmodeling,attentionis One of the biggest advantages of EB estimation is
usually not restricted to estimating fixed effects and vari- that the estimators of the level-1 parameters are no
ance components. Random level-1 coefficients are also of longer rooted only in the data for a particular level-2
considerable interest because these coefficients shed light unit. Because the EB estimator is a function of the fixed
on the behavior of the level- model in each of the level- effects, which are estimated from the pooled data, the
2 units. The question is how one should estimate these level-1 parameter estimates, in effect, borrow informa-
coefficients. tion from the data for other level-2 units. Borrowing
One option is to estimate level-1 coefficients sepa- strength is a major advantageof multilevel modeling (see
rately for the different level-2 units (e.g., using OLS). The Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Kreft and De Leeuw 1998;
advantageof this approach is that unbiased estimators of Raudenbush 1988; for a political science example see
the level-1 coefficients can be obtained for each level-2 Western 1998). It makes it possible to draw inferences
unit (assuming that the level-1 sample sizes are suffi- about level-2 units even in the light of sparse data for
cient) to allow estimation. Unfortunately, these estima- those units. Of course, the need to borrow strength is in-
tors often lack precision because they are based on lim- versely related to the sample sizes for level-2 units. And
ited data, namely, the data for a particular level-2 unit. the ability to borrow strength depends on how much the
Especiallywhen the sample sizes for the level-2 units are level-2 units have in common.
small, the variance of the separate regression estimators
can be large. Discussion
An alternativeestimation approach is pooled regres-
sion, i.e., regression analysis of the level-1 units com- Now that the logic and estimation of multilevel models
bined across all level-2 units. The pooled regression esti- have been discussed, it is natural to ask what these mod-
mator of the effect of a level-1 predictor may be biased els have to offer for political analysis compared to alter-
for a particular level-2 unit, in that the true effect of the native approaches. First, the notion of borrowing
predictor in this unit is different from the pooled esti- strength that is embedded in EB estimation offers a ma-
mate. On the other hand, there are efficiency gains in re- jor improvement over separate regression estimation.
lying on pooled estimators because all of the data is used When faced with causal heterogeneity, political scientists
and fewer parameters are estimated (see Bartels 1996). often resort to separate estimation of level-i units for
each level-2 unit. However,this is not an efficient estima-
tion strategy and we expect that in many cases EB esti-
16Morespecifically,REMLpartitionsthe likelihood function into mation is a much better choice. In this regard, a multi-
two parts,one of which containsthe fixed effects.Variancecompo-
nent estimatesarebased on the part of the likelihoodfunction that level modeling approach to causal heterogeneity can be
does not include the fixed effects. verybeneficial.
MODELING MULTILEVEL DATA STRUCTURES 227

A second major benefit of multilevel models is that The argument here is that political parties are an impor-
they permit the analysis of substantive contextual effects tant context that shapes the opinions of party support-
while still allowing for heterogeneity between contextual ers. As a result supporters from the same party tend to
units. This is an important improvement over the alter- share similar views about the EU (e.g., Franklin, Marsh,
natives of dummy variables models and contextual mod- and McLaren 1994), suggesting clustering.17
els. Dummy variables models can account for level-2 het- Considering these three levels of analysis together,
erogeneity, but they contain no substantive explanation what emerges is a multilevel data structure: individuals
of this heterogeneity. Contextual models provide sub- (to the extent that they are party supporters) are nested
stantive explanation, but make the unrealistic assump- within political parties, which in turn are nested within
tion that this explanation eliminates any remaining level- EU member states. We can model this data structure
2 heterogeneity. Multilevel models combine substance through a three-level multilevel model. The dependent
with (more) reasonable assumptions about level-2 het- variable in this model can be written as Supportijk,which
erogeneity. denotes the level of support for the EU for an individual
A third major benefit of multilevel models concerns i who supports party j in country k.
statistical inference. The multilevel character of much of
political science data is often ignored. Political scientists
often treat multilevel data structures as if no hierarchy
Theory
between units of analysis existed. Consequently, observa- Three substantive questions arise when we think of EU
tions are treated as independent, whereas in fact they are support as a three-level phenomenon. First, what is the
to some extent dependent because of the hierarchical importance of each of the three levels for understanding
nesting structure. This can easily lead to incorrect infer- EU support? Second, how do we account for EU support
ences, such as rejecting the null hypothesis of no effect at the differentlevels?That is, what predictors can explain
too frequently.Multilevel models improve inferences be- EU support? Finally, is there causal heterogeneity in the
cause the hierarchical data structure is explicitly taken effects of predictors?These questions follow a logical pro-
into consideration. gression-later questions presuppose an answer to earlier
To illustrate the application of a multilevel model, questions. Let us now outline how one would translate
we now provide an empirical illustration of multilevel these questions into appropriatemultilevel models.
analysis. First, does support for the EU vary across the three
levels of analysis that we have identified? We can answer
this question by way of an ANOVA that decomposes the
variance in EU support:18
Application
Supportijk = Yooo+ Vook+ 5ojk + Eijk- (22)
We illustrate multilevel models through an analysis of
17Afourth level of analysis is time: how do opinions about the EU
public support for the European Union (EU). Studies of
vary over time (e.g., Eichenberg and Dalton 1993)? For the sake of
EU support typically rely on multilevel data. As such, the
simplicity, we will not consider this level in this paper, focusing in-
topic of EU support is an excellent test case for illustrat- stead on one particular point in time, namely 1996.
ing multilevel models. Our goals in this section are two- 18To derive this model, consider the individual-level model
fold. First, we show how to develop multilevel models
Support ijk = aojk + ? ijk
from substantive researchquestions and how to interpret
the results. Second, we show the implications of ignoring where a jk is the mean level of EU support in political partyj in
the multilevel data structure. country k, and ? k is individual-levelvariationaroundthis mean.
We model the mean by way of the party-levelmodel
The literature on EU support discusses at least three
different levels of analysis. First, a large number of stud- OCOjk= POOk + Ojk-

ies concentrate on the individual level; these studies as- Here Pookis a national mean for EU support and 8sjk is party-
level variationaroundthis mean. Finally,
sess the nature and determinants of inter-individual dif-
ferences in attitudes toward the EU (e.g., Inglehart, = 7000 +Vook,
POOk
Rabier,and Reif 1991). Second, a sizable literature docu- where Yooois the overall mean of EU support and Vookis cross-
ments the nature of cross-national differences in EU nationalvariationaroundthis mean. Back-substitutionof this for-
mula yields
support (e.g., Inglehart, Rabier,and Reif 1991). More re-
cently, scholars have become interested in national po- aCjk = Yooo+ Vook+ 6ojk-
litical parties as a third, intermediate level of analysis. Furtherback-substitutionyields (22).
228 MARCO R. STEENBERGEN AND BRADFORD S. JONES

