Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 8, 2023

Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko,

George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 8, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces
daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive
monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on December 8. ISW will cover
subsequent reports in the December 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his presidential bid for 2024 on December
8 in an obviously staged effort to seem that he was running at the request of Russian
servicemen. Putin announced that he would run for president in the 2024 elections in conversation
with Russian military personnel after the presentation of Gold Star medals in the Grand Kremlin Palace
on December 8.[1] Putin quietly announced his presidential campaign after Artem Zhoga, commander
of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Sparta” Battalion, claimed that the people of Donbas want
him to run in the elections.[2] Zhoga specifically emphasized that Russia needs Putin as president to
integrate occupied Ukrainian territories and restore peace. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov
absurdly claimed that Putin’s announcement was ”completely spontaneous” and was ”a reaction to
people’s appeal.”[3] Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matvienko similarly framed
Putin’s announcement as a response to requests from Russians.[4] Russian State Duma Deputy
Chairman of the Federal Assembly Sergey Neverov stated that the leading United Russia party
”unconditionally supports” Putin’s nomination as a presidential candidate and ”will do everything for
his victory.”[5] Russian ”Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky responded to Putin’s
announcement, claiming that although the results of the elections are already known, the ”process
needs to be arranged appropriately.”[6] Khodakovsky claimed that new Russian political energies are
emerging - implying that some Russians want to oust Putin - but that Russia does not need such
“political games“ during wartime. One Russian milblogger claimed that Russians are more concerned
about the rising price of eggs than Putin’s announcement.[7]

Putin’s announcement of his presidential bid in a military setting indicates that his
campaign may focus on Russia’s war in Ukraine more than ISW previously assessed,
although the extent of this focus is unclear at this time. ISW previously assessed that Putin’s
presidential campaign would likely not focus on the war in Ukraine and instead would focus on

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domestic stability and criticisms of the West.[8] Putin’s presidential bid announcement at a ceremony
rewarding Russian military personnel fighting in Ukraine in a conversation with a DNR combatant
suggests that the war in Ukraine may play a more significant role in his campaign strategy. These staged
circumstances were possibly directed a very important constituency: Russians directly affected by the
war in Ukraine including the roughly 2.2 million military personnel the Kremlin claims are currently
under arms, personnel previously wounded, and their relatives (as well as relatives of those killed in
action).[9] Relatives of Russian mobilized personnel have recently appealed to the Russian government
and military for the release of their relatives from military service and for better treatment of mobilized
servicemen in the Russian military, and the Kremlin has repeatedly attempted to censor these
groups.[10] These Kremlin censorship attempts suggest that the Kremlin is concerned about the
possible negative effects of these protests on Putin‘s image during the presidential campaign.[11] The
Kremlin may be using Putin’s military-focused announcement in an attempt to convince this large
group of voters that the Russian military writ large supports Putin. Putin’s announcement may
alternatively aim to demonstrate that he has the support of the Russian military in order to make any
further discussion of the war in Ukraine during his campaign unnecessary. The Kremlin may have
tasked the Russian military with capturing Avdiivka, and possibly Kupyansk, before the March 2024
elections, and this exhibition of the military’s support for Putin’s candidacy is possibly meant as a
hedging strategy should the Russian military be unable to meet these given deadlines.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the
night of December 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on December 8 that Russian forces
launched seven Shahed-131/136 drones and six S-300 missiles on the night of December 7 to 8 and 19
Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles against Kyiv Oblast and infrastructure facilities in Dnipropetrovsk
Oblast on the morning of December 8.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces
also launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile against an unspecified target.[13] Ukrainian forces
downed five Shahed drones and 14 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles.[14] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head
Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian S-300 missiles struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City,
Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck targets in Pavlohrad,
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[15] Kyiv City Military Administration Head Serhii Popko stated that the
December 8 strike was the first Russian cruise missile strike launched from a Tu-95MC strategic
bomber against Kyiv City since September 20, 2023 -- 79 days ago.[16] Ukrainian Air Force
Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russia has ”somewhat restored” its cruise missile stockpiles by
not launching large-scale strikes during the fall months.[17]

Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin forecasted on
December 7 that there will be “no agreement” between Russia and Ukraine to end the
war and ”no freeze” of the frontlines in Ukraine, marking a notable shift from Girkin’s
prior claims that the Russian military intended to “freeze the frontline” until after the
Russian presidential elections. Girkin stated during an interview with Russian news
outlet Baza published on December 7 that the situation in Ukraine has ”radically worsened” and that
Russia has entered a period of ”acute instability.”[18] Girkin added that Russia’s tactical successes
during summer and fall 2023 do not “eliminate or balance” the facts that the war is entering its 21st
month and that there is no end in sight. Girkin’s interview with Baza was almost certainly approved by
the Kremlin, and the Kremlin thus likely put constraints on what Girkin could and could not say about
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and other topics such as his criminal case, his patron within the siloviki,
and the assassination of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Girkin claimed in a letter on
October 9 that he was ”99 percent” certain that the Kremlin will decide to ”freeze the frontline” until

