Real-Estate-Transactions-draft Cy
Real-Estate-Transactions-draft Cy
AY 2023-2024
Atty Jose Fernando Cuenca
By: Lim, Cyril Dave JD3
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted
on the building erected on the land belonging to another.
In the enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, this
Court ruled that, "it is obvious that the inclusion of 'building' separate and distinct from the
land, in said provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property".
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(Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr., et al., L-10817-18, Feb. 28, 1958; Associated Inc. and Surety Co., Inc. vs.
Iya, et al., L-10837-38, May 30, 1958).
Thus, while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation
of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from
the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage for
the building would still be considered immovable property even if dealt with separately and
apart from the land (Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644). In the same manner,
this Court has also established that possessory rights over said properties before title is vested
on the grantee, may be validly transferred or conveyed as in a deed of mortgage (Vda. de
Bautista vs. Marcos, 3 SCRA 438 [1961]).
What is Ownership?
Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to
recover it. (348a)
Ownership is the independent and general right of a person to control a thing particularly in his
possession, enjoyment, disposition, and recovery, subject to no restrictions except those
imposed by the state or private persons, without prejudice to the provisions of the law.
FACTS: Petitioner Corporation sold to the Government a parcel of land to be used by the latter
in connection with the relocation of squatters. The Government occupied the land at once,
although it had given only the down payment of its price, the balance to be paid in the future
after the seller shall have rst caused the registration of the property in its name. In the
meantime, is the seller (who has not been completely paid, but who has already delivered the
land) required to pay the real estate taxes thereon?
HELD: No, the seller is not required to pay the real estate taxes on the lot sold, because after
all, it has already delivered the land to the Government. Ownership has therefore been
transferred to the government by virtue of said delivery. Be it noted that generally, payment of
the purchase price is not essential to e ectuate the transfer of ownership. Not being the owner
anymore, the Corporation had no duty to pay said taxes. Since payment has already been
made "under protest," a refund must be made in favor of the Corporation. Incidentally, the fact
that the condition regarding registration, has not yet been complied with is of no signi cance,
insofar as the payment of said taxes is concerned.
Rights of Ownership
Jus Possidendi – the right to possess ( the right to hold a thing or to enjoy a right.
Jus Utendi – the right to use ( the right to exclude any person, as a rule, from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof.
Jus Fruendi – the right to the fruits (the right to 3 kinds of fruits – natural, industrial and civil
fruits)
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Jus Abutendi – the right to consume (and also to transform or abuse)
Jus disponendi – right to dispose ( the right to donate, to sell, to pledge, or mortgage)
Jus Vindicandi – The right to recover (Art. 428)
Jus Accesionis – the right to accessories
In general, only Filipino citizens and corporations or partnerships with least 60% of the shares
are owned by Filipinos are entitled to own or acquire land in the Philippines subject to the
following exceptions:
-acquired before the 1935 Philippine Constitution
-acquired by reason of succession or inheritance (parent/s was/were Filipino citizens at the
time of their death)
-purchase of not more than 40% interest in a condominium project
-Former natural-born Filipinos can own land in the Philippines, subject to limitations prescribed
by Philippine Republic Act 8179 (for residence purposes- up to 1000 square meters of urban
land or one hectare of rural land) and Batas Pambansa 185 (for business or investment
purposes 5000 square meters of urban land or three hectares of rural land).
-Filipinos who are married to aliens who retain their Filipino citizenship, unless by their act or
omission they have renounced their Filipino citizenship
Dual Citizens of the Philippines under Philippine Republic Act 9225 can own land in the
Philippines without restrictions similar to foreigners or former natural-born Filipinos.
SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, sheries, forests or timber, wildlife, ora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty- ve years, renewable for not more than twenty- ve years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, sheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
bene cial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens,
as well as cooperative sh farming, with priority to subsistence shermen and shworkers in
rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical of nancial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scienti c and technical resources.
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The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.
SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classi ed into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classi ed by
law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty- ve
years, renewable for not more than twenty- ve years, and not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than ve hundred hectares, or
acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject
to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands
of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor.
Ong Ching Po vs CA
Land Titles and Deeds – Aliens disquali ed from acquiring public and private lands)
Facts: Petitioner and respondent disputed over a parcel of land. Respondent contends that she
bought the said land from a certain Ong Joi Jong, evidenced by a notarized deed of sale; and
entrusted the administration of the same to petitioner, a Chinese citizen and the brother of
respondent’s husband. Petitioner on the other hand claims that she bought the disputed land
from the same vendor and the sale is evidenced by a photocopy of a deed of sale.
Issue: WON an alien may acquire lands in the Philippines by virtue of a Deed of Sale.
Held: No. Whether or not said deed of sale is genuine, the Constitution provides that aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disquali ed from acquiring public lands, hence
disquali ed also in acquiring private lands.
Note: The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to
individuals or entities ‘quali ed to acquire lands of the public domain’.
Republic vs Lapiña
FACTS: On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their
residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo
Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born
Filipino citizens.
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On February 5, 1987, the spouses led an application for registration of title of the two (2)
parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time,
however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship
through naturalization.
ISSUE:Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he
acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied
with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)? - YES
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.
RATIO: Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15,
Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural- born citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him
as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of
which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and
who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of
a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land,
or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of
married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both
shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein xed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still
be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes
which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas
herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed
by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in
favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP
185.
Muller vs Muller
Facts: Helmut and Elena Muller were married in Germany in September 1989, and eventually
decided to move and permanently reside in the Philippines in 1992. Around this time, Helmut
inherited a house in Germany which he sold latter. The proceeds were used to purchase a
parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal. The property was registered in the name of Elena Muller.
Unfortunately, Helmut and Elena separated. Helmut led a petition for separation of properties
before the RTC Quezon City. The Court rendered a decision terminating the absolute
community between Helmut and Elena, and ordered the equal partition of properties. As regard
the Antipolo property, the Court held that Helmut cannot recover his funds from the purchase
of the said property despite using his paraphernal funds because it would be in violation of the
Constitutional prohibition on ownership of lands by aliens.
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Helmut appealed before the CA, which modi ed the decision. It upheld that Helmut was merely
praying for the reimbursement of the purchase of the property, and not the acquisition or
transfer of ownership to him. It also considered Elena’s ownership over the property in trust for
Helmut.
Hence, the instant petition where in Elena contends that Helmut is disquali ed to own private
lands in the Philippines, which he is aware of, and that his purpose is to obtain exclusive
possession, control and disposition of the property. Helmut however claims he is merely
praying for the reimbursement of funds used to purchase the property; that funds were given to
Elena in trust; and that equity demands that responded should be reimbursed of his funds.
Issue: Whether or not Helmut is entitled to reimbursement of funds for the acquisition of the
Antipolo property.
Ruling: The Court ruled against Helmut. He was aware of the Constitutional prohibition when
he purchased the property. He declared the property in the name of Elena because of said
prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming right on the said property cannot
be sustained. To allow reimbursement would in e ect permit Helmut to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own.
Further, there was even no implied trust created. Save for hereditary succession, an alien’s
disquali cation is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no
trust result in favor of the party who is guilty of fraud. To hold otherwise would allow a
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. Finally, he who seeks equity must do equity, and
he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Helmut cannot seek reimbursement of
funds he used to purchase on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the Constitutional prohibition.
The 1935 Constitution classi ed lands of the public domain into agricultural, timber and
mineral. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provided the following classes: agricultural,
industrial of commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands,
and such other classes as may be provided by law, giving the government great leeway for
classi cation. Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classi cation with
one additional category: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
CA No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended, remains to this day the existing general law
governing the classi cation and disposition of lands of the public domain, other than timber
and mineral lands.
Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution (Art 12 sec 2), land that has not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase, grant or any other mode recognized by law,
belongs to the State as part of the public domain. No public land can be acquired by private
persons through any other means, and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to
public land should show that his title was acquired through purchase or grant from the State,
or through any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 318
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The classi cation of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the
government and not of the courts. In the absence of such classi cation, the land remains as
unclassi ed land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. ° This is in
consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. The fact that the land classi cation map showing subject
property to be within the unclassi ed region is not presented in evidence will not operate
against the State considering the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the
omission, mistake or error of its o cials or agents
The case of Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap's
illustrates the classi cation by Presidential at of Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay,
Aklan. On November 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones
and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
Respondents Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr, et al. led a petition with the regional trial court in Kalibo,
Aklan for the registration of their claims. The Republic opposed the petition, maintaining that
Boracay Island is an unclassi ed land of the public domain and cannot be the subject of
alienation. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. The case reached the Supreme Court.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the case, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064 classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners led with the Court an original petition for the nulli cation of
Proclamation No. 1064. They contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying
Boracay into agricultural land. Being classi ed as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is
deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the rst
Public Land Act.
The Court dismissed the petition. There is no showing that prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were the subject of a government proclamation that the
land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classi cation or reclassi cation cannot be
assumed. The Court further declared that except for lands already covered by existing titles,
Boracay was an unclassi ed land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Under
PD No. 705, or Revised Forestry Code, all unclassi ed lands are considered public forest. In
the absence of the classi cation as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassi ed land
until released and rendered open to disposition. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already
existing prior to its e ectivity.
RA 7042 This Act shall be known as the, "Foreign Investments Act of 1991”
RULE I. DEFINITIONS
SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF TERMS. – For purposes of these Rules and Regulations:
a. Act shall refer to Republic Act No. 7042 entitled “An Act to Promote Foreign Investments,
Prescribe the Procedures for Registering Enterprises Doing Business in the Philippines, and for
Other Purposes”, also known as the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8179.
Compliance with the required Filipino ownership of a corporation shall be determined on the
basis of outstanding capital stock whether fully paid or not, but only such stocks which are
generally entitled to vote are considered.
For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere
legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full bene cial ownership of the
stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential. Thus, stocks, the voting rights of
which have been assigned or transferred to aliens cannot be considered held by Philippine
citizens or Philippine nationals.
Individuals or juridical entities not meeting the aforementioned quali cations are considered as
non-Philippine nationals.
c. Foreign corporation shall mean one which is formed, organized or existing under laws other
than those of the Philippines.
Branch o ce of a foreign company carries out the business activities of the head o ce and
derives income from the host country.
Representative or liaison o ce deals directly with the clients of the parent company but does
not derive income from the host country and is fully subsidized by its head o ce. It undertakes
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activities such as but not limited to information dissemination and promotion of the company’s
products as well as quality control of products.
d. Investment shall mean equity participation in any enterprise organized or existing under the
laws of the Philippines. It includes both original and additional investments, whether made
directly as in stock subscription, or indirectly through the transfer of equity from one investor to
another as in stock purchase. Ownership of bonds (including income bonds), debentures,
notes or other evidences of indebtedness does not qualify as investment.
The purchase of stock options or stock warrants is not an investment until the holder thereof
exercises his option and actually acquires stock from the corporation.
f. Doing business shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening o ces, whether
liaison o ces or branches; appointing representatives or distributors, operating under full
control of the foreign corporation, domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay
in the country for a period or periods totaling one hundred eighty (180) days or more;
participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, rm, entity
or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of
commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts
or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to and in progressive
prosecution of commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization. The
following acts shall not be deemed “doing business” in the Philippines:
(1) sales of products to bonded manufacturing warehouses of export enterprises; (2) sales of
products to export processing zone enterprises; (3) sales of products to export enterprises
operating bonded trading warehouses supplying raw materials used in the manufacture of
export products; and (4) sales of products to foreign military bases, diplomatic missions and
other agencies and/or instrumentalities granted tax immunities of locally manufactured,
assembled or repacked products whether paid for in foreign currency or pesos funded from
inwardly remitted foreign currency.
Sales of locally manufactured or assembled goods for household and personal use to Filipinos
abroad and other non-residents of the Philippines as well as returning overseas Filipinos under
the Internal Export Program of the Government and paid for in convertible foreign currency
inwardly remitted through the Philippine banking system shall also be considered exports.
i. Output shall refer to the export enterprise’s total sales in a taxable year, The term sales shall
refer to value in case of heterogeneous products and volume in case of homogeneous
products.
Heterogeneous products shall refer to products of di erent kinds and characteristics as well as
to those of the same kind but with various categories using di erent units of measurement.
Homogeneous products shall refer to products of the same kind or category using a common
unit of measurement.
k. Domestic market enterprise shall mean an enterprise which produces goods for sale,
renders service, or otherwise engages in any business in the Philippines.
l. Joint venture shall mean two or more entities, whether natural or juridical, one of which must
be a Philippine national, combining their property, money, e orts, skills or knowledge to carry
out a single business enterprise for pro t, which is duly registered with the SEC as a
corporation or partnership.
p. Paid-in equity capital shall mean the total investment in a business that has been paid-in in a
corporation or partnership or invested in a single proprietorship, which may be in cash or in
property. It shall also refer to inward remittance or assigned capital in the case of foreign
corporations.
q. Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL) or Negative List shall mean a list of areas of
economic activity whose foreign ownership is limited to a maximum of forty percent (40%) of
the outstanding capital stock in the case of a corporation or capital in the case of partnership.
r. NEDA Board shall refer to the body constituted as such under Executive Order No. 230
entitled “Reorganizing the National Economic and Development Authority” and in which reside
the powers and functions of the Authority.
s. NEDA shall refer to the NEDA Secretariat, which is the body constituted as such under
Executive Order No. 230 and which serves as the research and technical support arm and the
Secretariat of the NEDA Board.
u. BTRCP shall refer to the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection as
represented by the provincial o ces of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
w. Technology Transfer Board shall refer to the Bureau of Patents. Trademarks and Technology
Transfer (BPTTT).
x. Former natural─born Filipinos shall mean those who have lost Philippine citizenship but
were previously citizens of the Philippines falling in either of the following categories: (a) from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship; or (b)
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by having elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, if born before
January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers.
y. Transferee of private land shall mean a person to whom the ownership rights of private land
is transferred through either voluntary or involuntary sale, devise or donation. Involuntary sales
shall include sales on tax delinquency, foreclosures and executions of judgment.
z. Direct employees shall mean Filipino personnel hired and engaged under the control and
supervision of the applicant investor/employer in the production of goods or performance of
services. Excluded from this de nition are personnel hired as casual, seasonal, learner,
apprentice or any employee of subcontractor or those under xed term employment.
aa. Start of commercial operations shall mean the date when a particular enterprise actually
begins production of the product for commercial purposes or commercial harvest in the case
of agricultural activities. In the case of service oriented activities, the date when the enterprise
begins catering or servicing its clients on a commercial basis. In the case of export traders and
service exporters, the date when the initial export shipment in commercial quantity has been
made or initial performance of service as borne out by the appropriate supporting documents.
Laurel vs Garcia
FACTS:
President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to
avail of reparations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The
subject property in this case is the Roppongi property which is one of the four (4) properties in
Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement. The
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properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for
national development projects are part of the indemni cation to the Filipino people for their
losses in life and property and their su ering during World War II. The property has twice been
set for bidding.
