Security of Radioactive Sources (Category 3 – Level C)

Corporate Communication Unit

Atomic Energy Licensing Board
Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate Change
Batu 24, Jalan Dengkil, 43800 Dengkil, Selangor
Email: shukor@aelb.gov.my
Tel: 03-89225888 Fax: 03-89223685
INTRODUCTION
 Safety

• Radiation safety was the prime focus, and the sources could be
used for their intended beneficial purposes without harming either
the user or the public
• Safety deals with attempt to prevent/ minimize the exposure
to radioactive sources, that may cause harm to human health
e.g Application of shielding when handling
radioactive sources
 Security

 Security deals with attempting to prevent unauthorized or

illegal acquisition and use of radioactive sources, with or
without intention, including act for malevolent purpose
– e.g; CCTV at the radioactive sources storage facility

 Security failure, may lead to the safety incident/accident.

– Gamma projector theft may lead to accidental radiation
exposure to the public
 CATEGORY 3
10 > A/D ≥ 1

Examples :
• Fixed industrial gauges that
incorporate high activity sources
(Co-60, Cs-137)
• Well logging gauges (Cs-137,
Am-Be)
SOURCES CATEGORY VS. RISK

EXTREMELY DANGEROUS

VERY DANGEROUS

DANGEROUS

UNLIKELY TO BE
DANGEROUS

VERY UNLIKELY
TO BE DANGEROUS
AREAS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CONTROL

END START

MANUFACTURER

R
BO
R DE Y
R
EX DER BO NTR
IT E

IN IL ITIE
IT E

FA CTI
S
C ST

U ITIE S
IE

A
C V

SE S
FA W A
IL

:
- Sabotage - Illegal sale for profit
- Intent to harm others -Avoidance of costs of
ownership
- Radiological Disperse
(e.g. dumping to avoid disposal
Device (RDD) fees)
- Terrorist threats - Extortionist threats
 STATISTICS ON SECURITY EVENTS
No. EVENT ACTIVITY LOCATION YEAR
1. Medical Kuala Lumpur 1990s
LOST

2. Industrial Radiography Kuantan 1990s

THEFT

3. Industrial Radiography Taiping 1990s

LOST

4. Industrial Radiography Kemaman 2001

STORAGE INTRUSION

5. Industrial Radiography Miri 2004

STORAGE INTRUSION

6. Industrial Radiography Kemaman 2006

STORAGE INTRUSION

7. Gauging - Kemaman 2007

LOST
Oil Logging
8. Industrial Radiography Sibu
THEFT 2008

9. Industrial Radiography Paka

THEFT 2009

10. Industrial Radiography Paka

LOST 2011
 STATISTICS ON SECURITY EVENTS
NUM. EVENT ACTIVITY LOCATION YEAR
11. THEFT Industrial Radiography Paka 2012

12. THEFT Gauging Pasir Gudang 2012

13. Gauging - Labuan

LOST 2014
Oil Logging

14. LOST Industrial Radiography Sipitang 2014

15. UNAUTHORIZED Unknown Kuala Lumpur 2015

POSSESSION
16. THEFT Missing Sources (Gauging) Kemaman 2016

17. Industrial Radiography Klang

THEFT 2017

18. LOST Industrial Radiography Shah Alam 2018

SECURITY SYSTEM
LEVEL C
(Category 3)
 Purpose of a Security System
A security system should be designed to prevent unauthorized access
to radioactive sources at all stages of their life cycles (storage, use,
transport, decommissioning and disposal), in order to;

 Prevent unauthorized transfer and use and of radioactive

sources
 Prevent damage to radioactive sources
 Prevent loss of radioactive sources
 Prevent theft of radioactive sources
 Deter adversaries from committing a malicious act, or
 Minimize through detection, delay and response the likelihood
of an adversary succeeding in completing such a malicious act
 Security Functions
A security system to protect radioactive sources should be designed
to perform basic security functions:

 Deterrence Security

 Detection
 Delay
Management
 Response
 Security Management
 Deterrence

The objective of deterrence is to dissuade an adversary

from attempting a malicious act.

Deterrent measures have the effect of convincing the

adversary that ;
the malicious act would be too difficult,
the success of the act too uncertain, or
the consequence of the act to the adversary too
unpleasant to justify the undertaking
 Deterrence

Deterrence involve communication to the adversary about

the presence of measures performing the other security
functions.