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after the 2024 presidential elections and that Russian forces would continue conducting a strategic
defense on the existing frontline.[19] Girkin has repeatedly claimed and expressed great concern that
there is a faction within the Kremlin in favor of freezing the current frontline in Ukraine competing with
another faction in favor of continued Russian offensive operations for influence over Russian President
Vladimir Putin.[20]

Girkin may be adjusting his forecast in response to private and/or public indications that Putin has
sided with the latter faction. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on November 27 that the
West is trying to “freeze” the war in Ukraine to rearm Ukraine for future attacks against Russia and
advocated against negotiations, a likely Kremlin-sanctioned acknowledgement of the prolonged
Russian war effort.[21] Lavrov also did not promote previous Kremlin information operations feigning
interest in negotiations with Ukraine and freezing the war during his speech at the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Council of Foreign Ministers on November 30.[22] ISW
previously assessed that the Kremlin may have strategically allowed Russian opposition party Yabloko
founder Grigory Yavlinsky to advocate for a ceasefire in Ukraine during an interview on December 5 to
deter factions within the Kremlin that may want to freeze the frontline in Ukraine from publicly or
privately voicing their opinions.[23] Girkin’s adjusted forecast is yet another indication that Putin
retains his maximalist objectives and is unlikely to enter peace negotiations with Ukraine, except to buy
time to reconstitute for future offensive operations.[24]

The Russian military has reportedly banned the use of civilian cars for military purposes
likely as part of ongoing formalization efforts, sparking criticisms from Russian
milbloggers. Russian milbloggers and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Deputy Information
Minister Daniil Bezsonov circulated an image of a putative Russian military order stating that the
Russian military command prohibited Russian forces from using personal and humanitarian vehicles
and that any vehicles from civilian government entities need to be logged on a military unit’s balance
sheet.[25] The order also allegedly bans Russian soldiers who are not mechanics or who lack driver’s
licenses from driving the vehicles. This measure, if reports are accurate, likely supports Russian
formalization efforts to centralize administrative control over Russian military supplies, especially
those not provided by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). This measure would also impact
grassroots Russian efforts to provide Russian frontline soldiers with supplies, including civilian or dual-
use vehicles.

The Russian information space largely criticized these alleged reforms as unnecessary and harmful.
Bezsonov and Russian milbloggers claimed that this order will hinder Russian military movement,
supplies and ammunition deliveries, and casualty evacuations, and will thus ultimately demoralize
military personnel. Bezsonov claimed that this order is unreasonable because some DNR personnel
have been trying to register their cars with the Russian MoD for a year and instead called for the Russian
military to eliminate bureaucracy to make solders’ lives easier.[26] A milblogger claimed that Russian
military personnel do not want to register their cars with the Russian military because the command
will not allow a soldier to deregister a car and will then commandeer the car as MoD
property.[27] Russian milbloggers have resisted prior Russian formalization efforts that impose greater
rules on Russian military personnel, including requiring soldiers to register personal cars with their
units and establishing grooming standards about beards.[28]

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is expanding its ability to guard Russian
officials and entities abroad likely to better surveil Russian and international actors
outside of Russian territory. The FSB published amendments to its regulations on December 8
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that allow it to offer protection services for various Russian representative offices and Russian
companies in addition to the Russian diplomatic institutions to which the FSB already offers
service.[29] The FSB would guard such entities, which could include trade and commercial entities,
through a mutual agreement and at the entity’s expense.[30] The FSB claimed to have made the
amendments in response to the “growing number of protests and demonstrations” in front of Russian
government and business offices abroad.[31]

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to artificially alter the demographic

composition of occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union on Human Rights – a union
composed of 26 human rights-focused nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) – reported on
December 6 that Russian authorities have resettled up to 800,000 Russian citizens in occupied Crimea
and forced around 100,000 Ukrainian citizens to leave Crimea since 2014.[32] The Union reported that
Russian authorities relied on policies such as preferential mortgage lending, relocation of Russian
officials and their families, expulsion of Ukrainian citizens to mainland Ukraine, and ”encouragement”
of Ukrainian citizens to move to Russia to free up residences in Crimea and encourage Russian citizens
to resettle.[33] The Union reported that Russian occupation authorities in other areas are
implementing similar repopulation efforts. The Union reported that Russian authorities are currently
struggling to encourage Russians to resettle in occupied Crimea due to the high intensity of hostilities
near Crimea, however.[34]

