CHAPTER 8

Operations Security

For Patriot units to successfully accomplish their mission on the air-land

battlefield, information about friendly unit activities, plans, and operations
must be denied to enemy forces until it is too late for these forces to effectively
react. Operations security (OPSEC) and ADA survivability are synonymous for
all practical purposes.
Generally, OPSEC includes the coordinated application of a wide range of
techniques and procedures to deny information to an enemy. It is primarily
common sense systematically applied to a unit's situation and mission. Coun-
tersuppression actions are taken to protect friendly operations from attack.
OPSEC and countersuppression actions and procedures fall into four catego-
ries, the first three of which are OPSEC areas:

* Countersurveillance - action to protect the true status of friendly

operations.

* Countermeasures -actions to remove or reduce the enemy intelligence and

electronic warfare threat.
* Deception - actions to create a false picture of friendly activities and
operations.

* Countersuppression - actions taken to directly defend or enhance the

defensive capability of the unit.

CONTENTS
page page
Section I - COUNTERSURVEILLANCE Section III - DECEPTION

AREAS OF COUNTERSURVEILLANCE ..... 8-2 DECEPTION OPERATIONS ............... 8-10

STANDINGOPERATING PROCEDURES ... 8-6 DUMMY POSITIONS...................... 8-10

DECOYS ... ... ....................... 8-11
Section II - COUNTERMEASURES
Section IV - COUNTERSUPPRESSION
MOVEMENT..8-9
STINGER AND SMALL ARMS FIRES...... 8-11
RADAR EMISSION CONTROL ............. 8-9 NBC DEFENSE TECHNIQUES.............8-12

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Section I - COUNTERSURVEILLANCE

AREAS OF COUNTERSURVEILLANCE
Measures and actions in this subcate- the KG-27 used with the AN/GRC-103 UHF
gory are those takei to prevent location of the radio, and the VINSON family of speech
unit by visual, electronic, or photographic secure devices.
means. Countersurveillance encompasses the
following four areas: This equipment sends an unintelligible
signal to receivers not having the same equip-
1. Signal security (SIGSEC). ment. If the enemy has a limited SIGINT
capacity, monitoring these secure nets will
2. Electronic counter-countermeasures. probably be of lower priority than nets oper-
3. Information security. ating in the clear.
4. Physical security. These secured radio nets allow easy,
rapid communications and are not as vulner-
Countersurveillance measures comprise able to certain forms of electronic counter-
the bulk of the actions available to the unit measures. To maintain secure nets, it is
commander when incorporating OPSEC into essential that proper encryption codes and
his operations. authenticators are used. Codes are changed
SIGNAL SECURITY regularly as prescribed.
Signal security encompasses actions units
can use to minimize enemy interception and Transmission Security. When using direc-
analysis of radar and radio signals. Catego- tional antennas (dipole, flyswatter, dish),
ries of SIGSEC are electronic security units should position antennas to keep trans-
(ELSEC), communications security, and mission lobes from facing directly toward the
TEMPEST. enemy. This will decrease vulnerability to
ESM and ECM. Whenever possible, emplace
Electronic Security equipment where terrain will mask transmit-
ELSEC is the protection of transmis- ters from the enemy.
sions from noncommunication devices. It
includes measures such as approved operat- Emission Security. Brevity is also one of
ing procedures, proper siting techniques, the keys to COMSEC. Unless a need exists to
maintenance procedures, and training pro- transmit, radios should remain silent. Neces-
grams. Radar emission control is the princi- sary AM and FM transmissions should be
pal ELSEC measure and is addressed in sec- kept short, 20-30 seconds to include short
tion II. concise RATT messages. As much reporting
as is tactically feasible should be transmitted
(Ccmriunications Security via written reports and courier. The remainder
COM()SEDrinc udes meas ires taken to should be channelled into the UHF system
deny the nem info:mation from friendly because that system normally operates 24
comm oic.ltions.
tu This includeb crypto secur- hours a day.
ity, trar smissicn security, emission security,
physical security of COMSEC information, Physical Security of COMSEC Informa-
and mE asulres to ir_ sure the authenticity of tion. COMSEC materials must be very closely
commuylicati< n .. controlled. Limited dissemination is very
important. Generally, radio operators should
Crypto Security. Crypto security centers on not have more than two or three changes of
the use ar d cor trol of speech secure equip- secure codes. If operations lend themselves to
ment and codes. This equipment currently closer control, the new codes should be issued
consists of buik encryption devices, such as on an "as. needed" basis.

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Additionally, physical security of radio or away from enemy forces. This will reduce
encryption equipment is of great importance. their vulnerability to jamming and detection.
If a properly coded KY-57, for example, fell
into enemy hands, the enemy would have Power Levels
access to the most sensitive unit communica- Sometimes it is possible to burn through
tions. Therefore, speech secure devices should ECM by stepping up the power of the trans-
be guarded much the same as classified mitter. To preserve this option, always oper-
paper; properly stored, accounted for, and ate on the lowest power level that will suffice.
used. This will also reduce the range at which the
Authenticity of Communications. In cases threat can detect Patriot transmissions.
when secure nets are not available, tactical Antennas
operations (TACOPS) codes must be used. To
Radar antennas are directional by design,
prove authenticity of clear text messages,
as are certain radio antennas. Directional
authentication tables are required. It is radio antennas should be used whenever
imperative that all radio transmissions be
possible. They will also channelize the signal
secured or authenticated.
and have the effect of boosting the radiated
power in the desired direction.
TEMPEST Hazards
This addresses those SIGSEC considera- INFORMATION SECURITY
tions that are less obvious. For example,
radios and telephones may "leak" transmis- Compromise of information security is
the primary means whereby enemy forces
sions, known as TEMPEST hazards. If radio-
receive the bulk of their intelligence. Some
frequency shielding of radio and command
sources are lost documents, classified waste
shelters (ECS, CRG, and ICC) is damaged,
improperly disposed, passing sensitive infor-
the unit may be transmitting in directions
mation in the clear, discussing classified
that are unplanned. Another common
matters in unsecured areas, and generally
TEMPEST hazard is collocating secured
wirelines with nonsecured ones. These lines failing to follow proper plans and procedures.
must have, as a minimum, a 6-foot separation.
Control
ELECTRONIC COUNTER- The most important area is document
COUNTERMEASURES control. Not only do documents contain a
Electronic counter-countermeasures are wealth of information, but, in addition, their
taken to protect friendly electronic emitters compromise almost always affects more than
from enemy detection, location, and identifi- one organization.
cation. ECCM, in this OPSEC context, Considerations Two things to consider in
includes use of proper power settings, antenna document control are administrative control
siting, masking and remoting radio anten- and physical security. Administrative con-
nas, equipment checks for radiation leakage, trol is the use of access rosters and classifica-
and proper training. tion markings. Physical security is the pro-
tection of documents during storage, use, and
Siting transportation.
Units should attempt to emplace the
radar set and radio antennas so that side and Dissemination. Custodians should verify
backlobes are absorbed or blocked. If this is clearances and the need-to-know of everyone
not possible, try to orient these lobes parallel requesting access to classified information.

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Only the minimum information necessary to certain addition procedures should be imple-
the mission should be extracted or distrib- mented as the conditions are not always the
uted to verified using personnel. same.
Denial. Units must always be prepared to Storage.In many cases, regular four-drawer
deny their classified material to enemy safes are too heavy to transport or are unavail-
forces. Measures range from simple evacua- able. Usually, field safes or field filing cabi-
tion to the destruction of materials. Since nets are used. These containers are generally
rapid destruction may become necessary, too small for the number of documents in a
documents should be maintained in central Patriot unit. Additionally, a field filing cabinet
storage facilities. If documents and equip- is not secure. Therefore, documents should be
ment must be destroyed use document de- kept in a continually manned location (CP,
stroyers and thermite grenades. Document staff operations vans).
destroyers are placed in file drawers while Classified waste. These papers (carbons,
thermite may be placed on the outside of the typewriter ribbon, extra or superceded mate-
container. It is better to overuse flame devices rial) must be securely stored until destroyed.
than to leave classified materials for the It is recommended that this material be
enemy. burned daily.
Field Security Procedures Site Police. A thorough clean up of paper
Units should exercise the same care and scraps should be conducted to insure no clas-
safeguards over classified material in the sified material is inadvertently lost. All other
field as is practiced in garrison. However, document waste should be buried.

PHYSICAL SECURITY
Actions and measures used to defend a large perimeter. To accomplish this, all avail-
Patriot position are discussed in this para- able means of defense must be employed. The
graph. As a Patriot firing battery normally typical firing battery ground defense scheme
disperses over an area 1,000 meters in radius, illustration shows a sample ground defense.
commanders must be prepared to defend a

TYPICAL FIRING BATTERY GROUND DEFENSE SCHEME

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Barriers and Entry Control Bunkers/Weapons Sites

All high-speed avenues of approach Sites for M60 machine guns should be
(roads, trails, open terrain accessible to vehi- selected to provide all-around defense. Sites
cles) should be blocked if possible. Methods to are selected to give the best defense the ter-
accomplish this include: rains allows. Then use trip flares, booby
" Mines. traps, and Claymore mines, and employment
of reaction forces to cover gaps in the machine
" Wire barriers. gun fields of fire. Insure that LAWs are
available along vehicle approach routes. If
" Road blocks (vehicular). time permits, crew-served weapon sites
" Earthworks (engineer support needed). should be bunkered to enhance their survi-
val. These weapons are the backbone of the
" Cratering (engineer support needed). defense and will be targeted. Weapon sites
One route should be left open and moni- should be dug for all individual and crew-
tored by an entry control point (ECP). If an served weapons. Bunkering is a desirable
access route is not blocked, it should be second priority.
covered by light antitank weapon, M203, or Each weapon site should have a range
crew-served weapons. If units have access to card showing sectors of fires. The bunkered
indirect fire support, (field artillery, mortars) sites must have communications to the com-
preplanned missions should be coordinated. mand post. Wire communications are prefer-
Whenever possible, units should use availa- able; FM radio serves as a backup until wire
ble engineer support to assist in constructing is laid. These sites are continuously manned.
barriers.
It is necessary to have access to the posi- Observation Posts/Listening Posts
tion, however, the ECP must be rigidly con-
trolled. To achieve control, it is necessary to Observation posts (OP) or listening posts
(LP) along covered avenues of approach
halt vehicles and personnel. For this reason,
should be continuously manned. Properly
an ECP must either be covered, or have a
positioned OPs and LPs provide early warn-
covered holding area nearby. Communica-
ing and may provide fire direction if artillery
tions to the unit command post are essential.
Most organizations collocate their ECP with support is available. Typically, the security
squad mans two OPs, the launcher platoon
a bunker, providing medium weapon cover-
mans four OPs, fire control platoon mans one
age and communications through the perim-
OP, maintenance platoon mans one OP, and
eter defense net.
battery headquarters mans the ECP. These
The function of the ECP is to halt, iden- posts must have communications to the CP
tify, and record the passage of personnel and via wire lines. These short stretches of wire
equipment in and out of the battery position. will not hamper unit mobility, as the posted
Personnel who are not assigned to the unit personnel can recover the wire as they return
should not be allowed to enter until autho- to the perimeter. If the battery is not aug-
rized by the CP. The ECP is normally manned mented with a security squad, adjustments
by an element from battery headquarters. must be made in the ground defense plans.
During night operations, personnel man- The wire lines also provide a ready guide
ning an ECP should split into two teams. for personnel returning to the perimeter at
These are the security team and control team. night. By following the lines, soldiers will
The control team challenges and records enter the perimeter at the same place each
entries and exits, while the security team time. To facilitate safe passage and control,
provides cover from a concealed overwatch wire lines are routed through a bunker or
position. ECP.

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FM 44-15

In addition to OPs and LPs, small patrols matic (as with chemical M8 series) or man-
may be employed as an additional physical ual. Manual alarms can be sounded by anyone
security measure. The security squad is detecting a hazard, or on direction of the CP.
trained on patrolling techniques. Due to the large area covered by a Patriot
Reaction Forces unit, audible alarms originating from a sin-
To counter small-unit, sabateur, and ter- gle source will probably not be heard through-
rorist attack, two quick-reaction teams are out the area. Additional alarm points and
designated and on standby. These teams visual markers must be used to insure all per-
have the following tasks: sonnel receive warnings of hazards. These
alarms range from vehicle and equipment
" Defend the firing battery with empha- horns and sirens, metal ring and bar systems
sis on the fire control and launcher platoons. to colored flags and geometric shapes. All
unit personnel must be trained to recognize
" Contain penetrations.
and react properly to all alarms.
" Counterattack to restore the perimeter.
" Act as hunter teams to suppress snipers. Control of Ground
Defense Operations
The fact that these teams are available All activities conducted to insure the unit
does not remove the requirement for all avail- is defended must be integrated into a central
able personnel to respond to ground attack control element at the battery CP. This gives
and return fire. Both quick-reaction teams the commander an ability to oversee his
should not be dispatched to the same area entire defense from one location; to direct
unless necessary. This will prevent over- actions and monitor the status. The CP also
committing manpower to a feint attack. collects tactical information from bunkers,
Alarm Systems ECPs, OPs, LPs, and quick-reaction teams.
It is not feasible to disseminate voice The CP must have communications with
warnings to all soldiers. Therefore, audible the subordinate elements. Wire is preferred,
and visible area alarms are used. Standard and two separate networks should be avail-
means for both types are prescribed in a var- able. Rapid relay of NBC reports and warn-
iety of publications such as STANAGs and ings to and from the perimeter is also accom-
joint manuals. Control of the alarms is auto- plished over the ground defense nets.

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

As a general rule, countersurveillance infrared scattering and radar transparent.
procedures such as camouflage, conceal- The radar/infrared scattering is the primary
ment, pattern painting, and light and noise system and comprises the bulk of the unit's
discipline are covered in SOPs. SOPs also issue. Radar/infrared scattering screens are
cover the way units make use of buildings, used to camouflage selected unit equipment
forests, roads, and equipment. except radar and radio antennas. The trans-
parent screens are used specifically for that
CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT purpose as radars and radios can operate
beneath them without significant signal deg-
These are the two traditional methods of radation. As these screens are not inter-
reducing visibility on the battlefield. With changeable, care must be exercised to insure
the great variety of detectors available to each is used for its intended purpose. There
modern armies, they have become more are also different color schemes for each;
important than ever before. woodland and jungle.
Camouflage Screen Systems Camouflage screen systems are lessened
These systems come in two types: radar/ in value if the support systems are not prop-

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 FM 44-15

erly employed. The poles and spreaders must billets, CP and decontamination facilities,
be placed to raise the screen off the top and and landline communications.
away from the sides of the item being camou-
flaged. This prevents the outline from being TONE DOWN
revealed. In the case of the radar transparent By itself, camouflage and concealment
screens, poles should not be placed in front of are not sufficient to completely hide a unit (it
the antenna lens. Care must be used when may be impossible). Even a well concealed
camouflaging the LS. The front of the launch position can be revealed if proper tone down
tube and rear of the LS must be kept clear. has not been accomplished.
Vegetation And Terrain Reflective Surfaces
The Patriot system is unique among Reflectors, lights, and windows will reflect
ADA systems in that it can be almost com- and "flash" sunlight if they are not properly
pletely concealed without affecting system covered. Anything, such as canvas, clothes,
operations. The RS and LS can be sited in grass, mud, and sandbags, can be used to
woodlines, as long as openings exist for their perform this function. The only limiting factor
tactical operation. Equipment in fields should is the ingenuity of the soldiers and leaders.
be placed near the edges to blend the camou- Infrared Sources
flage with the woodline. Emplacing in and
around woods has the following advantages: One common method of tone down for
vehicle windshields is to raise the hood. This
* Camouflage is natural and less likely method is good if the engine is cold. Raising
to attract attention. the hood when the engine is hot just exposes a
* Radar/infrared scattering screens can very good infrared source to enemy detection.
be employed primarily along the sides of Camouflage paints issued to US forces are
equipment to help defeat side-looking airborne infrared absorbing, therefore the hood should
radar (SLAR) surveillance. stay down until the block has cooled. Other
infrared sources that are easily identified
* Air under trees is cooler; branches and include:
leaves spread heat from equipment and * Exhaust pipes.
shadow heat sources. This reduces infrared
detectability. * Tires (heated by road march).
* Trees provide some natural protection * Exhaust vents.
against small arms, fragments, and NBC.
Trees also reduce and screen missile backblast * Power cables.
and launch flash. Everything should be covered with proper
camouflage screening and/or infrared paint.
* Personnel can move more freely when
Tires can be smeared with mud. Cables should
concealed by woods.
be buried or covered. Units may consider
* Trees absorb radar and radio sidelobes carrying a supply of white material to serve
and backlobes. as winter camouflage.
In the event a unit is employed in an area Tracks
that is built up, a modified approach is taken. When driving into positions, it is inevi-
Equipment can be emplaced in and around table that some tracks (ruts in mud or soft
buildings without great difficulty. Trucks earth, trampled grass and weeds) will be left.
and generators should be parked and camou- These tracks are excellent indicators of
flaged in places where shrubbery would nor- occupied positions, as well as individual sites
mally be found. A camouflaged item standing within a position. After the system is opera-
in the middle of a paved area is not hidden. tional, the following actions should be accom-
As another example, placing a radar set in a plished:
courtyard will block side and backlobe radia-
tion. The buildings also provide shelters, * Fill in any rutted areas.

