EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES

Vol. 56, No. 5, July 2004, 637–660

Ruling with Decrees: Presidential Decree

Making in Russia and Ukraine

OLEH PROTSYK

THERE IS A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE LITERATURE on post-communist transition

of the importance of presidential decree making for explaining the nature of the
political process and policy-making outcomes both in Russia and Ukraine.1 At the
same time, there have been very few studies dealing specifically with this aspect of
presidential activity. Remington et al.2 and Parrish3 analysed how presidential
decree-making powers were used in Russia during the first years of democratic
transition and Mishler et al.4 discussed in great detail the patterns of use of one type
of presidential decree, defined as normative decrees, during the 1991–98 period in
Russia.
While these studies examined only certain types of presidential decrees, this article
attempts to provide a detailed overview of the total decree output across six
presidential terms in Russia and Ukraine between 1991 and 2002. It examines the
temporal evolution of decree-making practices over time and analyses differences
between countries in the patterns of use of decree powers by the presidents. It also
discusses political factors that contributed to differences in the frequency of use of
decree-making powers and to variation in the substantive focus of the presidential
decrees across countries and over time. It contributes to the existing literature by
addressing some of the major issues raised in these studies, such as the policy scope
and policy relevance of presidential decrees, the evidence for the existence of a
political business cycle in decree use, and the expectation of a gradual decrease in the
use of policy-related decrees over time.
Expanding the scope of research on presidential decree making both thematically
and temporally also allows me to draw attention to some aspects of decree authority
use that have been overlooked, such as the effects of differences in presidential
leadership style and the level of institutionalisation of the presidency, the increased
salience of unpublished decrees in overall decree output that offsets some of the
decline in numbers of policy-related decrees, the large magnitude of appointment
decrees and their critical importance for maintaining huge patronage systems and
securing the presidents’ ability to shape political and policy processes.

Methodology and data

The data set on presidential decrees was created on the basis of a number of databases
that contain a comprehensive list of presidential decrees: Sistema (Centre for Legal
ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/04/050637-24 © 2004 University of Glasgow
DOI: 10.1080/0966813041000235083
638 OLEH PROTSYK

Information, Federal Agency of Government Communications, Russia), Spravochnye

pravovye sistemy (Konsultant Plus, Russia) and Zakonodavstvo (Office of Computer
Systems, Apparatus of Parliament of Ukraine, Ukraine). Every attempt was made to
cover all presidential decrees issued between 1991 and 2002 in both countries.5 The
decrees are classified according to broad policy area, substantive focus and time of
issue. Appendix 1 provides the classification details. Additional parameters of
classification were introduced in the course of analysis of specific research issues
raised at different stages of this research project. These classification parameters are
explained in the text during the discussion of the relevant research problems.6

The scope of presidential decree making

The number of presidential decrees issued in Russia and Ukraine is very large. The
annual number exceeded 1,000 throughout the post-communist period in both coun-
tries, with the exception of 1992–94 in Ukraine. Even before the institutional
frameworks enacted by the 1993 Russian and 1996 Ukrainian constitutions — which
awarded the presidents very considerable decree powers — came into place, the
presidents actively started to use this policy instrument to consolidate the powers of
their newly created office and to implement policies for which they lacked both
legislative and broad societal support. The interpretations of these presidential actions
during the early years of democratic transition varied substantially — from seeing the
presidents as trying to solve the problems of collective action (Parrish) and to
champion unpopular but necessary reforms (Huskey) to explaining their behaviour as
attempts to usurp power and create a delegative democracy (Kubicek).7 Under either
interpretation the presidential decrees were instrumental in achieving the presidents’
goals, which further underlines the importance of a systematic examination of the
presidential decree output for developing a better understanding of the nature and
extent of presidential involvement in the political process and policy making.
Similar to other presidential or semi-presidential democracies where the presidents
have executive decree authority,8 a number of very different actions are initiated by
presidential decree in Russia and Ukraine. Appendix 2 provides data on the share of
policy-related, ceremonial, appointment and unpublished decrees in overall decree
output. Only a fraction of total decree output explicitly deals with policy-related
issues, which are the main focus of academic scholarship on presidential decrees. One
part of policy-related decree output concerns the initiation of new policies by the
president. The other part deals with what can be described as routine executive
administration or rule making directed at implementing existing laws. A large portion
of presidential decree output deals with so-called ceremonial issues and reflects
presidential control of such inherent executive prerogatives as awarding medals,
honorary titles and pardons. Two other substantial portions of decree output in the
Russian and Ukrainian context deal with appointments at the various levels of
government and with matters that constitute state secrets.
Figure 1 provides a summary of several major aspects of decree making in Russia
and Ukraine. The total number of decrees is plotted in the upper left graph and
indicates that the Russian presidents were issuing a much larger number of decrees
than their Ukrainian counterparts. The difference in the numbers was especially
 RULING WITH DECREES IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 639

Source: Author’s calculations: data from databases Sistema (Centre for Legal Information, Federal Agency
of Government Communications, Russia) and Zakonodavstvo (Office of Computer Systems, Apparatus of
Parliament of Ukraine).

FIGURE 1. PRESIDENTIAL DECREES AND PARLIAMENTARY LAWS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE, 1992–2002.

pronounced during the earlier years of democratic transition, reflecting differences in

the style of political leadership adopted by the first post-communist presidents, El’tsin
and Kravchuk. Leadership styles themselves were, to a large extent, a function of
differences in the political charisma and degree of conservatism or reform-minded-
ness of the presidents and their immediate political entourage.9
President El’tsin, who established a reputation as a risk-taking and reform-oriented
leader long before he became president, saw decree powers as an effective instrument
for exercising his influence over the political process and policies. President
Kravchuk, whom most analysts describe as a very cautious and risk-averse politician,
enjoyed neither El’tsin’s charisma nor his democratic credentials. Kravchuk was often
hesitant to take the initiative and exercise his powers as president. These differences
640 OLEH PROTSYK