If this communication has the intended effect or

successful, deterrence is the result.

Deterrence cannot be measured !!

 Detection
Detection is the discovery of an attempted or actual intrusion which
could have the objective of unauthorized removal or sabotage of a
radioactive source.

Detection can be achieved by several means, including;

 visual observation
 video surveillance
 electronic sensors
 accountancy records
 seals and other tamper indicating devices
 process monitoring systems, etc.

Adversary awareness of detection measures can also serve as a

deterrent
 Delay
Delay impedes an adversary’s attempt to gain unauthorized access or
to remove or sabotage a radioactive source, generally through
barriers or other physical means.

A measure of delay is the factor of time, after detection, that is

required by an adversary to remove or sabotage the radioactive
source.

Adversary awareness of delay barriers can also serve as a deterrent

 Response
Response encompasses the actions undertaken following detection to
prevent an adversary from succeeding or to mitigate potentially
severe consequences.

Typically performed by security personnel, include;

interrupting and subduing an adversary while in action
preventing the adversary from using the radioactive source to
cause harmful consequences
recovering the radioactive source
reducing the severity of the consequences

The prospect of successful response can also serve as a deterrent

 Security Management
Security management includes ensuring adequate resources
(personnel and funding) for the security of sources.

Includes developing;
procedures
policies
records, and
plans for the security of sources and for a more effective security
culture

Includes developing procedures for;

proper handling of sensitive information, and
protecting it against unauthorized disclosure
+ +
 Description of Security Measures

To meet the security objectives a combination of security measures,

need to be implemented including;

 General administrative measures (common for the

management of all sources)

 Administrative measures (graded according to security level)

 Technical measures (graded according to security level)

 Applicable Security Measures
Administrative

 Access control procedures;

 Alarmed access points (e.g. with radiation detectors);
 Key control procedures;
 Video cameras or personal surveillance;
 Records related to the management of sources;
 Source inventories;
 Regulations and guidance;
 Reliability and trustworthiness of personnel;
 Information security;
 Quality assurance measures; and
 Establishment of a safety culture and security culture.
 Applicable Security Measures
Technical Measures

 Fences
 Walls
 Cages
 Transport packaging
 Locked
 Shielded containers
 Intrusion detection systems
 Locks, hinges and interlocks for doors
 Security Level base on Categorization System
Activity ratio
Category Type of Sources Security Level
A/D

Irradiators
1 A/D ≥ 1000 A
Teletherapy sources

Industrial gamma radiography sources

2 1000 > A/D ≥ 10 B
High/medium dose rate brachytherapy sources

Industrial gauges with high activity sources

3 10 > A/D ≥ 1 C
Well logging gauges

Low dose rate brachytherapy sources

4 1 > A/D ≥ 0.01 *Apply
Industrial gauges with moderate/low activity
measures as
sources
described in
the Basic
Positron emission tomography (PET) sources 0.01 > A/D & A > Safety
5 Standards -
Electron capture devices exempt
Asset
 Security Measures for Security Level C

The goal of Security Level C is TO REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD

OF UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL OF RADIOACTIVE
SOURCES.
Detection and assessment have to occur early enough to enable
response personnel to respond with enough time and with sufficient
resources to interrupt the adversary and prevent the source from
being removed.
Security measures should be in place, commensurate with the
security level for each security functions:
Detection, Delay, Response, and Security Management
DETECTION
 Detection
Security objective :
Provide detection of unauthorized removal of the source

Security measures :
Tamper detection equipment and/or periodic checks by operator personnel.

 Operators should verify that the sources are present.

 Include physical checks that the source is in place,
 Verification of seals or other tamper indicating devices, and measurements of
radiation
 Or other physical phenomena that would provide an assurance that the source is
present and functional
 Detection
Security objective :
Provide immediate assessment of detection.

Security measures :
Assessment by operator or response personnel.

 Once tamper detection or a physical check indicates a

source may be missing, there should be an immediate
assessment of the situation
 To determine whether an unauthorized removal has
actually occurred.
 Detection
Security objective:
Provide a means to detect loss through verification.