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FM 44-15

* Rake over or standup any flattened * Gunfire.

weeds or grasses.
These sounds are not necessarily loud,
* Move vehicles away from the points but they are distinctive and catch attention
where they entered the woods. easily.
Until erased, any tracks left by the vehicle While noise control is a consideration 24
will act as a pointer to the vehicle's site. hours a day, light discipline really only comes
To avoid leaving trails in obvious loca- into play during night operations. White
tions the following rules apply: light can be seen for extremely long distances
at night, and even the red "blackout" lights
* Enter and travel through fields and are visible a good distance. To reduce the
meadows on the edges. Tracks are harder to light signature from unit locations perform
see near boundaries, and often trails are the following:
already established.
* Cover bottom flaps of all tents. Repair
* When crossing a plowed field, when- holes and tears to prevent leaks. Keep venti-
ever possible cross in the same direction as lation flaps closed at night; the night air is
the furrows. cool enough to keep temperatures down.
* Emplace equipment near the edges of * Keep the M14 protective airlock
open areas, close to woods or roads and trails. installed on the ECS/ICC.
This provides covered routes or even already
* Turn out all lights when entering or
existing farm trails to equipment locations.
exiting tents/vans. Proper entry control will
* Refuel the 15-kw generator on the eliminate problems. Use shades on all lights.
Patriot LS using 5-gallon fuel cans. This will Use blue or green bulbs whenever possible.
avoid leaving trails with the unit tanker.
* Use blackout drive when moving at
If revetting is to be accomplished, obtain night. When flashlights must be used, use a
dirt from covered or distant locations, or use blue or green filter. Try to avoid shining the
the dirt excavated when placing equipment light upward.
in trenches or dugouts.
* Emplace away from likely ground
approach routes. Emplace in covered loca-
NOISE AND LIGHT DISCIPLINE tions whenever possible.
Even if all other passive defense mea-
sures are implemented perfectly, they are * Use no fires. Mess burners are kept
useless without proper noise and light inside at night.
discipline. * Keep covers on control panels with
Noise discipline will be somewhat hard indicator lights closed. Open them under
to implement fully due to the requirement to cover; (a poncho or blanket).
operate generators. Current models are rea- * Make every effort to emplace LSs in
sonably quiet and the noise can be deadened woods, and clear flammable material from
further by vegetation and buildings. Using the backblast areas. Trees help screen the
ducting materials can further muffle sound. flash from the launch; clearing the back area
The following are other sounds that should will reduce the fire hazard.
be minimized:
* Metal striking metal. SITE HARDENING
* Loud voices. As with all electronic equipment, Patriot
units are vulnerable to damage from small
* Ringing telephones. arms fire and fragmentation.

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 FM 44-15

The most common method of gaining especially for crew-served weapons. Obvi-
protection from hostile fires is to use the ously, the degree of hardening depends on
existing terrain. Except for the radar set, how long the unit will be occupying a par-
emplacing in gullies, ravines, woods, even ticular position. Bunkers and foxholes should
buildings, provides cover (and concealment) have overhead cover as a defense against
from attack. Patriot units have no organic napalm and NBC. This overhead cover could
earthmoving equipment. Any major site not hamper small arms fire against aircraft.
improvement will have to be done by support-
Whether or not time exists to revet and
ing engineer units. If engineer support is
fortify, proper dispersal of equipment enhan-
available, revetments should be constructed
ces survival. In a highly mobile situation,
for the system and personnel areas.
dispersal may be the only way to protect the
To enhance unit ability to survive ground system.
and air attack, fortifications may be devised,

Section II - COUNTERMEASURES

MOVEMENT
Countermeasures are actions taken to at least once daily.
reduce the enemy threat by removing or cov-
To maintain the Patriot unit's mobility,
ering indicators of unit presence, or actions
planning and care in execution must be exer-
that offset an inherent weakness of the unit.
cised. The Patriot equipment is large and
Movement is a primary method of insur- heavy, so emplacement and convoy move-
ing survival. Multiple launches will reveal ments will become more important than for
unit positions despite any other attempts at previous HIMAD systems. Silent moves
concealment. Movement is critical to Patriot could be the normal. Movement procedures
survival. Patriot firing batteries should move are detailed in chapter 7.

RADAR EMISSION CONTROL

Radar equipment should only radiate are prepared at battalion level. Emission
when required. Repairs and checks should be control schedules for three and six opera-
accomplished in a quiet mode whenever pos- tional firing batteries are shown in the emis-
sible. Initialization parameters should be sion control schedule illustration. In this
loaded or -obtained from other sources to example, each battery is in two hours of
avoid having to radiate unless active surveil- standby, when the unit exercises EMCON,
lance, mapping or engagement is being con- and one hour of surveillance operations when
ducted. Only radars needed for early warning the unit actively performs surveillance. This
should radiate; all others can wait in ambush. radar blinking makes RDF efforts less suc-
When two or more units can maintain sur- cessful. Shorter radar blinking periods
veillance over the same area, coverage can be increase survivability by reducing the effec-
alternated between units. Units should plan tiveness of enemy RDF equipment, but may
to change PTL of firing batteries at intervals, cause increased radar maintenance. EMCON
if this can be done without degrading the combined with movement are two keys to
battalion radar coverage. EMCON schedules Patriot survival on the air-land battlefield.

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FM 44-15

EMISSION CONTROL SCHEDULE

Section III - DECEPTION

DECEPTION OPERATIONS
Deception operations are taken to mis- Deception operations may be conducted
lead an enemy. They may include the because a commander sees an opportunity to
following: deceive the enemy. A deception may be
required because countersurveillance opera-
" Dummy equipment.
tions are not sufficient to mislead the enemy
" Demonstrations. so an operation can succeed.
" Distortion of an activity so it is not By properly using deception techniques,
what it seems. units can enhance the effectiveness of their
other defense measures.
" Feints.
" Manipulation of electronic signatures.

DUMMY POSITIONS
If enemy forces believe a false position is smoke signatures. A deliberate dummy posi-
real, they will either cease looking or be less tion generally requires more equipment, and
sensitive to indicators of an actual position. thus more time. The advantage of a deliber-
Dummy positions can be one or two items of ate position over a hasty site lies in its believ-
equipment "accidentally" exposed to enemy ability. A deliberate position has more ancil-
surveillance. These exposed "end items" can lary items, such as camouflage nets, tents,
be wooden mockups; cannibalized, destroyed, and personnel.
or non-operational pieces of equipment.
Building fires in concealed sites near the Another form of deception is infrared
dummy items can give false infrared and deception. Infrared sensors are commonly

8-10
 FM 44-15

found on the battlefield, therefore, giving might be possible to disguise it. For example,
false infrared indicators raises the believea- when emplaced in built-up areas, generator
bility of a dummy position. When a unit can- exhaust can be ducted into buildings thereby
not disperse or hide its infrared emissions, it simulating normal furnace output.

DECOYS
Patriot ARM decoys are currently under intended target-the Patriot RS. The decoys
development. These decoys will deceive the also serve to reduce the accuracy of threat
seekers of ARMs as to the actual site of their RDF sensors.

Section IV - COUNTERSUPPRESSION

STINGER AND SMALL ARMS FIRES

Countersuppression actions are those of the radar's track sector, Stinger team
actions a unit takes to increase its survivabil- members must be trained to visually identify
ity if attacked. Self-defense against air attack aircraft without the benefit of early warning
and NBC defense techniques are covered in alerting or cueing. (In some cases, Stinger
this section. Ground defense has been pre- teams may be able to tie into a SHORAD
viously covered in section I. battalion early warning broadcast net
(EWBN). FM 44-18 contains more detail on
The Patriot battery has a mix of Stinger Stinger team operations.
and small arms available for close-in defense
against air attack. Each firing battery has
two Stinger teams and HHB has one. Patriot TYPICAL STINGER EMPLOYMEN
units have M16 rifles, and M60 and M249
machine guns available.

STINGER EMPLOYMENT
In defense of a firing battery, Stinger
teams should be positioned on nearby terrain
astride likely air avenues of approach approxi-
mately 2 to 3 kilometers from the fire control
area. To provide coverage where the Patriot
system cannot engage, the Stinger teams are
normally positioned approximately 1200 on
either side of the PTL. A typical Stinger
deployment is shown in the typical Stinger
employment illustration. This deployment of
Stinger teams allows for two potential inter-
cepts prior to ordnance release. Because the
battery TCO and TCA cannot see targets out

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FM 44-15

SMALL ARMS
Small arms are used for self-defense fighting positions should be able to fire on
against attacking aircraft. Small arms have overflying aircraft (especially the crew--
a limited range in an AD role and require served machine guns) so that attacking air-
close coordination to be effective. Effective craft can be driven off before significant
range in the AD role of the M16 rifle and M60 damage is done. Early warning must be dis-
and M249 machine guns is 350 meters. seminated to these weapons positions from
the unit CP or ECS. FM 44-8 describes tech-
The primary consideration in using small niques which any unit can use to counter air
arms against aircraft is volume of fire. All attack.

NBC DEFENSE TECHNIQUES

NBC defense techniques must be fully ing ADA units. Chemical contamination of
integrated into all aspects of operational areas or equipment could greatly hamper the
planning and execution. The Soviets have a ability of ADA units to accomplish their
large and versatile arsenal of chemical and mission.
nuclear munitions. In some Soviet forces,
commanders have delegated authority to use While this section is not intended to pres-
chemical munitions to the division level. ent an in-depth overview of NBC defense
measures, it will highlight the important
Since some chemical agents are persist- areas for consideration.
ent, they are an excellent method of hinder-

CHEMICAL AGENTS
Patriot units can expect to face the full in massive strikes. The intent is to cause
range of chemical agents and munitions, large scale casualties over a wide area to dis-
with the preponderance of type being influ- rupt and disorganize the defense. The non-
enced by the unit's mission and location. For persistency of these agents allows the Threat
example, unit's located in the rear operations to advance with relatively little hazard to its
area can expect to see persistent chemical own forces.
agents delivered by long-range rockets, tacti-
cal ballistic missiles, and aircraft spray tanks The rear area forces can expect to receive
and ordnance. The more forward units will more persistent types of chemicals, such as
receive non-persistent agents from delivery liquid nerve agent and the blister agents.
systems such as MRL, cannon artillery, as These will be targeted on airfield operations
well as by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. areas to slow the counterair and CAS sortie
generation rate; on logistics complexes to
The forward area will generally be tar- slow resupply; on supply routes to slow or
geted by the less-persistent agents (blood reroute traffic, or to create choke points for
agents, choking agent, gaseous nerve agent) air interdiction.

NUCLEAR STRIKES
The use of tactical nuclear weapons on most important to the commander since they
the battlefield is quite possible. Nuclear muni- will create personnel casualties and materiel
tions can be used for a wide variety of tactical damage within the timespan of the current
purposes and have several effects that are of operation. The principal initial casualty-
military significance. Nuclear weapons effects producing effects are blast, thermal radia-
may be classified as initial and residual. tion, and initial nuclear radiation. Other
Initial effects occur in the immediate area initial effects (EMP and transient radiation
within 1 minute after a detonation and are effects on electronics [TREE]) affect electri-

8-12
 FM 44-15

cal and electronic equipment. Residual effects, may also have serious impact on success or
such as fallout, are primarily of long-term failure in the immediate battle area.
interest but, under certain circumstances,

INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE MEASURES

The purpose of this paragraph is to out- " The impact of casualties and equip-
line both individual and collective measures ment damage on his ability to accomplish the
for defense against chemical, biological, and mission.
radiological hazards on the air-land battle-
field. * Identification of the type, degree, and
persistency of the hazard.
The objective of individual and collective
protection against NBC hazards is to survive * Influence of weather and terrain on the
hazard.
and fight. To reduce the impact of these
hazards, the primary principle is to avoid * Impact of prolonged operations in par-
both immediate and residual contamination tial or full protection.
hazards. Whenever possible, units avoid inten-
tional or inadvertent entry into known or " Time required and available to react.
suspected areas of contamination. If the unit " Estimate of effort necessary to elimi-
is in a clear area which subsequently becomes nate or reduce the contamination hazard.
contaminated, the unit leaves the area as
soon as operationally possible. When con- * Probability of follow-on NBC attacks.
tamination cannot be avoided, protection is
required-protection for each soldier and in Contamination Avoidance
many cases, collective protection for selected Contamination avoidance refers to those
teams or crews. Protection enhances surviv- individual and unit collective measures taken
ability against both the immediate and resid- to evade or minimize the immediate and
ual hazards and supports mission accom- residual NBC hazards. Contamination avoid-
plishment for limited periods of time (several ance reduces, and sometimes eliminates,
hours for individual protection, days for col- requirements for protection and decontami-
lective protection). If the residual contamina- nation. Contamination avoidance is achieved
tion hazard must be reduced or eliminated, as follows:
decontamination is eventually required.
Therefore, the following three fundamental " Take passive OPSEC measures.
measures form the basis for defense against " Limit contamination spread.
NBC hazards:
" Detect, identify, and mark contamina-
1. Contamination avoidance. tion hazards.
2. Protection. " Issue contamination warnings.
3. Decontamination " Relocate to an uncontaminated area.
Factors to Consider
Protection
Flexibility is essential to adapting the
Prior to enemy use of NBC weapons,
three NBC defensive fundamentals to situa-
commanders evaluate the impact of NBC
tions anticipated on the battlefield. When
hazards on mission performance. Based on
subjected to an NBC hazard, each commander
this analysis, appropriate levels of individ-
assesses the following factors in planning
ual and collective protection are established.
his course of action:
Individual protection enhances the soldiers
" The assigned mission. survivability and capability for continued

8-13
FM 44-15

operations in an NBC environment. Individ- Partial Decontamination. Partial decon-

ual protection includes the following: tamination is the removal or neutralization
of all visible or detectable contamination
* Prophylactic measures. from individual clothing and equipment and
* Protective uniform. from those surfaces of equipment that opera-
tors or crew personnel must contact to per-
* Decontamination and first aid kits. form their mission. Its objectives are to pre-
* Field protective mask. vent contamination of clean soldiers and
equipment, limit the spread of contaminated
Collective protection is provided in both soldiers and equipment, and reduce require-
the ECS and ICC. This equipment provides ments for complete decontamination. Partial
total collective protection-overpressure plus decontamination is conducted by unit per-
an environmental control system. sonnel as a normal, ongoing function.
Decontamination CompleteDecontamination. Complete decon-
Decontamination is the removal or neu- tamination reduces all or most of the contam-
tralization of hazardous levels of NBC con- ination hazard to a level which permits
tamination from personnel and materiel. removal of the individual protective mask
Extensive time and logistical support factors and gloves. The objective is to increase com-
make decontamination a requirement a com- bat effectiveness by eliminating the require-
mander wants to avoid or circumvent in an ment for soldiers to fight and operate in full
intense battle. These reasons highlight the protective clothing. Because complete decon-
importance of contamination avoidance. If tamination requires time and additional
commanders can keep their soldiers, equip- resources, it is conducted only when neces-
ment, and supplies from becoming contami- sary to continue the mission or to support
nated, decontamination may not be required. another requirement, (maintenance, rest and
Decontamination is undertaken only if it relief, reconstitution). Decontamination
helps preclude casualties and enhances com- assistance is provided by decontamination
bat effectiveness. teams at battalion level. Specialized decon-
tamination units at corps and division levels
The decontamination system emphasizes conduct or assist in complete decontamina-
simplicity, speed, and thoroughness. Partial tion of unit equipment.
decontamination of unit equipment and sup-
plies is performed as far forward as possible NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS
and at the lowest levels by operators and DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
crew personnel using on-board decontamina- Defense techniques are proposed config-
tion systems. The intensity and fluidity of urations and procedures for employment of
combat on the battlefield establishes partial personnel and equipment to lessen or mini-
decontamination as the expected mode of mize their vulnerability to nuclear weapons
operation. Complete decontamination is accom- effects. These techniques are intended to be
plished only when absolutely necessary and field expedients. Defense techniques fall into
requires the assistance of specially trained three general categories: actions taken before,
teams. during, or after a nuclear attack.
Emergency Decontamination. Emergency
decontamination is the immediate neutrali- Defensive Actions Before
zation or removal of contamination from a Nuclear Attack
exposed portion of the skin. Emergency An enemy nuclear attack will probably
decontamination is performed to enable the come with little or no warning. Warning of a
soldier to survive. It is conducted by the indi- planned nuclear strike by friendly forces can
vidual soldier, or if he is incapacitated, by be expected only minutes before the desig-
another soldier. nated time-on-target. In either case, there will

8-14
 FM 44-15

be little time to take protective actions. Indi- " Minimize exposed skin areas.
vidual and unit defensive measures must be
automatic and instinctive. Therefore; long- " Protect exposed skin areas.
range planning, training, and maintenance " Keep clothes loosely fitted.
for operations on the nuclear battlefield as
well as an understanding of the optimum " Wear headgear at all times.
protective postures for "strike-warned" troops " Remove dark camouflage face paint.
are essential.
" Wear ear protection.
Preparationof the Battlefield. As with
conventional operations, knowing the ter- As stated before, digging in, or taking
rain and using it to our advantage is basic. cover before an attack provides the best pro-
Prior reconnaissance will help in finding tection from nuclear effects. Some considera-
cover, such as caves, ditches, and culverts, tions when digging in are-
during an attack. Extraordinary consump-
" Earth is a good shielding material.
tion of expendable materials, medical sup-
plies, and water can be anticipated. Knowing " Dig round foxholes.
the location and availability of water sources
can greatly help decontamination efforts. " The smaller the foxhole opening, the
better.
Preparationof Personnel. The need for
training is obvious. If we expect the soldier to * A deep fighting position/foxhole gives
continue combat operations after a nuclear more radiation protection than a shallow
one.
attack, he must be taught how to recover from
the effects of the nuclear explosion and how * Keep as low as possible.
the unit plans to operate in a nuclear
environment. An overhead covering of earth or other
material will reduce the amount of thermal
Unit Operations. Operationally, the most and initial radiation that reaches the soldier
effective means of surviving on the nuclear and help prevent the entrance of fallout.
battlefield is to avoid being detected and tar- Massive overhead cover is best, but it must be
geted from the start. Dispersed units and able to withstand the blast wave. The follow-
equipment are less likely to be detected and ing are important factors to remember in con-
are less likely to be destroyed by the effects of struction of effective overhead cover:
a nuclear attack. Camouflage not only redu-
ces detection, but can significantly reduce the " Choose dense covering materials.
effect of thermal radiation. Cover is the best " Cover in depth.
protection from nuclear attack. Whenever the
tactical situation allows, critical facilities, " Provide strong supports.
personnel, equipment, and supplies should be " Cover as much of the opening as
dug in or placed in the best shelter available. possible.
The basements of masonry and light steel
buildings can provide significantly more blast * Vehicles make good expedient over-
and radiation protection than wheeled head cover.
vehicles. Certain type of buildings offer excellent
Recommended Protective Postures for shelter from the effects of nuclear detona-
Personnel. Some of the actions to consider tions and require a minimum of time and
for self protection on the nuclear battlefield effort to adapt to your needs. Choose the
are as follows: buildings carefully. The strongest structures
are heavily-framed steel and reinforced con-
* Protect your eyes. Do not look at the crete buildings, while the worst choices are
fireball. the shed-type industrial buildings. European