were reflected in the use of decree powers and affected the way the process of
institutionalisation of the presidency evolved in the two countries.10
The gap in the total annual number of presidential decrees decreased substantially
after the arrival in office of the second Ukrainian president, Kuchma, in the second
half of 1994. Two unrelated trends contributed to the narrowing of the gap. The first,
which signified a real change in presidential behaviour, was the increased frequency
with which Kuchma relied on decree authority to influence the political process and
policy making in Ukraine. The second was partly due to a change in the practice of
issuing ceremonial decrees by El’tsin.11 Realising the high administrative costs
involved in issuing a separate decree for each medal or title awarded, the Russian
president started to rely increasingly on issuing ceremonial decrees that would cover
a group of award recipients rather than a single individual. The change in the number
of ceremonial decrees issued in Russia was also partly due to the fact that the variety
of honorary titles awarded between 1993 and 1995 declined rapidly.12 As a result, the
total number of ceremonial decrees dropped from 1,300 in 1993 to less than 300 in
1995.
The upper right graph excludes ceremonial decrees from the total count, which
includes ceremonial, policy-related, appointment and unpublished decrees, and pro-
vides a summary of the changes in decree numbers that more accurately reflects the
general patterns of presidential involvement in the political process and policy
making. The differences between Russia and Ukraine become even more pronounced
in this graph. The magnitude of these differences varied from about 200 to 900
decrees per year. Similar to the first graph, the differences were most substantial
during the early years of transition, 1992 and 1993. The differences in the numbers,
however, increased sharply on two separate occasions later in the decade: 1996 and
2000, the years of presidential elections in Russia, saw spikes in the number of
non-ceremonial decrees and a widening gap in decree issuance between Ukraine and
Russia.
The graph also suggests that the most substantial differences in the frequency of
use of decree authority in each of the countries are related to leadership changes in
the presidential office. In Ukraine, the transfer of presidential power from Kravchuk
to Kuchma in 1994 led to a dramatic increase in the number of decrees issued. The
annual decree numbers during Kuchma’s presidency, however, varied significantly
less and remained on a much higher level than the annual numbers during Kravchuk’s
incumbency. In Russia, while the frequency of decree issuance fluctuated quite
substantially during El’tsin’s presidency, the year 2002 saw a fall in the number of
decrees below the range of variation established during the El’tsin period. This graph
suggests, as some scholars have already argued, that, after the initial year, Putin’s
presidency may indicate the emergence of a new pattern of less frequent use of decree
authority in Russia.13
This observation, however, needs to be qualified in several important respects. One
qualification is presented in the bottom left graph, which provides data on another
important aspect of presidential decree making, unpublished decrees. A different
methodology was used for collecting data on unpublished decrees in Russia and
Ukraine. While neither the title nor any indication of the content of these decrees is
published in Ukraine, the government information databases specify the number, the
 RULING WITH DECREES IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 641

date of issue and the ‘not for publication’ status of these decrees. In contrast, the
Russian official sources do not contain any information on this type of decree. I
followed Parrish’s approach to estimate the quantity of unpublished decrees. The
numbers were calculated by subtracting the number of published decrees from the
total annual number of decrees as indicated by the numbering of the last decree issued
during the year (the decrees are issued in numerical order starting from number one
for the first decree issued in January and continuing until the end of December).14
If my estimates are correct, the Russian presidents since 1993 routinely issued more
than 500 unpublished decrees each year, with 1997 being the only exception. As the
graph indicates, the number of unpublished decrees peaked in 2000 when Putin, first
as acting and later as newly elected president, issued slightly more than 900 decrees.
The annual average of unpublished decrees for Putin’s presidency is much higher than
for the two consecutive El’tsin terms, which implies increased reliance on this type
of decree by the president.
While most executives in the world have the power to issue so-called secret
decrees, the graphs indicate that the Russian and Ukrainian presidents used this power
with very different frequency. Between 1992 and 2002 the annual number of
unpublished decrees in Ukraine never exceeded 100. Although the gap in the annual
number of unpublished decrees between the two countries is probably partly a
function of Russia’s ‘great power’ status and concomitant security, military and
intelligence engagements, it is difficult to determine the scope of the issues dealt with
by secret decrees. As the recent journalistic discovery of the content of one secret
decree in Ukraine suggests, even relatively infrequent use of the practice of issuing
secret decrees does not provide any guarantee that they are used only to deal with
narrowly defined matters of state secrets.15
The legal norms that would specify the rules for classifying decrees as ‘not for
publication’ remain vaguely defined in both countries. In the absence of such specific
rules, the use of secret decrees provides grounds for serious concern about the
transparency and accountability of post-communist executives. It should be of
particular concern given that the share of unpublished decrees in the overall decree
output, as Appendix 2 shows, increased in both countries over time. The increase was
especially dramatic in Russia, where the share of unpublished decrees in the overall
decree output grew from 13% in 1992 to 42% in 2002. The large number of
unpublished decrees, especially in Russia, also creates a problem for the analyst trying
to assess the extent and impact of presidential involvement in various areas of public
policy. Much of the following discussion of the presidential practices of using decree
authority should be taken with this caveat in mind.
Monthly data on the numbers of non-ceremonial and unpublished decrees, which
are presented in Appendix 3, also indicate that the frequency with which the president
relied on decree authority was affected by the presidential electoral cycle.16 The
frequency charts for both non-ceremonial and unpublished decrees in Russia provide
evidence of the existence of both beginning and end-of-term effects.17 There was a
substantial rise in the decree numbers during the months that immediately preceded
or followed the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. While the same pattern can be
detected in the frequency charts for the 1994 presidential election in Ukraine, the
642 OLEH PROTSYK

overall evidence from the non-ceremonial and unpublished decrees graphs for the
1994 and 1999 presidential elections is not conclusive.
The bottom right graph in Figure 1 provides a summary of parliamentary activity
that constitutes the legislative context in which presidents in Russia and Ukraine
operate. As the lines capturing the changes in the annual passage of laws by the
parliaments indicate, there have been upward trends in the numbers of laws passed in
both countries.18 Although this trend is much more pronounced in Ukraine than in
Russia, the data on law passage may suggest the growing assertiveness of parliaments
in both countries. This trend remains intact even after excluding from the annual
counts those laws that introduce only stylistic changes or amendments to the existing
laws, without affecting in any significant way policies established by prior legislative
acts.
The most noticeable feature of this graph, however, is the higher level of legislative
activity in Ukraine, as measured by the number of laws passed, than in Russia. With
the exception of two years, the Ukrainian parliament annually passed a larger number
of laws than its Russian counterpart. The year 1998 was one of the exceptions when
the number of laws passed by the Ukrainian parliament dropped behind the number
passed in Russia. This drop can probably be attributed to the deputies’ preoccupation
with electoral politics due to the parliamentary elections held that year in Ukraine.
Election year politics, however, do not seem to have affected legislative productivity
negatively in any other year during which elections were held in either country.
Parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine in 1994, 1998 and 2002 and in Russia
in 1993, 1995 and 1999. Although the differences in the numbers lessen during the
last two years, it is unclear at this point whether there is a converging trend in
legislative productivity.
The overall differences in legislative output between the two countries give some
support to the claims that a bicameral legislature slows law making by introducing
another powerful institutional actor, an upper legislative chamber, into the legislative
process. One interpretation of the burgeoning literature on veto powers is that the
larger the number of institutional actors with veto powers over legislation, the slower
the decision-making process will be. It is unclear, however, how such an interpret-
ation relates to the findings of some leading scholars on the Russian legislature.
Remington argues, for example, that bicameralism reduces the complexity of decision
making in Russia in such a way that only one dimension of conflict is dealt with at
a time.19
In order to assess the ‘veto gates’ argument fully, the roles of legislative commit-
tees, parliamentary rules of procedure and party factions in parliament have to be
analysed comparatively. While there is a large amount of literature with a single
country focus dealing with these issues — the literature on Russia is especially large
— there have been few attempts at a genuinely comparative analysis of how the
legislatures in Russia and Ukraine operate.20
The predominantly competitive rather than submissive nature of the Ukrainian
parliament’s relationship with the president might be another factor behind higher
levels of legislative output in Ukraine.21 While a systematic analysis of this relation-
ship, similar to one conducted by Mishler et al. with regard to Russia, is outside the
scope of this article, the effects of executive–legislative confrontation on the character
 RULING WITH DECREES IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 643

and quantity of the decree and law output in Ukraine constitute a promising research
programme.22

