M-136

4th MANIPAL RANKA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2018

BEFORE THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

WRIT PETITION NO: WP(C) 27/ 2018

IN THE MATTER OF

SANAYA BEGUM.................................................................................PETITIONER

v.

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS................................................................RESPONDENT

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

UNDER

ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

MEMORIAL SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

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TABLE OF CONTENT

1. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................................4
2. LIST OF ABBREVIATION....................................................................................................................8
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION........................................................................................................9
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS.....................................................................................................................10
5. ISSUES RAISED.....................................................................................................................................12
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................................13
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED...................................................................................................................15
1. THAT THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER UNDER ARTICLE 32 IS NOT
MAINTAINABLE.....................................................................................................................................15
1) THAT THE PETITON IS NOT MAINTAINABLE AS THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF
FUNDAMNETAL RIGHTS......................................................................................................................15
2) THAT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 IS NOT MAINTAINABLE WHEN THERE IS A
CLAIM FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLE......................................................17
2. THAT THE TALAQ UNDER SECTION 2 OF SHARIAT ACT IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL..........................................................................................................................19
1) THAT THE TALAQ GIVEN BY THE HUSBAND WAS VALID RESULTING IN THE
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE............................................................................................................19
2) THAT THE PRACTICE OF TALAQ IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14, 15 AND 21 OF
THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION............................................................................................................21
3. THAT THE UNIFORM CIVIL CODE CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED..........................................26
1) THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFORM CIVIL CODE VIOLATES THE RIGHT UNDER
ARTICLE 25, 26 AND 29.......................................................................................................... 26
2) THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF UCC WILL VIOLATE SECULARISM GUARANTEED
UNDER INDIAN CONSTITUTION....................................................................................................28
3) THAT THE DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES ARE DISCRETIONARY AND CANNOT OVERRIDE
FUNDAMETAL RIGHTS.....................................................................................................................29

4) THAT COURT CANNOT INTERFERE IN POLICY MATTERS..................................................30

5) THAT UNIFORM CIVIL CODE WILL BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE........................................30
4. THAT THE FIFTH MARRIAGE THAT TOOK PLACE BETWEEN RIZWAN AHMED AND
AFREEN REHMAN IS NOT VOID......................................................................................................32
1) THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RIZWAN AHMED AND SANAYA BEGUM WAS
DISSOLVED AS SOON AS TALAQ WAS DECLARED.................................................................32
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2) THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO RAPE AND KIDNAP AND HE CANNOT BE PROSECUTED
FOR THE SAME.....................................................................................................................................33
5. THAT THE PRACTICE OF BIGAMY IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.........................................36
1) THAT THIS PRACTICE IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 AND ARTICLE
15..................................................................................................................................36
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
ARTICLES:

1. MOHAMMAD SHABBIR, MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW, UNIFORM CIVIL CODE AND JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM, 65 (1997).
2. SALEEM AKHTAR AND AHMAD NASEEM, PERSONAL LAWS AND UNIFORM CIVIL CODE, 104
(1998).

BOOKS:

1. 1, 2, 3 and 6 D.D BASU, COMMENTARIES ON THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION (LEXIS

NEXIS 2008).
2. 1, DR. V.N. TRIPATHI, THE CONSTITUION OF INDIA (PREMIER PUBLISHING
COMPANY 2016).
3. 1, HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND (BUTTERWORTHS 1973).
4. AQIL AHMAD, MOHAMMEDAN LAW (CENTRAL LAW AGENCY 2006).
5. ASAF .A.A FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MOHAMADDEN LAW (OXFORD UNIVERSITY
FORUM 2008).
6. B.R VERMA, COMMENTARIES ON MOHAMMEDAN LAW [LAW PUBLISHERS
(INDIA) PVT. LTD 2005].
7. BHATTACHARJEE, MUSLIM LAWAND THE CONSTITUTION (EASTERN LAW HOUSE
2016).
8. DR. R.K SINHA, MUSLIM LAW (CENTRAL LAW AGENCY 2006).
9. M.P JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (LEXIS NEXIS 2016).
10. MAULANA MUHAMMAD ALI, THE RELIGION OF ISLAM (BOOK CRAFTERS,
MICHIGA, U.S.A, 1990).
11. MULLA, MULLA PRINCIPLES OF MOHAMMEDDAN LAW ( 2014).
12. PARAS DIWAN, MUSLIM LAW IN MODERN INDIA (ALLAHABAD LAW
AGENCY, 1997).
13. RAKESH KUMAR SINGH, MUSLIM LAW (UNIVERSAL LAW PUBLICATION 2011).
14. S.R MYNENI, MUSLIM LAW (ASIA LAW HOUSE 2009).
15. SUBHASH C KASHYAP, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (UNIVERSAL LAW
PUBLICATIONS LEXIS NEXIS).
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16. TAHIR MAHMOOD, THE MUSLIM LAWOF INDIA (LEXIS NEXIS BUTTERWORTHS
2002).
17. V.N SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (EASTERN BOOK COMPANY 2017).
18. YAWER QAZALBASH, PRINCIPLES OF MUSLIM LAW (MODERN LAW HOUSE 2005).

CASES:

1. Ahmedabad St. Xavier college society and others v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389.
2. Amiruddin v. Khatun Bibi, AIR 1917 All 371.
3. Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India,(2008) 6 SCC 1.

4. Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2002 SC 1533, (2002) 4 SCC 34.
5. Asmar v. Khatunnisa, 1939 All 592.
6. B. Krishna Bhat v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 65.
7. Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors v. State of Kerala & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 748.
8. Bishamber Dayal v. State of U.P.,AIR 1982 SC 33.
9. Bishan Das v. State of Punjab,(1962) 2 SCR 69 (78).
10. Bishan v. Govt of Punjab, AIR 1993 SC 972.
11. Budhon v. State of Bihar,AIR 1955 SC 194.
12. Charanjit Kaur v. Union of India,AIR 1994 SC 1491.
13. Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India,AIR 1951 SC 41.
14. Chitra v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 35.
15. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha
Swamiar of Shri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
16. Dhanyalakshmi Rice Mills v. Commissioner of Civil Supplies, AIR 1976 SC 2243.
17. Dharam Dutt v. Union of India,AIR 2004 SC 1295.
18. Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui Etc, Mohd. v. Union Of India And Others, AIR 1995 SC 605.
19. Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI,(2005) 2 SCC 317.
20. Fazi v. Ali Mohammad Pando, 1975 Cr.LJ.1228 at p.1229.
21. Fertilizers Ltd v. KSEB, AIR 1988 SC 1989
22. Gopal das v. Union of India,AIR 1955 SC 1.
23. Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh,AIR 1981 SC 2198.
24. H.H. Srimad Perarulala Ethiraja Ramanuja Jeeyar Swami v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR
1972 SC 1586
25. Ibrahim v. syed bibi,I.L.R. 12 Mad 63: ILR 36 All.453.
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26. Jamshedji v. Soonabhai, ILR (1909) 83 Bom 122.

27. Kailash Nath v. State of U.P.,AIR 1957 SC 790 (792).
28. Kavalappara v. State of Madras and Ors.,AIR 1959 SC 725, Page 734.
29. Kedarnath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal,AIR 1953 SC 404.
30. Kochunni v. State of Madras,AIR 1959 SC 725.
31. Krishna singh v. Mathura Ahir, (1981) 3 SCC 689.
32. Maharishi Avdhesh v. Union of India,1991 (1) SCR 480.
33. Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors v. Union Of India & Ors, AIR 1980 SC 1789.
34. Mohammad Ali v. Fareedunnisa Begum, AIR (1970) A.P.298.
35. Mohd.shamsuddin v. Noor jahan, AIR 1955 Hyd 144.
36. Moti Das v. Sahi,AIR 1959 SC 942.
37. Nilabati Behara v. State of Orissa, AIR 1979 SC 765.
38. Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of A.P., (1996) 2 SCC 498
39. Pogakula Lekshmi Reddy v. Principal Secretary to the Government of A.P.,AIR 1997 AP
6.
40. Premium Granites v. State of T.N., (1994) 1 SCR
579. 41. Rajasaheb,In re, 1920 (44)Bom.44,54,I.C 573.
42. Rashid Ahmed v. Mst. Anisa, AIR 1932 PC 25.
43. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay,AIR 1954 SC 388.
44. S.R. Bommai, State of Karnataka v. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia,AIR 2004 SC 2081.
45. Saifuddin v. State of Bombay,AIR 1962 SC 853.
46. Saleha bi v. Sheikh Gulla, AIR 1973 MP 207.
47. Sarabai v. Rabiabai, (1905) 30 Bom 537.
48. Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay,AIR 1962 SC 853.
49. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635.
50. Sarup Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1959 SC 860.
51. Savita v. Union of India,(1993) 2 SCC 357.
52. Shayara Bano and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2017 SC 4609.
53. Sheikh Fazlur Rahman v. Mst Aisha (1929) 8 Pat 690.
54. Shrikishan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1995 SC 795
55. Sr. Bommai, State of Karnataka v. Rd. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, AIR 2004 SC 2081.
56. Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi v. State of U.P.,(1997) 4
SCC 606.
57. Srinivasa Aiyar v. Saraswati, AIR 1952 Mad 193.
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58. Sumedha Nagpal v. State of Delhi and Ors (2009) SCC 745.
59. Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay,1962 Supp (2) SCR 496.
60. Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. AIR 1970 SC 21.
61. Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, 2004 4 SCC 62.
62. Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608.
63. A.K.Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
64. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.

CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES:

1. 2, CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA, (1947).
2. 7, CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA, CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES (1947).

ONLINE RESOURCES:

1. CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/culture (last

visited July 26, 2018).

STATUTES:

1. Constitution of India, 1949.

2. Shariat Act, 1937.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATION

& And
A.P Andhra Pradesh
AIR All India Reporter
All Allahabad
Anr. Another
ATC Administrative Tribunal Cases
Bom. Bombay
CBI Central Bureau of Investigation
Cl. Clause
Co. Company
Cr.L.J Criminal Law Journal
Dr. Doctor
Ed. Edition
Etc. Et cetera
Hyd. Hyderabad
i.e That Is
I.L.R Indian Law Journal
Ibid Ibidem
IC Indian Cases
Id Same as above but at a different page
J. Justice
KSEB Karnataka State Electricity Board
Ltd Limited
M.P Madhya Pradesh
Mad Madras
Ors. Others
p. Page
Pat Patna
PC Privy Council
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Report
St. Saint
Supp Suppliers
T.N Tamil Nadu
U.P Uttar Pradesh
U.S United States
UCC Uniform Civil Code
v. Versus
W.B West Bengal
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner has approached the Honourable Supreme Court of India under Article 32 1of
the Indian Constitution of India, and the Respondents Humbly Submit to the same.

1
Remedies under Article 32 of the constitution of India.
1) “The right to move to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of the rights
conferred by this part is guaranteed.
2) The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs in the nature of Habeaus
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, which ever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this part.
3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (1) and (2), Parliament may by
law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under Cl. (2).
4) The right guaranteed by provided by this article.” this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise.”
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Chandramukhi, a Hindu girl of 20 years and Rizwan Ahmed, a muslim boy of 24 years
fell in love when both were students in the same college. Chandramukhi expressed her
desire to get married according to Hindu customs but Rizwan insisted her to convert to
Islam and to have Nikah as per Shariat. Chandramukhi converted to Islam and was
renamed Sanaya Begum. The Nikah was performed in the year 2010 as per Muslim
customs. They had one son Mohammed Irfan and a daughter Shayara Bano.
2. In 2013, in spite of objection raised by Sanaya Begum, Rizwan had a second marriage
with a 20 years old Umaira Naaz. Rizwan then had a third marriage with Gulshan
Parveen in 2016. He married a fourth wife Ishrat Jahan in January, 2018 despite being
objected from Sanaya Begum, he claimed that he was allowed by Islamic law to have 4
wives at a time.
3. Because of this the relations between Sanaya and Rizwan became strained. Sanaya left
her husband’s house and started residing at her parent’s house. He opened her
apartment and sent her clothes to her parental house. He then discontinued maintaining
his first wife and children.
4. On 10 February, 2018 Rizwan Ahmed in presence of two witnesses declared
“Talaq,Talaq,Talaq” and hence divorced his wife Sanaya Begum. The message was
conveyed on mobile of Sanaya Begum. A Deed of Divorce was executed on
10.02.2018 and it was sent to Sanaya through speed-post along with a demand draft of
Rs 51,000/- comprising payment of dower and expenses of waiting period. Rizwan
after divorce through “Triple Talaq” got attracted to a club dancer Afreen Rehman. He
kidnapped her, took her to a posh hotel and raped her. On persuasion, he had Nikah
with her in a simple ceremony on 01.03.2018 .
5. The petitioner, Sanaya Begum approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 for a
declaration that ‘talaq-e-biddat’ pronounced by her husband be declared void ab-initio
and talaq under section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act be
declared unconstitutional.
6. The petitioner also submitted that divorce of instant nature cannot be treated as “rule of
decision” and is violative of Articles 14,15 and 21 of the Constitution. That ‘Talaq-e-
biddat’ cannot be protected under Articles 25(1), 26(b) and 29 of the Constitution has
been submitted by the petitioner. The petitioner has also sought that Uniform Civil
Code be directed to be enacted within 5 years. She also claimed that the fifth marriage
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with Afreen is illegal and Rizwan be prosecuted for committing rape and kidnapping.
She also contended that bigamy needs to be declared violative of Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution.
7. Respondent Rizwan Ahmed has admitted factum of marriage and birth of children. He
claimed that the petitioner left the matrimonial house on her own accord.
Pronouncement of ‘talaq’ was in consonance with prevalent and valid mode of
dissolution of Muslim marriage according to Shariat. Rizwan married Afreen with her
consent and therefore the question of rape does not arise. Respondent denied the
charge of kidnapping and rape. Respondent also submitted that the petition under
Article 32 is not maintainable.
8. The petitioner will be heard before a 5 Judge Bench on 29th September, 2018.
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ISSUES RAISED

1. That this petition filed under Article 32 of the Indian constitution is not maintainable.
I. That the petition filed under Article 32 is not maintainable as there has been no
violation of fundamental rights.
II. That the petition under Article 32 is not maintainable when there is a claim for
implementation of Uniform civil code.
2. That Talaq under section 2 of Shariat Act is not unconstitutional.
I. That the Talaq given by husband was not void-ab-initio.
II. That the practice of Talaq does not violate Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Indian
constitution.
3. That Uniform civil code cannot be implemented.
I. That implementation of Uniform civil code violates the rights under Article 25, 26
and 29.
II. That implementation of Uniform civil code violates secularism guaranteed under
Indian constitution.
III. That the Directive Principles are discretionary and cannot override fundamental
rights.
IV. That court cannot interfere in policy matters.
V. That Uniform civil code will be counter Productive.
4. That the fifth marriage that took place between Rizwan Ahmed and Afreen Rehman is not
Void.
I. That the marriage between Rizwan and Sanaya was dissolved as soon as Talaq was
declared.
II. That there has been no rape and kidnap and he cannot be prosecuted for the same and
thus the prosecution and punishment for rape and kidnap does not come under the
jurisdiction of Article 32.
5. That the practice of Bigamy is not unconstitutional.
I. That the practice of Bigamy is not violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Indian
constitution.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. THAT THIS PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION IS