8-15
FM 44-15

rural and urban structures can provide good " Remove, cover, or tape glass.
protection. Characteristics to look for include
pre-WWII design and construction; full base- " Protect critical areas of the vehicle.
ments constructed of concrete and stone; " Anchor or tie-down vehicle and cargo.
thick-walled, masonry structures; and build-
ings with the least amount of glass. Select a " Cushion and shock-secure sensitive
shielded building. Get below ground level, if equipment.
possible. Your position inside of the building " Protect vehicles in slot trenches.
can make a difference.
" Do not park vehicles on asphalt.
Generally, wheeled vehicles not only pro-
vide little or no protection from the effects of " Consider removing vehicle canvas and
nuclear explosions, but are particularly vul- seats.
nerable to vehicle overturn and therefore Tactical communications and electronic
expose driver and passengers to increased equipment are vulnerable to nuclear blast
risk. Mitigation techniques are to- and thermal effects. In addition, such equip-
" Avoid the use of wheeled vehicles. ment requires EMP protection.
" Protect yourself inside the vehicle. Some blast and thermal defense tech-
niques are-
" Secure all loose equipment inside the
vehicle. " Cover (not bury) wires and cables.
" Prepare alternate shelters. " Turn horn antennas away from the
blast.
" Park the vehicle inside a shelter.
* Leave covers and wrappings on wire
Recommended Protective Posture for and cable reels.
Equipment. Equipment is vulnerable to the
same basic nuclear effects that personnel are. * Protect generators and other support
However, air blast will normally dominate by equipment.
dragging, overturning, or crushing equip- Some EMP mitigation techniques are-
ment. Nuclear radiation can cause TREE. In
general, the same procedures used to protect * If the mission permits, as a general
personnel will be needed to protect equip- rule, remove exterior conductors.
ment. These general procedures are listed
below: * Use UHF equipment in preference to
VHF equipment when possible.
" Dig in.
" Avoid use of broadband radios.
* Secure all loose equipment.
" Shut down and protect unneeded and
" Seek shelter. redundant radio systems.
" Anchor or tie down when possible. * When possible, use antennas that have
small radiating elements.
Blast damage to wheeled vehicles is one
of the predominant effects which can be * Keep cable and wire runs as short as
expected from a nuclear burst. The majority possible.
of damage will be the direct result of vehicle
turnover. Some considerations are- * Keep cable runs as straight as pos-
sible-avoid loops.
" Place vehicles tail-end to the blast.
* Keep cables and wires on the ground
" Place two or more vehicles side-by-side. where practical to do so.
" Leave brakes and transmissions * Use shielded, twisted pair cables where
disengaged. options in use of cables exist.

8-16
 FM 44-15

" Use shielding against EMP. cause system upset, permanent or temporary
loss of memory, or damage. Some defense
" An effective EMP shield requires that
techniques are:
all openings be closed with metal covers.
" Store duplicate tapes at two separate
* Maintain EMP shields and shelters.
locations.
Pay special attention to gasketing, cable
shields at connectors, power system filters, * Store critical information and pro-
holes in shelters, and access panels. grams on drums, disks, or tapes.
* Keep exterior grounds short and of low * Shield handheld calculators from
impedance. EMP.
" Establish good exterior grounds when
possible. Defensive Actions During
a Nuclear Attack
* Use a common ground for equipment.
An enemy nuclear attack will no doubt
* Insure all antenna guy wires are prop- come without warning. The first indication
erly insulated. will be a very intense light followed by
* Avoid the use of commercial sources of extreme heat. Initial radiation comes with
power. the light and the blast wave and hurricane-
like winds follow within seconds. There will
* Keep a supply of critical spare parts. be little time, possibly a second, to take pro-
Blast and thermal radiation may dam- tective actions. Illustration below shows
age computers that are also potentially what can be done during a nuclear attack.
vulnerable to both EMP and TREE. EMP can

PROTECTIVE ACTIONS DURING A NUCLEAR ATTACK

IN THE OPEN
" IMMEDIATELY DROP TO THE GROUND.
" PROTECT EYES, EARS, AND EXPOSED SKIN AREAS.
" STAY DOWN.

IN A FOXHOLE
" GET AS LOW AS POSSIBLE AS FAST AS POSSIBLE.
" STAY DOWN.

IN A SHELTER OR BUILDING
" DIVE FOR COVER.
" AVOID WINDOWS AND DOORS.

IN A WHEELED VEHICLE
" GET OUTSIDE.

IN A TENT
" GET OUTSIDE.

8-17
FM 44-15

Defensive Actions Immediately

After a Nuclear Attack
Immediately after a nuclear attack is the taken soon after the burst, can reduce the
time when several actions, if planned for and eventual effects of the detonation.
P~-c~-i--~- ~-~--
I I-a~ i~l
~a~-r;~- -~- s~ --- - -~~I~---
C DEFENSIVE ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER A NUCLEAR ATTACK

General Defense Measures Summary

Many of the OPSEC techniques already possible. Movement from contaminated areas,
discussed are also applicable to NBC. Each out of fallout or chemical hazard areas, should
unit must also have well trained NBC teams be one of the unit's highest priorities. Mobil-
to perform specific tasks of radiation and ity is the most important defense measure the
chemical detection, and fallout and chemical unit possesses. Because of the threat of attack
decontamination. Some techniques that are with toxic chemical agents, units must train
helpful in various areas of NBC defense can and be proficient in mission accomplishment
be found in FM 3-100. while in mission oriented protective posture
(MOPP) 4. This can only be attained through
As a final reminder, the best NBC defense periodic training of all tasks under simulated
is to be out of range of NBC effects as soon as chemical attack.

8-18
 Change No. 1

CHAPTER 9

Combat Service Support

The combat service support system develops and maintains maximum

combat power by sustaining combat forces. It may include administrative,
chaplain, food, finance, legal, maintenance, medical, supply, transportation,
and other logistical services.

The success of any combat operation is highly dependent on combat service

support planning, timeliness, and the efficient use of available resources. The
combat success of any ADA unit relies on the combat service support system's
ability to-

* Arm. Provide the proper type and quantity of equipment, arms, and
ammunition, when and where needed.

* Fuel. Insure the availability of fuel stocks at the right place and the right
time.

* Fix. Provide maintenance support to return noncombat ready and dam-

aged equipment to the user with minimum delay.
* Man. Insure that weapon systems are manned by personnel who are fit to
fight and properly trained through effective use of a responsive personnel
service support system.

This chapter focuses on combat service support of the Patriot battalion.

9-1
Cl, FM 44-15

MODERN COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Commanders must plan tactics and sup- impact, commanders should also be aware of
port concurrently to insure that the concept the status of their-
of the operation is logistically supportable.
They consider the constraints that support " Ammunition stocks.
planners identify and modify unsupportable " Fuel.
plans or accept the risks involved. To develop
the support scheme and evaluate the combat " Transportation system capacity.
service support system's ability to support " Maintenance capabilities (mechanics
a particular operation, commanders should and spare parts).
consider-
AUSTERITY
" Supportability. If the resources are suf-
ficient, is the support system capable of get- Future conflicts will be intense and con-
ting them where they are needed for the sume resources rapidly. Austerity will be the
initial operation and for sustainability? rule. Efficient tactical support planning will
be mandatory. Commanders will have to
I Risk. To how much risk will support conserve resources, especially ammunition,
resources be exposed by the tactical scheme? fuel, and repair parts. When capabilities do
When the support structure is austere, how not meet requirements, commanders must
will the loss of a few support personnel and establish priorities for support. For greatest
facilities affect the maintenance effort? efficiency, the maintenance system must re-
• Future Operations. At the end of the pair damaged equipment far forward in the
current operation, how well will the support battle area, preferably on site.
system be able to support contingencies or
future operations? REQUIREMENTS
The combat service support system sup-
* Availability. Are there sufficient com- ports weapon systems and the soldiers who
bat service support resources (trained soldi- man them. Those who direct the support
ers; ammunition; repair parts; trucks; tools; effort insure that critical weapon systems,
and petroleum, oils, and lubricants) to pro- such as Patriot, have sufficient missiles and
vide the support required? Will shortages fuel, that they are quickly repaired or re-
require that priorities be established? If so, placed, and that soldiers are available to
approximately when? operate them. Combat equipment is armed,
fueled, fixed, and manned as close to the
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT point of employment as possible. Supplies are
CAPABILITIES provided to forward units according to the
All commanders and staff officers should commander's priorities. Replacement per-
know the capabilities of their support units, sonnel are moved forward to maintain the
as well as the assistance available from the strength of frontline units. Weapon system
next higher headquarters. To plan realisti- replacement operations provide major
cally, anticipate problems, and reduce their weapon systems in a ready-to-fight condition.

ORGANIZATION

* Each level of command has a combat the command's table of organization and
service support element to provide its sup- equipment to provide specified types and
port. From firing battery level through bat- quantities of support. At corps level and
talion level, support elements are built into above, combat service support is designed

9-2
 C1, FM 44-15

and organized to provide the amounts and support and general support supply, mainte-
types of support required by the force. Gener- nance, and field services. However, units of
ally, combat service support requirements for the theater army area commands do not pro-
Patriot batteries are provided by- vide intermediate maintenance support of
* Organizational operators and mechan- the Patriot system.
ics, maintenance clerks, administrative
clerks, supply clerks, and medics. Air Defense Support Command
* Corps support command units. * The logistics mission of the air defense
* Theater army area commands and support command is to provide sources of
functional commands in a multicorps theater. logistics management/operations as follows:
* Air defense support command.
* Supply and maintenance management
for class II (maintenance-related), V, and IX
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT supplies.
RESPONSIBILITIES
The combat service support provided at * Receipt, storage, and issue of all class
each level is explained below. IX supplies by air defense support command
maintenance support units.
Battalion
* The combat service support elements of * Provision for general support missile
the battalion provide organizational main- maintenance to include operation of theater
tenance (less teletypewriter and multichan-
reconstitution points for theater air defense
nrel radio) and supply, transportation, per- weapon systems.
sonnel, medical, and food service. Most of the
combat service support elements are part of
the firing batteries. * Management of the general support
Corps supply base assets needed to support air
defense missile systems.
* The corps support command provides
corps-wide supply, maintenance, and field
services to units located in the corps area. * Provision of intermediate Patriot mis-
This includes support in the areas of health sile system maintenance.
services, personnel and administration, trans-
portation, ammunition, and civil affairs. It * Provision of backup direct support mis-
does not provide maintenance of the Patriot sile maintenance.
system.
Theater Army * Provision of intermediate/direct sup-
* The theater army provides support to port maintenance services for system sup-
units located in the communications zone, port equipment and other nonmissile pecul-
through two types of commands: functional iar items as needed to maintain mobility and
commands and theater army area com- self-defense capabilities. The net result is an
mands. Functional commands provide a spe- addition of DS automotive maintenance and
cific type of service in support of the entire related class IX supply capabilities.
theater. Theater army area commands pro-
vide a variety of services within a designated
area in the communications zone. The theater * Operation of direct exchange (DX) sup-
army area command is responsible for rear ply support for selected equipment in the
area protection and provides most direct command.

9-3
C1, FM 44-15

* Management of Army air defense support command designed to support a large

command property records in accordance corps consists of a materiel management
with current regulations, directives, and center, finance support center, movement
automated procedures. control center, support groups, ammunition
group, personnel and administration battal-
* Peacetime management, commitment, ion, petroleum supply battalion, transporta-
and obligation of funds needed to execute the tion brigade, civil affairs brigade, and medi-
Army air defense command mission. cal brigade.

* Management of modification work

orders, product improvement programs, and Theater Army
other similar equipment improvement pro- * Functional commands of the theater
grams. army are the medical command, personnel
command, transportation command, and
* Coordination of command transporta- engineer command. The theater army area
tion requirements (both air and ground). command normally consists of a materiel
management center, area support groups,
conventional ammunition group, graves reg-
ORGANIZATION istration battalion, personnel and adminis-
* The organization of combat service sup- tration battalion, area finance support cen-
port elements is tailored at each level to the ter, aviation support battalion, petroleum
mission and logistical requirements of the supply battalion, and explosive ordnance
supported unit. disposal center.

Air Defense Support Command

Battalion The creation of an air defense support
7 Each Patriot battery's headquarters sec- command will establish a technical chain of
tion provides unit administration, supply, command from the maintenance support
and mess functions. Each Patriot firing bat- company commander through the air defense
tery has a maintenance platoon which pro- support command commander to the Army
vides unit maintenance of all equipment with air defense command deputy commander for
primary emphasis on Patriot, power genera- support. The air defense support command
tion, communications, and automotive organization incorporates innovative fea-
equipment. Each Patriot battalion provides tures of command and control for its 11 to 15
personnel and administrative support, medi- direct support units, a materiel management
cal support, communications maintenance center, DS and GS maintenance, and a gen-
support, and supply support (less mainte- eral support supply base. This results in an
nance). The Patriot battalion also provide Army air defense command support struc-
NBC and quartermaster support. ture somewhat similar to the support de-
signed for a division. The activation of the
materiel management center will provide
Corps centralized management of material assets
* The corps support command is a flexible as well as autonomous operation by the air
organization which can be tailored to support defense support command DS and GS com-
a larger or smaller corps by adjusting the panies in emergencies. The complete struc-
number and types of combat service support ture of this new organization is depicted in
units assigned or attached. A mature corps the air defense support command illustration.

9-4
 C1, FM 44-15

AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT COMMAND

* Maintenance and supply company (GS).

The air defense support command will also * Receipt, storage, and issue of repair
include a missile maintenance and supply parts.
general support company. This company has
the mission of providing missile system GS * Storage, maintenance, and issue of
maintenance and backup DS maintenance operational ready floats for Hawk and Patriot
for selected air defense systems as required. systems.
This company provides-
* Quality assurance/quality control in-
* GS maintenance and general support spection for supported systems.
supply base for Hawk and IFF.
* Intermediate maintenance and general * Operation of the collection and classi-
support supply base for Patriot. fication point for damaged missile systems.
* Missile DX and class IX supply support * Organizational maintenance for all
to maintenance support companies. organic equipment.
* Receipt, storage, and issue of general
The organization of the maintenance
support supply base.
and supply company is shown in the mainte-
* DX for selected items. nance and supply company illustration.

9-5
C1, FM 44-15

R aa~aaa~
l-Ell
F-FI~-n~-~n~in~~~
~be~i~
(. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY COMPANY
9Pl~llliiilsL~a~an~-;nrP~i~ir -- I---~r~ s----- -~a~_
a~i-~a~-l~-~----~-- --a-m~--~-~-arxrr~-rar^-r~------- ~-~^

SUPPLY HAWK
AND SERVICE SUPPORT
PLATOON PLATOON

CHAPARRAL/ CHAPARRAL/
VULCAN/ VULCAN/
PLATOON FORWARD AREA FORWARD AREA
HEADQUARTERS ALERTING ALERTING
RADAR MISSILE RADAR MISSILE
SECTION PLATOON

SELECTRICAL- ELECTRICAL HAWK

PLATOON MECHANICAL I RADAR IFF
HEADQUARTERS SYSTEM SUPPORT REPAIR
SECTION SECTION SECTION

PATRIOT INTERMEDIATEPATRIOT
PLATOON
HEAQUATERNSUPOR FIELD ARMY SUPPORT OPERATIONAL
HEADOUARTERS SUPPORT ELEMENTS (4)READINESS
CENTER FLOAT SECTION
CENTER as~o8lu~r ~ L~sllaia

*Maintenance Support Company (DS)

The base of the air defense support command technical advice and assistance to the Patriot
will be the direct support organization cur- battalion. This company will be capable of
rently organic to each Hawk battalion, the performing its own unit administration, sup-
support platoon organic to each Patriot bat- ply, mess, and unit maintenance function.
talion, and the ordnance detachment The Patriot maintenance support company
assigned to each Chaparral/Vulcan battal- provides-
ion. Each of these elements will be redesig- * One-stop DS maintenance for non-
nated as a maintenance support company Patriot peculiar equipment.
(DS). Each Patriot battalion will be supported
by a maintenance support company. It is the * DS maintenance for engineer ground
focal point for logistics support. It provides support, signal, and automative equipment.

9-6
 Cl, FM 44-15

* Receipt, storage, and issue of 5,000 line * Data transmission services to the mate-
items (authorized stockage level). riel management center for own and sup-
ported units.
* Maintenance support teams to sup-
ported batteries as required. * Unit maintenance for organic equip-
ment.
" Maintenance of operational readiness
The organization of the Patriot main-
float.
tenance support company is shown in the
* Direct exchange support for selected Patriot maintenance support company illus-
items. tration.

PATRIOT MAINTENANCE SUPPORT COMPANY

~ ------r --- ~--; I

OPERATIONS
The combat service support operational basic loads of ammunition and ammunition
system performs specialized functions at all resupply.
levels in a theater of operations.
LOGISTICS Unit basic load. Units are authorized basic
Logistics services include the functional loads of ammunition, expressed in rounds per
areas of supply, maintenance, field services, weapon system, to sustain them in combat
and transportation. Specifically addressed until they can be resupplied. The theater
under the area of supply are ammunition and commander normally establishes a unit's
POL. basic load based on its mission, the types and
numbers of its weapon systems, its transport
Ammunition capability, and the time necessary to effect
resupply.
The combat service support system sus-
tains combat capability by providing unit The basic load is carried into battle on

9-7
C1, FM 44-15

the unit's cargo vehicles and with the indi- establishes a controlled supply rate (CSR),
vidual soldier. Standing operating proce- the actual resupply rate. The CSR is ex-
dures should prescribe distribution of the pressed as rounds per weapon per day by
basic load. ammunition item. Those ammunition items
for which the CSR is less than the RSR will
Resupply. To determine the requirements normally be identified in the appropriate
for a specific operation or time period, Patriot annex of operations orders or in combat serv-
units develop a required supply rate (RSR) for ice support plans or orders. After consulting
each type of ammunition. Expressed as with their operations and logistics staff offi-
rounds per weapon per day, the RSR may cers, commanders will normally establish
derive from experience or from reference man- priorities for the allocation of ammunition.
uals. The operations officer (S3) prepares the
RSR for the commander during the planning Timely resupply of ammunition is criti-
stages of the operation. Requests are consoli- cal. Basically, it occurs in the sequence de-
dated at each level until they reach the high- picted in the ammunition resupply illustra-
est Army headquarters in the theater. At that tion below. Ammunition requisition as shown
level the G3, G4, and commander review the in the class V conventional ammunition/
requirements and availability of ammuni- missile request-issue flow illustration on
tion. Based on this review, the commander page 9-9.