In this model, Y000is the grand mean of EU support (i.e., indeed has happened in the case of public opinion
the mean across individuals, parties, and countries). The toward the EU (Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994;
sources of cross-national variation, which cause particu- Franklin, Marsh, and Wlezien 1994; Franklin, Van Der
lar EU member states to deviate from the grand mean, are Eijk, and Marsh 1995; cf. Siune and Svenson 1993). As
contained in Vo0k. Similarly, 80jk contains sources of suggested before, cue-taking effects induce clustering at
cross-party variation. Finally, ?ijk captures inter-indi- the party-level because the supporters of a particular
vidual differences.The variancesof these differentsources party will tend to assimilate to the same cue.
of variation are given by coo0,Tooand 72, respectively.In Finally, consider the national level of analysis. Here
order to argue that all three levels of analysis are impor- we focus on two predictors. First,we consider the date at
tant for EU support, we should find that all three of these which a country acceded to the EU. Accession to the EU
variance components are statisticallysignificant. has been largely an elite-driven process. It is not uncom-
If EU support varies significantly at all three levels, mon to find that public opinion toward the EU is very
the next question to ask is how we should account for negative in countries that have recently acceded to the
this variance? The EU literature suggests several impor- union. However, often public opinion toward the EU be-
tant covariatesthat help predict EU support. At the indi- comes more favorable as time passes. Hence, we expect
vidual level, scholars have discussed three major predic- EU support to be greaterin older EU member states than
tors of EU support (see Gabel 1998). First, an extensive in more recent member states.
literature describes the impact of economic consider- Second, individuals may look at the dependence of
ations on EU support. A key finding in this literature is the national economy on the EU in determining whether
that bad economic conditions for an individual tend to to support or oppose the union. As the national economy
reduce support for the EU, while good economic condi- becomes more dependent on EU membership, EU sup-
tions tend to increase such support (e.g., Gabel 1998). In port may increase because people realize how important
this article, we use a person's income as an indicator of the EU is for their country. One indicator of this depen-
economic circumstances. Specifically,we distinguish be- dence is the percentage of the trade-flow (imports and
tween people in the bottom income quartile, the top in- exports) that is intra-EU (e.g., Eichenberg and Dalton
come quartile, and the two middle income quartiles (our 1993). We expect that higher percentages of intra-EU
baseline category) in the income distribution of an EU trade are associated with greaterEU support.
member state. We expect people in the bottom income Having defined the relevant theoretical factors pre-
quartile to be the least supportive of the EU. dicting EU support, we now consider how to bring these
Second, political orientations appear to be associated different predictors together in a multilevel model. We
with EU support. There is considerable debate about the start by defining an individual-level model:
relative importance of these orientations, but it appears
that citizens with a leftist ideological orientation are = + +
Supportijk aojk aljkLIijk a2jkHIijk
more opposed to the EU than those with a rightist ori- + a3jkIDijk+ a4jkOLijk (23)
entation (Inglehart, Rabier,and Reif 1991). Thus, we in-
a,5jkMaleijk+ a6jkAgeijk + ?ijk-
clude ideology as an individual-level predictor.
Third, Inglehart (1970) has argued that EU support Here Lijk is a dummy variable for the lowest income
is higher among opinion leaders than among the general quartile, Hlijkis a dummy variable for the highest income
public. The reason is that opinion leaders have a better quartile, IDijkis a person's ideology, and OLijkis opinion
understanding of the EU, which makes them feel less leadership. We include two demographic control vari-
threatened by it. The impact of opinion leadership is as- ables in the model: Maleijkis a dummy variable for gen-
sumed to be messageindependent:opinion leadership en- der (1 is male) and Agejkis an individual's age.
hances EU support regardless of the information envi- By modeling the individual-level constant, cOjk, we
ronment (Inglehart, Rabier,and Reif 1991). We put this can introduce the party-level predictor that we identified:
assumption to test later in this application.
Moving to the party level, recently a literature has + PolkCuejk+ O8jk,
aojk = POOk (24)
emerged about partisan cue-taking effects. Such effects
arise when parties take a position on an issue such as Eu- where Cuejk stands for party cue. Further, by modeling
ropean integration, which is then used by party support- the party-level constant, Pook, we can introduce the
ers to inform their own opinions about the issue. As a re- country-level predictors:
sult, the supporters assimilate their opinions to those of
the party. There is now good empirical evidence that this Pook= Yooo+ YoolTenurek + Vook, (25)
+ Yoo02Tradek
MODELING MULTILEVEL DATA STRUCTURES 229

where Tenurekdenotes the length of a country's EU tional political parties are an important source of mes-
membership and Tradekdenotes the percentage of the sages-or cues-about the EU. Opinion leaders are likely
country's trade that is intra-EU. to receivethese cues because they are tuned into the com-
Substitution of (25) into (24) gives munication flow about the EU (which is usually not true
of the general public). Moreover,opinion leaders are also
aOjk= Yooo+ YoolTenurek + 7002Tradek likely to accept these cues if they come from the party they
+ support. After all, this party is a trusted source in the eyes
PolkCuejk + Vook + 6ojk.
of the opinion leaders.Thus, we expect that opinion lead-
If we make the assumption that the effect of party cues is ers are likely to be persuaded by the party cues.
fixed (i.e., Polk= Yo0o)and that the effect of the indi- But if this is true, opinion leaders' support for the
vidual-level predictors is fixed as well (i.e., apjk= Ypoofor EU depends on the nature of the party cues to which
p ? 0), then substitution of this result into (23) yields: they are exposed. If the cue that the party sends is pro-
EU, then opinion leaders should also be pro-EU (and
more so than the general public). On the other hand, if
Supportijk = Yoo + yoolTenurek + yoo2Tradek + YoloCuejk the party cue is anti-EU, then opinion leaders should op-
+ ylooLIijk+ Y2oHIijk + Y300IDijk+ 400OLijk
pose the EU. Thus, instead of predicting a uniformly
+ Y5ooMaleijk+ y600Ageijk+ VOOk
+ 80jk + ?ijk positive effect of opinion leadership on EU support, we
(26) hypothesize an effect that varies with party cues.
How do we model this effect?We do this by dropping
This model has several notable features. First, it is com- the assumption in (23), that the effect of opinion leader-
prehensive in that it brings together the predictors at dif- ship is fixed. Instead,we model this effect as follows:
ferent levels. Second, (26) makes no assumption that
these predictors fully account for the variation in EU (27)
(4jk = P40k+ P41kCuejk+ 64jk
support at the different levels. Thus, the model implies
variance components (y2 for ?ijk, T00 for 60jk, and 0oo
This model stipulates that the effect of opinion leader-
for Vo0k.These features make the model appropriate for
ship, which is given by a4jk in (23), varies as a function
answering the second question that the EU data raise, of party cues. We do not expect these cues to explain all
namely, how do we account for EU support at different of the cross-party variation in aX4jk.Our theory does not
levels of analysis?
An important limitation of (26) is the assumption suggest that the right-hand side coefficients in (27) vary
across countries, so that we asume these coefficients to be
that the individual-level predictors have fixed effects. For
fixed (i.e.,^40k = Y400and [41k = Y410).If we retain our ear-
one of the predictors, namely opinion leadership,there is
lier assumption that the remaining individual-level and
an a priori reason to question this assumption.19 Al-
party-level predictors have fixed effects, we obtain:
though Inglehart has argued that the effect of opinion
leadership on EU support is uniformly positive (Ingle-
hart, Rabier,and Reif 1991), there is theoretical reason to = Yooo+ yOolTenurek+ yo02Tradek +
Supportijk YoloCuejk
expect the effect of this predictor varies as a consequence + + Y200HIijk +
of party cues.20In other words, there is causal heteroge- YlLIijk 300Dijk + Y4000Ljk
+ y5ooMaleijk + Y60oAgeijk+ y41oCuejk
neity in the effect of opinion leadership.
x OLijkVook +
The theoretical rationale for this hypothesis comes 0Ojk+ 64jkOLijk+ Eijk-
from Zaller's (1992) theory of mass opinion. This theory (28)
claims that individuals are persuaded by a message to the
extent that they receive the message and accept it. Na- This model contains the same variance components as
(26). In addition, it contains a variance component T44
(for 64jk) and a covariance component T04 (which cap-
19Wealso tested the assumptionfor the other individuallevel pre- tures the relationship between 80jk and 64jk). In terms
dictorsand for partycues. Forthese predictorswe had no theoreti- of the fixed effects, the model contains a cross-level inter-
cal expectationthat their effectsvary.The tests do not suggestsuch
variation either, so that we retain the assumption of fixed effects action, Cueikx OLiik.We expect this interaction to have a
for these predictors. positive effect. Because of the presence of this cross-level
interaction, (28) allows us to answer the third question
20Inglehart(1970) alludedto the possibilitythat the effectof opin-
ion leadershipis relatedto the content of elite messages,but did that we posed, namely whether the effect of the predic-
not pursue it. tors is uniform or heterogeneous.
230 MARCO R. STEENBERGEN AND BRADFORD S. JONES