NOT MAINTAINABLE.
The counsel on behalf of respondent submits that this petition filed by the petitioner is
not maintainable because there has been no violation of fundamental of rights which is
the primary requirement for the petition to be maintainable under Article 32 of the Indian
constitution.
2. THAT TALAQ UNDER SECTION 2 OF SHARIAT ACT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The counsel on behalf of the respondent submits that this practice of Talaq being based
on rational classification does not discriminate between individuals and thus would not
violate any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under part III of the constitution. This
being a religious practice which is done in pursuance of religion is protected under
article 25, 26 and 29 of the constitution and therefore constitutional.
3. THAT UNIFORM CIVIL CODE CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED
Article 25 and Article 26 protects acts done in pursuance of religion therefore
implementation of uniform civil code will violate the rights guaranteed under this article
because implementation of UCC curbs the individual’s rights to practice their religion and
thereby implementing this would violate the principle of secularism guaranteed under the
Indian constitution.
4. THAT THE FIFTH MARRIAGE THAT TOOK PLACE BETWEEN RIZWAN AHMED AND
AFREEN REHMAN IS NOT VOID
The marriage which took place during the period of Iddat undergoing by any of his
previous wives would not invalidate the marriage because under Muslim law such
marriage is considered as irregular which can be regularised by remedying the prohibition
which is leading to unlawfulness in the marriage. Therefore the counsel would like to
submit that the marriage between Rizwan and Afreen is absolutely valid marriage and the
petitioner’s allegation of Rape and Kidnap cannot be considered under Article 32 of the
constitution because this court can decide on question where the facts have been proved
but as in this case the facts not having been proved or admitted to committed cannot be
considered by the court.
5. THAT THE PRACTICE OF BIGAMY IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
This practice of bigamy which is a recognised practice under Muslim law will not violate
article 14 or 21 because equality before law does not mean equality under all
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circumstances and where by this principle being based on unequal terms i.e reasonable
classification cannot be considered as discriminatory leading to violation of fundamental
rights. Therefore the counsel would like to submit that this being a practice recognised
under personal law protected under article 25, 26 of the Indian constitution cannot be
dwelled into by the court in determining its constitutionality. Therefore this practice of
bigamy recognised and permitted by personal law is not unconstitutional.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. THAT THIS PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION IS

NOT MAINTAINABLE.
1.1. The counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent humbly submits that the petition filed
by the petitioner under article 32 of the Indian constitution is not maintainable because
there has been no violation of fundamental rights and the petitioner’s claim that the
practice of Talaq-e-biddat results in violation of fundamental rights is not valid at all
because this practice falls under personal laws which are protected under article 25, 26
and 29 of the Indian constitution. And the petition filed under article 32 of the Indian
constitution is not Justiciable because the questions asked and claims put forth by the
petitioner are not maintainable under Article 32 of the Indian constitution.
1.2. Article 32 of the Indian constitution : Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by
this Part
1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part.
3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2
), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of
its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (
2 ).
4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided
for by this Constitution.2
I. THAT THE PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 IS NOT MAINTAINBALE AS THERE
HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMNETAL RIGHTS.
The counsel on behalf of respondent humbly submits that the practice of Talaq-e-biddat
does not violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14, 15 and 21 of the
Indian constitution.

2
Indian constitution of India,Article 32, 1949.
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1.3. Article 14 states: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.3”
The counsel on behalf of the respondent submits that, the practice of a unilateral divorce
at the instance of husband which is unique only to Muslim religion is not violative of
Article 14 of the Indian constitution because the enactment of different personal laws in
respect of different communities such as the Hindus and the Mahomeddans does not
result in violation of Article 14, as the customs and usages of different communities are
different4 and thus by comparing the practices of one religion with the practices of other
religion will not result in violation of the principle of equality guaranteed under Article
14 of the Indian Constitution. In the same way permitting Muslims to marry four wives
and prohibiting Hindus from having more than one wife is not violative of Article 14, 5
because the institution of Marriage is differently looked upon by the Hindus and the
Muslims. Whereas to the former, it is a sacrament, to the latter it is a matter of contract.
That is also the reason why the question of the dissolution of marriage is differently
tackled by the two religions. While the Muslim law admits of easy divorce, Hindu
marriage is considered indissoluble and it is only recent that the State passed legislation
has permitted divorce among Hindus.6 Therefore Muslim Religion has its own practices
and the same cannot be compared with that of other religions. Thus this practice of
having unilateral divorce peculiar only to individuals following Muslim law is not at all
violative of Article 14 of the Indian constitution. Hence the petitioner has no right to
complain under article 32 of the Indian constitution as no fundamental right has been
infringed.7
1.4. Article 15 states: “Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex
or place of birth
(1)The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.8”
The counsel on behalf of the respondent submits that the practice of Talaq-e-biddat as
prescribed by Muslim personal law is not violative of fundamental right guaranteed
under Article 15 of the Indian constitution because, In Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir,
3
Indian constitution, Article 14,1949.
4
State of Bombay v. Narasu, 1952 Bom 84.
5
Ibid.
6
Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG) and Ors. vs. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 3614.
7
Zahir v. Union of india, (1993) 23 ATC 812.
8
Indian constitution, Article 15,1949.
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the Supreme Court had given the view that personal laws are immune from being
challenged under fundamental rights, because they do not touch upon these laws and that
personal laws fall outside the scope of fundamental rights. 9 And as the petitioner has
contended that this practice is violative of both on basis of religion as well as sex, it
cannot result in violation of article 15 because this article does not hit on discrimination
where there is more than one ground present. 10 Therefore the petitioner’s contention that
this practice discriminates on the basis of sex resulting in violation of Article 15 has no
stance and the same cannot be considered in the petition filed under Article 32 of the
Indian constitution as no fundamental right has been violated.
1.5. Article 21 states: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law”. The women are placed on same pedestals
under all three forms of divorce hence the petitioner’s claim of Talaq-e-biddat alone
being violative of fundamental rights is not approving because this form of Talaq is
recognized under Hanafi school of law and the practice of the same by the respondent
belonging to Hanafi sect of Sunni Muslims does not result in deprivation of anyone’s
dignity.
Therefore the counsel on behalf of the respondent submits that the petitioner’s claim for
declaring the practice of Talaq as unconstitutional on grounds of being violative of
Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Indian constitution filed under Article 32 of the Indian
constitution is not maintainable because it was held that such petitions cannot be
disposed off on merits as such matters were to be dealt by the legislature.11
II. THE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 IS NOT MAINTAINABLE WHEN THERE IS A
CLAIM FOR ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLE.
1.6. The counsel on behalf of respondent humbly submits that the petition claiming for the
enforcement of uniform civil code under Article 32 of the Indian constitution is not
maintainable because no question other than violation of fundamental rights will be
12
determinded in a procedding under article 32 and therefore a writ under article 32
cannot lie for enforcement of directive principle.13
1.7. Article 44: “The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code
throughout the territory of India.”

9
Krishna singh v. Mathura Ahir, (1981) 3 SCC 689.
10
Chitra v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 35.
11
Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 3614.
12
Gopal das v. Union of India,AIR 1955 SC 1.
13
B. Krishna Bhat v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 65.
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In B. Krishna Bhat v. Union of India14, it was held that, the law embodying the
principle among the Directive Principles of state policy depends on the will of the
legislature. Determining the choice of priorities or formulating perspectives thereof is a
matter of policy and article 32 is not the machinery through which policy preferences or
priorities can be determined, nor is the Supreme Court a forum where conflicting claims
of policies or priorities can be debated to make the state accept a particular policy,
desirable and necessary as the policy might be, is not the function of Article 32.
15
1.8. In Maharishi Avdhesh v. union of India , it was held that, petition for issuing
Mandamus for enactment of Uniform civil code for all citizens of India and for certiorari
for declaring the Muslim women protection as void and for prohibition for not directing
not to enact Shariat Act in respect of matters affecting dignity and rights of Muslim
women was held not maintainable under Article 32 of the Indian constitution.
1.9. Therefore this petition filed by the petitioner claiming for the enactment of uniform civil
code and for declaring the practice of Talaq as unconstitutional under Article 32 of the
Indian constitution is not maintainable.

14
Supra 13, at 16.
15
Maharishi Avdhesh v. Union of India,1991 (1) SCR 480.
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2. THAT TALAQ UNDER SECTION 2 OF SHARIAT ACT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

I. THAT THE TALAQ GIVEN BY HUSBAND WAS NOT VOID-AB-INITIO
2.1. The counsel appearing on behalf of respondent humbly submits that the talaq given by
the husband was not void –ab- initio and was perfectly valid which dissolved the
marriage as soon as it was declared because this practice of Talaq-e-biddat is recognized
and permitted under the Hanafi sect of Sunni Muslims. Hence the counsel submits that
the Talaq given by husband Rizwan Ahmed was valid and dissolved the marriage
immediately and irrevocably.
2.2. In Muslim law divorce procedding at the instance of husband has two forms:
(i) Talaq ul sunnat
(ii) Talaq-e-biddat
a) Talaq-e-biddat could be pronounced in two ways, in the first form three
pronouncements are made in single tuhr,either in one sentence, ‘I divorce thee,’ or
separate sentences like ‘ I divorce thee, I divorce thee, I divorce thee.’16
b) The other is to pronounce Talaq in a single pronouncement, made during tuhr with
clear intention to irrevocably dissolving the marriage. Husband has to say, “I divorce
thee irrevocably.”17
2.3. The Talaq-ul-biddat form of divorce when practiced becomes irrevocable immediately
on its pronouncement or on execution of Talaqnama. On its characteristic feature of
being irrevocable it is also called as Talaq-ul –bain.
2.4. The word talaq is usually meant repudiation literally it means the taking off of any tie or
restraint, to repudiate the wife or free her from the bondage of marriage. 18The single
irrevocable divorce made during either during tuhr or even otherwise is called talaq ul
bain and may be given in writing as such a bill of divorcement comes into operation
immediately and severs the marital tie.19
2.5. A Talaq communicated in writing is valid in Hanafi law. The respondent belonging to
Hanafi sect of Sunni Muslims , Talaq in writing as well as words is recognized and the
same becomes effective on declaration resulting in immediate dissolution of marriage.

