Lambert ShNa Con Georgetown Spring 2024 Round 1
Lambert ShNa Con Georgetown Spring 2024 Round 1
C1: POWER
Subpoint A - Nuclear War
Rahman, again, wrote in 23 Rahman, Sami Ur, Syeda Nosheen Bukhari, and Nasir Zaman. "ABOLISHING
VETO POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL; FOR BETTER OR WORSE?." Pakistan Journal
of International Affairs 6.4 (2023)] [thiele]
[https://pjia.com.pk/index.php/pjia/article/download/932/649] [Sami Ur Rahman = Associate Professor
of Law, The University of Faisalabad, Pakistan; Bukhari = Principal, Peace International School, Multan,
Pakistan; Zaman = Freelancer/Academic Writer, Law Graduate from Bahria University Islamabad]
In 1993, Australian unfamiliar writer Gareth Evans wrote that the veto power was laid out to guarantee
that the powerful assembled countries didn't focus on things it would not be able to finish because of
extraordinary power resistance (Schindlmayr, 2001).
The fact that the veto power has kept the Security Council from approving the use of force against a
permanent member is another argument in favor of the current arrangement. Since all of the
permanent members have access to WMDs and a battle between them may have disastrous effects, this
has helped to avert a war between them. (Nollkaemper, 2022).
Cotton-Barratt, researcher at Future of Humanity Institute, wrote in 17, Dr. Owen Research Associate at
the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, “Existential Risk,” Global Priorities Project,
https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf
1.1.1 Nuclear war The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented
destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United
States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely
destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse:
the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which
would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption
– a nuclear winter. According to one model 9, an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons 10 could lead to a
drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could
leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious
situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is
only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with
stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some
models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a
nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate
might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this
does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten
civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large
nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including
more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and
adapt, would have high returns. It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk
from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals.
According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14
However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly
greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have
increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in
the future.
secondly, politically, the only way the veto gets abolished is if the UN gets abolished
Paige, law professor at Deakin University wrote in 23 [Tamsin Phillipa Paige "Stripping Russia’s veto
power on the Security Council is all but impossible. Perhaps we should expect less from the UN instead"
The Conversation. September 20, 2023][https://theconversation.com/stripping-russias-veto-power-on-
the-security-council-is-all-but-impossible-perhaps-we-should-expect-less-from-the-un-instead-213985]
[Paige = Senior Lecturer with Deakin Law School and periodically consults for the UN Office on Drugs and
Crime in relation to Maritime Crime, Graduate Certificate of Higher Ed. Learning & Teaching, Deakin
University, 2020 Doctor of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, 2018 Master of Philosophy, Australian
National University, 2014 Bachelor of Law(s), Univ. of Technology Sydney, 2012]
So, what about veto reform? If the existence of the veto prevents any Security Council action from being
taken against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine (or against any other P5 state when they engage in
similar conduct), why don’t we just reform it? Well, this can’t be done because the drafters of the UN
Charter made reform incredibly difficult. Namely, the P5 ensured they have a right to veto any proposed
reforms to the UN structure by requiring all charter amendments to be ratified by each of them, in
addition to getting a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. In essence, this means reforming the
UN Charter is off the table because the P5 would be able to veto a reduction of their veto power. The
only avenue left for reform is to dissolve the UN Charter and reform the UN under a new treaty that
limits or abolishes the power of the veto. Given the state of global solidarity is very different today
compared to the end of WWII when the UN was established, I’m loathe to test this approach. A P5 that
is restrained by the Charter when it suits them is less dangerous than a P5 that opts out of international
law entirely, leaving them completely unrestrained in their aggression.
Fourth, even if this works, a lack of a veto would end the UN
Bellamy, international security professor at Griffith, wrote in 14 [Sara Davies; Alex Bellamy "Don’t be too
quick to condemn the UN Security Council power of veto" The Conversation. August 11, 2014] [thiele]
[https://theconversation.com/dont-be-too-quick-to-condemn-the-un-security-council-power-of-veto-
29980] [Davis = ARC Future Fellow, Griffith University; Bellamy = Professor of International Security,
Griffith University]
Recent events in Gaza and Ukraine and the ongoing gridlock in Syria have dominated newspapers and
airwaves – and debate in the United Nations Security Council. Despite UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon voicing strong condemnation of alleged crimes against humanity in Gaza, the UN has been widely
criticised for its inability to ensure global co-operation to protect the world’s most vulnerable
populations. Given the high-profile vetoes of Russia and China on Syria and the repeated vetoes from
United States in regard to the Israel-Palestine conflict, renewed debate over United Nations Security
Council reform and attempts to curtail the controversial power of veto has ensued. So, why do some
Security Council members have the veto power? And where would the Security Council be without it?