The petitioners led petitions for prohibition to enjoin the respondents from proceeding with the
bidding for the sale of the Roppongi property. The following grounds are provided
1. the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public service" as provided in
Article 420 of the Civil Code; therefore being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one
can attach to it, not even by the State. It cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter of
contracts.
2. Executive Order No. 296 contravenes the constitutional mandate to conserve and develop
the national patrimony stated in the Preamble.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine
Government
(2) Whether the Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply in the sale of Roppongi
property.
(3) the Chief Executive, her o cers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property
Held: (1) As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social
group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is
intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
The Roppongi property is correctly classi ed under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code
as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service
does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. A property continues to be part of the
public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such
Abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be de nite. Abandonment cannot
be inferred from the non-use alone especially if the non-use was attributable not to the
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government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of nancial support to repair and
improve the property. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal
premises.
(2) The Japanese law -its coverage and e ects, when enacted, and exceptions to its
provisions- is not presented to the Court. It is simply asserted that the lex loci rei site or
Japanese law should apply without stating what that law provides. It is assumed on faith that
Japanese law would allow the sale.
There is no con ict of law rule that should apply when no con ict of law situation exists. A
con ict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of
conveyance, the essential validity and e ect of the transfer, or the interpretation and e ect of a
conveyance, are to be determined and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance
is asserted to con ict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence,
the need to determine which law should apply
None of the above elements exists. The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or
title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority
of the respondent o cials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity
of the procedures adopted to e ect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex
situs does not apply.
(3) It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her
own sole will.
Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence.
MIAA vs CA
FACTS: The term "ports" under Art. 420(1) of the Civil Code includes seaports and airports.
HELD: The MIA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a "port," constructed by the State.
Facts: Petitioner, Pilar Development Corp., led a complaint for accion publiciana (action to
recover better right of posession) with damages against respondents for allegedly building their
shanties, without its knowledge and consent, in its 5,613-square-meter property located at
Daisy Road, Phase V; Pilar Village Subdivision, Almanza, Las Piñas City. It claims that said
parcel of land, which is duly registered in its name under Transfer Certi cate of Title No.
481436 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, was designated as an open space of
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Pilar Village Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and amenities for subdivision
residents.
The trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint, nding that the land being occupied by
respondents are situated on the sloping area going down and leading towards the Mahabang
llog Creek, and within the three-meter legal easement; thus, considered as public property and
part of public dominion under Article 5027 of the New Civil Code, which could not be owned by
petitioner. The trial court also opined that respondents have a better right to possess the
occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement purposes and that only the
local government of Las Piñas City could institute an action for recovery of possession or
ownership.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which sustained the dismissal of the
case. The appellate court ruled that the 3-meter area being disputed is located along the creek
which, in turn, is a form of a stream; therefore, belonging to the public dominion. It said that
petitioner could not close its eyes or ignore the fact, which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-
meter strip was indeed reserved for public easement. By relying on the TCT, it is then estopped
from claiming ownership and enforcing its supposed right.
Based on article 630 of the Code, petitioner argues that although the portion of the subject
property occupied by respondents is within the 3-meter strip reserved for public easement, it
still retains ownership thereof since the strip does not form part of the public dominion. As the
owner of the subject parcel of land, it is entitled to its lawful possession, hence, the proper
party to le an action for recovery of possession against respondents conformably with Articles
428 and 539 of Code.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner retains ownership of the subject property.
Ruling: No. They have no right or title over the subject portion of the land because it is a public
land. In the case at bar, the applicability of DEN A.O. No. 99-21 dated June 11, 1999, which
superseded DEN A.O. No. 97-05 dated March 6, 1997 and prescribed the revised guidelines in
the implementation of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1273 and Presidential
Decree (P.D.) Nos. 705 and 1067, cannot be doubted. These prove that petitioner's right of
ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to the 3-meter strip/ zone
along the banks of Mahabang log Creek.
Notes:
An easement or servitude is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable,
whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
something to be done on his or her property, for the bene t of another person or tenement; it is
jus in re aliena, inseparable from the estate to which it actively or passively
Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs
to di erent persons.
In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the
provisions of this Title. (392)
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the bene ts as well as in the charges, shall be
proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be
void.
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The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless
the contrary is proved. (393a)
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their
rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied.
MANUEL T. GUIA VS. CA AND JOSE B. ABEJO GR NO. 120864 October 8, 2003
Facts: Two parcels of land covering a shpond equally owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza
Araniego. The one half undivided portion owned by Araniego was later purchased by plainti
from his father Teo lo Abejo, the only heir of the original owner (husband of Araniego). Prior to
this sale, the whole shpond was leased by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge
and consent of Teo lo A. Abejo in favor of De Guia. De Guia continues to possess the entire
shpond and derived income therein despite the expiration of the lease contract and several
demands to vacate by Teo lo Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, Jose Abejo. Abejo led a
complaint for recovery of possession with damages against De Guia. However, Abejo failed to
present evidence of the judicial or extrajudicial partition of the shpond.
Issue: Whether a co-owner can le ejectment case against a co-owner?Whether Abejo was
entitled to rent?
Held: Under Article 484, “there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing
or right belongs to di erent persons. A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of
the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time
the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Article 487 also provides that ‘anyone of the co-
owners may bring an action for ejectment”. This article covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession. Any co-owner may le an action under Article 487 not only against a
third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts
exclusive ownership of the property. However, the only purpose of the action is to obtain
recognition of the co-ownership. The plainti cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the
property because as a co-owner he has a right of possession.
If one co-owner alone occupies the property without opposition from the other co-owners, and
there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent.
Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from
the co-owner who dwells in the house.
The Lejano Heirs and Teo lo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE
GUIA’s lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent.
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Adriano vs CA
Facts: On October 29, 1933, Lucio Adriano married Gliceria Dorado; they had three children,
namely, Celestina, Manolo, and Aida, private respondents in this case. On or before 1942,
Lucio and Gliceria separated. The latter settled in Laguna where she died on June 11, 1968.
After their separation Lucio cohabited with Vicenta Villa and subsequently ve months after the
death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta with whom he had eight children: Marino, Renato,
Leticia, Imelda, Maria, Alicia, Ligaya, Jose Vergel, and Zenaida. All were petitioners except to
Jose Vergel due to his death before the inception of the proceedings. In 1972 the spouses
separated. On October 10,1980, Lucio executed his last will and testament disposing of all his
properties, and assigning, among others his second wife Vicenta and all his children by rst
and second marriages as devisees and legatees therein. The properties bequeathed in the will
were a 45,000 sq. m. lot and the residential house, rice mill, warehouse and with all the
equipment situated thereon in Candelaria, Quezon. On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and
Celestina Adriano, Lucio’s executrix, led a petition for the probate of the will immediately after
the death and Vicenta opposed the said petition, but still granted. Hence, the petitioner led an
action for the annulment of Lucio Adriano’s will.
Issue: Whether or not the property bequeathed in the will of Lucio Adriano were conjugal
property of the latter and his second wife, Vicenta Villa-Adriano.
Ruling: No. The properties, which were under this issue, belong to the conjugal property of
Lucio and Gliceria. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that a man and
woman living together as husband and wife without the bene t of marriage must not in any
way be in capacitated to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while
Lucio’s marriage with Gloria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Because it was clearly
supported that the properties was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal
fund from his rst marriage.