16
Amiruddin v. Khatun Bibi, AIR 1917 All 371.
17
Sarabai v. Rabiabai, (1905) 30 Bom 537.
18
Bailee, I, 205.
19
Sheikh Fazlur Rahman v. Mst Aisha (1929) 8 Pat 690, Mohammad Ali v. Fareedunnisa Begum, AIR (1970)
A.P.298.
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20
2.6. In Asmar v Khatunnisa it was held that written Talaq given by Sunni husband
becomes operative from the date of execution. In Rajasaheb, In re 21it was held that the
communication of talaqnama to the wife within a reasonable time is sufficient and held
that Talaqnama becomes effective from the date of execution.
2.7. In Syed Mahmood vs State of A.P it was held that efforts of reconciliation is not a
precondition for announcement of divorce by husband and said that though holy Quran
and hadith make it obligatory to make effort for reconciliation before Talaq is
pronounced.
If the Talaq is addressed to someone and properly superscribed it is called customary
(masroom).if this kind of a document is prepared then it would take effect even though
the husband had no intention of divorcing and also if it was not brought to the knowledge
of wife.,22
2.8. When a written Talaq is concerned it is of two kinds, one is customary and the other is
usual form when it is in customary form then the Talaq is manifest form from the recitals
of the document and takes effect immediately and is irrevocable, in this form of talaq it is
sufficient that the recitals of the deed are clear that the wife is divorced and the deed
signed by two witnesses the Talaq becomes irrevocable. 23It is sufficient if there is clear
intention to put an end to conjugal relations is clearly conveyed.24
2.9. In Fyzee’s compendium of Fatimid Law, it is stated that the husband is permitted to give
Talaq to his wife with or without any cause. It is true that the Talaq is disaaproved but it
is not forbidden. He mentioned that divorce stands to be void on certain circumstances,
but in none of the paragraphs of his provision there was no mention that a talaq given
without any mediation as void.25
2.10. Hence the counsel on behalf of the respondent submits that Talaq-e-biddat is a
recognized form of Talaq among Hanafis26. Though theologically it is considered as bad
among Hanafi law but it is perfectly valid resulting in the dissolution of marriage.27

20
Asmar v. Khatunnisa,1939 All 592.
21
Rajasaheb,In re, 1920 (44)Bom.44,54,I.C 573.
22
Mohd.shamsuddin v. Noor jahan,AIR 1955 Hyd 144.
23
Fazi v. Ali Mohammad Pando, 1975 Cr.LJ.1228 at p.1229.
24
Ibrahim v. syed bibi,I.L.R. 12 Mad 63: I.L.R.36 All.453.
25
Asaf A.S Fyzee,Vide Outlines of Mohammedan Law,152 and 153( 4th ed. ).
26
Saleha bi v. Sheikh Gulla,AIR 1973 MP 207.
27
Rashid Ahmed v. Mst. Anisa,AIR 1932 PC 25.
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II. THAT PRACTICE OF TALAQ DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14, 15 AND 21 OF THE
INDIAN CONSTITUTION
2.5. The counsel on behalf of the respondent submits that the practice of Talaq does not
violate any of the fundamental rights and it is the practice permitted by Islamic law
protected under Articles 25(1), 26(b) and 29 of the constitution of India.
2.6. Article 14 states: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. 28” The practice in question is not
violative of Article 14 as the proper or “regular” means of Talaq namely Talaq-e-hasan
and Talaq-e-ahsan also gives the husband a unilateral right to divorce without stating a
valid reason. Article 14 guarantees only similarity of treatment and not identical
treatment. It was held in Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan that, if the law in
question based on rational classification it is not regarded as discriminatory because
equality before law does not mean that the things which are different shall be treated as
though they were same.29Thus these practices being applicable to different person i.e
persons who are placed on unequal terms cannot be regarded as discriminatory.
2.7. In Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. Ltd. V. State of U.P. 30 it has been
observed that: “Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality among equals: its aim is to
protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not however
operate against rational classification. A person setting up a grievance of denial of equal
treatment by law must establish that between persons similarly circumstanced, some
were treated to their prejudice and the differential treatment had no reasonable relation to
the object sought to be achieved by the law.”
2.8. In all the three modes of Talaq, every woman is subject to the unilateral right vested in
the husband and in each case no valid reason is required to be stated. Therefore even
when divorce is obtained through Talaq-e-hasan or Talaq-e-ahsan, it does not give any
extra right to the divorced wife and are hence all three are equally circumstanced with no
discrimination. In all the three modes of divorce, the object and the grounds on which the
Talaq-e-biddat has been challenged remains the same. Equal protection means the right

28
Indian constitution, Article 14,1949.
29
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2002 SC 1533.
30
Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. AIR 1970 SC 21.
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to equal treatment in similar circumstances 31 . In the present case the same has not been
violated in any way.
2.9. The contention of petitioner that Article 14 and 15 has been violated on the grounds that
women under the practice of other religions are not being subjected to any means of
personal divorce but to divorce decrees passed by the court and therefore Muslim women
who (1)The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion,
race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.32”
2.10. Equality before law does not mean that things which are different shall be
treated as though they are the same 33. The varying needs of different classes of persons
often require separate treatment34. Legislation making provisions for Hindus specifically
on matters falling within the ambit of Hindu Law has been upheld even though similar
laws have not been made for other groups and the court had pointed out that the same
was held because Hindus have been enjoying for long their own indigenous system based
on Hindu scriptures in the same way as the Mohammedans were subject to their own
personal law35
In Moti Das v. Sahi36, the court held that there was no violation of Article 14 if the
Legislature provides for different constitution of Boards for the superintendence of
Hindu and Jain religious endowments because there lies a difference between the Hindus
and the Jains in matters of faith and religious practices.
2.11. Article 15 forbids “only such discrimination as is based solely on the ground
that a person belongs to a particular race or caste or professes a particular religion or was
born at a particular place or is of a particular sex, and on no other ground. A
differentiation based on one or more of these grounds and also on other grounds is not hit
by the Article37”. In the present case, the Muslim women have a different means for
getting divorce not only because they are from a different religion but also because they
are women. While divorce in other religions are governed by one act for both spouses, in
Islam religion the divorce coming from the side of the men is governed by the Shariat
Act while the divorce coming from the side of the wife is governed by The Dissolution
of Muslim Marriages Act,1939. Hence the petitioner’s contention that there has been

31
Shrikishan v. State of Rajasthan,AIR 1995 SC 795.
32
Indian constitution, Article 15,1949.
33
Ashuthosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan,(2002) 4 SCC 34.
34
Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India,AIR 1951 SC 41.
35
Srinivasa Aiyar v. Saraswati, AIR 1952 Mad 193.
36
Moti Das v. Sahi,AIR 1959 SC 942.
37
Chitra v. Union of India,AIR 1970 SC 35(38).
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differentiation on two grounds i.e on the basis of religion and the other on basis of sex
has no stance because Article 15 does not hit on more than one ground in any case.
Therefore Article 15 cannot be said to be violated as more than one ground is present.
2.12. Article 21 states: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law”. The petitioner has stated that the
Article has been violated on the grounds that, Talaq-e-biddat deprive the muslim women
of their dignity. All other three forms of Talaq place the divorced women on the same
pedestal as Talaq-e-biddat. Therefore the Practice of Talaq-e-biddat does not violate any
of the fundamental rights guaranteed under article 14, 15 and 21 of the Indian
constitution.
Furthermore, the counsel on behalf of the Respondent submits that this said practice is
protected by the fundamental rights guaranteed under article 25, 26(b) and 29 of the
Indian constitution.
2.13. Article 25(1),26(b) and 29. Article 25 states that “subject to public order,
morality and health and to other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled
to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate
religion.38” Article 26(b) states that “Subject to public order, morality and health, every
religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to manage its own
affairs in matters of religion. 39”Article 29 states that“ (1) Any section of the citizens
residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or
culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same. (2) No citizen shall be
denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving
aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of
them.40”
The provisions of Article 25(1) not only guarantee freedom of religion, but also protect
the acts done in furtherance of such religious belief. Though the court is entitled to
decide what constitutes as an essential practice with regards to the practices which is
regarded by the community as an essential part of its religion 41. The fundamental right
guaranteed under Art.25 involves not only Freedom of conscience but also freedom of
thought, opinion and religion and includes the right to manifest a chosen religion.42Any