Establishing the veto The UN Charter, proclaimed at the UN’s establishment in San Francisco in 1945,
gives the Security Council primary responsibility for international peace and security. Today, the Security
Council comprises five Permanent Members, the “P5” – China, France, the UK, the US and Russia – and
ten non-permanent members elected for a two-year term. Australia is currently one of the non-
permanent members. Nine affirmative votes are required for a resolution to pass. However, if one of the
P5 casts a negative vote, a draft resolution will not be approved. The P5’s veto powers proved
controversial in San Francisco. An Australian-led revolt against the veto was rejected by the US.
Washington argued that a world organisation that hinged on ongoing participation of the great powers
must allow them to protect their “vital interests” or fall into irrelevance. This proved to the case for the
UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, which had no veto provisions in its Covenant. By the time it
was most needed, at the onset of the Second World War, none of the most significant world powers
(US, USSR, Germany, Japan) were members. Without the veto, the UN Security Council would surely
have suffered the same fate. It is difficult to imagine how the UN would have survived the Cold War
were it not for the veto. Facing an anti-Soviet majority in the years immediately after 1945, the USSR is
unlikely to have remained committed to a capitalist-dominated UN.
Fifth , politically, the only way the veto gets abolished is if the UN gets abolished
Paige, law professor at Deakin University wrote in 23 [Tamsin Phillipa Paige "Stripping Russia’s veto power on the
Security Council is all but impossible. Perhaps we should expect less from the UN instead" The Conversation.
September 20, 2023] [thiele] [https://theconversation.com/stripping-russias-veto-power-on-the-security-council-
is-all-but-impossible-perhaps-we-should-expect-less-from-the-un-instead-213985] [Paige = Senior Lecturer with
Deakin Law School and periodically consults for the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in relation to Maritime Crime,
Graduate Certificate of Higher Ed. Learning & Teaching, Deakin University, 2020 Doctor of Philosophy, University of
Adelaide, 2018 Master of Philosophy, Australian National University, 2014 Bachelor of Law(s), Univ. of Technology
Sydney, 2012]
So, what about veto reform? If the existence of the veto prevents any Security Council action from being taken
against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine (or against any other P5 state when they engage in similar conduct), why
don’t we just reform it? Well, this can’t be done because the drafters of the UN Charter made reform incredibly
difficult. Namely, the P5 ensured they have a right to veto any proposed reforms to the UN structure by requiring
all charter amendments to be ratified by each of them, in addition to getting a two-thirds majority in the General
Assembly. In essence, this means reforming the UN Charter is off the table because the P5 would be able to veto a
reduction of their veto power. The only avenue left for reform is to dissolve the UN Charter and reform the UN
under a new treaty that limits or abolishes the power of the veto. Given the state of global solidarity is very
different today compared to the end of WWII when the UN was established, I’m loathe to test this approach. A P5
that is restrained by the Charter when it suits them is less dangerous than a P5 that opts out of international law
entirely, leaving them completely unrestrained in their aggression.
C2: Conflict
Subpoint A is Ukraine
Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin, is a well traveled and educated man. He holds a doctorate, speaks four languages
and has spent a lifetime representing his country’s interests in all kinds of interesting places and diverse forums. But if history is any guide, to
be a successful Russian ambassador to the United Nations you really need only learn to say one word,
again and again: “no.” In the last year, Russia and China have used this word to effectively put the brakes on any serious U.N. sanctions
or action against the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Russian-led vetoes are proof of the country’s
influence, but have also served to neuter the entire international body and caused some to question the point of even having a United
Nations. In the 67-year history of the United Nations, Russia has cast more veto votes than any other Security Council member. Its 128 vetoes
account for nearly half of all vetoes in the council’s history, more than the number cast by the United States and Great Britain combined. While
the veto gives Security Council members outsized power, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that Russia’s love affair with
the no vote actually weakens the country’s standing and takes entire council’s influence down a peg as well. “ Russian
power, in many
respects, is reflected through their capability of having the veto in the Security Council ,” Albright told us.