AMMUNITION RESUPPLY

CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION RESUPPLY

MISSILE RESUPPLY

COMMUNICATIONS THROUGHPUT
ZONE FORWARD
STORAGE LOCATION

~~ ~------ -1.

9-8
 C1, FM 44-15

CLASS V CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION/MISSILE

REQUEST-ISSUE FLOW

UNIT SUBMITS
UNIT SUBMITS
REQUISITION FOR
REQUISITION FOR
CONVENTIONAL MISSILES (PATRIOT)
AMMUNITION ITEM
,l l

REQUISITION PASSED I~ : REQUISITION PASSED

TO BATTALION S4 TO BATTALION S4

:: --

AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT

COMMAND MATERIEL
REQUISITION PASSED MANAGEMENT CENTER REQUISITION PASSED
ONE:
TO SUPPORTING TO SUPPORTING

H
MONITORS EXCEPTION
AMMUNITION
BATTALION 00 REQUISITION SPECIAL AMMUNITION
SUPPLY POINT

MISSILES DELIVERED
TO AMMUNITION
TRANSFER POINT

AMMUNITION ISSUED MISSILES ISSUED

TO UNIT TO UNIT

11 .
, _. - . ; ._ - -
. .,n- ,- - - - - r.." -«~_ -
* Since Patriot firing batteries do not have normally establishes an ammunition trans-
organic transportation for missile resupply, fer point for Patriot missiles. The theater
the battalion provides all missile resupply Army throughputs missiles directly to the
transportation. Initially the battalion will ammunition transfer point. The Patriot bat-
move missiles from the nearest ASP directly talion's guided missile transporters then re-
to the firing batteries. Loaded guided missile load battery launching stations.
transporters should be prepositioned with
the firing batteries that are expected to take Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants
the brunt of phase one suppression attacks. The CSS system maintains combat cap-
Subsequently it is advantageous to move ability by providing bulk POL supply and
launching stations to the rear for resupply resupply.
and reloading. This takes advantage of the
8:1 ratio of launching stations to guided mis- Bulk POL. A dedicated supply system man-
sile transporters in a battalion. The battalion ages, transports in special containers, and

9-9
C1, FM 44-15

issues the supply of bulk petroleum. As long center. Established requirements are com-
as fuel is available, it moves on demand to pared to force capabilities. The limited stor-
refill storage containers of subordinate units. age and distribution capabilities for fuel
The initial allocation is derived from esti- tankers, tank and pump units, and trailer-
mates that using units project based on expe- mounted pods in Patriot battalions must be
rience or standard planning data in FM 101- considered and planned for.
10-1. Such estimates should consider special
factors, including terrain and weather and Resupply. Resupply follows a process as
the type of mission. Forecasts are refined and shown in POL resupply illustration. The
consolidated at the brigade, and then for- requisitioning process is shown in the illus-
warded to the corps materiel management tration below and on page 9-11.

* POL RESUPPLY

CORPS REAR
XXX
PETROLEUM
SUPPLY
LBATTAL ON

AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT COMMAND CLASS III (PACKAGE)

REQUISITION/MATERIEL RELEASE ORDER/ISSUE FLOW

USING
UNIT

MAINTENANCE- -- ---- - - ARMY AIR DEFENSE

MAN COMPANY
SUPPORT COMMAND MATERIEL
(DIRECT SUPPORT) MANAGEMENT CENTER

* MAINTENANCE AND
**e SUPPLY COMPANY
(GENERALSUPPORT)

- AREA SUPPORT
(NONDIVISIONAL AREA INTERMEDIATE
SUPPLY AND SUPPLY SOURCE
1 SERVICE COMPANY)
LEGEND:
FORWARD STORAGE
THROUGHPUT-- -* TACTICAL SITE
INFORMATION ....
REQUESTS
ISSUE 000 RESERVE
ISSUES * * * * * * " STORAGE ACTIVITY
. . . _ =

9-10
 Cl, FM 44-15

AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT COMMAND CLASS IV REQUISITION FLOW

AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT COMMAND CLASS VII REQUISITION FLOW

UNIT NEEDS
i II~ i II ITEM PREPARED FOR
MAJOR ITEM (
AND ISSUED TO UNIT

REQUEST TO
BATTALION S4

REQUEST TO MATERIEL .- AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT

MANAGEMENT CENTER COMMAND MAINTENANCE
PROPERTY BOOK SUPPORT COMPANY
OFFICER TEAM . i . +r (DIRECT SUPPORT)
• - -

REQUEST PASSED TO THEATER

ARMY MATERIEL MANAGEMENT CENTER
WITH SUPPORT ADDRESS OF
MAINTENANCE SUPPORT COMPANY
THAT SUPPORTS UNIT

LEGEND:
REQUISITION FLOW
INFORMATION COPT
OF REQUISITION
ASSET SHIPPED
I ;,; - RECEIPT . O . 9 •
TO MAINTENANCE DOCUMENTATION
SUPPORT COMPANY

9-11
Cl, FM 44-15

Other Supplies
The combat service support system of the battalion are queried. Should the bat-
maintains combat capability by providing- talion be unable to locate the part within the
battalion, the requisition would be passed to
" Rations.
the brigade which determines if other Patriot
" Water. battalions within the brigade have the part
on hand. Requisitions which cannot be filled
" Clothing. from within the brigade are passed to the
" Personal-demand items. corps or theater army materiel management
center. Units operating in the communica-
" Individual and unit equipment. tions zone will normally pass requisitions
" Fortification and barrier materials. directly to the theater army materiel man-
agement center. Requisitions for supplies
" Major end items of equipment. other than Patriot repair parts follow the
" Repair parts. usual flow for nondivisional units. Medical
supplies and equipment are obtained through
" Items intended to support nonmilitary medical channels.
programs.
Due to the nature of Patriot maintenance, Normally, the wartime supply system for
the availability of repair parts is critical. materiel provided, by surface movement in a
Requisitions for repair parts for nonopera- fully developed theater of operations follows
tional Patriot equipment are submitted to the an established sequence such as that shown
maintenance support company. If the part is in the materiel supply by surface movement
not available, the remaining firing batteries illustration below.

MATERIEL SUPPLY BY SURFACE MOVEMENT

9-12
 C1, FM 44-15

The wartime supply system for items air lines of communication illustrations
provided by air lines of communication in an below and on page 9-14. In a contingency
established theater also follows an estab- operation, the highest Army headquarters
lished sequence as shown in the supply by deals directly with the CONUS support base.

SUPPLY BY AIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION

REQUIREMENT
I ROUTINE MATERIEL
. -- '=RELEASE ORDER
I MATERIEL FLOW

00 RECEIPT CONFIRMATION
I I Q i l

Maintenance
The combat service support system maintenance units assist the Patriot battery
maintains combat capability by providing mechanics. Teams consider controlled ex-
forward support, recovery and evacuation, change of parts or components prior to evac-
repair parts supply and direct exchange, and uation, but they do not remove parts from
battlefield controlled exchange and canni- systems which can be repaired quickly.
balization. Organizational maintenance for Extensively damaged systems may be
conventional items (trucks, radios, etcetera) sources of repair parts.
in Patriot units is especially important for
units to be able to move and communicate.
Recovery and evacuation. Recovery oper-
Forward support. Organizational mainte- ations remove materiel from forward units to
nance teams assess equipment damage. They nearby safe locations for immediate repair
determine the appropriate disposition based or, if forward repair is not practical, to the
on the extent of damage and the combat unit's trains. Each unit is responsible for
situation. To reduce the time required to recovering its own damaged equipment.
return equipment to battle, DS contact teams Wreckers and other recovery vehicles move
repair it as far forward as possible. This is the equipment that cannot be repaired on site to
essence of the forward support maintenance collection points along designated routes.
concept. Under this concept, maintenance Immovable items remain in place until sup-
support teams from battalion and corps porting maintenance units can recover them.

9-13
C1, FM 44-15

Evacuation operations move equipment Repair parts supply and direct ex-
from the recovery site or maintenance collec- change. Direct support maintenance units
tion point to an area where it can be repaired supply repair parts. Units can exchange
or cannibalized or from which it can be evac- selected recoverable and repairable compo-
uated farther. Maintenance, supply, and nents for serviceable items. Direct support
transportation elements coordinate evacua- and general support maintenance units requi-
tion efforts. sition repair parts through supply channels.

9-14
 C1, FM 44-15

Battlefield controlled exchange and If graves registration platoons are not

cannibalization. Forward maintenance available during the early stages of combat,
support also involves battlefield controlled it may be necessary to train unit personnel in
exchange and cannibalization. In controlled recovery, identification, care, and disposition
exchange, maintenance units remove serv- of remains. Remains are evacuated to collec-
iceable'parts from unserviceable but econom- tion points in the division support area and
ically repairable equipment, using them to from there to a corps collection point.
repair like equipment so that it can be re-
turned to combat immediately. Unservice- COSCOM field services companies pro-
able parts should stay with the equipment vide laundry service. COSCOM detachments
from which the serviceable parts were taken. also perform post exchange sales, when pro-
Controlled exchange decisions should be vided. The supply and service company,
made as close to the damaged or disabled when augmented with a clothing exchange
equipment as possible, preferably by using and bath platoon, provides clothing ex-
unit maintenance personnel. Both using and change and bath services.
support units will practice controlled ex- The supply and service company sal-
change extensively on the battlefield. To vages damaged and irreparable equipment.
cannibalize is to remove parts from irrepa- The company operates salvage collection
rable equipment for stockage or immediate points. These points are normally collocated
use. Guidelines for cannibalization and con- with the maintenance battalion's mainte-
trolled exchange are established at higher nance collection points. It also operates sal-
headquarters. vage collection points in support of units in
Field Services the corps rear area.
Field services generally include- Transportation
As the connecting link between other
* Laundry. logistic functions, transportation moves per-
* Bath. sonnel and materiel. It moves repaired
equipment from maintenance units to stor-
* Clothing exchange. age areas or using units and moves supplies,
* Bakery. including repair parts, where they are needed.
It also moves personnel replacements from
* Textile renovation. reception areas to combat units.
* Salvage. The transportation elements within a
theater perform three functions: modal oper-
* Decontamination.
ations, terminal operations, and movement
* Graves registration. management. Modal operations move per-
sonnel or materiel in any conveyance by air,
* Clothing renovation. rail, road, and water. Terminal operations
* Post exchange sales. shift cargo from one mode of transportation
to another or from one type of transport
* The provision of general duty labor. within a mode to a different type. Only eche-
In the division area, the supply and lons above the division have terminal oper-
transportation battalion is responsible for ations capability. Movement management
providing water. Elements of the COSCOM involves the staff planning and coordina-
provide water in the corps rear area. tion necessary to the transportation system's
effectiveness.
In peacetime, most support units do not
PERSONNEL AND
have graves registration or clothing ex-
change and bath capabilities. During war- ADMINISTRATION
time these capabilities are provided by aug- Personnel support operations maintain
mentation units. unit strength and provide morale and welfare

9-15
Cl, FM 44-15

services to the individual soldier. Personnel at brigade level will provide quick replace-
support includes- ments until the requisition process provides
support. However, commanders must judge
" Personnel services. unit effectiveness by more than personnel
" Chaplain activities. strength. Seldom is it good practice to break
up a proficient team in combat.
" Administrative services.
Within the theater, replacement requisi-
" Legal services. tions begin at the lowest level that can accu-
rately determine needs. Each level of com-
" Health services. mand validates and adjusts its requirements,
with critical military specialties receiving
" Comptroller and finance services.
the highest priority.
" Morale and welfare support services.
Casualty Reports
" Personnel automatic data processing
support and services. Prompt and accurate casualty reporting
is essential. Casualty reporting channels
* Public affairs. account for personnel, and they influence the
flow and distribution of replacements.
Personnel Services Casualty reporting and its interaction
Accurate strength accounting necessary with replacement operations is shown in
for long-range tactical planning is handled the personnel reporting and replacement
through the Standard Installation/Division illustration.
Personnel System. To support current opera-
tions, units feed personnel status reports to Health Services
the battalion Personnel and Administration In all wars involving US troops, more
Center by the administration/logistics net. soldiers have been hospitalized by disease
Precision and detail may be sacrificed in the and noncombat injuries than by enemy ac-
interest of timeliness. Personnel staff officers tion. The ratio has run as high as 3 to 1. The
provide immediate staff reports to command- health service mission is to conserve fighting
ers and operation centers at each echelon. strength by promoting and maintaining the
general health of all soldiers in the theater.
Troop Replacement Health service support includes-
The theater replacement system requires
centralized planning and decentralized exe- " Medical treatment and hospitalization.
cution. Timely individual and unit replace-
ments keep combat units effective. Head- " Intratheater medical evacuation.
quarters Department of the Army (HQDA)
coordinates and directs the flow of replace- " Medical regulating.
ments. Without waiting for theater requisi-
tions, HQDA assigns personnel replacements " Blood bank services.
for the first 60 days. It does so based on the
strength of the deployed force and on esti- " Medical materiel supply and mainte-
mated battle losses. Using requisitions and nance.
casualty reports from the theater, it reevalu-
ates and updates the estimates to maintain a " Dental services.
constant replacement flow.
" Veterinary services.
Commanders may have to adjust
strength among batteries or battalions, mov- " Preventive medicine.
ing soldiers from one unit to maintain the
effectiveness of another. Reorganizing units " Medical consultation.

9-16
 Cl, FM 44-15

PERSONNEL REPORTING AND REPLACEMENT

STRENGTH REPORTING

REPLACEMENT FLOW

XG1 S1S1

PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION

WITH REPLACEMENT
REGULATING DETACHMENT

LEGEND:
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS
FLOW OFREPLACEMENTS

CASUALTY REPORTING

INDIVIDUAL HAVING
KNOWLEDGE OF
LEGEND: MILITARY POLICE CASUALTY
FINANCE
CASUALTY REPORT -- GRAVES REGISTRATION
INFORMATION
SURGEON
POSTAL

9-17
Cl, FM 44-15

HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

9-18
 C1, FM 44-15

Health service support within a theater services system provides four levels of medi-
of operations is organized into levels: unit, cal support, evacuation, and treatment facili-
division, corps, and communications zone ties as shown in the health services support
(COMMZ). A system of increasingly sophis- illustration.
ticated treatment organizations, beginning
with the unit aidman, provides medical
treatment and hospitalization. In general, AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT COMMAND
each level of health service support has
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
treatment capabilities similar to the levels
just below it, as well as additional, more The primary logistics operator in the
sophisticated capability. Each level of medi- Army air defense command is the air defense
cal support has air or ground medical evac- support command commander. He is respon-
uation assets. The preferred method for evac- sible for logistics in the command in accor-
cuation is by air. Use of air evacuation, dance with the priorities established by the
however, depends on availability, the treat- Army air defense command commander.
ment required, the locations of adequate
treatment facilities, tactical situations, and
weather. Patients will be evacuated no far-
ther than required for treatment. A system of Brigade Support Element
medical regulating elements located at the An intermediate command and control
medical command and control headquarters' organization called the brigade support ele-
controls this flow. ment will be provided by the air defense sup-
Medical support for Patriot units is pro- port command and will function at the ADA
vided by the battalion medical section sup- brigade level. The brigade support element
ported by division or corps medical elements monitors the performance of subordinate
on an area basis. Forward of the division rear maintenance support companies and pro-
boundary, casualties are evacuated to the vides a technical chain of command for the
nearest division clearing station. Evacuation maintenance support company commander.
is normally the responsibility of the division The brigade support element commander is
medical personnel, however, Patriot unit the logistics operator for the ADA brigade.
commanders must be able to evacuate their As such, he coordinates the priority of logis-
own casualties since demands on the division tical support in accordance with the ADA
medical elements will likely be heavy. In the brigade commander's priorities. The brigade
corps rear area, casualties will be evacuated support element monitors the use of opera-
to the nearest combat support hospital. tional readiness floats in the maintenance
support companies, coordinates the efforts of
To insure that soldiers are physically the DS companies and, when necessary, di-
able to fight, commanders must establish rects company-to-company transfer of opera-
comprehensive programs of health preserva- tional readiness floats equipment to meet
tion and restoration. The theaterwide health operational needs.

9-19
Cl, FM 44-15

Supported Units
* Supported units would evacuate all by the Patriot battalion would be passed
equipment needing DS repair to the mainte- through the maintenance support company
nance support company. Items not within the to the materiel management center. Unit
repair capability of the maintenance support commanders requisition replenishment
company would be transported to an appro- equipment from managers of the materiel
priate general support unit by the mainte- management center. Subsequently, the major
nance support company. This results in item will be provided to the unit through sup-
a single logistics point of contact for port channels via the general support supply
ADA customers. All requisitions for class II base, or through an air defense support com-
(maintenance-related) and IX items needed mand maintenance support company.
J ~I-~ ~~-~--~~-~..-----~---------s~-----s~ - ~
-- 111

( AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS

Communications and Automatic Data

Processing Support
*t Communications and automated data center must have access to ADP service and
processing support are essential elements of the command logistics base. The materiel
this logistics structure. Continuous support management center must have its organic
is mandatory if the logistics system is to mobile computer system to enable it to inter-
function. Each maintenance support com- face with air defense support command DS
pany must be able to communicate with the and GS units. The air defense support com-
Army air defense command materiel man- mand communications illustration shows the
agement center. The materiel management required communications nets.