Ukraine’s partners continued to announce military and financial aid packages to

Ukraine recently. Germany announced on December 7 that it delivered aid to Ukraine, including
1,750 155mm artillery shells, 10 reconnaissance drones, 70 grenade launchers, and 100,000 first aid
kits.[35] Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida also pledged $4.5 billion to Ukraine, including $1
billion in humanitarian aid to support Ukraine’s recovery efforts and $3.5 billion to fund credit
guarantees for World Bank loans to Ukraine.[36]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his presidential bid for 2024 on
December 8 in an obviously staged effort to seem that he was running at the
request of Russian servicemen.
• Putin’s announcement of his presidential bid in a military setting indicates
that his campaign may focus on Russia’s war in Ukraine more than ISW
previously assessed, although the extent of this focus is unclear at this time.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine
on the night of December 7 to 8.
• Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin
forecasted on December 7 that there will be “no agreement” between Russia and
Ukraine to end the war and ”no freeze” of the frontlines in Ukraine, marking a
notable shift from Girkin’s prior claims that the Russian military intended to
“freeze the frontline” until after the Russian presidential elections.
• The Russian military has reportedly banned the use of civilian cars for military
purposes likely as part of ongoing formalization efforts, sparking criticisms
from Russian milbloggers.

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 • The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is expanding its ability to guard
Russian officials and entities abroad likely to better surveil Russian and
international actors outside of Russian territory.
• Russian occupation officials continue efforts to artificially alter the
demographic composition of occupied Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s partners continued to announce military and financial aid packages
to Ukraine recently.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-
Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk
City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia
Oblast and made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia
Oblast.
• Udmurt Republic Head Alexander Brechalov announced on December 7 that
the region formed and will soon deploy four new units to fight in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 8 that Russia is
trying to destroy Ukrainian children’s connection to Ukraine and that swift
intervention is necessary to maintain this connection during a speech at the first
meeting of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children.0

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-
covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are
assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of
these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and
specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against
humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

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 • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the
remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and
northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on

December 8 and reportedly made unconfirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces advanced east of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and near Synkivka (9km east of
Kupyansk) and Bilohorivka (13km south of Kreminna), although ISW has not observed visual evidence
of these claims.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian
attacks in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka and Ivanivka (20km southwest of Kupyansk) and in
the Lyman direction near Spirne (25km south of Kreminna) and Terny (17km west of
Kreminna).[38] Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr
Fityo stated that Russian forces are also attacking near Vesele (31km south of
Kreminna).[39] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces
intensified offensive operations in the Lyman direction.[40] Mashovets stated that elements of the
Russian 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army,
Western Military District) unsuccessfully attacked east of Terny; elements of the 228th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (90th Guards Tank Division, Central Military District) unsuccessfully attacked between
Dibrova (6km southwest of Kreminna) and Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna); and elements of
the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) unsuccessfully
attacked Bilohorivka from the southeast.[41] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are
also attacking from Dibrova towards Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna) and near the Serebryanske
forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[42]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked along the Kupyansk-Svatove-
Kreminna line on December 8. Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergei Zybinsky
claimed on December 8 that Russian forces repelled five Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka and Lake
Lyman northwest of Synkivka, and Russian Central Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Alexander
Savchuk claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian attacks near Yampolivka.[43]

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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the
entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut but did not make any claimed or
confirmed advances on December 8. The Ukrainian General Stuff reported on December 8 that
Ukrainian forces continued assault operations south of Bakhmut.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Bakhmut direction near
Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) on December 8.[45]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut but did not make any confirmed advances
on December 8. Russian milbloggers claimed on December 7 and 8 that Russian forces advanced to the
eastern outskirts of Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut); south of the Berkhivka reservoir (about
2km northwest of Bakhmut) and Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut); in the heights north of
Klishchiivka; and towards Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported
on December 8 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Bohdanivka, Ivanivske, Klishchiivka,
and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the
Russian 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Northern Fleet [NF]) are
operating near Bohdanivka.[48] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 98th
Guards Airborne (VDV) Division and the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating near
the Berkhivka reservoir.[49] Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz
Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]), 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk
People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps), and Chechen ”Akhmat” Spetsnaz forces are operating near
Klishchiivka.[50]