38
Indian constitution, Article 25,1949.
39
Indian constitution, Article 26(1),1949.
40
Indian constitution, Article 29,1949.
41
H.H. Srimad Perarulala Ethiraja Ramanuja Jeeyar Swami v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 1586.
42
1, Halbury’s Laws of England,(4th Ed. 1973).
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religious practice is a way to express religious belief. Therefore, the freedom of religion
extends to freedom of carrying out any such practices in furtherance of such a religious
belief. And the state is precluded from issuing any orders which directly or impliedly
offend the religious sentiments or freedom of conscience. 43 Since the practice of Talaq-e-
44
biddat has been in force since 1400 years it can therefore be inferred that it is an
essential element of the religion or an essential belief of the Muslim community.
Therefore this practice of Talaq-e-biddat which has been followed by the Muslim
community believing it to be an integral part of their community cannot be restricted by
state in any way and by doing so it would violate of article 25 of the Indian constitution.
2.14. In Ratilal Panchand v. State of Bombay45 it was held that: “Every person has
a fundamental right under our Constitution not merely to entertain such religious belief
as may be approved of by his judgement or conscience but to exhibit his belief and ideas
in such overt acts as are enjoined or sanctioned by his religion and further to propagate
his religious views for the edification of others.”
2.15. In Jamshedji v. Soonabhai46, it was observed that: “If it is the belief of the
community- and it is proved undoubtedly to be the belief of the Zorastrian community- a
secular judge is bound to accept that belief- it is not for him to sit in judgment on that
belief- he has no right to interfere with the conscience of a donor who makes a gift in
favour of what he believes to be an advancement of his religion and for the welfare of his
community or mankind.”
47
This was upheld in Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala and the court observed
furthermore that the question is not whether a particular religious belief appeals to the
court but if the belief or practice in question is genuinely and conscientiously held as a
part of the profession or practice of religion. I was also held in the same case “that
Article 25 is an article of faith in the Constitution incorporated in recognition of the
principle that the real test of a true democracy is the ability of even an insignificant
minority to find its identity under the country’s Constitution.” If the practices or matters
are considered integral by the community itself, it is protected by Article 25 and 2648.

43
Pogakula Lekshmi Reddy v. Principal Secretary to the Government of A.P.,AIR 1997 A.P 6.
44
Asaf Fyzee,Outlines of Mohameddan Law (4th ed. 2008).
45
Ratilal Panchand v. State of Bombay, (1954) SC 388.
46
Jamshedji v. Soonabhai, ILR (1909) 83 Bom 122.
47
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala,AIR 1987 SC 748.
48
Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi v. State of U.P.,(1997) 4 SCC 606.
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In Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh49 a writ petition was instituted under Article
32. The Supreme Court stated that the State could not interfere with the established
customary rights and enforced the customary rights of the Shia community on a piece of
land.
2.16. Therefore the counsel would like to conclude that The protection of Articles
25, 26 and 29 do not extend to only those practices which are mentioned in the doctrines
but also to practices or acts which are done in pursuance of the religion and hence
guarantees for ritual and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are
integral parts of the religion50. Article 29 states that when a cultural or linguistic minority
desires to preserve its own culture the State would not by law impose upon it any other
51
culture which might irrespective of whether its local or not . Talaq-e-biddat is an
essential element of practice and faith of the minority community and the practice in
question is being practiced for 1400 years. The practice in question has not violated any
of the fundamental rights and therefore is not violative of public order, morality or
health. The practice of Talaq-e-biddat is constitutional and is protected by Articles 25(1),
26(b) and 29 of the Indian constitution.

49
Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh,AIR 1981 SC 2198.
50
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay,AIR 1962 SC 853.
51
6, D.D. Basu,Commentary on the constitution of India , 5513 ( 9th ed. 2014).
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3. THAT UNIFORM CIVIL CODE CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED

I. THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFORM CIVIL CODE VIOLATES THE RIGHT
UNDER ARTICLE 25, 26 AND 29

3.1.Article 25 is very widely worded. It guarantees all persons, not only freedom of
conscience but the right to profess, practise and propagate religion. The Court has
expanded religious liberty in its various phases guaranteed by the Constitution and
extended it to practices and even external overt acts of the individual. Religion is more
than mere matter of faith. The Constitution by guaranteeing freedom of conscience
ensured inner aspects of religious belief. And external expression of it them are protected
by guaranteeing right to freely practise and propagate religion.52
Thus, subject to the restrictions which this Article imposes, every person has a
fundamental right under our Constitution not merely to entertain such religious belief as
may be approved of by his judgment or conscience but to exhibit his belief and ideas in
such overt acts as are enjoined or sanctioned by his religion and further to propagate his
religious views for the edification of others. 53 And the exception under Article 25(b) only
provides for social reforms and not religious reforms which means, it does not enable the
legislature to reform a religion out of its identity.54
3.2.Article 26 of the Constitutions grants freedom to every religious denomination or any
section thereof to manage its own affairs “in matters of religion”. 55The right under 26(b)
cannot be taken away by the legislature 56except on the ground of ‘public order, morality
or health. It is not subjected to other provisions of part III as is the case in art. 25, and is
therefore broader in its scope.
3.3.Supreme Court has identified certain principles related to these Articles, the first principle
laid is that the protection of these articles is not limited to matters of doctrine or belief.
They extend also to acts done in pursuance of religion and, therefore, a guarantee for
rituals and observances, ceremonies and motive of worship which are integral parts of
religion. The second principle is that what constitutes an essential part of religion or

52
Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635;MOHAMMAD SHABBIR, MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW, UNIFORM
CIVIL CODE AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 65 (1997).
53
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay,AIR 1954 SC 388.
54
Saifuddin v. State of Bombay,AIR 1962 SC 853.
55
Indian constitution, Article 26,1949.

56
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shri Shirur
Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
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religious properties has to be decided by the courts with a reference to the doctrine of a
particular religion and includes practices which are regarded by the community as a part
of its religion.57 A religious denomination or organization enjoys complete autonomy in
the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets
of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with
their decision in such matters.58
3.4.The Supreme Court has itself acknowledged that every person has a fundamental right to
entertain such religious belief as may be approved of by his judgment or conscience. 59
Therefore, marriage, inheritance, divorce, conversion are as much religious in nature and
content as any other belief or faith. Going round the fire seven rounds or giving
consentbefore Qazi are as much matter of faith and conscience as the worship itself. 60 A
component of personal law has the protection of Article 25 of the Constitution.61
3.5.Justice Khehar has rightly mentioned in the Shayara Bano case that, “Religion is a matter
of faith, and not of logic. It is not open to a court to accept an egalitarian approach, over
a practice which constitutes an integral part of religion. The Constitution allows the
followers of every religion, to follow their beliefs and religious traditions. The
Constitution assures believers of all faiths that their way of life, is guaranteed, and would
not be subjected to any challenge, even though they may seem to others unacceptable, in
today's world and age... The Constitution endeavours to protect and preserve, the beliefs
of each of the separate entities, Under Article 25.”62
3.6.While examining issues falling in the realm of religious practices or 'personal law', it is
not for a court to make a choice of something which it considers as forward looking or
non-fundamentalist. Courts cannot decide if is prudent or progressive or regressive.
Religion and personal law, must be perceived, as it is accepted, by the followers of the
faith and not others. Interference in matters of 'personal law' is clearly beyond judicial
examination.63
3.7. Therefore, it becomes clear that personal laws, which are based on the religious beliefs
and faith of the community and are regarded by them as essential part of their religion are