Presidential decrees and policy

Estimating the policy significance of presidential decrees involves significant method-
ological difficulties. On one hand, Carey & Shugart advocate a highly restrictive
understanding of a decree that affects policy.23 They differentiate between decrees
that establish new policies or change the existing policies and decrees that are merely
rule-making orders which are used for implementing policies set by the legislature
and which inherently belong to the arsenal of tools available to the executive. They
acknowledge that sometimes difficulties emerge in differentiating between these two
types of decrees but claim that the difficulties are not major. On the other hand,
Mayer, in his analysis of presidential orders in the United States, argues that even
setting up a temporary commission in the presidential office can constitute a policy
move because it makes a certain type of policy outcome more or less likely.24
Classifying decrees according to their policy importance obviously introduces a
degree of subjectivity on the part of the researcher. This is especially so in the context
of our two post-Soviet republics, where a large portion of decree output falls in the
conceptually grey zone of decrees whose scope and subject matter make them
comparable in terms of policy effects to the laws and decrees that are merely
instructions for civil servants regarding the implementation of statute norms.
To measure the frequency and scope of presidential decree-based intervention in
the various policy areas I proceeded by classifying policy-related decree output in two
steps. First, following Mishler et al., I categorised all decrees dealing with policy-re-
lated issues according to broadly defined policy areas: polity, economy and society.
Appendix 1 provides details on what sub-categories were included in each category.
All decrees dealing with issues in the specific policy area were included in the count,
regardless of the scope and nature of the actions required by the decree. When a
decree dealt with multiple issues or crossed policy boundaries, it was assigned to the
category that best described the decree’s primary focus.

Policy-related decrees
There were a large number of presidential decrees dealing with various policy-related
issues in both countries during the first post-communist decade. As most of the
literature suggests, the decrees were crucial for establishing policies in very diverse
areas. Major recent studies of presidential decrees done by legal scholars in both
countries are indicative of the scope of issues the decrees were trying to regulate. For
example, Luchin & Mazurov chose to devote six separate chapters to the Russian
president’s involvement in setting norms in the following policy areas: government
and administration, economy, finance, land reform, labour relations and crime
prevention.25
The policy-related decrees include decrees with broad normative or regulatory
scope such as, for example, N. 1272, ‘Issues of the Federal Tax Police Agency’
(Russia, 25 September 1999), N. 62, ‘On Measures for Protecting Property Rights of
644 OLEH PROTSYK

Peasantry in the Process of Reforming the Agrarian Sector of the Economy’ (Ukraine,
29 January 2001);26 decrees with a much narrower scope such as N. 550, ‘On
Additional Powers and Responsibilities of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the
President of the Russian Federation in Primorsky Region’ (Russia, 4 June 1997) and
N. 70, ‘On Ensuring the Proper Functioning of the Local Government Authorities in
the City of Yalta’ (Ukraine, 30 January 1998); and decrees that are no more than
administrative instructions on restructuring presidential offices or changing routine
bureaucratic procedures such as N. 152, ‘On the Department of the Administration of
the President of the Russian Federation on Cooperation with the Executive Bodies of
the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (Russia, 1 March 1997) and N. 63, ‘On
Amendments to Appendix N. 1 of the Statute on Government Experts on State
Secrets’ (Ukraine, 27 January 1998).
Figure 2a summarises the data on policy-related decrees in Russia and Ukraine.
The upper left graph provides data on the total numbers of policy-related decrees.
These numbers are broken down according to the three broad categories — polity,
economy and society — in three other graphs. As all of these graphs indicate, the
differences between the two countries in terms of policy-related decrees are less
pronounced than the differences in decree issuance patterns presented in Fig. 1.
Although the Russian president started the first post-communist decade by issuing a
larger number of decrees in all policy areas, the differences between the two countries
started to narrow during the last years of Kravchuk’s incumbency. The patterns in
decree issuance became decidedly mixed after Kuchma assumed office.
The overall policy-related decree output was larger in Russia prior to 1999. Since
2000 the total numbers of policy-related decrees issued in Russia and Ukraine have
been almost the same. A similar pattern characterised decree issuance in the polity
area. The changes in decree numbers in the economy and society areas were
somewhat different. Decree issuance in these categories exhibited a higher level of
variation and the annual numbers of decrees in the two countries overlapped more
frequently. Overall, the data on policy-related decree issuance in Russia suggest a
downward trend, while no similar trend in the number of policy-related decrees in
Ukraine can be detected.
This difference in the trajectories of policy decree issuance has its sources in the
patterns of presidential leadership during the first years of post-communist transition.
As was noted earlier, the starting points in practising decree making in Russia and
Ukraine were very different. President El’tsin, who opted for a more activist
leadership style and enjoyed a stronger popular mandate than his Ukrainian counter-
part Kravchuk, started his presidency with a very enthusiastic embrace of decree
powers. The Russian president’s reliance on policy decrees began to diminish during
the last years of the El’tsin presidency and, as Remington points out, gave place to
a more co-operative and parliament-regarding style of decision making during the first
years of Putin’s administration.27 It is the first years of El’tsin rule that allow us to
interpret the Russian graph as a downward trend rather than just a drift.28
Although the total number of policy decrees has steadily declined during the second
term of Kuchma’s presidency, this decline, when put in the perspective of presidential
decree making in Ukraine over the whole period, cannot be described in terms of a
trend. The decline in the number of policy decrees during Kuchma’s second term has
 RULING WITH DECREES IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 645

FIGURE 2(a) POLICY-RELATED DECREES IN RUSSIAAND UKRAINE, 1992–2002 (b) DISTRIBUTION OF POLICY-
RELATED DECREES

different sources than the decline attributed to Putin’s approach to policy making.
There has been no noticeable increase in the degree of co-operation between the
president and parliament during Kuchma’s second term, even after a short-lived
majority pledging co-operation with the executive was constructed in January 2000.29
Political scandals, growing domestic and international opposition to his presidency,
and resulting political weakness, rather than Kuchma’s willingness to forego decrees
646 OLEH PROTSYK