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Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka and made a confirmed advance on
December 8. Geolocated footage published on December 8 indicates that Russian forces advanced to
the sewage treatment plant south of Krasnohorivka (5km northwest of Avdiivka).[51] Russian sources
claimed on December 7 and 8 that Russian forces advanced towards Novokalynove (13km northeast of
Avdiivka), to the outskirts of the Avdiivka Coke Plant northwest of Avdiivka, and in the industrial zone
southeast of Avdiivka.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed on December 8 that Russian forces are
consolidating positions in Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka) and are clearing the settlement,
whereas another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions on the eastern
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outskirts of Stepove.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully
attacked east of Novobakhmutivka (9km northwest of Avdiivka); south of Tonenke (5km west of
Avdiivka); and near Stepove, Avdiivka, and Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka).[54] Russian
sources claimed on December 7 and 8 that Russian forces also attacked north of the Avdiivka Coke
Plant and near Ocheretyne (15km northwest of Avdiivka), Novokalynove, Sieverne (6km west of
Avdiivka, and the industrial zone.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 8 that positional
battles are ongoing in the Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) and Tonenke directions.[56] A Russian
source claimed that difficult weather conditions have slowed the tempo of both Russian and Ukrainian
operations near Avdiivka.[57] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr
Shtupun stated that there are more than 40,000 Russian troops fighting in the Avdiivka direction and
that Russian forces are redeploying reserves from Storm-Z units and mobilized personnel who lack
training and provisions to the area in order to make up for losses.[58]

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked west of Donetsk City in
Marinka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) on December 8.[59]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City but did not make
any claimed or confirmed advances on December 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian
forces unsuccessfully attacked near Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City), Marinka, Pobieda
(5km southwest of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk
City).[60] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces do not completely control Marinka and that
fighting is ongoing in the northwestern part of the settlement.[61]

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Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline
positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces reportedly continued limited offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast
border area on December 8 but did not advance. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces
attacked near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both about 9km south of Velyka Novosilka) as well as
Zolota Nyva (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[62] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that
Russian forces did not conduct any ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area,
however.[63]

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Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 8 but did
not make any claimed or confirmed advances. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled
Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne, west of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne), and west of Novofedorivka
(21km southeast of Orikhiv).[64] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces
also repelled Ukrainian attacks near Nesteryanka (11km southwest of Orikhiv) and Uspenivka (11km
southeast of Orikhiv).[65] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that poor weather conditions prevent
both Russian and Ukrainian forces from making significant advances or operating large reconnaissance
drones in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 8 and
recently advanced. Geolocated footage published on December 7 shows that Russian forces made an
advance south of Robotyne towards Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne).[67] The Ukrainian

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General Staff reported on December 8 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near
Robotyne and west of Verbove.[68] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that
Russian forces are taking advantage of the reduced tempo of Ukrainian offensive operations in
Zaporizhia Oblast to reorganize their force grouping and create operational reserves but noted that
Russian forces currently cannot allocate significant resources to these reserves.[69]

Ukrainian forces continued ground operations in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on December 8.
Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and
2km from the Dnipro River) and that Ukrainian forces have increased the tempo of operations in the
area.[70] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces temporarily advanced south of Krynky before
Russian artillery fire forced Ukrainian forces back again on December 7-8.[71] The Russian MoD
claimed that Russian forces thwarted multiple Ukrainian attempts to land sabotage and reconnaissance

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groups on the east bank between December 3 and 8.[72] Other milbloggers claimed on December 8
that Russian forces are increasing the intensity of glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in this
area.[73] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces have changed defensive tactics in east bank
Kherson Oblast and are now trying to exhaust Ukrainian personnel on the east bank with heavy air and
artillery strikes.[74]

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Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat
power without conducting general mobilization)

Udmurt Republic Head Alexander Brechalov announced on December 7 that the region formed and
will soon deploy four new units to fight in Ukraine.[75] Brechalov stated that the newly-formed
”Yevgeniy Dragunov” Separate Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion, the “Cheptsa” Anti-Aircraft Missile
Division, the “Varmun” Motorized Battalion, and the ”Kama” Air Assault (VDV) Division will soon
deploy to Ukraine. Brechalov claimed that Udmurt residents staffed these new units after signing
unspecified contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). These units appear to be Russian
irregular formations with unknown strengths that likely do not correspond with the doctrinal end
strengths of their reported echelons. Authorities in the Republic of Udmurtia are likely recruiting local
volunteers to staff these units to immediately reinforce the frontlines in Ukraine.

The Russian MoD claimed that Russia further simplified the procedure for issuing combat veteran
certificates for participants of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russian MoD announced on
December 8 that Russian fighters will no longer need to apply to receive their veteran certificates
because the MoD will automatically issue these certificates based on the already-available information
about the combatant.[76] The simplification of this procedure may be part of an ongoing Russian
formalization effort that seeks to reestablish Russia’s administrative control over irregular forces
involved in the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Russian regional authorities continued efforts to forcibly coerce migrants into military service. Russian
opposition and local outlets reported that Udmurt military police raided a migrant community in
Izhevsk and reportedly will force migrant men aged 18 to 27 into military service.[77] Udmurt officials
are reportedly offering to allow migrant men older than 27 to sign a contract with the Russian MoD to
fight in Ukraine. Vladivostok City officials reportedly conducted a similar raid on migrant taxi drivers
and issued summonses to the military registration office to 10 detained migrants.[78] BBC’s Russia
service reported that Russian officials also recruited detained migrants who attempted to cross the
Russian-Finnish border to fight in Ukraine before returning some of these migrants to the Republic of
Karelia from Rostov Oblast.[79] BBC’s Russia service reported that some migrants refused to deploy to
Ukraine after realizing that Russia intended to commit them to battle in exchange for dropping their
deportation cases.