Data TABLE
2 VariableDescriptions
Data for the dependent variable and for the individual Variable Description
level predictors come from Eurobarometer survey 46.0,
Support A compositeof twoitems:(1) "Generally speak-
which was fielded in the fifteen EU member states in Oc-
ing, do youthinkthat[ourcountry's]membership
tober and November of 1996.21We consider only the of the EuropeanUnionis (a bad thing,neither
subset of respondents who declared support for one of good norbad, a good thing)?and (2) the desired
the parties in our set (see below) and who were of voting speed of Europeanintegration(1=integration
shouldbe broughtto a "standstill;"
7=integration
age (at least 18 years old) at the time of the survey. As a r=
shouldrun"asfast as possible").inter-item
party supporter we count anyone who indicated in the .474;standardizeditema = .643. Thecomposite
survey that they would be a likely voter for that party in rangesbetween0 and 8, withhigherscores
the next general elections (the respondents could give indicatinggreatersupportforthe EU.Source:
only one choice). A total of 6354 respondents meet these Eurobaraometer 46.0.
requirements. Our measures of the dependent variable LI A dummyvariableindicatingthata respondent
and the predictors are described in Table2.22 fallsinthe bottomquartileof the incomedistribu-
At the party level, we consider only those parties for tionof his/hercountry.Source:Eurobarameter
which we have data about their EU position. These data 46.0.
were collected via an expert survey (Ray 1999). The sur- HI A dummyvariableindicatingthata respondent
vey instrument consists of a seven-point rating scale of fallsin the top quartileof the incomedistribution
the position of a party's leadership vis-a-vis the EU in of his/hercountry.Source:Eurobarameter 46.0.
1996 (the scale runs from "stronglyopposed to European ID Respondent'sideologicalself-placementon a 10-
integration" to "strongly in favor of European integra- pointscale (0-left;9=right).Source:Eurobara-
tion"). The survey was sent to party experts for each of meter46.0.
the EU member states, who provided ratings for the most
OL Respondent'slevelof opinionleadershipon a 4-
important parties in that country. We use the averageex- pointscale. Thismeasurecapturesthe respon-
pert rating for a party as a measure of the EU cue that the dents'potentialforactivepoliticalinvolvement
(for
party was sending at that time.23We have information on measurementdetailssee Inglehart1977).The
party cues for 100 different parties.24 originalscale rangesfrom1 (highopinion
The data for intra-EU trade are for 1995, the year leadership)to 4 (lowopinionleadership).We
reversedthisscale and centeredit aroundthe
prior to the Eurobarometer survey. We introduce this samplemean.Source:Eurobarameter 46.0.
one-year lag because we believe that individuals base
Male Respondent'sgender(1=male).Source:Euro-
barameter46.0.
46.0: PersonalHealth, En-
21Mellich, Anna. 1996. Eurobarometer Age Respondent'sage (inyears).Source:Euro-
ergy,DevelopmentAid,and the CommonEuropeanCurrency(com- barameter46.0.
puter file), 2nd release,Brussels:INRA Europe (producer), 1997;
Koln: ZentralArchiv fur EmpirischeSozial Forschung(distribu- Cue Partycue as measuredby the followingitem:
tor), 1999;Ann Arbor,MI:Inter-UniversityConsortiumfor Politi- "[What of the party
is] the overallorientation
cal and SocialResearch(distributor),1999. leadershiptowardEuropeanintegration?" (1 =
to 7 =
stronglyopposed integration; stronglyin
22Wehave centeredseveralof the predictors,including those that
form the cross-level interaction in (28). We centered about the
Theresponsesto thisitem
favorof integration).
came frompartyexpertsforthe differentEU
grandmean of these predictors,i.e., their mean acrossindividuals,
parties, and countries. On the topic of centering see Kreft, De
memberstates. Weaveragedthe responsesof all
Leeuw,and Aiken (1995) and Hofmann and Gavin (1998). expertswhoevaluateda particular party.For
purposesof the analysisthisaveragewas
23Herewe maketwo assumptions.First,the averageexpertratingis centeredaroundits mean.Source:Ray(1999).
a reasonableapproximation of a party'sstance vis-a-vis the EU.
Second,a party'sstanceis public informationso that it can serveas Tenure Thenumberof yearsa countryhas been an EU
a cue. Both assumptionsseem reasonable.First,with very few ex- memberstate.Thisvariablewas centeredaround
ceptions, there was a remarkableagreementamong expertsin po- the mean.
sitioning parties on the issue of the EU. Moreover,there also was
agreementbetweenthe expertjudgmentsand partymanifestodata Trade trade
Theratioof a country's1995 intra-EU
(Ray 1999). Second,we are not awareof any cases in which parties balance(in 1000 ECUs)overthe country'stotal
tried to hide their EU position from the public. tradebalance(in ECUs).Thisvariablewas
24The number of centeredaroundthe mean.Source:1997
parties per EU member state ranges between 4
and 10. The number of supportersper partyrangesbetween 1 and StatisticalYearbook.
International
383.
MODELING MULTILEVEL DATA STRUCTURES 231