Security measures:
Monthly checking through physical checks, tamper indicating devices,
etc.

Monthly checking consists of measures to ensure that the sources are

present and have not been tampered with.

Physical checks that the source is in place,

 Verification of seals or other tamper indicating devices, and
measurements of radiation or
 Other physical phenomena that would provide an assurance that the
source is present.
 Detection

Performance measures

Time for communication and assessment;

 A long time between sensor alarm and assessment lowers probability of
detection
 Frequency of nuisance alarms
 Probability of detection

Operator personnel can provide both an alarm and assessment simultaneously

“AN ALARM WITHOUT ASSESSMENT IS NOT DETECTION”

DELAY
 Delay
Security objective:
Provide delay to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized
removal of a source.

Security measures:
One barrier (e.g. cage, source housing) or under observation by
operator personnel.

At least one barriers;

 Separating the source from unauthorized personnel
 Delay
For sources in use, include the source housing or use of the source
in a secured area.

For sources in storage, include a locked and fixed container, a

device holding the source or a locked storage room to separate the
container from unauthorized personnel.

For mobile sources in use, continuous visual surveillance by

operator personnel may substitute for the barrier.

FENCELINE
CONCRETE WALL

ROOM
 Delay

Performance measure = Time to defeat obstacles

• Effective Delay must occur after detection

RESPONSE
 Response
Security objective:
Implement appropriate action in the event of unauthorized
removal of a source.
Security measures:
Procedures for identifying necessary actions in accordance
with contingency plan.
 Should ensure that any suspected unauthorized removal or loss
of a source is assessed and, if confirmed, reported to the
appropriate authority without delay.
 This should be followed by an effort to locate and recover the
source and investigate the circumstances leading to the event.
 Response

Immediate means that responders should arrive, once

notified, in a time shorter than the time required to breach the
barriers and perform the tasks needed to remove the source.

Adequate means that the response team is sufficient in size

and capability to subdue the adversary.

Response may be a directly employed security force, a third

party security team, local police, or national gendarmerie .
 Response

Performance measures

Probability of communication to response force

Time to communicate
Probability of deployment to interrupt intrusion
Time to deploy
Response force effectiveness (neutralization)

Part of the response may be the operator personnel who have

detected the event
 Exercise - Question

Goal of Security Level C is TO; REDUCE LIKELIHOOD OF

UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL .

Based on security objectives, propose a measure for each

security functions as follows;

 Detect – 1 example
 Delay – 1 example
 Response – 1 example

5 minutes
 Exercise - Answer

 Detect – Intrusion detection system and CCTV

 Delay – Walls & Lock
 Response – Security guard

5 minutes
Illustration of Security Measures
 Deter Mitigate
Actions Task Results
Begin
Action Complete
Adversary Task Time

Delay
PPS Time Required

First
Alarm Assessed
Alarm

Interrupted
Adversary
Defeat
Detect Respond Adversary

T T T TC
0 A I
Time
Exercise – Attack Example

NO DETECTION, NO DELAY !!!!!..

 SECURITY
MANAGEMENT
 Security Management
Security objective :
Provide access controls to source location that effectively
restrict access to authorized persons only.

Security measures :
One identification measure

 Access control - to limit access to the source location, only to

authorized persons

 Temporarily allowing authorized persons to disable physical

barriers such as a locked door (delay measures) upon verification
of the person’s identity and access authorization.
 Security Management

The identity and authorization of access can be verified

by :
 A PIN to activate a door control reader;
 A badge system which may also activate an electronic reader;
 A badge exchange scheme at an entry control point;
 Biometric features to activate a door control device.
 Security Management
At least one identification measure should be required ;
The use of a swipe card, PIN, computer password, controlled key
Or visual verification of identity by other authorized personnel.
For sources in use, such measures should control access to the area where the
source is used.
For sources in storage, such measures should control access to the locked room
or other location where the source is stored.
For mobile or portable sources in use, continuous visual surveillance by
operator personnel may substitute for access control.
 Security Management
Security objective:
Ensure trustworthiness of authorized individuals.
Security measures:
Appropriate methods for determining the trustworthiness of
authorized individuals with unescorted access to radioactive
sources and access to sensitive information.
 Trustworthiness - assessed through a satisfactory background
check
 Depth of background checks is proportion to the security level of
the radioactive sources
 Minimum background checks ;

PROCESS PERIODICALLY REVIEWED !!!