Russia reportedly continues to defend its border with Ukraine with a limited number of conscripts. A
Russian conscript told Russian outlet Mozhem Obyasnit (We Can Explain) that there are almost no
Russian border guards defending the Russian state border in Bryansk Oblast.[80] The conscript
claimed that at least 10 conscripts had died as a result of shelling on the Russian-Ukrainian state border.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological

innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian forces are trying to
copy Ukrainian naval drones that have been targeting the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF).[81] GUR
Representative Andriy Yusov stated that Russian forces are collecting fragments of Ukrainian naval
drones and are trying to improve their drone production.

A Ukrainian head of a volunteer organization stated that Russia is actively relying on automatic optical
drone navigation and that Ukraine does not have a systematic way to counteract Russian
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automation.[82] Head of the Ukrainian ”Victory Drones” volunteer initiative (and director of the
Aerointelligence Support Center) Maria Berlinskaya stated that Russia is increasingly trying to
automate its drones, shift towards automatic optical navigation, and move to launching ”drone swarms”
to overwhelm Ukrainian forces. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have launched 3,083
Shahed 136/131 drones since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine based on data published
by the Ukrainian General Staff.[83]

A Russian milblogger amplified footage purporting to show that Russian forces installed the first sets
of “Soltik-BL” DMR AES256 radio communications systems for armored vehicles, which will allow
these vehicles to receive a publicly available standard connection with relay capability.[84] The
milblogger specified that volunteers produced the “Soltik-BL” DMR AES256 systems.

Radio Liberty’s Schemes project found that Russian security services spied on Ukrainian state and
private infrastructures since 2014 via thousands of security cameras that operated on Russian
“TRASSIR” software belonging to the Russian “DSSL” company.[85] Schemes found that the
companies storing information from these security cameras are linked to the Russian Federal Security
Service (FSB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative

control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian
sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 8 that Russia is trying to destroy
Ukrainian children’s connection to Ukraine and that swift intervention is necessary to maintain
children's Ukrainian identity during a speech at the first meeting of the International Coalition for the
Return of Ukrainian Children.[86] Zelensky stated that forced deportation is one of Russia‘s most
”cynical” war crimes and that Russian authorities are teaching children lies about Ukraine and the war.
Zelensky noted that Russia’s crimes against Ukrainian children and families are ”organized” efforts to
erase the national identity of young Ukrainians. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s forced
deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children likely constitutes a violation of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[87]

Russian state news wire RIA Novosti reported that Russian officials detained Russian “Donbas
Railways” Director Vladimir Kabatsyi in Donetsk City on December 8 under suspicion of abuse of
power.[88]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated that Russia will not negotiate with Ukraine on
Ukraine’s terms in response to US Deputy National Security Advisor Jonathan Finer on December 8.
Finer stated that the US wants to position Ukraine in such a way that Russia will need to decide to
negotiate on Ukraine’s terms or confront a stronger Ukraine by the end of 2024.[89] Peskov responded
by stating that Finer’s comments are ”absolutely unrealistic.”[90] The Kremlin consistently signals that
it is not interested in any negotiations that do not offer Russia full capture of Ukraine.

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger criticized the Russian government for missing an

opportunity to provide Kyrgyzstan with Russian school textbooks to further spread Russian ideology in
Central Asia.[91] The milblogger commented on Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan

19 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Akylbek Japarov’s announcement that Kyrgyzstan will replace Soviet STEM and hard sciences
textbooks with textbooks from Oxford and Cambridge.[92] The milblogger claimed that Kyrgyzstan is
now increasingly advocating for the Kyrgyz language and national identity and noted that Russian
officials’ inaction allowed the United Kingdom to occupy an ”extremely important niche” in the Kyrgyz
education sphere.[93]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in

Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with United Arab Emirates (UAE) President Sheikh
Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan on December 8.[94] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Al
Nahyan on December 6.[95]