and to seek the implementation of his policies through the parliament, explain the
decline in the number of policy decrees in recent years in Ukraine.
The frequency of the issuance of policy-related decrees also seems to be affected
differently by election year politics when compared with the frequency of the
non-ceremonial decrees (which combined policy, appointment and secret decrees)
presented in Fig. 1. While there was a spike in the numbers of all types of
policy-related decrees during the year of the 1996 election in Russia, with the
exception of society-related decrees there was no comparable rise in policy decree
numbers during 2000. This means that the rise in number of non-ceremonial decrees
in Russia during 2000, which was registered in the upper right graph of Fig. 1, is
almost entirely due to the rise in the number of secret and appointment decrees. The
monthly data on policy-related decrees in Appendix 3 also clearly indicate a large
surge in the number of policy-related decrees during the months that surrounded the
1996 presidential election and a much lesser impact of the 2000 presidential election
on the policy-related decree numbers in Russia.
The changes in numbers of all policy-related decrees in Ukraine more closely
followed the general pattern established in the non-ceremonial decrees graph for
Ukraine in Fig. 1. The numbers of policy-related decrees were on the rise during
1994, the year of one presidential election campaign, and peaked during 1999, the
year of the second presidential campaign in the sample. The 1999 peak is explained
by the rise in the numbers of decrees dealing with economic and social issues.
The fact that the highest number of economic decrees was issued during 1999 was
a product of the expiry of the president’s special economic decree powers rather than
of beginning and end-of-term effects. A closer look at the monthly data on policy-re-
lated decrees for Ukraine in Appendix 3 reveals that the only significant spike in the
number of policy-related decrees took place in June 1999. That was the month when
a three-year term of special decree powers, which were awarded to the president by
the 1996 constitution and which allowed him to issue economic decrees in areas
unregulated by laws, expired. Monthly data on policy-related decrees for the 1994
presidential election in Appendix 3 suggest the existence of the end-of-term effect but
not the beginning-of-term effect.
The finding that large increases in the number of policy-related decrees in both
countries took place during the pre-election periods for the 1996 and 1994 presidential
elections and not for the 2000 and 1999 elections is probably partly due to a higher
decree of uncertainty about the outcomes surrounding the earlier presidential elections
in Russia and Ukraine. Especially in Russia, as many observers noted at the time, the
1996 presidential election, owing to the seriousness of the challenge the communist
candidate Zyuganov posed for the politically increasingly unpopular and physically
ailing El’tsin, was of a highly contested and unpredictable nature. In contrast, Putin’s
very high approval ratings, first in the capacity of prime minister and later of acting
president, provided little room for doubt about the outcome of the 2000 election.30
The evidence that the frequencies of issuance of policy decrees were affected by
the electoral cycle provides an indirect but very important source of support for the
claim that presidential decrees matter. If they did not matter and were inconsequential
in terms of affecting substantive policies and, ultimately, electoral outcomes, there
 RULING WITH DECREES IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 647

would be very little reason for the existence of the seasonal (political seasons)
component detected in the data.
This reasoning should, however, take into account the unsustainable and often
‘single intervention’ approach of many policies initiated by such decrees. The very
titles of some of the decrees issued during that period — N. 550, ‘On Immediate
Measures for Improving Pension Provision for the Citizens of the Russian Federation’
(Russia, 15 April 1996), N. 819, ‘On State Support for Gardeners and the Owners of
Homestead Plots’ (Russia, 7 June 1996), and N. 318, ‘On Immediate Measures for
Ensuring Legality of Retail Sales Operations and Strengthening the Fight against
Retail Speculation’ (Ukraine, 18 June 1994) — are indicative of their populist nature.
While Fig. 2a provides data on the absolute numbers of decrees in the different
categories of policy-related decree output and summarises the changes in these
numbers over time, Fig. 2b shows the relative weight of these categories in the overall
policy-related decree output and traces the temporal changes in their relative weight.
More than half of policy-related decree output throughout the years consisted of
decrees dealing with various aspects of the polity. The share of polity-related decrees
was slightly higher in Russia than in Ukraine. In both countries the share of polity
decrees has further increased in recent years, largely at the expense of economic
decrees. The relative weight of the latter declined very significantly in comparison
with the early 1990s both in Russia and Ukraine. While in 1992 the shares of
economic decrees in Russia and Ukraine were 36% and 24% respectively, economic
decrees accounted for only 13% and 12% of policy-related output in these countries
in 2002. The share of decrees dealing with society issues varied in the range of
6–20% during the entire period, averaging 12% for Russia and 14% for Ukraine.

Policy norms
In the second step of classifying policy-related decrees I attempt to estimate how
often the president actually initiated new policies or introduced a major change to
existing policy in any of three broadly defined policy arenas: polity, economy and
society. For lack of a better term, I call these decrees ‘policy norms’. Appendix 4
provides details on what type of decrees were included in this more restrictive count
of policy-related decrees.
The results are presented in the ‘Policy: norms’ graph in Fig. 2a, which shows that
the number of policy decrees that initiated new policies or introduced a major change
to existing policy is quite substantial. It also indicates that changes in the number of
policy norms followed the same patterns as changes in the total numbers of
policy-related decrees. The decline in the number of these decrees over the years was
more pronounced in Russia than in Ukraine.
While decrees introducing policy norms deserve separate and detailed treatment,
which is outside of the scope of this article, the numbers in this graph provide
important additional information with regard to the problem of estimating the direct
effect of presidential decrees on initiating new policies. Parrish, following the official
Russian collection of laws and executive acts, divided presidential decrees into two
categories: ‘normative’ and ‘non-normative’. He claimed that only ‘normative’
decrees, which in Russian legal usage establish a precedent of some sort, could be
648 OLEH PROTSYK

regarded as genuine policy decrees. The Russian numbers from the graph support the
present author’s suspicion that even the number of normative decrees overstates the
number of times the president in Russia makes new policies.
Yet in absolute terms the number of decrees initiating new policies remains large.
For example, in Russia 106 out of 188 policy-related decrees in 2001 and 101 out of
174 in 2002 were classified as policy norms. Equally important is the fact that the
share of policy norms in the total count of policy-related decrees has not changed
much over the years. The average share of policy norms in the annually based count
of policy-related decrees for the 1992–2002 period in Russia was 61%. The figures
for 2001 and 2002 are respectively 56% and 58%. This means that presidential
policy-related decrees continue to deal with major policy issues. There was little if
any increase in the share of presidential decrees dealing with such routine executive
functions as providing government officials with specific and relatively minor instruc-
tions and orders regarding the implementation of existing statues and norms.

Presidential appointment decrees

The appointment decree powers of presidents in Russia and Ukraine have so far
received very little attention in the literature. Yet the importance of such presidential
decrees is difficult to overestimate. Appointments are an indirect but often very
effective way of influencing policies. In many circumstances, choosing among the
alternative candidates for key government positions implies making a choice between
alternative courses of action. The significance of appointment powers becomes even
more felt in highly personalised politics where rules, norms and procedures are
weakly institutionalised and informal political mechanisms often substitute for formal
political channels.
Appointment decrees are critically important for understanding how politics func-
tions, not only because of their potential effect on policy outcomes but also because
they provide important insights into political and bureaucratic elite recruitment and
upward mobility. Appointment decrees are essential for the president’s ability to build
and maintain political support. They are a valuable patronage resource for presidents
who always need to reward loyalists, attract the hesitant and co-opt rivals.
Both in Russia and Ukraine the presidents make hundreds of appointments each
year. Figures 3a and 3b provide a summary of the numbers and character of
presidential appointments and their relative importance in the overall decree output.
The appointment decree numbers in both figures include both appointments and
dismissals made by presidential decrees. In the following discussion whenever I use
the term appointment decrees I refer to decrees that deal with either appointments or
dismissals.
The graph ‘Appointments: total’ provides information on the annual number of
presidential decrees in Russia and Ukraine. Starting from 1995 the Ukrainian
president consistently made a substantially larger number of appointments than his
Russian counterpart. The gap in the total output has grown especially large since
2001, largely owing to the drastic decline in the number of appointments made by
President Putin. Like other types of decrees, the numbers of appointment decrees were
 RULING WITH DECREES IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 649

Source: Author’s calculations; data from databases Sistema (Centre for Legal Information, Federal Agency
of Government Communications, Russia) and Zakonodavstvo (Office of Computer Systems, Apparatus of
Parliament of Ukraine)).