Facts: Herein respondents were the plainti s in a Civil Case, an action for ejectment led
before the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina
Tumlos. In their complaint dated July 5, 1996. Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was the only one
who led an answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no
cause of action against her, since she is a coowner of the subject premises as evidenced by a
Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question
together with respondent Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November 15, 1996, the MTC required the parties
to submit their a davits and other evidence on the factual issues de ned in their pleadings
within ten days from receipt of such order, pursuant to section 9 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Guillerma Tumlos submitted her a davit/position paper on November 29,
1996, while the respondents led their position paper on December 5, 1996, attaching thereto
their marriage contract, letters of demand to the defendants, and the Contract to Sell over the
disputed property.
Ruling: Petitioner's central theory and main defense against respondents' action for ejectment
is her claim of co-ownership over the property with respondent Mario Fernandez. At the rst
instance before the MTC, she presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his spouse.
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The MTC found this document insu cient to support her claim. The RTC, however, after
considering her allegation that she had been cohabiting with Mario Fernandez as shown by
evidence presented before it, ruled in her favor. On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces
of evidence adduced before the RTC could no longer be considered because they had not
been submitted before the MTC. Hence, the appellate court concluded that the claim of co-
ownership was not satisfactorily proven. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and
woman who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together
conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property acquired during the cohabitation only
upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation
without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
Cuizon vs Remoto
Facts: The property in question is a 4,300 sq.m land in Barangay Basilisa, Agusan del Norte.
Petitioner spouses Encarnacion Lambo Cuizon and Salvador Cuizon rely on TCT No. RT-3121
in the name of Encarnacion, married to Salvador, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Agusan
Del Norte on March 15, 1984. TCT No. RT-3121 stems from a notarized Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Sale dated August 3, 1983 executed by the heirs of Placida Tabada-Lambo,
wherein they adjudicated to themselves the one-fourth share of Placida, and, at the same time,
sold said portion to Encarnacion, their co-heir. (TCT No. RT-183, where TCT 3121 came from,
originally covers 16 hectares in the name of Placida (married to Gervacio Lambo), Eugenio
Tabada, Raymunda Tabada and Patrecia Tabada, each being one-fourth shareowner.) On the
other hand, respondents have a notarized Deed of Sale of Real property dated September 19,
1968, involving a portion of the same property covered by TCT No. RT-183, measuring 4,300
square meters, executed by Placida in favor of Angel Remoto, husband of respondent
Mercedes C. Remoto. In a previous decision dated March 9, 1990, the court ruled for the
property to be reconveyed in favor of respondents in the case they led against petitioners.
The respondents can legally claim possession and ownership of the lot in dispute covered by
the duly notarized but unregistered Deed of Sale of Real Property. Vendor Placida Tabada, her
husband, and vendee Angel Remoto also signed the document. The Petitioners contended that
at the time the 1968 deed of sale was executed, no written notice was given to all possible co-
redemptioners, co-heirs, and co-owners.
ISSUE/S
1. W/N the Remotos have the better right to the property over the Cuizons (Who has a better
right to the property?) (There were also other contentions but they are irrelevant for property)
2. W/N a property co-owned can be disposed of freely by one of the co-owners (co-ownership
issue2 )
(This was just a sub-issue in the case so it makes the facts appear quite disconnected since
this “issue” only came up when the court was trying to decide on who has the better right to
the property.)
HELD
First, the 1968 Deed of Sale executed by Placida in favor of Angel Remoto should prevail over
the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale made by the heirs of Placida in favor of Cuizon. This is
supported by the maxim prior tempore, potior jure which means that he who is rst in time is
preferred in right. When Placida sold her one-fourth portion of the property to the respondents
in this case, they immediately took possession. The sale, as mentioned earlier, is evidenced by
the duly notarized deed of sale that although unregistered is acknowledged by a notary public
which makes it a public document and admissible in evidence.
· The contention of the petitioner that the document was unregistered is of no merit because it
does not a ect the validity of the contract. Registration only serves to bind third persons. The
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petitioners are not third persons with respect to the Deed of Sale as Encarnacion is an heir of
Placida.
· The petitioners also had a knowledge of the unregistered deed of sale prior to his claimed
acquisition of the land. This is evidenced by the statement of the witnesses. The knowledge of
the petitioners had the e ect of registering the land as to them.
Second, Petitioners heavily rely on the TCT issued in their names. At the time the document
was entered into by the heirs of Placida, they no longer were the owner of the property as it
was already sold to Angel. Nemo dat quod non habet or no one can give what one does not
have.
2. Yes, Placida can dispose of her portion of the property.
The petitioners contested that no notice was given to all possible redemptioners or heirs at the
time of the execution. The said right of legal redemption only pertain to Placida’s co-owners
and not to her heirs. This notice serves as an assurance that no one would contest the
alienation. Also, records show that even if the property is not formally subdivided, particular
portions belonging to the co-owners have already been allocated and have been exercising
proprietary rights over their allotments (mortgages, deed of sale with right to repurchase). More
importantly, Placida’s right to sell her portion of the property is supported by Art 493 of the
NCC which provides that: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
the fruits and bene ts pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the e ect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership
Facts:
Respondent Maria Coronel is one of the co-owners of Lots 3250 and 3251 located at Sagrada
Familia, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioners, spouses Alfredo and Rosario Mendoza, occupied said
lots upon tolerance of respondent and her co-owners without paying any rent. When
respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the premises, the latter refused.
Respondent led a case before the MTC of Hagonoy, Bulacan for unlawful detainer against
petitioners. The MTC ruled in favor of respondent.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan which ruled in their favor. RTC held that
the co-owners of the subject lot should have been impleaded as indispensable parties. CA
eversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
Held:
Yes. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
Article 487 is a departure from the rule laid down in the case of Palarca v. Baguisi which held
that an action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners.
Section 1. Title of Decree. This Decree shall be known as the PROPERTY REGISTRATION
DECREE.
Section 3. Status of other pre-existing land registration system. The system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law is hereby discontinued and all lands recorded under said
system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.
Hereafter, all instruments a ecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law
may be recorded under Section 113 of this Decree, until the land shall have been brought
under the operation of the Torrens system.
The books of registration for unregistered lands provided under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344, shall continue to remain in force; provided,
that all instruments dealing with unregistered lands shall henceforth be registered under
Section 113 of this Decree.
History
Land registration is the general system that determines ownership over particular pieces of
land. It lists down information such as the name of the owner(s), the technical description of
the land, and other relevant information. Records of this and of matters relating to land
possession and other rights are kept and issued in the Register of Deeds.
Torrens title is a land registration and land transfer system, in which a state creates and
maintains a register of land holdings, which serves as the conclusive evidence (termed
"indefeasibility") of title of the person recorded on the register as the proprietor (owner), and of
all other interests recorded on the register.
Republic vs Umali
Facts: The land situated in Tanza, Cavite which consists of 78,865 square meters was originally
purchased on installment from the government on July 1, 1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who
allegedly transferred her rights thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio and Julio, all
surnamed Cenizal, in 1922. Tomasa and Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and
Gregorio. In 1971 these three assignees purportedly signed a joint a davit which was led with
the Bureau of Lands to support their claim that they were entitled to the issuance of a
certi cate of title over the said land on which they said they had already made full payment. On
the basis of this a davit, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources executed Deed
No. V-10910 (Sale Certi cate No. 1280) on September 10, 1971, in favor of the said a ants.