 Security Management
Security objective:
Identify and protect sensitive information.

Security measures:
Procedures to identify sensitive information and protect it
from unauthorized disclosure.

Should ensure that the operator assesses whether those individuals

with access to security information or radioactive sources are
reliable.
Unless determined to be trustworthy, they should not be granted
unescorted access.
 Security Management
Security objective :
Provide a security plan.

Security measures :
Documentation of security arrangements and reference
procedures.

 Security arrangements and reference procedures should

be adopted in the form of a security plan.
 Security Management
Security objective:
Ensure a capability to manage security events covered by security
contingency plans

Security measures:
Procedures for responding to security-related scenarios

The security statement should include procedures for investigating

and reporting any unauthorized access to or removal of a source.
 Security Management
Security objective:
Establish security event reporting system.

Security measures:
Procedures for timely reporting of security events.

The operator should develop procedures for reporting of security events

to the regulatory body, first responders, and others as appropriate within
a time frame required by the regulatory body commensurate with the
security significance of the event.
 Security Management

Events to be reported may include:

 Discrepancy in accounting data;
 Suspected or actual theft of a radioactive source;
 Unauthorized intrusion into a facility or source storage area;
 Discovery of a suspected or actual explosive device in or near a facility or store;
 Loss of control over a radioactive source;
 Unauthorized access to or unauthorized use of a source;
 Other malicious acts that threaten authorized activities;
 Suspicious events or sightings which might indicate planning for a sabotage
attack, an intrusion or removal of a source;
 Failure or loss of security systems that are essential to the protection of
radioactive sources.
 SECURITY CULTURE

Nuclear security culture is defined as:

The assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behaviour of

individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as a
means to support and enhance nuclear security

Aims of Nuclear Security Culture

To ensure that the implementation of nuclear security
measures receives the attention warranted by their
significance
ROLE OF LICENSEES
 ROLE OF LICENSEES

 clearly defines lines of authority for decisions on security;

 establish organization's arrangements and lines of

communications that result in an appropriate flow of
information on security within the entire organization;

 identify and protect Sensitive information according to

national regulations;

 manage radioactive sources in accordance with a security

plan, when required by the AELB .
 ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONS

 To ensure the availability of a nuclear security policy which

contains the aspects of a sound management system

 To define roles, responsibilities and accountability for each level

of the organization, including security and other interfaces

 To allocate sufficient financial, technical and human resources to

implement the assigned security responsibilities

 To make arrangements for the regular review of their nuclear

security practices and systems
ROLE OF MANAGERS IN ORGANIZATIONS

 To influence culture throughout their organization

through their leadership and management practices

 To ensure that appropriate standards of behaviour and

performance associated with security are set and well
understood

 To ensure that staff members are appropriately motivated

 To seek continual improvement in nuclear security

culture and work to prevent complacency
 ROLE OF PERSONNEL

 To be accountable for their behaviour and are

motivated to ensure nuclear security

 To comply to with rules, regulations and

procedures, and also constant vigilance and a
proactive questioning attitude on the part of
personnel
SAFETY AND SECURITY
CULTURE
 INTERFACES SAFETY AND SECURITY

The Common Aim

To protect persons, society and the environment from
harmful effects of radiation

A well coordinated approach in safety and in security is mutually

beneficial, hence:
Consultation and coordination are maintained between those responsible for
safety and security to ensure efficient security of radioactive material

Major decisions regarding safety and security require participation of experts

in safety and in security on a continual basis;

The safety and security interfaces should be strengthened by building safety

culture and nuclear security culture into the management system.
 SAFETY AND SECURITY CULTURE

Nuclear Security culture is defined as

The assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behaviour
of individuals, organizations and institutions which serves
as a means to support and enhance nuclear security1.

Nuclear Safety culture is defined as

“that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in
organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an
overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive
the attention warranted by their significance”
 Feel Safe, Secured and
Safeguarded
Thank You

www.aelb.gov.my
----------------------------------------
Atomic Energy Licensing Board
Batu 24 Jalan Dengkil
43800 Dengkil, Selangor
MALAYSIA