their evaluations of the EU on past trade information TABLE


3 ANOVA
since this information is most accessible. These trade
data come from Eurostat,the StatisticalOffice of the EU. Parameter Estimate
FixedEffects
Constant 4.990**
Results
(.233)
Is there significant variation in EU support at the indi- VarianceComponents
vidual, party and national levels?To answer this question Country-Level(ooo) 0.745**
we estimated the ANOVA model described in equation (.297)
Party-Level(0oo) 0.283**
(22). Table 3 shows the ML estimates of the grand mean
and the variance components.25All of the variance com- (.062)
Individual-Level(a2) 3.844**
ponents are statistically significant, suggesting that there (.069)
is significant variance in EU support at all three levels of
-2 x LogLikelihood 26765.530
analysis.26This is evidence that the multilevel character
of the EU support data should not be ignored. Note:Tableentriesaremaximumlikelihood estimateswithesti-
(IGLS)
In order to obtain a better sense of the importance of matedstandarderrorsinparentheses.
the various levels of analysiswe consider the ratio of each **=p<.01.
variance component to the total variance in EU support
(see Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Snijders and Bosker
1999), which is equal to (o00 + T0 + O2). For example, neous statistical inferences. The estimates of the intra-
the ratio of (2 over the total variance indicates the im- cluster correlations at the party and national levels are
portance of the individual level of analysis. With data equal to the proportion of the total variance that the
measured at the individual level, it should not come as a variance components at these levels account for (Bryk
surprise that the variance component at this level ac- and Raudenbush 1992; Snijders and Bosker 1999). Thus,
counts for a major portion of the variance in EU sup- at the party level we observe an intra-cluster correlation
port, namely about 79 percent (i.e., 100 times 3.844/ of .058, while the intra-cluster correlation at the national
(.745+.283+3.844)). Importantly,however, 21 percent of level is .153. These are sizable positive correlations that
the variance in EU support is due to higher levels of suggest a fair amount of clustering-or overlap between
analysis. Specifically, the party level accounts for about observations-in particularat the national level. One can
5.8 percent of the variance in EU support. The contribu- ignore this aspect of the data only at the peril of drawing
tion of the national level is even greater,at 15.3 percent. incorrect statistical inferences.
Clearly,to ignore these sources of variance is to miss out The results of the ANOVA model indicate very
on important aspects of support for the EU. This could clearlythat there is significant variation in EU support at
result in erroneous substantive conclusions about EU all three levels of analysis.Now we turn to the question of
support (Opdenakker and Van Damme 2000). whether the model specified in equation (26) can ac-
Ignoring the multilevel characterof the data has an- count for this variance. The second column in Table 4
other adverse consequence as well. It leads the researcher gives the ML estimates of the fixed effects and the vari-
to neglect the clustering of observations at the party and ance components of this multilevel model. This model is
national levels. As we have seen, this could produce erro- a significant improvement over the ANOVA model:
X2 = 175.56, df= 9, p < .01, suggesting that at least a sub-
set of the predictors has effects that are different from 0.
25Theseestimates,as all otherestimatesin this paper,wereob- At the individual level we observe a powerful effect
tained using MLwiNV1.1 (Rasbashet al. 2000). of opinion leadership on EU support. This effect is in
26Thereare several ways in which the statistical significance of the direction that Inglehart (1970; Inglehart, Rabier and
variancecomponents can be established.Here we rely on a likeli- Reif 1991; see also Janssen 1991) predicted: opinion
hood-ratio test in which we compare the fit of two models (see leaders are more supportive of the EU than the general
Bryk and Raudenbush1992;Snijdersand Bosker 1999). The first
model does not restricta particularvariancecomponent and pro- public. Despite this strong effect of opinion leadership,
duces a likelihood of L1.The second model restrictsthe variance the overall performance of the individual-level predic-
component to zero, producing a likelihood of Lo.Now 2[ln(L1)- tors is disappointing. The effect of income is weak, while
ln(L0)]is asymptoticallydistributedas a X2-variatewith one degree
of freedom.Thus, it is possibleto compute a p-value for the test of ideology does not have a statistically significant effect.
the restriction.This test approachcan be extendedto tests of mul- Of the control variables, age has the strongest effect; the
tiple parameters,includingfixed effects. effect of gender is only marginally significant. As a set,
232 MARCO R. STEENBERGEN AND BRADFORD S. JONES

TABLE4 Determinantsof EU Support the cross-party variance in EU support in the data. We


determine this level of explained variance by comparing
Multilevel Regression the party-level variance components of two models, one
Parameter Estimate Estimate
including the level-1 and level-3 predictors but not party
FixedEffects cues, and another model that adds party cues as a predic-
Constant 5.504** 5.016** tor (see Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). The relativechange
(.220) (.124) in the party-level variance component is (.282 - .100)/
Tenure 0.014 0.011**
.282 = .645. This is impressive and demonstrates the im-
(.014) (.002)
Trade 0.032 0.039** portance of party cues for understanding public opinion
(.025) (.003) toward the EU.
PartyCue 0.233** 0.275** At the national level, we find no statistically signifi-
(.028) (.018) cant effects from the predictors. While the signs on the
LowestIncomeQuartile -.106+ -.181** coefficients for tenure and trade are in the correct direc-
(.064) (.068)
0.048 -.001 tion, neither predictor approaches statistical significance.
HighestIncomeQuartile
(.059) (.062) Clearly, our explanation for cross-national variation in
Ideology 0.019 0.023+ EU support is inadequate.
(.015) (.013) Considering the random effects, we observe that the
OpinionLeadership 0.152** 0.166** variance components at all three levels of analysis remain
(.028) (.030)
Male 0.088+ 0.093+ significant after controlling for the predictors at these
levels. This is even true at the party level, where the vari-
(.050) (.053)
Age -.013** -.014** ance component remains sizable despite the powerful ef-
(.002) (.002) fect of party cues. Clearly,the predictors at the party and
VarianceComponents country levels do not account for all of the variance in
Country-Level
(o00) 0.551** EU support at these levels.
(.213) In sum,the results suggest that our explanation of EU
Party-Level
(too) 0.100** support at the different levels of analysis is only partially
(.029) successful.The explanation is best at the party level, where
Individual-Level
(o2) 3.771**
we find strong support for the position taken by Franklin
(0.067
RegressionDisturbance 4.335** and his colleagues that party cues affect support for the
(.003) EU (Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994; Franklin,
-2 x LogLikelihood 26589.970 Marsh, and Wlezien 1994; Franklin, Van Der Eijk, and
F 71.502 Marsh 1995). The explanation is considerablyless success-
ful at the individual level, where much of the variance in
Note:Multileveltableentriesare maximumlikelihood(IGLS)estimates
withestimatedstandarderrorsin parentheses.Regressiontableentries
EU support remains unaccounted for. In terms of ex-
are ordinaryleast squaresestimateswithestimatedstandarderrorsin plaining cross-national variation in EU support, our ex-
parentheses. planation is the least successful. Clearly,other predictors
+= p <.10, **= p <.01. should be considered at this level (perhapsin a design that
includes multiple time points).
It is useful at this point to consider the implications
the individual-level predictors explain very little of the of ignoring the multilevel data structure. Specifically,
individual level variance in EU support. We can assess what inferences would we draw if we were to ignore the
this explanatory power by comparing the individual- multilevel characterof the EU data?To answer this ques-
level variance component in Table (4) to the same com- tion we estimated an OLS regression model on the data,
ponent in Table (3) (see Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). treating them as a "flat"data structureinstead of a hierar-
The difference in these variance components is 3.844 - chy. The last column in Table (4) presents the results
3.771 = .073. Relative to the size of the ANOVA variance from this analysis. The noteworthy feature of these re-
component, this is a reduction of .073/3.844 = .019. sults is the large number of statistically significant pre-
Thus, the individual-level variance components explain dictors. Indeed, with the exception of the highest income
less than 2 percent of the individual-level variance in EU quartile, all predictors are significant at the .10 level and
support. most are significant at the .01 level.
The story is quite different for our party-level pre- These results stand in stark contrast with the multi-
dictor. Party cues exert a powerful effect on EU support. level results discussed earlier.The differences are particu-
These cues by themselves account for about 65 percent of larly clear at the national level of analysis. Neither of the
MODELING MULTILEVEL DATA STRUCTURES 233