FIGURE 3(a) APPOINTMENT DECREES IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE, 1992–2002 (b) DISTRIBUTION OF DECREES
TYPE.

election-sensitive, especially in Russia, where the two election years of 2000 and
1996 saw increases in the numbers of decrees.
In both countries the presidents appoint cabinet ministers, heads of the various
central government agencies, top civil servants, military and security apparatus, top
management of some state-owned industries, judges, diplomats and the countries’
representatives to international organisations, and make a number of appointments at
the regional level. The nature of appointments at the regional level varies owing to
the differences between the federal and unitary design of the two countries. The
Russian president appoints the presidential representative in the regions, special
650 OLEH PROTSYK

representatives charged with specific tasks and, starting with the Putin presidency,
presidential representatives in the federal districts.31 The Ukrainian presidents, with
the exception of an approximately 12-month period during 1994–95, appointed first
the presidential representatives in the oblasti and later the heads of the oblast’ state
administrations, who enjoyed substantially larger powers on the regional level than
the presidential representatives in the regions in Russia.32 Prior to 1995 the Ukrainian
presidents also actively used presidential decrees to appoint presidential representa-
tives in raiony, a function that later became primarily reserved for presidential
executive orders.
The substantially larger numbers of appointment decrees issued on a regular basis
by the Ukrainian president is especially puzzling given the fact that the constitutional
appointment powers of the presidents in Russia and Ukraine are roughly comparable
and that the Russian president has to appoint several times as many diplomats, judges
and presidential representatives in the regions. Although the Russian president makes
more frequent use of the practice of issuing one decree for a number of appointments,
for example, to appoint judges, than his Ukrainian counterpart, so-called multiple
decrees constitute only a very small part of appointment decree output. The vast
majority of appointment decrees concern the appointment or dismissal of a single
person.
The right graph in Fig. 3a helps to identify some of the answers to this puzzle. It
shows the number of decrees in a key appointment area, cabinet. As the graph
indicates, the Ukrainian presidents since 1993 were issuing many more cabinet
appointment decrees. Both ministerial and deputy ministerial appointments were
included in calculating these numbers. The gap was especially large during the early
years of the first Kuchma administration in Ukraine (1995–97): the Ukrainian
president was issuing on average 200 cabinet appointment-related decrees during that
period. The only year during which the gap between Russia and Ukraine almost
closed was 1998, a year of financial meltdown in Russia that led to frequent cabinet
changes. There was also a significant drop in the number of cabinet appointments
during that year in Ukraine.
A higher decree of politicisation of bureaucratic appointments and a higher level of
cabinet instability in Ukraine explain the differences presented in the graph. The
president in Ukraine routinely made many more deputy ministerial appointments than
his Russian counterpart. Presidents El’tsin and Putin chose to use presidential decrees
to appoint deputy ministers almost exclusively in ministries that deal with the policy
areas in which, according to the Russian constitution, the president has special control
over the activity of government agencies: defence, security, internal affairs, foreign
affairs and emergency situations (Article 32). In Ukraine president Kuchma has been
appointing deputy ministers across the whole spectrum of cabinet ministries.
Neither the Russian nor Ukrainian constitutional clauses specify rules regarding
deputy ministerial appointments. The fact that the presidents chose to interpret them
differently is primarily a function of differences in their political and constitutional
strength. President Kuchma, whose constitutional powers and political strength have
been consistently lower than those of his Russian counterparts, fought hard with the
cabinet and parliament over the control of appointments of deputy ministers and,
more recently, state secretaries, in order to compensate for his political and
 RULING WITH DECREES IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 651

institutional weaknesses. A highly politicised upper echelon of the civil service, a

recurrent problem in transitional and developing countries against which numerous
World Bank publications warn repeatedly,33 has been a by-product of actions taken
by a politically insecure president trying to build a comprehensive patronage base and
consolidate the powers of his relatively new office.
Many observers noted that the presidents in both countries tried to maintain control
over the political elite by balancing rival factions.34 In Ukraine, where economic
reforms in general and privatisation in particular lag behind similar reforms in Russia,
access to state resources continues to be exceptionally critical for different elite
factions. Presidential appointments are one of the key mechanisms that regulate
access to state resources. President Kuchma had to use different types of appoint-
ments more frequently than his Russian counterpart in order to balance rival factions
and pre-empt challenges they could pose to his leadership. He rewarded weak factions
and punished factions that were growing too strong by appointing or dismissing their
members to or from key government positions.
Cabinet instability, the second reason behind the higher number of cabinet
appointments in Ukraine, can also be traced to the lower degree of political strength
and to more credible political threats to Kuchma’s presidency on the part of the
various political opposition forces. Kuchma’s leadership over the executive has been
routinely challenged by several prime ministers. His response to these challenges was
to dismiss the prime ministers and their cabinets, thus generating more ministerial
turnover.35 There have been nine new prime ministers in Ukraine since 1991. In
contrast, Russia saw only six new prime ministers during the same period and only
one of them, Primakov, could be considered as contesting the presidential leadership
over the executive.
The appointment frequency graphs in Appendix 3 provide some indication that the
number of presidential appointments was sensitive to the stages of the electoral cycle,
although in both countries the effects of presidential elections on the appointment
numbers were smaller than, for example, the election effects on the numbers of policy
decrees. A more detailed statistical analysis of monthly frequencies is needed in order
to estimate properly the impact of elections on changes in the decree numbers.
To illustrate how frequently the presidents issued appointment decrees in compari-
son to decrees dealing with policy-related issues, Fig. 3b provides data on the average
annual number of appointment and policy-related decrees for the 1992–2002 period
and on the annual numbers for the last year in the sample, 2002. In both countries
appointment decrees outnumbered decrees in any policy-related category but in
Ukraine the difference between the numbers of appointment and policy-related
decrees was especially large. Even after dividing the appointment numbers by two in
order to account separately for decrees dealing with appointments and dismissals,
each new category for Ukraine would include almost the same number of decrees as
all policy-related categories combined. The appointment decrees, especially in
Ukraine, constitute a very important instrument of presidential involvement in the
political process and policy making.
Figure 3b also provides another way of comparing the most recent data on
presidential decree making, with the averages for the entire period. The upper left and
right bar graphs illustrate what was established earlier as a significant drop in
652 OLEH PROTSYK

presidential decree making in Russia. A substantially smaller number of appointment

decrees, as well as policy-related decrees, were issued during 2002 compared with the
annual average. The lower left and right bar graphs indicate that the same indicators
for Ukraine for 2002 differ very little, with the exception of economy-related decrees,
from the averages for the entire 1992–2002 period. While the number of appointment
decrees in Ukraine was dropping during the last two years of the period, these drops
do not fall outside the range of variation in the number of appointment decrees
established during Kuchma’s two-term presidency. The president seems to be a firm
adherent to the old dictum that cadres decide everything and continues to run the
country, to a much larger extent than his Russian counterparts, through appointment
decrees.