“But ironically, what it does is make the Security Council less relevant. … By just doing a block, they take themselves out of
having a leadership role in multilateral diplomacy.” George A. Lopez, a professor at Notre Dame specializing in the U.N. who
also served on the U.N. Panel of Experts for Security Council sanctions on North Korea from October 2010 through July 2011, said he thinks that
the vetoes in and of themselves do not weaken the council any more than the “frequent vetoes of the U.S. protecting Israel.” But he added via
email that “the vetoes have sparked more and more critique from mid-level U.N. nations, many of whom would be on the council permanently
themselves if the council was reformed to reflect in its membership and voting the more accurate global balance of power and influence. So
there is greater impatience, cynicism, and symbolic actions at the General Assembly level due to these vetoes.” The vetoes also can have
negative, unintended consequences for Russia. “The time that was very difficult with the Russians was over Kosovo,” said Albright. “We wanted
to have a U.N. mandate for the atrocities we were finding.” The then-secretary of state didn’t want to produce a resolution that would only be
batted down by the Russians in the Security Council (“I didn’t want us driving into a cul de sac on this”) so she took a trip to Moscow. Once
there, the Russians “made it clear that they were going to veto anything we brought forward.” Albright and then-President Clinton were forced
to take the issue out of the
Security Council and into a venue where the Russians effectively had zero leverage: NATO. The outcome was exactly what the Russians had
been hoping to avoid with their threatened veto, a victorious NATO bombing campaign in the Rodina’s backyard. Why
do the Russians
veto more than any other Security Council member state? Lopez thinks that when it comes to recent history, it
comes down to a difference in philosophy. The Russians, and to some extent the Chinese, both claim
that “they are trying to save the council from doing what it should not, and is prohibited in
International law, from doing — intervene in a civil war by taking sides with rebels. Moreover, they claim, the
over-zealous actions of the U.S. for Israel and the U.S.’s new attitude toward ‘revolution’ and the overthrow of long-time leaders … must be
resisted if the integrity of the U.N. and the Security Council as ‘neutrals’ is ever to be saved.” Albright said that Russia isn’t always a nay-sayer,
despite its historic voting record. The Russians, she said, “have been quite helpful on Iran” possibly because “people are genuinely nervous of
the direction that the Iranians are going in. … People are concerned of the potential of Iran being a nuclear power.” She said that initially she
saw the possibility of Russia playing a more positive role, that they saw themselves as part of the solution as opposed to just the blocking
aspect of it. But she said the Syria problem is more complicated than the one Iran presents, given that the Russians have had a long and close
relationship with al-Assad and they have a naval port in northwestern Syria, on the Mediterranean. Still, said Albright, on Syria the Russians
“are betting on the wrong horse.”
Aleks Phillips is a Newsweek U.S. News Reporter based in London. His focus is on U.S. politics and the environment. He has covered climate change extensively, as
well as healthcare and crime. Aleks joined Newsweek in 2023 from the Daily Express and previously worked for Chemist and Druggist and the Jewish Chronicle. He
is a graduate of Cambridge University
A Russian propagandist with close ties to Vladimir Putin has warned nuclear war is "unavoidable" but
that it won't lead to the collapse of humanity by citing previous nuclear blasts. ¶ In a recent debate on state TV, Rossiya-1 host Vladimir
Solovyov justified his view by saying that a nuclear strike would not lead to widespread death and destruction if "used against a non-nuclear
nation"—perhaps a foreboding hint at the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, which has turned into a slow, attritional war with over 300,000 Russian
casualties.¶ Newsweek reached out to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs via email for comment on Friday. ¶ The
use of nuclear
arms is something the Russian president has previously threatened , sparking outrage from NATO, but has yet to act
on given the nuclear arsenal held by members of the alliance, including the United States. ¶ However,the threat of nuclear attacks
by Russia is something propagandists have increasingly been mentioning as the military situation in
Ukraine grows more dire.¶ According to a translation by the Daily Beast's Russia Media Monitor unit, published on Thursday,
Solovyov told panelists nuclear war was "unavoidable," adding: "It will happen, no doubt about it." ¶
When Vitaly Tretyakov, a Russian journalist and dean of a TV school at Lomonosov State University, expressed a desire to make sure that it
does not happen, Solovyov disagreed.
Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri's Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social
Responsibility. He has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics
and Technology; he also maintains the website Nuclear Darkness. Starr also teaches a class on the Environmental, Health and Social Effects of nuclear weapons at
the University of Missouri.
A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in
human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that ends human
history. There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even
after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that
could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The
world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear
war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their
studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would
create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow
food. Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex
life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of
nuclear war
would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout, produced not only by nuclear bombs,
but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons
of smoke would act to destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer and block most sunlight from reaching
Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military
leaders who control nuclear weaponsstrictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of
nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the
Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that
predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially
uninhabitable.