A complaint for reversion was led on October 10, 1985 when the registered owners of the
land, following several transfers, were Remedios Micla, Juan C. Pulido, and Rosalina, Luz and
Enrique Naval. They asked to return the property to the State on the aforestated grounds of
forgery and fraud. The plainti claimed that Gregorio Cenizal having died on February 25, 1943,
and Maria Cenizal on January 8, 1959, they could not have signed the joint a davit dated
August 9, 1971, on which Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certi cate No. 1280) was based In their
answer, Pulido and the Navals denied any participation in the join a davit and said they had all
acquired the property in good faith and for value. By way of a rmative defenses, they invoked
estoppel, laches, prescription and res judicata. For her part, Miclat moved to dismiss the
complaint, contending that the government had no cause of action against her because there
was no allegation that she had violated the plainti 's right, that the government was not the
real party -in-interest because the subject land was already covered by the Torrens system,
and that in any event the action was barred by prescription or laches.
Issue: Whether or not the land under the new owners are obtained thru forgery and fraud and
subject to return the property to the State
HELD
We agree with the contention that there is no allegation in the complaint led by the petitioner
that any one of the defendants was privy to the forged joint a davit or that they had acquired
the subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees for value was never
questioned in that pleading. Not having been disproved, that status now accords to them the
protection of the Torrens System and renders the titles obtained by them thereunder
indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not change despite the aw in TCT No. 55044.
Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided: Every person receiving a certi cate of
title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered
land who takes a certi cate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all
encumbrance except those noted on said certi cate.
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration in the certi cate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of
the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner might rest secure, without
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the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to
avoid the possibility of losing his land.
Registers of Deeds perform both functions of an administrative character and functions which
are at least of a quasi-judicial nature. It must be stressed, however, that the function of a
Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, instruments and
the like is ministerial in nature." For instance, he may not validly refuse to register a deed of
sale presented to him for registration.
The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered. If the
purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the e ect or invalidity
of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a
necessary consequence that registration must rst be allowed, and the validity or e ect thereof
litigated afterwards. Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the
duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but is for a court of competent jurisdiction to determine.
Indefeasible
A certi cate of title is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of their ownership of the property.
It serves as evidence of an incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet
title to land and put stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title.
However, ownership is not the same as a certi cate of title. Registering a piece of land under
the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership.
A certi cate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to
perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property.
Good faith must concur with registration, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility.
A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that
registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is
that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered
holds it as a mere trustee.
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary
successors. Possession is a mere consequence of ownership where land has been registered
under the Torrens system, the e cacy and integrity of which must be protected. Prescription is
rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose objective is to suppress fraudulent and stale
claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their
representatives when the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the defective
memory or death or removal of witnesses.
Section 48. Certi cate not subject to collateral attack. A certi cate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modi ed, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
A certi cate of title, once registered, cannot be impugned, altered, changed, modi ed,
enlarged or diminished except in , direct proceeding permitted by law. . The validity of the
certi cate of title can be threshed out only in a direct proceeding led for the purpose. I A
Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally. The e cacy and integrity of the Torrens system
must be protected.
XPN:
Leyson vs Bontuyan
Facts:
Calixto Gabud was the owner of a parcel of land located in Brgy. Adlawon, Mabolo City. The
said property was divided into two parcels of land because of a construction of a provincial
road. He later on executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of spouses Protacio Tabal and
Vivencia Bontuyan, the spouses then sold the two lots to Lourdes V. Leyson as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale. Despite the knowledge of Gregorio Bontuyan that said property has
been sold to his son-in-law and daughter, spouses Noval, he led an application with the
Bureau of Lands over Lot no 17,150 alleging that the property was public land and was neither
claimed nor occupied by any person and that he rst entered upon and began cultivating the
same in his favor. Thus, he has obtained a Free Patent on the said lot and another parcel of
land, lot no 13,272, was also registered under his name.
Meanwhile, Gregorio again executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the two lots
in favor of Naciansino Bontuyan. He then executed a Real Estate Mortgage over lot no
17,150 in favor of Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as a security for a loan. Shortly
thereafter, Naciansino and spouse has left the Philippines and resided in the US. When the
spouses arrived in the Philippines to redeem their property from DBP, they later on
discovered that it was tenanted by Engr. Leyson, on of the late Lourdes Leyson’s children.
Issue:
Whether or not Gregorio Bontuyan acted in bad faith when he applied for free patent for the
same parcels of land.
Ruling:
Yes, record show that at the time when Gregorio applied for free patent, he was living with his
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daughter, Vivencia. Thus, Gregorio must have known that at the time when he applied, the
subject lots were already sold by his daughter. Furthermore, records also show that he sold
twice the lot no 17,150 to plainti appellants. The rst was in 1976 and the other was in 1980.
Plainti -appellants o ered no reasonable explanation why Gregorio have to sell it twice. These
are badges of bad faith which a ect the validity of the title of Gregorio over the subject lots.
Considering that Lourdes Leyson was in actual possession of the property, the respondents
cannot claim that they were in good faith when Gregorio allegedly sold the property to them.
Manlan vs Beltran
FACTS: Spousers Manlan bought a portion of the property from Orbeta. The Orbetas executed
a Deed of Sale conveying a portion of the property to Sps Beltran. Sps Beltran then bought the
remaining sqm of the same land, and was registered in their name. Sps Beltran then demanded
from petitioners to vacate the property in dispute. Unheeded, Sps then led a complaint for
quieting of title and recovery of possession of the land.
2. RTC held in favor of Sps Beltran, ruling that even though there was a defect in the
notarization of the Deed of Absolute sale, it did not a ect the legality of the conveyance of the
land to the respondents. CA a rmed, ruling that the rule on double sales do not apply here,
since the lands in dispute are NOT the same.
3. Petitioners insist that this is a plain case of double sale. They argue that they bought in good
faith the 500 sq.m. portion of Lot 1366-E in 1983, while respondents bought the subject
property only in 1990. They stress that they have a better right over the property following the
rules on double sale under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code
ISSUE: Whether the rule on double sales apply, and hence petitioners have the better right on
the land. NO. LAND BELONGS TO THE RESPONDENTS.
RATIONALE:
1. Article 1544 provides that If the same thing should have been sold to di erent vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have FIRST TAKEN POSSESSION
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
a. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who
in good faith FIRST RECORDED it in the registry of property.
2. Cheng v Genato enumerated the requisites for Art 1544 to apply:
a. Same subject matter, and must be valid sales transactions
b. Each buyer must represent con icting interests C.
Each buyer must have bought from the very same seller
3. There is double sale when the same thing is sold to di erent vendees by a single vend
It only means that Article 1544 has no application in cases where the sales involved were
initiated not just by one vendor but by several vendors.
4. Here, petitioners and respondents acquired the subject property from di erent transferors.
a. The DOAS dated November 20, 1990 shows that all of the original co- owners (except for
Manuel and Serbio, who are already deceased) sold the subject lot t respondents.
b. On the other hand, the Receipt and Promissory Note both dated May 5, 1983, reveal that
only Manuel sold the lot to petitioners. As found by the RTC and the CA, nothing on the
records shows that Manuel was duly authorized by the othe co- owners to sell the subject
property in 1983.
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Original Registration as amended by RA 11573
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may le in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona de claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall le the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may le an application
for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for
redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the
property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and
may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by
him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.
Section 6. Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is hereby amended to read as follows:
“SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may le at any time, in the proper
Regional Trial Court in the province where the land is located, an application for registration
of title to land, not exceeding twelve (12) hectares, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
“(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain not covered by existing certi cates of title or patents under a
bona de claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the ling
of the application for con rmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certi cate of title under this
section.
“(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned riverbeds by right of
accession or accretion under the provisions of existing laws.
“(3) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
“Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall le the application jointly.
“Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may le an application
for the original registration of the land: Provided, however, That should the period for
redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the
property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and
may continue the proceedings.
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“A trustee on behalf of the principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust
by the trustee, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.”
RA11573
Section 7. Proof that the Land is Alienable and Disposable. For purposes of judicial
con rmation of imperfect titles led under Presidential Decree No. 1529, a duly signed
certi cation by a duly designated DENR geodetic engineer that the land is part of alienable and
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain is su cient proof that the land is alienable.
Said certi cation shall be imprinted in the approved survey plan submitted by the applicant in
the land registration court. The imprinted certi cation in the plan shall contain a sworn
statement by the geodetic engineer that the land is within the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain and shall state the applicable Forestry Administrative Order, DENR
Administrative Order, Executive Order, Proclamations and the Land Classi cation Project Map
Number covering the subject land.
Should there be no available copy of the Forestry Administrative Order, Executive Order or
Proclamation, it is su cient that the Lad Classi cation (LC) Map Number, Project Number, and
date of release indicated in the land classi cation map be stated in the sworn statement
declaring that said land classi cation map is existing in the inventory of LC Map records of the
National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) and is being used by the
DENR as land classi cation map.
Evidence of Ownership
Section 3. Status of other pre-existing land registration system. The system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law is hereby discontinued and all lands recorded under said
system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.
Hereafter, all instruments a ecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law
may be recorded under Section 113 of this Decree, until the land shall have been brought
under the operation of the Torrens system.
The books of registration for unregistered lands provided under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344, shall continue to remain in force; provided,
that all instruments dealing with unregistered lands shall henceforth be registered under
Section 113 of this Decree.
Evangelista vs Santiago
FACTS
-Evangelista, et al. alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of land in Motalban,
Rizal, by virtue of Deeds of Assignment by Ismael Favila
-Based on the Deeds, the subject properties formed part of Hacienta Quibiga, which was
awarded by the Queen of Spain in favor of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. It was further claimed
that Favila is one of the heirs and successors-in-interest of Rodriguez. Also, by virtue of SPAs
executed by his “mga kapatid,” Favila assigned the properties to Evangelista, et al. in
exchange for the labor and work done on the property.
-Evangelista, et al. came by information that Santiago was planning to evict them from the
property.
-Their investigations revealed that the Subject Property was included in TCTs, which originated
from OCT 670, which was issued to Isabel Manahan and 3 others. The whole property was
then transferred to Manahan, then to her son respondent Carmelino Santiago by Deed of
Donation.
-Evangelista, et al. led with the trial court an action for declaration of nullity of Santiago’s
certi cates of title on the basis that OCT 670 was fake and spurious. Among the defects were:
OCT 670 was not signed by a duly authorized o cer
Material data therein were merely handwritten
OCT 670 was not printed on the O cial Form used in 1913
It failed to indicate the Survey Plan, etc.
-Santiago led his Answer with Prayer.
-He claimed that Evangelista, et al. had no legal capacity to le the Complaint; thus, the
Complaint stated no cause of action. (AKGL: He meant lack of personality. Will be discussed in
the ruling)
PD 892 required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration.
He also raised prescription.
Santiago denied knowing Evangelista, et al., much less, threatening to evict them.
-During said hearing, Evangelista, et al. presented their lone witness, Engineer Placido Naval,
a supposed expert
on land registration laws.
Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled illegally would revert to the State if
the Torrens title was cancelled, and that it was the State, through the O ce of the Solicitor
General, that should le for the annulment or cancellation of the title.
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-Santiago, on the other hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings
and documents he had so far submitted
[RTC] Dismissed the petitioner’s complaint
-TC gave credence to the testimony of Evangelista, et al.witness – the State through the O ce
of the Solicitor General who must initiate and le a case of this nature.
-the said “Deed of Assignment/s” which were based on Spanish title have lost their evidentiary
value pursuant to PD 892.
-Principal issue in this case is for the declaration of nullity of defendant’s title, which has
nothing to do with Evangelista, et al.’ claim of ownership and possession.
[CA] A rmed TC’s decision.
ISSUE
: W/N Evangelista, et al. have the legal personality to le the complaint against Santiago? NO!
They were not able to prove their claim of ownership.
RULING:
Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plainti is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or
does not have... the necessary quali cation to appear in the case, or does not have the
character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of
personality to sue upon proof that the plainti is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded
on failure to... state a cause of action.
Cruz vs Miguel
FACTS:
Petitioners are the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by a TCT which they
purchased from their predecessor-in-interest who was granted an OCT. The petitioners
led a complaint against the respondent who was claimed to have occupied a portion of
the subject land. The respondent answered that she has been occupying the land since
February 1946 and no one molested her in her actual possession and that she had in her
possession tax declarations to support her claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent’s contention is correct?
RULING:
No, the respondent’s contention is not correct.
The Court ruled that a tax declaration does not prove ownership. It is merely an indicium
of a claim of ownership and that payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, it is, at best,
an indicium of possession in the concept of ownership. Neither tax receipts nor
declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right
to possess realty when not supported by other e ective proofs. Having no title or
document to overcome petitioners’ ownership as evidenced by certi cate of title over the
land in question, respondent is an intruder or squatter whose occupation of the land is
merely being tolerated.
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Del n vs Rabadon
FACTS:
Respondents led before the RTC an action to recover the ownership and possession
of the subject property from petitioners, seeking as well the payment of damages. They
contended that the property was owned by their predecessor-in-interest, Emiliana
Bacalso and they were in possession until 1988. Even if the foregoing decree was lost
during the last World War, its existence could still be shown by a certi cation (LRA
certi cation) issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and a certi ed copy from
page 19 of the daybook of cadastral lots issued by the Register of Deeds (RD) of Cebu
City. However, in 1989, they discovered that the said property was already in the
possession of Alejandra and some of her children and their families already constructed
their houses thereon when they confronted Alejandra, she claimed that petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest, Remegio Navares, previously bought the said property;
however, when they asked to see a copy of the deed of sale, she could not produce the
same.
The RTC ruled that petitioners had the better right to the ownership and possession of
the subject property. It based its conclusion on the fact that the subject property was
declared by petitioners for taxation purposes and that they paid the realty taxes due
thereon. The CA Ruling the CA reversed the RTC’s pronouncement, holding that
respondents had the better right of ownership and possession over the subject property.
The CA stressed that tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess the land when not supported by other evidence of
actual possession which remained wanting in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents have the better right to the ownership and possession of
the subject property.
HELD:
Court nds that the respondents have shown a better right to the ownership and
possession of the subject property. The probative value of petitioners’ evidence, which
consist of tax declarations and tax receipts, pales in comparison to that of respondents’
evidence which consists of a decree of ownership under the name of their predecessor-
in-interest, Emiliana. While the actual copy of the said decree was lost, the existence of
the said decree was actually proven by the LRA certi cation and the daybook entry. It is
an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or
may have existed prior to the decree of registration. By the issuance of the decree, the
land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to certain
Tax declarations and tax receipts may only become the basis of a claim for ownership
when they are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property. In fact,
petitioners altogether failed to prove the legitimacy of Remegio's possession and
ownership since they failed to present the deed of sale or any other evidence of the
latter's title.