Implications and conclusion

Presidential decree making dominated the political process and the design of public
policy in both Russia and Ukraine during the first post-communist decade. The
presidents in both countries frequently tried and were often successful in shaping
various political, economic and social outcomes by issuing policy-related decrees,
making hundreds of key political appointments and giving secret executive orders.
The presidential willingness to intervene in the political process and policy making
with decrees was shaped by a number of factors. Perceived necessities of economic
and social reforms, political imperatives and electoral concerns all played a role in
determining the extent of the presidents’ reliance on decree powers. The data analysed
in this article also suggest that differences in the style of the presidential leadership
were important in explaining differences in the frequencies and scope of presidential
decree making. The most significant and lasting changes in the number of presidential
decrees issued in both countries were associated with leadership changes in the
presidential office.
The leadership factor cautions against overestimating the importance of institu-
tional design in explaining the behaviour of post-communist executives during the
first post-communist decade. It is indicative that neither the 1993 Russian nor the
1996 Ukrainian constitutions, which, especially in the case of the former, significantly
increased presidential powers, led to radical changes in the frequency with which
presidents relied on decree powers. Prior to the adoption of the respective constitu-
tions, both El’tsin and Kuchma relied on decree powers as often as in the period of
their incumbency that followed the adoption of the constitutions. The data on the very
substantial differences between the two countries in the number of appointment
decrees and on the huge differences in the number of secret decrees, neither of which
can be explained with reference to variations in institutional design, further underline
the limitations of the legal constraints on presidential behaviour. The weakness of
legislative and judicial institutions undoubtedly contributed to the presidents’ ability
to chose how to interpret their constitutional powers both before and after the
adoption of the constitutions.
The article’s findings provide only limited support for the prevailing expectation
that the growing maturity of legislative institutions and the legal framework of
post-communist societies will lead to a rapid decline in presidential ability to rely on
 RULING WITH DECREES IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 653

decrees as a key instrument for influencing policy. As the data on total numbers of
decrees indicate, the numbers of non-ceremonial decrees in both countries peaked as
late as 2000. While there was a steady decline in the total number of policy-related
decrees in Russia after 1997, this decline was partly offset by a substantial increase
in the number of unpublished decrees. In Ukraine, where the number of policy-related
decrees was initially smaller than in Russia, to date no substantial drop below the
established range of variation in the number of policy-related decrees has taken place
during Kuchma’s second term.
The attempt to single out the most important policy-related decrees, those that
signal the initiation of a new policy or a major change in an existing one, led to
somewhat similar conclusions. There was a more substantial decline over the years in
the number of these decrees in Russia than in Ukraine. Even in 2002, however, the
presidents of both Russia and Ukraine were issuing, on average, between eight and
ten major policy decrees monthly. The increased willingness of President Putin to
seek agreement and compromise with the Duma does not imply refusal to use decree
powers in order to affect outcomes in the various policy areas. If judged by the
frequency and scope of only the very slowly declining numbers of policy-related
decrees, Kuchma remains an assertive president despite all the political scandals and
controversies surrounding his second term. Overall, more detailed research on the
content and implementation provisions of policy-related presidential decrees is
required in order to develop a better understanding of the role presidential decrees
play in planning, initiating and sustaining policies.
More detailed statistical research and a larger number of observations are also
needed to judge the effects of the electoral cycle on presidential decree making. The
coming rounds of presidential elections in both countries should help by generating
more data. This article emphasised the necessity of distinguishing between beginning
and end-of-terms effects. The data on presidential decree making during the 1996 and
2000 presidential elections in Russia and the 1994 and 1999 presidential elections in
Ukraine provide mixed support for the expectation that the last and first months in
office are associated with higher frequencies in presidential decree making. While the
data, for example, on the issuance of policy-related decrees during the 1996 presiden-
tial election provide strong support for the electoral cycle hypothesis, there were no
similar patterns in the numbers of policy-related decrees prior to and following the
1999 presidential election in Ukraine. The article suggests that both the uncertainty
of electoral outcomes and variation in categories and types of presidential decrees
should be taken into account when judging the effects of electoral politics on
presidential decree making.
The new institutionalism literature on presidentialism emphasises the importance of
viewing the presidency from the perspective of presidential ambitions to increase
control over institutions and processes.36 This article argued that two types of
presidential decrees, which have been largely outside the focus of scholarship on the
post-communist presidencies, unpublished decrees and appointment decrees, are
essential for the presidential ability to exercise such control. Scholars cannot say
much about unpublished decrees, except to analyse how their monthly and annual
frequencies are correlated with political and other types of events, and to attempt to
estimate the importance of these decrees from occasional revelations about the nature
654 OLEH PROTSYK

of specific decrees in the press. Yet the very large numbers of these decrees,
especially in Russia, should be of concern to those who study ways of increasing the
transparency and accountability of post-communist executives.
Appointment decrees, on the other hand, provide a wealth of information for those
interested in presidential politics, elite recruitment and mobility, and political pa-
tronage. Although presidential appointment decrees directly answer only the question
of who was appointed or dismissed, they provide a starting point for answering
questions concerning the reasons and circumstances of appointments and, subse-
quently, the patterns of change and stability in the political elite. The article found
that presidents in Ukraine routinely made a much larger number of political appoint-
ments than their Russian counterparts. This finding is especially startling given the
approximately similar appointment powers awarded to them by their respective
constitutions and the much larger size of the Russian political elite and bureaucratic
apparatus. Finding additional answers for this puzzle, besides those already discussed
here, would provide important insight into how the political process is organised and
how elite recruitment is structured.
Presidential decree making in both countries has been challenged in several ways.
On one hand, the presidents increasingly realise the limitations of ruling by decree.
The growing willingness to search for ways of implementing presidential initiative
through the parliament is one manifestation of attempts to build broader societal
support for the policies of the executive. On the other hand, presidential authority in
general, and decree powers in particular, remain politically and legally frequently
contested. Especially in Ukraine, where the constitutional debates are as strong today
as ever and the design of the entire semi-presidential constitutional framework is
under a great deal of scrutiny, the presidential ability to issue decres has been
increasingly questioned. Nevertheless, presidential decrees in both Russia and
Ukraine are likely to continue to constitute not only a significant information source
for studying the politics of the first post-communist decade but also a very important
instrument of presidential involvement in policy making.
University of Ottawa