Subpoint B is China-Taiwan
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden#:~:text=Tensions%20are%20rising.,go%20to%20war%20over%20Taiwan.\
China-Taiwan relations are uniquely poor in the status quo, Maizland 24, Lin 23 Taiwan
has been governed independently of China since 1949, but Beijing views the island as part of its territory. Beijing has vowed to eventually
“unify” Taiwan with the mainland, using force if necessary.Tensions are rising. The Democratic Progressive Party, whose
platform favors independence, won a third consecutive term in 2024, while Beijing has ramped up
political and military pressure on Taipei. Some analysts fear the United States and China could go to
war over Taiwan. U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to the island in 2022 heightened tensions
between the countries.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/397d7f5b-76c3-32df-9df2-b49fdf40fb97
In March and April 2023, Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen transited through the United State s, during which she met
with Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy. This meeting was framed as an alternative to an immediate visit to Taiwan by Speaker McCarthy,
and There were hopes that Beijing would not escalate as much as it did in August 2022 when Beijing
provoked the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis after then-speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. China nevertheless
carried out significant diplomatic and military measures. Diplomatically, Beijing intensified some of
its already-sharp measures aimed at punishing Taipei, while simultaneously softening its approach on other fronts.
Militarily, China’s activities were substantively different from those in August 2022, but no less
significant.
China uses their membership status in the UNSC to consolidate power, Jeong
12 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/213853349.pdf
A thorough analysis of the official UNSC documents show that the ultimate goal for China is to secure
the Chinese interests and compete for more decision-making power upon the global stage. China’s voting
behavior in the UNSC strongly support China’s pragmatism in multilateralism; to continue high economic growth and relationship building,
China has become highly sensitive to the changing international norms and constraints of
multilateralism, while gaining international support especially from the developing countries of Africa and Southeast Asia.
China is consistently aware of the UNSC mandate, and will continue to vote with firm positions on
state sovereignty and internal affairs, clearly because China has a strong interest and desire to avoid
foreign intervention in its own affairs.
Taking away China’s veto provokes China, Chong Yew Keat 22
https://www.eurasiareview.com/03102022-is-the-veto-system-really-unfair-oped/
Veto power is the first step in preventive diplomacy, where proven powers that have real and imaginary powers to deter and to enforce rules
act as the first barrier for any challenging force that intends to act rogue. By not having the first step to prevent conflict or aggression, it will
create a more dangerous climate in a two pronged risk. Firstly , if the states that currently possess this privilege and power, the P5, lose
this veto
advantage, they will lose their first preventive option in preventing threats to their own interests
and survival. By losing this first defence of deterring threats to their survival, it will provide greater
pretext and justifications for greater acts of forceful manouvres. Secondly, other states will pounce
on this opening for greater assertions and projections of power, both in challenging the bigger
powers’ primacy and in securing their own power calculations at a higher level regionally and
globally. The resulting impact will be rising anarchic tendencies and a deeper arms race cycle. The
veto structure serves both directions, as a crucial deterrence and check and balance spectrum but will
paradoxically create semblances of unfairness on others. However, the reality of international
relations and engagement remains rooted to the undeniable truth where smaller powers will need the
security assurances from the bigger powers, both as a form of trust and normative adherence.
The potential for a conflict over Taiwan is increasing due to China’s nuclear and conventional military
buildup and the threat of two simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia, which would severely
stress the ability of US and allied conventional forces to win in both theaters. Nuclear weapons will cast
a long shadow over a Taiwan conflict and could play multiple roles in the deterrence and warfighting
strategies and operations of both the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A conflict
over Taiwan has a number of attributes that will shape those roles. Those attributes make the potential
for limited nuclear escalation real and uncontrolled nuclear escalation possible.
While the PRC seeks to increase its influence globally and a US-China conflict could erupt over a number
of issues, the most likely flashpoint for an armed conflict between the two nuclear-armed major powers
is Taiwan. The PRC maintains that Taiwan is a part of China and reserves the right to use military force to
seize control of Taiwan if necessary. The United States agrees there is “one China” but opposes Chinese
use of force to resolve the status of Taiwan. US policy remains ambiguous about whether the United
States would intervene to defend Taiwan should China attack. But a successful Chinese invasion of
Taiwan would fundamentally undermine the strategic position of the United States in East Asia by
damaging the rules-based international order, causing severe economic disruption (e.g., in the
semiconductor industry),
and raising questions about the ability and will of the United States to defend its interests, and
the interests of its allies.
The problem the increasing Chinese threat to Taiwan poses to both the United States and China is the
prospect of a high-intensity conventional war with a nuclear-armed power over what both sides
perceive to be very high stakes. Such a conflict would be very costly even if it remained non nuclear.
But a US-China war over Taiwan also poses the threat of escalation to nuclear weapon use, which
would dramatically increase costs if the war remained limited, and pose a potential existential threat to
both countries if it does not.
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/china-and-nuclear-weapons/?scrlybrkr=214079ba
For decades, nuclear weapons have been largely peripheral to U.S.-China relations, but the nuclear
relationship is now growing more competitive as both countries pursue major programs to
modernize their forces.
The core U.S. concern is likely that improvements
in China’s nuclear arsenal, even if intended only to improve
survivability, will reduce the U.S. ability to limit damage in the worst-case scenario of an all-out
nuclear war with China.