Manila

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 205451. March 07, 2022 ]

ELIZABETH BRUAL, PETITIONER, VS. JORGE BRUAL CONTRERAS, LOURDES BRUAL-NAZARIO, ERLINDA
BRUAL-BINAY, RODOLFO BRUAL, RENATO BRUAL, VIOLETA BRUAL, DAVID DE JESUS AND ANTONIO DE
JESUS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:**

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the July 2, 2012 Decision2 and January 16, 2013
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121515 which reversed and set aside the
April 27, 2011 Order4 and the July 27, 2011 Resolution/Order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 15 dismissing the notice of appeal filed by respondents in Special Proceedings Case No.
09-121624.

Factual antecedents:

Fausta Brual (Fausta) remained single during her lifetime and was under the care of her nephew, Ireneo
Brual, and his wife Elizabeth Brual (Elizabeth; petitioner).6 On July 22, 2009 Elizabeth, as instituted heir
and co-executor, filed before the RTC a petition for probate of the last will and testament of the late
Fausta.7

The special proceedings ensued. However, Jorge Brual Contreras, Lourdes Brual-Nazario, Erlinda Brual-
Binay, Rodolfo Brual, Renato Brual, Violeta Brual, David De Jesus and Antonio De Jesus (respondents,
collectively), as nephews and nieces of Fausta, filed a manifestation and motion for intervention and
supplemental allegations (in support of the manifestation and motion to intervene) before the probate
court.8

The respondents alleged that Fausta's testamentary act of supposedly leaving all her properties to
Elizabeth and her husband was dubious. Elizabeth was a mere niece by affinity and a de facto guardian
of the decedent. Hence, she and her husband should not have been made heir or executor. Respondents
also averred that the petition for probate was defective in form since it did not contain the names, ages
and addresses of decedent's blood relatives.9

Elizabeth filed her opposition to the motion and manifestation. The respondents answered it with a
reply which Elizabeth countered with a rejoinder.10

On November 4, 2010, the RTC issued an Order/Resolution11 denying the respondents' motion for
intervention and supplemental allegation. The RTC held that Fausta, who died single and without
compulsory heirs, may dispose of her entire estate by will pursuant to Article 842 of the Civil Code. As to
the allegation on the formal defects of the petition, the respondents were not considered as compulsory
or testamentary heirs who were entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings. Assuming that
respondents were entitled to such a notice, the supposed defect was already cured due to the
publication of notice. Hence, the RTC did not find any compelling reason to grant the motion for
intervention.12
Respondents then filed their motion for reconsideration13 but it was denied by the RTC in its January
14, 2011 Order.14

Hence, on February 3, 2011, the respondents filed their notice of appeal of the November 4, 2010
Resolution/Order and January 14, 2011 Order.15 The RTC ordered Elizabeth to file a comment to the
motion which the latter complied with.16

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

On April 27, 2011, the RTC issued an Order17 dismissing respondents' appeal due to their failure to file a
record on appeal pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.18

Apart from respondents' procedural misstep, the RTC likewise held that a motion for intervention is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, after its exercise of discretion, it cannot be reviewed
by certiorari or controlled by mandamus, except when it was exercised in an arbitrary or capricious
manner. Considering that the RTC duly exercised its discretionary power in determining the propriety of
the motion for intervention, it found no reason to overturn its ruling.19 The dispositive portion of the
Order reads:

In view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.20

Undaunted, respondents filed their omnibus motion for reconsideration and admit records on
appeal.21 They reasoned that their failure to submit a record on appeal together with their notice of
appeal was due to inadvertence and excusable negligence. It was their belief that the submission of a
record on appeal would only come after the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of docket fees.
Thus, respondents sought the probate court's leniency. Further, in an attempt to cure the defect,
respondents submitted their record on appeal and prayed that the omnibus motion be
granted.22 Elizabeth vehemently opposed the omnibus motion.23

In its July 27, 2011 Resolution/Order,24 the RTC ultimately denied respondents' omnibus motion. The
disposition reads:

WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion To Reconsideration to Admit Records on Appeal is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.25

The RTC held that respondents' and that of their counsels' failure to file a record on appeal cannot be
considered as mere excusable negligence and that they would have to bear the consequences
thereof.26 Undeterred by the ruling of the RTC, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying their appeal.27

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The CA granted respondents' petition and reversed and set aside the RTC's dismissal of respondents'
appeal. It held that an appeal must not be dismissed based on mere procedural technicalities.28 The CA
gave weight to respondents' admission that they were of the honest belief that the submission of a
record of appeal would only come after the submission of a notice of appeal. The CA opined that the
RTC should have instead required the respondents to complete their record on appeal. The CA also
found that the respondents were not negligent and took into account their subsequent filing of a record
on appeal.29

The dispositive portion of the assailed July 2, 2012 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Resolution/Order dated July
27, 2011 and the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 27, 2011 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.30

Elizabeth filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its January 16, 2013
Resolution.31 Hence, this instant petition.