national level predictors achieved statistical significance TABLE


5 Modelwith Cross-Level Interaction
in the multilevel analysis. However, the OLS results sug-
Parameter Estimate
gest that both of these predictors are significant at the .01
level. Clearly, the inferences drawn from the regression Fixed Effects
analysis are different than those drawn from the multi- Constant 5.507**
level analysis. (.220)
These differences arise precisely because the OLS Tenure 0.015
standard errors are too small. This attenuation is caused (.014)
Trade 0.031
by ignoring the clustering of the data. The OLS analysis (.025)
assumes that we have 6354 independent observations in PartisanCue 0.225**
our data. With such a large N, it is not surprising that (.028)
most of the predictors in Table (4) attain statistical sig- LowestIncomeQuartile -.104+
nificance. The problem, of course, is that we do not have (.064)
HighestIncomeQuartile 0.046
6354 independent observations. As the variance compo-
(.058)
nents in Table (4) show, considerable clustering remains Ideology 0.019
even after controlling for the party- and country-level (.015)
predictors-the observations are hence not (condition- OpinionLeadership 0.148**
ally) independent. To pretend that they are independent (.034)
Male 0.088+
is to assume that one has more information than really
(.050)
exists. Thus, the OLS analysis presents too optimistic a -.013**
Age
view about the significance of the predictors. (.002)
To continue with our exposition of the multilevel OpinionLeadershipx PartisanCue 0.044*
model, we now consider the effect of opinion leadership (.021)
in greater detail by accounting for possible causal het- VarianceComponents
erogeneity. In Table 4, opinion leadership had a fixed ef- Country-Level
(0oo) 0.548**
fect, in keeping with the theory developed by Inglehart (.212)
(1970; Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif 1991). However, our Party-Level
Constant (Too) 0.107**
own theory suggests that the effect of opinion leadership
(.031)
varies across parties as a function of party cues. Which OpinionLeadership (X44) 0.019
of these theories are supported by the data? (.012)
Table 5 gives the ML estimates of the multilevel Constant, OpinionLeadership (X04) -.011
model in (28). Consistent with our predictions, the (.015)
Individual-Level
(a2) 3.751**
cross-level interaction between party cues and opinion
(.067)
leadership is positive and statistically significant at the
.05 level. It seems that the effect of opinion leadership is -2 x LogLikelihood 26578.970
moderated by party cues. Note:Tableentriesare maximumlikelihood(IGLS)estimateswithesti-
To obtain a better sense of the cue-dependence of matedstandarderrorsin parentheses.
+= p <.10, * = p <.05, **= p <.01
opinion leadership we make some comparisons. The
minimal value of party cues in the sample is -4.581 (on a
mean-centered scale), indicating an anti-EU party posi-
tion. For this position the expected effect of opinion leadership effects; such effects are at least partially pro-
leadership is -.068. Although small, this effect is opposite duced by cue-taking rather than an inherent tendency of
to the hypothesis that opinion leadership always en- opinion leaders to support the EU.
hances EU support. The maximum value of party cues in
the sample is 1.419 (again on a mean-centered scale). For
Discussion
this pro-EU party position the expected effect of opinion
leadership is .196. This is the expected positive effect, but In this application, we have shown the use of a three-level
its existence clearly depends on the nature of party cues. multilevel model for understanding public opinion to-
Thus, it appears that the argument that the effect of ward the EU. We asked three questions about this topic.
opinion leadership is uniformly positive is incorrect. The First, are the individual, party and national levels all rel-
multilevel statistical results clearly reveal considerable evant for EU support?The answer to this question is affir-
variation in the effect of opinion leadership across politi- mative. Second, can we account for the variation in EU
cal parties. This suggests a different rationale for opinion support at these levels?Here we found that our predictors
234 MARCO R. STEENBERGEN AND BRADFORD S. JONES