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Republic vs Metro Index Realty Corp
Facts:
1. Respondent led w/ the RTC of Cavite an application for judicial con rmation of title over
3 parcels of land located at Brgy. Mataas na Lupa, Indang Cavite
a. During the hearing it presented 2 witnesses
i. Dimayuga Project Documentation O cer who testi ed that respondent bought the
property from Herminia, Melinda & Hernando Sicap & that it was declared for taxation in the
respondents name in 2006 &&& the property is alienable & disposable land evidenced by the
certi cation issued by DENR
ii. Herminia testi ed that she & her siblings inherited the land from their parents who had
been in possession of the land since 1956 as shown by the tax dec & at the time they inherited
the property, they had been religiously paying taxes thereon & planted coconut, banana,
santol, palay & corn
2. RTC granted the application w/ CA a rmed ruling that the number of trees found in the
land is not the determination of ownership of the land (even only few trees are there, does not
mean that they did NOT own the land) & constructive possession
3. SC reversed the CA decision for failure to comply w/ the requirements of sec 14, PD
1529 (1st & 2nd par)
Issue:
W/N respondent had proven that he is entitled to the bene ts of PD 1529 on con rmation of
imperfect titles?
Held: NO!
1. Although respondents might be in open & continuous possession of the land, still it is
part of the public dominion
a. Public lands become only patrimonial not only w/ a declaration that these are alienable &
disposable lands but there must be an express govt manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the devt of the national wealth & only so
will prescription run against it
2. The classi cation of the land to be public or alienable should have 1st been addressed to
but was regrettably neglected
3. Public Land Act requires more than constructive possession & casual cultivation ---- a
mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession
under a claim of ownership
a. In this case lot 1 = 2k coconuts = 119 hectares
b. Lot 2 = 1k coconuts = 19 hectares
c. Reality = 1 hectare = 114 coconuts w/c means that only 25 hectares out of 138 hectares
being applied for was in fact cleared, cultivated & planted w/ coconut w/c need not be
tendered or watched
d. This only showed that casual or occasional cultivation of portions of the land in question.
In short, possession is not exclusive nor notorious, much less continuous, so as to give rise to
a presumptive grant from the govt
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Remedies in Challenging Registration
Can the real owner question the validity and correctness of the Decree of Registration as a
result of the LRC's Decision, even though the true owner did not participate in the land
registration proceedings, on account of the actual fraud employed by histtenant, so as to
e ectively deprive the former to be an interested party in the registration case?
The real owner can still question the validity and correctness of the Decree of Registration and
Certi cate of Title itself, thereby, praying for its total annulment and cancellation.
Under an existing law, covering this instant situation, it provides that:
"Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall
not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person
adversely a ected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments,
subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches
thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
con rmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to le in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and
after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for
value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.”
"Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certi cate of
title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration
in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud."
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Therefore, it is clear under the cited law that the real and true owner can still question the
decree of registration, within ONE (1) YEAR "from and after the date of the entry of such decree
of registration".
After the lapse of one (1), the real owner cannot anymore question or assail the decree of
registration because "upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration
and the certi cate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.”
What will happen if the real and true owner fails to learn about the fact of registration c the
decree of registration itself during that one [1] year prescribed period to review such decree?
Would it mean that the real or actual owner does not have anymore legal remedy or action to
recover his property against the pretender?
Fortunately, there are still legal recourse provided by law. One is recovery of damages from the
Assurance Fund if the real property has already been transferred to an "innocent purchaser for
value" by, at the very least, the perpetrator of fraud.
An innocent purchaser for value refers to the buyer of the property who pays for its full and fair
price without or before notice of another person's right or interest in it. He or she buys the
property believing that "the [seller] lils the owner and could [transfer] the title to the property."
On the other hand, the real owner, if there is no innocent purchaser for value that will be
a ected, can still recover the land through an Action for Reconveyance or, speci cally, Accion
Reinvindicatoria or Reinvindicatory Action.
In the event that the real and actual owner is still unsuccessful in utilizing to his advantage the
remedy of review of registration decree within a period of one year reckoned from the time
stated above, he can still le an ordinary civil action for the recovery of real estate's ownership,
provided it has not yet been validly conveyed to an innocent purchaser for value.
This is an action for reconveyance.
A complaint for reconveyance is an action which admits the registration of title of another party
but claims that such registration was erroneous or wrongful. It seeks the transfer of the title to
the rightful and legal owner, or to the party who has a superior right over it, without prejudice to
innocent purchasers in good faith. It seeks the transfer of a - title issued in a valid proceeding.
The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic fraud-fraud committed on the true
owner instead of fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of jurisdiction." 4
In this proceedings action for reconveyance], evidence of ownership must be presented,
established, and proved. This action is not absolutely concerned with the technical
descriptions of the property described in the certi cate of title.
Action for reconveyance deals mainly on establishing and proving ownership over a particular
and speci c real property,
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Time Frame within which to File the Action for Reconveyance
The aggrieved party, who is the real owner of the property, has a period of TEN [101 YEARS
from the time the defrauding party repudiates the ownership of the real owner, which is from
the time the former registers the land.
When the defrauding party repudiates the ownership and successfully registers the land
[Torrens system] in his name, he created an implied trust in favor of the owner. Consequently:
"An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from
the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certi cate of title over the
property.”
"If is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or
mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant
to Art. 1144. This ten year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party
repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers
the land. “
Prescription of Trust fi
Reversion - (instituted in IAC or CA by virtue of BP Big 129)
- An action which seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed to private
individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain.
The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the cancellation of the certi cate of title
and the resulting reversion of the land covered by the title of the state. Often times, it is called
annulment suit or cancellation suit. The action is instituted by the government through the
Solicitor General.
Public land Act (CA No. 141)- recognizes the power of the state to recover lands of public
domain pursuant to Section 124 thereof which reads:
SECTION 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or
executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one
hundred and twenty, one-one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty two, and one
hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and
shall produce the e ect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally
issued, recognized or con rmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the
property and its improvements to the State.
Grounds of reversion
- lands in violation of the constitution
- In cases of fraud or unlawful inclusion of land in patents or certi cates of title
Others: violation by the grantee or patentee of the conditions imposed by law or lack of
jurisdiction
A Torrens title issued on the basis of the public land patens become as indefeasible as one
which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one (1) year from date of issuance of the
patent, However, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how
such title has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether or not
fraud has been committed in securing the title.
The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription. It is well
settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic or its government is usually not estopped by
mistake or error on the part of its o cials or agents.
Where the title of an innocent purchaser for value who relied on the clean certi cates of the title
was sought to be cancelled and the excess land reverted to the government, the Court rules
that “It is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches again
the government to avoid an injustice to innocent purchasers for value.”
Laches will operate not really to penalize neglect of sleeping on one’s rights, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in clearly inequitable situation.
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Action for quieting of title
An action for quieting of title Is a real action which involves the issue of ownership or
possession of real property, or any interest in real property. For an action to quiet a title to
prosper, two indispensable requirements must concur, (1) the plainti or complainant has a
legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action, (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must have shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal e cacy.
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason
of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid
or e ective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ine ective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such
cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or
any interest therein.
EXISTENCE OF A CLOUD
The cloud on title exists because
1. Of an instrument or record or claim or encumberance or proceeding
2. Which is apparently valid or e ective
3. But is in truth and in fact, invalid, ine ective, voidable or unenforceable or
extinguished or barred by extinctive prescription
4. And may be prejudicial to the title
N.B: the nature of the action for quieting of title is an action in personam
Art. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom when
the contract, instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has terminated, or
has been barred by extinctive prescription.
Art. 479. The plainti must return to the defendant all bene ts he may have received from the
latter, or reimburse him for expenses that may have redounded to the plainti 's bene t.
Art. 480. The principles of the general law on the quieting of title are hereby adopted insofar
as they are not in con ict with this Code.