57
Id.; Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay,1962 Supp (2) SCR 496.
58
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shri Shirur
Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
59
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay,AIR 1954 SC 388.
60
Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India,(1995) 3 SCC 635.
61
Shayara Bano and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.,AIR 2017 SC 4609.
62
Id.
63
Id.
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protected under article 25 and 26 even if those are regarded as unacceptable in today’s
world. Therefore, interfering in the religious practices of different communities for the
sake of uniformity is violation of their right to practice their religion under article 25 and
also to manage their religious affairs under article 26.
3.8.Article 29 states that any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any
part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to
conserve the same.64Though the marginal note of the article mentions minority right, the
rights conferred by Cl. (1) are not restricted to a political minority in a state. It extends to
‘any section of citizens’ whether they belong to minority or majority community- the only
condition being that such section must have a distinct language, script, or culture of its
own.65 This is not subjected to exceptions as given under article 25 and 26.
Cambridge English Dictionary defines Culture as the way of life, especially the general
customs and beliefs, of a particular group of people at a particular time. 66 So, the personal
laws which are made up of customs and beliefs defines the way of life of people can be
termed as culture. So, all religious communities having distinct personal laws have right
to protect their personal laws under this article which would be affected by UCC.
Therefore, it is submitted that UCC would violate article 29.

II. THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF UCC WILL VIOLATE SECULARISM GUARANTEED

UNDER INDIAN CONSTITUTION.
3.9.Secularism is a part of fundamental law and an inalienable segment of the basic structure
67
of the Constitution. We in India, however, understand secularism to denote 'Sarva
Dharma Samabhaav' an approach of tolerance and understanding of the equality of all
68 69
religions. It is a positive concept of equal treatment of all religions. Secularism
prevents the State from identifying itself with or otherwise favouring any particular
religious sect or denomination, the State having been enjoined to accord equal treatment
to all religions and religious sects and denominations. Secularism is more than a passive
attitude of religious tolerance. It is a positive concept of equal treatment of all religions. 70
64
INDIA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 29,1949.
65
3, D.D BASU, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (2010); Ahmedabad St. Xavier college society and others v.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389.
66
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/culture (last visited July 26,
2018).
67
Sr. Bommai, State of Karnataka v. R.D. Praveen Bhai Thogadia,AIR 2004 SC 2081.
68
Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui Etc, Mohd. v. Union Of India And Others, AIR 1995 SC 605.
69
Id.
70
S.R. Bommai, State of Karnataka v. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia,AIR 2004 SC 2081.
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Religious tolerance, equal treatment of all religious groups and protection of their life and
property and of the places of their worship have been held to be an essential part of
secularism enshrined in our Constitution.71 The word ‘secular’ highlights the fundamental
rights guaranteed by Arts. 25 to 29.72 Religious freedom guaranteed by Articles 25 to 29
is the basic foundation of secularism.73
3.10. Implementation of a Uniform Civil Code for all the religious communities is against
the policy of Secularism as it infringes the religious freedom guaranteed under article 25,
26 and 29. This is also against the principle of equal treatment because UCC will affect
different communities differently. The practices of some religion will definitely be more
in line with the Uniform Civil Code than others, and hence, the interest of those whose
religious practices are different from that of UCC will be worse affected. Moreover, UCC
violates the principle of religious tolerance which is an important part of secularism.

III. THAT THE DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES ARE DISCRETIONARY AND CANNOT OVERRIDE
FUNDAMETAL RIGHTS.
3.11. B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly at the time of making of the
Constitution. his speech said that:
3.12. “I should also like to point out that all that the State is claiming in this matter is a
power to legislate. There is no obligation upon the State to do away with personal laws. It
is only giving a power. Therefore, no one need be apprehensive of the fact that if the State
has the power, the State will immediately proceed to execute or enforce that power in a
manner that may be found to be objectionable by the Muslims or by the Christians or by
any other community in India…We must all remember that sovereignty is always limited,
no matter even if you assert that it is unlimited, because sovereignty in the exercise of that
power must reconcile itself to the sentiments of different communities. No government can
exercise its power in such a manner as to provoke the Muslim community to rise in
rebellion.”74
3.13. This statement of Ambedkar shows that implementation of UCC is not obligatory but
only discretionary. Moreover, the word ‘endeavour’ used in article 44 shows that it is
discretionary.

71
Id.
72
Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui Etc, Mohd. v. Union Of India And Others, AIR 1995 SC 605.
73
Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India,(1995) 3 SCC 635.
74 th
7 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA, CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES 547 (1947).
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3.14. The importance of Directive Principles in the scheme of our Constitution cannot ever
be over-emphasized. Those principles project the high ideal which the Constitution aims
to achieve. But to destroy the guarantees given by Part III in order purportedly to achieve
the goals of Part IV is plainly to subvert the Constitution by destroying its basic structure.
Fundamental rights occupy a unique place in the lives. of civilized societies and have
been variously described as "transcendental", "inalienable" and "primordial" and as said
in Keshavananda Bharati they constitute the ark of the Constitution. 75 So, in order
to enforce UCC under art. 44, article 25, 26 and 29 under Part III cannot be overlooked.

IV. THAT COURT CANNOT INTERFERE IN POLICY MATTERS

3.15. It is not the domain of the Court to embark upon unchartered ocean of public policy in
an exercise to consider as to whether a particular public policy is wise or a better public
policy can be evolved. Such exercise must be left to the discretion of the executive and
legislative authorities as the case may be. 76 It must not be forgotten that in democracy the
Legislature is constituted by the chosen representatives of the people. They are
responsible for the welfare of the State and it is for them to lay down the policy that the
State should pursue Therefore. It is for them to determine what legislation to put up on
the statute bock in order to advance the welfare of the State. 77 Even though the results
seems laudable, an activist Court is not fully equipped to cope with the intricacies of the
legislative subject and can at best advise the state. For, in whatever measure be the
concern of this Court, it compulsively needs to apply, motion, described in judicial
parlance as self-restraint.78
3.16. Keeping these principles in mind Supreme Court in Ahmedabad women case 79 ,
refused to interfere in the matter of religion and personal laws. Therefore, it is submitted
before this Hon’ble court that it should leave the matter of implementation of UCC which
is a policy decision on legislature as it is not within the scope of the judiciary.

V. THAT UNIFORM CIVIL CODE WILL BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE

3.17. In a pluralist society where people have faith in different religions, beliefs or tenets
propounded by different religions, a uniform law, though is highly desirable, enactment

75
Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors v. Union Of India & Ors, AIR 1980 SC 1789.
76
Premium Granites v. State of T.N,(1994) 1 SCR 579.
77
State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84.
78
Shayara Bano and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2017 SC 4609.
79
Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 3614.
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thereof in one go perhaps may be counter-productive to unity and integrity of the nation.
In a democracy governed by rule of law, gradual progressive change and order should be
brought about. So, it is incorrect to think that all laws have to be made uniformly
80
applicable to all people in one go. Sahai. J. in his concurring judgment in Sarla
Mudgal’s Case said that“The desirability of Uniform Code can hardly be doubted. But it
can concretize only when social climate is properly built up by elite of the society;
statesmen amongst leaders who instead of gaining personal mileage rise above and
awaken the masses to accept the change…”81
3.18. The other side of the debate is that logical probability appears to be that the code
would cause dissatisfaction and disintegration than serve as a common umbrella to
promote homogeneity and national solidarity. 82Indians in general are religious people
and minorities are more so as they are everywhere. To force them to succumb to
majoritarian pressure is not only bad politics it is also bad ethics. The demand for UCC
should come from the communities themselves. The role of the state should be that of a
83
catalyst not that of a dictator." Sri K.M. Munshi rightly said in the Constituent
Assembly that when you want to consolidate a community, you have to take into
consideration the benefit which may accrue to the whole community and not to the
customs of a part of it.84 The argument that UCC is a means of uniting the nation is not
acceptable as Harmony is must for nation to be united. And if we assume uniform laws
brings harmony, there is no answer as to why there is so much disharmony among
different sects of Hindus governed by a uniform code.
3.19. Justice Chinnappa Reddy rightly said that“Our tradition teaches
tolerance; our philosophy preaches tolerance; our Constitution practices tolerance;
let us not dilute it”.85
3.20. Therefore, in light of the authorities cited and arguments advanced, it is finally
submitted before this Honourable Court that Religious protections regarded as
fundamental rights does not allow for the imposition of a Uniform Civil Code and
therefore uniform civil code cannot be implemented.