Belarusian military officials met with Egyptian officials on December 8 during the International Exhibit
for Defense and Military Industries (EDEX-2023) in Cairo, Egypt. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense
announced that a Belarusian military delegation, headed by Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense
Forces Commander Major General Andrei Lukyanovich, met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-
Sisi, Egyptian Air Force Commander Air Marshal Mahmoud Foaad Abd El-Gawad, and Egyptian Air
Defense Forces Commander Lieutenant General Mohamed Hegazy Abdul Mawgoud in Egypt to discuss
bilateral military cooperation and the modernization of air defense systems.[96]

Belarusian military officials, including Assistant to the Belarusian Defense Minister for International
Military Cooperation Colonel Valery Revenko, attended the Commonwealth of Independent State’s
(CIS) Coordination Meeting on International Military Cooperation in Moscow on December 8.[97]

A Russian milblogger claiming to be affiliated with the Wagner Group amplified footage on December
7 claiming to show elements of the Belarusian “Typhoon” Spetsnaz Detachment of military unit 5522
training with Wagner instructors.[98]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly
available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western
reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other
geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72935

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72935

[3] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/08/12/2023/65730dca9a79478ae54552b8

20 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
[4] https://t.me/valentinamatvienko/62

[5]https://suspilne dot media/634622-ukraina-ta-ssa-domovilisa-pro-virobnictvo-ozbroen-zelenskij-

zatverdiv-novi-sankcii-proti-rf-653-den-vijni-
onlajn/?anchor=live_1702036263&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://meduza dot
io/feature/2023/12/08/legitimatsiya-putina-idet-cherez-zhogu ; https://t.me/rian_ru/224173

[6] https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/3041

[7] https://t.me/dva_majors/30447

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120323 ; https://www.understandingw

ar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-
2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
november-28-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-
assessment-november-22-2023

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120223

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
december-3-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-
assessment-november-22-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-
offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-
2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
october-4-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-
assessment-november-24-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-
offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-
2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
september-20-2023

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
december-3-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-
assessment-november-22-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-
offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-
2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
october-4-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-
assessment-november-24-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-
offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-
2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
september-20-2023

[12] https://t.me/kpszsu/8367 ; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1733035130111893577; htt

ps://www.facebook.com/kpszsu/posts/pfbid0kekuufH3kJjBE5vdCbE5LwegAKEatdSdmmvvDvpfnn
NZWDoSYcVSqfP6WGYuYTHPl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/12/08/syly-ppo-vnochi-
znyshhyly-5-udarnyh-droniv-shahed/

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02H6FPmDxmcPcJSrw5Q4xRHma5yX
mJaRb7Nia58TBRNAawvxuCXJe43ndmQLhukp5Hl

21 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
[14] https://t.me/kpszsu/8367 ; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1733035130111893577; htt
ps://www.facebook.com/kpszsu/posts/pfbid0kekuufH3kJjBE5vdCbE5LwegAKEatdSdmmvvDvpfnn
NZWDoSYcVSqfP6WGYuYTHPl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/12/08/syly-ppo-vnochi-
znyshhyly-5-udarnyh-droniv-shahed/

[15] https://t.me/synegubov/7697
; https://t.me/dva_majors/30410 ; https://t.me/kommunist/18821 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchen
ec/38897

[16] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/3715

[17] https://suspilne dot media/634622-ukraina-ta-ssa-domovilisa-pro-virobnictvo-ozbroen-

zelenskij-zatverdiv-novi-sankcii-proti-rf-653-den-vijni-
onlajn/?anchor=live_1702040124&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=JCEyD4RGQUU

[18] https://t.me/strelkovii/6530 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/6531 ; https://baza dot io/posts/75023145-

ad0d-43b2-a163-3b45f282ceb3

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100923

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071223 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-

offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2023;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-
2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
june-2-2023

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20
Assessment%2C%20November%2027%2C%202023%20%28PDF%29.pdf

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar113023

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120523

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110423 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-

offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023

[25] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/31441 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/105895

; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/12490;
https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/3047; https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/3048; https://t.me/wehearf
romyanina/3055; . https://t.me/dva_majors/30397; https://t.me/dva_majors/30394

[26] ttps://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/31441

[27] https://t.me/dva_majors/30397

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
june-18-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-
assessment-january-20-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-

22 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
campaign-assessment-january-18-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-
offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-
2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
january-23-2023;

[29] https://t.me/bbcrussian/57579 ; http://regulation dot gov.ru/p/144158 ;

https://t.me/sotaproject/70542

[30] https://t.me/bbcrussian/57579 ; http://regulation dot gov.ru/p/144158 ;

https://t.me/sotaproject/70542

[31] https://t.me/bbcrussian/57579 ; http://regulation dot gov.ru/p/144158 ;

https://t.me/sotaproject/70542

[32] https://www.helsinki dot org.ua/articles/sotni-tysiach-rosiian-pereikhaly-na-okupovani-

terytorii-ukrainy-pokazovi-pryklady-kolonizatsii/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/12/07/u-
krym-z-2014-roku-nezakonno-prybuly-800-tysyach-rosiyan/

