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Econ 620 Syllabus

Game theory is a way of thinking about strategic situations. On the one hand its content is normative: it provides guidelines for decision makers to predict others’ actions and to recognize good and bad strategies. On the other hand its content is positive: it helps the social scientist to understand the nature of social interaction in various applications, in Economics, Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology. We will learn new concepts, methods and terminology. The course will emphasize

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TOM ZACHARIAS
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105 views3 pages

Econ 620 Syllabus

Game theory is a way of thinking about strategic situations. On the one hand its content is normative: it provides guidelines for decision makers to predict others’ actions and to recognize good and bad strategies. On the other hand its content is positive: it helps the social scientist to understand the nature of social interaction in various applications, in Economics, Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology. We will learn new concepts, methods and terminology. The course will emphasize

Uploaded by

TOM ZACHARIAS
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Economics 620 Attila Ambrus

Game Theory with Applications


Spring 2017

SYLLABUS

Location of Class: Sociology Psychology 126


Meeting Time: Tu., Th. 8.30-9.45 am
Attila’s Office hours: Wednesday 1-2.15 pm, Social Sciences 313
Attila’s phone and e-mail: 919-660-1835, aa231@duke.edu
TA: Jingyi Tian
TA’s Office Hours: Mon. 2.30-4pm, SoSci Graduate Lounge (3rd floor)

Text Books

Each of the following books provides a good background reading for the lecture material:

R. Gibbons: Game theory for applied economists, Princeton University Press 1992
ISBN 0-691-00395-5 (PB)

P.K. Dutta: Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice, MIT 1999
ISBN 0-262-04169-3

E. Rasmusen: Games and information: an introduction to game theory, Blackwell


Publishing, 2007
ISBN 1-4051-3666-9
(Not printable chapters are available online: http://www.rasmusen.org/GI/index.html)

Grading

Problem Sets 20%


Midterm 30%
Final 50%

Requirements: who should take this course?

This course is an introduction to game theory. For MA students, no formal prerequisite is


required. We will use calculus (mostly, one variable) and some probability theory.
Course Aims and Methods

Game theory is a way of thinking about strategic situations. On the one hand its content is
normative: it provides guidelines for decision makers to predict others’ actions and to
recognize good and bad strategies. On the other hand its content is positive: it helps the
social scientist to understand the nature of social interaction in various applications, in
Economics, Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology. We will learn new concepts,
methods and terminology. The course will emphasize examples and applications. We will
also play some games in class.

Outline and Reading

The readings are not compulsory, but they will help back up the class material.
G=Gibbons; D=Dutta; R=Rasmusen

Topic 1 (Jan 12) Normal form games: basic concepts; Dominated strategies
Reading G: 1.1.A, 1.1.B; D: 1.1-1.3, 2.3; R: 1.1, 1.2

Topic 2 (Jan 17, 19) Iterated dominance; Best responses; Rationalizability; Knowledge,
common knowledge
Reading: G: 1.1.B; D: 2.1, 3-4; R: 1.3, 2.2

Topic 3 (Jan 24, 26, 31) Nash equilibrium; Finding pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite
games; Applications: Cournot and Bertrand duopoly, voting games, partnership game
Reading: G: 1.1.C; D: 5; R: 1.4, 3.5, 3.6

Topic 4 (Feb 2, 7, 9) Mixed and correlated equilibria; Large populations; Tipping points;
Evolutionary stability
Reading: G: 1.2.A-1.2.B; D: 6-7; R: 5.6

Topic 5 (Feb 14, 16) Extensive form games; Backward Induction; Zermelo’s algorithm;
Incredible threats; Counter-intuitive predictions of backward induction
Reading: G: 1.3.A-B; D: 8-9; R: 2.1

Topic 6 (Feb 21) Applications: alternative-offer bargaining; Game of duel


Reading: G: 2.1.D; D: 11-12; R: 12.1-12.4

Midterm: Thursday February 23 (in class)

Topic 7 (Feb 28, Mar 2, 7) Imperfect information; Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium:
theory and applications; War of attrition
Reading: G: 2.2.A; D: 13; R: 3.2, 4

Topic 8 (Mar 9, 21) Bayesian games; Cournot duopoly with private information; Perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
Reading: G: 3.1, 3.2, 4.1; D: 21, 24.2; R: 6.1, 6.2

Topic 9 (Mar 23) Reputation


Reading: G: 4.3.C; R: 5.3-5.4, 6.4

Topic 10 (Mar 28, 30) Finitely repeated games; Renegotiation; One-step deviation
property; Infinitely repeated games
Reading: G: 2.3.A; D: 13-14; R: 5

Topic 11 (Apr 4, 6) Private information; Verifiable information; Costly signaling


Reading: G: 2.3.A, 4.2, 4.3.C; D: 15-18, 24; R: 11

Topic 13 (Apr 11, 13) Auctions: common values and private values; Winner’s curse;
Revenue equivalence
Reading: G: 3.2.B; D: 23; R: 13

April 18: Review session.

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