9-20
 Cl, FM 44-15

Separate Brigade Support

When an ADA brigade force is sepa- sources in order to provide the brigade with
rately deployed, the ADA battalions will be the required management capability.
supported by the normally assigned mainte-
nance support companies. A brigade support Separate Battalion Support
element would be attached to the ADA bri- When an ADA battalion is deployed sepa-
gade for integration of logistics support activ- rately in support of a force, it would be sup-
ities in the brigade. If necessary, the brigade
ported by its normal maintenance support
support element may be augmented by mate-
company.
riel management personnel from external

RECONSTITUTION
Regeneration
* Reconstitution is defined as emergency * Regeneration is the rebuilding of a unit
actions taken to restore units to a specified in which the mission capability has been
level of combat effectiveness by the replace- reduced or degraded. Regeneration is accom-
ment of personnel and equipment based on plished through the replacement of personnel
specified priorities. Reconstitution should be and equipment, the reestablishment of effec-
undertaken when a unit has sustained severe tive command and control, and the conduct
battle losses in personnel and equipment. of essential training. Where plans exist for
Reconstitution transcends normal day-to-day forces to be withdrawn after having accom-
force sustainment actions. Reconstitution plished a prescribed mission, the position-
actions that will be required to maintain ing of preconfigured refurbishment packs in
maximum combat power on the battlefield an agreed regrouping location should be
during war are described. considered.
Redistribution
THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
- Redistribution is the reallocation of unit
7 Reconstitution is a term for actions re- personnel, equipment, and supplies to
quired to restore the combat capabiity of an another unit, or returning them to the per-
incapacitated unit. The three types of recon- sonnel replacement or supply system. The
stitution actions are reorganization, regen- unit flag is then retired or held, pending
eration, and redistribution. These actions regeneration. Redistribution occurs when the
can be taken either singly or in combination. unit is no longer mission capable and the
tactical situation or lack of assets make it
Reorganization impractical for the commander to select
* Reorganization is the restoration of com- another reconstitution option. Redistribution
bat effectiveness by the cross-leveling of is the least desirable reconstitution option.
assets within a unit or by the formation of a
composite (smaller) unit at a full or over- LOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES
strength level. By cross-leveling assets a unit * Reconstitution is best accomplished in a
could, for example, distribute its assets so designated area which is not under imme-
that all subordinate units would be at 75 per- diate or direct enemy threat. Factors govern-
cent strength. By forming composite units, a ing selection of this area will include the size
mauled six-battery battalion could be reor- of the unit to be reconstituted, lines of com-
ganized into four full strength batteries. munications available, and future employ-
Reorganization is the means by which com- ment plans for the reconstituted unit. The
bat power can best be maintained during the responsibility for managing reconstitution
early stages of war and is the reconstitution efforts, other than reorganization, is nor-
option most easily executed by commanders. mally retained by the commander two levels

9-21
C1, FM 44-15

higher in the chain of command than the unit the assessment of equipment damage and to
requiring reconstitution. For example, the establish priorities for recovery, repair, and
battery is reconstituted by the brigade. Re- cannibalization.
sponsibility for reconstituting the battalion * Graves registration teams to assist.
rests with the Army air defense command. with identification and disposition of re-
The priority of effort is to fire units, fire direc- mains. Special handling of contaminated
tion centers, and combat service support remains must be coordinated with decontam-
units, in that order unless otherwise specified. ination teams.
LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL * Clothing exchange and bath teams to
ASSETS provide clothing exchange and bath facili-
ties. This augmentation also could assist the
* Logistics and personnel assets for recon- decontamination team.
stitution are provided in the form of individ-
ual equipment and personnel replacements,
complete unit replacements, a combination REQUIREMENTS, PRIORITIES, AND
of individual and unit replacements, or COORDINATION
through the combining of units. Primary * Commands at the appropriate level, in
support comes from corps, air defense sup- coordination with the unit being reconsti-
port command, or theater Army area com- tuted, identify requirements, recommend prior-
mands. During the early stages of war, ities, and coordinate available resources.
reorganization is the primary means of recon- Where refurbishment packs already exist, it
stitution by which combat power can be will be necessary only to make adjustments
maintained in the combat zone. For example, to the supplies being provided to reflect actual
if a battalion experiences heavy losses to its versus planned requirements. The air defense
batteries during an attack, one of the brigade support command coordinates requirements
commander's options is to direct combining beyond its capabilities with the theater Army.
the assets of six batteries to make four com- The Army air defense command when appli-
bat effective batteries. cable, specifies replacement needs to theater
Army support elements such as the theater
SPECIAL EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE Army materiel management center and per-
sonnel command. Theater Army provides
In cases where a unit has been severely necessary logistics and personnel support to
mauled or has suffered a nuclear or chemical coordinate the replacement of soldiers and
strike, a state of shock may exist. Special equipment and to assist an ineffective unit in
external reconstitution assistance may be becoming mission capable.
required. Some of the units that may be
necessary in these circumstances are-
EXCESS SUPPORT RESOURCES
* Decontamination teams to decontami-
nate casualties, personnel, command and * Reconstitution actions in ADA units can
control means, weapon systems, vehicles, create an imbalance with their support ele-
and equipment. ments. Combat service support reconstitu-
tion requirements could be relatively lower
* Medical augmentation teams to con- than combat requirements, and hence the
duct mass casualty treatment of radiation reorganization or regeneration of ADA units
and chemical injuries. may result in a temporary excess of re-
* Adjutant general forward elements to sources. Such excess assets should be rede-
assist with casualty reporting and strength ployed to fill logistic shortages elsewhere.
accounting. However, full support effort will need to be
reestablished if and when the units become
* Maintenance support teams to assist in fully reconstituted.

9-22
 C1, FM 44-15

TIME TO START RECONSTITUTION

* The level to which a unit is depleted vehicles and combat systems are refueled. All
before the commander decides to reconstitute fuel tank trucks and fuel storage tanks/
varies according to the tactical situation. bladders are topped off. Weapon systems are
During intense combat, a unit reduced to 60 rearmed and unit basic loads are replenished.
percent or less may be required to stay on line The retrograde movement of combat dam-
due to constant enemy pressure. Another unit aged equipment begins immediately, using
reduced to 70 percent may have the flexibil- corps and transportation command heavy
ity to pull back and be reconstituted, depend- equipment transporters and available host
ing on its mission and that of its higher nation support transportation (truck, rail,
command. The commander directing recon- and barge). Controlled substitution of equip-
stitution determines the priority of units to be ment is an option when authorized. Major
reconstituted within the command and the items of equipment are replaced per combat
level to which reconstitution is to be accom- loss reports and are delivered as far forward
plished. For example, the commander decides as possible to the unit being reconstituted.
whether to accept less than full combat read- Weapon system managers are designated to
iness or to allow the time needed to bring a allocate systems based on the commander's
unit to 100 percent combat effectiveness. priorities, known losses, and available re-
placements. Under normal circumstances, it
TIME TO COMPLETE is the maintenance and supply company
RECONSTITUTION which brings a weapon system into a "ready
for issue" condition; but, depending upon the
* A unit is reorganized or regenerated as echelon of unit being reconstituted, it may be
quickly as practical to be returned as a mis- the maintenance support company which
sion capable force. The time it takes to accom-
plish the reconstitution process is dependent completes this action. Weapon systems are
on many variables, including the following: transported or driven to the reconstitution
area. Crews link up with the weapon system
* Quality of the damage assessment. in a designated area and prepare for combat
operations.
* Speed of reporting, processing of re-
quests, and decision making. PREPOSITIONED MAJOR
* Selection of reconstitution option and END ITEMS
assignment of priorities. *C The air defense support command must
be able to rapidly replace battlefield equip-
* Availability of transportation and dis- ment losses by using forward positioned class
tances to be traveled. VII. This equipment is stored in operational
* Status of units and level of effective- condition. Some of these class VII packages
ness desired. are configured in unit sets to facilitate the
introduction of complete units into combat.
* Location of the reconstitution site(s). Such packages should be configured to sup-
* Requirements for decontamination. port rapid reconstitution of those elements
most likely to suffer heavy losses, for exam-
* Availability of replacements and ple, batteries in enemy air corridors.
equipment.
RECONSTITUTION
RECONSTITUTION EMPHASIS CONSIDERATIONS
* Reconstitution emphasis is on refueling, k Prior to reconstituting a unit, the nine
rearming, and remanning operational sys- factors shown in the reconstitution consider-
tems. This is followed by resupply of essen- ation illustration must be addressed. The
tial major items of equipment, critical repair reconstitution considerations are described
parts, water, and rations. All operational in the following paragraphs.

9-23
Cl, FM 44-15

I__________________J____ 1_ __1___1____ I _Ra~_ _ll____l_________--~111--~-- - -

C- RECONSTITUTION CONSIDERATIONS

Command and Control

SKey personnel and equipment are re- be located near a railhead or main supply
placed as required so that an adequate com- route to facilitate logistical operations. It
mand and control capability exists. may be necessary to conduct reconstitution
in a forward position. When reconstitution in
Materiel Damage and Personnel a forward position is necessary, the time
Assessments chosen should be when contact with the
* Assessments are made in the following enemy is at its lowest intensity, such as dur-
five major categories: command and control, ing night or adverse weather.
personnel, equipment, supply, and training. Security
The unit commander conducts detailed SFor reconstitution at either a rear or for-
assessments to determine losses and remain- ward position, security is provided or exist-
ing capabilities. The assessment is quickly ing security is augmented, as required. This
and accurately conducted (by military occu- is necessary since the unit normally has a
pational specialty position and line item reduced security capability and unit priority
number). This information is then provided, is placed on the reconstitution effort. Area
through operational channels, to the com- security assets are normally tasked with this
mander two levels above the unit being eval- mission.
uated for use in making reconstitution deci-
sions. This information is also passed expedi- Medical Support
tiously through the S1 and S4 channels. * Emergency treatment which returns sol-
diers to duty decreases the requirement for
Location replacements and enhances the total recon-
*A In the combat zone, reconstitution is best stitution process. As such, emergency treat-
undertaken in a secure location. This loca- ment starts as far forward as possible and
tion is designated by the appropriate com- continues in the reconstitution area. Every
mander. In the communications zone a recon- effort is made to treat nonincapacitating
stitution location is designated by the theater injuries as soon after injury as possible,
Army area command commander after coor- rapidly returning the soldier to duty. This
dination with the appropriate territorial process may require additional forward med-
commander. The reconstitution site should ical resources.

9-24
 C1, FM 44-15

Decontamination
* Necessary decontamination of personnel the importance of allowing a reconstituting
and equipment is performed either at the unit time to settle and establish internal
reconstitution site or, preferably, en route to a cohesion before it is again committed to
uncontaminated reconstitution site, if tacti- battle.
cally possible. Training
Resupply and Maintenance Support * Necessary training brings the newly re-
k Units receive needed supplies at the recon- constituted unit up to the appropriate level of
stitution site. Emphasis is placed on reestab- combat effectiveness. Ability to train is
lishing basic loads of ammunition and top- affected by the location of the reconstitution
ping off vehicles with fuel. Recovery and site and the tactical situation. Emphasis is
repair operations receive maxium attention placed on crew training. Training require-
to return major end items to the unit. Repaired ments are normally greatest when the unit is
end items are a major source of replacement. being regenerated.
Replacements
Personnel replacements (crew and indi- RECONSTITUTION PROCESS STEPS
vidual) are moved to the reconstitution site
and integrated into the unit. Other replace- * The steps of the reconstitution process
ments are provided by cross-leveling person- are identified in the reconstitution process
nel among subordinate elements of the unit. steps illustration. For illustrative purposes, a
Commanders at all levels should recognize battery is being reconstituted.

SRECONSTITUTION PROCESS STEPS

9-25
Cl1, FM 44-15

* The determination of combat effective- * When personnel strength approaches

ness is normally made by the commander one 60 percent.
level above the unit being considered for
reconstitution. The determination of unit * When availability of major equipment
effectiveness involves many indicators. approaches 70 percent.
Commanders assess the potential of their
units to perform the assigned mission. These * When the commander perceives that
indicators are measured quantitatively or the unit's potential for effective combat, in
evaluated subjectively. The following four terms of leadership, organizational climate,
broad areas provide indicators critical to soldier motivation, and unit cohesion is se-
determining the ability of a unit to continue verely degraded to a point of ineffectiveness.
assigned missions:
* It should be noted that these guidelines
1. Personnel status. Commanders eval- are approximate and will vary with the tacti-
uate unit strength, type of casualties, the cal situation. The final determination will be
presence of key personnel, weapon system a command decision based on the command-
crew status, and level of training. This in- er's subjective evaluation of all the quantita-
cludes evaluating mission capable personnel tive and qualitative indicators of the unit's
and the effectiveness of the remaining chain capability for mission accomplishment.
of command.
2. Weapons, equipment, communica- RECONSTITUTION
tions, and supply status/combat service sup- RESPONSIBILITIES
port capability. Commanders evaluate the Responsibilities of the level of command
status of major weapon systems, vehicles, conducting the reconstitution of a 'unit and
and communications equipment. They assess other selected units are explained below.
remaining ammunition and fuel supplies and For illustrative purposes, a battery is being
the capability of combat service support ele- reconstituted.
ments to resupply the unit and to repair or
replace damaged weapons and equipment.
S3
3. Combat support status. The availa-
bility of combat support is critical to the abil-
* The S3 coordinates staff effort for recon-
stitution, receives and distributes informa-
ity of ADA units to continue assigned mis- tion concerning reconstitution actions, aligns
sions. Commanders evaluate the availability reconstitution efforts in conjunction with
of electronic warfare, signal, intelligence, command priorities, and recommends priori-
engineer, and military police support. ties to the commander for the accomplish-
ment of reconstitution. The S3 also advises
4. Morale. In addition to the tangible on availability of personnel and equipment
indicators described above, the commander for reconstitution, identifies critical short-
considers a number of subjective factors that falls, and recommends method of reconsti-
bear on the ability of the unit to continue its tution in coordination with the S1 and S4.
assigned mission. Among the most impor- The S3 insures a coordinated flow of person-
tant of these intangible indicators are unit nel, units, and equipment to the unit being
leadership, soldier personal readiness, esprit reconstituted.
de corps, commitment, and cohesion.
* The following broad guidelines are pro- Sl
vided to help determine when a commander : The S1 determines availability of re-
should make a reconstitution assessment: placement personnel in coordination with

9-26
 C1, FM 44-15

Surgeon
the Army air defense command and coordi- * The surgeon provides, in coordination
nates personnel replacement requirements with the S1, recommendations to the S3 and
based upon established priorities and equip- S4 on allocation and redistribution of medi-
ment and weapon system availability. cal personnel, materiel, and units during the
reconstitution process.
S2
* The S2 advises on the threat situation Public Affairs Officer
facing units which are candidates for regen-
eration or redistribution and provides rear
* The public affairs officer provides a pub-
lic affairs team to advise and assist in deal-
area threat assessments for prospective recon- ing with press requirements.
stitution sites.
Chemical Officer
S4 * The chemical officer coordinates decon-
* The S4 recommends allocation of critical tamination requirements.
items of supply (less medical and crypto-
graphic), coordinates movement require- Air Defense Support Command
ments and maintenance support for the recon-
stitution process, and assists in coordinating * The air defense support command directs
host nation support to support the reconstitu- and coordinates the reconstitution effort of
tion process. subordinate organizations, provides re-
quirements to higher headquarters, specifies
materiel and personnel priorities, and desig-
nates locations for reconstitution activities
S5 within area of responsibility after coordina-
* The S5 assists in coordinating host tion with the theater Army area command.
nation support for the reconstitution process
and coordinates the temporary augmenta-
tion of qualified language personnel to expe- Theater Army Support
dite language communications required to
obtain additional host nation support at all
* The theater Army area command recon-
stitutes units as directed by the theater Army.
levels.
* The personnel command determines the
availability of replacement personnel, moni-
tors the availability of personnel for assign-
Engineer ment as replacements, directs the replace-
* The engineer officer provides recom- ment flow per established fill plan and any
mendations to the S3 on allocation and redis- S3 assigned priorities, and provides rec-
tribution of engineer units, personnel, and ommendations through the G1 to the G3 on
equipment during the reconstitution process. distribution of personnel with critical
specialties.
* The medical command returns the max-
Communications-Electronics Officer imum number of personnel to duty, coordi-
* The communications-electronics officer nates requirements for medical materiel and
provides recommendations to the S3 on allo- supplies for on-site support, and assists the
cation and redistribution of communications reconstituting units to improve equipment on
personnel, materiel, and units during the hand status through the US Army Medical
reconstitution process. Materiel Agency.

9-27
C1, FM 44-15

* The theater communications command

provides communications for reconstitution
efforts within the communications zone.
* The provost marshall coordinates addi-
tional area security assets required at recon-
stitution sites and advises on route and area
security considerations associated with selec-
tion of and movement to reconstitution sites.

9-28
 Change No. 1

APPENDIX

Battery and Battalion Air Battle

This appendix addresses the division of labor within the engagement con-
trol station and information and coordination central. In developing the div-
ision of labor, two concepts were evaluated. One concept recommended that
both operators perform the same functions but in separate geographic sectors.
The other concept separated the operator tasks into two functional areas-
weapons control and friendly protection-and assigned one functional area to
each operator. The second concept was judged to be more effective because it
evenly distributed operator tasks, exploited system automation, and retained
the appropriate officer/NCO division of responsibilities. Although this appen-
dix does not outline the exact procedures to be used during an air battle, it does
specify areas of responsibility and authority for each operator as well as identi-
fying recommended display console conditions.
This appendix also provides guidance on when to fight or fix the Patriot
system when fault indications exist. The use of the fault alert filter is also
addressed.

BATTERY AIR BATTLE

The ECS is manned by a crew of three- should have the friendly protect and the
one officer and two enlisted personnel. The ECCM assist switches enabled in the console
officer (usually a lieutenant) is a 14E and is mode group. The alerts associated with iden-
called the tactical control officer. He operates tification processing, equipment status/
manstation three and performs the friendly faults and A-scope are displayed on this
protection function. One enlisted soldier is an manstation. Other switches should be acti-
E5/E4 24T who operates manstation one and vated as outlined in the tactical control
is called the tactical control assistant. He officer responsibilities illustration on page
performs the weapons control function. The A-3.
second enlisted soldier is an E4/E3 31M who
operates manstation two (the communica-
tions station behind manstation one). He is
called the communications operator.