[33] https://www.helsinki dot org.ua/articles/sotni-tysiach-rosiian-pereikhaly-na-okupovani-

terytorii-ukrainy-pokazovi-pryklady-kolonizatsii/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/12/07/u-
krym-z-2014-roku-nezakonno-prybuly-800-tysyach-rosiyan/

[34] https://www.helsinki dot org.ua/articles/sotni-tysiach-rosiian-pereikhaly-na-okupovani-

terytorii-ukrainy-pokazovi-pryklady-kolonizatsii/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/12/07/u-
krym-z-2014-roku-nezakonno-prybuly-800-tysyach-rosiyan/

[35] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-dopomoah-nimechchyna-ukrayina-viyna-
uryad/32722251.html ; https://www.bundesregierung dot de/breg-en/news/military-support-
ukraine-2054992

[36] https://apnews.com/article/japan-ukraine-support-humanitarian-aid-g7-
ac26f0224efbdcdfd75fbfdfbf6c9da8 ; https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-zelensky-iaponia-
dodatkova-dopomoha/32719762.html

[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52617 ; https://t.me/rybar/54839 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/25601

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZYrVRWTgebvaHRNnJfGFdqZ7bxap
uxfPTaaoKUEjPhasCho5NLxez2Nsnev7jpVHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfb
id02jjF8JNCRFqLgjomBCo29Meo9epzcSDrtkEbBjmdpBd1EhDnTZzVwbiRPjuJHeXhxl ; https://ww
w.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02H6FPmDxmcPcJSrw5Q4xRHma5yXmJaRb7Nia58T
BRNAawvxuCXJe43ndmQLhukp5Hl

[39] https://suspilne dot media/634622-ukraina-ta-ssa-domovilisa-pro-virobnictvo-ozbroen-

zelenskij-zatverdiv-novi-sankcii-proti-rf-653-den-vijni-onlajn/

[40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1468

[41] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1468

23 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
[42] https://t.me/rybar/54847

[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/33331 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/33324

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZYrVRWTgebvaHRNnJfGFdqZ7bxap
uxfPTaaoKUEjPhasCho5NLxez2Nsnev7jpVHl

[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/33326

[46] https://t.me/rybar/54839 ; https://t.me/rybar/54840

; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57849 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12942 ; https://t.me
/dva_majors/30410 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57868 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/5502 ; http
s://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12968 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/105892 ; https://t.me/D
nevnikDesantnika/5327 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/9268 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52617

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02H6FPmDxmcPcJSrw5Q4xRHma5yX
mJaRb7Nia58TBRNAawvxuCXJe43ndmQLhukp5Hl
; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZYrVRWTgebvaHRNnJfGFdqZ7bxapuxf
PTaaoKUEjPhasCho5NLxez2Nsnev7jpVHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid
02jjF8JNCRFqLgjomBCo29Meo9epzcSDrtkEbBjmdpBd1EhDnTZzVwbiRPjuJHeXhxl

[48] https://t.me/rybar/54840

[49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57868

[50] https://t.me/rybar/54840 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57849

[51] https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1733090464587272448

[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57839 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5317 ; https://t.me/Dnevnik

Desantnika/5317

[53] https://t.me/rybar/54839 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5317 ;

https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52617

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02H6FPmDxmcPcJSrw5Q4xRHma5yX
mJaRb7Nia58TBRNAawvxuCXJe43ndmQLhukp5Hl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/p
osts/pfbid02ZYrVRWTgebvaHRNnJfGFdqZ7bxapuxfPTaaoKUEjPhasCho5NLxez2Nsnev7jpVHl; http
s://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jjF8JNCRFqLgjomBCo29Meo9epzcSDrtkEbBj
mdpBd1EhDnTZzVwbiRPjuJHeXhxl; https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/posts/pfbid0qvK
zRxfZAeXuNeQp7U2o5G7kp2uVDMnZcu4vpn2WXpW6t7gmLYmXcRTxkCSYzKVwl

[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57839 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16896 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya

_pomosch_Z/12968 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/70497 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1060 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/30410

[56] https://t.me/multi_XAM/1060

[57] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12979

24 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
[58] https://suspilne dot media/635328-bez-izi-ta-vodi-zmuseni-isti-snig-pid-avdiivkou-vouut-
ponad-40-tisac-okupantiv-recnik-sil-oboroni-osuv-tavria/

