G.R. No.

L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

RESOLUTION

In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas
corpus (A writ of habeas corpus is used to bring a prisoner or other detainee (e.g.
institutionalized mental patient) before the court to determine if the person's imprisonment or
detention is lawful) filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for
the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently,
the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a
change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or
sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified
and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory
wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which
consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21
Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of
Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);

Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby
to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil.,
113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it
must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular
government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the
state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or
severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty
cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least
during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily
to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory
occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented
from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II
Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44,
45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is
not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended
allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;

Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set
forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and
quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs.
Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a
government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must
have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the
military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the
first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the
occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government
thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension
of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907,
and therefore it can not be applied to the present case;

Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other
publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy
toward the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered
similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the
territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not
do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country
owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign
may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an
inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his
own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid
and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing
more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that
a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship
thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the
protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would
not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive,
while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the
legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of
the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague
Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of
government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim
cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to
the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government established
by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to
war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public
order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political
complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes
against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the
occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra);
and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were
inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were
also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the
preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code,
was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government,
because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during
the enemy occupation;

Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless
absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social
and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and
may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the
military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the
control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by
the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the
requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of
Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the
laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though
continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as
suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a
citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only
passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the
occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the
operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants
to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is
evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for
the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to
practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign;
and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military
occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully
resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;

Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity
and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling
inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the
risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military
operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole
nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would
sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the
exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;

(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and
penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said
government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised
through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was
made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the
Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the
sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of
the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . .
shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to
the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer
to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;

Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not
absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as
Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or
Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution
of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department
of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among
others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having
now the status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete
and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle
upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of
Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a
purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the
country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that
pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the
Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty
of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not
inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union
preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by
the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation
against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine
Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does
not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the
Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign
people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government established by this
constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";

This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's
petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said
opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros
dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.
FACTS:
 The Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory
that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason
 (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and
 (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.
 He was arrested by the United States Army and was interned under a commitment order for
collaborating with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation and since then was turned over to the
Commonwealth Government under the custody of the Director of Prisons, thereafter filing an original
action in the Supreme Court invoking the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He maintains that his
arrest was illegal and in violation of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court, in its resolution,
denied his petition and rejected his contention.
ISSUES:
1)Whether or not the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines is suspended during
occupation
2)Whether or not the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens to their legitimate government or sovereign is
abrogated by the enemy occupation
3)Whether or not the temporary allegiance borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy
toward the government established over them abolishes the absolute and permanent allegiance an inhabitant
owes to his legitimate government
4)Whether or not crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage, are suspended during
occupation
5)Whether or not the defendant is liable for treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code
6)Whether or not the occupant has the power to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason
7)Whether or not the change of the form of government from Commonwealth to Republic affect the prosecution
of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth

HELD:
1)No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because
the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the
sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or
society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and
may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of
sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least
during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the
occupant.

2)No. As a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the
enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and
therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.

3)No. Temporary allegiance to the enemy occupant’s government, is considered similar to the temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the
protection he receives, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen
residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a
government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in
the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason
against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them
aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more
than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen
who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since
he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives,
andwould, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the
laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is
entitled to in his own.

4)Yes. Same with political laws, which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and
citizens, crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage which are of political complexion
because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate
government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they cannot
be committed against the latter.

5)Yes. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, Is applicable to treason committed against the national security
of the legitimategovernment, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory are still bound by their allegiance
to the latter during the enemyoccupation.

6)No. Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject
to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or
forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a
corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for
the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to
adhere and give aid and comfort to him.

7)No. The change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution
of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense
against the same government and the same sovereign people.

RATIO:
Allegiance as an element of treason seems to be either permanent or temporary. Permanent allegiance
consists in the obligation
of fidelity and obedience which a citizen or subject owes to his government or sovereign. Temporary allegiance
is the obligation of fidelity and obedience which a resident alien owes to our government. This justifies
Executive Order No. 44, amending Article 114. The defense of suspended allegiance and change of
sovereignty is not accepted because a citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his Government.
The sovereignty of the Government is not transferred to the enemy by mere occupation. The subsistence of
the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during
the war is one of the rules of International Law; and what is suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty.
---