provide an imperfect explanation at best. Finally,is the ef- eses about cross-level interactions and variance compo-
fect of these predictors heterogeneous?The answer to this nents hinges on the availability of sizable numbers of
question was affirmativefor one of our predictors, opin- contextual units (see Kreft 1996; Kreft and De Leeuw
ion leadership,and resulted in an important modification 1998; Raudenbush 1998; Snijders and Bosker 1994,
of existing theory about the effect of this predictor. 1999). This is a steep requirement that is not always met
While this particular example is interesting because in political science data.27Multilevel models also place a
of the obvious multilevel character of EU opinion data, hefty premium on valid and reliable measurements. Bad
the lessons that this application teaches are much more measures in multilevel models "getworse"because such a
general. This application demonstrates all of the advan- heavy demand is placed on the data in terms of estimat-
tages of multilevel modeling that we discussed before. ing coefficients and variance components. In the absence
First, it demonstrates the ease with which causal hetero- of adequate measurement, it may be impossible to ex-
geneity is introduced in multilevel models. Our explora- ploit the benefits of multilevel analysis (see Bryk and
tion of the varying effect of opinion leadership across Raudenbush 1992).
political parties required only a few changes from the ba- Second, we should be equally aware that multilevel
sic model and the interpretation was as easy as interpret- models are theory intensive. The specification and inter-
ing any interaction term. pretation of multilevel models hinge on a theoretical un-
Second, our application shows the advantages of derstanding of the relevant levels of analysis (see Hox,
multilevel modeling in comparison to dummy variable Van Den Eeden, and Hauer 1990; Lazarsfeldand Menzel
models and interactive models. Instead of including 1969; Opdenakker and Van Damme 2000; Van Den
dummy variables at the party and national levels of Eeden and Huttner 1982) and of the processes at work at
analysis,we were able to include substantivelyinteresting each level of analysis and between (or among) levels of
predictors. Unlike interactive models, however, our mul- analysis. What complicates matters is that theory bridg-
tilevel models did not assume that these predictors ac- ing the gap between micro and macro levels is still rela-
count perfectly for cross-party and cross-national varia- tively scarce in political science. Microscopic and macro-
tion in EU support, which would have been incorrect. scopic explanations in political science, say of voting
Finally,this application shows the statistical benefits behavior, often have developed next to each other with
of multilevel models. Too often political scientists ignore few points of contact. Fortunately, this situation is
the multilevel characterof the data they frequently work changing, and we expect that cross-level theories will be-
with. As we have demonstrated here, this can have perni- come more common.
cious effects on the statistical inferences that are drawn Third, multilevel models increase the number of as-
from those data. Multilevel models offer a statistical tool sumptions that one has to make about the data. Not only
that can capture the data structure and thereby produce do we have to assume a distribution for the dependent
correct inferences. variable, we also have to assume distributions for one or
more of the parameters that link predictors to this vari-
able. When these assumptions are incorrect, this could
adverselyaffect statistical inference.
Conclusion Multilevel models, then, make heavy demands on
theory and on data. Thus, we caution researchersagainst
Researcherswho wish to analyze multilevel data face the "blindly"using these models in data analysis. Instead, we
task of selecting a methodology that addresses the chal- urge them to consider the full range of methods for han-
lenges such data pose and that allows exploitation of the dling clustered data that is now available.These methods
opportunities offered by those data. In this paper, we include replicated sampling techniques (Lee, Forthofer,
have discussed one such methodology-multilevel mod- and Lorimor 1989), sandwich estimation of the standard
eling. Widely applied in other social sciences, we think errors (Huber 1967), generalized estimating equations
multilevel analysis is a powerful tool that can greatlyben- (GEE;Liang and Zeger 1986; Zorn 2001), and multilevel
efit political science-if used appropriately.Appropriate modeling.
use is based on an awareness of the requirements and An important consideration in choosing between
limitations of multilevel analysis, and on a sense of when these methods is whether data clustering is merely a sta-
this modeling strategy can be used most beneficially.
First, researchers should be aware that multilevel 270f course, if an interaction or variance component is large it will
models are data intensive. A growing body of statistical probably be detected even when the number of contextual units is
literature suggests that sufficient power to test hypoth- small.
MODELING MULTILEVEL DATA STRUCTURES 235

tistical nuisance or if it is of substantive interest. If clus- Schnabel,and JiirgenBaumert.Mahwah,N.J.:Lawrence


ErlbaumAssociates.
tering is just a nuisance, our first choice would not be
multilevel modeling. Instead, we would use any of the De Leeuw,Jan,and ItaKreft.1986."RandomCoefficientMod-
els for MultilevelAnalysis."
Journalof EducationalStatistics
other methods that we described (or a combination 11:57-85.
thereof), in large part because they make fewer assump-
Dempster, Arthur P., Donald B. Rubin, and Robert K.
tions about the data. However, if clustering is of substan- Tsutakawa.1981."Estimationin CovarianceComponents
tive interest-if the dependencies between observations Models."Journalof the AmericanStatisticalAssociation
reveal a theoretically interesting aspect of reality-then 76:341-353.
multilevel is an ideal statistical tool. Dielman,TerryE. 1989.PooledCross-Sectional and TimeSeries
DataAnalysis.NewYork:MarcelDekker.
ManuscriptsubmittedSeptember18, 2000. Effron,Bradley,and CarlMorris.1975."DataAnalysisUsing
Stein'sEstimatorand Its Generalizations." Journalof the
Final manuscriptreceivedJuly 1, 2001.
AmericanStatistical Association70:311-319.
Eichenberg, Richard,andRussellDalton.1993."Europeans and
the EuropeanCommunity:The Dynamicsof PublicSup-
References port for EuropeanIntegration." InternationalOrganization,
47:507-534.
Fienberg,StephenE. 1980.TheAnalysisof Cross-Classified Cat-
Achen, ChristopherH., and W. Philips Shively.1995. Cross-
LevelInference. egoricalData.Cambridge: MITPress.
Chicago:TheUniversityof ChicagoPress.
Franklin,MarkN., MichaelMarsh,andLaurenMcLaren.1994.
Barcikowski,RobertS. 1981. "StatisticalPowerwith Group "TheEuropeanQuestion:Oppositionto Unificationin the
Meanas the Unit of Analysis." Journalof Educational Statis- Wakeof Maastricht."Journalof CommonMarketStudies
tics6:267-285. 32:455-472.
Barnett,Vic. 1991.SampleSurveyPrinciplesandMethods.New
York:OxfordUniversityPress. Franklin,MarkN., MichaelMarsh,and ChristopherWlezien.
1994."AttitudestowardEuropeand ReferendumVotes:A
Bartels,Larry.1996."PoolingDisparateObservations." Ameri- Responseto Siuneand Svensson." ElectoralStudies13:117-
canJournalof PoliticalScience40:905-942. 121.
Beck,Nathaniel,andJonathanN. Katz.1995."Whatto Do (and Franklin,MarkN., MichaelMarsh,and Cees Van Der Eijk.
Not to Do) with Time-SeriesCross-SectionData."American 1995."ReferendumOutcomesand Trustin Government:
PoliticalScienceReview89:634-647. PublicSupportforEuropein theWakeof Maastricht." West-
Boyd, L.H., Jr.,and Gudmund R. Iversen.1979. Contextual ernEuropeanPolitics18:101-107.
Analysis:Conceptsand StatisticalTechniques. Belmont,CA: Friedrich,RobertJ. 1982."InDefenseof MultiplicativeTerms
Wadsworth. in MultipleRegressionEquations." AmericanJournalof Po-
Browne,WilliamJ.,andDavidDraper.2000."AComparisonof liticalScience26: 797-833.
Bayesianand LikelihoodMethods for Fitting Multilevel Gabel,Matthew.1998."PublicSupportfor EuropeanIntegra-
Models."UnpublishedManuscript. tion:An EmpiricalTestof FiveTheories."Journalof Politics
Browne,WilliamJ.,DavidDraper,HarveyGoldstein,and Jon 60:333-354.
Rasbash.2000."Bayesianand LikelihoodMethodsfor Fit-
Geddes,Barbara.1990."Howthe CasesYouChooseAffectthe
ting MultilevelModelswith ComplexLevel-1Variation." AnswersYouGet:SelectionBias in ComparativePolitics."
UnpublishedManuscript. PoliticalAnalysis2:131-150.
Bryk,AnthonyS., and StephenW. Raudenbush.1992.Hierar- Gibbons,RobertD., and Don Hedeker.1997."Random-Effects
chicalLinearModels:Applicationsand DataAnalysisMeth-
ods.NewburyPark,CA:SagePublications. Probit and Logistic RegressionModels for Three-Level
Data."Biometrics53:1527-1537.
Burton,Paul,LyleGurrin,and PeterSly.1998."Extendingthe
SimpleLinearRegressionModelto Accountfor Correlated Goldstein, Harvey. 1986. "MultilevelMixed LinearModel
Responses:An Introduction to GeneralizedEstimating AnalysisUsing IterativeGeneralizedLeastSquares."Bio-
metrika74:43-56.
Equationsand Multi-LevelMixedModelling."Statisticsin
Medicine17:1261-1291. Goldstein,Harvey.1991."NonlinearMultilevelModels,with
Caldeira,GregoryA., and JamesL. Gibson.1995."Thelegiti- an Application to Discrete Response Data."Biometrika
78:45-51.
macyof the Courtof Justicein the EuropeanUnion:Mod-
els of InstitutionalSupport."AmericanPoliticalScienceRe- Goldstein,Harvey.1995.MultilevelStatisticalModels.London:
view89(2):356-76. EdwardArnold.
Charnock,David.1997."ClassandVotingin the 1996Austra- Hedeker,Don, and RobertD Gibbons.1994."ARandom-Ef-
lian FederalElection."ElectoralStudies16(3):281-300. fects OrdinalRegressionModel for MultilevelAnalysis."
Chou,Chih-Ping,PeterM. Bentler,andMaryAnn Pentz.2000. Biometrics 50:933-944.
"ATwo-StageApproachto MultilevelStructuralEquation Hofmann, David A., and Mark B. Gavin. 1998. "Centering
Models:Applicationsto LongitudinalData."In Modeling Decisionsin HierarchicalLinearModels:Implicationsfor
Longitudinaland MultilevelData:PracticalIssues,Applied Researchin Organizations." JournalofManagement 24:623-
Approaches and SpecificExamples,ed. ToddD. Little,KaiU. 641.
236 MARCO R. STEENBERGEN AND BRADFORD S. JONES