[59] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12968

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02H6FPmDxmcPcJSrw5Q4xRHma5yX
mJaRb7Nia58TBRNAawvxuCXJe43ndmQLhukp5Hl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/p
osts/pfbid02ZYrVRWTgebvaHRNnJfGFdqZ7bxapuxfPTaaoKUEjPhasCho5NLxez2Nsnev7jpVHl; http
s://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jjF8JNCRFqLgjomBCo29Meo9epzcSDrtkEbBj
mdpBd1EhDnTZzVwbiRPjuJHeXhxl; https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/posts/pfbid0qvK
zRxfZAeXuNeQp7U2o5G7kp2uVDMnZcu4vpn2WXpW6t7gmLYmXcRTxkCSYzKVwl

[61] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12968 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52617

[62] https://t.me/wargonzo/16896; https://t.me/dva_majors/30410

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZYrVRWTgebvaHRNnJfGFdqZ7bxap
uxfPTaaoKUEjPhasCho5NLxez2Nsnev7jpVHl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jjF8JNCRFqLgjomBCo29Meo9epzcSDrtk
EbBjmdpBd1EhDnTZzVwbiRPjuJHeXhxl; https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/posts/pfbid
0qvKzRxfZAeXuNeQp7U2o5G7kp2uVDMnZcu4vpn2WXpW6t7gmLYmXcRTxkCSYzKVwl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02H6FPmDxmcPcJSrw5Q4xRHma5yXmJa
Rb7Nia58TBRNAawvxuCXJe43ndmQLhukp5Hl

[64] https://t.me/rybar/54832; https://t.me/readovkanews/70497; https://t.me/dva_majors/30414

; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57900

[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/33336

[66] https://t.me/rybar/54832; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5315

[67] https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1732857818007368017; https://fb.watch/oOU90lkSYR/;

https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1732857820146520496;
https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1732849037731037187;
https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1732849039945691311;

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02H6FPmDxmcPcJSrw5Q4xRHma5yX
mJaRb7Nia58TBRNAawvxuCXJe43ndmQLhukp5Hl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZYrVRWTgebvaHRNnJfGFdqZ7bxapuxfP
TaaoKUEjPhasCho5NLxez2Nsnev7jpVHl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jjF8JNCRFqLgjomBCo29Meo9epzcSDrtk
EbBjmdpBd1EhDnTZzVwbiRPjuJHeXhxl

[69] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1467

[70] https://t.me/dva_majors/30410; https://t.me/wargonzo/16896

[71] https://t.me/rybar/54839

25 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/33336

[73] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12938; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/105876;

https://t.me/dva_majors/30410

[74] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5324

[75] https://udm-info dot ru/news/2023-12-07/aleksandr-brechalov-v-udmurtii-sformirovany-4-

novyh-podrazdeleniya-dlya-uchastiya-v-svo-3121861

[76] https://t.me/mod_russia/33328

[77] https://t.me/astrapress/43639; https://izhlife dot ru/society/vyyavlennykh-v-izhevske-

migrantov-s-rossiyskimi-pasportami-otpravyat-v-armiyu.html

[78] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/16750

[79] https://t.me/bbcrussian/57600

[80] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/3520

[81] https://suspilne dot media/635124-okupanti-namagautsa-kopiuvati-ukrainski-morski-droni-

zbiraut-zaliski-gur/

[82] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/rus/news/2023/12/7/7432049/

[83] https://t.me/milinfolive/112192

[84] https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/3051

[85] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/skhemy-kamery-sposterezhennya-trassir-
kreml/32718775.html

[86] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/12/08/rosiya-namagayetsya-znyshhyty-zvyazok-ditej-z-

ukrayinoyu-potribni-shvydki-diyi-glava-derzhavy/ ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/rosiya-
namagayetsya-znishiti-bud-yakij-zvyazok-ditej-z-ukray-87589

[87] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
december-7-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082023

[88] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/657298279a794721f272266f

[89] https://uk.sports.yahoo.com/news/us-hopes-ukraine-aid-force-
173700344.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_refe
rrer_sig=AQAAABp0nvwojuTVuRvap129Ed-6DEKxMGKPLZflHbKn35TCGeGrCuI-K6b-
IWCqE4PGcAOAXmkSGTCnUW7DF2xVwdBRMB0PLlLgAgehQMEls6otDSKK7AfaGfrxkvZX42d8vO
qakQRkZfT-JPfKQwJu022wbn_nG86g5_ePDrJk4sl9

26 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
[90] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2023/12/08/1010046-v-kremle-schitayut-
nerealistichnim-stsenarii-peregovorov

[91] https://t.me/rybar/54827

[92] https://kginform dot com/ru/news/20231205/53896.html

[93] https://t.me/rybar/54827

[94] https://t.me/pul_1/10714

[95] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120623

[96] https://t.me/modmilby/34483

[97] https://t.me/modmilby/34479

[98] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/5493

27 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023