TCO RESPONSIBILITIES
* The TCO is responsible for everything
that does or does not happen during battery
air battle operations. Specifically, he is re-
sponsible for identifying all targets. He

A-1
Cl, FM 44-15

* The TCO insures that the system is in the itor system operation and activate the man-
assigned identification mode. He activates ual clutter mapping and weather mode as
and deactivates the SIF and Mode 4 IFF as necessary.
appropriate. He monitors the situation dis- System reorientation orders are received
play, alert line, and tabular display area. He and acknowledged by the TCO but the actual
uses the track amplifying data tab to identify reorientation is performed by the TCA.
targets. The TCO also uses this tab to assist
him in determining whether or not the target The TCO monitors party line 2 (intelli-
is a false target. False targets normally have gence and radar reporting) for target identi-
erratic speed, direction, and altitude read- fication information. He also maintains close
ings. If it is a false target, the TCO should coordination with the TCA and keeps the
press the DROP TRACK switch/indicator. battery CP advised. As the TCO, he provides
guidance and leadership as appropriate. In
Most of the firing doctrine changes will the event that only one console is opera-
be accomplished at the battalion FDC and tional, the TCO operates that console and
sent to the various batteries. The TCO moni-
performs the TCA's functions also.
tors this function and insures that the
changes are implemented. He implements TCA RESPONSIBILITIES
changes which are provided to the battery * The TCA monitors and initiates all the
via voice communications. These changes engagements. In the automatic engagement
would encompass activation/deactivation of mode, the system engages targets more effec-
assets and volumes, change weight sets and tively than two operators can. The TCA's
KAA-63 codes, and authorize hostile indi- primary task is to monitor and operate the
cators (ECM, pop-up). The activation/ system to engage nonfriendly targets. There-
deactivation of a weapons control volume fore, he is responsible for controlling system
would be done by the TCO. functions which affect engagement. The TCA
In assuring that nonhostile aircraft are must have the weapons control switch ena-
not engaged, he is responsible for applying bled in the console mode group. The alerts
the engagement overrides (hold fire, cease associated with weapons control, engage-
fire, and engage hold). The removal of en- ments, radar status, and radar faults are dis-
gagement overrides is primarily the respon- played on manstation one as a result of ena-
sibility of the TCO. However, the cease fire bling the weapons control switch. Other
may be removed by the TCA as dictated by switches should be activated as outlined in
the situation. the tactical control assistant responsibilities
illustration on page A-4.
The manual IFF interrogation of targets
is performed by the TCO. IFF response eval- The TCA insures that the system is in the
uation and Mode 4 enabling/disabling is correct mode of control and engagement
done by the TCO in coordination with the mode. Further, he is responsible for having
TCA. the correct weapons control activated and
when directed, for activating the areas ena-
* ECM target evaluation is done by the ble indicator. He also controls system radia-
TCO. He uses the A-scope presentation as tion based on directions provided and mis-
appropriate to assist him. He works with the sion requirements. Launching station activa-
battalion FDC in attempting to range resolve tion is accomplished by the TCA. He also
the ECM track. The TCO should also mon- monitors the status panel for the launching

A-2
 C1, FM 44-15

station status, missile count, DEFCON, and mode of control and semiautomatic engage-
state of readiness. The TCA assigns kill sta- ment mode, all engagements are directed by
tus when appropriate.The display areas that the battalion FDC. This direction is given as
are monitored by him are the situation dis- verbal or digital fire control orders. The TCA
play, tab area, alert line, and the status acknowledges the fire control order and en-
panel. These are not listed in any priority gages the target when the target can be inter-
sequence and their order varies depending on cepted with a high probability of kill. If the
the situation. target must be engaged immediately, the bat-
talion FDC must give a voice command such
* The TCA engages targets employing the as "Engage 005 Now". The TCA always has
rules of engagement and supplemental fire the authority to engage in self-defense.
control measures in effect. In the centralized

TACTICAL CONTROL OFFICER RESPONSIBILITIES

A-3
C1, FM 44-15

j, TACTICAL CONTROL ASSISTANT RESPONSIBILITIES 9

FUNCTION RESPONSIBILITIES
Weapons control
* Engage targets.
CENTRALIZED (semiautomatic)

CONSOLE o Engage targets as directed by battalion.

Manstation one o Engage targets in self-defense.
DECENTRALIZED (semiautomatic)
o Engage targets in order of the TBE queue.
SWITCH ACTIVATION
o Engage targets in self-defense.
CONSOLE MODE INDEPENDENT (semiautomatic)

Weapon control o Same as decentralized.

AUTONOMOUS (semiautomatic)
MAP DATA o Same as decentralized semiautomatic.
DECENTRALIZED (automatic)
Weapons control volumes
o Monitor engagements.
TRACK DATA INDEPENDENT (automatic)
Unknowns (WEAPONS FREE) o Same as decentralized.
AUTONOMOUS (automatic)
Hostiles
o Same as decentralized.
Track numbers
LNIP " Release cease fire.
PIP " Reorient system.
Other switch/indicators momentarily " Place system in assigned mode of control.
as required to clarify situation.
" Place system in correct engagement mode.
" Place appropriate launchers to operate.
" Check that system is in assigned weapons control status.
" Activate/deactivate areas enable.
" Activate/deactivate radiation.
" Control alternate search sectors.
" Monitor party line 1 for air battle communications.
" Monitor situation display, alert messages, and status panel.
" Monitor status monitor alerts and assess selected alerts.
" Monitor system test indicators.

A-4
 C1, FM 44-15

In the decentralized mode of control and communications party line 1 (air defense
in the semiautomatic engage mode the TCA control).
manually engages targets in the order of the
TBE queue. In the automatic engage mode he COMMUNICATIONS OPERATOR
monitors the engagements. The TCA pro- RESPONSIBILITIES
vides kill assessments as appropriate. The communications operator is the sys-
tems communications monitor. As such he
In the independent and autonomous monitors the tactical FM sets. He makes
modes, the TCA would function the same as periodic checks of the data link terminal,
in the decentralized mode of control. routing logic radio interface unit, and the
The TCA monitors cease fires applied to three UHF racks. He is responsible for hav-
targets within his area of responsibility. ing the assigned address in the routing logic
He may apply engage hold on a target as radio interface unit. He assists the TCO in
appropriate. making assessments of communications
faults. He monitors and periodically checks
Strobe engagements are performed by the antenna mast group. He is responsible for
the TCA. He is directed by the TCO when to rotating and elevating the UHF antenna,
use this method of engagement as this is an when required. He implements all communi-
exception to the normal method of engage- cations ECCM in the engagement control
ment. The TCA should monitor the voice station, including use of the power amplifiers.

BATTALION AIR BATTLE

The ICC is manned by a crew of three- trol stations are in the assigned state of read-
one officer and two enlisted soldiers. The iness, DEFCON, and identification mode. He
officer is an 03 14E and is called the tactical monitors the battalion status panel and notes
director (TD). He operates manstation three the information and coordination central
and performs the friendly protection func- and higher echelon communications status.
tion. One enlisted soldier, E6/E5 24T, oper- He calls up the appropriate tab (fire unit sta-
ates manstation one. He performs the weap- tus tab 07) and notes the IFF status. If it is
ons control function and is called the tactical incorrect, he contacts the batteries and di-
director assistant (TDA). One enlisted sol- rects them to enable/disable SIF and Mode 4
dier, E4/E3 31M, operates manstation two as appropriate. He performs or directs IFF
(the communications station behind mansta- interrogations as required. He also super-
tion one) and is called the communications vises the battalion radiation schedule.
operator.
He is responsible to resolve target identi-
TD RESPONSIBILITIES ties. His main thrust is to insure that friendly
aircraft are not made eligible for engage-
* The TD is responsible for everything that ments. He is responsible to apply all engage
does or does not happen during battalion air overrides (HOLD FIRE, CEASE FIRE, or
battle operations. Specifically, he identifies ENGAGE HOLD). He also releases the over-
all targets. He should have the engage con- rides when required.
trol and the friendly protect switches acti-
vated. Alerts associated with identification, He monitors the higher echelon net and
engagements, weapons control, and engage- alert messages and responds to all but engage
ment overrides are displayed on this mansta- commands. He monitors party line 2 (IRR).
tion. Other switches should be activated as
outlined in the tactical director responsibili- He assesses environmental control unit,
manstation three, and communications
ties illustration on page A-6. faults. In the event that only one console is
The TD insures that the information and operational, the TD operates that console
coordination central and engagement con- and performs the TDA's functions also.

A-5
Cl, FM 44-15

TACTICAL DIRECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

TDA RESPONSIBILITIES
* The TDA monitors and initiates all en- * The TDA is responsible to perform all
gagements. In the semiautomatic engage- functions associated with engaging targets.
ment mode the TDA assigns all engagements. He monitors the battalion status panel and
In the automatic engagement mode he moni- insures that the FUs are in the assigned
tors and assigns engagements within the mode of control and weapons control status
battalion. He should have the engage control to include areas enabled. If they are not, he
and equipment control switches enabled. The directs them to the appropriate condition via
alerts associated with weapons control, en- voice or switch actions. He monitors the bat-
gagements, and equipment status appear on teries' equipment and communications sta-
this manstation. Other switches should be tus indicators, as well as missile inventory.
activated as outlined in the tactical director He calls up the appropriate tabs and notes
assistant responsibilities illustration on page the batteries' operational status and missile
A-7. status. He insures that the batteries and the

A-6
 Cl, FM 44-15

FDC are in the assigned engagement mode. ized. In the decentralized mode of control his
He directs the batteries to activate/ authority to engage is based on the rules of
deactivate radiation based on the TD's orders engagement and supplemental fire control
and the battalion EMCON plan, and he measures in effect.
keeps track of their radiation status. The TDA monitors cease fires applied to
In the semiautomatic engagement mode, targets within his area of responsibility
the TDA assigns all engagements. This is and may apply engage hold on a target as
done by using TBE queue as the principal appropriate.
indicator of what targets are most threaten-
ing and are to be assigned to which batteries. The TDA monitors status monitor alerts
He responds to all higher echelon engage- and assesses weapons control computer, peri-
ment alerts and takes whatever action is pherals, and manstation one faults. He also
required. His authority to engage is provided monitors the system built-in test equipment
as a voice command or alert message from panel. He monitors voice communications
higher echelon when the battalion is central- party line 1 (air defense control).
- ---- ---- --- -- -- ~s,

TACTICAL DIRECTOR ASSISTANT RESPONSIBILITIES

A-7
C1, FM 44-15

COMMUNICATIONS OPERATOR
RESPONSIBILITIES
* He monitors the FM nets, records mes- interface unit. He assists the TD in assessing
sages, and passes the information on to TD. communications faults. He implements all
He periodically checks the UHF stacks, rout- communications ECCM in the information
ing logic radio interface unit, and antenna and coordination central including the use of
mast group. He is responsible to set the the power amplifiers.
assigned address in the routing logic radio

FIGHT OR FIX GUIDANCE

* The fight or fix guidelines and synopsis by the TCO when presented with fault indica-
provide guidance to the tactical control offi- tions. A review is conducted by the TD at the
cer and the tactical director in deciding the battalion FDC. An analysis and review by
appropriate response to system failures that the battery system maintenance technician
occur during actual combat. The objective of is also required. The Status Monitor Hand-
fight or fix guidance is to bring as much ADA book provides a best estimate of the effect of a
capability to bear against the enemy as is reported fault on tactical capability.
possible and logical, despite system failures.
The fight or fix guidelines should be used
upon the order to assume battle stations. For TACTICAL CONTROL OFFICER
training purposes the guidelines could be ACTIONS
used when batteries are ordered to to assume
blazing skies. Patriot's status monitor and * When presented with an equipment fault
built-in test equipment conduct frequent alert, the TCO will display and hard copy the
checks on Patriot's many functions. When- operational assessment, fault data, and fire
ever the results of a test action are outside of platoon status tabs. The TCO notes the set of
established engineering parameters, an fault indicators and makes an initial decision
appropriate indicator is given to the operator to continue air defense operations or to enter
via the display and control console and the diagnostics based upon the guidance of the
fire platoon status console in the engagement fight or fix guidance illustration on page
control station. The appropriate indicator is A-9. The TCO immediately notifies the TD of
presented as soon as possible on the alert line the fault indications present and of the initial
unless the fault alert filter is activated. In fight or fix decision. The TCO calls for the
this case the fault must exist for three min- battery system maintenance technician to
utes after initial fault detection. The fault immediately assess the fault indications and
alert filter is described on page A-13. to review the decision. TCO furnishes all
* The fight or fix decision process consist amplifying information on the residual capa-
of three elements. An initial decision is made bilities to the TD as it becomes available.

A-8
 C1, FM 44-15

*k FIGHT OR FIX GUIDANCE

STATUS MONITOR RECOMMENDED

INDICATIONS ACTION COMMENTS

HANG OR CRASH MUST FIX Must fix if rebooting does not clear problem.

RADAR GROUP ISOLATED (ALERT) MUST FIX Must fix if rebooting does not clear problem.
~~D-n~D ~u~x~~~
REORIENT NO GO OR MORE MUST FIX Radar set's indicated azimuth is probably wrong.
THAN ONE DEGREE AZIMUTH
CHANGE WITHOUT A TAB 09
COMMAND

SEARCH NO GO DECISION Targets which may appear on the display can be

TRACK NO GO engaged, if the ~y are stable and if the fault data tab does
MISSILE GUIDANCE N( ) GO not display eitl her TVMAP or RTG faults.
OR
TRACK NO GO If either TVMA P or RTG (or both) faults are indicated,
MISSILE GUIDANCE NI3 GO the unit canI be used for surveillance support only.
,Ji~,
~s;~i~gL~C~.B~s~C-~IX~1:
E

MISSILE GUIDANCE N0 GO DECISION No guidancei s available if the fault data tab displays
PI1I1LIT _I\I:IWIY - :llr nlrl w IIIIII YYIII:-ltllll WWIU~II~~ III~1
support battalion surveillance if search and track are
available (go or degrade).
i i:

MISSILE GUIDANCE DEGRADE DECISION With the fault data tab displaying TVMCP, there is
reduced guidance capability against jamming targets.

ALL OTHER DEGRADES FIGHT Notify battery command post.

A-9
Cl, FM 44-15

TACTICAL DIRECTOR ACTIONS

* Upon notification of the set of fault indi- need for the subject battery's residual capa-
cations and the initial fight or fix decision, bility to support the tactical situation.
the TD reviews the decision from the battal-
ion's perspective (see the fight or fix decisions * Probable time available to conduct
illustration). The TD reviews the situation by diagnostics/corrective maintenance before
considering the following: the air battle.
" Apparent residual air defense capabil- The TD will consult with the battalion
ity of the battery. system maintenance technician as required
* Overall equipment status of the bat- and recommend the continuation or chang-
talion. ing of the initial fight or fix decision to
the battalion commander or his designated
" Tactical situation and the battalion's representative.

7k FIGHT OR FIX DECISIONS

A-10
 C1, FM 44-15

SYSTEM MAINTENANCE
TECHNICIAN ACTIONS
* Upon notification of a fight or fix deci- the display of data becomes so erratic that
sion, system maintenance technician should the operator realizes he has unreliable data.
report to the engagement control station as
soon as possible to gather and analyze all of *Reorientation no go. A reorientation no go
fault is a serious system fault that will not
the available fault indications. He can use all
available maintenance manuals and his ex- permit correct system operation. This fault
occurs when a reorientation has. been
pertise to assess the location of the problem,
the impact of the problem on the air defense attempted and failed. The result is that the
north reference is lost. Actual target position
artillery mission and the system's residual is probably in error although it appears to be
capabilities. He will provide information as normal on the situation display. Missile
soon as possible to the TCO and recommend acquisition may not be possible and the sys-
a course of action. tem cannot support battalion operations.
CATEGORIES OF RESPONSES *Radar group isolated. A radar group iso-
lated alert occurs when there is no data com-
7* Status monitor and the built-in test munications between the weapon control
equipment provide an extensive amount of computer and the radar set. The operator
equipment status information to the opera- should attempt to reestablish that data link
tor. Much of the equipment status informa- by depressing the RADIATE-DISABLE
tion, however, is either redundant or not tac- switch/indicator. If the failure persists he
tically significant during wartime condi- should reload the software. If the failure still
tions. Thus, fight or fix guidance draws from persists, the problem must be fixed.
the tactically significant fault indicators con-
sidering that an operator must make prompt Decision
decisions in response to a fault indication * The fault indications in this category do
during an air battle. Fight or fix categorizes not of themselves mean that no residual air
the tactically significant faults into response defense capability is retained. Neither do
categories of must fix, decision, and fight. these faults mean that sufficient residual
There is a subset of the fight category, fight capability exists relative to the air defense
while fix, in which the fault can be corrected mission such that a fight decision is automat-
without interrupting the air defense artillery ically made. Fault indications in this cate-
operations. gory require a quick correlation between the
operational assessment tab, target symbol-
Must Fix ogy, and the fault data tab information.
*k With the following fault indications, *Search no go. In most cases, a search no go
there is no system residual capability and if
initial immediate operator corrective actions in the operational assessment tab indicates
do not clear the fault, the system must be that status monitor has detected a condition
fixed. that prevents successful search and track
operations. However, these fault indications
* System fix or crash during normal oper- can be generated by conditions which have
ation. A system hang or crash could result little effect on the system's capabilities to
from failure or from an EMP. Normally the search and track. The operator should corre-
operator will immediately attempt a reload. late his operational assessment tab indica-
If unsuccessful, a decision to fix must result. tion with the presence and stability of target
One condition which can result in the inabil- symbology on the scope. If all or some of the
ity to recover from a hang or crash is a fault, same target symbols are still displayed and if
prior to the crash, in either tactical tape they are stable, the operator should continue
cassette (that fault becomes a must fix). In engagements. In case of continued opera-
addition, a fault condition may occur where tions, the FDC operators should be aware -