80
Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of A.P., (1996) 2 SCC 498.
81
Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635.
82
Id.
83
SALEEM AKHTAR AND AHMAD NASEEM, PERSONAL LAWS AND UNIFORM CIVIL CODE, 104 (1998).
84
2, CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA, 547-48 (1947).
85
Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors v. State of Kerala & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 748.
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4. THAT THE FIFTH MARRIAGE THAT TOOK PLACE BETWEEN RIZWAN AHMED AND
AFREEN REHMAN IS NOT VOID
I. THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RIZWAN AHMED AND SANAYA BEGUM WAS
DISSOLVED AS SOON AS TALAQ WAS DECLARED
4.1. The counsel on behalf of the respondent submits that the marriage between Rizwan
Ahmed and Sanaya Begum was dissolved as soon as Talaq was declared because this
form of Talaq where Talaq is declared thrice leads to immediate dissolution of marriage.
Hence the marriage of Rizwan and Afreen Rehman which took place during the period
of Iddat i.e waiting period of Sanaya Begum does not invalidate the marriage.
4.2. According to Muslim law, when a marriage is dissolved either by divorce or death of
husband, the wife is supposed to wait for a period of time before she can marry again.
The period during which she is forbidden to remarry is known as ‘Iddat’ or ‘Idda’.
4.3. Iddat is established from the Holy Quran and the Hadith of Rasoolullah which states that
:“Those women who are divorced should keep themselves in waiting for the period of
three months”.86It is clear from this sentence that this period of waiting is to be observed
by women and not by men, and also as Talaq-e-biddat is a form of divorce leading to
immediate dissolution of marriage where the parties have no ways to return back to each
other unless and until a fresh Nikah is performed. Therefore the counsel would like to
submit that the relation between Rizwan and Sanaya being completely dissolved cannot
in any ways invalidate the marriage between Rizwan Ahmed and Afreen Rehman.
4.4. The marriage being taken place during the waiting of Sanaya will make the marriage
irregular and not void. An irregular marriage is not an unlawful marriage but marriage
which is unlawful for something else. 87 This irregularity can be regularised and this type
of marriage which is done in violation of some of the impediment is called irregular
marriage under Muslim law. This marriage though it does not seem to be valid in the
beginning can be validated by remedying the prohibition. In Mohd. Hayat v. Mohd.
Nawaz it was held that during the Iddat of Fourth wife marriage with the Fifth wife
would make the marriage irregular. Hence the counsel would like to submit that this
marriage between Rizwan and Afreen though it seems to be voidable, it is perfectly a
valid marriage.88

86
Rakesh Kumar Singh, Muslim Law, 83 (2011 ed.).
87
Mulla, Mulla’s Principles of Muslim Law (20th ed. 2014).
88
Paras Diwan, Muslim law in Modern India, 45 (7th ed. 1997).
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II. THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO RAPE AND KIDNAP AND HE CANNOT BE PROSECUTED
FOR THE SAME AND THUS THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT FOR KIDNAP AND
RAPE DOES NOT COME UNDER THE JUSRISDICTION OF ARTICLE 32.
4.5. The petitioner has alleged that kidnapping and rape has been committed by the
Respondent. However, the same is not true and the Respondent denies such allegations.
Unless kidnapping and rape is proved, the petitioner cannot state that there has been a
violation of the fundamental right.
4.6. In the present case, the petitioner has demanded relief not for herself but for Afreen
Rehman which has been barred by Katakis v. Union of India wherein it was held that
the Supreme Court will not give a declaration which will not serve any useful purpose to
the petitioner89. Furthermore, where the issuance of a writ depends on the determination
of a highly disputed question of fact, the court cannot dwell into whether there was a
violation of fundamental right90. There are several decisions of the Supreme Court which
have upheld that disputed questions of fact cannot be decided in a writ petition under
Article 3291.
4.7. The court therefore does not normally investigate disputed facts under Article 32 as it is
not the function of the court92. In Kailash Nath v. State of U.P., the court held that the
question of violation of fundamental right can be decided only on facts admitted or taken
as proved. When facts are in dispute, the matter is to be inquired into and decided by
proper legal proceedings93. The court has the power to accept a petition only when the
petitioner has prima facie proved that there has been a violation of fundamental rights94
or when the disputed facts is not necessary to be dwelled into for proving that the
petioner’s fundamental right has been infringed95. However in the present case it cannot
be established that there has been a prima facie violation of fundamental rights without
proper investigation into the matter and this disputed fact is necessary to be investigated
into for proving the breach of rights.
4.8. The Court, in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction does not declare the rights and since
petitions under Article 32 are summary proceedings based on the pleadings of the
parties, the disputed question of facts cannot be involved under this Article and must be

89
3, D.D Basu, Commentary on the constitution of India,3724 (8th ed. 2008).
90
Savita v. Union of India,(1993) 2 SCC 357.
91
Dharam Dutt v. Union of India,AIR 2004 SC 1295.
92
Bishamber Dayal v. State of U.P.,AIR 1982 SC 33.
93
Kailash Nath v. State of U.P.,AIR 1957 SC 790 (792).
94
Kochunni v. State of Madras,AIR 1959 SC 725.
95
Bishan Das v. State of Punjab,(1962) 2 SCR 69 (78).
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decided by the appropriate courts after recording due evidence in the matter 96 . In
Sumedha Nagpal v. State of Delhi, the Supreme Court observed that:“ since these are
disputed facts, unless the pleadings raised by the parties are examined with reference to
evidence by an appropriate forum, a proper decision in the matter cannot be taken and
such a course is impossible in a summary proceeding such as writ petition under Article
32 of the Constitution.97”
4.9. Dealing with the disputed questions of facts, the Supreme Court observed in several
cases that the questions whether there was bias, ill-will, mala fides or a due opportunity
to be heard or to produce evidence given in the course of departmental proceedings were
so largely questions of facts that it was difficult to decide them merely on conflicting
assertions made by affidavits given by the two sides98.
4.10. Therefore the petitioner is required to prove all facts which are necessary to establish
his right99 and court can simply refuse to entertain if the petitioner is not ready with
evidence100. The Supreme Court has no power to issue a writ for any other purpose other
than enforcement of fundamental rights and it is not prudent on the part of the petitioner
to institute a writ petition on other grounds101.Writ jurisdiction deals with public law that
differs from that under private law such as law of crimes 102. In order to obtain a writ a
mandamus the applicant has to satisfy that he has a legal right to perform a legal duty by
103
the party against whom the mandamus is sought and in the present case no such
requirement has been satisfied. Mandamus is a public law remedy and if the element of
public law is absent, no mandamus can be issued. Mandamus cannot be issues where
there are triable issues such as disputed questions of fact 104. As explained by M.P. Jain “
The reason for this judicial stance is that the disputed questions of fact can be decided
properly by examining the pleadings raised by the parties and by taking evidence and
such a course is not possible in a summary proceeding like that of a writ petition under
Article 32.105”

96
Kavalappara v. State of Madras and ors.,AIR 1959 SC 725, Page 734.
97
Sumedha Nagpal v. State of Delhi and Ors (2009) SCC 745.
98
58th Law commission report,Structure and jurisdication of higher judiciary.
99
Fertilizers Ltd v. KSEB,AIR 1988 SC 1989.
100
3, D.D Basu, Commentary on constitution of India,3868 (8th ed. 2008).
101
Bishan v. Govt of Punjab,AIR 1993 SC 972.
102
Nilabati Behara v. State of Orissa,AIR 1979 SC 765.
103
3, D.D Basu,Commentary on the constitution of India, 3923 (8th ed. 2008).
104
Dhanyalakshmi Rice Mills v. Commissioner of Civil Supplies, AIR 1976 SC 2243.
105
MP Jain, constitutional law of India, 1362 (7th ed. 2016).
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4.11. The Respondent deserves a fair trial as it is aimed at ascertaining the truth to all
concerned106. The fair trial for a criminal case is necessary to find out the truth and
107
prevent miscarriage of justice . The right to fair trial has been observed in A.R.
Autulay v. Nayak wherein the court held that a law which “does not provide for a
reasonably prompt investigation, trial and conclusion of a criminal case” is not fair, just
and reasonable. A criminal investigation is open to challenge as the ground of violation
of Article 21 if the investigation is not conducted with due observance of procedure108.
4.12. Therefore in the present circumstances on the grounds that there has been no prima
facie breach of fundamental rights and presence of disputed questions of fact, the
Respondent deserves a fair trial in accordance with prescribed procedure and therefore
the concerned matter with regards to criminal proceedings do not fall under Article 32.