Issues

FIRST REASON

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE RULINGS OF THE PROBATE
COURT AND LIBERALLY INTERPRETED THE MANDATORY RULES OF PROCEDURE ON APPEALS DESPITE
THE INEXCUSABLE FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS TO COMPLY THEREWITH.

SECOND REASON

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION OF THE RESPONDENTS
DESPITE KNOWING THAT THE APPEAL WAS NOT PERFECTED AND HAD LAPSED IN FINALITY.

THIRD REASON

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION OF THE RESPONDENTS
DESPITE IT BEING THE WRONG MODE OF APPEAL.32

Our Ruling

The petition is granted.

Petitioner interposes that the comment filed by respondents should be disregarded because Anastacio
Revilla, Jr. (Revilla), one of the named partners of respondents' counsel Young Revilla Gambol and
Magat Law Firm has been disbarred. As such, the law firm has been perpetuating unauthorized practice
of law.33

Respondents, through Atty. Young of Young Revilla Gambol and Magat Law Firm, counter that while
Revilla was indeed disbarred, their firm retained his name. He was still connected to the firm as a
consultant but has not, since the promulgation of the disbarment case, signed any pleading. More
importantly, the crux of the present petition has nothing to do with Revilla's standing.

We agree with the respondents and reject petitioner's protestations.

It should be noted that in the present case, Revilla has not signed any pleading signifying his
involvement in the case. The signatures of the other lawyers in the firm suffices as a valid signature of
counsel and may be considered as due representation on the part of the respondents. Considering too
that the respondents are represented by a law firm, the individual act or standing of a lawyer who is or
was a part of the said law firm does not necessarily affect the validity of the representation especially
when the client has no involvement or knowledge of the anomalous actuations of the erring lawyer.

What is imperative is that the pleadings submitted before the Court shall be signed in accordance with
the rules. Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, then prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition,
reads:34

SEC. 3. Signature and address. – Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing
him, stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box.

The signature of the counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it and that it is not
interposed for delay.

An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such
deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not
intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in
violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report to
the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis Ours)

A review of the pleadings filed by the respondents in this Court reveals that they were duly signed by the
named partner, Atty. Walter T. Young, who, applying the presumption of regularity, should be regarded
as a bona-fide member of the Bar.35 This complies the requirements of the rules.

Be as it may, the allegations in the motion regarding the unauthorized practice of law by respondents'
counsel/law firm, if proven, is not tolerated by this Court. However, such complaint should be lodged
before the proper forum and not in this special proceeding for probate.

We now proceed to the nub of the petition and determine whether the CA committed a reversible error
that warrants the discretionary review of this Court.

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law.36 In Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. v. Villareal,37 this Court had the occasion to elucidate the
parameters of the right to appeal, thus:

To stress, the right to appeal is statutory and one who seeks to avail of it must comply with the
statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified
in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by
law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence failure to perfect the same renders the
judgment final and executory. And, just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so also does the prevailing party have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of a
decision in his favor.38 [Emphasis Ours]

Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court enunciates that an appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable.39 Parenthetically, in special proceedings, Section 1 of Rule 109
enumerates orders and judgments from which appeals may be taken, to wit:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. — An interested person may appeal
in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to
which such person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any
claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the
administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the
party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person
appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.

Prescinding from the above, the remedy of appeal in special proceedings is not limited to appealable
orders and judgments rendered in the main case, but extends to other orders or dispositions that
completely determine a particular matter in the case.37 This includes the denial of a motion for
intervention as in the case at bar.40

Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provide for the modes of appeal:

Section 2. Modes of appeal. —

(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple
or separate appeals where law on these Rules so require, tn such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.

Meanwhile, under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special
proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within which to perfect an appeal
because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the
approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse party,41 to wit:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of judgment or final
order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n) [Emphasis
Ours]

Thus, the rules are clear. While it is not necessary that a notice of appeal and a record on appeal be filed
simultaneously, the rule is unequivocal that the notice of appeal and record of appeal shall be filed
within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order.1âшphi1

Here, considering that the respondents intended to appeal the final order of the denial of their motion
for intervention in the special proceedings case, they should have filed both a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within the period prescribed by the rules.

The period for appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from receipt of the notice of the final order
dismissing the motion for intervention, or from November 15, 2010, the date respondents' counsel
received the order of denial.42 Respondents had until December 15, 2010 within which to file their
notice and record on appeal.