Hox, Joop, Pieter Van Den Eeden, and Joost Hauer. 1990. "Pre- Lau, Richard R. 1989. "Individual and Contextual Influences
liminaryNotes."In TheoryandModelin MultilevelResearch: on Group Identification." Social Psychology Quarterly
Convergenceor Divergence?ed. Pieter Van Den Eeden, Joop 52:220-231.
Hox and Joost Hauer.Amsterdam: SISWO. Lazarsfeld,Paul E, and Herbert Menzel. 1969. "On the Relation
Huber, Paul J. 1967. "The Behaviour of Maximum Likelihood Between Individual and Collective Properties."In A Socio-
Estimates Under Non-Standard Conditions." Proceedingsof logicalReaderon ComplexOrganizations,
ed.AmitaiEtzioni.
onMathematical
theFifthBerkeleySymposium Statisticsand New York:Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Probability1:221-233. Lee, Eun Sul, Ronald N. Forthofer, and Ronald J. Lorimor.
Huckfeldt, Robert and John Sprague. 1987. "Networks in Con- 1989. Analyzing Complex Survey Data. Newbury Park, CA:
text: The Social Flow of Political Information." American Sage.
PoliticalScienceReview81:1197-1216.
Li, Fuzhong, Terry E. Duncan, Peter Harmer,Alan Acock, and
Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. 1993. "Citizens, Con- Mike Stoolmiller. 1998. "AnalyzingMeasurement Models of
texts,and Politics."In PoliticalScience:TheStateof theDis- Latent Variables through Multilevel Confirmatory Factor
cipline II, ed. Ada Finifter.Washington, D.C.: American Po- Analysis and Hierarchical Linear Modeling Approaches."
litical Science Association. Structural
EquationModeling5:294-306.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1970. "Cognitive Mobilization and Euro- Liang, Kung-Yee,and Scott L. Zeger 1986. "Longitudinal Data
pean Identity."CompartativePolitics3:45-70. Analysis Using Generalized Linear Models." Biometrika
ChangingValues
Inglehart,Ronald.1977.TheSilentRevolution: 73:13-22.
and Political Styles among WesternPublics. Princeton: Lindley, Dennis V., and A.F.M. Smith. 1972. "Bayes Estimates
Princeton University Press. for the LinearModel (with Discussion)."Journalof the Royal
Inglehart, Ronald, Jacques-Rene Rabier, and Karlheinz Reif. StatisticalSociety,SeriesB 34:1-41.
1991. "The Evolution of Public Attitudes toward European
Lijphart, Arend. 1971. "Comparative Politics and the Com-
Integration: 1970-86." In Eurobarometer:The Dynamics of parativeMethod."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview65:682-
European Public Opinion, ed. Karlheinz Reif and'Ronald 693.
Inglehart. London: Macmillan.
Longford, Nicholas T. 1987. "A Fast Scoring Algorithm for
Iversen,Gudmund R. 1991. ContextualAnalysis.Newbury Park, Maximum Likelihood Estimation in Unbalanced Mixed
CA: Sage. Models with Nested Random Effects." Biometrika 74:
Jackson,John E. 1992. "Estimationof Models with VariableCo- 817-827.
efficients."PoliticalAnalysis3:27-49.
Longford, Nicholas T. 1993. Random Coefficient Models. Ox-
Janssen,Joseph I. H. 1991. "Postmaterialism,Cognitive Mobili- ford: Clarendon Press.
zation, and Public Support for European Integration."Brit-
MacKuen,Michael, and Courtney Brown. 1987. "PoliticalCon-
ishJournalof PoliticalScience21:443-468.
text and Attitude Change."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview
Jones, Kelvin, Ronald John Johnston, and Charles J. Pattie. 91:471-490.
1992. "People, Places and Regions: Exploring the Use of
Multi-Level Modelling in the Analysis of Electoral Data." Mason, William M., George Y. Wong, and Barbara Entwisle.
1983. "Contextual Analysis Through the Multilevel Linear
BritishJournalof PoliticalScience22:343-380.
Model."Sociological 1983-1984:72-103.
Methodology
Joreskog, Karl G. 1971. "Simultaneous Factor Analysis in Sev-
eral Populations."Psychometrika36:409-426. McDonald, Roderick P. 1994. "The Bilevel Reticular Action
Model for Path Analysis with Latent Variables."Sociological
Kackar,Raghu, and David A. Harville. 1981. "Unbiasedness of Methods& Research
22:399-413.
Two-Stage Estimation and Prediction Procedures for Mixed
in Statistics-Theoryand
LinearModels."Communications Meijer, Erik, Rien Van Der Leeden, and Frank M.T.A. Busing.
Methods 10:1249-1261. 1995. "Implementing the Bootstrap for Multilevel Models."
MultilevelModellingNewsleter7:7-11.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. De-
Morris, Carl. 1983. "Parametric Empirical Bayes Inference:
signingSocialInquiry:ScientificInferencein QualitativeRe-
search.Princeton: Princeton University Press. Theory and Applications."Journalof the AmericanStatistical
Association78:47-65.
Kreft,Ita G.G. 1996. "AreMultilevel Techniques Necessary?An
Overview, Including Simulation Studies."Multilevel Models Muthen, Bengt 0. 1989. "LatentVariableModeling in Hetero-
Project at the Institute of Education, University of London. geneous Populations."Psychometrika54:557-585.
Kreft,Ita G.G., and Jan De Leeuw. 1998. IntroducingMultilevel Muthen, Bengt 0. 1991. "Multilevel Factor Analysis of Class
Modeling.London: Sage. and Student Achievement Components." Journal of Educa-
tionalMeasurement
28:338-354.
Kreft, Ita G.G., Jan De Leeuw, and Leona S. Aiken. 1995. "The
Effect of Different Forms of Centering in Hierarchical Lin- Muthen, Bengt 0. 1994. "Multilevel Covariance Structure
BehavioralResearch
earModels."Multivariate 30:1-21. Analysis."SociologicalMethods & Research22:376-398.
Kreft,Ita G.G., Jan De Leeuw, and Rien Van Der Leeden. 1994. Opdenakker,Marie-Christine,and JanVan Damme. 2000. "The
"Review of Five Multilevel Analysis Programs: BMDP-5V, Importance of Identifying Levels in Multilevel Analysis:An
GENMOD, HLM, ML3, and VARCL."TheAmericanStatisti- Illustration of the Effects of Ignoring the Top or Intermedi-
cian 48:324-335. ate Levelsin School EffectivenessResearch."SchoolEffective-
Kuk,Anthony Y.C. 1995. "AsymptoticallyUnbiased Estimation
11:103-130.
nessandSchoolImprovement
in Generalized Linear Models With Random Effects."Jour- Przeworski,Adam, and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic of Com-
nal of theRoyalStatisticalSociety,SeriesB 57:395-407. parativeSocialInquiry.NewYork:Wiley-Interscience.
MODELING MULTILEVEL DATA STRUCTURES 237

Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Sorbom, Dag. 1974. "A General Method for Studying Differ-
Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immi- ences in Factor Means and Factor Structure between
grant and Racial Prejudice in Europe."AmericanSociological Groups."BritishJournalof Mathematical and StatisticalPsy-
Review 60: 586-611. chology27: 229-239.
Rasbash, Jon, William Browne, Harvey Goldstein, Min Yang, Steenbergen, Marco R., Whitt Killburn, and JennyWolak. 2001.
Ian Plewis, Michael Healy, GeoffWoodhouse, David Draper, "AffectiveModerators of On-Line and Memory-Based Pro-
Ian Langford, and Toby Lewis. 2000. "A User's Guide to cessing in Candidate Evaluation."Presented at the annual
MLwiN."London:Multilevel Models Project at the Institute meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,.
of Education, University of London. Stimson, JamesA. 1985. "Regressionin Space and Time: A Sta-
Raudenbush, Stephen W. 1988. "Educational Applications of tistical Essay." American Journal of Political Science 29:
Hierarchical Linear Models: A Review."Journal of Educa- 914-947.
tional Statistics 13:85-116. Swallow, William H., and John F. Monahan. 1984. "Monte
Ray, Leonard. 1999. "Measuring Party Orientations towards Carlo Comparisons of ANOVA, MINQUE, REML,and ML
European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey."Eu- Estimators of Variance Components." Technometrics 26:
ropeanJournalof Political Research36:283-306. 47-57.
Richardson, A.M., and Alan H. Welsh. 1994. "AsymptoticProp- Swamy,P.A.V.B.1970. "EfficientInference in a Random Coeffi-
erties of Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) Esti- cient Regression Model."Econometrica38:311-323.
mates for Hierarchical Linear Models."AustralianJournalof Swamy, P.A.V.B.,and George S. Tavlas. 1995. "Random Coeffi-
Statistics36: 31-43. cient Models: Theory and Applications." Journal of Eco-
Rokkan, Stein. 1966. "Comparative Cross-National Research: nomic Surveys9:165-196.
The Context of Current Efforts."In ComparingNations: The Thum, Yeow Meng. 1997. "HierarchicalLinearModels for Mul-
Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-NationalResearch,ed. Ri- tivariate Outcomes." Journal of Educational and Behavioral
chard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan. New Haven: Yale Uni- Statistics22:77-108.
versity Press. Van Den Eeden, Pieter. 1988. "A Two-Step Procedure for
Rubin, Donald B. 1981. "Estimation in Parallel Randomized Analysing Multi-Level Structured Data."In SociometricRe-
Experiments." Journal of Educational Statistics 6(4): 377- search2: Data Analysis,ed. Willem E. Saris and Irmtraud N.
400. Gallhofer.New York:St. Martin's Press.
Sayrs,Lois W. 1989. Pooled Time SeriesAnalysis.Newbury Park, Van Den Eeden, Pieter, and Harry J.M. Huttner. 1982. "Multi-
CA: Sage. level Research."CurrentSociology20:1-178.
Searle, Shayle R., George Casella, and Charles E. McCullogh. Western, Bruce. 1998. "Causal Heterogeneity in Comparative
1992. VarianceComponents.New York:John Wiley & Sons. Research: A Bayesian Hierarchical Modeling Approach."
Seltzer, Michael H., Wing Hung Wong, and Anthony S. Bryk. AmericanJournalof Political Science42:1233-1259.
1996. "Bayesian Analysis in Applications of Hierarchical Winer, Benjamin J. 1971. Statistical Principles in Experimental
Models: Issues and Methods." Journal of Educational and Design. New York:McGraw-Hill.
BehavioralStatistics21:131-167. Zaller, John R. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.
Siune, Karen, and Palle Svensson. 1993. "The Danes and the Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Maastricht Treaty: The Danish EC Referendum of June
Zeger, Scott L., and Rezaul Karim. 1991. "Generalized Linear
1992."ElectoralStudies 12:99-111. Models with Random Effects:A Gibbs Sampling Approach."
Snijders, Tom A.B., and Roel J. Bosker. 1994. "StandardErrors Journalof the American StatisticalAssociation86:79-95.
and Sampling Sizes for Two-LevelResearch."Journalof Edu- Zorn, Christopher J.W. 2001. "Generalized Equation Models
cational Statistics 18:237-261. for Correlated Data: A Review with Applications."American
Snijders, Tom A.B., and Roel J. Bosker. 1999. Multilevel Analy- Journalof Political Science45:470-90.
sis:An Introductionto Basic and AdvancedMultilevelModel-
ing. London: Sage.

You might also like

pFad - Phonifier reborn

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


Alternative Proxies:

Alternative Proxy

pFad Proxy

pFad v3 Proxy

pFad v4 Proxy