A-11
C1, FM 44-15

that some targets within the battery's radar battery can still engage quiet targets effec-
coverage may go undetected. In such cases, tively, so long as the targets remain as quiet
the TD should use the adjacent batteries' targets.
overlapping coverages in the affected sector
to manually oversee the sector. * If TVM-AP is displayed in the fault data
tab with a missile guidance degrade in the
operational assessment tab, some guidance
*.Track no go. A track no go in the opera- degradation may exist. The high lethality
tional assessment tab normally is accompa- envelope might be smaller. But the fact that
nied by a serach no go. The same guidance
the problem was not assessed as a no go sig-
and rationale for a decision apply for track no nifies that the problem is not grave. There-
go as it does for a search no go. fore, the affected battery's firepower should
be used, if needed.
* Missile guidance no go. There are two
basic sets of conditions that can generate a Fight
missile guidance no go in the operational
assessment tab. First, missile guidance is
* All other status monitor indicators fall
into this category. These faults vary in im-
never assessed at a level higher than search pact upon the air defense artillery mission
and track. Therefore, everytime a search or from no adverse affect to moderate impact.
track no go is displayed, missile guidance no However, the faults in this category are such
go will be displayed whether or not any fault that the battery should be used, if needed. In
exists in the guidance system. The absence of many cases, system contingency modes or
actual guidance problems is verifiable by redundancies compensate for the lost capa-
displaying the fault data tab. If TVM-AP is bility. In other cases, some capability is lost
absent from the fault data tab display, then and there is no back up, but the fire unit can
the system should be used to engage those still make significant contributions to the
eligible targets that continue to be displayed. battalion's conduct of the air battle.
* The other conditions that can generate a *Search/track degrade. A degrade in either
missile guidance no go are TVM-AP prob- search or track can result in modification of
lems. This condition is indicated by TVM-AP the normal search/track envelopes for the
being displayed in the fault data tab. In this system. The system is expected to retain all of
case, no residual missile guidance capability its functional capabilities within the reduced
exists and the only decision remaining is envelope. Targets under track are expected to
whether or not to retain the battery for sur- be reliable. However, there may be targets
veillance support to the battalion. within the search coverage that are not dis-
played (these would be at longer ranges).
* Missile guidance degrade. An operational
assessment tab indication of missile guid- *Target evaluation degrade or no go. A
ance degrade can be generated by varying target evaluation degrade or no go is usually
degrees of equipment failures which might associated with display error. Distortions on
result in an increase in miss distance. the situation display may confuse the opera-
tor and manual switch actions may require
*k When TVM-CP is displayed in the fault repetition. Such faults should be apparent to
data tab, performance against jamming tar- the operator. If the condition seriously
gets will be significantly reduced and the bat- hampers the operator, his tasks can be trans-
tery should not be used to engage jammers. ferred to the other display console.
The battery could be used to engage triangu-
lated jammers but if the triangulation sup- *Target identification degrade or no go.
port is lost during the engagement, the mis- Target identification faults refer to the IFF
sile will most likely be ineffective. Therefore, system. Since other means for target identifi-
another battery should be selected, if possi- cation exist, these faults would result in a
ble, to engage jamming aircraft. The affected decision to continue operations for as long as

A-12
 C1, FM 44-15

contingency identification exists. Contin- category. The only difference between the
gency modes include- two is that faults in this category can be
* Alternate IFF modes in instances corrected without interrupting the battery
where the identification fault applies to only from its conduct of the air defense artillery
a single mode of the IFF system. mission.
* Told-in target identification from *C-E faults. C-E faults are degrades and no
higher echelons. go's in the UHF communications system as
shown on the communications indicator on
* Passive identification via the auto- the firing platoon status panel. These faults
mated track history comparison to the pas- can be due to breakdowns of individual links
sive criteria initialized in the tactical data within the network and can be repaired while
base. the net is operational. If the fault is serious
*Reorientation degrade. This condition enough to result in a no go, the battery can
indicates that the achieved radar set azimuth continue to fully support search, track and
differs from that expected. It can occur at guidance in an autonomous mode.
system start-up following maintenance in
which the radar set was rotated manually. It *Launching station low fuel. The launch-
can also occur following a radar set retrain ing station low fuel warning indicates 2
command in which the radar set failed to hours or less of fuel for the generator. Refuel-
achieve its expected azimuth within two ing of individual launching stations is
degrees. The system can normally be used if accomplished while the remainder of the sys-
the current azimuth satisfactorily covers the tem continues operation.
assigned search sector. Otherwise, reorient
the radar set to the desired azimuth. *Hot missile count. The hot missile count
can drop due to missile launches or due to
*Tactical tape cassette. The tactical tape failures in the missile. Reload or replacement
cassettes contain the program tapes and the of rounds is accomplished while the re-
local site dependent data base. Cassette faults mainder of the battery continues operations.
can result in the system being unable to re-
start or to reorient. Cassette one contains the
tactical programs; a fault in this cassette *Launching station no go. Launching sta-
prevents the system from reloading, for tion corrective maintenance and missile re-
example, for EMP recovery. Cassette two load is performed without interruptions to
contains the site dependent data base as well the remainder of the battery's operations. If
as certain programs required to support sys- the indication is a digital data link red indi-
tem reorientation. A fault in this cassette cation for all activated launchers, the prob-
prevents both rapid reloading and system lem is most likely in the data link terminal at
reorientation. the engagement control station. Otherwise,
only those launching stations displaying
Fight While Fix DDL RED require maintenance and the re-
This category is a subset of the fight mainder can be used to support engagements.

FAULT ALERT FILTER USE

* In order to minimize the impact of inter- are filtered. That is, those faults detected
mittent fault alerts on tactical operations, a through the routine, cyclic status monitor
switchable filter of fault alerts is incor- activity. The filter is enabled by means of
porated into the system. the EQUIP CONTR switch on each display
console.
ENGAGEMENT CONTROL STATION Not all faults are filtered by activation of
* Only faults which can be intermittent the EQUIP CONTR switch. When the filter is

A-13
Cl, FM 44-15

INFORMATION AND
COORDINATION CENTRAL
enabled radar set faults which have been * At the battalion FDC, use of the EQUIP
stable for a least 3 minutes are reported. All CONTR switch causes fault alerts to be dis-
other faults are not displayed on the alert played at one, two, or no consoles. Prior to the
line. Failures of items other than the radar conduct of the air battle, the filter should be
set will continue to be detected and status used to direct alerts to manstation one. Dur-
displays will be updated to repeat these ing the conduct of the air battle, the filter
faults. Radar set failures that are associated should be enabled at both manstations. Since
with specific events, such as an RU AZI- the tactical director assistant is a trained
MUTH FLT generated by a reorientation maintenance person, he is able to interpret
attempt, will continue to be reported. The fil- and assess the majority of the alerts. Nor-
ter is recommended for use during initializa- mally, the tactical director will have the filter
tion and conduct of the air battle. In this way, enabled so that he does not receive the status
intermittent faults will not distract the oper- monitor alerts.
ator or bog down the alert reporting system.

A-14
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICEI 1986-491-421/40044
 Glossary

AADC Area Air Defense Commander ASM air-to-surface missile

AADCOM Army air defense command ATDL-1 Army tactical data link-1
AADCP Army air defense command post ATGM antitank guided missile
ACA airspace control authority ATP Allied Tactical Publication
AD air defense AUTODIN automatic digital network
ADA air defense artillery BITE built-in test equipment
ADC air defense control BOC battalion operations center
ADE air defense emergeny BSE brigade support element
ADIZ Air defense identification zone CAP combat air patrol
ADL automatic data link CAS close air support
admin administrative CBU cluster bomb unit
ADOA air defense operations area C-E communications-electronics
ADOLT air defense operations liaison CEOI Communications-Electronics
team Operation Instructions
ADP automatic data processing
CFA covering force area
ADSCOM air defense support command
clr sta clearing station
ADW air defense warning
COMMZ communications zone
aid sta aid station
COMSEC communications security
ALOC air lines of communications
CONUS Continental United States
amb ambulance
COSCOM corps support command
AMG antenna mast group
CP command post
APOD aerial port of debarkation
CPOC corps personnel operations
APOE aerial port of embarkation center
ARM antiradiation missile CPU central processing unit
ASF aeromedical staging facility CRC control and reporting center

Glossary-1
FM 44-15

CRG communications relay group evac evacuation

CRP control and reporting post EW electronic warfare
CSH Combat Support Hospital EWBN early warning broadcast net
CSR controlled supply rate FDC fire direction center
CSS combat service support FEBA forward edge of the battle area

DARCOM US Army Material Develoment FEZ fighter engagement zone

and Readiness Command FIDOC firing doctrine
DEFCON defense readiness condition FLOT forward line of own troops
DEFREP defense readiness posture FSCL fire support coordination line
DLA Defense Logistics Agency FSL forward storage location
DLT data link terminal FU fire unit
DMMC division materiel management gen general
center
GM guided missile
DS direct support
GMT guided missile transporter
DSU direct support unit
GOC group operations center
DX direct exchange
GRREG graves registration
ECCM electronic
GS general support
counter-countermeasures
ECM GSA General Services Administration
electronic countermeasures
ECP entry control point GS-R general support-reinforcing
GSSB general support supply base
ECS engagement control station
ECU GSU general support unit
environmental control unit
ELSEC HCU hard copy unit
electronic security
EMCON HE high explosive
emission control orders
EMP HF high frequency
electromagnetic pulse
HHB headquarters and headquarters
EPP electric power plant
battery
EPU electric power unit
HIDACZ high density airspace control
ESJ escort jammer zone
ESM electronic warfare support HIMAD high- to medium-altitude air
measures defense

Glossary-2
 FM 44-15

HUMINT human intelligence MRO materiel release order

ICC information and coordination MRR minimum risk route
central MS1(2 or 3) manstation one(two or three)
ID identification
NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
IFF identification, friend or foe
NCS net control station
IM intermediate maintenance
NICP national inventory control point
IMINT imagery intelligence
NOE nap-of-the-earth
IRR intelligence and radar reporting
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff OP observation post
LAW light antitank weapon OPCOM operational command

LLTR low level transit route OPCON operational control

LNIP launch now intercept point OPSEC operations security

log logistics ORF operational ready float

LP listening post OSRC Overseas Replacement

Command
LS launching station
P&A personnel and administration
MASF mobile aeromedical staging
facility PAC Personnel and Administration
Center
MBA main battle area
PER peripherals
MC maintenance center
PERSCOM Personnel Command
METT-T mission, enemy, troops, terrain,
and time PFE process for engagement
PIP predicted intercept point
MEZ missile engagement zone
PLL prescribed load list
MMC Materiel Management Center
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
MODEM modulator/demodulator
equipment PS personnel service
MOPP mission oriented protective PTL primary target line
posture R reinforcing
MP military police RADC region air defense commander
MPC message processing center RAP rear area protection
MRL multiple rocket launcher RATT radio teletypewriter

Glossary-3
FM 44-15

RDF radio direction finding STANAG Standardization Agreement

repl replacement STL secondary target line
RF radio frequency TA theater Army
RLRIU routing logic radio interface unit TAACO M Theater Army Area Command
ROA restricted operations area TACC tactical air control center
ROE rules of engagement TACOPS tactical operations
RP release point TAMMC theater army materiel
RRA retired, refitted aircraft management center

RRD replacement regulating TAPOC theater Army Personnel

detachment Operations Center

RS radar set
TBE to-be-engaged

RSOP reconnaissance, selection, and TBM tactical ballistic missile

occupation of position TCA tactical control assistant
RSR required supply rate TCO tactical control officer
SAM surface-to-air missile TD tactical director
SASP special ammunition supply point TDA tactical director assistant
SHORAD short-range air defense TOC tactical operations center
SHORADEZ SHORAD engagement zone TOE table of organization and
S/I switch indicator equipment

SIDPERS TREE transient radiation effect on

Standard Installation/Division
electronics
Personnel System
SIF selective identification feature
TSOP tactical standing operating
procedures
SIGINT signal intelligence
TVM track-via-missile
SIGSEC signal security
UTM universal transverse mercator
SLAR side-looking airborne radar (grid)
SOC sector operations center WAD weapons alert designator
SOJ stand-off jammer WCC weapons control computer
SOR state of readiness WCS weapons control status
SP start point WEZ weapons engagement zone
SSJ self-screening jammer ZI zone of interior

Glossary-4
 References

Required publications are sources which users must read in order to understand or comply
with FM 44-15.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PUBLICATIONS (JCS PUB)

JCS-8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Oversea Land Areas

JCS-9, Doctrine for Unified Defense of the United States Against Air Attack

FIELD MANUALS (FM)

1-103, Airspace Management and Army Air Traffic Control in a Combat Zone

44-1 (HTF), US Army Air Defense Artillery Employment

(S)44-1A, US Army Air Defense Artillery Materiel (U)

44-30 Visual Aircraft Recognition

100-5 (HTF), Operations

100-15 (TEST), Larger Unit Operations

100-42, US Army/Air Force Airspace Management in an Area of Operations

RELATED PUBLCATriiLNS
Related publications are sources of additional information. Users do not have to read them
to understand FM 44-15.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PUBLICATIONS (JCS PUB)

JCS-1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

JCS-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

References-1
FM 44-15

ARMY REGULATIONS (AR)

380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program

(S) 530-4, Control of Compromising Emanations (U)

710-2, Supply Policy Below the Wholesale Level

FIELD MANUALS (FM)

3-87 (HTF), NBC Reconnaissance and Decontamination Operations

5-100 (HTF), Engineer Combat Operations

30-102, Opposing Forces: Europe

44-3 (HTF), Air Defense Artillery Employment, Chaparral/Vulcan

44-8, Small Unit Self-Defense Against Air Attack

44-18 (HTF), Air Defense Artillery Employment, Stinger
44-90 (HTF), US Army Air Defense Artillery Employment, Hawk

63-3, Combat Service Support Operations, Corps

71-100 (HTF), Armored and Mechanized Division Operations

71-101 (HFT), Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Division Operations

100-10, Combat Service Support

101-5-1 (HTF), Operational Terms and Graphics

TECHNICAL MANUALS (TM)

9-1425-600-10, Description, Patriot System

9-1430-600-10, Engagement Control Station, Guided Missile, Truck Mounted,

AN/MSQ-104.

9-1430-601-10-1, Radar Set, Guided Missile, Semitrailer Mounted, AN/MPQ-53

9-1430-602-10, Information and Coordination Central, Guided Missile, Truck Mounted,

AN/MRC-136
9-1440-600-10, Launching Station, Guided Missile, Semitrailer Mounted, M-901

TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT (TOE)

44-635, ADA Battalion, Patriot
44-636, HHB, ADA Battalion, Patriot

44-637, ADA Battery, Patriot

References-2
 FM 44-15

TECHNICAL BULLETIN (TB)

380-6-8, Electronic Security (ELSEC) for Air Defense Artillery Weapon Systems

ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM (ARTEP)

44-635, ADA Battalion, Patriot

iOJECTED T 7PUBLI
-RELATED CATHiNS
These related publications are scheduled for printing. Upon print, they will be distributed
automatically via pinpoint distribution and will not be available for requisition from USA AG
Publications Center, Baltimore, until indexed in DA Pam 310-1.

FIELD MANUALS (FM)

3-100 (TEST), NBC Operations
34-1 (HTF), Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
(S)44-1A, US Army Air Defense Artillery Operational Planning Data (U)
44-15-1, Operations and Training, Patriot

63-4, Combat Service Support Operations, Theater Army Area Command

100-16, Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps.

References-3
 Index

A
Page Page

Active air defense ..................... 6-4 Support command .......... 9-11, 9-18
Administrative/logistics net ........ 5-1, 5-6 Types............................. 6-4
Aiming circle, M2 ..................... 7-3 Warning ......................... 4-11
Air battle
Air defense artillery
Command and control procedures .. 4-10
Coordination officer ............... 3-2
Crews ........................ A-, A-5
Employment
Drill ................... .... A-1, A-5 guidelines ......... 6-11, 6-15, 6-22
Management . ....... ........ 4-3 Mission ............................ 1-1
Phase I ................ ....... 2-10 Role in defensive operations......... 6-5
Phase II ............... ....... 2-11 Role in offensive operations ......... 6-5
Aircraft, threat ............. ......... 2-4 Role in retrograde operations....... 6-6
Fixed-wing............. ........ 2-4 Air-land battle
Doctrine ............... ...... 1-2
Rotary-wing ........... ........ 2-7
Impact on AD priorities ........... 6-7
Air defense
Action area ............ ...... 4-15 Patriot in ..................... 1-4, 1-5
Area .................. ....... 4-15 Air raid warning...... .......... ...... 4-11
Classes .............. ........ 6-4 Air threat .............................. 2-2
Control net........... .... 5-1,5-4 Aircraft and capabilities ............ 2-4
Definition ............ ........ 1-1 Missions ...................... 2-2
Distinction between AD and ADA ... 1-2 Munitions and attack techniques .... 2-8
Emergency ............ ....... 4-11 Tactics ............................ 2-10
Employment principles. 6-10 Altitude bands,
...... standard .................... 1-3
Identification zone ..... ....... 4-15 Very low ....................... 1-3
Objective ............. ........ 1-1 Low ............................... 1-3
Operations Area ....... ....... 4-15 Medium ........................ 1-3
Operations liaison team .,... ........ 4-7 High ............................. 1-3
Priorities ........................ 6-6 Very high .............. ........ 1-3

Index-1
FM 44-15

Page Page

Alternate positions ................. 7-1,7-8 Area air defense commander ............ 4-7

Ammunition supply ..................... 9-4 Area defense

Composite ........... 6-35
AM radio nets......................... 5-10
Definition .............. ............ 6-4
Back-up ADC and IRR........... 5-11
Patriot employment..... 6-14
Battalion command ................ 5-10
Army air defense command ........... 1-5
Brigade RATT ..................... 5-10
Attachment............. ............ 4-6
Analysis phase........................ 6-8
Automatic data link ....... 5-4
Antenna mast group ................ 3-8, 7-2
Autonomous operations..... .......... 4-13
AN/TSQ-73 Missile Mnder ............ 4-8

Balanced fires ..................... .. 6-11 Bombers ............................. 2-5

Balanced point defense . ........... .. 6-21 Bombing

Barriers..................... ... 8-5 Missions ....................... 2-3

Techniques .................... 2-8
Basic load .................... . . 9-3

Bombs ................................ 2-8

Battalion organization, Patriot ....... 3-1
Brigade support element ............... 9-15
Battery organization, Patriot
Firing battery .. ............... ... 3-4 Bunkers............................... 8-5
Headquarters and headquarters
battery ............... ...... ... 3-2

Camouflage ........................ 7-7, 8-6 Glasses of air defense .................. 6-4