Since they filed their motion for reconsideration43 on November 26, 2010, the period for filing of the
appeal was duly interrupted. When respondents however received the final order denying their motion
for reconsideration on January 24, 2011,44 the period to appeal, applying the fresh period
rule,45 resumed and they had 30 days thereafter or until February 23, 2011 to perfect their appeal in
accordance with the rules.46 Verily, respondents filed their notice of appeal on February 3, 2011
without a record on appeal.47 Thus, on April 27, 2011, the RTC dismissed the notice of appeal due to its
non-perfection and failure to file the required record on appeal.48 It was only on June 27, 2011 that
respondents filed their omnibus motion for reconsideration with motion to admit record on appeal
while claiming inadvertence and lack of knowledge on the timing of the filing of the record on appeal.49

There is ample jurisprudence holding that both a notice of appeal and a record on appeal are required
for appealing final orders in a special proceeding case.50 Here, respondents' long delayed filing of the
record on appeal without any justifiable reason clearly violated the settled rules thereon.

This Court, in Chipongian v. Benitez-Lirio,51 once more elaborated on the consequence of a failure to
timely file a record on appeal, thus:

In Lebin v. Mirasol, the Court has discussed the justification for requiring the record on appeal in appeals
in special proceedings, viz.:

The changes and clarifications recognize that appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional right, but
merely statutory, and the implication of its statutory character is that the party who intends to appeal
must always comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals, or else the right of appeal may
be lost or squandered.

As the foregoing rules further indicate, a judgment or final order in special proceedings is appealed by
record on appeal. A judgment or final order determining and terminating a particular part is usually
appealable, because it completely disposes of a particular matter in the proceeding, unless otherwise
declared by the Rules of Court. The ostensible reason for requiring a record on appeal instead of only a
notice of appeal is the multi-part nature of nearly all special proceedings, with each part susceptible of
being finally determined and terminated independently of the other parts. An appeal by notice of appeal
is a mode that envisions the elevation of the original records to the appellate court as to thereby
obstruct the trial court in its further proceedings regarding the other parts of the case. In contrast, the
record on appeal enables the trial court to continue with the rest of the case because the original
records remain with the trial court even as it affords to the appellate court the full opportunity to review
and decide the appealed matter.

xxxx xxxx xxxx

The elimination of the record on appeal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 made feasible the shortening of
the period of appeal from the original 30 days to only 15 days from notice of the judgment or final
order. Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, retains the original 30 days as the period for perfecting
the appeal by record on appeal to take into consideration the need for the trial court to approve the
record on appeal. Within that 30-day period a party aggrieved by a judgment or final order issued in
special proceedings should perfect an appeal by filing both a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
in the trial court, serving a copy of the notice of appeal and a record on appeal upon the adverse party
within the period; in addition, the appealing party shall pay within the period for taking an appeal to the
clerk of court that rendered the appealed judgment or final order the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees. A violation of these requirements for the timely perfection of an appeal by
record on appeal, or the non-payment of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees to the clerk of the trial court may be a ground for the dismissal of the appeal.

Considering that the petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule
41, he did not perfect his appeal of the judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the dismissal
became final and immutable. He now has no one to blame but himself. The right to appeal, being
statutory in nature, required strict compliance with the rules regulating the exercise of the right. As
such, his perfection of his appeal within the prescribed period was mandatory and jurisdictional, and his
failure to perfect the appeal within the prescribed time rendered the judgment final and beyond review
on appeal. Indeed, we have fittingly pronounced in Lebin v. Mirasol:

In like manner, the perfection of an appeal within the period laid down by law is mandatory and
jurisdictional, because the failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules of
Court causes the judgment or final order to become final as to preclude the appellate court from
acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment or final order. The failure of the petitioners and their
counsel to file the record on appeal on time rendered the orders of the RTC final and unappealable.
Thereby, the appellate court lost the jurisdiction to review the challenged orders, and the petitioners
were precluded from assailing the orders. [Emphasis Ours; citations omitted]

Hence, this Court finds no error when the RTC denied respondents' notice of appeal and the subsequent
omnibus motion for reconsideration. While this Court is aware that limited exceptions may be
considered in the strict application of the rules, mere inadvertence and honest belief that the record on
appeal is not yet due are simply unacceptable. An attorney seeking a review or reversal of a judgment or
order against his client must fully observe scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, with
keen awareness that any error or imprecision in compliance therewith may well be fatal to his client's
cause.52
As correctly observed by the RTC, excusable negligence to be "excusable" must be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. A mere reading of the rules could have
prevented respondents' blunder.53

In fine, this Court finds that the CA erred in finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it
dismissed the appeal of the respondents.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The July 2, 2012 Decision
and January 16, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 121515
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The April 27, 2011 Order and the July 27, 2011 Resolution/Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Manila which dismissed the notice of appeal filed by respondents in
Special Proceedings Case No. 09-121624, are hereby REINSTATED.

Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

Perlas-Bernabe, J.,* On official business.