1
Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia (Armonk, NY; M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Stephen
White, ‘Russia’, in Robert Elgie (ed.), Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1999), pp. 216–232; Bohdan Harasymiw, Post-Communist Ukraine (Toronto, Canadian Insti-
tute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2002); Andrew Wilson, ‘Ukraine’, in Elgie (ed.), Semi-Presidential-
ism in Europe, pp. 260–281.
2
Thomas F. Remington, S. S. Smith & M. Haspel, ‘Decrees, Laws, and Inter-branch Relations
in the Russian Federation’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 14, 4, 1998, pp. 287–322.
3
Scott Parrish, ‘Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991–1995’, in John M. Carey &
Matthew S. Shugart (eds), Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1998), pp. 62–103.
4
William Mishler, John P. Willerton & Gordon B. Smith, ‘Hegemony or Rivalry? Laws,
Decrees and the Dynamics of Legislative–Executive Relations in the Russian Federation’, revised
version of a paper presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Slavic Studies, June 2001.
5
Owing to an especially large volume of both published and unpublished presidential decrees
in Russia, a number of proprietary databases provide incomplete information on the number of
decrees issued by the president. Several Russian legislative databases were compared to create the
most comprehensive list of published decrees.
 RULING WITH DECREES IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 655
6
Students of Russian politics familiar with the work on executiev–legislative relations done by
Mishler, Willerton & Smith will find some of the classifications used in this research highly
compatible with the ones developed by these authors. While I introduced a number of new
classification categories to address some additional aspects of presidential and legislative decision
making, I adopted most of the general categories they proposed. This should allow a broader
cross-national comparison, which is one of the goals of this project; see Mishler et al., ‘Hegemony
or Rivalry?’.
7
Parrish, ‘Presidential Decree Authority …’; Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia; Paul
Kubicek, ‘Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies,
27, 4, 1994, pp. 423–439.
8
Carey & Shugart (eds), Executive Decree Authority.
9
Anders Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, DC, Brookings Insti-
tution, 1995); Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London, Routledge, 1996); Taras Kuzio,
Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Anders Aslund &
George De Menil, Economic Reform in Ukraine: The Unfinished Agenda (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe,
2000).
10
The literature on political elites is important in this respect. It acknowledges multiple
constraints that the public’s predispositions and orientations impose on the political leadership, yet it
allows significant room for the leaders’ initiative and discretion. In this line of thinking, choosing
leaders is critical, more so than choosing policies; see for example John Higley, Jan Pakulski &
Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe (Basingstoke,
Macmillan, 1998).
11
The following categories of decrees were classified as ceremonial: awarding honorary titles,
diplomas and medals; awarding military, diplomatic and civil service ranks; granting or revoking
citizenship rights; granting pardons; commemorating events and important historical dates; establish-
ing professional days (e.g. Teachers’ Day).
12
For example, in January 1993, which is the year that saw the largest number of ceremonial
decrees awarded, the president signed decrees awarding to groups of individuals the following
honorary titles of the Russian Federation: Honoured Doctor, Honoured Builder, Honoured Lawyer,
Honoured Geologist, Honoured Engineer, Honoured Miner, Honoured Transport Industry Worker,
Honoured Technologist, Honoured Teacher, Honoured Professional Education Worker, Honoured
Housing Industry Worker, Honoured Forestry Worker, Honoured Fishery Worker, Honoured Machin-
ery Construction Worker, Honoured Scientist, People’s Artist, Honoured Physical Education Worker,
Honoured Art Worker, Honoured Chemist, Honoured Consumer Services Worker, Honoured Archi-
tect, Honoured Power Engineering Worker, Honoured Textile Industry Worker, Honoured Inventor,
Honoured Oil and Natural Gas Industry Worker, Honoured Communication Service Worker, Hon-
oured Metallurgy Worker, Honoured Commerce Industry Worker, Honoured Textile Industry
Worker. During the same month a number of decrees awarding medals to individuals were signed,
including such medals as ‘For Saving the Drowning’ and ‘For Courage during Fire’ (source:
Spravochnye pravovye sistemy (Konsultant Plus, Russia)). Ceremonial decrees undoubtedly deserve
to be further analysed by students of sociology and anthropology.
13
Thomas F. Remington, ‘Putin and the Duma’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 17, 4, 2001, pp. 285–308.
14
Parrish, ‘Presidential Decree Authority …’. Parrish calculates that during the period he
analyses (1994–96) there were 526 and 548 unpublished presidential decrees issued in Russia during
two full years for which he collected data, 1994 and 1995 respectively. My estimates of the number
of unpublished decrees for those years were 524 and 553, which indicates that our independent counts
produced almost identical results.
15
Ukraine’s strategy of joining NATO, according to one journalistic investigation based on
information from NATO’s headquarters, was the subject matter of one secret decree issued during
2002; see Yulia Mostova, ‘Syurplyas po-ukrains’ky’, Dzerkalo tyzhdnya, 18–24 January 2003.
16
Thomas D. Willett, Political Business Cycles: The Political Economy of Money, Inflation, and
Unemployment (Durham NC, Duke University Press, 1988); Jeffrey E. Cohen, Presidential Respon-
siveness and Public Policy-making: The Public and the Policies that Presidents Choose (Ann Arbor,
University of Michigan Press, 1997).
17
Monthly numbers of unpublished decrees for Russia were estimated according to the same
logic used to estimate the annual numbers: by subtracting the number of published decrees from the
total monthly number of decrees as indicated by the numerical order of the last decree issued in that
month.
18
While the number of laws passed does not tell us much about the effectiveness of the
legislative process or the quality of laws, these numbers are important in light of the current debates
656 OLEH PROTSYK