Cannon., aircraft........................ 2-8 Active ............................ 6-4
Capabilities Passive............................ 6-4
Aircraft, threat .. ................ 2-4 Close-in battle ......................... 1-4
Patriot ........................... 3-12 Cluster bomb units ..................... 2-8
Cease fire ............................ 4-14 Combat service support .............. 9-1
Centralized control.................. 4-12 Air defense support command ...... 9-17
Centralized management .............. 4-3 Field services.... .............. 9-10
Circuits, UHF....................5-1 5-4 Health services .................... 9-8

Index-2
 FM 44-15

Page Page

Maintenance...... ............ 9-5 Composite defense .......... 6-35

Organization ...... . 9-2, 9-11,9-14 Allocation of forces ...... 6-35
Personnel services ............ 9-7 Command and control ... 6-35
Responsibilities ... ............ 9-2 Hawk employment....... 6-35
Supply ........... ....... 9-3, 9-15 Planning factors......... 6-36
Support platoon ... ............ 9-3 SHORAD employment ... 6-35
Tactical missions ........ 6-35
Command ............. ..... 4-1
Chain ............. ..... 4-5 Contamination avoidance .............. 8-13

Nets............... 5-5, 5-7, 5-10 Control

And reporting center.... . 4-7
Post............... . . . . .• ..... 4-7
And reporting post...... . 4-7
Section ............ ..... 3-2
Chain ................. . 4-7
Command and control Convergent PTL orientation . 6-14
Chains ............ .4-5, 4-6
Countermeasures .......... . 8-9
Cornerstones ...... ..... 4-3
Emission control ....... . 8-9
Cycle.............. ..... 4-2
Movement ............. . 8-9
Functional areas ... ..... 4-2
Countersuppression ........ 8-11
Procedures ........ .... 4-10
NBC defense........... 8-12

Communications ....... ..... 5-1 Self-defense from

air attack ............ ........... 8-11
AM radio nets...... .... 5-10
Countersurveillance ........ ............ 8-2
Data .............. . 5-1,7-7
Electronic counter-
FM radio nets ...... ..... 5-5
countermeasures..... ............ 8-3
HF nets............ .... 5-10
Information security .... ............ 8-3
Platoon ............ ..... 3-3
Physical security ....... ............ 8-4
Relay groups....... .3-9, 5-3
Signal security ......... ............ 8-2
Security .......... ..... 8-2
Standing operating
UHF nets .......... .5-2, 7-7 procedures .......... ............ 8-6
VHF nets .......... ..... 5-5 Crews, air battle............ ........ A-1, A-5 -
Voice .............. . 5-1,7-7 Criticality ................. ............ 6-7
Wire .............. .... 5-11 Crypto security ............. ............ 8-2

Index-3
FM 44-15

Page Page

Data communications......... ... 5-1 Defense design phase . ........ 6-10

Data link terminal ........... ... 3-6 Evaluation phase ...... ........ 6-13
Data net, firing battery ........ ... 5-9 Implementation phase . ........ 6-13
Decentralized control ......... .. 4-12 Defense readiness postures ........ 4-10
Deception ................... .. 8-10 D elay ..................... ......... 6-6
Decontamination ............. .. 8-14 Destruction ............... ........ 3-12
Decoys ...................... .. 8-11 Detection ................ ........ 3-11
Deep battle .................. ... 1-4 Direct Support ............ ..... 6-2, 6-3
Defense readiness condition .. .. 4-10 Dive bombing ............. ......... 2-9
Defense design phase ........ .. 6-10 Division of labor concept ... ......... A-1
Defense design requirements . .. 6-12 Drill, air battle............. ..... A-1, A-5
Defense in depth ............. .. 6-12 Drones ............. ... ......... 2-6
Defense planning ............ ... 6-8 Dummy positions........... ........ 8-10
Analysis phase............ ... 6-8

Early engagement ............ .... 6-12 Employment guidelines, ADA... .. 6-11

Electric power plan ........... . 3-7, 7-9 Balanced fires......... ............. 6-11

Electric power unit ........... .... 3-10 Defense in depth ...... .... 6-12

Electronic Early engagement .... .... 6-12

Counter-countermeasures . 8-3 Mutual support...... .... 6-12
Countermeasures ........ . 2-3 Overlapping fires ..... .... 6-12
Security ................. . 8-2 Weighted coverage ... .... 6-11
W arfare .............. ... . 2-6 Employment principles, AD .... 6-10
Warfare support measures 2-13 Integration........... .... 6-11
Emission control ............. . 8-9 Mass............. .... 6-10
Emplacement ................ 7-7 M ix ................. "' .... 6-10
Employment, Patriot ......... 6-14 Mobility ............. .... 6-11
Area defense ............ .. 6-14, 6-21 Engage ................ ..... 4-3
Composite defense ....... .. 6-35, 6-38 Engage control ........... .A-6, A-7
Point defense ............ .. 6-21, 6-33 Engage hold ............. .... 4-14

Index-4
 FM 44-15

Page Page

Engagement control station ............. 3-6 Entry control point ..................... 8-5
Engagement mode ................ 4-13, A-4 Evaluation phase ..................... 6-13
Engagements . ....... A-3, A-4, A-7, A-8

False targets ............. ....A-2 Firing battery

Equipment ................ 3-6, 3-7, 3-8
Field services ............ ... 9-10
Organization ...................... 3-4
Fighter-bombers ........ .... 2-5
Positioning .................... 7-2, 7-8
Fighter engagement zone . ... 4-15
Siting ................... 7-2,7-8,7-10
Fighters ................. .... 2-5
FM radio nets ......................... 5-5
Fire control orders........ ... 4-14
Battalion administrative/logistics .... 5-6
Fire control platoon ....... 3-5, 7-8
Firing battery command ............. 5-7
Fire control section ....... 3-5, 7-8
Firing battery operations ............ 5-8
Fire direction center ...... 3-3, 4-8
Headquarters and headquarters
Fire distribution section ... .... 3-3 battery command ................. 5-5
Fire support coordination lirne........ ... 4-16 Friendly protect ............... A-2, A-3, A-6

General support .................. 6-2, 6-3 Ground defense ......... ........ ..... 7-7
General support-reinforcing ......... 6-2, 6-3 Guided missile .................... 3-7, 7-10
Gravity drop bombing .................. 2-9 Guided missile transporter ......... 3-3, 7-10
Ground attack.......................... 2-3

Hardening sites .................... 7-7, 8-8 Headquarters and headquarters battery

Organization ...................... 3-2
Hasty radar coverage diagrams .......... 7-8
Positions ........................ 7-10
Hawk
Communications with Health services .................... 9-8, 9-9
Patriot ................ 4-8, 5-4, 6-35 Helicopters ............................ 2-7
Attack............................. 2-7
Employment in composite
defenses .................. 6-35, 6-37 ECM .......... ................. . 2-7
Role ............ ................... 1-3 Utility ............................ 2-7

Index-5
FM 44-15

Page Page

HF nets .................... 5-10 High-to medium-altitude

air defense ......................... 1-4
Back-up ADC and IRR... 5-11
Hold fire .............................. 4-14
Battalion command..... 5-10
Hostile criteria ....................... 4-12
Brigade RATT .......... 5-10
Human intelligence .................... 2-13
High altitude .............. .1-3
High density airspace control zone 4-17

Identification Implementation phase ................ 6-13

Criteria .................. ... 4-12
Information and coordination central ..... 3-9
M ode..................... ... 4-12
Information security .................... 8-3,
Process.................. ... 3-11
Initialization ......................... 3-11--
Responsibility ....... A-1., A-2, A-5, A-6
Integration ........................... 6-11
Volumes ................. ... 4-12
Intelligence and radar reporting...... 5-1,5-4
Identification, Friend or Foe .... ° .... ... 4-12
Intercommunications nets
Imagery intelligence . ................. 2-13 Battalion ........................ 5-11
Impact of AirLand Battle Doctrine Battery .......................... 5-13
on AD priorities .............. . 6-7

Jammers........ ........... 2-6, 2-7, 2-14 Jamming targets .......... 6-20, 6-32, 6-34
Jamming ......... ........... 2-6, 2-7, 2-14

Launcher platoon.. ......... 3-5 Light discipline ........................ 8-8

Launching sation.. .... 3-7,7-10 Listening post ......................... 8-5
Laydown bombing . ........ 2-10 Locating ............................... 7-1
Levels of control... ........ 4-12 Low altitude ............ .............. 1-3
Liaison ........... .3-2, 4-5, 7-4 Low level transit route (LLTR)........... 4-18

M-2 aiming circle . ..................... 7-3 Platoon........................... 3-5

Maintenance UHF channel ................... 5-1, 5-4

Operations........... .............. 9-5 Management by exception .............. 4-5

Index-6
 FM 44-15

Page Page

Manual FDC ...... ......... 4-9, 4-10 Standard tactical ............. 6-2, 6-3
March order ...... . . . . . . o. . . . .7-6 Standard tactical with certain
elements modified or deleted ...... 6-3
M ass............. . . . . . . . . . . .
° . .
° 6-10
Threat aircraft ..................... 2-2
Medium altitude ....................... 1-3
M ix ................................. 6-10
Methods of fire ....................... 4-14
M obility ........................ ..... 6-10
Ripple ........................... 4-14
Modes of control ..................... 4-12
S alvo ............................. 4-14 Centralized ................. 4-12, 4-13
Shoot-look-shoot ................. 4-14 Decentralized .............. 4-1 2, 4-13
M ETT-T .... ...................... 6-9 6-10
Modulator/demodulator ........... 3-8, 5-3
Minimum risk route ................... 4-18 Motor maintenance section ............ 3-4
Missile engagement zone ......... 4-15, 4-16 Movement .................. 7-4 7-12, 8-9
M issile reload .................. ...... 3-13 Movement schedule .................. 7-12
Mission Munitions, Soviet air ................. 2-8
ADA ..... .................. . 1-1
Mutual support....................... 6-12
Narrative .................... . 6-3
Patriot battalion ................. . 1-4

Napalm .............. ................. 2-8 UHF .............................. 5-2

Narrative mission .... ................. 6-3 VHF .............................. 5-5
NBC defense.......... ...... 7-5, 8-12, 8-18 Wire ........................... 5-11
Nets, communications Noise discipline ..................... 8-8
HF .............. ................ 5-10

Objective of air defense ................. 1-1 Operational control (NATO) ............. 4-6

Observation post ...... ................. 8-5 Operational control (US) ............... 4-6
Organization
Occupation of position ................. 7-7
Battalion Patriot .................... 3-1
Operational command (NATO) ........... 4-6 Firing battery, Patriot ............... 3-4
Operational command (US) ............. 4-6 For control service support HHB ..... 3-2

Index-7
FM 44-15

Page Page

Passive air defense .. ............... 6-4 Reaction force ...... . 8-6

Patriot Weapons sites .... . . 8-5
Battalion mission ................... 1-3
Planning factors
Capabilities ................... 3-12 Area defense ...... 6-16
Communications ................... 5-1 Composite defense . 6-36
Employment.................... 1-4 Point defense ..... 6-21
Movement ... .............. 7-4 7-12 Point defense ......... 6-21
Organization ....................... 3-1 Pop-up criteria .......... 4-12
Role ............................ 1-3 Positioning ........... . 7-2
Personnel services .................... 9-7 Position requirements
Physical security ....................... 8-4
Battalion CP ........ ...... 7-10, 7-11
Fire control platoon.. 7-8, 7-9
Alarm systems ..................... 8-6
Launcher platoon.. . 7-9,7-10
Barriers and entry control.......... 8-5
Positive management ........ '.....4-4
Bunkers ......................... 8-5
Primary target line... .4-20, 6-17, 7-9
Control of ground
defense operations .............. 8-6 Prohibited volume ... ...... 4-12, 4-21
LPs/OPs ......................... 8-5 Protection, NBC... . ........ 3-6,3-8

Radar emission control .......... 8-9, 8-10 Reload, missile ....... ... 3-13
Radio direction finding ................ 2-13 Restricted operations area . 4-18
Radio and teletypewriter net, brigade.... 5-10 Restricted volumes ......... .. 4-12, 4-21

Reaction force .. ................... 8-6 Retrograde operations ...... . 6-6

Rear area protection ................... 1-5 Ripple fire ................. 4-14
Rear operations area ........... 6-21, 6-35 Rockets.................... . 2-8
Reconnaissance Role
Patriot. , ...................... 7-1,7-12 Hawk.. ....... ............... 1-3
Threat aircraft..................2-5 Patriot ............................ 1-3
Threat mission ................... 2-3 Routing logic radio interface unit ........ 5-3
Recuperability.................... 6-7 RSOP ................................. 7-1
Region air defense commander .......... 4-7 Considerations...............7-2, 7-4

Index-8
 FM 44-15

Page Page

Position reconnaissance ..... ... 7-4, 7-5 Hostile criteria ................. ... 4-12
Road movement ............. ....... 7-6 Level of control ................. ... 4-12
Route reconnaissance ....... ....... 7-5 Mode of control ............... ... 4-12
Rules of engagement ............ ...... 4-12 Self-defense ................... ... 4-12
Autonomous operations...... ...... 4-13 Weapons control status ......... ... 4-13
Fire control orders .......... ...... 4-14

S 2 ....................... ...... 3-3 S iting .................. .......... 7-2, 7-7

S3 ...................... ...... 3-3 Siting requirements
AMG ................ ............
.7-9
S 4 ...................... ...... 3-3
ECS ................ .............. 7-9
Salvo fire ................ ..... 4-14
EPP ................ .............. 7-9
Secondary target line ...... ..... 4-20
Sector of fire .............. LS .................. ............. 7-10
..... 4-20
RS .............. ................. 7-9
Sector operations center ... ...... 4-7
Small arms for air defense ............. 8-12
Self-defense ........... I- 4-12, 8-11
Services Special command statuses .............. 4-6
Attachment.......... .............. 4-6
Field ................... ..... 9-10
OPCOM(NATO)....... .............. 4-6
Health .................. 9-8 .......
OPCOM/OPCON(US). .............. 4-6
Personnel .............. .. 9-8, 9-9
OPCON(NATO) ....... .............. 4-6
Shoot-look-shoot ............ ..... 4-14
Tactical control....... .............. 4-6
Short-range air defense
Standard tactical missions .............. 6-3
Employment with Patriot. .. 1-4, 1-5
DS ................. .......... 6-2, 6-3
Engagement zone ....... ..... 4-16
GS ................. .......... 6-2, 6-3
Signal intelligence........... ..... 2-13
GS-R ............... .......... 6-2, 6-3
Signal security ............. ...... 8-2
R ................. ........... 6-2, 6-3
Communications security ....... 8-2 Standard-use Army aircraft route ....... 4-19
Electronic security....... ....... 8-2 Standing operating procedures ......... 8-6
TEMPEST.............. ....... 8-3 States of readiness ................... 4-10
Site hardening .............. ....... 7-7 Stinger ................. 3-4, 3-5, 7-7, 8-11

Index-9
FM 44-15

Page Page

Stop fire .............................. 4-14 Other classes ........... 9-5, 9-16, 9-17
Supplemental fire control measures..... 4-15 POL .......................... 9-5, 9-15
Air defense operations areas ....... 4-15 Support platoon ....................... 3-3
High density airspace control zone .. 4-17 Survey ............................... 7-3
Temporary airspace restrictions..... 4-17 Switchboard diagrams ............ 5-12, 5-14
Weapons engagement zone ........ 4-15
Supply
Ammunition ............... 9-4, 9-16

Tactical air control center . ....... 4-7 Threat

Air ............. .............. 2-2
Tactical aviation ......... ....... 2-1
Suppression ..... ............. 2-12
Tactical ballistic missile ... ...... 2-13
Tone down.......... .............. 8-7
Tactical control.......... ....... 4-6
Toss bombing ........ ............. 2-10
Tactical control assistant.. ...... 4-10
Transmission security .............. 8-2
Tactical control officer .... ....... 3-5
Triangulation ........ .. 6-19, 6-25, 6-30
Tactical director ......... ....... 4-9
Types of AD.......... .............. 6-4
Tactical director assistant . ....... A-7
Area ........... .... 6-4, 6-20 6-37
Tactical operations center . .. 4-8, 7-11
Point ............ ... 6-4, 6-21,6-38
TEMPEST ............... ............. 8-3
Temporary airspace restrictions... ...... 4-17

UHF.............................. 5-1,5-2 Nets............................. 5-1

Circuits ........................... 5-1 Utility helicopters ...................... 2-7
Equipment......................... 5-2

Vehicle size and weight ............ 7-2, 7-3 VHF nets ............................. 5-5
Very high altitude ..................... 1-3 Voice communications ............. 3-6, 5-1
Very low altitude .................. .... 1-3 Vulnerability .................. ........ 6-7

Index-10
 FM 44-15

Page
Page
Warning orders .............. 6-13, 7-4, 7-5 Weapons engagement zone (WEZ) ...... 4-15
Warning procedures and Fighter engagement zone (FEZ) ..... 4-15
alert statuses ................. ..... 4-10
Missile engagement
(ADE) Air defense emergency........ 4-11 zone (MEZ)........... 4-15, 4-16, 4-17
(ADW) Air defense warning ........ 4-11 SHORAD engagement
(DEFCON) Defense readiness zone (SHORADEZ) ............... 4-16
condition ......... .............. 4-10 Weapons sites, machine guns .......... 8-5
(SOR) State of readiness .......... 4-10 Weighted coverage ................. 6-11
(WAD) Weapons alert designator ... 4-10 Weighted point
defense ........... 6-21, 6-22, 6-29, 6-34
Weapons alert designator (WAD) ....... 4-10
Wire communications ................ 5-11
Weapons control status (WCS).......... 4-13
Intercommunication
Weapons free ................... 4-14 stations ................... 5-11,5-13
Weapons hold ..................... 4-14 Switchboard diagrams ...... .. 5-12, 5-14
Weapons tight .................... 4-14 Withdrawal ... ......................... 6-6

Index-11
 FM 44-15

4 APRIL 1984

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.

General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

ROBERT M. JOYCE
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, ARNG, and USAR. To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 B, Require-
ments for US Army Air Defense Artillery Employment (Qty rqr block no. 348); Air Defense
Artillery Employment, Nike-Hercules (Qty rqr block no. 369); and Operations of Army Forces in
the Field (Qty rqr block no. 405).

Additional copies may be requisitioned from the US Army Adjutant General Publications Center,
2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220.

*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 19 84 739 0 33 81