Art. 481. The procedure for the quieting of title or the removal of a cloud therefrom shall be
governed by such rules of court as the Supreme Court shall promulgated.
Assurance Fund:
Section 93. Contribution to Assurance Fund. Upon the entry of a certi cate of title in the name
of the registered owner, and also upon the original registration on the certi cate of title of a
building or other improvements on the land covered by said certi cate, as well as upon the
entry of a certi cate pursuant to any subsequent transfer of registered land, there shall be paid
to the Register of Deeds one-fourth of one per cent of the assessed value of the real
estate on the basis of the last assessment for taxation purposes, as contribution to the
Assurance Fund. Where the land involved has not yet been assessed for taxation, its value for
purposes of this decree shall be determined by the sworn declaration of two disinterested
persons to the e ect that the value xed by them is to their knowledge, a fair valuation.
Nothing in this section shall in any way preclude the court from increasing the valuation of the
property should it appear during the hearing that the value stated is too small.
Section 94. Custody and investment of fund. All money received by the Register of Deeds
under the preceding section shall be paid to the National Treasurer. He shall keep this money
in an Assurance Fund which may be invested in the manner and form authorized by law, and
shall report annually to the Commissioner of the Budget the condition and income thereof.
The income of the Assurance Fund shall be added to the principal until said fund amounts to
ve hundred thousand pesos, in which event the excess income from investments as well as
from the collections of such fund shall be paid into the National Treasury to the account of the
Assurance Fund.
Section 95. Action for compensation from funds. A person who, without negligence on his
part, sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in
consequence of the bringing of the land under the operation of the Torrens system of arising
after original registration of land, through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission,
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mistake or misdescription in any certi cate of title or in any entry or memorandum in the
registration book, and who by the provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded
under the provision of any law from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the
estate or interest therein, may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the
recovery of damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund.
> Section 95 provides a remedy where a person who sustains loss or damage or is deprived of
any estate or interest in land in consequence of the operations of the Torrens system of
registration, without negligence on his part, may bring an action for the recovery of damages to
be paid out of the Assurance fund
> Public policy demands that those unjustly deprived of their rights over real property by
reason of the operation of our registration laws be a orded remedies
> According to the principles of the Torrens system, it is a condition sine que non that the
person who brings an action for damages against the Assurance fund be the registered
owner, and as to holders of transfer certi cates of title that they be innocent purchasers in
good faith and for value
> There must also be a showing of loss or damage or deprivation of any land or interest
thereon by the operation of PD1529
> Where plainti is solely responsible for the plight in which it nds itself, the Director of Lands
and the National Treasurer are exempt from any liability
Subsequent registration
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of registered land
may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with
existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary
instruments as are su cient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary
instrument, except a will purporting to convey or a ect registered land shall take e ect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as
evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make
registration.
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The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or a ect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the
o ce of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
> It is the registration of contracts dealing with registered property in the corresponding
Register of Deeds that binds or a ects third persons
> Non-compliance with the formal requirements doesn’t adversely a ect the validity of contract
nor the contractual rights and obligations of parties
> Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract or instrument is inscribed
in the o ce of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certi cate of the title
covering the land subject of the deed, contract or instrument
> PD1529 only protects the holder in good faith, and cannot be used as a shield against frauds
IMPORTANCE OF REGISTRATION
> For a transaction as important as the sale of registered property of land, it may be necessary
to keep a record thereof
There is double sale when the same object of the sale is sold to di erent vendees. In the case
of Cheng V. Genato (G.R. No. 129760, December 29, 1998), the Supreme Court enumerated
the requisites of when a case is considered a double sale.
And in such case, who among the two vendees will be entitled to the disputed
properties?
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith rst recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith
was rst in the possession; and in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith.”
Accordingly, in case of double sale, if the thing sold is a personal property, the ownership shall
be transferred to the person who had rst taken possession of the property in good faith.
However, if the property sold was a real property, the ownership shall belong to the buyer who
rst registered in good faith the real property. In case both buyers have not registered the
property, the rst to possess it in good faith owns the property. And in case the property was
not registered and not under the possession of any of the two buyers, the buyer with the oldest
title in good faith has ownership thereof.
Reconstitution of title
Section 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens title. Original copies of
certi cates of title lost or destroyed in the o ces of Register of Deeds as well as liens and
encumbrances a ecting the lands covered by such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent
with this Decree. The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed
certi cate prescribed in said Act is hereby abrogated.
Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution shall be given to the Register of
Deeds of the place where the land is situated and to the Commissioner of Land Registration.
No order or judgment ordering the reconstitution of a certi cate of title shall become nal until
the lapse of thirty days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the Commissioner of
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Land Registration of a notice of such order or judgment without any appeal having been led
by any of such o cials.
> Republic Act 26: An Act Providing a Special Procedure For The Reconstitution of Torrens
Certi cate of Titles Lost or Destroyed
> A judicially reconstituted title has the same validity and legal e ect as the original thereof,
and isn’t subject to the reservation that it shall be without prejudice to any party whose right or
interest in the property was duly noted in the original at the time of loss or destruction but
which entry or notation hasn’t been made on the reconstituted title
> The limitation that reconstitution of title should be limited to the certi cate as it stood at the
time of its loss or destruction has reference only to changes which alter or a ect title of the
registered owner and not to mere liens and other encumbrances
> The fact that the title to the land was lost doesn’t mean that the lot ceased to be a registered
land before the reconstitution of its title
> As the subject land didn’t cease to be titled, it cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription
> Reconstitution is proper only when it is satisfactorily shown that the title sought to be
reconstituted is lost or no longer available
> Where the petition for reconstitution wasn’t to restore a lost registered certi cate of title but
to re-register and issue a new certi cate in the names of petitioner and her deceased husband,
in lieu of one originally registered in the names of other persons, the petition should be denied
without prejudice to the right of the parties to take the necessary action under Section 51 and
53 of PD1529
> Republic Act 26 provides for special procedure for the reconstitution of torrens certi cate of
title that are missing and not ctitious titles which are existing. Where a certi cate of title over a
parcel of land was reconstituted judicially and later it was found that there existed a previous
certi cate of title covering the same land in the name of another person, the court ruled that
the existence of the prior title ipso facto nulli ed the reconstitution proceedings
> As per LRC circular #35, the signed duplicate copy of the petition to be forwarded to this
Commission shall be accompanied by the following:
o A duly prepared plan of said parcel of land in tracing cloth, with 2 print copies thereof,
prepared by the government agency which issued the certi ed technical description, or by a
duly licensed Geodetic Engineer who shall certify thereon that he prepared the same on the
basis of a duly certi ed technical description. Where the plan as submitted is certi ed by the
government agency which issued the same, it is su cient that the technical description be
prepared by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer on the basis of said certi ed plan.
o The original, 2 duplicate copies, and a Xerox copy of the original of the technical
description of the parcel of land covered by the certi cate of title, duly certi ed by the
authorized o cer of the Bureau of Lands or the LRC who issued the technical description
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o A signed copy of the certi cation of the RD concerned that the original of the certi cate on
title on le with the RD was either lost or destroyed, indicating the name of the registered
owner, if known from the other records in le in said o ce.
> Shall be led by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having interest in the
property with the proper RTC where the same is based on sources enumerated earlier
1. To be published twice, at the expense of the petitioner, in successive issues of the O cial
Gazette
2. To be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of
the municipality or city in which the land is situated
3. Copy of the notice to be sent by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the
petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, within 30 days prior the
date of hearing
> The jurisdiction of the court is hedged in the fore-walls of the petition and the published
notice of hearing which de ne the subject matter of the petition.
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