about the advantages and drawbacks of the different types of legislative institutions because they
summarise one type of variation in the outcome of legislative activity.
19
Thomas F. Remington, The Russian Parliament: Institutional Evolution in a Transitional
Regime, 1989–1999 (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 157–158.
20
Legislative studies on Russia include Jeffrey W. Hahn, Democratization in Russia: The
Development of Legislative Institutions (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1996); Joel M. Ostrow, Compar-
ing Post-Soviet Legislatures: A Theory of Institutional Design and Political Conflict (Columbus, Ohio
State University Press, 2000); Steven S. Smith & Thomas F. Remington, The Politics of Institutional
Choice (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001); Remington, The Russian Parliament;
Josephine T. Andrews, When Majorities Fail: The Russian Parliament, 1990–1993 (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2002). On Ukraine see Paul D’Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, & Taras Kuzio,
Politics and Society in Ukraine (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1999); Paul D’Anieri, Robert
Kravchuk & Taras Kuzio (eds), State and Institution Building in Ukraine (New York, St. Martin’s
Press, 1999); Sarah Whitmore, ‘Faction Institutionalisation and Parliamentary Development in
Ukraine’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 10, 4, 2003, pp. 41–64.
21
Wilson, ‘Ukraine’.
22
Mishler et al., ‘Hegemony or Rivalry?’ Their paper invites, however, a number of questions
regarding the validity of measures used. Country specialists, for example, question the authors’
assumption that the rival president and parliament, when challenged in one specific policy area and
when choosing to compete rather than to acquiesce, will tend to compete by issuing laws and decrees
in other policy areas rather than resorting to other means of affecting the results in the initial policy
area.
23
Carey & Shugart (eds), Executive Decree Authority.
24
Kenneth R. Mayer, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001).
25
Viktor Luchin & Aleksei Mazurov, Ukazy Presidenta RF: Osnovnye sotsial’nye i pravovye
kharakteristiki (Moscow, Unity, 2000).
26
Although the decrees that were issued in the first half of the 1990s, especially in Russia in
such areas as privatisation or government restructuring, were the most resonant, the examples of
policy decrees that are cited here are chosen to reflect the continuing importance of presidential
decrees for policy making later in the decade.
27
Remington, ‘Putin and the Duma’.
28
For a not very technical discussion of these time series concepts see Richard McCleary &
Richard Hay, Applied Time Series Analysis for the Social Sciences (Beverly Hills, CA, Sage
Publications, 1980).
29
Harasymiw, Post-Communist Ukraine, pp. 294–295.
30
Richard Rose, ‘How Floating Parties Frustrate Democratic Accountability: A Supply-Side
View of Russia’s Elections’, East European Constitutional Review, 9, 1/2, 2000, pp. 53–61.
31
For a description of Putin’s use of appointment powers on the regional level see C. Ross,
‘Putin’s Federal Reforms and the Consolidation of Federalism in Russia: One Step Forward, Two
Steps Back!’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36, 2003, pp. 29–47. Presidents in Russia
appoint presidential representatives not only to the regions but also to selected government institu-
tions. For a description of this practice see Luchin & Mazurov, Ukazy Prezidenta RF.
32
O. Haran’, V. Kulyk & J. Maiboroda, Stanovlennya vladnyh struktur v Ukraini (Kiev, Den’,
1997)
33
The World Bank, The State in the Changing World (Washington, DC, The World Bank,
1997); The World Bank, ‘Ukraine Public Sector Reform Loan’, Washington, DC, The World Bank,
1997.
34
Mikhail Afanasiev, Klientelizm i Rossiiskaya gosudarstvennost’ (Moscow, Moskovskii ob-
shchestvennyi nauchnyi fond, 2000); Kost Bondarenko, Atlanty i kariatydy z-pid “dakhu” Prezydenta
(Lviv, Kalvariya, 2000).
35
Wilson, ‘Ukraine’.
36
Mayer, With the Stroke of a Pen; Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, ‘Presidents and the
Politics of Structure’, Law & Contemporary Problems, 57, 1/2, 1994, pp. 1–44.

Acknowledgement
The author thanks Theofil Kis and John P. Willerton for their suggestions and Vitaliy
Zamnius and Irina Mayevskaya for their assistance in collecting and coding data. This
project was supported by a grant funded by the Foundation Open Society Institute.
 RULING WITH DECREES IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 657

Appendix 1
TABLE A1
PRESIDENTIAL DECREES: SAMPLE CODING SHEET

Year
Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total

Appointments
Cabinet ministers 2 0 2 6 35 2 4 36 3 3 2 2 97
Central government 0 1 2 1 4 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 11
agencies
Military and police 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4
Judges 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5
Presidential 0 1 7 1 2 5 3 0 3 2 4 3 31
representatives in
regions
State enterprise 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 5
managers
Others 4 11 11 15 17 8 8 19 16 16 6 8 139
Ceremonial 35 12 55 38 26 45 29 30 61 39 44 53 467
Policy
Polity
Government and 7 3 9 4 6 10 3 10 13 6 8 11 90
administration
Military and police 1 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 5 2 0 0 14
Non-governmental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
organisations
Citizenship and 1 0 12 11 7 4 3 4 5 0 3 5 55
democratic norms
Economy
Economic issues 3 0 2 3 1 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 14
Natural resources 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 4
Budget and finance 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 7
State enterprises 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 6
Society
Social services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Demographics and 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
nationalities
Social problems 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arts and sciences 1 0 3 0 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 3 19
Unpublished 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 5

Total 107 41 35 58 44 73 33 67 65 57 47 87 741

 658

Appendix 2
TABLE A2
DISTRIBUTION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREES, 1992–2002 (% OF TOTAL)

Overall 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Russia
Appointments 17.45 21.31 10.32 9.63 17.55 22.79 22.95 21.77 20.44 23.06 11.38 10.74
Ceremonial 32.00 42.96 57.27 57.65 17.85 15.34 23.46 22.69 26.65 22.96 29.14 36.05
Policy 18.09 22.27 15.31 13.73 23.93 31.75 24.33 19.33 12.36 11.62 12.51 11.90
Unpublished 32.45 13.46 17.50 19.71 41.56 31.19 30.05 37.55 42.20 42.79 47.50 42.13
Ukraine
Appointments 36.65 31.74 24.58 29.59 37.00 40.74 39.91 31.91 34.47 46.91 45.53 40.76
Ceremonial 39.40 50.00 49.00 35.64 35.29 35.93 45.24 45.39 42.89 28.80 28.79 36.40
Policy 19.36 14.85 21.57 30.09 22.34 20.17 13.35 18.05 18.82 17.48 18.47 17.73
OLEH PROTSYK

Unpublished 4.60 3.41 4.85 4.69 5.37 3.15 1.50 4.64 3.82 6.80 7.20 5.12

N ⫽ 19,303 (Russia).
N ⫽ 12,097 (Ukraine).
Source: as Fig. 1.
 RULING WITH DECREES IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 659

Appendix 3

Source: as Figure 1.
Note: 1996m6 and 2003m3—presidential elections in Russia; 1994m7 and 1999m10—presidential elections
in Ukraine.
FIGURE A1. PRESIDENTIAL DECREES: MONTHLY FREQUENCIES, 1992–2002.
660 OLEH PROTSYK

Appendix 4
Policy Norms: Types of Presidential Decrees Included in or Excluded from the Count

Polity Included Decrees that: established the various types of central government agencies;
determined the structure of the military; regulated the activity of
non-government organisations; specified the norms of behaviour for the
civil service, police and military; dealt in general ways with democratic
norms and citizenship rights. Example: N. 42, ‘On Establishing the
Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation’ (24 January 1992).
Excluded Decrees that dealt with organisational issues surrounding the establishment
and functioning of the presidential administration and temporary
commissions and committees established under the auspices of the
president. Example: N. 27, ‘On the Protocol Services Department of the
Administration of the President of the Russian Federation’ (20 January
1992).
Economy Included Decrees that: established norms of economic activity addressed issues of
budget and finance; regulated the use of natural resources; provided
various types of benefits for territorial constituencies.
Excluded Decrees that addressed the problems of functioning, restructuring or
ownership of individual state enterprises.
Society Included Decrees that: established social services; raised salaries and pensions;
provided material assistance to different categories of citizens; addressed
problems of nationalities and demographics; dealt with the issues of arts
and sciences.
Excluded Decrees that provided benefits to the staff of individual government
departments, individual citizens and individual families.

Note: From the count in all three spheres (polity, economy and society) decrees were also excluded that:
cancelled previous presidential decrees when the stated reason for the cancellation was the passage of a law
in the sphere that was previously regulated by the presidential decree; regularly issued decrees that were
the product of established procedure and did not imply initiative on the part of the president, such as
decrees about the regular military draft and dismissal; a very small number of presidential decrees giving
specific instructions regarding the implementation of statutes and norms, a domain that is primarily
reserved both in Russia and Ukraine for presidential executive orders.