106
Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat,2004 4 SCC 62.
107
Charanjit Kaur v. Union of India,AIR 1994 SC 1491.
108
3, D.D Basu, Commentary on constitution of India,3153(8th ed. 2008).
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5. THAT THE PRACTICE OF BIGAMY IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL

I. THAT THE PRACTICE OF BIGAMY IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 AND
ARTICLE 21
5.1.Article 14 of the Constitution states that – “The State shall not deny to any person
equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”
Article 21 of the Constitution states that :
“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the
procedure established by law.”
5.2. Articles 14 to 18 constitute the right to equality. The makers of the Indian Constitution
knew that widespread social and economic inequalities, often sanctioned by law or
public policies or exercise of public power, supported by religion and other social norms
and practices, existed and flourished. The right to equality in the Constitution of India is
not merely a negative right not to be discriminated against, but also a positive right to be
treated as an equal. Article 14 guarantees to every person, including non-citizens and
transgenders, the right to equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws. It
means that all are equally subject to the ordinary laws of the land.109
5.3. Equality before the law or equal protection of the laws does not mean the same treatment
to everyone. As no two human beings are equal in all respects, the same treatment to
them in every respect would result in unequal treatment. For example, the same
treatment in all respects to a child as to an adult, or to a sick or physically challenged
person as to a healthy will result in unequal treatment. Therefore, the underlying
principle of equality is not the uniformity of treatment but rather to give them the same
treatment in those respects in which they are similar and different treatment in those
respects in which they are different. The principle of equality does not mean that every
law must have a universal application to all persons who are not by nature, attainment or
circumstances in the same position. The varying needs of different classes of persons
require different treatment.
5.4. The first expression “equality before law”, which is said to have been taken from the
English common law, is a declaration of equality of all persons in the eyes of law,
implying absence of special privilege in any individual. Underlying principle of Article
14 is that it forbids class legislation but it does not forbid reasonable classification.
Article 14 does not negate classification, it permits it. It forbids class legislation but it

109
V.N Shukla, Constitution of India (11th ed. 2017).
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110
does not forbid reasonable classification. Our statutory law is full of instances of
special legislation applying only to a particular class or groups. Such classification
undoubtedly differentiates between persons belonging to one class and the others, but
that by itself does not make the legislation obnoxious to article 14. The Supreme Court
has time and again reiterated that Article 14 does not rule out classification for purposes
or legislation. In Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of W.B.111, the court said that “the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution does not mean that all
the laws must be general in character and universal in application and that the State is no
longer to have the power of distinguishing and classifying persons or things for the
purposes of legislation.”
5.5. Test for Reasonable Classification - In order to pass the test for permissible
classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, 1) the classification must be
founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are
grouped together from others left out of the group; and 2) the differentia must have a
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. 112 The
object of classification cannot be any object; it must be lawful. Classification made in the
utmost good faith; classifications that are scientific and rational, that will have direct and
reasonable relation with the object sought to be achieved can be bad because the object
offends Article 14. But our courts have not yet specifically applied these tests in any
case. On the contrary in the context of affirmative action or reservation for backward
classes under Article 15, the court has clearly held that the US principles of “suspect
legislation”, “strict scrutiny” and “compelling state necessity” are not applicable in our
Constitution.113
5.6. The court in the case of Subramaniam Swamy v. CBI114 held that the question whether
a legislation can be challenged on the ground of unreasonableness or arbitrariness is not
yet conclusively answered and seems to be pending for the decision of a larger Bench of
the court. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or
unreasonable.
5.7. In the present case at hand, there is a classification created between men and women by
allowing men to marry more than once but not women. But this does mean

110
M.P Jain,Indian Constituional Law (7th ed. 2016).
111
Kedarnath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal,AIR 1953 SC 404.
112
Budhon v. State of Bihar,AIR 1955 SC 194.
113
Ashok kumar thakur v. Union of India,(2008) 6 SCC 1.
114
Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI,(2005) 2 SCC 317.
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discrimination rather there is a reasonable classification created between men and

women because men and women are not equal. They are, by nature, purpose and
attainment, different from each other. The choice to Muslim males to marry more than
once is given by Quran and there is no specific objective behind this which is unlawful
and it does not violate the equality clause of Article 14 because it clearly states that
equals should be treated equally and unequals should be treated unequally. Therefore, it
is contended that bigamy is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
5.8. The definition of “laws in force” under Article 13 does not include personal laws. The
inclusive list in Article 13(1)(a) referring expressly to ordinance, order, bye-law, rule,
regulation, notification, custom or usage is based on what kind of law is under challenge
and not based on its subject-matter. For instance, irrespective of whether a notification
deals with criminal law or civil law or personal law, the same would come within the
definition of under Article 13(3)(a) as long as the State action is in the nature of a
notification. Hence, the omission of personal law from Article 13 signifies only that
traditional personal law, which constitutes a different kind of law deriving from
extralegal sources, would not be open to scrutiny under Article 13.115
5.9. Article 21, even though couched in negative language, confers on every person the
fundamental rights to life and personal liberty and has become an inexhaustible source of
many rights. By the term “life”, as here used, something more is meant than mere animal
existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties
by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body or
destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with
the other world. This statement was further approved by our Supreme Court in Francis
Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi116. It must, in any view of the matter, include the right to
the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as
constitute the bare minimum expression of the human self.
5.10. The expression “procedure established by law” was initially interpreted as procedure
prescribed by the law of the State. The Supreme Court in the very first case on Article
21, A.K.Gopalan v. State of Madras117, held that “expression ‘procedure established by
law’ means procedure enacted by a law made by the State. It required, firstly, existence
of an enacted law authorising interference with the life or personal liberty, secondly, the

115
1, D.D Basu, Commentary On constitution of India, (8th ed. 2008).
116
Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608.
117
AK Gopalan v. State of Mysore,AIR 1950 SC 27.
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law should be valid, and thirdly, the procedure laid down by the law must be followed.
In the absence of non-compliance of any of these conditions any deprivation of life or
personal liberty of a person by any authority violates Article 21.”
5.11. In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India118, the Supreme Court had held that
“the procedure which deprives the person of his personal liberty must be ‘right, just and
fair’ and not ‘arbitrary, fanciful and oppressive’”.
5.12. In the case at hand, the respondent has not deprived the petitioner of her right to life
or property. She had been given a separate flat to live along with her children. Moreover
she was also given monthly allowance to maintain herself. The respondent has not
neglected her or ill-treated her in any way. Moreover, the procedure by which the
respondent had married other women other than the petitioner is also procedure
established by law. It is not an arbitrary or oppressive procedure. Bigamy or polygamy is
allowed by the personal laws of the Muslims and the respondent has followed that. He
has not gone against any law or broken any law of the State. Infact the Constitution itself
safeguards the personal laws of various communities by way of article 25 and 26. Hence
it is contended that bigamy is not violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.
5.13. Therefore, it is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that bigamy is not violative of
Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution as it is matter related to the personal laws of the
people which cannot come under the scrutiny of Article 13 of the Constitution and hence
cannot be held unconstitutional and void.

118
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
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PRAYER

Therefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments
advanced the counsel for the Respondent humbly prays before the Honorable Supreme court
to declare:

1. That the writ petition filed by the petitioner under Article 32 is not maintainable.
2. That Talaq under Section 2 of Shariat Act is not Unconstitutional
3. That the implementation of Uniform Civil Code Violates Rights Guaranteed under
Article 25, 26 and 29 of the Constitution and therefore it cannot be implemented
4. That the marriage between Rizwan and Afreen Rehman is absolutely valid
5. That practice of Bigamy is not unconstitutional

And pass any other order or relief which the court deems fit in the interest of justice, equity
and good conscience.

All of which is humbly submitted and affirmed.

Date: 29.10.18

For This Act of Kindness, the Petitioner Shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.

Sd/-………..…/…..…………
(Counsel for Respondent)